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To the Editor:

I've just been reading the May-June 1986 issue of Africa Report to introduce myself to the UN Special Session on Africa's economic crisis. This is serving as an excellent guide and stepping-off point. In other research I have been doing, I have read back articles from Africa Report along with many other sources and I feel your standards just astonishingly high. Without your publication I don't know where I would be! Keep up the good work.

Brian Hull
Metuchen, New Jersey

To the Editor:

You have an excellent, perceptive series of articles on South Africa and Namibia in the current issue of Africa Report (March-April 1988). There has been too little "pro-active" attention given to Africa in the "halls of power" and it is good that this attention is growing. Africa's problems are complex, particularly those of southern Africa. Our government must avoid registering its abhorrence at apartheid and the death sentences on some of them have been commuted to life imprisonment by the president and in the case of two former prominent politicians, to house arrest. This is clear evidence that the judicial process has taken its normal course and the president exercised his constitutional power of mercy.

The most blatant example of Greenfield's bias is his continued attempt to link Somalia's economic difficulties to internal policies rather than to the external economic environment. Can he be aware of the debt crisis in many developing countries, the problems of drought, refugees, etc., and the common plight of the least developed countries like Somalia as they try to shore up scarce resources through devaluation and other austerity measures? It is only fair to view the situation of the country within the context of the international economic environment.

Greenfield has also widely misjudged Somalia's position in the Ethiopia-Somalia negotiations. The irrelevance of his speculation that our president might be "pressured" into making an "unpopular deal" has been shown by the recent Somalia-Ethiopia agreement. That agreement is evidently based on Somalia's call for peace and stability in the region and the creation of a conducive atmosphere for the normalization of relations between the two countries by adopting confidence-building measures such as the mutual withdrawal forces up to a distance of 9 miles, the cessation of hostile propaganda, the establishment of diplomatic relations, and the exchange of prisoners of war and detainees. These measures are necessary for the reduction of tension and the establishment of an appropriate climate for meaningful negotiations to take place on fundamental issues.

Greenfield is better advised to examine the facts before he jumps to far-fetched conclusions. He should also perhaps turn his attention to some other areas where he may be more conversant with the facts, rather than engaging in a futile propaganda campaign generated by his mentors in London.

Mohamud Adan Ali
Permanent Mission of the Somali Democratic Republic to the UN
New York
Black Market Arms for Somalia?

The government of the Somali Democratic Republic, in the throes of a succession crisis has, in recent months, been seriously troubled by increasing guerrilla activity, particularly in the north of the country.

In 1960, former Italian Somaliland, administered following World War II as a United Nations Trust, achieved independence and at once united with the former British protectorate to the north which had become independent only days before. Both before and after the 1969 coup which brought Maj.-Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre to power, Somali politics came to be dominated by the desire to add further Somali-inhabited territories to the new republic.

Large Somali populations in the former northern frontier district of Kenya, the former Afar and Issa Territory (now Djibouti), and in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, responded. But "Greater Somalia" did not materialize. Kenya was soon consolidated within its "colonial" boundaries: Djibouti became an independent republic; and over the years other Somali demands have been modified into some form of "self-determination" for the Ogaden. Now diplomatic ties between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu have been resumed.

All this outward-looking diplomacy has nevertheless masked the fact that whilst the Somali state has enjoyed a high degree of cultural, religious, and historical uniformity and is bordered on every frontier by other Somalis, there nevertheless remains considerable and chronic tension between the great clan families which make up the Somali nation.

In all nations, at times of stress and crisis when aspirations fail to materialize, national cleavages widen and mutual suspicion grows between ethnic groups. Although the opposition Somali National Movement (SNM) forces proclaim a struggle for national liberation, they are having difficulty in shedding a northern and even predominantly Isaaq image.

The government similarly faces a serious and deepening dilemma. On the one hand, it is aware that many Somali clansmen regard it as having degenerated into a family affair, run by a few greedy families from the small southern Marehan clan; but whom else is there to trust?

Barre: Wheeling and dealing (or arms)

This dilemma was well-illustrated recently when a secret letter from the "viceroy" of the north, Brig.-Gen. Mohamed Siyad "Morgan", advocating the "obliteration" of the Isaaq clan was leaked (Africa Report, September-October 1987). After a painful silence, the regime eventually declared the letter a forgery, but Morgan now acknowledges its authorship to friends and clearly still believes in the "unreliability" of certain clans.

The Somali armed forces are accustomed to training and fighting with increasingly scarce Soviet equipment, but the Soviet Union now arms the Ethiopian war machine—which is similarly engaged in bitter struggles with its own citizens. The U.S. sees little mileage in supplying "defensive" and "counter-insurgency" arms to a decaying regime whose leader is well into his eighties—whatever staging advantages may have been agreed for the rapid deployment of U.S. forces in the sector.

The SNM currently operates from across the border, in Ethiopia—just as the currently quiescent Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) has had its headquarters in the neighboring capital. The hard fact is that under pressure from a dispirited army, Siad Barre is desperate for arms. His military attaches have long since scoured the unofficial markets, but the Somali treasury is devoid of foreign exchange and the mark-up demanded by dealers in illicit armament is high.

In an attempt to solve this problem, the Somali President last year personally instructed envoys to endeavor to barter his nation's products—fish and fishing rights, meat, skins, farming produce—for arms. The secret correspondence conducted, for example, between the presidency, the military attaché's office in Paris and a Swiss-registered company, lists in stilted English the availability of specific explosives; rockets and rocket launchers of Eastern origin; ammunition, mortars, cannons, mines, anti-aircraft guns—and even used tanks, helicopters and hydrofoil torpedo boats, "with reparations [repairs] and guaranteed function." If this and other deals go through, there will be more hungry people than ever in the Horn of Africa later this year.

—Richard Greenfield
Bonn exposed in secret submarine deal with Pretoria

Several West German companies have allegedly gone ahead with plans to illegally help Pretoria construct four submarines and have provided vital components for a strike command vessel, according to recent parliamentary investigations in Bonn. Such a deal would represent a serious breach of the United Nations arms embargo against the South African regime. The $250 million contract would allow South Africa to replace its ageing French-built submarines and greatly enhance its capacity to launch sweeping commando raids against the South African regime.

Meanwhile, Gabon is an all-important source of uranium for France's nuclear power program as well as a key producer of oil, which is pumped and sold by the French-Gabonese company, Elf Gabon, as part of a highly lucrative financial arrangement. In return, says Le Canard Enchaine, France has showered Bongo with attention and on occasion, has indulged his taste for the high life.

Bongo says goodbye to economy class

President Omar Bongo has always been known to have a soft spot for traveling in style, but now, thanks to a generous donation from the French Ministry of Cooperation, the Gabonese leader will be on cloud nine when his newly reconverted luxury DC-8 takes off from Libreville. According to Le Canard Enchaine the Paris-based satirical newspaper, Minister of Cooperation Michel Aurillac has agreed to shell out nearly $3 million in “aid” to enable Bongo to lavishly redecorate the interior of his private plane.

As a small token of appreciation for Bongo's warm and lasting friendship, the Gabonese president is being paid directly out of the French government's Aid and Cooperation Fund for Black Africa—a sum which nearly matches the $3.4 million a year Paris officially contributes to Gabon for various development projects. Bongo is reportedly prepared to foot the bill for the remaining $1.8 million that is required if he is to go ahead with plans to convert his DC-8 into a veritable flying palace, featuring a few fashionable accessories like a $720,000 cinema and stereo system.

While the disclosure of the French government's donation did raise a few eyebrows in Paris, the deal more than anything underlines the special relationship that France has cultivated with its former colony. About 13,000 French nationals live in Gabon, and France continues to provide the lion's share of the country's military budget, including the permanent military presence of nearly 800 men.

offshore gas plan since April 1986, has really been masterminding the construction of the submarine project.

Evidence obtained by The Independent seems to support their allegations. A confidential letter from William Venter, head of the South African company building the submarines, to IKL general manager Lutz Nohse, recommends that selected members of the government should be told about the project, but suggests that “a process of subtle release of calculated disinformation” be used to keep it secret.

According to Africa Confidential, Bonn approved the initial sale of submarine plans to Pretoria in 1983 and much of the material was routed through third countries, particularly Israel and Turkey. Despite declarations to the contrary, HDW, IKL, and other German firms have furthermore continued to work on the project since 1986.

Although an earlier investigation committee set up in December 1986 concluded that West German authorities had never approved the sale and should therefore be let off the hook, it appears that nearly half the government was aware of the illegal plans and did nothing to stop them. Norbert Gansel, a Social Democrat spokesman for the current investigation committee, says HDW and IKL sent the outline and timetable of the deal to the finance and defense ministers in Bonn and to senior officials in the economics and foreign ministries.

But efforts to fully investigate the affair have hit a snag. Gansel claims the authorities and members of the ruling coalition parties are doing everything possible to obstruct the committee's attempts to uncover the truth, while the Kiel prosecutor's office, which is supposed to decide whether to open investigations of the companies, seems to be in no hurry to set the ball in motion. "They have been dragging their feet and not making a decision for months," says Gansel. In the meantime, the committee has sought through legal channels to seize the companies' dossiers on the entire affair, but so far have come up empty-handed.
BENIN

More than 100 army officers have reportedly been detained in Cotonou after an attempted "palace revolution" failed to overthrow President Mathieu Kerekou in late March. Kerekou said the plotters had tried to take over the country because they had recently lost their financial privileges.

Among those arrested were a group of 15 senior military officers, including Lt.-Col. Francois Kouyami, head of public security, and Lt.-Col. Badjo Gounme, one of the president's old comrade-in-arms who had played a leading role in the successful coup that brought Kerekou to power in 1972. The alleged ringleader of the plot, Capt. Hountondji of the Presidential Guard, was also apprehended. The government did not immediately reveal the fate of those detained, but it is likely they will be tried by the state security court established in mid-April to handle all cases involving internal and external security.

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Much to the dismay of the authorities in neighboring Nigeria, President Teodoro Obiang Nguema's government has reportedly signed a contract with Pretoria calling for the expansion of Malabo airport to accommodate South African airliners. According to informed sources, Pretoria will provide all material and engineering support, and supply troops to protect the infrastructure and experts involved in the project.

The growing South African presence in Equatorial Guinea is of particular concern to Nigeria, which fears a hostile military presence in the vicinity of its oil fields, only 15 minutes away by air. Pretoria has already admitted being involved in a so-called agricultural aid project in the country, while a large number of South African businessmen have flocked to Malabo in recent years, fanning speculation that they may be buying Nigerian oil through intermediaries as part of a sanctions-busting operation.

LIBYA

In accordance with a new liberalization policy announced to mark the eleventh anniversary of the Jamahiriya, Col. Muammar Qaddafi literally took the law into his own hands in early March by personally demolishing the gate of the main prison in Tripoli with a bulldozer. All told, about 600 detainees were released after Qaddafi announced an amnesty for all Libyans, save those accused of plotting with help from abroad.

One week later, Qaddafi freed another 130 foreign prisoners, and also called for the abolition of the death penalty, suggesting life sentences as an alternative for those who "commit one of the three sacrifices—secret work, use of arms, and treason." Proclaiming March 12 as Libya's official "Day of Freedom," he then destroyed immigration records of Libyans banned from traveling in the past.

SWAZILAND

After sitting in secret for four months, a special three-man tribunal found former Prime Minister Prince Bhekimpni Dlamini, Prince Mfanasibili Dlamini, and five other Swazi leaders guilty of high treason in mid-March, and sentenced them to 15 years imprisonment for their part in conspiring to illegally depose Queen Regent Dzelieze from office in August 1983. Three other politicians were given lesser jail terms, while former Labor Minister Prince Phiwokwakhe Dlamini and Prince Mahlaba Dlamini were acquitted.

The long-running purge of the Dlamini family, which began when King Mswati III took the throne in April 1986, continued two weeks after the treason trial when Special Branch police detained eight more prominent Swazis, including three princes. They were arrested under the 60-day Detention Act as a result of evidence disclosed during the trial, and held in the maximum security section of Matsapa central prison in Mbabane.

BURKINA FASO

As a gesture to promote national reconciliation, Capt. Blaise Compaore released 13 civilian and military leaders from prison in late March, including former Minister of Higher Education Valere Some and former Foreign Affairs Minister Basile Guissou. They had both been detained since December for allegedly writing and disseminating tracts calling for the overthrow of the Popular Front government.

However, another 30 former cabinet ministers and government officials, arrested in the aftermath of the bloody coup which toppled President Thomas Sankara in October, remain in prison. Compaore recently announced that several would be tried by the popular tribunals of the revolution at a later date.

Heading the group still in detention are former Territorial Administration and Security Minister Ernest Ouédraogo, and Capt. Pierre Ouédraogo, the head of the now-dissolved Committees for the Defense of the Revolution.

LIBERIA

Authorities in Monrovia foiled an alleged plot to overthrow the government and assassinate President Samuel Doe in mid-March, arresting 13 of 19 suspected conspirators and charging them with treason. Among those detained were William Gabriel Kpolleh, president of the banned Liberia Unification Party (LUP), and his deputy, Harold Ndama, as well as several members of the armed forces.

The attempted coup—the eighth against Doe since he seized power in 1980—was apparently unearthed when members of the security forces discovered "a large quantity of arms, ammunition, and uniforms" in an apartment in a Monrovia suburb occupied by one of the accused, Joseph Robert Kaipaye. A former U.S. Marine, Kaipaye allegedly committed suicide during interrogation by security agents. Information Minister Emmanuel Bowier said the other plotters would stand trial for treason in the near future but that no date had yet been set.
Botha government puts Cosatu on the firing line

After nearly two years of emergency rule during which 17 anti-apartheid organizations have been closed down and an estimated 30,000 people have been imprisoned, President P.W. Botha's government is now setting its sights on the best organized and potentially most serious threat to white minority rule—South Africa's powerful black trade union movement.

In recent months, the Botha regime has launched a full-scale blitz against the country's largest labor federation, the 750,000-strong Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). Authorities have issued an edict forbidding Cosatu from engaging in political activity, and have also raided several of the union's offices, detained a number of its officials, and distributed thousands of fake pamphlets making claims like, "Cosatu: We don't want to strike." Moreover, Botha has sought to push through a bill pending in Parliament preventing all organizations from receiving foreign funds for political use that could severely hamper Cosatu's activities. The federation presently relies on 80 percent of its funds from abroad.

But the Labor Relations Amendment Bill, which is expected to be passed by the South African Parliament during the current session, represents the most serious long-term challenge to black unions. The proposed law sets out to reverse the gains made by the labor movement over the last decade, threatening to turn the clock back to 1979 when black workers first won the right to join trade unions and to strike legally.

The bill—which Labor Minister Pietie du Plessis says aims to "restore the balance" in South African labor relations—will greatly weaken workers' ability to strike within a legal framework, effectively outlaw sympathy and solidarity strikes, undermine workers' job security by making unfair dismissals and retrenchments legal, and allow bosses to re-employ workers selectively after a strike. But perhaps the most sweeping provision is the one making unions legally responsible for losses resulting from an illegal strike, meaning that even if labor officials are opposed to an industrial action, the union can be sued for damages and its assets confiscated.

Cosatu spokesman Frank Meintjes calls the labor bill "a blatant attack on the one arena where the government has come up with credible reform, where opposing interest groups can sit together and negotiate." According to Cosatu, the new law will also destroy the mediation process and make it even more difficult for unions to channel workers' militancy within the legal framework. Says Meintjes, "There do not appear to be any benefits for those who might follow its provisions and stay within the system. It is all stick and no carrot."

While the bill would give employers the legal clout to clamp down on the official trade union movement, some employer organizations have expressed fears that unless the proposed legislation is watered down, a massive upsurge in wildcat strikes will ensue.

Babangida delivers body blow to deeply divided trade union federation

Following weeks of factional infighting which threatened to irreparably split the powerful Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), President Ibrahim Babangida's government opted for the heavy-handed approach by dissolving the country's 10-year-old umbrella organization and appointing a sole administrator to run its affairs in consultation with Labor Minister Abubaker Umar. In effect, the crisis within the NLC played right into the hands of the federal government, given that authorities had long been looking for an opportunity to neutralize the labor federation because of its vocal opposition to the proposed removal of oil subsidies and other controversial structural adjustment measures.

In a nationwide broadcast, Umar explained that the government had badly been forced, "in the national interest," to intervene under the Economic Emergency Decree of 1985 in order to put an end to the NLC's internal wrangling. Citing the need to maintain a single labor federation. Umar argued that the government and unions should be "partners in progress," and warned that the existence of warring factions constituted a threat to peace and stability in Nigeria.

"Never again will the government allow the unions to be divided into small, fragmented organizations that cannot command the respect of the employers," declared Umar. "The federal government 10 years ago established the NLC to be a united, virile, and respectable central labor organization. It is a very sad development which threatens to take the country 10 years back in its labor movement." NLC labor leaders, he added, had become captives of "ideological intolerance and narrow, selfish interests," making them unable to carry out meaningful negotiations with the government and employers on behalf of rank-and-file workers.

Factionalism, which has plagued the NLC at various times since its creation in 1978, came to a head once again in late February when the rift between President Ali Chiroma's "progressive" camp and Takai Shammang's "democratic" wing resulted in two delegates' meetings being held simultaneously.
in Benin City at what should have been the federation's quadriennial conference. Each side accused the other of serious constitutional abuses and financial irregularities, and both factions were alleged to have accepted funds from the authorities, fanning speculation that the government had worked behind the scenes to split the labor congress.

Under Chiroma's leadership, the NLC had led a successful campaign last year against the government's plan to scrap the oil subsidy. The federation won the backing of Nigerians nationwide by arguing that the increase in the price of petroleum would subsequently lead to major increases in the cost of living, and this forced the government to put its scheme on hold. But with the NLC effectively crippled for at least six months, the government promptly took over the labor federation. Led by Afonso dos Santos, a dissident member of the opposition National Resistance Front of Sao Tome and Principe (FRNSTP), the rebels had apparently intended to overrun the presidential palace in a surprise attack and take over the government after executing da Costa and other cabinet ministers.

Government troops captured dos Santos and 42 members of the commando unit—composed mainly of Namibia-trained Sao Tomean exiles flanked by mercenaries and nationals of several African countries—and killed the other two insurgents. Quintiliano Louies Amado, the Lisbon-based secretary-general of the FRNSTP, dissociated his group from the attack, calling the coup attempt a "crazy" act carried out by dissidents within the organization which was aimed at "drawing the attention of Western countries to the situation created in the country by the government."

According to Amado, the operation had begun in late February when a group of rebels arriving by boat from Cameroon had gone on a reconnaissance mission and assaulted several fishermen on the islands' shores. By the time the dissidents launched their incursion 10 days later, the country's security forces were on alert and fully prepared to meet the challenge.

Amado claimed that dos Santos had set up his own faction, renamed the FRNSTP-Reconstructed, after having been forced to leave Gabon for Walvis Bay in Namibia when relations between Libreville and Sao Tome began to improve in 1984. Once the plot was in place, a group of rebels allegedly went to Cameroon to meet up with dos Santos and other recruits before setting out by boat to reach the shores of Sao Tome.

The Angolan News Agency reported that dos Santos had trained his opposition group with the support of the South African government and quoted sources suggesting that Pretoria had provided the dissidents with the necessary logistical support to carry out their plot. South Africa had denied press reports in May 1987 that it was training 90 Sao Tomean "refugees" in Namibia for a coup against the da Costa government, but it appears that several members of the Walvis Bay group actually took part in the invasion.

In light of the coup attempt, da Costa nonetheless reaffirmed his government's commitment to the ongoing process of democratization and reconciliation which is aimed at bringing about "free and fair" presidential and legislative elections by 1990. Da Costa's conciliatory policy has recently paid dividends with the return from exile of former Health Minister Carlos da Graca, one of the government's main critics who had formed the FRNSTP in 1981. Da Graca was named foreign minister earlier this year by newly appointed Prime Minister Celestino Rocha da Costa following far-reaching constitutional amendments by the ruling Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe (MLSTP).

However, Miguel Trovoada, the country's first prime minister who now lives in exile in Paris, dismissed the government's liberalization policy as an "operation of political propaganda" and an attempt to "maintain continuity under the guise of change." He denied involvement in the aborted coup, but claimed that the nature of the da Costa government "can lead to desperate acts like this." "As long as there is really no climate in which people have the possibility of participating in the development process of the country, obviously all types of ventures can be expected," he added.
the NLC's constitution, and Chiroma was returned as president in a landslide election.

Umar, who was billed to open the conference, was conspicuous by his absence, adding fuel to Chiroma's allegations that the federal government had sought to prevent the meeting from taking place. Although authorities denied these accusations, within days, the government stepped in and dissolved the executive of the NLC and named Michael Ogunkoya, a personnel director at John Holt (Nigeria) Ltd., as sole administrator. Ogunkoya was given the power to run the union central's affairs and to organize the election of a new executive with the participation of all 42 industrial unions within six months.

Following the government order banning the two NLC factions and declaring them "illegal and unlawful," three industrial unions affiliated to the umbrella organization filed a suit in a Lagos High Court in early March challenging the legality of the authorities' action. But the court threw out the unions' legal action two weeks later, upholding the government's countersuit filed on the grounds that they had no locus standi to institute the motion.

COSATU...continued

is likely to occur. The specter of a workers' movement which sees no point in operating within the legal industrial relations framework is a cause for concern for many employers who worry that such restrictive labor practices could be counterproductive. Theo Heffer, a spokesman for the Premier food group, has already suggested that if the bill is pushed through, management and unions should by-pass the new law and create independent industrial structures through which to negotiate.

Despite such reservations, most employers have been calling on the government to tighten the existing labor laws so as to remove the "loopholes" which have allowed black workers to increasingly flex their industrial muscle. In 1987, growing labor militancy led to 9 million work-days lost, compared to only 13 million the year before. For every day lost through strikes in 1986, there was a full week lost last year. As a result, when six employer organizations met with Cosatu officials in March to discuss the bill, they rejected union demands to condemn it out of hand, saying they saw "much that was positive" in the proposed legislation.

Faced with the prospect of an all-out confrontation with the apartheid regime in coming months, Cosatu has stepped up efforts to mobilize support against the bill. In February, Cosatu leaders launched a seven-week campaign of factory demonstrations to express the union's opposition to the legislation, and later called a special national congress for May 7 and 8 to discuss the bannings of political organizations and attacks on the labor movement. Originally scheduled for early April, the federation postponed the congress to give Cosatu affiliates an opportunity to consult more broadly with their members in an effort to better coordinate a national response to the "union-bashing" labor legislation, and warned it would call for three days of national protests should authorities ban the meeting.

Meintjies claims that if worst comes to worst, labor organizations can survive by going underground and operating clandestinely in the workplace, but as he also admits, "The government has sought themselves a small space. We're on the retreat. The challenge we face is to try to continue without walking into the full brunt of the government's attacks. This is a challenge all groups face."

Lesotho water project gets under way

After 30 years of protracted negotiations with Pretoria, work on the gigantic $2 billion Lesotho Highlands Water Project has finally gotten off the ground, underlining the increasingly close ties that have blossomed between the two countries since Maj.-Gen. Justin Lekhanya seized power a little more than two years ago. The long-mooted project, which will supply water to South Africa's rich mining and industrial complex in southern Transvaal, is also expected to give Lesotho's struggling economy much-needed boost, developing the kingdom's limited infrastructure and creating at least 4,400 jobs during the first phase of construction alone.

The final obstacles to launching the project were cleared in October 1986 when South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha and Col. Thaabe Letsie, the Lesotho Military Council member responsible for foreign affairs, signed a treaty providing for the diversion of water from the kingdom's remote mountain regions to South Africa's Adys Transvaal. Under the agreement, Lesotho is to supply 18 cubic meters of water per second by the time the first phase is due to be completed in 1995, and up to 70 cubic meters of water per second when the third and final stage is terminated in 2017. In return, Lesotho will initially earn an estimated $50 million a year in royalties from South Africa.

A total of 18 ancillary projects worth millions of dollars are tied to the water scheme, including six large dams, 180 miles of new access roads, and 150 miles of water tunnels. A power plant near Butha-Bethe close to the South African border will also be built, initially generating about 250 million kilowatt hours of energy a year, before expanding to an annual output of 800 million kilowatt hours for consumption throughout Lesotho when the project is fully operational.

On the down side, critics point out that some 17,000 peasants are due to be displaced, while the country's already limited share of arable land will be further reduced. A total of 4,000 hectares of arable land and 18,000 hectares of grazing land will be sacrificed, adding to existing problems of landlessness and soaring unemployment. Authorities in Maseru, however, have promised to maintain or improve the standard of living of those affected with the help of compensation plans, alternative employment schemes, and relocation deals.
Since deciding to go ahead with the water project, the Lekhanya government has hammered home the overall long-term benefits that will come Lesotho's way, while downplaying its growing ties with the apartheid regime. Given that more than 120,000 Basotho workers are already employed in South African mines and that their wages account for more than half of Lesotho's gross national product, authorities in Maseru have defended the launching of the water scheme in very pragmatic terms. Said Lekhanya recently, "Lesotho is not moving any closer to South Africa than has always been necessary for its economic survival."

Hans Pettenburger, the South African representative of the project's joint permanent technical commission, has stressed the mutual advantages of the water scheme irrespective of any political changes that might take place in Pretoria or Maseru in the foreseeable future. "South Africa must have the water and Lesotho needs the electricity and development the scheme provides, as well as income from its major export commodity—water," he pointed out.

Donor agencies, led by the World Bank and European Economic Community, have been more sensitive to criticisms about the project's links to the apartheid regime and have sought to keep South African involvement to a minimum, but there are already signs that Pretoria's presence is likely to grow as construction proceeds. Although no loans for the Lesotho project are to be made to South Africa, much of the basic supplies like sand, cement, and other materials will undoubtedly come from across the border.

Moreover, several South African firms are presently competing for many of the key contracts to build tunnels and roads in the remote areas of northern Lesotho. A number of access roads and bridges are reportedly already being financed by the South African Development Bank—a sure sign that the apartheid regime has every intention of playing a prominent role in the construction of this key project in years to come.

Locust invasion plagues the continent

The worst plague of locusts in 30 years is posing an "unprecedented threat" to crops in North and West African countries and will require "swift and decisive action" by all affected nations and international aid donors if a major food crisis is to be averted, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) warned recently.

Swarms of desert locusts up to 30 miles long and two miles wide have been devouring about 4,000 tons of vegetation each day, and could soon be covering 40,000 square miles of the continent—particularly in the Sahel and much of North Africa. "A veritable plague situation has developed and we are in a state of general alert," said FAO director-general Edouard Saouma. "If unchecked, the next generation of locusts will spread to the countries of the Sahel and create a devastating plague similar to the one experienced 30 years ago—one that lasted over 10 years."

At an emergency meeting called in Rome in early April, the FAO estimated the cost of treating the initial 2 million infested hectares in the worst-hit countries of Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania at $30 million. But the overall bill—including the loss of crops—could balloon up to as much as $150 million, with no guarantees that the anti-pest campaign will prove to be effective. As Lukas Brader, director of the FAO's Emergency Center for Locust Operations, put it, "The extent of the area infected is comparable to the height of the last plague. We are not optimistic it can be controlled. We fear it will spread at least through next year."

Several key factors have contributed to the sudden explosion in the desert locust population. Unusually heavy rains in regions noted for drought, combined with warmer than average weather, have produced ideal conditions for the breeding of a second generation of locusts since the first waves were detected last October. In such an environment, scientists say that females can lay as many as three batches of 100 eggs each during a life of several months, creating new swarms of several million locusts.

The FAO also admits a failure over the past two years to contain relatively localized infestations in Chad, Ethiopia, Mauritania, and other areas, allowing the present plague to reach disastrous proportions. Affected countries have also experienced shortages of insecticides, aircrafts, and spraying equipment, and to make matters worse, restrictions on the use of various chemical pesticides, known not only for their effectiveness in combating locusts but also for the dangers they pose to the environment, have further hampered operations.

Some FAO experts argue that the time has come to re-examine the use of dieldrin which has been banned because of its toxic effects. They fear that the main pesticides presently being used—malathion, fenitrothion, and carbaryl—are so safe that they will prove to be less than effective, and that the only way the current plague can be checked is through the controlled and supervised spraying of dieldrin over the affected areas. In any event, say most specialists, even if the ongoing operation is a success, not all swarms will be destroyed, and it will take at least three years of concerted action to rid the affected countries of the locust menace.
LIBERIA

President Samuel Doe sacked more than 200 employees of the finance ministry and the National Bank of Liberia in mid-March to highlight his well-publicized drive to stamp out corruption. Finance Minister John Bestman—who had been brought into the cabinet last year to boost the country's creditworthiness abroad—was unexpectedly dismissed earlier in the month when Doe paid a surprise visit to his office and found him absent. He was replaced by former Minister of Commerce and Industry David Farhat.

The wholesale financial shake-up follows the arrival of 17 American "operational experts" to Monrovia who have been vested with the power to virtually run the economy for a two-year period. Their primary task is to straighten out Doe's financial mess by curbing public expenditure and playing a pivotal role in the country's economic planning.

ZIMBABWE

After a 2 percent fall in GDP last year, economists are predicting that Zimbabwe's economy will grow by 3 to 5 percent in 1988, thanks largely to the mining sector's recovery and heavy rains which should help agriculture rebound from serious drought.

Mining production, buoyed by rising world market prices, increased by 17 percent in 1987 to a record $475 million, and is forecast to top $580 million in 1988. Led by gold, which accounted for 43 percent of total value last year, the mining sector has benefited from the government's decision to buy out privately-owned mines deemed uneconomic, and the use of the latest expertise to attract foreign companies seeking new opportunities abroad.

The sale of farm produce fell by more than 11 percent in 1987 because of drought, but this year, economists expect agriculture to show an overall real growth of 12 percent, with tobacco nearly doubling earnings to about $300 million before the auction floors close in October.

EGYPT

Government officials have publicly admitted for the first time that the low water level of Lake Nasser—the vast reservoir behind the Aswan High Dam which generates up to 40 percent of Egypt's electric power—could pose a serious threat to the country's agricultural output as well as to its massive desert-reclamation program. Should the amount of water in the lake continue to dwindle at the present rate, warned Energy Minister Mahir Abaza, the dam would eventually have to be shut down because lake sediments could damage the turbines' blades, leading to widespread power shortages.

Until recently, Egyptians had been kept in the dark about the lake's perilously low water level. But poor water management, combined with drought in the Ethiopian highlands, has caused a 10-20 percent drop in power at Aswan.

BUSINESS BRIEFS

GABON

The discovery of a massive onshore oil field in southern Gabon is now widely expected to turn the country's economic fortunes around, boosting petroleum output by 50 percent to about 12 million tons in 1990, and refurbishing reserves that should last at least three decades. Oil accounts for about 80 percent of Gabon's export earnings, but until the Rabi-Kounga field was uncovered by Shell Gabon, the country's production had been plummeting and its long-term oil potential looked bleak.

Once the Rabi-Kounga field, with reserves of 40-70 million tons, is fully operational by 1990, 15 percent or an estimated $600 million a year in oil revenues will go to the Gabonese state, while the remainder will be shared equally by the principal partners in the endeavor, Shell Gabon and Elf Gabon. The find—currently the target of a $500 million development program—has led to a surge in onshore exploration and transformed Gabon into an oil producer of considerable potential.

UNITED NATIONS

The final report of a UN-sponsored conference in Khartoum on Africa's economic recovery sharply criticized IMF-directed austerity programs and appealed for increased funds in an effort to impress Western donors with the need to put a "human face" on adjustment measures. The so-called Khartoum Declaration of early March argued that such programs have often aggravated the human condition because they are "incomplete, mechanistic, and of too short a time perspective."

"Financing Africa's Recovery," another UN report by a panel of independent financial experts, reached similar conclusions and further suggested that sub-Saharan countries needed a minimum of $5 billion "to restore prospects for development and growth." The group calculated that Western countries had pledged about $3 billion, but proposed reducing interest rates on debt to provide an extra $1 billion and called for an additional $1 billion in donor aid to make up the difference.

UGANDA

Despite the devastation caused by two decades of war and continuing internal political turmoil, President Yoweri Museveni's economic reform program appears to be on the right track, judging by the positive response of the World Bank and the international donor community. Top World Bank officials recently completed an inspection visit to Kampala and announced that $500 million would be lent to Uganda in the next two years.

But inflation is rampant, at an unofficial rate of about 200 percent, while the value of the new Ugandan shilling introduced in May 1987 has plunged, so that black market operators in Kampala offer up to five times the official rate for foreign exchange. These currency difficulties have only aggravated the already widespread problem of corruption, making the crackdown on such practices a priority if the government hopes to win its uphill battle to revive the economy.
The Democratic front-runner for the presidential nomination, Governor of Massachusetts Michael Dukakis, recommends toughened economic sanctions against South Africa among the measures to bring about negotiations to end apartheid. In this Africa Report election exclusive, he also outlines a new American approach to Africa's debt crisis and economic development needs.

The U.S. presidential campaign is in full gear, but the Democratic and Republican candidates' projected policies toward Africa remain a mystery to most American voters. As in every election year, Africa Report seeks to fill this void, offering each candidate the opportunity to outline his views on major issues affecting African-American relations. In this issue, we publish the written replies of Democratic candidates Michael Dukakis, Governor of Massachusetts, and the Reverend Jesse Jackson to a series of questions posed by Africa Report. The responses of the Republican candidate, Vice President George Bush, will appear in our July-August issue.

Africa Report: What are the United States' basic interests in Africa? What would be your administration's Africa policy goals? What are the most appropriate means of pursuing these interests and goals?

Dukakis: Ten million Africans in 15 countries are on the edge of starvation—in a continent that once could feed itself. The images of human tragedy—the stick-thin legs, hollow eyes, and swollen stomachs of our fellow human beings rise up before us and challenge us as a nation and as a caring people.

No, we can't make the rain fall. We can't—and we shouldn't try—to govern Africa. And because of the legacy of red ink the next president will inherit when he takes office, our foreign aid dollars will be limited. But we can do a lot more to help the African people than we have during the past seven years. The current administration has militarized American foreign aid: it has imitated the approach traditionally taken by the Soviet Union; it has helped to beat ploughshares into swords throughout the less-developed world.

As president, I'm going to do all I can to see that the children of this world have the chance to survive and grow, and that their parents are given the help they need to live with each other, not the weapons they might use to destroy each other.

We need a president who will fight for human rights around the world. And we need a president who will make it clear—once and for all—that America stands for democracy and social justice in South Africa. The government of South Africa is the enemy of peace and progress and social justice. It is at war with its neighbors and with its own people. It has imprisoned and tortured children. It has violated peace agreements, thumbed its nose at the UN, and set the stage for bloody and protracted conflict throughout the southern third of the African continent.

"The next president must sit down with the leaders of the developing countries and with their creditors to ease the debt crisis that is threatening democracies and stifling growth."
It's time we say "no" to doing business with this regime. We must join with the international community to enact tough international sanctions against South Africa. We must reach out to those—white and black—who are struggling to end apartheid and establish democratic rule. We must sit down with them, we must speak up for them with our allies and at the UN. We must provide economic assistance to them. And we must understand that their struggle is our struggle, their suffering our suffering, their victory our victory.

**Africa Report:** The Reagan administration has been criticized for putting undue weight on military as compared to economic aid and for politicizing allocations of foreign aid and humanitarian assistance. Several African nations have seen their economic support funds cut back in the FY1989 budget. What would be your administration's priorities in the allocation of foreign aid to African countries? Given Africa's overwhelming needs, are current aid levels sufficient?

**Dukakis:** U.S. aid to African nations should be increased, if our fiscal situation permits. The administration's proposed economic assistance is inadequate; Congress has already begun to take steps to increase funding. Bilateral assistance is only the beginning—we should encourage our allies in the industrial world to help as well. I also plan to work with Congress to see that our foreign aid dollars are invested to help to meet real needs. No more lining the pockets of dictators; no more helping the Somozas and the Duvaliers and the Marcoses. No more shipping sophisticated arms to countries while their people starve to death.

**Africa Report:** Many African countries are suffering from severe debt burdens as well as net outflows of concessional resources. What measures would you support to address Africa's debt problems? Should Africa be regarded as a special case given the continent's major economic difficulties?

**Dukakis:** The next president must sit down with the leaders of the developing countries and with their creditors to ease the debt crisis that is threatening democracies and stifling growth. America must develop a creative and flexible response to the international debt crisis. Creditor governments, banks, and debtor nations in Africa and all of the Third World would benefit from fresh strategies for dealing with the debt problem developed in accordance with the following principles:

- The net outflow of capital from debtor nations in the Third World must be reversed. If banks are unwilling to lend additional money to developing countries, they should reduce the amount of interest they collect by lowering their return or allowing capitalization of interest. Alternatively, a certain percentage of debt payments could be used to finance investments in developing countries.
- Any strategy needs to be carefully tailored to address the circumstances of individual countries. For countries such as Sudan, debt relief may well be the only answer. A variety of other creative solutions, including arrangements such as debt-equity swaps, may play a useful role in less severe cases.
- Every effort must be made to protect the poor from the effects of IMF-designed austerity packages and draconian budget cuts. The IMF should produce "poverty impact statements" for its recommended economic policies, and the World Bank should be prepared to increase funding for poverty programs that have been cut.

**Africa Report:** Since the UN Special Session on Africa's Economic Crisis in 1986, many African nations have adopted IMF-sponsored austerity programs, but such belt-tightening policies have come under attack for creating severe hardship on their populations. Further, the international community's support of these efforts has been deemed inadequate. What policies would you recommend to promote Africa's economic recovery and should the U.S. play a more active role in mobilizing Western financial support?

**Dukakis:** Seventy percent of the African people are subsistence farmers. They are handicapped not by a lack of will, but by a lack of training, a lack of credit, and—above all—by the lack of fair prices for the food they grow. African farmers—like American farmers—need and deserve a living wage. They won't get that if prices are driven down by the dumping of American and European food commodities; they won't get it if African governments continue to subsidize urban consumers at the expense of the farmers; they won't get it if international lenders encourage governments to rip up farmland to plant export crops to increase foreign exchange. If we are to help the people of Africa to build their economies, we must work with our European allies to end the trade wars and the dumping of farm products that depress food prices around the world.

The International Fund for Agricultural Development is an example of the kind of approach we should encourage. Since 1974, the Fund has combined the petrodollars of OPEC with the resources of the industrialized nations to provide training and credit to 15 million families, mostly in Africa, mostly small farmers and rural ranchers.

As president, I'm going to propose to Gorbachev that on the day we sign an agreement making deep cuts in strategic arms, we should create an International Humanitarian Relief Fund, and each of us should put up a half billion dollars a year of what we save in weapons expenditures to fight famine, poverty, and disease throughout the developing world. Finally, I will go to the international community with a plan to stop the sale of advanced military equipment to countries that lack the resources to care for their own people.

**Africa Report:** The Reagan administration's policy of "constructive engagement" with South Africa does not seem to have achieved its goal of contributing to a peaceful end to the apartheid system, as violence and repression seem to be worsening. What would be the essential elements of your administration's policy toward South Africa?

**Dukakis:** Apartheid is wrong. In the context of the late 20th century, it is the equivalent of slavery. Yet the South African government's token "reforms" have left the apartheid system firmly entrenched, as it continues to deny the vast majority of its citizens the most fundamental political, economic, and human rights.

Throughout my public life, I've opposed apartheid and supported the cause of human rights and self-determination in southern Africa. I'm proud that Massachusetts was one of the very first states in the nation to terminate its pension fund investments in South Africa.
I believe America can play a meaningful role in promoting the cause of peace and human rights in southern Africa. But we must make our opposition to apartheid crystal clear. And we must take firm measures to demonstrate the depth of our concerns for the future of the entire region.

As president, I will encourage the development of non-racial leadership committed to a peaceful transition to political and social equality in South Africa. Leaders like Archbishop Tutu and Allan Boesak deserve our support in their struggle for human rights for people of all races in South Africa.

I support the holding of internationally sponsored, all-party negotiations for the abolition of apartheid and the creation of a constitutional, non-racial democracy committed to respect for the political and economic rights of all South Africans—talks that include the African National Congress.

Change is coming in South Africa. The question is whether it will be peaceful and led or by bloodshed. We must do all we can to bring change to South Africa that is rapid and peaceful, and that provides for all peoples of that country and its neighbors those fundamental human rights and protections that America seeks for all the peoples of the world.

Africa Report: In 1986, the U.S. Congress overrode a presidential veto and passed the Anti-Apartheid Act, legislating limited economic sanctions against South Africa. Do you support economic sanctions as a means of pressuring the South African government, and do you think the current sanctions in force should be strengthened?

Dukakis: As president, I will toughen U.S. economic sanctions against South Africa and seek multilateral agreement with our allies for a more comprehensive trade embargo against that country, in the absence of agreement by the South African government to enter into prompt and meaningful negotiations for the abolition of apartheid and the creation of a non-racial South Africa.

Africa Report: Would your administration stop providing covert aid to Jonas Savimbi's Unita rebels and would it extend diplomatic recognition to the Angolan government?

Dukakis: As president, I will stop U.S. aid to the Unita rebels in Angola, recognize the Angolan government, and work toward creating conditions that will lead to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and improved relations between Angola and the West.

Africa Report: What policy initiatives would you propose to break the long-standing deadlock on Namibia's independence? What is your view of the linkage of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola to Namibia's independence?

Dukakis: My administration would target the real issue in Namibia—the illegal occupation of the country by the South African government. In violation of UN resolutions, Pretoria has consistently blocked Namibians of all races from negotiating a democratic solution to one of Africa's longest-running guerrilla wars. Moreover, South African forces have used bases in northern Namibia and the Caprivi strip to launch invasions into both Angola and Zambia.

UN resolution 435 makes no reference to the withdrawal of Cuban troops and the current administration's insistence on formally linking the two issues has simply handed the South Africans an excuse to stall on withdrawal until the Cubans leave.

Africa Report: The southern African nations bordering South Africa have suffered the brunt of Pretoria's destabilization policies. What support would your administration give to the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) as it attempts to free its member-nations from economic dependence on South Africa?

Dukakis: As president, I will assist South Africa's neighbors, such as Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique, to attain greater economic independence from South Africa, and to become less vulnerable to South Africa's military and economic pressure, and support the efforts of SADCC to improve the lives of the 65 million Africans who live in its member-states.

Africa Report: What role—if any—should the U.S. play in resolving Africa's regional crises, such as Chad, the Western Sahara, and the Horn of Africa? Does military aid assist in or deter resolution of these conflicts?

Dukakis: As Americans, we want a world where every nation is able to determine its own destiny free from outside interference of any kind, free from outside coercion, free from fear. The current administration has tried to impose 1950s solutions on a 1980s world. It has acted alone, when it should have sought support from regional powers. It has relied on force, when it should have used diplomacy. It has tried to manipulate nations, when it should have tried to understand them. It has created confusion about our goals and values, when it should have stood up for what America stands for around the world.

In the long run, we will strengthen America, and we will increase our influence and prestige around the world, only if we use our strength for the right reasons and the right goals.
Africa Report: What are the United States' basic interests in Africa? What would be your administration's Africa policy goals?

Jackson: The U.S. has a broad range of political and economic interests in Africa. Economically, the U.S. is interested in increasing trade with Africa. Politically, we need to secure strong allies on the African continent. Strategically, the U.S. needs to strengthen and expand ties with a number of African countries for long-term U.S. interests. The short-sighted policies of successive U.S. administrations prevented policy-makers from developing and pursuing long-term, positive goals in the region.

There are over half a billion people on the African continent. Africa is a major source of strategic minerals, diamonds, gold, copper, and other resources important to the U.S. and the rest of the world. The critical importance of Africa's human and economic resources must be recognized and appreciated. My administration's policy goals would be the Jackson Doctrine, based on the following principles:

- Strengthening of the rule of international law: We must commit ourselves to respect and strengthen such international institutions as the UN and the World Court.
- Promotion of self-determination and human rights: We must recognize that Africa has the right to choose its own destiny, to find ways to cope with poverty, illiteracy, and political rights.
- Support for international economic justice and development: We must address the enormous debt burdens and austerity development policies promoted by the IMF which are crippling Africa's potential and threatening its very survival.

The pursuance of the Jackson Doctrine calls for the total redefinition of our relationship to Africa. It calls for U.S. goals and interests to be more in line with those of African leaders and their peoples. It calls for the U.S. to recognize that African economic, political, and social goals are based on the fundamental realities of their people and not on rigid ideological lines. The many challenges of Africa today offer an opportunity for America to develop new forms of partnership for

The Reverend Jesse Jackson: Setting the Policy Agenda

Election '88

Jesse Jackson's campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination has altered the face of American politics, setting a new agenda for the candidates' debates on domestic and foreign policy options. His efforts to bring Africa's political and economic crises to the forefront of American concerns may have a lasting impact on the policies of whoever occupies the White House in 1989.
political alliances and economic growth and to create and expand bonds of mutual respect and trust.

Our Hawed policy of choosing our friends and allies based on an anti-communist litmus test has forced us to surrender our moral authority. We can no longer use Cold War assumptions to analyze 21st century political realities. We must go in a new direction, forged by a new consciousness, renewed respect, and a new understanding of Africa. The first step in that new direction must be to demonstrate to Africa that our policy will no longer be tainted by trying to preserve our relationship with 1 million Afrikaners in South Africa, at the expense of a half billion Africans in the rest of the continent.

Africa Report: What would be your administration's priorities in the allocation of foreign aid to African countries?

Jackson: There is no sub-Saharan African country in the list of the top ten recipients of U.S. aid. Given the developmental and debt crisis which is gripping Africa, the U.S. aid response is dismal. The Jackson administration would increase aid levels to Africa, but that would not be our ultimate goal. Our priority is to increase trade and self-sufficiency and decrease aid which prolongs dependency. Our aid program must be based on Africa's human needs and not on U.S. strategic and military needs. At present, the U.S. has increased its military aid to Kenya and Somalia. Each is receiving $34 million in aid, while aid to the frontline states—the victims of South African aggression—is much lower.

The South African apartheid war against its neighbors has resulted in $25 billion worth of damage to the frontline states. Over 100,000 people have been killed and 1.5 million people face starvation. Yet, U.S. aid allocations to the frontline states in 1987 were only $60 million, while one country, Zaire, a close U.S. ally, received $30 million. Angola and Zimbabwe received no assistance at all.

The Jackson administration's aid policy will be to encourage and support African development in line with the efforts of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference [SADCC] and those of the OAU and UN agencies. We must move toward increasing our input through these multilateral aid vehicles and away from bilateral aid.

Africa Report: Many African countries are suffering from severe debt burdens as well as net outflows of concessional resources. What measures would you support to address Africa's debt problems?

Jackson: Africa, like most of the Third World, is strangled by a crushing debt crisis. Health care, education, and other vital social services necessary to increase the standard of living of people are falling further behind. The falling prices of Africa's commodity exports and the increasing rising costs of interest on loans are exacerbating the debt crisis and killing the dreams of Africa.

America must play a pivotal role in helping Africa meet this crisis. We must create a bold vision which can inspire the international community to rally around Africa in its hour of need. My administration would undertake the following tasks:

- Explore ways to restructure the debt to allow Africa the breathing space it needs to grow.
- Establish a new and innovative international mechanism which would assume some of the largest African debt from private banks and convert it to longer term notes.
- Call for an international conference of bankers and African creditors to extend some loans, convert loans to grants, and encourage the writing off of others.
- Instruct the U.S. representatives to the IMF, the World Bank, and other international institutions to marshal all their forces in developing a debt relief plan for Africa. These measures would signal to the international community that Africa's major economic problems deserve special attention.

Africa Report: Since the UN Special Session on Africa's Economic Crisis in 1986, many African nations have adopted IMF-supported austerity programs, but such belt-tightening policies have come under attack for creating severe hardship on their populations. Further, the international community's support for these efforts has been deemed inadequate. What policies would you recommend to promote Africa's economic recovery?

Jackson: The richness and variety of material and human resources in Africa can make a tremendous contribution to the world. The U.S., more than any other country, has a stake in facilitating that contribution. The economic vitality of Africa and other Third World regions, and that of the U.S. and other Western nations are closely related. As president, I would provide the vision and the political will to implement the following programs:

- Establish an international Marshall Plan for Africa in which Japan, West Germany, and other trade surplus nations take the lead in creating a capital fund for African development and debt relief.
- Support a moratorium on IMF austerity programs which place tremendous burdens on African economies, which affect the poorest of the poor in Africa while not improving the debt problem at all. We must have the vision and creativity to develop an economic program promoting fiscal responsibility while promoting growth, raising hope while dashing fears, demonstrating compassion while eliminating despair.
- Generate democratic development strategies which will promote African self-reliance and equitable distribution of resources within African countries.
I would undertake all of these programs with our U.S. allies with particular focus on mobilizing political and financial support to bring about a new economic order in Africa.

Africa Report: The Reagan administration's policy of "constructive engagement" with South Africa does not seem to have achieved its goal of contributing to a peaceful end to the apartheid system, as violence and repression seem to be worsening. What would be the essential elements of your administration's policy toward South Africa?

Jackson: We have seen nearly eight years of a very destructive Reagan administration policy toward South Africa which has only resulted in more hardship, pain, violence, and bloodshed for the peoples of the southern Africa region. The fact is that the Botha regime still perceives our nation as a reliable friend and ally. This is because the Reagan administration continues to pursue a policy which contains no element of serious U.S. pressure on the apartheid government to engage in good faith negotiations with authentic anti-apartheid leaders like Nelson Mandela and others and organizations such as the African National Congress.

Indeed, the hour is dark in South Africa. These are the bitter fruits of the "do nothing/do little" Reagan policy toward South Africa. The Reagan administration has done nothing but issue verbal condemnations of the recent South African crackdown through various State Department spokespersons. When the president was given an opportunity to comment on the deteriorating situation in South Africa at a press conference earlier this year, he chose not to strongly condemn the Botha government policies on behalf of the American people, nor did he call for any new, tough U.S. action.

Last year, Reagan violated the spirit and letter of the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 by refusing to impose stronger U.S. sanctions against South Africa, since that government had not met certain conditions Congress has outlined in the law. This is in stark contrast to our recent policy toward Panama, where Reagan has harshly criticized President Noriega and applied swift and strong sanctions in an effort to oust him from power.

The essential elements of a Jackson administration policy would include exerting strong moral leadership at the highest level to let the apartheid rulers in South Africa know in no uncertain terms that the American people and the U.S. government will not stand by and allow 24 million black people to be held hostage by an undemocratic, racist, and repressive government which defines the value of human life and the possibility of opportunity solely on the basis of one's skin color. The time for tough action is long overdue.

As president, I would heed the call of Archbishop Tutu and the other religious and trade union leaders and organizations in South Africa and break diplomatic ties with apartheid and end U.S. trade with and corporate investment in the apartheid economy. Every investment dollar we put into South Africa and every dollar we help that government earn through foreign exchange helps the apartheid regime stay in power and remain intransigent. I would instruct the U.S. representative at the UN to vote for global, comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the UN charter within the Security Council. I would consult with our Western allies and ask them to join the U.S. in imposing such sanctions. This is consistent with the spirit of the policy provisions of the current sanctions law.

I would also have to seriously consider sending military assistance to the ANC and to the black-ruled states neighboring South Africa to help them defend themselves against the repressive grip of apartheid. Together, I believe these political options would provide vital assistance and strong encouragement to the forces opposing apartheid and help force the

"Our priority is to increase trade and self-sufficiency and decrease aid which prolongs dependency. Our aid program must be based on Africa's human needs and not on U.S. strategic and military needs."
government of South Africa to the bargaining table. The white minority rulers of South Africa could not ignore or withstand the kind of economic and political pressure that would be brought to bear with a strong collective U.S./Western response. I believe the democratic values of our nation and of the American people would support the Jackson policy toward South Africa.

**Africa Report:** Do you support economic sanctions as a means of pressuring the South African government, and do you think the current sanctions in force should be strengthened?

**Jackson:** Congress is now considering tougher sanctions legislation offered by Congressman Ronald Dellums which would end virtually all our trade with South Africa and require the more than 200 U.S. corporations who maintain direct and indirect investment there to withdraw. I support this measure as a necessary response to the very grim situation in South Africa which has worsened considerably in recent months. This sanctions policy would considerably strengthen our existing sanctions law, the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, which Congress passed over Reagan's veto. The current law was an important step in the right direction, but it contains only selective and limited sanctions provisions. There are also various loopholes in the law and several key provisions missing which allow business to continue as usual between the U.S. and South Africa in important areas.

The apartheid rulers of South Africa have demonstrated time and time again that they are unwilling, on their own, to end apartheid and negotiate for a new non-racial and democratic South Africa, based on one-person, one-vote. Non-violent funerals and peaceful protests are met with deadly police violence, bullets, murders, mass detentions, martial law, banning orders, the filing of thousands of young children. The black majority and its organizations and leadership continue to call for mandatory, comprehensive sanctions as one of the few remaining non-violent means of putting additional pressure on South Africa's white minority regime so that further bloodshed and violence can be avoided.

In my view, the recent actions of the South African government reveal a fundamental flaw in our current sanctions policy and that of the major Western powers: We have refused thus far to work to apply the maximum bilateral and collective diplomatic and economic pressure on that government which could force it to the bargaining table. If we are to be completely honest about what we have done thus far, as important as it has been, we must admit that it amounts to only a slap on the wrist. In other words, the punishment thus far has not fit the crime nor the reality of the current situation.

The Botha government does what it continues to do because it knows that it does not have to fear a strong U.S. and Western response. The lesson that we must draw from South Africa's latest crackdown is not that sanctions do not work. On the contrary, it shows that we have not raised the economic costs or political stakes high enough for the white apartheid rulers to seriously rethink their commitment to the preservation of apartheid or force them to negotiate. As Peter Zuze, president of the UN Council for Namibia has said, "Whites in South Africa have yet to feel the loneliness of isolation and the pain of solitude" as the price they must pay for keeping the evil system of apartheid intact.

The sanctions actions we have imposed thus far are relatively weak and therefore easily circumventable. The U.S. continues to trade with South Africa even though our imports from Pretoria have been reduced in key areas. We continue to export heavy machinery and computers. Our oil companies such as Mobil and Caltex are helping South Africa refine crude oil and are providing its military with strategic petroleum products. Oil is South Africa's Achilles heel. It produces none. Without it, its planes and helicopters could not attack the frontline states and its trucks could not patrol the townships in South Africa and Namibia.

The president has also violated the intent of the current sanctions law by allowing the importation of uranium hexafluoride from South Africa, a form of uranium not specifically cited in the law's ban on uranium imports. He also allowed South African uranium to be imported and processed for export to third countries. The Act called upon the president to engage in negotiations and convene an international conference with our allies to reach cooperative agreements to impose sanctions against South Africa. There have been no such negotiations and no international agreements have been reached because we have violated the law by doing nothing. On February 20, 1987, the U.S. representative to the UN Security Council vetoed a resolution calling for global implementation of the very sanctions passed by Congress. On at least two other occasions since October 1986, we have vetoed UN-proposed sanctions against South Africa.

In October of last year, pursuant to a requirement in the sanctions law, Reagan reported to Congress on the extent to which South Africa had made significant progress toward ending apartheid and establishing a non-racial democracy in the
The law says that if certain conditions were not met, the president should recommend additional sanctions. The law required a repeal of the state of emergency in South Africa and respect for the principle of equal justice under the law. The law called for the release of black trade unionists and all political prisoners. The law set as a condition for continued trade the right of the black majority to form political parties, express political opinions, and participate in the political process. The law called for South Africa to end its military and paramilitary actions aimed at its neighboring states.

The president has acknowledged that South Africa has made no progress, but he has reached the wrong conclusion. He said that our sanctions have only made matters worse and has chosen to disobey the law by refusing to recommend stronger sanctions. He has taken no action because he fundamentally opposes sanctions. Instead he has called for a period of "active and creative" diplomacy which means more of doing nothing. His inactive and pro-leadership has once again shamed our nation and kept us in bed with this racist regime. We need a stronger sanctions policy now! The president cannot undermine our already limited sanctions with lax enforcement, have our nation keep the rest of the world from adopting our own sanctions, continue doing business with South Africa, and argue at the same time that sanctions do not work.

But even the adoption of our limited sanctions has had some impact on South Africa. White business, academic, and church groups have been encouraged to open discussions with the ANC. Confidence among some whites has been shaken. The apartheid government, which arrogantly proclaims that it can ignore outside pressure, has been forced to allocate more resources to sanctions busting and anti-sanctions propaganda. Much of this reaction would never have occurred without U.S. sanctions and the threat of future stronger measures.

Africa Report: The Reagan administration provides covert military aid to Jonas Savimbi's Unita rebels in Angola, although it does not support the Renamo rebels in Mozambique. What changes in policy would you undertake toward Angola and Mozambique?

Jackson: Angola and Mozambique are currently bearing the brunt of South Africa's war of economic and military destabilization against the frontline states in southern Africa and therefore deserve special consideration in U.S. policy. In both instances, South Africa is militarily supporting bandit groups—Unita in Angola, Renamo in Mozambique—who are terrorizing the civilian population and destroying vital economic infrastructure.

During my visit to southern Africa in 1986, I personally witnessed the enormous human suffering generated by the conflict in both countries. There is widespread famine, malnutrition, food shortages, and massive physical destruction. In Mozambique, over 400,000 health facilities are no longer operating. Some 200,000 children have been orphaned and nearly 4 million people face severe food shortages. Thousands have died, mostly civilians and children.

In Angola, a similar situation prevails, where 600,000 people, again mostly women and children, have been maimed and crippled, mostly by anti-personnel mines planted by the Unita bandits. Between 1980-85, Unicef says that at least 100,000 deaths occurred through war-related famine and its effects. This large-scale human suffering and carnage must end. Our policy toward both nations and southern Africa can make a difference and help bring peace in the region.

In the case of Angola, I would, as president, first join the rest of the world and establish full diplomatic relations with Luanda. Our country and South Africa are the only two nations which do not recognize Angola as part of the community of nations. Second, I would end all U.S./CIA military assistance to Unita. Since 1986, the Reagan administration has provided some $30 million in covert military aid, including sophisticated Stinger missiles to Unita and its leader, Jonas Savimbi. Unita receives the bulk of its military support from South Africa and its forces have fought side-by-side with Pretoria's troops against Angolan army forces. Our aid to Savimbi puts us in a de facto military alliance with South Africa and makes us willing accomplices in its policy of destruction, terrorism, and death against the people of Angola. We have engaged in this despised marriage with Savimbi simply because he claims to be a strident anti-communist.

Third, I would engage in good faith negotiations and mediation efforts with the Angolans, Cubans, and South Africans to work out a peace settlement which would ultimately lead to a withdrawal of the thousands of Cuban troops there and an end to the massive South African troop presence. The Cubans first came to Angola in 1975 to help repel a South African invasion. They have since remained to help defend Angola against constant South African intervention and bombardment. President dos Santos made clear to me that the Cuban troops can leave once the South African threat no longer exists.

The recent round of negotiations to resolve the conflict, involving our government, have failed to produce a peace settlement because of the administration's continued support for Savimbi and refusal to pressure South Africa to withdraw from Angola, as well as relinquish its illegal control over neighboring Namibia. We cannot be viewed as a neutral and trusted
arbiter in the conflict because of our support for South African policy in Angola, Namibia, and the region.

We must support the African consensus on this issue, which opposes our misdirected policy toward Angola and military aid to Unita. Recently, a high-level delegation from the OAU visited the U.S. to meet with members of Congress and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker, about the escalating war in Angola and U.S. policy. They appealed to us to end our support for Savimbi which they say has impeded our role as a fair mediator in the conflict. Zambian Foreign Minister Luke Mwanasikina, a member of the delegation, said that conditions exist for the U.S. to move rapidly toward a southern African solution if we stop our aid to Unita. This most recent OAU appeal comes at a time when the administration is reportedly planning to request another $40 million in U.S. taxpayers money for Unite this year.

As president, I would expand upon the basic policy options I have outlined and provide a substantial amount of emergency humanitarian assistance and food aid to help the people and war victims in Angola. Moreover, within the framework of a normalized relationship with Luanda, we must help Angola rebuild its devastated economy and expand our existing significant commercial links and trade there. In 1986, investment by several U.S. corporations in Angola exceeded $500 million and Chevron plans $1 billion in new capital investments before 1990. The U.S. at present is Angola's largest trading partner. Despite the fact that we do not have normal relations with Luanda, the two-way annual trade between the U.S. and Angola has grown to over $1 billion since Keagan assumed office.

In Mozambique at present, the administration has pursued a somewhat more enlightened policy. We maintain full diplomatic relations with the government of President Joaquim Chissano. We have publicly denounced Renamo and thus far have refused to provide any aid to that group of bandits. The administration has also provided $75 million annually in emergency food aid as well. I would increase emergency food aid to Mozambique and provide additional emergency agriculture, health, and water infrastructure assistance as well.

Moreover, I would build upon the current policy by doing more to help Mozambique rebuild and expand its mixed economy and maintain the vital Keira corridor to the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, we should provide military training and assistance to help Mozambique defend itself against repeated Renamo/South African attacks. Our ally, Great Britain, already provides much training to Mozambican troops.

Since independence in 1975, Mozambique has faced drought, repeated military attacks from South Africa, and the economic and political destabilization wrought by the South African-backed Renamo forces. Despite these setbacks, the government of Mozambique remains committed to the economic development of the country and to a non-aligned political stance. In recent years, Mozambique has seriously worked to improve its relations with the U.S. and the West, and has signed agreements with the World Bank and the IMF. We must encourage these sincere efforts with a policy of stronger U.S. support.

Africa Report: What policy initiatives would you propose to break the long-standing deadlock on Namibia's independence?

Jackson: Namibia is often the forgotten child in the southern African conflict. Under South Africa's illegal occupation, the people of Namibia have been subjected to ruthless repression and untold suffering. Thousands of Namibians have been murdered, detained, and tortured. Northern Namibia, where over half of the population lives, resembles an armed camp under a dusk-to-dawn curfew. Thousands of Namibians have been forced to flee and live as refugees in Angola, Zambia, and other countries.

Namibia is a country richly endowed with natural resources such as diamonds, uranium, and other precious metals, and has one of the richest fishing grounds in the world. But South Africa's occupation and the development of an economy based on export and profit for international investors and multinational corporations—including U.S. ones—have left Namibia's black population among the poorest in Africa.

The Reagan administration's policy on Namibia, as it is for all of southern Africa, is based on the misguided and shortsighted premise that the principal threat to peace and U.S. interests in the region is communism and the Soviet Union, rather than the racist apartheid system. Ignoring the historical conditions which brought Cuban troops to Angola—the need to defend Angola's fledgling government from invasion by South African forces—the Reagan administration, with South Africa, has created the major stumbling block to the implementation of UN Resolution 435 and Namibian independence by linking Namibian independence to a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. This is an extraneous issue which has nothing to do with Namibian independence.

South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia long predates the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. We must not have the freedom of the Namibian people being held hostage by the issue of the removal of foreign troops from a sovereign country. We must categorically reject the Reagan policy of linkage regarding Namibia. As signatory to UN Resolution 435, adopted in 1978, the U.S. is on record calling for the with-
withdrawal of all combat troops from Namibia, free and fair elections under UN supervision, and a constitutional convention elected by universal franchise. This is stated U.S. policy.

A Jackson administration would take action to support this policy by pressing for the immediate implementation of Resolution 435 and the withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia. I would also support the call of the international community for mandatory, comprehensive sanctions against South Africa, because of its illegal occupation of Namibia.

Until Namibia is free. I believe our nation also has an obligation to assist the Namibian people in their efforts to prepare for the day when they will one day be the rulers of their country. To this end, we should appropriate more funds to the UN Institute for Namibia. The Institute, which depends on voluntary contributions from member-states, was established by the UN in 1976 in Lusaka, Zambia to help provide skills and leadership training to Namibians and serve as a research, information, and documentation center on Namibia. At present only $110,000 has been made available by the U.S. to the Institute for 1988.

Africa Report: What support would your administration give to the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) as it attempts to free its member-nations from economic dependence on South Africa?

Jackson: The effects of international sanctions against South Africa will be limited as long as South Africa can maintain its military and economic stranglehold over its black neighbors—the frontline states of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

President Reagan said in Chicago on August 2, 1986 that the fundamental difference between South Africa and Nicaragua is that the Sandinistas go beyond their borders and South Africa does not. This is simply ignorance or disinformation. The facts are that South Africa is more than a state, it is an evil empire. South Africa is an octopus with tentacles in all its neighboring states. South Africa’s destabilization has cost the region more than $10 billion and a cost in human lives that cannot be measured. This is South Africa’s “total strategy” policy, which aims at the total economic and political subjugation of southern Africa.

We must have a comprehensive policy for the region that meets the regionally defined needs of these countries. We must provide economic assistance to the frontline states. If we are to play a useful and progressive role in southern Africa, then we must help those in the region who are trying to help themselves. We must listen to the black southern Africans and respond to the priorities, programs, and policies of the southern Africans. The majority-ruled states of southern Africa have joined together in a dynamic regional organization, SADCC, the ideal mechanism through which the U.S. government can assist the southern African countries in their struggle to achieve economic progress and to reduce their dependence on South Africa.

The U.S. and our allies should make a major development assistance commitment to the SADCC states. Such economic assistance must include a substantial increase in multilateral aid that emphasizes SADCC’s priorities. These include:

- Expanding trade and self-sufficiency in agriculture to reduce foreign debts, stabilize deteriorating environments, and reduce poverty and malnutrition in the region.
- Rehabilitation and reconstruction of the non-South African transportation routes in the region, particularly the Beira Corridor and the port of Maputo in southern Mozambique.
- Education and training of southern Africans for all levels of technical, scientific, managerial, and administrative work.
- Coordination of regional industrialization policies to foster urgently needed job creation and the production of industrial goods currently being imported from South Africa and overseas.
- Improvement of independent regional communication systems.

Last year, Congress approved a mere $50 million in aid to SADCC for one year only. U.S. funding levels to SADCC are deplorable when you compare them to what other Western countries (with much smaller economies!) give. Rep. Hill Gray’s legislation, calling for $700 million over a five-year period, was aimed at meeting the minimum aid request made by representatives of SADCC. That measure was rejected by Congress at a time when development and economic assistance to Africa in general has been slashed overall.

As president, I would—as part of a major overhaul of our nation’s military and economic aid commitment and priorities—make a major commitment to help the SADCC nations help themselves by increasing our financial assistance to these struggling nations.

It is foolhardy to talk about economic aid without realizing the external and military context in which that aid is to be utilized. The frontline states must be provided with military security to defend themselves against South African invasion and terrorism. I must reiterate that the U.S. must stop its financial and military support of the South African-backed Unita forces in Angola and demand that South Africa withdraw its troops from Angola. (Our failure to provide non-lethal support to Mozambique in its right against the South African-backed Renamo forces helps prolong a devastating war that is the primary cause of hunger in southern Africa.

Our American agenda with southern Africa is not an African-American agenda alone, although African-Americans have strong ties to the continent. It is not simply a Democratic agenda, although many Democrats are deeply committed to a policy of international economic justice and human rights. It is an “American” agenda—one which is in our national interest and one which deserves the support of all our citizens. We can no longer afford to ignore the needs of 550 million Africans in favor of a few million Afrikaners.

There must be a summit between South Africa’s black neighbors—the frontline states—and the U.S. and the European community. Reagan has refused such a meeting between the southern African leaders and the U.S. This is unfortunate, since we all share in the responsibility to assist the millions of people in southern Africa to achieve a full measure of prosperity and independence. We need a coordinated policy to bring about a merger of the economic and political forces in the region. We need to help the frontline states lessen their economic dependence on South Africa and defend themselves against South Africa’s military aggression.
In this *Africa Report* special report, we focus on Renamo's war against the Mozambican people—one which is dimming any prospects for the nation's economic recovery. Our correspondent reports from the camps of the conflict's *deslocados* and talks to U.S. Ambassador Melissa Wells. We also provide excerpts from the State Department's survey of Mozambique's refugees, which offers damning evidence on Renamo's conduct of the war.

**BY ANDREW MELDRUM**

The train from Maputo is crowded and tense, but the mood of the passengers is somehow jovial as the battered cars rattle along the tracks. A mother suckling an infant grimaces as the dilapidated train jolts to a halt and a crowd of young men pushes to get off, stepping over two old women sitting in the aisles.

After several minutes, the train begins its bumpy journey south toward the South African border 70 miles away as vendors, freshly stocked from Maputo's plentiful market, sell fried fish, biscuits, and bananas in the packed cars. Passengers watch silently as the train rolls by the burned-out and bullet-pocked hulk of a railway car that was attacked by Mozambique's anti-government Renamo rebels.

A trip on a Mozambican train is lively, colorful, and dangerous, as Renamo has targeted the railways, in addition to other forms of transport, for its deadly ambushes. "I know some trains are attacked by the *bandidos* (Portuguese for bandits)

Andrew Meldrum, an American journalist who has been based in Zimbabwe for six years, reports on southern Africa for *The Guardian of London, Agence France-Presse, and the Voice of America.*
Young man in Maromeu Hospital whose leg was blown off by a Renamo mine: "In the past year, hundreds of people have been killed in attacks on convoys of buses and cars bandits, what Mozambicans call Renamo), but we need to visit family," said a woman passenger on the train to Matola-Gare, about 25 miles south of Maputo.

Just a week after that train made its journey, a train traveling toward Maputo along the same line was derailed by a Renamo mine and attacked by a rebel band. Ten passengers were killed and 23 other injured as the rebels ransacked the cars, robbing a group of Mozambican miners returning from lucrative work in South Africa.

The scene on the train is indicative of Mozambique's current situation in more ways than one. The country, like the railway, is plagued by violent and seemingly unending sprees of Renamo attacks. But as expressed by the passengers, life still manages to go on. The cities, especially, are more vibrant and visibly affluent than they have been for years, largely thanks to the economic restructuring program designed by the IMF.

Mozambique's cities—Maputo, Beira, Quelimane, Tete, and Nampula—are the main areas where the government has been able to assure security and where economic restructuring has had an effect. But Mozambique's vast rural areas, where 85 percent of the 14.7 million population lives, are trapped in a nightmare of chaotic violence that has made nearly 6 million people—more than one-third of the entire population—unable to feed themselves in the fertile country. Even when food aid is available, Renamo sabotage of road and rail transport prevents deliveries to the remote regions where it is needed.

It is to guard transport routes that about 8,000 Zimbabwean army troops are deployed in central Mozambique—to keep open landlocked Zimbabwe's 180-mile road, rail, and oil-pipeline link to Beira port. In April, Zimbabwean troops became engaged in battles to safeguard the 370-mile railway line from Zimbabwe to Maputo port. The rehabilitation of that rebel-sabotaged railway line has been funded by a £14 million British grant.

As the war has ripped Mozambique's cities from their tropical hinterland, the state of sustained anarchy in the countryside has exposed Renamo for what it is: a surrogate force for South Africa that has no political program except to make the country so troubled and disrupted that it cannot be an independent beacon for South Africa's black majority.

"A surrogate force for South Africa, Renamo has no political program except to make the country so troubled and disrupted that it cannot be an independent beacon for South Africa's black majority."

deaths of more than 400 civilians between August and January this year. As a result, many Maputo residents won't consider traveling more than 12 miles outside the city.

The capital of the war-torn country is surprisingly bustling and active, much more lively than it was just a few years ago. Shop windows that were once empty now boast brightly colored fabrics, dresses, shoes, and batteries. But while the IMF economic restructuring program has breathed new life into Maputo and other Mozambican cities, the ongoing war makes it questionable whether this economic success can be maintained.

"I haven't been to this restaurant since I was a teen-ager," said a Mozambican woman enjoying fresh prawns piquantly spiced with the local piri-piri (chili) sauce. "We used to hang out here, but it has been closed for at least 10 years, maybe longer." Where a few years ago, a visitor to Maputo could find only meager meals at the main international hotel, the Polana, now restaurants and cafes, as well as shops, have reopened throughout the city. This has been in response to the incentives offered in the government's wide-ranging Program for Economic Rehabilitation (popularly known as PRE, its Portuguese acronym).

The first phase of the program began
in January 1987 and has seen three devaluations of the Mozambican currency from 40 meticais to the U.S. dollar to the current 450 meticais to the dollar. The restructuring also includes cut-backs in government spending and layoffs of 14 percent of the government’s workforce. Most importantly, the program completely overhauled Mozambique’s price, wage, tax, and credit systems.

“Very broadly, the economic restructuring has set about dismantling the centralized economic machinery of a socialist state and is replacing it with a free market economy,” said a Western economist in Maputo. So far, it has been very successful. But many goods, such as clothes, are out of reach for the average consumer. A secondary school teacher earns about 6,000 meticais per month, so the 2,800 meticais price-tag for a pair of plastic sandals is quite daunting.

The decontrol and subsequent rise in prices has stimulated production of food by the peasants so that the output of private family farms has risen dramatically to 34 tons, an amount not attained since Mozambique became independent from Portugal in 1975. Certainly the positive effects can be seen at the city’s hectic open-air market where tomatoes, oranges, papayas, and avocados are abundant and at relatively affordable prices. There is a brisk trade in potatoes, at 450 meticais per kilo. The more affluent, generally expatriate shoppers choose fresh prawns, squid, and crabs.

Diplomats and expatriates working in Maputo live very well, getting fresh foods at the market, and buying the imported items they need in U.S. dollars at the “Loja Franca” (the currency store). But the sudden and somewhat superficial wealth of Mozambique’s urban areas contrasts dramatically with the utter devastation and wretchedness of the country’s war-ravaged rural areas. Although President Joaquim Chissano’s government has managed to maintain the country’s urban areas, they are cut off from the rest of the country, where an estimated 5.9 million people are either displaced by the war or so badly affected that they cannot continue their subsistence farming.

The first phase of the economic program has not been able to reach the rural areas where daily life has been disrupted and the lack of transport prevents delivery of goods to or from the market. It is hard to foresee continued increases in agricultural production when so many Mozambicans cannot carry out the most basic subsistence farming because of continual raids by Renamo gangs. Similarly, a continuation of the country’s 18 percent increase in industrial production in 1987 is not likely when Renamo keeps up effective sabotage of factories, power supplies, and transport routes.

The second phase of economic reform is expected to be more controversial, as it should make life much more expensive for the average urban worker. Further devaluations and increased prices and rents are expected. In April, the government substantially reduced subsidies on basic foods, causing prices to soar. The official price in the cities for the staple foods of rice and maize meal went up 577 percent and 286 percent respectively. Maize meal went up from 37.5 meticais per kilo to 145 meticais. The price of sugar increased by 428 percent to 264 meticais per kilogram. Bread, soap, and cooking oil also went up.

The reduction of subsidies and the resultant price rises were intended to spur peasants to produce more food, according to Labor Minister Auiar Mazula, who announced the measures. To make up for the price rises, the government also announced wage increases, raising the minimum wage from 7,5(K) meticais (about $16.66) per month to 12.8(K) ($28.40 per month).

“The second phase could bring real hardships to the city worker, not to mention the many who are unemployed or just eking by,” said a Mozambican railway executive. "If the IMF program is not implemented carefully and flexibly, it could create urban unrest, which the government can hardly afford at this point. What we really need is an end to the war to bring this country back to economic health.”

That statement becomes particularly evident in a visit to Zambézia and Sofala provinces in central Mozambique, which have been especially badly hit by rebel violence in recent years. In Dondo, about 20 miles outside the central city of Beira, there are several camps of displaced people, or deslocados as they are called in Portuguese.

Mostura Alfondega and her six children live at one of those camps. She and her family spent two months hiking through Mozambique’s thick tropical bush to find a safe place to settle. Speaking through an interpreter, Alfondega said her family had lived for two years in an area of rural Inhambinga Province...
which was controlled by Renamo. She described a grim life of forced labor and insufficient food, saying she would be whipped if Renamo members thought she had not carried enough water or firewood.

“They took all our clothes so we only wore sacks. When we grew food, they took it all so we had none.” she said. Her husband was taken to fight with Renamo and her 14-year-old daughter was taken “to be a girlfriend.” she said sadly. “We could not continue there so we ran away into the bush,” she said.

Hers is just one of the thousands of such stories of Mozambicans uprooted by the bitter war. According to UN figures, there are 1.1 million such displaced Mozambicans, refugees in their own country. Another 700,000 Mozambicans have taken refuge in neighboring countries. Tiny Malawi has nearly 500,000, with Zimbabwe, Zambia, Swaziland, and South Africa sharing the rest.

Alfondega is living in a camp of about 4,500 people who have all fled from her rural Cheringoma district. Many of the refugees arrived naked and suffering from severe malnutrition. They have been clothed in donations from Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Western Europe, and North America, resulting in an incongruous mix of frilly party dresses, somber woolen winter coats, and flamboyant disco shirts.

Alfondega's children play with sticks with a group of other youngsters, some of whom show signs of malnutrition. "All these people have histories," said Cheringoma district administrator Everisto Tomo, who also fled the area to the new camp. "The government has provided us with emergency food and now with seeds. Each family has a machamba (a small garden plot). This year we are building a school for 300 children and we hope to eventually get a health clinic," said the enthusiastic Tomo.

The sandy soil at Dondo is not very good for the maize, cassava, and beans that families grow. But Alfondega said she is happy to be able to till the land in peace. The people of her camp have organized their own militia to guard against any rebel attacks. Within a radius of 20 miles, there are several such camps of displaced people. Each camp is attempting to become self-sufficient, but it is easy to see the vast amounts of government and international assistance needed to keep these displaced people from the brink of famine.

Deeper into central Mozambique is Maromeu, on the banks of the Zambezi River. Maromeu's huge 18,000-hectare sugar plantation and refinery used to produce nearly half of Mozambique's total sugar output until it was sabotaged by Renamo in January 1986. The fields were systematically burned and it will take three years of cultivation to return them to cane production. The large turbines at the refining factory were blown up.

Renamo targets such large-scale economic projects for sabotage. The giant Cahora Bassa dam and hydroelectric plant is operating at less than one percent of its capacity because Renamo has blown up some 500 power pylons. The Moatize coal mining complex used to produce all the coal Mozambique needed as well providing significant exports. Renamo sabotage has essentially closed down the mine, which employed a workforce of 2,500.

Renamo has also methodically destroyed Mozambique's social infrastructure. According to Prakash Ratilal, coordinator of Mozambique National Energy Committee, 1,800 schools have been destroyed by Renamo and hundreds of teachers killed, causing more than 300,000 children to do without school. Similarly, 720 health centers

"While the IMF economic restructuring program has breathed new life into Mozambican cities, the ongoing war makes it questionable whether this economic success can be maintained."
have been destroyed. The country's commercial network has also suffered, as the rebels have destroyed 900 stores, representing one-third of Mozambique's total, according to Katial. An international donors' conference was to be held in Maputo April 26 and 27 to raise funds, not only for food supplies, but also to help fund the rehabilitation of the ruined infrastructure.

Surprisingly, with all its successes in destroying targets throughout the country and in restricting government activities in large areas, Renamo has not established any sort of alternative administration for the benefit of the people. "This war is one of the most brutal anywhere, the massive scale of misery suffered by civilians is unprecedented. Not even Uganda's killings have been as widespread as this," said a Western diplomat in Maputo. "We see no signs that Renamo tries to win over support from the population. This leads us to conclude that Renamo, at the bidding of its South African backers, is just ruining whatever it can in Mozambique, with no attempt to take it over."

South Africa has repeatedly denied that it has backed Renamo since it signed the 1984 Nkomati non-aggression pact with Mozambique. But in 1986, papers captured by Zimbabwean troops showed continuing South African training and support for Renamo. Most recently, Renamo's European spokesman, Paulo Oliveira, defected to Maputo in March, dramatically recounting several ways that South Africa continues to back Renamo. Oliveira said he eventually became disillusioned and disgusted with "the level of terror carried out by Renamo as dictated by South Africa."

Perhaps most tragically of all for Mozambique, there does not appear to be any resolution in sight to the violence. "Negotiations don't appear to be a possibility, because Renamo does not appear to have any leadership for that and South Africa has already proved through the Nkomati pact that it cannot be trusted," said a UN official. "It seems the only hope of ending Mozambique's suffering is for the end of South Africa's apartheid system and its regional policy of destabilization."

When Melissa Wells drives up to the Lhanqueni Center, the 35 boys playing in the yard spontaneously stand to attention and say "Bon Dia, Senora." Wells, the U.S. ambassador to Mozambique, has taken a special interest in the center for boys aged 7 to 15 who were taken by Renamo and trained with weapons. Many of them were forced to kill and all of them witnessed murders and mutilations—cutting off of lips, noses, ears—that have become Renamo's gruesome hallmark. These boys escaped from Renamo and the government has established the center to ease them back into normal life.

Wells often visits the center, talking and joking with the boys. She has also obtained funding for repairs of the centers windows and lavatories. Outgoing and fluent in Portuguese, it is easy to see why she is popular in Maputo, highlighting the dramatically improved U.S.-Mozambican relations.

The American ambassador speaks highly of President Joaquim Chissano's government and seriously questions Renamo's tactics. Wells cites the Mozambican government's economic restructuring efforts and a more open political climate as important reasons for the warmer, more friendly relations. Such a diplomatic success on the tightrope between the Reagan administration and an avowedly Marxist government was probably just what Senator Jesse Helms feared when he held up Wells' confirmation for an unprecedented 11 months. During that period, Wells said she read up on all matters regarding Mozambique, particularly the literature from Renamo's Washington office.

"Since coming to Mozambique, I've been trying to figure out how the devastation I've seen in the countryside can possibly achieve those [Renamo's] objectives," said Wells, referring to her extensive travels in nine of Mozambique's 10 provinces. "I'm very troubled because in my travels I make a point to check out schools, hospitals, and water supplies. These are probably the most sensitive social infrastructure points and in most of the villages I have visited, they have been targeted along with looting and abductions of the local population," said Wells, who has also met people mutilated by Renamo. "If this is a particular technique of war, then I think it's pretty awful."

Wells said she believes South Africa has continued its support to Renamo. "We know there was a very open relationship between South Africa and Renamo and that's why the Nkomati Accord was signed in 1984, there were no bones about it," said Wells. Following the defection of Renamo official Paulo Oliveira and his revelations of continuing South African support to the rebels, Wells said, "Generally his description of continuing connections between South Africa and Renamo are consistent with our information of a continuing pattern of South African contact with and support for Renamo."

Wells has no easy answers when asked what would end Mozambique's bitter war. She suggests that the government's position has been strengthened by many pragmatic steps, including the economic reforms, improved relations with the Catholic and other Christian churches, and most importantly, an amnesty offer to all Renamo rebels who give themselves up.

The ambassador said the Mozambican military could be strengthened with Western aid. The U.S. Congress has prohibited any American military assistance to Mozambique, but Wells said "other countries are carrying their weight in this. Western countries, the British, the Portuguese, and a number of other NATO allies are looking into this."

Summing up U.S. relations with Mozambique, Wells said American policy was to "continue to support it on the course it has chosen for itself." She added: "As we see that it is becoming more truly non-aligned in terms of developing broader contacts with the Western countries. . .We are supporting the government in its search for peace. Our policy has been not to have official contacts with Renamo and it continues to be that."

—A.M.
A CATALOGUK OF ATROCITIES

As many as 100,000 Mozambican civilians may have been murdered by South African-backed Mozambique National Resistance Movement (Renamo) rebels over the last two years, according to a detailed U.S. State Department document published in April. The survey, representing the first systematic attempt to substantiate widespread allegations of Renamo atrocities, is based on interviews with nearly 200 refugees in Mozambique and neighboring countries conducted by Robert Gersony, an independent consultant for the department's Bureau for Refugee Programs. Below we reproduce extracts of the report:

Quantification of Renamo Conduct
The great majority of the total of 196 interviewed refugees whose migration was caused by conflict violence cited Renamo actions as the reason for their flight. Roughly 40 percent reported personally witnessing the murder of civilians principally by Renamo combatants and Renamo police in the absence of resistance or defense. The 169 refugees who arrived at their current locations in 1987-1988 reportedly roughly 600 such murders. The refugees provided eyewitness or other credible accounts about these killings which included shooting executions, knife/axe/bayonet killings, burning alive, beating to death, forced asphyxiation, forced starvation, forced drownings, and random shooting at civilians in villages during attacks.

The results in the other abuse categories were similar. Nearly 40 percent of the refugees had direct knowledge of the imposition by Renamo of forced portering on the civilian population; about 20 percent had themselves served as porters. Over 70 percent of those who had served as porters witnessed severe beatings of porters who could not keep up, who stumbled, or who dropped their loads. About 60 percent of those who served as porters reported that they eyewitnessed or had credible reports of captive porters who were beaten to death or executed along the route for the same reasons.

Over 15 percent of the refugees reported patterns of systematic rape of civilian women by Renamo combatants. One rape complaint against government soldiers was reported. About one-third of those reporting house burnings saw their own houses burned. No complaints of house burning were reported against government soldiers.

Nearly 40 percent of the refugees complained about abduction of civilians, a pattern most typical of the nominal "destruction areas." Of these, over a quarter had themselves been victims of abduction. 94 percent of these identified Renamo combatants as the abductors; the remainder were split between government soldiers and unknown parties.

Looting and forced contribution of resources was reported by nearly 60 percent of the refugees. Of these, some 45 percent reported that beatings were used when necessary to extract resources. 93 percent of the looters were identified as Renamo combatants, 6 percent as government soldiers, 1 percent as unknown parties. Mutilations, reported by 5 percent of the refugees, were all attributed to Renamo combatants.

For the 1987-1988 arrivals, discounting non-conflict migrants, 91 percent of the refugees’ reports were categorized by the author as “very negative” toward Renamo; 5 percent as “negative”; 1 percent as “positive.” Three percent offered no report and no complaints.

Summary of Findings
From 48 districts in northern, central, and southern Mozambique, in 25 refugee camps in five countries separated by as many as 1,500 miles, nearly 200 Mozambican refugee accounts of their experiences are strikingly similar. If that sample is reasonably representative, their accounts, corroborated in large measure by independent experience of some religious and relief assistance workers, compel certain unavoidable findings.

First, the level of violence reported to be conducted by Renamo against the civilian population of rural Mozambique is extraordinarily high. Roughly 170 refugees, each representing one family, who arrived in 1987/88, collectively reported about 600 murders by Renamo of unarmed civilians, in the absence of resistance or defense. If the refugee reports are generally accurate and the sample reasonably representative, it is conservatively estimated that 100,000 civilians may have been murdered by Renamo in this manner.

The same 170 refugees report many hundreds of cases of systematic forced portering, beatings, rape, looting, burning of villages, abductions, and mutilations. These patterns of systematic abuse represent many hundreds, if not thousands, of individual instances reported by this small sample. Conservative projections based on this data would yield extremely high levels of abuse.

That the accounts are so strikingly similar by refugees who have fled from northern, central, and southern Mozambique suggests that the violence is systematic and coordinated and not a series of spontaneous, isolated incidents by undisciplined combatants.

Second, the relationship between Renamo and the civilian population, according to the refugee accounts, revolves almost exclusively around a harsh extraction of labor and food. If these reports are accurate, it appears that the only reciprocity provided by Renamo for the efforts of the civilians is the possibility of remaining alive. There are virtually no reports of attempts to win the loyalty—or even the neutrality—of the villagers. The refugees report virtually no effort by Renamo to explain to the civilians the purpose of the insurgency, its proposed program, or its aspirations. If there is a significant sector of the population which is sympathetic to this organization, it was not reflected in the refugee accounts. LJ
"The long-term impact of the Harare gathering rests with how the artists, writers, and intellectuals choose to follow it up."

Largely as a result of this symposium and a subsequent musical rally in which local artists gave freely of their talents, Senegal presented a resolution at the OAU heads of state summit in July 1987 that 1988 be declared the "Year for the Protection, Survival, and Development of the African Child." The resolution passed unanimously.

While the children of the frontline fall under this initiative, Unicef has long recognized their needs as unique and requiring far more attention than they have so far been accorded. The hard and chilling facts are contained in a little red and black book, "Children on the Frontline," released by Unicef last year. "The impact of drought on Africa has been vividly brought home in literally thousands of reports," the book starts. "But in southern Africa, the impact of war and apartheid has often been greater than that of drought, and appears to be intensifying as drought recedes."

All told, says the report, South African destabilization cost the nine Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) countries $25-28 billion between 1980 and 1986. By the end of 1985—to cite some more figures—25 percent of the primary health facilities in Mozambique had been destroyed and 40 percent of the primary schools had been destroyed or abandoned. Figures for Angola were incomplete, but rose even higher.

Meanwhile, the report estimates that in 1986 alone, 140,000 children died of destabilization-related causes in Angola and Mozambique. This meant that every four minutes, a small Angolan or Mozambican child was lost who would otherwise have lived. And as the conference learned while it listened to children from these two countries speak, those who live carry deep physical and psychological wounds.

Could the artists portray this suffering? That is the challenge that Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe put forward when he addressed the second Unicef symposium in Africa, organized under the patronage of the first lady, Sally Mugabe.

"Political jargon," said the President, "will not do it. Scientific precision alone will not do it. Philosophical discourse will not do it. And certainly charity has not done it, even though we have received some of this. We should no longer be content to see lawyers sitting in their own specialist conferences drafting resolutions or analyzing the laws of a fascist regime. We should no longer watch or listen to pediatricians cataloguing the horrors of child mortality in specialist journals that are unreadable to everyone else. These efforts, though well-intentioned, no longer suffice if they ever did. What is now required is action."

Still dressed in black and the most forceful adult voice for the children on the frontline, Graca Machel, widow of the late Mozambican President Samora Machel, outlined some of the directions action might take. Her audience ranged from writers like Kenya's Ngugi wa Thiong'o, critics like South Africa's exiled Lewis Nkosi, intellectuals like Ali Mazrui, musicians including King Sounds, Maxi Priest, Manu Dibango, and a host more, as well as other "influential people" like Lisbet Palme (wife of the late Swedish Prime Minister, Olof Palme), Jean Young, (wife of Andrew Young), and Matilda Cuomo (wife of the New York state governor and co-chair of the New York state task force on child abuse and neglect).

First, Machel pointed out, the problems in the frontline states could not be de-linked from apartheid whose eradication had to remain the central focus. Second, she said, solidarity is already being practiced within the frontline states. In Mozambique, for example, 220,000 orphans have been adopted by hard-pressed rural families. Zimbabwe and Tanzania both have troops stationed in Mozambique. "We feel," Machel said, "that we have a moral right to ask for..."
solidarity, because we are already practicing it ourselves."

"What we need," she added, "is to be able to walk by ourselves. Of course we need food, of course we need clothing, but then we'll eat today and tomorrow we'll be in the same situation—we'll come to ask for more food. What we much more need are instruments: tools of how to produce by ourselves, how to educate our children. We want to walk by our own feet, not depending on asking and begging all the time." To the artists she said simply, "Use your talent to tell the truth. We are not asking for more."

Taking up this theme, Ngugi wa Thiong'o told his colleagues that as part of the image-making process, they could either "draw pictures of the world in harmony with the needs of the forces of human destruction, or in harmony with the forces of resistance and survival."

Harry Belafonte (left) with Archbishop Tutu at the Children of the Frontline Music Festival: "We as a collective are beginning to understand that we are not impotent. We are perhaps one of the most powerful forces on earth"
The Children's Testimony

In increasing numbers, southern Africa's children are the innocent victims of the region's bloody conflicts, jeopardizing any chance for a normal and healthy future.

Following Unicef's recent symposium in Harare, artists and intellectuals have pledged to focus new attention on their plight in an alliance for child survival and development.

BY COLLEEN LOWE MORNA

If any of the writers or musicians who attended the Harare symposium on children in the frontline states initially entertained this view, it was effectively altered after the first day of the meeting, when the children themselves gave their testimony.

Fernando, for example, is a Mozambican youth who at the age of 16 had killed four people, plundered, and destroyed. Two years ago, he explained to the delegates, he and other villagers were captured by the South African-backed Mozambique National Resistance Movement, known by its Portuguese acronym, Kenamo. Together with other children, he underwent forced military training. "They gave me a grenade, an AK rifle, and a pistol," he told the conference. "We went to villages and killed cows."

Bigger things were in store. Fernando was among those who laid the dastardly ambush in which 278 civilians were killed 48 miles north of Maputo last October. He killed four people before giving himself up to the Mozambican government, which has placed the youth in a rehabilitation camp.

Twelve-year-old Saziwa comes from northeast Zimbabwe, close to the border with Mozambique. Late last year, she watched a neighboring family being hacked to death by Renamo rebels who later ransacked the rest of the village, stealing what clothes and property they could find. The nightmare haunts her young mind.

Antonio Calengu, 15, comes from Angola. Four years ago, he watched South African and U.S.-backed Unita rebels shoot his parents in cold blood. As he fled screaming, the youth was shot in the leg. Days later, when Angolan government forces found him half-dead in the bush, his leg had to be amputated.

Little Patricio from Mozambique tells a similarly gruesome story. He lost both arms and watched six of his friends die, when a landmine exploded on their way back from school. "Children are suffering," he told the 140 delegates who sat numbly in their chairs, fighting back tears. "I will be glad if you help end the war of apartheid which is giving the bandits food and arms in Angola and Mozambique."

For a whole week, this simple plea permeated the Harare International Conference Center where writers, intellectuals, and influential people from across the globe—but especially Africa—had gathered to probe their role in the survival and development of children in the frontline states.

The conference climaxed in a marathon, 12-hour "Rocking Down South" concert. Though neither on the same scale—nor likely to be the same commercial success—as Bob Geldof's Band Aid, the concert was the first major event of its type held in Africa, marking the first collective statement by African

On the Frontline

"The 12-hour 'Rocking Down South' concert was the first major event of its type held in the first collective statement by African artists and those from the black diaspora on the plight of children in this sub-region."

Colleen Lowe Morna is a Zimbabwean freelance journalist based in Harare.
What the Celebrities Had to Say

**Orchestra Marrabenta:** What can I say when in my country [Mozambique], every four minutes one child dies. Let's fly together, let's give our children a chance.

**King Sounds:** Music is the only international language that we have got. Let's exploit it to feed the children of the world.

**Maxi Priest:** I'm proud to be here, to be able to play a part in this one love organization.

**Hugh Masekela:** It's amazing what a few artists put together can pull together as far as world influence in concerned.

**Manu Dibango:** If we Africans don't believe in Africa, who will believe in Africa?

**Youssou N'Dour:** When a plane crashes, that draws so much attention worldwide. Yet each day, more children are dying in this region than are killed in one plane crash. When I think of this, I cannot help but be committed to this cause.

**Harry Belafonte:** The symposium is to test our ability and intelligence as intellectuals and artists to design and implement a project that will forcefully and definitively change not only the plight of our children on this continent, but the way in which we artists use ourselves individually and collectively in the service of humanity.

**Ali Mazrui:** In Africa, there are no illegitimate children—there are only illegitimate parents from time to time.

**Lewis Nkosi:** We are not just victims of history, but creators of values, with something to defend.

**Ngugi wa Thiong'o:** Within our field as artists, writers, and intellectuals, let our pens, brushes, and voices articulate the dreams of all the children of southern Africa for a world in which their survival and development is ensured.

Billed as Africa's own Band Aid, Harare's "Rocking Down South" concert may have failed to live up to original expectations. For one thing, as Harry Belafonte explained at a press conference mid-week, the symposium (though postponed from November) had been fateful timed to coincide with the Grammy awards. While it is not clear who might have attended that did not, the names of Sade, Stevie Wonder, and even Michael Jackson had been mentioned in the weeks leading up to the event.

To add insult to injury, on the appointed day, a week of perfect sunshine gave way to gloom and drizzle, enough to keep most Hararians—spoiled by this city's near perfect climate—indoors. Against these negatives, however, must be counted the fact that a state of the art performance, involving the importation of 42 tons of sound, lighting, and laser equipment, took place at all on South Africa's doorstep.

By mid-afternoon, as the rain began to let up, a sizeable crowd had gathered in the new 60,000-seat sports stadium. Following a last-minute announcement on the radio that children could come in free, crowds of youngsters gathered on the turf, providing the stuff that cameras badly needed for the video due to be released in the next few months and expected to be the major money spinner out of the whole event.

With the crowd warming up, Harry Belafonte—doyen of the musicians present—made his grand entry on stage, unexpectedly accompanied by South African Nobel laureate, Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Soon Belafonte had the crowds swaying to the immortal "Kingston Town," as—to the delight of all—the children of the frontline danced in a spontaneously formed ring. This really was what it was all about.

As day gave way to dusk, the beat picked up with South Africa's Johnny Clegg, P.J. Powers, Brenda Fasie, Hugh Masekela, and Miriam Makeba taking the stage in turn. Senegalese "m'balax" king Youssou N'Dour introduced a West African beat, ably followed by an old-time favorite, Cameroon's Manu Dibango. Stealing much of the stage show were Zimbabwe's own Bhundu Boys who have taken Europe by storm and were recently voted London _Time Out_ magazine as Britain's best live band of 1987.

The evening ended with the reggae sounds of London's Maxi Priest and Jamaica's King Sounds. At the close of it all—somewhere near 2 in the morning—artists and singers joined together in singing "We are the World."

Were it to happen all over again, there are no doubt some things the organizers would do differently. By the admission of the first lady, who chaired the Zimbabwe Committee on Child Survival and Development in the Frontline States, which was tasked with coordinating this mammoth event, the group comprised amateurs whose main strength lay in their enthusiasm.

No doubt the concert could have been timed differently, and notices sent out much earlier to ensure a broader participation. Greater effort could also have been made to involve journalists who—though a crucial subsector of the "communicators" that Unicef is trying to reach—were relegated to the usual status of outsiders waiting for some event to break.

The singers similarly had very little to do with the discussions and lacked cohesion, which perhaps accounted for the fact that the concert ended with a borrowed tune, rather than with a new and innovative "We are the frontline states." A catchy new hit would no doubt have helped to establish the concert more broadly, more immediately.

But the long-term impact of the Harare gathering rests with how the artists, writers, and intellectuals—individually or in groups—choose to follow it up. The words of anti-apartheid activist Allan Boesak will continue to ring in the minds of many.

He told the conference: "Our children deserve more than our coming together and sitting at a conference. Our children deserve that we make sure that they do not inherit something worse than we now have to give."

_AFRICA REPORT_ • May-June 1988
Angola

The Military Stalemate

As diplomatic efforts to resolve the war in Angola heat up, South Africa—not Unita—has become a main actor in the conflict and its ultimate resolution. Our correspondent reports from the battlefield on South Africa's latest military incursions in a war which continues to hold Angola's considerable economic potential to ransom.

BY KARL MAIER

FAPLA soldier: "UN officials and Western diplomats estimate that over 50 percent of all government spending goes to the war effort"
Peace is not about to break out in Angola. Diplomatic efforts led by the U.S. to negotiate a settlement in the vast southwest African nation have been pushed aside by a new South African invasion. While U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker was sparking a whirlwind of diplomatic activity aimed at securing the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Angola, the South African army was besieging the small, but strategic town of Cuito Cuanavale and was reportedly sending troops further north to the Benguela railway.

"South Africa's message in Cuito Cuanavale is clear," said one Western diplomat. "Everybody can forget about any kind of deal in Angola until Pretoria says so." South Africa's current intervention is the biggest since it tried to capture the capital, Luanda, on the eve of independence from Portugal in November 1975 to prevent the MPLA from establishing a government in the impoverished nation of 8 million people.

Over the ensuing years, repeated South African incursions and guerrilla attacks launched by the U.S.-backed Unita have destroyed much of the country's huge economic potential. Famine threatens nearly 500,000 peasants displaced by the war, and Unita landmines in the countryside have maimed over 20,000 people.

Since last December, the South African Defence Force (SADF), backed by units of Jonas Savimbi's Unita rebel movement, has pounded Cuito Cuanavale with thousands of rounds of 155-mm shells fired by mobile G-5 and G-6 mobile artillery guns. When the first group of foreign journalists to visit the Cuito Cuanavale war zone arrived in late February, young Angolan soldiers were moving warily across the swift Cuito river in the southeastern province of Cuando Cubango as eerie whooshing sounds announced the arrival of a barrage of South African shells. Their impact sent up clouds of dust and smoke less than 1,000 yards away. "The artillery was very heavy this morning," said Angolan army Maj. Armindo Morreira. "Sometimes the bombardments last two or three hours."

In the history of military clashes in Africa, the battle for Cuito Cuanavale was one of the biggest in terms of troops and firepower. The South African-led force of 8,000 deployed Mirage ground attack jets, AML-90 armoured cars, heavy artillery, and Scorpion tanks. Defending the town were an estimated 10,000 FAPLA troops, backed by thousands of Cuban soldiers, air-defense units, and logistics specialists who reached the town in mid-January. Angolan and Cuban pilots flying Mig-23 fighter jets boured the South Africans with daily strafing runs, while FAPLA's improved air defense system, coupling modern Soviet radar with SA-8 missile batteries, began to keep Pretoria's ageing airforce in check.

FAPLA had invited the assault on Cuito Cuanavale by making another failed attempt to overrun the South African-held town of Mavinga about 80 miles to the southeast. The Angolans had ignored the advice of senior Cuban advisers not to make the try, and their mistake was confirmed when South African artillery routed the advancing FAPLA columns last October. Had the Angolan army captured Mavinga, it would have been in a position to threaten Unita's Jamba headquarters further south, near the Namibian border.

But as happened in 1985, FAPLA was forced to pull back to Cuito Cuanavale. By last November, with the Angolans in full retreat, South African Defense Minister Magnus Malan decided on pursuit. The decision was costly.

Stalemate has taken hold in Cuito Cuanavale as the South African assault stalled about 10 miles east of the town. SADF artillery shells relentlessly slammed into the defense lines, but FAPLA, inhabiting an underground world of trenches and bunkers, appeared able to hold on.

"In the history of military clashes in Africa, the battle for Cuito Cuanavale was one of the biggest in terms of troops and firepower"
With increasing accuracy, FAPLA's anti-aircraft gunners were shooting down South African planes. Morale was high among the young troops outside Cuito Cuanavale in late February as they described how they shot down a Mirage piloted by Maj. Edward Every on February 20. South Africa confirmed the loss two days later.

While Angolan claims to have downed 40 South African aircraft between September and March may be an exaggeration, Pretoria's airforce, already weakened by the international arms embargo, in taking losses. Casualties are rising accordingly, with a reported 41 white soldiers, hundreds of black troops, mainly Namibians, and an estimated 2,000 Unita guerrillas dying between last November and March. Some analysts put FAPLA's losses at 1,500, and Cuban casualties at 39, according to Cuban sources.

"The South Africans are embarrassed. They used to think that invading Angola was a tourist trip," said Capt. Branco Armindo Fraternidade, commander of the 35th brigade in the southern province. "They may come with any weapon they like, but our people will defeat them."

"The racist government of South Africa does not want to lose men and weapons," said Col. Manuel Francisco Tuta, the Angolan military commander of Cuando Cubango province. "They may come with any weapon they like, but our people will defeat them."

As it became clear that the SADF was stuck in Cuito Cuanavale with fW prospects of taking the town and its airstrip without heavy casualties, the South Africans struck a bold move. Cuban sources have confirmed reports that the SADF had outflanked FAPLA and carried the battle 400 miles inside Angola around a settlement called Punto Verde in the central highlands near the Benguela railway. The apparent goal was to cut Cuito Cuanavale's supply lines. It is in the central plateau area that Unita enjoys some popular support among the Ovimbundu people who are attracted to the rebel movement's tribalist appeals. Savimbi's birthplace, Munhango, reportedly fell at the turn of the year to Unita rebels receiving supplies from neighboring Zaire, where the CIA is running a $15 million per year covert program to aid Unita.

Angolan officials explained the sustained assault on Cuito Cuanavale by arguing that Pretoria wanted to install a provisional Unita government. The campaign also bolstered South Africa's position both as the ultimate protector of Savimbi's Unita movement and as the dominant regional power which must be taken into account in any peace talks among the white electorate.

Dr. Crocker's diplomatic initiative has brought him to the negotiating table with top Angolan, Cuban, and South African officials. Along with National Security Council staff member Ambassador Herman Cohen, he sat down with Cuban affairs chief and politburo member Jorge Risquet and Angolan Foreign Minister Afonso Van Dunem for two days of talks in Luanda on January 28-29. A similar meeting took place on March 9-11, followed by a meeting between Crocker and South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha.

State Department spokesmen crowed that the talks had produced a major breakthrough in Angola's acceptance of a complete Cuban troop withdrawal. Cuban officials say, however, that the Angolan-Cuban position remains unchanged from that of 1982, when Luanda proposed moving Havana's "internationalist" forces north of the 16th parallel in return for an end to South Africa's occupation of the mineral-rich former German colony of Namibia.

Many analysts believe that South Africa's aggressive military stance in Angola indicates that it wants nothing to do with a negotiated deal, preferring instead to keep the Cubans around to justify its rule of Namibia and to score political points with its increasingly hardline white electorate.

Previously, the Botha government, in tandem with the Reagan administration, had linked Namibia's independence under UN supervision to a Cuban troop pullout. On March 15, however, Foreign Minister Botha raised a new condition: "We are staying there [in Angola] until the Cubans leave," he said in an interview with The Washington Times. "They showed no signs of leaving voluntarily. And until that situation has been settled, we will not withdraw from Angola."

In early April, Defense Minister Malan proposed the establishment of a "neutral" government in Luanda and informed Savimbi that South Africa was opening direct talks with Angola. Angolan officials said privately that the MPLA government would be prepared to reach an agreement with the Unita movement, provided Savimbi was not part of the deal. Savimbi responded to that view during the celebrations of Unita's 22nd birthday in Jamba in March. "Sometimes people try to divide Unita and Savimbi," he said. "The Angolan government may be so afraid of me, but let me stop dreaming. When you are saying Unita you say Savimbi. Talk about Unita, I am included."

Yet at the war front in southern Angola, it seemed clear that the armies of South Africa, Angola, and Cuba—and not Unita—were the main actors. And however much FAPLA has improved over the years, the SADF remains the most potent military force in Africa. Two South African airforce raids on the key southwestern city of Lubango in February demonstrated that South African pilots are still capable of punching gaping holes into Angola's air defense system.
South African war planes streaked north from bases in Namibia along the winding river beds of southern Angola and bombed the outskirts of Lubango, defying the air defense network and a giant statue of Jesus Christ on the rugged mountains above, his outstretched arms blessing the city's swelling population of 100,000. The immediate targets of the raids were villages of Namibians run by South West Africa People's Organization (Swapo) which is fighting a low-level guerrilla war to end South African occupation of Namibia. The raids began on February 20, a day after a bomb exploded and killed 23 people in Oshikati, a Namibian town about 40 miles from the Angolan border. South Africa blamed Swapo for the bombing, but the liberation movement denied the charge. In a matter of hours, South African Mirage and Impala jets roared down the tarmac at the Namibian air base in Ruacana and 270 miles north to Lubango, whose wide streets and Portuguese architecture recall the pre-independence days when the town was known as Sa de Bandeira. South Africa claimed to have eliminated 93 "terrorists." Town-dwellers said that as many as 23 people died.

Attack planes struck again five days later in a seven-minute raid. Independent confirmation of casualties and damage was impossible because local officials, sensitive about Swapo's presence in the region, would not permit foreign journalists to visit the camps.

Why their highly touted air defense system had not performed was a matter of embarrassment to the Angolans. The 35th brigade commander, Capt. Armando Fraternidade, blamed the failure on "the carelessness of our rearguard troops." "They always think they will be warned by the forces at the frontline." Unita spies, he added, had informed the South Africans when the air defense was not properly manned.

Other military sources had different ideas. During the February 25 raid, said one, the radar system stopped working for 10 minutes, allowing the South Africans to attack and return to base free of an effective Angolan response. The reported technical breakdown has sparked speculation that South Africa has the ability to temporarily jam the radar.

But skilled pilots can usually avoid even the best air defense system, argued an army lieutenant. "Such systems can never stop everything," he said. "Sometimes we get lucky and bring down one or two planes." In late March, the Angolans appeared to have found the range, downing Maj. VanCopenhagen and his Mirage jet near the Namibian border.

The defense of Lubango, the military and economic nerve center of the southwest, is vital. For the past several years, the capital of Huila province has remained largely free of the war which has brought much of the rest of Angola's oil-dependent economy to its knees. Huila and the neighboring provinces of Cunene and Namibe are the focus of a multi-million dollar economic development program to promote agriculture, animal husbandry, and fishing, which has attracted aid and investment from the European Community and the UN.

"It is a model both in terms of external assistance and local initiative," said Teklesadik Eshetu, representative of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization in Angola. "One of the purposes of South African and internal destabilization in the area could be to discourage investment in production," he said.

The economic program under way around Luanda is the first step in the avowedly Marxist government's efforts to combine reduced state control and greater private investment in a bid to rebuild the broken economy. On January 1, President José Eduardo dos Santos unveiled SEF (Saneamento Econômico e Financeiro), as the new package of measures is known. Like its Mozambican cousin across the continent, Angola, in conjunction with the World Bank, is working to restructure parastatal companies, improve supply systems, and employ price incentives to raise productivity, purchasing power, and consumption.

Facing a $4 billion foreign debt, the Angolans are trying to attract external finance as well. Luanda has applied to join the World Bank and the IMF, but is reportedly meeting American resistance. Government technicians are revamping the foreign investment law, and officials say joint ventures are expected between foreign companies and state and private firms. To indicate how seriously the government regards the economic crisis, dos Santos suspended for three months all overseas visits by government missions unless they were specifically linked to the SEF.

The good news on the economic front is that oil production and revenues are rising. Currently at 450,000 barrels per day with $1.7 billion in annual earnings, industry analysts expect production to rise to 500,000 barrels per day next year. How much of that revenue will be able to escape from the black hole of military spending remains a major question mark. UN officials and Western diplomats estimate that over 50 percent of all government spending goes to the war effort. Some estimates run up to 80 percent.

The scale of Angola's economic crisis is overwhelming. Hunger haunts nearly 600,000 peasants who have been displaced by the war and another 1 million urban dwellers. At best, cereal production this year will meet half the country's needs, and the lack of security jeopardizes the delivery of thousands of tons of food aid brought in by the UN and the Red Cross. Only a handful of the major roads are open, and most food relief must be moved by air.

The gloomy panorama has led most development experts to conclude that ending the war is the prerequisite to improving the lot of the Angolan people. "If the international community really wants to help Angola, they should be working to end the war," said Eshetu of FAO. "because until the war is over, there will be no real development here."

D
Interview with Olusegun Obasanjo

As Africa Report went to press, negotiations between representatives of the Angolan, Cuban, American, and South African governments were taking place in London. Former Nigerian head of state Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, who has played a role as facilitator in the ongoing discussions, provides the background to the latest diplomatic efforts to end Angola's war.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: What role have you played in the recent diplomacy surrounding the Angolan conflict?
Obasanjo: I went to Angola at the express invitation of President dos Santos. I was briefed by the chief of defense staff on the military situation and by the minister of state for production. After that, I saw the president and we had a long discussion. By then, there had been direct negotiations going on between the American administration and the MFLA government. So he gave me the details of that. I went to Lubango in the south, capital of Huila province, which is as close as you can go to really have the feel of the war.

Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo: "Namibia is definitely part of the package, because if it isn't, then the Angolans are not secure"
Three things emerged from these discussions. First, the war is sapping the resources of Angola badly, both human and material. Second, the Angolans genuinely want to see an end to the war, but not at any cost. They want to end the war with honor. Thirdly, they definitely want a normalization of relations with America. These three points were particularly observable to me and made me get involved in the negotiations, not by participating in them, but by facilitating—for example, I talked to Chester Crocker [the American Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs] and then the Angolans on the other side.

I have gone to Angola twice over the last three months. After my second visit to Angola, I even had to visit Cuba. Again in Cuba, it was obvious to me that the Cubans want an end to the war in the same way that the Angolans do, but not at any cost. They want an end with honor. The Angolans and the Cubans have since been able to put their heads together to come up with a proposal which includes phased withdrawal of the Cuban troops concurrently with the implementation of UN resolution 435 on Namibia.

Africa Report: What is new about this proposal? Didn’t the Angolans and Cubans agree to that a few years ago?
Obasanjo: Yes, but what is new is that the Cubans have now agreed to pull out definitely within a specific period of time, provided the concurrent implementation of resolution 435 and the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola. Before now, on the Angolan and Cuban side, they had been saying that there is no linkage. What has happened now is that in a way, linkage has been accepted. That is the thing that is new.
Their fear all along is what they see as the unreliability of the South African regime, that when you give South Africa an inch, it will want to take a foot.

Africa Report: What has changed in the diplomatic context to make them accept linkage?
Obasanjo: Before, Angola and America never talked. A number of things have changed lately. The Americans and Angolans never got to the point of bringing the Cubans in to discussions. The Americans are saying that the Cubans can only come in in the delegation, but they are not going to sign any agreement with them. But the Cubans are participating, it doesn’t matter how you look at it. These are some of the things that have changed. As far as I am concerned, I believe that the Americans will have to bring some pressure to bear on South Africa.

Africa Report: Is the U.S. prepared to do that now?
Obasanjo: Well, they gave the impression that they are, that if they strike a reasonable agreement, then they will get their allies to endorse it and bring the South Africans in line.

Africa Report: Some observers have said that the Angolans are really looking at now is just getting South Africa out of Angola and that Namibia’s independence has been dropped from the equation.
Obasanjo: No. They are definitely not forgetting about Namibia. Namibia is definitely part of the package, because if it isn’t, then the Angolans are not secure. Unless you bring that buffer zone, as it were, you are talking of a different ballgame.

Africa Report: Are you seen by the Angolan government as a mediator?
Obasanjo: No, I am not a mediator. I am only a facilitator.

Africa Report: At various points in the past, the Nigerian government made efforts to mediate between Unita and the Angolan government.

Obasanjo: I have nothing to do with Unita and the MPLA.

Africa Report: It has been said that a number of African countries—Nigeria and Kenya for example—are attempting to mediate between the government and Unita.

Obasanjo: No, I think you are confusing the issue. Savimbi said that he would want some African countries to mediate and he specifically mentioned Nigeria and Kenya. I don’t know whether Kenya ever reacted to that, but the former Nigerian foreign minister, Bolaji Akinyemi, said he would mediate. However, that presupposes that you are putting the MPLA government and Unita at the same level. In fact, it was probably the MPLA government’s concern for the pronouncement of the former Nigerian foreign minister that made them invite me to find out what was really behind his statement. I told them that I don’t think it was a considered government statement. It was the foreign minister’s statement.

Africa Report: There have been some reports of direct contacts between the Nigerian government and Savimbi, in which Savimbi was reported to have said that he was prepared to be part of a national unity government, but only in a role second to President dos Santos.
Obasanjo: I don't know about that. What the MPLA government told me—and I believe that it is right—is that it will talk of reconciliation and reabsorption of Unita elements, less Savimbi.

Africa Report: However, Savimbi said recently that no one can separate him from Unita, and that if there is any deal with the government, he must be pail of it. Obasanjo: I have never believed that any human being is indispensable. So to that extent, I would say anything is possible.

Africa Report: Is the U.S. playing a positive role in the negotiating process at this time?

Obasanjo: At least up to the last time I was in contact, I believed the U.S. administration was serious and trying to play a positive and constructive role. My fear is whether it will be able to deliver on South Africa.

Africa Report: When you were in southern Angola, did you get the sense that South Africa had gotten in over its head militarily, or that it is digging in to stay?

Obasanjo: Take for instance, Cuito Cuanavale, which the South Africans and Unita claimed to have captured. Cuito Cuanavale has become a symbol of resistance against South Africa and to the extent that it cannot be captured, it shows some weakness on the South Africans' part, especially when they had announced it to the world in anticipation of being able to capture it.

Africa Report: Given that there are only a few months left to the Reagan administration, do you think such a diplomatic solution is likely?

Obasanjo: I believe that if an agreement is not struck by July, then we will forget it.

Africa Report: There has been a lot of talk about the Soviet Union's new policy toward regional conflicts in general and southern Africa in particular, that the Soviet Union is putting pressure on the Angolan government to make a deal.

Obasanjo: I haven't talked to anybody in the Soviet Union. I hope to be in the Soviet Union next month [May], and I hope we might have an opportunity to interact with people there sufficiently to be able to assess what people call their new policy. But I can only try to assess it from what they have done in Afghanistan. Having struck an accord the way they have done it in Afghanistan, without absolute assurance for the Kabul regime, is an indication of what one would call their new policy of getting the hell out of it.

In Angola, the Soviet Union must have been putting in a lot of money and a lot of resources—air transport, equipment—and the Cubans are putting in a lot of resources in manpower. I think the Soviet Union will want to have some arrangement that guarantees security for Angola, takes the Cubans out, and allows them to stop putting resources in Angola—either to back up the Cubans or to sustain the Angolan troops.

Africa Report: Some have suggested that it might be time to look at the possibility of peace-keeping forces or demilitarized zones in southern Africa as one way of dealing with the security problems.

Obasanjo: I don't see that as a feasible proposition because what is important is implementation of UN resolution 435. If you are going to put in UN troops and all that, then you put them in Namibia and not in Angola.

Africa Report: Do you think that the South African government is going to give up Namibia at this point when it faces pressure from its own right-wing? It seems that it is digging in as opposed to even thinking about leaving Namibia.

Obasanjo: Which is a stupid thing because what P. W. Botha is doing is not even half-measures, but one-tenth measures, which is annoying his right and not satisfying his left, let alone satisfying the blacks. If he was a sensible man, he would go the whole hog, in which case his right-wing will become insignificant! If you enfranchise 25 million Africans, then your 1 million rightists will become insignificant!

Africa Report: But given that domestic reality, is South Africa really likely to give up Namibia?

Obasanjo: The South Africans too need the subregion. They want to be accepted in the subregion—that is their home! They might as well start working out how they will live in that area in peace!

Africa Report: Do you have any indication that they are doing that? Have you talked to the South Africans in your role as a facilitator?

Obasanjo: No, I haven't talked to anybody in government. I haven't gone to South Africa—I have met one or two people on the periphery.

Africa Report: If South Africa does not get out of Namibia, wouldn't peace-keeping forces or a DMZ be an idea?

Obasanjo: No, I would not agree to that. Anything that takes the Cuban troops out of Angola must also involve the implementation of resolution 435.

Africa Report: But if none of the current plan goes forward?

Obasanjo: Then you continue the fight! That's OK! I don't know who would provide the peace-keeping force. Which countries? You need to have individual countries to contribute first. I don't believe any African country will contribute. I hope not.

Africa Report: Are you optimistic about an imminent breakthrough vis-a-vis Angola?

Obasanjo: I am very pessimistic, because we are dealing with a group of people [the South Africans] who can only be moved by superior power or real danger to their existence. The African National Congress has not yet brought superior power or serious danger to their existence. By superior power, I mean Western governments bringing economic measures, or the guerrillas being effective on a daily basis.

Africa Report: You said earlier that you thought perhaps the U.S. was going to apply pressure to get South African compliance.

Obasanjo: Yes, they said that to me, that if they get an agreement that they consider reasonable from the Angolans and Cubans, then they will apply some pressure, meaning I think that those that have the greatest economic clout with South Africa will be brought in to use it.

Africa Report: But what if there is no breakthrough by July?

Obasanjo: Then we will have to forget it for now with the Reagan administration and look to the next administration.

Africa Report: What is your role from here to July?

Obasanjo: I am keeping myself available for any facilitating role.
THE POLITICS OF APATHY

BY CAROLINE ALLEN

The success of the Zambian government's efforts to address the nation's economic crisis will be put to the test when citizens go to the polls later this year. With low voter registration worrying officials, the government's challenge is to inspire a population worn down by economic woes.

Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda is facing one of his roughest election years since his United National Independence Party (UNIP) became the sole legal party in Zambia in 1972. After local and parliamentary elections, which have been put off from May to August, he will go to his people for another "yes" vote to add five more years to his presidency, which began when Zambia became independent from Britain in 1964.

There is little doubt that Kaunda, known on world stages for his passionate addresses and his ubiquitous white handkerchief, will get it. But the apathetic registration exercise, with its prospect for a low turnout at the polls, is worrying party officials. In 1972, there were 2.37 million voters registered, this year it is hoped the figure will top 3 million, but registration deadlines had to be extended when few citizens appeared interested.

Officials cite poor transport as the main obstacle in the exercise, while a report to the party from the President's College says that the economic situation "has everything to do with the chronic apathy." To register, voters need a party card, which are "unavailable" in many districts, allegedly because local politicians won't issue cards to voters whom they suspect will not support them, or the cards are being sold at prices people cannot afford. In other areas, local press reports say food is only sold from state shops to card-holders, while some voters in the northern town of Solwezi complained finally when they were forced to register at gunpoint.

The government record over the last five years is not encouraging for a sweeping vote of confidence, and most

recently there has been talk of doing away with parliamentary elections altogether—which would save both money and difficulties which might arise in any controversies.

Inflation runs at 60 percent a year, employment in the formal sector is dropping, and services have been cut to pay off a massive $5 billion foreign debt. Since foreign aid has been drying up after the government’s sustained and public quarrels with the IMF and the World Bank, some diplomatic observers in Lusaka believe that Zambia is now trying for status as a "least developed country" (LDC) within the UN system—a tag it has so far, with its serious difficulties, avoided.

LDC status would enable Zambia to tap aid sources which are closed to it at the moment, but there are Requirements, among them a certain gross domestic product level and a low literacy rate, which are taken as indicators of LDC status. Local press reports which gave Gambia's literacy rate as 90 percent over the last few years have recently dropped that figure to 40 percent—a level which would certainly qualify the country for special LDC aid packages.

The IMF has demanded that Kaunda cut subsidies on basic commodities, but the move has already resulted in rioting and a degree of internal unrest the country cannot sustain. In fear of widespread violence in marginal urban areas, people have also been warned they will be forcibly resettled in rural areas if urban drift becomes unmanageable.

With a kind of desperate braveness, local papers report of top politicians and businessmen making fortunes on the black market and through the embezzlement of public money. Ministers and officials who constantly pledge anti-corruption drives are regarded with increasing skepticism: The governor of the copperbelt town of Chingola was jeered and booed when he made an electoral campaign visit to a local market to check that official prices were being enforced.

A devastating crackdown in February ended the most recent spree of black marketeering. Over 70 businesses had their licences withdrawn, most of them owned by the undoubtedly powerful Asian business community, some of whose toilets were found stuffed with foreign currency they would rather destroy than hand over to the government, when police raided their homes. Relatives in neighboring Zimbabwe recalled the witchhunts against Asians in Idi Amin's Uganda and said they expected an influx from Zambia in the coming months.

If Kaunda is battling the commercial instincts of the private sector on the one hand, he has found no relief from the trade union movement on the other.

"Some diplomatic observers believe that Zambia is now trying for status as an LDC within the UN system—a tag it has so far, with its serious difficulties, avoided."

Since an attempted coup in 1980, which the president charged involved cooperation between the CIA and labor leader Frederick Chiluba, official relations with the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions have been shot through with suspicion and resentment.

After odd spells in detention over the last few years, Chiluba and two other union officials had their passports withdrawn in September last year. Some Zambians say, and President Kaunda evidently believes, that the articulate and youthful Chiluba represents a rare challenge as a presidential candidate, although union officials deny he has political ambitions.

If there was any cradle for a successor to the historic opposition figure of Harry Nkumbula, it would be the union movement, which boasted effective political action and consciousness-raising long before any political party was formed in the former British colony. Kenneth Kaunda himself came to prominence through his activities in the teachers union.

Zambia's increasingly desperate economic state has prompted some businessmen to openly criticize the government, particularly over its quarrel with the IMF reforms and the existence of the enduring and flourishing black market. "The tiling about this black market is that it's the only place we can find what we need. If there was good organis..."
zation in the country, there wouldn't be a black market," said a taxi driver who operates as a mobile "fence" for any goods he can.

Government, according to the businessmen, sees it the other way around—that the black market, which pegs the prices of even the essentials at three times the official rate, is what is destroying a coherent economic rehabilitation program.

In October 1986, there were reports of an attempted coup by businessmen from the northern copperbelt region, home of the declining copper mines which bring in 90 percent of the country's foreign exchange. The copperbelt, which was the glory of Zambia in the 1960s when the country produced 12 percent of the world output of the mineral (as the third largest producer), is a shadow of its former self, and the future, with no sustained increase in world prices for copper, looks dim.

The 18-mile four-lane highway linking the copperbelt towns of Kitwe and Ndola is the only one in Zambia. Fringed with unkempt forest and encroaching grass, its surface is now pitted with yard-wide potholes. It is known as Route 47—after the AK47 assault rifle—because of the gangs which maraud along it after dark. It is legend that the copperbelt residents smash their cars and Ndola is the only one in Zambia.

The copperbelt decline began with the crash of the world copper price in the 1970s when plastics and microchips replaced copper for many items. Zambia's share of the world market fell to 6 percent and the first cutbacks in production started. For Zambia, there are no other commodities which can easily replace copper and its by-product, cobalt, although there are inquiries into the mining of semi-precious stones, particularly emeralds, and coal and uranium, as well as the development of agri-based industries.

The huge consortium, Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), has realized that its future spans another 40 years at best and has also diversified into tourism, a move criticized by the World Bank, which recommended that the company "stick to activities directly associated with the mining industry." It is also suggested that ZCCM "seek private participation in subsidiary companies to see that they are established on a firm commercial basis," a swipe at the plethora of semi-state-owned companies which absorb high inputs of foreign exchange for very little output and no profits.

In 1986, ZCCM, in which the major foreign interest is Anglo American, prepared a five-year plan which concentrated on rationalizing operations, reducing costs, closing unprofitable mines and directing scarce resources to profitable operations, departing for the first time from long-held goals of avoiding retrenchment of the 60,000-strong workforce and maintaining output levels.

Last year, as the trimmed management of the state-controlled company became more decentralized and more accountability was introduced, three mines with production levels of 40,000 tons of copper were closed and 3,000 workers retrenched. When copper revenue declined after the price collapse in 1974, government offset the loss by increasing all the taxes open to it.

From 1983, there was a special mineral export tax on the mining industry, on production before profits, which one official described as "stealing from shareholders," as ZCCM seldom made a profit after paying the hefty levy. The mineral export tax, which raised $170 million from 1983-87, was done away with last year, and productivity increased by 5 percent, a rise which was rewarded in an unprecedented way in the February budget when miners were freed of taxes on their overtime earnings.

But even increased copper production is not going to save the copperbelt in the long run, and the decline of the mines will affect more than production statistics or even foreign exchange earnings. The copperbelt towns run from Ndola to Mufulira, clustered along a rail line perched above the ore body, which runs north into Zaire. Copperbelt residents, even those who don't work for the mines directly, benefit from mine-run hospitals—the best in the country—sports facilities, schools, and shopping districts. They live in ZCCM houses and all businesses in the region serve the mines.

Said one resident businessman of 30 years: "We don't really want to think about it, but it's happening now. It's started. ZCCM's job from now on will be to buy the government time to restructure and build up viable alternatives."

What is being quietly discussed now is whether government still has the energy and initiative to fight off the threat of total financial chaos, or whether Zambia will succumb to the enormous strains on its people, government, and infrastructure—and indeed, what "succeed" will mean. Zambians say it has not always been like this: There were sometimes shortages but these were righted, sometimes pressures—the Zambians suffered cruelly for their support of the Zimbabwe independence war—but these were born with a very real, cheerful stoicism.

Even now, Zambians will list a stream of complaints against rules and regulations, cite instances of corruption large and small, exchange outrageous gossip, and laugh finally, turning to a visitor to say: "It's not so bad really—now Mozambique, that's really bad."

The endurance of Zambians is renowned—suggestions that "something must happen," perhaps "someone" must happen, bring a shrug and a laugh. But few are tempted into what they see as the charade of politics, to the extent of not bothering to register. "We Zambians," offered an academic at the University of Lusaka, "have not had a liberation war. We don't fight to change things because they don't change, only the people change."

His thesis might not be shared by the school students who rioted in Ndola in March for better food and more discipline of their absentee teachers, nor by the students detained on his own campus last year after disturbances forced the university to close.

Although it is unlikely Zambia will purge its suffering with a violent coup, as has been the fate of many other African countries, the ruling UNIP party must be asking itself how it can still inspire a people so worn down by the reality of their political life.
On the Right Track

Tanzania's port and railway lines may provide the safest alternative for the frontline states' trade, given destabilization of the region's other corridors to the sea. Our correspondent looks at efforts to refurbish Dar es Salaam port and the railway which serves it, and takes a ride on the "Great Uhuru" line.

BY COLLEEN LOWE MORMA
When Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi repeated his offer of Dar es Salaam port to countries threatened by South Africa at a regional conference this year, it may have sounded like just another case of political posturing.

In fact, Dar es Salaam port and its main access routes—though less heard of than the now-famous "Beira Corridor" through Mozambique—have been undergoing a major facelift which enabled the port to handle 2.2 million tons of cargo last year. This represented an increase of 30 percent over the year before and was the equivalent of almost one-quarter of southern Africa's total overseas trade.

Today, thanks to the rehabilitation work and a conscious effort on the part of Zambia to redivert its cargo north, Dar es Salaam has resumed its role as Zambia's most important port and is becoming increasingly important for Malawi. To what extent the port will actually serve the more geographically removed countries that border South Africa will depend on political developments. But should the need arise, Dar es Salaam now provides an option for Zimbabwe and Botswana—and Tanzanians refer proudly to their largest port as the "gateway to the south."

Only a few years ago, Dar es Salaam port, with its deceptively blue waters and gracious expanses of sand, had gained a reputation for inefficiency, congestion, and theft. Tazara, the 1,116-mile long railway line built with Chinese support in 1976 as Zambia's answer to sanctions against Rhodesia, did not fare much better. The Chinese-supplied DFH2 diesel hydraulic locomotives proved inadequate, leading to numerous line failures. Partly as a result of low motive power, the average turnaround time on the Tazara network rose from 11.7 days in 1975-76 to 26.1 days in 1981-82. Numerous serious accidents—partly a result of inexperience among personnel—further damaged the railway's image.

At its lowest ebb in 1980, Tazara, which is designed to carry far more than Zambia's total exports and imports, transported a mere 30 percent of this southern African country's total trade. The rest was diverted over longer routes, through independent Zimbabwe, to South Africa. Meanwhile, as a result of poor management and similar operational problems, traffic along the Tanzania railways Corporation (TRC) system, responsible for getting goods from within Tanzania as well as Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi to the port of Dar es Salaam, fell from a peak of about 1.6 million tons in the early 1970s to 0.88 million tons in 1986.

It wasn't for want of fund-raising initiatives that this happened. According to Tanzania Harbor Authority general manager Athumani Janguo, plans to rehabilitate the port of Dar es Salaam have been on the drawing board since the demise of the East Africa Harbors Authority in 1977. And despite Tazara's numerous approaches to Western aid do-

It's not just precious exports and imports that get hauled along the "Great Uhuru" (freedom) railway line from Zambia to Tanzania—even if that is the main reason for all the work currently going on along the route. Unable to haunt the persistent "informal sector" that also operates along the route, the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (Tazara) has hitched an extra luggage wagon to its northbound passenger train for the day-old chicks that chirp their way from the copperbelt town of Kapiri Mposhi, where the line begins, to Dar es Salaam, where it ends.

The same coaches return laden with everything from second-hand clothes to radios purchased in Tanzania, where such goods have become available since the country adopted IMF-sponsored trade liberalization policies in 1986. These are sold in Zambia, which broke with the IMF in May last year, following riots over the removal of food subsidies. Luxuries are so scarce in the Zambian capital of Lusaka that even soft drinks like Coca-Cola have disappeared from the shelves.

Because—as with most other railways—Tazara's passenger service is a loss-making effort, it has not been the primary target of rehabilitation efforts. However, with recent improvements in locomotive power, passenger services have picked up from one to three pairs a week, providing a vital service in Tanzania where roads are in appalling shape, and in Zambia where the spare parts shortage has made travel by bus hazardous at best and unavailable at worst.

Days before the trains leave at either end, passengers line up for tickets—the equivalent of $20 for a seat in first class, $5 for a seat in third class—to travel for over 48 hours on one of Africa's longest overland routes. Among the passengers who scramble to get on have always been a sizeable proportion of entrepreneurs—except that while they used to comprise mainly of Tanzanians going to shop in the more highly industrialized Zambia, the pendulum has swung, with the change in the economic fortunes of the two countries.

One of the "regulars" on the train is a young man clad in a trendy pair of yellow shorts with a Walkman strapped around his belt. He spends most of the two days on the southbound trip either bobbing to reggae tunes, playing basketball on a toy electronic set, or consuming generous quantities of food. Luxuries are so scarce in the Zambian capital of Lusaka that even soft drinks like Coca-Cola have disappeared from the shelves.

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Days before the trains leave at either end, passengers line up for tickets—the equivalent of $20 for a seat in first class, $5 for a seat in third class—to travel for over 48 hours on one of Africa's longest overland routes. Among the passengers who scramble to get on have always been a sizeable proportion of entrepreneurs—except that while they used to comprise mainly of Tanzanians going to shop in the more highly industrialized Zambia, the pendulum has swung, with the change in the economic fortunes of the two countries.

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network—has partly resulted from Tanzania's 1986 decision to go with an IMF-sponsored structural adjustment program, which Western donors generously welcomed. The other explanation is geopolitical. Since its inception in 1980, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)—which aims to ease the region's economic dependence particularly on South Africa—has highlighted transport routes. However, only three of its countries have coastlines, and two of these (Angola and Mozambique) are ravaged by South African-backed rebels.

Despite its distance from most SADCC countries, Tanzania provides the safest outlet and has thus been accorded priority by the regional organization. Donors—perhaps partly to divert attention from their own half-hearted actions against South Africa—have responded favorably to these calls. Thus, to take one example, Tazara has become a major beneficiary of the $93 million in extra aid to SADCC unveiled by U.S. AID chief Peter McPherson at the 1986 annual consultative conference in Gaborone.

According to sources close to the agency, the U.S. required a transport project in which to pour a sizeable chunk of the money quickly. With the highly publicized Mozambican port of Beira well-subscribed and Tanzania the most viable transport project in the region security-wise, Washington has earmarked $48 million for this project which, ironically, it argued against in the 1970s on the grounds that it was not economically viable. With the support from U.S. AID, the four Nordic countries, the EEC, World Bank, West Germany, Switzerland, Australia, and China, Tazara has secured $145 million out of the $250 million being sought for a 10-year development plan. $49 million is under negotiation.

Some 14 out of 22 projects in four categories (permanent way and construction, signal and communication, motive power, rolling stock and mechanical equipment, general management and training projects) are currently being implemented. The most pressing short-term need, according to Tazara general manager Standwell Maphara, is for the repowering of a few Chinese locomotives—which Tazara has been doing on its own with engines bought from West Germany—pending the arrival of new locomotives. This is evidently a touchy point with donors. According to American officials, U.S. AID can't provide money to buy parts from West Germany, while West Germany would rather supply new locomotives than spare parts.

However, the wagons and locomotives already supplied, coupled with a major overhaul in management, are already paying dividends. Turn-around time is down to 12 to 15 days. According
to Mapara, a Zambian, traffic handled on the line shot up from 984,000 tons in 1985-86 to 1.22 million tons in 1986-87, largely due to increased usage by Zambia, which now sends 80 percent of its exports and receives 45 percent of its imports through Dar es Salaam. "All things being equal, we should reach a capacity of 1.5 million tons in 1990," Mapara noted.

Additional capacity is also likely to become available on the parallel Tanzam highway, which is being resurfaced under a World Bank/African Development Bank project that has just commenced. Meanwhile, following a special Tanzania Railway Corporation donors conference in February 1987, an emergency recovery program is being implemented along internal routes, and it is hoped that by 1990, capacity on TRC will increase to 1.5 million tons.

A major new development within SADCC is the $100 million "northern corridor" project, which involves the rehabilitation of ports along the northern shores of Lake Malawi, to which cargo will be hauled, and an improvement of the road system to Mbeya in Tanzania, where goods will be taken for transportation either by Tazara or the Tanzam highway to Dar es Salaam. Ordinarily, Malawian cargo would go via the Mozambican port of Nacala, but almost all of this has been diverted to South Africa, at vastly higher cost, as a result of Renamo activity.

Although the Nacala corridor is currently undergoing a $200 million rejuvenation—which casts some doubt on the economic wisdom of the northern corridor project—Malawi is anxious to have a safer option. The World Bank, which is coordinating donor support for the project, justifies it in terms of future trade volumes and transport route needs. Already, about 10 percent of Malawi’s imports and exports of about 700,000 tons per annum are passing along this route. Tazara expects to handle some 318,000 tons of Malawian cargo by 1995.

The port is also gearing up for action. Since the launching of a major rehabilitation program three years ago, about three-quarters of the $200 million required has been pledged by the World Bank, Nordic countries, the Netherlands, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Major projects include the provision of container handling facilities, a new grain terminal, and improvement of existing training facilities.

Improved security and the move toward containerization has made high rates of pilferage a "thing of the past," according to Janguo. Freight agencies agree that with improved operational efficiency, Dar es Salaam is far less congested than it used to be. Port users are further being encouraged to follow the example of Zambia which has its own depot (the "copperyard") away from the port to help keep it clear. Malawi is already building cargo centers at Dar es Salaam and Mbeya.

Projects which still require funding, according to Janguo, are the improvement of the entrance channel, "which is shallow, narrow, and meandering," the rehabilitation of the lighter wharf, bulk oil-handling facilities, and dockyard facilities for repairing tugs and smaller ships. Even without these developments, however, it is estimated that Dar es Salaam will be capable of handling 4 million tons of dry cargo by 1990.

If plans to rehabilitate the smaller ports of Tanga and Mtwara also take off, Tanzania could have a port capacity of 5 million tons—a total equal to half of all SADCC’s overseas trade and in excess of what the roads and railway lines are likely to be able to handle. "We are conscious of the fact that we should not overexpand," says Janguo, "because what determines the throughput is not only what you can do, but also available cargo."

"A major new development within SADCC is the $100 million 'northern corridor' project—rehabilitation of ports along the northern shores of Lake Malawi and an improvement of the road system to Mbeya in Tanzania."

Projections so far are based largely on an expected increase in domestic production since Tanzania’s implementation of the economic reform program and an anticipated increase in traffic from the central African countries (which currently account for 13 percent of throughput), Zambia, and Malawi. However, to fully justify the current developments at the port, it would have to be used more by countries further south, notably Zimbabwe. To a man, Tanzanian officials are convinced that Zimbabwe’s largely white business community is unfairly biased against the port. As Tanzania’s Minister of Communications and Works Mustafa Nyang’anyi puts it, there is a "deliberate smear campaign" in Harare.

All agree, however, that it is a long way from Harare to Dar, especially as road goods must first go through Bulawayo, then on to Kapiri Mposhi (where Tazara starts) to Dar—a total of 2,100 miles. This compares unfavorably with Beira (420 miles) and Durban (1,680 miles). But trial shipments have been made, and depending which way the political winds blow next, Zimbabwe may yet take up President Mwinyi’s offer.
Cyril Ondatto, a candidate for Parliament on Kenya's coast, saw trouble coming more than two weeks before election day. The bribes he had distributed before the preliminary round hadn't worked, he said—some people "ate" his money, then voted for candidates from their own tribe.

"I do not want you to repeat the same mistake," Ondatto told an election meeting. The people repeated their "mistake" and denied him a seat. Ondatto's case, though unimportant on a national scale, is one small window into the conduct of Kenya's recent election.

As during previous elections in the East African country, races were hard-fought at the local level. Bribery was common and rigging occurred, though its extent is difficult to gauge. And like earlier elections, the balloting left one matter beyond the voter's mandate—

The Queueing Controversy
BY TODD SHIELDS

Voting procedures in Kenya's recent elections and the cabinet reshuffle which followed have highlighted President Moi's continuing efforts to assert the supremacy of KANU, the sole political party, with an erosion of the nation's democratic traditions a likely consequence.
the party as moribund. Now, "KANU and its government" is the term used by the party. And Moi himself affirmed KANU's leading role during a debate last year over whether the party or Parliament was supreme.

The parliament-party argument coincided with the controversy over the queueing system, which was decided upon suddenly and with little debate at a 1986 party conference. KANU's endorsement did not prevent the emergence of a number of critics, notably church leaders and the Law Society of Kenya, who said the system's lack of a secret ballot would leave the common voter unduly open to influence and intimidation.

But the critics concentrated on the so-called "70 percent" rule, a provision that advances unopposed to Parliament any candidate receiving support from 70 percent or more of those queueing. Such cases leave non-party members no choice in choosing their MP, since the successful party nominee in effect bypasses the electorate.

Lying behind such criticism is the fact that there are fewer KANU members than registered voters—that a minority (the party) would in effect vet candidates for the electorate as a whole. This tendency is compounded in areas where a minority of party members turn out on queueing day. In tacit recognition of that weakness, Moi and other leaders conducted a massive registration drive meant to strengthen KANU's claim to represent all Kenyans. The campaign, conducted in the months leading to the February 22 elections, brought party membership to 4.3 million, against 5.6 million registered voters.

Party officials could now point to a large membership when defending queueing, in addition to the reasons originally advanced for imposing the system. Among these was a wish to avoid the situation in past elections, where five or more candidates commonly vied for the same seat, leading to confusing races and fractured mandates for the winners. Officials also said queueing would be more difficult to rig than secret balloting, and that it would democratize a nominating process that had been left to a KANU committee.

About 43 percent of party members took part in the queueing. Given KANU's newly enlarged membership, the relatively high turnout lessened the sting of critics who said queueing would merely represent the electorate's will. But the turnout still represented only one-third of the electorate. And it was much lower in urban than in rural areas, with less than 7 percent of registered KANU members appearing in one Nairobi constituency.

"Public queueing, along with Moi's demotion of his long-serving vice president, represent the most important long-term implications to arise from the elections."

Several reasons were advanced for this urban-rural difference: that educated and sophisticated urban voters value the secret ballot more highly than rural voters, and that the chiefs and rural administrative machinery, answerable directly to the president's office and highly influential in country life, were able to mount a more effective "get-out-the-vote" campaign.

The election results, along with a number of cases where candidates had no opponents, sent 65 politicians unopposed to Parliament. That left 123 of 188 electoral seats to be contested in the March 21 voting by secret ballot, with the top two or three vote-getters from the queueing on the ballot in each constituency. In terms of enfranchisement, about 68 percent of the country's registered voters had a choice before them on election day. Of those voters, about 60 percent participated—on the face of it a better showing than the last general elections in 1983, which drew 48 percent of the electorate, the lowest turnout since independence in 1963.

The two rounds resulted in losses for one-third or more of incumbents seeking re-election, a figure roughly comparable to 1983 when 40 percent of incumbents were rejected by the voters. Three cabinet ministers lost in this year's election, compared with five in 1983.

Most notable among this year's losing ministers was Justus ole Tipis, who until a demotion earlier this year was a powerful minister of state in the president's office in charge of internal security. Tipis lost to the local KANU branch chairman, who had been prevailed upon not to run in the 1983 and 1979 elections. That protection was withdrawn when Tipis fell afoul of the president, likely over the heavy-handed management of Kenya's border tensions with Uganda late last year and the arrests of two American lawyers in Nairobi to monitor a trial. (The lawyers were quickly released.)

Another prominent loser was Martin Shikuku, an enormously popular figure in his home constituency, who gained a reputation as a gadfly for repeatedly questioning government policy. Shikuku, who lost by several hundred votes to a longtime rival, said he would go to court over the defeat after ballot papers marked with his name were found in a neighboring constituency, where they could not be counted toward his total. Shikuku and Tipis were among 21 losers who claimed interference by local administrators and indicated they would petition the courts.

Nairobi voter has his finger dipped in indelible ink to show he has voted in the March elections: "The election results sent 65 out of 188 politicians unopposed to Parliament."

Theirs were not the only voices of protest, for a handful of candidates had claimed rigging during the preliminary queueing round. And the Christian mag-
arguments over election results were still in full swing when Moi announced the ouster of Vice President Mwai Kibaki and his replacement by relative political newcomer Josephat Karanja, who like Kibaki is a member of the dominant Kikuyu ethnic group. Two days later, in a speech marking his inauguration for a third five-year term, Moi scoffed at rumors about his health. The statement, a response to persistent rumors that the president has throat cancer, was contributed to the air of uncertainty generated by the elevation of the little-known Karanja.

Kibaki, the leading Kikuyu figure, had for some time been seen as in danger of losing the job he held since Moi became president in 1978. The local press carried reports saying that Kibaki may not have been loud enough in backing Moi—an important consideration since loyalty to the president is judged largely by such pronouncements. Observers also pointed to a possible personality clash between the populist Moi and the cooler, more intellectual Kibaki.

A further problem for Kibaki may have been the following he acquired through the years of his vice presidency. The president, by relegating him to head the relatively insignificant Ministry of Health, withdrew the opportunity for that power base to continue growing. At the same time, the appointment of Karanja, a politician of little independent standing, drew the vice presidency more firmly into the president’s orbit. And by replacing one Kikuyu with another, Moi, a member of the small Kalenjin ethnic group, blunted charges that he was seeking to reduce Kikuyu influence.

The move also lessened the vice presidency’s prestige, according to one analysis. Moi served for 12 years as vice president before succeeding Jomo Kenyatta, and Kibaki’s long tenure increased the expectation that a vice president would succeed the president. With an office-holder like Karanja, who clearly owes his position solely to Moi, the vice president “becomes a deputy, not a successor,” one well-placed Kenyan said.

Whether the highly educated Karanja, who was Kenya’s first high commissioner to London, can expand beyond such a narrow role is unclear. His initial sallies into electoral politics left him winless in two attempts for a parliamentary seat in his upcountry home district. He entered Parliament in November 1986 in a by-election in a Nairobi slum constituency and has since been noted mainly for loudly supporting the president and the ruling party.

The Karanja appointment aside, Moi’s new cabinet was marked largely by continuity, with all key ministers retaining positions. Only three ministers who retained their seats were dropped. At the same time, Moi created five new ministries to bring the total number to 29. Among the new bodies was the Ministry for National Guidance and Political Affairs, which quickly made itself felt by lambasting the magazine Financial Review for an article that claimed the Karanja appointment would lessen Kikuyu influence. The government denunciation was followed by a chorus of ministers decrying the magazine—the same pattern of events that led to the banning of Beyond.

The ministers and the rest of the 198 elected MPs join 12 MPs appointed by Moi in the 200-seat Parliament. A substantial number of MPs have been named assistant ministers—enough to give the government 108 front-benchers in a body already noted for its subservience to government wishes.

Despite Parliament’s habitual quiescence, a seat in the body remains highly prized as an important source of local power and prestige and as an entry point to the power games played behind closed doors in Nairobi. Because of this, many seats were fiercely contested during the six-week campaign. A lack of national issues—all candidates proclaim loyalty to Moi and KANU—left the battles to be fought in a series of local and sometimes bitter rivalries.

The campaigns take place in a political culture that accepts bribery, if only grudgingly. In a poor country where feasts can be far between, food is a common payoff. But beer appears to be the favorite inducement: Midway through the campaign, the national brewery reported that sales were up more than 11 percent over the same period a year earlier, a development attributed to politicians buying rounds for potential supporters. Church leaders and editorialists decried the bribery, and some local officials moved to forestall it by banning night discos and wedding parties, or barring parliamentary candidates from hosting parties.

If bribery was the benign side of the intense local rivalries, scattered campaign violence was a more ugly manifestation of the competition. Fist fights, heckling, stone-throwing, and occasional pitched battles were reported at election rallies around the country, with one person dying and dozens injured.
Senegal

The Myth of Democracy?

Riots, charges of fraudulent voting, and arrests of opposition leaders marred the recent presidential elections in Senegal, calling into question whether democracy really exists in a nation which prides itself on its multi-party system of government.

BY FRANZISKA OPPMANN

Senegalese are proud of having one of the few multi-party democracies in Africa, but at the end of February their faith was shaken in a hail of stones, broken glass, and tear gas as thousands of youths clashed with riot police in the country's two major cities.

The violence erupted around national elections held on February 28, in which incumbent President Abdou Diouf won another five-year term of office, with a nationwide total of 73.2 percent against the 25.8 percent won by his main rival, Abdoulaye Wade, and the remaining 1 percent split between presidential candidates Babacar Niang and Landing Savane. In the legislature, the ruling Socialist Party took 103 out of a total of 120 seats. As in the previous elections in 1983, voter turnout was low, under 60 percent.

Within one day after the elections, several opposition leaders were arrested, Dakar was under a state of emergency, a night-time curfew was in effect, and many Senegalese were asking themselves whether democracy really exists in their country or whether the violence had shattered a dearly held myth.

The Participants

Senegal's 17 political parties range from Diouf's ruling liberal Socialist Party (PS), to Wade's just left of center Senegalese Democratic Party (FDS), to various Maoist and Marxist splinter groups.

Six parties fielded candidates in February's legislative elections and voters had four presidential candidates to choose from.

Incumbent Diouf stood on his record as a pragmatic administrator, tackling the country's desperate economic situation by doing the necessary—carrying out reforms and austerity measures à la IMF and World Bank. Diouf's agricultural policies—raising producer prices for farmers—have gained him support in rural areas and that remained his power base during the elections.

Opponent Wade has drawn his support from the urban centers, where economic reforms have not gone down as well and where the cost of living has steadily risen while jobs and prospects for the future have diminished. The PDS candidate promised to cut the price of rice in half if elected, a measure bound to be popular with the urban masses in particular, but one which would certainly have gotten Senegal in trouble with its financial backers.

Franziska Oppmann is an American journalist based in West Africa who has been covering African events for the past seven years.
Incumbent Diouf stood on his record as a pragmatic administrator, tackling the country’s desperate economic situation by doing the necessary.

Lawyer Babacar Niang of the populist People’s Liberation Party ran a measured campaign, denouncing the rising cost of living, unemployment, especially among the country’s youth, and other social ills. More radical candidate Landinc Savane of the Maoist Revolutionary Movement for a New Democracy called for a break with the past, including Senegal’s close ties to France, and his message found some support among the youth and within certain intellectual circles.

The Campaign

The candidates had three weeks to present their platforms and square off against one another. The campaign leading up to the elections went relatively smoothly, despite some incidents at the very beginning, but in general it was short on discussion of substantive issues and focused more on the personalities of the candidates. There was the usual fiery rhetoric and many promises that candidates knew they could not keep.

The opposition complained that the electoral code favored the party in power. There were threats of violence by the PDS if it deemed the voting fraudulent and at one point PDS candidate Wade threatened to turn his party into a liberation movement. Senegal was abuzz with political discussion and there was a refreshing openness about the political process.

The mood soured on the last two days of the campaign however, when violence erupted in the country’s second largest city, Thiès, about 42 miles from Dakar, after local government officials banned a scheduled rally by PDS candidate Wade. Several thousand young PDS supporters gathered along major streets and in front of the local party headquarters and eventually clashed with riot police. The youths threw stones and police reacted with tear gas and rubber bullets. There were numerous light injuries and arrests.

Election Day

Election day went smoothly, despite incidents in Wade’s hometown of Kebeber in the north of the country. At many polling stations, there were claims by opposition party observers of fraud and rigging, but most of these were impossible to verify on the spot. Admittedly, the fact that a high percentage of the population is illiterate and has to ask for instructions at the polling station leaves opportunities for manipulation.

There were complaints by numerous voters that they had not received their registration cards and while the opposition immediately cried foul, it was not possible to ascertain to what extent the missing voter cards were the result of manipulation by the ruling party or pure inefficient management.

Another point of controversy was the use of the secret ballot. Voting booths were provided and voters had a choice of casting their ballot in public or in the privacy of the booth, but journalists out on voting day concurred that only a handful of people were actually seen entering voting booths. Asked about his choice for president, one Dakar resident said he rather liked the opposition candidate, but that he would vote for Diouf, because after all, “That’s what the marabout ordered.”
Public support for the incumbent president by the country's powerful marabouts, or religious leaders, stirred a great deal of debate. The opposition said the marabouts should stay out of politics, but these religious leaders have played a crucial role in Senegal for some time and are simply too powerful a lobby group to be ignored. They were woefully and won over by the ruling party and as one Western diplomat observed, most of the marabouts are also farmers who have benefited from Diouf's agricultural policies.

The Reasons

The authorities accused the opposition, especially Wade's FDS, of having manipulated youngsters into going into the streets and throwing rocks. It is true that many of those rioting were too young to vote, but the PUS slogan, Sopi, meaning "change" in the local language, Wolof, struck a responsive chord in much of the local population. People in Dakar and Thies were shouting for a "change" from what many see as a ruling party that, after 28 years in power, has become synonymous with the state apparatus.

While many people said that incumbent Diouf is a good administrator and an honest and well-meaning man, they also said that his party has too much power and intends to hold on to it at all costs. "No party should have that much power, they need to be balanced by other interests; that's what democracy is," said Serigne Mor Uiop, an out-of-work carpenter in Dakar. Many average workers in Dakar shook their heads at the events, muttering, "This is no democracy."

Western diplomats said they think Diouf is committed to a multi-party democracy, but they are not as certain how deep that commitment is within the ruling party. Those in the party have gotten used to the perks of power and intends to continue to "liberalize" his own one-party state. Côte d'Ivoire's government newspaper, Fraternité Matin, followed suit, with an only slightly veiled reference to "abuse of democracy" and "chaos," at the same time extolling the virtues of Côte d'Ivoire's one party and its democratization efforts. Later, on a visit to Senegal, Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko said he was "shocked" when he heard about the violence.

At a news conference following the official announcement of the election results, President Diouf promised to continue the country's pluralistic democracy, but he added that the government was considering certain "safeguards" against possible abuse of the system. When asked whether Senegal was moving in the direction of a de facto one-party state, one Western diplomat said frankly, "Democracy is one of Senegal's major export commodities," indicating that a lot of Western foreign aid might not be as readily available should Senegal not remain on the multi-party democratic path.

Yet, how real is democracy in Senegal? One veteran French journalist who covered the elections said the violence "shattered a myth." Another Western observer pointed out that democracy is an "evolutionary process," that perhaps one has to experience "bad democracy" to achieve "good democracy." A Senegalese journalist threw up his hands and said simply, "If you have to constantly discuss the meaning of democracy, then you don't really know what it is."

Many rural Senegalese may not know much about democracy "Western-style," but urban residents talk about politics and democracy with passion. They demand it and at least this past February, many Senegalese did not feel they had a true democracy.

Sofri, a vague concept going far beyond any one political party, Sofri became a battlecry of discontent against the establishment, of discontent with rising prices, economic austerity, and the lack of jobs and educational opportunities. Within days after the violence, a relative calm returned to Dakar, but the government was concerned enough to extend the state of emergency beyond its initial 12 days.

The curfew on Dakar and the surrounding area was finally lifted in mid-April, but at that time other emergency measures, such as the ban on public demonstrations, remained in effect. Soldiers were still reported to be guarding major areas of town and state secondary schools remained closed as an expression of student protest against the detentions of a number of opposition leaders, the continuing state of emergency, and conditions in the schools themselves.

On April 21, opening day of the trial of opposition leader Wade and seven co-defendants, violent demonstrations broke out in Dakar, with young PDS supporters battling riot police. Several cars were burned and police responded with tear gas to disperse the crowds. As the trial resumed on April 25, further violent incidents were reported. In his statement before the court. Wade denied any role in the rioting surrounding the February elections and claimed that he had won the presidential contest.

Sofri is likely to stay around—a problem for any government, of whatever political party, to deal with. And many of those youngsters who were out in the streets throwing stones at the police will be of voting age for the next election in five years. The real test of Senegalese democracy will be if those youngsters feel they have a choice at the ballot box or if they see the only avenue for "change" in the streets.
The Succession Crisis
BY WILLIAM HOWARD

Recent scandals involving government ministers and ethnic-based political rivalries are causing increasing concern in Abidjan. At the root of an atmosphere of intrigue and uncertainty is the ageing Houphouët-Boigny's continued unwillingness to oversee his own succession.

By refusing to vacate the political scene, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the 82-year-old leader of Côte d'Ivoire, whose career has often been appraised in the West as a triumph of peaceful development in a region scarred by war and economic deprivation, has led his country to the brink of political disaster, in the view of many Ivorians.

As he has aged, a number of influential Ivorians have described the president in private conversations as virtually single-minded in his pursuit of prestige and self-glorification, appointing ministers whose chief qualification often seems to be their talents as sycophants.

With the country's much-touted high growth rates of the 1960s and 1970s now only a fond memory, the economy is feeling the strong pinch of low producer prices for its commodities and an exorbitant debt burden. Despite these new realities, domestic critics say that Houphouët has persisted in building costly monuments to himself, jeopardizing the country's finances for decades after he has left power.

The growing list of monuments include the entire "capital" of Yamoussoukro, the president's birthplace, with its broad, well-lit but barren avenues, a sumptuous new cathedral, a new Abidjan mosque, and a fairy-tale-like basilica being built in the capital that will rival Rome's finest religious structures—at a cost that the president is now anxiously describing as entirely his own, to allay fears of wasted public funds.

Finally, these critics say, adding to the sense of growing political turbulence caused by the worsening economic conditions is Houphouët-Boigny's unwillingness to oversee his own succession.
ional political career that has spanned nearly 50 years, recent events make it appear more likely than ever that his grip on his own political creation—the ruling Parti Democratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) and the bourgeoisie that it spawned—is slipping.

The elements of this decline are numerous, but none is as unpardoning as the irrevocable toll of age. Barely ambulatory and unable to read since two long-delayed cataract operations in the past year, the president has become dangerously reliant on the competing supplications of his ministers, many of whom have proved notoriously self-serving and corrupt.

Last November, Houphouët dismissed the young Minister for Rural Development, Gilles Laubhouet Vally, without public explanation. While ordinary Ivorians are still asking themselves what the 41-year-old minister, whose father, Marcel, was an early political ally and later a crony of Houphouët, did to deserve his unceremonious departure from government—not finding the answer in either the politically sterile local press or in the rife local rumor mills—the true scenario slowly filtered its way through the Abidjan elite.

According to one former minister—whose account was bolstered by the statements of two other highly-placed officials—Laubhouet had steadfastly worked at accumulating a fortune since being named to the rural development post in 1985. While this alone is hardly enough to attract the concern of a president who has publicly urged his ministers to "enrich yourselves," Laubhouet had reportedly used his ministerial primatur to engage in a massive land reclamation scheme, suddenly becoming one of the largest landowners in the country.

The scheme reportedly involved the seizure of small family-owned plots from local farmers in the west of the country, near Quiglo. Laubhouet is said to have explained to his victims that their land was being given over to the state for an experimental farming effort. According to the sources, who requested anonymity for obvious reasons of personal security, the plan backfired when a group of Baoulé farmers—non-indigenous plantation owners living among the influential local Guere ethnic group—reached out to Houphouët for redress of their grievances.

Outraged that the young minister had reportedly appropriated as much as 10,000 hectares of land for his own use, the president is said to have summoned Laubhouet for an explanation and decided to tire him only when the minister failed to show the proper degree of contrition.

The incident, while hardly of a nature that could by itself topple a government, is illustrative of a wider pattern of shady deals and corruption that pervades Ivorian political life and has spawned resentment in the bulk of the population. Two other ministers who have recently strayed into illicit dealings only to be caught up in scandal were forgiven by the president and remain in the government.

The Minister of Health, Alphonse Djedje Madi, was implicated in a financial scandal when, two years ago, airport customs officials stopped a Lebanese traveller leaving the country with massive sums of foreign currency in his carry-on luggage. The traveller told the police he had received the money from the Health Minister, who, it appears, was involved in an amusement park construction scheme with local Lebanese partners.

More recently, Transportation Minister Aoussou Kofi, who is the past chief executive officer of the troubled regional airline, Air Afrique, was kidnapped in Abidjan by French business partners who were miffed that the minister had taken over total control of a local hotel-night club complex, the "Wafou," and reportedly refused to repay them their interests as co-investors. When Kofi was released unharmed by his captors, the local press, which had maintained a total blackout throughout the kidnapping, announced in bold headlines to universal ridicule, "Aoussou Kofi Found Safe and Sound."

The paternalistic mistrust the regime holds for its citizens' ability to digest news was reflected again in the banning of the publications of the Paris-based Jeune Afrique group. The publishing group's troubles began following the assassination of President Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso.

The ban came when the newsweekly Jeune Afrique—which has historically treated the Ivorian leader with the utmost deference—reported, as had numerous Western publications, that Capt. Blaise Compaoré, the new President of Burkina Faso and ringleader of the anti-Sankara group, was married to a relative of Houphouët—suggesting Ivorian involvement in the coup.

The ban on Jeune Afrique, which leaves Ivorians at the mercy of the local press, comes in the midst of a media charm campaign aimed at helping the president earn his long-cherished wish, the Nobel Peace Prize.

These heavy-handed tactics came on the heels of a senseless showdown with the union of secondary school teachers, whose leaders have been jailed and were placed in army camps for political re-education in March because they attempted to preserve the independence of their union. In the wake of these government actions, the youth and growing numbers of adults in Abidjan have come to openly mock the rhetoric of a regime that has long revolved around the two watchwords: peace and dialogue.

Most troubling to the Ivorian leader, however, is the ethnic-based rivalry that ripples just beneath the political surface in the country. Houphouët has long practiced a system of governing by ethnic quotas—insuring that each major ethnic group in the country is repre-
showing up the naysayers in a career that has that his grip on the PDCI is slipping”

sented in the government, while rewarding groups seen as most loyal with extra representation.

With death now a near-term prospect for the aged ruler, the problem for him, and for his Baoule tribe, is assuring their continued dominance. In the latest congress of the ruling PDCI, Houphouet placed Henri Konan Bedie into a favorable—though by no means certain—position to succeed him by making him president of the National Assembly, effectively eliminating from the running the infirm former number-two, Philippe Gregoire Yace.

Two other highly-placed candidates for the president’s seat are Jean Konan Banny, the Minister of Defense, and Camille Alliali, a longtime Houphouet stalwart and minister of state. Both men are trusted Baoule sidekicks who have proven their loyalty to the president through years of unquestioning service.

In reaction to the coalescence of Baoule forces, other ethnic groups have tentatively explored alliance-building in view of insuring an altemance of power from one group to another. Most threatening to the Baoule are contacts between the country’s largest, but most fractious group, the Djoula, who have roots in neighboring Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso, and those of the center-west regions of the country, the largest of which are the Bete, who the Baoule fear will one day exact revenge for a 1971 army slaughter of Bete villagers that was largely suppressed in both local and international news coverage.

This issue recently came to a head when Minister of Maritime Affairs Lamine Fadika was dismissed from the government in December—again with-

out any public discussion of motive—for his alleged participation in an obscure plot to import amis from West Germany, presumably for the purpose of a coup or post-Houphouet show of force.

Fadika was soon placed under residence surveillé, and his dismissal was immediately connected to the replacement of four local-level party general secretaries from the north-western region near Touba where Fadika is from, and the naming of the long-time commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Brig.-Gen. BertinZeze Baroan, a Bete, as ambassador to Brazil.

According to well-informed sources, Gen. Baroan was suspected by the Baoule power elite of having entertained discussions with the Bete of a post-Houphouet alliance that would block continued Baoule dominance. Fadika’s dismissal, while it is difficult to establish the truth about the supposed shipment of arms, seems to have at least as much to do with fears that he could prove to be an effective leader in rallying the Djoula to action.

The official policy of refusal to acknowledge or publicly discuss these important ethnic currents in the society stems from a hope that if problems are carefully ignored, they will go away. Unfortunately for the future, history has never borne this out.

A theoretical publication based on Third World scholarship in and beyond academia, Third Text addresses particular issues raised by contemporary art and culture. The magazine foregrounds the conjunction of art practices and ideological presuppositions and concepts. It further provides a platform for the discussion and appraisal of work by Third World/black artists. The first international publication of its kind, the magazine aims at establishing historically and theoretically informed Third World Perspectives on the visual arts.

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Interview with Ahmed Ben Salah

INTERVIEWED BY ANDRE ASTROW

For eight years between 1961 and 1969, Ahmed Ben Salah was super-minister of finance, economy, and planning in Tunisia, and widely regarded as the likely successor to President Habib Bourguiba, overseeing the country's development strategy and directing one of the boldest cooperative agricultural experiments ever undertaken in Africa. But in 1969, Ben Salah suddenly became Bourguiba's scapegoat and was sentenced to 10 years' forced labor for high treason, before escaping from prison in 1973.

Once in exile, he formed the Popular Unity Movement (MUP), initially a clandestine political organization which later became the subject of a major treason trial in 1977. Several MUP members—including Ben Salah in absentia—received prison terms for distributing leaflets in Tunis proposing a five-point program to introduce greater democratic rights. Since the late 1970s, the MUP and other legal opposition parties have formally been allowed to participate in local and national elections, but more often than not, have called on voters to boycott the process because of the lack of political freedom.

The palace coup of November 7, 1987 in which Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali deposed Bourguiba, however, has now fueled hopes in Tunisia that the repressive political climate of recent years will be brushed aside in favor of the government's much-publicized era of national reconciliation. Several of Bourguiba's former opponents have already returned to Tunis, and the odds seem to favor a government amnesty which will shortly enable Ben Salah to do the same. While on a recent visit to New York, the secretary-general of the MUP agreed to this exclusive interview with Africa Report.

Africa Report: How do you assess November's palace coup in which Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali deposed President Bourguiba after 31 years in power?

Ben Salah: It was like a second liberation—not for Tunisia as a state but for Tunisian society—because political independence had in practice been diverted away from the people's aspirations to other objectives. After some years of consensus and equilibrium, the Bourguiba government's policies had deviated from their objectives. The last years were really the last phase of paralysis for both individuals and society, a trend which was no longer acceptable because it was leading Tunisia on the road to inevitable destruction. The style of government was the source of this instability.

Tunisia is not a passive country. Some people think of Tunisians as very moderate, but of course they have their limits. If this change had not been carried out in a constitutional way, we would certainly have been condemned to violent change. So we said bravo to the new team in government for taking action, because with the fall of Bourguiba, power can now be transferred back into the hands of the Tunisian people.

My comrades in the Popular Unity Movement (MUP) in Tunis have argued that political change is urgently needed, but this is not at all an attempt to weaken our support for the new team. On the contrary, it is an expression of our concern that it succeed. We don't want this change to be condemned to failure because this would have serious repercussions for the future.

If there is no real change in the style of power, and Tunisian people cannot democratically participate in shaping the future of their country, then disillusionment will set in. This could turn very quickly to despair and lead to violence. A group of Tunisians were intelligently able to eliminate Bourguiba, but if nothing changes, there are many other intelligent Tunisians who can in turn eliminate them. And that's what we want to avoid because it could lead to an endless cycle of violence.

Africa Report: What do you think of Ben Ali's claim that Bourguiba's fall marks the beginning of a new era?

Ben Salah: There are signs of a new era in day-to-day life, but the problem is how to build democracy gradually—but with great determination—within the political institutions, the economic sphere, the state and administrative structures, and the political parties themselves. What will be very important for the future is that the parties become democratic in their management. If any party is dictatorial in style, how are we to be convinced that it will be democratic when it takes over the structures of the state? So it is necessary to teach democracy in the ranks of the party if we are to prevent another long era of pathological dictatorship.

Africa Report: There are reports that you now intend to return to Tunisia. In what capacity would you consider returning from exile?

Ben Salah: I haven't set any conditions. The only thing I ask for is my freedom—to be able to express myself as a Tunisian citizen, to voice my ideas, and to continue as MUP secretary-general if I am re-elected at the party's next congress. After that, it depends upon the tactics and strategy adopted by the party that can best contribute to the building of a new democratic society.

Africa Report: Has the government granted you an amnesty?

Ben Salah: So far there has been no amnesty. A few years ago, I was not even allowed to go back to Tunisia to say adieu to my brother who died in a very horrible accident. I only wanted to go for a few hours, but Bourguiba was entirely hostile to the idea. Now, of course, anything is possible. After
all, I am not a terrorist! In fact, I was recently told by the Tunisian ambassador to Washington, on the personal instruction of the new president, that for the first time in 18 years I will once again be given a Tunisian passport.

Africa Report: The new government has pledged to reform the constitution and to introduce greater political and press freedoms. Do you think this is likely to happen, or is this largely rhetoric?

Ben Salah: If it is only rhetoric, the new team in government will fail. At first, it may be necessary to have certain restrictions on democracy to establish an equilibrium. I think the press should be entirely free, letting the public decide what information is worthwhile. During the last years, there was supposedly a multi-party system, but it was entirely rhetorical. Bourguiba was not only president of the ruling Destour Party but in effect, president of each party that he recognized. In reality, there was no political opposition and no political diversity in the country.

Africa Report: Do you feel that the government has taken any significant steps to carry out its well-publicized program of political liberalization?

Ben Salah: The liberation of thousands of people is significant. Most of them are members of the Islamic movement, which indicates that this movement is not what the Bourguiba government portrayed it to be. Tunisia did not need the kind of repression that went on for weeks, creating widespread fear in the country. The crackdown against the Islamic tendency was similar to the continuous repression against the workers' movement. In effect, Bourguiba wanted to establish a single force in the country and destroy all other competing forces by replacing them with mercenaries. It just didn't work in Tunisia. One day everything was bound to explode.

Africa Report: Although Prime Minister Hedi Baccouche has said the new government is determined to make pluralism a reality, he made clear that early elections are out of the question. What is the MUP's response to this?

Ben Salah: My party and I never proposed early elections after November 7. That does not mean we agreed with those in power, but rather that it is not possible to organize real elections if all the guarantees of political normalcy do not exist. For example, if our movement is not yet accepted legally, then we have no possibility of expressing our opinions and dealing with such an election. If there is no change in political life—and it was demonstrated in the recent by-elections—then we have reason to be skeptical about the running of such elections. It means that democracy does not yet exist.

The problem is not one of elections but one of returning power to the people. The groundwork needs to be done to normalize political life and to organize freedom of the press. People must be given the chance to be informed of what is going on inside the country and not be bombarded only with barrage of propaganda on the activities and desires of the president.

Africa Report: What specific steps would you want taken to establish the kind of democratic situation inside the country that would allow for free and fair elections?

Ben Salah: I will give you only my personal opinion since I have not yet had the chance to meet with members of the MUP political bureau. In my opinion, it should be possible for the new team in government to dissolve parliament. At present, it is not a real parliament. Everybody knows how it came about. Secondly, the maximum number of opinions should be brought together in a national commission to lay the foundation for a democratic state, and to prepare the basis for a new constitution. Then elections could be held in normalized political circumstances. It could take maybe six or eight
But we first need to change the substance of the relationship between the state and civil society. We can no longer accept an accumulation of power by one or even five people. It runs against the dignity of the Tunisian people, as well as against those who acted to change the political situation in Tunisia.

**Africa Report:** Do you think liberalization on the domestic front should be extended to such groups as the outlawed Islamic Tendency Movement?

**Ben Salah:** I don't know what the government intends to do, but in principle our position is that every group with a political program should have the right to express its opinion. The Tunisian people should be the ones to judge.

**Africa Report:** Do you agree that Islamic fundamentalism is the biggest problem facing the new government today?

**Ben Salah:** It's true, but what Western governments ignore is that the rise in Islamic fundamentalism is caused by the system of government they support and sometimes manipulate. We hope and wait for the liberation of all political prisoners, Islamic or not, but today I don't believe there is any repression against the Islamic movement. Secondly, the religious problem is not a Tunisian characteristic, it is everywhere. In Tunisia, I don't think there is a tendency toward extremism in religion. Tunisian people are Muslim, but in a very quiet way.

The problem is how to give young people the motivation to build their lives, their nation, their society. When there is no ethic or motivation, then people find refuge in religion. A few decades ago, it was in the extreme left. When people find no political and spiritual nourishment, they look for a refuge.

**Africa Report:** Is Ben Ali's strategy to overcome the political vacuum that has developed between the government and the people by encouraging the legal parties to fill the void? In what ways is the MUP taking advantage of this new situation?

**Ben Salah:** This new situation does not yet exist. It may be coming, but it is not yet here. We are not going to take advantage of this situation. We only want to help transform Tunisia into a real political force capable of playing a prominent role—not merely symbolic—in regional conflicts or in the Middle East. We believe that with a democratic consensus and a new style of government, Tunisia can become a real political and intellectual force.

**Africa Report:** How would you characterize the MUP's political platform?

**Ben Salah:** Our policy is founded on two basic inspirations or ideas. The first is nationalism. We prefer to build Tunisia ourselves, to make our own decisions in running the economy, in structuring our society on the basis of our analysis, of our specific knowledge of Tunisian history and the country's relationship to the rest of the world. We also want to preserve the most important part of the country's strategic independence—not militarily, but politically and culturally.

The second, which is just as important as the first, is our inspiration from the workers' movement. We believe that society cannot be stable and modern without producing a new kind of human being that can contribute to the progress of civilization by helping to destroy the last remnants of feudalism. If you bear that in mind, you can work out the best way to structure society and develop the economy.

We are entirely linked to the modernist tradition in Tunisia that produced a nationalist movement that was always supported and even inspired by the trade unions, not only as a professional movement fighting for better salaries, but one seeking to create equality in society. You could call that socialism. If it is socialism, it is our very specific brand of socialism. If it is democracy, it is our democracy. Democracy is not voting for one person or another. Democracy is the ability of men and women who vote to understand why they vote for one tiling or another.

**Africa Report:** One of the most significant developments in recent years has been the dismantling of Habib Achour's once-powerful General Union of Tunisian Workers [UGTT] and its replacement with a reconstituted labor confederation which has simply given the government its stamp of approval.

**Ben Salah:** Even that is an exaggeration. The new confederation is nothing. It has not accomplished anything. You could say that when the so-called secretary-general of the UGTT said yes, it only meant that Bourguiba was saying yes. Tunisia is a poor country. We do not have the right to dismantle the trade union movement and the public sector. These are our strengths. Today, the possibility for a real democratization process exists. But you can well imagine that not all groups in Tunisia want democracy. Many groups supported the indefinite presence of Bourguiba—people who were corrupted, who used their public power to accumulate more and more money.

**Africa Report:** What is the next step in terms of government/labor relations? What steps need to be taken to reestablish the old UGTT?

**Ben Salah:** All parties, legalized or not, would accept that the UGTT needs to hold a totally free congress and organize an election, renewing itself without outside interference. There is only one organization in the history of Tunisia which has been democratic, and that is the UGTT. I know because I was UGTT general secretary for a few years in the 1950s after Ferhad Hached, the organization's founder.

It is no coincidence therefore that the UGTT has been destroyed many times. When the government destroyed the UGTT, it destroyed the only democratic organization. I don't know of one case of fraud or ballot-rigging in the history of the UGTT, except when the government or agents of the government intervened. But in such cases it was no longer the
UGTT. Today the UGTT is underground. If you reject this reality, it means you are not ready for change.

Africa Report: Obviously there are many people in the ruling party who will resist change to preserve their privileges. How do you deal with this problem?
Ben Salah: Of course it is a problem. The problem is the relationship between the state and the political parties. It might be possible to bring together all the country's political forces in order to decide what can be done in reorganizing the political scene. Perhaps a new organization can be created, bringing together all the old Destourians—whether they are still in the party or not—who are critical of the negative direction the party has taken.

Other members of the ruling party may very frankly say that they are not for change. They have the right to do that and can organize with others to form a party opposed to change and democracy. That is also their right. But I think Tunisian people understand that not everything they do has to be linked to preserving their power. If you have the ambition to reorganize society, you will have your place in the sun because it is based on a consensus.

Africa Report: Since the 1960s, Tunisia's economic direction has changed dramatically. Do you still stand by the socialist cooperative program that you engineered in that period?
Ben Salah: Do you know that the socialist cooperative program is an invention? It was not our policy. Our policy was founded on a doctrine involving three sectors of the economy. Perhaps something new is necessary now. But the spirit should be the same. The problem is that everyone talks of the cooperatives. But you know, the 1960s were not only about cooperatives. We created a national economy. We decided that with an egalitarian political party—even unique at that time—and with the presence of a free and dynamic trade union, we could develop our economy.

But the problem was how to introduce the essential reforms able to destroy the feudality of the old economic sector, especially agriculture. We sought to have the state play an equilibrating role in all sectors so that everybody could participate in building the democratic economic plan. And it was becoming more and more successful in the 1960s.

So why does everybody talk about the failure of this system and concentrate maliciously on the role of the cooperatives? Because Bourguiba chose to focus on this aspect of the economy. I was not in favor of generalizing the cooperatives. I made that clear to the party, but Bourguiba rejected my position and decided that since we had created only 10,000 cooperatives in nine years, we should create 100,000 cooperatives within a few months. In other words, he wanted this economic experiment to fail and he used me as the scapegoat. Not because of the cooperatives, but because I was successful. Bourguiba thought very wrongly that I was becoming too powerful.

Africa Report: He felt threatened by you.
Ben Salah: Yes. He wanted to feel threatened, because he knew very well that I was not a politician. I have never been a politician. I am a militant with a background in the party and the trade union movement, blending both nationalism and workerism equally.

Now many economists are discovering that Tunisia was doing very well in the 1960s and we have World Bank reports to prove it. Only a few months before the crisis erupted in 1969, the World Bank signed an $8 million contract to expand the agricultural cooperative movement. How can one explain the sudden change that followed? It had nothing to do with the failure of the economy.

But the political propaganda against me was so violent that I was sent to jail. I had no opportunity to respond to the charges. When I was in government, all the congresses of the party, the UGTT, as well as women and youth sections, had approved each step of the cooperative plan until one day everyone forgot everything.

Africa Report: What kind of economic prescriptions or solutions would you put forward today?
Ben Salah: We have to define that together among all Tunisians. I have my ideas, but we have to do that together. Our hope is that—even if the point of departure between the MUP and other groups is different—we can decide together in the very near future.
Women

"The Mother of the Struggle"

BY AMEEN AKHALWAYA

In our continuing series to highlight the contributions of women to Africa’s political and economic development, we profile Helen Joseph, an activist and crusader against apartheid for 40 years. Now at age 83, Helen Joseph’s indomitable spirit and her history of involvement in the struggle for human rights has made her an inspiration to South Africans, black and white.

Helen Joseph had a heart attack and a stroke last year; her mobility has been restricted by a painful knee; she had a cataract removed from her left eye and another is to be removed from her right eye; she runs out of breath when she talks.

In April, Helen Joseph, born in England but now a South African, turned 83. The South African government still considers her a threat. Successive administrations have restricted her in one form or another. But 40 years after her political awakening to the realities of life for blacks under apartheid, Helen Joseph still speaks out against the National Party government.

When I interviewed her at her modest home in Norwood, an affluent white northern suburb of Johannesburg, she had just returned from Cape Town where she attended a festival of music, art, and drama organized by the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW). "It was wonderful, heart-warming," she enthused. "There was uncertainty about whether it would be banned. But there wasn’t a policeman in sight. People of all colors, shapes, and sizes... They were so happy. I was happy to see them so happy."

Bubbling with joy at seeing others happy may be exceptional against the background of her treatment by the killjoys of Pretoria. But then Helen Joseph is an exceptional woman. An exception in many ways, some might say. Some black consciousness supporters dismiss her as the "mother of the northern suburb liberals." Others, pointing to the sacrifices she has made, regard her as an exception among whites.

Those who subscribe to the ANC-backed Freedom Charter point to her as an example of how committed whites can work with blacks. In fact, until the recent emergence of young radicals, Helen Joseph was one of the very few white women in South Africa to side openly with the liberation struggle.

In the marathon treason trial between 1957 and 1962, she was one of two whites among the major accused. After the trial and five months in detention, she was the first person in the country to be placed under house arrest.

At the age of 83, the "tough old bag" still recalls her career in politics and her 57-year stay in her adopted country with remarkable clarity. Born Helen Fennell in Sussex, England, she graduated from London University with an honor’s degree in 1927. She went to India and taught at a girls’ school, but after a riding accident, she wrote to a friend who agreed that she could come to South Africa to recuperate. A year later, in 1932, she married a dentist, Billy Joseph. Joseph continued to teach and kept touch—and still does—with South Africans of Indian origin.

When World War II broke out, she joined the women’s auxiliary air force. "I had to give the troops lectures about conditions in South Africa. Before I could do that, I had to learn about South Africa. That is when I started finding out about the repression and the injustices against the black people." Ironically, some of those who opposed the South African war effort on the side of Britain were soon to be voted into power in South Africa.

After the war, while studying for a social work diploma at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, she was appointed director of a community center in a poor white suburb of the city. In 1948, she was divorced. A year later, she moved 900 miles away to Cape Town where she became a social worker among the "coloured" people of the Cape flats. "The social work was wonderful," she recalls. "It was like aspirin for a headache, but I needed to find myself active in politics."

Two years later, the Garment Workers Union’s Solly Sachs appointed her secretary of the Transvaal Clothing Industries Medical Aid Society in Johannesburg. She flirted with the Labour Party (since disbanded). Then came the Defiance Campaign of 1952-3, spearheaded by the ANC. It made a profound impression on Helen Joseph.

She was among those who decided to launch the Congress of Democrats, the white ally of the ANC. That is when she
"Until the recent emergence of young radicals, Helen Joseph was one of the very few white women in South Africa to side openly with the liberation struggle."

started working closely with black women leaders such as Lilian Ngoyi and Mary Moodley, who influenced her enormously, and Albertina Sisulu. They launched FEDSAW in 1954, with Joseph becoming its provincial and then national secretary.

In 1956, she was among the leaders of a massive march on Pretoria to protest the issuance of the dreaded passbooks to African women. Later, she was arrested along with many other activists and accused of treason. During the trial, she came into closer contact with Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Moses Kotane, Lilian Ngoyi, and others. "They had to prepare me to give evidence. It was a tremendous education. I am very proud of that," she says. Though the state's case collapsed, Helen Joseph was banned for five years. This meant she could not attend meetings.

"We thought then that was pretty tough. But far worse was to come."

Initialy with Amina Kachalia and Joe Morolong, she covered 8,000 miles in two months, traveling to all parts of South Africa and neighboring countries such as Swaziland and Basutoland (now Lesotho). "We found 34 out of about 140. The banishments had been going on for 12 years. The wives of some of the men had not seen them since they were taken from home. The men were banished to distant rural areas where the language was strange. They were illiterate and therefore could not communicate with their families. They were horrifying places.

"The worst were Frenchdale and Driefontein. In one instance, six men lived in a hut. There was nothing inside. There was nothing outside. It was so devastatingly lonely and bare. The men got two £2 a month, of which three-
quarters was in the form of food rations. Their agony was horrifying. It was remarkable that they stayed whole men and didn't go bonkers.

"They were left to nothingness. There was no end to their term of banishment. Only the Governor-General (when South Africa was still part of the Commonwealth) could decide to let them out. They waited for death or freedom, whichever would come first. When we told their families, they didn't believe the men were still alive. They cried when we arranged visits for them."

The men were later allowed out of banishment. "The government," says Joseph, "no longer needs that law. It has acquired more weapons such as banning and detention without trial, and arms which it uses." She addressed meetings throughout the country to highlight the plight of the men. The government retaliated with a new weapon. It placed Helenjoseph under house arrest. It placed her under house arrest.

She had to be at home between 6:30 pm and 6:30 am, all day Sundays and public holidays, and report each day at noon to the police or be charged with breaking the law. She was charged. She couldn't speak to banned people—and most of her friends were banned. "In 1964, I was listed as a communist. That meant I couldn't—and still can't—be quoted in South Africa. Why they took such action against me, I don't know. They knew I am not a communist, that I live alone."

In 1966, she was "quietly paid off, sacked" from her job. "I believe," Joseph speculates, "that the security [police] branch told them I had maligned the GWU in my book published in England. That was not true. But I am grateful the union looked after me for 16 years through detention, trial, and house arrest until I became a hot potato. I'm very grateful to them."

In 1971, she was found to have cancer. "The government got frightened that I might die, so they lifted the house arrest." Frightened or not, the restrictions placed on Helenjoseph are exceptional for their lack of logic. She can address public meetings, but she cannot be quoted in South Africa, which means that this interview can't be published in South Africa, but can be printed overseas. Her autobiography, Side by Side, published abroad two years ago, can be imported to South Africa, but cannot be distributed here. She is allowed to be a patron of a political organization, but not a member or office bearer.

The National Union of South African Students (Nusas) elected her honorary president. For two years at its meetings, Joseph recalls, Nusas left an empty chair on the stage to symbolize her restrictions. She is now an honorary vice-president of Nusas. "Actually, I am the honorary unpresident," she laughs.

She is also a patron of the Federation of Transvaal Women. In 1983, when the United Democratic Front was launched in Cape Town, she was elected one of its patrons. "I was described as the mother of the struggle," says Joseph. "I don't deserve that, but I am very proud."

It was an accolade repeated by Winnie Mandela, wife of the jailed ANC leader, when she spoke at a small party of friends who were invited to celebrate Joseph's 83rd birthday. Mandela described Joseph as her mother. There is great mutual affection between them. Pride of place among the pictures, sketches, and copy of the Freedom Charter on the walls of Joseph's living room goes to a color photograph of Winnie Mandela hugging her.

"When Winnie spoke at my party, she was so natural, so graceful. She put it so beautifully and simply that I am her mother. I didn't deserve it, but I can understand it because she is the daughter I had never had. She calls me 'mama.' We influence each other mutually. Whenever we get together, it is like a family reunion."

When news of the party was carried in a local newspaper, a man whose voice she recognized from threatening calls in the past phoned her. He started to sing. "Happy birthday to you, happy birthday Helen, happy birthday to you," she mimicks his whine. "Happy birthday Helen, now I am coming to kill you." She hung up.

She doesn't scare easily. When she was under house arrest, someone pumped shotgun bullets into her bedroom. Someone also attached a bomb to the front gate of her house. The device was prime to go off when she opened the gate. The package looked like a kite, says Joseph.

"My dog barked wildly. When I went to pick up the package, I noticed the batteries attached to it." She put it down gingerly and called the bomb disposal squad. She asked a member of the squad how much damage the bomb would have done. "It wouldn't be lethal—you might have lost an arm or a leg." Laughs Joseph: "That was a comfort."

Helenjoseph is comforted by the fact that she still has many friends and others who recognize her role in the South African struggle. Asked if she has lost many white friends, she says, "In Norwood, I'm called 'that commie.' I've always been something of a loner. But I've been too busy making friends to notice those I had lost."

But what of the future? "I want to see freedom first before I die," she says wistfully. But will she? "I don't know. I wish I could say yes firmly... But I don't think it will take place during my life."

"What is important is what Oliver Tambo [the ANC president] said in America, and I agree with him: 'We can see light at the end of the tunnel.' " Joseph adds: "It's a long, rough road yet, but we can see the light." Asked what makes her say so, she replies, "My faith in the people, my experience with the young, my experience of the people's resistance to tyranny and repression."

"We had this latest crackdown [in February!]. It's happened before, but the people pick themselves up and go on. I see the wonderful courage of people on trial as it was in the 1960s. Their commitment just can't be broken. I would like to see a massive sanctions campaign, but I also believe in the enormous growth underground of the ANC. What we are seeing, their actions, is a tip of the iceberg."

How would she like to be remembered after her death? "A journalist once asked what the government had done to me. I told him they made me a tough old bag. I would like to be remembered as a tough old bag. And the UDF called me the mother of the struggle. I'd like to be remembered as that too," she adds without the slightest trace of arrogance.
Challenging the Restrictions

BY JOETHLOLOE

The South African government's recent clampdown on anti-apartheid organizations and individuals has failed to assuage its right-wing, nor has it succeeded in intimidating popular protest. Various groups are challenging the restrictions and looking for creative ways to continue their work.

The restrictions placed by the South African government on 18 organizations on February 24 appear to have had three objectives in mind: to win back voters who are defecting in large numbers to the right-wing Conservative Party, to intimidate organizations to the left of the government to the point where they voluntarily inhibit themselves, and finally to do all this while projecting a picture of reasonableness to the rest of the world.

The South African government continues to argue the reasonableness of the restrictions: The organizations have not been banned, only stopped from fomenting unrest; as soon as the state of emergency is lifted, they will be free to continue their normal activities; only a few of the United Democratic Front's (UDF) 700 affiliates have been restricted and the rest can continue functioning normally; etc.

To the South African government, the world's angry reaction to the restrictions seems perverse, if one is to judge by the reports of the South African Broadcasting Corporation. The govern-
ment could have used the Internal Security Act to close down the organizations permanently as it did with the African National Congress (ANC) and the Fan Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1960 and the black consciousness organizations in 1977. Instead it used its powers under the state of emergency, making the restrictions appear, at least on paper, temporary.

There was also an inexplicably random selection of organizations and people which were targeted: the UDF and a handful of its affiliates, the Azanian People's Organization (Azapo) and its recently-formed youth wing, the Azanian Youth Organization (Azayo), and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). The overwhelming majority of the UDF affiliates can still function normally. On the black consciousness side, the Azanian Students Movement, which provides the majority of members in Azapo, has been left untouched.

From the selection of organizations, one can safely assume that the intention was not to ban them, but to frighten the left into toeing the line. But the line between what is acceptable to the government and what is not is vaguely defined. The Detainees Parents Support Committee monitors detentions-without-trial and gives support to relatives of people in detention; the Soweto Civic Association is among the organizations behind the current rent boycott in Soweto; Azayo has just been formed and has not started on any effective campaign; and Cosatu is a trade union federation.

The only thing that all these organizations have in common is that they oppose the government and the National Party. But others saying and doing exactly the same things have not been restricted. Even the restrictions on people appear to have followed the same random pattern: Albertina Sisulu, one of the three presidents of the UDF, was restricted, but equally vocal UDF patron Dr. Allan Boesak was not.

Just to add to the seeming confusion, the government slapped the same measures on a committee that was formed to oppose the measures—the Committee for the Defense of Democracy (CDD), created by a number of concerned clergymen. The ban on the CDD was another clear indication that the government is hoping that anti-apartheid groups will check themselves, fearing that they could be next.

The restrictions were carefully timed, announced on the eve of the by-elections in Standerton and Schweizer-Renehke on March 2. That the government subsequently lost the by-elections to Dr. Andries Treurnicht's Conservative Party shows that one of the three objectives was not achieved. Ironically, the closure of the New Nation for three months was again announced by the government on the eve of another by-election, this time in Randfontein on March 30. Again the National Party lost to the Conservative Party.

But has it been able to check the left? The answer again is no. All it has done is to fuel anger among blacks. The restrictions come when most of the unrest in the townships has subsided, when the townships are nursing a sullen anger, licking their wounds after the bloodletting that started in September 1984. The anger remains, ready to burst open again in future.

Immediately after the restrictions were announced, a new organization designated the Azanian Coordination Committee (Azacco) was created "to fill the political vacuum created through the banning of legitimate people's organizations." This committee was one of the organizations that organized a Sharpeville Day service at Soweto's Regina Mundi church.

This year's Sharpeville Day, March 21, when South Africa remembers 69 people who were killed when the PAC protested against the pass laws in 1960, also demonstrated the anger that was aroused by the restrictions.

On the eve of Sharpeville Day, 13 affiliates of the UDF placed advertisements in the country's newspapers calling on "the people of South Africa—our workers, students, traders, and professionals, and on all democratic and peace-seeking organizations, churches, mosques, and temples—to protest the banning of the UDF and 17 other organizations, the silencing of Govan Mbeki, Albertina Sisulu, Archie Gumede, and all our leaders, and the restrictions on Cosatu."

March 21 saw thousands of black workers staying away from work, making the streets of Johannesburg look as if a plague had wiped out the population. The strike was well supported in Johannesburg, the Vaal triangle, the eastern Cape, and Durban.

Thus the restrictions had very little effect on the ability of the various bodies to organize. Notwithstanding the fact that the restrictions exist largely on paper, four of the restricted organizations—the UDF, the Release Mandela Campaign, the Detainees Parents Support Committee, and Cosatu—have started litigation to have them set aside by the courts. The case is to be heard in the Cape Supreme Court. Lawyers acting for these organizations are arguing that the state of emergency was not properly proclaimed and that the regulations that flow from it are invalid.

Even if the organizations win this round, it might be another hollow victory, with the government going back to the drawing boards to rewrite the regulations. The newspapers know about these empty victories: When they had the regulations under the state of emergency set aside by the courts, the government went back to write even tougher ones that were technically harder to challenge.

At another level, the organizations continue searching for ways to fight the restrictions. Cosatu has called a special congress for early May to discuss them and it has announced that if the government interferes with the congress, it will call for "three days of protest"—indicating the fight still left in the restricted organizations.

The South African government has thus failed to achieve any of the objectives it had hoped to achieve—the left is not intimidated and is in fact adapting to the restrictions, the white right is still convinced that the government is soft on "terrorism," and the rest of the world is now convinced that there is no progress in the reform program.

But with typical South African arrogance, nobody in government is going to admit "we were wrong." Instead, it will continue to tell the world "to do its damned," as the South African ambassador recently threatened at the United Nations.
Standing Up for the Voiceless

The South African government, apparently intent on crushing all vestiges of organized dissent, is in the midst of a three-pronged attack on anti-apartheid organizations. The assault includes the February 24 restrictions on 17 major anti-apartheid organizations and 18 individuals, a "creeping crackdown" on the alternative media, and pending legislation which would block foreign funding of organizations and individuals whose activities are considered to have "political purposes."

Among the targets of the February 24 restrictions, which are in force until the state of emergency is lifted, were the Detainees' Parents Support Committee (DPSC) and the Release Mandela Campaign—groups which have played an important role in drawing local and international attention to the excesses of the state security apparatus and the plight of political prisoners and detainees.

The DPSC was founded in August 1981 by the parents and friends of detainees held in a wave of arrests. From small beginnings, the group evolved into a countrywide monitoring and advocacy organization, whose fact sheets and reports were considered both locally and overseas to be among the most reliable records of repression available.

Prior to the declaration of the first limited state of emergency in July 1985, the DPSC was already beginning to gain prominence as an advocate of detainees' rights. In 1982, the organization designated March 12 as "National Detainees Day," a day of protest and remembrance that annually grew in scope until this year's crackdown. The same year, the DPSC published a "Memorandum of Torture," one of the first reports to break through the veil of secrecy surrounding the treatment of detainees, alleging the use of torture in 72 detailed case studies.

As a result of the organization's representations, the minister of law and order drew up directives for the treatment of detainees held incommunicado under Section 29 of the Internal Security Act.

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Detainees' Parents Support Committee meeting: "One of the organization's most important functions was to publish the names and organizational affiliations of detainees"
"From small beginnings, the DPSC evolved into a countrywide monitoring and advocacy organization, whose fact sheets and reports were considered among the most reliable records of repression available."

Although not legally binding, the directives specified that a "detainee shall at all times be treated in a humane manner with proper regard to the rules of decency and shall not in any way be assaulted or otherwise ill-treated or subjected to any form of inhumane or degrading treatment."

The DPSC grew exponentially as repression increased in response to the uprisings that began in September 1984. Committees were established around the country and an advice office was opened in Johannesburg shortly before the first declaration of a limited state of emergency in July 1985. The DPSC campaigned for changes in the security laws and the rights of political prisoners and worked closely with family members of detainees, who at the height of the repression, would form lines stretching out the door of its Johannesburg advice office.

Staffers helped families in the often Herculean task of tracing detained family members, in finding lawyers, and when permitted, in arranging visits, food parcels, and clothing. Needy detainees were given tracksuits and a small weekly allowance to buy items at the prison store. The DPSC also established a medical and psychological panel to assist detainees with the frequent problems that resulted from their incarceration.

In order to help break the isolation felt by former detainees and the family members of current detainees, the DPSC gave regular tea parties often attended by as many as 600 people. Because most political gatherings are proscribed under the emergency, these social occasions were an important source of solidarity.

One of the organization's most important functions was simply to publish the names and organizational affiliations of detainees. "The authorities wanted to carry out detentions in secret," noted a founding member. Police are not required to release the names of detainees, and under the terms of the emergency, the media is not allowed to report their names unless permission is granted by the ministry of law and order.

In 1987, the government passed emergency legislation forbidding any reports on conditions of detention. Even evidence given in trials—which can usually be published freely under court privilege—could only be reported after a final judgment, which could take months or even years.

Nevertheless, in the first weeks of the nationwide state of emergency in 1986, the DPSC compiled thousands of names of detainees, which were published in a Johannesburg newspaper, and continued to release extensive listings. The only organization able to calculate the sheer magnitude of government repression, it has estimated that at least 30,000 people have been detained for varying periods since the June 12, 1986 emergency declaration. Prior to being restricted, the DPSC estimated that there are still 2,000 people in detention, at least 250 of whom are under age 18.

DPSC members believe the organization started riling authorities when its work became more overtly anti-apartheid, particularly after members concluded that campaigning against detention was useless unless one targeted the underlying political structure. Campaigns in alliance with other anti-apartheid organizations to free children held in detention, as well as an international program to "unlock apartheid's jails," were widely publicized.

An indication of its effectiveness was the virulent attack delivered by Minister of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok last October, after the organization participated in an international conference in Harare on children in detention. Vlok said the DPSC was using every imaginable platform to smear South Africa by telling the world the government was detaining and martyring innocent children.

Campaigns by the Release Mandela Committee, the DPSC, and other organizations on behalf of detainees and political prisoners resulted in a decree in April 1987 banning such community actions by empowering the commissioner of police to identify certain acts, like wearing a button calling for the release of detainees, as "subversive statements." The Release Mandela Committee, the Black Sash, and the DPSC succeeded in having the order overturned in court on technical grounds. In April of this year, the state lodged an appeal.

With the effective banning of the DPSC, the advice offices and support work have been taken over in Johannesburg by the Black Sash and the Witwatersrand Council of Churches. As for the monitoring work, former DPSC members insist that it will continue.

"You cannot silence everybody," said one.

On April 23 in Johannesburg, Free the Children, an alliance of 26 organizations, held hearings on the detention of children. A DPSC campaign to highlight the plight of detained women with the slogan, "A woman's place is in the struggle, not behind bars," continued under the auspices of the Federation of Transvaal Women.

"The organizations are gone, but the people who are doing the work don't seem to stop," noted Sheena Duncan of the Black Sash. The amount of time it takes activists to regroup after a major crackdown "gets shorter each time," she said.

Nevertheless, activists and organizations dependent on the monitoring capabilities of the DPSC say they are experiencing increasing difficulty in gathering information. "We used to be able to call them up and get the latest list of detainees," said the American Committee on Africa's Jennifer Davis. "Now it is hard to get effective and quick information. We haven't had a bst to publish since the bannings."

One of the organizations likely to step into the breach created by the restrictions on the DPSC is the Black Sash, which has previously taken
a high profile on human rights issues. Last February, the Sash in Johannesburg held a meeting protesting unsolved political killings. And in April, the organization released a study, based on affidavits and statements collected by the Albany, Eastern Cape, and Border regions, supplemented by material from Eastern Cape lawyers, denouncing abuses by municipal police forces that have "brought terror and disorganization" into Eastern Cape communities.

At its annual meeting in March, the Sash resolved to help fill the need for service and crisis work created by the restrictions and also to use Sash publications and public platforms to provide outlets for the voices of banned organizations. However, this assistance might be short-lived. Sash members expect they will be among the groups whose activities will be curtailed by the newly tabled Promotion of Orderly Internal Politics Bill, which may become law before Parliament ends its session in June.

The legislation, proposed for March 1, is expected to effectively block the foreign financing of numerous anti-apartheid organizations and individuals, including the churches and trade unions, by fiatly prohibiting any organization or person from receiving any money which "may be used to further, propagate, pursue, or oppose any political aim or object."

"I do not know whether to pursue justice, democracy, and peace is to propagate a political aim or object," commented leading Black Sash member Sheena Duncan, "but the pursuit of those ideals certainly involves opposing the political aims and objects of apartheid."

The bill also gives the minister of justice the power to block foreign funds if he is "satisfied that an organization or person is being used as a channel for introducing money which . . . is to be used for the financing of activities which may endanger the safety of the public or the maintenance of public order, or which may delay the termination of the state of emergency." In all these cases, the minister has the discretion to act without prior notice or hearings. Penalties for contravening the legislation include heavy fines and jail terms.

The authorities have previously attempted to block the foreign funding of anti-apartheid activities through the Affected Organizations Act. However, according to Minister of Justice Kobie Coetsee, the advantages of the new legislation will be that funds brought in for "good, laudable aims" will not be restricted. "Foreign funders will find themselves having money accepted by the government purely for projects acceptable to the government," noted a Black Sash member.

The bill proposes the appointment of a registrar of restricted organizations and persons, who will have the right to appoint inspectors to search the offices of suspect organizations without prior notice. The inspectors may search all records, accounts, and documents, as well as examine any office-bearer of a restricted organization.

Among Black Sash projects that are financed with overseas support are the Transvaal Rural Action Committee, which monitors and attempts to fight forced removals, and the offices that dispense advice to the thousands of people caught in the tangle of apartheid legislation.

"There are hundreds of organizations doing work that is largely humanitarian that will be affected by this legislation, because their services come into conflict with the principles of apartheid," commented Black Sash President Mary Burton. "In our case, our protest work is derived from our experiences in our advice offices and our rural action."

"The legislation wouldn't kill the Sash. . . we would simply have to find other ways of working or raising that money."

The funding restrictions are also expected to add to the already extensive government arsenal trained on independent media outlets, many of which receive foreign financing. Adding to severe restrictions already in place, authorities published new regulations last August, providing for the suspension or prior censorship of publications that Minister of Home Affairs Stoffel Botha deems guilty of "systematic or repeated" publication of materials "promoting revolution."

The regulations provided for a progressive series of actions, leading the Weekly Mail, one of the publications targeted, to call it a "creeping dampdown."

In March, the Catholic Church-sponsored New Nation, whose editor, Zweelake Sisulu, has been in detention since December 1986, was suspended for three months after unsuccessfully contesting the minister's order in court. Among the items the minister found objectionable were advertisements implying police torture in South Africa and various articles and photographs that he alleged promoted the image of the banned African National Congress.

Other newspapers that have been warned are The Sowetan and two Cape publications, Grassroots and Saamstaan. Two periodicals that have been warned a second time and are thus closer to suspension are Work in Progress and South. One of the latter's transgressions, it appears, was to prove the minister of law and order wrong after he denied the detention of two 14-year-olds.
The Bhundu Boys, a Zimbabwean musical sensation that’s the talk of the British club circuit, hit New York recently with their jit music and local fans were anything but jittery.

Packed audiences at S.O.B’s, a down-town club, were treated to the true grit of the youthful quintet’s jit—sound—chopped bass cords complemented by infectious undertows of twinkling, interlocking lead guitars and a disco-like bass-drum that shifts to Latin, calypso, and rock beats all in one song.

The lyrics, delivered mostly in Shona (Zimbabwe’s major language), speak of the trials and travails of social problems confronting a post-independence Zimbabwe, presented in an upbeat, sometimes humorous fashion.

For the converted, the New York sessions were déjà-vu to the days “back home” when a gxxl time meant not missing a live set of raunchy jit sounds at the local community hall, performed by a garage band—classmates with squeaky instruments.

As a teenager, I vividly remember the intense competition in Zimbabwean backyards among local groups to put out the most appealing:!? sound. Since I realized early that I possessed neither singing nor instrument-playing talent (not even a triangle), I settled for the task of carrying around equipment for band members.

Back to New York: It was reassuring to witness that the music finally had crossed its traditional boundaries and that the audience was taken by its rhythm, if not its subtle, progressive political message.

While belting away at “Ndipeiwo Manhenga” (please give me some wings), Biggie Tembo, the group’s ever-smiling front man, asks the audience to make Happing motions and sounds to pretend we’re birds Hying into the sunset. The response is overwhelming. “Mhururu, mhururu! Mhurrrrr. . . ”, Tembo tells an obviously worked-up crowd at the conclusion of a pulsating tune. “Mhurrrrrr!” the audience responds on cue to this joyous chant that’s a mainstay of Zimbabwean wedding ceremonies.

As testimony to how good music transcends language, the audience was on its feet throughout the two-hour sets and occasionally, when the group delivered a tune interspersed with English lyrics, the crowd roared. The group talks about everyday people who frequent after-hours joints where alcohol is served illegally. The band members act out the characters in the song they’re performing, “Shabini” (speakeasy). The moral of the story: Many people spend their paychecks trying to impress friends at these shabins, but those friends disappear when they go broke.

The group dwelled on material from their three albums—Shabini, Tsvimbodzemoto (a reference to guns in the liberation struggle), and True Jit. The latter album is scheduled to be released next month in the U.S. by Island Records.

To American audiences, jit music is so different and yet so danceable. Says one lady on the dance floor, her pair of shoes in kind: “I know I hkedjit the first time I heard it last night. It reminded me of something, I don’t know what. I know I haven’t heard this music in my life and yet it’s kind of, er, nostalgic. You know what I mean, right?” Well, not exactly, but I can surmise it’s the;tf bug. I understand.

Which brings us to the young men behind this phenomenon. The Bhundu Boys—their name is derived from a reference to the Zimbabwean freedom fighters in the war for liberation against the white-minority regime of Rhodesia—came together in 1980, shortly after Zimbabwe’s independence. They are: Kenny Chisvatsva, drums; Rise Kagona, guitar; Shakie Kangwena, keyboards; David Mankaba, bass; and Tembo, guitar. They all sing.

“We came a long way to even begin getting some form of the recognition that we’re getting now,” says Tembo in his hotel room in the Upper West Side. Indeed, the “Boys,” as they are affectionately referred to by Zimbabwean fans, rose to their current fame the old-fashioned way—they earned it.

“The message behind our music hasn’t changed since we formed the band. What has changed is the way we present it,” Tembo says. “After our independence, every Zimbabwean had reached a certain level of consciousness that comes with attaining liberation. But we also realized that we had a new war to fight, that of social ills. We felt we had a responsibility to promote the betterment of our people. Gaining indepen-
dence alone does not accomplish that," he says.

With a frankness that's uncharacteristic of most musicians, Tembo then goes into a detailed analysis of the economics and politics of his country, emphasizing that the group members' sense of patriotism is engrained in their musical mission. That's not to say, he adds, that they don't criticize some government policies they feel do not necessarily advance the interests of ordinary citizens. "We grew up ordinary people, still are ordinary people and we want to stay that way. So, it is only natural that our music reflects the experience of ordinary citizens."

I was told some time ago by a music writer that I should always ask artists the obligatory question: Who influenced your music? Without exception, all band members look up to Thomas Mapfumo, another Zimbabwean artist, as one of the many people who guided their music in its initial stages. Mapfumo, one of the most popular Zimbabwean musicians, is known for his chimurenga (liberation) songs—music that was an inspiration to many during the years leading up to independence. Beyond that, Tembo says it's unfair "to characterize one person or group as having influenced us. It's not true. We listen to everything from rock, reggae, disco, to the blues."

Growing up in colonial Rhodesia, Tembo says that most Zimbabweans had no choice but to be subjected to European music because whites controlled everything in the country, including entertainment outlets. The evidence is there in the Boys' twin-guitar playing—

"The lyrics, delivered mostly in Shona, speak of the trials and travails of social problems confronting a post-independence Zimbabwe, presented in an upbeat, sometimes humorous fashion."

influences of rock groups like Led Zeppelin, Black Sabbath, Thin Lizzy, the Rolling Stones, and Jimi Hendrix.

"Within Zimbabwe, Thomas Mapfumo's chimurenga (with guitars playing to the mbira sound) music served as a background, some kind of soundtrack, during our war of liberation. When we came onto the scene it was soon after independence and people were ready for something uplifting," says Tembo. "It's not that Zimbabweans don't want to hear Mapfumo's music at all. No, they want something that has always been there, jit music, but no one had bothered to record it. Along with other artists like John Chibadura (another/oriented Zimbabwean artist), we started publishing the sound. We filled a void."

The trek from Zimbabwe to Britain two years ago is a story the Boys often want to talk about. Says guitarist Kagonya: "Scotland was disheartening, but we kept working on it. In our first date, 20 people showed up at this club and after the first few songs everybody started yelling at us, 'You're black, play some reggae or some disco.' We held our ground. We're here to play/-. And they all left the club."

It all began in 1986, when a Scottish graphics designer named Gordon Muir heard some tapes of the group's music through a friend. Muir becomes enthralled and contacts the group in Harare, Zimbabwe. He asks them to do 10 dates in Scotland and they won't even have to bring their instruments; he'll take care of everything. Fine. The Boys arrive in Scotland. But where are the instruments? This guy Muir has no business address and he doesn't have any experience in entertainment management. Never mind, the Zimbabweans are optimistic and they work things out with the Scot.

Before long, the group is playing dates all over Europe and they land a recording contract. The word is out that they were signed on by WEA, the Warner Bros, subsidiary in Europe, for a five-record deal. In the works also is a world tour that would include U.S. dates. "The tour will begin in Africa, we hope. You see, we're very particular about that. A lot of our brothers and sisters who achieve international recognition find it very difficult to come back home to Africa to perform. They want to go all over the world except Africa. We feel differently," Tembo says.

The Bhundu Boys' next date is in Boston. After that they're due in Washington, D.C. and other appearances are in the works. Prior to their New York debut, they appeared to critical acclaim in San Francisco and Los Angeles.

So what does Tembo make of the U.S. reception to their music? "I was surprised that the American audience readily accepted our style. Before we came over, everyone was telling us that after one appearance, we might as well pack our bags because Americans don't easily accept what's foreign to them. I disagree. The response of the audiences in New York and in California doesn't hold the predictions to be true," he says with a big smile.
In the 1960s, a small nucleus of African women began to voice their feelings about the female condition in colonial and post-colonial Africa, drawing attention to the daily problems of women living in societies in transition, caught between "tradition" and "modernity."

Writers such as Grace Ogot (The Promised Land) from Kenya, Mabel Dove-Danquah (Anticipation) from Ghana, and Adeleke Casely-Hayford (Mista Courifer) from Sierra Leone adopted a relatively moderate position, their analyses restricted to the ways in which African women are subjugated, with their sole recognition stemming from motherhood. Others, like Ama Ata Aidoo (Dilemma of a Ghost) and Efia Sutherland (Edufa) from Ghana, and Flora Nwapa (Efuma) from Nigeria made the emancipation of African women central to their work.

In the 1970s, a second wave of African women writers emerged with Nigerian Buchi Emechta (Second Class Citizen), South African Bessie Head (A Question of Power), and Senegalese Nanissatou Diallo (A Dakar Childhood) and Mariama Ba (So Long a Letter, The Scarlet Song).

They boldly contested conventional attitudes toward African women which, in the words of Leopold Sedar Senghor, assumed, "The African woman doesn't need to be liberated. She has been free for many thousands of years." To this effect, several among them brought the institution of polygamy into sharp focus, challenging those who equate it with African identity and tradition.

The novels of Mariama Ba in particular, during her brief career as a writer, provide a rare insight into the intimate world of African women living in a polygamous society as seen and felt from within. Her tales surface from the fundamentals of her religion, culture, and society.

Ba has been praised for adding a new dimension to writing in Africa by paving the way toward the development of a "female imagination." Her articulation of the aspirations, fears, and problems of African women in a balanced, non-polemical style is characterized by acute sensitivity and emotional intensity, devoid of sentimentality.

Her largely autobiographical first novel, So Long a Letter, published in 1980, was chosen among 130 works of African writers of diverse fields contesting for the prestigious Noma Award for Publishing in Africa. It was translated into 12 languages and is now regarded as a classic. Her second book, A Scarlet Song, was published after her premature death in August 1981.

Mariama Ba was born in Dakar in 1929 of Senegalese parents. Her mother died when she was too young to remember her and she was raised by her maternal grandparents. Her father, a banker and politician, wielded considerable influence on her. He taught her how to read and furnished her with books from his travels around Africa. A devout Muslim, she received an Islamic and French education following which she taught primary school. Though a mother of nine children and an active member of the Senegalese feminist movement, she chose to describe herself as an "average woman of the house."

A Scarlet Song unfolds in the form of a letter written by Kamatoulaye, a recently widowed mother of 12, to Aissatou, a childhood friend living in the U.S. The narrative revolves around an Islamic religious and juridical precept, the mirasse, which defines the exact nature and procedure of inheritance in the Muslim family. Ba uses the mirasse as a device that enables Ramatoulaye not only to disclose her husband Modou's material possessions but also to expose his character and deeds.

Ramatoulaye laments the death of her husband, but in confessing her uncompromising love for him, it gradually becomes apparent that he had repudiated her. After 25 years of marriage, Modou suddenly took a second wife, and adding insult to injury, chose a classmate of Kamatoulaye's daughter. He effectively abandoned his senior wife to her own resources and made her emotionally redundant.

Only after Modou's death do Ramatoulaye's true feelings begin to surface. She realizes that there was no justification for his taking a second wife: "I was irritated. He was asking me to understand. But to understand what? The supremacy of instinct? The right to betray? The justification of the desire for variety? I couldn't be an ally to polygamous instincts. What, then, was I to understand?"

Aissatou's experience as senior wife in a polygamous union was similar. However, she categorically rejected the fait accompli and left her husband in order to pursue a career abroad. Her example offers Ramatoulaye a constant source of encouragement and hope. With this newly-born consciousness, she confidently rebuffs two propositions to polygamous marriage, optimistic about her prospects as a single woman. Ramatoulaye starts as a deceived and abandoned wife trapped in tradition and emerges as an assertive woman determined to pass her experience on to her daughter.

A Scarlet Song offers an account of the racial, class, and cultural conflicts that destroy an interracial marriage with polygamy as a catalyst. Just as the originality of So Longa Letterhes in the use of the mirasse, so that of A Scarlet Song is embedded in a Wolof proverb that appears at the end of the book: "When one abandons one's own hill, the next hill which one climbs will crumble," in other words, the repudiation of one's culture leads to ruin.

Mireille de la Valée, a French diplomat's daughter, falls in love with Ousmane Gueye, a struggling Senegalese fellow student. When her parents find out about their liaison, they send her back to France. The couple is determined to overcome all obstacles and af-
ter years of correspondence, Ousmane goes to France and marries Mireille who converts to Islam.

Just as the problems seem to have been resolved, their tragedy begins. The couple returns to Senegal after being disowned by Mireille’s parents. Ousmane’s family, particularly his mother, treats her with suspicion and hostility, despite her efforts to adjust to her new environment.

Meanwhile, Ousmane is overwhelmed by a misguided desire to assert his negritude at the expense of his French wife and their half-caste son. He secretly marries his Senegalese childhood sweetheart and establishes a second household with the help of Mireille’s salary. When the latter finds out about her co-wife, driven by despair and revenge, she poisons her son and stabs her husband.

Bá succeeds in balancing the dilemmas of both characters. As an African, she identifies with the forces that motivate Ousmane. After repudiating his background to marry Mireille, he is expected to conform to her Western conception of marriage. In addition, family pressures, religion, and the desire to be accepted by his peers further distance him from her. His decision to marry the woman he was in love with as an adolescent signifies his need to return to his roots.

As a woman, Bá is sympathetic towards Mireille who provides a sharp contrast to her other female characters. Her experience with polygamy is similar to Ramatoulaye’s, yet their responses are diametrically opposite. Ramatoulaye resiliency acquiesces until her husband dies; Mireille rejects polygamy outright, while the added conflicts of color, class, and culture further exacerbate her predicament.

She renounces her own culture assuming she can adopt Ousmane’s, but once abandoned, she has nothing to fall back on. Her son, half-black, half-white, is not accepted by either culture or family and unlike Ramatoulaye, Mireille has nothing positive to pass on to him. Victim of an injustice beyond her sphere of reference, she resorts to violence.

Manama Bá’s work analyzes the social forces that induce men to take many wives and compel most women to acquiesce. She traces the process of abandonment of the senior wives and focuses on their response. Her premise is that polygamy is based on a distorted and exploitative relationship between husband and wife; she holds both sides responsible, though men more so than women.

This precarious and negative interaction directly affects the welfare of the family, while its social, economic, and cultural ramifications pose a formidable obstacle to social change. In the words of one of her heroines, “The success of the family is born of a couple’s harmony... The nation is made up of all the families, rich or poor, united or separated. The success of a nation therefore depends inevitably on the family.”

Thus, for Manama Bá, polygamy is more than just a problem concerning women. It is an urgent social ailment upon whose cure depends the future well-being of society. The antidote she proffers is based on an alternative role model for African women that radically redefines the institution of marriage, the family, and society at large.

The stereotype of submissive African women stoically resigned to their polygamous lot is dismissed by demonstrating how the devastation of abandonment can set off a struggle that transforms them. Once abandoned, her heroines develop a consciousness of equality and justice that gradually frees them from the confines of marriage. They emerge confident enough to control their lives and futures, inspiring others to follow suit.

Manama Bá’s work underscores that polygamy will not be abolished through the repudiation of African tradition and culture. Rather, it will become obsolete only when the role of African women (and by extension that of the family and society in general) is redefined from within. The author did not explain in detail how an alternative model of African womanhood might overcome obstacles associated with tradition, nor did she indicate what role men might play in the redefinition of marriage and the family. Nonetheless, Bá has established a vital link between polygamy and development and has set a high standard for the literature of social change.
The roots of American soul food go back to West Africa. When you go there, you'll find greens, yams and barbecue galore.

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