

AFRICA REPORT

AMERICA'S
LEADING MAGAZINE
ON AFRICA

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JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1984

African Refugees: The Burden of Exile

FOCUSING ON:

The Horn
Central Africa
Southern Africa
U.S. Policy

ALSO IN THIS ISSUE:

Post-Sobhuza Swaziland
Repression in the
Homelands
Politics in Brazzaville





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IN THIS ISSUE

The African continent is host to more than a quarter of the world's 10 million refugees. This issue of *Africa Report* examines not only the plight of those who have fled from their nations of birth, but also their impact on the fragile economies of the asylum countries, a subject that will be addressed at the second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa, to be held in July under the auspices of the OAU and the UN High Commission for Refugees.

Tony Hodges provides an overview of Africa's refugee crisis and an interview with William R. Smyser, UN deputy high commissioner for refugees. We also focus on three regions bearing Africa's heaviest refugee burdens — the Horn, and central and southern Africa — in analyses by Michel Barton, Alastair Matheson, and Joe Molefi, respectively. From the U.S., Chester Crocker, American assistant secretary of state for African affairs, outlines official policy on African refugees, and U.S. Congressman Ted Weiss suggests that the Reagan administration's Africa policies are contributing to the conditions that have created the refugee problem.

In another story, a special correspondent analyzes Swaziland's political climate in the period after the death of King Sobhuza. And in two reports on recent developments in South Africa, the homeland governments as vehicles to stifle opposition are investigated by Miriam Labob, and John Matisson addresses how the government is apt to respond to the resurgence of black resistance in the wake of the November referendum. Howard Schissel looks at how Congo's President Sassou-Nguesso has been able to steer a course between East and West while achieving a degree of economic development.

Analysis

Africa's Refugee Crisis
By Tony Hodges

4

Interview

William R. Smyser,
United Nations Deputy High Commissioner
for Refugees
Interviewed by Tony Hodges

11

Southern African Refugees

Few Safe Havens for Apartheid's Exiles
By Joe Molefi

14

Viewpoint

American Policy and African Refugees
By Ted Weiss

18

Ethiopian Refugees

Resettlement and Repatriation in the Horn
By Michel S. Barton

20

African Update

Editor: Michael Maren
Assistant Editor: Jason Zweig
Researcher: Stephen Adkisson

23

Document

Africa's Humanitarian Crises
and U.S. Policy
By Chester A. Crocker

39

Central African Refugees

Uganda's Two Decades of Turmoil
By Alastair Matheson

40

South Africa

Homelands: The New Locus of Repression
By Miriam Labob

44

South Africa

The UDF: Resurgence of Resistance
By John Matisson

48

Swaziland

The Post-Sobhuza Power Struggle
By a Correspondent

51

Congo

Pragmatists or Partisans in Brazzaville?
By Howard Schissel

55

Letters to the Editor

58

Photo Credit

The cover photo of an Ethiopian refugee and her child was taken at Dar el Naem, near Port Sudan, by L. Gubb/UNHCR.

Africa's Refugee Crisis

BY TONY HODGES

The statistics paint a frightening picture. One in every 200 Africans is a refugee. In Somalia, which has no less than 700,000 refugees within its borders, the ratio is one in seven. Indeed, the African continent has more than a quarter of the world's 10 million refugees, although it has less than a tenth of the planet's population.

Africa is facing a refugee crisis. This is not just because the number of African refugees has grown alarmingly over the past two decades, from a "mere" 400,000 in 1964 to more than 2.5 million today. Just as important is the fact that almost all these refugees have settled in countries that are among the poorest in the world and are facing grave difficulties in meeting the needs of their own peoples. For these countries, with per capita incomes of less than \$600 — and frequently less than \$300 — a year, a large influx of re-

fugees can place an unbearable strain on resources.

Moreover, as the United Nations high commissioner for refugees, Poul Hartling, warned last August, "the present world economic situation has aggravated the condition of refugees and affected countries alike, and has also placed a considerable strain on the ability of donors to maintain the appropriate level of funding."

Given these conditions, one might have expected some African governments to resort to mass expulsions of refugees. Happily however, instances of forced repatriation or deportation to a third country are relatively rare in Africa. The real tragedy is that more often than not, there are few prospects of finding effective, durable solutions to the refugees' predicament. By and large, the root causes of a refugee exodus remain as powerfully present as ever, militating against a voluntary return home, while only a small minority can be successfully integrated at a reasonable level of self-sufficiency in their poverty-stricken countries of asylum.

Until the mid-1970s, most African refugees came from countries where bloody wars were being fought by colonial powers or European settlers to suppress nationalist guerrillas. During the Algerian war for independence,

which raged for eight years until 1962, some 200,000 Algerians took refuge in neighboring Tunisia and Morocco. During the following decade, the wars in Portugal's colonies of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique spawned huge movements of refugees. By 1972 there were 421,000 refugees from Angola, 82,000 from Guinea-Bissau, and 64,000 from Mozambique. Together, they accounted for 56 percent of Africa's 1,018,000 refugees.

Portugal's colonies finally achieved independence in 1974-75. Refugees still streamed out of Zimbabwe, however, and by 1979 there were a quarter million Zimbabweans sheltering in camps in Mozambique, Zambia, and Botswana. They were eventually repatriated in 1980-81, after the December 1979 Lancaster House agreement paved the way to majority rule.

Today, black African countries play host to refugees from the remaining two countries under white minority rule at the southern tip of the continent, Namibia and South Africa. There are 70,000 Namibians in camps in Angola and 5,000 in Zambia, and approximately 25,000 black South Africans have settled in the Frontline states of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Tony Hodges is Africa editor at the Economist Intelligence Unit, London. He recently participated in a UNHCR-sponsored study tour of African countries to examine Africa's refugee problems.

However, the refugees from these oppressive white-ruled states now constitute less than 5 percent of Africa's refugees. Besides the phenomenal increase in their numbers, the most striking fact about the African refugees of the past few years is that the overwhelming majority of them have fled from independent African countries. They have left their homes to escape ethnic or communal strife, the exactions of tyrannical governments, or wars.

This should not be taken to mean that all of independent Africa is awash with refugees. In fact, the problem is heavily concentrated in a few regions. There is a belt of refugee-creating and receiving countries running south from the Horn (where almost one-half of the continent's refugees may be found) through central and eastern Africa to the Frontline states of southern Africa. By contrast, West and North Africa have relatively few refugees — the sole significant exception being the 167,000 Sahrawi refugees estimated to be living in Algeria, which, as an oil-producer with a per capita income of more than \$2,000 a year, is much better placed to cope with a large refugee population than any of the other major African countries of asylum.

It is in the Horn of Africa that the refugee problem is of a truly appalling magnitude. Refugees first started leaving Ethiopia about 15 years ago, from the Eritrea region, which has been at war for 22 years. Later, refugees fled from other regions of Ethiopia such as the Ogaden and Tigre, and now there are an estimated 1.2 million exiles from Ethiopia living in the neighboring countries of Somalia, Sudan, and Djibouti. The largest concentration is in Somalia, where 700,000 refugees from the Ogaden are living in 35 camps in the regions of Gedo, Hiran, Lower Shebelle, and the northwest. The majority of these refugees are of Somali ethnic background, though a large minority are Oromos.

In eastern Sudan, there are an additional 460,000 refugees from Ethiopia, most of them from the adjoining regions of Eritrea and Tigre. In Djibouti, there are another 35,000 Ethiopian refugees.

Besides accommodating 460,000

refugees from Ethiopia, Sudan has at least 200,000 refugees from Uganda and some 5,000 from Zaire, settled in camps in the extreme south of the country in the region of Equatoria. The Ugandans, who first left in large numbers to southern Sudan in 1979, are just part of a huge Ugandan refugee diaspora that numbers about 300,000 in all. The other major groups of Ugandan refugees are in Zaire and Rwanda, where thousands fled after violence in the Mbarara district in October 1982.

Most of the 44,000 people who sought asylum in Rwanda after the Mbarara clashes were in fact Rwandans who had been living in Uganda as refugees since the civil war between the Hutu and Tutsi after Rwanda's independence, which caused tens of thousands of Rwandans to flee to Uganda, Burundi, Zaire, and Tanzania. There are still 54,500 Rwandan refugees in Burundi, 48,000 in Uganda, and a few thousand more in other countries in the region. The analogous, but



Ethiopian refugees: "It is in the Horn that the refugee problem is of truly appalling magnitude"

Photo: UNHCR/L. Gubb

much bloodier, Hutu-Tutsi civil war in Burundi in 1972 that resulted in more than 50,000 deaths, forced over 200,000 Hutu to escape to Tanzania, where 147,000 Burundi refugees still live to this day, and to Rwanda, which has 18,000 refugees from Burundi. As is evident from these examples, several countries are both generators of refugees and hosts to refugees from neighbors. Zaire, for example, is a country of asylum for some 300,000 refugees, including about 215,000 Bakongo from Angola and about 65,000 Ugandans, while an estimated 60,000 Zairians are refugees in Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Sudan, and other countries.

It should be noted that the term "refugee" is used here in accordance with the definition employed by the Organization of African Unity in its "Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa," adopted at the OAU summit in Addis Ababa in 1969. This defines a refugee as any "person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is un-

able or, owing to such a fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country," or "who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality."

This definition does not cover "economic refugees" or internally displaced persons — people who have been forced, usually by war or civil strife, to flee their homes and take refuge elsewhere but have not crossed an international frontier. These internal "displacees," who are akin to refugees, are numerous in some parts of Africa. Totalling one to two million in the continent as a whole, they are concentrated, as would be expected, in the conflict-torn regions with the most serious refugee problems, such as Ethiopia, Uganda, and Angola.

In Angola, for example, almost one-tenth of the country's population of 7.5 million has been displaced, while there are 96,000 refugees — 70,000 from Namibia, 20,000 from Zaire, and about 6,000 from South Africa. More

than 150,000 Angolans have been forced to flee the southern province of Kunene, which has been turned into a no-man's land since its capture by the South African Defense Force in Operation Protea in August 1981, and half a million Ovimbundu peasants have been displaced by the war with UNITA in the country's central plateau.

About two-thirds of Africa's refugees are of rural background. They tend to cross borders en masse in relatively remote and uninhabited areas and to settle in districts where the services and infrastructure necessary to bring them prompt and adequate assistance is lacking. To mount an emergency relief program, to meet such basic needs as shelter, food, and medical care, requires substantial resources. Settlement sites must immediately be located, taking into account such factors as water supply and their agricultural potential. Access roads often need to be repaired or improved, to enable relief supplies to be delivered.

Even when the refugees' immediate survival needs have been met, there often remains the immensely difficult problem of finding a long-term solution to their plight. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which coordinates assistance to refugees worldwide, has three classic ways to implement its mandate to seek "durable solutions" to refugee problems. In order of preference, they are: the refugees' voluntary repatriation to their country of origin, their integration into the country of asylum, and their resettlement in a third country. The resettlement of African refugees outside the continent, in Europe or North America, is rarely encouraged by UNHCR, if only because the developed, industrialized countries tend to accept only the most highly qualified refugees, depriving Africa of much needed doctors, engineers, technicians, and specialists.

Over the years, UNHCR has been able to coordinate large-scale voluntary repatriation programs in several parts of Africa. Naturally, these have only been possible where the problems that gave rise to the original refugee movements have been resolved, in full or in part, or the refugees have received some minimal assurances of the safety of their re-




Photo: UNHCR/M. Vanapelghem

Newly arrived Angolan refugees in Zambia: Almost one-tenth of Angola's population has been displaced

turn. One of the earliest UNHCR-sponsored repatriation programs in Africa was mounted for the 200,000 Algerian refugees in Morocco and Tunisia after the conclusion of Algeria's war for independence in 1962.

In 1972-73, UNHCR coordinated the return of 194,000 Sudanese refugees from the Central African Republic, Zaire, and Uganda after the Addis Ababa Agreement that ended the war in southern Sudan. Then in 1974-76, UNHCR arranged for several hundred thousand refugees to return home to Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique after independence from Portugal. Likewise, 250,000 Zimbabweans were repatriated in 1980-81. The respite in the fighting in Chad in 1982 enabled 200,000 Chadians to return from exile in Niger, Cameroon, and the Central African Republic.

Now UNHCR is trying to assist refugees from Ethiopia who wish to go home. The Ethiopian government has declared a general amnesty, and its relief and rehabilitation commission has set up reception centers with UNHCR aid near the border with Somalia and in Eritrea. UNHCR has budgeted \$20.3 million, including a donation in kind of 25,000 tons of wheat from the government of Australia, for this program, which is designed to assist spontaneous returnees already in the country and to help create a climate conducive to further voluntary repatriation.

In addition, UNHCR has earmarked \$8.2 million to organize the repatriation of refugees in Djibouti who wish to return to Ethiopia. The 35,000 refugees in this resourceless ministate on the Red Sea, who live in sprawling camps at Dikhil and Ali Sabieh about 50 to 75 miles from Djibouti city, constitute one-eleventh of the territory's population, and, given the arid climate, the sparse natural resources, and the lack of infrastructure, cannot hope to achieve self-sufficiency there. The only viable solution is that they return to Ethiopia.

To this end, UNHCR and the government of Djibouti and Ethiopia have set up a tripartite commission, which first met in January-February 1983, to oversee the repatriation of all those refugees who wish to go home. Though it is anxious to be rid of as many of the refugees as possible, the Djibouti gov-

REFUGEES AS MILITARY TARGETS

The massacre at Kassinga in southern Angola in May 1978, when 600 Namibian refugees were slaughtered by a raiding party of South African commandos, was southern Africa's horrific equivalent of the mass murder at Sabra and Shatila. Since then, the successive attacks on unarmed, defenseless refugees from Namibia and South Africa—and the economic reprisals and military raids suffered by their countries of asylum for giving them refuge—have become a matter of grave concern to UNHCR.

There was an international outcry in December 1982 when 100 South African commandos charged into Lesotho's capital, Maseru, and gunned down 30 South African refugees and 12 Basotho citizens in their homes. More recently, the South African government has tried to strangle the economy of Lesotho, which it completely surrounds, by imposing restrictions on border traffic, in an attempt to force the Maseru authorities to deport some of the ANC supporters to whom they have given asylum.

The South African refugees in Mozambique have been victims, too. In January 1981, South African commandos raided the houses of refugees living in the Maputo suburb of Matola, murdering 12 of them and wounding another seven. In 1982, a prominent South African exile, Ruth First, was assassinated in Maputo by a mail bomb. In 1983, there were two more South African raids. In May, South African aircraft bombed Matola, killing four Mozambicans, and in October, a commando unit was infiltrated into Maputo to destroy an African National Congress information office.

Alarmed by the seriousness and frequency of attacks on refugees in southern Africa and some other parts of the world, notably Central America, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, UNHCR's Executive Committee decided in October 1981 to study "the need for special measures to protect and ensure the safety of such refugees." The job was given to a former high commissioner for refugees, Ambassador Felix Schnyder of Switzerland, who has since drafted a "Declaration on the Prohibition of Military and Armed Attacks on Refugee Camps and Settlements." As protective measures, Schnyder proposed that refugee camps be clearly demarcated, that UNHCR officials have free access to them (or in serious danger zones be permanently stationed in them), and that refugees be moved as far away as possible from the borders of countries from which there is a danger of attack—a measure already taken by the government of Angola, which moved all its Namibian refugees to the province of Kwanza Sul, in the northwest of the country, after the Kassinga massacre.

However, the 41 member states of UNHCR's Executive Committee failed at the committee's 34th session, held in Geneva last October, to reach agreement on the draft declaration. While there was unanimous condemnation of attacks on refugees, there was controversy over the apportionment of responsibility for them. Some states wanted particular emphasis placed on the need for refugees to refrain from "subversive" activities that might provoke a military attack. Others, however, objected that the introduction of this kind of qualification could provide a pretext for a state to attempt to legitimize an attack on a refugee camp. They believed that the greatest emphasis should be placed on the responsibility of the aggressor.

Since no consensus was reached, the Executive Committee called on its chairman, Ambassador Hans Ewerloff of Sweden, to continue consultations so that a final agreement could be reached with the least possible delay. Ultimately, it is hoped, the declaration will be submitted to the UN General Assembly.

—Tony Hodges

ernment has joined UNHCR in stressing the strictly voluntary character of this program. Upon registering for repatriation, the refugees have to sign a declaration stating their desire to return to Ethiopia voluntarily. The Ethiopian government for its part has allowed UNHCR and voluntary agencies to monitor repatriation movements across the frontier and to have free access to returnee settlements in Ethiopia. It is obviously anxious to make a success of this relatively small-scale repatriation exercise, in order to prove the sincerity of its amnesty and win the confidence of refugees who are biding their time to see what fate awaits the first returnees.

Registration of volunteers for repatriation began in August, and the first returnees left Djibouti a month later. By mid-November, 1,650 had already arrived in Ethiopia and another 3,000 had registered for repatriation. However, the program appears to have been seriously mismanaged at first, for rumors quickly spread among the refugees that repatriation would be compulsory. Some 750 refugees fled Djibouti for Somalia, where they settled in the Darbi-Hore camp 135 miles northwest of Hargeisa. One small group of refugees even fled Djibouti by boat across the Red Sea to North Yemen, from where they crossed into Saudi Arabia, sailed back across the Red Sea to the Eritrean coast, and with the help of

Eritrean guerrillas, trekked to a refugee camp at Tawawa in eastern Sudan.

UNHCR does expect, however, that most of the refugees will eventually want to be repatriated. In the main, they are Issas from the border region who fled into Djibouti to escape the fighting in their home areas during the Somali-Ethiopian war in 1977-78. Now that peace has returned, they have little reason to remain in Djibouti, in UNHCR's view. UNHCR recognizes however that there will be few, if any, volunteers for repatriation among the political exiles in Djibouti — salaried employees, workers, and students from Ethiopian cities — who constitute about 15 percent of the refugees in Djibouti.

So far, only a minuscule minority of the 1.2 million refugees from Ethiopia have been repatriated, or seem likely to return home in the near future. A fundamental constraint is that despite the Ethiopian government's amnesty and though the fighting has stopped in certain regions, the political landscape remains frozen and the war continues in Eritrea and Tigre. The insurgent movements will inevitably discourage repatriation, not only because the refugees form part of their population base, but also because their return to Ethiopia would be hailed by the authorities in Addis Ababa as a victory.

Where voluntary repatriation is im-

possible, UNHCR favors African refugees' integration into their host countries. Through long-term settlement programs, it tries to help refugee communities become self-supporting, so that they cease to be a burden on their countries of refuge and, in the best of circumstances, contribute positively to these countries' economic development. Achieving self-sufficiency is equally important for the psychological well-being of refugees with little hope of returning to their homes, as prolonged dependence on charity can destroy a refugee's sense of purpose and mold a mentality of helplessness and lethargy.

UNHCR has been supporting rural refugee settlements in Africa since the mass exodus of Rwandan refugees in 1963. Now, more than one million refugees are living in some 160 rural settlements at various levels of self-sufficiency in 14 African countries. Sometimes, settlements are created spontaneously by refugees, in which case UNHCR's role is to help them attain self-sufficiency by providing seeds and agricultural equipment and reinforcing local infrastructure such as roads, schools, and clinics. In other cases, UNHCR and the host government have to select sites for settlement, and make a substantial investment to provide basic infrastructural services.

Tanzania is a case in point. When tens of thousands of refugees from Burundi sought refuge in the densely populated Kigoma valley on the shores of Lake Tanganyika in 1972, the Tanzanian authorities offered to resettle them on virgin land further east at Ulyankulu and Katumba. Within a year, each settlement had a population of more than 60,000 refugees, making them at that time the largest organized refugee settlements in Africa. A series of bad harvests in 1976 and 1977 and the overpopulation of the Ulyankulu settlement prompted the Tanzanian government to establish a third settlement at Mishamo in the Mpanda district. Today the 37,000 refugees at Mishamo, who grow cassava, maize, and beans as well as cash crops such as tobacco, are not only self-sufficient in food, but produce surpluses for sale on the open market. At Ulyankulu, where 5,000 families live in ten villages, the

**Africa's Refugee Burden:
The Principal Asylum Countries**

| | Population (millions) 1982 | Refugees (thousands) 1982 | Ratio of refugees to local population 1982 | GNP per capita 1981 |
|-----------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|--|---------------------------|
| Somalia | 5.1 | 700 | 1 in 7 | \$280 |
| Djibouti | 0.4 | 35 | 1 in 11 | \$480 |
| Sudan | 19.5 | 637 | 1 in 31 | \$380 |
| Zambia | 6.2 | 89 | 1 in 69 | \$600 |
| Burundi | 4.5 | 58 | 1 in 77 | \$230 |
| Angola | 7.5 | 96 | 1 in 77 | n/a |
| Swaziland | 0.6 | 7 | 1 in 84 | \$760 |
| Rwanda | 5.3 | 62 | 1 in 85 | \$250 |
| Zaire | 30.3 | 301 | 1 in 101 | \$210 |
| Tanzania | 19.1 | 159 | 1 in 120 | \$280 |
| Uganda | 14.1 | 116 | 1 in 121 | \$220 |
| Algeria | 20.3 | 167 | 1 in 121 | \$2,140 |
| Lesotho | 1.4 | 12 | 1 in 123 | \$540 |

Sources: Population figures are from the UN's *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*; refugee figures from UNHCR; and GNP per capita figures from the *World Bank Atlas*, 1983.


refugees' cooperative runs shops, a hotel, a maize mill, and a carpentry workshop. Some of the refugees in Tanzania have been granted full citizenship.

In Angola, 14,820 acres of land in Malange province have been made available to the African National Congress, which hopes to grow enough food there to meet the food requirements of all the 6,000 South African refugees in the country.

Striving for refugee self-sufficiency is a dire necessity in a country like Sudan with a truly vast refugee population. To date, just over one-third of Sudan's 640,000 refugees have been relocated in organized rural settlements, and some of these have become at least partially self-sufficient. Some 102,000 refugees from Ethiopia have been set up in 23 organized settlements in the eastern region of the country, and about 140,000 Ugandan refugees have been accommodated in 30 settlements and transit centers in the south. Extensive tracts of land have been cleared, wells dug, and irrigation systems created for these settlements, for which the UNHCR budgeted \$19.5 million in 1983.

The refugees in these Sudanese settlements are grouped in villages of 1,000 to 7,000 people and given plots of land of about 5-10 acres. Most of the land is used for staple crops — sorghum in eastern Sudan and maize in the south. As the villages achieve self-sufficiency, their food rations from the UN World Food Program are gradually phased out. All of the villages in the south are still partially dependent on these rations, but most of the settlements in the east have achieved self-sufficiency. Some settlements are able to produce substantial surpluses for sale, or venture into cultivation of cash crops, such as sesame, groundnuts, or tobacco.

In Somalia, where almost all the 700,000 refugees from the Ogaden remain totally dependent on relief assistance for their survival, six years after their flight from Ethiopia, the Somali government announced last March that it would launch a program of local settlement. Technical studies are now underway, with a view to setting up medium-sized agricultural settlements



Repatriation center for Chadian refugees in Nigeria in 1981: Some repatriation programs have been successful

Photo: UNHCR/N. van Praag

in 1984. The initial aim is to accommodate 40,000 of the refugees in these settlements.

However, it would be unrealistic to expect more than a tiny minority of the refugees from the Ogaden to achieve self-sufficiency in rural settlements. Somalia has very little cultivable land, and practically all of it is already being farmed by local Somalis. Furthermore, pastoral resources, which have already been seriously eroded by overgrazing, are insufficient to allow the huge refugee population (which is predominantly pastoral and nomadic in background) to meet its needs through stock-raising. Short of opting for repatriation to the Ogaden, most of these refugees are condemned to prolonged dependence on relief. A country as poor and barren as Somalia simply cannot provide more than a handful of them with viable means of self-support.

Achieving self-sufficiency is often just as difficult for Africa's urban refugees. Most of the South African refugees come from an urban background, and so do many of the Ethiopian refugees who gravitate to eastern Sudanese cities like Khartoum, Gedaref, Kassala, and Port Sudan. All told, about one-third of African refugees, including 155,000 Ethiopians in Sudan, live in urban areas where they only rarely succeed in finding jobs, and usually shelter in the worst squatter settlements and slums. A study recently done in Khartoum revealed that only 5

to 10 percent of the refugees living there were regularly employed.

When confronted with a mass influx of urban refugees, governments sometimes propose transferring them to rural areas. But this is seldom popular among the refugees themselves, who, if they come from cities in their home countries, are in any case unlikely to adapt well to living in the countryside; both the way of life there and the work on the land are unfamiliar to them.

In many parts of Africa, UNHCR has funded income-generating schemes designed to help urban refugees be set up in business as artisans, craftsmen, or small shopkeepers. Other projects are aimed at training urban refugees in skills that are in demand on the local job market. Only a small minority can be assisted in this way, however. Unemployment — and underemployment — are rife in most African cities, which have been swollen by an incessant influx of migrants from the rural areas. In Lesotho, ironically, jobs are so scarce that most adult males have to spend several years of their lives as migrant workers in the country from which the 11,000 South African refugees in Lesotho's capital, Maseru, have fled.

It is not unusual, moreover, that where refugees do succeed in finding jobs, either in urban areas or as farm laborers, they are employed as cheap labor. The refugee, desperate for any work, is in no position to seek improvements in his working conditions

or his wages. In Sudan, for example, thousands of refugees have been accommodated in plantation settlements, where they have no right to the land and work for a pittance as seasonal laborers on large irrigated estates.

However, it is not just the refugees who suffer. In Africa, major refugee influxes put enormous strains on the already fragile economies of the countries of asylum. In arid regions like the eastern Sudan and Somalia, the presence of hundreds of thousands of refugees has accentuated the shortages of pastures, water, and firewood, and accelerated the dangerous process of desertification.

Scarce resources have to be diverted from normal development priorities to cope with the needs of huge numbers of destitute fugitives, settled in regions with inadequate infrastructure and resources. Additionally, ports, railways, and road transport services tend to be swamped by the abnormal requirements of large refugee relief programs, while medical facilities, which are already inadequate to meet local needs, are saturated with refugees suffering from malnutrition and such classic re-

fugee ailments as dehydration, gastric disorders, and tuberculosis.

In the cities, the arrival of large numbers of refugees compounds the problem of urban influx, swelling the ranks of the unemployed and depressing wages, straining already overstretched urban services such as health, sanitation, transport, water, and education, and increasing competition for housing and pushing up rents.

A fundamental problem is that most African countries cannot absorb large numbers of refugees productively. They have very low or negative rates of growth, and so cannot absorb all of their own fast-growing labor force. Indeed, Africa's real per capita income actually fell between 1978 and 1982, according to the IMF's *World Economic Outlook* for 1983.

The gravity of the refugee problem in Africa prompted the UN General Assembly to vote unanimously in November 1980 for the convening of the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA), one of whose purposes was to "assist countries of asylum adversely affected by the large-scale presence of refugees

to obtain international assistance for projects aimed at strengthening the ability of those countries to carry the extra burden placed on their services and facilities."

Held in Geneva in April 1981 under the joint auspices of the UN, the OAU, and UNHCR, ICARA succeeded in raising \$560 million. In the view of many African countries, however, the developmental ramifications of the refugee problem were not effectively addressed at ICARA. As UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar remarked in February 1983, some African countries "felt that the additional assistance required to help the countries of asylum carry the heavy burden imposed on their economies by the presence of refugees and returnees received inadequate attention."

For this reason, the UN General Assembly voted in December 1982 to convene a second conference, ICARA II, which is to be held in Geneva in July 1984. One of its purposes is to counter compassion fatigue, to remind the world that the refugee problem in Africa has not gone away, and to raise additional funds for refugee relief, settlement projects, and repatriation programs. However, its other major purpose, in the words of the General Assembly resolution, is to "consider the impact imposed on the national economies of the African countries concerned and to provide them with required assistance to strengthen their social and economic infrastructure to cope with the burden of dealing with large numbers of refugees and returnees."

To this end, the United Nations Development Program has joined the UN, the OAU, and UNHCR on ICARA II's steering committee, and many other development-related agencies will be participating in the conference.

"Given the economic fragility of those African countries receiving refugees and the considerable difficulties they are facing in sustaining even their own economies," the high commissioner for refugees declared last August, "UNHCR's work needs to be complemented by efforts of a more developmental nature. Such assistance is the crucial new element of ICARA II." □




Photo: UNHCR/Y. Muller

"Major refugee influxes put enormous strains on already fragile economies of asylum countries"

William R. Smyser,

United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees

INTERVIEWED BY TONY HODGES

AFRICA REPORT: How grave is the refugee problem in Africa?

SMYSER: We regard it as quite serious in several ways. First of all, there are large numbers of refugees, several billion of them. Second, the refugees in many cases do not have any immediate prospect of a permanent solution to their difficulties. Third and perhaps most serious for Africa itself, many refugees are in asylum countries that are very poor, in need of development. Countries are welcoming refugees, but they have very few resources to offer them.

AFRICA REPORT: In which regions of Africa is the refugee situation most serious?

SMYSER: The single most serious area is the Horn of Africa, where there are over a million refugees, living in Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan. But by citing that, I don't want to forget that there are lots of other serious situations, like the Namibian refugee problem, the situation in Rwanda and Burundi, and recently northern Uganda, from which tens of thousands of refugees have crossed over into Zaire and Southern Sudan.

AFRICA REPORT: What solutions does UNHCR [United Nations High Commission for Refugees] propose for tackling these refugee influxes?

SMYSER: There are three classical solutions to refugee problems. The first, which the high commissioner favors and tries to implement wherever possible, is for the refugees to return home to their lands or their work. We can't always do that in Africa. We are doing that right now in the case of some refugees in Djibouti who are returning to Ethiopia. Where that is not possible, we try to encourage local integration, in which case the refugees move into agricultural

settlements, are given land by the countries of asylum and some resources by ourselves, and essentially establish themselves in the new areas. The third solution is resettlement, which means that refugees move on to a third country, usually in North America or Western Europe. That is the most difficult culturally for the refugees. It is not a solution we advocate very strongly in Africa, because it can create a brain drain.

AFRICA REPORT: Turning to your first solution—repatriation to the refugees' country of origin—could you indicate where this has been successfully achieved in Africa in recent years?

SMYSER: There have been two recent examples. One was in Zimbabwe where over a quarter of a million refugees returned a few years back. And then in 1982, over 200,000 returned to Chad from Cameroon and Nigeria. So it does happen.

AFRICA REPORT: The numbers of Angolans repatriated from Zaire, and of Shabans repatriated from Angola to Zaire, must have been comparable.

SMYSER: Yes, but that was some time earlier. There have been some large repatriations. We always hope there will be some more.

AFRICA REPORT: There has been some controversy over the program to repatriate Ethiopian refugees living in Djibouti. Some refugees are reported to have fled from Djibouti to Sudan upon hearing of the repatriation plans. Is this a truly voluntary program?

SMYSER: The refugees in Djibouti are essentially of two types. One, which we think is the smaller number, though

we will see over time, are those who left Ethiopia because they felt genuinely politically persecuted. It is our guess that many of those, perhaps all of them, will not want to return. Then there are others who left because of the fighting in the areas where they lived. The fighting is now over, and it looks as if many of them want to return. Some of them in fact returned spontaneously before we even established our program. We believe that for these people repatriation should be possible. In fact, we have had indications that most of them would like to go back, even though it may take them some time to make their final decision.

AFRICA REPORT: Why though did some of the refugees in Djibouti take fright when the repatriation plan was announced?

SMYSER: I think the fears were aroused among those who felt they would be politically jeopardized if they went back. They were afraid that the repatriation program would not be entirely voluntary, that they would be forced to go back. One of the big efforts we have made since this repatriation was first discussed has been to make clear to every one of the refugees that it is a strictly voluntary program.

AFRICA REPORT: And no refugees who have returned to Ethiopia have faced difficulties upon arrival?

SMYSER: Not to the best of our knowledge. We have watched it pretty carefully and the Ethiopian authorities recognize, I think, that if they create difficulties for any of the refugees, the others won't come back.

AFRICA REPORT: I understand that apart from those being repatriated by UNHCR from Djibouti, there are also some refugees returning to the Ogaden from Somalia. Could you give an idea of the numbers involved?

SMYSER: The total number of refugees in Djibouti was around 35,000. Several thousand of them returned voluntarily and spontaneously before we started our program. Since then, there have been several others that signed up for repatriation under our program. I think that what will happen is that quite a few will decide to return over time, but they will want to see what happens to the first ones. As far as the repatriation from Somalia to the Ogaden is concerned, there you are talking of a much larger order of magnitude. There are hundreds of thousands of refugees in Somalia. That is obviously a problem that is going to take a lot longer to solve. Some actually can settle in Somalia; some in fact already have. So far, only a few thousand have returned to the Ogaden, at least under an official program. Some may have returned by themselves, without passing through any official process.

AFRICA REPORT: Is there any danger that UNHCR repatriation programs could be exploited for propaganda purposes by the governments of countries to which refugees are returning?

SMYSER: I can't judge that. I suppose there could be, but we are looking at this more from a humanitarian standpoint of what's best for the people than in terms of what kind of exploitation might be made of it.

AFRICA REPORT: You said that UNHCR's second preferred solution to refugee problems is local integration into the countries of asylum. To what extent has UNHCR succeeded in enabling African refugees to become eco-

nomically self-sufficient so that they cease to be a burden on these countries?

SMYSER: In some countries we have done very well. We should not claim all the credit. The principal credit should go to the countries that have received the refugees. I think that one of the important concepts we have to understand is that the African asylum countries are also donors. For example, at Mishamo in Tanzania, the government of Tanzania has made available to refugees an area of land bigger than the state of Rhode Island. The government of Tanzania has also given citizenship to refugees who settle there. When governments are prepared to do that, we are ready to make the adjustments in our program to establish agricultural settlements. In a number of countries such as Tanzania and Zambia, that has been possible. We are also hoping to be able to do some of that in Somalia, because the Somali government has now told us that it is prepared to let some refugees settle there permanently if they wish.

AFRICA REPORT: There have been similar programs, have there not, in Sudan? Of the half million refugees in Sudan, how many would you say are self-supporting at this point?

SMYSER: It is very difficult for me to say right now, because the figure has been changing recently. Altogether there are probably 200,000 who are economically self-supporting. Many of them are in eastern Sudan, near the border with Ethiopia. They have moved into the cities and found jobs. Quite a few of them also are in southern Sudan, where there are a number of agricultural settlement projects. Now some of those have recently been upset by new influxes, and that is why it is difficult for me to give specific figures. But local integration has worked. In essence, a number of refugees have settled in Sudan and we suspect they will probably stay there.

AFRICA REPORT: Next July, the United Nations, UNHCR, and the Organization of African Unity are co-sponsoring the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa [ICARA II]. Why is the conference being held?

SMYSER: It has several motivations. One is to try to remind the world that there still are refugees in Africa. People have not seen them much on their television screens recently, but they are still there, and they are still in need of assistance. Another objective is to focus on something I mentioned before, the fact that the countries of asylum are often desperately poor, with very low levels of development, and we must try to encourage the so-called donor countries—the nations of the West—to contribute funds to help African countries overcome the impact on their development caused by the presence of refugees.

AFRICA REPORT: This is the second such conference. The developmental dimension of the refugee problem was not given much attention at ICARA I in 1981. Why has this now come to the fore?

SMYSER: At the 1981 conference, the great concern was to try to provide relief to the refugees who had recently fled, for example, from the Ogaden into Somalia, or into Sudan and several other areas. In that case, there was a great focus on relief, which was good. A lot of money was raised—over

half a billion dollars, which is a fantastic amount of money. But now we have also noted that while the international community could help the refugees, the countries of asylum were often severely affected. That is why we want to take a look at that particular problem at ICARA II, to see if, along with relief for the refugees, there is some way of improving the situation faced by the host countries.

AFRICA REPORT: How serious would you estimate the economic losses incurred by host governments in host populations that have had to cope with very large refugee influxes?

SMYSER: It is very difficult to put a precise number on this. Let's take eastern Sudan as an example. Refugees come in. They need firewood. So in an area that at one time was fairly green, there is not a bush left. It wasn't very green, but there was vegetation there. Now all the vegetation has gone. The refugees also compete for the scarce water. Wells have to be sunk. If they find jobs locally, the refugees tend to depress wages. Relief goods for refugees tend to clog up existing transport systems. It is very hard to put a figure on the overall economic cost, but we know the kinds of problems caused and so we will try to deal with them.

AFRICA REPORT: What scale of aid are you hoping to mobilize at ICARA II?

SMYSER: Right now there are a series of technical teams visiting Africa to look specifically at needs and possible programs. We will be talking about several hundreds of millions of dollars again, but I cannot give you an order of magnitude right now because it depends on what these teams find out and what it is that will ultimately be disbursed.

AFRICA REPORT: But will a very substantial proportion of the projects, and the funds for them, be to meet various economic and infrastructural requirements faced by the host countries? Will this be the conference's principal emphasis?

SMYSER: That's right. It will be the emphasis in terms of the concepts of the conference, because it will be that part of the assistance that will be a new effort. Of course, we also hope that the conference will produce some continued assistance for relief of the refugees, and, as I said earlier, we will hope to call attention to the problem, but basically an important and the single new element of this conference will be to look at economic development assistance.

AFRICA REPORT: Does this imply much more coordination between UNHCR and the United Nations Development Program [UNDP] than hitherto?

SMYSER: Clearly. In fact, UNDP has been invited to sit on the steering committee of ICARA II largely to make sure that this coordination begins at an early phase. It won't just be UNDP. There will be lots of agencies involved. There will have to be much clearer coordination than there has been in the past.

AFRICA REPORT: Turning to a very different matter, the safeguarding of refugees under the threat of attack, as in Angola, Lesotho, and Mozambique where refugees have been killed in South African raids, what measures could be taken to protect them?

SMYSER: We have looked at this problem in our executive committee for the past two years, and as a result the high commissioner asked Ambassador Felix Schnyder of Switzerland, a former high commissioner, to examine this. He has produced a report. It has not yet been officially approved by the executive committee, but some of the ideas he suggested were the moving of the camps farther away from the border and their demarcation to provide an additional deterrent effect.

AFRICA REPORT: In some African countries, there are enormous numbers of internally displaced persons. Often they are in a position similar to refugees. They have fled strife or civil war and have been forced to leave their homes. Though they have remained within their own country, they have still had to take refuge. Why is UNHCR unable to tackle their plight? Why does it aid only those forced to flee across international frontiers?

SMYSER: The main reason is that it is not part of our mandate. The commissioner has a very specific mandate, which enjoins him to assist refugees as universally defined—namely, persons who have had to cross an international frontier for fear of persecution or, in the case of Africa, to escape conflict, whether it be civil war, aggression, revolution, or whatever. That is a very specific mandate. It is a very important one, and it is not an easy one. The high commissioner believes that that is his job. We can only do it well if he concentrates on it. We are not the only agency in the world that takes care of the people. There is the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator, the International Red Cross, and the World Food Program. There are many other agencies that can assist in the case of displaced persons, and we think they do it pretty well.

AFRICA REPORT: Permanent solutions to the refugee problems in Africa will be impossible without resolving the underlying political conflicts that give rise to the movement of refugees. Are you hopeful that these conflicts will be successfully tackled, or is Africa going to face a huge refugee problem for years to come?

SMYSER: We try very hard not to predict catastrophe. Anybody who has looked at the history of the world over the past few decades, or for that matter the past millennia, cannot be entirely optimistic that we are going to move into an era of imminent peace and stability. I think we have to continue to be ready. Solutions have been found to some conflicts, and we keep hoping that others will be resolved too. People get tired of wars. But our attitude is that until a solution is found, we will do our best to take care of the people who need it.

AFRICA REPORT: UNHCR itself cannot help resolve the underlying political problems?

SMYSER: No, we can't. Essentially what we try to do is to take care of the effects. There are all kinds of institutions in Africa, including the Organization of African Unity and of course the United Nations, which work hard at trying to resolve the political problems. I don't think we could do it better. We'll take care of our responsibility and we hope that they can take care of theirs. □

Few Safe Havens for Apartheid's Exiles

BY JOE MOLEFI

The destabilization of the southern African region through South Africa's military attacks, its support for antigovernment guerrilla movements, and its application of selective sanctions against these countries for their acceptance of political refugees from the apartheid system vividly underscore the continuing challenge the refugee problem poses for the host countries and the international community as a whole. The South African government claims that its neighboring states harbor "terrorists" of the liberation movements, the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), who allegedly use these territories as launching pads for attacks inside South Africa.

The governments of the neighboring countries have declared from time to

Joe Molefi is a political refugee from South Africa who fled to Lesotho in 1961 after having been acquitted, along with 155 others, of charges of high treason. As a journalist, he has reported on events in Lesotho for the local and international press and radio. He is now in charge of the public relations and information department of the Lesotho National Development Corporation, the Lesotho government's industrial development arm.

time that political refugees are granted asylum in their countries on the understanding that they abide by the laws of the countries and conditions of their asylum, including a pledge not to engage in any subversive activities against their country of origin.

Over the years, there has been a steady, continuing influx into neighboring countries of political refugees from South Africa, most of whom have been members of either the ANC or PAC, whereas others have been drawn from the black consciousness movement and the Non-European Movement. Following the riots that shook South Africa in the black township of Soweto and other main centers in 1976-77, a new group of refugees composed of young students began to flow into the neighboring countries.

The presence of South African and Namibian political refugees in the host countries in southern Africa has been a thorny question over the years, and South Africa, with its military and economic power, has always been prepared to coerce its neighbors to bow to its demands on the refugee issue. This coercion has led to the destabilization of the governments and populations of these countries in the political and economic fields in order to erode their determination to accept the political

exiles. Some of the tragic examples of South Africa's efforts to deter these countries from providing asylum to refugees have been the brutal attacks by the South African Defense Force (SADF) on the homes of ANC refugees in Maseru, Lesotho, and in Maputo, Mozambique, and the carnage at Kassinga, Angola, in 1978, when 600 refugees from Namibia were massacred and 400 wounded.

The destabilization controversy is perhaps one of the most debated issues in the politics of southern Africa today and must be seen against the background of strained relations between South Africa and the independent states of the region. In an article entitled "The Destabilization Controversy: An Analysis of a High-Risk Foreign Policy Option for South Africa," Deon Geldenhuys, a South African academic at the Rand Afrikaans University, said that the neighboring countries of Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe perceive themselves as the South Africans' primary targets for destabilization.

Geldenhuys describes destabilization as an interstate confrontation analagous to two boxers in a ring. Boxer *D* (destabilizer) intends to land punches that will do more than hurt *T* (target) momentarily; *D* is determined to fight *T* to the limits of the latter's

capacity to absorb punishment. At that point, *T* drastically changes his style, or throws in the towel, or risks getting knocked out by *D*. This description can be applied to South Africa's actions against those neighboring states that maintain that they are the victims of Pretoria's destabilization attempts.

According to Geldenhuys, the South African government is greatly preoccupied with what it terms "a total onslaught" by Marxist forces, who are seen to have established footholds already in Angola and Mozambique. South Africa fears that a belt of Marxist states stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian oceans will be formed, thus presenting a grave danger to the security of the republic. Part and parcel of the perceived total onslaught is what South Africa sees as the Marxist-inspired terrorism of SWAPO and the ANC. South Africa is not willing to countenance guerrilla presence in neighboring black states — hence the repeated SADF military attacks on SWAPO positions inside Angola and the raids on ANC refugee homes in Maputo and Maseru.

South Africa's means of destabilizing Lesotho has been the "carrot and stick" approach, with the purpose of undermining its sovereignty and forcing it to recognize apartheid through acceptance of Pretoria's bantustan satellite states. On December 9, 1982, the SADF attacked Maseru with guns and mortars, killing 30 ANC refugees and 12 Lesotho nationals in their sleep in what the South African government described as "a preemptive strike against ANC terrorist bases." The Lesotho government denied the existence of ANC terrorist bases in Maseru and challenged the South African government to substantiate its claims.

In spite of Lesotho's assertion, South Africa subsequently demanded the expulsion of 68 refugees from Lesotho because they posed "a security threat against South Africa." The Lesotho government later found that 21 of the names of the refugees on the list were persons who had never set foot on Lesotho soil. The removal of some ANC refugees from Lesotho and their resettlement elsewhere was the price for the normalization of the strained relations with South Africa. After the

SADF raid on Maseru in December 1982, more than 100 ANC refugees left Lesotho for Mozambique and were later moved to Zambia, Angola, and Tanzania.

Apart from the threat of South African military attack, Lesotho also finds itself strangled by South Africa's application of economic leverage because of the mountain kingdom's poverty and economic vulnerability. A landlocked nation completely surrounded by South Africa, Lesotho is heavily dependent on its powerful neighbor for remittances from Lesotho nationals who work as migrant laborers in South African mines and industries. The remittances from mine laborers alone contribute about 45 percent of Lesotho's gross domestic product. More than 60 percent of its revenue is from its share of the customs pool in the Southern African Customs Union with South Africa, Botswana, and Swaziland.

A further economic constraint on Lesotho is its current account balance of payments deficit vis-à-vis South Africa — in 1983, \$360 million — which was only offset by the capital transfers into Lesotho by its migrant workers in South African mines and industries and by aid from donor countries and international agencies. Other pressures South Africa exerted on Lesotho in 1983 were the embargo of defensive weapons destined for the country when they reached South African harbors in

transit and the restriction of the movement of Lesotho citizens and goods at the border posts between the two countries.

Further, these acts of destabilization against Lesotho have taken place against the background of a campaign of violence by insurgents of the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), the military wing of the exiled opposition Basutoland Congress Party, who are believed to be harbored, trained, and given logistical support by the SADF to launch attacks against the country from South African farms in the Orange Free State. South Africa moved elements of the LLA insurgents to the bantustan territory of Transkei with the purpose of maintaining pressure on Lesotho while refusing to accept liability in terms of the territorial origin of the aggression.

The Lesotho government has accused South Africa of harboring, training, and supplying the LLA with arms in an attempt to overthrow the government of Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan. In a series of diplomatic notes exchanged between Maseru and Pretoria over LLA activities emanating from South African territory, Pretoria admitted that the insurgent group was using South Africa as a base for its attacks. Lesotho, on the other hand, maintained that South Africa was violating international law, which prohibits a country from allowing its territory to be used for attacks against






Photo: UNHCR/M. Vanappelghem

Maputo, Mozambique home bombed by South Africa in 1982: Pretoria hopes to coerce Mozambique to expel South African refugees

another by internal opposition. "How else can South Africa's tolerance of the LLA be interpreted as anything but destabilization?" the Lesotho government asked Pretoria. Relations between the two countries improved somewhat after South Africa's recent arrest of eight suspected LLA members and after an agreement reached earlier in the year that neither country would allow its territory to be used for cross-border strikes.

Although South Africa's destabilization of the southern African region has taken different forms, the ostensible objective of these increasing acts of violence has been to rid these countries of guerrillas of the ANC, PAC, and SWAPO, thereby depriving them of bases within striking distance of South Africa. In Mozambique, 12 political refugees were killed and seven injured when South African commandos raided the Maputo suburbs of Matola on January 30, 1981. And in a South African military incursion at Porto do Ouro, a tourist resort situated about one and a half miles from the South African border, one Mozambican and two South African soldiers were killed. In May last year, three Mozambican nationals were killed in Matola when in a 15-minute air raid two South African jets fired rockets into the jam factory in which the Mozambicans were working. The jets also bombed the home of an ANC member and attacked the house of

a Mozambican advertising agency director only minutes after the man and his wife had left. Fourteen houses were attacked in the air raid.

Although the ANC had reportedly operated out of Maputo in the past, the reckless attack on the city, in which innocent Mozambicans were killed and wounded and property was destroyed, coupled with Pretoria's support for the dissident Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), suggests that the South African government's intentions are to coerce the Mozambican authorities to expel South African refugees, as well as to attempt to undermine the government of Samora Machel.

Mozambique's secretary of state for foreign affairs, Aleriano Ferrao, told a United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) fact-finding mission of journalists in September that despite these attacks, his government had adopted "a humanitarian approach by accepting South African refugees" and could not "return them to South Africa." "Instead, we will accept them and give them effective asylum," he said.

The Mozambican government's approach to the refugee problem is based on security considerations stemming from the country's geopolitical position and the deteriorating relations with South Africa, as well as on the government's determination to lend material,

political, and diplomatic support to the southern African liberation movements. The refugee problem is seen as part of the struggle for the liberation of the people of the region. After the mid-1983 SADF attacks on Maputo, the Mozambican government decided for security reasons to relocate South African refugees at centers away from the capital. New refugee centers have been established in Nampula province and Nacaros. However, the constraints on Mozambique's ability to meet refugee protection needs and related welfare requirements must be seen in the context not only of South Africa's military attacks, but also of Mozambique's longstanding economic dependence on South Africa. More than half a million Mozambicans are employed on South African farms and in its mines and industries, and about 50 percent of Maputo's foreign trade is with South Africa.

In Angola, South African destabilization measures include military support for the antigovernment UNITA rebels with the intention of undermining the country's economy and crippling the government of President José Eduardo dos Santos. Apart from South African military operations on Angolan territory against SWAPO guerrillas, South African incursions into the country are also aimed at coercing dos Santos to come to terms with Jonas Savimbi of UNITA. The Angolan foreign minister, Paulo Jorge, dashed any suggestion of negotiations with the rebels when he told visiting international journalists in September that the MPLA government "has no room for contact or reconciliation with a group of traitors and counterrevolutionaries."

Although Namibian independence appears an unlikely prospect in the near future, stalemated over Pretoria's demands for the withdrawal of some 20,000 to 30,000 Cubans as a precondition for the removal of South African troops from Angola, the frustrations of life in Angolan refugee camps for more than 70,000 Namibian refugees have been channeled into hopes for the future through self-help efforts undertaken under the guidance of SWAPO in partnership with UNHCR and the Angolan government. The official estimate of the number of refugees in An-

gola increased during 1982, bringing the total to some 96,200, partly owing to the arrival of about 600 South African refugees, increasing their total number to 6,500. The government of Angola also reassessed the number of Zairian refugees in the country to 20,000, including some 2,000 cases not previously assisted by UNHCR. However, the largest group of refugees in Angola is Namibian, whose number has stabilized at about 70,000. Refugees in Angola are primarily situated in Kwanza-Sul province, where 40,000 Namibians are accommodated; in rural settlements in the country's central and northeastern areas, which accommodate 18,000 Zairian refugees; and in the urban areas of Luanda and Benguela, with 6,500 South African refugees.

In cooperation with the Angolan government, UNHCR has adopted a new approach for the 1983 and 1984 programs of assistance to refugees, one aimed at reducing the dependence of refugees on relief by giving priority to improving their standards of living through medium-term projects. Self-help projects to provide shelter have been planned; and in the health, education, and community development areas, infrastructural projects have been organized at the new settlement sites made available by the Angolan government.

Assistance to South African refugees has been directed at improving agricultural production on the 14,820 acres of land made available to the ANC by the government in the province of Malange. It is hoped that the produce from this farm will eventually meet the food requirements of all South African refugees in Angola.

The Luanda government is also faced with the problem of integrating and rehabilitating returnees from Zaire in the province of Uige and meeting the relief needs of persons displaced from the provinces in the south of the country to the central plateau regions. UNHCR, with funds from its special programs, is contributing to projects for the benefit of both groups.

The implementation of UNHCR projects for Namibians and South Africans is entrusted to the respective liberation movements, SWAPO and the ANC. UNHCR hopes to improve the

planning and evaluation of projects in the construction sector by making available the necessary technical expertise to advise its implementing partners.

As refugee host countries, Angola, Lesotho, and Mozambique have borne a heavy burden. Refugees have become destabilizing factors vis-à-vis these countries' infrastructures, since the local populations share their land, food, shelter, and all other essentials. The host countries have had to divert huge resources toward national security as well as toward the implementation of special refugee assistance programs.

These southern African countries, despite the dangers of South African destabilization, have rededicated themselves to continue acting as hosts to the large numbers of refugees who have fled from persecution in their countries of origin. They will, however, find it impossible to continue with their humanitarian work unless they are assured of support and encouragement from the international community. It is hoped that the second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II), to be held in Geneva in July 1984, will find durable solutions to the problems created in host countries with large refugee populations.

Against the background of South Africa's destabilization of the southern African region, Lesotho's foreign minister, Evaristus Sekhonyana, has raised the idea of a regional security conference on refugees, which may

provide some guidelines toward the solution of these burning problems. Addressing an international workshop entitled "Development and Destabilization in Southern Africa" at the National University of Lesotho last October, Sekhonyana said that although the Organization of African Unity had repeatedly taken a strong position calling on member states to support and assist refugees from the apartheid system, the refugee issue could not be divorced from the security situation in southern Africa as a whole.

"What can be done to halt the pursuit of the victims of apartheid into their first country of refuge, or into their second or even third country of refuge?" Sekhonyana asked. The presidents of the Frontline states should take joint actions on this regional problem, lest it result in further threats to the security of the other countries in the region. The Palme Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (1980-82), among its various recommendations, called for periodic or ad hoc regional conferences on security and cooperation similar to the conference launched in Helsinki for Europe in 1975. Such a conference could be held in the near future in Maseru to discuss the entire southern African region. And despite South Africa's increasing volume of acts of violence against its neighbors, UNHCR and the OAU could act as catalysts to facilitate the intervention of the international community in the plight of southern Africa's refugees. □



Some of the 40,000 Namibians in Angola's Kwanza-Sul province: Angola and UNHCR are trying to reduce their dependence on relief via self-help projects

Photo: UNHCR/M. Vanappelghem

American Policy and African Refugees

BY TED WEISS

Warfare, drought, and persecution have forced several million Africans to flee from their native lands and have displaced perhaps a million more internally. Host countries usually receive the strangers with extraordinary hospitality rooted deep in African tradition, but their resources are severely limited. Staggering in its magnitude, the refugee problem in Africa is an international responsibility.

In recent years, the United States has carried one-third of the financial burden for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Additional aid is provided through U.S. programs in the Agency for International Development and the State Department. At the same time, however, two major components of the Reagan administration's policy toward Africa contribute to the very conditions that have created the refugee problem.

First, the policy of "constructive engagement," or closer cooperation with South Africa, implies tacit approval of a system of brutal repression that has sent thousands of refugees fleeing from South Africa and Namibia into the surrounding states. Second, this administration is increasing the proportion of funding for military and security purposes in our overall package of assistance to Africa, thus fostering the strife and violence that uproots families and communities. In President Reagan's view, the world is locked in a bitter East-West struggle, an outlook that motivates his foreign policy in Africa as in the rest of the world.

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THE REFUGEES OF APARTHEID

Under the Reagan administration, the United States has strengthened its ties with the ruling regime in South Africa, which it views as a bastion against alleged communist encroachment in the region. The administration claims that the Soviets and their allies are a primary cause of instability there and that a major U.S. objective is to frustrate these activities. Overlooked and virtually ignored under official U.S. policy is the true cause of the regional turmoil. It is institutionally entrenched racism—not communism, socialism, or any particular political philosophy—that perpetuates the misery of the nonwhite majority in South Africa.

Angola is one of the region's refugee-accepting nations. Mass arrest, imprisonment, and torture at the hands of the South African military have forced an estimated 70,000 Namibians to escape to refugee camps in Angola. Even after flight, they continue to live in fear of persecution or mass attack. South Africa's military raids have violated international standards of civilized conduct, wreaking destruction and death in the camps.

Lesotho also provides a haven for refugees, sheltering some 11,000 South Africans who have escaped intolerable conditions in their native land. South Africa has applied strong-arm tactics against this tiny, land-locked nation in an effort to force the termination of its role as a sanctuary. In December 1982, refugee homes in Maseru were attacked. More recently, borders have been closed, interfering with the import of staple goods as well as workers' daily commutes to the mines of South Africa. Other nations in the region that receive South African refugees, including Swaziland, Zambia, Botswana, and Tanzania, are subjected to South Africa's pressure as well.

South Africa itself harbors more than two million refugees—those blacks who have been stripped of their citizenship and forcibly relocated in desolate "homelands." This number will grow as long as South Africa continues to pursue its goal of denationalizing its black citizenry.

Compassion for these victims and outrage at South Africa's persistent violations of human and political rights should be sufficient cause for the U.S. to abandon "constructive engagement." Moreover, the policy has utterly failed to achieve its intentions. Since it was initiated, persecution of blacks in South Africa has actually intensified, and Namibia is no closer to independence now than it was in the late 1970s.

The damage that the policy has wrought in our relationship with black Africa is incalculable. In their media and in world forums, including the United Nations, black African leaders have condemned the Reagan policy. Most of them are convinced that "constructive engagement" is intended chiefly to protect U.S. economic interests in South Africa and that the administration cares little about majority rule in South Africa or Namibia.

REFUGEES OF WAR

Elsewhere on the continent, the American policy of escalating militarization undermines the goals of our refugee assistance. The increase in U.S. military and security aid has been dramatic, especially to the nations in and near the Horn of Africa. Between 1981 and 1982, security aid to Sudan rose by 104 percent; to Somalia by 122 percent; and to Kenya by 264 percent. The estimated 1983 and proposed 1984 levels for these three nations show smaller increases, but they are still greater than those for development aid.

This is the same region that has the greatest refugee problem. UNHCR reports 700,000 refugees in Somalia, nearly 80 percent of whom are women and children. Most came from Ethiopia in the late 1970s. Sudan meanwhile is host to an additional 665,000 refugees, the majority of whom are also Ethiopian. Somalia and Ethiopia rank among the lowest nations in the world in per capita income. Their factional rivalries are among the most bitter on the continent.

Heavy military aid to such nations contributes to the tensions and violence that create masses of refugees and displaced persons. U.S. security and military assistance may be intended to strengthen them so they can better serve our strategic interests in the Horn, but it actually exacerbates internal problems that are disruptive to their security. Inevitably, the arms are used by the controlling group to maintain or broaden its power base. The opposing groups seek assistance from other sources, thus drawing both sides into the superpower struggle.

Furthermore, militarization of developing nations drains the scarce resources available for roads, bridges, water systems, food-storage capacity, and other urgent needs that would help ease the plight of refugees as well as of the rest of the populace. American military aid to these nations may seem minuscule in the context of our own huge defense budget, but it assumes a disproportionate importance within the budget of a small developing country. It is sufficiently influential, in fact, to distort priorities and change policy directions. The significance of other objectives, such as improvement of agriculture or social ser-


vices, diminishes, while the armed services achieve pre-eminence.

MEETING REAL NEEDS

Our policies suffer from an inherent contradiction and are at odds with the real needs of the continent. Africans have priorities other than participating in the Soviet-American power struggle. They know that the black majority in South Africa will eventually achieve self-determination. They know that the instability in the Horn is rooted in age-old rivalries, not in the superpower competition.

Finally, they understand the real needs of their nations—negotiated solutions to factional and territorial disputes, strong international cooperation in the effort for long-term development, and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons.

It is imperative that we reconcile the divergent elements in U.S. policy toward Africa and open our eyes to the damage that we may be causing. The needs of the continent are monumental and compelling. It is urgent that we develop a policy that transcends East/West interests and seeks what is best for the African nations themselves. I believe we would find such a policy to be the best bulwark against the spread of repression and instability. In the long run, we would discover such a policy to be in our own best interests as well. □



Angolan refugees in Zambia: "Africa's refugee problem is an international responsibility"

Photo: UNHCR/M. Vanappelghem

Resettlement and Repatriation in the Horn

BY MICHEL S. BARTON

Ethiopia is in many ways unique among African states. Because of the geographical isolation of the former Amhara kingdom, upon which the modern state is built, Ethiopia shares little of the history or culture of its neighbors. Nor does it share the experience of colonial domination that has been the cause of many of modern Africa's problems. But however unique its experience, Ethiopia has not been able to avoid the turmoil that has been a dominant feature of recent African history. Nowhere else, perhaps, have man-made and natural disasters combined so effectively to spread hunger, misery, and death.

It is impossible to state precisely how many Ethiopians continue to be affected by the twin scourges of drought and warfare. In the Ogaden, and in the regions of Tigre, Eritrea, Gondar, and Wollo — which together constitute roughly half of the country — as many as five million persons might be affected. Some have been displaced just a few or a few dozen miles from their homes, whereas others have fled across

borders to become refugees in the internationally accepted sense of the term. An estimated 1.2 million Ethiopian refugees now receive direct or indirect assistance from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in the neighboring states of Somalia, Sudan, and Djibouti. Untold others form a diaspora spreading from Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf to Italy, Northern Europe, and North America. How many have been "internally displaced" is a matter for conjecture, but an estimate of three million would not be excessive. No more than one-third of these refugees are receiving any form of international assistance, while others remain in remote and dangerous areas beyond the reach of relief assistance.

The problem is not new. The war in Eritrea is the longest one in recent African history. Nowhere else in this century, except in Vietnam, has war been fought for as long as it has here. Whether it can last much longer is a question that cannot be answered. The misery inflicted on civilian populations for the last 22 years appears completely disproportionate, whatever the objectives pursued. And according to what they say, both the Ethiopian government and the rebels are prepared to fight for years — "for centuries," in the words of one government official — in the name of independence, of territorial integrity, and of historical responsibility. In the Ogaden, the absence of a po-

litical settlement means that renewed fighting remains only a misjudgment or a provocation away.

How, in the face of such intractable political struggles, can strictly humanitarian objectives be attained? In the specific case of refugees under the care of UNHCR, what durable solutions can be envisaged? The answer is, and will continue for some time to be, a combination of three solutions: local settlement in the country of asylum, resettlement abroad, and voluntary repatriation. All three are being pursued together.

Among these options, resettlement is the least significant in terms of numbers, though not the least controversial.

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Many observers believe that selection for resettlement almost invariably focuses on persons whose skills and education are vital to their own community, leading to a form of "brain drain." This is a serious concern that deserves more careful attention than it has thus far received. Critics, however, should not underestimate the need for resettlement opportunities in cases in which personal security or family reunification is concerned.

In Somalia and in Sudan, possibilities of local settlement and integration exist and are being actively pursued. Hundreds of thousands of Ethiopian refugees have, through their family or tribal connections, but also thanks to their skills and energy, managed to integrate spontaneously. This is fortunate in the sense that refugee camps are numerous enough as it is, but it is not a situation to be complacent about. Experience has shown that pockets of extreme poverty are often part of unassisted settlement patterns. They place a burden, furthermore, on the economy of the host region, which, though difficult to quantify, obviously produces heavy pressures on housing, prices, medical and education services, and communications and transportation. These effects on host economies will be discussed during the second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II), to be held next July.

In early 1983, the Somali government informed UNHCR of its intention to allow refugees who do not wish to repatriate voluntarily to be integrated locally in rural settlement schemes. This might offer a solution to many of the refugees who crowd the 35 established camps in Somalia. But it will take time. Hydrological and geophysical studies are now being undertaken, and it will not be until late in 1984 that the first medium-sized settlements will come into being.

In eastern Sudan, organized settlements for refugees have existed for nearly 15 years. Today, 25 of them accommodate some 110,000 of Sudan's officially estimated 450,000 Ethiopian refugees. Among them, approximately half live as farmers on land that has been allocated to them by the government and on which they can raise

rain-fed crops — sorghum primarily, and in some instances sesame. These land settlements have been relatively successful, and the majority of refugees on them can be considered more or less self-sufficient. The margin, however, is very narrow. None of these settlements could survive a bad harvest without an immediate and significant infusion of food aid.

Over 50,000 Ethiopian refugees in Sudan live in semiurban or wage-earning settlements without land. They seek jobs in the cities — usually in restaurants and warehouses, and occasionally in construction — or on larger mechanized and irrigated farming developments that offer seasonal employment. They form a migrant labor force whose fortunes rise and fall depending on the timing and volume of rains. The partial drought from which eastern Sudan has suffered during the past two years has hit them severely.

There has been a mixed record, therefore, for local settlement. Improvement and expansion are, however, possible, and considerable resources are being applied to that end. As has been the case in recent years, Somalia and Sudan will receive by far the largest share of UNHCR expenditures in Africa, or nearly one-fifth of the budget recently approved by UNHCR's executive committee for operations around the world in 1984.

How much longer this aid will be required will increasingly depend on the numbers availing themselves of the opportunity to return home. In 1982, UNHCR launched a \$20 million program for assistance to returnees in Ethiopia. It involves the distribution of food rations and basic household goods to returnees from abroad or internally displaced persons who register at one of 25 reception centers spread throughout the Hararge region and Eritrea. Tens of thousands of individuals and families, most of them completely destitute, have so far received sacks of corn, blankets, cooking utensils, and a medical once-over before being offered transportation to their town or village of origin.

The returnee program also includes a rehabilitation component consisting primarily of three rural settlement projects at Aliguidir in Eritrea and at Kelafo and Mustahil in the Ogaden. There is also a modest project for fishermen in the city of Massawa (Eritrea) and on the Dahlak Islands in the Red Sea. These have been slow in getting off the ground, in part because of delays experienced as a result of temporary disagreements over the equipment required and the inevitable transportation bottlenecks common to the region.

A more immediately rewarding chapter of the program has been the



Food distribution for Ethiopian refugees at Tawawa camp in Sudan: There are 25 organized refugee settlements in eastern Sudan

Photo: UNHCR/M. Hutchinson

distribution of "self-sufficiency" packages aimed at allowing returnees to resume their former ways of life; these packages include seeds and tools for agriculturalists, and cattle and goats for pastoralists. A single cow and a combination of 10 goats and sheep is enough for a nomadic family to get started again. In Hararghe, the program is beginning to succeed.

In June 1983, UNHCR launched a separate appeal for \$8.2 million to fi-

nance the voluntary repatriation of Ethiopian refugees in Djibouti. This program is distinct from the one covering returnees in that it involves the identification by UNHCR of candidates for voluntary repatriation among the refugees in Djibouti. The program will supply them with transportation back to their homes and will include aid aimed at making them rapidly self-sufficient. Action was initiated following both the extension of an amnesty law enacted by

Ethiopia in 1980 to cover refugees in Djibouti and formal assurances given to the government of Djibouti and to UNHCR that the refugees would be allowed to return home unmolested and that they would receive assistance under the supervision of UNHCR officers.

The first repatriation took place on September 19, 1983, and involved the return of 171 persons to the village of Adigala, 60 miles from the border along the railway line built by the French three generations ago. A happy moment, witnessed by two dozen journalists, but an event surrounded by unusually intense polemics. Several individuals and private agencies had over the preceding weeks warned publicly against abetting the return of refugees to Ethiopia lest they face retribution. One agency went so far as to accuse UNHCR of perpetrating something it called "ethnocide," an altogether baffling charge when one considers that the ethnic composition of the area is identical on both sides of the border.

As of early November, more than 1,500 persons had left Djibouti's refugee camps and returned to their homes in Ethiopia. Heads of families representing 3,000 more had signed UNHCR voluntary repatriation forms and were awaiting departure, which was to take place as soon as preparations to receive them in their respective villages were completed. More journalists and diplomats were scheduled to visit refugees and returnees on both sides of the border, and some planned to ride the trains back with them.

To some distant observers, the notion that persons might be voluntarily returning to Ethiopia while others are leaving it appears to be a contradiction. It is not. Of the millions of Ethiopians displaced by violence and disaster over the past 20 years, the overwhelming majority have had to struggle on their own. This has meant — and it continues to mean — moving back and forth away from the shifting theaters of war, away from hunger, away also from the despair of exile. What pushes and pulls them has very little to do with the abstractions in the name of which so many have died. In the face of it all, they are determined to live and to hope. □



Photo: UNHCR/M. Hutchinson

September 1983: Part of the first group of Ethiopian refugees to return home from Djibouti under the UNHCR voluntary repatriation program

Britain and France criticize U.S. stand on Namibia 'linkage'

Britain and France, two of the five members of the Western contact group which is trying to negotiate independence for Namibia, have publicly criticized U.S. backing of South Africa's position of linking the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia to the removal of Cuban troops from Angola.

In a tough speech on South Africa, prior to the Commonwealth conference in India in November, British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe stated: "The continued presence of South African troops in Angola, and armed conflict there, make the withdrawal of Cuban troops more difficult. I therefore urge the South Africans to pull back their forces from southern Angola as a vital step."

Howe's deputy for Africa, Malcolm Rifkind, on a trip to South Africa, said the Cuban withdrawal should not be a precondition for a Namibian settlement, although the British government favored the pullout of all foreign troops, South African and Cuban, from Angola in order to reduce tension in the area.

Howe said of Namibia: "A settlement which enables the people of Namibia freely and without external interference to determine their own future would be clearly in Western interests. It would reduce, not increase, the opportunities for external meddling and for further violence. It could help promote the removal of the Cubans from Angola."

At the Commonwealth conference, the 15 African leaders there urged British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to use her influence with the Reagan administration to try to get the linkage issue dropped. She was reported to have told the Africans that merely denouncing linkage would not accomplish anything, but that constructive efforts

were needed to break the impasse.

Subsequently, the Commonwealth leaders agreed to step up diplomatic efforts on Namibia, to have Britain and Canada, another contact group member, attempt to persuade the U.S. to change its policy, and to try to get the American people to back Namibian independence in an effort to start the negotiations moving again.

U.S. dismisses criticism

Discussing the Commonwealth criticism of the linkage issue, Chester Crocker, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, called the Commonwealth a "kind of gentleman's version of the [UN] General Assembly." "If the Com-

monwealth has a solution to the Namibian problem, let them do it."

"We have the whole package on the table with everything on it but the ribbon," the Assistant Secretary said. The ribbon, presumably, would be the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Crocker was confident that an agreement would be reached as soon as the Cuban issue was settled. "There are no more Namibian issues left to be resolved," he said. He also predicted that the other members of the contact group would join the U.S. when the agreement was reached.

In light of Crocker's optimism, the criticism which came from France a few days later must be

Continued on next page

Disturbances cast doubt on Doe's pledge to return Liberia to civilian rule by 1985

A coup attempt involving several members of the People's Redemption Council (PRC) was foiled in late November. Liberian Head of State Samuel Doe announced on Monrovia Radio that an army officer, Capt. Johnny Herring, had revealed that leading officers of the PRC, as well as corporate officials and at least one cabinet member, were planning a coup. Doe also quoted Herring as saying that a foreign embassy was aware of the plot and had promised money and arms. He did not name the embassy. However, a day later, the Liberian government declared as *personae non gratae* the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Ulanov, and Ghanaian chargé d'affaires Peter Sackey, for "activities incompatible with their diplomatic status."

Shortly thereafter, at least five people were shot dead in Yakepa in Upper Nimba county, near the Guinean border. The PRC linked the shooting incident—described in one report as executed by "an uni-

dentified gunman," and in another report as caused by "a group of armed elements"—to Brig. Gen. Thomas Quiwonkpa, former head of the Liberian armed forces. Quiwonkpa was named specifically by the government as ringleader of the coup plot.

In a possibly related and thus far unexplained incident, the former director of staff of the armed forces, Brig. Gen. Robert Sey, was first dismissed for "holding secret meetings" and then, a few weeks later, was shot and killed at Quiwonkpa's farm in Nimba. Monrovia radio claimed that Sey was shot by Quiwonkpa's bodyguard "while Quiwonkpa and his troops" were waiting to meet him. The broadcast did not explain why Quiwonkpa's bodyguard would shoot someone waiting to meet his employer, nor did it explain how Quiwonkpa could be commanding troops after his dismissal from the army.

The latest troubles reflect the
Continued on p. 25

Linkage *continued*

seen as a serious setback for U.S. policy.

Confusion over French statement

Speaking before the National Assembly in early December, French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson said that the contact group "is no longer serving any useful purpose."

"The French position regarding the implementation of the UN Security Council resolution is very clear. We wish that the resolution should be implemented as soon as possible. We do not accept any precondition. This is consistent with our general policy of denouncing foreign forces in whatever country, and there are South African foreign forces in Namibia."

The French have long been frus-

trated with U.S. and South African insistence on linkage. The French statement, therefore, comes as no surprise, and it is clearly aimed at exhorting the U.S. to alter its position on linkage.

In his statement, Cheysson described the U.S.-South African position as "unacceptable maneuvers attempting to link Namibian independence to problems in third countries." He said the contact group had "completed its mission" during 1982 by preparing the conditions for the implementation of UN resolution 435, which calls for Namibia's independence. He added that the contact group should "be disbanded because it has no willpower to honestly exercise the mandate that was conferred on it."

Most observers interpreted Cheysson's statements to mean that France was pulling out of the con-

tact group, and several newspapers reported that France had indeed withdrawn. The U.S. State Department quickly issued a statement saying, "We have received assurances from the French government that it is neither withdrawn from the contact group nor calling for the breakup of the contact group." Cheysson later clarified his statement, saying, "We are not leaving the contact group." He then added, "If there was to be a meeting of the group we would not, given the present circumstances, have the intention of attending."

France's deputy director for African affairs reportedly commented that France would willingly participate in "genuine efforts" aimed at implementing resolution 435. "France will not be party to a group used as a cover for interminable talks." □

WESTERN AFRICA

Western promise of aid seen as endorsement for Rawlings

At a meeting of the "Paris Club" in late November, Western aid donors and multilateral institutions gave their support to Ghana's three-year recovery program. The donors pledged \$150 million in aid for the first year of the program, which is expected to require \$700 million in direct foreign aid as a part of the total cost of \$4 billion.

This move by the donors—Britain, the U.S., France, West Germany, and Japan—is an important endorsement of Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings' efforts to resurrect Ghana's devastated economy. The Paris Club decision is also the direct result of Ghana's 90 percent devaluation of the cedi in early October. The devaluation, coming under heavy pressure from the IMF, follows a series of awkward attempts to achieve the effects of a devaluation without formally devaluing the currency. Military coups in Ghana have traditionally followed devaluations, and Rawlings, already the target of four coup attempts, has been understandably reluctant to devalue.

The October devaluation was in fact little more than a readjustment of the complicated surcharge and bonus pricing plan which was introduced last April. The April austerity

program added to the inflation rate, which has soared to a cumulative total of 600 percent over the last three years. Despite the doubling of the minimum wage which accompanied the austerity program, the Ghanaian people will still be the ones to make the sacrifices in the name of future economic recovery. Having captured the support of Western donors, the trick for Rawlings will now be to maintain the loyalty of his people.

• A New York-based opposition group, the **United Front for the Liberation of Ghana**, has been lobbying against Western assistance for the PNDC. Michael Sackey, chairman

of the group, explained: "We think that the government has been irresponsible and cannot utilize these loans for the benefit of the people as a whole . . . Once assistance is given, we don't think the Ghanaian people are going to benefit. We speak from experience. We are going to do all we can to inform potential donors that they should elicit from this government some very strong guarantees for human rights."

The group, which claims to have 300 members, was formed last July and claims as its goal "the restoration of parliamentary democracy in Ghana." □

CHAD: Talk of talks

• As the fighting in the civil war abated in late 1983, President Hissène Habré and Goukouni Oueddei, leader of the GUNT rebel faction, continued to declare their "willingness" to negotiate. Goukouni announced that he was ready to meet with Habré in Ndjamena, "government to government." Habré said that "we are ready to stretch out a hand to all our opponents . . . Goukouni will be welcome as will all Chadian opponents." But al-

though both men spoke of "national reconciliation," no meeting took place. Goukouni even offered to resign as GUNT president "provided the people of Chad agreed to it," but Habré ignored the offer, just as Goukouni had ignored his "welcome."

Finally, though, in late November the two leaders agreed to meet in Addis Ababa for "round-table" discussions to be sponsored by the OAU at the end of December. Both sides said they had agreed to talks "without preconditions." A few days after Habré and Goukouni

agreed to participate in the OAU talks, several of the factions opposed to Habré's government—among them Goukouni's GUNT and the Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR) led by Acheik Ibn Oumar—announced the formation of a "National Liberation Council." Apparently Habré was then left uncertain if he would have to negotiate only with Goukouni or whether he would be asked by the OAU to meet with the new coalition of opposition groups. In early December, on Habré's request, the talks were postponed for another three weeks "to permit more time to prepare for the meeting." Noting that Habré and Goukouni have long been sworn enemies, observers were skeptical that the differences between the two men could be resolved, but did not completely rule out the possibility of a settlement.

GUINEA: Seeking investment

• In an attempt to attract European investment, Guinea's Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Touré visited Britain for the first high-level meeting between the two countries in at least a decade. Touré sought financing for the Mifergui-Nimba iron ore project and encouraged the British steel industry to purchase Guinean iron ore. Mifergui-Nimba has large deposits of high-grade iron and is located only 24 miles from the Liberian railway which continues on to the Atlantic. Nevertheless, one-third of the estimated \$1.3 billion needed has yet to be found, and a smaller project is now being considered. Because the market for iron is oversupplied, sources of finance such as the World Bank and the EEC are hesitant to make loans for new projects. Guinea's overvalued currency, and the \$1 billion national debt, which absorbs up to half the country's foreign exchange earnings for repayments, have also discouraged investors.

In addition, President Ahmed Sekou Touré's abysmal human rights record has not contributed to a favorable climate for investment. The European Parliament recently condemned Guinea's treatment of political prisoners and refugees and voted to authorize an inspection of Guinean prisons by the International Red Cross.

IVORY COAST: Cocoa crisis

• While the 1982-83 drought devastated agriculture throughout the rest of western Africa, it generated wild fluctuations in the price of cocoa. Speculators on the commodities futures market anticipated that the bush fires caused by the drought would greatly reduce the Ivorian cocoa harvest, and cocoa futures peaked in late 1983, reaching their highest point since 1980. The Ivorian cocoa harvest was expected to be the smallest since 1978-79, and President Félix Houphouët-Boigny moved to forestall discontent among cocoa farmers by announcing a 16 percent increase in the producer price paid to farmers by the government's central purchasing organization. The increase was the first in five years; in fact, since 1978, the government had been reducing the purchase price each year because of bountiful harvests.

The "cocoa crisis" is only one of Ivory Coast's economic difficulties. Inflation and unemployment, which formerly were remarkably low, have climbed sharply in the last three years, while the economy's annual growth rate has fallen. Houphouët spent over four months abroad in late 1983, seeking to attract massive investment from the United States, Canada, and France.

Soon after his return, Houphouët formed a "new government," reducing the number of cabinet posts from 35 to 28. Although he did introduce four new officials into the government, most ministers were retained or shuffled to other posts. Houphouët did not appoint a vice president, leaving open the question of who would be the aging president's successor.

Liberia continued

anxiety and uncertainty within the People's Redemption Council. In October, Doe reshuffled the PRC for the first time in two years, bringing in a second deputy head of state. Doe also shifted Quiwonkpa from head of the armed forces to secretary-general of the PRC, a position Quiwonkpa would not accept "until certain concerns had been addressed." Quiwonkpa's refusal to take up the new post resulted in his dismissal from the army. Doe

then prohibited all visits to Quiwonkpa, threatening to arrest any government officials, military personnel, or foreign diplomats found near Quiwonkpa's home.

Just before the alleged coup attempt, Doe took measures to eliminate dissent. Over 900 students from Saniquellie Central High School in Nimba were dismissed and banned from seeking admission to other schools after disturbances in which 13 students were wounded. Doe also declared that academic authorities would be held responsible for "harboring individuals who attempt to teach socialism in whatever form" to young Liberians.

Doe also reportedly dismissed and arrested Brig. Gen. Joseph Fangalo, the Nimba county superintendent. Shortly before the shootings in Yakepa, Fangalo had criticized the government's ban on rice importation, an historically sensitive issue for Liberians. The government later warned officials against making remarks which would confuse the public or arouse anti-government feeling.

The editor and assistant editor of the government-owned newspaper, the *New Librarian*, were dismissed following charges that they had failed in "their social, political, and social responsibilities as editors of the paper and to double-check information which does not reflect the image and policy of the government of Liberia . . . causing great embarrassment to the government." Three months earlier, Liberia's only independent newspaper, the *Daily Observer*, had been closed down for its "tendency of presenting stories on developments in Liberia in a negative manner."

On his return from the Franco-African summit in October, Doe was quoted as saying that it would be "foolhardy" to allow a return to civilian rule in April 1985, as scheduled, if economic conditions are not propitious. Recent political events place the return to civilian rule in greater doubt.

MALI: On the Algerian axis

• After its admittance into the West African Monetary Union (UMOA), and after declaring its resolve to end its border dispute with Upper Volta, Mali continued its efforts to

improve relations with its neighbors. In November, General Moussa Traoré, Mali's president, made his first official visit to Guinea-Bissau. Just after hosting Ghanaian leader Lt. Jerry Rawlings, Traoré went to Ouagadougou to reciprocate the earlier visit of Upper Volta's President Thomas Sankara and to continue negotiations on the border dispute. Traoré also visited Senegal and Mauritania.

Traoré's regional diplomacy coincides with a tightening of relations between Algeria and Mali, and French sources claimed that the rapprochement between Mali and Upper Volta was made possible by the mediation of Algerian President Chadli Benjedid.

Traoré's trip to Senegal came soon after Senegalese President Abdou Diouf paid a four-day official visit to Algiers. Diouf's trip to Algeria was an important change from the aloofness maintained toward Algeria by his predecessor, Léopold Senghor. Algeria also moved closer to Upper Volta when it upgraded its diplomatic presence in Ouagadougou at the end of November, opening an embassy there for the first time. The new increase in diplomatic activity by Algeria and Mali suggests that Chadli is seeking to form an "Algerian axis" in West Africa to isolate Morocco and strengthen support for the Polisario Front in the Western Sahara.

MAURITANIA: Food shortage

- The government has appealed for international emergency aid to help alleviate the food shortage caused by drought. Rainfall in 1983 was only half that of the previous year, which was itself 50 percent drier than normal. The 1982-83 harvest produced only 12,000 tons of grain, while more than 130,000 tons are necessary to feed the population. The government established an emergency commission to deal with the problem, but there is little that can be done without large amounts of food aid.

NIGER: Civilian cabinet

- The October coup attempt against President Seyni Kountché seems to have been an domestic af-

Reagan urges cut in aid to IDA

President Reagan has requested a limit of \$750 million a year on U.S. assistance to the International Development Association (IDA). The IDA provides interest-free, long-term loans to the world's poorest countries, most of which are in Africa and Asia.

Reagan's announcement came in mid-November as a U.S. Treasury delegation was leaving for discussions with 32 other donor countries in Paris.

Secretary of State George Shultz disagreed with the President, recommending a U.S. contribution of between \$900 million and \$950 million. Shultz's position is closer to that of the other donors, who would like to see a total IDA pool of \$12 billion over the next three years. The U.S., which has already pledged to contribute 25 percent of the total, pushed for a \$9 billion maximum.

The U.S. position on a lower pool was based, Treasury spokesmen said, on the desire to make a "credible" commitment to the IDA. Several conservative members of Congress have stated that they will not support any more than a \$750 million contribution when the appropriations bill comes before the House of Representatives.

The U.S. position has been almost universally condemned. Britain's *Financial Times* editorialized: "It is not hard to concoct an emotional case against this American tight-fistedness. One is talking about an extra \$250 million a year for a fund that will disburse 90 percent of its resources in countries with a per capita income of less than \$1 a day. This meeting of IDA deputies comes one week after the U.S. defense secretary [proposed] that U.S. defense spending be boosted by \$55 billion to \$304 billion for the year beginning in October 1984."

- In late November, a bipartisan commission released a report criticizing the manner in which the U.S. handles its foreign aid programs. The report pointed out that only once in the past five years has an aid bill been both authorized and appropriated. "There is no single spokesperson in the administration for the total foreign assistance program," the report said, and it recommended a new agency, to be called the Mutual Development and Security Administration, to coordinate all U.S. aid programs.

Among its many other recommendations, the report called for special attention to the needs of Africa.

fair uninfluenced by Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi, as first reports speculated. Shortly thereafter, Kountché reshuffled his cabinet. The only three military men in his previous cabinet, including former finance minister Moussa Tondi, were dropped. The new prime minister, replacing Oumarou Mamane, is Hamid Algabit, a Tuareg from the north of the country. Mamane was named by Kountché to head the Development Society, the president's program to reorganize Niger's social and political structure.

NIGERIA: New administration

- In November, President Shehu Shagari named his new cabinet, making several important changes. Only six ministers from the pre-

vious cabinet were retained, and only two remained in their original posts.

Shagari appointed Yusuff Maitama-Sule, formerly Nigeria's ambassador to the UN, to head the newly-created Ministry of National Guidance. Shagari said that the new ministry will be responsible for his administration's "ethical reorientation program," which is intended to root out corruption in the country.

The president also established a task force to review all capital expenditures in excess of \$50 million. The task force will therefore be in a position to set priorities for government projects. The group will be headed by Gamaliel Onosode, Shagari's budget adviser.

Ali Baba, formerly Minister of the Interior, is now the Minister of Employment and Labor. Emeka Anyaoku, former deputy secretary

general of the Commonwealth, replaced Ishaya Audu as Foreign Minister. Audu was moved to the post of ambassador to the United Nations. The Minister of Agriculture in the previous government, Adamu Ciroma, a close confidant of Shagari, has become Minister of Finance in the new cabinet.

TOGO: Approaching Israel cautiously

• In late October, President Gnassingbé Eyadema made an official visit to the United States and met briefly with President Reagan. The two leaders discussed bilateral relations and the U.S. invasion of Grenada. They also talked about the Middle East, and Eyadema commented, "The Arabs are very difficult. They do not consider the voice of reason."

While in the U.S., Eyadema met with members of the American Jewish community. Last September, he had been the only African leader reported to have praised Liberia's Head of State Samuel Doe for going to Jerusalem, and it is evident that Eyadema would like to re-establish relations with Israel. He appears, however, to be waiting for other francophone countries, such as Ivory Coast, to do so first.

Just before Eyadema's trip, the government-controlled newspaper of Ivory Coast, *Fraternité Matin*, ran a front-page story accusing Libya of plotting a coup in Togo. Togo radio also referred to "an ill-intentioned foreign power" which was seeking to destabilize the country. The "Libyan threat" was an important subject of discussion dur-

ing Doe's visit to Jerusalem, and it provides a convenient pretext for African countries seeking closer connections with Israel.

UPPER VOLTA: Feeling threatened

• The National Council of the Revolution (CNR), which assumed power after a coup last August, continued to charge in late 1983 that "foreign mercenaries," "sinister individuals," and "reactionary vermin" were seeking to overthrow the government led by President Thomas Sankara.

The CNR spoke repeatedly of imminent aggression by mercenaries and alleged that weapons and ammunition were being smuggled into Upper Volta, although it did not specify through which neighboring country the smugglers were passing. "Shady individuals," the CNR also charged, were posing as government impostors in Ouagadougou, searching hotels, holding "bogus" CNR rallies, and extorting money from foreigners. In early November, two weeks after the presidential palace grounds were declared off-limits to the public, a foreigner "of the white race" was shot dead nearby.

Amid the charges of destabilization, Sankara took several measures to tighten his control. He placed more than a dozen public figures under house arrest, among them the prominent professor Joseph Ki-Zerbo and former presidents Maurice Yaméogo and Saye Zerbo. Zerbo had attempted a counter-coup in September, but the other detainees were not charged.

Sankara also dissolved the courts and instituted "revolutionary people's tribunals." A defendant will appear before the tribunals "without the assistance of a counsel. He will ensure his own defense . . . sentence will be passed without the possibility of appeal and can only be challenged by appealing for mercy. Sentences will be put into effect immediately."

But other changes have begun to improve the quality of life in Upper Volta. The country's youth, always politically active, have become more prominent under Sankara. The Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) are being organized throughout the country and consist largely of young people who lead political discussions and organize communal work projects. The army will also participate in agriculture and the construction and maintenance of schools and roads. A "revolutionary solidarity fund" was established in November to collect voluntary contributions from public officials, businessmen, and students to help alleviate the suffering caused by the drought. The CDRs have also enrolled large numbers of women, encouraging them to participate in national development.

Sankara's involvement of the country's youth is seen as an effort to extend his popular support and reduce the possibility of a counter-coup. Observers note that political activity in Upper Volta has traditionally been reserved for a small elite, and Sankara's attempt to involve "the masses" is unprecedented in the political history of his country.

EASTERN AFRICA

Détente in East Africa's 'cold war' leads to border opening

The most visible result of the agreement reached by Presidents Julius Nyerere, Daniel arap Moi, and Milton Obote in Arusha in mid-November was the immediate opening of the Kenya-Tanzania border. Kenya and Tanzania have been the main antagonists in the three-way East African split, and there is optimism that the defunct East African Community (EAC) can be revived now that the border has been opened. Most of the disagreements which kept the three

countries apart for seven years disappeared in a few months of not particularly arduous negotiations.

When the slowly decaying community finally split in 1977, each country grabbed all the assets within reach. Aircraft, buildings, and railroad cars were nationalized. Kenya ended up with most of the East African Airways planes and the bulk of the jointly-owned railroad cars. Each country also sought to distance itself from the common debts that the EAC had incurred.

In 1978, the World Bank appointed a mediator, Dr. Victor Umbricht, to straighten out the assets and liabilities of the former member states. More arguments ensued as Umbricht sought to assign values to each of the assets, and once those issues were settled, more disagreements followed on the manner in which compensation would be made to Uganda, the biggest loser in the breakup.

The agreement reached in Arusha in November is nearly the same

one that Umbricht had presented in 1980. It calls for each of the countries to receive its original equity share from the Community. Kenya will get 42 percent, Tanzania 32 percent, and Uganda 26 percent. Under this formula, both Kenya and Tanzania already have more than their share, and they have agreed to repay nearly \$1 billion to Uganda. The agreement should be finalized by the end of March, 1984.

Another problem between Kenya and Tanzania has been that each country has provided asylum for the other's dissidents. The exchange of at least some of the exiles in early November greatly eased tensions before the Arusha agreement was reached. There were 16 Kenyans and six Tanzanians who had found refuge across their borders.

Among those known to have been sent back are two Kenyan airforce men, Hezekiah Ochuka and Pancras Oteyo Okumu, considered to be the leaders of the August 1982 abortive coup attempt in Kenya, and a Tanzanian Airways pilot who was accused of plotting to assassinate Nyerere. Some of the exiles have official refugee status, and their exchange may have been a violation of the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees. The U.N. High Commission for Refugees sent a delegation to investigate. □

DJIBOUTI: Aid for 'new Hong Kong'

● In late November, 26 countries and 23 international organizations participated in Djibouti's donors' conference. The donors committed \$400 million, approving 65 percent of the projects and 70 percent of the requested funding for Djibouti's new five-year development plan. The French delegation was led by Christian Nucci, the Minister for Cooperation and Development, an indication of the great strategic importance France attaches to Djibouti. Along with more than 15,000 other French residents, there are 4,000 French troops in the tiny republic, which is the only remaining overseas base of the French Foreign Legion. Djibouti hopes to become the "Hong Kong of the Red Sea," an *entrepôt* for trade between East Africa and the Middle East.

Among the approved development projects were: a geothermal energy plant, a cement works, improvements of housing and highways, and expansion of the airport and harbor facilities.

KENYA: Economic gains

● Kenya has planned an aid donors' conference to be held in Paris at the end of January. The donors will be asked to assess the effect of economic reforms that Kenya has instituted to correct its balance-of-payments deficit and chronic shortage of foreign exchange. Through import restrictions and other measures, Kenya has succeeded in reducing its current account deficit from a 1981 high of \$725 million to under \$400 million in 1983. The conference will coincide with the publication of Kenya's 1984-88 development plan, which stresses the themes of government decentralization and self-sufficiency.

Kenya received some good economic news in the form of an 85 percent rise in the price of tea over the last six months of 1983. With prices at their highest point in seven years, Kenya managed to increase tea production by 25 percent in 1983. "It is proving to be the biggest bonanza since the coffee and tea boom of 1977-78," said one official.

MAURITIUS: Trading with Pretoria

● October press reports that Deputy Prime Minister Gaetan Duval was to visit South Africa have been denied by a Mauritian government spokesman. However, his brother, Hervé Duval, the minister of labor, did visit South Africa to discuss the importation of South African tea, maize, and coal at preferential prices. The meetings, described as "sensitive" and "semi-official," were arranged by a Mauritian businessman who lives in South Africa.

Mauritian diplomatic sources have indicated that the visits are part of a policy by the coalition government of Prime Minister Aneerood Jugnauth to re-establish commercial links with South Africa. Trade with South Africa had been sharply reduced in June 1982 by the former government led by Paul Berenger.

SEYCHELLES: Not Grenada

● After the U.S. invasion of Grenada, former Seychelles president James Mancham held a news conference in London and requested U.S. help in "insuring that a democratic government returns to the Seychelles." The U.S. ambassador to the Seychelles, David Fischer, responded that the U.S. has "no interest whatsoever" in overthrowing the Seychelles government of Albert René. René ousted Mancham in 1977.

There were also reports from South Africa in early December indicating that South African police had foiled an attempted mercenary invasion of the Seychelles. Five men—two Britons, two South Africans, and one Zimbabwean—were arrested and questioned about the alleged attempt to recruit mercenaries. Later reports indicated that some of the men had been released and possibly deported.

TANZANIA: Oil scandal

● Two Tanzanian officials are suing the London *Observer*, which alleged in November that Tanzania bought South African oil and then sold residual fuel to South Africa. Minister of Energy Al-Noor Kassum and Sylvester Barongo, head of the state oil corporation, were accused by the newspaper of taking commissions from the Swiss-based company Marcotrade, which handled the alleged transactions.

The *Observer* made a point of saying that Kassum and Barongo may not have known that Marcotrade was trading with South Africa. President Julius Nyerere's office issued a statement "categorically and indignantly denying" the newspaper reports, and noting that Tanzania has observed a total boycott against South Africa since 1961.

UGANDA: Obote's party gains

● By-elections to fill eight vacant seats in the national assembly were held in mid-November. Six of the seats went unopposed when the opposition Democratic Party (DP) refused to field candidates, maintaining that the election was "a

farce." The small Conservative Party unsuccessfully challenged the ruling Uganda People's Congress (UPC) in Mokono East and Mubende Southeast districts. The two contested seats had been held by the DP but became vacant when the MPs were murdered shortly after the 1980 election.

With a total gain of eight seats, the UPC has strengthened its solid majority of 90 seats against the DP's 35 seats. The constituency of an-

other murdered DP parliamentarian remains vacant. The MP, Africanus Sembatya, was shot in early October. An army private has been arrested in connection with the shooting.

In early November, seven Ugandans, including several prominent members of the UPC, were kidnapped and killed. There were no suspects reported.

• **Maj. Gen. Oyite Ojok**, Uganda's army chief of staff, was killed in a

helicopter crash in early December. Ojok led the 1979 battle to overthrow Idi Amin and was considered to be the most influential man in Uganda behind President Milton Obote. Eight other people also died in the crash.

The National Resistance Army claimed responsibility for the crash, but Uganda radio said that the claims were "without foundation," and most sources in Uganda agree that the crash was an accident.

CENTRAL AFRICA

Gabon, irked with France, seeks closer relations with U.S.

President Omar Bongo, responding to the publication in France of the book, *Affaires africaines*, instructed the Gabonese news media to boycott news items of French origin. The book records several scandals in Gabon's political affairs and in its relations with France. Bongo complained that the French media gave the book too much publicity and suggested that the publication was part of a plot to destabilize his government.

In October, France dispatched a special envoy, Roland Dumas, but his visit failed to ease tensions and contrasted with the warm reception given to the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Chester Crocker, in November. Crocker announced a new trade agreement between the U.S. and Gabon. Bongo, emboldened by an improving economy which allowed him to relax austerity measures, compared Gabon to "a very beautiful girl whom all men wish to woo" and announced that "when France says, 'No, I cannot give you that,' we will go to other countries." He is encouraging Canadian, Japanese, and Belgian firms to invest in Gabon.

Despite these threats to French dominance of Gabonese economic affairs, the French role remains strong. A French engineering firm has joined the Gabonese government as a 30 percent partner in the construction of Gabon's first steelmill. The purpose of the project, in keeping with Gabon's efforts to diversify its economy, is to process Gabon's iron ore domestically. Gabon is also cooperating with Congo to obtain foreign aid to assist in mining iron ore deposits

along their common border.

Gabon has also received a loan from the American Export-Import Bank to help finance the Booué-Franceville leg of the Transgabonais railway. The completion of this

line will link the port of Owanda with the eastern regions, rich in uranium, manganese, and timber. These commodities are now exported through Pointe Noire in Congo. □

CAMEROON: Independents can run

• In late November, Cameroon's parliament passed a bill allowing candidates who are not members of the sole legal party, the Cameroon National Union (UNC), to campaign for the presidency. The bill ended the 17-year monopoly of the UNC on the presidential candidacy, but it did not authorize the creation of new political parties. By stipulating that candidates must have been in continuous residence in Cameroon for five years, the new law effectively prevents the participation of the Union of the People of Cameroon (UPC) opposition party, most of whose leaders are in exile. The law also requires all presidential candidates to obtain "representative petitions," signed by 50 "notables" from each of the country's ten provinces, to prove that the candidates have legitimate support.

Soon after the passage of the law, President Paul Biya announced that elections would be held in mid-January, 1984. It was expected that several candidates, calling themselves "independents" under the terms of the law, would oppose him in the short campaign period. The UNC monopoly on the presidential candidacy was ordained by Biya's predecessor, Ahmadou Ahidjo, and the new law is a further step in the

liberalization begun by Biya since he succeeded Ahidjo just over a year ago.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: Bokassa moves

• In early December, President Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast foiled former Central African dictator Jean Bédel Bokassa's plans to return home and seize power. According to French sources, Bokassa had arranged to slip aboard a plane in Abidjan bound for Bangui. Upon being informed of the plot, reportedly by Guy Penne, French adviser for African affairs, Houphouët-Boigny ordered the plane to take off before Bokassa could board.

Houphouët-Boigny, who had granted Bokassa "humanitarian asylum" under great pressure from the French government after Bokassa was deposed in 1979, deported the former dictator to France just after his attempt to return to Bangui. The French, who are reluctant to keep Bokassa, are now searching for a country willing to harbor him.

Bokassa said that he wants to return home to Central African Republic even if it means standing trial there.

There were also reports that

"members of the ex-Emperor Bokassa's network" had been arrested in Bangui and charged with preparing to circulate leaflets announcing his impending return.

ZAIRE: Mobutu banishes dissidents

● President Mobutu Sese Seko has banished six members of the Group of 13 to their home villages. Since their release in last May's amnesty, the 13 former members of Zaire's parliament have been speaking out against Mobutu's one-man rule and pressing for the legalization of a second political party. There were also reports that as many as 100 supporters of the Group of 13 may have been arrested at the same time.

Seven members of the U.S. congressional delegation which visited Zaire in August (see *African Update*, November-December 1983) wrote a letter to Secretary of State George Shultz protesting recent developments in Zaire, including the detention of two American reporters.

ZAMBIA: No contest

● The magnitude of President Kenneth Kaunda's October election victory has surprised even his most ardent supporters. Against a background of the worst economic crisis in Zambia's history and renewed disagreements with Zambia's powerful trade unions, Kaunda managed to win the approval of 94 percent of the voters with a 64 percent turnout at the polls. He was the only presidential candidate in the one-party election, but voters were nonetheless given the opportunity to reject him. Disapproval of the president could be expressed by placing a mark beside the figure of a sullen-looking frog while support could be registered by marking an eagle. The unprecedented approval speaks more to Kaunda's personal appeal than to the effectiveness of his policies. The president even received support from political foes like Frederick Chiluba, chairman of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, who exhorted workers to vote for Kaunda.

Kaunda did not do as well in the copperbelt districts of Kankoyo and Kantanshi, where the "no" vote reached 18 and 19 percent respectively. Despite the endorsement of

Brazil seeking more trade with Africa

Brazilian President João Figueiredo spent ten days in November on official visits to Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Cape Verde, and Algeria. Figueiredo has declared that Africa is the second priority, after Latin America, in Brazilian foreign policy. Brazil already has established approximately 300 businesses throughout Africa, and Brazilian exports to Africa amounted to almost \$2 billion in 1982.

During his visits, Figueiredo reiterated that Brazil would not join the proposed South Atlantic Treaty Organization, a security alliance which would include South Africa. In Guinea-Bissau, Figueiredo commented that the pact would be "likely to attract to the region rivalries that are alien to it."

Brazil has always been closely involved with the Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa. Figueiredo and the Portuguese foreign ministry are reportedly developing a proposal to create a "tricontinental commission" with Brazil, Portugal, Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe as members. The commission will organize regular meetings on trade and commerce.

Brazil's economic relations with non-lusophone countries are expanding rapidly as well. Brazilian oil companies are involved in prospecting in Congo, Libya, Algeria, and Angola. Engineering firms are active in Nigeria, Mozambique, and Ivory Coast, and Mauritania's \$1 billion trans-Saharan highway was built by a Brazilian engineering company. Brazil has also become the world's fifth-largest arms exporter, and Algeria, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria, Togo, and Tunisia have all purchased Brazilian-made military equipment.

Several agreements were reached during Figueiredo's visit to Nigeria, Brazil's largest trade partner in Africa. A reciprocal credit line was established between the two countries, allowing debts of up to \$150 million to be settled on a quarterly basis. Nigerian trade restrictions imposed after the fall in oil prices have caused imports from Brazil to fall drastically from the 1981 record of over \$700 million, but the new credit arrangements should facilitate trade between the two countries. The credit line is between the two governments, leaving private companies free to "make their own deals." Brazil also agreed to increase its imports of Nigerian oil in exchange for larger Nigerian purchases of Brazilian-made products.

In Algeria, Figueiredo discussed the possibility of increasing Brazilian exports of coffee, sugar, and vehicles manufactured by Brazil's Mercedes-Benz and Volkswagen factories. By visiting Senegal, Figueiredo ended the chill in Brazilian-Senegalese trade which began in early 1982 when Senegal stopped importing Brazilian goods to retaliate for Brazil's cutoff of purchases of Senegalese phosphates.

Senegal and Algeria, like many other francophone African countries, perceive trade with Brazil as an important alternative to continued dependency on the French. Like France, Brazil can supply machinery, technology, and military equipment, but its status as a Third World country makes Brazil a sympathetic trade partner. Figueiredo's visit is considered only the first move in a new and concerted effort by Brazil to increase its trade with Africa.

the labor leaders, the unions and the government have still not reached a wage agreement, and the workers in the highly unionized mining areas still have not forgiven Kaunda for the 10 percent wage hike limits that have been imposed as part of the country's austerity program. Labor tensions flared up again in early November when railway workers went on strike, disrupting traffic between the copperbelt and major cities.

● A few days before the election, **Harry Nkumbula**, one of the fathers of Zambian nationalism and a perennial opponent of Kaunda, died at the age of 67. Nkumbula was the official opposition leader until Zambia became a one-party state in 1972. Kaunda granted his old foe a state funeral and awarded him the country's highest honor, the Order of Distinguished Service.

Continued on p. 36

1983 Index

AUTHOR INDEX

- Ayari, Chedly, "What strategy for Africa's development?", Sept-Oct 8
- Bowman, Larry W. and Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, "U.S. strategic policy in northeast Africa and the Indian Ocean," Nov-Dec 4
- Bush, George, "A new partnership with Africa" (document), Jan-Feb 39
- Callaghy, Thomas M., "Africa and Third World debt crises" (book review), Jan-Feb 55
- Cot, Jean-Pierre, "France and Africa: What change?", May-Jun 12
- Crocker, Chester, "Current U.S. policy in southern Africa" (document), Mar-Apr 43
- Cunha, Antonio-Gabriel M., and Joanne Donnelly, "Defusing Africa's debt", Sept-Oct 17
- Daly, M.W., "Safari in Sudan" (book review) Mar-Apr 57
- de St. Jorre, John, "Constructive engagement: An assessment", Sept-Oct 48
- Diamond, Larry, "Nigeria: A tarnished victory for the NPN?", Nov-Dec 18
- Dimsdale, John, "Tanzania: Rhetoric meets reality", Nov-Dec 14
- Donnelly, Joanne and Antonio-Gabriel M. Cunha, "Defusing Africa's debt", Sept-Oct 17
- Dugard, John, "Denationalization: Apartheid's ultimate plan", Jul-Aug 43
- Edlin, John, "SADCC: Key to southern Africa's economic independence", May-Jun 43
- Ensign, Tod, "Zimbabwe: Struggle and inheritance" (book review), Jan-Feb 54
- Ergas, Zaki, "Political agriculture" (book review), Mar-Apr 56
- Gavshon, Arthur, "Seychelles: A tilt to the West?" Nov-Dec 56
- Gecau, Kimani, "A theater for development in Zimbabwe", Nov-Dec 24
- Grant, Stephen H., "Léopold Sédar Senghor, former president of Senegal" (interview), Nov-Dec 61
- Hodges, Tony, "François Mitterrand, master strategist in the Maghreb", May-Jun 17
- Hormats, Robert D., "Africa in the global economy", Sept-Oct 4
- Hurley, Archbishop Denis E., "The Catholic Church and apartheid", Jul-Aug 17
- Isaacman, Allen, "Joaquim Chissano, Foreign Minister of Mozambique" (interview), Jan-Feb 42
- Isaacman, Allen and Barbara Isaacman, "Mozambique: In pursuit of nonalignment", May-Jun 47
- Isaacs, Gayla Cook, "Women in southern Africa: The media and the ideal woman", Mar-Apr 48
- Kassebaum, Nancy Landon, "Current U.S. policy in southern Africa" (document), Mar-Apr 41
- Kirfi, Alhaji M.B., "Current U.S. policy in southern Africa" (document), Mar-Apr 42
- Konie, Gwendoline, "Women in southern Africa: Gaining political power", Mar-Apr 11
- Lavrencic, Karl, "UNCTAD VI: Looking for the silver lining", Sept-Oct 61
- Lefebvre, Jeffrey A. and Larry W. Bowman, "U.S. strategic policy in northeast Africa and the Indian Ocean", Nov-Dec 4
- Legum, Colin, "Uganda: After the Amin nightmare", Jan-Feb 15
- "Inside a Ugandan jail", Jan-Feb 18
- "Milton Obote: President of Uganda" (interview), Jan-Feb 19
- "Gong Dafei, Vice Foreign Minister for African Affairs, the People's Republic of China" (interview), Mar-Apr 20
- Le Vine, Victor T., "Cameroon: the politics of presidential succession", May-Jun 22
- Lugira, Aloysius M., "Is Colin Legum a victim of Obote's propaganda?" (letter), May-Jun 66
- Mann, Matt, "Ethiopia: Assessing the revolution", Nov-Dec 47
- Matsepe-Casaburri, Ivy, "Women in southern Africa: The legacy of exclusion", Mar-Apr 7
- Möller, Rev. G.S.J. with Moolman, Rev. L., "The Dutch Re-

- formed Church and separate development", Jul-Aug 39
- Mortimer, Robert A., "Ivory Coast: Succession and recession", Jan-Feb 4
- Muchena, Olivia, "Women in southern Africa: Are women integrated into development?", Mar-Apr 4
- Mugabe, Robert, "Current U.S. policy in southern Africa" (document), Mar-Apr 39
- Novicki, Margaret A., "Zimbabwe: The economic outlook", Jan-Feb 8
- "Zimbabwe: Tourism with a socialist slant", Jan-Feb 49
- "Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia" (interview), May-Jun 4
- "The Rev Allan Boesak, President, World Alliance of Reformed Churches" (interview), Jul-Aug 7
- "Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Secretary, Economic Commission for Africa" (interview), Sept-Oct 12
- "The Addis summit: A test for African unity", Sept-Oct 52
- "Peter Onu, Secretary General Ad Interim, Organization of African Unity" (interview), Sept-Oct 57
- "Aristides Pereira, President of Cape Verde" (interview), Nov-Dec 43
- Robbins, David, "Drought plagues southern Africa", Jul-Aug 56
- Rondos, Alex, "Mitterrand's two-year record", May-Jun 8
- Rubens, Monique, "At the United Nations: Combating apartheid", Jul-Aug 47
- Schissel, Howard, "Mauritania: Saharan sandstorm blows on", May-Jun 55
- "What prospects for the oil industry?", Sept-Oct 43
- Seiler, John, "South Africa: Toward a state of siege?" Jul-Aug 20
- Streek, Barry, "South Africa: The myth of reform", Jul-Aug 53
- Taib, Saad Eddine, "The Addis Ababa summit" (letter), Nov-Dec 65
- Tutu, Bishop Desmond, "The blasphemy that is apartheid", Jul-Aug 4
- Villa-Vicencio, Charles, "South Africa: The Church: discordant and divided", Jul-Aug 13
- Wall, Roger, "Niger: Politics and poverty in the Sahel", May-Jun 59
- Wells, Rick, "Kenya: What mandate for Moi?", Nov-Dec 10
- Williams, Maurice J., "Toward a food strategy for Africa", Sept-Oct 22
- Youssoufou, Oumarou G., "The Addis Ababa summit" (letter), Nov-Dec 65
- Zvobgo, Eddison, "Zimbabwe: Removing laws that oppress women", Mar-Apr 45

SUBJECT INDEX

African National Congress

- African Update, Jan-Feb 23, 38; Mar-Apr 38; Jul-Aug 23, 35, 36, 37; Sept-Oct 34; Nov-Dec 39, 40
- "South Africa: Toward a state of siege?", by John Seiler, Jul-Aug

Agriculture

- African Update, Jan-Feb 24, 25, 26, 34; Mar-Apr 26, 29, 30, 32; May-Jun 27, 30, 34, 41; Jul-Aug 24, 27, 32, 33, 34; Sept-Oct 30, 32, 39; Nov-Dec 32, 33, 35, 37, 39
- "Drought plagues southern Africa", by David Robbins, Jul-Aug 56
- "Toward a food strategy for Africa", by Maurice J. Williams, Sept-Oct 22

Aid, economic

- African Update, Jan-Feb 24, 26, 28, 34, 35; Mar-Apr 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33; May-Jun 27; Jul-Aug 28; Sept-Oct 30; Nov-Dec 34, 35, 36, 40, 42

Amnesty International

- African Update, Jan-Feb 25; Mar-Apr 34; May-Jun 33, 36; Nov-Dec 34

Apartheid see South Africa

Arts

African Update, Nov-Dec 41

"A theater for development in Zimbabwe", by Kimani Gecau
Nov-Dec 24

"Léopold Sédar Senghor, former president of Senegal" (inter-
view), Nov-Dec 61

Books

Aronson, Jonathan David, ed., *Debt and the Less Developed
Countries*, reviewed by Thomas D. Callaghy, Jan-Feb 55

Bates, Robert H., *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The
Political Basis of Agricultural Policies*, reviewed by Zaki
Ergas, Mar-Apr 56

Franko, Lawrence G. and Marilyn J. Seiber, eds., *Developing
Country Debt*, reviewed by Thomas D. Callaghy, Jan-Feb
55

Goodman, Stephen H. ed., *Financing and Risk in Developing
Countries*, reviewed by Thomas D. Callaghy, Jan-Feb 55

Hoagland, Edward, *African Calliope: A Journey to the Sudan*,
reviewed by M.W. Daly, Mar-Apr 57

Martin, David and Phyllis Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe:
The Chimurenga War*, reviewed by Tod Ensign, Jan-Feb
54

Stoneman, Colin, *Zimbabwe's Inheritance*, reviewed by Tod En-
sign, Jan-Feb 54

"Women in southern Africa: A bibliography", Mar-Apr 54

Development

"Are women integrated into development?", by Olivia Muchena,
Mar-Apr 4

"Southern African women speak out" (interviews), Mar-Apr 15

"SADCC: Key to southern Africa's economic independence", by
John Edlin, May-Jun 43

"What strategy for Africa's development?", by Chedly Ayari,
Sept-Oct 8

"Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Secretary, Economic Commission
for Africa" (interview), Sept-Oct 12

"UNCTAD VI: Looking for the silver lining", by Karl Lavrencic,
Sept-Oct 61

Economics

"Zimbabwe: The economic outlook", by Margaret A. Novicki,
Jan-Feb 8

"Africa and Third World debt crises" (book review), by Thomas
M. Callaghy, Jan-Feb 55

"Women in southern Africa: The legacy of exclusion", by Ivy
Matsepe-Casaburri, Mar-Apr 7

"Current U.S. policy in southern Africa" (documents), Mar-Apr
39

"Mitterrand's two-year record", by Alex Rondos, May-Jun 8

"François Mitterrand, master strategist in the Maghreb", by Tony
Hodges, May-Jun 17

"SADCC: Key to southern Africa's economic independence", by
John Edlin, May-Jun 43

"Niger: Politics and poverty in the Sahel", by Roger Wall, May-
Jun 59

"Drought plagues southern Africa", by David Robbins, Jul-Aug
56

"Africa in the global economy", by Robert D. Hormats, Sept-Oct
4

"What strategy for Africa's development?", by Chedly Ayari,
Sept-Oct 8

"Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Secretary, Economic Commission
for Africa" (interview), Sept-Oct 12

"Defusing Africa's debt", by Antonio-Gabriel M. Cunha and Jo-
anne Donnelly, Sept-Oct 17

"Toward a food strategy for Africa", by Maurice J. Williams, Sept-
Oct 22

"African economies: A statistical profile", Sept-Oct 58

"Tanzania: Rhetoric meets reality", by John Dimsdale, Nov-Dec
14

Education

African Update, Jan-Feb 37; Mar-Apr 29, 33, 36; Jul-Aug 26, 27,
28; Sept-Oct 29, 40; Nov-Dec 38, 40, 41, 42

Famine

African Update, Jan-Feb 26; May-Jun 29, 33, 39, 41; Jul-Aug 24;
Sept-Oct 38; Nov-Dec 34

Gas, natural

African Update, Jan-Feb 34; May-Jun 34, 36; Sept-Oct 35

"François Mitterrand, master strategist in the Maghreb", by Tony
Hodges, May-Jun 17

International Monetary Fund

African Update, Jan-Feb 26, 27, 34, 35; Mar-Apr 26, 29, 31; May-
Jun 27, 30, 31, 32; Jul-Aug 28, 32, 34; Sept-Oct 32, 37;
Nov-Dec 29, 33, 35, 36, 37, 39

"Africa and Third World debt crises" (book review), by Thomas
M. Callaghy, Jan-Feb 55

"Africa in the global economy", by Robert D. Hormats, Sept-Oct
4

"Defusing Africa's debt", by Antonio-Gabriel M. Cunha and Jo-
anne Donnelly, Sept-Oct 17

Journalism

African Update, Mar-Apr 34; May-Jun 33; Jul-Aug 31; Sept-Oct
29, 42; Nov-Dec 33

Media

"Women in southern Africa: The media and the ideal woman", by
Gayla Cook Isaacs, Mar-Apr 49

Military aid and equipment

African Update, Jan-Feb 35; Mar-Apr 25, 31, 36, 37; May-Jun 28,
33, 38, 39, 41; Jul-Aug 24, 34; Sept-Oct 27, 32, 34, 35, 36;
Nov-Dec 32, 38, 40, 41

"U.S. strategic policy in northeast Africa and the Indian Ocean",
by Larry W. Bowman and Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, Nov-Dec 4

Minerals, mining

African Update, Jan-Feb 25, 34, 37; Mar-Apr 26, 27, 31, 37; May-
Jun 27, 31, 32, 35, 36; Sept-Oct 32, 36, 38, 39; Nov-Dec
36, 37, 40

Oil

African Update, Jan-Feb 34; Mar-Apr 24, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34,
35; May-Jun 27, 35, 36; Jul-Aug 25, 34; Sept-Oct 30, 32;
Nov-Dec 37

"What prospects for the oil industry?", by Howard Schissel,
Sept-Oct 43

Organization of African Unity

African Update, Jan-Feb 24, 35; Mar-Apr 24; Jul-Aug 23; Sept-
Oct 28, 29, 30, 31, 37; Nov-Dec 38

"The Addis summit: A test for African unity", by Margaret A.
Novicki, Sept-Oct 52

"Peter Onu, Secretary General Ad Interim, Organization of Afri-
can Unity" (interview), Sept-Oct 57

"The Addis Ababa summit" (letters), Nov-Dec 65

Refugees

African Update, Jan-Feb 33; Mar-Apr 24, 30; May-Jun 29, 30, 35,
39; Jul-Aug 24, 29, 32; Sept-Oct 33, 38; Nov-Dec 34, 36,
39

Religion

African Update, Jan-Feb 26, 34; Mar-Apr 23, 32, 34, 35; May-Jun
34, 37, 42; Sept-Oct 27, 34, 39; Nov-Dec 28, 37, 38, 41

"The blasphemy that is apartheid", by Bishop Desmond Tutu,
Jul-Aug 4

"The Rev. Allan Boesak, President, World Alliance of Reformed
Churches" (interview), Jul-Aug 7

"The Church: Discordant and divided", by Charles Villa-Vicencio,
Jul-Aug 13

"The Catholic Church and apartheid", by Archbishop Denis E.
Hurley, Jul-Aug 17

"The Dutch Reformed Church and separate development", by
the Rev. G.S.J. Möller in collaboration with the Rev. L.
Moolman, Jul-Aug 39

Tourism

African Update, Jul-Aug 26, 38; Sept-Oct 33; Nov-Dec 35
"Zimbabwe: Tourism with a socialist slant", by Margaret A. Novicki, Jan-Feb 49

Trade unions

African Update, Jan-Feb 23; Mar-Apr 23, 28, 34, 37; May-Jun 28; Jul-Aug 26, 34; Sept-Oct 36; Nov-Dec 37, 40

Transportation

African Update, Jan-Feb 26; Mar-Apr 38; Sept-Oct 38; Nov-Dec 32, 35, 40

United Nations

African Update, Jan-Feb 37; May-Jun 27; Sept-Oct 32, 34; Nov-Dec 34

"Combating apartheid", by Monique Rubens, Jul-Aug 47

Women

"Are women integrated into development?", by Olivia Muchena, Mar-Apr 4

"The legacy of exclusion", by Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri, Mar-Apr 7

"Gaining political power", by Gwendoline Konie, Mar-Apr 11

"Southern African women speak out" (interviews), Mar-Apr 15

"Removing laws that oppress women", by Eddison Zvobgo, Mar-Apr 45

"The media and the ideal woman", by Gayla Cook Isaacs, Mar-Apr 48

"A statistical profile", Mar-Apr 52

"Bibliography", Mar-Apr 54

African Update, Jul-Aug 37

World Bank

African Update, Jan-Feb 26; Mar-Apr 28, 30; Jul-Aug 28, 32; Sept-Oct 30, 31, 32, 37; Nov-Dec 33

COUNTRY INDEX**Algeria**

African Update, Jan-Feb 34, 35; Mar-Apr 31; May-Jun 27, 31, 36, 37, 38; Jul-Aug 23; Nov-Dec 34

"François Mitterrand, master strategist in the Maghreb", by Tony Hodges, May-Jun 17

Angola

African Update, Jan-Feb 23; Mar-Apr 23, 33; May-Jun 38; Jul-Aug 35; Sept-Oct 38, 41, 42; Nov-Dec 38, 41

"SADCC: Key to southern Africa's economic independence", by John Edlin, May-Jun 43

"Constructive engagement: An assessment", by John de St. Jorre, Sept-Oct 48

Arab States

African Update, Jan-Feb 35; May-Jun 37; Nov-Dec 31, 37

"What strategy for Africa's development?", by Chedly Ayari, Sept-Oct 8

Benin

African Update, Jan-Feb 24; Mar-Apr 24, 25, 26, 28; May-Jun 29; Sept-Oct 31; Nov-Dec 34

Botswana

African Update, Jan-Feb 35; May-Jun 27, 28, 39; Sept-Oct 38
"SADCC: Key to southern Africa's economic independence", by John Edlin, May-Jun 43

Britain

African Update, Jan-Feb 23, 25; Mar-Apr 37; May-Jun 36, 37; Jul-Aug 31, 35; Sept-Oct 38; Nov-Dec 35, 40, 42

Burundi

African Update, Jan-Feb 28; Sept-Oct 35

Cameroon

African Update, Jan-Feb 28; Mar-Apr 30; May-Jun 28, 34; Jul-Aug 24, 25; Sept-Oct 35; Nov-Dec 27

"The politics of presidential succession", by Victor T. Le Vine, May-Jun 22

Canada

African Update, Jan-Feb 23, 25; Nov-Dec 42

Cape Verde

African Update, May-Jun 29; Sept-Oct 29

"Aristides Pereira, President of Cape Verde" (interview), Nov-Dec 43

Central African Republic

African Update, Jan-Feb 28; Mar-Apr 30; May-Jun 28, 35; Jul-Aug 32, 33; Sept-Oct 35

Chad

African Update, Jan-Feb 24; Mar-Apr 25; May-Jun 28, 29, 35, 37; Jul-Aug 25; Sept-Oct 27, 29; Nov-Dec 27, 29, 32

"U.S. strategic policy in northeast Africa and the Indian Ocean", by Larry W. Bowman and Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, Nov-Dec 4

"The Addis summit: A test for African unity", by Margaret A. Novicki, Sept-Oct 52

China

African Update, Jan-Feb 35; Mar-Apr 31; May-Jun 37; Jul-Aug 36; Sept-Oct 39

"Gong Dafei, Vice Foreign Minister for African Affairs" (interview), Mar-Apr 20

Comoros

African Update, Sept-Oct 33

Congo

African Update, Mar-Apr 30; May-Jun 35; Nov-Dec 30

Cuba

African Update, Jan-Feb 23; Mar-Apr 23; May-Jun 29, 39; Jul-Aug 35; Sept-Oct 34, 38, 41; Nov-Dec 38, 40, 41

"Constructive engagement: An assessment", by John de St. Jorre, Sept-Oct 48

Djibouti

African Update, Mar-Apr 28; Sept-Oct 33; Nov-Dec 34

Egypt

African Update, Jan-Feb 34; Mar-Apr 32; May-Jun 28, 37, 39; Jul-Aug 34; Sept-Oct 36; Nov-Dec 37

"U.S. strategic policy in northeast Africa and the Indian Ocean", by Larry W. Bowman and Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, Nov-Dec 4

Equatorial Guinea

African Update, Mar-Apr 30; May-Jun 35; Jul-Aug 33; Sept-Oct 35; Nov-Dec 36

Ethiopia

African Update, Mar-Apr 28; May-Jun 27, 33, 38; Jul-Aug 23, 30; Sept-Oct 33, 34; Nov-Dec 34

"Assessing the revolution", by Matt Mann, Nov-Dec 47

France

African Update, Jan-Feb 23, 28; Mar-Apr 24, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 33, 38; May-Jun 30, 31, 34, 36; Jul-Aug 30, 33; Sept-Oct 27, 28, 30, 33, 35; Nov-Dec 27, 29, 30, 34, 36

"Mitterrand's two-year record", by Alex Rondos, May-Jun 8

"What Change?", by Jean-Pierre Cot, May-Jun 12

"François Mitterrand, master strategist in the Maghreb", by Tony Hodges, May-Jun 17

Gabon

African Update, Mar-Apr 24, 30, 31; May-Jun 28, 35; Jul-Aug 25

The Gambia

African Update, Jan-Feb 24; May-Jun 29; Jul-Aug 26, 29; Sept-Oct 29

Germany, West

African Update, Jan-Feb 23, 37

Ghana

African Update, Jan-Feb 24; Mar-Apr 24, 25, 28; May-Jun 27, 28, 30; Jul-Aug 26; Sept-Oct 29, 31, 32; Nov-Dec 30, 34

Guinea

African Update, Jan-Feb 25; Mar-Apr 24; May-Jun 27, 30; Sept-Oct 30; Nov-Dec 30

Guinea-Bissau

African Update, Jan-Feb 24; Mar-Apr 26; May-Jun 29; Jul-Aug 26, 29; Sept-Oct 30; Nov-Dec 31
"Aristides Pereira, President of Cape Verde" (interview), Nov-Dec 43

Indian Ocean

African Update, Nov-Dec 40
"U.S. strategic policy in northeast Africa and the Indian Ocean", by Larry W. Bowman and Jeffrey A. Lefebvre

Israel

African Update, Jan-Feb 34; Mar-Apr 31; May-Jun 28, 41; Sept-Oct 30, 31; Nov-Dec 27, 30, 31

Italy

African Update, Jan-Feb 34; May-Jun 36

Ivory Coast

African Update, Jan-Feb 25; Mar-Apr 24, 26; May-Jun 27, 28, 30, 39; Jul-Aug 24, 27; Sept-Oct 30, 31, 35; Nov-Dec 31, 34
"Succession and recession", by Robert Mortimer, Jan-Feb 4

Kenya

African Update, Jan-Feb 27; Mar-Apr 28; May-Jun 27, 28, 33, 34; Jul-Aug 24, 31, 36; Sept-Oct 36; Nov-Dec 35
"A new partnership with Africa" (document), by George Bush, Jan-Feb 39
"U.S. strategic policy in northeast Africa and the Indian Ocean", by Larry W. Bowman and Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, Nov-Dec 4
"What mandate for Moi?", by Rick Wells, Nov-Dec 10

Lesotho

African Update, Jan-Feb 36; Mar-Apr 33, 38; May-Jun 28, 39; Jul-Aug 35; Sept-Oct 39; Nov-Dec 31, 34
"SADCC: Key to southern Africa's economic independence", by John Edlin, May-Jun 43

Liberia

African Update, Jan-Feb 25; Mar-Apr 26; May-Jun 30, 32; Jul-Aug 27, 29; Sept-Oct 29, 31; Nov-Dec 30, 31, 33

Libya

African Update, Jan-Feb 24, 34; Mar-Apr 24, 25, 32; May-Jun 29, 37, 38; Jul-Aug 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, 34; Sept-Oct 27, 28, 31, 34, 37; Nov-Dec 30, 31, 32, 34
"The Addis summit: A test for African unity", by Margaret A. Novicki, Sept-Oct 52
"U.S. strategic policy in northeast Africa and the Indian Ocean", by Larry W. Bowman and Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, Nov-Dec 4

Madagascar

African Update, Jan-Feb 27; Mar-Apr 29; Sept-Oct 33; Nov-Dec 34

Malawi

African Update, Jan-Feb 36; May-Jun 27, 28, 39; Jul-Aug 24, 36; Nov-Dec 31, 39
"SADCC: Key to southern Africa's economic independence", by John Edlin, May-Jun 43

Mali

African Update, Mar-Apr 26; May-Jun 31; Jul-Aug 24, 25; Sept-Oct 31; Nov-Dec 32, 34

Mauritania

African Update, Jan-Feb 26; Mar-Apr 27; May-Jun 27, 31, 38; Jul-Aug 24; Sept-Oct 31
"Saharan sandstorm blows on", by Howard Schissel, May-Jun 55

Mauritius

African Update, Jan-Feb 27; May-Jun 33; Sept-Oct 33; Nov-Dec 35

Morocco

African Update, Jan-Feb 35; Mar-Apr 32; May-Jun 36, 37, 38; Jul-Aug 23; Sept-Oct 37, 38; Nov-Dec 37, 38
"Francois Mitterrand, master strategist in the Maghreb", by Tony Hodges, May-Jun 17
"The Addis summit: A test for African unity", by Margaret A. Novicki, Sept-Oct 52
"The Addis Ababa summit" (letters), Nov-Dec 65

Mozambique

African Update, Jan-Feb 36; Mar-Apr 34; May-Jun 39; Jul-Aug 36; Sept-Oct 33, 39, 42; Nov-Dec 40
"Joachim Chissano, Foreign Minister of Mozambique" (interview), Jan-Feb 42
"The State Department perspective", Jan-Feb 46
"Southern African women speak out" (interviews), Mar-Apr 15
"SADCC: Key to southern Africa's economic independence", by John Edlin, May-Jun 43
"In pursuit of non-alignment", by Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, May-Jun 47

Namibia

African Update, Jan-Feb 23, 37; Mar-Apr 23; May-Jun 27, 36, 41; Jul-Aug 35; Sept-Oct 41; Nov-Dec 41
"Southern African women speak out" (interviews), Mar-Apr 16
"Current U.S. policy in southern Africa" (documents), Mar-Apr 39
"At the United Nations: Combating apartheid", by Monique Rubens, Jul-Aug 47
"Constructive engagement: An assessment", by John de St. Jorre, Sept-Oct 48

Niger

African Update, Mar-Apr 24, 26, 27; May-Jun 27; Jul-Aug 25, 28; Sept-Oct 31; Nov-Dec 32, 34
"Politics and poverty in the Sahel", by Roger Wall, May-Jun 59

Nigeria

African Update, Jan-Feb 26; Mar-Apr 24, 27, 30; May-Jun 28, 29, 30, 31, 39; Jul-Aug 25, 26, 28, 36; Sept-Oct 31; Nov-Dec 33, 34
"Current U.S. policy in southern Africa" (documents), Mar-Apr 42
"A tarnished victory for the NPN?", by Larry Diamond, Nov-Dec 18

Portugal

African Update, Mar-Apr 26; Jul-Aug 35; Sept-Oct 38; Nov-Dec 40

Rwanda

African Update, Jan-Feb 33; Mar-Apr 30; May-Jun 35; Sept-Oct 36; Nov-Dec 36

Senegal

African Update, Jan-Feb 24, 26; Mar-Apr 24, 26, 27; May-Jun 32; Jul-Aug 26, 29
"Léopold Sédar Senghor" (interview), Nov-Dec 61

Seychelles

African Update, Jan-Feb 27; Mar-Apr 29; Sept-Oct 34
"A tilt to the West?", by Arthur Gavshon, Nov-Dec 56

Sierra Leone

African Update, Jan-Feb 26; May-Jun 30, 32; Jul-Aug 29; Sept-Oct 32; Nov-Dec 32, 33

Somalia

African Update, Jan-Feb 28; Mar-Apr 29; May-Jun 33; Sept-Oct 33, 34; Nov-Dec 34

"U.S. strategic policy in northeast Africa and the Indian Ocean", by Larry W. Bowman and Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, Nov-Dec 4
"America's ally in the Horn" by Guy Arnold, Nov-Dec 51

South Africa

African Update, Jan-Feb 23, 27, 36; Mar-Apr 23, 24, 34; May-Jun 27, 28, 35, 36, 39, 40; Jul-Aug 23, 36, 37; Sept-Oct 33, 34, 38, 39; Nov-Dec 32, 38, 39, 40

"Southern African women speak out" (interviews), Mar-Apr 17
"Current U.S. policy in southern Africa" (documents), Mar-Apr 39
"Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia" (interview), May-Jun 4
"SADCC: Key to southern Africa's economic independence", by John Edlin, May-Jun 43
"The blasphemy that is apartheid", by Bishop Desmond Tutu, Jul-Aug 4
"The Rev. Allan Boesak, President, World Alliance of Reformed Churches" (interview), Jul-Aug 7
"The Church: Discordant and divided", by Charles Villa-Vicencio, Jul-Aug 13
"The Catholic Church and apartheid", by Archbishop Denis E. Hurley, Jul-Aug 17
"Toward a state of siege?", by John Seiler, Jul-Aug 20
"The Dutch Reformed Church and separate development", by the Rev. G.S.J. Möller in collaboration with the Rev. L. Moolman, Jul-Aug 39
"Denationalization: Apartheid's ultimate plan", by John Dugard, Jul-Aug 43
"At the United Nations: Combating apartheid", by Monique Rubens, Jul-Aug 47
"The myth of reform", by Barry Streek, Jul-Aug 53
"Drought plagues southern Africa", by David Robbins, Jul-Aug 56
"Constructive engagement: An assessment", by John de St. Jorre, Sept-Oct 48

Spain

African Update, May-Jun 36; Jul-Aug 33; Sept-Oct 35; Nov-Dec 36

Sudan

African Update, Jan-Feb 35; Mar-Apr 33; May-Jun 27, 33, 37; Jul-Aug 30, 34; Sept-Oct 29, 37; Nov-Dec 37

"Safari in Sudan" (book review), Mar-Apr 57
"U.S. strategic policy in northeast Africa and the Indian Ocean", by Larry W. Bowman and Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, Nov-Dec 4

Swaziland

African Update, Jan-Feb 38; May-Jun 40; Jul-Aug 37; Sept-Oct 42; Nov-Dec 31, 41

"SADCC: Key to southern Africa's economic independence", by John Edlin, May-Jun 43

Tanzania

African Update, Jan-Feb 33; Mar-Apr 29; May-Jun 27, 28, 34; Jul-Aug 24, 32; Sept-Oct 33, 42; Nov-Dec 35, 39

"SADCC: Key to southern Africa's economic independence", by John Edlin, May-Jun 43
"Rhetoric meets reality", by John Dimsdale, Nov-Dec 14

Togo

African Update, Jan-Feb 26; Mar-Apr 24, 26, 28; May-Jun 27, 28; Jul-Aug 24, 27; Sept-Oct 32; Nov-Dec 32, 34

Tunisia

African Update, Jan-Feb 35; May-Jun 38, 39; Sept-Oct 37; Nov-Dec 38

Uganda

African Update, Jan-Feb 28, 33; Mar-Apr 30; May-Jun 27, 28, 34, 35; Jul-Aug 32; Nov-Dec 35

"After the Amin nightmare", by Colin Legum, Jan-Feb 15
"Inside a Ugandan jail", by Colin Legum, Jan-Feb 18
"Milton Obote, President of Uganda" (interview), Jan-Feb 19

United States

African Update, Jan-Feb 23, 28, 34, 35, 38; Mar-Apr 23, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37; May-Jun 29, 33, 36, 37; Jul-Aug 27, 30, 34, 35, 38; Sept-Oct 28, 31, 34, 35, 36, 38; Nov-Dec 27, 30, 39, 41, 42

"A new partnership with Africa" (document), by George Bush, Jan-Feb 39
"U.S./Mozambique: The State Department perspective", Jan-Feb 46
"Current U.S. policy in southern Africa" (documents), Mar-Apr 39
"Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia" (interview), May-Jun 4
"Constructive engagement: An assessment", by John de St. Jorre, Sept-Oct 48
"U.S. strategic policy in northeast Africa and the Indian Ocean", by Larry W. Bowman and Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, Nov-Dec 4

USSR

African Update, Mar-Apr 28, 32, 37; May-Jun 33, 37; Jul-Aug 35, 38; Sept-Oct 34; Nov-Dec 40

Upper Volta

African Update, Jan-Feb 26; Mar-Apr 26, 28; May-Jun 32; Jul-Aug 30; Sept-Oct 27, 31; Nov-Dec 32, 33

Western Sahara

African Update, Jan-Feb 24, 35; May-Jun 36, 37, 38; Sept-Oct 31, 37, 38; Nov-Dec 37, 38

"The Addis summit: A test for African unity", by Margaret A. Novicki, Sept-Oct 52
"The Addis Ababa summit" (letters), Nov-Dec 65

Zaire

African Update, Jan-Feb 33; Mar-Apr 30, 31; May-Jun 27, 28, 35, 39; Jul-Aug 33; Sept-Oct 36; Nov-Dec 27, 31, 39

Zambia

African Update, Jan-Feb 34; Mar-Apr 31; May-Jun 27, 28, 36, 39; Jul-Aug 24, 33, 35; Sept-Oct 36, 42; Nov-Dec 36, 39, 41

"Southern African women speak out" (interviews), Mar-Apr 17
"Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia" (interview), May-Jun 4
"SADCC: Key to southern Africa's economic independence", May-Jun 43

Zimbabwe

African Update, Jan-Feb 35, 38; Mar-Apr 34, 38; May-Jun 27, 39, 42; Jul-Aug 38; Sept-Oct 38, 42; Nov-Dec 41, 42

"The economic outlook", by Margaret A. Novicki, Jan-Feb 8
"Tourism with a socialist slant", by Margaret A. Novicki, Jan-Feb 49
"Zimbabwe: Struggle and inheritance" (book review), by Tod Ensign, Jan-Feb 54
"Southern African women speak out" (interviews), Mar-Apr 18
"Current U.S. policy in southern Africa" (documents), Mar-Apr 39
"Removing laws that oppress women", by Eddison Zvobgo, Mar-Apr 45
"SADCC: Key to southern Africa's economic independence", by John Edlin, May-Jun 43
"A theater for development in Zimbabwe", by Kimani Gecau, Nov-Dec 24

NORTHERN AFRICA

Algeria and France strengthen relations after Chadli's visit

In November, Chadli Benjedid became the first Algerian president ever to make an official visit to France.

Although Algeria's eight-year war of independence from France ended in 1962, relations between the two countries have been deeply scarred ever since.

It was vital for Chadli and French President Francois Mitterrand to set a tone of ceremonial healing, and one of Chadli's most significant gestures was to place a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Paris. Some 17,000 French soldiers lost their lives trying to crush the Algerian rebellion, and Chadli had been a guerrilla fighter in the revolution. The Champs Elysées, which

leads to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier under the Arc de Triomphe, was lined with Algerian flags—which, two decades ago, had been among the most hated symbols in France.

Discussions between the two leaders centered on the legacies of the war: Algerian nationalization of French companies; the interests of French colonists who had returned to France after Algerian independence; current French racism against young Algerian immigrants; Algerian administration of cemeteries in which French soldiers are buried; and the fate of the *harkis*, or Algerians who fought alongside the French against the rebels. Most of these issues, still sensitive for both

sides, will require long negotiation.

But some immediate agreements were reached. Algeria ordered 2,800 Renault trucks and two Airbus jetliners from France. It was decided that the Franco-Algerian joint commission would meet in Algiers in December and would discuss, among other topics, the prospect of joint ventures in heavy industry.

Chadli also expressed satisfaction with French efforts to ensure the safety and prosperity of Algerian immigrants in France. Both Chadli and Mitterrand are concerned that revolutionary Islamic fundamentalism may spread among the discontented immigrants and cause security problems in both countries. □

MOROCCO: Interim government

• In late November, King Hassan II created an interim "government of national unity" to prepare for Morocco's upcoming elections. Two members of the previous government, Foreign Minister Mohamed Boucetta and Prime Minister Maati Bouabid—each of whom is the leader of a political party—have been named as ministers without portfolio in the new government, along with the heads of four other political parties. Bouabid will be replaced by Mohamed Karim Lamrani, a close adviser to the king and an experienced administrator who had been prime minister in 1971 and 1972. Boucetta's replacement in the foreign ministry is Abdelwahad Belakziz, former minister of information.

Lamrani, who is not formally affiliated with any party, will oversee the general elections this February, the first to be held since 1977. Moroccan elections have often aroused allegations of fraud, and the king charged the prime minister with making orderly elections his first priority. The second priority of the new government will be to supervise the referendum on the future of the Western Sahara; it is uncertain, however, when the referendum will take place.

Another sign of the "opening" in Moroccan politics was the release from prison of two prominent opposition figures. Mounir Amaoui, secretary-general of the Democratic Labor Confederation, and Mustapha Karchaoui, editor of the socialist daily newspaper *Al Moharrir*, had been jailed since last June.

SUDAN: Another threat

• In late November, while President Gaafar al-Nimeiry was on a four-nation tour to the U.S. and Europe, Sudanese radio announced that conspiracies were being "hatched by Ethiopia and Libya against Sudan." The reports alleged that "forces of saboteurs were massed on the Ethiopian-Sudanese border . . . with the aim of carrying out attacks on border positions, striking at oil fields, and sabotaging the Jonglei canal." The Sudanese sources later announced that "the saboteurs have suffered heavy losses of lives and equipment." Sudan also reported that Ethiopian jets had been regularly violating Sudan's airspace and had killed one person and injured nine others.

Ethiopia said that the reports were a total fabrication timed to coincide with Nimeiry's trip "in order to obtain massive military supplies from foreign governments, notably the U.S."

While in Washington, Nimeiry emphasized "the Libyan threat" to Sudan's security, but there were no reports of U.S. promises to increase military assistance. In February 1983, the U.S. increased Sudan's military aid package from \$25 million to \$60 million after there were reports of an imminent Libyan invasion.

TUNISIA: Party time

• Soon after designating Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali as his official successor, President Habib Bourguiba made Tunisia a multi-party state for the first time in its history, legalizing two of Tunisia's opposition parties. The "center-left" Socialist Democrats' Movement (MDS), led by former ambassador and defense minister Ahmed Mestiri, and the "leftist" Second Movement for Popular Unity (MUP-II), led by Mohamed Belhadj Amor, will now be permitted to hold party congresses and campaign openly for legislative seats. Soon after the establishment of pluralism, Bourguiba dismissed the minister of equipment, Mohamed Sayah, who had allegedly ordered the bloody suppression of a strike by the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT) in Tunis in 1978.

While announcing the legalization of the two parties, Bourguiba

referred to a comprehensive "reorganization of political and trade union life in the country." That reference apparently distressed many of the unionists, who have long exercised considerable influence in Tunisia. Seven of the 14 members of

the executive bureau of the powerful UGTT accused the union's leader, Habib Achour, of financial mismanagement and abuse of power. The dissidents' spokesman also implied that Achour and Bourguiba were planning to "pluralize"

Tunisia's labor unions. Achour denied the corruption charges and added that he did not favor a "pluralistic union" analogous to the new multiparty political system. The dissidents were expelled from office.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Blacks stay away from polls in South Africa township elections

Black South Africans turned their backs on township council elections in December as they did five years ago, heeding a vigorous campaign for a boycott.

The turnout in Soweto was 10.3 percent, compared to about 6 percent in 1978. There are only 237,000 registered voters in Soweto, South Africa's largest township with an estimated 1.5 million people. The other two dozen or so townships in the country also for the most part boycotted the elections, with an average turnout of 20 percent.

The boycott was organized by the full spectrum of black political organizations, ranging from the Inkatha movement of Gatsha Buthe-

lezi to Soweto's Committee of Ten and the United Democratic Front (UDF).

At a boycott rally, a UDF leader, Oscar Mpetha, the veteran Cape Town trade union activist, told Sowetans that they should remember that their children who were killed in June 1976 died because they wanted to do away with institutions of oppression such as community councils.

Dr. Nthato Motlana, the Committee of Ten chairman, said the councils "operate in a vacuum" as long as blacks are denied participation in the central government.

The new councils, recently reorganized under the Black Local Au-

thorities Act, are supposed to have as much power as their white counterparts—an acknowledgement, some believe, that the government recognizes the permanent presence of urban blacks in "white" areas.

However, the government expects the councils to be self-sustaining even though there is no business tax base (since apartheid policy insists that major businesses must be in "white" areas). Therefore the councils must rely on rents and liquor revenues. □

ANGOLA: Force rejected

● Angola said that it would reject any proposal that was designed to replace the Cuban troops in Angola with a multinational force. The rejection was in response to Nigerian President Shehu Shagari's proposal to replace the Cuban troops with a peacekeeping force from other countries.

The proposal was summarily dismissed by African leaders at the Commonwealth conference in New Delhi in late November. The leaders adopted the position that Cuban troops were in Angola at "the invitation of a sovereign state to protect it from attack." Angola's deputy minister for foreign affairs, Venancio de Mora, said that he regarded the idea as "an attempt to resuscitate a corpse—the linkage policy—which had been condemned by the international community as a whole."

BOTSWANA: Border clashes

● Tension along the Botswana-Zimbabwe border persisted throughout 1983. Botswana claimed in October that Zimbabwean troops had crossed the border and attacked a village leader, but Zimbabwe denied the charge. In November, rifle-grenade and mortar fire was exchanged when a Botswana border

U.S. lodges protest on forced removals

The Reagan administration has delivered an unusually high-level protest to the South African government over Pretoria's planned forcible removal of Mogopa villagers to the BophuthaTswana "independent" homeland.

Lawrence Eagleburger, the undersecretary of state, delivered the note to South Africa's ambassador to Washington, Brand Fourie. The note was described as similar to the State Department's public statement, which said in part, "We deplore any action by any government to remove citizens from their homes forcibly or to destroy their property."

Pretoria has mounted a public relations effort to try to justify the removal, which is based purely on apartheid ideology since Mogopa is in a "white" area and the government's policy is for all non-urban blacks to be relocated to the farflung homelands.

South Africa's deputy minister for information, Louis Nel, was sent to Mogopa to explain the government's side to the large contin-

gent of foreign reporters, particularly American and British, gathered there.

Nel told the reporters: "It is basically a Third World situation, which cannot be judged by New York or London standards."

The international attention on Mogopa, similar to that focused on another black village facing relocation, Driefontein, whose leader was killed by police in April, clearly has irked the government, which considers the media coverage one-sided. "We are bitter that Allister Sparks (of the *Washington Post*) and Alan Cowell (of the *New York Times*) commented on the relocation without having been to both places," said the information attaché of the South African embassy in Washington.

Shortly afterward, the government helicoptered the two correspondents and seven other American reporters to the condemned village and to its eventual location 60 miles away, where the government has spent \$6.8 million to set up the new community, complete with three schools and a health clinic. □

patrol found "elements of the Zimbabwean national army" burning huts three miles within Botswana. Zimbabwe responded by saying that the Botswana patrol had mistaken "gangs of dissidents" for Zimbabwean regular troops. Upon Botswana's demand, an "urgent meeting" between the two countries was held two days later, and Zimbabwe assured Botswana that Zimbabwean troops "were under strict instructions never to cross into Botswana in any of their operations."

- Botswana's economy should benefit from the projected \$1 billion Trans-Kalahari railroad, which will connect Botswana's developing coal mines with a shipping terminus on the Namibian coast, making exploitation of coal reserves more profitable. Feasibility studies are being conducted by a British engineering firm. Meanwhile, diamond production, the leading source of Botswana's revenue, continues to increase. In 1983, Botswana replaced South Africa as the world's third-largest diamond producer, behind the Soviet Union and Zaire.

LESOTHO: ANC restricted

- In late November, South Africa agreed to stop supporting Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) guerrillas who are seeking to overthrow the government of Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan. In return, Lesotho agreed to restrict the activities of the African National Congress (ANC) within its borders.

- The head of Jonathan's ruling Basotho National Party (BNP) denied reports that church leaders had successfully arranged a meeting between Jonathan and the exiled opposition leader, **Ntsu Mokhehle**. Mokhehle founded Lesotho's first political party, the Basotho Congress Party, and is now considered the leader of the LLA. The Roman Catholic church, which is "campaigning for national reconciliation," was instrumental in Jonathan's original ascent to power in the 1960s, when it supported him strongly because of his anti-communist views. Lesotho's religious leaders, however, have been distressed by Jonathan's recent overtures to communist countries. Although Mokhehle has been in exile for almost a decade, he is still popu-

lar and is now regarded as more conservative than Jonathan.

MOZAMBIQUE: Drought and destabilization

- Although Mozambique's worst drought in modern history began to ease in late 1983, the guerrilla war conducted by the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) made distribution of emergency aid almost impossible in the areas most devastated by the drought. According to Oxfam, the British relief organization, more than 600,000 people may be threatened by famine in the southern provinces of Gaza and Inhambane. Thousands of people have fled the countryside, flooding into Maputo and other coastal communities. But the government has already expelled "unemployed parasites" from Maputo, sending them to rural areas in the north, and more such expulsions are likely.

President Samora Machel's three-week visit to Europe in October yielded some results, the greatest of which may have been increased publicity for his country's plight. Machel and his hosts in Portugal, France, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Yugoslavia signed agreements on loans, credits, and investment in development projects. Some military aid will be provided by Britain and Portugal. Machel's efforts to obtain military assistance may have been aided by a "pre-emptive operation" carried out by South African troops against the Maputo offices of the African National Congress (ANC) while Machel was in Europe. South African commandos planted bombs on the roof of a building in downtown Maputo, and five people were wounded in the explosion.

In early November, U.S. envoy Frank Wisner visited Mozambique and spent three hours talking with Machel and senior members of his cabinet. An official in Mozambique said that the talks "could be considered positive."

SOUTH AFRICA: Rebuff from U.S. Congress

- An amendment to the U.S. congressional funding bill for the International Monetary Fund will make it difficult, if not impossible, for South Africa to tap the fund as it did

earlier this year for a \$1.1 billion loan. The amendment to the controversial bill, which increases the U.S. contribution to the IMF by \$8.4 billion, requires the Treasury Secretary to certify to Congress that any future loans to South Africa will:

- benefit the majority of South Africans economically;
- be for a balance-of-payments problem that cannot be solved by private sector loans;
- occur only after a reduction of "severe constraints on labor and capital supply mobility" through increased access to education and substantial reduction of racially-based restrictions on the geographical mobility of labor.

Although President Reagan strongly opposed the amendment, he is expected to sign the bill because of his support for the IMF increase.

As the largest contributor to the Fund, the U.S. plays a key role in granting loans and controls some 20 percent of the vote. If Congress is not satisfied with the certification, then the new bill calls for the U.S. to actively oppose South Africa's application.

The South Africans and other observers are said to believe that if this bill and the more significant Export Administration Act with its anti-apartheid provisions become law, South Africa would suffer severe economic consequences. The Export Administration Act contains the Gray amendment, which calls for an end to new corporate investment in South Africa, and three other anti-apartheid provisions.

SWAZILAND: Elections

- In Swaziland's mid-November general elections, voters chose 80 members of parliament out of the 160 candidates nominated by the Liqoqo, or royal supreme council.

Just after the parliamentary elections, a new cabinet was named. The Prime Minister, Prince Bhekimpfi, who has established his loyalty to the Liqoqo, retained his post.

Richard Velaphi Dlamini, who reportedly favors closer relations with South Africa, also retained his post of foreign minister.

Africa's Humanitarian Crises and U.S. Policy

BY CHESTER A. CROCKER

Africa's poverty is marked and exacerbated by constant threat to human life on a wide scale. It is not just one drought or one emergency refugee situation. Drought is endemic in Africa, striking first one region, then another. In some countries, like Mauritania, drought conditions have persisted so intensely over the last seven or eight years that whole segments of the population have been driven from their ancestral homes and way of life, perhaps never to return again.

FOOD

In this situation, the United States' role as a supplier of food and other agricultural assistance becomes more than an occasional humanitarian act. The United States is a major source of long-term and emergency food to Africa. We have an unparalleled record of assistance in addressing this problem. We have not shrunk from this call, regardless of the political ideology of governments whose people are hungry and threatened.

In fiscal year 1983, the United States provided \$250 million of food to sub-Saharan Africa, of which over \$40 million was in emergency food aid. Recipients have included Mauritania, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Djibouti, Ghana, Upper Volta, and other countries.

In just over a month of this fiscal year, we have already committed \$11 million and the United States is likely to increase our fiscal year 1984 emergency food assistance level for Africa to well over \$50 million. In addition, regular food assistance under PL-480 will be maintained at substantial levels in 1984.

The long-term problems of food production and availability are also being urgently addressed. For the past two decades, per capita agricultural production has declined in Africa—the only region of the world where that is true.

For that reason, our foreign aid programs in Africa have concentrated on means to increase the continent's food production. In addition, we have used our own country's abundant agricultural production to help encourage reforms and policies to increase Africa's own food production.

Chester A. Crocker is the U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs. This is an excerpt from a speech by Dr. Crocker at a conference on U.S.-Africa relations since 1960, presented by the University of Kansas and Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R-Kans.), on November 10, 1983, in Lawrence, Kansas.

REFUGEES

As with drought and hunger, refugees are part of the African scene and a problem of both immediate and long-term concern. Wars, famine, and internal strife have produced throughout Africa hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons. Some of the largest pockets of refugees, in Sudan and Somalia, have been in this condition for many years and there is no early prospect for resolving their plight. In Angola, torn by internal and internationalized strife, thousands are constantly periled by a lack of food and shelter.

African nations have an extraordinary record of accepting refugees into their countries and providing long-term shelter. But the strain on already poor economies is enormous.

The United States has been consistently sensitive and responsive to this problem. In 1981 we faced a dire situation in which many thousands of African refugees were in constant danger of starvation and exposure. At a conference that year jointly sponsored by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, the United States, represented by Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, stepped out front in pledging \$285 million for refugee programs. Since then, working closely with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and private voluntary organizations, we have succeeded in improving the management of relief efforts to the point where most refugees are out of immediate danger and we can concentrate on contingency planning and lasting solutions.

We have supported repatriation as the best solution where that is possible. There have been successful programs of that sort in Equatorial Guinea and Zimbabwe. We are particularly proud of a program now under way to repatriate Ethiopians from Djibouti, which was worked out despite many difficulties. Another significant approach has been our \$1.5 million training and education program for southern African refugees aimed at making them self-sufficient and alleviating the burden they represent to host countries.

We are constantly concerned to see that funding for continuing these efforts will be adequate. Traditionally, we have contributed about one-third of the United Nations refugee budget for Africa and we intend to continue to pull our weight, while pressing other donors to pull theirs.

Similarly we have contributed the largest single share of the International Committee of the Red Cross' Africa program to help those displaced by war or famine within their own countries. Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and a number of other countries benefit from this humanitarian effort and the ICRC's presence on the ground. □

Uganda's Two Decades of Turmoil

BY ALASTAIR MATHESON

Few countries have had a more complex history concerning refugees than Uganda. In the majority of cases, countries produce refugees who flee for various reasons to live elsewhere, while other nations provide asylum and care for refugees either on a temporary basis pending their return home, or until a more durable solution can be found. Uganda has not only hosted refugees from neighboring countries for 20 years or more, but has also produced large groups of refugees who have fled from several different regimes since 1966.

Those who have fled from Uganda over the years have been not only impoverished peasants, but also some of the nation's elite, including the current president, Milton Obote, who was forced into exile by a military coup in 1971. Fleeing before him in 1966 was the monarch of the Baganda Kingdom, the last *kabaka*, King ("Freddie") Mutesa II. And after eight years of au-

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torocratic and despotic rule that forced thousands to flee for their safety across Uganda's border, President Idi Amin Dada himself had to flee when his regime was toppled by a joint force of Ugandan exiles and accompanying troops of the Tanzanian army. Uganda's years of turmoil, which began soon after independence in 1962, have resulted in a confusing situation, at times with one group of refugees returning to the country as another group was fleeing. This movement is continuing even at the present time, with a two-way flow of Ugandans to and from southern Sudan.

THE FIRST INFLUX

It was in 1960 that southeastern Uganda saw its first refugees streaming over the mist-laden hills that separate the Kigezi district from Rwanda, which at that time was still under Belgian rule as the trusteeship territory of Ruanda-Urundi. Those who arrived in Uganda at that time, together with huge herds of cattle with their distinctive lyre-shaped horns, were Tutsi (or Watussi) peoples who for centuries had been the minor but dominant ethnic group in their homeland.

The first Tutsi exodus began after they fell victim to the mass resentment of the majority Hutu, who felt they had

been subjugated long enough by the aristocratic Tutsi in a feudal serf/overlord relationship. While Belgian administrators tended to look the other way, the Hutu proceeded with the systematic slaughter of the Tutsi, which lasted for several years and produced large numbers of refugees not only in Uganda but also south in what is now Burundi, with others securing asylum in Zaire and Tanzania. A few, including their *mwami*, or king, found refuge in Kenya.

At that time, western Uganda still had plenty of open spaces and even



some unoccupied land, recently freed from the scourge of the tsetse fly. It was here that the fleeing Tutsi were settled to rear their cattle herds, or turn to cultivation. It was not altogether a strange environment, for in Ankole there were also cattle of the same Zebu strain, tended by Bahima herdsmen who sprang from the same stock as the Tutsi. But it was only a few years before trouble was to reach Ankole, as it was one of the four traditional kingdoms in Uganda, together with Bunyoro, Toro, and Buganda. After trying to rule the newly independent country, leaving certain powers to the rulers of the kingdoms, President Obote decided he needed full control. This meant doing away with the monarchies and their titular heads, an operation he carried out without bloodshed, except in Buganda where the kabaka took a stand with his followers in the palace at Mengo, on the fringes of Kampala.

With the aid of the Ugandan army commanded by the then General Idi Amin, Obote soon crushed the Bagandan resistance, but the kabaka was able to escape in time with some of the Bagandan aristocracy, making his way to Britain and exile. On this occasion, there was no mass flight of refugees, and except for those Baganda who found it too difficult to transfer their deep-rooted allegiance from the kabaka to a president from a northern ethnic group, the people of the abolished kingdoms settled down to life under a republican government.

OBOTE FORCED INTO EXILE

Sudden change came in January 1971 with the toppling of the Obote regime when the president was on a visit in the Far East. The army took over and installed their chief, Major General Idi Amin, as the new president, abolishing all political parties and the elected parliament. Over the bloody years that followed, large numbers of Ugandans fled into exile and with them went thousands of Asians whom Amin expelled from the country as part of the "economic war" he declared — an effort to place all businesses and industries in indigenous hands, primarily his cronies in the army and fellow countrymen from northwestern Uganda.

Many Ugandans found asylum in

Kenya, while others passed through Nairobi on their way to Europe and North America — a route also taken by most of the expelled Asians who found new homes in Britain and Canada. There was also a large exodus of indigenous Ugandans south into Tanzania, where President Obote had already found asylum. While those seeking shelter in Kenya were primarily Bagandan business and professional people who found Kenya's free enterprise system to their liking, those who went to Tanzania and also to Zambia were mostly left-wing academics and supporters of Obote's outlawed Uganda Peoples' Congress party (UPC), as well as Lengi and Acholi military men fleeing from the bloody purge conducted by Amin in his efforts to rid his army of disloyal elements.

After this was completed, the dictator turned his wrath on Uganda's intellectuals and religious leaders. As a result, many of the country's best minds who survived by fleeing contributed their talents to other African states, as well as to countries around the world.


Probably due to the close friendship that existed between Presidents Obote and Julius Nyerere, anti-Amin refugees found a warmer welcome in Tanzania than those seeking to integrate themselves into Kenya's commercial and social life. Many lived under the con-

stant threat of repatriation, although the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) worked hard to prevent this on a large scale, finding alternative homes for those threatened with return and almost certain death in Amin's Uganda.

INVASION "LIBERATES" UGANDA

Once the invasion forces that formed in Tanzania crossed the Kagera River into Uganda in 1979, doggedly fighting their way toward Kampala, the picture inside Uganda changed dramatically. Delighted residents of towns along the route welcomed the "liberators" with genuine enthusiasm, and as streams of hopeful exiles began arriving home, Amin's demoralized army disintegrated almost overnight, most of the soldiers fleeing north to their homes. After gathering their families and their possessions, including considerable loot from the south, they crossed into southern Sudan together with vast herds of cattle to escape what they rightly feared would be the wrath of the invading army of liberation.

Meanwhile, traffic became a two-way affair on the Uganda-Kenya border as anti-Amin exiles began returning, hoping to pick up where they left off, while some of the richer "fat cats" who had kept Amin in power were fleeing into Kenya with expensive cars and



Milton Obote addressing crowds upon his 1980 return to Uganda: Those who have fled from Uganda have been not only peasants, but some of the nation's elite

Photo: Camerapix

other "prizes" of office. Once civilian rule was reestablished in Uganda and some semblance of democracy restored, there were hopes that the country would soon return to its former prosperous and progressive self, and that the scheduled elections would be free and fair. The first polling exercise in 1981 proved a bitter disappointment to many political opponents of Obote's UPC, which had hastily reactivated itself. Many of them took to the bush and soon bitter guerrilla warfare was again disturbing the peace and recovery of Uganda, especially in the Baganda country around Kampala and in areas where the Ankole leader, former Defense Minister Yoweri Museveni, held sway with his National Resistance Army.

In the midst of the renewed turmoil that was threatening to paralyze the Obote government, a new stream of 80,000 refugees suddenly began leaving Uganda, intending to cross into Rwanda. These were not Ugandans, but the families of those who had fled from Rwanda two decades before, claiming now that they had been ordered out of Uganda and had nowhere to go but back to their land of origin. To the surprise of many, the Rwandan authorities were not eager to grant all of them entry, especially since the Ugandan government denied there had been any expulsion order. The latter officials only acknowledged that there had been mysterious hostility between the former refugees and the local Ugandans that had led to a serious outbreak of violence. This culminated in a spate of attacks directed against the ex-Rwandans, which ended in organized arson and terrorism by local youths, forcing the "strangers" to flee.

This fluid situation became somewhat stabilized by October 1982 after 44,000 people crossed into Rwanda and another 30,000 to 35,000 people were housed in makeshift camps on the Ugandan side of the border. A series of consultations began between the Rwandan and Ugandan officials, first at Gabir, Rwanda, and then at Kabale, Uganda, to try to unravel the tangle. From these talks emerged an agreement that Ugandan ministers would interview those already across the border in Rwanda and determine which of them

were considered to be truly Ugandan. Those so classified would be permitted to return if they wished, while Rwanda would accept the balance. Rwanda's reluctance to accept the entire 80,000 or more was due not only to its already high population density, but also to the fact that those of Tutsi origin were not really welcome home, although the authorities went to great lengths to hide this reluctance, as well as the fact that the original exodus had actually been caused by the attempt at genocide against the Tutsi by the Hutu.

The exercise to determine "who is who" continues, but the latest reports indicate that relations between the two governments have become much more cordial again following talks between Rwanda's President Juvenal Habyarimana and Ugandan Minister of State Peter Otai. In Uganda, meanwhile, the government is trying to cope with an untidy situation by moving the fresh wave of refugees away from the border area and settling some 15,000 in a newly established camp at Kyaka in the Kabarole district of western Uganda, some distance from where they have been living at Nakirale. Getting the 70,000 cattle belonging to this one group to their new quarters entails a major logistical operation, with 180 men herding the cattle all the way in a three-month trek that was to have ended by early December, when they were to be joined by the final batch of women and children traveling in a fleet of buses to their new homes.

WHERE AMIN HAD HIS POWERBASE

While refugee movements between Uganda and Rwanda have been sporadic over the years, the flow into southern Sudan and also to eastern Zaire has been almost nonstop since the end of the despotic Amin regime. Much of this has been due to the excessive zeal of trigger-happy troops of the Uganda National Liberation Army in its "cleaning up" operations in northwestern Uganda. Here in West Nile, with the Sudanese border to the north and the Zairian border to the west, is where Idi Amin had his powerbase, although he actually originated from that part of the Kakwa ethnic group that lived on the Sudanese side of the bor-

der. Most of the people are Muslims and some served with the Anyanya guerrillas who formed the core of the rebel movement in southern Sudan, which fought the Khartoum government for 17 years until 1972.

In successive "mopping-up" operations by the Ugandan army since Amin was crushed in 1979, waves of civilians have been fleeing for safety into Sudan or into Zaire, whichever border was nearest when the soldiers struck. While there have been periods of tranquility when some of those who fled cautiously returned, then fled again, the Ugandan refugee population in camps in southern Sudan around Juba, plus others "spontaneously settled" nearer the border, has risen steadily, and unofficial reports now put the total number of Ugandan refugees in Sudan at 350,000. These consist of 250,000 officially registered with UNHCR and another 100,000 or so spontaneously settled Ugandans who prefer living outside of refugee camps in order to engage in smuggling and other dubious pursuits. There are now more ethnic Ugandans living in the Yei River district than Sudanese, causing an increase in tension there. In eastern Zaire, the Ugandan refugee population is estimated at 75,000, but there is a slow trickle back home to the West Nile.

To help returnees reestablish themselves back in Uganda, more than a million dollars has been given by the American and British governments and the European Economic Community. These funds have mostly been spent on relief items and construction materials to rebuild schools and medical facilities damaged during military operations in the West Nile district. Altogether, 130,000 returnees have come back from Zaire voluntarily since 1981 and have been joined in resettlement centers by another 110,000 people displaced from their homes, but who have since returned from elsewhere in Uganda.

In spite of appeals from President Obote and cabinet ministers to other Ugandan refugees to come back from Zaire and southern Sudan, the response has been slow, numbering only in the hundreds every month. A group of 160 refugees returned to West Nile from Sudan in October, traveling by way of Zaire because of "security problems"

on the direct route. Meanwhile, others have been fleeing from West Nile to go to camps in southern Sudan.

A state of anarchy has existed in Uganda's West Nile region for the past year as the Ugandan National Liberation Army encounters stiff resistance from anti-Obote guerrillas, especially by the Uganda National Rescue Front, formerly headed by the man who was Amin's finance minister, Brigadier Moses Ali. And with the extreme northeastern corner of Zaire over 1,000 miles from Kinshasa and even further from Khartoum, conditions in this remote border area are best described as a "free-for-all," and government intervention is minimal. This entire lawless area is fast degenerating into its former self, when as the infamous "Ladd Enclave" it was happy hunting grounds for elephant poachers, smugglers, and bandits in the last century.

Now with the increase in rebel activity against the Khartoum government by the "Anyanya II" guerrillas in the south, a fresh exodus of civilians is once more in progress. In the past month or so, between 20,000 and 25,000 Nilotic southerners have fled into the Ilubabor region of Ethiopia in the Gambela area where they are being looked after by the Ethiopians with an urgent \$400,000 grant from UNHCR. Sudanese President Gaafar al-Nimeiry has disputed the size of the refugee population and accused the Addis Ababa government of organizing training camps for the refugees to equip them for their eventual return as guerrilla fighters. A UNHCR team was scheduled to visit the Gambela area in December to investigate.

To the outside world, these comings and going of Ugandans have been extremely puzzling, until they become aware of the country's deep ethnic animosities. This was especially evident when Amin's "death squads" were hunting down Lengi and Acholi tribesmen after he took power in 1971. After his overthrow in 1979, it was his own people, the Kakwa, and some neighboring groups such as the Lugbara, Nubians, and Madi, who took the spoils of conquest across the frontiers into southern Sudan and Haut-Zaire. More recently, with the restoration of Obote and the ascendancy of his ruling

party, the UPC, the Bantu Baganda and other opposition groups decided it was time for them either to leave the country or to take to the bush and join the guerrilla war against what they regard as a purely Nilotic regime of northerners.

In other East African states, while the refugee situation is far less complicated than the Ugandan scene, the attitudes of governments differ greatly. Sudan, for example, has always adopted a humanitarian attitude toward those seeking shelter and keeps its borders open to all who request asylum in spite of the length of its frontiers. By contrast, Kenya's attitude is governed by the fear that every refugee is a potential security risk, so asylum is granted sparingly and only after thorough checking. This policy has even resulted in refugees being sent back to their countries of origin, often with dire consequences.

Although a large number of refugees have passed through Kenya, most have moved on to other countries, so that today Kenya has only 6,170 refugees, consisting of 2,524 Ugandans, 1,643 Ethiopians, 1,496 Rwandans, plus a few Mozambicans, Namibians, South Africans, and Somalis. When Kenya refuses asylum to a person seeking it, UNHCR attempts to delay the deportation until a third country can be found.

While voluntary repatriation is the

happy ending UNHCR always welcomes, this seldom happens in Africa, except in a special case such as Zimbabwe, where 250,000 former freedom fighters returned home from the bush after independence. The second-best solution is when the host country offers citizenship to the refugee. The outstanding example of such generosity is Tanzania, which not only has granted farmland to 10,000 Rwandans, but has given 30,000 of them citizenship. For this, President Nyerere recently received the Nansen Award from UNHCR on behalf of his country. Dr. Poul Hartling, the present high commissioner for refugees, paid tribute to Nyerere's unstinting dedication to the cause of refugees, "whatever the cause of their uprooting," and also pointed out that Tanzania had cared for hundreds of thousands of refugees over the past two decades. Tanzania, however, has yet to decide what to do in the case of another 40,000 refugees from Burundi, while Burundi itself still shelters over 200,000 people, most of them Tutsis from Rwanda, so completing the chain. Few African countries have the political courage to befriend strangers and there is a greater tendency these days to turn back those who seek asylum, even though it can mean lengthy detention, torture, or even death in their countries of origin. □



Rwandan refugees herding cattle in Uganda: Refugee movement between the two countries has been sporadic over the years

Photo: UNHCR/D. A. Bertoni

Homelands: The New Locus of Repression

BY MIRIAM LACOB

Last November, white South Africa gave Prime Minister P.W. Botha an overwhelming mandate to include Coloureds and Asians in a new, three-tiered form of central government. This development, following 35 years of undiluted Nationalist government rule, comes in a year that has also seen a slump in high-profile security police activity and a substantial drop in the number of bannings and detentions. Optimistic observers ascribe these developments to an increasingly pragmatic Nationalist government, which despite such opposition guerrilla activity as the explosion of a car bomb in the heart of Pretoria last May, now has the confidence and power to begin to put real reform into operation. However, although the South African government has certainly moved away from the white purism that characterized its earliest years, it has so far shown no movement away from a key tenet of its power — separate development.

Miriam Lacob is a South African writer living in New York.

The country's 23 million Africans will have no role in the new constitution. Their political rights, say government officials, will be found in 10 "nation-states" (the latest government terminology for homelands or bantustans), four of which have become "independent" since 1976, and six of which are being guided along that route.

Thus, although the new constitution may represent a change in direction, it is clear that the South African government is moving ahead on its homeland policy on the same course it began developing over 30 years ago. And it is in these 10 "nation-states" — far removed in many cases from urban centers, from human rights groups, and from a watchful press — that the new locus of blatant repression in South Africa is to be found.

Presented by Nationalist ideologues as models that will prove the efficacy of separate development, the homelands, in all their stages of self-rule, have instead developed into poverty-stricken fiefdoms, ruled by well-paid homeland politicians who have demonstrated little tolerance for opposition. Equipped with South African-trained security

police and, in most cases, helped into power by the South African authorities because of their demonstrated sympathy with Nationalist ideals, these leaders, with titles like "chief minister," "prime minister," or "president for life," have used a wide variety of means to crush any resistance, including the detention of opposition candidates during election campaigns and the passage of catchall repressive legislation that is in many cases more stringent than South Africa's. These laws give homelands police the power to detain those they suspect of threatening the security of the state for indefinite periods without trial or review. And at times of tension, when these leaders have felt their grip on power loosen, those so suspected, restricted, and arrested have included doctors, lawyers, trade union officials, students, teachers, and even the organizers of sports events and beauty contests.

Any organization that could be the basis for effective resistance to homeland or South African rule has been outlawed. Thus, the "independent" homelands, located in border areas, or as in the cases of Transkei and Ciskei, in areas of traditional opposition to

white-minority rule, have, like the South African government, banned the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). The homeland governments appear as well to have taken over the role of the South African security forces.

Last September, Venda security forces patrolling the Zimbabwe border area of this remote homeland reported killing three insurgents out of a group of five who had infiltrated into South Africa. The Ciskei, whose "president for life," Lennox Sebe, has been quoted as describing the ANC as "skulking in the dark to murder the defenseless," last April jailed two young blacks after lengthy periods of detention on charges of furthering the aims of the banned organization. South African security police investigating the case in the white South African town of King William's Town forced one of the accused, Mncekeleli Peter, to stand beside the tombstone of black consciousness leader Steve Biko in leg irons and handcuffs, while police threatened to shoot him, the court was told. In Transkei in 1978, President Kaiser Matanzima's security police detained 11 suspected PAC sympathizers for almost two years before bringing them to trial.

In addition to the blatant use of force, the homeland leaders can and do exercise their control and ensure continuing support for their government by more subtle means. Their legislatures control the homelands' limited budgets, most of which has been supplied by the South African government. They disburse pensions and the few social security benefits that exist, as well as housing in the overcrowded urban townships and rural slums. As the homelands are located in areas with little or no industry, government service provides most of the available employment and is widely used as patronage to be distributed to loyal supporters. At the local level, chiefs and headmen with considerably augmented power control the allocation of land and scarce contract work in white South Africa.


Analysts of the political processes of the Nationalist government ascribe many roles to its homeland policies. That most often focused on is the homelands' role as the repository of blacks whose labor is not needed in

white South Africa. Recognizing this, a group of South African researchers who recently published a three-year study of forced relocation in South Africa called their work "The Surplus People's Project." But observers increasingly are noting that the homeland policy plays an important role in the containment and repression of black resistance. They point out, for example, that the legislative groundwork for the creation of separate black areas administered by conservative traditional leaders was laid in the 1950s and 1960s at a time of intense resistance in the black community. Thirty years later — although observers unwilling to give credibility to homeland independence dismiss the homeland leaders as puppets playing out a patent farce — the homeland governments nevertheless have a horrible reality for their unwilling citizens. The use of blacks to smother black protest, writes *New York Times* correspondent Joseph Lelyveld, is "one of the key strategems of the updated and streamlined apartheid state."

The unbridled use of power by homeland leaders has been demonstrated in its more extreme form during recent events in Ciskei, the impoverished and overcrowded Eastern Cape area that, under President Lennox Sebe, was granted "independence" in

December 1981. Although Ciskei has always been an area of intense political unrest and autocratic homeland rule, Sebe's actions in Mdantsane, the sprawling black town outside the port city of East London, have, in the view of some observers, surpassed even his own previous records. Faced in July with a suspected coup plot and the simultaneous but unrelated boycott of a bus service part-owned by his government, Sebe detained at least 12 government officials, including his brother Charles, the former security chief, and several of his nephews. The president, in a move unprecedented in South Africa, banned the South African Allied Workers' Union — the organization that represents most of the workers who live in the territory — and detained its leaders. And to crush the widespread support for the bus boycott, he subjected his citizens to a reign of terror. By late November, members of a reliable monitoring group reported that between 50 and 80 of South Africa's estimated 130 detainees were being held in Sebe's jails.

The Mdantsane bus boycott was launched by a broad coalition of township residents who were unable and unwilling to pay an 11 percent fare increase to ride to low-paying factory jobs in East London. Sebe, it appeared,



*Homelands granted "independence" by South Africa

viewed this boycott, still widely supported in early December, as a challenge to his already shaky rule. In response, he mobilized the Ciskei police, soldiers, and a private army of vigilantes — that he had used to good effect during periods of unrest at least twice before — to prod the commuters onto the buses by any means.

The actions of Sebe's enforcers, according to an October report by the University of the Witwatersrand Center for Applied Legal Studies, have ranged from harassment and extortion to "naked physical violence." Commuters using private transport were forced out of cars and vans at road blocks, beaten mercilessly, and sometimes left unconscious at the side of the road. Police blockading a railroad station in early August shot and killed at least five commuters who were attempting to peacefully board trains to work.

Residents claim the death toll over the boycott period at as high as 90; Ciskeian officials admit to a total of less than ten deaths. Among those, residents reported, were a young schoolboy who was playing soccer with his friends (under emergency regulations, gatherings of four or more were prohibited), and the fatal police shooting of a young man (walking in the street with his girlfriend) who had refused to produce his residence documents on demand.

Sebe proclaimed a state of emergency and a curfew, both still in effect three months later. According to newspaper reports, the Ciskeian authorities arrested and charged over 1,000 people for violations of these regulations. Those whose families could not raise the \$400 bail stayed in jail until charged. In some cases, the vigilantes hauled off suspects to the Sisa Ducashe sports stadium in the township, where they were taken to locker rooms, beaten, and held for days before being charged, sometimes with totally unrelated offenses.

Legal-center attorney Nicholas Haysom, who interviewed community leaders and victims, reported numerous allegations of arbitrary arrest and torture. One victim, arrested and held at the Sisa Ducashe stadium days after Ciskeian police shot his sister to death, offered this description: "I was suspended while handcuffed, and whipped

on my body and feet with *sjamboks* [truncheons] and sticks for several hours. Thereafter I was left in a changing room with approximately 35 persons who had been brought there by the vigilantes. We were given no food and no water. [He was held for four days.] There was no toilet in the room. Within two days, there were approximately 80 persons in the room, which was about eight meters square."

Events in Ciskei are the worst example of the lack of restraint demonstrated by homeland leaders and their security police. However, incidents elsewhere clearly indicate that the local enforcers of homeland rule in all 10 "nation-states" operate within few limits. The response of Venda security police to an ANC attack on a police station in October 1981 demonstrates this. Following the attack, in which two policemen died, Venda police detained between 14 and 20 people, including a number of ministers and laymen associated with the Lutheran church in the area. Among them were Lutheran Dean T.S. Farisani and Isaac Tshifhiwa Muofhe, the latter a salesman and lay worker. Two days after his detention, Muofhe died in his police cell, slumped over a water basin. The inquest revealed that the young lay worker died of blood loss and bruises as a result of severe and prolonged beating. In a judgment unusual for South Africa where inquests have only once before found police responsible for the death of a detainee, the presiding magistrate found two Venda security policemen responsible for Muofhe's death. The two, Capt. Muthuphei Ludwig Ramagilega and Sgt. Phumula Josias Mangaga, were in charge of interrogating Muofhe, and according to Dean Farisani, were also responsible for the prolonged ill treatment he suffered while in detention. However, at their murder trial in 1983 a South African judge, who had been transferred to Venda shortly before "independence," found the two policemen not guilty of murder or of any other charge because "the state had failed to prove elements of its case beyond a reasonable doubt."

Incidents of police abuse of their powers of arrest and detention have surfaced in most of the "independent" and self-governing homelands. Transkei, which between 1963 (the time of

self-government) and 1976 (the year of independence) detained 1,170 people, but found a total of only 58 guilty of any crime, experienced three deaths in detention in a four-year period following independence. One was the case of Simfundile Matalazi, who died of an alleged self-inflicted hanging on December 23, 1980, after 112 days in detention. Police explaining the circumstances of the detainee's death at the inquest told the court that Matalazi had joined his pair of socks together and tied them around his neck, tying the other end to the window. He then allegedly lay down on the floor, covered himself with a blanket, and, using his left arm to exert pressure, died of strangulation. Many observers were skeptical of this version of events. "It was an exceptional piece of acrobatics," commented the *Sowetan* in an editorial.

BophuthaTswana, which gained its "independence" on December 6, 1977, has the only legislature in South Africa that has thus far passed an enforceable bill of rights. However, cases of the abuse of police power have surfaced in this fragmented homeland as well. The most notorious case that has come to light was the January 1982 death of three men whom tribal police had locked in a strongroom in blazing summer heat for 48 hours without food or water. Two survivors told of being beaten up and then laughed at by the tribal police when they banged on the door of the room to be let out.

In edging its homelands to "independence," the South African government has gone to great lengths to convince detractors that the option of independence was freely taken by the majority of members of a democratically elected government. Researchers investigating this have found some support for homeland independence from homeland residents. They theorize that this is because independence does away with some of the more humiliating aspects of segregation in white South Africa. It also provides opportunities for land and home ownership, privileges that are denied blacks in white areas. It is also often favored by chiefs and headmen, whose traditional power is often much augmented under homeland rule. However, the percentage of those participating in

homeland elections is low, indicating that few residents, and even fewer blacks who live outside the homeland but are considered to have that citizenship, take the opportunity to democratically choose their representatives very seriously.

Even those who have chosen to work with the homeland government systems have often found that their legal and legitimate candidacy lands them in trouble. The response of the homeland rulers to their democratically elected rivals has often been extreme. In Venda in August 1978, prior to elections leading to "independence," Chief Minister Patrick Mphahlele detained at least 55 people, most of them supporters and members of the rival Venda Independence party. This number included at least 11 legislative assembly members, two magistrates, and an assistant magistrate. Just over one year later, Venda became "independent." Dr. J.S. Otto, then commissioner-general for Venda, observed at the time that the members of the legislative assembly had "committed themselves to the democratic principles embodied in the Venda constitution."

Similarly, Transkei held its pre-independence election in 1976 while most of the members of the party opposed to homeland independence were held in detention. Kaiser Matanzima, then chief minister and now state president, used emergency regulations — known in the Transkei as Proclamation R400 and provided for in the South African homeland legislation for black self-government — to take his rivals out of circulation.

This provision for emergency measures has been widely used by emerging homeland leaders. Just before its 1977 "independence," BophuthaTswana introduced Proclamation R174 for the administration of declared security districts. It made provision for the imposition of a curfew, the prohibition on the movement of people, the indemnity of the local authorities, the protection of chiefs and headmen, and detention without trial for the purposes of interrogation. In 1977, Venda passed Proclamation R276 to deal with school unrest. It was identical to Ciskei's R252, which that government passed during the disturbances that followed the death in

detention of black consciousness leader Steve Biko in 1977. Ciskei, under the security police chiefdom of Charles Sebe, kept those emergency regulations in effect until 1982, when a national security act, devised by the now-jailed security police chief, was promulgated.

In addition to provisions for emergency regulations, the constitutions of the homelands that have asked for "independence" all contain a clause that preserves South African law — and the country's broad network of



Transkei State President Kaiser Matanzima: "Playing out a patent farce"

Photo: Darquennes/Sygnia

security legislation — until they are repealed. Following independence, the homeland governments have in many cases devised their own security legislation, which has often proven more draconian than that in operation in South Africa. In the seven years that have passed since Transkei became the first territory to opt for "independence," the security legislation in that territory has become so wide-ranging as to effectively stifle the open expression of any opposition sentiment. The territory is still in a state of emergency imposed in 1980 to crush the then countrywide school unrest. The Transkei proclamation declares scholars, students, and employers of any educational institution in Transkei as "affected persons," and prohibits such people from being in public places or leaving their homes unless to go to school or church. It can be a capital offense to question the independence of

the territory, and a lesser, but still serious, offense to threaten the dignity of the state president, in this case, former Chief Minister Kaiser Matanzima.

South African journalists Barry Streek and Richard Wicksteed, analyzing how Matanzima and his brother George, who is prime minister, appropriated almost total power in Transkei, note that Kaiser Matanzima has used the "state president's clause," which was taken undebated from the South African constitution, to arrest and try numerous rivals. The most important case was Matanzima's use of this clause against Paramount Chief Dalindyebo Sabata, his most powerful rival. Sabata, traditionally Matanzima's superior, was a vocal opponent of homeland independence. Convicted of insulting the dignity of the president, Sabata was deposed and fled into exile.

There are strong indications that with time, conditions in South Africa's already overcrowded homelands are going to worsen. The Surplus Peoples Project, which recently completed a three-year study of forced removals, concludes that in the past 22 years the Nationalist government has uprooted and relocated almost three million Africans in the general direction of the 10 designated "nation-states," and that at least two million Africans are threatened with removal in the near future.

With poverty and unemployment already endemic in these areas (per capita income in Ciskei is estimated to be less than \$400 a year, while unemployment in some areas of Venda is estimated at as high as 75 percent), the growing pressure of people can only increase misery, tension, and probably political opposition in the homelands. Given their records, one can only expect that the response of the homeland leaders to political or economic crises in their territories will be extremes of repression. Commenting on this, attorney Nicholas Haysom writes that the homeland rulers are "increasingly called upon to police the policy of separate development, and its resultant political and economic tensions, by fair means or foul. They do at least have the reassuring knowledge that, in the last instance, they will be backed by South African might." □

The UDF: Resurgence of Resistance

BY JOHN MATISONN

In November, white South Africa held a referendum to decide whether to go ahead and implement a new constitution. The result was as expected: an overwhelming endorsement of the prime minister's plans, which involve adding two new chambers to the present parliament — one for Coloureds (people of mixed race) and one for Indians. The new system's structure ensures that only a white from the majority party in the white chamber can become state president, the position that will wield the decisive power in the new system.

The new plan marks a significant change in the government's tactics to maintain power despite increasing pressures from a growing black population and increasingly critical world opinion. Some Coloureds and Indians have accepted the plan, announcing that they intend to participate in the parliament it creates.

The plan excludes black South Africans from participation in the central government, for whom new legislation

has been prepared. The primary elements are the Black Local Authorities Act and the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill. The former provides blacks with increased power at the local (municipal) level, while the latter escalates the fines for violations of the country's laws excluding unauthorized blacks from the cities; these fines range from \$400 to over \$4,000, and are to be paid by both the "offender" and his or her employer.

National political rights, according to the government, will continue to be exercised by blacks in the homelands, to which some are connected only through distant ancestors. The nature of the homelands has become more apparent of late, especially through the activities of the latest "independent" state of Ciskei. Ciskei's president for life, Lennox Sebe, recently imprisoned members of his family and cabinet and is responsible for extensive imprisonment without trial. Cases of torture by officials are now well-documented. Unlike Pretoria, the Ciskei authorities have even banned a black trade union, the South African Allied Workers' Union.

To fight the new constitution and the "Kooornhof Bills," as the new legislation is known (named after minister of cooperation and development, Dr. Piet Kooornhof), the United Democratic Front (UDF) was launched last August.

The inaugural meeting followed months of organizing to bring in as many affiliate organizations as possible under the new umbrella. The formation of the front was provoked by a call from the president of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, Dr. Allan Boesak. Its platform is to oppose the new constitution and the Kooornhof Bills, and it now boasts about 570 affiliate organizations.

Though some of its affiliates have endorsed the Freedom Charter to which the banned African National Congress subscribes, the UDF has not done so. Its only program is to campaign against the constitution and the specific legislation mentioned above. Affiliates include some 400 largely black organizations, as well as former members of the "congress alliance" such as the Natal Indian Congress, and progressive white organizations like the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) and the Black Sash, a women's organization that protests against apartheid and runs legal clinics to help victims of the country's racial laws.

Meetings tend to be reminiscent of the pre-banning days of the congress alliance, which is surprising, considering the strict laws prohibiting any activity that could be construed as "furthering the aims" of a banned organization. Though there appear to be no overt violations of the law by identifiable individuals at meetings, clearly the

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net effect is to sail fairly close to the wind.

At a meeting at Lenasia, the designated Indian area near Soweto, on the weekend before the white referendum a crowd of people of all races was in an assertive mood. The organizers were meticulous in ensuring that the meeting did not fall afoul of South Africa's intricate anti-activist laws. To avoid the clause in the Internal Security Act that is used to proscribe outdoor meetings, everyone was accommodated inside a hall. When that hall overflowed, a second hall in the same area was ready to take the late arrivals, and those outside were warned to move to avoid constituting a possible unlawful gathering.

An announcement was made before the start of the meeting that anyone who might be wearing a "Free Mandela" T-shirt should cover it up, as the T-shirt itself had been banned. Nelson Mandela, serving a life imprisonment term for his work as leader of the ANC, is a symbol who must be referred to in guarded terms. But an indication of crowd sympathy came when at various intervals during the afternoon, someone would shout from the hall the name "Oliver." The immediate response, "Tambo," made it clear that there was considerable enthusiasm for the exiled president of the ANC. The afternoon was punctuated with refrains of the names Oliver Tambo, Nelson Mandela, and Joe Slovo, the latter a white exile the South African government regards as the military strategist of the ANC.

Before the referendum took place, some UDF meetings were banned and arrests were made. But UDF lawyers won a court case overruling the banning of one meeting, and lawyers were on standby to act in case this one was banned. A wide cross-section of South African society was present, and the enemy was not whites, but participants in "the system."

Special anger is reserved for the black homeland leaders like Sebe, and for his action against trade unionists who had the misfortune of straying into Ciskei. Father Smangaliso Mkhathswa, general secretary of the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference, and designated a "patron" of the UDF, is also a recent victim. Mkhathswa, banned by Pretoria for eight years, three of

which he spent under house arrest, was visiting Ciskei to address students when he too was arrested. Repeated efforts by bishops and other clerics failed to obtain even official confirmation that he was being held, let alone where, under what charges, or whether he could be brought a change of clothes or food. Even the South African government will usually answer at least those minimal questions about a detainee.

Part of the objections to Sebe is that he chose to take "independence," thus accepting the basic premise of homeland policy — that blacks are not South African citizens, but citizens of one or another of these "states." But the more formidable homeland leader is Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, chief minister of KwaZulu and president of the Inkatha movement, which claims a membership of over 700,000. Buthelezi is widely held to have more credibility than Sebe among blacks for his stand against accepting "independence" and for his continued outspokenness against Pretoria, despite his working through the system. He argues that he holds his position in the KwaZulu legislature precisely to prevent someone like Sebe from getting the position and choosing to opt for independence South African-style.

But on the weekend of the UDF rally, some of Buthelezi's supporters were reported to have stormed the rooms of students at the University of Zululand where opposition to Inkatha is high, breaking down doors, killing at least five, and hospitalizing others. Not surprisingly, Buthelezi came in for scathing comments from speakers in Lenasia. "The enemy went into the rooms of the children and murdered them," said a speaker. And from exile, an ANC official also condemned Buthelezi in the strongest terms for not preventing the bloodshed nor condemning the perpetrators.

During the referendum campaign, Buthelezi appeared on platforms with the moderately liberal, white Progressive Federal Party to whip up opposition to the constitution. But the PFP fared badly as the government chalked up considerable gains among the PFP's supporters. After the white referendum, Buthelezi, clearly hurt by the PFP's weak showing as well as the

news of his supporters' actions at the university and in other incidents, appealed to the UDF to meet with him. He proposed an alliance of convenience against the common enemy. Decisions have not been taken, but the UDF seems unlikely to accept a meeting unless he takes responsibility for the university incident and meets other pre-conditions.

Speakers at UDF rallies include many of the old guard of apartheid opponents — the older generation from the Natal Indian Congress founded by Mahatma Gandhi and recently revived; Dr. Nthato Motlana, who came to prominence as chairman of the Soweto Committee of Ten; Bishop Desmond Tutu, general secretary of the South African Council of Churches; and academics of all races. Its patrons include Mandela and all other prisoners serving life sentences under the security laws, such as the ANC's Walter Sisulu, as well as others with no ANC connection.

Among the younger leadership are former leaders of the black consciousness movement, whose founding father, Steve Biko, was killed in a South African prison in 1977. The UDF's spokesperson, for example, is Mosiuoa Lekota, nicknamed "Terror," for his prowess on a soccer field. Last November, Lekota ended a six-year term in the Robben Island prison after a conviction in the marathon black consciousness trial of 1975 and 1976. He was national permanent organizer of the South African Students' Organization (SASO) before his arrest. Though he regards the black consciousness movement as a necessary stage in the country's political development, he now rejects its exclusion of whites from political participation alongside blacks.

Lekota said, "An increasing number of us perceive that the South African state does not only consist of the Nationalist government. It has delegated power to the Ciskei, KwaZulu, etc. Many of us see that we are ruled not just by whites, but by a section of the whites in collaboration with a section of the blacks. Some of those committed to apartheid are not white — but Buthelezi, Sebes, and others. And those who are committed to a free and democratic society are not only black."

Reverend Beyers Naude, whose father was a founder of the powerful secret society, the Afrikaner Broederbond (Brotherhood), could have been a national statesman, Lekota said. Instead he made a choice to show that apartheid was unacceptable, and has been banned since 1977. Other whites he mentioned included Helen Joseph, a septuagenarian who has been banned most of the last 20 years.

The UDF's policy of nonracialism is distinct from multiracialism, says Lekota. Nonracialism means judging people on merit, not skin color. Multiracialism retains race as a criteria by allocating representation to each race. "We would argue that in a nonracial state even if the most capable leaders were all white, it would still be representative of everyone. People think they might see a Coloured or Indian president under this new constitution. In fact, only a white will become president. But now he will be empowered to coopt one or two Indian and Coloured members of parliament into the cabinet, to give a facade of genuine representation. At its best, that might be considered multiracialism. So for us the distinction is important."

Not all those coming off Robben Island have moved away from the black consciousness philosophy. Another smaller organization, the National Forum, was formed to bring together the philosophy's adherents. Muntu Myeza, sentenced to a prison term in the same trial as Lekota, is the registrar of the National Forum, and was president of SASO. Ironically, much of the differences between him and his former co-accused, Lekota, revolve around a question some might have thought peripheral — the role of whites in the fight against apartheid.

Myeza accepts that some whites are genuine in their commitment to fight apartheid, but believes they should work among their own people. "What business has a white in a black trade union? They do not have the same interests," he argued. According to his point of view, a black head of a homeland is still powerless compared to whites. In South Africa, skin color determines one's position in society. Nevertheless, he has moved some way from what he sees as the "restrictive"

racial analysis prevalent at the height of the black consciousness period. Myeza now sees class as important in setting one's place in society. But, he says, in South Africa, class is still largely determined by race.

The debate between black consciousness supporters linked to the National Forum and the "progressive democrats" whose philosophy is non-racial is still the main divide within extraparliamentary antiapartheid circles in South Africa. The differences run deep, but there are anomalies. For example, the Council of Unions of South Africa (Cusa), a federation of unions about 120,000 strong, remains affiliated to both the UDF and the National Forum. Its affiliation probably does not mean much in either case, as Cusa representatives are not very active members in either organization.

The other major trade union federation, the Federation of South African Trade Unions (Fosatu), with roughly the same number of members, has stayed out of both. Although its sympathies clearly lie much closer to the UDF, its leadership has major criticisms of the UDF structure. Fosatu does not like to act on anything without a mandate. It is wary of participation in a body where political action may be decided upon lightly. If it is to participate in an organization, it wants to know that it will be represented proportionately in the decision-making bodies. In the UDF, a trade union federation is entitled to roughly the same influence on decisions as any of the large number of small, activist organizations that participate and make decisions, but are answerable to fewer people.

For Fosatu, trade union unity has a higher priority than participation in the UDF. Since trade unions are organized by factory or industry, Fosatu's members include black consciousness adherents as well as progressive democrats. It does not wish to risk alienating members, thus jeopardizing labor unity. Delicate talks are underway with Cusa, but the end is not in sight.

Most of the criticism of those who sympathize with the UDF's goals center around whether it is prepared to withstand the sort of government crackdown that has destroyed other or-

ganizations in the past. Fosatu has undertaken its own political actions to oppose the new constitution and support one person, one vote. Unions feel that the democratic nature of their organizations and their ability to mobilize their members effectively provide a strong base for whatever carefully considered actions are undertaken. But what political base will enable the UDF to do the same? What if the government bans or arrests people and closes the UDF down?

Against that argument, UDF members point out that the UDF works through its affiliates. There is little structure that is dependent on a central organization. So the government would have to ban 570 organizations, which is highly unlikely. International support for the UDF will provide little protection, most argue. Certainly there is little in the history of the Reagan administration to indicate that it considers the UDF an important avenue for peaceful change inside the country. Contacts between the United States and the UDF have been minimal. Administration interest appears to have been limited to pressure on Pretoria to provide a few black leaders with high profile abroad, such as Bishop Tutu and Dr. Motlana, with passports to travel. The administration's policy of "constructive engagement" with the region finds much that it sees as positive in the constitutional changes.

The UDF opposed the constitution, implicitly suggesting that white supporters should vote "no." Some of its white affiliates were more explicit in pressing for a "no" vote. Following the referendum campaign, the front campaigned for a boycott of the elections to local black authorities. Its next test will be the most important — to see what impact it can have on the expected elections of Coloureds and Indians to the segregated parliamentary chambers next year. The front will face conflicting pressures. Most members will want to boycott the events. But some are likely to press for a UDF ticket that would try to win the elections and debilitate the system by refusing to cooperate in the process. How that campaign is handled will determine whether the UDF has the capacity to grow into a powerful force to be reckoned with. □

The Post-Sobhuza Power Struggle

BY A CORRESPONDENT

The postcolonial reign of the late King Sobhuza II of Swaziland was that of a benevolent autocrat. While the constitutional order he shaped after the scrapping of the Westminster system in 1973 reduced the majority of Swazi commoners to passive spectators of his court, he was nevertheless revered by the people as an honest, trustworthy, and legitimate leader. The political atmosphere of his time was one of calm stability and freedom from fear and suspicion.

The 15-month period since his death in August 1982 has seen these positive qualities in the exercise of power disappear. Instead, there is now institutional instability and an atmosphere of fear, suspicion, and cowed acquiescence. Today, Swaziland is a country of the whispered rumor and anxious sideways glance; idle gossip or an intemperate remark can result in arrest as the police respond to hearsay reports of informers. Mere possession of an anti-government pamphlet has become an act of

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Former Prime Minister Prince Mabandla: "His strategy was to weaken and divide the Liqoqo"

retrospective sedition subject to a maximum 20-year sentence.

All this and more is the product of a brutal and fratricidal war that has erupted within the ranks of the Swazi ruling house. It is a no-holds-barred struggle for power and it has produced a series of stunning and, for Swaziland, unprecedented events. These include the sacking of a prime minister and his flight into exile to (of all places) South Africa; the deposition of the late king's

choice as queen regent and her enforced physical removal from her royal village; aristocrats such as princes, princesses, a chief, as well as the first Swazi attorney-general and a senior civil servant, disappearing into indefinite detention cells; the long-serving and respected chief justice tamely surrendering the independence of the courts to the dictates of a cabinet minister; and the already dissolved Parliament being hastily recalled to enact a draconian piece of security legislation. None of the many observers who speculated on the likely course of events after Sobhuza's death predicted that Swaziland would so rapidly take the same familiar path to totalitarianism as its neighbor, South Africa. But that is what is happening. One side effect has been to push to the backburner the issue that dominated the last years of Sobhuza's reign: the proposed land deal with South Africa.

This struggle for supremacy in the state has so far been fought in three rounds. The first was initiated by the then prime minister, Prince Mabandla, and saw him lose his position; the second was between Queen Regent Dzeliwe and a traditional but influential advisory body to the monarchy known

as the *Liqoqo*, and resulted in the Queen Regent's dismissal and removal to the Zombodze Royal Village. The third and present phase has been a showdown between Dzeliwe's supporters and her opponents in which the latter have gained the ascendancy and are now consolidating their domination of the politics of the post-Sobhuza era.

ROUND 1: THE OUSTING OF MABANDLA

To analyze Mabandla's challenge, one must understand the role and position of the prime minister and his cabinet in the structure of power that Sobhuza fashioned after 1973. In that year, he abolished the independence constitution of 1968, banned all political parties, shut down Parliament, and through his cabinet exercised all effective executive and legislative authority. The operative word here is "through," for the cabinet's role was now reduced to administering and implementing decisions and policies made by Sobhuza and his advisers at Lobamba, the royal capital. This remained the case even when Sobhuza allowed for the resurrection of the Parliament in 1979. Parliament's function became that of legislatively rubber-stamping into law Lobamba's decisions while the cabinet continued to put them into operation.

That was also the case in the tripartite structure of power that emerged after Sobhuza died. Headship of state passed to the other leg of the traditional dual monarchy, the office of the queen

mother, then held by Inkhosikati Dzeliwe. Joining her in the regency was the "authorized person," a post described by some as a special adviser to the queen regent. By tradition, the regent serves until the installation of the new king and his queen mother.

The second center of power to emerge was the *Liqoqo*, the traditional council composed of leading princes, chiefs, and selected commoners whose advice the king might value. Under Sobhuza, the *Liqoqo* had been a small and relatively anonymous body, but now it was resuscitated and expanded to comprise 16 males, all but four being princes and chiefs. Its members were sworn in by the chief justice on September 21, 1982, exactly one month after Sobhuza's death. A critical point to note here is the present designation of the *Liqoqo* as the Supreme Council of State. This term was first used when the minister of justice, Polycarp Dlamini, published in a government gazette the names of the members of the *Liqoqo*. Many saw this as a significant deviation from the traditional description of the *Liqoqo* as an inner council of advisers. To now call the *Liqoqo* the "Supreme Council" appeared to be an attempt to elevate the body to a status above that of the queen regent. Right there, the seeds for a clash between the regency and the *Liqoqo* were sown. It was to take 10 months to flare into the open.

Completing this power triangle was Parliament and the cabinet, which, in terms of policymaking, remained impotent. This is thought to have frustrated Mabandla. Not that he was a radical bent on far-reaching changes, but in one crucial area he was a dissident, and that was over the land deal so cherished by Sobhuza and his closest coterie of advisers.

Though he had never publicly expressed his opposition to incorporating the KaNgwane bantustan and the Ingwavuma region of KwaZulu into Swaziland, Mabandla had not expressed any public support for it either, and it is known that in June 1982 he had argued against incorporation both in the cabinet and before Sobhuza. In order to scuttle the deal, Mabandla had first to weaken those who had inherited the task of consummating it. His first move was to persuade Dzeliwe to transfer the


veteran minister of justice and member of the land deal negotiating team, Polycarp Dlamini, to the vacant ambassadorship in Washington, D.C. Within days, that decision was reversed following pressure from Foreign Minister Richard Dlamini (a land deal advocate) and the *Liqoqo*. Mabandla next tried to move against the *Liqoqo* itself by ordering two of its members, Prince Mfanasibili and Chief Mfanawenkhozi Maseko, arrested on charges of uttering seditious statements. In fact, what they had done was to intercept a speech prepared by Mabandla and some of his close supporters for the opening of Parliament in which they argued for the policy of primacy of the cabinet over the *Liqoqo*. Parliament never heard that speech, but the nation did, as it was read over the radio on the night of Parliament's opening. What Parliament heard was an opposite assertion in a speech written by the *Liqoqo*.

Mabandla's strategy was to weaken and divide the *Liqoqo*, for, in addition to the jailing of two of its members, it was said others would be subpoenaed as state witnesses against their colleagues. In retrospect, Mabandla overreached himself by seeming to attack the integrity of one of the basic institutions of the traditional Swazi state, and even his one strong supporter on the *Liqoqo*, Prince Gabheni, distanced himself from that. Days before the scheduled trial, Dzeliwe was "persuaded" to dismiss the prime minister. Within a week, he and his family had fled to safety in South Africa. Appointed to succeed him was Prince Bhekimpi, a junior cabinet member but highly respected in royalist circles and a passionate advocate of the land deal.

In several speeches since his assumption of the premiership in March, Bhekimpi has lectured his audiences on the history of Swaziland's border adjustments and has reaffirmed the determination of his government to regain their "lost territories." Instead, therefore, of killing the land deal, Mabandla succeeded in bolstering the political position of its advocates.

ROUND 2: DEPOSITION OF DZELIWE

In the context of all that has occurred in recent months, Mabandla's sacking



David Robbins

was only a preliminary skirmish. It was nonetheless important. First, it was a defeat for Dzeliwe who seemed to have favored him and many of his ideas. Certainly she supported him and his actions for as long as she possibly could. Second, it was a setback to those in his cabinet and in the civil service who had hoped that the post-Sobhuza era would initiate a period of reform in such areas as land use, the keeping of cattle, and other traditional agricultural practices. They looked to Mabandla to spearhead this process of modernization. Finally, his political demise saddened the Swazi people, for to them he had a certain populist appeal. His image was that of a "Mr. Clean" because of his attempts to root out official corruption through a commission of inquiry, whose efforts the king terminated when it began to probe certain sensitive areas of royalist power and patronage. Mabandla described this as a "defeat" and many Swazis undoubtedly shared that view.

Despite its importance, Mabandla's eclipse was not, however, the decisive phase of the post-Sobhuza power struggle. That began last July and was triggered by the fact that the life of the Swazi Parliament was nearing its end and new elections were scheduled for October. Parliamentary elections in Swaziland are indirect and are conducted according to a unique system. The country is divided into 40 electoral districts known as *Tinkhundla*. On election day, all Swazis are required to report to a *Tinkhundla* (there is no electoral register and no proof of Swazi identity is required or asked for), where they are presented with the names of four candidates selected by the elders of that district and presumably cleared in advance by the politicians at Lobamba. No speeches, nor any forms of electioneering are permitted. The candidates simply place themselves in front of a gate leading to a wooden enclosure and the voters file through the gate of the candidate of their choice. The two candidates who in this manner attract the most support are the winners, but the point is that their election is not to Parliament, but to a national electoral college. This begins its work immediately after the elections when all members are cloistered together where they, like the papal electoral college, remain

until they have completed their work. And their task is to screen a list of approximately 80 potential members of Parliament with a view to electing 40 to the body's lower house. To that number are added 10 members nominated by



Prime Minister Prince Bhekimpi: "A passionate advocate of the land deal" with South Africa

the head of state. A smaller upper house, or senate, is similarly constituted.

Therefore, there are two critical stages in this system: the preparation of the list of potential parliamentarians and the selection of the nominated members. Four years ago, both tasks were performed by Sobhuza. The key question in 1983 was who would do so this time — Dzeliwe or the Liqoqo. The stage was set for a decisive confrontation.

The question needs to be posed here as to why, if Parliament was as described earlier, a powerless rubberstamp, it should matter who constitutes it. The answer is that it does not, but the point is that the struggle that followed was not really about Parliament's composition at all. The elections were simply the catalyst for Dzeliwe and the Liqoqo to settle once and for all the question of who was to be supreme in the new era.

The Liqoqo made the first move. On August 2, 1983, the Liqoqo presented Dzeliwe with a document transferring many of her functions to an "authorized person," the senior member of the Liqoqo. The document was in English and, according to the September 9 edition of Colin Legum's *Third World*

Reports, was drafted by an especially hired "South African lawyer." Not being fully conversant with the English language and particularly its legal terminology, Dzeliwe sought the advice of Arthur Khoza, principal secretary in the agriculture ministry and the late king's official interpreter. His advice was that she should not sign and she never did. A week later, a government gazette announced Dzeliwe's dismissal and replacement by Queen Ntombi, mother of the designated heir, Prince Makhosetive, a 15-year-old studying in England. The gazette was signed by the "authorized person" and not (obviously), as the law required, by the head of state. Dzeliwe's response was to challenge the action in the high court on the grounds of the doubtful legality of the gazette, that the Liqoqo had no legal powers to dismiss her, and that tradition had it that she remain regent until the official installation of the heir, which had not yet occurred.

Dzeliwe's suit was filed on her behalf by Chief Lukhele, assistant registrar at the local university. In court, she was represented by a Harvard-trained lawyer, Douglas Lukhele, a former attorney-general and the first and only Swazi to hold that post. Hearing the case were two assessors and Chief Justice Charles Nathan, a South African only months away from retirement after many years on the bench. In the initial hearing, Nathan appeared hostile to the Liqoqo's case as presented by a white South African lawyer from Pretoria. At the conclusion of these proceedings, Nathan announced judgment would be given in seven days.

In the interim, the "authorized person" issued a second gazette decreeing that the high court was incompetent to pronounce on this issue as it was a question of Swazi custom and tradition and thus had no place in the Western courts. Two days before judgment was due, Minister of Justice Polycarp Dlamini met with the chief justice and one of his assessors to discuss the case. On judgment day, Nathan announced his acceptance of the decree rendering his court incompetent to pronounce on Dzeliwe's dismissal. On the same day, Douglas Lukhele was picked up at the Swazi border and placed under 60-day detention. He had apparently spent a

week in South Africa out of fear for his safety. Also detained was Dzeliwe's adviser, Arthur Khoza. In many quarters, the court's decision to avoid a legal judgment was greeted with dismay and anger, the strength of which was borne out by the fact that Justice Nathan complained later of the many abusive telephone calls he had received.

ROUND 3: THE SHOWDOWN

What followed was a series of events that included:

- A further spate of detentions of four princes, one of their wives, Chief Dambuza Lukhele, his brother, and two of the daughters of Douglas Lukhele.
- A rash of anti-government pamphlets.
- Two street demonstrations by college students.
- The reenactment of an old colonial law on sedition that vastly increased the penalties for conviction.
- The dismissal of Prince Gabheni from both his cabinet post and membership in the Likoqo, and the arrest of his wife and some of her fellow employees at the Swazi Central Bank on charges of sedition.
- The removal of Queen Dzeliwe from her Lobamba home.
- The termination of Queen Ntombi's mourning period and her assumption of the regency. (She had originally refused to take it up on the grounds that she had not yet completed the three-year period of mourning prescribed by custom.)
- A brief return to Swaziland by the heir, Prince Makhosetive, so that he could be introduced officially to the nation as its next king. (This was not, it should be noted, his official installation or coronation — that awaits his attainment of adulthood. Makhosetive's visit was widely interpreted as an attempt by the Likoqo to give legitimacy to their actions, for many regarded their overthrow of Dzeliwe and appointment of Ntombi as a perversion of custom.)
- The signing by Ntombi of the same statement that Dzeliwe had rejected in August.

This last action set the seal on the Likoqo's triumph, because it implicitly recognized the supremacy of the

Likoqo over the regency. The stage was now set for the elections. Fears of a widespread boycott of the *Tinkhundla* meetings were countered by threats from some chiefs that those who failed to vote would lose their land rights and by an unprecedented security operation involving endless army and police road blocks on all major highways, plus car and body searches. Election day passed without incident, though accounts vary as to the turnout. The local papers talked of a record poll, while the South African press spoke of a large-scale boycott. The truth probably lies somewhere between.

The electoral college completed its work in late November and a new Parliament and cabinet will shortly emerge. It hardly seems unrealistic to suggest that the latter will be one purged of all elements considered sympathetic to the old order of Mabandla and Dzeliwe. One rumor is that only three of the existing cabinet will retain their seats, namely the prime minister and the foreign and justice ministers, Prince Bhekimpi, Richard Dlamini, and Polycarp Dlamini, respectively. All three are hardliners and have all along been aligned to the Likoqo's thinking, so the rumor is plausible. Likewise, it is thought that once the cabinet is in place, a similar purge of the senior ranks of the civil service will follow.

What does all of this mean? The first point is that the strife within the royal family has essentially been factional rather than ideological. It has been a struggle for position, over who will exercise power and not over the end or the policies to which that power could be put. This is not to say that it would have made no difference at all had Mabandla prevailed over the Likoqo, but the difference would have been deviations from established policies rather than fundamentally new policies. Mabandla was a modernizer, not a progressive reformist.

A second qualification concerns Dzeliwe's motives, which were not essentially those of a lust for power. She saw herself as the inheritor of Sobhuza's mantle and role as effective chief executive — a monarch who ruled. That had been Sobhuza's task. Dzeliwe sought to perform the role that her interpretation of tradition required

of her. Others share that interpretation, which is why the Likoqo is seen as a usurper of power by many in the Swazi nation.

This raises another crucial observation: that the monarchy no longer exercises real power in Swaziland. The Likoqo has managed to achieve what the British in their long constitutional negotiations before independence could not — namely, to reduce the monarch to that of a symbolic figurehead. When Ntombi signed over her powers to the "authorized person," she assumed a subordinate position. What the Likoqo has done is to elevate itself from an advisory position to the wielder of power.

And within the Likoqo itself, there appears to be a process of power stratification under way. Recently, the formation of a standing committee within the Likoqo was announced that will be charged with day-to-day decision making. It would seem that this is now the locus of real power in Swaziland. Four of the members of this group are Prince Mfanisibili, Dr. George Msibi, Senator A.K. Hlophe and, interestingly, Princess Mnen-gwase, a new appointee to the Likoqo and the first and only woman member. Ideologically, these four are conservative and thought to favor a deepening of economic and other ties to South Africa. They can be expected therefore to cooperate with South Africa on such security issues as clamping down on the activities of the African National Congress inside Swaziland, while also pursuing vigorously the negotiations over the proposed land transfer.

Whether, however, those "lost lands" are ever gained depends as it always has not on them but on what suits Pretoria's interests best. Presently, the South African government appears to be vacillating on the issue, perhaps because of the unexpected degree of opposition to the deal inside South Africa. So for now the issue has been relegated to a judicial commission where it seems likely to stay for at least until the new constitutional dispensation in South Africa is complete. Perhaps finally here is an issue upon which the Likoqo will not be able to ride roughshod over all opposition and force its will. □

Pragmatists or Partisans in Brazzaville?

BY HOWARD SCHISSEL

Having celebrated with great pomp last August the twentieth anniversary of the 1963 demonstrations that toppled President Abbé Fulbert Youlou's unpopular government and laid the groundwork for the creation of Africa's first self-proclaimed "Marxist-Leninist" regime, Congo is at present actively preparing next summer's crucial congress of the ruling Congolese Workers' Party (PCT). For President Denis Sassou-Nguesso, the upcoming PCT congress will be a critical test of his ability to consolidate the country's political stability of the last few years as well as its growing pragmatism in economic matters, while remaining outwardly faithful to Congo's ritualized revolutionary traditions.

After years of political turmoil that included the still unexplained assassination in 1977 of President Marien Ngouabi and the disgrace and imprisonment of President Joachim

Yhombi-Opango in 1979, the Congolese political scene has experienced a much-needed respite since the coming to power in 1979 of President Sassou-Nguesso, although political debate and ideological and ethnic rivalry have not ceased within the PCT. A type of *modus vivendi* has emerged in PCT ranks as if there was an official consensus that the country needed a breather to take stock of its turbulent past and envisage the future with more serenity. Indeed, the situation until 1979 had become extremely preoccupying, for as one commentator on the Congolese political scene aptly put it: "The system was cannibalizing its elite at too fast a pace."

The emergence of President Sassou-Nguesso was generally interpreted as a victory for the PCT's left wing against the opportunism of the two-year Yhombi-Opango period. In reality, the situation is much more complex. While revindicating a return to the Ngouabi line, the new Congolese leader has sought to widen his power base by rehabilitating members of the *Mouvement du 22 Février* (commonly referred to as M-22, it is associated with the pro-Chinese group in the early 1970s led by Ange Diawara), opening up the party to technocrats and moderates, and seeking to attract home mem-

bers of the exiled opposition community. Hardliners have attempted to halt this drift, but thus far they have not been very effective.

To complicate matters even further for Sassou-Nguesso, politics in Congo are often intimately intertwined with ethnic and regional rivalry. The Western press generally portrays the country as dominated by the struggle for power between the north and south. Yet the situation is not that clear-cut. Though northern ethnic groups have dominated the Brazzaville political scene since 1968, they are far from a homogenous

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group. The last three presidents have come from the Cuvette region and this is not necessarily satisfying to other northern groups. Likewise, the south is divided. The coastal Vili population has tended to support the regime, while the Lari and Kongo groups in the Pool area around the capital have over the past 10 years maintained a distrustful distance from Brazzaville's often unpredictable political events.

The Congolese head of state has been able to navigate on these treacherous waters with a fair degree of success. In particular, he has skillfully utilized carrot-and-stick tactics to reinforce his authority. The rehabilitation of leading personalities in the M-22 movement provides the president with a means of counteracting pro-Soviet hardliners within the PCT without cutting himself off from rank-and-file party radicals. In this way, Sassou-Nguesso has been able to diminish the prerogatives of Minister of Interior François-Xavier Katali without excessively rocking the boat. Likewise, last year he dismissed Minister of Information Florent Nsiba, suspected of encouraging ethnic dissidence.

In foreign affairs, Brazzaville has striven to diversify its partners. Although the country has a friendship and cooperation treaty with the Soviet Union, Brazzaville has carried out a diplomatic rapprochement with the West. The 1981 victory of President François Mitterrand's Socialists enabled relations between Paris and its former colony to be quickly patched up. In both 1982 and 1983, Sassou-Nguesso made official visits to France, and the French leader paid a state visit to the Congo at the beginning of 1983. This rapprochement, however, did not rule out Congolese criticism of French policy during last summer's Chadian crisis.

Although diplomatic relations were reestablished with the United States at the end of the 1970s, the Congolese still remain highly critical of the Reagan administration's African policies, be it "constructive engagement" towards South Africa, unreserved support for President Mobutu Sese Seko's regime across the river in Kinshasa, or military cooperation with Somalia, Sudan, and Egypt. Opposition to American foreign

policy goals in Africa is perhaps the single most important point of convergence between Brazzaville and Moscow.

Soviet influence is generally limited to the armed forces and the security apparatus. It is estimated that there are some 100 Soviet advisers in the country to train the Congolese armed forces in the use of Soviet weaponry, including MIG-21 and MIG-23 jet fighters. Cuban and East German advisers also play a role in the training of security forces. However, Congolese-Soviet friendship has not precluded Brazzaville from maintaining good relations with China, which has built a new people's palace in the capital. Economically, Congo's links with the Soviet bloc are marginal, representing less than 3 percent of foreign trade.

In general terms, Congolese foreign policy in African affairs is associated with the "progressive" cause, supporting Polisario in the Western Sahara, Goukouni Woddeye's forces in Chad, and the liberation movements in southern Africa. It is principally Zaire's special relationship with the United States that accounts for the frosty relations between Brazzaville and Kinshasa. The Congolese leadership has always thrown its support behind the MPLA government in Angola — even allowing its territory to be utilized during the Cuban airlift of men and material to Angola in 1975-76 — and watches with great concern attempts to weaken President José Eduardo dos Santos. Ideological differences between Brazzaville and President Omar Bongo's regime in Gabon, however, have not soured excellent bilateral ties.

Along with detente in Congo's politics and a certain overture toward the West in the diplomatic arena, Sassou-Nguesso's four years in office have also been characterized by unprecedented prosperity and a timid liberalization of the economic system. The Congolese leader's accession to power luckily coincided with the second oil boom in 1979 and the more than doubling of the country's primarily offshore oil production. Along with Cameroon, according to a recent World Bank report, Congo is singled out as the only other West or Central African state in the 1980-82 period to have registered a per

capita growth in gross domestic product in real terms. From \$1.7 billion in 1980, Congolese GDP rose to \$2.2 billion in 1982, resulting in a boost of per capita GDP over the same period from \$1,100 to \$1,300.

The massive influx of petrodollar wealth enabled Congolese economic planners to elaborate an extremely ambitious five-year development plan (1982-86). Ignoring advice from certain French experts, the Congolese economic strategy is based on the rapid transformation of oil wealth into infrastructure and productive capacity in order to enable the country to achieve a broader-based and more self-centered economy by the end of the 1980s. In certain ways, the Congolese approach resembles the headlong rush toward industrialization and agro-industry adopted in Algeria under late President Houari Boumediene. It is likely however, as in Algeria, that lack of trained manpower, supply bottlenecks, and other objective economic constraints will rapidly blunt Congo's economic targets.

The 1982-86 development plan was calculated under the assumption that the price of oil would remain at least at \$33 per barrel, and that output could reach as much as 10 million tons a year by 1986. Expenditures were geared to this highly optimistic scenario. Thus, in recent years, Congo experienced an unprecedented expansion, with new administrative buildings springing up in Brazzaville and the Pointe Noire coastal oil center, a boom in luxury housing for the large number of new expatriates, an acceleration of road building, and an expansion of domestic trading activities. Congolese economists reckoned that the first signs of a slowdown and overheating of the economy could start appearing in 1985-86. However, the changes in the world oil market beginning in mid-1982 brutally reversed this conjecture.

With the price of Congolese oil down to \$29 per barrel and a downward revision of production projections, Congolese economic planners were obliged to slam on the brakes in 1983. Already, Pierre Moussa, minister of planning, has spoken of two years of austerity. Fortunately, Congo has adopted a flexible planning approach with the re-

jigging each year of expenditures according to expected oil revenues. Infrastructure is to receive priority in development spending, while productive schemes in industry and agriculture are now to be put off for better times. Critics of the infrastructure option maintain that the construction of the expensive highway to the north has more of a political than economic purpose, as the payoff period, when combined with the high cost of financing, building, and specially maintaining the highway, will make the project a long-term drain on the economy. The sparsely populated northern region, it is stressed, despite its forestry potential, will be unable to generate sufficient output to justify the investment outlay.

Cutting back on public expenditure is likely to be a tricky task. For one, the Congolese population's expectations for a better life remain extremely high. Secondly, expansion of the state system is the principal purveyor of jobs for the country's increasingly well-educated youth. Finally, much of the political calm of recent years has been attributed to the healthy economic climate. For example, the government planned investments of \$353 million in 1982, but wound up spending \$493 million. In mid-1983, investment budget expenditures for the year were trimmed back from \$410 million to \$360 million. Pressures are so great to keep the economic machine operating at full steam that it is unlikely that purely domestic factors can manage to oblige the government to respect its own spending ceiling.

External factors, on the other hand, are soon liable to force the government to come to grips with many delicate problems. Foreign debt has been expanding at a rapid pace, and debt service relative to exports has doubled every year since 1980. The government estimates foreign debt at around \$870 million and the debt-service ratio at 27 percent for 1983. The International Monetary Fund, for its part, places overseas debt at closer to \$1.12 billion with the debt-service ratio approaching 35 percent. This debt crunch could become a central factor influencing government economic decisions in the years to come.

Timid efforts have already been

made to reform the unwieldy public enterprise sector. In April 1983, the PCT central committee estimated that the parastatal deficit for 1982 stood at \$82 million, a figure representing some 10 percent of the 1982 state budget. Moreover, as in many other African countries, this sector is highly inefficient and wasteful of limited resources. Given Congo's political history, any attempt to prune the parastatals is viewed in some quarters of the party, the trade unions, and the armed forces as a return to "capitalism."

As long as the economy was expanding, it was possible to support the public-sector burden. But at a time when austerity is rapidly becoming the watchword, measures must urgently be taken. This is the reason why the economic slowdown could engender significant social and political tensions for the president. Without directly dismantling the parastatals, the government hopes to convert many into *sociétés de gestion* (joint management companies) in which both private Congolese and foreign investors can play a part.

Congolese agriculture, already the economy's "poor cousin," will suffer from reduced governmental allotments. Less than 1 percent of the country's total land mass is under cultivation, and most of that is on a subsistence level. The production of export crops like cocoa and coffee collapsed over the past decade, as did sugar output after nationalization of the Nyaki complex in the late 1960s. The result has been that Congo's dependence on food imports has been seriously exacerbated, with a larger share of precious hard currency earmarked to pay the food import bill. The attempt to upgrade agriculture has often been linked to the creation of large and costly agro-industrial complexes, whose efficiency is far from assured. Even with the availability of vast tracts of unused land, the country's cattle-rearing potential has yet to be more than just partially realized.

The benign neglect of the rural areas has led to an accelerated drift to the urban centers, further depriving the rural economy of manpower. Congo has experienced one of the fastest rates of urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa. Some estimates indicate that as much as

75 percent of the population could be living in cities and towns by the end of the century. This phenomenon could produce intractable headaches for the regime as it is improbable that sufficient social services and basic infrastructure necessary for guaranteeing a decent standard of living for the majority of the population can be provided.

The immediate source of the current wave of economic difficulties is the retrenchment in the Congolese oil industry. Production has climbed from 2.5 million tons a year in 1978 to just over 5 million in 1983. Output should peak between 6 and 7 million tons in 1985-86, instead of the hoped-for 10 million tons a year. The drop in the price of oil and the revised global strategy of Elf Aquitaine, the French state-controlled oil company, has played havoc with plans for the oil sector. Elf, which produced some 75 percent of Congo's oil, has shifted its emphasis to the more lucrative possibilities in neighboring Angola and to its long-term commitment to reinforcing activities in the United States. Thus, formerly attractive investment targets on the Congolese continental plateau have been put on the backburner. Two American consortiums, headed by Coastal Petroleum and Cities Service, have started drilling on Congolese territory, but so far have not turned up commercially profitable fields.

The first months of 1984 — when the initial effects of the economic pinch should start to make themselves felt — will be crucial for determining the future course of Congolese politics. Already, left-wing PCT activists are trying to capitalize on discontent within the party, the trade union movement, and the state administration with a view to pushing for a radicalization of the political process. President Sassou-Nguesso will require considerable political acumen to maintain a modicum of unity and consensus within the PCT to carry forward the pragmatic reform measures that have been the hallmarks of his rule. Attention will therefore be focused on the preparation of the party congress and the selection of delegates. In Brazzaville, most people are aware that important political events usually precede party congresses. □

Letters to the Editor

TILTING AT GAVSHON

To the Editor,

I have read Arthur Gavshon's article "Seychelles: A Tilt to the West" (November-December 1983, pp. 56-59) and would like to point out two glaring errors made by the author. The first error is found on page 57: "This strain on public funds has had to be paid for not only in increased income and other taxes, but also by international borrowing from institutions like the International Monetary Fund, which depend on Western finance."

I would like to inform Mr. Gavshon that the Republic of Seychelles has never had to borrow money from the International Monetary Fund. This is a record that we are proud to stand on.

The second error occurs on page 58. Mr. Gavshon incorrectly states that the Republic of Seychelles abstained on the Falkland/Malvinas item in the General Assembly. The fact is, the Republic of Seychelles did not participate in the vote. Let me add that there is a difference between nonparticipation and abstention. Due to severe personnel constraints and being a one-person Mission, the Seychelles ambassador cannot vote on every single issue in the United Nations.

Before I conclude, I would like to state that Mr. Gavshon's own conclusion should have provided him with a better title for his article. Perhaps "West Tilts to Seychelles" would have been more appropriate.

Giovinella Gonthier
Ambassador and Permanent
Representative, Permanent Mission
of the Republic of Seychelles
to the United Nations

The author responds:

Ambassador Gonthier has a point. I should have made it clear that the World Bank, not the IMF, is financing certain development projects like a new highway between Victoria, the capital, and the airport. Other international aid takes the form of bilateral arrangements.

Ambassador Gonthier, however, knows as well as I do that her act of absenting herself from the UN General Assembly debate and vote on the disputed future of the Falklands was the result of instructions from her government. The distinction between abstentions and absences in General

Assembly debates is hard even for connoisseurs of UN diplomacy to define, especially when delegates act under instructions.

Contributors to *Africa Report* do not write the titles for their own articles, but Ambassador Gonthier presumably noticed that my analysis concluded with the observation that the Seychelles' shift toward the center of the nonaligned movement probably has been a response to lessened hostility on the part of some major Western powers.

Arthur Gavshon
London, England

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ECOWAS and the Economic Integration of West Africa

Uka Ezenwe

ECOWAS—the Economic Community of West African States—is one mechanism by which Africa is attempting to complete an economic integration which would render it more competitive in the world marketplace. This book reports on the current state of this economic evolution and the role ECOWAS has played.

CONTENTS: Introduction; Economic Setting and Development Perspectives in West Africa; The Theory of Integration and African Economies; Distributing the Costs and Benefits of Integration; The Performance of Existing Integration Schemes in West Africa; ECOWAS: Prospects, Problems, and Perspectives; The Role of External Forces; Prospects for Growth in the 1980's; Epilogue: ECOWAS Policy on Population Movement and its Implications; Selected References; Index.

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
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
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