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Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega with Flt.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings: "We identify with the struggle of the Nicaraguan people to be a free and sovereign nation even if they are in the backyard of a superpower"

Flt.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings
Chairman, Provisional National Defence Council, Ghana

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: It has been nearly five years since you called for "nothing less than a revolution" to transform Ghana's society and economy. Have you achieved the transformation in Ghanaians' attitudes that you sought, and if not, who is to blame—you and your government or the Ghanaians themselves? Rawlings: That call for "nothing less than a revolution" remains valid. It is a challenge to the Ghanaians as well as the government. A total transformation of Ghana's society and economy was needed to reverse the dramatic decline. It was not to be a coup—the replacement of one set of people holding political office with another lot, and then "business as usual." No! The period since December 31, 1981, has certainly not been a "business as usual" period. Many changes are taking place in the attitudes of people. There is a growing recognition that our economic reality is what we make it, how much productivity we generate, how the rewards we expect are related to what we have produced, etc. But of course, old attitudes remain and what is worse, influential groups in our society are sometimes manipulated against their own interest and into opposing necessary progress. We could have moved further ahead within this period—sometimes we take a couple of steps forward and then we are pulled back a step.

But you must not forget that there have been powerful forces against us from the beginning, determined that we do

Shortly after the coup attempt in Lomé, Flt.-Lt. Rawlings answered the Togolese government's charges in an exclusive interview with Africa Report. The Ghanaian leader also comments on his country's troubled relationship with the United States and outlines new initiatives in the political and economic spheres.
not survive, and they have not stopped. A personal disappointment I have is about how much time I have had to devote to the issues of our nation's security instead of being out there with the people, securing the future of our children through a massive effort of mobilization for productivity. Significantly though, our people themselves have made sure their responsibility. Our security is not from any elaborate apparatus we have created—it is from the confidence that we have gained in ourselves as a people, in our ability to create the new Ghana, from our determination to be satisfied with nothing less than a revolution!

Africa Report: Your efforts have come under a lot of scrutiny—and criticism—from Western observers of varying political persuasions. Some analysts have called Ghana a "split personality nation," citing what they perceive as a contradiction between your government's capitalist economic policies and your staunchly anti-imperialist foreign policy. Leftist analysts have said that you have been won over by the right in what they have termed an internal struggle between socialist/Marxist thinkers and "economic pragmatists." Is there any truth in either of these analyses?

Rawlings: Shouldn't the analysts and observers be asking themselves whether their categories for analyzing us are not defective? For instance, we identify with the struggle of the Nicaraguan people to be a free and sovereign nation even if they are in the "backyard" of a superpower; we make no compromises with apartheid in South Africa; we remain true to our foundation membership in the Non-Aligned Movement, and some observers see this as being anti-West and hence do not understand that we can have economic relations with institutions like the World Bank or the IMF. But this is strange. Many people in the United States support the struggles of the Nicaraguans and of black South Africans. The House of Representatives and the Senate have overturned President Reagan's veto on the sanctions legislation. Many of the congressmen and senators are even Republicans, members of the President's party who even admire his president. Are they schizophrenic to part company with him when principle demands it?

The causes that we defend in our foreign policy and our economic policy are wholly consistent. We aspire to establish an economic system that caters for the needs of our population. But our economy is part of the world economy, and we are hit by external constraints, such as the prices of cocoa and gold. We have also been hit by natural disasters such as bush fires and drought. And we have said: Here's what we are doing, any help from outside, from countries that we have had centuries of economic interaction with, is most welcome as long as it is consistent with our objectives. When any country has said, "Go down on your knees before we help you with morsels of food," we have said, "No way!"

You know, many of these critics do not really understand the psychology of the downtrodden—we demand our freedom to be, to create, and to trade the products of our creativity with even the most powerful. We will not be cowed by their sheer power because we believe that however powerless we are, we share a common humanity, a desire for dignity, and a measure of independence. This is what makes for individuality even at the level of nations and cultures, and those who only search the world for masters and their slaves will not find us! Africa Report: Your economic recovery program continues to win you praise from Western donors and creditors, yet criticism from certain sectors of Ghanaian society, i.e. the unions, which have suggested that you have sacrificed their interests to the IMF. Has your economic program given you more headaches than concrete achievements? What advice would you give other African governments contemplating an equally rigorous IMF-supported economic reform effort?

Rawlings: It is not advice that we would give to other African governments—they have their own reality and can negotiate with as much conscientiousness as we are trying to do. But it is clear to me how important it is for us to exchange ideas, to compare notes on our experiences and not make the same mistakes, whether these are mistakes of technical appreciation or of negotiating strategy, or even of a more political kind. In dealing with donors, the IMF or what have you, we must remember that they have interests which will need to be molded to our particular situation. There may even be dogmas that our practical situation refutes and we need to make foreign agencies sensitive to what our reality is. This requires a constant vigilance as well as close attention to technical detail. Loan institutions should not set our priorities, but that is always the danger, and we must admit in all honesty that when our preparatory work has not been as thorough as it should have been, we have sometimes given in to conditionalities that we should have thought through more fully.

"The effort of economic recovery can be painful given the background of laxity, but these headaches will be overcome by the lasting pain-killer of success in building a strong, efficient, more self-reliant economy in which the freest possible rein will be given to the creativity and initiative of the working people."

But the criticisms that you refer to from some sectors of Ghanaian society must be carefully assessed. Let me point out that some so-called spokesmen of the unions should not be equated with the unions. You see, the trade union movement, like other institutions—the military, political parties, etc.—has had its own history of power being exercised by a few who do not always express the real interests of that constituency. Some of these spokesmen do not see beyond the short-term; they will not analyze the implications of purely wage claims within an economy in which production is declining. We have not sacrificed the interests of working people to the IMF. We have certainly asked for restraint as far as immediate and often unreasonable demands are concerned, so that we can have a sustainable economic recovery in which workers will benefit the most. We must not forget that by restraining infla-
ton alone, this government has protected that worker’s wage. And for the overwhelming majority of working people—the peasants—we have ensured from the very beginning a fairer price for their produce. The producer price of cocoa has increased about four times since December 31, 1981. These are real gains even in the short-term. The effort of economic recovery can be painful given the background of laxity, but these headaches will be overcome by the lasting pain-killer of success in building a strong, efficient, more self-reliant economy in which the freest possible rein will be given to the creativity and initiative of the working people.

**Africa Report:** Nevertheless, some critics maintain that as a consequence of your tough economic policies, your credibility with the nation’s working classes—once the bedrock of your support—has eroded considerably, citing as evidence your difficulties with the Trades Union Congress. How would you respond? Do you think the Ghanaian people at large support the economic recovery program?

**Rawlings:** I think so, but I would also be the first to admit that people are entitled to expect more by way of improvement in their conditions of life. But the Ghanaian people understand that it is only out of their own sustained efforts—not from government handouts—that further improvements can come. The resources at government’s disposal are what the nation produces. The difficulties with the Trades Union Congress have often come from a communication gap. For instance, when we tried recently to begin a process of streamlining allowances that are paid in the public as well as private sector by abolishing the leave allowance, we should have provided the explanations very fully before the event. As it turned out, when the Secretary for Labor eventually went on the air about this issue, many workers wished they had known earlier. In fact, there have been some extremely frank discussions between members of government and the Trades Union Congress in recent months on the economic recovery program and there is growing understanding of what we are trying to do. I like to think that there is no longer an attitude of confrontation which some elements tried hard to instigate for their own purposes.

**Africa Report:** What is the economic rationale behind the weekly foreign exchange auction you have just introduced and how will it further the goals of your recovery program?

**Rawlings:** Foreign exchange is a scarce resource in Ghana and if the official banking system fails to recognize its scarcity premium, an avenue is provided for racketeers to exact rents. Providing foreign exchange at rates well below the actual transaction prices really means that the government is subsidizing such racketeering instead of appreciating the need to generate more foreign exchange for national needs. We have instituted the “second window” as a way of letting the value of official foreign exchange also be determined by first, those in the economy who need the foreign exchange to sustain their productivity, and second, those who generate the foreign exchange through their export activities. If the rate at the second window can provide us with additional resources to compensate better those who produce non-traditional exports like copra, that way we will ensure more foreign exchange and remove the premium that is obtained on the parallel market.

We are determined to make the official banking system the only foreign exchange market and not give easy money to those who engage in parallel market activity, who are only concerned for their private profit. The second window makes the determination of foreign exchange not just a subjective matter decided from time to time by the government. There are aspects of the functioning of the economy over which government really has little control.

**Africa Report:** On the political front, your government is criticized for having failed to achieve its goal of “participatory democracy,” that there are no avenues for the expression of political views. Some see the National Commission for Democracy as bereft of any new political initiatives. What is your response?

**Rawlings:** It is true that we have not quite institutionalized the new forms of participatory democracy that we are committed to developing, but the building blocks are being put in place, and in many ways, there is real participation in the affairs of government, particularly by sections of the community who previously would not have been allowed a voice. I wish you had been here a few months back when the regional conferences of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution [CDRs] were held. Representatives from all walks of life and all corners of the regions came together with their PNDC regional and district secretaries, regional heads of government departments, as well as some participants from central government, to thrash out problems and work out policies.
Democracy is not an easy one; we do not expect them to impose some foreign model or an abstraction on our situation. I know the commission has been interacting with people throughout the country so that they can express the deepest aspirations, values, and traditions of the nation. But I am also the first to urge the commission to speed up its work and enable us to move further to a clearer articulation and institutionalization of an authentic national democratic experience. I will have less work to do then!

Africa Report: Judging by the number of plots against your government which have been based in neighboring countries, it does not appear that your neighbors have become any more vigilant in controlling these elements. On the other hand, your government has been highly effective in aborting these attempts and in some cases apprehending the culprits, yet efforts to destabilize you continue unabated. Why, considering that you have signed security agreements with your neighbors with respect to these attempts?

Rawlings: We know who have been involved in these plots and we have often notified our neighbors to the west and east, Ivory Coast and Togo, about the activities of some of these people. It is clear that substantial funds are being invested in the activities of these people, in purchasing tons of arms and ammunition for them, in facilitating their movement in and out of various capitals trying to coordinate their subversive acts. Our own security agencies have been vigilant enough to keep us ahead of them, but we have certainly expected cooperation from our neighbors, particularly when we provide detailed facts and figures of what is going on from their territory.

When we signed the quadripartite agreement between Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria in Lagos in December 1984, I made some observations I would like to recall: AH too often criminality is defined in terms of the small fry after whom law enforcement agencies go with great enthusiasm. When it comes to the big fish who have connections and are regarded as respectable even though their activities do more serious harm to our countries, there is a lot of hesitation and even covering up—this is true of cooperative efforts in tracking down crime, as well as local law enforcement.

As to why destabilization attempts continue against us, one basic factor is simply desperation. Those involved have already compromised themselves and have to go on as a way of life—a rather comfortable way of life, I might add, especially for the leading elements. With the financing they obtain from certain quarters, they cannot be idle—they must have something to show!

Africa Report: How do you react to the accusations by the Togolese government about Gliana's alleged involvement in the recent attempted uprising in Lome?

Rawlings: A host of contradictory and wild allegations have been made by the Togolese authorities, insinuating possible involvement of Ghana in the recent incident. We have been restrained in our reaction to these ridiculous and insulting accusations because we knew they were a pretext for introducing into this sub-region the armed presence of a big power. In fact, the whole story as it has been presented by the Togolese government is not really convincing. How can you believe that a group of "well-trained and well-equipped professional fighters," as they presented them, could be responsible
for such a muddled fiasco? It is even harder to believe that any serious country could have backed them! I am sure you know the standards of professionalism and expertise that Ghana's security forces have developed. Even France, which overreacted to Eyadema's SOS call, has been extremely cautious about mentioning any external implication. It is anyway a worrying fact for all the region that a country can so easily and without any proof of external threat bring in extra-African troops and means. The whole affair was strangely enough not a surprise for the Togolese authorities since a senior French officer close to Eyadema said to the public that they "were waiting for them."

In fact, Togo's attitude seems to be aimed at provoking a stronger reaction from our side. How else to understand that 16 days after the coup attempt, four Togolese jets flew over our Volta Region, many kilometers within our borders? We warned the Togolese authorities to put an end to their "show of strength" and rather to ensure our citizens' security. President Eyadema personally gave our diplomatic mission in Togo assurances which we expect to be made real. Our compatriots are still victims of unjustified harassment.

We have requested the Togolese government to provide information to assist investigations that we ourselves initiated to ascertain the possible involvement of, for instance, Togolese exiles who may have passed through Ghana. Unfortunately, we have not received a response from the Togolese. We absolutely do not believe in stirring up any problems for other countries and we will not be an alibi for any country's internal worries. Our adherence to the principles of the OAU and the UN is clear in the record of our political practice.

**Africa Report:** American policy toward Ghana appears somewhat schizophrenic—on the one hand, the U.S. praises your economic policies and on the other, you uncovered the existence of a substantial CIA network in Ghana, and American involvement in a mercenary attempt to overthrow you has been documented. How do you explain this? Do you believe the U.S. government is bent on overthrowing you, and if so, why?

**Rawlings:** Could it be that when you imagine somebody to have a "split personality" as you mentioned some observers believe about Ghana, you may also react in a split way to the different perceived sides of the personality! I don't know the answers to your questions. I have often asked myself why Ghana should be of such interest to the CIA and I have wondered to what extent the other organs of American foreign policy—the ambassadors and aid agencies for instance—knew of the CIA network that was admitted to exist by the U.S. itself some months back.

I recently read an account of American foreign policy in Africa during the Kennedy era by an old school mate of mine, William Mahoney, in which he reveals the ignorance of his father, who was then the U.S. ambassador to Ghana, about certain activities of the CIA in Ghana against Nkrumah. Apparently, when Ambassador Mahoney got to know, he took a plane to Washington and complained to President Kennedy who gave new foreign policy instructions that brought the activities of the CIA under the control of the ambassador. The book does not go on to say whether the CIA's activities against Nkrumah stopped after Mahoney's visit to Washington. But you know that after Nkrumah's overthrow, there have been detailed revelations by American journalists about the complicity of the CIA in the plot that led to his overthrow. Recently, a group of American mercenaries arrested in Brazil on a ship carrying tons of arms destined for a destabilization attempt here had been told that they had the backing of the U.S. government.

On our side, we are a small country trying to achieve a life of dignity for our people in a rather hostile international environment. We have a great deal of respect for the American people and for their rich traditions of revolutionary independence, creativity, and democracy. Our people, as I'm sure you've noticed, are very warm to Americans, particularly our black American cousins. We represent no threat whatsoever to the U.S. and we remain vigorously non-aligned. Why should the U.S. government or its agencies want to overthrow us? If any agency of the U.S. government is indeed bent on supporting destabilization moves against us, I can do no better than echo the words of a former U.S. assistant secretary of state: "It's the wrong game for a great country, and the players you have chosen are the wrong players!"

**Africa Report:** Are there any particular misconceptions you feel the American public has about your government and is there any message you would like to get across to them?

**Rawlings:** Well, I hear a judge who tried a number of Ghanaians including a former finance minister involved in arms trafficking with a view to overthrowing the government of Ghana made some strange remarks about us and applauded our opponents as "freedom fighters!" I don't really know what he knows about Ghana except perhaps what the good connections of the accused may have told him. Incidentally, doesn't the result of that trial illustrate my earlier point about the big fish generally having ways of slipping out?

You see, I think Americans should learn more about other countries and not interpret the world too simply in terms of superpower rivalries. Perhaps the media in the U.S. can help by being more informative about our countries instead of imposing superficial interpretations on events they report. We have a visit from President Ortega, or President Nujoma of Namibia, or Colonel Qaddafi and all they see is red! At the same time, they hear that we have agreements with the IMF and the World Bank to support our economic recovery program and they can't reconcile this to their earlier prejudices. But the problem must be their oversimplified world view, not us! I believe that the public in countries like the U.S. and indeed the Soviet Union must really try to understand the reality of small countries like ours—our history, our problems, and our objectives. I have been impressed by the tremendous sympathy expressed in the U.S. for the famine in Africa and the support for the struggle of black people in South Africa against the apartheid regime. This shows how committed the American people continue to be to the ideals of the American revolution. We share those ideals and hope that our continent will find Americans continuing to live up to these ideals, defending the cause of the oppressed and supporting our struggles for liberation as Abraham Lincoln would have wished to see.  

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West African politics have long been dominated by the towering presence and influence of the Ivorian leader. In the autumn of his career, however, Félix Houphouët-Boigny confronts an evolving regional political context in which Côte d'Ivoire's preeminence is no longer assured.

Houphouët's Region

BY HOWARD FRENCH

Ivorian President Félix Houphouët-Boigny has always been a man of grand visions and grand ambitions. Since his emergence as leader of his country's nascent political scene in the 1930s and 1940s, Houphouët has become accustomed to—some would say obsessed with—being seen as the region's preeminent leader.

By the mid-1950s, Houphouët had already succeeded in virtually quelling any serious political challenge to his leadership of Côte d'Ivoire. Since that time, he has energetically prevented the emergence of potential rivals, neutralizing or eliminating from the political scene, as the case may be, all those who risked becoming threats to his power.

Having succeeded in mastering the domestic political milieu, the Ivorian leader set his sights around him to the West African region, where he would likewise employ almost any means to achieve and consolidate his preeminence.

On the eve of the West African independence era, the Ivorian leader founded the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), an alliance of newly formed political movements from several of the region's former French colonies. With Ghana's attainment of independence in 1957 and France's difficulties with its North African and Indochinese colonies, President Charles de Gaulle began to see the handwriting on the wall and contemplated formulas for according independence to France's sub-Saharan empire. Houphouët-Boigny intended that the RDA would serve as the platform from which he would influence the modalities of that independence.

The post-World War II decade proved to be a prosperous time for Côte d'Ivoire. By the mid-1950s, the colony had become more well-off than its French West African rivals, including Senegal, France's administrative base for the region. With the Ivorian economy booming, Houphouët became obsessed with the idea of preventing his country's resources from being redistributed by France for the benefit of the rest of the region. His particular wariness of Senegal, where the elites of all of francophone West Africa received their education, made him determined to free Côte d'Ivoire from Dakar's fiscal and administrative control.

Ghana's independence and Kwame Nkrumah's role as the self-appointed advocate of universal independence from colonial rule set three francophone leaders down different paths toward independence. France had proposed that its colonies opt for independence within a French-sponsored "Community." Inspired by the example of independent Ghana, Guinea's leader, Ahmed Sékou Touré, rejected the French proposal. Guinea was granted independence in 1958 with no assurances of French support.

Senegal's Léopold Senghor accepted the idea of a "Community" with France, but sought to prevent the balkanization of French West Africa by urging that the region be consolidated into one entity.

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President Félix Houphouët-Boigny "set his sights around him to the West African region where he would employ almost any means to achieve and consolidate his preeminence"
with Dakar as its political capital, as it had been the administrative capital under colonialism.

Houphouët, on the other hand, motivated by the desire to be independent from Senegal (more than from France), argued for a Franco-African Federation inspired by the British Commonwealth, in which each former African colony would retain its own government, sharing some degree of sovereignty with France.

In the ensuing melee of rival interests, none of the African leaders clearly prevailed. Houphouët never forgave Sékou Touré his defiance, not only against de Gaulle, but against himself. Touré’s Parti Democratique Guinéen (PDG) was a member of the RDA, and to Houphouët’s line of reasoning, Touré, the younger of the two men, should have bowed to his leadership.

Houphouët resented Touré’s newfound stature, and most of all his budding alliance with Nkrumah, whose prestige had already made him the Ivorian leader’s major rival. He would come to fight every attempt by Nkrumah and Touré to bring about political unification in Africa, fearful as he was of relinquishing any political resources to less well-endowed states.

Houphouët-Boigny failed to convince the French of the need to create a community based on the Commonwealth model. Bitter from this defeat, he refused to join the Community as proposed by France. Senegal, which had accepted the Community, was busily building toward its goal of a unified French West Africa. In 1959 and 1960, Senghor convinced Mali and Dahomey to join the “Mali Federation,” whose goal was to be the building block for a regional unitary state. Guinea, though not a member, looked favorably on the Mali Federation.

The Ivorian leader felt it was crucial to block the consolidation of the Mali Federation, whose success he feared would consolidate Senegal’s grip on the region and possibly engulf his country. At the same time, anxious to protect himself from accusations that he was a balkanizer, he sought to link himself to some of the weaker states in the region. For this purpose he created the Entente Council, enlisting as members Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey, the latter of which he persuaded to break away from the Mali Federation (some claim he promised jobs for Dahomean teachers and civil servants who had recently been expelled en masse from Côte d’Ivoire).

Houphouët’s refusal to acquiesce was a key element in the demise of both the French “Community” scheme and Senghor’s Mali Federation, neither of which could sustain momentum without the Ivorian leader’s cooperation. Already in 1960, Houphouët had proven himself to be the force to be reckoned with in regional politics, and the French president’s adviser on African affairs, Jacques Foccart, began to study ways of employing the stubbornness and vanity of the Ivorian leader to French advantage. At the creation of the Entente Council, Malian President Modibo Keita characterized Houphouët as “anti-African,” saying that the Ivorian had “always been for the division of Africa.”

The Entente Council would prove to be the only long-lived instrument of influence built by Houphouët until 1973, although not for lack of trying. In the early 1960s, he championed the found-
joying the prestige that its hosting would have conferred upon him.

Houphouët used isolation to cripple these two rivals, encouraging mistrust of them by the Entente countries, and in the case of Guinea, by using his considerable influence in France to prevent a healing of the rift between Conakry and Paris. The Ivorian supported exiled revolutionary movements, obliged Mali to keep its distance from Sekou Touré, and used lobbying to persuade the U.S. not to replace France as a major donor.

Sékou Touré’s isolation was an unattended success, and with Nkrumah overturned in 1966, Houphouët turned his attention to Nigeria, the region’s demographic and geographic giant, which he was determined to prevent from becoming an economic or political giant. With the outbreak of the civil war in 1966, the occasion presented itself to encourage the disintegration of Nigeria, and hence the elimination of the most redoubtable challenge to his preeminence.

Considerable evidence exists to show that Houphouët was instrumental in convincing France to back the Biafran rebellion by supplying arms, mercenaries, money, sympathy, and propaganda. Houphouët and his long-time ally, President Omar Bongo of Gabon, eventually recognized Biafra and allowed their countries to serve as the staging grounds from which vital supply operations into Iboland were organized. In this conflict, they found themselves allied with the likes of fascist Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa, all of which wanted to see a diminished Nigeria emerge from the civil war.

"The Ivorian leader badly wanted to create and maintain a political organization of former French colonies that he could use to force his views on the OAU."

To Houphouët’s dismay, Nigeria emerged united and ultimately stronger from the Biafran war, and eventually began to assume the mantle of regional leadership that he had always feared with the creation of the Economic Com-

munity of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 and the adoption of an increasingly vocal and Africanist foreign policy during the same decade. Nigeria’s oil boom further haunted Houphouët with fears that Lagos would become the region’s pole of attraction and economic powerhouse.

In anticipation of Nigeria’s creation of ECOWAS, Houphouët engineered the establishment of a rival community, the Communauté Économique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEAO), in 1973. The idea for an economic community, in fairness to the Ivorians, was not new, nor was it stolen from the Nigerians. Houphouët-Boigny had long cherished the notion of linking the other CFA franc countries of the region into a common market which would provide most favored nation trading status among member-states, thus giving Côte d’Ivoire—with its relatively developed industry—a captive market base on which its economic growth could depend.

Already in late 1965, Houphouët proposed according dual nationality to resident nationals from [then] Upper Volta, and was quickly petitioned by the heads of state of the other Entente Council countries for the same status for their countrymen. To the dismay of the Ivorian president and the Franco-Ivorian industrialist class, the Ivorian people instantly manifested their discontent over the proposed dual nationality plan and forced the idea to be dropped. Dual nationality was, in effect, the political sweetener offered to his Entente Council counterparts to get them to accept Côte d’Ivoire’s economic dominance and Houphouët-Boigny’s political preeminence in the region.

The backfiring of the scheme spelled the instant retirement of the Entente Council from the region’s list of important active political organizations. It has never been officially disbanded, however. Meanwhile, the CEAO, shortly after its inception, seemed to be a remarkable success, in the words of West Africa magazine, “linking Ivory Coast, Benin, Togo, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Guinea, Senegal, and Burkina to France in a linguistic, monetary, economic (and for many political) unit.” Such a linkage of sovereign states with France was after all what Houphouët had craved since
independence, and now he had achieved it with its clear economic and political leadership emanating from his country.

The CEAO worked by exempting the industrial exports of member countries from most of the taxation to which extra-regional industrial products are subject. Here again, a "sweetener" was required to get the non-industrial members to swallow the CEAO package. Since Côte d'Ivoire, and to a much lesser extent, Senegal, are the only industrial members of the community, they agreed to pay the bulk of the capital to the various CEAO regional development funds.

As long as these two economic motors were able to keep the organization's machinery oiled by constantly increasing contributions to the solidarity funds, the CEAO functioned smoothly, and the Nigerian "ogre" with its supposed designs of economic dominance (and "its" organization, ECOWAS) was kept at bay.

Unfortunately, the CEAO, like the Entente and the UAM before it, began to fall apart and lose momentum. Economic crises in the early 1980s left Côte d'Ivoire unable to sustain the level of contributions to which the other member-states had become accustomed. Corruption and patronage hiring became rampant within the CEAO and finally, Houphouët began to distort its economic function.

In 1984, Houphouët-Boigny sought to employ the CEAO as a political instrument, leading it away from its intended economic vocation and eventually precipitating a crisis which would call into question the future of the organization. By attempting to isolate Burkina Faso's President Thomas Sankara by arranging for his country's turn as head of the organization to be skipped in favor of Malian President Moussa Traoré, Houphouët fueled the antipathy between the two men and set off a cycle of mutual recriminations that would end two years later in war between the neighboring states.

When Sankara finally assumed the presidency of the CEAO in 1985, he launched an investigation into corruption which uncovered evidence prejudicial to both Mali and Côte d'Ivoire. Houphouët fueled the antipathy between the two men and set off a cycle of mutual recriminations that would end two years later in war between the neighboring states.

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In the autumn of his long political career, Houphouët-Boigny finds his once-legendary influence in the region vastly diminished. His most recent coup was pulled off when his foreign minister, Simon Aké, rushed into shuttle diplomacy to bring about a cease-fire between Mali and Burkina Faso last January. Nigeria and Libya had already prepared terms agreed upon by both sides for a truce, but when the Ivorian leader persuaded Mali of the peril of allowing a Libyan role in the peace process, the Libyan-Nigerian talks mysteriously fell through.

Just as relations between Houphouët's Côte d'Ivoire and those countries where Ivorian influence has traditionally been great has changed, so have relations with those countries that have been traditional "rivals" to that influence.

While relations with Ghana warmed
somewhat in the post-Nkrumah era, Ivorian-Ghanaian ties have remained rocky. A seemingly permanent obstacle to better ties is the clandestine cocoa traffic from Ghana to Cote d'Ivoire which Ivorian authorities have done little to arrest.

Houphouet has also repeatedly harbored opponents to whoever has been in power over the years in Accra—perhaps in order to hold in reserve a means of applying pressure on Ghanaian governments. Another form of pressure the Ivorians have used to punish or sway Accra has been the periodic closure, or threat thereof, of the long border shared by the two countries. In 1982, this was done in conjunction with Togo, thus cementing a warm relationship between Ghana and its only other neighbor—Burkina Faso.

Since Senghor's retirement from the political scene in Senegal, relations between Dakar and Abidjan have improved. Abdou Diouf enjoys Houphouet's respect, perhaps in part because of his formal adherence to the vaunted African respect for elders. This respect takes the form of extensive contacts between the two governments and periodic visits by Diouf to Yamoussoukro, where, in the obligatory airport press conference, he unfailingly praises the Ivorian president's wisdom.

"Motivated by the desire to be independent from Senegal—more than from France—Houphouet argued for a Franco-African Federation."

The two leaders differ starkly, though, in several areas, including "dialogue" with South Africa, the use and meaning of democracy, and their styles of rule. Diouf has also turned a deaf ear to the Ivorian leader's lobbying for reestablishment of relations with Israel.

In the two years before Sekou Toure's death, Houphouet felt that he had finally forced the Guinean leader to accept his view of the world, and is quoted as having said that Sekou Toure was now in the camp of Africa's "moderate" leaders. After an initial bid to extend Ivorian influence over Toure's inexperienced successor, Conakry has shown itself to be uncontrollable—at least from Abidjan or Yamoussoukro. A sense of drifting entropy, more than any ideological divergence, has led Houphouet to realize that Guinea is not likely to soon fall into his orbit.

The region now looks very different to Houphouet from the time when the leaders of Upper Volta, Togo, and Niger were steady allies, and the regimes of Mali, Benin, and even post-Nkrumah Ghana were usually sympathetic to his positions. At present, an independent and leftist Sankara government prevails to the north; Togo's government—recently his closest ally—rocks insecure; and with the possible exception of Mali, no other government in the region goes further than performing an occasional bow in deference to Le Vieux for his endurance.
The 1987 anniversary celebrations of President Eyadema’s 20 years in power will be overshadowed by September’s coup attempt. Togolese allegations of the involvement of its neighbors and its reliance on French military support highlight the political insecurity that has long plagued Eyadema’s rule.

Eyadema's Nightmare

BY RICHARD EVERETT

The recent quashing of yet another coup bid in Togo will only add to the popular Togolese myth, encouraged by President Gnassingbe Eyadema himself, that the military leader is fated to survive any attempts to assassinate him or otherwise topple him from power.

Like his survival of a mysterious plane crash in 1973, Eyadema has walked away unscathed from what he has called an attempt by "armed terrorist commandos" to assassinate him and overthrow his government. Less than one week after the attack, foreign journalists were shown seized weapons, cowering captured "terrorists," and a jubilant president, who said the plotters had "not a single accomplice among the military and civilian population."

According to Togolese Interior Minister Kpotivi Tévi-Djidjogbe Lacle, on the night of Tuesday, September 23, a group of 60 heavily armed men attempted to kill Eyadema and overthrow the government by seizing a military barracks, the ruling Togolese People’s Rally headquarters, and the country’s television and radio stations.

Togolese security forces, tipped off in advance to the attack, ambushed a Lome villa, capturing a number of men and large quantities of arms and neutral-

"Just one week after the attempt, Eyadema led his ministers on an impromptu walk through the streets of Lome to demonstrate his popularity and self-confidence in publicizing what Togolese officials said was a main assembly point for the assailants. Scattered gun battles continued throughout the night as the military encountered other groups of attackers moving about the city.

The situation appeared normal by Wednesday, however surprise outbreaks of gunfire Thursday morning terrified Lome residents and sent the army out again to mop up an apparent last-ditch attempt by the assailants. One hundred fifty French paratroopers and four French air force Jaguar jets arrived Thursday night from Bangui and Libreville to help restore order, although by the time they had landed, Togolese security forces had regained control of the seaside capital.

Togo’s director of national security, Seye Memene, told Africa Report that 27 people had initially been taken into custody. He said that 19 were captured in the villa, while another 10 were arrested between Tuesday and Thursday. Two of those arrested in the villa later
died in the hospital, reportedly from wounds suffered when security forces rushed the house.

Another six, all said to be Ghanaians, including two with Ghanaian military IDs, died in the initial attack when their landrover was hit by army gunfire. At least eight civilians, including a Frenchman and a German businessman, also died in the fighting. No mention was made of army casualties.

Togolese authorities immediately closed the border with neighboring Ghana, saying the attackers had infiltrated from the Ghanaian town of Aflao which lies 50 meters across the border on the outskirts of Lomé. Ghana has since responded by closing its side of the border.

At a news conference on Monday, September 29, Ladé said the attackers claimed they were trained and armed by Ghanaian and Burkinabe military officers in those two countries. Ladé avoided directly accusing the two governments of involvement in the plot, maintaining under repeated questioning from journalists that all his information came from the captured assailants, and that the investigative authorities had not reached their final conclusions.

Eyadema also declined to directly accuse the governments of Ghana’s Fit.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings and Burkina’s Capt. Thomas Sankara, saying he wished to first present them with his findings to see “what they know and what they think.”

Through it all, the three governments have expressed the desire to remain good neighbors, and despite the maintenance of troop alerts, there have been no clashes between their forces, aside from a few scattered shots along the Ghana-Togo border shortly after the attempt failed.

In addition to implicating Togo’s neighbors, the captured attackers also accused two of Eyadema’s sworn enemies—Gilchrist Olympio and Francisco Lawson. Olympio, the son of Sylvanus Olympio, former Togolese president murdered in a 1963 coup led by then-Sgt. Eyadema, and Lawson, a former army captain, have been implicated in previous coup plots, most notably the so-called mercenary plot of 1977.

The two men have never concealed their dislike of Eyadema, and many Togolese interviewed in Lomé said they would not be surprised to find them somehow involved. However, it is only the declarations of some of the captured assailants that point to them as possible accomplices. The two have yet to publicly comment on the accusations, although the Movement for Togolese Democracy, a Paris-based opposition group which Olympio has ties to, denounced Togo’s claims as a fabrication.

Ladé said the attackers had identified Olympio as the ringleader and financier of the plot. He purportedly paid for Amah Ayayi, a Togolese resident in Ghana, to recruit and train Togolese and other West Africans for a commando raid. Ayayi, allegedly working in collusion with Ghanaian army officers at Gondar barracks in Accra and a certain Capt. Tchindjere in Burkina, spent several months arming and training the men. According to the captured assailants, the group was to kill Eyadema and establish a provisional renewal council which would rule until Olympio arrived to form a government after about a week.

After successfully crushing the attempt, Eyadema’s position could hardly be stronger. His advance knowledge of
the coup plot, aided by French intelligence and paid informers, showed that Togolese security can adequately keep tabs on dissidents, inside or outside the country. A French military officer said there was no doubt that Togo knew about the attack at least a week in advance, although not all the details about timing and logistics were known.

In addition, the attack brought an outpouring of support from Eyadema’s allies. France, the former colonial power, showed its support with its rapid deployment force which Lacle pointedly noted was there more for “psychological and diplomatic than tactical” reasons. Togo is to host the Franco-African summit of France and its former African colonies later this fall, and the two countries have a strong interest in ensuring that any security problems are ironed out well in advance.

Eyadema’s "grand frères" and counsellors in the region, Côte d’Ivoire’s Félix Houphouët-Boigny and Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko, immediately sent delegations expressing their support. Mobutu himself arrived for a two-day visit less than a week after the attempt, bringing 50 Zairois paratroopers in a symbolic gesture recalling Eyadema’s dispatch of Togolese troops to help Mobutu during the Shaba disturbances.

Eyadema also received gestures of support from other neighboring countries, including a message from Nigerian President Maj.-Gen. Ibrahim Babangida and a visit from Liberian President Samuel Doe, another West African leader prone to security problems. Finally, he received overwhelming support from Europe and North America, with U.S. President Ronald Reagan sending a team of "experts" to help the Togolese with their security operations.

Following the attack, Eyadema presented himself to journalists as a self-assured leader who never doubted he had the upper hand in the affair. Just one week after the attempt, he led his ministers on an impromptu five-kilometer walk through the streets of Lome to demonstrate his popularity and self-confidence in public. Meanwhile, the Washington-based public relations firm of David Apter and Associates, charged with showing visiting journalists around Lome, did its best to sell the idea that privatization and tourism were more interesting stories than a successfully handled security problem.

However, a number of aspects about the affair leave room for questions, most notably the fact that most of the details of the plot and all of the accusations come from the mouths of the captured attackers. A small number of prisoners were exhibited to the press at the news conference, but were led away as journalists pressed forward to ask questions.

As a result, it is difficult to judge the veracity of their statements, especially those about the training, and how they were elicited from the men. The seven showed no signs of having been beaten, but it is not known if they were coerced into making their accusations.

In addition, there are some doubts as to the "professionalism" of the so-called commandos. Despite an impressive array of Kalashnikovs, rocket launchers, grenades, ammunition, and walkie-talkies, the small number of men used to seize a number of major well-guarded targets like the barracks and the radio station seems poorly planned. In addition, the different groups, although having an elaborate system of code names and key commands, appeared to be wandering around the city out of contact with each other once the attack began.

However, the fact that most of their arms and the main command post, as well as one-third of the force, were seized two hours before the attack began may have been the cause of the confusion. Journalists present at the press conference agreed however that the sorry bunch of prisoners hardly looked like a band of professional terrorist commandos.

Lacle and Eyadema have carefully avoided directly accusing their neigh-
bors, while presenting an apparently detailed case against members of their armed forces. In naming Gondar barracks, Accra's central military installation, as the training center for the attackers, the Togolese are suggesting that if the allegations prove true, senior Ghanaian military officials knew of the plot.

Some captured assailants said they were trained by a Ghanaian army captain and Michael Soussoudis, a cousin of Fit.-Lt. Kawlings who was arrested last year in the U.S. on espionage charges and later released in trade for Ghanaians detained in Accra for alleged CIA connections. By naming Soussoudis, the implicit suggestion is that Rawlings was aware of the plot.

Relations between Rawlings and Eyadema have always been tense, with each one claiming the other is harboring political dissidents. Between his two tenures as head of state, Rawlings was once briefly detained by Togolese authorities while returning overland from a visit to Benin. However, diplomats in the region express skepticism that the two young radicals—Sankara and Rawlings—would actively pursue the overthrow of their older, more conservative neighbor. But they say it is clear that this latest incident will poison relations for some time to come.

"Journalists present at the press conference agreed that the sorry bunch of prisoners hardly looked like a band of professional terrorist commandos."

The aborted attack also raises questions for the Togolese themselves, including the sticky issue of how to react to what has become a regional incident. At least officially, Eyadema has shown a strong inclination to avoid direct conflict and to instead seek satisfaction through various regional bodies, including the ANAD defense and non-aggression pact and the Entente Council, both of which fall under the watchful eye of francophone doyen, Houphouet-Boigny, an advocate of dialogue.

Interestingly however, on August 11, the same day that the Togolese authorities convened international journalists in Lome to reveal an alleged plot by Libyan-backed "terrorists" to bomb the American embassy and Lome's central market, Eyadema and Houphouet—along with Mobutu and Gabonese President Omar Bongo—met in Yamoussoukro to discuss "security issues"—a gathering distinctly outside the framework of any of the regional organizations.

Following the September attempt, Nigeria's dispatch of a senior military delegation and an ensuing exchange of messages with Eyadema about regional security suggest that President Babangida (Ux) would like to use his influence to resolve the dispute in his capacity as head of the 16-member Economic Community of West African States, the only regional organization which includes Ghana as well as Burkina and Togo.

Finally, the Togolese people are asking themselves if their country will ever solve its ongoing security problems, which have plagued Eyadema throughout his near 20 years in power. The captured attackers have said that they were responsible for last year's bomb explosions in Lome, thus apparently linking the attack and those events as the work of one group. However, the authorities have made no connection between this incident and the bomb plot revealed in August.

More importantly, although Eyadema has at least the passive support of his countrymen, his regime will continue to be menaced by potential threats as long as there is a well-financed opposition to his rule. For a number of years, Eyadema has asked the French to deport Olympio and other Paris-based opposition figures. It remains to be seen if the heightened French support will include this further step, something the French have until now been reluctant to do.

Moreover, it seems clear that despite a lack of popular support for their activities—which perhaps stems from fears of further internal repression—there will always be a group of dissidents who will continue to hatch new plots against Eyadema, leaving the prospect of many more sleepless nights.
Despite the Nigerian people's overwhelming opposition to an IMF agreement, the Babangida government has gambled that its recent economic reforms, including a de facto devaluation of the naira, will be sufficient to attract new revenues and open credit lines. Is a deal with the IMF around the corner?

**The Year of the IMF?**

**Nigeria**

BY PETER BLACKBURN

Nigeria's President, Maj.-Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, has taken a courageous political gamble in carrying out a major devaluation of the local currency, the naira. His move toward a more realistic exchange rate, by introduction of the Second Tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM), has broken the long deadlock with the country's external creditors and offers prospects for economic recovery.

The gamble is remarkable as it comes less than one year after the Nigerian people categorically rejected the idea of an International Monetary Fund agreement—the crucial prerequisite for which was a major devaluation of the naira—after an emotional and one-sided debate. The debate was characteristic of Babangida's more open style of government and contrasted with the repression and rigidity of his predecessor, Maj.-Gen. Muhammadu Buhari.

Babangida said that a major reason for his bloodless coup in August 1985 was Buhari's failure to halt the economic decline during his 20 months in office. "Austerity without structural adjustment is no solution to our economic predicament," Babangida declared. He spoke of the need to break the deadlock in negotiations with the IMF over terms for a $2.5 billion loan—a stalemate which had dragged on since April 1983.

Babangida argued that an IMF agreement would lead to not only a major World Bank structural adjustment loan, but also a rescheduling of the country's external debt and possible fresh commercial credit.

But the national debate, intended as an exercise in public education, backfired badly. Conducted mainly in the country's outspoken press and on radio and television, the discussion was mostly irrational and irate, with the outcome never in doubt.

"Opponents of an IMF agreement, ranging from academics to market women, argued that it would surrender 'national sovereignty' to the faceless gnomes from Washington."
subsidy which resulted in a doubling of gasoline and tripling of diesel prices. Other IMF reforms, such as greater fiscal and monetary discipline, reduced subsidies for parastatals, revision of trade tariffs, and introduction of export incentives, were also announced.

However, two major conditions remained unfulfilled. The first, trade liberalization, is considered more a matter of timing than a question of principle. The second, devaluation of the naira, was a more complex and politically sensitive decision.

"Import licenses were often considered to be pieces of political patronage to be resold to desperate industrialists for huge profits."

The budget was preceded by a 15-month "economic emergency" program which has so far been peacefully accepted by the volatile Nigerian people, and has demonstrated their capacity for Nigerian if not IMF-imposed austerity, observers pointed out. The measures included cuts in civil service and military salaries, a one-third reduction in foreign diplomatic staff, and the banning of rice and maize imports.

Although the SFFM was first announced in the 1986 budget, its implementation was delayed many months due to difficulties in working out modalities and pressure from various interest groups which stood to lose by the new arrangement. When finally introducing the measure in September, Finance Minister Dr. Chu Okongwu said that the SFEM was like a "military operation," requiring complex planning and tight security.

One of the most serious risks is that the devaluation brought about by the SFEM will trigger a steep rise in the price of imported food and essential consumer items. However, analysts point out that most consumers in Lagos and other large Nigerian cities are already accustomed to paying inflated black market prices, so in fact their purchasing power may be little affected.

Secondly, prices may even drop after a few months as unscrupulous traders eventually release hoarded goods onto the market. For its part, the government may be holding stocks of certain strategic items, such as sugar, to offload onto the market when prices start to spiral. The rise in imported food prices will also strengthen the government's campaign to encourage Nigerians to eat more locally grown staples such as cassava and yams.

Opposition to the SFEM has come from many quarters. Manufacturers complain that the cost of imported raw materials and spare parts will rise steeply, making local production uneconomical and forcing many bankruptcies unless the government relaxes its price controls.

Nigerian industry is about 70 percent dependent on imported raw materials, which have been increasingly difficult to obtain because of the shortage of foreign exchange. In addition, profit margins have been squeezed during the past year by the increase in fuel prices. The government is urging industry to rely more on local resources, although businessmen point out that this goal will take several years to achieve.

According to observers, the government's long delay in introducing the second tier market reflected the lack of popular enthusiasm for the new system. The former system of import licenses and foreign exchange controls gave considerable power and wealth to certain members of the government bureaucracy and the military establishment. It was regarded, especially by southerners, as benefiting the northern Muslim traders and reflecting the balance of power in previous civilian and military governments. Import licenses were often considered to be pieces of political patronage to be resold to desperate industrialists for huge profits.

Finance Minister Okongwu points out that one of the advantages of a "realistic" exchange rate policy is that "it will eliminate bureaucratic controls on foreign exchange and trade." In this way, it will reduce the possibility for corruption. However, bureaucrats are already making some moves to introduce "pre-import registration" in order to discourage the wastage of foreign exchange on frivolous consumer imports. Controls are also likely to prevent a flight of capital out of the country.

According to Okongwu, the government aims to merge the first and second tier foreign exchange markets within one year. The latter covers all transactions except government debt service and payments to international organizations. Importers who have deposited naira with the banks to cover their foreign exchange applications are also concerned that they will now have to make extra payments under the new and
higher exchange rate to get their goods into the country.

Despite the World Bank's recent approval of a $450 million loan to help finance the second tier market, there are fears of a shortage of foreign exchange to meet the demand at the weekly auctions. This could mean that the devaluation could spiral out of control as more and more naira bid for ever scarcer amounts of hard currency. With the Nigerian economy flush with unwanted naira, this could indeed happen.

One group that has been consistently hostile to the IMF and any move toward devaluation is the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC). Labor leaders argue that devaluation and the consequent rise in food prices always hit the workers hardest. They regard the second tier market as a "disguised devaluation" and a secret sell-out to the IMF. Indeed, the first foreign exchange auction on September 26, which resulted in a 67 percent devaluation of the naira reducing it to close to the black market rate, seems to have borne out their worst fears.

The NLC, representing some 3 million workers from 70 trade unions, has been severely weakened by the economic recession that has gripped Nigeria since the early 1980s. There have been massive layoffs, especially in the private sector, and an estimated 5 million people are now unemployed, about 80 percent of them under age 25.

For the past two years, abundant food harvests have helped allay social unrest. The rural population has had plentiful food supplies, some of which help to feed the cities, while the government has so far been able to finance essential food imports to make up the balance.

However, the collapse in oil revenues this year has helped to hasten the crunch for the Nigerian economy. A bunching of medium and long-term debt maturities combined with the build-up in trade arrears has brought the country close to financial collapse.

Nigeria has already been forced to unilaterally impose three three-month debt repayment moratoria, the latest one extending until the end of the year. Ironically, Nigeria's external debt of some $14 billion, combined with trade arrears of about $6 billion, is modest by Latin American standards. "Nigeria has plentiful mineral, agricultural, and human resources. Its present crisis is largely due to mismanagement and poor public relations," one banker commented.

In the debt-rescheduling talks, commercial bankers have refused to treat Nigeria as a "special case," as this would set a dangerous precedent for dealings with the much larger Latin American debtor nations.

The 90-day debt moratoria are only a stop-gap solution and have done nothing to meet Nigeria's desperate need for new financial resources to pay for food and raw material imports or for longer-term productive investment without which economic recovery is impossible.

As President Babangida has apparently rejected the "default" solution to Nigeria's financial crisis, he has sought to "adjust" the exchange rate in a bid to reach an understanding with the IMF, in the absence of which a rescheduling of official debt owed to the Paris Club and commercial debt to the London Club cannot be achieved, nor new credit lines extended.

The coming weeks and months could be extremely tense as Nigerians adjust to the new second tier market, whose mechanisms neither officials, bankers, nor businessmen fully understand. The government will be watchful of speculators trying to unduly depress the value of the naira, inflate food prices, or organize a flight of capital.

The biggest threat may still come from traditional supporters within the army and in the Muslim north who have seen one of their main sources of enrichment evaporate. Babangida is unlikely to take time off to celebrate the coming new year, as it is a favorite time for launching coup attempts.

Will the "disguised devaluation" brought about by the second tier market be enough to secure the IMF's approval for Nigeria's own economic reform program, enable a rescheduling of the external debt, and bring in fresh money? The signs certainly point in that direction.

In early October, a joint note by the IMF and World Bank characterized the policy reforms, particularly the naira devaluation, as a "major turning point in Nigeria's economic policy," and stated that "support from the international financial community will be essential ingredients in the success of the program." To assist in the reform efforts, the World Bank has agreed to a three-year $4.3 billion project loan for next year, and an economic policy memorandum has been signed with the IMF, clearing the way for a possible debt rescheduling.

While skeptical bankers are likely to insist on strict IMF monitoring of the adjustment program, Nigerians' pride in their national sovereignty could make this too bitter a pill to swallow. As one Western banker said, "The government has introduced some impressive budgets in recent years, but they have never been properly implemented. We want to avoid the same fate for the adjustment program, especially if our money is tied to it."
Guinea

Conté in Control

President Lansana Conte has not found it easy overcoming the legacies of Sékou Toure's corrupt and authoritarian rule. Emerging strengthened from last year's failed coup attempt, the President is attempting to restore both domestic and international confidence in his ability to rebuild the country.

BY HOWARD SCHISSEL

Two and a half years after the death of Ahmed Sékou Toure and the subsequent military coup that swept away the debris of his autocratic system, Guinea is still in a state of flux. The wave of enthusiasm that captured the population, particularly the youth, during the first days of the new government proved to be ephemeral. It soon became strikingly evident that many long and difficult years would be required to overcome the handicap represented by the heritage of 26 years of economic mismanagement and often brutal dictatorship.

Guineans wanted not only the guarantee of respect for human rights, but also improved living standards. Guinea's economy, potentially one of the richest in West Africa thanks to substantial mineral resources and immense agro-industrial possibilities, was largely shackled under the anckn regime by a plethora bureaucracy and institutionalized corruption.

Under the banner of "African socialism," Sékou Toure fostered a system which benefited a small group of senior bureaucrats and allied traders almost exclusively. The result was that almost 2 million Guineans were forced to seek their livelihoods abroad and the underground economy flourished.

The reform of the stagnant economy was at the top of the agenda for the new military government. But the application of a reform program needed strong and credible leadership. The Military Committee of National Recovery (CMRN), the ruling body created by the armed forces, turned out to be a heterogeneous organ lacking a clear political direction.

In the first heady days of the post-Toure era, almost all the senior brass, many of whom played a role in the periodic purges organized by the late dictator, were automatically given a seat on the CMRN. The aim was to project the image of a united army and a consensus among the country's diverse ethnic groups. Rapidly, however, the CMRN proved to be unwieldy. Personal ambitions and ethnic rivalry paralyzed its deliberations. Top officers and their cronies quickly enriched themselves. The population became skeptical about the prospects for positive change.

The most serious problem, however, was the sharpening divisions between President Lansana Conte, a Soussou from a village about 50 miles north of the dilapidated capital, Conakry, and then-Prime Minister Diara Traore, a Malinke like the late head of state. The latter, impetuous and self-serving, sought to rally support both in the country and

President Lansana Conte: "Without any military or civilian rival, he has become the country's uncontested chief"
abroad to fulfill his ambitions.

It did not take long before it became clear that Guinea's two top officers were on a collision course. President Conte took the initiative of eliminating the prime minister's office during a cabinet reshuffle at the end of 1984. At that time, Col. Traoré was demoted to one of the four newly-created state minister posts. This situation was short-lived, however. Early in the summer of 1985, Traoré spearheaded a failed coup attempt. The French played a major role in enabling the president to reestablish his authority.

Many officers close to Traoré, as well as civilian supporters of the ex-prime minister, were arrested in the wake of the foiled putsch. Most of those arrested were of Malinké origin, although the government tried to downplay the ethnic nexus behind the coup. The blame was placed on Traoré's ruthless quest for power. In Conakry and other towns, the population often blamed the Malinké for seeking to reestablish their dominance lost with the passing of Sékou Touré.

The attempted coup is still shrouded in mystery. His government initially promised that the plotters would be brought to public trial. This has never occurred. Traoré's fate remains unknown. In Conakry, most sources reckon that he was executed, along with all the male members of the Touré family. Other members of the former first family, including Madame Andree Toure, are either in prison or under house arrest. It is believed that they know the whereabouts of the large sums of money which Guinea's first leader reputedly stashed away abroad.

Instead of precipitously reshuffling his cabinet after the failed putsch, President Conte took his time. Indeed, he required almost six months to decide on a new government and initiate the first economic reform measures. This extended delay gave the impression of indecision and weak leadership. Conte, who prides himself on his peasant origins, tends to deliberate carefully before coming to an important decision. But remaining firmly in control, he has been able to form a new government designed to give the country the measure of confidence it lacked.

One of the main hallmarks of the government that emerged last December UN-sponsored fish-smoking project: “International organizations have been assisting Guinea on the difficult road to economic recovery”
was the decline in the role of the military—an increase from nine to 19 in the number of civilian ministers. It also marked the entry onto the political scene of a bevy of young technocrats, most of whom owe their promotion to the president's good will. Also worth noting was the enhanced role granted expatriate Guineans—a number of whom returned after a long exile to accept cabinet portfolios—meant to reassure wealthy Guinean traders in neighboring states and tempt them to invest back home.

Conté also used the cabinet reshuffle as a means of diminishing the influence of potential rivals in the armed forces: Many were sent to the hinterland as resident ministers. Former Foreign Minister Facinet Toure, a Soussou with a reputation as forceful and somewhat ruthless, was appointed minister for the Forest province near the frontier with Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia.

"Remaining firmly in control, Conté has been able to form a new government designed to give the country the measure of confidence it lacked."

Col. Mamadou Baldé, the highest ranking Feu! officer, was sent to administer Upper Guinea, the fief of the Malinke. The Peul community was the principal target for persecution under Sekou Toure, and many leaders of this group feel that they have not yet received restitution. Finally, Commander Mankan Camara, a Malinke, was given authority in Middle Guinea.

The president strongly reinforced his own hand, appointing a key supporter, Commander Kerfalla Camara, as permanent secretary of the CMKN. Sensitive ministries were placed under the president's wing with minister-delegates named for the portfolios of planning and international cooperation, interior and centralization, defense, and information. The armed forces command was also reorganized, with officers close to the Guinean leader given key posts.

However, it took only a few months before the first crisis developed. Minister of Information Jean-Claude Diallo, the top expatriate Guinean in the government, devised a plan to liberalize the import of basic foodstuffs. Known as the Programme Libre de Commerce (PLC), it was criticized as designed to favor the Peul community and opening the door for all sorts of sundry commercial practices. An influential French adviser, Bernard Vatrican, who was given the sobriquet the "white marabout," also backed the PLC.

A coalition of French and indigenous economic forces convinced President Conté to abolish the PLC and maintain state control over vital imports. Diallo, who obviously felt targeted by this action, took advantage of a trip abroad earlier this spring to resign and denounce the venal practices of the government.

His action, contrary to expectations, did not have much impact in Guinea. The other ministers representing the Guinean expatriate community kept their posts. Vatrican, whose role became controversial, used the opportunity of the PLC affair to resign and leave the country.

Without any military or civilian rival, Conte has become the country's uncontested chief. Although he resides amid intense military security at Camp Samory in a Conakry suburb, the president has assumed the trappings of power. Within his crack presidential guard unit, certainly the best armed and trained in the Guinean armed forces, he has set up a special mounted guard used for honorary parades and receptions. Both the French and the Moroccans provide training for the presidential guard, composed principally of soldiers from the Soussou ethnic group.

The Guinean leader makes few public appearances and rarely travels abroad. He is not accustomed to the media and therefore gives few interviews. His future plans are an open question. Like other African military leaders, such as President Moussa Traore of Mali, he could attempt to institutionalize his regime by organizing presidential elections.

Such an option, however, is undoubtedly years away, for the president would have to create a new political party and a parliament. For the moment, however, the main preoccupation appears to be putting into motion wide-ranging economic reform measures and making sure that the transition period does not engender excessive discontent in the urban areas and possible disturbances which could be used to destabilize the government.

Guinea's economy was in shambles at the fall of Sekou Toure's regime. Western economists estimate that up to a third of the country's gross domestic product passed through parallel black market networks. Due to low domestic producer prices, farmers often sold their cash crops in the neighboring states of Sierra Leone, Liberia, or Senegal. In these countries, they were paid in a convertible currency which could then be exchanged at favorable black market rates for the Guinean syli or used to buy food or consumer products abroad.

Guinea was also flooded by smuggled manufactured goods and foodstuffs that made fortunes for well-connected traders, politicians, and customs officials. Much of Guinea's diamond and gold output found its way to markets outside the country. The outrageously overvalued currency rendered any economic reform efforts worthless.

Sekou Toure used the bloated state administration and parastatal sector to create a political base through the granting of employment opportunities. State companies were notoriously inefficient. Moreover, they required constant subsidies to be kept afloat.

This system also corresponded to the needs of a group of bureaucrats who held the reins of power under the ancien régime. By controlling official monetary transactions, for example, they were able to amass considerable fortunes. At

"Growing social inequities could pose serious problems for the government and discredit free market economics as a panacea for the country's ills."
the same time, the bauxite mining sector, representing 97 percent of export earnings, operated as a prosperous enclave in a drained economy. The mines, operated by foreign partners, had little impact on the overall economy.

Once President Conté gave the green light to start cleaning up Guinea's economic morass, foreign experts first had to solve the currency problem. The Guinean syli was massively devalued in October last year, bringing its value broadly in line with the CFA franc. Early this year, the syli was replaced by the new Guinean franc and a dual exchange rate was established for public and private sector transactions.

In June, this system was abolished because of the Guinean franc's remarkable stability, as it maintained its near parity to the CFA franc. This monetary reform went through smoothly and it is likely that Guinea will soon join the CFA franc zone, thereby guaranteeing it a convertible and transferable currency. This would certainly bolster confidence in Guinea among potential foreign investors as well as the affluent expatriate community.

The banking sector was also overhauled. Three new banks were created, each under the auspices of a large French financial institution. French trading houses established a joint venture with the government for the import of vital foodstuffs. Guinea's parastatals are being reorganized by the French Institute of Industrial Development. Other French firms have taken over responsibility for strategic economic sectors.

A Frenchman, Léon Chaize, was appointed vice-governor of the Banque Nationale de Guinée, although he is officially a World Bank functionary. This sudden thrust of French interests has created friction: It is common, for instance, to find Guineans bitterly complaining that France is seeking to make up for lost time by "neo-colonizing" the country.

International organizations also have been assisting Guinea on the difficult road to economic recovery. Since the beginning of 1986, the International Monetary Fund has granted a $33.6 million 13-month standby loan to help implement reforms. The World Bank, for its part, agreed to a $42.6 million structural adjustment loan to support the government program. The Paris Club reached an agreement during the spring on the rescheduling of $200 million of Guinea's foreign debt.

Guinea owes the Soviet Union around $400 million from past purchases of arms and industrial equipment; this is being repaid by bauxite exports from the Kindia mine operated by Soviet technicians. Compared to other West African states, Guinea's overseas debt is quite manageable.

Foreign donors have proven to be generous with Guinea. With the country's overture to the West and its attempt to implement free market economic guidelines, Guinea has become a favorite in the Western donor community. France, naturally, has played a leading role: In 1985, for example, Guinea was the second largest recipient of soft loans from France's Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation (FAC) with $88.6 million. The United States, West Germany, Belgium, Italy, and Arab sources have also kicked in considerable sums for infrastructure and development schemes.

Outside the mining sector, there has been little fresh private investment. Australia's Bridge Oil has set up a joint venture, Aredor, to mine Guinea's rich diamond reserves. A Canadian-Swiss consortium, Chevanning Mining, has begun prospecting a highly promising concession in the Siguiri region. American concerns are involved in oil prospection off the Boé region after a continental plateau dispute with Guinea-Bissau was settled in a judgment rendered by the International Court of Justice.

Despite immense agro-industrial possibilities, few foreign investors have been tempted. The country's lack of infrastructure and trained cadres represents a bottleneck. Some firms have adopted a wait-and-see approach in order to judge if political and financial stability can be assured.

Guinea's other large mining projects are finding it difficult to get off the drawing boards. A scheme to open a fourth bauxite mine at Ayékoyé has met with little success. This $2.2 billion project involves the construction of an aluminium smelter and a large hydroelectric dam on the Konkouré river. The weak price of aluminum on world markets and soft demand does not bode well for the Ayékoyé project.

In addition, a $1.5 billion iron ore mine at Mount Nimba, close to the frontier with Liberia, is in suspended animation. Guinea envisages setting up a joint company with Liberia and associating African and Western interests in the development of this high grade ore lode. However, as with the proposed bauxite mine, iron ore is suffering from weak international demand. Guinea also faces competition from other West and Central African states—notably Senegal and Gabon—who have rival iron ore projects in the pipeline.

Bringing order to the state administration and parastatals is liable to pose some delicate problems. A study of the administration revealed thousands of fictitious posts, and those with genuine
jobs, some 84,000, were under-employed or had few real qualifications. Most of these civil servants live in Conakry and have only passing awareness of the country's realities. This inefficient organization costs the Guinean exchequer dearly. After payment was ended to fictitious civil servants, a plan to pare down the administration was enacted. The government announced that it expects to reduce the state sector to some 50,000 by the end of 1987.

It is hoped that the private sector will be able to absorb the laid-off civil servants, many of whom were given cash bonuses to encourage them to open businesses. In particular, it is feared that disgruntled civil servants could create a political backlash which could be exploited by anti-Conte forces. This is all the more the case as Conakry is submerged by unemployed youth, many of them school graduates who are dissatisfied with their lot and face a grim future.

The reform of the monetary system and other IMF-sponsored measures have resulted in a sharp increase in the cost of living in Conakry and other urban centers. The population has therefore experienced a deterioration in its already low standard of living. To alleviate some of the hardship, the government granted the remaining civil servants a hefty wage increase.

As the majority of the population struggles to eke out a livelihood, a class of nouveaux riches has flourished in Conakry. Never before have there been so many luxury cars and such outward flaunting of wealth in the capital. This has given rise to bitterness among average Guineans who claim that the wealth is largely misbegotten. This is often confirmed by official statements pledging to punish corrupt functionaries and traders, but these declarations are rarely followed by concrete action. Growing social inequities could pose serious problems for the government and discredit free market economics as a "panacea" for the country's ills.

In the industrial sector, the parastatal reform program has led to the closure of seven companies, the reorganization of four, and the offering to the private sector of another 13. Manufacturing units, usually working at a quarter of capacity, are over-staffed money-losers. The non-industrial sector, encompassing some 130 state-owned concerns in the import-export, wholesale, and distribution business, is also being rationalized.

As Guinean economist Diallo Mammadou Lamarana suggests, "There is a risk of seeing the development of a speculative market in real estate and import-export, two sectors reputed to be highly profitable. Investment in industry, profitable in the long term, will be the practical monopoly of foreign interests. And a situation could develop where a compradore bourgeoisie would benefit from its position in the state bureaucracy to engage in affairism. . . "

At present, there are few forces capable of resisting such a drift in the economy. Another potential problem is the development of a new system of ethnic nepotism and sinecures modeled on Sekou Toure's government—but benefiting ethnic groups other than the Malinke.

Yet another question mark concerns the rural economy. Under the first republic, the peasants were punished by low producer prices and inefficient government services. The result was a virtual stagnation of subsistence agriculture and a regression in the export-oriented sectors. The new government has declared that the development of agriculture and livestock is one of its top priorities. Implementing these good intentions may be more difficult than imagined: The peasantry is extremely weary of the central government's verbal commitments. Furthermore, the Guinean community could play an important role in investing in agricultural schemes, but until now they have made only timid moves.

Of course, 30 months is a relatively short period to transform an economy and a society still under the influence of a quarter-century of misgovernment and varied abuses. Bad habits are hard to change. While progress has been made, the task that lies ahead is immense. The population cautiously supports President Conte, but the institutions remain fragile and the shock of change could produce unexpected developments. •
In the first of a series of articles to explore the contributions of African women to national economic and political development, *Africa Report* talks with Joséphine Ouédraogo about the Burkina government's innovative approach to women's issues and the role of donor organizations in supporting these efforts.

**Joséphine Ouédraogo**

Minister of Family Affairs and National Solidarity, Burkina Faso

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

**Africa Report:** Your government is perhaps the most progressive on the African continent in its commitment to women's advancement, evidenced by the fact that there are currently five women ministers. Could you explain the philosophy of your government insofar as the role of women in national development is concerned?

Ouédraogo: I think what is important in the Burkinabe government's conception of the liberation of women is that women must be accepted as partners at all levels. The fact that at the moment there are five women ministers in our new cabinet shows that at the highest levels, women are accepted as partners in making important political decisions and in the conception of the nation's development program. This is a really extraordinary mark of the confidence the government has invested in us women in Burkina. Not only are there women ministers, but also many women who occupy other posts of political, administrative, and technical responsibility, such as high commissioners and directors of companies and departments. If women are not participating in decision-making in any given country, it's because they are not regarded as having the necessary competence and analytical abilities. Therefore, for us, it is a mark of the National Council of the Revolution's [CNR] confidence in our women that we have been asked to participate at the highest levels.

One might think—well, it's only the elite of our women who are so privileged. But in reality, women are involved at every level in the country, equally down to the very basic grassroots. From the very beginning of its existence, the CNR decided to organize our women so that they would be represented at all levels and would be able to provide their views and participate in political activities. This is very important. Even at the village level, women have their representatives. An office of the Union of Burkinabe Women [UFB] has recently been created in each village. But even before that, there was at least one woman member of the village bureaus of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution [CDRs]. This translates concretely into the fact that in all village activities, I women have the opportunity to be present and to participate—even in collective ef-
Operation Literacy Commando: "At the operations closing ceremonies, a woman delegate stood up and said she wanted to openly register her dissatisfaction that so few women were chosen to benefit from the literacy campaign!"

forts, such as the construction of a reservoir, a school, or a well.

If they are not doing so, it can only be because perhaps they haven't understood the opportunity which is being offered to them to participate, because there are too many other constraints on their time, or because there hasn't been sufficient political education. Nevertheless, the door is open to them, and to illustrate this point, I want to tell you a story about something that occurred during our "Operation Literacy Commando," a program we carried out in February and March to introduce literacy to 36,000 peasants under the aegis of the Ministry of Agriculture. At the operation's closing ceremonies, in front of all the members of government, a woman delegate stood up and said she wanted to openly register her dissatisfaction that so few women were chosen to benefit from this literacy campaign! She had a good point! She felt the program was an important one, she was invited to express her views, and she did so! And although some were embarrassed that she spoke out like that, she proved that the door is really open for women to participate and to express themselves.

I think it is this change in perceptions that is essential, because all those "women's projects" sponsored by non-governmental organizations [NGOs] and governments—we have had so many of them here over the last 20 years—are all very nice, but as long as women are not brought into the decision-making process, are not involved in the modern sector, are not educated, and don't make the decisions, these small projects will never be able to change the status of women! You can launch an income generation or educational project for women, but it will only marginalize them and will never lead to their involvement in the political, economic, or cultural scene as equal partners with men. I think it is this dimension that has been lacking and what the CNR has been able to provide through the revolution. It wouldn't surprise anybody here even if 10 women are named as ministers!

Africa Report: As you pointed out, "women's projects" often tend to marginalize women. Therefore, have you changed the policy guidelines you utilize in dealing with NGOs who are interested in financing women's projects?

Ouédraogo: Yes, we are, but this is a change that will come about progressively. The NGOs have already been made aware of our point of view. However, we do not yet control all the aspects of project design insofar as women's projects are concerned. Many of these projects are still designed by the NGOs and are already being implemented. We hope ultimately to arrive at a situation where, if donors want to undertake a project for women in Burkina, they will find an interlocutor at our national level who will be able to say, "No, we think that this project, given our realities, will contribute to marginalizing our women, and it would be better to change it in such or such a way." Ultimately, we hope to arrive at a situation where even at the level of agricultural projects, their impact upon women will automatically be taken into account, because very often agricultural development projects have marginalized women, with the end result that they lose their sole source of income.

Ultimately we need to design the projects ourselves, because we have learned that many NGOs really don't believe in equality for women, even those which are busy extolling the virtues of "women's projects!" In reality, they fund these projects only to assuage their consciences and to prove to everyone that they are interested in women's issues. There are NGOs which are funding very interesting programs on the economic front, for example, but which admit, "The social implications are not our problem. We are here to build a road, a school, a dam—its social or political implications don't concern us." They forget that the dam they build or the agricultural project they undertake will bring about transformations in the society—whether by marginalizing women, by giving more authority to men, or whatever. There is not a single action that one can undertake that will not have an impact upon the population and therefore upon the women.

Africa Report: It seems that NGOs often put the cart before the horse, in their view that it is the proliferation of these small projects that will bring about women's advancement, rather than understanding that a certain level of development and clearly defined development objectives are necessary before these small projects can have an impact.
**Ouedraogo:** Or even before knowing what small projects are needed! These small projects do not bring about development. I think what you said is especially true for Burkina—a country which has received perhaps the most assistance in the form of these small NGO projects. We have received an enormous amount of assistance at this level. But why hasn't it changed anything? It's because the big picture—development in all its aspects—hasn't been taken into account. Furthermore, in the past, there was no precise definition of the form of the population's participation in the development process which clearly spelled out the priorities, and then within these priorities, which small projects were needed. Without such clarity, each NGO comes with its own view of things and chooses its own preferred area, but that doesn't contribute to anything but a dispersal of funds and often a considerable waste of money. Maybe the lot of one group of villagers is improved, but that isn't enough. In the end, however, the effort has to come from us, and as long as a government doesn't have the political will to clearly define its conception of development, then you can't blame the NGOs for taking advantage of the situation.

**Africa Report:** Could you outline the priorities of your ministry insofar as women are concerned, and how these priorities are addressed by the recently launched five-year development plan?

**Ouedraogo:** My ministry is not solely involved in women's issues. In tackling specific priority issues, we are involved with a variety of social groups, for example, marginalized persons such as juvenile delinquents. We believe that through various activities we undertake, we can indirectly contribute to raising the status of women. For example, we are tackling the issues of family planning and increasing women's incomes. Concerning family planning, the objective is not specifically to reduce the birth rate, but rather to educate the family to understand that limiting the number of children or spacing births will contribute to their well-being. They must understand that failure to do so can harm the health of the mother and the child and limit the family's access to social benefits. Therefore, by educating the family, we will be contributing to raising the status of women. We have decided, for example, that our strategy of consciousness-raising on this issue will be directed at both the men and the women. We will attempt to create a dialogue between men and women on this issue. In the context of our society, this is something very new, given our traditional sexual division of responsibilities. The world of men is often far apart from the world of women. When society was purely traditional, there was a certain equilibrium in this arrangement. Today, however, it is only the world of men which is open to societal changes, while the world of women has remained somewhat forgotten.

There has also been a rupture in relations between men and women in the household. They don't talk to each other and rarely discuss the issues which affect the family, such as, for example, the education of their children. Each concentrates on his or her own problems and the children are socially and morally abandoned. The extended family system is eroding. Hence, we want to contribute to creating a dialogue between men and women, thereby forcing the men to accept that women also have a point of view concerning their health, their pregnancies, etc. When women have an opportunity to speak out, they tell us: "Men regard us solely as baby machines. As soon as you are pregnant, the men are satisfied and they ask nothing more of you. If you give birth to a son, they are even happier. But if you don't get pregnant or if you bear only daughters, your status is very low."

When the women are able to express these feelings, they feel liberated, and the men see that in fact their women are not machines, that their wives think and speak their minds. This becomes uncomfortable for the men! We think this is very important because by enabling women to express themselves about problems on which they have been obliged to keep silent, that contributes to an evolution in thinking. Similarly in our project to launch day nurseries for children between the ages of three and six, we are involving both parents—fathers and mothers—trying to get them to see the welfare of their children as a family problem, not just a problem for the women.

Hence, all these activities contribute to having women accepted as equal partners in the family. We are talking about the qualitative element here—our priority in this ministry is to have the woman accepted as an interlocutor, as a person with opinions about her life, her relationship with her husband, and the education of her children. On the economic front, one of our priorities, for example, is to raise the personal economic status of women. Here, we are in the midst of defining projects which will enable women to earn an income, because it is a sign of independence for women to earn their own money and therefore have their own resources. Traditionally, women had this option, but with all the transformations which have occurred for example in the agricultural sector, as I said earlier, the women have lost a great deal of their economic autonomy.

Therefore, one of the slogans of our five-year development plan is "For each woman, an income." We will be looking at what types of activities we can undertake that will enable women to earn an income. But first, we are organizing a seminar to be held next year which will bring together women who are involved in all types of economic activities to provide...
Women lead President Sankara's official motorcade: "The CNR decided to organize our women so that they would be represented at all levels"

their views on this project. We are aware, for example, that if we create additional activities for women without having resolved their domestic problems, such as the education and care of their children, in fact we will be creating monstrous problems. If women don't have access to an income today, it is probably because they have to spend too much time on their domestic responsibilities, and these burdens must be eased. If women aren't trained or educated, it's not because they don't want it, but rather because they are already too preoccupied. We can't solve this problem for them—the women participating in this seminar must do so. We will discuss all these questions. Those women who are already involved in artisanal activities, for example, will explain how they manage, given their domestic responsibilities. Is it that they dump their domestic responsibilities onto another woman? In that case, this is a justification for polygamy! Is it that they rely on a type of family slavery by exploiting their daughters or young girls in order to have the necessary free time? We can't close our eyes to these questions. Therefore, what must come out of this debate is a determination whether the projects that we are going to undertake to increase women's incomes are really going to improve their lives.

Africa Report: Could you provide some examples of the types of income generation projects you envision for women in the rural areas?

Ouedraogo: For example, market gardening is an activity that can increase women's incomes. It can also augment the income of the family when men are involved. In regions with food deficits, like our northern provinces where we are encouraging market gardening in order to achieve food self-sufficiency—in these regions where survival itself is a priority—we're not going to tell women, "You must abandon your family plots so that you can earn an income." That would be very foolish.

Therefore, even if we design ways that various activities can earn an income for women, such as artisanry, cattle-raising, or food processing, we must first do preliminary studi-
Africa Report: What are the aims of the Family Code?
Ouedraogo: The Family Code is not yet finalized, because we plan on submitting it for the views of many women and a certain number of men—for the moment, it is the work of a commission. But in the end, the Family Code will be the first time that we will have one single law which regulates the life of the family in Burkina. Presently, there are many different laws—the Napoleonic Code and various customary laws related to religious traditions, for example—which regulate social and family life in Burkina. For example, whether or not a man is Muslim, he may abide by Muslim laws in running his family and in regulating his relations with his wife—her rights, duties, etc. If it's in a man's interest to use this or that law, he will do so. If the woman doesn't know any better, it's she who loses in the end. There are cases of marriages that have been consecrated under customary law without the woman's knowledge! A man marries a woman and he is a polygamist. When the woman complains about it, he says that Muslim law allows him to be polygamous.

Therefore, we will have one Family Code which will apply to everyone and which we hope will provide equal justice for men, women, and children. The Family Code says that monogamy will be the rule, although we will accept polygamy here because we can't just dissolve it like that. In the past, all polygamous marriages were recognized. But henceforth, although you can be polygamous if you choose, in the eyes of the law, polygamy will not be recognized. While not doing away with polygamy, this will allow us to diminish somewhat its negative aspects. Many women have warned that if polygamy is banned, they will be penalized. They say that it's not polygamy itself, but rather the entire economic system that makes them have too much work, it's the social system which makes them have too many children. We accept polygamy as insidious, but we can only abolish it progressively.

The Family Code will also give women a say in making certain household decisions such as management of the household income and in the case of divorce, the disposition of the children. In the past, if a couple divorced, children were automatically given to their fathers from the age of seven. A customary law concerning widowhood will also be done away with. This law says that when a woman is widowed, she must choose between staying in her husband's family or leaving it. If she chooses to stay in the family, she is required to marry one of her husband's relatives. She is not allowed to stay in the family as a single woman. Often a woman had to accept this in order to stay with her children, because if she refused to marry a member of the family, she would be required to leave the family, including her children. This law was very painful for women. Through the Family Code, women will be given more rights than they previously enjoyed.

Africa Report: What advice would you give to an American NGO, for example, which is interested in supporting women's efforts in Burkina?
Ouedraogo: I would first of all tell an NGO that it should have a clearly defined sector when it says it wants to do something for women. Then, depending on the area, it can address itself to my ministry or to the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Health, or one of the other ministries. It depends on its focus. Hit doesn't have a specific focus, then it should come to my ministry because my ministry touches on many different aspects. We will see from there because we already have our own projects. If an NGO has its own program, we will determine whether this is something we want. We're in the midst of setting up a national structure which will define our priorities as far as women are concerned, and which at any given moment can provide the picture of women in Burkina as well as the impact of all that has already been done. Any NGO that is interested in being involved in women's issues will automatically address itself to this structure, at which level we will be in a position to say: "This is what we want to do, and this is how you can become involved." And the UFB will be involved as a support structure because it is already undertaking work to mobilize and conscientize our women. The fight against female circumcision, for example, cannot be carried out by anyone but the UFB because that is a cultural battle, a battle for women by women. The UFB is useful for virtually any technical activity that one wants to undertake for women. If you want to reach women in a certain village, it's possible now because the women are already organized by the UFB.

Africa Report: Is there anything else you would like to add about women in Burkina?
Ouedraogo: At this point, the impact of what we are trying to do, as I said earlier, is above all at the qualitative level. We believe that at this stage, the qualitative aspect is much more important than any concrete actions we might undertake, because it will lead us to a better understanding of our women and what their real preoccupations are. But it must be the women themselves who articulate their priorities. Even if women aren't at a certain level, they are capable of conceptualizing and expressing their views on their own situation.

My ministry's predecessor, the Ministry of Women's Status, had so conditioned our women to think that sewing and knitting were the priority that today when we go to a village and ask women what they want, they reply, 'Teach us how to crochet!' Thus, because they have been so brainwashed, our women end up by ignoring what their real priorities are! But what we're trying to do today is to get our women interested in all issues and to ask themselves to define their own priorities. Thus, we're in the phase where internal work is the most important. Even if we don't receive much in the way of external assistance, I say to myself, "Fine, this isn't a problem." And if some people don't understand what we're trying to do here, I say: "Too bad!" Later on, the concrete activities that we'll undertake will be much clearer, they will be well thought out, and therefore the impact will be much more significant.

As long as they are well-intentioned, anyone who wants to come and support us today is welcome. We will work together to outline precise areas in which to cooperate, because every day we are learning more and more about what is necessary and in which areas we need to act, and we will understand this even better in the future.
A Seven-Cornered Solution?

Political repression and a bankrupt economy have left Liberia with a divided opposition that has failed to provide a credible alternative to President Samuel Doe's government. Critics contend that the short-term efforts to resolve the economic crisis are only leading the country toward further chaos.

BY LARRY JAMES

The chain of events in Liberia, beginning with the October 1985 elections followed soon after by November's abortive coup and the subsequent imprisonment of opposition leaders, has led to a deepening political crisis pitting the government of President Samuel K. Doe against his political rivals.

The recent flight from the country of former Finance Minister Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf—one of the Doe government's strongest critics—underscores the extent of the problem. She was jailed in the wake of last year's coup attempt and stood trial on treason charges until she and a number of others were released under an amnesty announced by Doe.

The government claimed the pardon was a humanitarian gesture aimed at national reconciliation. Johnson-Sirleaf contended that the government had not proven its charges in court and released her in order to avoid further embarrassment. After her release, she resumed an active role in the opposition movement, which called for new elections to replace last year's vote which they claimed was rigged to favor a Doe victory. Johnson-Sirleaf's repeated requests for an exit visa were denied. The deteriorating security situation finally impelled her to flee without a visa.

In a late August interview in Monrovia, she described the situation as tense and admitted she feared for her life. "It isn't Doe I fear," she said. "Strangely enough, after all that has happened, I can still talk to him. In fact, he called me into the Executive Mansion since I've been out of jail. It's the thugs in the NDPL [National Democratic Party of Liberia] who scare me. I believe they would stop at nothing to keep holding on to the power they have."

On October 1st, the Elections Commission issued a statement calling on Doe's NDPL to disband its "task force," set up prior to last year's general elections ostensibly to insure a peaceful campaign. The opposition charged that in fact it was the task force which was responsible for creating violence and intimidating anyone who opposed the head of state. Commission Chairman Isaac Randolph said the group should be

"When demonstrators gathered in defiance of government warnings, riot police used tear gas and batons to disperse the crowd"

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banned, as its continued existence would disturb the public peace "to the
detriment of our political system," he said.

Many Liberians remain unconvinced
of the sincerity of the Doe government's
commitment to a truly free political sys-
tem. In September, a Reuters report quoted Foreign Minister Bernard
Blamo as saying that the government had uncovered an invasion plot by
rebels, some of whom allegedly took part in the abortive coup last Novem-
ber. Skeptics say the threat of invasion was imaginary and reports of it were
deliberately leaked to journalists so that the government would appear justified
in further clampdowns on the opposition.

In August, three opposition politi-
cians were jailed for failing to pay a fine
levied on them for creating what the
court called an "illegal political party.
This grouping, at one time called the
"grand coalition," was made up of the
Liberia Action Party (LAP), the Liberia
Unification Party (LUP), the Unity
Party (UP), and the United People's
Party (UPP).

The three men, LAP's Jackson Doe,
LUP's William Gabriel Kpolleh, and the
UP's Edward Kesselly, were released
in September after each paid the $1,000
penalty, but not before the situation had
deteriorated to the point of violent con-
frontation between supporters and riot
police.

"Gabriel Bacchus Matthews of the UPP
said his party would form a loyal oppo-
sition and try to work with the govern-
ment"

The men were confined at the maxi-
mum security prison, Bella Yella, in rural
Lofa county. The fact that they were
held in a penal institution with a notorious
reputation for torture led to opposi-
tion charges that the government was
violating their human rights and civil lib-
erties. When demonstrators gathered
in defiance of government warnings,
riot police used tear gas and batons to
disperse the crowd.

The release of the three politicians
helped defuse the situation somewhat,
but tensions remain high. Opposition
leaders charge that the Doe govern-
ment has no real commitment to any
sort of national reconciliation and that
the head of state privately taunts them
with his power while in public affecting a
conciliatory tone. They have vowed to
suspend the activities of their individual
parties until the government yields to
their demands for new elections.

As Kenneth Best, managing editor of
the independent Daily Observer puts it:
"We have a political crisis on our hands,
a situation in which the opposition lead-
ers have not accepted the results of the
election. It's an explosive situation."

"Sour Grapes"

Many officials in the Doe administra-
tion dismiss opposition charges of foul
play in the October 1985 elections as
"sour grapes." They claim the opposi-
tion is composed of elitists who want to
return to the good life they enjoyed be-
fore Doe's April 1980 military coup
ended more than 130 years of rule by
"Americo-Liberians," the descendants
of freed American slaves who founded
the country in 1847.

"The indigenous people of Liberia
have had a taste of power and they are
not going to turn the government over
to the Americo-Liberians again," says
Justice Minister Jenkins Scott. "From
now on they will always be a part of the
government of this country."

According to Scott, it is the maneu-
vering of the former ruling class which is
the root cause of the country's current
turmoil. "We wouldn't be having the
troubles we have right now except that
Americo-Liberians are behind it. There
may be indigenous Liberians fronting
these so-called parties, but the
Americo-Liberians are the ones calling
the shots."

"People try to give you the impres-
sion that the opposition represents
some sort of popular movement," Scott
says. "Well, it's just the other way
around. We're the ones the people of
Liberia are behind, and don't think for a
minute we don't intend to stay. I've
heard people try to compare what hap-
pened in Haiti or the Philippines with
what might happen here. Well, I'll tell
you this. If some U.S. official came up to
me and said, 'We've got a plane waiting
for you, let's go,' I'd say shoot me on the
spot and bury me on the spot. I'm not
going anywhere."

Similar views are expressed
throughout the government. "We don't
need these people," says Information
Ministers. MomoluGetaweh. "I know
them all and not one of them has a plan
for the development of this country. All
they are interested in is getting back
into power. We need Samuel Doe be-
cause he has the power to keep the
peace so this country can develop. Peo-
ple have so little here that they think
their only chance to get anything will be
to take it from those in power. It's a sad
fact of life about Liberia and it's not going
to change overnight."

At least one opposition party has
moved to distance itself from what was
the "grand coalition"—LAP, LUP, UP,
and UPP. Gabriel Bacchus Matthews of
the UPP said his party would form a
"loyal opposition" and try to work with
the government to solve the country's
problems.

Some former UPP supporters
viewed that action as a self-serving capitulation on Matthews' part. Those critics were not surprised when on September 22, Doe announced the lifting of a 13-month ban on the UPI, the country's most popular opposition party. Doe called his action "another manifestation of the government's sincere desire to bring about unity and true reconciliation among Liberians."

Last August, the party had been banned from participating in the 1985 general elections which returned Liberia to civilian rule. Authorities charged it with having "aims and objectives detrimental to the peace and stability of the country." At the time, political observers said the move was clearly Doe's attempt to eliminate his only serious opponent.

**Economic Uncertainty**

Since Doe came to power six years ago, Liberia has struggled with a steadily worsening economy. Even his worst critics will admit that Doe inherited a bad situation, but they are quick to point out that he has done little to improve it.

"Foreign investors have no confidence in Doe and until there is a government here they can have faith in, things are not going to get better," says Unity Party leader Edward Kesselly. "I will admit he has been given bad advice, but it was his fault that he took it. The very worst thing he could have done he did, and that was to listen to the people who suggested he mint his own money. We may never get over that blunder."

The seven-cornered dollar coin is generally blamed for much of the country's current economic trouble. The government says there is some $30 million worth of the coins in circulation. Other estimates put the figure closer to $50 million. Whatever their number, their existence has created a local currency in a country where the U.S. dollar was once the legal tender. The dollar is still officially the legal currency, but it is increasingly hard to come by. In the past year, the Liberian dollar has lost 50 percent of its value and there is now an active black market for greenbacks.

In August, the International Monetary Fund sent a team of advisers to Monrovia to assess the state of the economy and to evaluate the new programs put into effect by Finance Minister Robert Tubman. It is expected that those advisers will recommend a reduction in the coinage in circulation, something Tubman is not likely to want to hear.

Critics admit that Tubman, a former financial adviser for the Economic Community of West African States, has been able to meet the current government payroll and has caught up with past payroll obligations. Before he took office earlier this year, many workers had not been paid for four or five months. But his critics claim he found the money by simply minting more seven-cornered coins, which they claim will only worsen the country's cash crunch later on.

Tubman denies the charge. "What we did was set up a system of priorities to make sure the most important debts got paid first," Tubman says. "Before I took this position, the policy was to respond to foreign creditors first. My belief is that you must pay the people who fuel your own economy if you expect to get that economy moving. That is what we did."

Tubman remains optimistic. He believes that the World Bank and IMF may be ready to do business again with Liberia now that some of the country's debts have reportedly been paid. Liberia still owes $90 million to the IMF and $1.4 billion to the World Bank. Interest on that debt alone exceeds annual government revenues. At the end of August, the United States granted $28.2 million to help pay off some of the debt.

Even with that assistance, however, bankers still consider Liberia a basket case. There has been virtually no response to Doe's repeated calls for foreign investment in the country. Consumers are now hard hit by severe shortages of consumer goods, such as milk and sugar, and common drugs, such as chloroquine. Doe put a temporary clamp on opposition activities with the imprisonment of the opposition leaders, but intermittent detentions cannot be a permanent solution to the country's political problems, any more than the minting of dollar coins can solve the economic crisis.
Samora Moises Machel was born into a peasant family on September 29, 1933, in the village of Xilembene, near the fertile Limpopo Valley in Gaza Province. His forebears took an active part in the wars of resistance against colonial conquest. Thus, from an early age, he was schooled in the patriotic tradition of his family.

During his youth, Machel experienced life under the system of compulsory cotton cultivation, in which the monopolies forced the Africans to grow vast acreages of cotton which were then bought at starvation prices. Many people died of hunger as a result of this brutal exploitation. Large numbers of peasants were left with no choice but to abandon their land and accept being sold to the goldmines on the South African Rand. Machete oldest brother and many close relatives died in the mines, while others came back as permanent invalids.

In the early 1950s, the colonial government expelled the Limpopo peasants from their land to make way for landless Portuguese. The land cultivated by Machel's family was confiscated by the colonialists and his family home was demolished.

Through an agreement with the Vatican, the Portuguese colonialists had put African education totally into the hands of the Catholic missions which required that every student be baptised in the church.

Thus, although Machel came from a Presbyterian family, he was forced to be baptised as a Catholic in order to study. In addition to paying high fees, the students were forced to cultivate the rich fields of the missions. Since the schools were primarily concerned with teaching the catechism, any progress made by students was due entirely to their own effort.

Machel completed his primary education, but for an African to go on to secondary school was practically impossible. Nonetheless, the missionaries decided that the rebel, as Machel was called, should continue his studies at the seminary. Machete refused and decided to go to work. He finished his secondary studies in nursing at night school, paying for his course out of his wages.

The late 1950s and early 1960s saw a rapid growth of patriotic awareness in the African continent. Ghana's independence in 1957, the conflict in the Congo, and the beginning of the Angolan liberation struggle in 1961 were powerful catalysts for the Mozambican patriotic movement and filled Machel and his colleagues with enthusiasm.

Frelimo was formed on June 25, 1962, under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane. Machel joined in 1963 and was among the first group to be trained in Algeria. He played an active part in launching the armed struggle on September 25, 1964, working out the plans, selecting the fighters, and organizing their infiltration into Mozambique.

Machel was then entrusted with the responsibility of training Frelimo's forces. In 1965, he directed the launching of the armed struggle in the eastern section of Niassa, and then organized the Center for Political and Military Training in Nachingwea, Tanzania, where the cadres of the Mozambican revolution were trained in guerrilla warfare.

Under Machel's leadership, Frelimo began the process of transforming the semi-liberated areas. Through the deployment of trained guerrillas, Frelimo replaced the feudal power structure with people's committees. The cooperative campaign aimed to establish the basis for collective production and trade.

Between 1960 and 1970, a power struggle ensued between the moderate and radical forces within Frelimo. When the moderates failed to defeat the most politically conscious and organized elements in Frelimo, they allied themselves with Portuguese colonialism and helped assassinate eminent leaders such as Mondlane, Sansao Muthemba, and Paulo Kankhomba. Throughout this crisis, Machel successfully isolated the moderates and mobilized the patriotic forces behind Frelimo.

It was in this context that the third session of Frelimo's central committee was held in April 1969. To preserve unity, a presidential council was created, to which Machel was appointed in May 1970. The fourth session of the central committee elected Machel president of Frelimo.

After the overthrow of the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974, Machel led the Frelimo delegation in negotiations with the new Lisbon government. On September 7, 1974, an agreement was reached that power would be handed over to Frelimo within the year. On June 25, 1975, independence was declared and Samora Moises Machel became president of the People's Republic of Mozambique, in which capacity he served until his death on October 19, 1986.

Allen Isaacsman, a leading American authority on Mozambique, knew President Machel for many years. He provides the following tribute to the late President:

"Samora Machel loved life. Anyone who had the privilege of meeting him could not help but recognize how his eyes radiated and his smile beamed. There was something electric in the way he stepped to the podium and engaged enthusiastic crowds in song and banter. And there was something reassuring in the way he grasped your hand and while acknowledging the many problems his young country faced, reminded you that these difficulties paled by comparison to the hardships the handful of poorly armed young men and women encountered when they began their struggle against Portuguese colonialism. Even his harshest critics acknowledged that he was 'a charismatic leader.'"

"But Samora Machel was more than that. His biography encapsulates the struggle of the Mozambican people for a more equal and just society. President Machel often recounted with pride how his grandfather had played an important role in the 1895 Maguiguana rebellion—the first of many attempts to dislodge the Portuguese. He recalled how his father and brother had no alternative but to work for meager wages in the South African mines, an ordeal from which the latter never returned."

"And he anguished as he described the hated system of chibalo—enforced cotton cultivation—under which his parents and other peasants suffered. In a long interview, Machel emphasized that his own political education began 'not from reading Marx or Engels, but from seeing my father and mother forced to grow cotton for the Portuguese and going with them to the market where they received prices which were appreciably lower than those paid to the Europeans.'"

"Against all odds, he, along with Frelimo's first president, Eduardo Mondlane, led the Mozambican people against the Portuguese colonial regime. Victory did not come easily. He suffered the loss of Mondlane, his close friend, and saw many other compatriots die in battle. He watched helplessly as his father and brother were arrested, and he was devastated by the loss of his young wife, Josina, herself a leading militant in the anti-colonial struggle."

"Independence brought new problems and little relief. Drought, famines, and the flight of virtually the entire skilled labor force left Mozambique's underdeveloped economy paralyzed. Machel's commitment to aid the Zimbabwean freedom fighters resulted in massive reprisals at the hands of the Ian Smith regime and the Mozambican National Resistance Movement, which the Rhodesian security forces created and the South African military sustained. His outspoken criticism of the apartheid regime and support for the African National Congress brought new attacks from Pretoria and its MNR clients which wreaked further havoc on the economy."

"And yet throughout it all, Samora's commitment to building a socialist society, free from the grip of the apartheid regime, never wavered. The energy and hope which he radiated inspired millions of Mozambicans. His loss will be felt throughout the continent."
Leaders of the United Democratic Front (UDF), the Congress of South African Trade Unions, and the National Education Crisis Committee emerged briefly from hiding in early October to launch a united resistance campaign at a clandestine press conference in downtown Johannesburg. It marked the first joint effort by the three major black activist organizations to protest against the state of emergency since it was imposed in June.

Murphy Morobe, UDF acting national publicity secretary, said the initiative represented a "reorganization and galvanization of our forces which have been besieged in the months of the state of emergency," but he was reluctant to provide details of the campaign in order to avoid countermeasures from the government. The official campaign statement simply called on "all patriots" to fight for several key demands, including lifting the emergency, releasing all political prisoners, establishing "people's education," unbanning organizations, and the right to strike.

The three groups—which together claim a following of 3 million—described the campaign as a significant step toward uniting extra-parliamentary forces. Morobe said that "a process is now starting whereby we can attain the kind of unity we crave—disparate forces in the political spectrum can be brought in. We seek unity not only at the leadership level, but also amongst the masses."

The black activists told the press that the other major goal of the initiative was to get moderates to take a stand. As Morobe put it, "We are also implementing a 'fence-shaking process.' People who support this campaign must come out publicly and distinguish themselves from forces still operating under President Botha's scheme of things. It is no longer good enough to pledge support in the dark. This campaign will result in the clearer drawing of the battle lines in the country."

Less than a week later, President P.W. Botha's government drew its own battle lines by declaring the UDF an "affected organization"—a measure that falls short of banning, but effectively severs the most influential multi-racial group in the country from foreign funding. The restriction could deal a devastating blow to the UDF, whose domestic fundraising has been severely hampered by the state of emergency. Over half the organization's revenue has been contributed from abroad, mainly by Scandinavian countries and anti-apartheid groups in the West.

Under the Affected Organizations Act—passed in the early 1970s to destroy "un-South African" organizations—the president is empowered to take action against any group if he is "convinced that politics is being conducted by or through that organization with the help of . . . an organization or person overseas." The government has frequently accused the UDF of being a front for the proscribed African National Congress.

The UDF, a federation of more than 700 organizations, has borne the brunt of the state crackdown against anti-apartheid activists since the emergency was declared. AzharCachalia, UDF national treasurer and one of the few leaders not in hiding or detention, said that between 70-80 percent of the estimated 20,000 people detailed under the emergency were affiliated with the UDF "in one way or another." But he promised that the UDF's national and regional leadership would meet in secret to discuss future action against the latest government restriction.

Cachalia admitted that "the proclamation will certainly hurt the UDF, but not to the extent that it will cripple us"—even if it is merely a preliminary move to outlawing the organization entirely. As he said, "It's going to take more than declaring us an affected organization; it's going to take much more than banning the organization to stop the tide of resistance in the country."

Pretoria's expulsion of migrant labor deals blow to Mozambican economy

Pretoria's decision in early October to terminate the employment of Mozambicans in the mining and agricultural sectors of South Africa dealt a crippling blow to the economy of the frontline state. Remittances from workers in South Africa comprise Mozambique's largest single source of foreign revenue—approximately one-third of its annual earnings from abroad.

The migrant workers must depart when their current contracts expire, and none will be recruited in the future, Pretoria said. The announcement came just days before President Samora Machel was killed in a plane crash in South Africa.

The Mozambican government viewed the expulsion of workers as a deliberate effort to further undermine its economy. South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha, however, justified it as a response to Mozambique's alleged support of violence by the African National Congress (ANC).

The decision followed an incident in which six South African soldiers were wounded when their vehicle detonated a landmine close to the common border. Charging that Mozambican security forces were responsible, Pretoria reiterated earlier threats of military retaliation.

Continued on next page
Mozambique. . . continued

"If President Machel chooses terrorism and revolution, he will clash head-on with South Africa," warned Defense Minister Magnus Malan.

Officials estimated that up to 100,000 Mozambicans were working in South Africa—more than half in the gold mines of Eastern Transvaal. Mozambican workers allegedly hold higher-level jobs in the mines than other black miners. In addition, they have been less likely to join the National Union of Mineworkers because of fears of repatriation. Mozambicans also form a significant portion of the labor force on farmlands in the Eastern Transvaal.

The number of Mozambicans working illegally in South Africa is expected to grow dramatically as a result of Pretoria's action. Many of them come from famine-stricken areas of Mozambique, and their wages represent the only means of survival for their families back home. Others are refugees with no homes to return to.

The economic blow coincided with Mozambique's worst military crisis since independence, as the South African-backed Mozambique National Resistance Movement (Renamo) launched an offensive, capturing strategic towns that link northern and southern Mozambique and that control the Beira corridor. The rebels overran key Mozambican bases, built up a large force in the town of Zumbo at Lake Cabora Bassa, and were said to be in control of the Zambezi River Valley by mid-October.

The committee also decided to reduce expenditures by paring scholarship programs to a bare minimum and terminating support for the marine training and forestry institutes in Liberia and the telecommunications institute in Sierra Leone, stating that they should be financed by the individual states. Union priorities have been narrowed down to agriculture, communications, energy, industry, and transport.

The union was founded 13 years ago by Liberia and Sierra Leone, with Guinea joining in 1979. One of its most important goals—construction of a highway from Monrovia to Freetown with support from the African Development Bank—has recently stalled due to lack of funds. The other key project—the $2.5 million Mano River Bridge between Liberia and Sierra Leone—was completed in 1976. In addition, a common external tariff on major imports was established in 1977 between Liberia and Sierra Leone. Plans for a hydroelectric project to serve all three countries and a Freetown-to-Conakry branch of the highway are pending.

COTE d'IVOIRE

Hard times brewing for cocoa

Agriculture Minister Denis Bra Kanon confirmed in early October that for the first time in four years, Abidjan would not raise cocoa and coffee producer prices for the coming season due to difficult international markets for the two commodities.

According to President Felix Houphouet-Boigny's government, output is likely to drop for both coffee and cocoa in the 1986-87 season. As the world's leading cocoa producer, Cote d'Ivoire hit a new record of 580,000 tons in 1984-85. But because of unusually low rainfall this year and the cumulative effect
of three successive good crops, output is expected to decline by at least 50,000 tons next season.

BraKanon said the Ivorian coffee and cocoa plantations faced difficult climatic conditions this year, with the main growing regions in the southwest, west, and center of the country receiving only one-third the normal annual rainfall. As a result, the 1986-87 coffee crop is also expected to fall—by as much as 10 percent from last season's output of 281,000 tons.

Houphouët-Boigny; Swallowing a bitter brew

The government made its pessimistic forecast only a few months after reluctantly agreeing to participate in the newly-negotiated International Cocoa Agreement in late July. The five-year deal was concluded after the failure of five other attempts by the world's main consumers and producers to reach a consensus that would stabilize the market price of cocoa.

Côte d'Ivoire—the key producer country—had walked out of the United Nations-sponsored talks earlier in the year when it could not be guaranteed a minimum price for its cocoa. But when producers and consumers subsequently agreed to a compromise pact, BraKanon said that although the accord was not ideal, it was sufficiently flexible for his country to join.

The new pact, however, which was to take effect in October with the expiration of the previous agreement, has yet to come into force since too few importers have completed the necessary legal procedures. A four-month transitional period has been proposed to allow countries more time to give the UN at least provisional assurances that they intend to participate. Ivorian cocoa producers contend, however, that the delay will not jeopardize implementation of the new pact.

GHANA
Window shopping in Accra

Flt.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings' government introduced a weekly foreign exchange auction system in mid-September, aimed at increasing the country's foreign exchange reserves, eliminating the foreign currency black market, and encouraging exports of non-traditional products.

In establishing what amounts to a second-tier foreign exchange market, the ruling Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) specified, however, that certain vital transactions, including the purchase of crude oil and essential drugs, government debt servicing, and cocoa revenue, would continue to be calculated at the current rate of 90 cedis to the dollar. The Second Window Rate—as the value of the cedi fixed by the auction is known—is determined by changes in supply and demand of foreign exchange.

The auction is open to holders of import licenses, who submit their bids to the Bank of Ghana. According to a government communiqué, this is "to ensure that only organizations and individuals requiring foreign exchange for priority areas of the economy can participate in the auction and prevent speculation in foreign exchange."

The Rawlings government said that to avoid the problems encountered by other countries with foreign exchange auctions, adequate safeguards have been built into Ghana's two-tier system. In particular, a method of strict monitoring has been initiated to make certain that winning bidders use the foreign exchange for their stated intention and to prevent those who have hoarded cedis from using the auction to filter their money out of the country.

A spokesman for the PNDC's Structural Adjustment Programme Team said the new procedure would encourage Ghanaians living abroad to send remittances home through the banking system instead of through the black market. The auction system should also remove bottlenecks in the long administrative processes through which foreign exchange is allocated.

In pursuing a realistic exchange rate policy through the "second window," the government has in effect continued its policy of progressive devaluation, which is expected to produce a new rate closer to that obtained on the black market of 180 cedis to the dollar. The first weekly foreign exchange auction in late September produced an exchange rate of 128 cedis to the dollar, representing a devaluation of about 30 percent. By the third week, the rate had jumped to 145 cedis to the dollar, establishing a pattern which the government expects will allow it to effectively compete with, and eventually absorb, the black market.

Proponents of the two-tier foreign exchange market, however, have warned that the auction system cannot in itself solve all the country's economic ills. According to Yaw Manu Sarpong, chairman of the Foreign Exchange Auction Committee, "The new arrangement cannot provide an adequate solution to our economic problems. The key to the success of this arrangement will depend on our reaction and response to the new situations likely to be created."

But the government anticipates that the second window will help expand the economy's productive capacity, as it gives a competitive edge to locally produced goods against imported substitutes. Ultimately, the real value of the cedi depends upon productivity, and therefore the exchange rate established by the weekly auction will accurately reflect Ghanaians' efforts to
Visa policy prompts charges of racism

The British government's recent decision to require visitors from Nigeria, Ghana, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh to obtain entry visas before traveling to Britain has sparked heated debate over immigration policy. Commonwealth countries—except for Sri Lanka—had previously been exempt from such controls.

In defense of the policy, Home Secretary Douglas Hurd claimed that peoples of the Third World are becoming "increasingly footloose" in their search for better prospects. The change in policy was partly a response to the Immigration Service Union's call for action to alleviate "intolerable" conditions at Heathrow and Gatwick airports, where growing crowds of Third World visitors have created long lines and short tempers. Travelers awaiting processing were being put up in nearby hotels or overcrowded, military-like detention centers.

Critics of the Tory government policy argue that employing additional immigration officers at the airports might be a more reasonable solution. They charge that the visa policy has racist overtones which will exacerbate relations with Third World countries and damage the Commonwealth.

Shadow Home Secretary Gerald Kaufman said it was "deplorable" for the Home Secretary to implement the controversial policy before it could be debated in the House of Commons. Both the opposition Labour Party and the Liberal/Social Democratic Party Alliance described the new policy as "racialist."

The policy was applied to visitors from the Indian sub-continent on October 15. In a rush to beat the deadline, thousands of Asians boarded flights for London, creating chaos at British airports and prompting warnings of additional stampedes if procedures are not altered before the restriction is imposed on Ghanaians and Nigerians.

The debate over immigration from developing countries has also intensified in other European countries. In France, the government expelled 10 illegal immigrants from Mali in October—the first significant application of a new immigration law that gives the administration full power to oust immigrants who lack proper papers. SOS Racism?, various trade unions, and other French anti-racist organizations attacked the move.

The entry visa requirement imposed on 38 countries after the recent wave of terrorism is part of the French government's tougher stance on immigration and security. However, it has been enforced unevenly as police reported that no American had been denied entry into the country since the policy was initiated, while up to 30 percent of visitors from North and Central Africa were prevented from boarding flights for France or entering at the border.

In mid-October, the Danish Parliament also approved tough new restrictions on immigration that will cut the stream of refugees by 50-80 percent. As a result of the government-sponsored legislation, refugees will now be required to show a valid passport or visa at the border before being allowed to apply for asylum from inside the country.

In West Germany, Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Christian Democratic Party is expected to follow suit, pushing fora constitutional amendment to narrow the right of political refugees to seek asylum in the country. However, liberal parties have made it clear that they would fight such a change.

NIGERIA

Seeking political consensus

The political bureau which has coordinated national debate on a political system for the Third Republic over the past year is now summarizing recommendations with a view to presenting President Ibrahim Babangida with a proposal by the end of 1986.

Babangida had charged the committee with assessing the failure of Nigeria's past forms of government. Committee members were to seek a new system—"rooted in a truly Ni-
The 17-member team toured the states to survey local opinion and collect submissions from individuals who had played key roles in past administrations. However, local debate was somewhat phlegmatic, due largely to public disillusionment with politics and restrictions Babangida has imposed, including the recent ban on political participation by officials who served in the Shagari administration.

The debate, nonetheless, was kept alive in the press. Academics, journalists, military officers, politicians, market women, and others made proposals, including a return to the British parliamentary system that was adopted after independence or to the American presidential system that was used from 1979 to 1983. Some Nigerians have urged that the military retain a role, while others want traditional chiefs to play a part in the Third Republic. Other issues include the number of parties which should be allowed and federation versus a decentralized confederation of states.

Retired Gen. Theophilas Danjuma, whose proposal in the Lagos Guardian attracted considerable attention, suggested the following timetable: elections for governors and local government councillors in December 1987, elections to a Senate and House of Representatives in December 1988, and presidential elections in August 1990, two months before the military is due to hand over the reins of power.

Anthony Enahoro, a traditional chief whose views were solicited, advocated a "hybrid" system that links the unique qualities of Nigeria's political experience with a known system of government, probably a multi-party democracy. A plurality of parties could eventually be consolidated into a two-party system, he said, which could solve the problem of ethnic bias in parties that plagued the First and Second Republics. Minority groups could be ensured government representation through the constitution.

In one of the last debates—organized by the Punch Group of newspapers, Maj.-Gen. David Ejoor argued against rushing into a new system, urging that proposals be tested first at the local government level. G.L. Adeola, director of research for the Punch Group, recommended a "rootocracy" in which individuals would become eligible for national office at the community level so as to avoid the divisiveness of national party politics.

But some commentators have charged that the very nature of the discussion is misguided. Rather than seeking the perfect political system, Nigerians should be searching within themselves for the answer to why they could not make past systems work, they said.

**SIERRA LEONE**

Momoh struggles with reforms

In the face of growing public pressure for improved economic conditions, President Joseph Momoh is pleading for patience and reminding Sierra Leoneans that he inherited the problems of corruption and indiscipline plaguing the country.

Responding to recent charges that the nation is "unhappy and restless," Momoh publicly acknowledged that his popularity has diminished considerably in recent months. The public turnaround is in sharp contrast to the enthusiasm that greeted his promises of reform when he was elected president only one year ago.

Enormous price increases triggered by the 1986-87 budget reforms introduced in June have put many goods and services beyond the reach of the average consumer. The government abandoned currency controls and floated the leone. According to Finance Minister Sheku Kanu, the government and the International Monetary Fund agreed on the floatation in order to stimulate exports and make foreign exchange more available.

In addition, government controls were lifted from key domestic prices and a phase-out of subsidies on essential items was initiated—a measure long advocated by the IMF as a major condition for a new standby. Heavy export tariffs were imposed as a revenue-raising device, including a 22 percent duty on scrap metal, 20 percent on fish and drugs, and 10 percent on semi-finished goods and raw materials.

The effect of these drastic measures has been an economic upheaval. Traders and shopkeepers continued to demonstrate confusion about the real value of the currency several months after the floatation. Moreover, some powerful businessmen have apparently decided to curtail their investments in Sierra Leone, while others are moving in to fill the gap. In particular, Liat, a firm which reportedly has close ties to Israel and South Africa, is establishing itself in the agricultural, engineering, mining, and transportation sectors.

While calling on his countrymen to remain patient, Momoh awaits an IMF standby and increases in concessional aid from donor governments and financial institutions.

**Museveni thwarts coup plotters, rebels**

Three cabinet ministers, six officers from the 35th battalion of the Ugandan army, and more than a dozen others were charged with treason in early October for plotting to overthrow the government. The accused are suspected of supporting the rebels who have launched repeated attacks on President Yoweri Museveni's northern garrisons in recent months.

The alleged plotters, who had been under government surveillance for more than four months, include leaders of several opposition parties that were invited to join the government after Museveni came to power last January. Prominent among them is Paulo Muwanga, leader of the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) and former vice-president, and Anthony Ssekweyama, editor of the Citizen, the Democratic Party (DP) newspaper.
The cabinet ministers—all key members of political parties—are Commerce Minister Evaristo Myanzi (DP), Environmental Protection Minister David Lwanga (Federale), and Energy Minister Andrew Kayiira (Uganda Freedom Movement). UFM members comprise most of the 35th battalion, which had been stationed in the north.

Troops also searched the UPC headquarters and the offices of Internal Affairs Minister Paul Ssemogerere, DP leader. Museveni has banned party activity, but some parties have maintained pared-down office operations.

The accused had banded together to oppose recent government actions—such as Col. Muammar Qaddafi's visit to Uganda in September and the establishment of village-level committees of resistance—which they viewed as a slide to the left, according to New Vision, the government newspaper. The three ministers and others among those arrested are Baganda—generally considered relatively conservative in their political views.

The conspiracy, rebel attacks, and growing pressure to restore the Baganda monarchy have severely undermined Museveni's struggle to unify the nation. In the first serious uprising since Museveni's takeover of the north five months earlier, rebel troops attacked Gulu, Kitgum, and other northern sites in August. Chraging that the Sudanese government had armed and supplied the rebels, Museveni closed the border and stationed troops along the frontier and routes between the northern towns of Gulu, Kitgum, Moyo, and Arua.

Sudanese government officials vehemently denied the charges and flew to Entebbe in late September to confer with Museveni. Subsequently, Uganda reopened the border and in return, Sudan consented to Kampala's request to pursue the rebels across the border into territory where the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) is waging guerrilla warfare against Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi's government.

The SPLA draws the bulk of its forces from southern peoples who share a Nilotic heritage with the Acholos and Langis who comprise the majority of the Ugandan rebels. Thus, it is likely that the rebels have received help from Sudanese sources. The problem has been compounded by the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Sudan to their Ugandan homelands.

Meanwhile, pressure for restoration of the Kabakaship has intensified among the Baganda. In early September, the government arrested 25 plotters for allegedly employing witchcraft in an effort to overthrow the government and reintroduce the monarchy. New Vision described them as "the lunatic fringe" of the royalist movement.

The plot was detected shortly after Museveni rejected a formal plea to restore the monarchy and just two weeks after Prince Ronnie Mutebi's return to Kampala following 20 years of exile. The prince is heir to the throne of the late Kabaka who died in exile after abolition of the federal status of kingships in 1966. Mutebi came home to a hero's welcome. Ten thousand Baganda gathered at a religious service to welcome him, and elders knelt before him as he climbed the steps to the church.

Museveni held a series of meetings with Baganda elders to discuss their demands, but maintained that his interim government lacks the authority to decide such a complex constitutional issue. The monarchy could be restored as a cultural entity but not a political institution, he said. The Baganda, however, have said they would not accept this compromise.

**DJIBOUTI**

Aden Robleh's quick getaway

Former Commerce Minister Aden Robleh Awaleh was sentenced to life imprisonment in absentia by a state security court in early September, after being convicted of "attempting to destabilize the regime and murder senior officials." Five alleged co-plotters also received jail sentences—three of them in absentia.

Third vice-president of the ruling People's Rally for Progress (RPP) and a leading candidate to succeed President Hassan Gouled Aftidon in next year's presidential elections, Aden Robleh had fled the country in May after being forced out of the politburo and learning that he was about to be arrested. He crossed the border to Ethiopia with another party leader. Deputy Omar Elmi Khaire, before making his way to France, where he is reportedly seeking political asylum.
downfall began in January 1986 when a bomb exploded at RPP headquarters, leading to the charges that he had plotted to overthrow the government.

KENYA
Banks go bust

Confidence in indigenous financial institutions has been slow to recover following the recent collapse of two banks and several credit institutions.

New managers were appointed at the troubled institutions, and Finance Minister George Saitoti is heading a Special Investment Committee (SIC) of government and Central Bank officials to advise the appointees. The committee will try to recover the funds of thousands of independent depositors and to persuade Kenya's public and private sectors to refloat the institutions.

Some observers believe that government and Central Bank officials are partly to blame for not acting more swiftly to head off the crisis and for possibly colluding with the institutions' directors in unethical or illegal practices. Thus, the SIC is likely to find the restoration of public confidence a difficult task, and the possibility of another run on the banks remains a threat to the financial community.

A public stampede in late August brought down the Pioneer Building Society and its affiliate, the Capital Finance Company. Hundreds of depositors rushed to make withdrawals at Pioneer's Nairobi headquarters, forcing the building society to close its branches in Eldorel, Meru, Mombasa, Nakuru, and Thika.

While earlier collapses were triggered by similar panics, it was the alleged diversion of funds to individuals and companies linked with the directors of the institutions that was the root cause of the crisis. For example, the directors of Continental Bank, which had to close its doors in July, are said to have withdrawn large sums in low-interest loans, resulting in a shortage of operating funds which triggered panic first in the financial community and then among depositors.

The early August failure of Union Bank of Kenya and its affiliates, Jimba Credit Corporation, Ltd. and Kenya Savings and Mortgages, was probably due partly to a domino effect set off by public fears.

A year and a half earlier, the Rural-Urban Finance Corporation, a building society, had gone into receivership after suffering serious troubles. The government has not yet worked out a means of reimbursing the thousands of depositors who lost their savings at that time.

Rural-Urban, Union, and Continental are among the dozens of indigenous financial institutions that mushroomed during the past decade, most of them founded by Kikuyu businessmen in an effort to break the long-time monopoly originally held by the British banks, Barclays and Standard, and later shared with Kenya Commercial Bank and the National Bank of Kenya—both owned by the Kenyan government.

While these four giants still control the industry, the newcomers enjoyed some success, fueled by heavy investments from government funds, including the National Social Security Fund and the National Health Insurance Fund. Workers and retirees have frequently had trouble collecting their benefits from these funds, and as the recent crisis unfolded, the Central Organization of Trade Unions publicly called for action to protect workers' contributions to health, social security, and retirement plans.

President Moi responded to the crisis by declaring it was a plan to sabotage Kenya's economy, and he ordered drastic action against the responsible parties. The directors of the financial institutions "should not be allowed to sleep after causing heavy inconvenience and suffering to Kenyans," he said.

In mid-August, at least seven directors of Rural-Urban and Continental were held for interrogation. Andrew Kimani Ngumba, Rural-Urban president, managed to evade arrest by fleeing to Europe. Only a week earlier, Ngumba, a member of Parliament, had been removed from his post as assistant minister of planning and development. It is not clear why certain directors were singled out for questioning, particularly since the problems at Rural-Urban date back to 1984.

Meanwhile, amendments to Kenya's Banking Act—including implementation of a system for insuring individual depositors—are due to take effect soon, just in time to apply to the Thabiti bank which plans to open its doors in 1987—"a bold step under the circumstances," commented The Weekly Review.

MADAGASCAR
Doubts cast on progress

This year's food harvest falls short of government goals, despite producer price increases imposed as part of the country's structural adjustment program, according to Africa Analysis.

Artificial shortages caused by hoarding and speculation have exacerbated the problem, leading to doubts about the real benefits of the International Monetary Fund's structural adjustment program.

The latest IMF standby arrangement—one of a series initiated in 1980—followed a 20 percent devaluation of the Malagasy franc in August. The IMF will provide SDR 30
million over 17 months in support of the 1986-87 structural adjustment program.

The IMF points to progress in several areas, particularly reductions in the fiscal deficit and the rate of inflation—now 10 to 11 percent compared to 30 percent in 1982. However, the balance of payments situation "has remained under continuous pressure," the IMF reports, due to poor weather and marketing difficulties exacerbated by insufficient competitiveness, a rigid exchange and trade system, and tight controls over many areas of economic activity.

SEYCHELLES
Plotters falter, coup fails

Government officials uncovered a military plot to overthrow President Albert Rene while he was attending the Non-Aligned Summit in Harare in September.

The coup was planned by army officers loyal to Col. Ogilvy Berlouis, the minister of youth and defense, according to Paul Chow, secretary-general of the exiled Seychellois National Movement. However, the plot failed when the conspirators disagreed over whether to seize control while Rene was abroad or to bide time until his return in order to attempt an assassination. Chow said.

After receiving word of the plot, Rene cancelled his state visit to Kenya and flew back to Victoria in a plane supplied by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. He dismissed several high-ranking military officers—Majors Raymond Bonte, Phillip Lucas, and Roily Marie, but did not detain them. The government subsequently announced that Berlouis had resigned and departed for an unknown destination abroad, while Bonte fled to Kenya.

Berlouis figured prominently in the 1977 coup which removed President James Manemah from office and brought Rene to power.

Following the removal of Berlouis and the majors, the President announced high-level personnel changes in the armed forces and the first government reshuffle since 1982. Rene took over the defense portfolio and appointed seven new members to the cabinet, including the country's first female minister, Rita Sinon, to head internal affairs.

The Rene government has been the target of several aborted coups, including an attempt to seize power by a group of South African mercenaries led by "Mad" Mike Hoare in November 1981.

TANZANIA
Weak party support for Mwinyi

President Ali Hassan Mwinyi's vigorous anti-corruption campaign in the civil service and parastatals has been undermined by the absence of support from Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Tanzania's ruling party. The general public, however, appears to be strongly behind...
the drive, demonstrating support for Mwinyi's effort at recent rallies in Dares Salaam.

In public statements, Mwinyi has repeatedly focused on the corruption that riddles Tanzania's public sector. "I am (old the peasants cannot get any service in rural areas until they oil the hands of those concerned," he said recently. Tanzanians must now pay even to exercise their constitutional rights, he told a Coast Province group which had come to congratulate him for an anti-corruption speech. He has also carried his message to the party, charging that the CCM tends to protect its officials who are known to be dishonest or corrupt.

The president has backed his words with action including the suspension or firing of public employees and a reshuffle of key parastatal directors. In addition, Finance Minister Cleopa Msuya has implemented strict controls, including quarterly reviews of expenditures, on government spending units.

In a parallel effort. Zanzibar's Chief Minister Seif Sharrif Hamad is crusading against corruption on the islands, cutting the salaries of hundreds of senior and mid-level officials and suspending others from their jobs. The drive has earned him the antipathy of a growing circle of critics, many of whom have been targeted in his campaign.

The CCM leadership has also failed to promote the economic reforms being implemented in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) standby arrangement—finally signed in late August. Observers noted that party stalwarts are apparently unwilling to compromise their long-held opposition to IMF-imposed conditions. Former President Julius Nyerere, who heads the party through the end of the year, resisted the IMF's harsh prescriptions during his last years as president.

The standby for SDR 64.2 million over 18 months will support Tanzania's $4.5 billion Economic Recovery Program, which focuses on increasing agricultural productivity and industrial capacity, reviving transportation and communications infrastructures, and reforming fiscal and trade policy.

Israel makes a comeback in Yaoundé

Cameroon has restored full diplomatic relations with Israel—a major boost to Jerusalem in its drive to regain official recognition in sub-Saharan Africa. The controversial announcement by President Paul Biya's government came at the end of a two-day visit to Yaoundé by Prime Minister Shimon Peres in late August, marking the first Israeli head of state visit to black Africa in 20 years.

Most African countries severed ties with Israel following the 1973 Yom Kippur war to protest Israeli occupation of Egyptian territory. Among Organization of African Unity members, only Lesotho, Malawi, and Swaziland failed to join the boycott.

Israel began its comeback in sub-Saharan Africa when it officially resumed diplomatic links with Zaire in May 1982 and Liberia in August 1983. Earlier in the year, Abidjan joined the fold, fueling speculation that several more African countries would soon follow. In the meantime, Israel established special interest sections in the embassies of eight additional African states, including Gabon, Kenya, and Togo, as a first step toward regaining full diplomatic representation.

The latest Israeli foreign relations triumph follows five years of growing economic and military cooperation with the Biya government. According to Israeli officials, the two countries initiated secret trade relations in 1981. Israel was subsequently allowed to establish an interest section in Yaoundé when Biya took power two years later, with a number of Israeli companies operating in Cameroon under cover names. Since then, trade between the two countries has flourished, with Israeli exports for the first half of 1986 unofficially estimated at $984,000—a 300 percent increase over the same period last year.

Perhaps more importantly, Israel has significantly increased its military assistance to Cameroon since Biya suppressed a bloody coup attempt in April 1984. An Israeli military mission has been training the country's 7,000 army in Yaoundé, while many of Cameroon's top army brass have been sent to Israel for instruction. Under-scoring the close military cooperation between the two countries, the Biya government recently announced that it had agreed to buy 12 Kfir fighter bombers and four Arava transport planes from Israel for an estimated $30 million.

Peres' visit could hardly have been better timed to bolster Israel's image in the country. The prime minister arrived in Yaoundé with a team of doctors and medical specialists just as the Biya government was appealing to the international community for relief in the wake of the toxic volcanic gas leak that killed neatly 2,000 people in northwest Cameroon. The Israeli medical personnel were the first foreigners to reach Lake Nios, bringing with them large quantities of emergency relief equipment.

Biya, who agreed to visit Israel at a later date, said the resumption of relations was dictated by "mutual national interests," and that the Arab states' boycott was "limited in time," since Egypt and Israel had made moves toward mending fences. Cameroon and Israel agreed to set up a joint commission to promote cooperation in agriculture, trade, tourism, communications, and defense.

CHAD
Shadow boxing with Habre

Goukouni Oueddei's Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) suffered yet another blow to its credibility when the Chadian Liberation Front (Original Frolinat) pulled out of the Libyan-backed opposition to President Hissene Habre's government in mid-September. Several weeks earlier, Acheikh Ibn Omar's much larger Revolution-
ary Democratic Council (CDR) announced that it had decided to leave the GLINT, preferring to continue its struggle against the N'djamena government independently.

While Original Frolinat Secretary-General Abdelkader Yacine condemned the "lack of a clear-cut position by the GUNT" and "its condoning of political stalemate," the CDR went further. In explaining the decision to break away, Acheikh accused Goukouni and his men of resorting to "torture, arrests, and even killings" in their attempts to impose factional unity. Nevertheless, he said, the CDR would continue to maintain its links with the fighting forces and political trends associated with the GUNT.

However, fighting broke out in late August at the Fada oasis in northern Chad between CDR and GUNT units supporting Goukouni, leaving 30 dead and 50 wounded. The CDR seized control of Fada—the most important locality in the region after Faya-Largeau—where Libyan troops stationed there reportedly observed a strict neutrality. Acheikh and Goukouni subsequently went to Tripoli as part of a Libyan effort to mediate between the two opposition factions.

Despite the disintegration of the GUNT, Acheikh made clear he would not return to N'djamena, claiming the Chadian president has not sought real negotiations. Moreover, said Acheikh of Habré's national reconciliation policy, "To recuperate several personalities does not resolve the problem of the Chadian masses."

The GUNT, which has suffered a major leadership crisis since Goukouni failed to show up for a March 1986 meeting with Habré in Brazzaville, has been plagued by several key defections including that of its vice-president, Col. Wald Abdelkader Kamougue, in June. But the pull-out by the CDR—the best armed and most organized GUNT faction—leaves Goukouni more isolated than ever before.

Acheikh has already indicated that preparations are underway for a gathering of anti-Goukouni factions in an effort to establish a "new common platform of struggle" distinct from the GUNT. At least half of the dozen factions which until recently have made up the Libyan-backed opposition are expected to take part, including the Popular Armed Forces (FAP) of Mahamat Issa Idriss and the First Army of Mahamat Abba Seid, who also have left the GUNT since mid-August. •

**EQUATORIAL GUINEA**

**Key coup plotter executed**

Eugenio Abeso Mondu, who allegedly masterminded a plot to overthrow President Teodoro Obiang Nguema, was executed by firing squad on August 17. Mondu was a deputy in the national assembly and had served as a diplomat in Havana, Moscow, and Madrid. His brother, Melchior Ndong Mondu, was sentenced to 20 years in jail.

**A military tribunal handed down 28-month sentences to other plotters, including the president's uncle. Deputy Prime Minister Fructoso Mba Onana; Planning and Development Minister Marcos Mba Ona; Finance Minister Guillermo Obiang Nguema Elu; and National Bank General Director Damian Ona Mane.**

The relative speed with which the trial and execution were carried out has fueled speculation that the discovery of the plot was used as a pretext to neutralize key government officials who posed a threat to Obiang Nguema.

The alleged plot was foiled on July 17 when forces loyal to the president intercepted some 30 civilians and military officers as they tried to take over the presidential palace in Malabo.

**Mubarak battles fundamentalist fervor**

President Hosni Mubarak's government has arrested hundreds of Islamic fundamentalists in recent months in a bid to hold back the tide of religious fervor sweeping the country. Interior Minister Zaki Badr, who took office with a reputation as a hardliner, has directed the Egyptian government's latest campaign to break the stronghold of Islamic militants—particularly on university campuses.

In trying to stamp out what the Mubarak government considers a serious long-term political threat, Badr has said that his mission is to "detect and prosecute" those using the "slogans of Islam to conduct terrorist activities and to shake the stability and security of this country." Although it is unclear how many arrests have been made—Islamic militants claim the total is at least 900—several major court cases involving fundamentalists have made headlines in the local press.

One case involves 75 defendants charged with setting fire to a number of theaters, video rental clubs, and a grocery store selling alcohol. They were also accused of advocating the overthrow of the regime and of stealing firearms and ammunition from the armed forces and the police. In another well-publicized trial, Mubarak issued a decree mandating that a military court try 37 defendants charged with forming a clandestine organization to overthrow the government.

The growing popularity of Islamic fundamentalism is most striking on university campuses where militants have swept virtually all student elections despite government attempts to scratch most of them off the ballots. Said one foreign professor, "The fundamentalists dominate the university. They do what they like in lectures. They start the lecture by praising Islam, they interrupt classes. The Christian students live in fear of something happening."

Islamic fundamentalism has also made its mark at the community level. IT Assiout, south of Cairo, several primary schools privately run by Islamic groups represent a growing challenge to the state-run education system. The parallel infrastructure is making in-roads at the grassroots level, due largely to the deteriorating quality of most institutions operated by the government.

A military tribunal handed down 28-month sentences to other plotters, including the president's uncle. Deputy Prime Minister Fructoso Mba Onana; Planning and Development Minister Marcos Mba Ona; Finance Minister Guillermo Obiang Nguema Elu; and National Bank General Director Damian Ona Mane.
Islamic alternatives have come to appear increasingly attractive to many Egyptians. Islamic institutions, including health clinics and small hospitals, banks, insurance plans, and business services, are generally operated more efficiently than the state-run counterparts, which are breaking down under the weight of Egypt's population explosion and economic difficulties.

The fundamentalists' ultimate goal of establishing an Islamic state in Egypt, however, is a much longer-term project. As one Cairo University lecturer put it, "These Islamic groups are competing now for the loyalty of the average citizen, of the layman. They are not necessarily pushing for a political confrontation, but rather seeking to gain the support of the average Egyptian, one by one, inch by inch. . . . What we are seeing is an alternative society in formation, an alternative society being born gradually and incrementally."

LIBYA
No longer in the driver's seat
In late September, Col. Mu'ammar Qaddafi's government unexpectedly agreed to sell its shares in Eiat, following several rounds of negotiations with Giovanni Agnelli, chairman of the Italian motor and industrial conglomerate. Libya had earlier rejected all attempts to buy out its 15.9 percent stake in the company, but falling oil revenues combined with the Italian government's growing pressure to accept the $3.15 billion deal apparently forced Qaddafi's hand.

The Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company (Lafico) bought the stake for about $400 million 10 years ago at a time when the automobile manufacturer was suffering from severe losses and labor problems. In the 1980s, however, Fiat made a spectacular economic recovery, helping transform the Libyan share into a secure and lucrative investment.

But the Libyan link—which included the presence of two Lafico members in the Fiat boardroom—became a growing source of embarrassment for the car company, particularly after the Italian government accused Tripoli of supporting terrorism and expelled several Libyan diplomats and businessmen earlier this year. Lafico's Rome office manager was deported, while another Lafico employee was arrested during an investigation into terrorist activities.

The sale of the Libyan stake removed a possible barrier to Fiat's effort to gain Pentagon contracts in connection with the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative. In May, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger blocked a $7.9 million contract with a Fiat subsidiary to supply bulldozers to the Marine Corps, on the grounds that part of the profit from the deal could wind up in Libya's hands. Three months later, the Pentagon lifted the ban on contracts when Fiat formed a trading company in the U.S. to isolate Libya from any profits derived from the Italian firm's participation in Star Wars projects.

After the Libyan government revealed in June that it had no intention of selling its Fiat stake, Italy stepped up its economic pressure on Tripoli. In August, a court in Milan froze $5 million of Libyan assets in a case brought by an Italian civil engineering contractor. Although the amount was relatively small, it set an ominous precedent for Libya. Faced with growing Italian hostility, the Qaddafi government acquiesced to Fiat's demands, evidently preferring to stay in the good graces of its number-one trading partner.

Just as importantly, the deal gave Libya a large sum of much-needed cash to compensate for declining oil revenue. American and European cutbacks on imports of Libyan crude oil, together with plummeting prices, have seriously squeezed the Qaddafi government as its oil earnings have shrunk from a peak of $22 billion in 1980 to $5 billion this year. Said one financial analyst in explaining the deal, "The combination of a huge profit and the absolute need for cash is a pretty powerful argument."

MAURITANIA
Second-class citizens on trial
The government of President Maouya Sid Ahmed Ould Taya arrested more than three dozen people in early September—including several leading public figures—for allegedly taking part in an "unauthorized public gathering and distributing leaflets aiming to undermine national unity." Within two weeks, 20 detainees were tried and convicted in Nouakchott, with sentences ranging from six months to five years. Their names were not released, however.

In confirming the arrests, Interior Minister Djibril Ould Abdallah said a group of "mislled persons" had been "intoxicating the people with hate and confusion," and "making contacts outside Mauritania with a view to sowing seeds of discord." He claimed that working from abroad, the group had produced and distributed a document aimed at "dividing our people."

Relatives of the detainees suggested that the government's clampdown was part of "punitive measures against black Africans who no longer want to be considered as second-class citizens in Mauritania." The document—described as a "manifesto of oppressed black Africans"—reportedly denounced the ascendancy of the Moors over black Mauritians.
and criticized the government's policy of arabiization—especially in the south where black ethnic groups predominate.

The majority of those arrested were black Africans, including Tafsirou Djigo and Mamadou Ly, both business executives and former government ministers. Others detained were Abdoul Aziz Ba, a former member of the national assembly, and Oumar Ba, a prominent historian and linguist. Several Arab-Berbers were also said to have been arrested, but relatives of the accused have claimed they were "only scapegoats," held in an attempt to camouflage an anti-black campaign by the government.

SUDAN

Food for thought in the south

"Operation Rainbow," the $1 million relief airlift, finally got underway in mid-October when two chartered aircraft carrying emergency food supplies landed safely in Sudan's war-torn south despite threats by the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) to shoot them down.

The relief operation, sponsored by the U.S., Canada, the Netherlands, and several private and international agencies, had been scheduled to begin nearly two weeks earlier, but was delayed for "technical reasons." Organizers estimate that up to 2 million people face starvation in southern Sudan, which has been ravaged by drought and a continuing civil war between Col. John Garang's estimated 12,000 soldiers and Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi's government troops.

Sponsors of the airlift had earlier negotiated an agreement with the SPLA so that food could be flown to the government-controlled town of Wau and the rebel-held area of Yirol. But Sudanese authorities rejected the plan and demanded that initial flights go exclusively to government-controlled areas.

The SPLA promptly condemned the relief sponsors for "capitulating to the Khartoum government" and warned that they would be flying at their own risk. In mid-August, the SPLA shot down a Sudan Airways flight as it left the city of Malakal, killing all 60 passengers. As a result of the accident, an earlier airlift was cancelled.

While the Mahdi government has argued that relief supplies should be flown to the main towns, the SPLA has said that starvation is much worse in the countryside. Garang has pointed out that if international aid agencies want to help the greatest number of people, "There must be a basic agreement on proportions... When they talk about relief they talk about relief to the towns, not to the countryside. We did not cut off relief supplies. It is the relief supplies that have never come."

Because Garang's forces control as much as 95 percent of the mainly Christian or animist south—except for a few government-held towns that are under siege—the only way to reach people in the rural areas is through the SPLA's relief wing, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association.

Although each side has used food as a weapon of war that has served to polarize the conflict, Garang says the SPLA does not want to split the country along Muslim-Christian lines. Rather, the SPLA seeks to convince leaders in Khartoum that Sudan can no longer afford to be dominated by the north. As Garang put it, "We are not fighting to be invited to dinner. We are fighting to effectively participate in the decision-making of our country, in the restructuring of political power in Khartoum. Our aims are to create a new Sudan."

African leaders at United Nations:

The debt burden of developing nations and the anti-apartheid struggle were the main focus of African leaders who addressed the 41st session of the UN General Assembly in September and October. Several African representatives also discussed problems facing their individual countries.

Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe: "African governments and peoples are becoming increasingly aware that they, more than anybody else, must play a major role in their continent's economic regeneration. They are aware of their responsibility to effect and ensure the success of painful structural adjustment measures, which may not be without serious political and social consequences. However, there can be no denying that unless our efforts are generously supported and complemented by the international community, and especially by the industrialized countries, Africa's economic recovery, growth, and development prospects will continue to be remote."

External Relations Minister Leandre Bassole, Burkina Faso: "The fact is that Africa has rarely been the master of its own development: Africa's development has almost always been the brainchild of persons who have had and still have a very questionable understanding of our profound being. So far, Africa has been content with being a passive consumer of products and ideas coming from outside the continent. Therefore, another strategy is required, which means breaking with the practices of the past."

External Affairs Minister Afonso Van Dunem, Angola: "The People's Republic of Angola continues to be faced with an undeclared war situation created by the South African racist regime, which has forced the Angolan people to endure enormous sacrifices... Defenseless children, women, and elderly people are one of South Africa's favorite targets and the racist forces constantly blow up our bridges, railways, and roads, and destroy our hospitals and schools, not sparing our industrial installations. Material damage caused to our country has been estimated at $12 billion."

Foreign Minister Maj. Jean Traore, Guinea: "The north-south dialogue has become bogged down and has reached a dead end in all fora of the UN system. Some countries have even pitted some organs of the system against others, as though deliberations on international trade, industrialization, finances—for example, in the UN Conference on Trade and Development and the UN Industrial Development Organization—were encroaching on the
Speaking out on debt, apartheid

competence of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or the IMF, while in fact the activities of all these organizations are complementary and closely interrelated."

Ambassador to the UN Wilbert Chagula, Tanzania: "There have been questions about whether the special session of the General Assembly on Africa was a success or a failure. The adoption of a consensus resolution on the critical economic situation in Africa was, in itself, a positive and significant outcome of the special session. However, the realization of the success of the special session is yet to be seen, since it all depends upon how the international community as a whole will implement the UN Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986-1990."

Prime Minister Sadig al-Mahdi, Sudan: "We intend to make an overall revision of the volume and sources of external debt. However, we will not be in a position to deal with all our external debts according to the customary commercial basis. We will pay what we can in a manner that does not disturb the norms of life of our people while bearing in mind the need to provide them with the requested level of development. We shall also continue to address the rich debtor countries, hoping that they will understand the still critical economic situation in Africa was, in itself, a positive and significant outcome of the special session. However, the realization of the success of the special session is yet to be seen, since it all depends upon how the international community as a whole will implement the UN Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986-1990."

Prime Minister Farah Dirir, Djibouti: "The Republic of Djibouti is situated in one of the most arid regions in the world, and the scarcity and irregularity of rainfall are impediments to undertaking any meaningful agricultural development. Livestock has been the principal livelihood of the population before the development of urban centers. However, the overgrazing of pastoral land and the recurrent drought have brought about an environmental change which means that livestock rearing is no longer a viable means of subsistence. Consequently, the rural population has become more and more dependent on urban centers for their sustenance. As a result, Djibouti is a net importer of almost all the food needed for local consumption."

TUNISIA
Mzali blamed for national ills

Ex-Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali was sentenced in absentia to a year in jail for illegally fleeing the country in early September. The sentence came after President Habib Bourguiba decided to expel him from the Socialist Destour Party (PSD), cancel his parliamentary immunity, and pursue charges against him. A judicial enquiry into his six years in office is foreseen.

The government was expected to announce additional charges against Mzali, who was unceremoniously dumped from power in July, only days after the aging Bourguiba had called him, "my son... my right-hand man in the party and the state."

Disguised in sunglasses, false moustache, and a fez, Mzali slipped across the border September 3, spending several days in Algeria before flying to Europe. He was granted a provisional right to remain in Switzerland. He told the press he had not planned to flee until his trip to Switzerland as vice-president of the International Olympic Committee was cut short at Tunis Airport in mid-August, despite his having received invitations from the committee president and French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac.

He also reportedly suspected that he was about to be arrested after the government stepped up harassment of his relatives with investigations into their financial affairs. Three sons, a son-in-law, and other relatives were detained and interrogated. The residence of his wife, Fatnha Mzali, former head of the Ministry for the Family for Women's Affairs, was under surveillance. Two sons, Rafik and Hadem, subsequently received two-month suspended sentences for helping their father escape. From exile, Mzali denounced the persecution of his family, describing it as an unprecedented development in Tunisian history.

Government officials have blamed Mzali and his associates for misdeeds ranging from neglect and mismanagement of the country's economic affairs to siphoning of public funds over a period of years. They have also claimed that he aided radical elements in Tunisia's growing Islamic fundamentalist movement. His program of arabization of public education has come under heavy criticism and is already being reversed by a new emphasis on French instruction at the primary school level.

Evidence has surfaced that Mzali and Minister of Culture Bechir Ben Slama used public funds to publish fundamentalist propaganda as well as their own biographies and an Italian translation of the former prime minister's works.

Meanwhile, investigations were also underway into the past activities of Bourguiba's ex-wife, Wassia Ben Ammar, who now resides in Paris. After 25 years of marriage, their divorce was official on August 11, although she had been expelled from the presidential palace last January. According to Jeune Afrique, the government has evidence to convict her of amassing a personal fortune for herself and her family, appropriating expensive gifts presented to the head of state, and various charges of corruption, nepotism, and influence trafficking.

It was her personal forays into international diplomacy, however, that were said to have disturbed Bourguiba the most—particularly her contacts with Algerian officials, including an alleged request that they assume a direct role in solving Tunisia's "crisis of authority," and her friendship with Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi.
In addition, a power struggle between Wassila and Mzali was reportedly a key factor in their downfall. Mzali was allegedly preparing a detailed file of charges against her, while Wassila was said to be attempting to undermine the prime minister’s credibility with the president by emphasizing his obsession with the succession issue to the exclusion of other important matters.

**SOUTHERNAFRICA**

**Black workers form rival labor giant**

Another chapter in the history of South Africa's black labor movement was written in early October when the Council of Unions of South Africa (Cusa) and the Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions (Azactu) finally merged to launch a "super-federation." With the amalgamation of the black consciousness labor groups, the Cusa/Azactu federation is expected to become a major rival to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), the multi-racial super-union body born in December 1985.

According to its president, James Mndaweni, the new federation has 248,000 paid-up and 420,000 signed-up members, linking 23 unions—12 from Cusa and 11 from Azactu. The black consciousness-inspired union is thus somewhat smaller than Cosatu, which represents 450,000 paid-up industrial and commercial workers in 34 multi-racial but black-dominated trade unions, including the powerful National Union of Mineworkers (NUM).

Azactu spokesman Pandelani Nefolovhodwe said the new labor giant would operate on four fundamental principles: one union for each industry, worker democracy, financial accountability, and black working class leadership. Emphasis on black leadership, however, is the key provision which distinguishes the new federation from Cosatu, whose commitment to non-racialism became a major stumbling block to uniting the labor movement late last year. Cusa and Azactu withdrew or were excluded—the version of each side differs—from the negotiations leading to the formation of Cosatu following differences over this issue.

Despite the political divisions that have plagued the black workforce, the labor movement flexed its growing muscle in early October when about 325,000 miners staged the biggest-ever stayaway in any one industry to mourn the 177 killed in the Kinross gold mine disaster.

According to Cyril Ramaphosa, general secretary of the NUM, which called the successful day of action, "Management should take heed that the NUM is prepared to take up any issue, be it wages, politics, safety—it can mobilize workers around virtually any issue." Another 275,000 members affiliated with Cosatu engaged in unprecedented solidarity action, organizing work stoppages, memorial meetings, and demonstrations, according to federation spokesman Jay Naidoo.

The miners—all but five of them black—were asphyxiated by toxic fumes from a fire in a mile-deep shaft. Said one survivor, "The miners didn't stand a chance. They ran into a wall of smoke and must have dropped like flies."

The Chamber of Mines proposed a token five-minute silence to commemorate the dead, but the NUM dismissed the employers' suggestion and called for a one-day work stoppage. A memorial service organized by the mine owners, the General Mining Union Corporation, was similarly condemned.

Explained one angry worker, "We don't respect management and we don't respect their memorial." Hundreds of militant mine workers waving sticks and chanting slogans disrupted the ceremony and called on the crowd of 2,000 to walk out. "We are not going to pray with whites today. We've never been allowed to pray with whites. We'll have our own rites," they shouted.

The NUM blamed the disaster on slack safety measures which have led to more than 46,000 deaths in the gold mines since the turn of the century and some 9,000 in the last decade. As the statement by the United Democratic Front, the country's major legal anti-apartheid organization, put it, "Despite all the profits accrued from mining proceeds, South Africa still has the worst record for mine disasters and deaths."

**ANGOLA**

**Stamp of approval on rebel aid**

In the final weeks before adjournment in mid-October, Congress gave President Reagan a vote of confidence for covert aid to Unita and endorsed legislation sending a message of disapproval to American oil companies operating in Angola.

By a 229-186 vote, the House of Representatives deleted an amendment to the intelligence authorization bill that would have required Congress to openly acknowledge and approve assistance to Unita, the South African-backed rebel group which is waging a war against the Angolan government.

The White House has admitted that it has supplied the rebels with $15 million in covert military assistance, which is said to include Stinger missiles and light anti-tank weapons, as well as training by American advisers.

Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-IN), chairman of the Intelligence Committee and sponsor of the amendment, and other opponents of aid to Unita emphasized that the aid would escalate the war in Angola and put Washington in league with South Africa. "Aid to Unita is aid to apartheid. Make no mistake about it," said Rep. David Bonior (D-MI). Hamilton blamed the defeat of the amendment to election year pressures and threats of being "soft on communism."

In addition, Congress passed two amendments on U.S. oil companies doing business in Angola in an effort to resolve the contradiction between military backing for the rebels and U.S. corporate support of the Angolan government through taxes and royalties.
The first was a "sense of the Congress" resolution—which does not have the force of law—requesting that the President consider using his authority under the Export Administration Act to restrict U.S. business transactions that conflict with U.S. security interests in Angola. The original version of the legislation would have banned Export-Import Bank credit to U.S. oil firms in Angola.

The weakened version, nonetheless, sets a bad precedent, according to Steve North, a spokesman for Chevron, who said that existing loans would not be affected. Instead of seeking new loans from the Export-Import Bank, companies planning to initiate operations in Angola might approach European financial institutions, "so the impact could be damaging to American commercial interests in Angola," he said.

Congress also approved an amendment to the Department of Defense (DOD) authorization bill, prohibiting DOD from purchasing Angolan petroleum products from U.S. oil companies in Angola in an effort to "reduce to an absolute minimum DOD procurement of Angolan oil products." Originally, the measure was worded in much tougher language, but it was watered down after administration representatives told members of Congress that it would endanger national security.

Meanwhile, the government of President Jose" Eduardo dos Santos continued efforts to establish diplomatic relations with the U.S. government. Foreign Minister Alfonso van Dunem called for a meeting between top Angolan and American officials, and the Luanda government retained former U.S. Defense Secretary Elliot Richardson, who held several cabinet positions in the Nixon and Ford administrations, to investigate how best to succeed in this endeavor.

BOTSWANA
Two decades of progress marked

Pride in the country's social and economic progress merged with trepidation about the future in speeches commemorating Botswana's 20th anniversary of independence in late September.

Primary education is now nearly universal, and almost every village has clean drinking water, President Quett Masire said in a celebration speech. When Botswana became independent in 1966, the country had only three kilometers of tarred roads, and life expectancy was 35 years. Today there are nearly 2,000 kilometers of tarred roads connecting every major village in the country, and average Batswana can expect to live to age 58, according to Masire.

In addition, the economy is doing well, largely because of the rich reserves of high-quality diamonds discovered shortly after independence. Botswana is one of the few African countries with a trade surplus, and the local currency—the pula—is stronger than the South African rand. According to the World Bank's 1986 world development re-
Chiepe: Forecasting another raid

Mmusi in his 1986-87 budget presentation earlier this year. He said that although diamond reserves are expected to last for 40 years, the windfall profits of recent years are coming to an end.

Government efforts to revive the lagging agricultural sector have failed, due largely to the severe five-year drought, which is expected to last at least two more years and is now exacerbated by crop destruction from flocks of quelea birds and brown locusts.

ZIMBABWE

Unity on the horizon

Prospects for a successful merger between the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU-PF) and Joshua Nkomo's opposition Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) improved dramatically in late September when Prime Minister Robert Mugabe gained the backing of his central committee for proposals to integrate the two party structures.

Mugabe, who said the unity talks had reached an "advanced stage," is understood to be planning a merger whereby Nkomo would be appointed to a newly-created post of second deputy prime minister. As part of the package deal, ZAPU is likely to obtain a small minority representation in the merged party's two main executive organs—the politburo and the central committee—as well as in the cabinet. Such an arrangement would go far toward creating the one-party state Mugabe has envisaged.

As the junior partner in the proposed merger, ZAPU has reportedly agreed that the new party be called ZANU. This marks a retreat from Nkomo's earlier insistence that the name pay some tribute to ZAPU's role in the liberation struggle.

The latest breakthrough in the long-stalled unity talks followed the government's August release of 10 prominent ZAPU officials and former guerrilla commanders accused of plotting to overthrow the government. Among those freed were ZAPU National Chairman William Kona and Chief Whip Sid-Musiu Malunga. In July, about 50 lesser-known ZAPU members were also released.

Mugabe said that the government had decided to release the political detainees in the interests of national unity, because the alternative would have been a treason trial that might have implicated Nkomo and terminated the merger talks. The delicate and protracted negotiations, added Mugabe, have reached a "critical stage" and "the atmosphere for success must be created."

The ZANU government also revealed that Zimbabwe's Attorney General Godfrey Chidyausiku would begin a complete and immediate review of all pending cases of ZAPU political detainees—estimated at under 200—to determine whether pardons should be granted. This could open the door for the release of Dumiso Dabengwa, ZAPU's former military leader, who remains the key to the success of the unity talks.

Arrested in 1982 following the discovery of arms caches on ZAPU-owned farms and charged with plotting a coup, Dabengwa was subsequently acquitted by the High Court before being re-detained under the emergency powers regulations. He is widely perceived as the one ZAPU leader with the authority to end the former guerrillas' dissident campaign that has plagued the Mugabe government in Matabeleland.

Authorities in Harare recognize that an inter-party consensus is essential if Zimbabwe is to successfully defend itself in any showdown with Pretoria. The Mugabe government has alleged for some time that dissidents in Matabeleland receive funds and weapons from South Africa and is concerned that the destabilization campaign could eventually turn into a massive operation along the lines of the Renamo rebels in Mozambique.

In this context, the Zimbabwean government has pushed peace and reconciliation in Matabeleland to the top of its agenda. Explained Mugabe, "With a neighbor like the racist South African regime, division in our nation can only operate to our detriment by playing into [Pretoria's] hands."

Most observers say that the economic progress of the first two decades has probably reached a plateau. "To plan on the assumption that these favorable conditions will continue would be very unwise," warned Vice-President Peter Gaositwe Chiepe. However, much of Masire's economic progress of the first two decades is expected to last for 40 years, the windfall profits of recent years are coming to an end.

Government efforts to revive the lagging agricultural sector have failed, due largely to the severe five-year drought, which is expected to last at least two more years and is now exacerbated by crop destruction from flocks of quelea birds and brown locusts.
Recent revelations of the role of President Kamuzu Banda's government in supporting the Mozambican National Resistance's destabilization campaign, as well as continued South African backing of the rebels, point to increasing security threats for the Maputo government.

The Malawi Connection

Mozambique

BY ALLEN ISAACMAN

South Africa's continued violation of the Nkomati Accord has taken a new twist which could spark a regional conflict. In the face of mounting evidence of collusion between Pretoria and Blantyre, President Samora Machel is reported to have warned that his country "will close its border with Malawi and station missiles on the frontier" unless Life President Hastings Kamuzu Banda's government ceases its support for the South African-backed Mozambican National Resistance Movement (known alternately as the MNR or Renamo). The ultimatum came at a closed meeting this fall between Banda and Machel, who was accompanied by Zambian Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda.

The participation of the latter two leaders suggests how seriously the frontline nations view Malawi's defection. Their presence also raises the prospect that in an effort to pressure landlocked Malawi to reverse its policy, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania might pursue a joint strategy. At present, Malawi's ambiguous relationship with South Africa threatens the very survival of the regional economic alliance—the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

In March 1984, Mozambique and South Africa signed the Nkomati Agreement. Each party agreed "not to allow its territory to be used for acts of war, aggression or violence against the other." From the outset, there has been a glaring disparity in the degree to which the two countries have implemented the agreement.

Shortly after the accord was signed, Mozambican security forces began to disarm members of the African National Congress. Within a few weeks, the ANC presence was drastically reduced, and the organization has since been permitted to maintain only a limited diplomatic presence in Mozambique. For the Frelimo government, this strategic, if painful, concession was acceptable only in the hope of ending the bandit war and reversing the spiral of economic destruction: The decision initially strained relations with the ANC and raised doubts among many of Mozambique's long-time allies.

By contrast, South Africa covertly violated both the spirit and the substance of the accord. Documents captured at Renamo headquarters inside Mozambique reveal that shortly before the Nkomati agreement, Pretoria provided Renamo with sufficient arms to pursue military activities for several months. An entry in one of the captured diaries noted that Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama met "on February 23, 1984, at 10 a.m. in Pretoria...[with] the general of military intelligence."

The purpose of the meeting was to "plan the war in the face of the situation taken up by the South African Republic"—a euphemism for the impending Nkomati agreement. General Van der Westhuizen is quoted as reaffirming the commitment of the South African security apparatus to Renamo. "We the military will continue to give them [Renamo] the support without the consent of our politicians in a massive way so that they can win the war."

While it is possible, even likely, that differences existed between the South African military and civilian branches of government, they seem to have centered around the level of support South Africa should continue to provide to Renamo. At no time after the Nkomati agreement has taken a new twist which could spark a regional conflict. In the face of mounting evidence of collusion between Pretoria and Blantyre, President Samora Machel is reported to have warned that his country "will close its border with Malawi and station missiles on the frontier" unless Life President Hastings Kamuzu Banda's government ceases its support for the South African-backed Mozambican National Resistance Movement (known alternately as the MNR or Renamo). The ultimatum came at a closed meeting this fall between Banda and Machel, who was accompanied by Zambian Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda.

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On October 19, 1986, shortly after the author submitted the following article on Mozambique to Africa Report, President Samora Machel was killed in a plane crash in South Africa as he returned home from a meeting in Lusaka, Zambia. As we go to press, the exact cause of the crash remains unknown. Reports from South Africa claim that the accident was due to bad weather, and in point of fact, there was substantial air turbulence in the region that night. Mozambican officials are withholding judgment, but have not ruled out the possibility of sabotage. On October 22, the government appointed a high level commission of inquiry headed by Armando Guebeza to investigate the air crash.

At this point, there are several troubling questions. What was the plane doing so far off course? Why did Pretoria, which monitored the flight path of Samora Machel's plane, fail to inform the Mozambican government of the crash for nine hours? And finally, there were Samora Machel's own disturbing comments just two weeks before his death. According to journalists who were present at a meeting of news editors called to discuss the South African military buildup, Machel revealed that there had been a recent attempt on his life. In fact, it was the South African buildup and Mozambique's fear of an impending invasion which in part had prompted the trip to Lusaka from which Machel would never return.
agreement did the civilian leadership move to disarm Renamo, dismantle its South African bases, or close down its communication centers. To the contrary, senior civilian officials, including then-Deputy Foreign Minister Louis Nel, as well as a high-ranking military officer, clandestinely visited Renamo bases in Mozambique in direct contravention of the accord.

Simultaneously, South African planes and ships violated Mozambique's air space and territorial waters to resupply Renamo. An entry from one of the captured diaries dated October 19, 1984—approximately six months after the Nkomati agreement—suggests the extent to which Pretoria was committed to rearming Renamo. The document notes that during the week ending September 28, South African Dakota and DC-3s air-dropped supplies to Renamo forces operating in the provinces of Sofala, Maputo, Inhambane, and Zambesia. When confronted with this evidence, South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha conceded that there had been some technical violations of the accord, but claimed that the supplies were only for humanitarian purposes.

South Africa's repeated denial of any complicity and its refusal to rein in Renamo effectively undercut the Joint Security Commission set up to implement the terms of the Nkomati Accord. In October 1985, Machel suspended his government's participation in the commission and announced that Mozambique would intensify military efforts against Renamo.

This decision, coupled with Machel's highly visible Western diplomatic offensive in the fall of 1985, posed a serious problem for the Botha regime. On the one hand, Western governments, especially the Reagan administration which had brokered the Nkomati Accord, exerted pressure on Pretoria not to violate the agreement. On the other hand, powerful domestic forces, including key sectors of the military and security apparatus, the right-wing of the National Party, and the increasingly powerful Portuguese community representing 15 percent of the electorate, all demanded that Botha escalate support for Renamo.

One way to accommodate these potentially contradictory pressures was for South Africa to curtail some of the more visible aspects of its destabilization campaign. Although Pretoria continued to resupply Renamo by submarine and night flights, senior Mozambican officials acknowledged that the number of airdrops from planes based in South Africa has declined over the past year.

At the same time, however, there are indications that South African military intelligence has helped to forge clandestine supply networks stretching from the Middle East to Somalia, the Comoros, and Malawi. Indeed, Pretoria's shift in strategy rests on the expanded involvement of the Malawian government which, since 1981, had periodically allowed Renamo to launch attacks across its frontier.

Military bases in Malawi, adjacent to the vast border with Mozambique, provided an ideal way to surreptitiously resupply Renamo. They also offered easy access to strategic economic targets in central and northern Mozambique. The existence of a South African embassy in Malawi also facilitated the collection of intelligence information, allowing South African security to coordinate strategic military planning for Renamo.

In a rare interview, Mozambique's chief of staff, Sebastiao Mabote, claimed: "Malawi is helping South African-backed guerrillas materially, logistically, and is also providing them with travel documents and airport access so that they can move around the world." When pressed for specifics, he cited "the presence of Renamo training bases in southern Malawi" and the fact that "South African helicopters and DC-3s were using airstrips in Malawi to resupply Renamo forces in Niassa, Zambesia, and Tete provinces."

At a news conference in Maputo immediately after his meeting with Banda this fall, Machel was blunter. He charged that "the Malawian police, security, and military are controlled by South Africa and are being used to destabilize Mozambique."

There is mounting evidence to support these claims. Zimbabwean intelligence officers who recently returned from Mozambique confirm the existence of Renamo bases run by South Africans in Malawi. They also report that Pretoria is using airstrips in southern Malawi for covert night flights into Mozambique. In private, some Western diplomats agree that Malawi is harboring Renamo forces, and Britain has reportedly put pressure on Malawi to curtail Renamo activity.

Recently, a journalist for The Observer of London witnessed Malawian troops fraternizing with Renamo forces at the frontier post of Muloza. The Malawian commander was quite candid: "We are with them all the time and we help them against Frelimo" (The Ob-

"Malawi's life president may simply be closing his eyes and giving Pretoria a free hand."
server, August 24, 1986). And when Machel confronted Banda with this documentation at their recent meeting, the Malawian president conceded that there could be clandestine bases in the south operating without his authorization.

On the face of it, Malawian support for the South African-backed Renamo would seem inexplicable. Not only does such a policy further isolate the Banda government from its African neighbors, but Renamo attacks have disrupted Malawian commerce which relies heavily on Mozambican ports. As a result, Malawian businessmen have had to use more costly transport routes via South Africa and Tanzania.

Despite his government's repeated public denials, there are several possible explanations for Banda's policies. Some observers suggest that because of close economic and security ties to Pretoria, Malawi's life president may simply be closing his eyes and giving Pretoria a free hand. Others point to Banda's longstanding claim to much of northern Mozambique which he maintains had historically been part of a greater Malawian empire. Control over this territory would give landlocked Malawi direct access to the Indian Ocean.

In the early 1960s, he proposed to then-Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere that the two countries divide northern Mozambique. Banda subsequently aided a tiny separatist movement (Uniao Nacional Africana de Rombezia) as part of a plan to integrate northern Mozambique into a greater Malawi.

In explaining Banda's position, it may also help to note his well-documented ties with Portuguese investors who fled Mozambique after independence and who are now bankrolling Renamo and playing important roles within the rebel movement. Consider the background of Evo Fernandes, currently the leading Renamo spokesman in Europe. During the colonial period, he worked for the Portuguese industrial and newspaper magnate Jorge Jardim, whom Banda had appointed Malawi's consul-general in Beira. Orlando Christina, another Portuguese who held a leadership position in Renamo, also worked for Jardim and had close connections to the Malawian government.

Whatever Banda's motives, escalating Renamo attacks from Malawi in the first half of 1985 led to a deterioration of the security situation in central and northern Mozambique. At an urgent
meeting in June 1985, the leaders of Tanzania and Zimbabwe promised to increase their military support for Machel's government. Tanzania, whose own resources are limited, agreed to train Mozambican recruits fighting in the three northern provinces. For their part, Zimbabwean officials, who now privately acknowledge "that they had not taken the Renamo threat seriously enough," have moved to rectify this situation.

Since 1984, Zimbabwe has dramatically increased its military support for Mozambique. The numbers of its soldiers deployed in that war-torn country and providing logistical back-up from Zimbabwe tripled to more than 12,000. Most of these forces are used to protect the corridor connecting Harare to the Indian Ocean port of Beira and strategic areas in the Zambezi Valley.

Senior Zimbabwean military officials emphatically deny reports that slow progress in the war has caused them to reconsider their commitment. To the contrary, they stress the fact that overall military assistance will increase substantially in the near future. "If we lose Mozambique to South Africa, we are landlocked and ultimately will be strangled."

To avoid this eventuality, Zimbabwe has offered to train several thousand Mozambican troops and officers and to provide greater logistical support and additional supplies. Hans are also underway for increased Zimbabwean economic and agricultural assistance in the adjacent Mozambican provinces of Tete, Manica, and Sofala.

With the help of Zimbabwe, Mozambican forces have reversed the deteriorating military situation in several parts of the country. A sustained Mozambican offensive in the southern provinces of Inhambane and Gaza has effectively eliminated the Renamo threat in those areas. Security is also considerably better in the central provinces of Manica and Sofala, leading American Ambassador Peter de Vos to conclude that "since January 1985, the military situation has generally improved." He emphasized that "the Mozambican government is a long way from collapsing."

Diplomats in Maputo also note that Renamo's terror tactics, problematic political agenda, and total dependence on South Africa call into question its credibility as a legitimate opposition force. One Western ambassador put it rather bluntly: "My impression is that Renamo is composed of desperate groups of gun-slingers, thugs, white Portuguese opportunists, and other assorted anti-Frelimo types in the service of Pretoria."

Splits within the Renamo leadership have compounded its political problems and frustrated its quest for political legitimacy. Renamo dissidents organized a meeting in Cologne this spring at which they tried unsuccessfully to purge Evaristo Nkrumah and his coterie of Portuguese followers, whom they claimed were dominating the movement.

This summer, the Washington Times, which has enthusiastically backed Renamo, expressed concern that "political in-fighting among exiles from the southeastern African country has thrown confusion into conservative groups trying to get Reagan administration support for the resistance" (August 20, 1986). The article went on to note that Free the Eagle and the Conservative Action Foundation are touting different Renamo representatives. The former has endorsed Luis Serapiao, a professor at Howard University, while the latter has embraced Arturo Vi-landuku. The Washington Times reported that "each accuses the other of being a fraud and lining his pockets with funds raised in the name of resistance."

This in-fighting, however, has not prevented Pretoria from pursuing its rather successful policy of destabilization. Indeed, the situation in Mozambique remains very serious. Despite some recent gains on the battlefield, there is little evidence that government forces, even jibed by Zimbabwe, have the military capacity to blunt Renamo as long as it remains an arm of the South African military. Moreover, there are indications that the Botha regime is willing to take a higher military profile as the conflict escalates. In May and again in August this year, South African transports landed men and war materiel in the central Mozambican province of Manica.

The cumulative effects of this cycle of destruction and terrorism have been devastating. Between 1983 and 1985, Renamo attacks were responsible for the closing of more than 1,800 schools and the displacement of 313,000 students, thereby crippling the government's rural education and literacy programs. In 1985, Renamo activity was responsible for the destruction of more than 900 stores in the countryside.

A July 1986 report of the Ministry of Agriculture revealed that production plummeted over the past three years in sharp contrast to the period from 1977 to 1982. And in late September, the Mozambican government issued an urgent appeal for food aid for nearly 4 million people who are facing famine. While a number of poorly conceived and badly implemented state policies have contributed to this agricultural crisis, escalating violence in the countryside remains at the core of the problem.

The decision in July to name a prime minister to oversee daily governmental operations suggests how seriously Frelimo views the security problem. Recent efforts to upgrade the poorly trained and beleaguered army and a more aggressive policy toward Malawi both point to a new military offensive.

But as long as the South African regime stays in power and continues to support Renamo, and as long as the United States and other Western nations are not prepared to take effective measures against the apartheid regime, peace in Mozambique and indeed throughout the region, remains illusory.

Daily accounts of repression in South Africa, the continued illegal occupation of Namibia, attacks against Angola, as well as recent reports that a large Renamo force based in Malawi has invaded Mozambique, highlight the volatile conditions in this strategic region.
As newly elected chairman of the OAU, the Congolese President outlines the organization's economic and political priorities for the coming year. He also puts Congo's recent agreement with the IMF in perspective and candidly discusses his country's efforts to meet the challenges of the post-oil era.

INTERVIEWED BY ANDRÉ ASTROW

Africa Report: You have come to the U.S. as the newly elected chairman of the Organization of African Unity. What is your agenda for the coming year? Will it be significantly different from that of your predecessor, Senegalese President Abdou Diouf?

Sassou-Nguesso: I think you may have followed the declaration I made at the 41st session of the General Assembly. In that declaration, after having touched on general international issues—the crisis in multilateralism, problems of disarmament and others—I also dealt with two essential questions specifically concerning Africa, the continent's critical economic situation and the dramatic situation in southern Africa. I think these are the two key issues.

Today, in the aftermath of the United Nations Special Session on Africa's economic crisis, the point is to put into effect Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery and the action plan of the United Nations. Therefore, after the conclusion of this special session under my predecessor's mandate, we must now go into action. Having mobilized international public opinion through this special session, we must now press for specific commitments and obtain announcements of contributions. This is the path that I am pursuing with respect to Africa's economic crisis.

Concerning the issue of southern Africa, we are doing similar work to mobilize international public opinion by establishing contacts in the U.S. and other countries. Earlier, I met with Secretary of State George Shultz and discussed the very issue of southern Africa, to push for the adoption of international and mandatory sanctions against South Africa. When we talk of economic sanctions, we mean that countries such as the U.S. should oppose the importation of strategic raw materials like uranium, gold, steel, iron, and coal, as well as agricultural products. They should take concrete measures in this direction. The U.S. should ban investments by companies and banks in South Africa, oppose air and sea traffic destined for the apartheid regime, sever all sports links, and put an end to technical and cultural cooperation with that country.

These are the kind of comprehensive and concrete mea-
sures that we expect from the U. S. and other countries. We have seen the tentative decisions taken by the European Economic Community and we think that they will be strengthened. Thus, we are acting on two fronts: the economic situation in Africa, as well as the eradication of apartheid in South Africa and the independence of Namibia.

There are naturally other questions facing the continent. In June of next year, we hope to convene the Congress of African Scientists. In so far as we are able, we would also like to work toward bolstering pan-African sentiment. Moreover, there are of course specific issues like Chad and the Western Sahara that we must address. Concerning the Western Sahara, for example, I had lengthy discussions with the secretary-general of the United Nations to continue the work that had been initiated by my predecessor—that of encouraging negotiations between Morocco and Polisario.

Africa Report: But some critics of the OAU claim it is a divided and ineffective body which has little power to implement its resolutions. Do you think the OAU is a viable organization capable of tackling the major tasks it faces?

Sassou-Nguesso: Yes. To critics we can begin by pointing out that African leaders and the African people can be proud to have established the only viable continent-wide political organization that exists in the world. Other continents have yet to successfully create such an organization, so this is in itself a considerable achievement and an important element to consider. Every organization has its weaknesses and its strong points. Since its creation 23 years ago, the OAU has nevertheless led numerous countries under colonial rule to independence, and the OAU Liberation Committee in these cases has played a very important role.

With respect to the economic crisis, the OAU formulated the Lagos Plan of Action, outlining a development strategy for Africa during an OAU economic summit in 1980. And more recently, we drew up Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery. I think these are encouraging signs. Even the United Nations has its problems. It has not resolved all problems in the world, for otherwise Namibia would already be independent. Therefore, I do not think that one should criticize the OAU without examining it in greater detail. It has its weaknesses, but it also has many strengths.

Africa Report: Earlier you talked about South Africa. At the 22nd OAU summit in Addis Ababa, a resolution was passed calling for comprehensive mandatory sanctions against Pretoria. How do you answer those who claim sanctions would be more harmful to black South Africans and to the frontline states than to the Botha regime?

Sassou-Nguesso: We say that it is pretentious to claim to know better than those who are directly affected, since it is the African people themselves who are asking for the implementation of sanctions. They are the ones who say that they will not experience greater suffering than that already caused by apartheid. So to claim to know better than they is absurd. In addition, I don't think it is possible to evaluate the effectiveness of sanctions before having implemented them. That is our opinion, which is why we continue to demand comprehensive and mandatory sanctions.

Africa Report: Can the OAU have a meaningful impact on the U. S. policy in southern Africa? Do you think the U. S. can play a positive role in the region?

Sassou-Nguesso: All the discussions that I am having at present with U. S. authorities are working toward this goal: to ensure that the U. S. has a real influence over the South African regime to help Africa eradicate apartheid. We think that the U. S. can effectively help Africa to achieve this goal.

Africa Report: You have touched on the formidable economic tasks confronting the African continent. Perhaps we could discuss more specifically some of the recent economic difficulties facing your country. For many years your government was one of the few in Africa that had steadfastly opposed an agreement with the International Monetary Fund. How do you explain therefore the recent accord with the IMF? Is it deteriorating economic conditions that forced this turnaround or does it signal a change in your political approach to the West?

Sassou-Nguesso: No, we have never categorically opposed an IMF agreement. You may recall that in 1978 we came to terms with the IMF. What we said in 1985 was that our analysis of the economic situation revealed that by implementing our own internal measures, we could successfully lead the country to economic recovery. This was in June 1985. A few months later, as you know, came this oil crisis: The price of oil nose-dived, and the value of the dollar dropped. These two factors together produced an entirely new situation, leading us to sign an agreement with the IMF. But it is not the first one. It is the second one. It is therefore not a change in approach, but rather changing conditions that have justified the signing of such a pact. We have acted today as we did in 1978.

Africa Report: Given the drastic fall in the price of oil, what
measures have you taken to diversify the economy to prepare the country for the "post-oil" era? How has this affected the projects initiated in the 1982-85 development plan?

Sassou-Nguesso: This is the question. We believe that precisely because of the unpredictable nature of oil revenues, we must envisage a post-oil economy. We do not lack the means to achieve such an objective. That is why during the course of the 1982-1985 development plan, we concentrated our energies on developing basic infrastructure in the rural areas. We have built many roads, bridges, and airports, extended the electricity network, and improved the country's telecommunications. We have thus quietly begun to develop a basic infrastructure. Today, we believe that we can move toward developing various productive sectors, particularly in agriculture, if certain preconditions are met.

We have good land, a lot of water, sunshine, and the workforce required to relaunch our agricultural sector. We have vast woodland reserves with, for example, 20 million hectares of forests. We have an ambitious reforestation program, as today we have produced nearly 25,000 hectares of eucalyptus trees, which will allow us to manufacture paper. Thus the conditions exist in the country to prepare the economy for the post-oil era.

Africa Report: Your government has continued to espouse Marxism-Leninism as a guiding economic and political philosophy. Would it not be more accurate to say that on most economic issues, pragmatism has come to override the Congolese Labor Party's [FCT] ideological principles as evidenced by the austerity measures along capitalist lines adopted in the well-publicized Structural Adjustment Program?

Sassou-Nguesso: We do not intend to operate beyond the bounds of reality. You seem to be presenting Marxism a little bit like a fetish, like a dogma. It is a science which is based on the analysis of the realities of life. We analyze them continually, and each time a situation presents itself, we analyze it scientifically and make our decisions based on this situation without changing our primary orientation for the development of our society. Marxism is not a fetish, it is a social science which develops and which has a living existence.

Africa Report: In this respect, you have accounted for the PCT's pragmatic approach in the past by arguing that Congo is presently in the national democratic stage of its revolution, thereby laying the basis for socialism. In what way is Congo concretely pursuing the strategy of scientific socialism? And how do you reply to skeptics who say that developing countries are inevitably forced back along the capitalist path through the pressures of the world economy?

Sassou-Nguesso: We say that we are presently in the national democratic and popular stage of the revolution and consider this a period through which countries like ours that have suffered from colonial domination and exploitation must necessarily pass. We have seen the creation of structures that were never meant for development but rather for exploiting the riches of our countries. To attain socialism, it is necessary to pass through this very delicate and difficult stage, but pass through it we must, by adapting the structures to the realities of what actually exists.

When we say that in the course of this stage we will accept the coexistence of various sectors—a state sector, a mixed sector, a private sector, a cooperative sector—it reflects a full set of measures that we are taking that are connected to the current stage of the national democratic and popular revolution—the stage which prepares the conditions necessary for socialism. But on this question one must not take a short-sighted approach, seeking blueprints, or drawing hasty conclusions—that because we are doing this or that it means that we are already in the clutches of capitalism.

In any case, in Third World countries the capitalist option has not exactly been a resounding success. We can see here and there horrible cases of misery in those countries that have opted for capitalism. There is no model that has been a total success. I speak here of the Third World.Maybe one should not draw immediate conclusions. Let's first allow peoples' lives to develop. History will be the judge.

Africa Report: Have you got anything to add for our American audience?

Sassou-Nguesso: I would simply like to say that we ask the American people to remember their own history. To recall that their history is one of a people fighting for independence. They fought an intense struggle to create a multi-racial society which developed and which has a living existence. The American people must remember that when they came to Europe's rescue against Nazism and helped Europe to rebuild after World War II, the African continent made its share of sacrifices. Although monuments may not have been erected in their memory, thousands of Africans died in the struggle against Nazism. But today, Africa is confronted by the problem of apartheid, and the economic situation is catastrophic. So we hope that the American people will side with the African people. I think the historical facts are there to show that the American people do not lack the capacity to act in this way. That is my message.
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Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe is widely credited with having injected a new dynamism into the Non-Aligned Movement following the eighth heads of state summit. During his tenure as chairman, southern African issues are expected to take precedence in the organization's agenda.

BY ANDREW MELDRUM

The unfolding South African revolt against apartheid was the central focus for the Non-Aligned Movement's (NAM) eighth heads of state summit, dramatically held in Harare just a few hundred miles from Pretoria.

A sensational appearance by Libyan Col. Muammar Qaddafi, the continuing conflict between Iran and Iraq, and the storming of a hijacked airliner in Karachi while Pakistani President Gen. Zia-ul-Haq was attending the summit all made headlines and temporarily took center stage in Harare, but those events failed to divert the conference from its primary task of considering the South African crisis.

There was some disappointment that the Harare summit did not commit the 101 non-aligned countries to imposing sanctions against South Africa, but the new Non-Aligned chairman, Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, declared his satisfaction at the more limited measures taken by the Harare summit to support the anti-apartheid struggle. He said the summit increased the international momentum for sanctions.

"The focus really was on southern Africa," said Mugabe at the predawn press conference to mark the end of the September 1-7 summit. "There was no one who did not make reference to South Africa and the region. And we are very pleased with the declarations and resolutions approved. We are delighted that for the first time in the organization,
we have emerged with a real, viable program of action.”

Mugabe was referring to the creation of the Africa Fund to channel non-aligned donations of financial and material aid to southern Africa’s majority-rulled frontline states to help them weather the spill-over effects of impending sanctions.

He cited the creation of the fund as “the most important achievement” of the Harare summit because it represents “a bid now by the Non-Aligned Movement to work vigorously and purposefully in this region, to aid the frontline states and other countries that might need assistance in fighting apartheid... Almost every area of concern has been covered: roads, railways, transport, communications, and several other areas including trade will all be supported by the Africa Fund to protect us from the adverse effects of sanctions or of retaliation from South Africa.”

Mugabe’s high hopes for the fund are somewhat qualified by the fact that no specific pledges of money or material goods were announced during the summit. Outgoing Non-Aligned chairman, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, and Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda will head the fund, which is to work closely with the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), the organization striving to make the nine majority-rulled countries of southern Africa more economically independent from South Africa.

But practical steps to launch the fund have begun as Indian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Edward Faleiro toured the frontline states to study what specific assistance the non-aligned group could give to best help those countries.

The Harare Non-Aligned summit also urged the United Nations to impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa and criticized the Western powers that have blocked such action by the world body.

Non-aligned members Zambia, Zimbabwe, and India, as well as Australia, the Bahamas, and Canada, dramatically committed themselves to sanctions weeks before the Non-Aligned meeting at the special Commonwealth mini-summit in London at the beginning of August. But the momentum toward sanctions faltered at the summit meetings of the six frontline states and nine SADCC members held in Luanda, Angola, just a week before the Non-Aligned summit.

Both the frontline states—comprised of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe—and SADCC—those six, plus Lesotho, Malawi, and Swaziland—stopped short of actually committing themselves to imposing sanctions and instead “commended” and “endorsed” sanctions. There was some surprise that the more militant frontline states did not join Zimbabwe and Zambia in their sanctions stand, but the moderated position reached in Luanda exactly matched the Non-Aligned Movement’s sanctions decision taken in Harare.

The non-aligned leaders reasoned that they could not effectively impose sanctions against Pretoria without the participation of South Africa’s main Western trading partners. In October, the United States Congress passed a tough sanctions package, but the Reagan administration remains opposed to sanctions and would certainly veto a new UN sanctions move. Other Western governments remaining opposed to effective sanctions are Britain and West Germany.

To encourage those countries to alter their opposition to punitive measures, the non-aligned leaders decided to send a delegation of foreign ministers to meet with leaders of industrialized countries in Bonn, London, Tokyo, and Washington.

The Non-Aligned summit also strongly urged the two superpowers to agree to nuclear disarmament in the interests of world peace and called for the industrialized countries to help bring about a new world economic order. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund came under particular criticism for their economic dictates to Third World countries.

Cuban leader Fidel Castro, a previous Non-Aligned chairman, reiterated his call for Third World countries to simply cancel their huge debts, but the final economic document suggested that indebted countries follow the proposal of Peru’s president, Alan Garcia, to limit their debt payments to a selected percentage, ranging from 10 to 30 percent of their annual foreign exchange earnings.

Of course, of the 49 heads of state who attended the Harare summit and addressed the meeting, virtually all of them attacked the apartheid system in neighboring South Africa and praised the efforts to topple the Pretoria government. But it was two South African speakers who caught everyone’s attention and focused the issues at stake in the current anti-apartheid unrest: African National Congress (ANC) President Oliver Tambo and the Rev. Allan Boesak, a patron of the United Democratic Front (UDF), South Africa’s largest legal anti-apartheid movement.

At a packed press conference at the start of the summit, Tambo forcefully urged both the West and specifically the...
NAM countries to impose sanctions against South Africa. He argued that sanctions imposed by African and non-aligned countries could be effective, even if they were not joined by the big Western economic powers.

"I earnestly appeal to this historic assembly of the leaders of two-thirds of mankind to join in action," said Tambo. "Otherwise, Zambia and Zimbabwe will stand alone and exposed" to possible retaliation from South Africa.

Although the summit did not meet Tambo's call for sanctions and although he never directly addressed the summit, the Harare assembly was seen as a success for the ANC. Tambo was sought after for private meetings with the heads of state, particularly from Latin America and Asian countries that had not previously paid much attention to the ANC.

A carefully worded and articulate speaker, Tambo made strong impressions upon non-aligned leaders. He gave a characteristically considered response to a question about the use in South Africa's townships by anti-apartheid youths of the "necklace" form of killing, whereby a petrol-soaked tire around the victim's neck is set on fire to burn the person to death.

"We would rather there is no necklace, this is a hint," said Tambo, somewhat distancing himself from the gruesome form of execution and apparently sending a message to those in South Africa to discourage its use. But Tambo refused to denounce those using the necklace. "The necklace is a recent appearance, it coincides with a period of extreme brutality by the government against the people... its cause is apartheid."

He said that the ANC could not condemn the necklace killings of suspected government collaborators or other anti-apartheid violence such as landmines and explosions because those in South Africa battling apartheid were operating against tremendous odds. Other ANC officials pointed out at the summit that the number of necklace deaths are under 150, while more than 2,000 blacks have been killed in the past two years of unrest, most of them by police.

Tambo also expressed a willingness to meet with top officials of the British and American governments, but warned them not to try to divide the ANC into two camps, those who are members of the South African Communist Party and those who are not. "We are all members of the ANC and we have one goal, to end apartheid," said Tambo.

Shortly after the summit, Tambo met in London with British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe. He was also expected to meet U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz during his tour of southern Africa, solidifying the widespread belief that no serious negotiations about a settlement in South Africa are possible without the ANC.

The rival black nationalist movement, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), was also quite visible at the summit, represented by its new chairman, Johnson Mlambo. Zimbabwe newspapers quoted the PAC leader as saying that the organization would seek full membership status in the Non-Aligned, like the Palestine Liberation Organization and the South West Africa People's Organization. But the Non-Aligned Movement would have to grant dual membership for South Africa, and was not eager to give such status to both the ANC and PAC. In any case, the ANC announced it would not seek membership and no more was heard about the PAC's bid.

"The non-aligned leaders reasoned that they could not effectively impose sanctions against Pretoria without the participation of South Africa's main Western trading partners."

Robert Mugabe had personally invited South African church leader Boesak to Harare to impress upon the leaders how crucial and strategic a moment it is for the international community to increase its support for the people's revolt against apartheid.

Although strict NAM regulations forbid any non-head of state from addressing the summit, Mugabe held a special dinner where Boesak used his well-known oratory skills to describe the South African people's battle against oppression, visibly moving several heads of state, according to those present.

Boesak brought eyewitness descriptions from South Africa of violence against blacks at a funeral of 15 people killed by police during rent protests in Soweto. "One does not have to be a prophet to see that violence will escalate," said Boesak.

"Every single act that the government does is almost calculated to make the level of tension rise in the townships. The anger of the people will grow more and more, because this funeral has already given rise to another and so will the funeral tomorrow and the funeral next week."

Boesak told the non-aligned leaders that the current state of emergency had attempted to assert the Pretoria gov-
emment's authority over the townships, but that was "very shallow and extremely short-term."

"The violence will not end because apartheid still exists," said Boesak. "The people know the government would rather kill our children than give up white people's over-privileged position of economic and political power. Because we know that, there will always be more violence."

Like Oliver Tambo, Allan Boesak urged the Non-Aligned Movement to take concrete steps to help the current struggle. Boesak said that the South African courts had ordered him not to speak about sanctions, but speaking for the people of South Africa, the anti-apartheid crusader said, "What we are looking for is not yet another statement. Whatever the non-aligned leaders come up with, the most important thing is that they make it stick, can they carry it through? Will they be determined enough to understand that the time for talking tough about South Africa, the time for making statements full of moral indignation is finally and definitely over?"

The Non-Aligned Movement, which celebrated its 25th anniversary at the Harare summit, has been known mostly as a forum for its Third World members to air their views about international affairs and their criticisms of the world economic order, but not as a body taking action on any particular issue. The Harare summit challenged the Non-Aligned Movement to move beyond its long-stated opposition to apartheid and give tangible assistance to the anti-apartheid forces.

The effectiveness of the NAM's response to that challenge to a large extent depends on new Chairman Robert Mugabe, who must turn the declarations and funds for southern Africa into meaningful action.

Mugabe has already let it be known that he intends to be an activist Non-Aligned leader, not only on the question of South Africa, but in reshaping the organization's operations and decision-making process.

At the close of the summit, Mugabe announced his intention to put the Non-Aligned Movement on a more formal basis and to drastically change the organization's mode of operation by using majority voting and creating a permanent secretariat.

Mugabe said that because the Non-Aligned has grown so, the tradition of reaching consensus to make decisions has become unwieldy. He cited the example of the disagreement on what country should host the next NAM summit in 1989. Nicaragua had the strongest bid for the honor, which would include taking over the chairmanship from Mugabe, but total agreement could not be reached, so the decision was postponed until the foreign ministers meet in 1988. But then, the close of the Harare meeting was delayed for 10 hours as no consensus could be reached over where to hold the foreign ministers' meeting.

North Korea had long been the favorite to hold that meeting, but six Western-leaning countries blocked that decision at the last moment. Finally, Cyprus was agreed upon as the site for the meeting.

Mugabe said such long-winded wrangles among the 101 members could be avoided by using a two-thirds majority for important NAM decisions. Such a change in policy would be a dramatic shift for the Non-Aligned which has always prided itself on getting all members to agree on decisions.

But Mugabe would argue that the consensus style of decision-making has made the NAM less decisive. And he would also argue that running the NAM without a permanent secretariat makes the body less effective. He has already announced that Zimbabwe will staff a small secretariat.

With Robert Mugabe tackling such structural problems, it seems clear that he will also manage the Non-Aligned Movement to make the most of the Harare summit declarations concerning South Africa and southern Africa, particularly in the creation of an Africa fund that will channel meaningful financial and material aid to the frontline states facing a belligerent South Africa.
Joe Thloloe
Features Editor, the Sowetan

A leading South African journalist describes the draconian restrictions imposed upon reporters by the state of emergency and comments on the role of the press in the struggle against apartheid.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: Could you tell us a bit about what it is like to be a black journalist in South Africa today, using your own career as an example?

Thloloe: I started journalism in 1961 on the Bantu World. From there, I worked for various newspapers inside South Africa—the Rand Daily Mail, Golden City Post, Drum magazine. It's been a very long career. At the moment, I am features editor on the Sowetan.

The first time I got into trouble with the South African authorities was in 1960 when the anti-pass campaign was called by the Pan Africanist Congress. I participated in that campaign and was convicted. I spent nine months in 1960 inside jail. When I was released, I matriculated and then joined the newspapers. The next time I got into trouble was in 1976. At the time, I was president of the Union of Black Journalists [UBJ]. Following the events of June 16 of that year, we had published a magazine with journalists' first-person accounts of what they had seen on June 16. Although some of the stuff had been published before, it had a lot of impact put together. I think that edition of the UBJ bulletin was very frightening to the government because they banned it and they locked us up. I was put under "preventative detention" from the first of September until Christmas day in 1976. They were preventing me from doing harm to myself!

Then on the first of March the following year, 1977, I was back in jail. This time I was held under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act, for 18 months in solitary confinement. I was interrogated as they wanted information that they believed I had. Then on my release, I went to work for the Transvaal Post. The UBJ and the World had been banned in October 1977, while I was in jail. But the same staff that had produced the World was now producing the Post, so it was a change of name only—the staff was the same, the contents of the paper were more or less the same, only a little more restrained because of what had happened to the World. We continued functioning in a new union, the Media Workers Association of South Africa (Mwasa). In 1980, Mwasa held the first newspaper strike in South Africa, when we closed down the Post for the duration of the strike, as well as the black editions of major white papers. It was mainly a strike over pay and on recognition of the union, and management in the end agreed to pay increases and to recognize Mwasa. Fortunately, we were having very good relations with management up until this point.

But then the state decided to intervene. First they told the Argus management that its registration had lapsed during the duration of the strike. But even if it had not lapsed, they were in fact going to ban the Post, so the Argus management shouldn't try to revive it. That was the first action they took. Next, they picked on the leadership of Mwasa and clamped us with three banning orders. These were people like Zwelakhe Sisulu, Mathatha Tsedu—all of us were banned, confined to our townships, not allowed to work for our newspapers, not allowed to attend meetings, not allowed to be on newspaper premises, not allowed to be in factories. We were confined to our houses from 6 pm to 6 am during the week, and then weekends from Friday night until Monday. It was a bizarre way of living.

While we were banned, Mathatha Tsedu and I were arrested again under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act, in June 1982. After a process of detention and solitary confinement, eventually in November they charged me and a few other chaps with terrorism. Then in April 1983, we were convicted of furthering the aims of the Pan Africanist Congress [PAC]. The actual charge was that I was found in possession of a PAC.
pamphlet, and I was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment. I started serving the sentence in April 1983, but on appeal, it was discovered that we were convicted under a law that wasn't in existence at the time our crimes were supposed to have been committed. So I was released in January 1984. At this point, our banning orders had lapsed so I went back to work for the Sowetan, where I'm still working. Hopefully they won't send me back to prison.

**Africa Report:** How is it working as a black journalist under the current press restrictions?

**Thloloe:** The first few days of the current state of emergency were very frustrating. We'd walk around the office with long faces not knowing what to do and what not to do. But as we are getting used to the regulations, it has become a very exciting game. It's a game of Russian roulette—to see how far you can go without breaking the law. Most of our staff has developed a sixth sense—you feel something might be wrong with a particular story, so you pick up the phone and you read it to the lawyers. They are on tap 24 hours a day since the emergency regulations started. We always try to push to the limit, and fortunately for us, they are also into this game of how far you can push. In a way, it has become fun. But as I said, initially it was very depressing.

I remember when it started, we wanted to comment on the state of emergency—was it necessary, would it achieve what they hoped, were they trying to throw a red herring instead of looking at the actual problems? Because we couldn't comment unfavorably on the emergency regulations, we felt we had to leave a blank space, to signify our protest. We did the same thing with pictures. Where we felt we could have used a good picture showing what was happening in the townships, we left a blank space.

But after a week or two, there was a meeting of editors and the top brass of the police, and our editor was told that the blank spaces that he was leaving in the paper were subversive, and would he mind stopping that practice. The word subversive is a catchall phrase—anything they don't like in the paper they say is subversive. So when he came back, he went to the others and said, "The police are saying these white spaces are subversive. Do you agree with them?" We said, "Of course the police are talking nonsense." But the problem is that this question will not be tested in a court of law. They will merely seize copies of the daily paper or they will suspend publication of the paper for the duration of the state of emergency. So we were advised to stop using these blank spaces, because of the risks involved. So that is the kind of game we are involved in.

Recently, the English-language papers in the country took the government to court because they believed that the emergency regulations made it almost impossible to publish. They won a few concessions, but these are meaningless because in the end, the government ministers can go back to their desks and write up new regulations, so these victories are merely pyrrhic. One of the victories of this court case was that the court said that it was ridiculous that journalists could be kept out of unrest areas. After the initial decision, journalists went back into unrest areas during the period of grace they had gotten from the courts. But all the government did was to go back and rewrite the regulations to keep journalists out.

We had a very interesting problem when the regulations were first promulgated. Our sports editor went out to interview a football player in Soweto. The editor himself lives in Soweto; he had come into the office to do his normal diary and he was going back to interview this chap. He came to a police roadblock and he was turned back because he was a journalist. He was told that journalists were not allowed inside Soweto. He said, "No, I live in Soweto, I woke up in Soweto this morning." They said that was for reasons other than reporting, but now he was told to go in as a reporter, therefore he couldn't. So he came back to the office and we sent off a telex to the Bureau for Information trying to get clarification on why this man had been turned back, because the impression we had was that the oily thing we were not allowed to do was report on the unrest. Then shortly after, the women's editor went into the township and she was also turned back. I personally got very furious and picked up the phone and called the bureau. The guy who answered was very cheerful—"How are you, Mr. Thloloe?" So I explained the problem, and he changed his tone and said: "If you read regulation 7-1C in conjunction with something else, you will understand why they were turned back. Good day, Mr. Thloloe."

So, I phoned the lawyers and asked what these regulations meant and I was told that Soweto had been declared an unrest area and as a result no journalist could get into the township, whatever stories they were reporting—whether a football match or a funeral. It took us about a week to get all that reversed, because all the things we were publishing at the time were illegal. Fortunately, they didn't close us down for that. But in the end, they realized that this was ridiculous and so they said we could go in and do stories other than unrest stories, which must come from the Bureau of Information, not from any other source.

**Africa Report:** What effects are all these restrictions having on how people understand what is going on inside South Africa? Is the news getting out in any qualitative way, or is it so...
filtered that we really don't see the true picture of what is happening.

Thloloe: I think it's controlled both for the foreign media as well as for us. In fact, the media in South Africa is losing credibility because of the restrictions. We're now getting to the point where people rely more on word-of-mouth stories than on what is published in the newspapers. And this is fanning rumors, fanning what the government is trying to stop. I suppose a development from this is that people are going to resort to pamphlets, to underground newspapers, etc. It hasn't reached that point yet, but it's definitely coming—where people would rather inform each other than rely on newspapers. In fact, the circulation of black newspapers has taken quite a knock because of the regulations.

Africa Report: How are the restrictions affecting how the world views what's going on in South Africa?

Thloloe: What I have noticed in my short visit to the U.S. is that people are becoming more sensitive to what is happening in South Africa. The stories that come out with little logos saying that they have been censored—that's much more effective than if the true story is told. So it's having exactly the opposite effect to what the government intended. Our government is always working in this type of circular atmosphere—what they intend doing does exactly the opposite.

Africa Report: Much is made in this country of the principle of the "objectivity" of the press. Can South African journalists really be "objective" given what is going on in the country?

Thloloe: When journalists get very bored, they talk about objectivity and fairness! But any practicing journalist will tell you it's not possible to be objective—you always write from a perspective, from a particular angle. In South Africa, the lines are very clearly drawn. You either write or broadcast from the oppressor's perspective, or from the perspective of the oppressed. It's a very simple choice. We are in this very difficult position that we have very few publications that are actually controlled by blacks. The paper I work for, for instance, is owned by a white company, the biggest newspaper company in the country. They allow us to be to the left of most of their newspapers because of the audience we're addressing—the blacks in the townships.

But we cannot go to the point where we actually choose our sides. We would prefer to come out much more openly and say we are on the side of the oppressed. But the people who own us, the Argus, think of what the advertisers will do. They are always saying that the advertisers will pull away if we get more radical than we are. They are always worried about what the government will do to the paper and how much they will lose. They always tell you of what happened to the World and the Post, and how much money they lost as a result of those closures. We don't have the latitude to say what we want to say. We try to push ourselves to the limit within the system, but we know we can't say what we want to. But on the other hand, the people who are on the side of the oppressor decide what goes into the papers. So we are being bombarded all the time with what the oppressor wants.

Africa Report: A South African observer once commented that the white liberal press had lionized Desmond Tutu, Allan Boesak, and Beyers Naude as the leaders of black South Africans by virtue of always giving them the publicity, to the exclusion of other leaders within the black community, and that in turn affects how the average person views who are the leaders of the community. Do you think it's true that the South African press can almost outline political options?

Thloloe: In fact, it has done that to a very large extent. The liberal press has picked on the United Democratic Front [UDF] to back. The choice is between the Afrikaner press which will push Buthelezi and homeland leaders—whatever the government picks—and the English-language papers which pick the UDF. And there aren't any other newspapers. There isn't any other media that is controlled by blacks. That's the major problem. It becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy—so-and-so is the leader, this organization is the organization, and they sing the same tune so often that people then begin singing it—a whole big public relations exercise.

Africa Report: In the U.S., we hear very little about the black consciousness groups, for example. On the other hand, apologists for apartheid say that the black community in South Africa is so divided that there is no way everyone can unite under a common cause. Are these alleged divisions in the black community artificially created or are they a serious matter?

"We're now getting to the point where people rely more on word-of-mouth stories than on what is published in the newspapers. And this is fanning rumors, fanning what the government is trying to stop."

Thloloe: I don't think the divisions are as serious as they are made out to be. The black consciousness organizations and
the UDF have more or less the same objectives—they want to see the creation of a non-racial society. They are both vaguely socialist. The major difference comes over tactics. The black consciousness organizations say that all our lives are run by whites—that's the essence of apartheid. You go to work—your supervisor is going to be a white man. You go into education—your inspector will be a white man. So they are always in a position of control, while blacks are outside that power position. Therefore, if we create our own organizations, we should not transfer into them the same structures. This is a chance for people to learn how to run their own lives.

If you invite a white man to become secretary of a trade union, you are robbing a black man of the chance to learn how to run a trade union. You will appoint the white man because he is more efficient, he's better educated, he's got expertise, etc.—obviously good reasons for doing so. But the point is that the black man in that union is dependent on that white man, so you've transferred the power structures from society into your own organizations. So, black consciousness says we should do our own thing without any white participation. We can go and ask for assistance from whites where we need it, but let us show some measure of independence.

The UDF position would be that there are some whites who are as committed to black liberation as blacks and we should already anticipate our future—where we will be choosing people on merit and not on color. It sounds like a very fair argument, except that the people who come into this non-racial enclave are at different levels and the most powerful people in that group will always be the whites. They come in with the money and the expertise, not at the ordinary level. Take the trade unions, for example. I don't believe there are any white blue-collar workers who are members of Cosatu, but there are whites who are organizers and secretaries. So essentially that is the basic argument. One group believes its method will take us to liberation much faster than the other. But both intend getting to the same place. These divisions are being magnified by the press to the point where people forget to look at their similarities and look more and more to their differences. That is why we get these inter-organizational fights.

Africa Report: Such as in the unions?

Thloloe: They are still along the two lines—those that believe in black consciousness and those that believe in the UDF type of non-racialism. Again, the unions are a very good barometer of people's thinking. Cosatu has the largest number of members, but these figures are inflated by the National Union of Mineworkers. If you remove the National Union of Mineworkers, you have an even balance between the black consciousness unions and the non-racial unions. But if you read the press every day, you will get the impression that it is only those people who support the UDF or the Freedom Charter who are dominating the country, and that they are being projected as the only viable group in the country. It is not true. Again it is the creation of the press.

Africa Report: You have written quite extensively on the unions. Do you think that in the coming year, they will become more involved in pressing the very basic political issues in South Africa through work stoppages, etc.—or will they focus more on resolving shop floor issues?

Thloloe: I don't think they will be tied to what is happening on the shop floor for a simple reason: I might get a two rand increase at work, but that doesn't affect the way my life is being run. At the workplace, we find there is more and more talk of integration. But what in fact is happening is that there is a shortage of white skilled labor. Whites are being pushed up much faster. As they are being pushed up, blacks are being put in to replace them. The dividing line is still there, but it's moving upwards. 'This gives the illusion that there is change at the workplace, but there really isn't. The more you try to fight that dividing line, the more you realize that it is tied into what is happening in society generally. It is very frustrating. As I said, you get a two or three rand increase at work. You go back to the township and find you are living under exactly the same conditions, the people that control your life are still the same people. So you start questioning the whole system.

Africa Report: Do you envision more strikes, more of the unions flexing their political muscle in the larger political scene as the situation becomes more untenable?

Thloloe: Yes, I think so. Their advantage is that they have coherent communication systems so that they are able to take decisions much more easily than the political organizations. As it is now, almost all the major political organizations have been hit very hard by the emergency regulations. But the unions are still functioning and are still able to take decisions, so that they will be used more and more in mass strikes, etc.

Africa Report: How do average black South Africans view American policy at this time? Even though the Reagan administration is claiming it wants to talk to the black leadership, is the U.S. so discredited at this point that people would just say, 'What for? Why should we talk to you?'

Thloloe: I think American policy is very unpopular as of now. We get Americans visiting and the foreign journalist asks to talk to us. It's a difficult decision to agree to talk to that person. But at the government level, lines are clearly drawn—nobody is going to talk to any member of the American government. America has never been as unpopular as it is now and it's growing. It will continue growing as long as Americans support Savimbi and Americans are seen to be supporting white South Africa, and as long as they continue to invest in what we see to be the past of our country and not in the future. If I were an American, I would cut all ties with South Africa through work stoppages, etc.—or will they focus more on resolving shop floor issues?

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"Hear No Evil"

President Daniel arap Moi's efforts to clamp down on internal dissent may have backfired, as underground opposition to his rule continues to grow. Increasing social inequities, along with abuses of power, are fueling fears for Kenya's political future.

Last July, Joseph Munyao, an MP from Kenya's Maehakos District, complained in Parliament that thugs were roaming the countryside around Maehakos, robbing, beating, and sometimes killing people. His constituents were living in fear, he told his colleagues, and 20 to 30 victims of these attacks were arriving at the hospital every day.

Several weeks later, President Daniel arap Moi spoke in Maehakos and declared that it was not possible that 20 to 30 people were dying every day. Standing on the same dais with Munyao, Moi reprimanded the MP for "causing unjustified alarm" and threatened to have him tossed out of KANU, the country's only political party.

The next day, a humbled Munyao issued a public apology to President Moi: "He is my president and I have a lot of respect for him. . . I have never done anything to annoy him. I would like to apologize to him personally and to the nation at large. . . I have no other president. My president is Daniel arap Moi . . . I have never dreamt of serving any other person."

Thus another debate on public policy was closed in Kenya.

In similar fashion, the government in recent years has silenced voices which complained about famine, landlessness, and poverty. It seems to matter little to the government that the crime spree that Munyao spoke of continues in Maehakos or that the streets of Nairobi are becoming crowded with the poor and landless. Rather it appears that Kenya's rulers are intent on sustaining the illusion of peace and prosperity and on dealing harshly with anyone who might suggest that things are otherwise.

Had Munyao not issued his groveling apology, his political career would have been finished—and, as it is, he has placed himself in danger of becoming a political nonentity in Kenya. But Munyao could have also found himself joining the ranks of Kenyan MPs who have had to flee the country in recent years, fearing for their lives after saying things that the government found unacceptable.

The most recent politician to go into exile is Koigi Wamwere who fled the country in September. Wamwere, a former MP, charged that his defeat in the last parliamentary election was a result of fraud and that he had been harassed by government officials in his home Nakuru District ever since. From Norway he wrote a letter to Kenya's Weekly Review, claiming that he had been under close police surveillance and feared that the government planned to "liquidate" him because he used to "speak the truth in Parliament on behalf of the voiceless poor."
Wannviv had been declined twice before, most recently following the 1982 attempted coup, and had been associated with dissident members of Parliament, all of whom have since lost their seats, live in exile, or remain in Kenya on the condition that they keep their opinions to themselves.

But the country's hear-no-evil approach to dealing with problems has begun to backfire. In the past, Kenyans could count on the occasional dissident voice to be raised in Parliament to speak for the interests of the poor and to challenge the edicts of the president and his ministers. But under Moi, the Parliament, always greatly limited in its political power, is slowly being drained of the last vestiges of its influence. And now, robbed of any outlets for their many grievances, Kenyans are beginning to look to dissidents outside of government for leadership.

The most recent manifestation of that dissent has emerged in the Mwakenya movement. Mwakenya, a Swahili acronym for the Patriotic Front for the Liberation of Kenya, first came to the public's attention last March when the government announced the arrests of several lecturers and dissidents, charging them with membership in an underground organization and of possessing or distributing the organization's publication, Mpatanishi (Swahili for "The Arbiter").

The government decided to deal with Mwakenya openly in an attempt to rally public support against the organization. Past experience had taught them that the Kenyan people had little sympathy for the self-labeled intellectuals and would-be liberators who periodically arose to challenge the government.

"Under Moi, the Parliament, always greatly limited in its political power, is slowly being drained of the last vestiges of its influence."

The list of detainees continued to grow, reflecting the sweeping and increasingly arbitrary manner in which Kenya's secret police, known as the Special Branch, were doing their jobs. Instead of the usual collection of university lecturers and professional dissidents, the rolls of the arrested included Gathoga Kihara, a farmer charged with possession of Mpatanishi; David Mutonya, a district information officer; David Mzirai, an engineer; and Stanley Mburu, a bank employee. This is Kenya's middle class, the people on whom the government once counted for support.

And there was something else that made Mwakenya unique: There seemed to be no single ethnic group at its center. "This is the first truly national resistance movement I've seen," said a Western diplomat.

The organization continued printing its seditious literature, once littering the streets of Nyeri town with pamphlets and another time delivering a copy to each MP's mailbox in the Parliament building. The public began to see them as Robin Hoods rather than as traitors and the publicity given to the arrests became a testimony to the scope of the movement rather than to the strength of the government.

In June, the government reversed its strategy and declared an end to public discussion about Mwakenya. Moi cancelled all public meetings that were scheduled on a national holiday on the flimsy pretext that attendance at these events would keep farmers away from their fields at a time when they should be planting. Moi also warned foreign diplomats and journalists about "spreading rumors," and hinted that Mwakenya was under foreign control.

The government's attempt to portray Mwakenya as a small and isolated organization has failed miserably. "The government gave the dissidents their biggest boost by publicizing the movement in the first place," a Western diplomat in Nairobi said. "I guess that there are probably a thousand core members of the organization and hundreds of thousands of sympathizers."

But despite all the excitement, very little is known about Mwakenya. The organization is divided into cells along the lines of Kenya's anti-colonial Mau Mau movement. Members take blood oaths and never meet in large groups. Even if one cadre were to talk to the police, he couldn't know the names of more than a few others. Although the
government claims to have detained Mwakenya's leaders, there is no way it can be sure of who they are.

"As there is no conflict of interest law in Kenya, it is legal for politicians to engage in business if they want to—and all of them do."

Mwakenya is a descendent of a group that was known as the December Twelfth Movement, or DTM after the date that Kenya was granted independence from Great Britain. Like Mwakenya, DTM made its presence felt primarily through its publication, Pambana, from 1982-84. Its ideas and goals were identical to those of Mwakenya's, and many of its leaders are now probably behind the Mwakenya movement—but DTM never had any real public support.

But Mwakenya is operating in a changed environment. The ranks of Kenya's poor and landless are swelling while the blatant accumulation of vast fortunes by the country's ruling elite makes a mockery of the government's unkept promises of assistance.

When Moi became president after the death of Jomo Kenyatta in 1978, he launched a drive to rid the country of corruption. Political prisoners were released and Kenyatta's corrupt cadres were run out of government. In the next elections, some unpopular politicians who were perennial winners were defeated. It seemed like the dawn of a new era in Kenya. People began to speak openly about politics; politicians began expressing opinions; and newspapers started offering some lively commentary. At one point, university students even staged a pro-Moi march through the streets of Nairobi.

But that lasted for less than two years. Once Kenyatta's loyalists were safely out of the way, Moi's populist rhetoric faded. He began building his own empire, putting his people into key government positions and allowing them to begin amassing private for-

THE CASE OF SALIM LONE

When I arrived in Nairobi to research this article, I went to visit Salim Lone, a Kenyan journalist I'd met in New York. Lone had been living in the U.S. and working for the UN since 1982 when he left Kenya in the wake of the sweeping arrests which preceded the August 1982 attempted coup. Lone returned to Kenya to visit his family last July after receiving assurances from senior Kenyan officials that it was safe to do so.

I went to the apartment building where Lone was staying and asked a young woman in the office for the number of his apartment. "He is not here," she said softly, her eyes scanning the open spaces behind me.

"What do you mean? Has he gone out for a short time or left for good?" But it was already clear from the look on her face that Lone had not just gone out for breakfast.

They came for him in the morning," she whispered.

I went up to Lone's apartment and discovered who "the/ were. The man who greeted me at the door was tall and well-dressed. Behind him, I could see two other men rifling through the apartment, searching through books and overturning seat cushions. It was the Special Branch.

"What do you want?" the man demanded, trying to block my view of the rest of the apartment with his body.

"Sorry, wrong apartment," I said, and hurried away.

Although Kenya's Special Branch had detained over 100 people since the rise of Mwakenya, they had never gone so far as to grab someone holding a UN passport or with as many friends outside of the country. Through his previous work and current job as press spokesman for the UN Office for Emergency Operations in Africa, Lone had gotten to know many international journalists, and word about his detention quickly reached New York where the story was published in papers across the U.S. The UN vigorously protested his detention and for the first time, the Kenyan government was under intense pressure from the international media to release one of its detainees.

After two days of relentless interrogation, Lone was freed and advised to leave the country immediately. Back in New York, he learned while listening to the BBC that his government had taken one more action against him: In an unprecedented move, the Kenyan authorities had revoked his citizenship. Lone found himself a man without a country.

Although he cannot exactly be regarded as a friend of the Kenyan government, Lone is not an active opposition spokesman and can hardly be classified a dissident. In Kenya, he was best known for publishing controversial articles in Viva, a women's magazine he edited. He cut through the thin veneer of official government positions, often giving coverage to "unpopular" politicians such as Koigi Wamwere and reporting the Kenyan army massacre of Somali children in the eastern town of Garrisa.

It was not what Lone said that annoyed Kenyan officials, but what he saw and reported. He never advocated the overthrow of the government nor did he ever directly attack any of Kenya's leaders. But he had alienated enough of the country's ruling elite to give him good reason to fear for his freedom in 1982.

Lone chooses his words carefully when speaking to the press about Kenya. He has been advised to limit his comments to his own case, and says little about the internal situation that led to his arrest. "I deny that I have ever been disloyal, though I said that I have ever been disloyal, though some of my political views do not coincide with the government's—and that was reflected in my journalistic work," he said.

While in detention, Lone was drilled about his political positions and was asked to characterize them. "I told them that I considered my views to be nationalist," he said.

He says that he was fairly well-treated in detention, although never informed of the charges against him and refused permission to make a phone call.

Lone has retained a lawyer to contest the withdrawal of his citizenship. "I cannot believe that the law allows for the revocation of a Kenyan's citizenship without due process," he protested. "The right to citizenship is one of the most deeply cherished of the basic human rights, and I will struggle to have it restored."

Lone is the first Kenyan to have that right revoked for political reasons. Even dissidents like Ngugi wa Thiongo who openly advocate the overthrow of the government are still citizens. Perhaps the government was gambling that taking away citizenship from Lone, who is of Asian descent, would prove popular at a time when the government is again blaming Asians for many of the country's problems. Alternatively, it may have been a way of saving face after having shown the bad judgment to arrest him in the first place.

Whatever the case, the government appears to be shooting in the dark in its attempt to smother the growing dissent in the country. Despite the high-level assurances of safety he received, Lone's arrest is another example of the extraordinary powers that are being accrued by the Special Branch. In Kenya's current political climate, Lone's appeal for the reinstatement of his citizenship is not likely to succeed. It may be a long time before Salim Lone goes home again.

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times. When voices were raised in protest, Moi silenced them.

That process was temporarily slowed by the abortive attempt by Air Force NCOs to seize power in Kenya. The abortive attempt by Air Force NCOs came at a time when corruption and detentions of political dissidents were again on the rise in Kenya. The coup attempt sent a shock through government officials who couldn't help but notice the enthusiastic support given to the rebels by Nairobi's urban poor.

But those lessons seem to have been forgotten in four short years. In the past year alone, President Moi and his business partners have bought up large real estate holdings in Nairobi. "Kenyans no longer try to figure out which buildings Moi owns; they try to figure out which buildings he doesn't own," a Kenyan friend told me in Nairobi.

Along with some of Nairobi's major buildings, Moi's personal business holdings are said to include Marshall Peugeot, Kenya's largest automobile dealership, and Fox Theaters, recently purchased from 20th Century Fox, which has a monopoly on the importation of films to Kenya.

Reliable sources have also confirmed that Moi was behind the purchase of Mobil Oil Kenya by a Delaware-based holding company. (Much to the chagrin of the Mobil Oil Corporation, Moi has changed the name of the company to Kobil while keeping the familiar Mobil logo.) Moi has also reportedly bought a controlling interest in Firestone's Kenya subsidiary through another holding company, and he earlier attempted, without success, to buy out Barclays Bank, Kenya. (Barclays reportedly threatened to leave the country if another buyout was attempted.)

Kenya's elite also began to open their own banks, undercapitalized and poorly managed institutions which were ripe for failure from the start. Several of these banks have already gone under, the most recent example being Continental Bank. When the bank folded in July, the government revealed that the bank's directors had lent themselves and their relatives some $23 million in unsecured loans.

But other banks survive while operating in a similar fashion. Many informed sources in Kenya believe that the failure of Continental Bank, and the earlier collapse of the Rural-Urban Credit Finance Company were helped along by the government. Both the bank and the credit company were Kikuyu-owned institutions (Vice President Mwai Kibaki was one of the principals in Continental Bank). Both institutions put considerable economic weight in the hands of a group of people who have been deprived of much of their political and economic power in the last few years.

As there is no conflict of interest law in Kenya, it is legal for politicians to engage in business if they want to—and all of them do. There is no distinction made between the interests of the individuals who comprise the new ruling elite and the interests of the government and the country, and the government can dictate which institutions succeed and which fail simply by telling government-owned corporations where to keep their money.

Selling influence and tailoring government policy for personal gain are not considered as corruption in Kenya. But where politicians get the money necessary to engage in their business transactions is another matter. Wherever it comes from, it represents a vast drain of public funds into private pockets. "In terms of corruption, Moi now ranks a close second to Mobutu," a Western diplomat said. "And he's not done yet."

Kenyans accepted the corruption that flourished under Kenyatta's vast patronage system. Politicians were expected to take their share, but some fruit always fell from the tree. "Under Kenyatta everybody stole and everybody was encouraged to get big," a Nairobi shopkeeper said. "Now people are afraid to get big, because if they do, the president might notice and take their businesses."

"I can only compare the mood in Kenya today to that just before the 1982 coup," a veteran Kenyan journalist told me. "The corruption. . . the fear. . . the mistrust. There is a feeling that something is going to happen."

The amassing of wealth by the elite is clashing with natural limits of the environment and beginning to be felt throughout the society. Kenya's population of 20 million is growing at the world's highest rate of 4 percent per year and there is no more land. Only one-third of this country's land is arable to begin with, and all that is taken. Meanwhile government officials and the elite continue to create estates reminiscent of the banished colonial empire.

But if the present situation is proving difficult for many Kenyans, the future seems even more frightening. Most Kenyans know that the overthrow or change of government is not an answer to all of their problems. "The people have seen what has happened in Uganda and in Ethiopia," I was told in Nairobi. "This government doesn't seem too bad in comparison. Most people just hope that the government doesn't do something stupid and force the army to act. The mechanisms still exist to turn things around here democratically. . . but those mechanisms are being destroyed."

My friend's fears were prophetic. A week later, in mid-August, KANU announced the abolition of the secret bal-
"The amassing of wealth by the elite is clashing with natural limits of the environment and beginning to be felt throughout the society."

lot. Voters in the next primary elections will cast their votes by lining up behind the candidate of their choice. If a candidate receives 70 percent of the vote in the primary, he will stand unopposed in the general elections. KANU officials claim that the procedure is being put in place to eliminate fraud and vote-buying. In practice, however, the new method will assure that no candidate opposed by KANU will be elected—no Kenyan citizen would dare to publicly contravene the stated will of the party.

The government's attack on free elections immediately raised protests from churches in Kenya. In an unprecedented move, the National Christian Council of Kenya firmly denounced the change, embroiling the church and government in a heated war of words. One cabinet minister challenged the church's opposition to the new law by questioning how the church, which considers itself the light of the world, could approve doing anything in secret.

Although the party has won the political battle, the church's challenge has been duly noted by Kenyans and can only damage party and government credibility in the end.

It would appear that Moi's drive to consolidate power has gone beyond the point of diminishing return. Kenyans are now wondering why Moi would push for power after his hold on the government has seemingly been secured.

And eight years into his presidency, people still question whether Moi is running the country or if someone else is pulling the strings. Moi is often perceived as craving public approval and as being a populist at heart—characteristics that are at odds with the harsh methods of his rule. The popular wisdom contends that the government is actually run by Simon Nyachai, the permanent secretary in the office of the president.

On several occasions, Nyachai has had to step in to "clarify" off-the-cuff statements that Moi has made. Most recently, Moi announced in his May Day speech that workers would only have to work five days a week rather than six. The call was greeted with jubilation by workers, but threw shopkeepers, businesses, and public corporations into a panic. Nyachai had to explain that the details of the proposal had yet to be ironed out and that it was not intended for immediate implementation.

First considered no more than a convenient ethnic compromise—a Kalenjin in a country dominated by the Luo and the Kikuyu—Moi shocked friends and enemies alike by adeptly securing his own power base and ridding the government of all challengers. The most highly publicized of these moves was the political destruction of Charles Njonjo, the feisty minister of constitutional affairs who at one time was considered the real power behind Moi, simply bidding his time until circumstances were right for him to take over.

In 1983, Moi dispensed with Njonjo in one bold move and proceeded to remake the government in his own image. The only remaining government official who was not strictly indebted to Moi is the vice president, Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu from Nyeri whose presence in government was seen as an insurance policy against a Kikuyu uprising.

But earlier this year, Moi moved against Kibaki. In March, an MP stood up in Parliament and attacked Kibaki on a trivial issue. It seems that Moi had spoken in Kibaki's home district of Nyeri and urged politicians to stop squabbling among themselves. After commenting that there wasn't any squabbling going on, Kibaki was attacked for contradicting the president.

While Moi kept his distance from the incident, it is apparent that no one would criticize the vice president without the approval of a higher authority. Criticism of Kibaki persisted, but the vice president was able to hang on.

But most observers agree that eliminating Kibaki would be a grave error on Moi's part. It would be seen as a blow against all Kikuyu, many of whom already feel that they have been victimized economically and politically by the Moi government. At a time when dissent is on the rise, Moi can ill afford to make unnecessary enemies.

The president's popularity is clearly on the wane. At a recent rally, Moi stood in front of a huge crowd chanting, "Nyayo, nyayo" (Swahili for "footsteps") as he has done for years. At Kenyatta's death, Moi proclaimed that he would fuata nyao, or follow in Kenyatta's footsteps. As opposition to Moi's ascendency to the top post was beaten back, politicians and leaders joined the nyayo call, indicating that they would follow in Moi's footsteps.

It is Moi's personal rallying cry, and the crowds that come to greet the president usually return "Nyayo" in enthusiastic reply. But at this political rally, the huge crowd was noticeably reticent. They silently looked on as if the president were no more than a curiosity. All the same, Moi continued to raise his fly-wisk to his own cries of "Nyayo." It was as if he couldn't hear that the crowd wasn't with him.

Many observers believe that Kenya is now facing the greatest threat to its stability since independence. The only thing that is keeping the lid on the political situation, they argue, is the strength of the economy due to the combined effects of lower oil prices, high prices for Kenya's principal exports of coffee and tea, and record levels of tourism. But this cushion won't be there forever, or even for a few more years.

Kenya today is filled with fear—fear of the current government and of the Special Branch secret police who have overstepped their bounds, and fear of what might happen if the Moi government's excesses lead to its overthrow.

Not one of the people I talked to in Kenya would allow me to use his or her name, and many refused to talk to a Western journalist at all. My Kenyan friends were especially reluctant to discuss politics. Foreign journalists based in Kenya sit on their stories and plan to use them after they leave the country for good. They feel that it would be too risky to publish the truth while they are still there, for there is nothing the rulers of Kenya seem to fear more than the truth.
Morocco's King Hassan and Col. Muammar Qaddafy of Libya have dissolved their two-year-old "Arab-African Union." Morocco's close relationship with the United States and the Libyan leader's support for radical causes rendered this unlikely partnership untenable.

BY GEORGE HENDERSON

On August 25, King Hassan II of Morocco unilaterally ended his country's treaty of unity with Libya, signed two years earlier. The following day, the King announced his decision on Moroccan television, making it clear that he had already informed Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafy. His action, he explained, was prompted by an August 25 communique issued in Tripoli at the end of Syrian President Gen. Hafez al-Assad's two-day visit to the Libyan capital.

What offended the Moroccan ruler was the reference in the communique to his meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres at the end of July, an event which was greeted with negative comment throughout the Arab world. At the time, Libya issued no official statement. Showing unusual reticence, Qaddafy merely expressed his "amazement" on being told the news but avoided any additional public pronouncement. However, on the occasion of Assad's visit, and no doubt partly through his prompting, Libya's August communique called the Moroccan action "treason."

Soured Relations

Although abrupt, the Moroccan decision was not altogether unexpected. Recent trends in Moroccan policy indicate that the move had been coming for several months. Many observers thought that the King merely capitalized on an opportune moment to formalize the break. Clearly, enthusiasm for the Treaty of Oujda had waned for some time—at least in official Moroccan circles—and a good excuse was all that was needed to cancel it.

Indeed, from the beginning of 1986, Morocco showed increasing embarrassment at being associated with a country vilified as responsible for a series of appalling acts of international terrorism. After the mid-April U.S. bombing of Tripoli, for example, Morocco contented itself with a purely formal declaration of support for the Qaddafy government in its hour of need—even though the Oujda treaty incorporated special provisions for mutual defense in such situations.

King Hassan was also irritated by Libya's actions in the wake of the Tripoli raid. After having convened the Arab foreign ministers in Fez to prepare for a full meeting of Arab heads of state, the King discovered that Libya, on whose behalf the meeting was called, would agree to the summit only if it were held in Sebha, in southern Libya. Syria backed the Libyan demand, and both countries insisted that the meeting address only the attack on Tripoli, although other Arab countries wanted to discuss the Gulf war and the Arab-Israeli dispute as well.

However, it was not only Morocco which had become increasingly unenthusiastic over the political implications of the treaty. Libya had begun to resent the limitations the treaty imposed on its radicalism—over the Western Sahara, for example. The Qaddafy government was also frustrated at its continued exclusion from Algeria's economic and political integration with Tunisia—the result of the 20-year Treaty of Concord and Fraternity signed by the two countries in March 1983 and to which, in part, the pact with Morocco had been a riposte.

Libya tried to join the Algerian initiative for Maghrebian unity in December 1983, but was rebuffed because of its refusal to compromise over the two countries' common border in the Ghat region. Libya's anxieties over its relations with Algeria deepened after the...
August 1985 expulsion of over 30,000 Tunisian workers from Libya. Algeria roundly supported Tunisia, particularly after Libya allegedly threatened to invade Tunisian territory. As the U.S. grew more hostile toward Libya at the end of 1985, the Qaddafy government was clearly anxious to restore friendly relations with Algiers.

The Algerians, however, remained cautious in their responses to the ever more urgent Libyan signals for rapprochement, although President Chadli Benjedid's government was privately delighted at the possibility of increasing Rabat's isolation in the Maghreb. Clearly, at least one of Algeria's demands for improved relations would be tied to Libya's support for Polisario, the Saharawi liberation movement fighting Morocco's occupation of the Western Sahara.

Moroccan discomfort with the Libyan connection was therefore intensified by these moves. Rabat's anxieties came to a head in January this year, when it was announced that Qaddafy and Chadli met at the Algerian desert border town of In Amenas. The Algerian authorities approached this meeting with apprehension, given U.S. claims of Qaddafy's involvement with international terrorism following the attacks on the Vienna and Rome airports at the end of December 1985.

After all, in 1985 Algeria had expended considerable effort to improve its relations with Washington, partly in hopes of persuading the Reagan administration to reduce its support for Morocco over the Western Sahara issue—precisely because of the Moroccan-Libyan link. Algiers clearly did not want to lose the benefits of its diplomatic shift toward the West by any precipitate action in favor of Tripoli.

"It was evident that Hassan had decided that closer relations with the U.S. were far more important to Morocco than a continued but moribund federation with Libya."

On the other hand, the Chadli government was increasingly predisposed toward improving relations with Tripoli because of its desire to avoid Arab and African accusations of support for American policies on terrorism and the Middle East. At the same time, the opportunity to wean Libya away from Morocco was too good to miss. Algeria held out the bait of economic cooperation to seal the bargain, involving supplying Algerian natural gas to northern Libya, linking electricity grids of both countries, cooperation over Algerian automobile production and Libyan aluminum smelting, and joint oil exploration, mineral extraction, and industrial enterprises.

To Moroccan leaders, it seemed as if Libya was returning to its old habits of support for radicalism in North Africa, particularly over the Western Sahara issue. The Algerian media indicated that Libya would renew its support for Polisario—although this proved too sanguine. At least in part, this was due to Hassan's offer to both Libya and Washington to act as a mediator after the U.S. attacks on missile sites in the Gulf of Sirte and the bombings of Tripoli and Benghazi in March and April, respectively.

The U.S. showed no interest in the offer, but Libya did. As a result, no evidence surfaced in the media or elsewhere that Libya had decided to openly support Polisario—at least before the end of August. The Algerian press would certainly have publicized such news as part of its campaign against Morocco's obdurate refusal to modify its stand on Western Sahara.

Observers quickly noted, however, that Mohamied Abdelaziz, president of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), Western Sahara's government-in-exile, attended the September 1 celebration of the 1969 Libyan revolution which brought Qaddafy to power. Presumably, once Morocco had unilaterally breached its unity treaty with Libya, Qaddafy no longer saw any point in concealing his basic sympathies for the SADR.

The Background to the Treaty

Indeed, the SADR president's participation in the 17th anniversary celebrations of the Great September Revolution provided an appropriate symbol of the unrealistic nature of the treaty between Morocco and Libya—the Arab-African Union. The union had after all been born out of frustrations over the Saharan conflict and the consequent political divisions in North Africa.

The union had originally been a Moroccan proposal, made just a year after Qaddafy's own unexpected appearance in Rabat in June 1983. He had come to
repair relations with Morocco, broken in the wake of Libya’s ill-judged and premature support for the abortive army-backed Skhirat coup plot against the Moroccan ruler in 1971. Aware of Qaddafi’s frustration at Algeria’s refusal to consider Libyan participation in the Treaty of Concord and Fraternity, Hassan exploited the opportunity by making his unity proposal in mid-August 1984, thus breaching Morocco’s own isolation in North Africa.

Algerian anger over the totally unexpected Moroccan initiative intensified with the discovery that the proposed union was identical to one the King had offered to Chalidi earlier in the year. The Moroccan treaty also formalized Libya’s termination the previous year of material aid to Polisario. This persuaded Algeria that Morocco had no intention of satisfying Organization of African Unity (OAU) demands for a negotiated end to the Western Sahara conflict. After Libya accepted the proposal, Algeria began large-scale military support to Polisario. Libya further restricted its contacts with the Western Saharan movement and abstained on the issue in discussions at the OAU and the UN.

The unity treaty between radical Libya and the conservative Moroccan monarchy—strange bedfellows indeed, particularly in view of their mutual antagonism during the previous decade—was greeted enthusiastically in Morocco. In a referendum on the issue at the end of August, 96.7 percent of the electorate approved the union. The overwhelming vote of approval reflected both genuine enthusiasm for regional unity—a major platform for all political parties since independence—and popular resentment against Algeria for opposing Morocco’s claims to the Western Sahara. Most Moroccans feel Algerian leaders have done their best to frustrate these claims since the 1960s.

In Libya, there was unanimous support for the unity proposals from the 1,347 peoples’ congresses. The Libyan government is after all founded on the premise that regional unity in North Africa and the Middle East is the ultimate goal of foreign policy. Admittedly, this unity proposal was unlike Libya’s six previous attempts, since there could be no easy integration of national political structures. Nonetheless, it did seem to offer the only short-term opportunity to realize Libyan policy objectives in this direction.

Complex federal political structures were created by the treaty which, unlike the Algerian Treaty of Concord and Fraternity, was to be open to other Arab and African states without precondition. There was to be a two-year rotating presidency, advisory committees on common political, economic, and technical matters, a mutual defense obligation, and a federal tribunal to pronounce on breaches of the treaty.

Although an administrative backup for the presidency was created, together with a joint parliamentary committee and some technological committees, it was soon evident that the political will needed to sustain the system was not really there. King Hassan never made his promised visit to Tripoli, and Col. Qaddafi never returned to Rabat.

There were, however, developments in the economic field. Moroccan companies were granted special contract terms in Libya and Moroccans themselves began to look toward Libya for employment opportunities. Eventually, around 20,000 Moroccans found work in Libya and, unlike Egyptians and Tunisians, were excluded from the expulsions begun in August 1985 when Libya decided to cut back on its foreign payments by reducing the migrant labor force.

During 1985, Morocco also received 500,000 tons of crude oil from Libya at preferential rates. In addition, Tripoli promised a loan of $100 million for cereal purchases—although, given the collapse in oil prices during the latter part of 1985 and 1986, it is unlikely that it was actually made. A joint holding company, Salima, was set up by Libya’s foreign investment arm, Lafico, and by the Moroccan Office de Développement et Industrialisation, with a capital base set at $43 million.

At the end of 1985, both countries signed an agreement to facilitate remittances and commercial payments, and Moroccan companies operating in Libya were given special status. Negotiations were also underway for joint projects in oil prospecting, fertilizer production, and iron ore supply from Morocco to the new Libyan steel complex at Misurata.

Nevertheless, it was apparent that the main purpose of the unity treaty was diplomatic—at least as far as Morocco was concerned. Indeed, the primary purpose was to keep Libya from supporting Polisario and to prevent Algeria from increasing its hegemony over the North African region. In this respect, Hassan can well feel pleased, since for the past two years, the treaty achieved precisely these results.

At the same time, Morocco was able to use the respite to complete its defensive system in the Sahara, which now controls over two-thirds of the territory. Furthermore, tacit Libyan support for Morocco’s moves in the Western Sahara helped deflect international criticism following Morocco’s OAU
annoyed the U.S. administration. After the treaty arrangements that so elsewhere in the Sahel, and problems with European states such as France. (PLO), its interference in Chad and line Palestine Liberation Organization port for Iran, its antagonism to the main-
given its intense isolation in the Middle East and Africa resulting from its sup-
beries to cut future military aid.
In fact, U.S. aid did not fall signifi-
cantly despite the threats, totalling $150 million in fiscal year 1984, $135 million in 1985, and $140 million in 1986. Of this total, military aid comprised approximately $65 million, $45 million, and $52 million, respectively. The Libya treaty, however, helped senators and congressmen who wished to see the admin-
istration take a more even-handed approach in the Western Sahara conflict—
for the U.S. tended to support Morocco. Now they could argue the case against Morocco far more easily and expect to receive a better public hearing.
In any event, the Reagan administra-
did not significantly reduce its sup-
port for Morocco, although the U.S.
embassy in Algiers did revive the cautious contacts with the Western Sa-
harans that existed at the end of the 1970s. The White House did, however, make it clear to Moroccan envoys, such as the King's personal adviser Reda Guedira, that the treaty with Libya would make it extremely difficult to maintain close personal contacts be-
tween Moroccan and U.S. officials—es-
pecially between the president and the King.
As a result, Hassan was forced to 
renew his traditional annual visit to Washington until July this year, when 
the trip was once again delayed to make 
way for the historic meeting between the King and Peres. Despite this sign of presidential displeasure, Morocco never-
theless was able to ensure that U.S. food aid continued and that the Algerian 
president's first official visit to the U.S.
in 1985 would not signal any change in 
policy toward Morocco.
In fact, it appears that the King had carefully calculated the dangers of his Libya pact. The U.S. weighed its obvi-
ous irritation against the real advantages of close relations with Morocco—facili-
ties for the Rapid Deployment Force at Kenitra airbase and at Side Slimane and for the new Voice of America transmi-
ter in Tangier. Furthermore, Morocco could offer support for U.S. policy in the Middle East, for the King was the chair-
man of the standing committee of the Arab league.
During 1986, the significance of this slowly became apparent, as King Hast-
san gingerly edged toward a dramatic change in policy involving open contacts 
with Israel. This move also coincided with Rabat's reckoning that the Oujda 
treaty had served its purpose, and that Libya was now probably severely enough affected by declining oil reve-
ues to be unable to offer significant mil-
itary aid to Polisario.
During Hassan's visit to France in late November 1985, there were hints that a meeting with Peres was not altogether 
out of the question. This came on the heels of Morocco's decision to allow Is-
raelis, including Likud Knesset mem-
ers, to visit the country for a Moroccan Jewish Congress in May 1984 and the 
King's decision to jointly sponsor a standing Jewish congress in Quebec in 
1985 with the Israeli prime minister.
Although Hassan made no secret of his belief that negotiations over the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian 
situation were essential, it was not an accident that his initiative coincided with 
more direct efforts to improve relations with the U.S. At the King's 25th anni-
versary celebration of his accession to the throne, American guests were

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**The Libyan treaty had outlived its usefulness and the King had been looking for an appropriate opportunity to break it for several months.**

AFRICA REPORT • November-December 1986
prominent and included CIA Director William Casey and U.S. ambassador to the UN Gen. Vernon Walters.

It was evident that Hassan had decided that closer relations with the U.S. were far more important to Morocco than a continued but moribund federation with Libya, especially in view of the open confrontation between the U.S. and Libyan governments. There were, however, other more direct benefits.

Morocco has a massive foreign debt, now totalling close to $14 billion. As one of the 20 most heavily indebted countries in the world, it is a prime candidate for aid under the Baker Plan proposals. Over the past three years, however, the Moroccan government, with IMF and World Bank help, has been restructuring its economy, enabling it to reschedule its bilateral, multilateral, and commercial debt.

Nevertheless, there have been problems with commercial banks—in which U.S. banks predominate—and with the IMF, which has been worried over the implications of recent levels of government expenditure. The result has been the withdrawal of IMF standby credit and problems over further rescheduling of commercial debt. Support from the U.S. government could well ease both these problems at a time when the Moroccans believe they are close to resolving their economic difficulties, despite the costs of the Western Sahara war and the continued depression in international phosphate prices. (Morocco is the world's largest exporter of phosphates, which form the most important component of its exports.)

There are two other crucial economic considerations as well—both of which would have pushed Morocco to reevaluate and improve its relations with the U.S. at Libya's expense. First, Morocco, in common with all U.S. aid recipients except Israel, must fear the dangers of the across-the-board aid cuts threatened by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment. Even though the original amendment has been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court, it will reappear in another form, threatening all American aid recipients.

By demonstrating its importance for U.S. policy in the Middle East and North Africa, Morocco might well improve its aid position in FY 1987. Furthermore, Morocco is also anxious for U.S. aid in another direction. During his visit to the Western Sahara in March 1985, King Hassan announced a five-year $1 billion rearmament program for the Moroccan armed forces.

A crucial element is the acquisition of new aircraft for the Moroccan airforce. The original intention was to acquire Mirage 20XXs from France, but neither Saudi Arabia nor France were willing to offer financial aid for the purchases. Now it appears that Morocco is looking toward the U.S. to both supply appropriate aircraft and help with the financing. Improved relations between the U.S. and Morocco are thus essential. No wonder then that the treaty with Libya was jettisoned.

King Hassan's decision to abandon his two-year-old treaty with Libya also corresponds with the monarchy's improved sense of internal stability now that the military problems of the Western Sahara appear to be solved. This has been marked by a pronounced foreign policy move toward the West and a readiness to reject the iron certainties that have characterized Middle Eastern politics for so many decades, particularly over the Arab-Israeli conflict. The immediate benefits are considerable—economic assistance, military aid, and future kudos over Morocco's new posture in the Middle East. The loss of Libyan support must seem extremely slight by comparison.

At the same time, Morocco must now deal with increased isolation inside the Middle East and North Africa. Not only will Hassan's government be rejected by the radicals—who have in any case long been suspicious of the Moroccan ruler's pro-Western tendencies—but moderates will also have to be circumspect in their relations with Morocco in the short-term at least.

Indeed, there are already suggestions that Middle Eastern radicals have turned their unwelcome attentions toward the Sharifian monarchy. Moroccan security services claim to have uncovered two terrorist plots, one involving two Palestinians and two Tunisians arrested in Casablanca in possession of explosives, and the other involving a planned attack on a Casablanca synagogue.

Moderates like Tunisia, who would like to strengthen ties with Morocco and see a degree of regional unity believing this is the only way to resolve the Western Sahara conflict, must now stand back and wait for better times.

Hassan, however, clearly feels that the U.S. option is best for Morocco. This parallels the Moroccan attempt to find a basis for entry into the European Economic Community (EEC), proposed in 1985 as a means of resolving the economic problems between the southern Mediterranean states and the EEC. Quite simply, Hassan believes that Morocco can and should act as a bridge between the West and Middle East.

Further, Morocco should be prepared to point the way to Middle Eastern states in making unpalatable decisions, such as talking to Israel—ensuring, at the same time, that Israel is forced to recognize the relevance and immutability of Palestinian demands and the role of the PLO.

In the end, the Libyan treaty had outlived its usefulness and the King had been looking for an appropriate opportunity to break it for several months. Yet, Hassan cannot forget his domestic constituency. Moroccans have learned to accept and respect their ruler's subtle and frequent shifts in foreign policy, but they may also have different imperatives. Most Moroccans perceive arcane considerations of the importance of U.S. relations as secondary to the vital social and political imperatives of Arab and Maghrebi unity.

They are bound, therefore, to be intensely disappointed with the consequences of the recent policy changes in Rabat. Yet, they will tolerate the King's decisions—provided they result in easing the austerity of daily life and not in more profound regional isolation. However, Moroccan memories are long and it is a tradition that they do not easily forget their rulers' mistakes. It is therefore hoped that the Reagan administration will respond appropriately to the King's moves and not treat them cynically as part of its simplistic strategic view of the Middle East and North Africa as surrogates in the greater conflict between East and West.
The new Sudanese Prime Minister has had little time to address the country's economic problems due to the spreading war in the south. The reluctance of foreign oil companies to continue operations given the security risks will pose further hardships on an already collapsing economy.

BY CAROL BERGER

After a three-month delay in releasing the budget, preliminary figures from the Sudanese Ministry of Finance suggest it will closely mirror the deficit budget of 1985. The budget was planned to coincide with the launching of a long-awaited recovery program, but financial authorities abroad are hardly holding their breath.

After adopting a wait-and-see attitude following the April elections, their mood has turned into impatience and disenchantment. The World Bank had urged Khartoum to introduce reforms at the time it announced the budget, and unless it soon does so, say bankers, any large multilateral rescue package is considered unlikely.

Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, long viewed in the West as a moderate, has spent his first months in power pursuing Arab unity. In trips to the Soviet Union, Kuwait, and Iran, his advisers undertook an international mediating role in conflicts far beyond Sudan's traditional sphere of influence. Back home, the economic and political situation worsens.

Political insiders suggested months ago that Mahdi's political career may have peaked with his election and warned that Western leaders were naive in their assessments of the premier, a member of the Ansar, the largest northern religious group. As head of a coalition government representing the Khattmiyya sect's pro-Egyptian Democratic Unionist Party, Mahdi confronts what is considered an unworkable division of party and national interests.

The current mood of Sudan's international donors varies. The Netherlands, considered a key donor, is understood to fully support the new government; West Germany is described as hesitant; the United Kingdom's Overseas Development Agency says its funds are exhausted.

The U. S. is still reassessing its commitments. Despite political pronouncements to the contrary, Washington is reportedly disillusioned with Mahdi. Sudan's growing links with Libya have led to significant cuts in the U.S. aid program—allergedly for security reasons.

On April 15—only hours after the American bombings of Tripoli and Benghazi—a U.S. embassy employee was seriously wounded in Khartoum. In the days following the attack, the embassy evacuated more than 300 American citizens. Many of those remaining were directly involved in the disbursement of aid. However, despite acutely strained relations, Sudan will be the largest black African recipient of American aid in FY 1986-87, receiving $223.5 million, an increase over the previous year, but less than the requested $254 million.

The prognosis for economic recovery is poor, however. Agricultural output continues to fall. The effects of extended drought and seed shortages have slashed grain yields; at the same time, white fly infestation of the cotton harvest has dramatically reduced earnings.

Carol Berger is a freelance journalist who has reported from Sudan for The Times of London, the BBC World and Africa Services, The Economist, and other publications and new services.
Most of the 1984-85 cotton crop went unsold until August of this year, when the Sudan Cotton Company sold some 324,000 bales of barakat (long-staple) cotton at far below world market prices. In 1985, the World Bank advised that the crop could fetch $0.90 per pound. Some reports suggest that the recent sale was for only half that amount.

Total revenue from agriculture fell by a staggering 33 percent between the 1984 and 1985 seasons. Cotton earnings declined by 25 percent while other crops saw similar reductions. Gum arabic fell by 36 percent, and sesame by 39 percent. Revenue targets in recent years are evidence of the country's narrow tax base. Targets were hit in part by import restrictions and the ban on alcohol imposed in 1984 by former president Gaafar al-Nimeiry.

In recent years, the development budget was financed almost entirely by foreign grants and loans and the local proceeds of commodity aid. With no government recovery program in sight, however, the International Monetary Fund declared Sudan ineligible for further borrowing in February this year. The suspension of Fund lending has had little practical effect, but it is significant in political terms. The decision marked a new low in Sudan's decline in creditworthiness and was a warning to donors against further loan commitments.

Budget details for the current year were presented by Finance and Economic Planning Minister Beshir Omer on September 18. The deficit is estimated at $1.2 billion in fiscal year 1986-87. The estimated deficit in the previous year was $1.12 billion. About $795 million will be financed by foreign loans and grants. Revenues are projected to total $1.1 billion against only $538.2 million the previous year.

Expenditure has been set at $2.2 billion, compared with $2.43 billion in 1985-86, including $952 million for development and $212 million for debt servicing. Arrears to the IMF are estimated at $300 million. In the absence of a decisive economic reform program, the international donor community is unlikely to provide the multilateral rescue package needed to address the debt. Total debt is now estimated at a staggering $10 billion.

"If the government shows it is doing a reasonable job of putting its house in order, then it will be time for talks on an international effort to begin," said one economist. "In a situation where no specific policies exist, a rescue plan will not be launched."

To date, the government has given little indication of its plans for reform. In a speech to the national assembly on July 7, Mahdi did refer to the need to reduce expenditure and review inefficient government corporations. However, economists are discouraged by references to continued meat subsidies and the banning of some livestock exports.

During budget discussions, the World Bank reportedly emphasized the need to draw up a comprehensive economic program. As a senior Bank official said, "Sudan's economic problems are beyond the stage where measures such as a moderate budget deficit will give relief."

If the government follows IMF directives, the program will include measures on the exchange rate, revenue increases, and a deregulation of diesel and water prices. But financial analysts hold out little hope for dramatic reform in the near future. "It doesn't look too good," says one. "It is a tremendous problem to tackle the economy while the war is still going on."

The three-year war with southern Sudanese rebels has accelerated since earlier this year. With substantial backing from neighboring Ethiopia, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) has effectively halted all aid and development in the resource-rich south, and taken control of large areas in the remote region.

The August 16 downing of a civilian aircraft killing all 63 aboard further intensified calls in northern Sudan for a renewed offensive in the south. Pressure has been building in the northern cities as more and more southern refugees from the war settle in the urban slums. Fears are now growing that violence will soon spread to the northern centers.

In the weeks leading up to the April handover of power, the Transitional Military Council (TMC)—led by Maj.-
Chevron's exploration expenses at its southern Sudan fields, was put at $2.5 billion. The value of the pipeline itself was said to approach $1 billion.

While sporadic anti-government clashes were well underway in 1983, it was not until February 1984 that violent and well-planned attacks by the SPLA paralyzed both oil exploration and work on the Jonglei canal water project in the Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal regions of southern Sudan. Both the oil and canal work were in the heart of Sudan's remotest territory. In September, the French firm contracted to build the Jonglei canal took the Sudanese government to court for $30 million in damages.

In the same month that the rebel attack on Chevron's Rub Kona base camp ended what had been a $500,000-a-day project. Chevron and the Royal Dutch Shell Group signed an agreement giving Shell 25 percent of Chevron's equity stake in WNPC. Shell also took on 25 percent of Chevron's production-sharing agreement.

After more than two years of suspended oil work in the now war-torn south, the cancellation of the WNPC contracts marks a turn for the worse in Sudan's hopes of recovering what are considered to be important reserves. Some industry estimates put Chevron's Unity field reserves at 150 million barrels. Total reserves are estimated at 200 million to 300 million barrels.

According to a senior Chevron spokesman, the company has spent $1 billion to date in its Sudan concession. How that investment will be protected—from both a logistical and political standpoint—is unclear.

Energy and Mining Minister Adam Moussa Madibu said recently that the government told WNPC directors of its plans to cancel the company's licenses to operate in Sudan. The government wants to liquidate the oil company, the minister added, but a decision on such a move will be deferred until the board's next meeting in Khartoum in December.

Senior Western officials at WNPC have sharply contradicted government statements about the liquidation. The board is understood to have made no such decision, although it has agreed to close its offices.

"Even if we elect to liquidate, it must be done in an orderly fashion. First of all, we must cancel remaining contracts," says one spokesman. He declined to comment on what could prove to be protracted talks with company shareholders about WNPC debt. But he noted, "A lot of work was undertaken in the name of White Nile, a lot of money was spent. The money was provided by somebody and it wasn't White Nile. Now White Nile has an obligation."

That somebody was Chevron and Royal Dutch Shell. The companies have already lent White Nile about $132 million as compensation to contractors during the extended work shutdown.

Despite these considerable difficulties, the government has not given up the idea of developing its oil reserves in the near future. Publicly, it says that for the time being, the low world oil price has made the export pipeline unfeasible. However, oil companies consider the price of oil to be academic next to the overriding security problems.

France's Total, which has licensing rights in the rebel-controlled Upper Nile region, has been unable to pursue exploration for almost three years. Company officials say its Khartoum offices were effectively closed in mid-September, when its last remaining "trouble-shooter" left the country. Total, best known in Sudan oil circles for attempting negotiation with the southern Sudanese opposition, has apparently abandoned hopes for a peaceful resolution in the near future.

Chevron now says its comprehensive review of Sudan prospects will be presented to the government in mid-1987. Meanwhile, expatriate staff have been cut to 12 and work in the relatively secure areas of southern Kordofan has been shut down since May.

It is now clear that other oil interests operating outside areas of conflict are also reassessing their investment. Sun Sudan Oil Company, operator in a 175,000-square-kilometer block in northern Sudan, is not operating at present. The U.S. firm's local subsidiary has drilled three wells and is now interpreting seismic and drilling results. Africa Report understands its expatriate staff has been reduced.
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