as institutionalized in Mali, since producer prices are so exploitative that most officials now admit they have become a serious obstacle to national production. Despite the severe effects on the drought, which affected the area around Kayes, Bamako, and between Gao and Timbuktu, production has remained relatively high. Yet in almost all the main products, there has been a significant drop in the marketing figures.

In 1976, 128,400 tons of cotton — the only product unaffected by drought — were produced and 118,888 marketed. Last year, the figures were respectively 131,000 and 113,800, while the producer price rose from 74 to 86 Malian francs. Groundnut production rose from 160,000 in 1976-77 to 193,300 tons in 1977-78, but the amount marketed dropped 50% (from 84% to 42.2%). Though producer prices rose from 45 to 50 Malian francs, the fact that prices paid producers in Mali are only half of their equivalent in Senegal causes too great a temptation to sell to private traders. Revenue from tobacco — whose cultivation was introduced and expanded only recently — has also dropped.

	1976-77	1977-78
Production	1,150,000	942,920 tons
Marketing	31,080	26,440 tons
Producer price	32 Malian francs	36 Malian francs

Some of this is kept for the so-called hungry season, when the rains are on and there is no substantial harvest. But much is sold to private traders to avoid the national marketing system with its unattractive producer price.

Rice production has also been affected: 216,400 tons were produced in the last harvest as opposed to 350,000 in the previous year. Even the Office du Niger, the massive pioneering development of the Niger Basin controlled and directed by Chinese specialists, experienced a drop in marketed produce. This year 58,000 tons of the 63,000 produced were marketed; the figures for the previous season were 68,000 out of 89,300 tons. In all, it is reliably estimated that up to one-third of the national cereal crop has been exported illegally to neighboring countries. A similar, though less easily quantifiable situation obtains in livestock production, normally one of the strengths of Mali's economy.

International Development Association

Peanut farming has been aided by the International Development Association, but low producer prices inhibit agriculture

More basic are the weaknesses in infrastructure. Mali is a huge country, and transportation problems are daunting. Until recently, inhabitants of Kayes, an important outlet on the Senegal River, felt totally isolated from Bamako. The U.S. Agency for International Development, along with other agencies, has drawn up estimates for road repairs and construction over the next few years, according to which about 4,800 miles of track will have to be repaired. The Malian authorities have been criticized for failing to embark on an extensive road building program. When it comes to drought relief, as all donor agencies will testify, tracks are of little help in offering routes for emergency supplies, nor are they adequate to normal needs. At present, the farmers find it easier to take goods across the border than to the national center, Bamako.

This lackadaisical approach to communications is all the more surprising given Mali's landlocked situation. Ever since 1962, when the Malian Federation between Mali and Senegal broke up, Mali has lacked reliable outlet to the sea, though three free ports in Senegal, Togo, and Ivory Coast help matters. Much, perhaps too much, faith has been placed in the Trans-Saharan Highway which will open up the north of the country, and on the Senegal River.

It is often said that Kayes should become a seaport, a reference to the Senegal River Development Program (OMVS), of which the Manatali Dam is an integral part. The dam will make the river navigable from Kayes to St. Louis on the Atlantic. It is also expected by the regional planners to create some 750,000 acres of land for irrigation, and will regulate the flow of the Senegal River to develop hydroelectric power needed for the iron ore mining at the deposits of Kenieba and Bafing-Makana, near the Senegalese border. The OMVS project, which comprises Senegal, Mali, and Mauritania, still has a long way to go. President Traore has made a number of trips abroad both to the Arab countries and to the West in search of financing, and it is now reported that the U.S. is seriously considering a grant of some $50 million.

In the long run, it is these economic problems and potential which will provide the major test of whatever regime emerges from Mali's current political flux. □

ZIMBABWE

An Alternative View

By PROFESSOR EMMET V. MITTLEBEELER

Given the rapid sequence of events in Rhodesia, it is important to bear in mind not only the historical facts that have brought about the present state of affairs, but also some observations about Africa and politics generally. Rhodesia (or Zimbabwe, as it will soon be officially known) is a topsy-turvy land in which practically anything can happen; and unless policymakers view that unhappy place in the proper perspective, they risk condoning, or bringing about, debacles (the plural is used advisedly) of unprecedented consequences.

To understand the drama as it unfolds within the next years, one must keep three basic principles in mind:

First, African politics does not work according to the rules of European parliamentarianism. Any objective observer must admit that the successful implementation of parliamentary institutions in the overwhelming majority of African states has yet to be attained. Nor are parties and elections renowned for their success, in spite of lip service frequently given them. As Peter Enahoro, of the *New African*, has written, African politics is conducted by the heart, not the head, and morality is a secondary consideration.

Second, in nationalist movements — real or spurious — force (or its variant, terrorism) can be decisive. In most cases, the side which possesses the instruments of coercion has emerged victorious. Guns in the hands of even a few trained persons can have a tremendously persuasive effect, even against an unarmed majority that might be lukewarm or hostile toward the armed groups. Numerical majorities in parliamentary elections have a habit of fading in importance in the face of modern weapons or violence, and it is a truism of both politics and warfare that one must never underestimate the strength of a disciplined or dedicated minority, especially if it has arms.

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Third, in most African countries, external rule did not eliminate ethnic or geographical conflicts; it simply suspended them. In the colonial period, and not only in British dependencies, some semblance of law and order was established, though today that policy is denounced as one of "divide and rule." Nevertheless, in one country after another, interethnic trouble flared up after independence. Zaire and Uganda are only among the bloodiest examples. There is not a single country in sub-Saharan Africa which does not have at least some ethnic tensions; Rhodesia/Zimbabwe is no exception.

The present Rhodesian regime should be seen against this background. The present government is responsible to, and supported by, a predominantly white electorate; it has a firm basis in the constitution which was adopted by the country in 1969 (putting aside for the moment the question of legality in British eyes, where the basis is much shakier). But the present government is a strange sort of hybrid; while Ian Smith is still the prime minister, he is a member of the four-man Executive Council consisting of three nationalist leaders as well as himself.

Of these, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, churchman and leader of the United African National Congress, is a member of the majority Shona group. Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, also a Shona, is of the Shangaan subgroup, though born in Ndebele country, popularly known as Matabele-land, and a former head of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). The Shona Chief Jeremiah Chiru, of the Zimbabwe United People's Organization (ZUPO), a member of the upper house of Parliament, is the third. Most observers would concede that these three, at least at present, command the allegiance of a majority of Africans. None of the three is an Ndebele, an ethnic group numbering about 20 percent of the population.

Pix

Prime Minister Ian Smith: An underestimated political volte face

In addition, each ministry acquired a dual headship — one African, one European — rotating as acting minister. Any student of public administration could predict that such an arrangement would run into difficulties.

The transitional government, as the present regime is called, was the result of an agreement of March 3, 1978, which though respectable in constitutional terms, was fraught with great risk for the four participants. For Smith it

United Nations: Camera Press

Bishop Abel Muzorewa: Leader of a declining majority

was the culmination of a complete about-face he had made a few months before — an acceptance of majority rule. Indeed, it is likely that only Smith could have made a transitional government agreement, just as the anti-communist Richard M. Nixon was able to make successful contact with the People's Republic of China, and the right-wing Menachem Begin entered into an agreement with Egypt.

For the three African leaders, the risk may even have been greater. They consorted with the arch-enemy in order to pave the way to an African government which they, presumably, would control. This required not only confidence in a man whom their followers could be expected to castigate, but an imperviousness to the attacks of competing black nationalists, and armed and belligerent ones at that.

The preamble to the agreement states its two major purposes: end of sanctions imposed by the United Nations, and "cessation of the armed conflict," in reference to guerrilla action carried on by rival nationalists under the name of the Patriotic Front.

The crux of the agreement is that there shall be a new constitution whereby a 100-member legislative council, reflecting majority rule, should be set up, with 72 of the 100 members to be blacks elected by a common roll. But the selection of the remaining 28 is more complicated, reserved as it is for whites. (Reservation of seats for certain ethnic groups has not been uncommon in colonial or immediately postcolonial Africa though they were usually abandoned after independence.)

This constitutional settlement is to remain for 10 years or two Parliaments, whichever is the longer, and then be reviewed by a commission. If that commission recommends a change, that amendment must receive the affirmative votes of not less than 51 members, as well as provide that the 72 seats should not be reserved for blacks.

The transitional government is enjoined to bring about a cease-fire, deal with such matters as the composition of future military forces and rehabilitation of persons affected by the way, the release of detainees, review of sentences for political offenses, further removal of discrimination (at least on paper, much discrimination has already been eliminated) "creation of a climate conducive to the holding of free and democratic elections," drafting of a new constitution, and voter registration procedures.

Finally, Independence Day was to be December 31, 1978 — ironically, since for practical purposes the country has been independent for over thirteen years — though that date appears to have been put back several months.

Drafting of a new constitution is now going on, and whites are to vote upon it in an advisory capacity, though this is not in the agreement. The actual adoption, though, must be in accordance with the present (fourth) constitution, which requires a two-thirds vote of both houses. Then come the elections for Parliament and head of the new state. At that point, presumably, majority rule will be officially ushered in for the State of Zimbabwe.

What has been the record of the transitional government? The two purposes stated in the preamble have not been attained; sanctions are still in effect, and the war waged by the Patriotic Front is still going on. As for the former, no one in Rhodesia could possibly guarantee the lifting of sanctions, for that is a United Nations matter. True, individual countries like Britain (where the out-of-office Conservatives are already clamoring for it) and the United States (where Congress almost voted to end sanctions) could unilaterally resume trade, and establish diplomatic relations with the transitional government, but that would bring up grave questions about respect for United Nations mandates. Furthermore, opposition among Third World states and the Eastern bloc to lifting of sanctions, or to any show of friendship for the Smith regime, is so strong that one could hardly consider sanctions-lifting a viable possibility.



Cameramix

U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance with ZAPU-founder Joshua Nkomo, whose popularity appears to be increasing

As for the latter, since 1972 the country has been suffering from what is in effect a civil war with the Patriotic Front, a loose coalition of two forces, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, based in Mozambique and headed by the Karanga (a Shona subgroup) Marxist Robert Mugabe, and the other the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, based north of the Zimbezi and headed by the Ndebele (more specifically Kalanga) founder of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), Joshua Nkomo, described by Britain's foreign secretary as "the father of his people . . . the longest serving nationalist leader."

The civil war has been one of guerrilla operations similar to those used in Algeria and World War II Yugoslavia. The Front strikes at the most vulnerable targets, like civilians, and avoids contact with government forces; there is even some question about control over its own men, as when guerrilla forces, after shooting down a civilian plane between Kariba and Salisbury, proceeded to gun down some of the passengers. Nkomo denied responsibility for the slaughter, though not the downing of the plane.

Since the appearance of the transitional government, the guerrillas have increased their activity, and may even hold sway over most of the country, though the regular Rhodesian army (one of the two best in Africa) appears to be holding its own and to be making some headway against the enemy, even making effective, though ill-timed, strikes at enemy installations across the border.

At the time of this writing, no date has been set for elections; they were to have been held before the end of the year, but now the government has postponed them until early 1979. The delay may have been partly due to administrative difficulties, since preparing registration lists for hundreds of thousands of people who are illiterate, speak only Shona or Debele, have never voted before, and have similar, or even identical names, is a monumental task. More importantly, elections await pacification, since areas torn by war and terrorism are hardly ideal places for free elections. But whatever the reason, delays weaken the prestige of the transitional government.

As for racial discrimination, repeal of legislation is easy compared with the task of rooting it out from all aspects of society. Africans are understandably impatient, but in Rhodesia, just as in the United States, irrespective of legislation on the subject, blacks will not move into areas previously reserved for whites unless and until they can afford to do so, and proper qualification must precede entry into many jobs. The present constitution is itself discriminatory and is to be changed, but other measures toward removal of discrimination have already been taken. The Land Tenure Act, with its racial restrictions, has been abolished, and hospitals and schools have been opened to all, though on a graded basis the effect of which is not altogether clear.

The transitional government has committed some incredible political blunders, as when it discharged the co-minister of justice, Byron Hove, a protégé of Bishop Muzorewa, for criticizing the slowness in eliminating discrimination, especially in the legal system. One can question the reaction of the prime minister in re-outlawing ZAPU after the plane incident. There have likewise been objections that all members of the Executive Council were not told in advance about retaliatory military raids across the border to neutralize guerrilla bases (which made sense militarily but were bad public relations). Internal dissension among black groups supporting the transitional government has likewise not helped the situation.

The conclusion, then, is that the transitional government is flimsy, though not a total failure. Available evidence indicates that the strongest member of the quadrumvirate in terms of popular support is Bishop

Camerapix

Robert Mugabe of ZANLA: Will interethnic struggle sabotage the Patriotic Front?

Muzorewa, with well over 50 percent. Six months ago he was alleged to have about 85 percent, so is clearly losing ground, though his forces could probably still win a free election. Conversely, sketchy and inconclusive evidence shows that Nkomo is gaining popularity as African unhappiness at the slowness in removal of discrimination or the continuance of the war increases. Economic dislocations, like the thronging of rural Africans into Salisbury, where they become an urban proletariat or a mass of unemployed, have also contributed to the dissatisfaction.

The transitional government has invited the leaders of the Patriotic Front to join it in its so-called internal settlement — an invitation which it has understandably rejected; if it joined, it would have to face an election that it could not (at least under present circumstances) win. From the practical standpoint it is the better strategy for the Patriotic Front to do all within its power, by continuing the war, to wreck plans for an election and thus contribute to the collapse of the government, and move in to pick up the pieces. What the armed forces of the then-government would do after a collapse is anybody's guess.

Several scenarios can be imagined in this most fluid of situations. Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien has suggested

the renunciation of UDI and a return to legality so that direct British administration might usher in majority rule, a view also propounded by former British Cabinet Minister Reginald Maudling. Others feel if the transitional government breaks down, the army (which has commissioned some black officers and has more black than white soldiers) would stage a coup d'état. Some African states advocate invasion by non-Rhodesian African troops to impose African rule. It is possible that if the transitional government continues the war, the Front will be reinforced by Cubans and "volunteers" from the Eastern bloc and finally take over.

The plan submitted by the British and American governments (the "Anglo-American Plan") resembles the internal settlement more than it differs from it, though it calls for implementation during the interim period under United Nations auspices, a cease-fire, meetings with all parties participating, a peace-keeping force, and open elections. It was accepted reluctantly by the Front, though Nkomo later declared it "dead." The transitional government has rejected it because it will not yield control over the security forces, and remembers the oft-repeated intentions of Nkomo and Mugabe to obtain control without a prior election, Mugabe's threat to nationalize land and try Smith in a people's court, and his demand for dismantling of the Rhodesian army and police. The plan could still be adopted, maybe with modifications, though in late 1978 this appears unlikely. And, of course, the transitional government could still muddle through for a time.

There is an argument for assisting it to do so. So far, more Africans than Europeans have been killed in the fighting with the Popular Front. The army fighting the guerrillas has more blacks than whites.

With the arrival of the transitional government, the concept of white-black conflict became obsolete. Sooner or later the whites will cease to be a political force, even though a white commander may serve under a black government (the present commander has already said he would). But the country runs a real chance of an intensified intra-black conflict. Armed clashes between ZAPU, whose leadership and much of whose membership is Ndebele, and the Shona-leaning ZANU, have been reported. Nkomo himself has Shona associates and probably is free from anti-Shona bias, but his Ndebele background is well known and in certain quarters has prevented his full-fledged acceptance as leader of the nationalist movement. There is even friction among Shona subgroups.

Even if the ethnic factor is overlooked, old ZANU/ZAPU animosities remain. Modern Africa has shown but few instances in which the opposition has been peacefully and functionally integrated into the political structure. In a parliamentary system, the loyal opposition is part of the picture; but where in Africa does one find such an opposition?

What *should* be done depends of course upon the criteria one employs: should the long term or the short term prevail? From what point of view is one looking at the question — the black Zimbabwean? the white Rhodesian? the African generally? In decisions of great international import — and decisions affecting Rhodesia are now in this category — the best interests of individual nations, or of people within the areas affected, do not always coincide. Decisions in such situations are usually made within the framework of generally accepted international behavior, and the outcome is often determined by force.

Recognition by other states would assist the transitional government, though in common practice states do not recognize young regimes without substantial reason to believe the regimes will survive. The longer the transitional government survives, though, the more likely it is to receive recognition, even from some African states.

Financial or military assistance would give the transitional government a lease on life, though it is difficult to see now where the assistance would come from. Resumption of trade, which is tantamount to widespread sanctions violations, would help also.

Given the three principles set forth at the beginning of this article, the future of a peaceful Zimbabwe is far from assured. Maybe the best a Rhodesian white could hope for is preservation of some semblance of stability until his own status is clarified. An American hope might be for a relatively orderly Zimbabwe which is not a duplicate of Angola, Uganda, or Cambodia. The realizable black Zimbabwean hope might be for the knowledge that political rule in his country has passed into the hands of persons of the same broad ethnic classification as himself. □

Camerapix

Guerrilla warfare has put white civilians like this young farmer under arms

FOOD

Ghana's Rabbit Project

"Get the rabbit habit!" "Make the bunny money!" From the capital city of Accra to northern areas bordering on the Sahel, the catchy jingles sing out from Ghana's radios and television sets. "Grow Rabbits, Grow Children," "Rear Them, Control Them, Use Them" — along the roadways and in public squares, and advice is blazoned across colorfully illustrated billboards and posters.

The publicity is part of a nationwide multimedia communications campaign backing Ghana's National Rabbit Project, which promotes backyard rabbit-breeding as a self-help means of increasing meat supplies at low cost and with a minimum of extra effort.

The rabbit project is a part of Ghana's nationwide drive to achieve food self-sufficiency to which the government has been committed for several years. Though the country now produces all of its own rice and nearly enough corn to meet the requirements of its more than nine and a half million people, there is still a chronic shortage of meat. When animal products do find their way to market, they are priced far beyond the means of the majority of the population.

The rabbit, which is of African origin, has several characteristics which make it ideal as a source of meat in developing countries. Most significant is the very rapid pace at which it multiplies. The gestation period is only 31 days, and a healthy female is able to produce three or four litters averaging six to eight offspring every year. Starting with a buck and a doe (each costing $8.00 in Ghana), a backyard breeder can obtain a quantity of meat over the course of a year equal to the weight of an entire cow. One rabbit is just the right size to feed an average family, and the supply of meat is continuous.

Rabbit food is readily available in Ghana. The animals will eat almost anything, including table scraps, leftovers from sugar cane harvests, various kinds of grass, and other local flora such as groundnut and sweet potato vines. Dried cassava provides good bulk for their diet, and brewer's mash, left as a residue from millet beer and formerly discarded as useless, furnishes an excellent source of protein.

While rabbits must have clean quiet quarters and special care in order to thrive, their upkeep is not difficult and requires no great amount of time. People who work during the day can easily tend them mornings and evenings. Hutches are simple to construct from locally available materials.

UNDP

All over Ghana, billboards press the merits of backyard rabbit-breeding

In Ghana, the wild native rabbit has always been highly prized by villagers, though these days it is very difficult to find. Any backyard breed which managed to gnaw through its cage would soon find its way into a stew pot.

Besides food, other uses of the rabbit might also be of economic benefit to developing countries. Rabbit fur is a main ingredient of felt, and pelts can be used to make hats and coats. The brain is used in making a blood-clotting agent widely used in hospitals. Fine rabbit leather, or vellum, has the ideal tension and quality required for tiny drive belts used in tape recorders and other delicate machines.

The originator and director of Ghana's National Rabbit Project is Newlove Mamattah, a former adult educator who has had a consuming interest in rabbit-breeding for more than 38 years. Mamattah's work, which began in his own back yard, has attracted considerable international attention. Currently, he is secretary of the Africa section of the World Rabbit Breeding Association, based in Geneva.

Back in 1972, Mamattah was able to obtain a modest grant of about $140,000 from the government's National Redemption Council. This enabled him to establish "rabbit for food for the millions" on a 32-hectare farm at Kwabenya, some 24 kilometers outside of Accra, with an initial stock of 80 breeding animals. At the end of 1977, the nation's first national rabbit census counted 13,948 rabbits owned by registered breeders throughout the country.

Since the wild local rabbit is a small animal, weighing approximately two