as institutionalized in Mali, since producer prices are so exploitative that most officials now admit they have become a serious obstacle to a producer organization. Despite the severe effects on the drought, which affected the area around Kayes, Namakalou, and between Gao and Timbuktu, production has remained relatively high. Yet in almost all the main products, there has been a significant drop in the marketing figures.

In 1976, 128,400 tons of cotton — the only product unaffected by drought — were produced and 118,888 marketed. Last year, the figures were respectively 131,000 and 113,800, while the amount marketed dropped 50% (from 84% to 42.2%). Though producer prices rose from 45 to 50 Malian francs, the fact that prices paid producers were still only half of their equivalent in Senegal causes too great a temptation to sell to private traders. Revenue from tobacco — whose cultivation was introduced and expanded only recently — has also dropped.

Reports of massive smuggling throw doubt on official figures for production of millet, maize, and sorghum — the basic food cereals.

Peanut farming has been aided by the International Development Association, but low producer prices inhale agriculture.
Bishop Abel Muzorewa: Leader of a declining majority

was the culmination of a complete about-face he had made a few months before — an acceptance of majority rule. Indeed, it is likely that only Smith could have made a transitional government agreement, just as the anti-communist Richard M. Nixon was able to make successful contact with the People’s Republic of China, and the right-wing Menenashen Begin entered into an agreement with Egypt.

For the three African leaders, the risk may even have been greater. They consented with the arch-enemy in order to pave the way to an African government which they, presumably, would control. This required not only confidence in a man whose followers could be expected to castigate, but an imperiousness to the attacks of competing black nationalists, and armed and bellicose ones at that.

The prelude to the agreement states two major purposes: end of sanctions imposed by the United Nations, and "cessation of the armed conflict." In reference to guerrilla action carried on by rival nationalists under the name of the Patriotic Front.

The crux of the agreement is that there shall be a new constitution whereby a 100-member legislative council, reflecting majority rule, should be set up, with 72 of the 100 members to be blacks elected by a common roll. But the selection of the remaining 28 is more complicated, re-

served as it is for whites. (Reservation of seats for certain ethnic groups has not been uncommon in colonial or immedi-

ately postcolonial Africa though they were usually abandoned after independ-

ence.)

This constitutional settlement is to remain for 10 years or two Parliaments, whichever is the longer, and then be reviewed by a commission. If that com-

mission recommends a change, that amendment must receive the affirm-

ative vote of not less than 51 mem-

bers, as well as provide that the 72 seats should not be reserved for blacks.

The transitional government is en-

joined to bring about a cease-fire, deal-

ing with such matters as the composition of future military forces and rehabilitation of persons affected by the war, the release of detainees, review of sentences for political offenses, further removal of discrimination (at least on paper, much discrimination has already been eliminated), creation of a climate con-
ducive to the holding of free and demo-

cratic elections," drafting of a new constitution, and voter registration pro-

cedures.

Finally, Independence Day was to be December 31, 1978 — ironically, since

where the out-of-office Conservative Party was already clamoring for it — and the United States (where Congress abort-

edly voted to increase aid) could un-

necessarily resume trade, and establish diplomatic relations with the transitional government, but that would bring up grave questions about respect for United Nations mandates. Fur-

nmore, among Third World states and the Eastern bloc to lifting of sanctions, or to any show of friendship for the Smith regime, is so strong one could be in danger of sanctions-lifting a viable possibility.

As for the latter, since 1972 the coun-

ty has been suffering from what is in effect a civil war with the Patriotic Front, a loose coalition of two forces, the Zimbabwe African National Libera-

tion Army, based in Mozambique and headed by the Karanga (a Shona sub-

group) Marxist Robert Mugabe, and the other the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army based north of the Zambezi and headed by the Ndebele (more specifically Kalinga) founder of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), Joshua Nkomo, described by Britain’s foreign secretary as "the father of his people . . . the longest serving national leader.

The civil war has been one of guer-

rilla operations similar to those used in Algeria and World War II Yugoslavia. The Front strikes at the most vulnerable targets, like civilians, and avoids con-

tact with government forces; there is even some question about control over its own men, as when guerrilla forces, after shooting down a civilian plane be-

tween Kariba and Salisbury, proceeded to gather some of the passengers. Nkomo denied responsibility for the slaughter, though not the drowning of the plane.

Since the appearance of the transi-

tional government, the guerrillas have increased their activity, and may even fold away over the whole country, though the regular Rhodesian Army is still, one of the two best in Africa) appears to be holding its own and to be making some headway against the enemy, even training effective, though ill-trained, units at enemy installations across the border.

At the time of this writing, no date has been set for elections; they were to have been held before the end of the year, but no one in government expected them until early 1979. The delay may have been partly due to administra-

U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance with ZAPU-founder Joshua Nkomo, whose

popularity appears to be increasing

tive difficulties, since preparing regis-

tration lists for hundreds of thousands of people who are illiterate, speak only Shona or Debele, have never voted be-

fore, and have similar, or even identical, names, is a monumental task. More importantly, elections await pacifica-

tion, since areas torn by war and ter-

rorism are hardly ideal places for free elections. But whatever the reason, de-

lays weaken the prestige of the transi-

tional government.

As for racial discrimination, repeal of legislation is easy compared with the task of root out it from all aspects of society. Africans are understandably impotent, but in Rhodesia, just as in the United States, irrespective of legis-

lation on the subject, blacks will not move into areas previously reserved for whites unless and until they can afford to do so, and proper qualification must precede entry into many jobs. The pre-

sent constitution is itself discriminatory and is to be changed, but other mea-

sures toward removal of discrimination have already been taken. The Land To-

ure Act, with its racial restrictions, has been abolished, and hospitals and schools have been opened to all, though on a graded basis the effect of which is not altogether clear.

The transitional government has com-

manded some incredible political blunders, as when it discharged the co-minister of justice, Byron Hove, a protégé of Bishop Muzorewa, for criticising the slowness in eliminating discrimination, especially in the legal system. One can question the reaction of the prime minister in re-outlawing ZAPU after the plane incident. There have likewise been objections that all members of the Executive Council were not in advance about retaliatory military raids across the border which neutralize guerrilla bases (which made seem militarily but were bad public re-

lations). Internal dissension among black groups supporting the transitional government has likewise not helped the situation.

The conclusion, then, is that the transitional government is flimsy, though not a total failure. Available evidence indicates that the strongest member of the quandrumviret in terms of popular support is Bishop

Robert Mugabe of ZANLA: Will interethnic struggle sabotage the Patriotic Front?

Muzorewa, with well over 50 percent. Six months ago he was alleged to have about 85 percent, so is clearly losing ground, though his forces could proba-

bly still win a free election. Con-

versely, sketchy and inconclusive evi-

dence shows that Nkomo is gaining popularity as African unashamedness at the slowness in removal of discrimina-

tion or the continuance of the war in-

creases. Economic dislocations, like the theorizing of rural Africans into Salisbury, where they become an urban proletariat or a mass of unemployed, have also contributed to the dissatisfaction.

The transitional government has in-

vited the leaders of the Patriotic Front to join in its so-called internal settlement — an invitation which it has under-

standably rejected; if it joined, it would have to face an election that it could not (at least under present circumstances) be expected to win. From the practical standpoint it is the better strategy for the Patriotic Front to do all within its power, by continuing the war, to wreck plans for an election and thus contribute to the collapse of the government, and move in to pick up the pieces. What the armed forces of the Inter-Front government would do after a col-

lapse is anybody’s guess.

Several scenarios can be imagined in this most fluid of situations. Dr. Conde Cruise O’Brien has suggested

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the renunciation of UDI and a return to legality so that direct British administration might usher in majority rule, a view also propounded by former British Cabinet Minister Reginald Maudling. Others feel that the transitional government cannot possibly contemplate the war, the Front will be reinforced by Cubans and "volunteers" from the Eastern bloc and finally take over.

The plan submitted by the British and

American governments (the "Anglo-American Plan") resembles the internal settlement more than it differs from it, though it calls for implementation during the interim period under United Nations auspices, a cease-fire, meetings with all parties participating, a peace-keeping force, and open elections. It was accepted reluctantly by the Front, though Nkomo later declared it "dead." The transitional government has rejected it because it will not yield control over the security forces, and remembers the oft-repeated intentions of Nkomo and Mugabe to obtain control without a prior election. Mugabe's threat to nationalize land and try Smith commander may serve under a black government (the present commander has already said he would). But the country runs a real chance of an internecine clash between ZANU and ZAPU, whose leadership and much of whose membership in Ndebele, and the Shona-speaking NUN, have been reported. Nkomo himself has Shona associates and probably is free from anti-Shona bias, but his Ndebele background is well known and in certain quarters has prevented his full-fledged acceptance as leader of the nationalist movement. There is even friction among Shona subgroups. Even if the ethnic factor is over-

Guerrilla warfare has put white civilians like this young farmer under arms

looking, old ZANU/ZAPU animosities remain. Modern Africa has shown that few instances in which the opposition has been peacefully and functionally integrated into the political structure. In a parliamentary system the opposition is part of the picture, but where in Africa does one find such an opposition?

What should be done depends on course upon the criteria one employs: should the long term or the short term prevail? From what point of view is one looking at the question — the black side or the white side? In the Rhodesian war? In the African generally? In decisions of great international import — and decisions affecting Rhodesia are now in this category — the interests of individual nations, or of people within the areas affected, do not always coincide. Decisions in such situations are usually made within the framework of generally accepted international behavior, and the outcome is often determined by force.

Recognition by other states would assist the transitional government, though in common practice states do not recognize young regimes without substantial reason to believe the regimes will survive. The longer the transitional government survives, the more likely it is to receive recognition, even from some African states.

Financial or military assistance would give the transitional government a lease on life, though it is difficult to see now where the assistance would come from. Resumption of trade, which is tantamount to widespread sanctions violations, would help.

Given the three principles set forth by the government of this article, the future of a peaceful Zimbabwe is far from assured. Maybe the best a Rhodesian white might hope for is preservation of some semblance of stability until his own status is clarified. An American and European hope might be for a relatively orderly, if chaotic, Zimbabwe, which is not a duplication of Angola, Uganda, or Camerob. The realizable black Zimbabwean might be for the knowledge that political rule in his country has passed in the hands of persons of the same ethnic classification as himself.

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Ghana's Rabbit Project

"Get the rabbit habit!" Make the bunny money!" From the capital city of Accra to northern areas bordering on the Sahel, the catchy jingles sing out from Ghana's radios and television sets. "Grow Rabbits, Grow Children." "Raise Them, Control Them. Use Them!" along the roads and in public places, and advice is hazed across colorfully illustrated billboards and posters.

The publicity is part of a nationwide multimedia communications campaign backing Ghana's National Rabbit Project, which promotes backyard rabbit breeding as a self-help means of increasing meat supplies at low cost and with a minimum of extra effort.

The rabbit project is a part of Ghana's widespread drive to achieve food self-sufficiency to which the government has committed for several years. Though the country now produces all of its rice and nearly enough corn to meet the requirements of its 30 more than one and a half million people, there is a chronic shortage of meat. When animal products do find their way to market, they are priced far below the meaning of the majority of the population.

The rabbit, which is of African origin, has several characteristics which make it ideal as a source of meat in developing countries. Most significant is its very rapid pace at which it multiplies. The gestation period is only 35 days, and a healthy female is able to produce three or four litters averaging six to eight offspring every spring. Starting with a buck and a doe (each costing $3.00 in Ghana), a backyard breeder can obtain a quantity of meat over the course of a year equal to the weight of an entire cow. One rabbit is just the right size to feed an average family, and the supply of meat is continuous.

Rabbit food is readily available in Ghana. The animals will eat almost anything, including table scraps, leftovers from sugar cane harvests, various kinds of grains, and other local flora such as groundnut and sweet potato vines. Dried cassava provides good bulk for their diet, and brewer's mash, left as a residue from malted beer and formerly discarded as useless, furnishes an excellent source of protein. While rabbits must have clean quiet

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Good Food for Good Health

All over Ghana, billboards press the merits of backyard rabbit-breeding

"Good food for good health."

CONTACT NATIONAL RABBIT PROJECT

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Ghana's Rabbit Project

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