AFRICA IN THE UNITED STATES

CHURCHES • LABOR
ECONOMIES • MEDIA • POLITICS

Beyers Naude • Edward Kennedy
Roger Wilkins • William Gray
A. W. Clausen
Sarah Breedlove was born to ex-slaves on a Louisiana farm in 1867. Orphaned at 7 and widowed at 20, this remarkable woman turned misfortune into success. Sarah became known as Madame C. J. Walker, legendary hair care business innovator and first Black woman millionaire. 

One day after Sarah discovered she was rapidly losing her hair, she prepared a secret remedy that not only cured her problems, but also gained immediate popularity. Madame Walker later designed more products for Black women's distinctive hair needs, including metal straightening combs. In 1910 Indianapolis became headquarters for Madame C. J. Walker Manufacturing Company. Internationally Madame Walker employed thousands selling cosmetics as well as in her salons and schools. This self-educated woman was highly respected by political, social and arts leaders. She generously donated money to educate Black youths and to nurture a variety of civic causes. At her request, a woman has always been company president. A firm believer in herself and her people, Madame Walker ably embodied wisdom, confidence and the power of perseverance.

THE BLACK PRESENCE IN BUSINESS

PEPSICO INC.
MAY-JUNE 1985

Africa Report

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Africa Report (ISSN 0001-9836), a nonpartisan magazine of African affairs, is published bimonthly in January-February, March-April, May-June, July-August, September-October, and November-December, and is scheduled to appear at the beginning of each date period at 833 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017. Editorial correspondence regarding subscriptions, distribution, advertising, and other business matters should be sent to Transaction Periodicals Consortium, Dept. 8010, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903. Telephone: (201) 932-2280. Subscription rates: Individuals: U.S. $21, Canada $27, air rate overseas $52. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: If this magazine is undeliverable, please send notice to Africa Report, Transaction Periodicals Consortium (address above). Telephones: Publisher (212) 949-5717; Editor (212) 949-5731. Copyright © 1985 by the African-American Institute, Inc.

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The cover photograph of a funeral for victims killed by police in Crossroads, South Africa was taken by Tannenbaum-Sygma; the photograph of demonstrators at Hamilton Hall, Columbia University was taken by Odette Lupis.
Where is South Africa Going?

The United States bears a moral responsibility to contribute to the process of peaceful change in South Africa. Recently unbanned after eight years, Bishop Tutu's successor as general secretary of the South African Council of Churches suggests a series of measures for American policy-makers to consider if the increasing violence in South Africa is to be minimized.

BY BEYERS NAUDE

S
outh Africa is in a state of crisis and if the South African government continues its present policies and practices, our country will inevitably and rapidly find itself in a state of siege. Is this what President Reagan and the U.S. State Department want? If the U.S. government protests that this is not what was intended, then it should terminate its policy of so-called constructive engagement and engage itself in real constructive efforts and actions to prevent our country from moving into a state of continuous violence and bloodshed.

As I write this article, I am on my way from Johannesburg to Port Elizabeth to meet with church and community leaders of Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage, as well as with people who were directly involved in the tragedy at Langa on March 21 where possibly 43 people were killed. This tragic event, which could have been prevented, occurred exactly 25 years after Sharpeville, March 21, 1960, where 69 defenseless people were shot and killed and 180 wounded in a peaceful march of protest against the pass laws.

Automatically, the question arises: What, if anything, has changed since Sharpeville 1960? And how many more Sharpevilles, Sebokengs (September-November 1984 where an estimated 150 people were killed), Crossroads (February 1985 where 18 people were killed and 225 wounded), and Langas have to occur before meaningful change toward a just and equitable society begins in South Africa?

It would be incorrect to state that nothing has changed since Sharpeville 1960. Certain changes have taken place both in laws on our statute books and in attitudes in our deeply divided society. In order to understand and evaluate properly the complexity of these changes, we need to indicate the main spheres where they have occurred.

A history of South Africa will show how a system of legislative and bureaucratic controls has been institutionalized to allow for not only racial segregation among the various population groups, but more fundamentally for the effective oppression and exploitation of the majority of people in this country.

The influx control laws are a cornerstone of this system of racial capitalism, determining where people work, what work they do, and where they live. In the sphere of pass laws and the laws affecting influx control of blacks from the rural to the urban areas, virtually nothing has changed. In 1984 alone, 238,000 people were arrested for influx control offenses and it is worth pointing out that since influx control measures were in-
ensures racial segregation, the Mixed Act in times of crisis.

Although the provisions of the Labour Relations Act allow for the formation of trade unions, the actual practice of trade unionism is not guaranteed anywhere, and is in fact subject to a whole host of other legislation.

Therefore, what trade union rights the Labour Relations Act allows for are simply removed by the Internal Security Act and other legislative restrictions which cover gatherings on both private and public property, such as the Trespass Act under which numerous trade union organizers have been arrested in the course of their trade union work.

With regard to social legislation which ensures racial segregation, the Mixed Marriages Act, the Immorality Act, the Group Areas Act, and the Separate Amenities Act all remain on our statute books. Although in the last few years, fewer prosecutions have taken place under these acts, the fact remains that despite pious pronouncements by the government, these acts are still legally in force.

Regarding legislation relating to the political rights of people of color, the new constitution has brought limited participation of the Coloured and Indian community, while in principle removing the 22 million blacks from any right of participation in the political decision-making process of our country. The new constitution has two legislative pillars: inequality in the new tri-racial parliament on a 4:2:1 ratio, and the total exclusion of the black majority.

The bantustans are where these 22 million blacks are expected to enjoy “political rights.” All the functions of the bantustans relate to the control of Africans in the 86 percent of South Africa set aside for white occupation. The bantustans act as pools of unemployed labor, while the pass laws remove people from the white areas, denying them access to any wealth whatsoever: 97 percent of the country’s wealth is generated in “white” South Africa and 87 percent of our population lives in the bantustans.

They are locked into impoverished land which is their only means of survival: there is no social security to rely on. Because of overcrowding, the land cannot support the people. In the Ciskei bantustan, 240 out of 1,000 children die before the age of one from malnutrition-related diseases.

Because of this poverty, people are forced to accept any work at almost no pay in “white” South Africa. Businesses and farms take advantage of this situation to pay so little, which means that there is one of the highest rates of profit in the world in South Africa. American and other overseas companies also take advantage of this when investing here.

The government has imposed a system of tribal rule in the bantustans: It appoints chiefs to rule over a forcefully divided population in local villages. It is not surprising therefore that blacks, who spend their lives and labor in “white” South Africa, but who are politically powerless and voiceless, regard bantustans as a political obstacle. The bantustans can have no legitimacy for those who are excluded from an urban area because of their bantustan “citizenship.”

Concerning the legislation relating to military matters and to educational issues, blacks are fully justified in saying that from their viewpoint, basically nothing has changed to effectively give them more legal rights. Qualitatively, controls have increased and the lack of rights has been entrenched. For example, community councils have been replaced in black townships by local authorities with more powers, but powers of control. In fact, the general feeling among blacks is that their situation, taking into consideration all the legal powers held and used by the government, has deteriorated during the last 25 years.

It would be seriously misleading if one would only judge South Africa by the changes in legislation. It is of much greater importance to look at the shifts of opinions, attitudes, and motivations—some of which may not be easily discernable. One of the crucial questions which need to be asked is: Have there been any meaningful changes in political goals, directions, or motivation?

The protagonists of National Party policy point to the Nkomati Accord, the new constitution, and new forms of labor legislation as proof that real political change has been initiated by P.W. Botha. The leadership of the black community, however, expresses an almost diametrically opposite view. They point out that the Machel government had no option but to accept the Nkomati Accord and that the new constitution is in every respect a retrogressive step of major degree, as all 22 million South African blacks are now officially constitutionally excluded from the political decision-making process and the principle of ethnicity has now been firmly entrenched.

The dramatic growth of the United Democratic Front (UDF) should be seen as a clear expression of the anger and the total rejection of the new dispensation by the vast majority of the black, Coloured, and Indian communities and by democratically minded whites. That is why many politically informed black leaders maintain that, taking everything
In the military sphere, a number of important developments have taken place. Since Sharpeville, the military has greatly increased its influence both in the South African government and in our lives. Compulsory conscription into the South African Defense Force (SADF) began and expanded in response to the growing challenge to apartheid.

“A serious obligation rests on the most politically powerful and the most materially affluent country in the world, the United States, to reconsider its responsibility and its role toward South Africa.”

Before Sharpeville, there was no compulsory conscription, but now white males are liable for four years of service. At the beginning of 1984, the government also decided to conscript immigrants who had previously been exempt. It has also indicated its intention to eventually extend conscription to white women and Coloured males.

Added to this are civic action programs with national servicemen teaching in black schools, military units at the Afrikaans universities, and cadet training at school. This year’s defense budget is $2.1 billion, plus a secret fund not specified in the budget.

Sharpeville 1960, Soweto 1976, Sboleng 1984, and Uitenhage 1985 quite clearly demonstrate the ability of the government to mobilize the SADF to suppress internal opposition to apartheid. In this context, it is significant that at any stage, up to 800,000 South Africans can be placed under arms by the SADF.

But it is especially on the educational level that a significant shift has taken place. While in the early 1960s there was very little activity on the educational front, the emergence in 1969 of the South African Students Organization (SASO), a breakaway from the National Union of South African Students, and the establishment of the University Christian Movement, became the forerunners of black student initiatives which led to 1984’s school and university boycotts, at one stage, of nearly 200,000 students.

For the observer of the black scene, it has become evident that during the last number of years, black opinion on political issues has become much better informed, support for resistance actions has become much more widespread both in urban and rural areas, black attitudes have become much more militant, and black actions have become much better organized.

The mood of the people has been expressed in a number of ways, for instance, in open support for the African National Congress (ANC) through the use of the ANC colors at funerals and meetings and of freedom songs at practically every political and student gathering, and by the determined disregard of the law prohibiting certain gatherings when there were strong feelings of anger toward police or government actions.

Increasingly, the democratic people of South Africa are using the Freedom Charter as a yardstick against which to measure the “reforms” in South Africa. The reality is that now, 25 years since the drawing up of the Freedom Charter by 3,000 representatives of the people...
from all walks of life, none of the demands have been met. At best, some have been addressed, but none of the fundamental demands have been met and there is no prospect of them being met.

But equally, there has been a significant shift in white attitudes during the last number of years. For decades, there was a tragic lack of interest and concern for the feelings, the aspirations, and the suffering of the black community. This was to a large degree due to successful government propaganda and brainwashing, linked to the traditional white attitude that the problems of the blacks were their own, and that they were the ones mainly responsible for the problems and therefore for their solution.

As a result of a number of new developments in the black community, there has been a general shift of white political feelings to the right, both in the Afrikaans and English-speaking communities. Proof of this is to be found in the growth of the Conservative Party, the successful publication of the Citizen, a conservative newspaper, the closure of the Rand Daily Mail, a “liberal” newspaper, on April 30, and in the new sense of insecurity and fear which has slowly begun to express itself after the recent unrest in black townships.

Having dealt with the attitudes and feelings of whites, I believe it is of vital importance to look very carefully at what has emerged in the thinking and feelings of the black community. The period after Sharpeville, when the ANC and PAC were banned and all black opposition ruthlessly suppressed, was one of deep despondency. A spirit of malaise created a sense of passivity which gave the regime ample time to implement more successfully its policy of apartheid, especially as far as the homelands were concerned.

In the early 1970s, however, a new spirit was born which soon expressed itself in the black consciousness movement. Following the government clampdown on all black consciousness organizations, blacks devised new strategies of resistance through the establishment of a wide range of independent or semi-independent local and regional bodies (trade unions, student associations, cultural and educational groups), which the government would find much more difficult to ban or to act against.

This new strategy hastened a nationwide process of conscientization in both urban and rural areas at the grassroots level—a forerunner to a massive mobilization of all these organizations on the national level at the appropriate moment. This new strategy also included a shift from black consciousness to an emphasis on non-racialism and democracy. This moment was in fact created and provided by the government in 1983 with the presentation and acceptance of the new constitution which sparked the establishment of the UDF with approximately 400 affiliated organizations—all bitterly attacking and opposing the new constitution.

A new spirit of hope and confidence among blacks was born. A more accurate and comprehensive analysis of political and economic developments became standard practice and a better coordinated strategy and planning emerged among progressive organizations, both black and white.

The government’s negative response to this led to the emergence of a new spirit of black militancy especially among students and the thousands of post-school youth, the majority of whom found themselves without employment because of South Africa’s serious economic recession. This militancy was fur-
ther fed by the growing belief among the youth that the government had conclusively proved that it was unwilling to initiate fundamental change and that such change could only be achieved through a measure of violence to counteract the violence of the state.

Thus the scene was set for the student unrest and school boycotts of 1984 and the growing number of worker strikes during the year. The era of protest politics was set aside, substituted by a new era of acts of resistance. The first phase of a militant revolutionary era had begun. Perhaps history will one day point to the government action in Sebenkeng in 1984, when 7,000 army troops moved in to assist the police in “reestablishing law and order.” as the turning point in our history. One youth leader expressed this conviction so ably and succinctly in the following words: “We are now at war.”

All indications are that 1985 will see an exacerbation of the hardships endured by the majority of the people in this country as well as an extension of the struggles waged in 1984. The recession is deepening, with companies going bankrupt daily and thousands of workers being retrenched. Wages are simply not keeping up with rising prices and increases in rent and service charges in the townships.

Conditions in the schools, the factories, and the communities are not improving. In fact, as the government cuts spending on education, conditions in the schools will get worse. As bosses try to hold down wages and push up productivity, tension in the factories will grow. As the community councilors continue to carry out apartheid’s dirty work and call in the police and the SADF, the communities will continue to be a battleground.

For any student of the history of oppressive regimes like South Africa’s, it is now clear that the year will bring more polarization between the white ruling classes and the majority of the people and between bosses and workers, more clashes between police and students and workers, more injuries and deaths. It does not require the insight of a prophet to predict that, unless the government initiates clear and fundamental change, the unrest throughout the country will increase, students will clash with the police time and again, workers will strike in increasing numbers, and violence will become not only endemic, but eventually uncontrollable.

For too long, the black community has suffered under political oppression, economic exploitation, educational neglect, and denigrating white attitudes and actions. For too long, the authorities (and those who put them in power) have ignored the warning pleas of millions of students and youth. For too long, people have been detained, tortured, banned, and imprisoned without adequate reasons. For too long, the regime has succeeded in-cajoling, manipulating, bribing, or pressurizing blacks, Coloureds, and Indians to collaborate with the government in implementing the apartheid policy and hoping that they will thus be incorporated into the system.

Now the moment has arrived when the people, after decades and decades of silent suffering, have started to rise up—in the burning of government properties, the bombing of the homes and businesses of black government officials, stooges, and supporters, in the killing of black police and collaborators. All these tragic developments were foreseen by many of us—for many years we have pleaded and warned that such a moment would eventually arrive. All this could have been prevented if these pleas had been heard and heeded. But now that this situation has become a bitter reality, what awaits us?

South Africans, both black and white, will now have to agonize on how to resolve the present crisis. But a serious obligation also rests on the most politically powerful and the most materially affluent country in the world, the United States, to reconsider its responsibility and its role toward South Africa.

In presenting a number of suggestions of possible actions which could be considered, I seriously hope that these will be interpreted as a genuine effort on our part to involve a government and a country which could assist us in minimizing the emerging violence and in maximizing the process of peaceful change.

My suggestions include the following:

- The lack of meaningful support by the United States of the South African black community in its struggle for liberation has created feelings of deep anger and animosity toward not only the American government and its policy of constructive engagement, but also toward many American institutions and initiatives in South Africa. A word of serious warning has to be sounded to the American government and people: Do not be surprised if the anger of black South Africans eventually turns to hatred or to a rejection of American policy and presence in Africa. Take serious cognizance of these feelings of anger and bitterness and consider active steps to create a more positive attitude.

- Give more serious attention and weight to the views and pleas of the churches and all those organizations in South Africa which are known for their outspoken opposition to apartheid and are trying to do everything in their power to bring about fundamental change by peaceful means or with a minimum of violence where such peaceful change is no longer possible. Equally support the efforts within the U.S. of those churches, academic institutions, and organizations which have initiated actions to pressurize the government to change its present disastrous policy.

- Terminate the policy of “constructive engagement” and initiate more meaningful pressures to hasten the process of fundamental non-violent change. I am aware that the debate on disinvestment is currently one of the main issues being hotly discussed in the U.S. I am bound to state, however, that the whole disinvestment debate could very soon become irrelevant or meaningless if the current unrest in South Africa continues unabated, thereby creating such a climate or conditions of economic instability and insecurity that overseas investors—of their own free will—will decide not to support any further investment or will initiate steps toward disinvestment.
as fast as possible, concluding that the risk of the future investment is too great.

- I am convinced that no return to stability and normality in South Africa is possible as long as Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners remain in prison. Therefore the demand for the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and all political prisoners, the right of all exiles to return, the unbanning of all organizations, the release of all detainees, the unbanning of the banned and banned, and the granting of the freedom to the people to elect their own leaders to initiate a process of negotiations should be clearly stated and supported.

- The situation in South Africa can eventually become so ungovernable that the government may be forced to declare a state of emergency, which could very easily become a forerunner to military rule of some kind. Such a step can only have disastrous consequences for the cause of justice and peace in South Africa. The effect this would have would be to fan the flames of violent revolution and to lead the country into a permanent situation of civil war. If the U.S. is sincere in its concern to prevent further violence, it should take effective steps to prevent the establishment of military rule with all its serious consequences not only for black and white South Africans, but for the whole of the southern African sub-continent.

- Another important responsibility for the U.S. government and its people is to reassess the current State Department policy toward Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. The present American policy is creating increasing frustration, cynicism, and bitterness toward the U.S. in all these countries. The State Department justifies its policy by expressing its strong fear of supporting countries with marxist or social-ist tendencies. The sooner both the U.S. and South Africa accept that part of the political change which black South Africans would wish to bring about will be a change of the present capitalist system of free enterprise toward some form of socialism, the less traumatic and painful the transition toward majority rule will become.

I believe that the U.S. can no longer determine the direction or momentum of change in South Africa, but it can help the South African government to understand and accept what is happening and to enlist the support of all other Western countries to prepare South Africa and themselves for the upheaval of fundamental change which is on its way. I share the fear of those who are concerned that this process is going to be stormy, painful, and bloody. But the sooner the apartheid system is dismantled and apartheid rule is terminated, the greater the hope of shortening this period of conflict and bloodshed and of the transition toward non-racial democratic rule.

"The dramatic growth of the UDF should be seen as the total rejection of the new dispensation"
A Call for Justice

Senator Edward Kennedy's recent visit to South Africa has convinced him of the need for the U.S. government to play a more active and vocal role in opposing apartheid. Reflecting on his experiences during the trip, he warns of the consequences should the U.S. remain passive to the continued denial of democratic freedoms to the black majority.

BY EDWARD M. KENNEDY

From January 5 to January 14, 1985, I visited South Africa and witnessed first-hand the many faces of apartheid that are often invisible to those who have never visited the country.

I was invited to South Africa by Bishop Desmond Tutu, the recipient of the 1984 Nobel Peace Prize, and by the Reverend Allan Boesak, president of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches. The purpose of my trip was to examine the conditions of life of the people who live under apartheid, and to see how the United States can best use its influence to advance peaceful change and racial harmony within that country.

I came away from South Africa with the feeling that South African whites are oppressed by that system as well as South African blacks. There is a sense of lost opportunity that permeates South African life. Because of the artificial barriers of race, millions of talented young black South Africans will never be able to contribute their energy or intelligence to the task of building a better world for themselves and for their people. Because of the fears and insecurities that afflict white South African society, millions of young whites will be forced to live out their lives in an unreal, unnatural, garrison-state existence.

The nation of South Africa could be a moral leader in the world, one of the most powerful and influential members of the international community, if it could put the curse of racism behind it. But its adherence to the system of apartheid is denying South Africa an honorable place in history. As long as apartheid persists, South Africa will be shut off from fulfilling what might otherwise be a productive, progressive, and peaceful destiny.

During my visit, I spoke with a broad and representative group of South Africans. I met with black families in a number of different communities: in Soweto, the crowded township of 2 million people outside Johannesburg; in Mathopepostad, a small agricultural community in the Western Transvaal scheduled to be uprooted and forcibly removed by the South African authorities; in Onverwacht, a relocation camp of over 270,000 people in the middle of an arid, inhospitable, treeless wasteland; and in Crossroads, the densely populated ramshackle shantytown outside of Cape Town. I visited schools, health clinics, and private homes, and I talked with health workers, teachers, and representatives of civic organizations.

I also talked with manual day-laborers in the Nancefield Hostel in Soweto and with the leadership of the Council of Unions of South Africa. I met with black journalists, editors, educators, and academics. I also talked with leaders of the United Democratic Front (UDF), a coalition of 600 organizations pledged to the ideal of non-violent change and a non-racial society, and I addressed a UDF rally in Cape Town.

I journeyed to the remote town of Brandfort where I met with Winnie Mandela, who has lived for over 20 years under a banning order that prohibits her from seeing more than a single individual at a time, and prevents her from appearing, speaking, or being quoted in public. She has been banished to a small, isolated town hundreds of miles from her home.

I also met with Gatsha Buthelezi, the chief minister of KwaZulu, an ardent opponent of disinvestment. I talked with the leadership of the South African Council of Churches, and attended mass at St. Pius X Church in Soweto.

I also sought the views of whites in South Africa. I met with a group of South African chief executive officers in charge of major commercial enterprises in that country, and with the heads of various national business organizations representing 80 percent of all South African businesses.

I talked with the Reverend Beyers Naude, the new general secretary of the South African Council of Churches, and with Archbishop Denis Hurley of Durban, president of the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference. I met with the author, Nadine Gordimer, and Helen Suzman, a member of Parliament from the opposition Progressive Federal Party. I talked with volunteers from Black Sash, an or-
ganization of white women dedicated to the task of assisting black South Africans who have run afoul of the pass laws. I talked privately with three ministers in President Botha's cabinet—Roeof Botha, Gerrit Vijoen, and Chris Heunis.

After leaving South Africa, I visited Lusaka, Zambia, where I met with Oliver Tambo, the president of the African National Congress, Africa's oldest national liberation organization, and with other members of its leadership. I also had lengthy discussions with Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda.

For most black South Africans, the conditions of apartheid remain unchanged and in many ways the situation has worsened. Black people in South Africa are still barred from playing any significant role in the economic, political, or social life of South Africa for no reason other than that they are black.

Color is the single most powerful organizing principle in their lives. Where they live, where and how they travel, whom they see, how they are educated, what they do for a living, how much money they earn, what property they own, what they read or hear or see, what kind of medical care is available, where they worship, what they can hope to achieve for themselves and for the members of their families—all of these fundamental issues in the life of any human being are sharply circumscribed and carefully controlled by the system of apartheid.

Racism is the overwhelming fact of life for a black person in South Africa today. In this fundamental respect, there has been no change and certainly no improvement in the lives of most black South Africans over the past 40 years.

In fact, the strictures of apartheid have increased in recent years. The policies and institutions of apartheid have become more sophisticated and more entrenched. Few blacks in South Africa today would quarrel with the notion that apartheid as a political and social system of institutionalized racism is now worse than it ever was before, and that the mechanisms of control are more comprehensive and more effective than ever.

The system of migratory labor—which guarantees a large pool of poor, unskilled, low-cost black workers for the large, affluent white communities in major cities—now operates with computerized efficiency. Black families live in inhospitable, economically unproductive homelands, while the men live for 49 weeks of the year in single-sex barracks, like the Nancefield hostel that I visited in Soweto. These hostels are located in black townships just outside the urban centers of the nation, and the workers are transported each day into the inner city to perform their menial tasks. (During my visit to South Africa, I never saw a white person performing manual labor.)

The sophisticated and technologically well-ordered system of state-run labor divides families, depresses wages, and guarantees an ever-ready, trouble-free supply of plentiful and cheap labor to service the needs of the white society. Individual records of all registered black South African workers have been logged into computers, thereby guaranteeing a measure of political and eco-

Senator Edward M. Kennedy with Winnie Mandela: "She has been banished to a small, isolated town hundreds of miles from her home"
economic reliability for potential employers. Those who have been identified as troublemakers or as having dubious work records need not apply.

In addition, the resettlement camps continue to grow, with whole areas like the Ciskei being transformed into one immense settlement. In these camps, such as the one I visited in Onverwacht, unemployment hovers around 50 percent, and the conditions of daily life are appalling. In some camps, the climate is so harsh, the people so poor, the shelter so sparse, and the basic human services so meager that the infant mortality rate during the first year of life frequently exceeds 40 percent.

The pass laws are still enforced with fines and jail terms, but are now applied with unprecedented efficiency achieved by computers. The number of arrests for pass laws violations doubled from 1980 to more than 200,000 annually in 1982 and 1983. Scores of black people are sentenced every morning in the courts of Johannesburg to “10 rand or 10 days.”

Until recently, forced relocations of black communities continued to occur, so that many families that had lived in their towns for four generations or more—like those I saw in Matoposstad—face the daily possibility that the soldiers will arrive with trucks and bulldozers to uproot the entire community to a strange and distant place. Since 1960, 3.5 million blacks have been removed from “white areas” under this policy.

The homelands policy is characterized by the pernicious practice of “denationalizing” black South Africans. Their South African citizenship is stripped away, replaced with citizenship in an arbitrary and artificial homeland. Four homelands exist today—Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda—and six more are slated for “independence” in the future. Since 1976, more than 8 million Africans have been deprived of their South African citizenship, and between 1960 and 1980, the proportion of the African population officially residing in the homelands increased from 40 to 53 percent.

Politically, apartheid is now part of the constitutional structure of the South African state. Before the new constitution was adopted, the exclusion of blacks from participation in the political life of the country was a matter of legislation that could be modified or repealed by Parliament; but blacks are now excluded constitutionally from playing any role in the national government.

It is true that, in recent years, some changes have been made, and the lives of some South African blacks have improved. There are successful black entrepreneurs who are increasingly included in high-level discussions with their white counterparts. The best black athletes are now free to compete on integrated teams in international sporting contests, and black consumers are no longer denied access to the best shops, hotels, theaters, and restaurants in the larger urban areas. But movie theaters remain segregated throughout South Africa.

Each of these so-called reforms, however, has an important qualification. The vast majority of black South Africans are prevented from playing any meaningful role in the economy because they are denied the right to own property in the most economically vital parts of the country—the cities.

With respect to the integration of South African sport, the underlying system remains totally segregated, as does the educational system, and the new dispensation has benefited only a handful of superstars. The increased integration of public accommodations is window-dressing for all but the most affluent of South African blacks since the overwhelming majority are not permitted to live near these facilities—and could not afford them even if they did.

The South African government argues that living conditions for black South Africans are better than for blacks in other African nations. Even if this were true—and in some areas, like health and education, it is demonstrably false—it is irrelevant for black South Africans. They regard themselves as South African citizens entitled to a fair share in the benefits that accrue to the nation as a whole. They compare their situation with that of other South African citizens—and under that comparison, there is no real dispute. In contrast to the comfortable lives of whites in South Africa, blacks live in squalor and misery.

One of the positive aspects of the situation is widespread agreement among many white South Africans that their system of apartheid must change in important ways. There is consensus, for example, that the influx control laws must be modified to accommodate increased numbers of urban blacks, that the Group Areas Act must be changed to allow more blacks to own property (and to live) in certain sectors of South Africa, that the Immorality Act and the Mixed Marriages Act must be repealed, and that the policy of forced relocations must be abandoned.

Ironically, the apparent willingness of white South Africans to accept reform in some areas is accompanied by a continued, if not a hardened, resistance to change in the most important area for all black South Africans—political rights. The reluctance by white leaders, either privately or publicly, to address the central dilemma of South African life—the continued disenfranchisement of 23 million black people—was one of the most discouraging aspects of the trip. The failure even to acknowledge this issue has led to greater polarization between the black and white communities with ever larger numbers of young blacks rejecting Western political values and economic models and turning toward armed resistance as the only hope for meaningful change inside South Africa.

One of the saddest discoveries of my trip was to learn of the low standing of the U.S. among most politically aware blacks in South Africa.

"One of the saddest discoveries of my trip was to learn of the low standing of the U.S. among most politically aware blacks in South Africa."
economy of the country and the Reagan administration's policy of "constructive engagement," the U.S. is now widely perceived among South African blacks as a collaborator in their oppression, an apologist for the racist minority regime, and the only friend that the apartheid government has in the world community.

This perception is plainly exacerbated by the widespread belief among both black and white opponents of apartheid that Herman Nickel, U.S. ambassador to South Africa, is too extreme in his defense of the Botha government's policies. Winnie Mandela told me that the Reagan administration's approach to South Africa was only "another shoulder to the wheel of apartheid."

I came away from my trip with a deep-seated feeling that the U.S. should not be passive in its opposition to apartheid in South Africa and that U.S. policies should in no way be neutral. On the contrary, we should be much more vigorous and much more visible—politically, economically, and morally—in the effort to end apartheid.

More active opposition to apartheid is in the best interests of the U.S. because of the importance of relations with the rest of the nations on the African continent and because of our standing with the black population in South Africa itself. Active opposition is also consistent with the most profound feelings of the American people that apartheid is immoral and that racism must be ended wherever it exists.

The U.S. should make clear, not just that it opposes apartheid in the abstract, but that it is prepared to use all appropriate influence in the struggle to dismantle it. For that reason, the U.S. should immediately take concrete steps to distance our country, politically and economically, from the apartheid system.

The primary focus of American policies should be on the government of South Africa. It is that entity that defends, administers, and perpetuates apartheid. It is that entity that will determine whether non-violent change is in fact possible inside South Africa.

To some extent, U.S. corporations have played a positive role inside South Africa, and the South African private sector has frequently been a force for reform and moderation. But that kind of pressure is slow to work, and its overall impact on the system of apartheid has been negligible to date. Whatever business leaders may accomplish to improve working conditions for their own labor force, their chances of being effective in the political arena are slim. As one commentator put it, "The notion that P.W. Botha will be moved by [the] political exhortations [of South African business executives] is, frankly, laughable."

Moreover, the notion that economic advances will in time be translated into political reform is belied by history. More than a century of industrial development and economic expansion has been accompanied by more, not less, racial discrimination.

It is a simple truth that South Africans are in charge of their own destiny, and that the United States cannot dictate an end to apartheid. We can, however, work to strengthen and encourage the forces for change that already exist—the various political movements in the South African black community and among the South African business community.

The U.S. has substantial leverage inside the country, despite protestations from South African government leaders to the contrary. A universal refrain in my conversations with the government ministers was, "We do not care what the U.S. does or says. We will decide for ourselves, and we will proceed at our own pace." But the South Africans' intense interest in events in the U.S., including the demonstrations at the South African embassy in Washington, the disinvestment campaign, and South Africa-related political developments, demonstrates that most South Africans care very deeply about what Americans think, do, and say about apartheid.

White South Africans want Americans to accept and respect them. They believe that they share our values and our ideals, and they want to be recognized as defenders of Western civilization and members of the Western community of nations. As South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha wrote to me, "It is no secret to you that South Africa supports the values represented by the United States." But as long as South Africa persists in its policy of apartheid, its racist regime will continue to be a pariah in the Western community.

In an effort to change the direction of U.S. policy toward South Africa, Senator Lowell Weicker and I, along with a growing group of co-sponsors, have introduced the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985 (S 635). Identical legislation has been introduced in the House by Congressmen William Gray, III, Howard Wolpe, Stephen Solarz, and over 100 other co-sponsors.

It will prohibit Americans from extending credit to the South African government or to any South African government entities, a policy which has increasingly been adopted by major U.S. lending institutions.

It will prohibit the sale of computers to the South African government or to any of its entities, thereby eliminating the complicity of U.S. industry in the administration and enforcement of the apartheid laws.

It will prohibit any new investment in South Africa and any new bank loans to South African entities, thereby terminating additional contributions to the economic structure of apartheid.

And it will ban the importation of krugerrands into the United States, thereby ending an annual transfer of dollars from Americans to the government of South Africa which, in 1984, exceeded $600 million.

The last two prohibitions can be waived by the president with the consent of Congress if the South African government satisfies any one of eight different conditions. Among these conditions are:

- release of all political prisoners;
- halting all removals of black populations on account of race;
- ending the policies of denationalization of South African blacks;
- entering into meaningful negotiations with truly representative leaders of the black population about full national participation of all the people of South Africa in the social, political, and economic life of the country;
- achieving an internationally recognized settlement for Namibia.

This legislation would send an important message, not only to the 23 million black South Africans, but to oppressed people throughout the world that the American people truly are on the side of justice, human rights, and liberty for all.
Can Africa break out of its cycle of economic decline? In this exclusive *Africa Report* interview, the President of the World Bank says the combination of better aid coordination among multilateral and bilateral donors, along with policy reform by African governments can make a difference.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

*Africa Report*: Over the past 15 years, the World Bank’s mission has been to reduce poverty and to secure economic growth in developing countries. But in sub-Saharan Africa, one-half to three-quarters of the population continue to live in absolute poverty and per capita incomes have continued to decline over the last 20 years. How successful do you think the Bank has been in achieving its goals in sub-Saharan Africa? In what specific areas do you think it has failed and why?

*Clausen*: Well, in a word, it’s not been very successful. I think the empirical evidence in sub-Saharan Africa almost without exception shows that there has been retrogression rather than progress. There are a lot of reasons: external, internal, population growth, the deepest recession in a great many decades where international trade flows by volume and commodity prices dropped, inefficiencies in some countries in the extreme, wrong-headed economic policies, stark physical conditions. All of these have been exacerbated in a good part of Africa by the worst drought in recent times and have not enabled the people in sub-Saharan Africa to increase their standard of living. They have just been slipping back. So that’s nothing that anyone can be proud of.

But helps starts at home. We are a partner. We do not develop countries; they develop themselves. It is our job to help them. And it’s everybody’s job to help these countries do better. I think there is a growing awareness within the African countries themselves that there are areas they can control— their internal economic dynamics. They can control their own priorities, their pricing policies, and incentives for greater production. Neither countries nor even the continent as a whole can control global inflation, capital flows, international prices, or interest rates, although clearly they’ll do better if all of that is more appropriate and more amenable to the individual objectives of the individual countries. While they really can’t have much of an impact on what the commodity prices are, they can have an impact on the incentives inside the country, the efficient allocation of indigenous resources, and policies that will be more conducive to growth and more efficient, equitable distribution of whatever productive wealth the country is producing. And we see evidence that countries are now taking stronger steps and putting in place economic policies that are more conducive to these desired objectives.

*Africa Report*: How would you assess the Bank’s record in providing technical assistance to Africa over the last 10 years? Are there areas you would criticize?

*Clausen*: If there aren’t areas I would criticize, the other side is that we’re perfect. We’re not, we’re far from it. We are providing a great deal of technical assistance to sub-Saharan Africa and it has only been within the last three years that we have significantly stepped up assistance through additional professional help. In 1981, we announced that we would provide an extra 20 professionals seconded to governments to help them with management of their economies. Within the last couple of months, we have approved a supplementary budget for 1985 to start the process of additional professional assistance for sub-Saharan Africa, part of which is to be implemented this year and will be included in our fiscal year 1986 budget—a special project preparation facility for IDA countries in general for those projects that the World Bank will finance.

We will also provide technical assistance or any other kind of assistance on a case-by-case basis to sub-Saharan African countries for project preparation no matter who finances the
project. Monies will not be returned to us. We will provide special monies for research.

Africa is a continent that spends less for research and in particular agricultural research than any other region or continent in the world partly because it is so poor. In recent years, it has been more interested in staying alive than in effecting a long-term cure. It’s very tough to invest in things where the returns are so far in the future, particularly if Friday is D-day, and you’ve got to have funds to feed your people or to make payments on the external debt. The debt servicing burden on so many countries in sub-Saharan Africa doesn’t get the headlines, but it is tremendous. Therefore to take very limited resources and to invest where there is a long-term payoff that you won’t see for maybe a generation, in the case of education, health, family planning, population, and research, is difficult. Part of the reason why the countries are suffering so much now is because of a lack of investment in these areas, mainly because of a scarcity of resources.

The Bank can step in to be a catalyst, not just through policy dialogue with individual countries, but on a macro-basis, to have Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) centers in Africa, to have a special relationship with the national research centers, to encourage governments to make the investment in national research centers and then to work on the extension linkages in agriculture all the way down to the farmer. Those linkages need attention and that’s one of the criticisms. There is so much to criticize, but I think rather than criticizing, I would prefer to think about what needs to be done, what we can do better.

Much of what has been done has been very good in Africa, but not all of it. The economic rate of return of completed projects in Africa is lower than completed projects elsewhere in the world—about 13 percent against a global return of close to 18 percent. Sub-Saharan Africa represents the biggest development challenge on planet earth, taking nothing away from Bangladesh, Nepal, or other countries in Asia that are also very poor, but in different ways. So many of these countries are new countries. The infrastructure, governmental and social, is very weak and it’s going to take time, but not that we can be complacent. A lot can happen in 15 or 20 years. Marvelous progress has been made in the last 20 years on a global basis, and in some countries like Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea, even better than marvelous. Sub-Saharan Africa has that possibility for the future, if we can get it all together, so we should not despair. There is hope, there can be a difference, there must be a difference.

Africa Report: In your foreword to the World Bank’s 1984 report, Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Joint Program of Action, you struck the same note, “hope and pragmatism.” But Africa is suffering from the worst drought in recent history, aid from developed countries and international agencies is stagnating, commercial flows are declining, repayments of maturing debts are becoming more and more burdensome, protectionism is on the increase. What grounds are there for optimism, given these constraints? Can Africa make substantial progress over the next decade or so, and is export-led growth a realistic means of doing so?

Clausen: The short answer to your phrasing that very despairing note is that there is no other choice. There have been a lot of mistakes in Africa. Even today, Africa is not wanting for development assistance. On a per capita basis, it is among the highest recipients as a region in the world. But there has been an unfortunate combination of events, not the least of which have been economic policies in these countries themselves. Help starts at home. That was the focus of the Joint Action Program that we came out with last summer before the Bank and Fund annual meetings.

We need better aid coordination among the donors. There has been an awful lot of aid given under the rubric of aid which only goes to help exports from the donor country itself and does not necessarily fit in with a country’s development strategy. It will add debt in some cases without leaving the wherewithall to provide for the repayment of that debt.

First of all, you’ve got to know where you’re bleeding before you know where to put the bandaid, or if you’re bleeding bad enough, then you can’t use a bandaid, you’ve got to use a tourniquet or in some cases, an amputation. It’s utopian to think of adjustments without some pain, but it’s a short-term pain to take some medicine in order to have a long-term cure. And we are in an era of limited resources. But there needs to be an awareness of that as a country, it’s going to get farther ahead if it stops using its energies to build a bigger cup and put...
it at the front door, but rather uses them inside its house to do whatever it can to those things under its control.

Countries are now doing that, and the donor community must orchestrate its aid in a more effective way—to identify and buy into a country’s development strategy. Donors must accept a country’s development strategy and that they can help develop that strategy. The World Bank in particular, because we have relationships with all these countries, believes that things can change. We are through the deepest recession in the last 40 years, and we are going to get some respite for a number of years. We are coming out of the deepest drought that we’ve experienced in at least 15 years, and there will not be another one for a period of years. There has been an unfortunate coincidence of negative factors that have exacerbated and compounded the problems of sub-Saharan Africa.

Groundnut planting on a World Bank project, Nigeria: “On a per capita basis, Africa is among the highest recipients of development assistance in the world”

But we can get some relief. With better economic policies, more effective aid assistance, and a rallying around by the donor community for better development strategies for these countries, a difference can be made, but a difference that one is not going to be able to see in six months or 10 months, or a year, or in some cases, not even two years. There are no quick fixes. But in countries like Ghana, in two years we can see a difference thanks to the policies the government has put into place. We can read a difference in Madagascar, Uganda, Zambia, Senegal. Policies do make a difference. So I don’t think it’s right for the international community to sit by and wring our hands, “Isn’t it terrible? There have been so many mistakes,” but rather to address our energies to what we can do given that it’s not been perfect. We cannot damn a country forever because it has screwed up its economy. Every country has a sovereign right to do whatever it wants. Rather we must constructively, collegially, and cooperatively help these countries straighten things out for the future.

That’s our effort, and that’s why we’re putting our highest priority on sub-Saharan Africa, to take nothing away from the others. We are a global institution, but where we have some poetic license at the margin, we plan to focus, to really help these countries in sub-Saharan Africa. That was behind our effort to go out and get more money, that’s our effort to do more in aid coordination, our effort to have more consultative groups, to help countries to develop a strategy around which the donor community can rally, to work more closely with UNDP on the round table that they sponsor, to have more resident missions on the scene, more monies for research, and a greater emphasis in CGIAR where we provide the secretariatship and the chairman—all to help and to heighten the awareness of the world to the problems—and not just the famine, the momentary crisis. The international community has responded rather eloquently to the food crisis, but food will fill bellies today, and next week they’re hungry again.

Therefore there ought to be, and I believe there is, a heightened awareness that one must also deal with the fundamentals. African countries themselves are reading those signs too. With famine and starvation affecting tens of millions of people in those countries today, they too must deal with the fundamentals so that when the next drought or famine comes, the impact will not be as severe and more of the fundamentals will be in place to be able to deal with it.

Africa Report: You touched a bit on the main points of the Bank’s Joint Action Program. Could you highlight a little bit more what is new and different in this approach from the Bank’s previous approach to African development? Could you also explain the criteria which will be used in allocating the $1 billion special facility for Africa?

Clausen: To go to the last point first, the facility is a special facility, it’s a focused facility as contrasted to a billion dollars of very concessional IDA [International Development Association] monies. The special facility will be available only for the poorest countries, the IDA countries, but those countries that have stabilized or are on the path of stabilizing their economies in economic policy and structure, and that are embarking on a path of restructuring their economies.

There are maybe 10-12 countries that that criteria would include and additional countries we’ve identified that are just starting in the early stages to address some of the basic fundamental problems in an economic reform sense that we would hope to include over the next 15-18-24 months. The
monies are designed to be quick-disbursing and to really help countries to restructure economic policy so that they can enlarge their capacities for productive increase. The Bank is in the business of creating wealth, not taking from the rich and giving to the poor, but through intermediating funds from other parts of the world, helping these countries create more productive wealth—food, industry, export earnings.

To go back to your earlier question, I think when you look at the absorptive capacities of the 5 billion people on planet earth and the fact that more than 50 percent of those are very low incomes, as their standards of living increase, the absorptive capacity of goods and services from one’s own country or from outside increases. Do we think there is a possibility for sub-Saharan African countries to really be able to improve their lot? Yes, we most certainly do, but it is going to take greater efforts. The needs are so huge—more than the $1.1 billion that we are making available in the special facility.

We hope that this will be a catalytic fund around which other monies, multilateral and bilateral, can associate themselves to reinforce the restructuring and the putting into place of economic policies that are more conducive to growth in these countries. That is not to turn our backs on anything else, because with $9 billion of IDA monies annually available to us for commitments to the poorest of the poor countries, about 34-35 percent or $3 billion goes to sub-Saharan Africa. This will now be augmented in a special way, to put some steam and emphasis on those countries that are on a path of restructuring, and we think the catalytic effect can make a difference.

None of it will hurt, does it do enough? Let’s say that the emphasis has got to be on policy implementation as much as money. Money alone will not do anything. Policy change alone without money will not help. Efforts of an individual country itself without any outside assistance are not enough. But it is the combination of all of those forces that can make a difference. We’ve got to do things differently, we’ve got to avoid the mistakes of yesterday. We’ve learned a lot. We have to put into place those policies that work and to constantly try to fine tune them.

Africa Report: Has the World Bank’s lending philosophy in sub-Saharan Africa undergone a shift in emphasis from project to program aid and if so, why? If there is a shift in emphasis, is it based on an assessment of the lack of success of the project approach in achieving economic development in Africa?

Clausen: No, I wouldn’t characterize it as turning our backs on project lending and going only to program lending. That’s not what has been happening. What has been happening in the Bank has been a growing awareness, as we have reviewed completed projects and have very objectively assessed and evaluated the results, that projects, if they are housed in an economic policy framework that is more conducive to a more rational, more efficient allocation of indigenous resources, with more incentives for growth, do better than a well-designed project in an utopian sense, housed in a package of economic policies that are wrong-headed. Countries also see that a project would have delivered a much higher payload had there been better producer prices, or had there been a different set of policies. So there has been this gradual, growing awareness, an evolutionary process. There have been a very great many projects that have been financed which have been successful, but, on a comparative basis, projects in Africa are not as successful as projects in other areas because of the stark conditions.

But the beauty of the special facility is that it is going to be more programmatic—quick-disbursing lending as differentiated from the financing of a hydroelectric dam that would be disbursed over 7 or 8 years. It’s going to be on the other end of the spectrum. The $1.1 billion minimum, which is still growing, will all be disbursed over the next 3-4 years, 5 at the most depending on projects, roughly $350 million a year. If it starts July 1, 1985, by July 1, 1989 it will be mostly disbursed.

In our discussion of the role of the Bank on a macro-global basis, there is agreement that traditional project lending should continue to be the mainstay of our lending. Structural adjustment loans and sector adjustment loans are currently 17-18 percent of our annual lending on a global basis, and I would guess that we are not going to see much difference in that area. But the special facility is going to be program lending to help structure economies and encourage policy reform—emphasizing those sorts of things as differentiated from project financing per se.

As a general proposition in sub-Saharan Africa, taking all of our lending—IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development], IDA, and the special facility—I would say that, yes, our emphasis now is a bit more on helping countries sort out the possibilities of economic policy reform. Economic policies are important. Because of the conditions of the world economy, I think there is a growing awareness that policies do make a difference. The kinds of instruments that we have to help countries develop and to accelerate development take all forms—specific projects on one side and structural adjustment lending on the other. But the weight of it is going to be more on the project side than on the non-project side.

Africa Report: Some African governments have expressed a concern about what they see as a growing focus on policy reform and conditionality in both multilateral and bilateral lending, charging that this is an orchestrated attempt by donors to force them to adopt free market, Western-oriented economic policies, and ultimately in some cases undermining their political sovereignty and stability. How does the World Bank respond to these criticisms, given that since 1980, the Bank has gotten more involved in policy reform through structural adjustment lending?

Clausen: I’d say that this subject is controversial in the abstract. I have not sensed, nor has it been our experience, that it is controversial in the specific. Our relationship with borrowing countries is a partnership, a voluntary relationship. There is no way that we can force a country to succumb or come groveling on their knees as a precondition for our lending. It is a long-term process—our relationship with most, if not all sub-Saharan African countries and other developing countries goes back to their independence. Countries have borrowed because it was useful to them and they could see it would help their productive capacity.

It’s only if you ask a country, “Would you rather have aid with strings or without?” If I were a country, I’d rather have mine without. It’s controversial to that extent. Our institution
has to be aware of the political and social—as well as economic—realities of the world. Perhaps in the extreme, there are some countries whose economic policies are so mixed up and their governments are so weak that they really don't have the political strength to even develop a development strategy. Then we and our board ask ourselves whether this is a circumstance under which we can really come in and provide loans.

We are not in the balance of payments business; we are in the business of helping countries with development strategies, financing those strategies, and helping countries to put into place policies that are conducive to achieving the objectives of those development strategies. It’s not a matter of sophistication or lack of it, but a matter of political and economic priorities and what’s important to a country given the environment, with which we must work. If there are about 90 countries that are borrowing, there are about 90 variations on the theme that we must be flexible and understand and adapt to do our business.

**Africa Report:** The Joint Action Program seems to apportion blame equally for Africa's economic crisis between the donors and the governments themselves, a bit of a shift from the Berg Report which seemed to unload more of the criticism on the African governments themselves. In what specific ways do you think donors can improve their performance and in what ways governments? You seem to think there is a growing realization on the part of African governments of the need to restructure their economies. Do you think a consensus is emerging internationally on the essential goals and strategy to promote African economic development?

**Clausen:** I would hope so. In fact, one of my hopes is that one of the rallying points of the Bank's development committee will be that there should be more aid coordination. Aid coordination sounds like mother, God, and country, but when you really think about it, it means that the donor community must buy into the development strategy of a given country, and not just for this year, but to give it a chance over a period of years.

We've made a lot of mistakes, but I think by speaking frankly and candidly about the mistakes and about what needs to be done, I can't argue against better coordination, better collaboration, more efficiency, better economic policies. Let's forget about building the great monuments that don't produce...
and especially the U.S., have been at loggerheads with the donors have agreed Aid coordination in that sense is a plus.

...have swung more on the bilateral side than on the multilateral ways is superior to bilateral, particularly when you're talking about tied or untied monies for the facility. If they untie, they would join Japan, Switzerland, and the Federal Republic of Germany on associated funds of 75 million pounds sterling over a five-year period. But yes, I would much rather have the United States join. I am a U.S. citizen and it bothers one when the things we want to do—we are a multilateral institution, with 148 shareholders, and when the bulk of our board, almost without exception wants us to do certain things—do not suit any one country. The special facility for sub-Saharan Africa would have been far more effective had the U.S. been a contributor to the multilateral pot, or had it even associated itself with it. Notwithstanding that, we'll be working very closely with U.S. AID, the State Department, and the Treasury because the objective of what used to be called the administration's Economic Policy Initiative is the same.

We're multilateral and we think that multilateral aid in some ways is superior to bilateral, particularly when you're talking about economic policies to be put into place. There are no hidden agendas. From a recipient standpoint, I think it is easier to take the criticism, assessment, analysis, and recommendations of a non-political institution than from a bilateral donor. You need both, but I think in the U.S., the pendulum has swung more on the bilateral side than on the multilateral side. That makes our job a bit more difficult, if not considerably more difficult. But even though the U.S. did not join, and the UK did not join, I would say that very clearly, the special facility for sub-Saharan Africa has to be put down as a success, if not a smashing success given the environment.

I think that one of the points that our 1984 report makes is that there should be more constructive collaboration, cooperation, communication and rallying over a period of years around a development strategy. If a country decides, “This is what I want, and all of you out there who are going to help me agree that if you were in my position, this is what you would pursue...” maybe there'll be some disagreements at the margin, but this is my country and this will enlarge our productive capacity, help our creditworthiness and will help to raise the standard of living of my people with a particular focus on poverty, will you help us?” And so everyone helps, and for the medium-term, the country can count on that and in exchange, it will do all it can to implement the strategy upon which it and the donors have agreed. Aid coordination in that sense is a plus.

We've not tried it in enough places, but the difficulty is in overlooking some of the direct benefits that accrue to donor countries if they give aid. Donors have to forget some subjective things, some linkages, some ties, for a better global environment. Development is not a zero-sum game, it's a plus-sum. Everyone benefits from it if it's done well. We need to weave all the partners—the private sector, the public sector, the countries themselves, the donors, multilateral and bilateral—we all need to orchestrate it better for sub-Saharan Africa. If we do, I think that substantial progress can be made. If you look to the end of this century, there can be a difference in Africa. You are right that we were pointing fingers at the donors. We just can't say things have gone wrong down there because we've been helping them. We've got to have some courage. In the long run, if a project's wrong, it's wrong. If it's not going to do that country any good for the moment, if it doesn't fit into the development strategy, I don't think we as donors should push it.

Africa Report: Donor coordination sounds so logical a solution, but I'm a bit skeptical that it will work in practice when donors have their own political agendas for giving aid.

Clausen: But on the other hand, solutions are not found if we despair. This is a different approach, it is a more concerted approach. We need to get collaboration and better coordination. The World Bank is not saying that we want to get a monopoly on this, but I'm saying that there is great integrity in this institution. Our decisions are not politicized; we have no ideologies other than whether a greater economic return to a country will result. Will it do some good and will it do enough good, not just 2-3 percent of good, but if we can do something worth 50 percent of good, let's do it and not the little stuff. It has to deliver a payload. Is it part of a strategy, and not just an ad hoc, disconnected project-by-project financing approach?

There should be a medium-term strategy for all developing countries. Then we place the projects to help support the implementation of that strategy, and get the others also to rally behind it and ensure success, because the worst thing that can happen is that a country starts down a long road—there are no quick fixes—but three or four years down the line, suddenly everyone abandons ship, including the country. We can't control certain things like coups, but there are ways in which we could do things better and we've got to make the effort. And that to me doesn't sound cynical.

Had the U.S. joined and exerted its leadership for everyone else to come in, it really would have been a success. Yes, I wish the U.S. were more sympathetic with the multilateral approach particularly to the poorest of the poor countries. IDA and the special facility are two examples in the extreme. They would have been far more successful and I think it would have been a better world had the U.S. joined because of the leverage it exerts. Five hours of the U.S. defense budget is the difference between $9 billion and $12 billion for IDA-7.

Africa Report: Why is IBRD lending down this year? Because of countries' hesitance to borrow?

Clausen: Partly because of the regrouping of countries on their own public investment expenditures, plus the fact that a good many of these countries are aware that external debt has to be repaid and there are three or four countries that are
already from our standpoint at a very high level of annual borrowings. Looking farther down the line, we do want to diversify. Some countries have massively reoriented their public investment priorities within a development strategy and therefore are emphasizing things that we are in the process of building. There are some IBRD borrowing countries with non-existent development strategies. The coincidence of all of those will drive our current commitment level down a bit this year from last year. But it will be up again in FY 1986.

If the objective is to have more loans out, we can fix that, but I'm not aware that that is our objective. Our objective is to help countries develop the right kinds of strategies and to accelerate their development in good, sound fundamental ways, and not to use chewing gum and paper clips and rubber bands to put it all together. We are the lender of last resort. We ought to be catalytic and if we see things that ought to be done elsewhere, it may be easier for us to do it. But we are a lender of last resort.

Africa Report: Could you comment on to what extent the World Bank and the IMF ought to coordinate their roles in Africa?

Clausen: I would say that collaboration is the rubric under which this subject is discussed. Fund-Bank collaboration is getting increasing attention in an evolutionary sort of way. The relationships we have with the Fund and collaboration with the Fund on individual countries around the world is very good. I'm told that it is better today than it was five or ten years ago. You might say that the external conditions are such that that's the way it ought to be. Is it perfect? No. Can it get better? Yes. Will it get better? Yes, because we are focusing on this issue and not just in any one particular part of the world.

The Fund has more arrangements and relationships with developing countries in the mid-1980s than it did in the 1970s, but I would say there is very good and close communication on strategies. Over the last 4 years, an institutionalized forum that helps to focus on this has been developed. On three occasions, 20 or 30 division chiefs of the Bank and 20-25 from the Fund have gotten together to discuss a particular country. The Fund division chief gives the Fund's perspective on the issues that the country is addressing, and then the same country is addressed by our colleagues here in the Bank, to share strategies and determine the priorities that we should be helping the country to achieve.

The Fund has the prerogative to address exchange rate issues, but it is helpful for the Fund to hear exchange rate issues addressed from a development standpoint. In a country negotiation, that's the Fund's turf. Public investment expenditures, however, and development issues are on our side of the street and these are not unimportant issues for the Fund. So that is just one of many fora, and it's been very effective in helping counterparts to get to know each other. We join on common missions. When the Bank has an economic mission, it is joined in a good many cases by somebody from the Fund, and when the Fund has a mission to a country, it is joined by one of our professionals in the Bank. So it's that joint approach. And often, before we take an agricultural sector loan or a sector loan to our board, we get input from the Fund and vice versa. More can be done and will be done.

Africa Report: It seems that the roles of the Fund and the Bank are converging a bit in terms of policy reform issues.

Clausen: No, I know that's a perception, but the roles of the two institutions are distinct and should remain distinct and separate. I think that in the context in which each of the institutions are viewing the distinct issues that are confronting them, there should be a greater sharing. Programs that we are financing should be supportive of, in a development sense, and aware of the programs of the Fund and vice versa without the fuzzing of the objectives. The two institutions are distinct and must remain distinct. It's essential. The Fund is the only institution in captivity that is able to address the extreme disequilibria and the imbalances, and our institution is one for the longer horizon, for development purposes.
Africa and the IMF

Toward a New Deal

Created to address economic imbalances in the industrialized world, the International Monetary Fund has taken on an increasingly prominent role in regulating African economies. But its "one size fits all" approach to the continent may be impeding rather than fostering African economic development.

BY ANTONIO-GABRIEL M. CUNHA

The slowing or even collapse of the development process in many Third World countries is a topic of global importance. Two dimensions of this issue have gained the attention of the Western world over the past few years. One—the indebtedness of the major Latin American countries—narrowly escaped becoming a major financial crisis due to concerted and strenuous efforts of governments, commercial banks, and international organizations—notably the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The other major issue—eclipsed by the above developments, but no less persistent—is the economic and financial crisis afflicting less developed countries (LDCs), particularly those in Africa. Recognized by such epithets as "poverty," "famine," and "underdevelopment," the crisis in sub-Saharan Africa has stimulated cries of concern that hopefully may trigger more effective international action.

Above and beyond the immediate problems of the drought-induced food shortages which have made headlines in the Western press, the economic deterioration of sub-Saharan Africa is so critical that very special, urgent, and more effective long-term measures are required for its reversal.

Prior to 1980, concern was already being expressed over falling rates of production and the need for institutional change at the domestic policy level that would increase the efficiency with which scarce resources were being used. Among the policies in place that were being questioned were low producer prices and the insufficient allocation of government revenues to the agricultural sector.

But since 1980, long-term structural problems that originated from external factors became manifested in chronic and unsustainable balance of payments deficits, exhausted foreign exchange reserves, and governments' inability to service their foreign debt obligations.

Sub-Saharan Africa has fallen victim to a steady procession of circumstances, in particular, crashing commodity prices, often aggravated by restricted access to markets, drought-triggered falls in output levels, the prolonged recession abroad, high interest rates internationally, an ever-rising U.S. dollar, and, not least, a squeeze on the flow of credit. Under the burden of these factors, the long-standing weaknesses—not failures—of sub-Saharan Africa's economic structures became more apparent.

Contrary to what is often thought, most African governments unilaterally recognized not only the advent of these circumstances, but more importantly, the need to conserve scarce resources and undertake corrective measures. Accordingly, evidence shows that governments reined in spending, therefore delaying or postponing the implementation of development programs, delays which in the long run, will adversely affect growth.

Despite an increase in lending by the World Bank to Africa from $954 million in fiscal year 1981 to $1.23 billion in FY 1983, the shortage in financial resources was aggravated by a sharp decline in official development aid between 1980 and 1983. This resulted in a movement toward private sources of funds, which came at a higher cost and with shorter maturities and grace periods.

Total outstanding loans reported by the members of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to Africa jumped from $38.8 billion in 1979 to $55.5 billion in 1982, contracting in 1983 to $54.8 billion. Given that this commercial bank debt corresponds to a high proportion—over 45 percent—of Africa's total external debt outstandings, the 1.3 percent rise in LIBOR rates in 1984 is estimated to have added another $1 billion to Africa's interest payments, more than outweighing the 2.4 percent improvement in primary commodity prices estimated for last year. The current situation, therefore, is unlikely to be reversed by the end of this decade.

However, if the continent is to regain the rates of economic growth it achieved in the 1970s, restoration of previous levels of capital goods inflows is a sine qua non. In this context, the role of the IMF is unique and crucial.

The Fund does not simply lend money to countries, nor does it simply provide them with guidelines for adjust-
ing their economies in order to cope with debt problems. It performs both functions simultaneously as a corollary to supposedly restoring a lasting balance of payments adjustment. The Fund’s guarantee that a borrowing country is willing to take austere measures to get back on its feet has long served as a “seal of approval” upon which governments and private banks have relied for making their aid commitments and loans.

Originally established under the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement by and for the countries of the industrialized world, the IMF was to ride herd on the international monetary system, making loans to ease short-term, temporary payments imbalances of developed countries that were operating within a framework of fixed exchange rates.

Put forward in its Articles of Agreement as “the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and... the development of the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy,” the original intent of the IMF was to correct imbalances in the external accounts without having countries resort to policies which stymied prosperity both nationally and internationally.

Indeed, IMF lending in the 1970s was a lot less conditional than it has been in the past four years. After the 1973-74 oil shock, about 80 percent of all IMF loans were on relatively more favorable terms than they are today. Targeted at specific problem areas, loans were extended under one or more of the following facilities: the Oil Facility, the Compensatory Financing Facility, the Buffer-Stock Facility, the First Credit Tranche, and the Gold-Trust Fund.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, in response to the second oil shock and changing economic conditions, the Fund went one step further and tried to extend loans that had less stringent conditions. Enlarging its lending power, the IMF designed new types of loans and easier qualification and repayment terms. Increased use was made of the extended facility arrangement which provided loans with longer maturities and emphasized badly needed supply-side measures.

But in 1981, an alliance between the Reagan administration and some European governments exercised its control over IMF decision-making and the new approach came to an abrupt end. The Fund adopted a hardline posture, tightening loan conditions and insisting once again on devaluations and credit ceilings—features of the more familiar standby arrangements today. Moreover, three-quarters of all recipients of these high conditionality loans are low income countries, judged here to be at a loss to comply with the more burdensome terms.

The Reagan administration has exerted pressure on other international agencies as well. In August 1981, the administration, together with others, vetoed a $20 million loan to Guyana by the Inter-American Bank on the grounds that the terms were not tough enough. In early 1982, the World Bank, alleging that Africa’s economic plight was largely the result of wrong policy measures, began to incorporate a “conditionality” aspect to some of its loans.

Meanwhile, the U.S. bilateral aid program to Africa has taken on an increasingly political cast, and aid is tied to those countries willing to accept Washington’s leadership. The Reagan administration recently released $67 million in previously withheld economic aid to Sudan. After former President Nimeiry’s visit to the U.S., the White House praised the country’s “highly commendable actions,” including a 48 percent devaluation of the currency and elimination of price subsidies on certain essential goods, as being “worthy of international donor support.”

Making no mention of the food riots in Khartoum, the Reagan administration expressed its desire to negotiate an additional $114 million in U.S. economic aid. The coup d’etat which overthrew Nimeiry in early April has underlined the questionable wisdom of the administration’s aid approach, as well as the ability of such governments to withstand the political repercussions of IMF stabilization programs.

Commercial banks for their part have reined in their overall exposures in Africa, in effect withdrawing from those countries lacking the IMF “seal of approval.” It is no surprise then that the IMF has not only become Africa’s chief economic architect, but has transformed itself into Africa’s lender of last resort. Accordingly, the continent’s use of IMF resources has risen dramatically over the last four years. By late 1984, of the total 45 countries under standby or extended fund arrangements, 17 were African.

Furthermore, whereas IMF loans to the continent amounted to $1.26 billion in 1984, repayments to the Fund amounted to $567 million. In 1985, there is strong probability that a net outflow of resources from the continent to the IMF will occur, as the $700 million in projected repayments falling due is likely to exceed inflows from the Fund.

In such a case, African countries which have borrowed to the hilt on their quotas may find themselves in a vicious circle. At a time when they are supposed to be returning to equilibrium—despite the unlikelihood of vastly improved export receipts—African coun-

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**SELECTED INDICATORS OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS**

($ billions; minus signs indicate debit)

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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Short-Term Capital</th>
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**Source:** International Monetary Fund
tries will be striving to meet the repayments schedule of the Fund.

In the next few years, with annual obligations to the IMF of about $1 billion, prospects for African borrowers are no less discouraging. Some countries in the clutches of an IMF program have deteriorated markedly—Tanzania, Sudan, and Zambia are in arrears on repayments to the IMF—while others considered to have performed well—Ghana, Senegal, and Zaire—will continue to need IMF help for some time to come.

A question arises: With most of the 17 countries either in the process of negotiating or already into their third consecutive Fund facility, what effect have IMF prescriptions had on improving the economies of African borrowers? Given that IMF loans are based on the need to redress imbalances on the external accounts, if borrowers repeatedly require Fund assistance, logic tells us something is wrong with the IMF's approach, especially as it relates to Africa's difficulties. The following is an attempt to illuminate the IMF's myopic, "one size fits all" approach to the continent.

In anticipation of a $2.5 billion IMF program, the Nigerian government implemented an austerity and recovery program in early 1983. In the last two years, imports have been cut at an annual rate of 28 percent, the currency—the naira—devalued by over 15 percent, public spending slashed drastically, and controls on money supply and new credit imposed. Yet negotiations with the IMF have lingered on for more than two years over the issue of devaluation.

The IMF views excessive domestic demand as the main cause of the economic imbalance and as a result, has prescribed broadly deflationary measures that are not very dissimilar from those already in place. The main area of contention is the IMF's insistence on a 50 percent devaluation in Nigeria. The Fund points out that the still-overvalued naira facilitates cheap imports, discourages exports, and subsidizes the urban population at the expense of the rural food producers—in effect dissuading self-sufficiency in food production.

Fearful of social unrest, the Nigerian authorities have balked at the 50 percent devaluation requirement as a price too high to pay for the IMF's $2.5 billion program. The IMF's devaluation, it is estimated, would raise the cost of already scarce imports—especially of essential foodstuffs—by at least 50 percent. Abrupt jumps in these prices elsewhere—Egypt, Sudan, and Tunisia—have caused riots.

Moreover, higher import prices would substantially boost the 60 percent rate of inflation (officially declared at only 40 percent). More importantly, Nigerian authorities feel that the country does not fit the IMF mold and that as a result, the devaluation is inappropriate. Petroleum, not agricultural and industrial goods, constitutes 95 percent of total exports, and given the U.S. dollar denomination of oil, it is hard to see how a 50 percent devaluation could make Nigerian oil more competitive.

By the same token, given that the neglect and decline of the agricultural sector has occurred over a long period of time, it is unrealistic to expect a structural correction, which would enable the country to become self-sufficient and a net exporter of agricultural goods, within the customary 12-18 month adjustment period.

Rather, Nigerian authorities feel the IMF should recognize their domestic concerns and that the Fund's policy measures are compatible with their own austerity program. On the specific issue of devaluation, they propose a gradual, controlled downward adjustment of the naira, instead of a sudden maxi-devaluation.

The IMF remains intransigent, maintaining that the devaluation will strengthen the economy by reorienting it to market forces. Any delays in its implementation will merely make the adjustment process more painful. Meanwhile, Nigeria has accumulated an estimated $7 billion in short-term debt arrears, partially the result of excessive and unwise borrowing in the past. But the country has never defaulted on medium and long-term debt obligations.

Nigeria needs to reach an agreement with the IMF, for without one, commercial banks will be reticent to extend badly needed new credit lines and the major export agencies will continue to be reluctant to reschedule its short-term trade arrears. Under these circumstances, the degree of policy flexibility is clearly rather narrow.

Payments on the term debt have been met at the cost of neglecting trade debt; foreign exchange reserves are still at depressed levels. If there is a major external shock to the economy, such as renewed pressures on oil earnings, the government may be forced to default on term debt obligations. Taking this a step
Further, if banks refused to reschedule Nigeria's term debt obligations for want of an IMF agreement, the country would have to declare a moratorium on its total external debt repayments and commercial banks would withdraw trade-related credits.

Some critics hold that in order to address problems such as Nigeria's, the Fund needs to reorient its approach. Today, the Fund has lost some of its clear-cut functions: The original task of currency convertibility has been more or less attained, and the overseeing of a currency convertibility has been more clear-cut functions: The original task of the Fund has lost some of its dress problems such as Nigeria's, the trade-related credits.

At the end of such periods, inflation, aggravated by major devaluations, is still rampant; investment performance is not significantly improved; and short-term amelioration in external accounts balances is often due to more favorable weather conditions. Whereas most industrial countries can correct such imbalances in about two years, oil-importing African countries, highly dependent on exports of vulnerable primary commodities and Western demand cycles, are required to achieve equilibrium in a matter of 12 months.

Another example of the industrialized countries' bias is the undue emphasis on restrictive monetary measures. In sub-Saharan Africa, financial deepening (the extent and degree of sophistication of the financial and banking base) is negligible. Among other things, high interest rates merely trigger a rash of private sector bankruptcies, loosening the already tenuous foothold of this fragile sector.

Equally critical, the IMF's emphasis on exchange rates has yet to be proven effective in containing domestic inflation and improving the competitiveness of exports. It has not been established that the volume of Africa’s exports has been increased enough by devaluations, gradually or suddenly, to make up for the lower prices they fetch on world markets. Furthermore, with imports more costly, devaluations simply raise domestic price levels.

The IMF undeniably is in the driver's seat of international finance, its influence brought to a peak by the debt crisis. African countries have become the IMF's largest group of borrowers, and the impact of IMF conditionality has been and promises to become increasingly substantial in the future. Conditionality will not disappear because it is intrinsic to the operational nature of the Fund, and its elimination could be even more debilitating to LDC borrowers. Up to the present, such conditionality has emphasized adjustment without growth.

The present situation in Africa calls for a more realistic and creative approach. The failure of numerous agreements largely reflects the shortcomings of the almost theological "one size fits all" approach to the continent. There is a need to extend the period of adjustment to at least five years because Africa's deep-rooted problems, structural in nature, require medium and long-term solutions. Also, in exercising surveillance over exchange rate and balance of payments policies in particular, the Fund must consider the level of development in each country seeking assistance.

In this vein, emphasis should be placed on supply-side measures that aim to maximize economic growth, generate employment, and more equitably distribute income—in other words, adjustment with growth. Such supply-side measures are crucial in avoiding the contradictions between a country's long-term economic development objectives and the IMF's present short-term adjustment program prescriptions.

As long as these contradictions persist, African borrowers will be pushed into deeper difficulties with little hope of reversing them. Such an end is definitely not in the spirit of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, which, as stated before, put forth "the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and... the development of the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy." There is no need to change the wisdom of such a tenet.
Food Aid

Congress and the White House At Odds

Despite the proliferation of bills currently before Congress aimed at addressing Africa's emergency food needs, the American government still seems unwilling to provide economic aid in sufficient amounts and for long enough periods to avert a repetition of the current crisis.

BY JACK SHEPHERD

Starvation in Africa continues to be tied to politics in Washington. Emergency food aid to sub-Saharan Africa, from both private sources and political purses, has now reached unprecedented levels. Private voluntary organizations (PVOs) have received more than $100 million in worldwide contributions, committing them to non-food assistance such as medicines, blankets, and tools to go with the large amounts of food they receive for distribution from the United States government. European nations, the European Economic Community, and the UN's World Food Programme have distributed 1.4 million metric tons of food in Africa since last fall. Even the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc have provided small amounts of food aid and transportation assistance.

In the U.S., Americans have donated some $1.4 million in cash to Interaction, a coalition of private U.S. voluntary organizations, and American Red Cross chapters have raised $14.7 million for relief efforts throughout Africa. The biggest donor worldwide by far is the U.S. government, which by spring 1985, had approved more than 2.3 million tons of emergency food aid for sub-Saharan Africa, valued at $751.9 million.

But Africa's famine may be worsening. It persists in some 21 sub-Saharan nations, where perhaps 150 million people need emergency food and some 20 million may actually be starving. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that Africa will need 6.8 million tons of emergency food in 1985 alone. Donor pledges so far, however, have reached only 4.4 million tons. Further, Africa will need long-term development aid into the next decade, and perhaps into the next century. Has the scale of Africa's crisis blunted our will to meet that need? If events in Washington—the capital of the world's leading emergency food and long-term development aid donor—are any indication, Africa faces profound difficulties in the coming years. Congress and the administration continue at odds over Africa's emergency food aid requirements, while in any case, Washington's idea of long-term development planning extends only into FY 1986. The politics of starvation in Washington are raising questions about America's willingness to fund economic aid in large amounts for long periods—aid that is essential to Africa so that the "worst famine of this century" is not repeated in the next.

Take a simple question: How much emergency food aid does Africa need this year? The answer should be easy. But most statistics about Africa are actually speculative, and are now complicated further by guerrilla fighting and the drought, which have scattered the hungry across borders and increased the numbers of refugees who are largely uncountable as they wander throughout the continent.

The FAO estimates that in 1985 alone, the unmet need in Africa—the gap between food needs and donations—will be 2.4 million tons. The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), which administers the Food for Peace program, places the gap at 1.8 million tons. Members of Congress, always eager to disabuse AID, argue that the agency overestimates the availability of food in Africa's black markets and the willingness of Africans to eat tubers and roots. They agree with the Congressional Research Service figures of 2.1 million tons of unmet food needs.

The estimate is important in terms of legislating an emergency response. But
whatever, all agree that the estimate will probably be wrong—on the low side—by the end of 1984-85 marketing year in June. At that time, the refugee crisis in Sudan and rising food shortages in Kenya will probably add at least another 600,000 tons in emergency food needs.

Frustration over this issue has been reflected in Congress during the past session, which began in January. During the last few months, legislators have considered at least eight emergency food aid bills for Africa, and several more long-term assistance bills. The Reagan administration, for its part, has asked for less than Congress, and in terms of economic aid, the administration appears determined to continue its policy shift, begun in 1981, away from economic assistance toward increased military assistance to the world's hungriest continent.

An examination of the various proposals and policies reveals not only the conflict between Congress and the president, but the increasingly apparent willingness of the administration to seek short-term solutions to Africa's famine, while not dealing with the continent's long-term needs.

On January 3, 1985, President Reagan announced his $1 billion emergency food and aid program for Africa. Rep. Ted Weiss (D-NY) promptly denounced it as so much "smoke and mirrors," and together with other congressmen pointed out that the emergency program actually included almost $500 million in food aid already committed to Africa for the fiscal year. What about the program was new?

- Supplemental funds totalling $235 million mostly for additional food aid, although $25 million was earmarked for medicines, tents, blankets, and other non-food assistance;
- Some $176 million in reprogrammed food aid derived from contingency funds (some shifted from non-African programs), and $100 million in wheat from the existing wheat reserve (about 300,000 tons).

The administration's proposals included funds that would cover 900,000 tons of emergency food, about half of AID's estimate of Africa's unmet need for the rest of the fiscal year. Although AID and Congress pointed out that the need, and therefore the gap may be greater, the administration did not indicate any willingness to return to Congress for additional emergency funding.

The dispute between President Reagan and members of Congress over how much additional emergency food aid is needed in Africa then took on the hazy reflection of politics. Administration officials claimed that providing more food before the end of the fiscal year would create logistical problems in Africa. Peter McPherson, administrator of AID, told the House Agriculture Subcommittee that the president's food aid request was sufficient, and any aid above that amount should be pushed into 1986.

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"The politics of starvation in Washington are raising questions about America's willingness to fund economic aid in large amounts for long periods."

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A vocal group of congressmen emphatically denounced the administration proposals as once again being cheap and indifferent to Africa's needs. Representatives Howard Wolpe (D-MI), Mickey Leland (D-TX), and others joined Weiss in trying to force the administration to spend more, because, as Wolpe said, past estimates of Africa's food needs "simply were inadequate." Even the Reagan administration, Wolpe pointed out, agrees that some 14 million Africans face starvation now. "It is terribly important that we understand the cost of underestimating the need," he said.

Not surprisingly, the first two bills out of the congressional chute sought substantially greater amounts of food aid than the administration was willing to grant. Weiss, Wolpe, and Leland called for a total package amounting to $881.5 million that would include at least 2 million metric tons of emergency food aid:

1.7 million in additional food and 300,000 from the wheat reserve. This would have met the uncovered food aid needed in Africa through September 1985. In addition, the bill provided $290 million for inland transportation costs, refugee assistance, emergency health needs, and support for the PVOs already distributing food in Africa.

Other bills quickly followed. Representatives Silvio Conte (R-MA) and Marge Roukema (R-NJ) sought $628 million for 1.2 million tons of emergency food, which when added to the 300,000 tons of wheat from the emergency reserve and 400,000 tons funded from reprogramming, would total 1.9 million tons in additional American emergency food aid through autumn.

Both the House and Senate also issued similar bills authorizing non-food assistance to Africa with dollar amounts between those of the two major House bills. Among its measures, the Senate offered an emergency package from Sen. John Melchior (D-MT) seeking $769 million in new aid and some 1.1 million tons of emergency food, along with other provisions.

By March, legislation for emergency food aid and non-food assistance for Africa seemed to fill both the House and Senate. Dollar amounts generally held at two to three times the President's requests for $285 million in new emergency food aid, and $100 million for disaster and refugee aid. The administration's proposal differed from the House and Senate in several important ways. It would fund about half the amount of additional food, provide less than half the levels for disaster relief and refugee aid, and provide nothing in assistance to the PVOs at work in the dusty relief camps of Africa.

In appearance a small matter, the conflict over the PVOs illustrates one of the basic differences dividing the Reagan administration and congressional policy on Africa. Since 1981, as a premise of its political ideology, the administration has sought both greater control over foreign aid, and (in other areas) the shifting of funding from the government to the private sector. The PVOs appear now to be the focus of both these political ideologies. Despite the fact that they are the principal food distributors on the ground in Africa, with a
long record of efficiency and low overhead, the PVOs find themselves cut out of the Reagan budget. Instead of expanding American assistance, administration officials complain that these relief groups should be subject to stricter accounting of their work and should increase their share of the costs of expanded relief efforts to reach hungry Africans in remote regions.

Administration supporters in Congress raised other issues in opposition. Rep. Pat Swindall (R-GA) spoke for the opposition majority when he complained that the emergency bills for Africa called for “money which we clearly do not have, which we would clearly have to go and borrow.” Several other members joined administration officials in asserting that U.S. food aid was going to Marxist nations, especially Ethiopia. As the nuances of this issue seem to slip by, Rep. Dan Burton (R-IN) captured the essence of the Reagan position when he said: “The United States of America has been in part responsible for subsidizing and supporting a communist dictatorship over there.”

Despite these arguments, the first congressional effort in 1985 to get emergency aid to the continent failed for quite a different reason. That bill, HR 1096, would have provided $175 million in additional funds for disaster aid and refugee assistance in Africa this fiscal year. The administration meanwhile had sought only $50 million. The House passed the bill on February 26 and the Senate approved it the next day—but not before attaching three additional amendments that provided emergency credit aid to American farmers. President Reagan promptly vetoed the bill because, according to White House spokesman Larry Speakes, “that [credit aid] money is just not needed at this time.”

Undaunted, Congress came back with HR 1239, S 457 and S 370, all three burdened with amendments for or stalled in disputes over domestic farm assistance. There is an underlying irony here in linking Africa’s famine and America’s farm belt in legislation.

The case of S 370 illustrates the role of politics in the hunger scenario. The bill, calling for $510 million in food aid and another $175 million for health care and refugee assistance, passed the Senate Appropriations Committee in March—and stalled. The president’s veto of the previous assistance bill now worried Republican senators, who thought that farm state Democrats might attach emergency farm credit legislation to the bill, almost certainly provoking another presidential veto.

The bill languished through the spring, recalling a similar fight between Congress and the president last year over another emergency food aid bill for Africa. In February 1984, the Reagan administration requested $60 million in emergency assistance for sub-Saharan Africa. Members of Congress increased this to $150 million, part of which was split into a separate bill that passed Congress and was eventually signed by the president. But some $90 million got stuck in the Senate by an administration-supported amendment calling for military assistance to anti-Sandinista contras in Nicaragua. As a result, emergency aid to Africa idled in the Senate through July 1984.

This time, HR 1239 and S 689 survived. Senate leaders and farm credit

Ethiopian refugees in Sudan: “Guerrilla fighting and the drought have scattered the hungry across borders”
advocates agreed to send forward the legislation unencumbered, and the Senate and House approved S 689 authorizing legislation for $175 million in non-food aid. Actual funding for food and non-food assistance was appropriated by HR 1239, which provided $784 million in new funds for food and non-food relief and recovery assistance in Africa through September 1985. As of press time, however, President Reagan had not signed the new legislation.

Two important features of the African Relief and Recovery Bill stand out. First, the legislation specifically designated items and activities for non-food recovery assistance: seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, farm implements, blankets, clothing, health care and water projects, small-scale agricultural projects, and the like. Second, the legislation also states that this American aid must “benefit the poorest people,” and that funds should be channeled through the PVOs and international organizations to do so.

It also waives the so-called Hickenlooper Amendment, which had prevented long-term aid from reaching any nation that had not reimbursed the U.S. owners of seized property. This would directly affect Ethiopia, and signals a congressional willingness to get on with long-term assistance to that nation. Both the PVO provision and the Hickenlooper waiver, however, ran counter to President Reagan’s own political position.

Not all of the struggle between Congress and the White House focuses on short-term emergency aid to Africa. In its FY 1986 budget requests to Congress, the administration has continued its basic shift in policy toward the continent. According to this policy, long-term economic aid for Africa will be awarded not on the basis of need, but on that of political ideology and East-West security considerations. Moreover, the administration’s shift in emphasis from multilateral to bilateral aid—for purposes of control over that aid—is diminishing, or ending altogether, important long-term assistance programs for Africa.

The Reagan budget, released in April, calls for an almost 60 percent increase in military aid to Africa over the FY 1985 levels, but only a 1.3 percent increase in development assistance. This budget continues a trend toward military aid over economic aid that the administration began in its first budget. If the FY 1986 budget is approved—an unlikely prospect at best—military assistance to sub-Saharan Africa will have increased by 176.7 percent since Reagan took office. Development assistance, on the other hand, will have increased by only 11.7 percent.

The emphasis on East-West security considerations and on rewarding old friends is evident in the allocations of American economic aid to sub-Saharan Africa. In the president’s FY 1986 budget, five nations—Kenya, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and Zaire—will receive 47 percent of all U.S. economic aid to Africa. The second fastest growing element of the Reagan administration will be economic assistance to Africa, the administration has deferred all U.S. monies, which will cut off ADF from funding projects in Africa after 1985. Further, while the World Bank and 13 donor nations recently established a $1.1 billion special facility that will offer economic assistance to Africa, the Reagan administration will not contribute to the fund.

Finally, this administration has also refused to allocate the $17 million in aid requested by the International Planned Parenthood Federation because something less than 1 percent of its funds—none of them federal monies in any case—go to abortion services worldwide. This move has eliminated family planning services in some 18 African nations, a myopic policy consideration given the 3.2 percent annual population growth rate in sub-Saharan Africa.

The struggle between Congress and the White House has resulted in unprecedented levels of short-term emergency food and other aid to Africa. In terms of long-range development assistance, however, the president’s record is abysmal. Of the industrialized countries of the West, only Italy has been less giving. It is a record that Congress might start addressing.

**“There is an underlying irony in linking Africa’s famine and America’s farm belt legislation.”**
Africa in the U.S.

Demonstrating Our Opposition

Since last November, the Free South Africa Movement has been in the forefront of American anti-apartheid activism. In this personal account, one of the key organizers of the movement explains its genesis, motivations, and strategies for future political actions.

BY ROGER WILKINS

In the winter-time when the leaves are off the trees, I can walk out of my front door and turn up Delaware Avenue and see the sun glinting off the Capitol dome against a crystal blue sky. It is a thrilling and beautiful sight and was never more so than on the crisp December morning when I knew that by nightfall I would be under arrest for having demonstrated—against apartheid and our government's policy of "constructive engagement"—within 500 feet of the embassy of the Republic of South Africa.

I knew that such political expression of displeasure with my government's policies could land me in a hard prison for a long time if I lived, for example, in Chile, in the Soviet Union, or especially in South Africa. But that morning, the Capitol dome symbolized the First Amendment and the free elections in the District of Columbia which had brought to power a black former civil rights worker, whose sympathies with our movement were translated into polite and correct police policies in dealing with our demonstrations.

Roger Wilkins, former columnist and editorial board member of The New York Times, is a senior fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C. This article was adapted from an earlier essay by Mr. Wilkins, which is reprinted by permission of the author and the Village Voice. Copyright © 1985.

AFRICA REPORT • May–June 1985

I could only wish that morning that our free press, flourishing under that same First Amendment, was as responsive to the struggle in South Africa and the programmatic efforts of black people and the organizations serving them as its freedom permitted it to be. But since Thanksgiving Eve, when Randall Robinson, executive director of TransAfrica, the black American lobby on Africa and the Caribbean; Congressman Walter Fauntroy of the District of Columbia; and Dr. Mary Frances Berry, a member of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, sat in and were arrested at the South African embassy, the press has under-reported the demonstrations and has consistently misinterpreted them.

The startling thing about the Free South Africa Movement is that it has sustained daily protests—Monday through Friday—for more than 22 weeks. There have been marches and arrests throughout the winter, even on the bitterest of January's coldest days, and into the spring. As the early euphoria wore off and the press wearied of the story, the daily drudgery of leading the demonstrations, briefing the arrestees, and plotting strategy devolved upon four people: Robinson, Berry, Dr. Sylvia Hill of the University of the District of Columbia, and myself.

The volunteers from the Southern Africa Support Project continued their invaluable support to the effort by insuring that there were pickets even on the days when organized groups were not scheduled to protest, by supplying peo-
people to lead the marchers in chants, and by seeing to it that the amplifying equipment was brought, set up, and taken away each day on time.

The response to this tiny apparatus has been astounding. More than 1,800 Americans from all over the country have submitted themselves to arrest in front of the embassy in Washington. They range from Sen. Lowell Weicker of Connecticut and 18 members of the House of Representatives, to Stevie Wonder, President Jimmy Carter's daughter Amy, my daughter Amy, Harry Belafonte, Arthur Ashe, and Tom Donahue, secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO.

Demonstrations have been mounted in 27 other American cities at consulates and dealers in South African gold coins by local affiliates of TransAfrica. These protests have resulted in almost a thousand additional arrests. There have been tens of thousands more unarrested protesters in the 28 cities.

So far, none of the arrestees in any of the protest cities have been prosecuted. In Washington, the U.S. attorney, Joseph DiGenova, has enunciated a specific policy of dismissing all charges. Free South Africa Movement leaders believe that it is a deliberate policy—urged upon him by the Department of State—of avoiding trials in Washington courts which would rehearse the evils of apartheid before the world and demonstrate the immorality of the policy of constructive engagement.

When the Rev. Jesse Jackson and his sons, Jesse Jr. and Jonathan, were brought to court after the arrests and the charges were being dropped, Rev. Jackson made a plea to be tried. The assistant U.S. attorney promptly dropped the charges and the judge told Jackson: "You cannot be tried because there is nothing before me." Jackson, a big man, looked left and right at his two broad-shouldered sons, spread his arms and said, "But we are before you." The judge smiled ruefully and said, "People, yes, but a case, no."

Deak-Perera, one of the nation's leading dealers in the krugerrand, the South African gold coin, has also been shy about the publicity a trial would generate. When 12 people, including Nobel prize winner George Wald and MIT professor Willard Johnson, were arrested for trespass at a protest against the Boston Deak-Perera outlet organized by the Boston affiliate of TransAfrica, the Commonwealth Attorney waited until the opening of the trial to drop the charges.

The 12 returned to the outlet the following day, trespassed, and disrupted the firm's business, but the manager, after conferring with his home office, declined to press charges and was prepared to permit the demonstrators to remain in the store all night. Similarly, when Berry, Hill, Fauntroy, Robinson, and I went to protest in the firm's Washington office, the manager locked us out, closed the store for the afternoon, and declined to press charges. Trials for Cleveland, Seattle, and Chicago protesters are scheduled for the near future.

Because this effort is black-led, much of the press can't seem to grasp the simple idea that it is not a civil rights effort. Though civil rights leaders and activists have joined and supported the movement, it is no more a civil rights movement than it is a labor movement or a religious movement or an elected officials movement or a celebrities movement, though people from all of those categories of our population have given of their substance, and sometimes have offered their bodies, to support this endeavor.

And Free South Africa did not start when it did because of the election. It started because close observers of the South African scene watched as the government of that country promulgated a new constitution which it heralded as a human rights advance, but which in fact indicated a recommitment to absolute constitutional repression of South Africa's entire black population. While permitting extremely limited political rights to the mixed race and Asian populations, the new constitution denies absolutely any political rights to the 73 percent of the population that is black.

The rest of the policy of apartheid—stripping blacks of their citizenship,
shipping them off to "homelands," and rigidly controlling almost every aspect of their lives—continues to be pressed relentlessly. So far 8 million black South Africans have been robbed of their citizenship and 3 million have been forced into the barren and despotic "homelands." When black leaders there protested against all of that last fall, many of them were slapped into jail without charges and held incommunicado. The promulgation of that constitution and the subsequent jailing triggered the Free South Africa protests, not Reagan's re-election.

The idea that black organizations dropped all their other activities to run up and protest in front of the South African embassy is equally fatuous. Though a number of civil rights leaders have joined the steering committee of Free South Africa and others have gone to jail, none of them stopped their normal work for the poor and the dispossessed in America.

The work of the NAACP, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the National Urban League, and a host of other organizations continues. Nevertheless, pundits and others, either in their ignorance or their arrogance, assume that blacks can hold only one thought in their heads at a time and conduct only one program at a time, so they have lectured us about the inappropriateness of our movement.

The fact is there is no more appropriate act for moral Americans to take than to fight against constitutional racism in South Africa and against the support that our nation is currently giving to it. In his letter from Birmingham City Jail, the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. wrote: "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere." This is a particularly apt lesson for Americans when they contemplate the ruthlessness of apartheid and our government's policy of constructive engagement.

To put it simply, some Americans are getting rich from the semi-slave labor of black South Africans and our government is encouraging them to continue doing that. Former South African prime minister John Vorster often said, "Foreign investment is the bricks and mortar with which South Africa is built." U.S. direct private investment in South Africa is approximately $2 billion. Total direct and indirect U.S. investments (including portfolio investments) amount to $15 billion.

The Carter administration attempted to apply steady pressure on the South African government to force it to deal equitably with its black citizens. Under the Reagan administration, that pressure has evaporated. U.S. bank loans to South Africa were at a level of $1.7 billion a year at the dawn of constructive engagement. In 1983, that figure had grown to $4.6 billion. Then, during the first six months of 1984, the 1983 figure was almost matched. American banks poured in $4.5 billion during that half-year.

America's hardware support of the apparatus of oppression has also increased enormously during the Reagan presidency. President Carter supported UN Security Council resolution 418, which extended a preexisting arms embargo to cover equipment and technology which, though having possible civilian uses, could also be used by the South African military police. As part of its constructive engagement policy, the Reagan administration has abandoned that embargo. As a result, transport planes, helicopters, advanced communications systems, and giant computers for use by the South African Energy Board at its Pelindaba nuclear enrichment plant, which is reportedly the site of Pretoria's nuclear weapons program, have all flowed from our shores into South Africa.

The combination of the staying power of this movement and the occasional drama it has generated in Washington and around the country has made apartheid and the U.S. government's relationship with South Africa a front-burner foreign policy issue in this country. A month after the movement began, President Reagan condemned apartheid in strong terms for the first time in his presidency.

Three months later, Secretary of State Shultz condemned the South African system in even harsher terms after 19 people had been killed by South African police in the township of Langa. Sen. Richard Lugar, the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, dealt at length with the South African issue in his first public appearance after being elevated to the chair. It is doubtful that any of these events would have occurred had the protests not focused attention on conditions in South Africa.

Moreover, apartheid is now receiving intense attention on Capitol Hill for the first time in recent memory. More than 100 bills of varying seriousness have been introduced. Although Free South Africa supports a number of bills introduced by individual members of Congress, it participated actively in the development of a bill chiefly sponsored by Sen. Edward Kennedy and Rep. William Gray. That bill would ban all new investments in South Africa, prohibit all new bank loans by U.S. banks to the South African public sector, ban computer sales to South Africa for use by the South African government, and ban the sale of krugerrands in this country.

The attempt to ban krugerrands is of particular interest. Krugerrand sales in the United States amounted to $485 million in 1984. This was more than 30 percent of the worldwide market for the coin and a quarter of the value of all South African exports to the United States. The krugerrand constitutes a massive economic prop to the South African regime because it is highly profitable since the metal is extracted from the earth by the semi-slave labor of blacks.

When the Kennedy-Gray bill was introduced with a broad bipartisan sponsorship, Sen. Weicker said that he was convinced that anti-apartheid legislation would pass the Congress in some form this year (as opposed to last session, when a strong House-passed bill was rejected by the Senate) and that the president would sign it. In addition to conducting its daily demonstrations and coordinating others around the country, the Free South Africa Movement is beginning to gear up for intensive lobbying efforts on the Hill and for a public education campaign focused directly on the krugerrand.

Robinson has said that the demonstrations will continue "as long as necessary," but even after the enactment of the anti-apartheid legislation, the movement plans to continue its work. All of the leaders of the movement have been involved in one way or another with South African issues for many years.
We know that the struggle in South Africa will continue even after Congress alters this nation's policies. Having captured the conscience of the nation, the leaders of the Free South Africa Movement intend to continue to press the fight "for as long as necessary."

As the hostile reaction to Senator Kennedy's visit by a small but significant black minority indicated, black South Africans are not unaware of our country's immoral support of oppression. By their treatment of him, they reminded us that our support of injustice in South Africa was a deep and wrenching tear in the fabric of American decency.

The first of the Free South Africa Movement's demands is that our government end its support of apartheid and that it reinstate pressure on the South African government to move toward peaceful change. Our second major demand is that the true leaders of the black majority be released from jail and that the government of South Africa negotiate with the leaders of all populations in that country to bring about a peaceful settlement that will provide political and economic justice for all South Africans.

As I was being cuffed late on that December afternoon, I wondered why my brothers and sisters in journalism were having such a hard time with such a simple story. Then, as I was being put into the paddy wagon with the son of the Reverend Ralph David Abernathy and the mayor of Tacoma Park, Maryland, I understood the answer. I was submitting myself to arrest for the same reason the press was misunderstanding the story. South African society is mainly about race and American society is more about race than most white people understand. I understand oppression there because I have been oppressed here and many whites have misunderstood oppression there because it is psychically important to them to minimize the amount of oppression here.

And the thing that I understood that day—cuffed and voluntarily deprived of my freedom—was that once the promise of freedom symbolized by the Capitol dome was unleashed for all human beings, an undying struggle was bound to ensue until there was justice for all or justice for none.

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**Headlines**

**On the police massacre of black South Africans at Langa on March 21, 1985:**

- **President Ronald Reagan:**
  "... Nothing can be solved by violence. And that isn't the answer. But remember the violence is not just alone stemming from a government putdown of demonstrators. You have, in the black community there, you've got rival factions and the violence is sometimes between them fighting each other. And we've seen evidence of that, and we've seen murders. And some of the 40 deaths have been created in and among the people without the government participating. ... But I was trying to point out that from this being simply people opposed to apartheid against a government that is supporting apartheid, no, it has gone beyond that. There is an element that wants to overthrow the government by violence and is not just limiting its fighting to the government. It is fighting its own fellow citizens, and even in the same communities."

  —From an interview with the *Washington Post*  
  April 2, 1985

- **Secretary of State George Shultz:**
  "Well, first as to our attitude and my attitude and reaction to this violence, let me just say again that I find it deplorable and have nothing except denunciation to say for it. There's no excuse for it and that has been said by the [State] Department. It's been said by the President and I say it right here. So I don't have any equivocation on that score. [The killings] only underline how evil and unacceptable that system is."

  —From testimony before the  
  Foreign Operations Subcommittee  
  of the House Appropriations Committee  
  March 21, 1985

- **Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester A. Crocker:**
  "We are against this kind of killing by the police of unarmed demonstrators. "There is no question whatsoever that that kind of action, belief or use of force by the police, as the first recourse in the event of that kind of situation developing, is unacceptable... If there is not constructive change, there is going to be chaos, there is going to be anarchy, there is going to be a blowup, and that's the key pressure for change. The white minority cannot run it with guns. They cannot run it on the basis of a labor force that's overwhelmingly black [unless there is negotiation and dialogue]. It's been delayed much too long."

  —From "This Week with David Brinkley"  
  March 24, 1985
**New Sudanese leadership aims for national reconciliation**

Sudan’s new leader, Gen. Abdul Rahman Sawar-Dahab, is reaching out to disparate factions in an effort to unify the nation. Negotiations were underway in mid-April between the military rulers and a coalition of unions and political parties over the length of the transition to civilian rule and the composition of the interim cabinet.

The ruling Transitional Military Council and the coalition—the Alliance of Forces for National Salvation—were close to agreement on a one-year transition period and an interim cabinet with strong civilian representation. The interim government will handle executive functions, though the military council will retain overall power.

The civilian factions are divided among themselves on many issues but in agreement with the military leaders on the broader issues facing Sudan—that democracy should prevail under a multiparty parliamentary government, that the top priority must be solving the country’s economic crisis, and that warfare should cease in the south.

Col. John Garang, leader of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which has fought for two years in the south to overthrow the Nimeiry government, complained that the military leaders—“Nimeiry’s regime without Nimeiry”—had “stolen victory from the masses.” Shortly after the bloodless coup, Garang declared that he would resume fighting unless the government was overthrown by civilians within seven days.

Sawar-Dahab sent an emissary to initiate talks with Garang, but dismissed the guerrilla leader’s ultimatum as unreasonable since it would be “impossible to convene a government in a week’s time.” The civil war, which resumed in 1983 after an 11-year hiatus, was one of the causes of Nimeiry’s downfall.

Libya has been the major source of arms for the SPLA, and Sawar-Dahab has indicated that he wants to improve relations with Col. Muammar Qaddafi, who has already made several overtures to the new government. Qaddafi and Nimeiry were implacable foes for more than a decade. Reconciliation with Libya and Ethiopia, which also supplies the SPLA, would be a vital step toward ending the civil war.

Sawar-Dahab has also reached out to Islamic fundamentalists by meeting with Hassan Turabi, leader of the Moslem Brotherhood. Turabi was foreign relations adviser to Nimeiry until the former president detained him and 200 other leaders of the brotherhood in early March—one of the sudden policy reversals that characterized his erratic rule. The brotherhood was largely responsible for implementing the harsher aspects of the sharia. Sawar-Dahab, has said that the civilian government that will take over in a year will determine whether to repeal the sharia.

Sawar-Dahab has stated that he intends to continue Sudan’s close relations with Egypt and the U.S. Sudan and Egypt are linked by a mutual defense pact.

Sudan, considered a strategic U.S. ally, receives more American military aid than any other African nation.

Continued on next page

**Campaign trail heats up in run-off to national elections in Zimbabwe**

Mounting political unrest continues to plague the country in the run-up to Zimbabwe’s first post-independence general election scheduled for June. While the election showdown—originally due in March—was postponed because of difficulties in registering voters and drawing up constituency boundaries, repeated clashes have occurred between supporters of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). For ZAPU in particular, it has been an uphill battle to campaign beyond the confines of its Mashonaland stronghold.

Police support units were deployed in the eastern city of Mutare in early April to end the harassment of ZAPU supporters by ZANU youth wing members who were forcibly evicting them from their homes. Over a period of 10 days, ZANU gangs had ordered dozens of occupants out of their houses, moving their belongings into the streets and smashing windows. Appeals by Minister of State for Political Affairs Maurice Nyagumbo to stop the evictions were not heeded, prompting the deployment of support troops. Nyagumbo revealed that a stricter code of conduct for ZANU youth groups soon would be introduced to restrain over-zealous party members.

Throughout the election run-up, ZAPU campaigning beyond Mashonaland has prompted massive protests by government supporters. In January, Nkomo was forced to suspend his meet-the-people tour on several occasions. He began his tour in the solidly pro-ZANU town of Masvingo, where he faced 2,000 Mugabe supporters demonstrating against his visit. He took refuge in Masvingo police station, which was

Continued on next page
ZIMBABWE continued

eventually besieged by over 30,000 angry protesters. Nkomo was forced to flee in what he termed a "shower of bullets and stones."

A few weeks later, in the town of Banket, 500 ZANU youths carried placards supporting a one-party state and others that read "Nkomo, father of dissidents, we don't want you here." They formed a "people's roadblock" to prevent him from passing through the streets. In Kariba, Karoi, and other parts of the country, large demonstrations were organized to protest his proposed visits.

Nkomo called a press conference to say that he believed the elections could not be "free and fair," since "no campaigning is being allowed." The attacks on ZAPU, he claimed, were part of a concerted government campaign of terror to destroy his opposition party.

Mugabe rejected these accusations, arguing that such protests were a "natural reaction" to murders of several ZANU officials by armed dissidents allegedly loyal to Nkomo. "Who is doing the greatest violence to our constitution? Certainly not my party. We regret those demonstrations which are violent, but in most cases they have been provoked. ZAPU must stop killing our members."

One such incident occurred in Matabeleland North where Michael Sibanda, Nkayi district chairman, was bayoneted and then shot three times by dissidents. The murder followed a series of rallies in the area by ZANU leaders. At the funeral gathering, Nyagumbo was not in a conciliatory mood. "We want to wipe away Nkomo in the following general elections. Anybody who will dare to lift him up after that will face the music."

More recently, the ZANU-ZAPU rift has intensified within Matabeleland. A report to the government by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe revealed that more than 50 key ZAPU members had disappeared in a series of night abductions which the party claims were organized by the government to suppress political opposition. ZAPU officials, teachers, and hospital administrators have been abducted from their homes in the middle of the night by squads operating in unmarked cars in the rural districts of Nkayi and Tsholotsho. The widespread kidnappings have forced many people in rural Matabeleland to flee to Bulawayo.

In a two-day military clampdown on Bulawayo in March, 4,000 troops and police searched houses for weapons, while soldiers and officers of the Central Intelligence Organization sealed off the townships with roadblocks. The government said that the operation was needed to quell violence between the two parties which had recently claimed several lives. A total of 1,282 people were temporarily detained in the security exercise.

Nkomo condemned the operation as an "election stunt" aimed at intimidating voters and accused the government of subjecting residents of Bulawayo to "inhuman and degrading treatment." At a rally in Bulawayo a few days later, attended by 50,000 supporters, Nkomo launched a vitriolic attack on the Mugabe government calling the elections "a fraud before they
Nigerian doctors call for truce

Nigerian doctors called off their strike on March 14, three weeks after the government had banned their professional organizations and ordered them back to work. The government’s cancellation of free health services ordered them back to work. The government’s cancellation of free health services for staff at teaching and specialist hospitals had precipitated the recent troubles with the medical community. But the frustrations leading up to the strike had been building for months. The doctors have insisted that their grievances are with the insufficient resources devoted to the health sector, rather than inadequate pay or poor working conditions.

A year ago, the doctors had warned that the health care delivery system was in peril. Last September, a strike was instigated by the National Association of Resident Doctors (NARD), one of the organizations that was later banned. In settling that strike, the government promised that five percent of the national budget would be devoted to the health sector and that a new task force would oversee national health policy. But the doctors soon complained that the government was not fulfilling the provisions of the settlement. The military regime argued that the doctors had no regard for the serious economic predicament facing the country. According to government officials, the Nigerian Doctors Association (NDA) exhibited “unpardonable bad faith by making endless demands on matters which are exclusively the responsibility of the government, such as restructuring of the Federal Ministry of Health... and the ongoing cost reduction measures in the public sector.”

The dispute reached a crisis in January when the doctors stopped treating patients with infectious diseases “as a precaution for self-protection” and in a protest over the cancellation of their free health services. After the public demonstrated widespread support for the doctors, the government admitted it had erred, and the free medical service was reinstated. Salary arrears for staff at teaching and specialist hospitals were also paid. The government’s conciliatory moves did not, however, soften the doctors’ position. Instead, they escalated their protest to a boycott of new patients and demanded that the government meet all of their demands.

In late February, the government banned the NDA and the NARD and announced that if the doctors did not return to work within 24 hours, they should consider themselves dismissed and vacate their official residences. In addition, a number of the doctors’ leaders were detained, and hospitals in several cities were put under military administration.

At first, most of the doctors resisted the government’s strong-arm tactics. Few returned to work, and many moved out of their government homes. Students at several Nigerian universities boycotted classes and held a mass rally to express their solidarity. The National Association of Nigerian Nurses and Midwives called on the government to reconsider its position and protested alleged torture of the imprisoned leaders. The Nigerian Labor Congress tried to mediate the dispute, although the effort failed when ministry of health officials refused to participate.

By mid-March, the doctors decided to call off their strike. Most of them complied with the government’s March 18 deadline to reapply for their government positions. In a press statement issued when the truce was called, the doctors called for the release of their detained leaders and said they were returning to work to show, “We are not subversive... but as patriotic citizens demand improvement of health services.”

BENIN

Kérékou sets party congress

The People’s Revolutionary Party of Benin (PRPB) will hold a congress this year to assess national progress made since 1972 when President Mathieu Kérékou came to power in a coup. The only other party congress held since then was in 1979.

Economic issues are expected to dominate the 1985 party congress. The event is being scheduled at a time when the country’s leadership is reassessing its economic policies. Though still fully committed to development along Marxist-Leninist lines, Benin is seeking a variety of methods to encourage national development.

“We are no satellite of the Soviet Union...” the president recently told the press, adding, “A pilot can land his plane from any direction, east or west, and there are different ways of maneuvering a plane towards the airfield.”

Kérékou has appealed to the pri-
vate sector to increase its contribution to the economy and to businessmen to diversify their investments. The move to encourage free enterprise began in the early 1980s. Many of the firms that were nationalized in 1974 have been dissolved or merged. In addition, Benin is seeking assistance and investment from Western nations, while maintaining its friendship with socialist countries.

**BURKINA FASO**  
Sankara plays the union blues

To ease growing tensions between the ruling National Council of the Revolution (CNR) and the country's influential trade union movement, a consultative body will be set up linking the government and trade unions to encourage "greater participation in decision-making at the governmental level." A few weeks earlier, President Thomas Sankara had met with leaders of three moderate union federations for the first time since he came to power. The purpose of the meeting was to clarify the role of workers in the revolution and to provide a forum to discuss "trade union freedoms."

Discontent has been on the rise over recently introduced austerity measures. The CNR had provoked considerable public opposition by suspending state, army, and private salaries for a month, reducing the mandatory retirement age from 55 to 53, and redirecting all commercial and industrial rents to the government because of a shrinking budget. Leaders of the 11 trade unions, which are largely controlled by the pro-Soviet Patriotic League for Development (LIPAD) and the pro-Albanian Voltaic Revolutionary Communist Party (PCRV) denounced the "fall in workers' living standards" and called on the people "to mobilize and prepare themselves for a struggle to defend trade union and democratic rights."

Sankara suspended the dissident union leaders from their jobs, charging them with "obstructing measures which promote the independence of the economy," and banned them from using public transport and public housing built with voluntary labor. The officials were also excluded from rent-free and tax-free provisions so that they could "better appreciate the interest of CNR measures in favor of the people."

The government has released former Minister of Foreign Affairs Arba Diallo, who had been under house arrest for four months. Regarded as the leading theoretician of LIPAD, Diallo had been detained,

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**Dioulo all a loan in the world**

To avoid facing criminal charges of embezzlement and fraud, Emmanuel Dioulo, the mayor and government deputy for Abidjan, fled to Belgium in late March in the wake of a full-blown financial and political scandal in Ivory Coast. Regarded by many as a likely successor to President Houphouët-Boigny, Dioulo has been the central figure in the controversy which has rocked the country from top to bottom.

It began innocuously as a civil tribunal dispute which pitted the largely state-owned National Bank for Agricultural Development (BNDA) against Dioulo's Coffee and Cocoa Exporting Firm (COGEXIM). BNDA charged COGEXIM with failing to repay $8 million in loans and interest advanced to fund purchases of cocoa and coffee between 1981 and 1983 and sued the firm when it was discovered that the loans were apparently used to buy $14 million of fictitious coffee stocks.

BNDA interim President Lamine Diabaté insisted that Dioulo, as director of the COGEXIM, "amused himself with large sums of money" and "fooled the banks and built himself an empire." Even though Diabaté claimed that the court case was a "purely commercial affair," it rapidly took on wider political dimensions.

While Dioulo has received favorable coverage in the Paris-based *Jouine Afrique Economique*, of which he is apparently a shareholder, the Ivorian media has repeatedly attacked him—prompting the mayor and his supporters to argue that the scandal was "an organized attempt to politically destroy him." Dioulo claimed it was part of a concerted effort to discredit him at a time when Houphouët-Boigny is expected to name his constitutional successor.

Dioulo wrote a controversial letter to Houphouët-Boigny, asking the president to intervene in the dispute and settle the BNDA's claims against his company. He alluded to a series of financial scandals involving the Ivorian elite and asked rhetorically "why those implicated in such scandals are the most virulent in their attacks on me."

The affair is complicated by the BNDA's recent history of financial mismanagement. In August 1984, the BNDA's then-director, Gervais Kadio Moroko, was "relieved of his functions" because of financial irregularities and replaced by Diabaté. Dioulo has held that $20 million of COGEXIM's alleged debts result from the bank's "bad book-keeping." An auditor's report of the "Dioulo affair" did reveal "important anomalies" and a "lack of rigor" in the bank's accounting, but also found some proof of debts of $32 million in COGEXIM's accounts.

Dioulo fled the country following a provisional ruling in the initial civil court case in which he was ordered to repay $14 million to the BNDA. An Ivorian auditing firm will determine in May whether COGEXIM is required to pay the rest. In the meantime, the company's bank accounts remain blocked and its factories in Toubobroko and Abidjan have been closed.

The national press called the tribunal's decision "too lenient." Minister of Defense Jean Konan Banny went further. In a televised address, he criticized the verdict as a "mockery of justice." and revealed that the government would ask for Dioulo's parliamentary immunity to be lifted so that "swift and total justice" can be carried out.
together with former Minister of Information Adama Touré, and accused of spreading disaffection against CNR policies and programs. To help bridge the gap with LIPAD, Sankara also indicated that Diallo would become one of his advisers.

Soumane Touré, a prominent LIPAD member and secretary-general of the Burkina Confederation of Trade Unions (CSB), remains in detention, however. Accused of embezzlement, he was arrested in January. In his evidence before a public tribunal, he said that the government had embezzled far greater sums since coming to power—a claim he has since retracted. At a press conference held in Ougadougou in March during the FESPACO film festival, Sankara explained that a commission of inquiry set up by committees for the defense of the revolution had found him guilty and was demanding “very serious sanctions.”

Sankara pointed out, however, that other commissions had been formed and would also have to submit their findings before a final decision could be reached. “You must understand we have a mission and a duty to safeguard dialogue, and to bear in mind that Burkina is not exclusively made up of militant people. Our role is to take the demands of all parties into consideration—both those who want a court martial and those who never thought what they were doing could lead them to a court martial. We are in the middle. We have to know how to listen.”

**THE GAMBIA**

Soccer clash strains relations

A clash between fans at a soccer match has provoked fears for the future of the three-year-old Senegambian confederation.

The Senegalese ambassador was recalled for ordering Senegalese troops to surround a stadium in Banjul when a brawl broke out at the soccer game. The Senegalese armed forces moved in on the Gambian athletes and their fans, and an estimated 100 persons were injured. Describing the situation as “serious and disturbing,” Gambian President Dawda Jawara recalled his envoy from Senegal.

The soccer match was part of a celebration for the third anniversary of the Senegambian confederation. Senegalese troops—now known as confederal forces—have been stationed in the Gambia since 1981, following a coup attempt against Jawara. The attempted coup and Senegal’s intervention led to the formation of the confederation.

The two countries have held protracted negotiations over the formation of an economic and monetary union, part of the plan for the confederation.

**GUINEA-BISSAU**

Bordering on a dispute

The International Court at The Hague recently settled the first maritime border dispute in sub-Saharan Africa to be brought before an international court.

The dispute originated in 1980 when Guinea-Bissau contended that off-shore oil prospecting done by the U.S. company, Union Texas Petroleum, in conjunction with the Conakry government, violated its territorial waters. Guinea-Bissau’s attempts to reach an accord with Guinea had failed since the government of then-president Sékou Touré repeatedly refused to acknowledge the border problem.

In February 1983, the present Guinean government of President Lansana Conté finally agreed to settle the deadlock at the International Court. The Conté government maintained that the disputed waters fell within Guinea’s border, just south of the Bijagos archipelago, as established by France and Portugal in 1866. Guinea-Bissau President João Bernardo Vieira disputed the colonial agreement, locating the border further south, as an extension of Guinea-Bissau’s on-land border.

The International Court made a compromise decision, cutting the waters in two, thus enabling both countries to prospect for off-shore oil. As Registrar of the Court Alain Pillepich said, “There are no winners and no losers after the border judgment.”

A decision has yet to be reached on a similar maritime border dispute between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal. Tensions between the two countries escalated a year ago when Senegal sent a Canadian drilling ship into the disputed area to prospect for oil. In response, Guinea-Bissau sent warships to force the ship to withdraw.

In a mid-March visit to Dakar, Vieira met with Senegalese President Abdou Diouf in hopes of settling the issue. They agreed to set up an international arbitration tribunal composed of three mutually acceptable members in Geneva within the next two months. In the meantime, both countries agreed to refrain from any activities in the contested area.

**LIBERIA**

Would-be assassin executed

A firing squad executed the deputy chief of the presidential guard on April 8, one week after he had been accused of trying to assassinate President Samuel K. Doe. Doe said that a military investigation had found the man guilty.

The would-be assassin, Lt. Col. Moses Flanzamaton, reportedly ambushed Doe’s jeep with a ma-
chinese gun late one night as the president was returning to his mansion. Doe said that bullets had pierced his hat and the tires of the jeep. Two of his bodyguards were wounded, one critically, but Doe himself survived unscathed.

Before his execution, Flanzamaton reportedly implicated several opposition party leaders and a U.S. security adviser in the assassination attempt. He said he had been promised $1 million to carry out the assassination and that the effort was planned at the home of a U.S. military adviser to the Liberian army, Richard Smith.

Doe arrested Gabriel Bacchus Matthews, leader of the United People’s Party; Tuan Wrey, leader of the Liberian Action Party, and Edward Kesselley, leader of the United Party, but released them one week later. Those detained had constituted Doe’s only viable opposition in the October 1985 presidential elections. Doe had already banned Amos Sawyer, leader of the Liberian People’s Party, pending an audit of the accounts of the national constitution commission, which Sawyer had headed.

The arrest and detention of party leaders is one of the obstacles that Doe has placed in the way of his political opponents. Others include stiff fees for party registration and bureaucratic delays in the registration process. There seems to be little hope that Doe will allow any real political challenge in the months remaining before the election, even though he would probably be able to defeat any opposition at the polls, given his incumbency and the divided nature of the opposition.

However, as one party leader pointed out, “It is not a question of who will win. We are in the contest because if we weren’t, we would be blamed for not helping the country return to a truly democratic system. It is really a question of whether the process by which Samuel Doe is elected president can be made to seem democratic.”

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**Eastern Africa**

**Links revived to spur regional trade**

Eight years after the dissolution of the East African Community (EAC), the three former member-states are embarking on new cooperative ventures that are expected to boost trade within the region. There are no plans, however, to revive the EAC, which was dissolved in 1977, 10 years after its founding.

At a meeting in Arusha, Tanzania, in late March, ministers from Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda agreed to work out new systems of cooperation and assessed the progress that had been made in dividing up the EAC assets and liabilities as prescribed in an accord signed in May 1984.

A planned powerline between Uganda and Tanzania is one of the major new cooperative ventures. The two nations recently signed a contract with an Italian firm to construct the line from Masaka, Uganda, to the power-starved Kagera region in northwest Tanzania.

The 150-megawatt hydropower station at Owen Falls Dam in Jinja, Uganda, will supply the power. Construction is due to start in July, pending approval of a soft loan from the Italian government.

The primary thrust of the new cooperative effort, however, is the revival of transportation links among the three nations. Rail services between Kenya and Tanzania resumed in mid-February with the delivery of a shipment of Tanzanian molasses to Nairobi. The rebirth of marine services between the two nations was also celebrated in February when the Tanzanian ship Nyogumi docked in Kisumu, Kenya, on the eastern shore of Lake Victoria, to pick up a load of fuel. Passenger services across the lake are also available again with the regular sailing of the Kisumu-Mwanza ferry.

Uganda, too, is stepping up its marine services on the lake. The Ugandan government has commissioned a second railway car ferry which recently began sailing between Jinja and Mwanza, Tanzania. The first ferry was launched in December, and a third will be commissioned later this year. For land-locked Uganda, the lake traffic provides an alternative outlet to the sea through Tanzania’s port of Dar es Salaam. Plans are underway to improve railway and road transportation between Uganda and Tanzania as well.

The former EAC members are increasing their efforts to cooperate with other neighboring countries too. Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda signed an agreement with Kenya in February to codify regulations for routing their freight through the Kenyan port of Mombasa. And in late March, Tanzania and Malawi signed a contract to establish a microwave communication link between the towns of Mzuzu, Malawi, and Mbeya, Tanzania. The link is part of the pan-African telecommunications network, Panafetel.

Tanzania has announced it will join the Preferential Trade Association (PTA) for eastern and southern Africa, which aims to improve intra-African trade among its members and decrease their dependency on Western trading partners. Its decision to join was especially welcome to the organization because of Tanzania’s geographic location between eastern and southern members and the importance of its three main ports in the proposed PTA regional transportation network.

Tanzania was one of six potential member-states which had been reluctant to join, partly because of its suspicion that the organization might chiefly benefit more industrialized nations like Zimbabwe and Kenya. Zimbabwe has only recently been accused of dominating the PTA with an overbalance of exports and few imports from other members. The fact that only a few member-states have taken advantage of the PTA clearinghouse, located in the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, has become a major concern to the PTA Secretariat.
COMOROS
Mercenaries foil coup attempt

French mercenaries, under the leadership of Maj. Bob Denard, foiled an attempt by presidential guardsmen and civilians to overthrow the government on March 8. The abortive coup took place while President Ahmed Abdallah was on a private visit to France. At least 20 soldiers in the elite guard, which oversees the president’s security, were detained for questioning, and three were later executed for their role in the uprising.

Denard has been associated with Abdallah since 1978, when he and 50 other European mercenaries staged a coup that returned the then-exiled ex-president to power. Since then, Abdallah has employed Denard and his mercenaries to protect him from disloyalty within the guard and the army.

When asked about the mercenaries, Abdallah responded, “The mercenaries? Yes, I have some. If someone attacks me, do you think that it is the French coëoperants who are going to protect me? In the time that it takes to telephone Paris in order to get Mitterrand’s permission, I would be finished.” Abdallah further displayed his confidence in the mercenaries by opting to continue his visit in France instead of returning immediately to Moroni.

The attempted coup was one in a series of recent incidents revealing political tensions in the archipelago. In January, Abdallah moved to strengthen his power by abolishing the post of prime minister and also removing Mohamed Taki, chairman of the federal assembly and one of his chief political opponents, from the line of presidential succession. This was followed by the deportation of two cabinet ministers, Mohamed Moumine (interior) and Mohamed Massoune (education), to France. Both had been detained for their alleged role in a recent plot to overthrow the government.

CIA evacuates Ethiopian Jews to Israel

The CIA engineered a top-secret airlift to Israel in late March to evacuate the remaining 800 Ethiopian Jews stranded in eastern Sudan. The State Department and the U.S. Air Force took part in the carefully planned three-day mission in late March. Ten C-130 Hercules transport planes landed on an airstrip near Gedaref, southeast of Khartoum, where the Jews had been assembled in the Tawawa refugee camp.

The number of Jews to be airlifted was less than half the total originally estimated, according to U.S. officials. Many had fled or died of famine and disease following the suspension in January of a similar Israeli operation out of Sudan. During that mission, 7,800 Falashas were flown to Israel between November 21 and January 6. “Operation Moses,” as the Israeli effort was code-named, proceeded quietly under a news blackout but was abruptly abandoned by then Sudanese President Gaafar al-Nimeiry when news leaked out.

The groundwork for the subsequent mission was laid during a meeting between Nimeiry and U.S. Vice President George Bush during his visit to Sudan in early March. Nimeiry consented to the airlift on the condition that it would be carried out in total secrecy and that Israeli planes would not be used.

After the successful completion of the operation, the details were disclosed by Charles Powers, a reporter for the Los Angeles Times, who had been detained by the Gedaref branch of the Sudanese security office after he was seen near the airstrip. He was released 16 hours later, after the rescue was concluded.

The impetus for the CIA operation came from the U.S. Senate, which had urged President Ronald Reagan to push “for the immediate resumption of the airlift.” Senators Alan Cranston (D-CA) and Alfonse D’Amato (R-NY) produced a letter signed by all 100 senators, warning that the survival of Ethiopian Jews in Sudanese refugee camps was “in jeopardy,” and that they were at “special risk.”

Cranston said the speed with which the Senate gave its unanimous support to the letter was “pretty unprecedented. Nobody had any hesitation.” No news of the operation was leaked to the press, leading Cranston to remark, “The astounding story is that the Senate can keep a secret.”
sympathizers.

Despite repeated denials by the regime of Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam that it is using famine as a weapon against rebel supporters, a confidential government report has confirmed for the first time that over three-quarters of the people in Tigré province are not receiving food aid.

The internal report by the government's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission revealed that a mere 22 percent of Tigré's population, mainly in the provincial capital of Mekele, is receiving food sent by Western donors. Only 4,000 tons of food per month are reaching the remaining 1.2 million Tigré inhabitants although they need 18,000 tons to subsist. Mengistu, however, still refuses to agree to a proposed "famine truce," repeating that he will never negotiate with the "terrorists."

KENYA

Student unrest adds to tensions

Fourteen students charged in connection with a student demonstration at the University of Nairobi received six-month jail sentences in March. Meanwhile, the trial of five other students continued into April, with the prosecution focusing on Mwandawiro Mghanga, the leader of the students' organization.

The 19 students had participated in a sit-in lasting several days to protest earlier government action against eight student leaders—the expulsion of three and cancellation of the scholarships of five. Mwandawiro was one of those expelled. The protesters ignored orders to return to classes and then called a meeting at the university's athletic field. Tear gas was fired to disperse the assembly, and students reportedly hurled stones and shoes at the police. According to government reports, one student was killed and dozens injured, although an unofficial source placed the death toll at 12. The arrest of 19 students and closure of several colleges at the university followed.

President Daniel arap Moi accused certain unnamed Kenyan politicians of misleading the students and conducting "subversive activities." He also claimed the students had foreign backing. A statement from the president's office compared the activities to "those which led to the disturbances in 1982," a reference to the attempted coup in August of that year which involved officers of the Kenyan Air Force as well as university students. Nine students are serving jail terms for their involvement in the coup attempt.

In the past decade, student disturbances resulting in the closure of the university have broken out every year except for 1984. Between October 1979 and August 1982, the university was closed six times.

The current university unrest occurs at a time of heightened political tensions in Kenya. Party elections are scheduled for later this year and

Hopes still alive for cocoa price pact

Indications that Ivory Coast may be willing to join a new international cocoa agreement were viewed as a glimmer of hope by delegates from cocoa-producing and consuming nations who gathered in Geneva in March.

The cocoa negotiations, attended by representatives of 70 countries, marked the third attempt to reach a new compromise that would stabilize prices in the volatile cocoa market. It is likely that the existing agreement, which expires in September, will be renewed for one year when the International Cocoa Council meets in July and that efforts to reach a new agreement will continue in the fall.

The problem that continues to block efforts to reach an agreement is the wide divergence of opinion between Third World producing countries and Western consuming countries over the level of price support in a new pact. At the Geneva talks, the producer nations called for a range of from $1.05 to $1.35 per pound, while the consumers wanted a range of 90 cents to $1.20.

Under the current agreement, cocoa prices are supposed to be regulated by the purchase and sale of "buffer stock," financed by a levy on cocoa bean sales. However, the operation was suspended several years ago because of insufficient funds. The fact that neither Ivory Coast, which produces more cocoa than any other nation, nor the U.S., which consumes more, had ever signed the pact was a major reason for its failure.

The wide swings in cocoa prices have been blamed partly on the rampant smuggling that prevents accurate crop predictions in Ghana and Nigeria. The strength of the U.S. dollar and a cocoa shortage due to drought in West Africa and Brazil helped boost prices to their highest level in seven years early in 1985. In addition, demand for the product has been escalating because of competition among chocolate manufacturers. Improved weather conditions and efforts underway to rehabilitate the cocoa industry in Ghana and Nigeria, however, could create a surplus in the near future, sending prices downward again.

More than half of the world's cocoa is produced in Africa, with the Ivory Coast covering 25 percent of the market; Ghana, 12 percent; Nigeria, 10 percent; and Cameroon, 7 percent. (Brazil is the world's second largest producer with 20 percent of the market.) Ghana and Nigeria led the world in cocoa production in the late 1960s, but their output declined steadily through the 1970s. Nigeria's crop plummeted to only about 115,000 tons in the 1983-84 season, but is expected to rise to between 150,000 to 160,000 tons this year.

Ivory Coast Agriculture Minister Denis Bra Kanon's reappearance at the cocoa talks just before they adjourned in mid-March, was interpreted as a sign that the producer countries may accept a lower price floor. It was believed that producers were contemplating a floor of as low as 95 cents a pound. The new willingness to compromise came too late to affect the stalemate of the Geneva talks but it left open the possibility of a settlement in the near future.
recruitment of members for the Kenya African National Union (Kamu), the country's sole political party, has been underway since January. Recruitment was supposed to last only three months, after which a date for the election would be set, but Moi announced on March 18 that the drive would intensify, an indication that recruitment may be lagging. "It would appear . . . that most branches [of the party] have not performed satisfactorily towards achieving the recruitment targets that they set themselves at the beginning of the exercise," said The Weekly Review.

**MAURITIUS**

**Sweetening South African ties**

The government of Prime Minister Aneerood Jugnauth has stepped up its campaign to reduce the country's dependence on sugar, which accounts for 25 percent of GNP and 62 percent of total export earnings. In hopes of diversifying the economy, the government has wooed foreign capital and, in particular, has pushed for closer economic ties with South Africa.

In a radio interview in early March, Deputy Prime Minister Gaëtan Duval said it was vital for the island's development that the South African market be open to Mauritius as it is to other countries in southern Africa. To obtain exemption from customs duties, the country should conclude a trade agreement with South Africa, he said. He did add, however, that diplomatic relations were out of the question because of South Africa's domestic policies.

The country participated in South Africa's Rand Show for the first time in April to showcase its industrial capabilities and to publicize its thriving tourist trade. South African companies already play a substantial role in the island's manufacturing and trade, while one-half of all tourists visiting Mauritius each year come from South Africa.

A Mauritius trade office is due to open in Johannesburg this year, to promote the island's productive and cheap labor force and incentives that include tax deferments of up to 20 years, exemptions of import duties on machinery and raw materials, and free repatriation of investment profits.

Jean-Michel de Senneville, the trade representative for Mauritius in South Africa has been negotiating a trade agreement that will include greater access to the country's markets. De Senneville is also trying to obtain loan and credit facilities and assurances from the Reserve Bank of South Africa that it will not interfere with South African businessmen who seek to establish an investment foothold in the island.

**CENTRAL AFRICA**

**Kaunda cracks down on strikers**

Tensions between the government and the trade unions mounted in mid-March when President Kenneth Kaunda prohibited strikes among "essential workers." Financial sector employees, who had gone on strike to protest an earlier anti-union decree from the government, returned to work, averting an open clash between government and labor. Kaunda issued the prohibition as a presidential decree under the Preservation of Public Security Act.

The workers had been protesting Kaunda's directive, issued in February, to employers in banks and other financial institutions to stop deducting union dues from workers' paychecks, thus cutting off the major source of income for the financial workers' union. Spokesmen for the country's influential labor movement interpreted the action as an effort to strangle the union. The Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the umbrella group for 17 unions, threatened to take the government to court over the matter.

Underlying the unrest, however, was the protracted negotiations between labor and the government over salary increases. The government recently granted Zambian public service workers pay increases of up to $12.83 per month, less than the ZCTU had been seeking, but enough to relieve some of the labor unrest. Relations between the government and the Zambian labor movement have been uneasy for several years, primarily because wages continue to trail far behind price increases. Last year, simmering discontent among workers over the government's failure to implement a promised wage increase was settled with a compromise, but only after strikes had started to spread in the public sector. In 1981, ZCTU leaders were imprisoned for allegedly conspiring to topple the government with wildcat strikes in mining towns and Lusaka. They were released a few months later.

Workers are also complaining about their leadership's participation in the endless consumer price increases. ZCTU officials sit on the boards of the parastatal organizations that set producer prices, but they are too few in number to exert any real influence. ZCTU chairman Frederick Chiluba has called for greater labor participation on the boards to counterbalance management's voice in decision-making.

The consumer price increases have followed devaluation of the kwacha, removal of government subsidies on many consumer items, and relaxation of price controls on many essential commodities. These are steps dictated by the International Monetary Fund in return for the loans and credits that are keeping the Zambian economy afloat. The IMF has also held the government to a 10 percent wage increase, despite the runaway prices.

The Zambia Daily Mail reported recently that Kaunda had strongly attacked the IMF's dictates, describing them as "terrifying conditions which bring about political tension in our countries." Kaunda added that the IMF, in prescribing economic remedies, "does not care whether you are suffering from economic malaria, bilharzia, or broken legs, they will always give you quinine."
CHAD
Habré tries conciliation

On his first tour of southern Chad since assuming power in June 1982, President Hissène Habré made a “patriotic, fraternal and responsible appeal” to rebel forces in the south attempting to overthrow his government. While visiting the city of Sahr on the first leg of his week-long tour, Habré called on the southern commandos to support national unity talks and offered to meet them “anytime, anywhere, to make peace.” He also promised that all Chadian exiles who returned would be offered a formal guarantee for their security.

Designed to promote national reconciliation, the tour began on March 9 and brought Habré to all five southern prefectures. Habré took advantage of the relative lull in the war in the south to embark on several occasions. The conciliatory tone of his message at least suggests a change in the government’s attitude toward the rebels under Col. Alphonse Kotiga, the leader of the southern commando groups.

Habré also released 100 political prisoners in early March, stressing that it was part of the Chadian government’s policy of “extending a hand of goodwill” toward the opposition. More such measures will be necessary, however, before it is possible to convene a second roundtable conference on national reconciliation in the Congolese capital of Brazzaville.

The first conference broke down last October when Habré insisted that he and not Goukouni Oueddei, the rebel leader of the Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT), represented the sole “legitimate government.” The fragmented and diverse nature of the anti-Habré opposition exacerbates the problems of reconvening the conference. As Congolese Foreign Minister Antoine Ndinga Oba pointed out, until all sides show more willingness to negotiate, “We don’t see the need to organize any new peace talks which will achieve nothing.”

EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Nigerian “canoe-men” rebel

The death of a Nigerian worker in Equatorial Guinea strained relations between the two countries in late February and exposed the plight of “illegal immigrants” known locally as “canoe-men.”

The incident prompted Lagos to send two ships and five military transport planes to evacuate 500 migrant Nigerians said to be working as slaves in neighboring Equatorial Guinea. But the migrant workers could not be found, and only 48 workers were brought back to Lagos.

The farm laborers had been recruited by a Nigerian called Etim and smuggled to Malabo to work on cocoa plantations where they were allegedly mistreated. Equatorial Guinean President Teodore ObiangNguema Mbasogo apologized to Lagos for the incident in which the Nigerian worker was killed, and promised to bring to trial the security official who had shot him. Es- tanisla Dte Mangue, an Equatorial Guinean diplomat in Lagos, however, denied allegations that the Nigerians were working as slaves in the country. Instead, he blamed local recruiters in Nigeria for any abuses of Nigerian workers.

The incident began with an uprising among the canoe-men who tried to Lynch Etim for exploiting them. They chased him to the Nigerian embassy in Malabo and a farmworker subsequently was shot dead in a clash with security forces trying to keep order. Etim was arrested and handed over to Nigerian authorities. Officials of the two countries met in Lagos in early March to ease diplomatic tensions.

ZAIRE
IMF, Israel help Mobutu

Financial institutions and private investors are responding to President Mobutu Sese Seko’s new efforts to impose economic austerity on the country. Although the economy is still staggering under the burden of heavy indebtedness, interest in Zairean investments is growing and officials of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have made optimistic statements about the country’s economy.

The IMF is making a new commitment for a standby loan of approximately $195 million. The IMF’s previous agreement with Zaire expired in March, and final details of the new loan were being completed at the end of the month, according to an IMF spokesman.

In addition, an Israeli industrial group, Tamman, announced plans to invest $400 million in Zaire during the 1985-86 period, the largest single foreign investment since the country became independent. A large part of that sum will be divided between the Zairean airlines and maritime company, and a portion will go to the creation of a factory to produce pharmaceutical products.

This is the type of investment that the Zairean government had anticipated when it renewed ties with Israel in May 1982, the first black African country to do so in the aftermath of the 1973 war in the Middle East. Israel held back from business investments in Zaire, where the government has had a habit of defaulting on loans and high-level corruption has been commonplace.

During the past year, however, the country has conformed to IMF dictates including cutting spending and borrowing by parastatals, holding wage increases to 25 percent, and allowing food prices to fluctu-
The race for the first nuclear power plant contract on the continent—outside of South Africa—is in its final stretch. Egypt is expected to decide on the $2.4 billion project by the end of May in what promises to be the country's most ambitious engineering plan since the construction of the Aswan dam. Egypt anticipates the construction of eight reactors by the year 2005 at a cost of $36 billion. The first pressurized water reactor at El-Dabaa, on the Mediterranean coast west of Alexandria, is planned for January 1983 for their October 1980 attempt to overthrow the government. The final chapter in the story of Zambia's only treason trial will be President Kenneth Kaunda's decision on whether to pardon the men. The plotters had allegedly planned to kidnap the president and force him to sign a resignation document. Their motive was said to have been opposition to Kaunda's socialist-leaning policies, which they believed were the cause of Zambia's economic deterioration.

Also in connection with the attempted coup, the court overturned sentences on former Bank of Zambia governor Valentine Musakanya, and Zairean politician Kanyembu Kabwita, and cancelled the 10-year jail term of air force senior officer Major Anderson Mporokoso.

Three international firms are hoping to get the green light for the initial stage of the project: Westinghouse of the U.S., the West German firm, Kraft Werk Union (KWU), and the Franco-Italian consortium, Framatone-Ansaldo. All three competitors are receiving support from their respective governments.

Egyptian Minister of Electricity and Energy Muhammad Mahir Abaza said: "Financing from the three countries is almost ready and we are expecting them to send us their answers to technical points that are still open, to complete the financing package." He added that a decision will be made in late May "based on purely technical grounds."

Westinghouse and KWU are each offering to build a single 1,000 MW reactor at $1.5 billion and $1.1 billion respectively, while Framatone-Ansaldo is proposing twin 900 MW reactors at a total cost of $2.5 billion. The Framatone-led consortium, which has 30 such reactors operating in the world, is hopeful that experience combined with credit-backing from French and Italian authorities of about $1.5 billion, will tip the balance in its favor. Westinghouse is having trouble remaining price competitive largely because of the strength of the dollar, and has secured only $300 million in credit-backing by the U.S. Export-Import Bank. However, Westinghouse is banking on the U.S. position as Egypt's leading trading partner and largest aid donor to secure the contract.

To ensure that KWU remains in the running, the West German Minister for Economics, Martin Bangemann, met in February with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Cairo to inform him of cabinet approval of a $630 million credit facility to be provided by Hermes export credit agency. Hermes' support for the bid by KWU, whose price proposal is the most competitive, may give the West German company the inside track on winning the contract.

ALGERIA

Good news in the pipeline

A massive five-year barter deal involving exchanges of Brazilian goods for Algerian liquefied natural gas (LNG) is set to be signed by mid-year. The pact, worth a total of $180 million a year, between Algeria's state-owned oil and gas company, Sonatrach, and the Brazilian state monopoly, Companhia Energetica de Sao Paolo, should allow for the first LNG shipment to reach Brazil in early 1986. In return, Brazil will boost its exports to Algeria, particularly for rail, hydroelectric, and housing projects.

Trade with Spain is also expected to flourish, following the settlement of a long-standing LNG war between the two countries. Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez and Minister for Trade Fernando Moran visited Algiers in the wake of the settlement, renewing trade relations which had deteriorated in the last two years.

Relations had soured when
Spain's state-owned company, Empres Nacional de Gas (Enagas), refused to live up to its side of a 1975 agreement with Sonatrach. Although the pact bound Enagas to pay for the entire annual supply under contract, Spain never took more than one-third of the total and refused to compensate Algeria for the remaining LNG, claiming that forecasts of consumption had far exceeded its needs.

As a result, Spain lost over one-third of its anticipated $1 billion in exports to Algeria following the imposition of a trade embargo on Spain last July. Algeria had also taken other retaliatory measures, including the cancellation of a contract with a Spanish consortium to construct a $74 million dam at Mexanna.

To put an end to the LNG dispute, which was seriously threatening Madrid's diplomatic strategy in the Maghreb, Spain finally agreed in late July to pay Algeria $500 million, partly in goods and services including a significant military input, for not fulfilling its “take or pay clause.” Henceforth, Spain will also be required to pay the same premium price for the gas as France and Italy—increasing the price from $2.89 to $3.89 per British thermal unit.

A desire to protect its place in the Spanish gas market against Soviet competition motivated Algeria to agree to the compromise. Spain will be allowed to reduce its contracted LNG purchases by more than 20 percent and to extend the deal by five years to the year 2000. This should enable Spain to expand its domestic gas grid and thereby more easily absorb the contracted quantities.

**Chadli visits U.S.**

In mid-April, President Chadli Benjedid made the first official visit to the U.S. by an Algerian head of state since the country’s independence 23 years ago. The four-day state visit signalled Algeria’s shift towards closer relations with the West and particularly with the U.S. in the six years since Chadli came to power.

Although Chadli said he was not coming to Washington with a “shopping list,” he did succeed in securing an agreement to purchase U.S. military equipment in a move designed to lessen his country’s dependence on Soviet arms.

The Reagan administration’s decision allowing Algeria to purchase arms was made possible by a presidential ruling declaring Algeria eligible as a “friendly” country. While the U.S. has sold C-130 transport planes to Algeria on a commercial basis in the past and just approved $50,000 to train Algerian officers under the International Military Education and Training Program, it is the first time that Algeria has been declared eligible to obtain general defense equipment under the Foreign Military Sales Program, which provides foreign governments with credit and concessional interest rates to help finance military purchases.

**LIBYA**

Qaddafi in spite of the U.S.

The formation of an organization which vows to carry out “revolutionary violence” and struggle for the “liberation of all Arab countries” has once again put Col. Muammar Qaddafi on the international hot-seat. Speaking at the first
meeting of the Libyan-sponsored Pan Arab Command for Leading the Arab Revolutionary Forces, Qaddafi said that the group should direct its efforts against the U.S. and moderate Arab nations because "there is no alternative to confronting the enemy with violence."

Composed of left-wing groups based in Iraq, Sudan, Lebanon, Belgium, Poland, and Britain, the Pan Arab Command will be largely financed by Libya. Its operations are likely to include suicide attacks on American and other installations in the region. As Qaddafi explained, "We want every one of us to say: I have decided to die just to spite America. If we could bring this nation to the point where it possesses this determination, it will definitely win."

The Reagan administration promptly condemned Qaddafi's latest initiative. A State Department spokesman said, "The world cannot tolerate the lawlessness and terrorism which Qaddafi so openly advocates. We will hold Qaddafi fully responsible for Libyan terrorism against Americans and other U.S. interests, whether carried out abroad or in the United States. Likewise, we will continue our consultations and cooperation to assist governments threatened by Libyan aggression."

Qaddafi had also provoked the Reagan Administration in late February with a speech to the annual conference of the Nation of Islam, a radical faction of the black Muslim movement in the U.S. In the address, relayed by satellite from Tripoli to the 15,000 Nation of Islam supporters in Chicago, Qaddafi urged all blacks in the U.S. to rebel against "your racist oppressors," adding, "This country must be destroyed. They refuse to accept you as American citizens. This means you are obliged to create a separate and independent state. The whites force you to do this by refusing you in political and social life."

Qaddafi said the 400,000 black American soldiers should desert and join black civilians to form the army that would be necessary to create their own nation. "You have the force, you have the soldiers. We are ready to give you arms because your cause is just. We will fight together shoulder to shoulder. The final victory will be soon."

Nation of Islam leader Rev. Louis Farrakhan thanked Qaddafi for his support and agreed. "It would be an act of mercy to end the white man's world because their world is killing you and us and all of humanity." Farrakhan, however, declined the invitation to take up arms. "Black Americans have no intention of overthrowing the government or to engage in an armed struggle against it," he said.

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**AFRICA REPORT • May–June 1985**

**U.P.D.A.T.E.**

**Race laws on sex, marriage to be lifted**

Pretoria has announced that the laws prohibiting interracial marriage and sex are to be abolished—a move designed to defuse escalating opposition to the apartheid system.

Home Affairs Minister Frederik de Klerk said the government will scrap what he termed South Africa's "most controversial" laws because they are no longer "essential" to preserving group identity. The announcement followed a parliamentary committee's conclusion that the Mixed Marriages Act, adopted in 1949, and Article 16 of the Immorality Act, prohibiting interracial sex, cannot be justified on scriptural or any other grounds.

Anti-apartheid groups in South Africa pointed out that the repeal is a minor reform which fails to address the most insidious aspect of the apartheid system—the denial of political rights to blacks. Sheena Duncan, president of the Black Sash, said she was disappointed that no amendments to the laws on residential segregation were being considered. Many activists, however, cautiously welcomed the an-
Botha gloats over paper's demise

The closure of the Rand Daily Mail on April 30 marked the end of an era in South African liberal journalism, and a victory for the South African government. President Pieter Botha said he was “glad to see a new spirit of South Africanism taking control over South African journalism” and added that the Rand Daily Mail’s extinction would help to accelerate “a new spirit of national unity.”

Harvey Tyson, editor of a competing newspaper, The Star, called it “the saddest blow to journalism in this country this century.” While an official of the black journalists’ union, Thami Mazwai, termed it the death of “the little voice of conscience for the under-privileged communities.” Rand Daily Mail editor Rex Gibson said, “we have lost a bridge between the various race groups in the country.”

The Oppenheimer empire, the Anglo American Corporation conglomerate which controls both English-language newspaper publishing groups in South Africa, was reportedly behind the closure. Competition between the two groups—Argus and South African Associated Newspapers (Saan), which publishes the Rand Daily Mail—contributed to escalating losses for both companies. The Rand Daily Mail lost about $22 million over the last decade, including $7 million last year. An expanded version of the newspaper’s financial insert, Business Day, targeted to an up-market readership, is being launched as a separate national publication in May.

Many observers view the decision to close the newspaper for financial reasons as a bitter irony. An outspoken critic of the country’s apartheid policy for nearly 40 years, the Rand Daily Mail had to fight off repeated government maneuvers to silence it. In the 1960s, the government attempted to kill the newspaper by involving it in a series of costly court cases that was highlighted by the prosecution of editor Lawrence Gander for articles exposing the abuse of black prisoners in South African jails.

In 1975, the government secretly tried to buy Saan as a means of stifling the Rand Daily Mail. When this failed, the government clandestinely launched The Citizen as a rival newspaper with a pro-government slant. After a long battle, the Rand Daily Mail exposed The Citizen’s secret funding, which contributed to the downfall of former Prime Minister John Vorster and Information Minister Connie Mulder.

The Citizen now emerges as the winner, although it has only half the circulation of the Rand Daily Mail and is published by a financially weaker company. The Rand Daily Mail had a circulation of 120,000, and two-thirds of its readers were black. Its demise leaves The Citizen as the only English-language morning newspaper in the Johannesburg area.

The death of South Africa’s major crusading newspaper will also critically affect the existence of two other anti-government papers, the Natal Mercury in Durban and the Cape Times in Cape Town. These two Saan papers depended heavily on the Rand Daily Mail’s editorial infrastructure and on its London bureau. The three papers shared advertising on a group basis, and the Durban and Cape Times papers may now appear less attractive to group advertisers. The Rand Daily Mail also contributed the largest share of costs and much of the coverage of the South African Press Association, the country’s main news agency, whose editorial independence may now be jeopardized.

of Johannesburg. A ban was also imposed on efforts to organize strikes such as those in Johannesburg last November and in Uitenhage in March. In addition, a 12-month ban was placed on indoor meetings relating to school boycotts. Three groups that have played a major role in the boycotts were singled out: the Azanian Students’ Movement, the Black Students’ Movement, and the Council of South African Students.

Many observers believe the new

The right-wing Conservative Party, the chief opposition to the governing National Party, denounced the move, implying that it will endanger Afrikaner racial purity. Daan van der Merwe, a Conservative Party spokesman, said that the step “endangers national identity.”

The recommendation was initially made in February by a parliamentary committee, but President P.W. Botha then appointed representatives from the new Coloured and Asian houses of Parliament to another commission which produced the same findings. Botha evidently wanted the Coloured and Asian members to be involved in the reform to increase their credibility. Parliament is expected to adopt the recommendation before adjourning in July.

Nearly 1,000 persons have been convicted since 1980 for “illegal sexual relations” under the Immorality Act, although the government began relaxing enforcement of the law four years ago, particularly in the major cities.

The anticipated repeal will pose dilemmas for the South African government in areas including housing, education, and travel. Questions that will have to be answered include where the inter-racial families will live, where their children will attend school, and whether families will be able to travel together. The parliamentary committee glosses over these issues with assurances that problems will be worked out “by administrative means.”

Meanwhile, the South African government has ordered army troops to reinforce police and banned meetings of 29 groups, including the United Democratic Front (UDF), in an effort to stifle ongoing notin in black townships.

The use of the army and the railway police to back up the regular police is part of a new strategy to “restore law and order,” the government announced. Army troops will be used for roadblocks, cordons, and police escorts in trouble spots.

The meeting ban applies to areas of Cape Province and two districts
measures will backfire, fueling instead of defusing dissent. Dr. Allan Boesak, president of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, said he feared the bannings would exacerbate an already volatile situation. Dr. Beyers Naude, general secretary of the South African Council of Churches, also warned that the crackdown would lead to further conflict.

Boesak and Naude were among 239 persons recently arrested for a march on parliament to protest the police killings near Uitenhage. In another illegal march, held the first week in April, Bishop Desmond Tutu led 30 clergymen through Johannesburg to protest the detention of his colleague, Anglican priest, Father Geoffrey Moselane, and other detainees being held without trial.

Protests sweep campuses

A wave of anti-apartheid protest is sweeping U.S. college campuses at an intensity unprecedented since the anti-war demonstrations of the late 1960s.

At the Berkeley campus of the University of California, students and local residents, who had been protesting for more than a week in mid-April, heard state legislators promise to help convince the university to withdraw $1.7 billion in investments in firms that do business with South Africa. The day before, more than 150 protesters had been arrested by campus police in riot gear. State legislator Maxine Waters told demonstrators, "You are not alone in this struggle. We don't like it when we see students being dragged off the steps of this building and being taken to jail."

Students at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey, and Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., continued their protests, demanding that their schools rid themselves of holdings in firms operating in South Africa. One of the Georgetown student organizers said that she and her fellow students had a special obligation to protest against apartheid because two former Georgetown professors, Chester Crocker, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, and Jeane Kirkpatrick, former U.S. ambassador to the UN, had given such strong support to the Reagan administration's controversial policy of "constructive engagement" toward South Africa.

Meanwhile, students at Columbia University in New York City continued to defy a judge's temporary restraining order, refusing to end their barricade of a campus building. Another court order has prohibited the university administration from "improperly sending in police against the protesters." Columbia officials have said the university has no plans to meet the student demands, but a judge ordered lawyers for both sides to meet together at the state supreme court.

The Columbia students are demanding that the university withdraw its $32.5 million of holdings in firms with assets in South Africa. The Columbia demonstration began on April 4, the anniversary of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King. Other demonstrations marking the day included a gathering of 4,000 at the South African embassy in Washington, D.C., where daily protests have been held since November, and rallies outside Mobil Oil and other New York City firms that do business with South Africa, followed by a march to the South African consulate.

**ANGOLA**

Shuttle helps break deadlock

In a move which could give a much-needed boost to the U.S. policy of "constructive engagement," South Africa withdrew the last of its combat troops from Angola in mid-April. South African Foreign Affairs Minister Pik Botha, however, pointed out that the security forces would "not hesitate to take whatever action may be necessary should the South West Africa People's Organization step up its cross-border violence."

The original withdrawal program was worked out under the February 1984 Lusaka agreement between Pretoria and Luanda, in which South African troops were to be pulled out within six weeks. But the disengagement quickly bogged down when South Africa accused Angola of continuing to support Swapo guerrillas.

The recent announcement came on the heels of a shuttle diplomacy initiative three weeks earlier by Chester Crocker, U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs. He met with Angolan Interior Minister Alexandre Rodrigues in Cape Verde, and then proceeded to South Africa for a fresh round of talks.

Although Crocker did not disclose details of the proposals fol-
lowing his meeting with Botha, he told reporters that he had submitted a "compromise plan" for a timetable leading to a phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, allowing the Luanda government time to adjust to security problems created by their departure. As Crocker said, "I believe it will be given serious attention by both sides. It could give us a basis to accelerate matters."

Reports from South Africa that Luanda had offered the immediate withdrawal of 10,000 Cubans and a phasing out of the rest over three years were denounced by Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos as distortions by the Western media. He said that Angola stood by the realistic proposals offered by his government last November, in which Luanda proposed repatriating 20,000 Cuban troops in stages over three years. That withdrawal would not begin until South African troops in Namibia had been phased out to 1,500, as stipulated in UN Security Council resolution 435. The remaining 10,000 Cuban soldiers in Angola would be required to protect Luanda and vital oil installations in the Cabinda enclave.

Although South Africa has accepted the UN resolution "in principle," it has continued to make the removal of all Cuban troops a condition for its implementation.

**LESOTHO**

**PAC threatened with expulsion**

Francis Matholoane, director of political affairs in the Prime Minister's Office, recently threatened all members of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) with mass expulsion from Lesotho if they did not stop their "hostile attitude" to the government. Speaking at an anti-PAC rally in late March, Matholoane accused the South African exile movement of training anti-government rebels of the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA). Another government official charged the PAC with aligning itself with Lesotho's opposition parties in the country's upcoming national elections.

Relations between the government and the PAC deteriorated sharply after the Lesotho paramilitary force killed six PAC members during an alleged shootout in mid-March. The group, including Thami Zani, the acting PAC representative in Lesotho, were reportedly transporting explosives when they encountered a paramilitary platoon. The PAC members were stopped at a road-block by the security forces in the Qacha's Nek district—an area bordering Transkei which is often used by the LLA.

The funeral proceeded against a background of demonstrations calling for the expulsion of all PAC members from the country by militant members of the ruling Basotho National Party's youth league in Maseru. The day before, the youth league carried placards in an anti-PAC demonstration, urging the government to move swiftly against the organization.

Political tensions have risen since late 1984 when Chief Leabua Jonathan announced that general elections would take place this year—the first since the annulled election of January 1970.

**MALAWI**

**Maize surplus feeds neighbors**

President-for-Life Hastings Kamuzu Banda opened the budget session of parliament in mid-March on a note of optimism, announcing that the 1985-86 budget would be a "normal one." Unlike last year's austerity package. Thanks to a 7.6 percent real growth in GDP and a surplus in the balance of payments in 1984, Banda claimed there was a "medicum of prosperity" in Malawi's economic outlook.

For the fourth year in a row, Malawi will be exporting grain to its neighbors following a successful agricultural season. The Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation's decision to raise the price of maize helped increase output by 6.3 percent. This enabled Malawi to export 200,000 tons of maize last year to Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique—a total which is expected to be matched this year.

High world prices for tea, a major foreign exchange earner, combined with sales of stockpiled tobacco and sugar, have also helped boost foreign exchange receipts to record levels. However, the decline in tobacco production, the country's largest foreign exchange earner, and continuing high transport costs are likely to adversely affect real growth in GDP this year. Rail links to the Mozambican ports of Beira and Nacala have been cut off by Mozambique National Resistance rebels trying to overthrow the Maputo government. This has forced Malawi to use alternative road routes through Zambia and Zimbabwe to the South African port of Durban, virtually doubling transport costs over the last two years.

**SWAZILAND**

**South Africa tightens its grip**

Foreign Affairs Minister Mhambi Mnisi's announcement in late March that Swaziland will soon open a trade mission in Johannesburg and strive for closer ties with South Africa provoked strong criticism from neighboring countries and even brought into question its continued membership in the Organization of African Unity.

Mnisi told parliament, however, that "no one can tell the Swazis what to do" and that the opening of the mission would take place "regardless of the views of nations that do not approve." He added that Swaziland was "reviewing its membership in various international organizations, including the OAU" because some were of "no benefit to Swaziland."

The warm relations between the two countries were underscored a few weeks earlier by South African Foreign Affairs Minister Pik Botha's visit to Swaziland to open a trade mission—defying the OAU ruling forbidding member states from having diplomatic relations with South Africa. Mnisi said, "We are paid-up members of the OAU in good standing, and if they try to mix trade with politics, then I say to blazes with them. It is my duty to make sure Swazi tummies are filled with food, not with political talk."
Interview

Congressman William H. Gray, III

Chairman of the House Budget Committee and member of the Congressional Black Caucus, William Gray is a leading advocate of the Anti-Apartheid Act in the U.S. House of Representatives. He outlines the policy issues behind efforts to legislate American opposition to apartheid and the potential impact of sanctions on the South African government.

INTERVIEWED BY PAULA HIRSCHOFF

Africa Report: Anti-apartheid sentiment in Congress is gathering strength as demonstrated by the many bills that have been introduced in the 99th Congress. In your view, what are the main factors behind this surge of interest? Why is it happening now?

Gray: I think that there has always been some interest. We've also been working on anti-apartheid legislation for some time. I think what has happened over the past four or five years is that things have progressively deteriorated in South Africa. That deterioration and the failure of present U.S. policy, which had promised to make major gains and turn South Africa around, have caused many members of Congress to become more concerned about South Africa, concerned that they may be looking at the Central America or the Middle East of the 1990s, and that America currently is implicated in the support and preservation of apartheid.

Secondly, there have been several other developments, for one that last year Bishop Tutu was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. I think that has raised a lot of interest across the world as to what apartheid is. Then on top of that, there is now interest in this country because of the failure of the United States Senate to accept the restrictions that we [the House of Representatives] passed in 1983 in the Export Administration Act. Last fall, the Senate refused to accept those restrictions on South Africa.

As a result, some black leadership in this country decided to march in front of the South African embassy to dramatize the situation. That has now continued for about four months, and it's not just a "black issue," but an American issue. You've had people from all walks of life demonstrating in front of the South African embassy. And so I think that all of those forces in fact have combined to increase the interest of Americans in examining what our policy is.

Africa Report: Do you think that some of these same factors are going to influence change in the administration's policy toward South Africa?

Gray: I don't see any change in the administration's policy toward South Africa. Last week, I had Secretary of State Shultz before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee [of the Appropriations Committee], and I must admit he was rather hostile at the very fact that I had the nerve to ask him a question about South Africa. His attitude was, 'How dare you question our commitment, our opposition to and abhorrence of apartheid?,' particularly when I pointed out that some of the members of the Secretary's party were introducing legislation that would exacerbate the situation there. Robert Walker from Pennsylvania and Newt Gingrich from Georgia have introduced legislation which really doesn't seek to deal with apartheid, but provides for American covert operations in southern Africa. When I asked him that question, he became quite angry about it. I would simply say that there has not been any change in U.S. policy.

Africa Report: Do you think there will be any change in that policy?

Gray: I think that there will only be change if Congress takes the initiative to bring about that change. Considering the kind of statements that President Reagan made in his press conference last week, [March 21] in response to the deaths of dozens of South Africans at Langa, I think that we are only going to see change come about as a result of congressional action.

Africa Report: What was your reaction to the statements the President made?

Gray: At best, I would describe his statements as symbolic of the worst kind of ignorance and insensitivity by anybody that
I've ever seen in all my years in public office. At worst, I would have to say that they were racist. For him to say that there were people in the crowd who were threatening the security forces of South Africa is an absurdity. And then to justify support of the murderous actions of the apartheid regime, by saying that there were black officers there who were shooting too, basically shows that the president sees it only as a black-white issue, and he's on the side of white folks. And I think that's tragic, because it's not a black-white issue. It's an issue of justice versus injustice. It would be the same if it were a black minority oppressing a white majority. The issue would not be black versus white. And so for the President to make that statement that there were black officers involved means that he really doesn't understand apartheid, and two, that he sees it only as a white-black issue, and he's taking the side of the white minority, which I think is very tragic.

Africa Report: What is the role of the Congressional Black Caucus in influencing legislation related to Africa and South Africa in particular?

Gray: This issue has gone beyond the Congressional Black Caucus. During the time when Congressman Charles Diggs was chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, South Africa was primarily a Black Caucus issue. But I would say that it’s gone far beyond a Black Caucus issue. When I introduced the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985 on the House side, and Senator Kennedy [introduced it] on the Senate side, it gained support from conservatives, Republicans, Democrats, liberals, moderates, across the political spectrum. The Black Caucus has been in the forefront of this issue for 20 years, but I think it clearly has become an American issue. It’s an issue of justice versus injustice. I would say that the Black Caucus continues to provide leadership. I’m a member of the Black Caucus. Mickey Leland, chairman of the Black Caucus, spoke out very strongly against Reagan’s comments, but I think that it is an issue that has gone beyond the Caucus.

Africa Report: I didn’t mean to imply that South Africa was a Black Caucus issue, but I wonder if you think the Caucus has a special role to play in the development of legislation relating to Africa?

Gray: Well, I think that the Black Caucus has a special feeling about the issue, a special sensitivity. We are black. We know what racism is about. We have experienced it in our own lifetimes and to some degree continue to experience it. We experience it in terms of U.S. foreign policy. We have a double standard: We are quick to light candles for human rights violations in eastern Europe, and rightfully so, but when it comes to Africa, we won’t even strike a match. We’re quick to speak out for the freedom of Sakharov and Sharanovsky, and we should do that—I have been a part of that effort and I will continue to be because injustice anywhere threatens justice everywhere—but yet we will not speak out against the oppression of Nelson and Winnie Mandela.

We get into comparative studies of oppression. Soviet communist oppression is much worse—to use the Jean Kirkpatrick structure—it is totalitarian, but apartheid is authoritarian, and we can maybe work to change it if we do it in a quiet, diplomatic way. Meanwhile, that authoritarian regime is killing hundreds of people. In the last six and a half months, over 200 South Africans have been gassed, brutally murdered by the South African security forces. What was their crime? Their crime was that they wanted to change the system and they wanted to have freedom. Were they carrying guns? No. Were they throwing hand grenades? No. What were they doing? Demonstrating.

For the United States to continue the charade of saying that we’re doing quiet diplomacy while we’re financing this evil monster is absolutely ludicrous, and I think it hurts us on the world scene. We are actually fertilizing the ground for Soviet expansion in Africa by these kinds of actions. So I often say to people who are more concerned about Soviet expansion and influence, if you want to stop it in Africa, you better learn what the issue is. It’s not capitalism versus communism, it is majority rule, and if we’re not careful, we’re going to make certain that the black majority turns to the East for its supplies for its war of liberation.

Africa Report: Do you think the current interest in South Africa by Congress and the American public is going to continue? What do you anticipate?

Gray: I think it will continue to grow. I think there’s going to be increasing pressure on South Africa from the majority of the population for its freedom. And the more pressure there is, the more acts of violence and repression you’re going to
have from the apartheid regime, like we've seen in the last two weeks. It may trickle off for a while, but it's going to flare back up.

**Africa Report:** And this is going to continue fueling U.S. public sentiment that will perhaps get legislation passed?

Gray: I think so.

**Africa Report:** The Anti-Apartheid Act that you introduced with Congressmen Wolpe and Solarz has four sanctions against South Africa, including a prohibition on new investment, but no provisions on disinvestment. Why is that?

Gray: Because I don't believe that at this time we should move toward disinvestment, because I think we haven't used other tools and remedies that we should be using, such as the prohibition against new investments to end future financing of apartheid or the prohibition against the sale of krugerrands.

There are a number of other steps that we need to take before any serious consideration of disinvestment. Divestment is when you say there is just no changing this thing, so we're going to just leave.

I am not urging that we throw our hands up in disgust and walk away. I am saying that we need to stay involved in the dialogue there, but we ought to be an honest broker. We are not an honest broker. We are financing apartheid. We are training apartheid. We are supporting apartheid. What we really need to do is get ourselves in the kind of posture where we can say that we're not financing apartheid in the future. Then we can say to South Africa, whether or not we do anything else depends really on what happens in your country. We can't control what happens in your country. But we will not be a party to that oppression.

I don't think we've taken enough substantive steps so that one could even argue forcibly at this point for disinvestment. So I am not for disinvestment. I am for a set of restrictions, step by step, which would apply some pressure for change and would also remove the United States from the financing and the military support of apartheid.

**Africa Report:** What about the Sullivan Principles? Legislation has been introduced to make them mandatory, but no provisions on disinvestment. Why is that?

Gray: I don't see the Sullivan Principles as changing apartheid. I am for the Sullivan Principles. But if anyone thinks that that is going to change apartheid, they are very naive. Even Leon Sullivan doesn't presume that. Leon Sullivan is a constituent of mine, a very close friend, and I am one of his greatest admirers. But his principles are not designed to change apartheid, but to change the behavior of American corporations by saying they don't have to practice apartheid inside their workplaces.

In fact, isn't it interesting that American corporations are practicing apartheid inside their plants when they don't have to under South African law? Isn't it interesting that 10 years after Leon Sullivan proposed his voluntary principles, only half the American companies in South Africa have subscribed to them, and only half of those have complied to any degree with those principles? I think that in itself tells the story.

Therefore, those who argue that the Sullivan Principles will change apartheid drastically and lead to an evolutionary process are like people who argue that if you put some air conditioning and carpeting in the slave shacks, you're going to change slavery. No, you will not. You will make the slaves much more comfortable, and there is merit to that. If you allow the slaves to go to school, reach management levels, yes, that is good, because one day when they get their freedom, they will be able to manage themselves, the farm, or the plantation. But the reality is that simply moving a person who is in a slave position in the field to the house doesn't change his status. He's still a slave.

So I'm just saying to you that while I am for the Sullivan Principles, I recognize them for what they are. They provide for equal pay, equal work conditions, equal opportunity for everybody in an American company. But that's so few people. People talk about them as if they would have a major impact. But we're only talking about 125,000 people employed under the Sullivan Principles, 75,000 of whom are black. Therefore, even though you may change the working conditions of those 75,000, increase their pay, increase their management skills, etc., you basically haven't touched the 5 million or so black South Africans in the work force, or for that matter, the Afrikaner work force.

And in fact, all you've done is raised hopes falsely, because a black who is a manager at IBM in South Africa is just another black African once he walks out the door of IBM and gets on the train along with all the other blacks who are trained in to provide the workforce for Johannesburg. In Soweto, he can't own a piece of land, he has to lease it; he cannot vote for those who make the decisions over his life; he has a false voting right for the mayor who has no power; he can still be stopped, searched, banned, incarcerated; he still cannot protest his condition. And he is reminded every day of his impotence, his non-citizenship, his non-personage. The eight hours at IBM are like a respite. And if anything, it raises his expectations.

History has proven that economic determinism does not
lead to political change. Those who look at the Sullivan Principles and say, "If we improve the economic conditions of the black majority, it will evolve into political change and social change," fail to understand that apartheid is not fundamentally economic. Apartheid is political. So even if you change the economics, you don't change the politics. And the only way you're going to change the politics is one man, one vote. And they're not about to do that. [Editor's note: Congressman Gray intends to join Stephen Solarz (D-NY) in introducing legislation which would require American firms doing business in South Africa to adopt the Sullivan Principles.]

**Africa Report:** What do you think your legislation would do to bring about change?

**Gray:** I think one, it would stop the United States' financing of apartheid. That's what it's designed to do. I'm not so naive to think that my legislation, if it passes, is going to mean that President Botha and Foreign Minister Pik Botha are going to call a conference and say they therefore are dismantling apartheid. No. Sanctions, restrictions never do that. We didn't think when we put restrictions on Poland that it was going to change the Polish government, did we? Why is it that we have to have a double standard now for Africa? No one expected the Polish government, did we? Why is it that we have announced that it was going to stop the "black spots" policy. I think we had a little something to do with that. When they looked up and saw Republicans, Democrats, conservatives, liberals on the House and Senate side saying they are going to support the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985, I think that had an impact.

**Africa Report:** Are you anticipating that it will pass the Senate?

**Gray:** I'm not anticipating, but what I'm saying is there's going to be a vote. And senators who represent American values and American ideals are going to have to stand up and be counted. You either support apartheid or you're against it. You can't say you're against apartheid, while you're willing to allow American industry and individuals to finance it. It's a very modest statement. My legislation does not jeopardize the jobs or companies that are currently there. It just says we're not going to finance it in the future. And I think that anyone who can't vote for that really is trying to rationalize their support for apartheid because it is not pro-divestment. It is a carefully crafted piece of legislation — no new investment, no bank loans, prohibition against krugerrand sales, no American computers to be used in influx control or the maintenance of the bantustans.

**Africa Report:** Are you anticipating that it will pass the Senate?

**Gray:** I'm not anticipating, but what I'm saying is there's going to be a vote. And senators who represent American values and American ideals are going to have to stand up and be counted.

**Africa Report:** Most observers think that Reagan will veto this legislation. Do you think the bill can have an impact even if it is vetoed?

**Gray:** Sure. Let the president veto it. You see, after listening to the president's comments last week, all Americans ought to be outraged. All of them ought to say, "If you veto it, we're going to ask our congressmen to override that veto," because if he vetoes, he clearly supports apartheid, as he has already been showing in the last few weeks. So I say, let him veto it. Let him say what he does and doesn't like about it and then bring it back to Congress. The way the legislative process works, if we agree with him, we'll strip certain things out and then send him a new bill.

**Africa Report:** Many people feel that if new U.S. investment is prohibited, competing industrial nations will just step into
the void. Is there any thought of coordinating efforts with European and other nations that invest in South Africa?

Gray: We do have a clause in the Anti-Apartheid Act asking the president to call on other nations to impose the same practices. One of our major competitors, Japan, doesn't invest in South Africa. They don't want to support apartheid. Now we compete with them everywhere in the world, but they're saying, "We want to make money, but we don't want to make it that badly." Japan understands if you treat the black majority that way, what do you think about Asians? Sweden has had a no new investment law since 1978. Their 22 subsidiaries there have not lost their share of the market, nor have they closed down and come home, nor has anyone else moved into the vacuum. That is just another excuse to rationalize support for apartheid. What you're saying is that your profits come ahead of what happens to the people there. Then we'll wonder what happens when the day of the revolution comes and the black majority comes to power, and they take over all the American companies. We'll say, "Hey, that wasn't fair." And the black majority will say, "Yes, but you supported apartheid that kept us in oppression."

Africa Report: Earlier you mentioned the bill relating to South Africa introduced by several Republicans in the House, saying it will exacerbate conditions in South Africa. Can you comment on that any further?

Gray: From what I understand, the bill introduced by Robert Walker and Newt Gingrich has basically been motivated by politics on the Republican side to sidetrack the Anti-Apartheid Act. The "Dear Colleague" letter they sent to other members clearly puts it in perspective—that this is an attempt to sidetrack the Anti-Apartheid Act. Basically what it calls for is a repeal of the Clark Amendment, recognition of Jonas Savimbi and Unita, and formal linking of Cuban troop withdrawal to Namibian independence, which is a violation of UN resolution 435. They want to legislate that now.

And it also calls for implementation of the Sullivan Principles by companies that would move into South Africa in 1987. What happens to the companies that are already there? And the penalty would be no new federal contracts for companies that didn't comply. Basically it is a legislative vehicle to get America involved once again in covert activities in Angola like we are in Nicaragua. But they call this anti-apartheid. It has nothing to do with apartheid.

Africa Report: Do you want to say anything else about your bill?

Gray: We're hoping to get it up to the floor of the House this spring. But the key is whether or not the American people understand what the stakes are. And the stakes are very high in this situation. We're talking about loss of credibility throughout Africa and throughout most of the developing nations of the world who see us contradicting all of our precepts and practices and who see us as a supporter of blatant racism in the only country in the world that still practices legalized, constitutionalized racism. And we rationalize it by saying we have to fight the communists. The fact is we have the exact opposite effect. What we're doing there actually encourages greater Soviet influence.

Africa Report: Do you think the many bills that have been introduced in the House tend to confuse people or dilute the effort to get anti-apartheid legislation passed?

Gray: Yes and no. Each person has a position. Some go further, like the divestment bill of Congressman Ronald Dellums, or the nuclear provisions of Congressman Charles Rangel. But we have all recognized that the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985 is the omnibus piece which all of us are sponsoring. Are there those who would say this bill doesn't go far enough? Yes. But they are supporting it because this is a consensus vehicle. The other bills allow people to push legislatively the area that they're most interested in.
A Conservative Viewpoint Against Apartheid

While the recent letter to the South African ambassador from 35 conservative congressmen has made opposition to apartheid a bipartisan issue in the U.S. House of Representatives, legislation which has been proposed to address the South African situation has taken different directions. Robert S. Walker, drafter of the letter, provides the background to conservative anti-apartheid initiatives in Congress.

BY ROBERT S. WALKER

The racial unrest and violence sparked by apartheid in South Africa make it clear that steps must be taken by the South African government to dismantle that unjust system. The violence in that nation over recent weeks has made it more necessary than ever that the United States exert, to the extent possible, a positive influence in the region and demonstrate American resolve that apartheid is a system which cannot be countenanced.

As a conservative, I recognize the strategic wealth which South Africa represents to the U.S. and the free world. Unfortunately, that wealth may have been, in the past, a justification for policy-makers to look the other way when apartheid-inspired violence has occurred.

The U.S. is dependent on South Africa for many strategic minerals. South Africa is one of the world’s largest producers of manganese, an essential ingredient in manufacturing steel. It also is our major source for chrome, used in stainless steel, and a vital component of many weapons systems.

South Africa also produces uranium and platinum and, of course, South Africa is famous for its gold. It has the largest gold deposits in the non-Communist world, and it is globally the largest exporter of gold and diamonds.

In addition to South Africa’s mineral wealth, that country is also blessed with a temperate climate and fertile soil. These factors, in addition to South Africa’s location along world trade routes, give that country the potential of becoming a prosperous leader in the free world.

In order for South Africa to realize all of its enormous potential, it must make use of another of its valuable resources: its human potential. The system of apartheid is weakening South Africa by limiting human potential. Currently, apartheid has made it impossible to even speak of a South African culture or society without defining it in terms of racial discrimination. This system ultimately limits South Africa’s prosperity and risks creating an unstable nation isolated from the rest of the world.

That white South Africans have failed to spread the bounty of their land among all the people is a disappointment. That they have created a socio-political system based almost entirely on racial prejudice is shameful. That they have used this system to oppress the rights of blacks and others is a moral outrage.

I believe my colleague, Rep. Mickey Edwards (R-OK), spoke profoundly when he said, “...freedom cannot be demanded of our enemies if we ignore its suppression by those we count as friends. By definition, a nation that maintains its government by suppression of freedom and by government brutality crosses the line to the other side in the battle between the free world and the unfree.”

Above all else, conservatives in America represent freedom, opportunity, and individual liberty. Since World War II, these goals as they apply to U.S. foreign policy have best been served, and still remain best served by opposing
Congressman Robert S. Walker: "It is important that conservatives as well as all U.S. policy-makers look at the full scope of U.S. regional policy toward southern Africa."

We hoped this move would change the tenor of the debate not only in this country, but in South Africa as well, and make the South African government realize that there is a considerable body of opinion that says it ought to be making vigorous efforts toward ending the racial divisions in its country.

The letter identified us, "for the most part, as conservatives," and stated our recognition of the strategic value of South Africa. "But precisely because we do feel strongly about our mutual interests," the letter continued, "we cannot condone policies of apartheid which we believe weaken your long-term interests and certainly our ability to deal with you in a constructive manner."

We also voiced our support for the Reagan administration's policy of "constructive engagement" but made it clear that this policy must not be interpreted as an excuse to continue the status quo regarding apartheid.

The letter demanded an immediate end to the violence in South Africa and a "demonstrated sense of urgency about ending apartheid." In the absence of such actions, we promised to be a part of efforts curtailing new investment in South Africa.

We wanted the letter to be strongly worded, but different in tone from the way one would address an enemy. Simply put, the theme of the letter was: Apartheid will destroy South Africa and result in the loss of a valuable friend; therefore, end apartheid.

One way or another, apartheid will come to an end. Either it will end in the bloodshed of a violent internal revolution, or it will end by putting construcive pressure on the South African government to take steps to dismantle apartheid itself. We prefer the latter, as would any rational person of any philosophical stripe.

Since Congress was not in session at the time I wrote the letter and circulated it among my colleagues, it was difficult to contact many of the members and get their endorsements. By the time I presented the letter to Ambassador Fourie in my office, however, we had collected nearly three dozen signatures. From the attention the letter received when we made it public, I know our effort did not go unnoticed.

Within a few weeks of the increased American attention to apartheid, as exemplified by the embassy demonstrations and our letter, there were indications of change in South Africa. A major influence in sending the letter had been the arrest of several black labor leaders, who were held without being charged with any crime. Soon after the letter was released, the South African government either freed the prisoners or charged them, an admittedly ambiguous result. The South African ambassador personally called me to deliver advance notice of this action, the first time any such call had ever come to my office.

More recently, however, South African deeds have not lived up to rhetoric. President Pieter Botha has made some offers of property and other rights to
blocks, a hopeful sign, but there is too little evidence of real change.

This has left anti-apartheid conservatives with little choice. We had publicly challenged our constituency, and taken a lot of political heat for our stance, but our reason for taking action was sound: Free and democratic allies are the strongest allies. Insofar as apartheid weakens South Africa as an ally, we must take steps to convince South Africa to end the destructive policy.

Legislation aimed at developing a conservative approach to abolishing apartheid was the logical next step. One alternative which we rejected immediately but which has been offered by others is disinvestment—withdrawal of all U.S. businesses and investment from the South African economy. Yet another alternative would be to end new investment, combined with provisions such as the banning of krugerrands and computer exports. Such an approach would allow present U.S. investments to remain but forbid any expansion. A third option which I developed with some of my colleagues is conditional investment, allowing American investment to continue, but under certain policy guidelines.

It quickly became clear that disinvestment would hurt blacks the most. Gatsha Buthelezi, leader of 6 million South African Zulus, says of disinvestment: "For Americans to hurt the growth rate of the South African economy through boycotts, sanctions, and disinvestment would demonstrate a callous disregard for ordinary people, suffering terribly under circumstances that they did not create, and would be a gross violation of any respect Americans may have for the principle that people should be free to exercise their rights to oppose oppression in the way they choose."

Some liberal policy-makers imply that blacks want disinvestment and they suggest that blacks are willing to live with the loss of jobs and economic progress brought on by disinvestment. Blacks, however, if that contention were really true, could bring the effects of disinvestment on themselves through a massive work stoppage, rather than wait for American policy-makers to act. The fact that they have not done so thus far indicates that they still regard their jobs, and the economic progress aided by American investment, as a positive and valuable influence.

Creating unemployment within the black community is not the best way for the U.S. to show its displeasure with the racial policies of South Africa, nor is limiting America's most powerful weapon for change in South Africa—the economic contributions of American business.

American businesses making up the majority of U.S. investment in South Africa have signed onto a code of conduct known as the Sullivan Principles, named for Philadelphia minister Leon Sullivan who designed them. They call for, among other things, integrated workplaces and equal payscales among the races.

"Insofar as apartheid weakens South Africa as an ally, we must take steps to convince South Africa to end its destructive policy."

The Sullivan Principles have proven to be a valuable and beneficial force within the South African economy. They help break down racial barriers and prejudices, and they enjoy wide support all across the political spectrum.

Conditional investment, based on the Sullivan Principles, is the best approach to fighting apartheid since its premise is the notion that economic growth is valuable for South African blacks. It uses an American presence in the South African economy as a reform mechanism. It does not seek to isolate South Africa so much as it asks American businessesmen to set an example for what South Africa must become in the future.

This approach fits perfectly with the views of Chief Buthelezi who recommends, "...it is in the circumstances of a rapidly growing economy, where the interdependence of black and white is vastly increased, that the prosperity of the country to change is enhanced."

Following up on our letter, several of the key signatories and I introduced human rights legislation with a worldwide scope, but which specifically addresses the problems of South Africa. Our bill prohibits any federal contracts or federal economic assistance from being granted to any company which does not implement the Sullivan Principles when doing business in South Africa. If passed, this provision would take effect in January 1987, unless President Reagan certifies that the government of South Africa has made significant steps toward the establishment of full human rights and democratic freedoms, in other words, the elimination of apartheid.

Beyond our efforts to end apartheid, it is also important that conservatives as well as all U.S. policy-makers look at the full scope of U.S. regional policy toward southern Africa.

Our legislation would address regional concerns by, first of all, repealing the Clark Amendment which prohibits covert assistance to non-government forces in Angola. Whether or not covert assistance is ever provided to Unita, it is important to eliminate this tacit recognition of the fact that the U.S. simply doesn't have the political will to assist the people of Angola against the weight of Cuban troops and the Marxist dos Santos regime.

The bill also calls on President Reagan to recognize Unita as Angola's legitimate governing authority, thereby putting us on the side of a popular movement in that country that stands in opposition to foreign domination.

Further, our bill would restate the acknowledged U.S. policy of insisting on a full withdrawal of foreign troops from Angola as an integral part of any settlement on the independence of Namibia. The legislation calls for free elections in Namibia, but states that those elections should not be predicated on the mandatory participation of any particular political organization, such as Swapo, for example.

Apartheid is a moral disgrace and must be ended. South Africa, as a nation where blacks and whites work and live together in a peaceful, prosperous economy, can become a beacon for freedom in Africa rather than a light hid under a bushel. A South Africa where all of its citizens are a part of determining its destiny is a South Africa whose destiny is full of enormous potential and whose presence as a contributing partner in the Western world will be of enormous value.
Economics rather than politics may prove to be the catalyst in forcing change in the basic structures of apartheid. The South African government will be under increasing pressure from its own consumers as well as the corporate community to address its massive shortage of skilled manpower.

BY TIMOTHY BELKNAP

It is nearly 7 a.m. in Johannesburg's main railroad station, and the weekday influx of tens of thousands of black workers from the townships to their city jobs is under way. Third-class cars crammed with workers, some of them singing, lurch by the whites-only platform to unload further down the track. A white railroad policeman standing on the platform flicks a short leather strap across the chest of a worker hanging out of a train doorway—apparently a transgression. Two white women waiting for a suburban train see the incident, but don't really notice it. There's no break in their conversation.

At 8:30 p.m., Lawrence Lindepasi takes his last look of the night at the starry sky of the western Transvaal. Steel doors shut and a huge elevator drops the 33-year-old Xhosa and 90 other men at about 10 yards per second into the depths of the Margaret shaft of the Stilfontein gold mine.

Although Lindepasi is a native of South Africa, he is officially listed as one of the country's 1.5 million migrant workers. When he was 24 years' old, the Transkei where he lived was declared an independent country by South Africa and thus became the first of the bantustans, the so-called tribal homelands.

Lindepasi receives free food and lodging at one of the mine's hostels. He sees his family once a year. For every 52 weeks of work, he gets 56 days of vacation, half of them paid. As a team leader, he has done as well as a black can do underground. All better positions are reserved for whites. He earns relatively good wages—about $12 a day—most of which he puts into his tiny farm at Willowval in the Transkei where his wife and three children live, and where he hopes to retire as soon as possible.

He hopes his children will become sufficiently educated so they will never have to work in the mines. Last year, 19 of Stilfontein's 10,100 mineworkers died underground. The men in Margaret shaft go down as far as 5,400 feet, surrounded by rock that is under tremendous pressure to obliterate their working vacuum, which, to the visitor, seems equal part heat, humidity, and noise.

These glimpses at facets of the South African workday will probably not jar most people's perceptions of an economy fueled by cheap labor and shored up by decades of apartheid. But the economy of South Africa is evolving and the doctrine of apartheid, already somewhat adjusted, faces a severe test not only in the light of international and internal political pressure, but also in terms of a long-term shortage of skilled manpower.

Every Sunday, the Johannesburg newspapers carry a dozen or more pages of personnel ads. Along with good salaries and medical and pension benefits, eye-catching perks are offered: "A 30 percent tax-free gratuity at the end of each two-year renewable contract"... "new housing"... "subsidized mortgage"... "100 percent house purchase loan"... "financial assistance for parents who prefer their children to attend boarding school"... "generous leave"... and "annual bonus and a company car." The latter, for managers, is often a BMW or Mercedes. Even for the young foreigners down a notch or two—"contract workers" from Scotland, Italy, Israel, from wherever the ads reached them—life is comfortable and there is plenty of spending money.

Underlying this boontown ambiance is a manpower shortage with significance beyond the economic realm, as South Africa begins to tap into its largest potential skilled labor pool: its black workforce.

Only in recent times, between 1979 and 1983, have laws reserving skilled jobs for whites been abolished ev-
There are no shortages of unskilled labor. South Africa is estimated to have an "economically active" population of 5.7 million blacks and about 1 million other non-whites with respective unemployment rates running at 8.1 percent and 6.8 percent. Unofficial estimates, though, put the black unemployment rate as high as 25 percent, taking into account rural and bantustan residents who were not considered in government surveys.

The surplus of unskilled labor is providing the push to the same dynamics that are being pulled by the shortage of skilled labor. Last October, in a study for the University of the Western Cape, economist Brian Kantor reported that the ratio of blacks to whites has increased during the past two decades in all the main sectors of the South African economy.

"To an ever-increasing extent, white workers have left the factory floor and the mine pit for administrative work of one kind or another," Kantor reported.

The trend, which correlates with those in Western countries, is not surprising given the fact that five generations of white South Africans have been compelled to attend school.

Importing workers to fill the skilled blue-collar vacancies offers no long-term solution to an economy that, with a 1984 inflation rate of 13.25 percent and a severely weakened currency, nonetheless must offer competitive salaries to draw foreigners. Already some skilled fields such as spot welding in the auto industry and production jobs in the chemical and plastic industries are just about exclusively black.

"The migrant system is only suitable for manual labor," says Bobby Godsol, labor consultant for Anglo American Corp., Ltd., one of South Africa's six major mining companies.

"The moment a worker is imbued with a set of skills, which can take as little as three weeks' training, it becomes unproductive to lose him within a year."

The transient nature of the workforce, due in good part to government policy, is compounded by the skilled labor shortage.

"It's not that ships or buildings or bridges are not being built," Godsol says. "What we have is an inflated labor price with turnover rates ranging from 50 to 100 percent because of the short supply of artisans as opposed to a 5 to 10 percent [annual] rate, which is considered ideal."

South Africa has about 50,000 registered artisans, workers who have undergone three to five years of training. About 80 percent are white and the rest are mostly Indians.

"The artisans are constantly being offered a few cents more to work next door," Godsol said. "In the metal industry, the minimum wage is 4.60 rand [about $2.40] an hour. A lot of artisans are earning double that, and that's a measure of the shortage. Almost all operating managers would say they want more artisans, and better ones."

The three-year-old recession has blunted the demand for skilled personnel in some fields, but not in export industries such as mining, nor in the service industries. Electricians are in great demand.

"If you know what you're doing, you've got a job," said Geoffrey Fry, who runs his own suburban Johannesburg business selling and installing appliances.

"I've had several black helpers in the past," Fry said. "As soon as they thought they knew something, they buzzed off."
"My black guys were handicapped, first, because they had difficulty reading English," he said. "They could put a TV together, if it was the same job every day, it was fairly easy. But you couldn't ask them to look at new electrical circuits and do fault-finding." Obviously, effective training is needed, and American companies, which employ one out of every 100 South African workers, pride themselves on being at the forefront of that effort. The American Chamber of Commerce in South Africa (AMCHAM) represents about 300 of the 350 U.S. firms there. Its senior vice president, Don Devine, is chairman of the Norton Co., which sells abrasives, tools, and other industrial materials.

"We, like many other firms, felt an acute shortage of skilled labor in 1980 and 1981," Devine said. Since then, he said, the company, without resorting to contract workers, has stocked up manpower in the most critical areas—sales persons, accountants, computer technicians—with in-house and external training programs. It operates two training centers where a three-year apprentice artisan program involves 33 trainees, 22 of whom are black. The firm gets tax incentives, but not funding, from the South African government for the training.

Right now the program more than meets the needs of the company, Devine says, "But we know full well if the economy picks up in '86 or '87, we could face a shortage."

Meanwhile, government-sponsored training programs for blacks are being expanded. The decades-old standard of 10,000 apprentices training in any given year to qualify as artisans was swollen in 1984 by the addition of 1,000 blacks who for the first time could legally hold any of the artisan positions.

Another 33,000 blacks are enrolled in non-apprentice technical classes. Further down the educational pipeline, about 370,000 blacks are enrolled in schools offering "practical" subjects such as woodworking and 138,900 in schools offering "commercial" courses such as accounting, economics, and typing, according to government figures. (This schooling no doubt has been affected by rampant boycotts and violent disruptions that began last fall and continue.) Last year, the first correspondence college offering technical courses to all races opened.

Clearly there is progress. In 1970, 3,652 blacks attended technical and trade classes, according to government figures. That reflected political rather than economic reality. Twenty-two years earlier, the De Villiers Commission on Technical and Vocational Education reported "a rapidly increasing demand for trained native labor in practically all categories and grades of work."

Indeed, by the 1960s, the South African economy was booming, with the annual growth rate at 7 percent between 1962 and 1966. But government policy was still based on the Bantu Education Act of 1953, which held that the black's place in society was as an unskilled worker. In 1959 came the formalization of apartheid economic theory holding that separate races must have separate economies, "a commonwealth of economies," as it was stated.

To say the least, that ideology proved to be very idealistic. It envisioned considerable sacrifice on the part of the private sector to shift industries from the white urban centers to the bantustans and for one, obviously having no choice in the matter.

Black workers needed in the urban areas found temporary housing in the African townships; the official bedroom communities that surround all the cities; in bachelor hostels; in unauthorized, but largely tolerated, shanty towns; and in several contrived bantustans that served as second-tier labor dormitories to the industrial areas.

"Reality has a way of overtaking politicians and social engineers," says Godsil of Anglo American. "Wherever black-designated land is near a white city or industrial area, influx control doesn't work at all. You have people farming shacks instead of vegetables. The sooner influx control goes, the better. In a three-year time frame, I predict it will be out."

"The central conundrum is that if blacks are going to be permanently here, they must have permanent political rights. What the government is looking for is a formula where power can be shared without losing control. If you'll look at the modernization of European
South African students at Pace Vocational School in Soweto: “By 1987, South Africa will need more than 1 million semi-skilled workers and nearly 4 million skilled workers”

countries, there is a precedent for expanding the electorate gradually.

“Even this government understands that it cannot have a stable society unless all can influence decisions. There is already a hopeful model with black unions having a say in how factories are run. This is access to power.”

Rarely is power eagerly relinquished. In response to a massive strike by black workers last fall, the government, citing chargeless security legislation, detained 13 labor leaders, including those heading the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) and the rival Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), each of which claims to represent about 150,000 workers. Altogether, black union membership stands at nearly 700,000, three times what it was in 1980.

Suzman, still in Parliament after 32 years, said the government panicked in its response to the strike. And, in her opinion, a timid business community cleared the way for such a reaction. “I was always disgusted how influential business leaders sat back and said nothing,” she said. “No one wanted to get in the government’s bad books. Now all sorts of people are opening their mouths. There was this sudden awakening to forced removals [of blacks from urban fringes to bantustans] about two years ago and just this past year they opened up on influx control.”

Suzman, whose Progressive Federal Party holds enough seats in Parliament—27 of 178—to be the official opposition voice, said that while world opinion has prompted businessmen to openly criticize government policy, there is a local, practical factor, too.

“Theyir black employees have to go through this tedious performance of getting official approval and then only to be allowed to come into the mines and cities as a migrant worker. Firms like to stabilize labor because they can train it better.”

Then you get the situation like we had with Ford (Ford Motor Co., which has since merged its South African operations with Anglo American) establishing a good negotiating relationship with the workers and then suddenly finding out the head of the negotiating team had been detained.”

According to Devine of AMCHAM, businessmen “for a good many years” lobbied with government leaders behind the scenes before their comments surfaced in public. Last winter, 126 AMCHAM members were, in effect, forced to directly lobby. These were firms that earlier had volunteered to sign the Sullivan Principles—specific steps proposed in 1977 by the Rev. Leon Sullivan, a member of the General Motors board of directors, to improve wages and conditions for black employees of U.S. firms in South Africa. On December 12, the principles were modified so that the signatories are now required to “support the ending of all apartheid laws.”

Will Pretoria heed? “That’s the $64,000 question,” as one of Connan’s colleagues at the U.S. consulate put it.

Devine said, “I think the government in my tenure here has been receptive to listening to businessmen. Only in more recent times has it seemed willing to take direct action.”

Such recent steps have included Pretoria wavering on decentralization by allowing long-term leases, and even some home purchases, in the townships; by legalizing resident workforces in some industries and by giving some urban blacks the right of permanent residence.

When he opened Parliament in January, President Pieter W. Botha promised to completely review influx control, declared a moratorium on forced removals, and said freehold rights for blacks would be extended.

But the country’s administrators themselves are an obstacle to further reform. A huge bureaucracy has been created to enforce apartheid—actually four huge bureaucracies to deal with each official race category of white, Asian, black, and Coloured (mixed race). Bureaucracies being bureaucracies, there is an instinct for self-perpetuation, and election analyses have indicated that the most conservative bloc of the electorate is the 155,000 white civil servants of the central government. Like the other big conservative bloc, the rural whites, they are mostly Afrikanders.

The incumbent National Party is also under pressure to placate voices even further to the right of its mainstream constituency not only to stay in office, but to avoid an internal “dirty war.” Targeting opposition figures, some hardliners are already involved in a low-level campaign of terrorism—thuggery would be a more precise term except that large arms caches have been uncovered.

Also weighing heavily on Pretoria are overseas proposals to initiate or broaden disinvestment laws and other sanctions unless reforms are forthcoming. Already in the U.S., five states, 14 cities, and about 40 colleges and universities have divested securities held in companies doing business in or with South Africa, and 22 states are considering following suit.

Such action is by no means uniformly embraced by black leaders and white lib-
erals in South Africa. Many of them agree with the business community's assertion that to retard the country's economic growth is to retard the economic advance of its blacks.

With prospects of sanctions from the U.S. and the United Kingdom intensifying, the South African press in recent weeks has been citing a 197H study by the University of Witwatersrand that estimated that a hypothetical 50 percent cut in all foreign investments would cost 52,000 blacks their jobs. A 50 percent trade boycott against South African exports would cost 1.08 million jobs, most of them held by blacks, the study projected. The hypothetical impact a decade later is hard to gauge because there has since been a net outflow of direct foreign investment, and foreign capital has a proportionally smaller role in the South African economy.

Domestic and exile dissidents counter that the anti-sanctions proponents "don't know their own best medicine," that long-term gains come from short-term sacrifices.

If the pro-sanctions argument prevails on Capitol Hill and in Westminster, South Africa will have to take further reform measures to pacify its trading partners or re-chart its current course, which is directed toward free trade and an open economy.

If it chooses to do the latter, it won't be the first time South Africa has adjusted its century-old relationship with the capital markets of the West. The arms embargo imposed on South Africa by the UN Security Council in 1977 gave birth to the success of ARMSCOR, the nationally-owned company that exports its weaponry throughout Africa and to many overseas customers. Although South Africans pay increasingly steep fuel prices, a 15-year-old oil embargo resulted in the country establishing huge coal-to-oil conversion facilities and has recently led to successful explorations.

While South Africa needs foreign capital to dig its mines, it escapes the double bind of most Third World countries that also need outside financing for technology before they can exploit export markets. Mining technology is a home-grown industry in South Africa because the country has geological conditions that exist nowhere else.

As for capital, it is not particularly hard to reroute investments through third countries. "If someone has the capital and sees a good return, he'll find a way," says Robert Craig, who researches mining prospects for investors scouting the Johannesburg stock exchange. (Under last year's version of the proposed U.S. Export Administration Act, individuals violating an outright ban on new U.S. investments in South Africa would face a $50,000 fine and five years' imprisonment and companies would be fined $1 million. Similar penalties are included in current versions yet to be legislated.) American direct in-
vestments in South Africa total $2.3 billion, with another $13 billion in indirect investments such as portfolios and bank loans.

South Africa's biggest trading partners—the United Kingdom, then the U.S. and West Germany—are well aware that sanctions-busting reached a state-of-the-art level in southern Africa during the Rhodesia era. Countries that in other regards have taken a wide range of actions to show their opposition to apartheid have shied away from sanctions, saying they won't work.

The Canadian government, for example, states as part of its policy on South Africa that "comprehensive economic sanctions would not be effective without the commitment and cooperation of South Africa's major trading partners. Even then the size and strength of South Africa's economy and the resources available to it would enable it to withstand economic measures of this kind."

Selective disinvestment by U.S. firms that supply South Africa with such crucial goods as high technology equipment has been suggested by CUSA as well as several American anti-apartheid figures. CUSA's general secretary, Phiroshaw Camay, said, "We would consider calling for total disinvestment but we don't think this would work." His counterpart in FOSATU, Joe Foster, said any call for disinvestment on his part would antagonize FOSATU auto workers, "Our members at Leyland would kill me."

Actually, the issue is so sensitive to the South African government that any public call for disinvestment or other sanctions is illegal, an act of treason. The law has proven to be more of a cobweb than a trip wire. Attribution is often indirect, but all sides of the sanctions debate are presented to South African newspaper readers every time there is a noteworthy development.

Nor does the law seem to have any bearing on the fact that sanctions simply are not a political issue within the white electorate. Even Helen Suzman thinks they are a bad idea.

Furthermore, there is widespread feeling throughout South Africa that the recent escalation of lethal confrontations between police and protesters in the townships will certainly lead to stern overseas reaction, and there is little at this stage Pretoria can do to appease.

Whatever happens on the sanctions issue in the near future, South Africa still faces the fact that if it is to tend to its own consumers, let alone export markets, it has no more than a decade to solve its massive manpower shortage. The latest warning came in April from the country's Manpower and Management Foundation: "Unless the skilled labor force increases 3.2 percent each year for the next 15 years, there will be severe unemployment."

The Foundation reported that at most, only 25 percent of the needed jobs could be expected to come from the white workforce.

In the words of Anglo American executive Godsoll, "There is no doubt this country is going to have to modernize its human capital."
Churches

Twenty-Five Years After Sharpeville

With the increasingly violent nature of the struggle in South Africa, the options available to apartheid's opponents are narrowing. Within ecclesiastical circles, disinvestment has replaced humanitarian aid to liberation movements as the most controversial anti-apartheid measure.

BY CHARLES VILLA-VICENCIO

On March 21, 1960, the shots fired at Sharpeville heralded a new era in black politics in South Africa. Protest hardened into resistance, and blacks were forced to think in terms of a revolutionary strategy. The significance of this new phase of the struggle was sensed throughout the world, and the Christian church, together with other organizations, addressed itself to the ensuing struggle for black self-determination with a new sense of urgency.

At Sharpeville, 20,000 people converged on the police station in support of the campaign to defy the pass laws. Sixty-nine people were killed, the majority of whom were apparently shot in the back while fleeing, and a further 180, including 40 women and eight children, were wounded.

A short while later, on April 8th, the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) were banned under the newly enacted Unlawful Organizations Act. These movements responded by committing themselves to underground activity, and several of their leaders went into exile, while others were banned and imprisoned. Today many of these people—Albert Luthuli, Nelson Mandela, Robert Sobukwe—continue to be the most potent symbols of black resistance in the country.

With Sharpeville, a new era in the black struggle for liberation had arrived. Anti-apartheid activity began to be coordinated at a different level. Sustained, though sporadic acts of counter-violence began to occur on a regular basis against the institutionalized oppression of the apartheid regime. This would in turn be used by the police as the necessary justification for further repressive violence. The spiral of violence has continued to intensify ever since.

As I write this article, police have opened fire on the black residents of Langa township, outside Uitenhage. Official reports are that 19 people have been killed, while eyewitness accounts put the number of dead at 45. Dozens more were injured, with the death toll continuing to rise. The police, we are told, were not given the command to open fire. The similarities with Sharpeville are quite frightening.

Clearly, the process that started at Sharpeville has not been suppressed. In fact, the will to resist is more resolute than ever before. Some suggest the phase of sustained revolutionary activity has only just begun.

Response of the Churches

The immediate response to Sharpeville by churches both within South Africa and around the world was the Cottesloe Consultation, meeting outside of Johannesburg from December 7-14, 1960. Here representatives of the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the eight South African member churches, including the NGK (white Dutch Reformed Church) synods of the Transvaal and the Cape Province, met to conclude that apartheid could not be reconciled with the teachings of Scripture.

H.F. Verwoerd, prime minister at the time, reprimanded the delegates of his church for allowing themselves to be manipulated by the WCC, and demanded they recant. They did so in sufficient numbers to divide the Afrikaans churches against the English-speaking churches and ultimately against the world church by resigning from the WCC.

It was not, however, until 1968 that programmatic opposition from the institutionalized churches got underway. The Message to the People of South Africa, distributed by the South African...
Council of Churches, rejected apartheid as a pseudo-gospel, anticipating the 1982 “Apartheid is a Heresy” resolution of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches by 14 years.

On the international scene, the stage was set by the 1968 Uppsala Assembly of the WCC meeting, which identified the need for a program within the WCC to work for the elimination of racism. The Programme to Combat Racism (PCR) was born a short while later. Two major thrusts against the white regime in South Africa emerged on the agenda of the WCC: the application of economic sanctions and the establishment of a special fund to supply humanitarian aid to liberation movements operating against colonial and white minority governments in southern Africa. The purpose of the special fund to oppose racism was “to support organizations that combat racism, rather than the welfare organizations that alleviate the effects of racism.”

Funding Liberation Movements

The decision to provide humanitarian aid to liberation movements resulted in controversy in churches around the world. Philip Potter, general secretary of the WCC at the time, explained the Council’s rationale: “When we make grants,” he said, “these are not meant, either explicitly or implicitly, as criticism against a movement about its use of counter-violence, nor are we attempting to show another, better way to liberation. Rather, the grants are intended as an expression of our commitment to the cause of economic, social, and political justice which the organizations concerned support. As always, our support is to be seen as a sign of solidarity which should be clearly distinguished from identification with a movement.”

Then came the banning orders on a number of individuals and organizations in South Africa on October 17, 1977. This was interpreted by world opinion as an unwillingness on the part of the government to allow legal, non-violent protest and opposition inside the country. It was suggested that at least one of the criteria demanded in any just war theory, that of “the last resort,” which allows Christians to resort to armed struggle as a means toward a just end, had legitimately been met.

At the same time, a medley of conservative and right-wing groups unleashed a relentless attack on the WCC and its member churches around the world. Despite the internal dissent this produced within the churches, and often in spite of their own criticism of the PCR, the churches with few exceptions continued their membership in the WCC. Given the nature of the attack against the WCC by the South African government and the nature of its threats against WCC member churches inside the country, this resistance cannot be lightly dismissed.

The provision of humanitarian aid to liberation movements continues. Representatives of these movements continue to be present at all major ecumenical gatherings, and a significant amount of discontent and confusion continues to reign in the churches as a consequence. But it is also clear that the bitter enmity which this program produced in its initial phases is no longer quite as explicit, and today the work of the PCR is accepted in ecumenical circles as an integral part of the church’s witness.

Disinvestment

The issue of disinvestment in the West—a program that has been advocated by the WCC since 1968—has in many ways replaced the provision of humanitarian aid to liberation movements as the most controversial anti-apartheid measure. At the same time, it has become a major item on the foreign policy agenda of every nation in the Western world.

Certainly in South Africa, the issue evokes the most spirited and recriminating debate in both secular and ecclesiastical circles. If the tenor of this debate and the response of the South African government is anything to go by, the political potential inherent in the disinvestment campaign is significant. A pertinent question concerns the precise nature of this potential.

Will disinvestment produce the kind of change that its advocates assume, or will it merely increase black suffering while driving whites into a laager of resistance? As relentless a campaigner against apartheid as Alan Paton contends that the very thought of a successful campaign is a nightmare to him because it is blacks who will suffer most. His observation produced an extended debate in the South African press. A letter to the Sunday Times from a Mr. Makhangoane, a resident of a black resettlement area in Witsieshoek, is worth quoting in full, because it focuses the debate:

“Disinvestment or not? The debate goes on and on. Bishop Tutu calls for the sabotage of the South African economy. But it is also clear that the bitter enmity which this program produced in its initial phases is no longer quite as explicit, and today the work of the PCR is accepted in ecumenical circles as an integral part of the church’s witness.
It doesn't concern me. After all, it is not my economy.

"What bothers me is this sudden concern Alan Paton, T.K. Mopeli, Gatsha Ruthlezi, and all the rich are showing about me."

"I will be the first to suffer, I will be hit the hardest, they say."

"So they don't believe that we are already starving.

Briefly stated, the disinvestment issue in South Africa is being debated from two very different perspectives. This becomes clear from a further contribution to the debate. An editorial in Varsity, a student newspaper, makes a rather simple, but pointed observation: "While P.W. Botha might talk of a bloodbath that is to come, opponents of apartheid... are pointing to the actions of brutality, or has become the victim of malnutrition, that the bloodbath is not already on. To fail to understand this is to fail to understand the intensity of black anger.

Most of the debate concerning disinvestment seems to ignore this yawning gap in perspective. Arguments "for" and "against" disinvestment seem to go on ad nauseum, while the Mr. Makhan-
with its own vested interests, on both sides of the debate. For example, it is difficult not to be suspicious of the motives of some of the advocates of private enterprise in South Africa and abroad who have almost overnight become avid advocates of the cause of economically deprived blacks and who eagerly support investment for “the sake of black workers!”

There are presumably also some American politicians who are more concerned about American foreign policy interests than with what actually happens in South Africa, arguing that the U.S. as the leader of Western democracy cannot afford to be seen to be involved in any way with the messy and morally reprehensible South African situation. And there are many professional lobbyists who are making a lucrative income on advising others to reduce their investment returns by withdrawing their foreign interests from South Africa, and by advising economically vulnerable laborers to risk their livelihood by supporting disinvestment. Motives are always difficult to assess, and because altruism and ambition are always mixed in history, there is probably little to be gained from trying to unravel them.

The Declining Influence of Liberalism

The positions taken by the different participants in the disinvestment debate are obviously influenced by a variety of political ideologies, while the presuppositions inherent in these positions are only rarely discussed. Central to this debate is the perennial failure of white liberalism to translate its noblest ideals into viable action capable of producing political change.

Having produced some of the noblest voices opposed to the atrocities of apartheid, white liberalism is a brand of politics that is alienating more and more blacks who continue to bear the brunt of apartheid. Having rejected violence as a means of opposing apartheid, most noted liberals seem to be opposed to the disinvestment campaign as well.

The question that many blacks are now asking them is what kind of alternative political program they envisage as a means toward political change? When pushed, an increasing number of liberals respond by saying blacks ought to participate in those structures that are being created for them, using them as a lever to exert pressure for further participation. This goes a long way in plac-

This is a position which Reinhold Niebuhr described as ethical realism, arguing that social justice can only be realized by “setting the power of the exploited against the exploiters.” In this same tradition, Martin Luther King said: “Evil must be attacked by a counter-acting persistence, by the day-to-day assault on the battering rams of injustice.” There are obviously different forms that this assault may take, but ultimately moral suasion alone is not the answer.

Afrikaner nationalism learned this lesson a long time ago in the struggle against British imperialism. It is this broad-based realization in the political struggle in South Africa that has largely marginalized liberal politics in announcing the demise of moral preaching as a strategy for political change.

Disinvestment as Strategy and Slogan

An unwillingness by those who are at the forefront of the struggle for black political rights in South Africa to settle for moral suasion suggests that in these circles, in addition to all other options—such as trade union activity and strikes—disinvestment is likely to remain one of the most viable and attractive programs at their disposal. This
The pertinent question is: Given this delay in political decision making, is it likely that the threat of disinvestment will be effective in forcing black workers to support South Africa for long?

The Christian church has made its decision in this regard. The dominant theological trend, at least in many circles, is that theology should be the perspective of the poor and the oppressed. There is little doubt, therefore, that those churches which adopt this doctrinal stance will take their cue from the perspective of black people in South Africa in assessing their attitude toward disinvestment.

**Beyond Debate**

It is this reality that renders the academic debate about disinvestment a little sterile, threatening to exclude the reflective process from the political arena altogether. The danger of this cannot be over-emphasized, but such is the extent of the alienation within the country.

At the same time, it is difficult to deny that the threat of disinvestment has been an incentive to reform in South Africa. Yet, the free enterprise ideologues argue that reform would have begun in any case. The problem is that the track record of free enterprise is anything but convincing in this regard, and South Africa has a shocking record of offering reform only after the blood has flowed in Soweto, Crossroads, and now the marketplace—at least this is how many black leaders and observers see it. It is this realization that has persuaded a well-known South African advocate of investment in accordance with a revised version of the Sullivan code to suggest that if the disinvestment campaign did not exist, like God, it would be necessary to create it.

The pertinent question is: Given this perception gap that Mr. Makhangoane has identified for us, who does the world listen to? There is a strong tradition in the West—the democratic principle—that says, “Listen to those whose lives are most affected by the process under scrutiny.”

The Christian church has made its decision in this regard. The dominant theological trend, at least in many circles, is that theology should be the perspective of the poor and the oppressed. There is little doubt, therefore, that those churches which adopt this doctrinal stance will take their cue from the perspective of black people in South Africa in assessing their attitude toward disinvestment.

**It is exceedingly difficult to convince a parent whose child has been killed in a hail of police bullets that the bloodbath is not already on.**
The Catholic Church and Apartheid

The Second Vatican Council of the Roman Catholic Church succinctly states the moral position which is the basis of religious concern for situations such as the one which prevails in South Africa: "Where citizens are oppressed by a public authority which exceeds its competence, they should not on that account refuse what is objectively required of them for the common good, but it must be allowable for them, within the limits of the law of nature and the Gospel, to defend their rights and those of their fellow citizens against this abuse of authority."

The considered judgment of every synod, assembly, and conference of the Roman Catholic and mainline Protestant churches (with the exception of the Afrikaans Reformed churches) has been that the present regime, together with its structures of domination, stands in contradiction to the Christian gospel to which the churches of the land seek to remain faithful.

Not content with pious generalizations, the churches have also involved themselves in specific investigations of governmental abuse and have provided both moral and material assistance to its victims. As a case in point, the trial of 16 people for high treason which is expected in May 1985 will result in tremendous cost. The churches will attempt to ensure that the defendants will have adequate legal counsel and that their families—breadwinners absent—will not suffer from want. Appeals have already been launched to overseas donors for assistance in meeting these objectives.

Late last year, the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference (SACBC) for the first time issued a joint report. Called "Relocations: The Churches' Report on Forced Removals in South Africa," it marked an advance in what was already a cooperative relationship. That document recounted the hardships imposed on more than 3 million South Africans, most of them black, who have been compelled to move from an area arbitrarily designated by government for "white occupancy" into remote, inadequate areas. The churches pledged themselves "to resist forced removal, and to support those who do not wish to be compulsorily relocated or who have suffered because of forced removal."

Later in 1984, the SACBC issued another report, "Police Conduct During Township Protests," a document which has increased relevance in recent weeks, given that the protests have intensified and have involved wider areas, and the response of the police (and military) has been brutal, resulting in more than 200 deaths.

The 1984 report asserted: "We see no hope of reaching a reasonable settlement embracing everyone in South Africa and an end to the continually smoldering unrest, unless all its causes and aggravations are honestly faced. . . We concede that there may have been times when the police were provoked or needed to protect themselves. But that cannot justify unwarranted or unlawful conduct on the part of the police."

Wanton violence, the report asserted, was utilized in provocative, callous, or insensitive conduct, in the indiscriminate or reckless use of tear gas, in assaults and beatings, damage to property, disrupting funerals, and rape. These injuries were not inflicted on a single occasion, but were spread over a period of four months covered by the report.

Since publication of the report, it is apparent that the policy of the government has not changed. On March 21, 1985, the anniversary of the infamous Sharpeville massacre of 1960, the police killed another 19 people who were peacefully marching to a funeral. This latest slaughter provoked new cries of protest not only from the SACBC, but from the Council of Churches in South Africa and in the U.S. "The level of anger of the people is continually rising, as well as their determination to achieve their freedom not tomorrow, but here and now," was the message from Beyers Naude, Bishop Tutu's successor as general secretary of the SACC.

Equally alarmed by the violent turn of events in South Africa, the Methodist Church in the country is taking the unprecedented move of convening special district synods. It is the first time in the history of the church in South Africa that such a step has been taken. The Reverend Peter Storey, national head of the Methodist Church, cited various reasons for the current disorders: the education system, the erosion of civil rights, the exclusion of blacks from the constitution, and the "provocative presence of armed police at funerals and memorial services and the awesome powers given to the security police."

Storey also expressed concern that white Christians are insulated from much of what is happening among their fellow black Methodists: "It is wrong that many of our people continue to worship in serene innocence while people are being killed on the doorstep of our township churches." The convening of extraordinary synods of the largest multi-racial church in southern Africa is aimed at examining the present crisis to see what role the church can play in reducing violence.

The leaders of the Roman Catholic Church stated: "We feel that no amount of provocation—if indeed there was any—can justify such bloodshed. . . The people were not
violently, nor were they singing when the police ordered them to disperse. We have been told that police opened fire and shot at the crowd indiscriminately." The bishops then called on all South Africans to observe a day of mourning for those killed in Uitenhage on March 21.

In the United States, the Uitenhage massacre gave new impetus to the churches' concern for southern Africa. Dr. Arie R. Brower, the general secretary of the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. (NCCUSA) sent a message to Secretary of State George Shultz stating: "You and President Reagan have both said that apartheid is repugnant. We urge you once again to express this repugnance in actions; abandoning the policy of constructive engagement, putting an end to U.S. economic, political, diplomatic, and military support for the South African apartheid government, and offering support to those who through dialogue and peaceful means seek to eradicate apartheid now and establish majority rule before still more lives are lost or wasted."

The Free South Africa Movement, which last November began daily demonstrations at the South African embassy in Washington and elsewhere, enjoys considerable church support. That support is given not as much by words as by participation of bishops, clergy, and laity of many denominations in the marches and in the number of "witnesses"—those who volunteer for civil disobedience and arrest—who are particularly identified with one church or another.

On one of the days I marched in Washington, I was impressed by the presence of a Lutheran bishop and numerous other Lutherans bearing placards or signs proclaiming their religious identity. On another occasion, seven black Roman Catholic bishops joined the march, and the Reverend Jesse Jackson has participated both as a marcher and as a "witness."

American religious leaders are disturbed not only by the shocking violent developments in South Africa, but also by the Reagan policy of constructive engagement. They rather see that policy, as Bishop Tutu put it, as "destructive engagement"—encouraging or tolerating the South African government's increased use of force in repressing black dissent. The president and his secretary of state have indeed denounced apartheid but, as Dr. Brower complained, have done nothing to exert pressure on that government. They contrast this stance with, for example, Reagan's reaction to the suppression of Solidarity in Poland, where economic sanctions were promptly invoked.

Again in Central America, the U.S. is openly supporting the overthrow of a government which is alleged to be Marxist and which is accused of not representing the will of the Nicaraguan people. The South African government is no less guilty—indeed much more guilty—of human rights violations, yet no sanctions are leveled against it. The progress which the administration claims to see in South Africa is invisible to church leaders, both in the U.S. and in South Africa itself.

In addition to their concern for the maltreatment and murder of people in South Africa, American churches are also involved in working for the independence of Namibia, the territory illegally occupied by South Africa for more than a decade. In Namibia itself, the Council of Churches has repeatedly called for the speedy implementation of UN Security Council resolution 435, which provides for a ceasefire, followed by free elections in an independent Namibia. That objective has been repeatedly backed in the U.S., particularly by the NCCUSA and leaders of the Lutheran and Roman Catholic communions.

The urgency of achieving peace in Namibia is heightened by the violent conduct of the South African forces occupying that territory. In 1983, the SACBC sent a delegation of bishops to Namibia to investigate charges of murder, torture, rape, robbery, and the detention of innocent people. The bishops returned with a strong indictment of the military, documenting their charges with specific incidents of misconduct. Their charges have been echoed by the Namibian Council of Churches and by other independent investigating teams.

At the beginning of the Reagan administration, the independence of Namibia was stated to be a primary objective of U.S. policy in Africa. It was the same administration which introduced the linkage of Namibian independence with the withdrawal of Cuban military forces in neighboring Angola. The South African government eagerly grasped onto the new excuse for delay. Despite assertions from the governments of both Angola and Cuba that the troops will be withdrawn when Angola's borders are secure from South African encroachment, the situation remains the same; South African forces are still inside Angola's borders and still terrorize the Namibian people.

It has often been stated that "time is running out" for South Africa to move away from apartheid, and that a bloodbath would be the result of continued intransigence and oppression. It would seem now that the bloodbath has begun: Almost daily there are news reports of people, including children, being injured or killed by police action. Black frustration is being unleashed against other blacks who are seen as collaborators with the apartheid regime—they are being beaten or killed. Instead of dialogue with the nation's authentic black leaders, the government continues to imprison them, charging some 16 with high treason—a crime carrying the death penalty if they are found guilty.

Church leaders and spokespersons are bound by their faith to eschew violence as the solution to human problems; their appeal is directed not so much at the black majority, but at the forces of "law and order"—the South African police and military. It is their violence which is producing the bloodbath.

—Father Rollins E. Lambert
Adviser on African Affairs
U.S. Catholic Bishops Conference
Father Lebamang Sebidi

A Catholic priest, Father Sebidi is chairman of the Executive Committee for the Institute for Contextual Theology in Johannesburg and a member of the Soweto Civic Associations.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: Could you comment on the political temperature in the black community in South Africa at this time? Has the black South African struggle undergone a shift from protest politics to a more militant revolutionary phase?

Sebidi: If you look at the history of the South African black struggle, you will remember that up until 1976, the struggle was really in the hands of “traditional” black politicians—people like Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Albert Luthuli, Dr. Nthato Motlana. But in 1976, something happened. The struggle was transferred from the hands of the old guard into the hands of the young students. The students took over the struggle and that has been happening from 1976 to our present time. Because students are somehow immune from fear of losing a house or a job, they have been pushing the struggle very, very hard and they have suffered. They have been killed, exiled, imprisoned, but because they are so enthused, so angry, so impatient, and so full of fire, government repression hasn’t been able to push them out. So has there been a change from protest to challenge? I would say yes, in terms of those dynamics. The youngsters are challenging the government.

Africa Report: Is non-violent change an option any longer?

Sebidi: It’s the government itself which makes non-violent change a non-viable option. If you look at the recent events, most of the leaders of the United Democratic Front have been imprisoned. If people like Frank Chikane, who is a minister of religion, is said to be violent, then everyone in South Africa is violent. So the government itself makes non-violent change a non-starter in the South African situation. It makes people like Bishop Tutu and Allan Boesak irrelevant.

Africa Report: A lot is made of Botha’s “reform politics” by both the South African and American governments. The new constitution and now the abolition of the Mixed Marriages Act are held up as evidence that apartheid is slowly changing. Do any sectors of the black community in South Africa buy that argument?

Sebidi: Yes, there are sectors of the black community that are buying that argument, particularly the community councilors, the so-called mayors in the urban areas, and the homestead leaders, and that’s why a lot of their homes are being burned by the students. Many of them have in fact lost their lives since September last year because these are the types of people who would say, “Let’s give the government a chance.” But some of them have had a change of heart of late. Some have resigned from their councilorships, and there are incidents of them standing up in public and saying, “I was wrong. I want to go back to the people.”

Africa Report: What steps would the South African government have to take right now to stop an increasingly incendiary situation from developing?

Sebidi: First, a distinction must be made between petty apartheid and grand apartheid. When you look at the present situation in South Africa, there are many schools being built, the government is even prepared to allow student representative councils, but that’s not going to stop the agitation and tension within the country because the students have come to realize that there is a distinction between reformism within petty apartheid and the process of denationalization, which is grand apartheid. So if the government wants to stop what is happening today, it must stop the process of denationalization on a grand scale, and it should give the people the right to vote. That’s the ultimate, and this is a non-negotiable issue with the black people in South Africa.

Africa Report: Much was made in the Western press of those sectors of the black community who protested Senator Kennedy’s visit to South Africa, citing this as evidence of the divided nature of black South Africans.

Sebidi: This question of black South Africans being divided is a red herring. Divided about what? South Africans are not divided about our ultimate aim—the liberation of the black people, our freedom. We may be divided about ways of getting there. Now with regard to the Kennedy visit, you must realize that we were not divided about the ultimate end, which is liberation. Some were saying, “Kennedy is not going to liberate us,” while others were saying, “OK, he’s not going to liberate us, but he might be useful in internationalizing the struggle.” But that’s not a real division. It’s a tactical difference, not a difference in terms of the blueprint of what we want for South Africa.

Africa Report: Similarly the view has been expressed that
Africa view the increasing anti-apartheid activity in the U.S.?

Sebidi: This is an obfuscation of the issue, an attempt to confuse the issue just because corporations don’t want to get out of South Africa. From the black point of view in South Africa, the whole issue of disinvestment is not really an economic issue. It’s a moral issue, a political issue. The United States is a world power and a world leader in democracy. For the U.S. to be seen to be putting South Africa on the back while South Africa is dehumanizing and oppressing people is unethical. This is what we are saying. We are not saying that you should liberate us. We are saying the U.S. should not be seen as participating in our oppression. I wouldn’t stress the question of who will suffer if the U.S. pulls out. That’s not the point. The point is that the U.S. will have stopped cooperating with an evil system. That’s what we are saying.

Africa Report: How does the black community in South Africa view the increasing anti-apartheid activity in the U.S.?

Sebidi: The majority of the black people welcome it because for us, every little thing that makes South Africa feel uncomfortable is good. It was the same thing with Senator Kennedy’s visit. Nobody is so naive as to think that Kennedy coming to South Africa is going to liberate us. But everything that seems to make South Africa uncomfortable is good, we accept it. We know that in the final analysis, it will be the blacks who will have to liberate ourselves, who will have to die for our country.

Africa Report: Where do you see American policy toward South Africa heading?

Sebidi: I think the President is too committed to the right. His position on Central American issues doesn’t give me any hope that he might change toward South Africa. So we are all waiting for 1988 in hopes of getting the American government to make a volte-face in its policy toward South Africa. The South African government is taking advantage of having President Reagan in the White House to make little “Mickey Mouse” changes here and there so that the U.S. can go on being constructively married to South Africa. That’s how South Africa somehow tightens the cord that binds Reagan and themselves together. Reagan can again stand up and say, “Of course, there are changes in the right direction.”

Africa Report: What can the American public do to help the process of change in South Africa?

Sebidi: The average American should acquaint himself with the actual black organizations inside South Africa. At the moment, we have two basic groups—the black consciousness organizations, and the UDF affiliates. I would say that both of these groupings are doing something good for us because they want to see the ultimate incorporation of all blacks into decision-making, and they want to see the liberation of our country. Their differences are tactical and strategic. So Americans should begin to know these groupings in South Africa and help them in any way they can, in terms of moral support, or in terms of a little monies here and there. A lot is going on in the U.S. vis-à-vis the South African issue, thank God I’ve seen that—and it is very positive and encouraging. You don’t see people demonstrating, sitting on the stairs at Columbia University for 12 days, without feeling something inside yourself. That’s commitment. Those people are really committed to our cause.

Africa Report: How do you see the role of the churches in South Africa in an increasingly violent situation? Can they remain committed to a non-violent alternative if the door continues to be closed on peaceful means?

Sebidi: First of all, one must be very careful when one talks of the non-violent stance of the churches. The churches lean toward non-violence because of the Christian ethic. But the churches are not pacifist in an absolute sense. If you read the doctrines of the churches on the whole question of war, the churches are committed to relative pacifism. So we can envision a situation where the churches would bless people taking up arms against an unjust government. This is common knowledge within the Christian church. It is in the teachings of St. Thomas and St. Augustine. So the church leans toward non-violence, but in a doctrinal sense, it is not adopting an absolute pacifism.

Africa Report: What role if any has the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy played in the struggle against apartheid?

Sebidi: Recently, we’ve had a very good man as president of the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference—Archbishop Denis Hurley. He has been known for his opposition to apartheid for a long, long time. In the 1950s, he was the lone voice speaking against apartheid. Since he has been president, we’ve been beginning to get good things from the SACBC. But if you are asking about the Catholic commitment in the struggle, I would say individuals are committed, but not the church as an institution. This is true of all the churches, really, not only our church, and it is really sad. In other words, the great power of the church has not been martialed to go against this evil system. Individuals like Archbishop Hurley who are brave enough and who are convinced have stuck out their necks.

I think we are prisoners of the idea that the church has got nothing to do with politics, only with spiritual salvation. The church doesn’t want to muddy its hands in politics and that’s not peculiar to the Catholic church, it’s true of all the churches in South Africa and maybe throughout the world unfortunately. The Latin American church is trying to change that, with liberation theology, but even there it is difficult. The Pope says, “No don’t do that, keep to your altar, your candles and incense.”

Africa Report: What would be the response if the Pope visited South Africa?

Sebidi: I don’t know. If he came and condemned the situation in no uncertain terms, that might have an impact, but otherwise... Someone said to me that the Pope is trapped in terms of South Africa because, during the time that Solidarity was in trouble in Poland, it was the South African government that was the first to open its arms to the Polish people. That’s why we pleaded with the Pope not to meet with F.W. Botha, but he met him. He had to say thank you for saving the Polish people. Now this may be a bit of an exaggeration, but people are talking about it, that the Pope is indebted to Botha for opening his arms to the Poles, so for him to stand up and condemn Botha would be like stabbing Botha in the back. So I
am almost tempted to say I wouldn't want the Pope to come to South Africa because he won't feel free to bring down the judgment of God on that evil system.

Africa Report: Where do you see the South African situation going over the coming months or years?

Sebidi: It is very hard to say because it does look like the South African situation is responsive to the outside world, especially to the U.S. For example, in 1974 the Portuguese were so strong in Mozambique, nobody would have guessed, but before you knew it, Mozambique was free because of what was happening in Portugal. So we seem to be in that situation.

There is so much happening outside the country. For instance, the so-called changes in the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts are little "Mickey Mouse" changes in terms of reformism. But one is interested to know what kind of forces or dynamics were at play for that to develop. It could be due to what's going on in the U.S.—to lessen the pressure. It's a little screw that has been unloosened a bit. If Botha claims, as he did on "Nightline" that South Africa will not respond to outside pressure, then he's a liar because if he was so impermeable to it, there wouldn't be a law that anyone who talks about foreign disinvestment is committing a crime. He is very sensitive to outside pressure.

But still it is very hard to know what will happen. The conservative forces are very strong in South Africa today and they are working very hard not to let go. But at the same time you have the youngsters who are very determined to lay down their lives to change the system.

"We know that in the final analysis, it will be the blacks who will have to liberate ourselves, who will have to die for our country"
In Washington

Reagan's African Aid Agenda

An examination of aid figures in the proposed FY 1986 budget may reveal a decline in real terms in American assistance to the African continent. And despite a substantial humanitarian response to the African drought and famine, the allocation of aid continues to reflect the Reagan administration's political and strategic priorities.

BY ROBERT A. MANNING

Africa has burst into the American consciousness in recent months with the unprecedented upsurge in anti-apartheid and disinvestment activism and the remarkable popular and official response to the drought and famine in Ethiopia and the Sahel. But a careful examination of fiscal year (FY) 1986 aid requests for the continent indicates that in the face of a $200 billion federal budget deficit, this heightened awareness of Africa has not been translated into any significant change in U.S. aid flows to Africa.

The FY 1986 budget suggests almost uniform continuity in U.S. policy toward Africa, with aid heavily weighted in support of American political and strategic priorities. As outlined by senior American officials, the main themes of that policy continue to be: resisting instability and destabilization resulting from Soviet/Cuban and Libyan intervention; supporting economic development by encouraging the adoption of free market policies; and "constructive engagement" to support peaceful change in southern Africa.

In addition, the U.S., traditionally a major donor of food aid to Africa, will supply more than $1 billion in emergency food aid this fiscal year, and is expected to deliver close to $1 billion in FY 1986 as well in response to the famine facing some 24 African countries.

In real terms, however, U.S. aid to sub-Saharan Africa has remained roughly constant since the first budget submitted by the Reagan administration: FY 1982 aid was $1.05 billion, compared to just over $1.1 billion requested for FY 1986. But given the decline in U.S. resources committed to multilateral institutions such as the International Development Association (IDA), the soft-loan arm of the World Bank and a major source of capital flows to Africa, it is at least arguable that notwithstanding food aid, there has been a slight decline in official American aid channeled to Africa.

Moreover, over the past four years, there has been a significant change in the composition of that aid, with a doubling of direct military aid—Foreign Military Sales, the Military Assistance Program, and International Military and Educational Training—from about 10 percent of the total aid request to about 20 percent.

The fastest-growing category of U.S. economic aid to Africa is the Economic Support Fund (ESF). (Other types include project-oriented Development Assistance [DA] and PL 480 food aid.) ESF is the most politically motivated form of aid and is technically listed as security assistance. It is aimed at bolstering American allies and can be used for a variety of purposes ranging from balance of payments support to direct financing of arms to development projects.

ESF funds to Africa reached $231 million in the first Reagan aid request in FY 1982, a 60 percent increase over the previous year, $333.1 million in FY 1984, and $461 million in the FY 1986 request. The FY 1986 request for DA, by contrast, is $357 million.

The aggregate figures, however, tell only a small part of the story. Africa receives only about 9 percent of the total foreign aid appropriation which, when Congress finally approves it, will total about $13 billion. In FY 1986, the total for Africa will equal about one-third the amount Congress earmarks for Israel.

More significantly, U.S. aid flows are concentrated among those African states most closely aligned with the U.S. Countries linked to the unfolding U.S. strategic network in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region, by providing base
access and/or perceived to be confronted with a Soviet/Cuban or Libyan threat, receive the lion's share of U.S. aid. Thus, according to a State Department analysis, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, and Liberia account for 41 percent of all requested ESF and DA to Africa for FY 1986. Similarly, the same four countries, all of which except Liberia have signed base access accords with the U.S., receive 75 percent of the $189.5 million in military aid requested for Africa.

The FY 1986 foreign aid bill, though unlikely to gain final approval before summer, cleared mark-up in both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee before Congress took its Easter recess. While the bill faces further scrutiny on the floor of both the Senate and House, it has weathered the mark-up phase, where many changes are frequently made, with relatively minor alterations.

The major difference between the Senate and House version is that on the Senate side, there has been more of an effort to keep totals frozen at FY 1985 levels. The House Subcommittee on Africa (and the Foreign Affairs Committee as a whole) did far more tinkering than the Senate with both amounts of aid and conditions regarding their disbursement, though to varying degrees from region to region.

North Africa
In light of last year's Treaty of Union between Morocco and Libya which took the Reagan administration by surprise, continuity in U.S. policy as mirrored in the FY 1986 aid request is in itself at least a nuanced change. Initially, the administration expressed serious concern about the future of U.S.-Moroccan relations as a consequence of the pact, which contains mutual defense commitments.

But after a spirited inter-agency policy review, the administration reaffirmed its close historical and geopolitical ties to Morocco, underscored by an FY 1986 aid request for a significant increase in both military and economic aid to Rabat—a package totalling $137 million ($50 million military, $22.5 million ESF, $19 million DA, $44.9 million PL 480).

The U.S. has tried to remain neutral in the war between Morocco and the Algerian-backed Polisario front over the phosphate-rich Western Sahara. But its continuing provision of military aid to Morocco has complicated efforts to improve ties with Algeria, as well as causing friction with Congress.

Nassif testified that the U.S. believes the Saharan dispute is not amenable to a military solution and supports "the principle of a referendum" for the people of the territory to decide whether they prefer independence to belonging to Morocco. Nassif acknowledged "an increase in tensions between Algeria and Morocco," which some analysts fear could spill over into a direct confrontation.

Barring changes when the aid bill reaches the floor of the House and Senate, Congress will cut at least $7 million out of the military aid request for Morocco. Underlying the continued administration commitment to King Hassan is an agreement with Rabat to allow the U.S. to upgrade two airbases to which the U.S. would have access. The Air Force is in the process of spending some $20 million on the facilities. But a congressional staffer expressed doubts over whether the U.S. would have sufficient access to the facilities. "The one time we asked permission—for Operation Bright Star in 1983—they refused," he commented.

The U.S. commitment to Morocco, however, has not prevented a slight warming in relations with Algeria, whose president, Chadli Benjedid, visited here in mid-April with an eye toward taking advantage of U.S. concerns over the Libyan-Moroccan pact to improve ties. Except for a small military training program ($100,000 in FY 1986), the U.S. has no aid program in Algeria, though the U.S. and Algeria have substantial economic ties—$4.3 billion in two-way trade in 1984—and Algeria is the second largest supplier of natural gas to the U.S.

The U.S. has sold 17 C-130 cargo jets to Algeria, and congressional sources say that the administration has softened its opposition to dialogue with Polisario, apparently seeking to demonstrate a more even-handed posture. Chadli's visit—the first by an Algerian head of state to the U.S.—raised the prospect of U.S. military sales.

Tunisia, which borders Libya and has been alternately wooed and harassed by Qaddafy, has been a recipient of a steady flow of U.S. military aid under the Reagan administration. Last year a squadron of F5A fighter-jets were delivered to Tunis, along with 54 M60 tanks. Of $95.7 million requested by the administration for FY 1986, $70 million is for military aid. Similarly, the administration seeks $20 million, mainly in economic aid, for Libya's neighbor to the south, Chad.

East Africa
Until the recent coup, Sudan's President Nimeiry was by far the largest recipient of U.S. aid in sub-Saharan Africa, obtaining close to $1 billion over the past four years. The initial pro-Western orientation of the new military regime suggests continuity in its relations with the
U.S.—by far Sudan's largest benefactor—which would not jeopardize the prospect of $275 million requested by the administration for FY 1986. The administration's mid-April announcement that it will as scheduled provide $40 million toward a petroleum fund for the Sudanese indicates its willingness to work with the new government, although some U.S. officials have expressed wariness over its ability to consolidate power.

In proportion to the size of its economy, Sudan has a world-class debt problem—its $89 billion debt surpassed its annual GNP—and it is $1.2 billion behind in meeting payments to the IMF. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Frank Wisner described Sudan as "the African equivalent to Brazil or Mexico."

The Sudanese economic morass led the administration to take the drastic step in February of suspending aid until Khartoum began to put its house in order. Ironically, the ending of subsidies on food and devaluation of the Sudanese pound resulting in a 30 percent increase in bread prices and a 66 percent increase for gasoline—moves required to gain an accord with the IMF and release U.S. aid—sparked the protests that led to Nimeiry's undoing.

It is unclear whether the U.S. embrace of former president Nimeiry—evidenced by Vice President Bush's Sudan visit in early March and Nimeiry's Washington meeting with Reagan during which the U.S. released $67 million in aid and promised the release of $144 million more which would disburse all FY 1984 and 1985 aid—will have any longer-term impact on U.S.-Sudan ties. As both an Arab and African country, Sudan, as the aid figures illustrate, has been a key strategic ally of Washington. It was the only Arab country to openly support the Camp David accord, and a Pentagon official confirms that the U.S. has an agreement with Sudan for American military use of Khartoum airport. During the Chad crisis, American AWACs used the airport, and according to well-placed congressional sources, Sudan allowed U.S. covert aid to Hissène Haïdré's forces in Chad to be channeled through Khartoum.

While U.S. officials concede that the prime sources of instability—Sudan's enormous economic problems and rebellion in the south—are internal, conflict with both Libya and Ethiopia also fuels regional tensions. Both Libya and Ethiopia have aided Sudanese rebels in the south, and Sudan has hosted Eritrean rebels seeking independence from Ethiopia, as well as backing some opposition forces.

Fears that the U.S. could stumble into a regional conflict led House Foreign Affairs chairman Dante Fascell (D-FL) and Africa Subcommittee chairman Howard Wolpe, along with the Congressional Black Caucus, to send a letter to Secretary of State Shultz last June, asking that the U.S. halt deliveries of military hardware to Sudan, "until Sudan shows that it is pursuing a policy of political reconciliation and negotiation."

While acknowledging the role of Ethiopia and Libya, the letter argued that the prime responsibility "must rest with the government of Sudan which has arbitrarily altered the political status of its southern population, applied Islamic law to Christian southerners, and embarked on a crackdown in the north." The FY 1986 aid bill includes language that military aid to Sudan should be linked to efforts toward a negotiated solution in the south.

The administration has requested modest aid increases for the two East African countries which have signed base access agreements with the U.S.—Somalia and Kenya—brought total aid levels to $85 million and $84 million, respectively. Kenya's freewheeling economy and pro-Western orientation have made it a long-standing friend, and the base access accords benefiting both U.S. air and naval forces (as is the case in Somalia) have led to U.S. aid in modernizing its military forces. In both Somalia and Sudan, the bulk of FY 1986 aid is in ESF and military aid.

Perhaps the biggest irony in East Africa is the fact that while the Soviets have supplied the Mengistu regime with more than $1 billion in military hardware, the U.S., which has diplomatic ties with Addis Ababa but no aid program, has funneled massive food aid in response to the famine. The U.S. is formally barred from providing development aid to Ethiopia by the Hickenlooper Amendment, which bans aid to countries that have nationalized American assets without proper compensation.

A State Department official said that there has been some progress on the compensation issue, but added, "Even without the ban, given the policies Ethiopia is pursuing, I doubt that we would channel much development aid, and there is not much opportunity for private sector investment."

West and Central Africa

The American aid program in West Africa, particularly in French-speaking Africa (with the recent exception of Chad, and Zaire), has reflected the U.S.' marginal involvement in the region. By far the largest recipient of American aid in West Africa is Liberia, "our closest ally in Africa," Wisner told the House Africa Subcommittee.

The administration has asked Congress for $77 million in FY 1986, a $12 million increase over this year's appropriation. The request is likely to be trimmed before the aid bill is passed, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee has added language stipulating that aid be linked to free and fair elections and a return to civilian rule. Since Samuel Doe seized power in 1980, the U.S. has continued a steady and substantial flow of aid to the country.

In general, the U.S. has taken a back seat to France in its relations with francophone West African countries, and policies, Wisner told Congress, "have been coordinated with France" at least in the case of the larger recipients such as Senegal. The administration has asked Congress for $39.5 million, primarily in economic aid, "to enable the Senegalese to undertake significant economic policy reforms under the auspices of the World Bank." According to Wisner, a $4.5 million military aid program is designed "to augment Senegal's capability to resist Libyan subversion."

Whereas Senegal receives more
American aid than any of the other francophone states, one new development is a proposed modest $5.2 million military aid program for the moderate military regime in Conakry that replaced the government of Sékou Touré.

Military aid to Zaire continues to be one area of dispute between the administration and Congress. In a letter to Rep. Fascell in late March, Secretary Shultz said he was “disturbed” by the Africa Subcommittee’s reduction of the administration’s military aid request from $10.4 million to $4 million. Traditionally a key U.S. ally in Central Africa, Zaire has been almost legendary for its corruption and mismanagement, but since uprisings in Shaba province in 1977-78, it has been relatively stable, though mired in economic crises.

The administration has asked Congress for some $57 million for the Mobutu government in FY 1986, most of it in economic and food aid. In making the request, Wisner argued that Zaire has met a number of major IMF goals such as currency devaluation and other policy reforms, and has signed a bilateral investment treaty with the U.S.

Southern Africa

There are several areas of controversy in the administration’s approach to aid to countries in southern Africa. Perhaps the most interesting new development, and one which underscores Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker’s claim that constructive engagement is “a regional policy, not one just toward South Africa,” is the administration’s decision to provide military aid to Mozambique.

The U.S. has been the largest donor of food aid to beleaguered Mozambique for the past three years, a period during which Maputo has widened its opening to the West and begun adopting policy reforms to encourage the private sector. This year, the U.S. is providing $13 million in economic aid and about $25 million in food aid. The administration has asked Congress for $17 million and $10 million for economic and food aid, respectively, with provisions for additional emergency food aid if necessary.

By law, President Reagan had to approve waivers on restrictions barring financial aid to Mozambique. Explaining the new initiative to provide military aid and training worth $1.5 million, Wisner told the Africa Subcommittee, “We are working in parallel with our allies to reinforce Mozambique’s support of regional stability by offering an alternative to total dependence on the Eastern bloc for military supply.” He also pointed out that the aid “will bring the Mozambican armed forces into contact with the U.S. military.”

Despite the moderate and generally pro-private sector economic policies of the Mugabe government in Zimbabwe, U.S. aid has dwindled from an original three-year $225 million package at independence to $28 million this year and an equal amount requested for FY 1986. Both State Department and Congressional sources cite the continued violence between Mugabe’s ZANU ruling party and Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU, as well as the drift toward a one-party state as underlying the decline in U.S. support.

The issue of how much of U.S. aid to southern Africa should be channeled through the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), the regional economic grouping, is a point of contention between the administration and Congress. The administration requested $30 million to be funneled through SADCC, which, Wisner told Congress, “we strongly endorse and support.” But the House Africa Subcommittee raised the amount to $40 million. A House staffer says: “We wanted to establish the precedent of aid to a regional organization in a serious way.”

The House variation would mandate a percentage of southern African aid to go directly to the nine-nation group which seeks to coordinate development projects. Regarding the small amount of aid in a “Human Rights Fund” for South African blacks, the House Subcommittee has earmarked 50 percent to go to private groups working on behalf of political prisoners and detainees. The administration has expressed concern about both moves. A State Department official says that the administration feels that “the SADCC requirement forces us into a box and we prefer the flexibility of keeping it bilateral on a number of projects.”

Policy Reform and Multilateral Organizations

Last year, in an effort to combine its emphasis on the private sector with a response to Africa’s deepening economic malaise, the administration developed a five-year $500 million program, the Economic Policy Initiative (EPI). The program seeks to reward countries undertaking economic policy reform with increased aid.

Congress approved a first installment of $75 million for FY 1985, but to date, none of the money has been disbursed. But the administration has been involved in discussions with Zambia, Malawi, Rwanda, and Mali in attempting to design aid programs to meet their needs in line with the aims of EPI. A State Department official says, “We expect to disburse all $75 million this fiscal year.”

The combination of drought, famine, low commodity prices, deteriorating terms of trade, and inefficient economic policies has led to a major rethinking about African development. Wisner told the Africa Subcommittee: “Country after country has changed economic course to devote more attention and resources to agriculture. This has sometimes involved major devaluations, reduced budget deficits. . . and unnecessary controls.”

U.S. officials concede that for such policies to succeed, Africa needs large-scale economic support. But a State Department economic adviser said: “Africa is beginning to do all the right things, but it’s the wrong time for us. How can we cut Medicare and food stamps and then boost aid to Africa?”

Policy reforms have been advocated and articulated by the World Bank in
three major reports on Africa over the past four years. Bank proposals to enlarge the resources of the International Development Association to $16 billion, then to a compromise figure of $12 billion, were defeated in large part due to American government opposition. The current IDA-7 program of $9 billion represents a decline in real terms and, as all but a handful of sub-Saharan states lack the credit ratings in a shrinking commercial bank lending environment, concessional funds such as IDA are a major source of capital flows.

In an effort to respond to Africa's economic crisis, the Bank set up a special facility for Africa, which, according to its report issued last September, required an additional $2 billion a year in bilateral and multilateral resources flows. After a donors' meeting in Paris on January 31, the World Bank obtained commitments of $1.1 billion for the special facility, to be administered by IDA.

But the U.S. refused to contribute to the fund, arguing that it has already demonstrated its commitment by establishing the EPI. While State Department officials maintain that the U.S. will coordinate its program closely with that of the Bank, it is difficult to avoid a note of irony. As part of the rationale for setting up the new fund, the World Bank noted that a key problem in providing assistance to Africa has been "donor preferences emerging from their own commercial" or political interests.

And while the U.S. has requested $56.7 million for the new replenishment of the African Development Fund (a three-year cycle), U.S. participation in other multilateral agencies such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the Food and Agriculture Organization are in question. In his FY 1986 budget statement to Congress, President Reagan put IDA on notice: "In light of current severe fiscal pressures, the administration is not budgeting at this time for future replenishments." In the past, the administration, while not listing the specific dollar amounts, has reiterated its support for multilateral lending institutions.

It is an unfortunate irony that given the apparent trend toward economic policy reform across Africa—a trend advocated by the administration—the U.S., with a $200 billion federal deficit and overall budget squeeze, is unable and unwilling to expand its aid program to support these changes. But politics and not solely economics are equally important in analyzing the aid policies of the Reagan administration. While American officials point out that the limited popularity of foreign aid at home sets the parameters of U.S. aid, the figures show that under this administration, the allocation of aid to the crisis-ridden African continent remains a highly politicized business.

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Ted Koppel and ABC’s “Nightline” journeyed to South Africa to bring the supporters and opponents of apartheid together before the television cameras only to find how little there was to talk about.

BY MICHAEL MAREN

By all accounts, the five-night broadcast of ABC’s “Nightline” from South Africa was an extraordinary event. It was the first serious in-depth American television coverage of the situation in South Africa, and the time and resources devoted to the broadcast went far beyond what had previously been given to coverage of any African country. It also brought “TV diplomacy”—as Ted Koppel has labeled it—to a new plateau of activism. Yet, what is more remarkable is that this examination of South Africa has come about in 1985, 25 years after the massacre at Sharpeville and 37 years after the policy of apartheid was imposed.

For the majority of Americans who have little or no idea about life under apartheid, the broadcast should have been enlightening. The eloquent voices of the Rev. Allan Boesak and Winnie Mandela for the first time reached a large American audience, as did the racist rhetoric of South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha and opposition Conservative Party leader Connie Mulder.

Despite Koppel’s attempts to appear unbiased under difficult conditions, South African President P.W. Botha called the broadcast “negative and one-sided.” At that point, it became clear that in South Africa, the truth is negative and one-sided.

For those already familiar with South Africa, the subject matter was old news. The real news was the broadcast itself, an event which has already become a part of the American vision of South Africa and changed the way Americans view that country.

In attempting to mediate between the South African government and the opponents of the regime, “Nightline” is following the path that it set for itself at its inception. Begun during the Iranian hostage crisis—tallying up the days of captivity—“Nightline” provided a stage for anti-U.S. demonstrators that brought it close to complicity in the crisis. The daily presence of the ABC cameras provided all the incentive that Iran needed to keep the Americans in captivity.

From there, Koppel went on to turn “Nightline” into a show that, more than anything else, was an examination of television news itself, often explicitly discussing the role of the media and always pushing at the existing limits of television news coverage. No network television news program has been more self-conscious and introspective than Koppel’s “Nightline.”

Yet for the duration of the South Africa segments, Koppel replaced self-examination with self-congratulation. He emphasized the uniqueness and the achievements of the broadcast for its role in bringing together people who had never spoken to each other before. Indeed, most of the praise is well-deserved, but the broadcast also raised some disturbing questions which must be dealt with.

By purporting to be bringing the two sides together for discussions, there is the underlying assumption that there are two sides to the question of apartheid—which is better treatment than the advocates of apartheid deserve. Racism is not an issue like taxation or welfare which needs to be debated. The debate should be over how to most quickly be rid of it.

Instead, the supporters of the South African government were given a platform from which to advocate their racist policies and obscure the larger issue of apartheid by concentrating on its petty
manifestations. To Koppel's credit, he made repeated attempts to steer clear of the rhetorical irrelevancies, but without the rhetoric, there is little that the South African government officials can say.

The real impact of the "Nightline" broadcast in the U.S. is that it has forced the South African issue to the forefront of news coverage. The other networks, trying to keep pace, have been reporting regularly from South Africa since the "Nightline" broadcast. The increased coverage of events within South Africa and of protests in the U.S. has given the impression that more is happening and in turn fueled the momentum of the anti-apartheid forces.

The presence of the ABC crew in South Africa during the massacre at Langa was almost certainly a factor in prompting U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz to issue the strongest condemnation yet of apartheid from a high-ranking Reagan administration official. Shultz called apartheid "evil and unacceptable."

But what the broadcast did not do—and what Koppel most earnestly hoped that it would do—was to bring the opposing sides together in a sort of video version of constructive engagement. The "Nightline" format rests on the assumption that dialogue between adversaries is almost always productive—and that in the case of South Africa, negotiations will begin a peaceful transition to majority rule. As moderator, Koppel was constantly groping to bring the participants together in something resembling a dialogue, but Koppel's version of constructive engagement proved to be no more successful than the political one which has dragged on for the last four years.

While Koppel was advocating the positive aspects of dialogue, his guests on "Nightline" were showing just how little the factions have to talk about. In one moment of frustration, Koppel turned to Winnie Mandela and said, "I can't believe that you are saying that it's no longer possible to talk. It's always possible to talk."

Indeed she was saying that it is too late for talks: "We are not the people who closed that chapter of negotiations. It was the government that closed that chapter of negotiations by jailing our leaders. . . I'm afraid one can only imagine very tragic times ahead of us if the government is not prepared to dismantle apartheid."

Another exemplary exchange was between Koppel and South African Minister for Cooperation and Development Gerrit Viljoen. Viljoen began with a blatant obfuscation of the South African policy of forcibly removing blacks from their land and deporting them to the so-called homelands:

Viljoen: This is part of the overall effort to bring about a geographic consolidation of the scattered areas in which the black community belonging to the same ethnic group reside so as to consolidate its rule in a coherent geographic area.

Koppel: But they look awfully coherent now. . .

Viljoen: The point is to bring about a geographic situation where the communities which are now scattered around in white-inhabited areas—white dominated areas—should be resettled with their cooperation, and in consultation with the homeland government concerned, in an area that can be socially and politically integrated with the community to which the people belong.

Viljoen then went on to say that the facilities in the new areas would be as good as, if not better than, those in the areas which the people were being forced out of. . . as if the entire issue of apartheid revolved around the quality of latrines.

Koppel then turned to Black Sash leader Sheena Duncan and said: "You have heard what Dr. Viljoen had to say and it sounds again like there is all kinds of willingness to negotiate."

Negotiate about what?

If there was any doubt about the government's intentions—any lingering il-
usions that P.W. Botha was a reformer dedicated to phasing apartheid out of existence—Botha set the record straight during the final segment of the series. The South African president plowed over Koppel's questions about the killings at Langa and the immorality of apartheid and read a list of "facts" concerning such things as the doctor-patient ratio in South Africa to show that at least blacks there were better cared for than those in Ethiopia. Botha was addressing Americans—white Americans—and appealing to their basest racist instincts.

As Koppel noted, Botha was still speaking in terms of the white man's burden: "No white minority anywhere in the world has done more to raise the standards of living of black communities as we have over the years. We are a Christian people, we know our jobs. We know our duties... They can't raise themselves up without our help. If you want proof of that, you can find it in the rest of Africa."

There is no need to go on. These are not the words of a man who is contemplating sharing any power with the black majority. These are the words of the leader and spokesman for a state so dependent on racist policy that there is no room for compromise. No amount of discussion or "constructive engagement" is going to change his mind. Botha said that he would only accept constructive engagement "as long as it isn't interfering in our internal affairs."

For the South African government, "dialogue" is a way to pass the time while the institutions of apartheid are reinforced against its enemies. Ironically, Botha put forth the strongest argument in favor of sanctions against his country. He confirmed that discussion alone, that the gentle prodding that is inherent in constructive engagement, won't lead to reform. Now that this is clear for all to see, the proponents of constructive engagement can stop pretending the policy is leading to reform in South Africa.

So despite Koppel's emphasis on the importance and necessity of discussion, his broadcast made it clear how little there is to talk about in South Africa, how irreconcilable the goals of the two sides now are, and that apartheid will not end until the white minority is forced to perceive that it is in its own interests to do so.

For Americans, it is time to more carefully examine our role in South Africa, to question why our president finds it necessary to defend the murders of black civilians, to see how our policies support apartheid, and to understand how our passivity perpetuates the injustice that thrives there.

The "Nightline" broadcast and the other media attention that has followed it have raised these long-ignored issues to the mainstream of public debate for the first time and may force U.S. politicians to take a stand on an issue that most of them would rather avoid. When the debate on sanctions reaches Congress this year, they should know that a better-informed public is watching and that the moral cowardice which has been characteristic of these debates in the past is no longer acceptable.
Filming Southern Africa


Recent events have thrust South Africa into world headlines. But news coverage has focused largely on black "unrest" and the white government's repressive response. The emphasis has been on "breaking news" while the long, complex history of apartheid and its daily impact on black South Africans is too often neglected. The Southern Africa Media Center attempts to complement the headlines and reach grassroots America through the unique medium of film.

As the arrests began at the South African embassy in Washington, D.C. last November, the Media Center was releasing three exceptional new films on black South African resistance to apartheid. In the week that followed, the Media Center mailed over 20,000 catalogues to activists across the U.S. so that these new resources could be effectively used in the ensuing anti-apartheid campaign.

The Southern Africa Media Center was created by California Newsreel in 1977 in the aftermath of the Soweto uprisings specifically to redress the media's incomplete portrayal of events in the region and to bring the voices of black South Africa to the American public. The Center brought together filmmakers, educators, religious leaders, and activists to develop innovative ways of using the films to inform and involve their communities in a grassroots debate over U.S. policy toward southern Africa.

A non-profit, tax-exempt corporation, the Center is guided by an advisory board composed of some of the most prominent American specialists and activists involved in the South African issue, including Harry Belafonte, Julian Bond, William Booth, Bishop H.H. Brooks, Ron Dellums, Milfred Fierce, George Hauser, Randall Robinson, the Rev. Dr. Kelly Miller Smith, James Turner, the Rev. Dr. Wyatt Tee Walker, and David Wiley.

Today the Center is the most widely used source of films on southern Africa in the world. Past releases, such as Last Grave at Dimbaza, Six Days in Soweto, Generations of Resistance, You Have Struck a Rock, South Africa Belongs to Us, The Discarded People, and Moving On, are often the first encounter students and ordinary citizens have with a critical and informed perspective on the region. There is hardly a university course or public event involving South Africa which does not feature one of the Center's releases.

During its seven years of operation, the Southern Africa Media Center has identified and developed an unique network of Americans committed to public education around southern African issues. Twenty thousand black and African studies teachers, religious leaders, student organizations, public policy groups, and community organizers look to the Center for reliable media coverage on the region. Through this network of concerned individuals and organizations, close to 1 million Americans each year devote an hour or two of their time to view and reflect upon a Southern Africa Media Center film.

Across the country, these highly motivated organizations—part of a grassroots "information network"—offer to their audiences an inexpensive and readily available alternative to the commercial media. This year the Center is using this network to "broadcast" its three new releases: Woza Albert!, Namibia: Africa's Last Colony, and Allan Boesak: Choosing for Justice.

These films are unique in that each was specifically designed to allow black southern Africans to speak in their own voices to an international audience. They offer the long overdue opportunity for Americans to "engage" not the white minority regime, but blacks speaking for and about themselves. Americans would have no opportunity to view these exceptional films if the Southern Africa Media Center had not imported them.

Woza Albert! is the unusual play written and performed by two black South Africans which has stunned audiences around the world. Now, thanks to this extraordinary BBC production, audiences across America can share—through their unique performances—the experience of what it means to be black in South Africa today.

The Center's second new release, Namibia: Africa's Last Colony, is the result of a remarkable BBC project. The Third Eye, an innovative British television series, puts the BBC's technical resources at the disposal of Third World activists, giving us the opportunity to see their countries through their own eyes. Our "eye" in Namibia: Africa's Last Colony is Nora Chase, education director of the Namibian Council of Churches, who describes how her country has been exploited and terrorized by German, British, and now South African oppressors.

In Allan Boesak: Choosing for Justice, the Center's third 1985 release, the Coloured South African minister explains how the message of liberty and brotherhood at the heart of the Christian tradition led him to devote his ministry to the abolition of apartheid. Boesak's election to the presidency of the 70 million-member World Alliance of Reformed Churches shook the Afrikaner establishment to its foundations. In 1983, Boesak helped found the United Democratic Front, a multi-racial coalition advocating immediate majority rule in South Africa.

The recent upsurge of resistance in South Africa, and the increased media attention it has received, has broaden the audience for the Center's films. The Media Center staff is busy consulting with national church and civic organizations which have committed themselves to public education about South Africa such as Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, the United Methodist Church, the Presbyterian Church in the U.S., A.M.E. Zion Church, National Black Law Student Association, National Medical Association, NAACP, U.S. Student Association, the Urban League, and others.

The Southern Africa Media Center releases provide a relatively easy but highly effective way for local chapters of these organizations to bring the issue of South Africa before their membership. We are also encouraging these groups to use the films to expand their outreach into the wider community—especially to such local opinion-makers as civic leaders, teachers, ministers, and newspaper reporters. These screenings can form the basis of a grassroots public policy debate which may perhaps lead to a people-to-people foreign policy between black South Africans and the American people.

Cornelius Moore
Director, Southern Africa
Media Center
San Francisco, California
The Dynamics of South African Foreign Policy


What priorities and values underlie South African foreign and defense policies? How are these policies made? How is policy-making tied to domestic politics? More specifically, how does domestic and foreign criticism and pressure affect Pretoria's policy-making processes?

These are vital questions to all observers of South Africa. I have wrestled with them in my own work since my first visit to South Africa in 1972, becoming painfully alert to the problems of access, language, and data that stand in the way of finding the answers.

Because of my own interest, I awaited publication of Deon Geidenhuys' book with great hope. As head of the political science department at the Rand Afrikaans University in Johannesburg, Geidenhuys is one of the very few Afrikaner social scientists to productively balance the demands of academic analysis with continued group loyalty. If anyone is to come to grips with the issues raised by the evolving structure of South African policy-making, it must be someone like Geidenhuys with access to the Afrikaner official and academic community and to the plethora of hard-to-digest South African sources in both Afrikaans and English. It must also be someone with enough intellectual distance and moral fiber to raise and attempt to answer difficult questions about South African policy-making.

Geidenhuys uses an extraordinary range of references: interviews with former and present prime ministers, ambassadors, and other senior officials; confidential interviews; secondary works in both English and Afrikaans; and analyses drawn from his own extensive research while on the staff of the South African Institute of International Affairs. The book will be an indispensable source for anyone attempting to write on any aspect of this general topic.

However, although well-written and well-researched, the book is disappointing. Its physical format of two columns per page is awkward and unattractive. More to the point, its intellectual format dissipates any sense of focus for the vast amount of detailed information.

For the general reader, even one with some background in South African politics, the book's organization clouds Geidenhuys' conclusions. Although he insists he uses no model, he actually makes use of a process systems model in which marginal "actors" in the policy-making process often receive far more attention than they merit. As a result, the central actors lose their significance—through a careful reading reveals which ones Geidenhuys believes to be crucial.

His central conclusions deserve restatement because they raise serious questions about any residual optimism in the U.S. regarding possible change in Pretoria's policies toward Namibia, the rest of southern Africa, and its own black people. These conclusions are seldom distinctly set out, but rather appear in various portions of the book, even cropping up in the methodological appendix.

His central conclusion is that the State Security Council has become the key element in foreign and domestic policy-making, and in security policy—a topic that generally receives far too little attention. While P.W. Botha remains the key actor in policy-making, the success of the system itself rests not on his personal style but on concerted participation from a number of government departments and senior politicians and officials. In short, it will survive beyond Botha's retirement from government.

Another key conclusion, which is buried in Geidenhuys' analysis, is that official perspectives, values, and priorities are strikingly homogeneous. Much more attention should have been given to this point, but its implications are clear: Policy-makers with such similar viewpoints are increasingly likely to generate policies that have been developed in a process involving little debate or serious challenge. Given Afrikaner values and views about international and domestic threats to communal security, their concerted policies will be narrow in their notions of accommodation and inclined to include the use of coercion or even force to deal with domestic and regional critics and opponents.

These general conclusions are illuminated in those few sections of the book in which Geidenhuys turns to case studies, particularly the case of the origins of the Information Department's covert activity during the 1970s (pp. 107-120) and his provocative assessment of South African priorities in the prolonged Namibian negotiations (pp. 222-231). These examples make palpably evident that the South African government has little incentive to yield to Western entreaties or pressures and considerable pride and ingenuity invested in holding to its own sense of direction in regional and internal policies.

Thoughtful readers, whether in South Africa, Europe, or the U.S. will be left with deepening pessimism about the prospect for peaceful change in Namibia or in South Africa itself.

John Seiler
Poughkeepsie, New York

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