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membership and the new constitution as evidence of "ferment taking place."

If "constructive engagement" realizes the package deal it is currently negotiating, the administration will likely be able to quell both congressional and African criticism of its policies toward the region. But if the talks drag on in an endless morass of proposals and counter-proposals, the second-term Reagan administration will face mounting congressional attacks over its policies. That the 98th Congress came so close to undermining the administration is a good barometer of what lies ahead.

Perhaps the most significant hint that the administration's "constructive engagement" policy is in trouble is the unprecedented action of Republican legislators apparently swept up in the wave of anti-South Africa activity. The incoming Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman, Richard Lugar (R-IN), wrote a letter to Reagan in early December, signed by Republican chairman of the Senate Africa Subcommittee, Nancy Kassebaum, expressing concern over the ambiguities in U.S. policy. The letter asked Reagan to speak out more forcefully against Pretoria's racial policies and repression.

Even more remarkable was a letter sent to South Africa's ambassador to the United States, Bernardus Fourie, on December 4, by 35 conservative Republican congressmen. The letter emphasized that all the signees were conservatives, but warned that if "an immediate end to the violence in South Africa accompanied by a demonstrated sense of urgency about ending apartheid" are not forthcoming, then the group would be prepared to recommend that the administration take two major steps. These are to "curtail new American investment in South Africa" and to "organize international diplomatic and economic sanctions against South Africa."

In the last session of Congress, one of the American policy initiatives, the U.S. Liaison Office (USLO) in Windhoek, Namibia, set up in early 1984 to monitor the Angola-South Africa disengagement process, was called into question by Africa subcommittee chairman Wolpe. While the USLO issue may appear obscure, it is a symbol of eroding administration credibility in Congress with regard to southern Africa policy. It is not entirely clear how such congressional frustration will be manifested, but if the Namibia talks dissipate into another stalemate in the early months of the second Reagan administration, there is little doubt that congressional frustration will be expressed in new initiatives.

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tion did Pretoria a favor in February 1984 by indefinitely suspending a 1974 contract that requires Pretoria to send 300 tons of natural uranium to the U.S. for enrichment. But the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act prohibits the U.S. from sending the enriched uranium back to South Africa. Thus, the administration not only failed to use potential leverage to press South Africa to apply nuclear safeguards, but also saved South Africa millions of dollars.

Leonard Spector of the Carnegie Endowment reported in a recent study that "South Africa has the capability to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons and may have accumulated enough material for between 15 and 25 nuclear explosives of the size used on Hiroshima." The study explained that "South Africa's continued unwillingness to permit international inspection of the Valindaba pilot enrichment plant meant that Pretoria remained free to accumulate highly enriched uranium and to prepare nuclear explosives without fear of detection. South Africa now possesses the capability to produce at least 50 kilograms per year of highly enriched uranium, enough for two or possibly three nuclear weapons, and its capabilities may be considerably larger."

The Reagan administration has been engaged in protracted negotiations to persuade South Africa to allow its soon-to-be completed enrichment facility to be safeguarded, in exchange for reintegration into the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and more bilateral nuclear cooperation with the U.S., but so far South Africa has refused. Nonetheless, in October, the administration voted against an IAEA resolution that passed 57 to 10 calling on the organization's member-states to end all nuclear cooperation with South Africa.

"Constructive engagement" has generated a growing backlash in the Congress, which has come close to not only reversing the administration's policies, but implementing tougher punitive measures than had been adopted by the Carter administration. Anti-South Africa amendments to the Export Administration bill had passed the House, and some had passed the Senate before the bill died in a House-Senate conference committee in October. House Democrats refused to drop an amendment banning new bank loans to the South African government in exchange for Senator Jake Garn dropping a provision unrelated to South Africa, allowing the Defense Department to review licenses on strategic exports, an administration-sponsored compromise.

The legislation included provisions to end new U.S. corporate investment in South Africa; ban commercial bank loans to South African government institutions and importation of South African gold coins; reinstate controls on exports to the South African military and police; and expand nuclear non-proliferation controls to prohibit nuclear equipment and technology transfers to countries that refuse to accept full-scope safeguards on their nuclear facilities. The Senate had passed a version of the nuclear non-proliferation provision. These measures are expected to be re-introduced in the first few months of 1985 as part of a new export bill.

In his September 26 testimony before the Senate Africa Subcommittee, Crocker repeated that the administration "remains totally opposed to the concept of disinvestment of trade and investment sanctions more broadly. We continue to approve divestment policies against companies operating in South Africa.

Already, 11 cities and five state governments (Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Nebraska) have passed some form of divestment legislation requiring that government funds invested in U.S. companies that do business in South Africa be withdrawn from their stock portfolios. Moreover, pro-divestment activists say that perhaps some two dozen states are expected to consider divestment legislation over the next year.

More recently, there is a divestment move aimed at the steel industry backed by pro-divestment groups such as the Washington Office on Africa and the United Steelworkers Union. South African steel imports have grown rapidly, increasing from some 400,000 tons in 1981 to about 550,000 tons by the end of 1983. If the unrest inside South Africa and the attendant repression continues, the divestment movement in the U.S. will increase its momentum.

In light of the recent rebellions and government repression in South Africa, frustration over South Africa's apartheid policy is likely to grow both in public and in the Congress during the next four years. One area on which the administration and Congress agree is in U.S. development support for South African blacks. Congress approved some 60 projects totaling $500,000 in educational aid, legal centers in urban areas, and other programs for FY 1984. A total of approximately $7.5 million, half in federal aid, has brought some 350 black South Africans to the U.S. for advanced study during the past three years.

As the almost daily demonstrations in front of the South African embassy in Washington continued into December, matched by protests in a number of major cities across the U.S., the administration took the unusual step of bringing Chester Crocker to the White House to defend his policy. After meeting with Reagan on December 3, Crocker expressed the President's concern about repression in South Africa and explained his view of why constructive engagement was successful. Crocker argued that there are "significant changes taking place in South Africa." He cited the opening up of trade unions to black
Namibian constituent assembly elected under UN supervision. Such moves, while modifying the implementation of resolution 435, did help to build mutual trust—the key element missing for a settlement.

But some analysts question whether South Africa would accept any Namibian settlement that results in a Swapo-led government. In public, Pretoria has said that it would abide by the results of a “free and fair” election in Namibia, regardless of the results, but over the past seven years it has persisted in trying to foster internal parties in Namibia and in granting more local autonomy to the territory. This raises fears that South Africa has been paving the way for an internal rather than an international settlement.

A Western diplomat remarked, “South Africa is less concerned about the Cubans than the Americans are, but far more concerned about the prospect of a Swapo government in Namibia, which is what resolution 435 would produce.” Other analysts and U.S. officials point to the devastated Angolan economy, the economic and military burden on South Africa, and hints of further Angolan compromise, such as the recent ouster of Minister of External Relations Paulo Jorge, as signs that the flurry of proposals reflects a new, penultimate phase of the negotiations.

While U.S. officials concede that months of “tough bargaining and delicate diplomacy loom ahead,” they feel a new plateau has been reached. If the package deal is realized, it would be a major foreign policy coup for the Reagan administration—removing Cuban troops from Angola, normalizing relations with Angola, and at least partially vindicating the policy of “constructive engagement.”

Over the past four years, the Reagan administration has reversed most of the punitive measures that the Carter administration had implemented to pressure South Africa and distance the U.S. from the apartheid regime. Chester Crocker summed up the Reagan administration’s approach to South Africa in his September 26 testimony before the Senate Africa Subcommittee, explaining: “The path of rhetoric and preaching has failed in the past...and it is no more likely to be successful now. We have not relied on bluster, threats or the actual implementation of punitive measures toward South Africa. All evidence suggests that U.S. influence for change is unlikely to be increased by ‘pinpricks’ such as restrictions on krugerrand sales or on landing rights for South African Airways. Such moves are more likely to become a show of impotence and to erode our influence.”

Ironically, this philosophy of all carrot and no stick is the exact opposite of the administration’s approach toward another government that it opposes and seeks to change—Nicaragua. In that case, the administration has applied all available pressure, including economic isolation, and some $70 million in covert aid to the “contras” seeking to overthrow the government.

In practice, “constructive engagement” with South Africa has meant that U.S. opposition to apartheid has been low key and essentially rhetorical. President Reagan has described the apartheid system as “repugnant.” Crocker has articulated U.S. opposition to Pretoria’s “homelands” policy, arguing that the exclusion of blacks from political rights “is bound to reinforce black bitterness,” explaining that “the administration has been more consistent in pointing out this fundamental flaw in the new constitution and our opposition to the attempt to ‘denationalize’ blacks by declaring them citizens of the so-called homelands.”

The administration supports peaceful change in South Africa, but Crocker has emphasized that there is “no U.S. blueprint or timetable” for change. South African behavior, such as the recent repression of black protest in the townships, has been publicly criticized, but the U.S. refused to vote for a September UN resolution condemning apartheid, and previously opposed a UN resolution condemning the South African invasion of Angola.

At the same time, during its first term, the Reagan administration expanded diplomatic ties with Pretoria, restoring military attaches and permitting South Africa to enlarge its consulates in the U.S. It loosened export controls on items that could be used by the South African military and police, allowed the export of several sophisticated computers, and increased nuclear-related assistance to South Africa. In March 1982, the administration allowed the export of a Control Data 170/50 computer to the state-controlled Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) in South Africa.

The computer had been held up for more than a year due to inter-agency disputes, based on its potential use in South Africa’s nuclear program. In August 1982, an AMDahl 470/V7 computer was approved. By May 1982, the Commerce Department had approved items of potential nuclear use such as vibration test equipment, which can test the reliability of warheads and ballistic re-entry vehicles; computers; and multi-channel analyzers, which can analyze data at a nuclear test site. A U.S. General Accounting Office report on nuclear exports, released in September 1983, showed that South Africa was the third largest recipient of U.S. nuclear exports between July 1981 and June 1982, receiving exports totalling $164 million.

In addition, the Department of Energy granted a number of licenses for U.S. firms to service South Africa’s Koeberg reactor in October 1983, and as of December, there have been 10 pending requests for U.S. firms to provide nuclear technology assistance to South Africa. A group of senators and congressmen, including Senators Kennedy, Proxmire, Cranston, and Hart, and House Subcommittee on Africa chairman Howard Wolpe have urged the Department of Energy to reject these requests.

South Africa has refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and will not allow international inspection on its semi-commercial enrichment plant at Valindaba. Nonetheless, the administra-
Constructive Engagement Round Two

At the beginning of President Reagan's second term, administration officials remain committed to “constructive engagement” in southern Africa. But with criticism of South Africa mounting in the U.S., the administration will be under increasing pressure to demonstrate that its policy is achieving results.

BY ROBERT A. MANNING

"W"e are at the beginning of what could become the end game," a senior U.S. official said in early November, describing the status of current American efforts to broker a "package deal" in southern Africa—Independence for Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Such buoyancy about the latest round of negotiations underscores the likelihood that "constructive engagement" will remain the centerpiece of U.S. policy in southern Africa, as the Reagan administration embarks on its second term in office.

After four years and countless rounds of shuttle diplomacy, critics charge that "constructive engagement" has produced neither independence for Namibia nor substantial change in South Africa's apartheid policies. Instead, they say, it has resulted in closer U.S. ties to South Africa, with Washington getting little in return.

Although he draws constant fire from black Africa and the Congress, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker, chief architect of the policy, is undeterred. Testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on Africa on September 26, 1984, Crocker defended his policies, arguing that "constructive engagement" has helped "encourage a regional climate of detente" and "a new dynamic at work in South Africa."

In a recent interview, President Reagan said, "South Africa is willing for Namibia to become independent, but not while... the possibility remains of Namibia becoming another satellite of the communist bloc." Explaining the new elements in the current phase of negotiations, Reagan explained, "For the first time, Angola has made a declaration that they are prepared to bring about the withdrawal [of Cuban troops]. They want to phase it and they have conditions on doing this."

Much of what the administration views as progress toward regional detente has actually been repair of the damage wrought by South Africa's efforts to destabilize its neighbors. The Lusaka agreement of February 1984 provided a framework for South Africa's withdrawal from Angola in exchange for Angola's curbing of South West Africa People's Organization (Swapo) guerrilla activity. But only two months earlier, Pretoria had launched "Operation Askari," penetrating 150 miles into Angolan territory.

The latest round of diplomacy on the Namibia package is in its second exchange of proposals and counter-proposals, but for the first time, there are concrete proposals on the table addressing the thorniest issue: linkage of Cuban troop withdrawal to independence for Namibia. The impetus for the current diplomatic round, according to a senior U.S. official, emerged from "a new consensus in Angola," with Luanda both publicly and privately acknowledging that withdrawal of the Cubans is part of the overall Namibian package.

At several points during Reagan's first term, Crocker presented optimistic "peace is at hand" scenarios for the Namibia talks, only to have the situation stalemated shortly thereafter. In June 1982, Crocker said that most of the elements were in place, and that elections in Namibia might be held by March 1983. Whether it was administration naivete or an effort to use the press to build diplomatic momentum, such "cry-wolf" has generated much skepticism.

To its credit, the administration did eliminate a number of obstacles during its first two years. Among its successes was persuading the parties to agree to a set of constitutional principles to be approved by a two-thirds majority of a
gotten. And trade by member-states has traditionally been harnessed to former colonial rulers, or with South Africa.

"The wealth of the PTA member-states has been flowing too generously toward the industrialized nations and in the efforts to divert the flow to benefit the people of Africa. I can foresee that we shall meet grave difficulties," Uganda's President Milton Obote told the last summit. "But we must meet this challenge. There is no alternative if we are to consolidate our independence. Let us not be deceived by political propaganda that our economic plight is due to peculiar weakness within us."

Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda said: "[PTA aims] will put all of us to a severe test in our resolution to attain genuine political and economic emancipation from the apron strings of our former colonial rulers. Collective self-reliance among ourselves can never fail on happy ears of the perpetrators of economic dependence and neo-colonialism. For promotion of trade among ourselves is diametrically opposed to their mentality of permanent subjugation."

Prime Minister Mugabe commented: "The launching is not and can never be an end in itself. It is but a beginning and our creation will require constant nurturing if it is to survive and finally flourish as we would wish."

Mugabe's deputy prime minister, Simon Muzenda, concerned that some PTA members have not paid their dues, appealed for full support to ensure the PTA does not collapse as other regional organizations have. "I urge you all to match your words with your deeds," he told PTA ministers. "Let us not give credence to the belief by some people that projects financed by African countries without assistance from outside will not succeed."

The need for more liberalized trade in Africa is greater than ever, experts agree. Trade patterns in Zimbabwe, Africa's newest independent nation, tell part of the story. In the first eight months of 1983, Zimbabwe sold $45.5 million dollars of goods to the entire PTA bloc and it bought a similar amount from its new partners. By contrast, trade with Britain—Zimbabwe's colonial master until independence on April 18, 1980—almost matched that. Exports to Britain were $38.6 million, imports $52.4 million. More significant, business with neighboring South Africa was double the volume for the 14 PTA states—$75.8 million of exports and $116.5 million of imports.

"PTA Interim Secretary-General Bax Nomvete noted that African countries traditionally had been slaves to Western-dictated trade patterns."

There are other problems:
- Air, sea, and telecommunications links are more regular and reliable between member-states and former colonial powers than between themselves. For example, Djibouti businessmen seeking to telephone would-be clients in Lesotho 3,000 miles to the south would be routed first through operators in Paris, London, and Johannesburg.
- While Western economies are recovering from recession and boosting their trade prospects, virtually all PTA nations are living on credit.
- The total value of African trade actually slipped by 15 percent between 1981-83, according to figures compiled by Bax Nomvete. Terms of trade have halved in the last decade. Africa's GNP has fallen from 0.8 percent in the 1970s (against the West's average 2.7 percent) to zero this year.
- Aid and grants declined through 1983-84 and foreign investment dried up.
- The fragile economies of most member-states have been battered by the current three-year drought, which the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) characterizes as the gravest in memory and which threatens the lives of millions of Africans.

The PTA has also had its growing pains. Two members had not paid their dues. Nomvete complained bitterly about a dire shortage of experienced administrators to run day-to-day business. African civil servants at the summit privately said there was widespread resistance to being seconded to the PTA secretariat. Most civil servants prefer better paid, more prestigious posts with the UN or the Organization for African Unity (OAU). And in November 1984, trade ministers could not agree on where to locate the proposed PTA Trade and Development Bank, which is to be set up with initial capital of $400 million. The fate of the bank, central to the coordination of PTA trade, is to be decided later.

But the foundations have been laid. Zimbabwe's Reserve Bank, one of the most efficient in Africa, will act as a clearing house and bank for the first two years. PTA members have already begun trading in some of the 209 items listed on the treaty. The list will be enlarged and amended every two years through negotiations. "And the aim will be to include in the common list over a period of 10 years all products for import and export that originate from member states," according to a PTA statement.

A PTA monetary unit, the UAPTA, similar to the special drawing right (SDR) of the International Monetary Fund, has been established. Based on the value of the British pound, deutschmark, French franc, American dollar, and yen, one UAPTA at the outset was worth $1.30 and the clearing house had a float of 134,700 UAPTAs. The currency is used to settle trade debts between members and the clearing house balances the books on all transactions every two months. Countries in the red are given 15 days to pay up or suffer penalties.

As President Kaunda put it, the creation of the clearing house established "positive conditions for the survival of the battered and overstretched economies" of member nations. He contended it was the surest means of achieving the objectives of the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action, and ultimately to pave the way for a pan-African common market.

PTA proponents remain optimistic. The Harare Sunday Mail commented: "There will be problems, differences of opinion, temptations to put the interests of individual countries before those of the region. But these must be negotiated and resolved through hard bargaining and no one should be tempted to pull out because the road is rough. It will be much rougher without the PTA."
The delegates to the third summit of Africa's newest regional club, which was first proposed by the ECA seven years before, were gathered for the unveiling of the PTA treaty which allows some free trade, slashes customs tariffs on 209 items from food to footwear, and breaks down other barriers as well.

"I see the PTA as one of the three major organizations that will lay the foundations for the eventual establishment of an African economic community," predicted Adebayo Adedeji, executive secretary of the ECA, referring to the existing bodies representing Central and West African nations.

When fully developed, these three organizations ideally would cover all 44 black-ruled countries in sub-Saharan Africa in compliance with the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action that envisaged an African common market based on regional economic groupings.

"Africa must strive very hard to achieve economic decolonization," Adedeji maintained. "Political decolonization, important as it is, is only part of the process and until we are able to achieve self-sustained growth and self-reliant development, political independence will not bring much benefit to the common man."

Adedeji, who chaired the initial exploratory talks in the Zambian capital of Lusaka in 1978, won from African leaders at the time an historic declaration of commitment and intent to establish a draft treaty of protocols embracing customs and trade, payment procedures, agriculture, transport, and communications.

That treaty was approved and signed in Lusaka in 1981 by heads of state and government. By the time the summit opened in Harare in 1984, 14 of 20 southern and central African nations originally proposed by the UN commission for membership had signed the treaty—Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Somalia, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

The six hold-out nations—Angola, Botswana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Seychelles, and Tanzania—have varying reasons for not immediately joining the club. Botswana, for example, is reluctant to break from the lucrative Southern African Customs Union, even though special provision is made in the treaty for Swaziland, Lesotho, and the Gaborone government to remain tied to that agreement for the time being. Others questioned whether the major industrial nations, Kenya and Zimbabwe, would benefit disproportionately from the PTA at the expense of less developed members.

"Most member states are aware that Zimbabwe, and probably Kenya, will derive relatively more trade benefits from the PTA than other countries," James Cameron-Dow, president of the Zimbabwe National Chambers of Commerce, conceded in a recent interview. "Zimbabwe will import from them in order to establish and consolidate mutually beneficial trade relations. The question of Zimbabwean import levels from the other PTA states is crucial to the long-term development within the PTA." Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe has repeatedly urged the six non-members to reconsider. "I am making a special appeal to our remaining six countries to join us in this noble cause," he said before the Harare summit. "Their participation is crucial for this sub-region."

As 1984 neared its close, reports from Tanzania, with its three main ports important links in an envisaged regional transport network, indicated that the Dar es Salaam government would soon join the organization, if only to restore better trade terms with Kenya and Uganda. Preferential treatment among the three neighboring countries had ended with the dissolution of the East African Community.

PTA Secretary-General Nomvete has stressed that the effectiveness of the organization is keyed to full membership of all 20 nations, representing 150 million of Africa's 500 million inhabitants. Adedeji rarely speaks of the club without referring to it as potentially 20-strong. "I believe the PTA is the best thing that could have happened to the sub-region, as it provides limitless potential for the promotion of economic cooperation and integration aimed at 20 countries," he declared in a recent interview.

Nomvete, sadly noting that many critics forecast that Africa will be irrelevant to the world economy by the year 2000, pictures the three regional groupings merging into a fully-fledged economic community within that time. "The PTA and the common market we envisage will be Africa's salvation," he said.

He also emphasized that the PTA would not conflict with the goals of the nine-nation Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), an organization formed in April 1980 by Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, to loosen traditional trade and communications ties with South Africa. Instead, he contended, the two would complement each other, but eventually SADCC (including three non-members of the PTA—Angola, Botswana, and Tanzania) would "be brought into the bigger family." Until then, he said, the two organizations would reinforce each other and work in close liaison.

The PTA's most ardent advocates admit that the road to economic independence—a goal that has eluded most African nations even two decades after winning their political freedom—will not necessarily be easy. The fate of the East African Community and the failure thus far of ECOWAS are not easily for-
Economies

A New Effort at Regional Cooperation

With the continent’s economies in crisis, the latest attempt to boost intra-African trade and lessen dependence upon traditional partners—the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa—assumes even greater significance.

BY JOHN EDLIN

When President Kenneth Kaunda bid farewell to the last governor of the British protectorate of Northern Rhodesia, he solemnly prophesized: “Like brother and sister African countries around us, we have won our political freedom. But we will never, ever, be truly free until we have also won our total economic independence.”

That was 20 years ago—the day, October 24, 1964, when Kaunda led the southern African territory to independence as black-governed Zambia. Two decades later, Zambia’s economy is even more dependent on foreign markets than it was then. More significantly, despite vocal support for economic sanctions against South Africa, Zambia—like most nations in central and southern Africa—acknowledges grudgingly that its main trading partner is the minority-ruled republic.

Part of Zambia’s problem—and it is a microcosm of some of the continent’s economic woes—was inherited from the colonial era when Africa’s resources were exploited to stuff the coffers of governments in Berlin, Brussels, Lisbon, London, Madrid, and Paris.

Colonial interests dictated that economic infrastructure be oriented toward export, with foreign exchange earnings a prime motive. Thus, manufacturers were heavily dependent on demand and prices as set by cantankerous foreign markets. And when it came to buying raw materials from abroad, prices were fixed by outsiders as well.

This dependence has been passed on to Africa’s post-independence rulers. But they are themselves partly to blame for not seeking to break those established trading patterns and, in some cases, by unabashedly clinging too tightly to the apron strings of former European powers.

But as far back as 1958—a year after Britain set the stage for decolonization in Africa by granting independence to the Gold Coast—the United Nations formed a special commission as an instrument for economic and social advance. The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), as it is still called, was seen by former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld as “an institution where the economic needs of the African people will be expressed and where action designed to meet these needs will be initiated and stimulated.”

Even though a former Liberian president, William Tubman, proposed a free trade area in the continent as early as 1964, most efforts to form common markets have been failures. African leaders routinely pay lip service to the concept, but in practice fierce competition rages between African nations for overseas markets, and prohibitive tariffs inhibit trade among themselves.

The 1975 Treaty of Lagos was signed by West African states to promote and liberalize trade and to boost cooperation and self-reliance. But the 16-nation Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) that emerged from the pact has yet to significantly alter established trading patterns away from the industrialized countries.

In December 1983, the 10-member Economic Community of Central African States was formed, also at the urging of the ECA. And more recently, in July, four presidents, a prime minister, and nine high-ranking ministers witnessed what Zimbabwe’s Sunday Mail newspaper hailed as “one of the most significant milestones in Africa’s march toward economic self-reliance.” The occasion was the launching in Harare, Zimbabwe, of the 14-nation Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade Area (PTA), an alliance like its West and Central African predecessors pledged to loosen the West’s armlock on their struggling economies and boost business among themselves.

PTA Interim Secretary-General Bax Nomvete, a South African exile, noted that African countries traditionally had been slaves to Western-dictated trade patterns. He told delegates: “The only way out is for African countries to control their own economic destinies just as they have controlled their political desti-
clearing and payments, and the establishment of a sub-regional trade and development bank. In addition, the protocols set out in great detail the functions of the sectoral technical committees which report to the inter-governmental commission of experts as indicated above.

Meetings of the technical committees are held regularly—typically at least twice a year. It is through such meetings and the recommendations arising from them that higher bodies of the PTA have been able to reach agreement on, for example, the common list, the launching of the clearing house, the simplification and standardization of transit documents and procedures, and the basic principles guiding the relaxation and subsequent removal of non-tariff barriers.

The PTA is obviously still in its infant phase of development. Many problems still have to be overcome. The establishment of the Trade and Development Bank still lies in the future. Not all members have decided to use the clearing and payments machinery established in February 1984. The Secretariat, headquartered in Lusaka, has experienced teething problems of its own, including the difficulty of securing suitably qualified staff. Besides, it has occasionally proved difficult to extract contributions to the budget within the time stipulated by the treaty from one or two member-states.

In addition, the full membership anticipated by the treaty is yet to be achieved. There are various reasons explaining this. Some potential members enjoy membership in organizations with functions and/or objectives that overlap those of the PTA and thus may wish to fully examine the possible impact on the organization of original membership. Indeed, the drafters of the treaty foresaw this problem in the case of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (BLS), which find themselves in a special situation in part because of their membership, together with South Africa, in the Southern African Customs Union. Thus, article 30 of the treaty, recognizing "the unique situation" of BLS, mandates the formulation of a protocol which would exempt the three countries for a certain period from the full application of certain treaty provisions. A committee on BLS was subsequently established and is currently at work on the problem.

The PTA is, of course, partly an experiment. Some countries may wish to see how the experiment works out before they consider joining. The history of inter-territorial cooperation in Africa has not always had a happy outcome. Various unions, federations, customs, and other arrangements have crumbled under the weight of political and other contradictions. Thus, the seemingly over-cautious approach of some governments to such experiments is understandable.

Yet the prospects for the PTA are considerably hopeful. Its strength in part lies in its pragmatism—its focus on problems of relevance to the lives and welfare of the people of the sub-region. Its modus operandi of moving step-by-step on the basis of consensus, while occasionally slowing its forward pace, assures that the ramifications of proposed measures are fully explored and any reservations set to rest by way of further study, clarification or compromise.

Besides, the PTA is in consonance with the political posture shared by virtually all African states with regard to the desirability of African unity, South-South cooperation, and collective self-reliance. These concepts have not only taken hold among political leaders and governments, but they are reinforced by the prevailing climate of international economic relations, in which the developing countries have not succeeded, despite repeated and determined efforts, in persuading the rich countries to accept and work toward the goal of a New International Economic Order.

The eastern and southern states, indeed, the OAU member-states, have long recognized that they are first and foremost the makers of their own development and that by pooling their resources and efforts through rational mechanisms of regional and sub-regional cooperation, they are likely to move forward more rapidly. It is in this spirit that the PTA was conceived. It is this spirit that nourishes and sustains it as it tackles the challenges it faces in translating treaty aspirations into reality.
Adebayo Adedeji, ECA executive secretary, "helped maintain the needed momentum in the initial PTA negotiations" of the tribunal, has already begun operating. Authority, council, and commission meetings have been business-like and pragmatic. The secretariat, after some teething problems, has settled down and is adequately servicing all the PTA bodies under the direction of the energetic secretary-general ad interim, Bax Nomvete. More significantly, the PTA's operational phase was launched on July 1, 1984, in Harare, Zimbabwe, during a special meeting of the authority chaired by Prime Minister Robert Mugabe. From that date, customs tariffs on selected goods were reduced by the following percentages for each commodity group in accordance with Article 4 of Annex I of the treaty:

- food (excluding luxury items) by 30 percent;
- raw materials—agricultural by 50 percent;
- raw materials—non-agricultural by 60 percent;
- intermediate goods by 65 percent;
- durable consumer goods by 40 percent;
- non-durable consumer goods by 35 percent;
- highly competitive consumer goods by 30 percent;
- consumer goods of particular importance to economic development by 70 percent;
- capital goods (including transport equipment) by 70 percent;
- luxury goods by 10 percent.

The common list, negotiated over a lengthy period and formally published in January 1984, is to be expanded from time to time with the addition of new commodities of export and import interest to the member-states. Similarly, non-tariff barriers to trade, with respect to commodities appearing on the common list, are to be progressively reduced with a view to their eventual elimination. The overall objective is to facilitate the PTA's evolution into a common market and, eventually into a full-blown economic community as envisaged in the treaty.

The promotion of sub-regional trade should not be viewed in isolation from other closely related aspects of cooperation in eastern and southern Africa. These include transport and communications, agricultural and industrial development, and the mobilization of financial resources for the economic development of the member-states, through such mechanisms as the proposed Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank.

The relationship between transport and communications networks on the one hand and the trade and development prospects of a given country or region on the other is obvious. Without such networks, free trade or cooperation will remain at the level of aspirations, rather than reality. The sub-region of eastern and southern Africa, like much of the rest of the continent, suffers from a poorly developed transport and communications infrastructure both within and even more so between territories.

Inter-territorial road, rail, air, inland, and coastal water transport, facilities, and services are either non-existent or greatly in need of improvement. It is imperative to undertake coordinated and collaborative development or refurbishing of these facilities in order to facilitate travel within the region. An air journey between Harare and Addis Ababa, for example, sometimes takes two or three days, due to lack of a convenient connecting flights. The rapid movement of goods and mail is also, of course, adversely affected by such transport deficiencies.

Under the various protocols annexed to the treaty, the PTA has defined the principles and objectives of sub-regional cooperation not only with respect to transport and communications, but also with regard to the other sectors mentioned above: agriculture, industry,
PTA: Toward an African Common Market

Fourteen countries have ratified the treaty establishing the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa. Although still in its infancy, the PTA hopes eventually to eliminate trade barriers, promoting the region's economic development.

BY C.M.B. UTETE

The Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern and Southern African States was established at a summit meeting of heads of state in Lusaka, Zambia, in December 1981. The aim was to coordinate sub-regional development, particularly by relaxing and eventually eliminating trade barriers.

The leaders adopted a treaty for subsequent ratification by the 18 prospective member-states: Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Fourteen states have now ratified the treaty, including Burundi and Rwanda, whose membership had not originally been anticipated. The hold-outs are Angola, Botswana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Seychelles, and Tanzania. The treaty took effect on September 30, 1982, "upon ratification by seven states."

The UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) played an important role in the PTA negotiations, helping to formulate the treaty and providing relevant documentation and other services. Its executive secretary, Adebayo Adedeji of Nigeria, helped to maintain the needed momentum in the negotiations as well as providing key personnel to begin establishing a secretariat.

The negotiations leading to the establishment of the PTA predated the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted in Lagos in April 1980. Nonetheless, the results were consistent with the decisions of the Lagos session, which included a proposal for an African common market by the year 2000.

The PTA is thus the eastern and southern equivalent of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and similar economic groupings elsewhere on the continent. They constitute potential building blocks of the proposed continental common market. The PTA seeks collaborative and coordinated economic development in eastern and southern Africa through free trade, necessitating phased or gradual elimination of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, and through cooperation in the development of industry, agriculture, and all modes of transport.

As an organization, the PTA works through five key institutions:
- the Authority, consisting of heads of state, which decides policy as well as appointing the secretary-general;
- the Council of Ministers, consisting of ministers of trade and finance, which makes recommendations to the Authority;
- the Secretariat, under a secretary-general, which carries out the administrative responsibilities;
- the Tribunal or judicial organ; and
- the Inter-Governmental Commission of Experts and Technical Committees.

The commission and the technical committees are made up of senior civil servants of all member-states. The committees, who investigate pertinent specialized issues—customs and trade, payments and clearing, transport and communications, agriculture, and industrial cooperation—advise the commission which in turn reports to the Council of Ministers. To date, the commission has been chaired by the head of the civil service of the "chairing" country as established by alphabetical rotation—typically the secretary to the cabinet.

This machinery, with the exception...
is particularly true in southern Africa.

We might ask what journalistic harm is done in interviewing these handy, though less reliable, sources as long as they're accurately described. The damage begins when the reporter takes quotes from these anemic sources and passes them off as the prevailing, well-nourished opinion of the majority. This common practice slips the standards, reinforces stereotypes, and misinforms readers back home who often have no way of double-checking news accounts.

Our star reporter did just that by writing: "The whites must stay," said Martin Gede, the porter. 'We must work together,' such opinions are commonplace as Rhodesia's 6.7 million blacks await majority rule." The "commonplace" African opinion was out in the Tribal Trust Lands, "off limits," beyond the reach of this white foreign correspondent.

"White" is important here because, as an Afro-American, I was able to move and report undetected among Africans in the rural areas. A white reporter with the best skills, the most acute sensitivity, could not gain access to the "off limits" African majority in Rhodesia, or in South Africa. Unfortunately, most editors have an unwritten policy of not sending black reporters to cover Africa; there is not a single Afro-American journalist permanently assigned to southern Africa.

This is no accident. A few years ago the editor of a major newswheed told a black Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter being interviewed for a post in Nairobi that his magazine, as a matter of policy, did not assign black reporters to Africa.

"We don't think they can be fair," the editor said when pressed. He went on to say that he had no concern about assigning Jewish reporters to cover Israel, or Irish journalists to Ulster. Furthermore, his magazine had never posted a black reporter to test this theory; and until this very hour has never posted a black journalist to that continent. Such institutional media bias greatly assists the likes of South African President P.W. Botha in denying reporters access, and thus misinforming the American public.

In addition to governmental denial of access, foreign journalists, with rare exceptions choose not to develop Third World news sources even when they are available to them. They occasionally would wander up to a willing taxi driver, a non-threatening porter, a friendly maid, a night desk clerk understudy at the tourist hotel. The people, the agrarian majority, are too poor, or too dirty, their culture too dissimilar, their languages too varied.

Thus for both institutional and individual prejudices, Third World reporting tends necessarily to be biased. This cultural bias American correspondents learn while growing up. Earlier generations of reporters were persuaded beyond hope that China was a nation of coolies and rickshaw drivers, incapable of governing China. Similarly most foreign correspondents I encountered in Africa tended to accept a version of the colonial notion that Africans are incapable of governing Rhodesia, or South Africa, or any developing country.

This bias makes foreign correspondents peculiarly susceptible to manipulation by racist regimes like that of Ian Smith or that of Botha. It accounts for the slanted dispatches filed out of Africa and other Third World countries. And it leaves readers incapable of making intelligent judgments about foreign policy, unable to foresee the collapse of the Smith regime or the fall of the Shah, or the defeat of Somoza.

In addition to the racial bias, access to Third World news sources is also hampered by individual countries' wary view of foreign correspondents, and of journalism itself. Many a tough investigative reporter has kicked in doors in the U.S., arguing that the public has a right to know.

Well, in southern Africa and most of the rest of the world, there is no concept of the public's right to know. There is little access to public documents. There is no First Amendment. There is no Freedom of Information Act. This denial of qualitative news sources is often crippling to reporters accustomed to being spoon-fed information, at city hall or on Capitol Hill.

Often, in Africa and other Third World countries, it takes skill, resources, and great patience to ferret out facts that in the U.S. could be obtained in an instant. In South Africa, for instance, during the present disturbances the government simply closed off black townships or the gold mines to foreign correspondents. Much of the information about government crackdowns on the Africans is released through government spokesmen and agents.

An underlying obstacle to comprehensive Third World coverage is foreign correspondents' uniquely industrialized outlook. They tend to slant and color their reporting according to their preconceived notions and sometimes their comfort. Foreign correspondents are products of their society, reflecting its biases, its political orientation, its love affair with toilets that flush, air conditioners, elevators that work, bureaucrats who show up on time for appointments. The scarcity of many of these things in the Third World erodes correspondents' patience and even intrudes on their ability to approach fairness, to say nothing of objectivity.

Moreover, in places like Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South Africa, foreign correspondents, subconsciously perhaps, tend to succumb to those quite strong differences that exist between the warring factions—the Europeans on one side, Africans on the other. In the Middle East, the Israelis, likewise, get the nod overwhelmingly in the cultural-religious choosing of sides.

The result is that the American public is ill-informed and often surprised when regional shifts occur. In 1976, Smith said, "Black majority rule will not occur in Rhodesia in 1,000 years." In 1977, Mr. Smith said that black majority rule will not occur in Rhodesia in "my lifetime." Two years later Smith, in talks with Sithole, Chirau, and Bishop Muzorewa, was struggling to ward off black majority rule for another two years. He was, of course, unsuccessful.

A similar thing happened with Mugabe's election. The media listened to South Africa and the Smith government and concluded that Nkomo and Mugabe would split the vote and Bishop Muzorewa would win the election—wrong.

In none of these cases did the American press corps give their readers and viewers sufficient coverage to indicate the inevitable outcome. One day they woke up surprised that Mugabe was the new prime minister, or that the Shah was exiled to Panama—or that, far more previously reported, the famine in Ethiopia was a holocaust.
American newspaper-reading public, the Red Brigades are a monstrosity. For that same public, the bandits in Mozambique who murder, mutilate, torture, and burn people alive, who rob and destroy their food and property, who perpetrate the most hideous crimes, can be conceived as people with whom it would be perfectly natural to have dialogue, power-sharing. They even are given visas to come and make public speeches in this country.

This is a result of the cultural gap and the consequent preconceived ideas that this gap nourishes in the subconscious. I am perfectly aware of the fact that this is a two-way gap, but the advantage you have in the field of mass media provides us with much more information produced by you about your reality than you receive from us about our own reality.

I am not trying to tell the American journalist what to do. I am simply offering a few thoughts for reflection. These thoughts are a result of a long debate concerning the problems of information gathering and dissemination within our own country. There too, we have a cultural gap. The press is urban; most of the population rural. The city reporter goes to the rural areas to see what is going on, then returns and writes with a city mind. His report then goes back from the capital to the rural areas on radio and in the newspapers, after having passed through this urban filter. I suppose some people might consider that to be objective. We think it is not.

Very often our journalist tends to see and report about the things that went wrong and is unable to see and report about the daily struggle, the enormous efforts, and the important achievements of the rural communities.

I believe it is a must for all of us to begin to look for ways to bridge our different cultures and our different stages of development. Our American colleagues can play an important role in this effort so that the picture of our region that they give to the world does more justice to their profession and to our reality. The democratic traditions of American journalism, the feeling among you that the pursuit of truth is a journalist's duty, make me believe this is possible.

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**Reporting Southern Africa: An American Perspective**

**BY LES PAYNE**

"Salisbury, Rhodesia—after 18 years of working up from 'room boy' to head waiter, John Martin was promoted recently to understudy the night manager at this city's most luxurious hotel," read the lead of a front-page story in one of the most influential newspapers in the United States. "But Mr. Martin, who is black, is concerned that his prospects may wither if a black government hostile to whites takes power.

"If they drive the whites out, the country will be ruined," he said across the establishment's restaurants and bars. A few paces away, a porter and a maintenance man, also black, nodded."

This dialogue reportedly took place in 1979, in Rhodesia, the day after three African leaders (Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole, and Chief Jeremiah Chirau) signed an "internal agreement" with the minority white regime of Prime Minister Ian Smith. The government propaganda engines had worked mightily—and successfully—to set aloft the perceptions that:

- Africans were incapable of governing the country without white leadership.
- Black majority rule (read: democracy) would force whites to flee.
- Africans themselves believed that if whites fled, the country would be ruined, politically and economically.

The propaganda of the Smith government was, of course, preposterous. It worked, however, because foreign reporters, who published the government line, were predisposed to believe it. The dispatch mentioned above was typical of those cabled home to inform readers that not only whites, but also Africans, feared black majority rule.

Third World hotel workers, of the type quoted here, are notorious for telling foreign journalists what their colonial government and vigilant supervisors wish them to say. From a war-torn Rhodesia teetering on the brink of black rule, the world needed to hear from the country's 7 million Africans. Those voices, though, were not in the luxurious hotel lobby, but in the alleys, the tribal kraals, the outback where the elephant trails make off for the hills.

Alas, the Rhodesian propagandists were not fools. They cut off foreign correspondents from these quality news sources. Two-thirds of the Africans lived in the rural Tribal Trust Lands, and this key source of information the government placed off limits to foreign correspondents. Upon entering Rhodesia in those days, correspondents were told that they would not be allowed to enter the "operational areas," which turned out to be the entire country except the cities of Salisbury and Bulawayo.

Proper access is a difficult, though not impossible, commodity in Third World countries. Government denial of access to news often contributes to foreign journalists' Third World bias. This
tors in the U.S., for example, have their own views of what is interesting or comprehensible to their readers or listeners.

I believe that in spite of the important changes due to the elimination of institutionalized racism, the racial feelings within American society are still an obstacle to a clear understanding of the Southern Africa problem. This fact generates a market approach to the selection of news and subjects. Thus, except for some of the larger American newspapers, a few news agencies, and some public, private, and religious groups, the information concerning our region is sensationalist, superficial, and generally influenced by South African propaganda.

The objective report filed by the man-on-the-spot is often changed by an editor whose eye is on market considerations. This in turn may influence the reporter who will try the next time to present a story in a form acceptable to his editor. Another classic example is the way in which Southern Africa problems are packaged as aspects of the Cold War, as being problems arising and mainly related to the East-West confrontation.

But I think there is a more fundamental impediment to objective American reporting in Southern Africa: the gap between our cultures. This cultural gap involves more than the difference between cultures. There is also a difference in the harmony of development. This is the great trap for our countries.

Societies which are advanced today have developed in stages, economically, technically, and scientifically. At each stage there was a parallel development in their form of government, their legislation, their civic behavior, and their values. Our societies, which were kept at a low stage of economic, technical, and scientific development, are today expected, because of the great advances in communications, to have patterns of life and behavior which are the same as in the West. The reality is that we are judged on every aspect of our life according to Western points of reference. There are no easy ways of resolving this contradiction, but we are aware that it exists and are seeking solutions day by day.

Let us start with a concrete situation. My country, Mozambique, is becoming increasingly familiar with the characteristics of American journalists. There was a time when we could not claim this familiarity because few American journalists visited Mozambique. American interest in the country has grown, however, especially after the Lancaster House agreement on Zimbabwe's independence in which Mozambique played a part. Since this agreement, there have been 80 reporting trips to Mozambique by American journalists, an average of one journalist every two-and-a-half weeks over a four-and-a-half year period. We are very happy about this growing interest in our country, and we hope that the number of visits will increase in the coming years.

Most of the American reporters who have been in Mozambique in recent years have worked very hard to produce good, objective, professional pieces of journalism. But to us it appears inadequate. We feel that much of the reporting about countries in our region falls short of explaining the African reality to a wider public. There is a problem of interpretation of events and situations, which, I believe, is basically a cultural problem.

What we are concerned about is underlying concepts that color an American reporter's view of southern Africa and consequently lead to a presentation of reality which may look very objective to the reporter but does not look particularly objective to the African who is being written about.

So wide is the cultural gulf that frequently an American reporter in Southern Africa will come up with the wrong answers because he has posed the wrong questions. And he does so, not necessarily because of any ill-will, but because the society around him, his education, his country's traditions and values, his life-style, have not prepared him to confront the totally different African cultural reality.

One problem is the distorted image of Africa, which has developed in the West, and which is accepted by many people. A good example of this image is the notorious Citicorp advertisement depicting Maputo city as a jungle, where savages with spears present a threat to the civilized white man. The picture bears no relation to reality. But it corresponds to the image which exists in the subconscious of millions of people.

In a society accustomed to this kind of portrayal of the majority-ruled countries of Southern Africa, it is not difficult for the enemies of our freedom and independence to plant lies and disinformation. I know that many American reporters and editors pride themselves on being able to see beyond the kind of stupidity I have just mentioned. But the stereotypes are there in the minds of people, including journalists, who look at Africa in one way and America and Europe in another way.

Let me give another example: I cannot remember a newspaper report saying that the Red Brigade terrorists were carrying out military operations over the whole of Italy or that discussions between the Red Brigade and the Italian government had begun.

In the last few weeks you have seen or heard many reports in the press, radio, and TV saying that the Mozambican government has been negotiating with the armed bandits that some representatives of the American press choose to describe as a "resistance movement." These negotiations, which your press tells me involve "power-sharing," are not surprising, because they operate in areas in all of Mozambique's 10 provinces, as we are repeatedly told. Mozambique's government has never had any negotiations with the bandits, and Mozambican ministers have denied this propaganda time and time again.

The Italian terrorists, however, did have negotiations with members of the Italian government. They had contacts even with personalities linked to the Vatican. They operated in every major Italian city. Yet I don't remember that any Italian minister ever had to deny that the Italian government was discussing power-sharing with the Red Brigade, because the press—and I'm talking about the U.S. press—never asked.

In the mind of the journalist from the U.S., one of these power-sharing scenarios was conceivable, the other was not. There is no objectivity in the approach so there can be no objectivity in the results. The crimes of the Italian terrorists never reached the level of the horrors and massacres committed by the bandits in my country. But for the
We in Africa should acknowledge our own shortcomings. My work has brought me into contact with many American journalists, so I know what they consider to be some of the impediments to objective reporting in our part of the world: failure to get reporters to the scene of the story; withholding of information by officials; lack of statistics; and, delays in providing facts.

There are historical reasons for many of these obstacles. We are economically underdeveloped, which means our communications systems are poor and the flow of information is slow. We have emerged from colonial rule relatively recently, and this fact has a profound effect on the media. Under colonial rule, journalism was mainly done by and for foreigners. We entered independence without an indigenous press corps, without a tradition of journalism. We had to start virtually from scratch, and this explains why our media institutions are still weak. This also becomes an impediment for American reporters, accustomed to gleaning vast amounts of information from professionally excellent newspapers, magazines, and broadcasting organizations.

In addition, it is only since independence that countries in our region have started to organize the flow of information from the countryside where the majority of our people live. The colonial media were not interested in rural people, unless they had some picturesque customs, so again we had to start from scratch in an absolutely crucial area for news gatherers.

Then there is the problem of persuading officials to talk, either on or off the record. It is important to remember that whereas a U.S. government department or program may have a dozen officials competent to brief the press on a given topic, in our countries there may be only one. If he is not there, or if his usually heavy schedule doesn't allow, you don't get your interview. Again, this is a problem of underdevelopment.

The shortage of qualified staff and absence of tradition of a solid state apparatus lead to a degree of inefficiency and to bureaucratism. We all know how much this affects our work as media people. These and many similar problems are real impediments for objective reporting, not only by the foreign media but often by our own journalists. Of course, they can be solved and considerable progress has already been achieved in our region.

But there are also impediments to objective reporting in southern Africa by Americans which can only be solved by Americans. A very important one is related to the way the southern Africa correspondent networks are traditionally organized. For the great majority of the international media, the center for collecting and disseminating news on all countries of southern Africa is the very heart of the apartheid regime—Johannesburg or Pretoria.

For historical, political, economic, and technical reasons, South Africa has been able to promote itself as a news center for the entire region. The big Western news agencies, newspapers, and broadcasting organizations have traditionally had their regional headquarters in Johannesburg. The South African regime uses the situation to provide Western correspondents with a great deal of propaganda, not only about apartheid itself but mainly against the independent nations of the region. When these correspondents visit our countries, we observe that their articles tend to be colored by their constant exposure to the regime's view of the world and to the influence of the white South African community. Many reporters are reluctant to admit this, but I repeat, that it is our observation.

Another impediment is the simple fact that if a reporter is not on the spot, he cannot evaluate what is news and what is not. Very often someone else will decide for him—usually his editor at home. So it is not only a problem of South African influence. A reporter based for example, in Zimbabwe may find two or three interesting stories a week, stories which say something about the reality of life in that nation. If he is merely visiting there, he will go only for "the big story of the day," which may be a true story but does not accurately and objectively portray life in Zimbabwe.

For this reason the Kadoma Declaration of the frontline states appeals to foreign news organizations to base correspondents in our countries to cover our reality. We are very encouraged by the fact that some correspondents have already been appointed to our countries.

The problem of objectivity may also go beyond reporting and news gathering. A reporter's work, no matter how objective it may be, is frequently reshaped by editors at headquarters. Edi-
President Julius Nyerere: “An outward buoyant confidence in the basic soundness of his policy”

tels, but it also hampers the purchase of spare parts that are essential to the operation of vehicles and factories. Meanwhile, urgently needed drugs are not available to treat epidemics such as cholera, measles, and rabies.

In a desperate bid to trade with other countries and build an export market, the country has resorted to the old-fashioned barter system. Tanzania has dealings with China, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe on this basis, but has been unsuccessful in concluding a similar arrangement with Kenya where both parties settle in foreign currency until the respective banks come up with a satisfactory alternative.

To settle its foreign debts, Tanzania needs twice what it earns annually in foreign exchange from all its exports, including coffee and cotton. But first the bill has to be paid for petroleum imports and that alone now consumes 60 percent of the annual income. The IMF has offered a way out of this impasse through a structural adjustment program, which Tanzania has finally accepted, while requesting a three-year loan for $900 million and a similar amount from bilateral donors. This money is intended to “cushion” the effects of rising fuel prices and foreign interest rates.

President Nyerere refuses to go to Washington or London for cash, but instead has relied on his trusted friends in Scandinavia, Holland, and Canada. Up to now they have not let him down. He has no great expectations for substantial financial aid from the Eastern bloc, except perhaps from China or North Korea.

Meanwhile, the country limps from season to season, the dry and the rainy, hoping there will be enough food until the next harvest, and equally important, that there will be adequate transportation to distribute the food where it is most needed. These days, it is unlikely that there is enough food to fill all the empty stomachs, but if the minimum protein-calorie intake can be provided, it will at least prevent tens of thousands of Tanzanians from dying of malnutrition, or falling prey to disease.

Tanzania’s history since 1977 has been a continuous series of disasters, natural and economic. The country has been hit by rising petroleum prices, floods, droughts, pestilence, epidemics, bankrupt parastatals, and the crippling cost of the war against Idi Amin in Uganda. Crop production has steadily declined and the acreages of some crops have shrunk for reasons no one can satisfactorily explain.

While more and more of his countrymen tend to despair, Nyerere maintains an outwardly buoyant confidence in the basic soundness of his policies. Now, with at least another year at the helm, Nyerere has a team of tried and trusted colleagues around him who are apparently convinced he is on the right track. But time is running out. President Nyerere once said it would take at least 20 to 25 years for the ujamaa version of socialism to show positive results. He is now nearing the end of that time span and he claims that the country’s greatest achievement is simply survival—not just for 10 years, but for more than 20.

He genuinely takes great pride in that, and also in the fact that although it is the world’s 18th poorest country, Tanzania has one of the highest literacy rates in the Third World at 85 percent, with places in school for almost every Tanzanian child.

But if Nyerere were asked today to describe the most painful decision of his career, he might no longer reply that it was having to call on the British army to disarm his own mutinous soldiers in 1964. He might now say it was having to accept the rigorous terms of the IMF and the World Bank in the face of a really desperate economic plight.
But he cannot deny that many of his closest lieutenants have deserted him, or at least modified their beliefs in the homespun socialism that "Tanzanians call "ujamaa." It began with the defection of the Tanganyika African National Union's first secretary-general and foreign minister, Oscar Kambona, who found the Arusha Declaration too bitter a pill to swallow and in 1967, fled to self-imposed exile in Europe by way of Kenya.

Some years later, the president was embarrassed at allegations in the London Observer that two top Tanzanians were selling oil to South Africa in shipments from Dar es Salaam, apparently behind his back. The whole story has never come out, but it appears that crude oil or sludge from Tanzania's storage tanks may have been exported secretly through a Swiss intermediary to South Africa where it was refined and sold back to Tanzania. (The two men allegedly involved in the deal, Energy Minister Al-Noor Kassum and Sylvester Barongo, are currently suing the Observer for publishing what they say are lies.)

Tanzania's former prime minister and first vice president, Rashidi Kawawa, is no longer the left-wing radical he once was. He is said to have gone "soft" on Nyerere's socialism, becoming increasingly bitter over what he viewed as his down-grading in the party hierarchy. Kawawa even allegedly tried to block the late Edward Sokoine's purge of economic saboteurs.

The greatest surprise of all has been the complete turnabout of the veteran Zanzibari revolutionary, Abdel Rahman Mohamed Babu. Once the firebrand of the clove islands—accused by his critics of trying to create an "African Cuba"—he recently announced his belief that Tanzania should water down its socialism with what he termed "the dynamic practices of capitalism."

As his audience for this remarkable speech, he chose the academic staff of Dar es Salaam University. Ignoring the dynamism of capitalism, he told them, amounted to "unrealistic emotionalism." The government and party paper, Daily News, quoted Babu as saying that the infusion of positive capitalistic practices into the country's economic system was essential to promote agriculture and infant industries. "Let the people be rich—socialism is about plenty, not poverty," he declared, advocating more private investment in socialist-oriented enterprises to encourage individual initiative.

In many respects, Tanzania has been slowly moderating its economic policies. And while the bulk of the population—85 percent at last count—are still working in the 8,000 ujamaa villages, the government no longer looks askance at private enterprise or foreign capitalists investing in joint enterprises with the state.

**"When asked to cite Tanzania's greatest achievement since independence, Nyerere replies: 'We have survived.'"**

The gradual change is due largely to the abysmal performance of most of the parastatal bodies, crippled by huge debts and gross managerial inefficiency. Corruption emerged later in Tanzania than in neighboring Kenya and Uganda, but is now vast in scale and country-wide. Since most of the distributive and retail trade is in the hands of state trading corporations, the corruption is being masteredmind by some senior civil servants in league with certain politicians.

The situation has become so serious that many Tanzanians believe that Sokoine was murdered in a staged road "accident" because his anti-corruption drive and crackdown on economic saboteurs was proving to be too successful. A series of disastrous fires that destroyed several government offices, including the Central Bank of Tanzania, has been ascribed by some to expert sabotage intended to destroy records and other evidence that could incriminate high-placed individuals. Nyerere has detained without trial a number of so-called "economic saboteurs," but the extent of high-level corruption is not known.

The trend toward total nationalization is being quietly reversed in many facets of life. No longer is neighboring Kenya derided as a pariah because of its openly capitalistic economic policy. The common border has been re-opened after a seven-year closure, and there is much talk of closer economic ties with the rest of East Africa, expansion of trade, and tourism.

In a recent report outlining its national food strategy, the Tanzanian government announced that private commercial farms should be encouraged to expand so that they can help increase crop production and exports. They will have the same foreign currency requirements as state-owned farms, but new private farming ventures will be expected to have their own source of foreign exchange. At the same time, the report adds, the further development of Tanzania's state farms will be limited and they will be required to operate on commercial lines. As for ranching, the government says its primary aim will be private management of livestock production, and only a relatively small expansion of state ranches is envisaged.

A large number of parastatal bodies have either been scrapped, merged with more successful ones, or absorbed into government departments in the hopes of preventing a further drain on the country's meager foreign exchange reserves.

Last year Lonrho, the British multinational, was allowed to reopen its operations in Tanzania. Its previous activities, primarily in farming and food processing, were nationalized in 1968 after the Arusha Declaration, but Lonrho settled for comparatively modest compensation on the condition that it reinvest the entire $10 million in the country.

If it is to make any headway in reestablishing tourism on a large scale, Tanzania will have to adopt a similarly open policy in that sector. Although its national parks and game reserves offer some the most spectacular wildlife in the world, especially the mass migration of plains game in the Serengeti, rural hotel accommodations are grossly inadequate and below international standards.

In all its efforts to improve its economic affairs, the Tanzanian government confronts the same paralyzing problem—the lack of foreign exchange. It not only prevents the importation of fittings and equipment for modern ho-
"frontliners" have tried to persuade them to take a different stand. They have met with some success in the case of France and West Germany. Meanwhile, Angola appears to have modified its total opposition to a Cuban troop withdrawal and, according to Chester Crocker, is prepared to negotiate with South Africa over how many Cubans can remain after Namibia becomes independent.

Nyerere, however, remains pessimistic about early independence or any end to apartheid in South Africa in the near future. At the end of 1983, he went on record with the view that a lot more blood would have be be spilled before any change takes place in South Africa.

"Change in South Africa will have to be by force because there is no philosophy of change there. Those people are not prepared to share power; they are against the sharing of power as a religion. For this they quote the Bible. The people there will have to keep on struggling, causing trouble," Nyerere told an interviewer.

Although not geographically on the frontline in the struggle against apartheid, Tanzanians nevertheless know the determination with which white South Africa is prepared to fight to preserve its racial dominance. Nyerere has given asylum to thousands of exiles from apartheid. In earlier years, he found that Pretoria was able to exploit his hospitality, infiltrating the liberation movements with a number of "moles" or informers. This explains Tanzania's obsession with security and constant vigilance against saboteurs.

The efforts of the frontline states against the bastion of apartheid were set back by Pretoria's twin diplomatic coups in 1984. With mock sympathy, South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha signed an historic non-aggression pact with Mozambican President Samora Machel, the Nkomati accord; and concluded the Lusaka agreement with Angola.

The two countries, brought virtually to their knees by South Africa's policy of regional destabilization, hope for some respite from persistent aggression and harassment. There hopes were, however, rudely shattered when South Africa dragged its feet on the withdrawal of its invading forces from Angola, and the ruinous attacks by MNR guerrillas throughout Mozambique did not cease. Most seriously hit by the sudden change in the region's political picture were the African National Congress (ANC) and Swapo liberation movements. The ANC, which has been using Mozambique as its forward base for raids and sabotage operations in South Africa, immediately found it was no longer welcome in Maputo and its members were forced to leave—many fled to Tanzania. Similarly, Swapo has had to revise its tactics drastically since it could no longer maintain safe bases in southern Angola, from which it launched punishing attacks upon South African military forces and their collaborators.

These two agreements caused consternation throughout much of Africa. Many, in fact, thought that Angola and Mozambique had treacherously "betrayed" the cause of African nationalism. With their own troubles as close neighbors of South Africa, this view was not shared by the frontline leaders. At a conference called hurriedly in the northern Tanzanian town of Arusha last May after the signing of the Nkomati agreement, the frontline leaders (and by implication, the OAU itself) endorsed the actions that Angola and Mozambique had been forced to take.

Some reports suggest that Nyerere was bewildered at the implication of the apparent roll-over by the two member-states, but decided to put on a brave face, rather than give the South African leaders what they wanted—open disorder in the African ranks.

Only a short time before, President Nyerere had been forced to submit to another form of capitulation, which had been just as repugnant to him. This was his surrender to the dictates of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, with such measures as the 26 percent devaluation of the currency. For years, he had stubbornly held out against them in the belief that their primary motivation was to persuade him to abandon his socialist policies.

Publicly, Nyerere refuses to admit that his policies have failed and, while acknowledging mistakes, still insists that he chose the right course—socialism—upon coming to power 23 years ago. When asked to cite his country's greatest achievement since independence, he consistently replies: "We have survived."
Ujamaa village in Tanzania: “While 85 percent of the population are still working in ujamaa villages, the government no longer looks askance at private enterprise.”

Nominated Nyerere at the opening plenary session in Africa Hall, there were no other contestants and consensus was immediate—and enthusiastic.

The subsequent smooth running of the summit (in comparison with previous sessions) augured well for the 62-year old president’s image. His no-nonsense approach was quickly evident in the brevity of speeches and the absence of stale rhetoric. Back in Tanzania, Prime Minister Salim is expecting to share the presidential burden, enabling Nyerere to devote more time to the pan-African issues that will come his way as OAU chairman at least for the first part of 1985, as the next summit is due in June.

Fortunately for impoverished Tanzania, the OAU has a new policy regarding its annual summit meetings. Because of a lack of invitations from member-states and financial constraints, future conferences will take place in Addis Ababa, the OAU headquarters, with member-states paying their own expenses. Although Tanzania has the chairmanship for the coming year, it will not be expected to host the 1985 summit.

Thus, Nyerere will be able to concentrate on the serious problems confronting the continent, including economic issues, Namibia’s long-delayed independence, and the continuation of apartheid in South Africa. At the summit, the OAU expressed its determination to deal with the catastrophic drought and hunger situation that has hit almost the entire continent. Under Nyerere’s stewardship, the organization is expected to do more than simply appeal to the outside world for help, a position that should encourage most potential donor nations. As OAU spokesman, Nyerere can also be expected to speak out about the need for fairer world prices for Africa’s export commodities.

The two other urgent issues before the OAU are primarily the concerns of the frontline states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). The OAU is thus especially fortunate to have the Tanzanian president as its new chairman in light of his experience as chairman of the frontline states since the group’s inception in 1976. All these countries except one share a border with South Africa or Namibia. Tanzania alone is out of range of attack by South Africa’s “hit squads,” which have frequently sought to destabilize neighboring countries with debilitating surprise attacks.

The six frontline states leaders do not always agree on policy toward South Africa, but despite their occasional differences, they have in fact been masterminding sub-Saharan Africa’s strategy against South Africa. The frontline states backed calls for sanctions against South Africa, supporting the OAU and other Third World countries in the face of strong opposition from the West.

Also without exception, these countries have rejected U.S. and South African insistence on the total withdrawal of the 25,000 Cuban troops from Angola, arguing that this was never stipulated in UN resolution 435 which they, as do others, regard as inviolate and the only foundation on which independence for Namibia can be negotiated.

Realizing that some members of the Contact Group (Britain, Canada, France, West Germany, and the United States) attach less importance to the Cuban issue than the U.S. does, the
A Notable Year for Nyerere

President Julius Nyerere has crowned what may be his last year in office with the chairmanship of the Organization of African Unity. Also leader of the frontline states, the Tanzanian president’s influence will be felt around the continent.

BY ALASTAIR MATHESON

The future looked bleak for Tanzania and its 20 million people in the early part of 1984, but prospects since have improved somewhat for this poverty-stricken nation. Its desperate and steadily worsening economic plight was compounded last year by drought, pestilence, cholera outbreaks, and a near collapse of the nation-wide transport system, bringing chaos to food distribution.

On top of these hardships, the discontent smoldering on the offshore islands of Zanzibar and Pemba flared into near-revolt, leading to the resignation in January 1984 of Tanzania’s vice president, Aboud Jumbe, who was also president of Zanzibar and chairman of its powerful Revolutionary Council. The subsequent unopposed election of Ali Hassan Mwinyi in his place on April 19 diffused a potentially explosive situation and assured the continued union between the islands and the mainland, although Mwinyi was still a relatively unknown quantity to many mainlanders.

In April, the nation was jolted by the sudden death of Prime Minister Edward Sokoine in a road accident as he returned from the new capital at Dodoma to Dar es Salaam. The up-and-coming politician, thought by many to be a possible successor to President Julius Nyerere, had only recently launched a determined campaign to stamp out smuggling, bribery, and other forms of economic sabotage, an operation which had made him some bitter enemies in high places. Rumors soon spread that Sokoine’s death was more than just an accident, although his driver, a South African refugee from a nearby camp, was subsequently sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for reckless driving.

In a drastic move to restore confidence in his leadership and administration, Nyerere made sweeping reductions in the public service and reduced his cabinet from 21 to 15 ministers, appointing his former foreign minister, Salim Ahmed Salim, as the new prime minister. Salim, a brilliant and highly experienced diplomat, might have become secretary-general of the United Nations had it not been for strong objections from the United States.

Speculation then focused on Salim as the most likely successor to President Nyerere, who had announced he would retire in 1985. But in August, Nyerere once again bowed to pressure from his colleagues and the Tanzanian youth movement by announcing at the congress of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) Party that he wanted to “think again” about his future. The latest rumors, however, from Ikulu, Tanzania’s beachside state house, is that Nyerere will step down from the presidency next October, and elections will follow. There will be at least three contenders—Salim, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, and possibly Rashidi Kawawa if his health has improved.

The government reluctantly agreed to a 26 percent currency devaluation in June, giving up its long-running battle with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The ensuing drastic economic cuts and reorganization of many parastatal bodies held promise for less criminal wastage of state funds and more efficiency than in the past.

Then, to the delight of Tanzanians and most East Africans, President Nyerere was elected to head the Organization of African Unity at its 20th summit in mid-November. With one of the few remaining founder-members as its chairman for the coming year, the OAU seemed to be reinvigorated after years of near-stagnation. Nyerere’s acceptance ended speculation about his retirement from public office—at least until 1986.

Although it had been strongly rumored that Nyerere would be nominated for the prestigious office, it was not a foregone conclusion. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia had been suggested for the job but made it known that he was not a candidate; then hints came from Madagascar that President Didier Ratsiraka would seek the nomination. However, when Kaunda nomi-
said Mugabe has successfully maneuvered between younger radical hotheads in the party who complained that the socialist revolution had lost its way, and more pragmatic moderates arguing for economic reality. Indeed, Mugabe told the country: “The process of transformation must take into account the realities of our society. It is not a mechanical process, nor can it take place overnight.”

Mugabe avoided any specific commitment to large-scale nationalization and land appropriation, and he guided delegates away from a radical resolution to railroad through immediate imposition of a one-party state. Instead the congress called for the creation of a single-party nation “in the fullness of time and in accordance with the law and the constitution.”

The key resolution at the party’s first congress in more than 20 years appears designed to assuage fears among Western aid donors—the United States being the largest—potential investors, and the white minority who still largely control the economy. The most influential whites are some 4,500 commercial farmers, pillars of the agricultural sector which dominates the country’s economy.

An important feature of the congress was the adoption of a leadership code aimed at preventing politicians from becoming a wealthy elite in a socialist society. At a time when Mugabe and other leaders were expressing concern at mounting high-level corruption involving millions of dollars, delegates voted for a strict code forbidding government leaders from acquiring wealth or accepting gifts. They barred party leaders from owning businesses, earning secondary incomes, holding company directorates, renting out homes or properties, or owning farms of more than 50 acres. The ascetic hand of Mugabe showed through the code, which also forbids immorality, drunkenness, and slovenly dress. The leadership code was adopted unanimously. But it is expected that most party officials, who have already acquired vast tracts of farmland and businesses, will ignore or circumvent it.

Despite the devastating three-year drought that has ravaged most of the sub-continent, Zimbabwe can boast a relatively good year. Fears that the country would have to import 600,000 tons of the staple corn meal, using scarce foreign currency, were allayed in September when Agriculture Minister Denis Norman announced that farmers had grown twice the harvest estimate—producing more than 900,000 tons.

This is enough for self-sufficiency and even leaves carry-over stocks. Black communal farmers produced 35 percent of the maize crop—a triumph for government policies in the rural areas. Before independence, communal farmers grew enough food to feed their families with a small surplus to sell at local markets. Commercial farmers, who are nearly all white, produced a record tobacco crop in quantity and quality, which is expected to earn growers more than $136 million and the country substantially more in foreign currency. There was also a record cotton crop of 90,000 tons of lint fiber and 155,000 tons of cottonseed expected to bring in more than $122.5 million in hard currency.

Still the economic outlook is grim. Gross domestic product (GDP) fell 3 percent last year and is going down faster this year. Inflation is running at nearly 30 percent and the government debt service ratio is 30 percent and rising. Small manufacturers of goods like clothing have been forced to shut down all over the country.

Minister of Finance, Economic Planning, and Development Bernard Chidzero, a former United Nations official whose pragmatism is praised by First and Third World diplomats, has presented tough budgets in the last two years, making Zimbabweans among the most highly taxed people in the world. Chidzero admits this, but says he has no choice if he is to restore vitality to domestic commerce at a time when all productive sectors are registering negative growth in output.

One of Mugabe’s arguments for a one-party state is that the alternative in Africa is a costly affair. Indeed, the troop deployments in Matabeleland have cost tax-payers millions of dollars, which Mugabe says should have been diverted to development. The average Zimbabwean supports Mugabe and will vote him into power for another four years, but they are also looking for the spoils of freedom.

A disheartening report published in November by a commission of inquiry set up after independence to examine the agricultural sector said the average Zimbabwean is poorer and hungrier today than he was in 1971. On the plus side, however, independence has brought vast improvements in two vital areas neglected by the former white government—education and health. Schooling is one of Zimbabwe’s success stories. Primary school enrollment, denied to most black children in Rhodesia, rocketed from 800,000 in 1980 to 2.4 million this year. There are 313,000 students now in secondary schools compared to 66,000 at independence.

But even this has brought headaches of its own as the world recession and drought have worsened the crisis of unfulfilled expectations. More than one million of the country’s 8 million people—half of them over 16 years old—are unemployed. There were 6,000 jobs for 80,000 school graduates last year and in December another 100,000 flooded the market.

Election fever will keep voters occupied at the beginning of 1985. But after that the people who return Mugabe to power will be looking for more than words to fill their empty stomachs.
sever all ties with ZAPU may set back his own plans to forge a one-party state. The original intention was for Nkomo’s ZAPU to merge with ZANU and play a secondary but not unimportant role in the government. When unity talks floundered, then failed in 1984, Mugabe announced his party was confident of winning nearly all the seats in the National Assembly. Under the country’s British-drafted Lancaster House constitution—which Mugabe insists he will not tear up—ZANU needs unanimous support in the 100-member assembly in order to abolish other political parties. Without the support of Nkomo, whose party now holds 20 of the 80 black seats, it is an unlikely dream.

Mugabe’s ZANU has 57 seats and former prime minister Bishop Abel Muzorewa’s party, the United African National Council, holds three. Twenty seats reserved for whites are divided among former Rhodesian prime minister Ian Smith’s Conservative Alliance and pro-Mugabe independents.

ZAPU supporters may be cowed, but they are not defeated. In city council elections in October in Bulawayo, the provincial capital of the Matabeleland province that is Nkomo’s traditional stronghold, voters gave Mugabe’s party a stinging defeat. They voted in all 22 Nkomo candidates, dashing ZANU claims that they are winning over the opposition electorate. ZAPU also swept the board at council elections in the southern town of Gwanda.

Nkomo says he is sure ZAPU can comfortably regain all its parliamentary seats, if not make inroads into ZANU gains, in a free and fair fight. But already the two parties are exchanging insults, accusing each other of trying to rig elections. Mugabe charges that Nkomo gives orders to the rebels who have murdered scores of ZANU officials and supporters this year. The November assassination of the most senior party official, Mugabe-appointed Senator Moven N’dlovu, is the catalyst for the ZAPU purge in the cabinet.

Mugabe says the assassination campaign is an Nkomo plot to eliminate key ZANU officials in the run-up to elections and to intimidate people into voting for ZAPU candidates. Nkomo counters that the murders are masterminded by Mugabe loyalists bent on discrediting the opposition party. He says that Mugabe is trying to create a false sense of panic so that he can justify sending more troops into Matabeleland to coerce voters to support ZANU.

Who’s telling the truth? There is no doubt that many of the rebels support Nkomo. The “dissidents,” as they are officially called, describe themselves to villagers as “Nkomo soldiers” and wear badges extolling him as the “father of Zimbabwe.” Two rebels sentenced to hang in November said they kidnapped six foreign tourists—including two Americans—in 1982 because they wanted to force reconciliation talks between Mugabe and Nkomo to solve the country’s “crisis.” The fate of the tourists is not known. The rebels fought for Nkomo’s Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army in the seven-year war to end white rule.

Mugabe and Nkomo forged a marriage of convenience under the banner of the Patriotic Front to fight the liberation war. But Mugabe abandoned his old ally to contest the 1980 independence elections alone. Nkomo’s soldiers were integrated into the national army after independence. However, hundreds deserted their barracks and took to the bush with their guns when Nkomo was fired from the cabinet. But there is no proof that Nkomo is in charge of the dissidents.

On a more mundane note, ZAPU legislators have charged that ZANU is trying to rig the elections through the machinery of the government. In the National Assembly recently, Member of Parliament Sydney Malunga said mobile voters’ registration units in Matabeleland were registering only ZANU supporters. ZAPU officials also fear that Mugabe loyalists could influence a four-man delimitation committee, headed by Supreme Court Judge Wilson Sandura, to set constitutional boundaries that will favor ZANU in areas where both parties have support.

Nkomo has led opposition politicians in calling for an end to “on sight” polling in rural areas, designed, they say, to intimidate voters into the ZANU ballot box. They recall council elections in the Tsholotsho district of Matabeleland last year where two ballot boxes were set up in the open—one for ZANU and one for ZAPU. Voters were forced to queue in front of the box of their choice—watched by gun-toting soldiers. Not unexpectedly, Mugabe candidates received the vast majority of votes in a district that has always overwhelmingly supported Nkomo.

Bloody stone-throwing and club-wielding clashes between rival supporters of Mugabe and Nkomo in recent months do not bode well for elections. Zimbabwe’s largest daily newspaper, The Herald, commented on October 30: “With violence erupting at this preliminary limbering-up stage, what will the campaign proper bring? A repetition of the devastation in the Midlands earlier this year?”

The editorial referred to June violence in which several people died and hundreds were injured when rampaging Mugabe supporters turned on ZAPU followers, blaming them for the rebel murders of ZANU officials. Rioting spread to nearly a dozen towns and cities, where ZAPU offices and homes of Nkomo loyalists were stoned, ransacked, or destroyed by arson.

Mugabe responded with a three-month clampdown on ZAPU. He closed the party’s offices and banned it from holding political meetings in three of the eight provinces. The editorial in The Herald, controlled by the state-owned Mass Media Trust, warned: “Unless immediate steps are taken to put a damper on inflamed tempers, the potential for disaster as the election gets fully into gear will be great indeed.” The newspaper called for an orderly poll to show that “the democratic process is alive and well... and to inspire trust in Zimbabwe as a nation with a stable future which investors can enter with confidence.”

The deafening silence that has greeted Zimbabwean calls for foreign investment is unlikely to end following the ZANU congress mandate for Mugabe to create a “socialist state based on Marxist-Leninist principles” and to speed up “socialist transformation” of the economy with increased state participation in key industries.

Foreign businessmen shuddered at the communist rhetoric. But Western diplomats observed that Mugabe is unlikely to deviate from the cautious mixed-economy route he has followed since independence. Party moderates
Mugabe's Election Maneuvers

The ZANU party congress gave Prime Minister Robert Mugabe an overwhelming mandate to proceed with his political and economic agenda. After the March elections, however, his ability to meet the expectations of his supporters is likely to be put to the test.

BY MICHELLE FAUL

Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, at his most powerful following his party's August congress, and his beleaguered archrival, Joshua Nkomo, are squaring up for what could be the last battle for Zimbabwe. There's no doubt who will stride away victor from the battlefield after what threatens to be bloody post-independence elections in this youngest of Africa's independent states.

A triumphant Mugabe emerged from the signpost congress of his ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Six thousand delegates voted him head of a new 15-man politburo to rule the country and gave him a mandate to entrench himself as state president—presently a ceremonial post—with his newly consolidated power. The congress wrote Mugabe a blank check to create a single-party state under the vanguard of his ZANU party in one of Africa's few multi-party democracies—a move denounced by his political opponents.

If Mugabe has never been more powerful, his one-time mentor and chief rival, Nkomo, has never been weaker. Their stormy, distrustful working relationship was shattered when Mugabe fired Nkomo from his independence coalition cabinet in February 1982 on charges of plotting a coup after arms caches were found on farms owned by his opposition Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).

Any hopes for a reconciliation between the two parties were dealt a death blow in November when Mugabe dismissed the last two Nkomo ministers in the government, declaring the party "enemies of the people" for allegedly supporting anti-government rebels. Nkomo strenuously denied the charge and accused Mugabe of wanting to start "a bloodbath." The ZAPU leader is heading for the March elections with a shattered party structure and still loyal followers, but who have also been intimidated and bewildered by waves of often brutal military clampdowns ordered by Mugabe to hunt down the rebels.

A disarrayed ZAPU suffered another major setback when Cephas Msipa, secretary-general of the party and one of the sacked ministers, resigned in November. "Now the [liberation] struggle has degenerated into a struggle between ZANU and ZAPU and it does not make sense that I should suffer or sacrifice for that kind of struggle," he said. The veteran nationalist, who is respected by Mugabe and worked ceaselessly to reconcile the parties, conceded defeat. He said that if the choice was between violence or a one-party state, people should opt for the single-party.

Missionaries who over the past year and a half reported that soldiers were murdering, raping, and brutalizing Nkomo's supporters in Matabeleland said recently that the number of violent incidents had declined substantially. The government's military campaign appears to have shifted to a political phase with soldiers rounding up civilians from Nkomo's minority supporters and forcing them to attend ZANU rallies where they must denounce Nkomo and sing Mugabe's praises.

Ironically, Mugabe's decision to
committee that organized the Transvaal general strike, said before his detention without charges in November: “We cannot go back any more now.”

Nor can the apartheid regime stop the mass activities of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the ANC’s army. Already by last August, the Institute of Strategic Studies of the University of Pretoria was saying that the “security agreements” that South Africa had entered into with various countries in southern Africa had failed to reduce the actual operations of Umkhonto we Sizwe. Six months after the signing of the Nkomati accord, Professor Gerhard Erasmus of the Afrikaans University of Stellenbosch said that even if the apartheid regime succeeded in creating a cordon sanitaire around South Africa’s borders, this would not help. He explained that such a cordon would not form a buffer against “the enemy” because the “enemy is within.”

When the Botha regime responds to mass unarmed struggles by the murder of activists, the arrests of leaders, and other forms of repression, it does no more than confirm the view of the ANC that the oppressed people cannot liberate themselves without resort to arms.

In his January speech, Oliver Tambo said: “The armed struggle must grow. We shall achieve victory through the combination of mass political action and organized revolutionary violence.” As we enter a new year, that remains the perspective for the further development of the struggle for the liberation of South Africa.

One of the main casualties of the determination of the people of South Africa to free themselves has been Reagan’s policy of so-called “constructive engagement.” The success of this policy is predicated on the all-around strengthening of the apartheid regime, the weakening or destruction of its opponents, and the use of the resultant balance of strength to impose on the people of southern Africa an order of “peace, security, and stability” in accordance with the combined interests of Pretoria and Washington.

At the beginning of his second term, Reagan will find that the apartheid regime has grown in strength in military terms only. Even then, the use of that military power has failed to stop Swapo’s onward march and failed to compel Angola, Lesotho, and other countries of southern Africa to carry out the wishes of the apartheid regime. Nor has it slowed down the struggle waged by the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe, and the fighting people of South Africa.

The policy of “constructive engagement” has similarly not succeeded in relieving apartheid South Africa of its pariah status by persuading the international community to accept the bona fides of the Pretoria regime as an architect of peace and an agent of progressive reform in South and southern Africa. On the contrary, the international community has read Pretoria’s intentions correctly and reaffirmed its commitment to continue the struggle against apartheid. During the period of the Reagan presidency, this position has been taken by organizations as diverse as the OAU, the UN, the non-aligned movement, the World Council of Churches, and the Socialist International.

The apartheid economy is in deep crisis, the effect of which is to prove daily to the people that this colonial economic structure, designed to benefit the white minority, calls for fundamental alteration, as visualized in the Freedom Charter, whose 39th anniversary will be observed during 1985. International Monetary Fund and other loans have not and will not help to give Botha the means to buy acceptance by passing even so much as a bagful of crumbs to the oppressed majority.

The ANC, a principal target of the coordinated strategy of the Washington-Pretoria axis, has emerged out of the offensive, which began with the assassination of its cadres in Matola, Mozambique, at the end of January 1981, stronger and with an enormously increased capacity to attend to the urgent business of the intensification of the struggle for the destruction of the apartheid state and its replacement by a democratic one.

It is on this latter issue that the line is drawn with regard to the South African problem. The question that the advancing struggle in South Africa poses to the international community, and, not least of all, to the people of the United States, is: On which side does this community stand?

There is no middle ground between racism and colonial oppression on one side and national liberation, democracy, and equality on the other. Nothing but genuine and total liberation will satisfy the people of South Africa. There is no hybrid creation made up of portions of apartheid and “reform” that will emerge which will meet the aspirations of the people of South Africa. Between the present Afrikaner and white Republic of South Africa and the future democratic republic of South Africa, there can be no peaceful coexistence.

Speaking in her personal capacity, Greta Ncapai, 72-year old veteran leader of the Federation of South African Women, said: “I will support anything that will bring change in this country. I would not say I am against violent change. If change must come through violence, then I cannot help it.” No one among the oppressed people of South Africa can help it.

—Thabo Mbeki
Secretary for Political Affairs
African National Congress of South Africa
The Struggle Inside South Africa

At the end of the two-day general strike in the Johannesburg region in early November, one of the strike leaders said, "We now have power in our hands and can use it in any way we like.

"We cannot go back any more now," he continued. "Our duty is to step up resistance and create an ungovernable situation." When he addressed the people of South Africa on January 8, 1984, the 72nd anniversary of the African National Congress (ANC), Oliver Tambo, ANC president, had also spoken on this issue.

"We must begin to use our accumulated strength to destroy the organs of government of the apartheid regime," he said. "To march forward must mean that we advance against the regime's state power, creating conditions in which the country becomes increasingly ungovernable." Tambo went on to urge the struggling people of South Africa to cultivate among themselves "a spirit of rebellion and a frame of mind which puts to the fore the politics of revolutionary change."

Many buildings in the urban townships have been destroyed in the latest round of unrest. A good number of the black representatives of the apartheid system, manning the local authority organs, have died. Other local councillors have resigned. With its organs of "indirect rule" destroyed, Pretoria will be obliged to reintroduce "direct rule." It remains to be seen, however, how long such institutions of direct rule will survive.

With the massive rejection of the new apartheid constitution by black South Africans as a whole, it is also apparent that organs of government introduced under the provisions of this constitution, to control the "Coloured" and Indian people, stand no chance of being accepted by these sectors of the population.

As Priscilla Jana, an Indian lawyer and activist of the Democratic Women's Movement, said during the campaign to boycott the apartheid elections last August: "Anybody, Coloured or Indian, who participates in the new constitution will be as guilty as the perpetrators of this crime against the people. He who participates is a traitor."

On New Year's day 1984, a major Afrikaans newspaper, Rapport, carried an editorial which ended with a plea to the apartheid regime. "There rests on the government a sort of burden of proof—that by its style, consistency, persistence, and propositions, it truly shows that we are going to establish a new set-up of association in place of the old path of discrimination."

The Botha regime, however, did not think it had any such obligation as it had no plans to abandon "the old path of discrimination." Knowing that its primary responsibility was in fact to ensure that the old path was not threatened, it spent the year pursuing three major objectives. These were to recruit the greatest possible number of puppets to increase its ability to "Vietnamize" the escalating struggle in South Africa, to intensify its campaign of repression against the democratic movement in order to paralyze the mass resistance struggle, and to create around the borders of South Africa the cordon sanitaire which ceased to exist with the collapse of the Portuguese empire and the defeat of the Smith regime in Rhodesia, in the hope that this would result in the destruction of the ANC.

The black oppressed, in their millions, have however refused to be deceived, bribed or coerced into being their own oppressors. Despite the murder in 1984 of at least 200 activists of the democratic movement, the arrest and detention of the people's leaders throughout the country and the attempt to suppress the mass struggle by force of arms, these struggles have continued unabated.

Southern Africa remains hostile to the apartheid system and refuses to be bullied into joining Pretoria's "constellation of southern African states" or into accepting an oppressive "Pax Pretoriana." More than ever before, the apartheid regime stands exposed among the people of the southern part of Africa as its common enemy whose destruction is in the objective interest of the entire region.

Perhaps more than any other episode, the one that symbolized the desperation and the failure of the apartheid regime during 1984 was its concentration of 7,000 armed soldiers and police to cordon off and comb the African townships of Sebokeng. As a result of this operation, some of the most cautious commentators in South Africa began to speak of civil war.

And yet less than two weeks later, the people of Sebokeng joined the Transvaal general strike, demonstrating conclusively that the more force the apartheid regime uses, the more urgently the people feel the need to act to remove this regime.

Thus "by its style, consistency, persistence, and propositions," the Botha regime, pursuing as before the goal of ensuring the Afrikaners' "destiny of domination in South Africa," has brought us closer to the day when the masses of the people will demonstrate, by taking power into their own hands, that the colonial system of white minority domination is an anachronism. As Thami Mali, a leader of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and chairperson of the
fices in the South African Council of Churches headquarters in Johannesburg, saying they were investigating treason charges. The government has said it will introduce legislation to control overseas funding to the council.

Tensions in the black schools also remain high. Professor André du Toit, an Afrikaans-speaking academic at Stellenbosch University, said in analysis of the educational unrest, "It is the schools, as in 1976, where grievances simmered and generally boiled over into the wider communities. Once again the flower of a whole generation is prepared to sacrifice itself in a desperate revolt against what they regard as the intolerable realities of the black situation in South African schools and townships."

Du Toit desperately pleaded for "the restoration of some of the urgency needed in our social response if we are to begin the healing process but, again, apart from financial limitations, there is little evidence of that urgency in government circles."

The government also faces considerable financial pressures from the homelands where blacks are meant to exercise their political rights and where more than half the African people of South Africa live. Two officials in the new government-owned Development Bank of Southern Africa said this year that the increase in the gross domestic product per head of population in the homelands between 1970 and 1980 was among the lowest in the world. They also said it is clear poverty is beginning to assume serious proportions in the homelands.

Their findings were underlined in a far-reaching inquiry into poverty in southern Africa sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation. It showed that the number of people without any income in the homelands had risen from 250,000 in 1960 to 1.43 million in 1980, and that the number of people in the reserves living below the minimum poverty level had almost doubled to 8.91 million. Another paper found that more than 50,000 black children had died from nutritional diseases in 1970 and 6,005 of these deaths had been due to severe forms of malnutrition.

The solutions to these problems are obviously complex. The moderate South African Institute of Race Relations has called on the government to remove the bans on the ANC and Pan Africanist Congress, which were outlawed in 1960, and the black consciousness organizations which were banned in 1977, as a start. John Kane-Berman, the Institute's director, said the key point is that black South Africans should be able to make democratic choices. "It is therefore imperative that they be accorded the legal right to do this through lawful organizations using lawful strategies. People denied democratic opportunities cannot be expected to cherish and protect those opportunities tomorrow."

That solution, however obvious it may seem to many, has yet to penetrate in Pretoria. And there are few signs that it is likely to do so in the foreseeable future. Frustration, dissent, and the iron fist remain the probable course of events, with decreasing government legitimacy and increasing military involvement.
The security forces tried to put the best image on their operations. In Sebokeng, they handed out orange stickers to people who had been searched which said, "Trust me, I am your friend." Police also handed out leaflets saying, "What are we doing here? We are here to promote a normal social life, continued education, safe travel, stability, a healthy community, and the delivery of food."

But the UDF said that the authorities were looking for something which could not be found under beds or wardrobes: "The anger of the people over rentals and lack of participation in government doesn't hide in those places."

Before the raid, Le Grange maintained that revolutionary forces had created a situation of unrest in black residential areas, resulting in the loss of many lives, extensive damage to property, the disruption of community services, and intimidation of schoolchildren to boycott schools. The government had therefore decided that lawlessness must be curbed, he said. Despite protests, the government continued to use the army in support of police operations in the black townships, making sure that everyone knew that it would use all its resources to control the disturbances, whatever the costs.

While the tension and conflict continued, a series of other setbacks for the government occurred. One was the occupation of the British consulate in Durban by six former detainees whose detention orders had been declared invalid by the Natal Supreme Court. The government strongly criticized the British decision to allow the six men to remain in the consulate, arguing its illegality. It then said it would not return four arms dealers from the state-owned arms corporation, ARMSCOR, to stand trial in Coventry, England, although the four men had only been granted bail after a South African embassy official had waived his diplomatic immunity to stand surety for them. The South African retaliation was officially deplored and described as totally unacceptable in Whitehall, indicating a sharp deterioration in relations between the two governments, only months after Margaret Thatcher had met then-Prime Minister Botha in London.

Then, the government was thoroughly embarrassed by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Desmond Tutu, the general secretary of the South African Council of Churches. It pointedly avoided any comment on the award and the government-owned television monopoly said the award was politically motivated and had been downgraded by giving it to Tutu. Anti-apartheid organizations and most of the churches, however, saw the award as a symbolic recognition of the struggle against apartheid.

Tensions between church and state remain high. The chairman of the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference, Archbishop Denis Hurley, was summoned to appear in court late last year following a statement he made about alleged police atrocities in Namibia. Dr. Allan Boesak was threatened with a similar summons after he criticized police actions in the townships. Shortly before the announcement of the Tutu award, police raided several of-
"The people of South Africa are angry," a community newspaper in the Pretoria area, Eye, wrote. "They are angry because of high rents and the high cost of living. They are angry because of bad education. They are angry because of apartheid. The life of the majority of South Africans is getting worse every day."

Michael Acott, assistant editor on The Cape Times, summed up conditions in the black townships this way: "They are usually dark, dingy, and dangerous. They are often, by apartheid decree, far from the workplace. Black employees rise before dawn and return home after dark, traveling long distances by bus, train, and on foot.

"Schooling is inferior, with few teachers properly qualified. Facilities are inadequate or overcrowded. Each black person is given an ethnic identity which determines in which homeland they can exercise their theoretical political rights. They are always subject to the fear of falling foul of influx control and the pass laws.

"And they know that there is little they can do to change their situation because black people are excluded, and will remain excluded, from any say in central parliamentary government. It all adds up to a highly combustible mixture, only needing the slightest spark to burst into flames."

Indeed, generations of neglect and the refusal of the government to face up to the immediate causes of frustration in the townships has begun to show its cost.

dozen trade unionists, including two key figures in the largest black trade union groupings—Chris Dhlamini, president of the Federation of South African Trade Unions (Fosatu), and Piroshaw Camay, general secretary of the Council of Unions of South Africa (Cusa)—were detained, allegedly for their role in the strike.

Trade union offices were also raided by the security police. The implications for the unions and for labor reform were so obvious that the three main business organizations—the Federated Chamber of Industries, the Association of Chambers of Commerce, and significantly the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (the Afrikaans Trade Institute)—issued an unprecedented joint statement calling on the government to release the trade unionists or to charge them.

And the legal future of the UDF, many of whose leaders were detained, could only be regarded as precarious. Le Grange publicly warned the organization, which was formed in August 1983, that it was treading on thin ice. He specifically named the UDF along with about 30 other organizations—many of them affiliated to the UDF—as being directly or indirectly involved in the unrest. He suggested that its actions could lead one to no other conclusion but that it was pursuing the policies of the ANC and the Communist Party. Le Grange also accused the UDF of creating a revolutionary climate.

Asked why the UDF had not been charged with fomenting revolution and promoting the aims of a banned organization, Le Grange replied, "These matters are involved. It takes time to investigate. It may take a few years. We are monitoring the UDF and some of its affiliates on a very close basis."

Apart from detention without trial and threats to anti-apartheid organizations, the government resorted to another more ominous method of controlling dissent and unrest—the army. Officially, the army was brought in as a back-up reinforcement to the police as they searched houses, but press photographs of the military standing in the streets of Sebokeng, the first area subjected to a full-scale combined military-police "Operation Bullrush," provoked a sense of shock among people who had defended a strong defense force to protect South Africa from external aggression.

Philip Myburgh, the former defense spokesman of the Progressive Federal Party who resigned his position when the party supported a move to end compulsory conscription of whites, reacted by saying, "My worst fears have become a reality." He said the action would create the impression among whites that all blacks were troublemakers, while blacks would see the military as having become part of the agencies that enforce government policy.

The UDF said the army action showed that civil war is now a reality, while Pat Poovallingham, the chairman of Solidarity, the opposition party in the Indian House of Delegates, said Le Grange's admission that South Africa was in a revolutionary situation showed that the government had failed completely to meet the reasonable wishes of all sections of the population.
electoral agreement not to fight each other, preventing splits in the conservative vote, as occurred in the past.

While the next elections for the white house of parliament have been postponed until 1989, giving the entire parliament an eight-year life and delaying a direct confrontation with the right wing, Dr. Andries Treurnicht's Conservative Party is determined to fight the new constitution and seems to be gaining increasing support for its stand. Although President Botha and his government have far more serious problems, it is a fact that its white support base is under serious threat, particularly among Afrikaans-speaking people, who until recently were the cornerstone of National Party electoral power.

In partial compensation, Botha is gaining some English-speaking support. Three MPs from the ever-diminishing New Republic Party (the remains of the United Party, which was in power in 1948) crossed over to the National Party in October, reflecting a growing acceptance of Botha as a moderate conservative.

The official opposition, the Progressive Federal Party, has had problems with its own right wing, which rebelled against a call to end conscription and against a decision by the party to admit members of all races in contravention of the law. Some of the dissidents in the Progressive Federal Party may eventually break away and head for their only alternative home, the National Party.

However, the support of a few more English-speaking MPs will do little to compensate Botha if the right wing continues to demonstrate increased support in by-election after by-election. The extraordinarily complex constitution, which provides for separate discussion of legislation but joint decision-making, will, it is widely believed, become increasingly unworkable, forcing the government to revamp its plans and eventually have one joint house of parliament for whites, Coloureds, and Indians—a scenario which can only benefit the right wing.

In these circumstances and in the absence of a general election, the legitimacy of white representatives in parliament could well decline, reducing the government's credibility among its power base. Enjoying little popularity among blacks, Botha and his multi-racial cabinet face serious and continuing credibility problems.

If the protests among blacks against the elections were not bad enough news for the government, the events soon afterward were. In Sharpeville—the black township immortalized in the history of the struggle for justice when at least 69 people were killed and 200 wounded after the police opened fire on a pass law protest in 1960—another 31 people were killed when underlying discontent erupted into protest and conflict with the authorities after the new black local authority, elected by a 14.72 percent turnout, imposed rent increases.

The incident sparked disturbances in black townships in the urban areas of the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeninging region (greater Johannesburg) and in other parts of the country. Between August 1 and September 20, the official death toll was 80, 65 of whom were shot by the police. By the end of October, 131 had died, according to the South African Institute of Race Relations. In the first week of November, when the police reported that the situation was calmer, a further 24 people had died. The final death toll has yet to be tallied, but Law and Order Minister Louis Le Grange said in a speech that the 1984 urban unrest was more serious than the 1976 school riots. The casualties eight years ago, when the official death toll was 575, were higher, but Le Grange said, "The present riots were more serious because they involved adults."

Those adults demonstrated their solidarity when the UDF and a number of trade unions called for a two-day strike in the greater Johannesburg area in early November. According to Professor Edward Webster of the University of Witwatersrand, about 500,000 workers participated, making it the most successful strike in South Africa in 35 years. As many as 250,000 schoolchildren took part.

The authorities have been quick to blame the UDF and its affiliated organizations and their alleged links to the banned African National Congress (ANC) and South African Communist Party, but it is clear that more basic issues provided the spark for the discontent.
Apartheid Under Siege

Facing unprecedented domestic unrest and pressure from its right wing, President P.W. Botha's government is turning to increasingly repressive measures to cope with a volatile political climate.

BY BARRY STREEK

By the middle of 1984, P.W. Botha, then prime minister but now executive state president of South Africa, could look back on the year with a considerable degree of satisfaction. Not only were his internal reforms for limited power-sharing going ahead satisfactorily, but a number of official and unofficial agreements with neighboring states had been negotiated, reducing tensions in the sub-continent.

In this atmosphere, Botha took off for an official 17-day, eight-nation tour of Europe. It was the most extensive tour of Europe by a South African prime minister since the National Party came to power in 1948. Botha, who, as one opposition newspaper wrote, "returned like a conquering hero," telephoned the acting prime minister from Rome, his last stop, to tell him that the visit had been extremely successful.

The visit provoked widespread protest—the anti-apartheid movement in Britain reported the greatest increase in membership in its history as a result—but in Pretoria, Deputy Foreign Minister Louis Nel summed up the government's feeling by saying: "The more realistic members of the Western world, as well as responsible leaders in Africa, now realize that something new, something positive and constructive has in fact happened in southern Africa. This realism has led to the acknowledgment of South Africa as a regional power in the African sub-continent."

And then it all came unstuck. The elections for the new Coloured (mixed race) and Indian houses of parliament at the end of August and the beginning of September provoked nationwide protests and a boycott, spearheaded by the United Democratic Front (UDF), an alliance of more than 600 organizations. Students launched a fortnight of protest. On the day that official figures concerning school attendance were released, an estimated 800,000 students staged a total stay-away from classes. The school boycotts were as wide as those during the disturbances in Soweto and elsewhere in 1976.

Voter participation in the elections was very low: officially 30.5 percent in the Coloured elections and 20 percent in the Indian elections. As only about 60 percent of the eligible Coloured voters were registered, the effective poll was 17.5 percent. In the Cape peninsula, where the bulk of the Coloureds reside, the official turnout was 11.1 percent, but the real turnout was 4.96 percent.

The founder and patron of the UDF and president of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, Dr. Allan Boesak, commented, "If this had been a referendum, the government would have received a massive 'no' from more than 80 percent of the Coloured population and it would have been forced to throw the constitution into the rubbish bin where it belongs." The Eastern Province Herald of Port Elizabeth summed up in an editorial: "One can only conclude that the Coloured and Indian people do not want the new deal."

But the government was undaunted. The much-debated constitutional plans went ahead with three separate houses of parliament for whites, Coloureds, and Indians, each with their own 'Council of Ministers' (cabinet). Each Council of Ministers is to be responsible, as the new constitution delineates, for its own affairs—education, housing, health, cultural affairs, and school sport. South Africa, including the homelands, now has 14 separate cabinets, itself an indication of the extent of racial division.

The one-time head of the Congregational Church, Allan Hendrickse, became leader of the Coloured House of Representatives and minister without portfolio in the central cabinet, which is now responsible for general affairs. The former chairman of the South African Indian Council, Amichand Rajbansi, became head of the Indian House of Delegates as well as minister without portfolio in the central cabinet.

Hendrickse and Rajbansi are the first non-white members of the cabinet in South Africa's history—a development the right-wing Conservative and Herstigte Nasionale parties interpreted as the first step in the slippery slide to black majority rule. The conservatives bitterly fought the constitutional legislation in parliament and for the first time, received real electoral support by winning two by-elections in the northern Transvaal and drastically reducing the Nationalist majority in Primrose, the once-safe seat in the Witwatersrand previously held by Dr. Piet Koornhof. The right-wing parties also reached an
President Reagan and Bishop Desmond Tutu: "Peaceful change in South Africa can come only when blacks and whites find a durable basis to live together and establish an effective dialogue."

Bishop Tutu addressing a vigil in Mogopa, South Africa.
African authorities to go to the conference table with the authentic representatives of all sections of our community.

I appeal to this body to act. I appeal in the name of the ordinary, the little people of South Africa. I appeal in the name of the squatters in crossroads and in the KTC camp. I appeal on behalf of the father who has to live in a single-sex hostel as a migrant worker, separated from his family for 11 months of the year. I appeal on behalf of the students who have rejected this travesty of education made available only for blacks. I appeal on behalf of those who are banned arbitrarily, who are banished, who are detained without trial, those imprisoned because they have had a vision of this new South Africa. I appeal on behalf of those who have been exiled from their homes.

I say we will be free, and we ask you: Help us, that this freedom comes for all of us in South Africa, black and white, but that it comes with the least possible violence, that it comes peacefully, that it comes soon.

The United States and Human Rights in South Africa

In a speech made on December 10 commemorating International Human Rights Day, President Ronald Reagan stresses the need for the American government to speak out against racism in South Africa and to work for constructive change in the apartheid system. The following are excerpts from his statement.

In nations far from our shores, we've seen progress toward reducing the repression of human rights and some strengthening of democratic institutions. In some of these nations which have authoritarian governments, but friendly ties to the United States and the community of democratic nations, quiet diplomacy has brought about humane and democratic change.

But we know there are occasions when quiet diplomacy is not enough—when we must remind the leaders of nations who are friendly to the United States that such friendship also carries responsibilities for them, and for us. And that is why the United States calls for all governments to advance the democratic process and work toward a system of government based on the consent of the governed.

From our beginning, regard for human rights and the steady expansion of human freedom have defined the American experience. And they remain today the real, moral core of our foreign policy. The United States has said on many occasions that we view racism with repugnance. We feel a moral responsibility to speak out on this matter, to emphasize our concerns and our grief over the human and spiritual cost of apartheid in South Africa, to call upon the government of South Africa to reach out to its black majority by ending the forced removal of blacks from their communities and the detention without trial and lengthy imprisonment of black leaders.

Such action can comfort only those whose vision of South Africa's future is one of polarization, violence, and the final extinction of any hope for peaceful democratic government. At the same time, we note with satisfaction that the South African government has released eleven black leaders, including the top leaders of two of the country's most important labor unions.

Because we care deeply about the people of South Africa and the future of that nation, we ask that the constructive changes of recent years be broadened to address the aspirations of all South Africans. Peaceful change in South Africa, and throughout southern Africa, can come only when blacks and whites find a durable basis to live together, when they establish an effective dialogue, a dialogue sustained by adherence to democratic values, and a belief in governments based on the consent of the governed. We urge both the government and the people of South Africa to move toward a more just society.

We pledge here today that if South Africans address the imperatives of constructive change, they will have the unswerving support of our government and people in this effort.

A few years ago, when I spoke of totalitarian ideologies as the greatest threat to personal freedom in the world today and the most persistent source of human suffering in our century, I also pointed out that the United States, too, has faced evils like racism, anti-Semitism, and other forms of intolerance and disregard for human freedom.

So, while we work to see human rights extended throughout the world, this observance of Human Rights Day reminds us of our responsibility to assure against injustice and intolerance in our own land as well. And today, I call on the American people to reaffirm, in our daily lives and in the workings of our private and governmental institutions, a commitment to brotherhood and equal justice under the law.
its toll of fatalities among the blacks.

Some may be inclined to ask: But why should all this unrest be taking place just when the South African government appears to have embarked on the road of reform, exemplified externally by the signing of the Nkomati accord and internally by the implementation of a new constitution which appears to depart radically from the one it replaces, for it makes room for three chambers: one for whites, one for Coloureds, and one for Indians; a constitution described by many as a significant step forward?

I wish to state here, as I have stated on other occasions, that Mr. P.W. Botha must be commended for his courage in declaring that the future of South Africa could no longer be determined by whites only. That was a very brave thing to do. The tragedy of South Africa is that something with such a considerable potential for resolving the burgeoning crisis of our land should have been vitiated by the exclusion of 73 percent of the population, the overwhelming majority in the land.

By no stretch of the imagination could that kind of constitution be considered to be democratic. The composition of the committees, in the ratio of four whites to two Coloureds to one Indian, demonstrates eloquently what most people had suspected all along—that it was intended to perpetuate the rule of a minority. The fact that the first qualification for membership of the chambers is racial says that this constitution was designed to entrench racism and ethnicity. The most obnoxious features of apartheid would remain untouched and unchanged. The Group Areas Act, the Population Registration Act, separate educational systems for the different race groups; all this and more would remain quite unchanged.

This constitution was seen by the mainline English-speaking churches and the official white opposition as disastrously inadequate, and they called for its rejection in the whites-only referendum last November. The call was not heeded. The blacks overwhelmingly rejected what they regarded as a sham, an instrument in the politics of exclusion. Various groups campaigned for a boycott of the Coloured and Indian elections—campaigned, I might add, against very great odds, by and large peacefully. As we know, the authorities responded with their usual iron-fist tactics, detaining most of the leaders of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and other organizations that had organized the boycott—and we have some of them now holed up in the British Consulate in Durban, causing a diplomatic contretemps.

The current unrest was in very large measure triggered off by the reaction of the authorities to anti-election demonstrations in August. The farcical overall turnout of only about 20 percent says more eloquently than anything else that the Indians and the Coloureds have refused to be co-opted as the junior partners of apartheid—the phrase used by Allan Boesak, the founding father of the UDF and president of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches.

But there is little freedom in this land of plenty. There is little freedom to disagree with the determinations of the authorities. There is large-scale unemployment because of the drought and the recession that has hit most of the world's economy. And it is at such a time that the authorities have increased the prices of various foodstuffs and also of rents in black townships—measures designed to hit hardest those least able to afford the additional costs. It is not surprising that all this has exacerbated an already tense and volatile situation.

So the unrest is continuing, in a kind of war of attrition, with the casualties not being large enough at any one time to shock the world sufficiently for it to want to take action against the system that is the root cause of all this agony. We have warned consistently that unrest will be endemic in South Africa until its root cause is removed. And the root cause is apartheid—a vicious, immoral and totally evil, and unchristian system.

People will refer to the Nkomati accord, and we will say that we are glad for the cessation of hostilities anywhere in the world. But we will ask: Why is détente by the South African government only for export? Why is state aggression reserved for the black civilian population? The news today is that the army has cordoned off Sebokeng, a black township, near Sharpeville, and 400 or so persons have been arrested, including the immediate ex-moderator of the Presbyterian Church of Southern Africa and Father Geoff Moselane, an Anglican priest.

As blacks we often run the gauntlet of roadblocks on roads leading into our townships, and these have been manned by the army in what are actually described as routine police operations. When you use the army in this fashion, who is the enemy?

The authorities have not stopped stripping blacks of their South African citizenship. Here I am, 53 years old, a bishop in the church, some would say reasonably responsible; I travel on a document that says of my nationality that it is "undeterminable at present." The South African government is turning us into aliens in the land of our birth. It continues unabated with its vicious policy of forced population removals. It is threatening to remove the people of KwaNkwegama. It treats carelessly the women in the KTC squatter camp near Cape Town whose flimsy plastic coverings are destroyed every day by the authorities; and the heinous crime of those women is that they want to be with their husbands, with the fathers of their children.

White South Africans are not demons; they are ordinary human beings, scared human beings, many of them; who would not be, if they were outnumbered five to one? Through this lofty body I wish to appeal to my white fellow South Africans to share in building a new society, for blacks are not intent on driving whites into the sea but on claiming only their rightful place in the sun in the land of their birth.

We deplore all forms of violence, the violence of an oppressive and unjust society and the violence of those seeking to overthrow that society, for we believe that violence is not the answer to the crisis of our land.

We dream of a new society that will be truly non-racial, truly democratic, in which people count because they are created in the image of God.

We are committed to work for justice, for peace, and for reconciliation. We ask you, please help us: urge the South
The Question of South Africa

In a statement before the United Nations Security Council on October 23, 1984, Bishop Desmond Tutu, Secretary-General of the South African Council of Churches and 1984 Nobel Peace Laureate, appeals to the Pretoria government to initiate talks with black leaders to halt the increasing violence in crisis-ridden South Africa.

BY BISHOP DESMOND TUTU

I speak out of a full heart, for I am about to speak about a land that I love deeply and passionately; a beautiful land of rolling hills and gurgling streams, of clear starlit skies, of singing birds, and gamboling lambs; a land God has richly endowed with the good things of the earth, a land rich in mineral deposits of nearly every kind; a land of vast open spaces, enough to accommodate all its inhabitants comfortably; a land capable of feeding itself and other lands on the beleaguered continent of Africa, a veritable breadbasket; a land that could contribute wonderfully to the material and spiritual development and prosperity of all Africa and indeed of the whole world. It is endowed with enough to satisfy the material and spiritual needs of all its peoples.

And so we would expect that such a land, veritably flowing with milk and honey, should be a land where peace and harmony and contentment reigned supreme. Alas, the opposite is the case. For my beloved country is wracked by division, by alienation, by animosity, by separation, by injustice, by avoidable pain and suffering. It is a deeply fragmented society, ridden by fear and anxiety, covered by a pall of despondency and a sense of desperation, split up into hostile, warring factions.

It is a highly volatile land, and its inhabitants sit on a powder-keg with a very short fuse indeed, ready to blow us all up into kingdom-come. There is endemic unrest, like a festering sore that will not heal until not just the symptoms are treated but the root causes are removed.

South African society is deeply polarized. Nothing illustrates this more sharply than the events of the past week. While the black community in the seventh heaven of delight because of the decision of that committee in Oslo, and while the world was congratulating the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, the white government and most white South Africans, very sadly, were seeking to devalue that prize. An event that should have been the occasion of uninhibited joy and thanksgiving revealed a sadly divided society.

Before I came to this country in early September to go on sabbatical, I visited one of the trouble-spots near Johannesburg. I went with members of the Executive Committee of the South African Council of Churches, which had met in emergency session after I had urged Mr. P.W. Botha to meet with church leaders to deal with a rapidly deteriorating situation. As a result of our peace initiative, we did get to meet with two cabinet ministers, demonstrating thereby our concern to carry out our call to be ministers of reconciliation and ambassadors of Christ.

In this black township, we met an old lady who told us that she was looking after her grandchildren and the children of neighbors while they were at work. On the day about which she was speaking, the police had been chasing black schoolchildren in that street, but the children had eluded the police, who then drove down the street past the old lady's house. Her wards were playing in front of the house, in the yard. She was sitting in the kitchen at the back, when her daughter burst in, calling agitatedly for her. She rushed out into the living room. A grandson had fallen just inside the door, dead. The police had shot him in the back. He was six years old. Recently a baby, a few weeks old, became the first white casualty of the current uprisings.

No death can leave us cold. Every death diminishes us. Every death is one too many. Those whom the black community has identified as collaborators with a system that oppresses them and denies them the most elementary human rights have met cruel death, which we deplore as much as any others. They have rejected these people operating within the system, whom they have seen as lackeys and stooges, despite their titles of town councilors, and so on, under an apparently new dispensation extending the right of local government to the blacks.

Over 100,000 black students are out of school, boycotting—as they did in 1976—what they and the black community perceive as an inferior education designed deliberately for inferiority. An already highly volatile situation has been ignited several times and, as a result, over 80 persons have died. There had been industrial unrest, with the first official strike by black miners taking place, not without
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Ali: What is the mechanism for aid coordination? How many distribution points are there in the country?

Africa Report: The EEC has said the main problem in Ethiopia is not so much insufficient donor assistance, but the inability of your ports and internal transportation systems to handle it. Who has the limitations? Are you addressing that problem?

Wassen: It is true that we have our limitations. Our ports were not designed to meet a 1984 drought problem. What perhaps has been misunderstood has been the efforts of the Ethiopian government to move as much as we can within our limits. We have utilized every possible means within our power to move from the port whatever we can. In fact, we are now, in a position to move about 400,000 metric tons of food daily. We have upgraded everything. We work almost 24 hours on facilities from Assab to Addis Ababa to Korem. We are now trying to improve the means of loading and so forth and hopefully when and if it arrives, the assistance provided by the U.S. to improve facilities, forklifts, and whatever will increase our capacity. This question has always forced us to accept the 50 percent reduction in our requirements because inevitably our capacity was the first thing that was thrown at us. Now through the use of air transport and air lifting and improved methods of port clearance, I think we have been able to overcome that difficulty, and it has surprised those who believed it was beyond us to handle the present delivery of food.

Africa Report: The pledging so far since our appeal in October are to 190,000 metric tons of food. The shortfall is around 70 percent of our estimated needs, but I think now with the steps taken by the government to improve the facilities and services around the ports, with the additional transportation assistance coming, with airlifts, etc., we will not have any problems in the future. Regarding the food aid that comes through the NGOs, there are certain difficulties. There are around 30 NGOs operating in Ethiopia, each with their own global objective, their own methodologies, their own systems and procedures of administration. So one has to see to it that all these different mechanisms are summed up together so that they can fit into the realities of the country.

Africa Report: What is the mechanism for aid coordination? How many distribution points are there in the country?

Ali: As far as relief is concerned, the operation basically stretches all over the country. We have about 860 distribution centers, but these differ in magnitude. One distribution center might accommodate 50,000 beneficiaries, another more than that. The influx and outflow of beneficiaries might be different. Both the government and NGOs distribute to those 860 centers, but the supervision is done by RRC.

Wassen: Previously we have made requests amounting to 50 percent of our estimated needs, but I think now with the steps taken by the government to improve the facilities and services around the ports, with the additional transportation assistance coming, with airlifts, etc., we will not have any problems in challenging donors to give us the 1.2 million that we need. With the working conditions that RRC has created, we can handle it.

Ali: We estimate that 6.4 million people will require immediate assistance over a 12-month period, so our gross requirements over a 12-month period come to 1.3 million tons of food, including supplementary food. When we assessed our previous experiences during the last 10 years, categorizing on a yearly basis the magnitude of assistance and of the drought situation, we thought that the required quantity might not be attainable. So we decided not to press the international community, asking for 50 percent to see how things develop. In fact, we reduced our whole requirement by half, and then we subtracted our existing stock and the pledges that were committed, and then we arrived at the net requirement. When we compare our net requirement with the pledges, there is a high shortfall. But now since the international community has really felt the difficulties we are facing and the government has basically mobilized domestic resources, we might be in a position to handle the total requirement.

Wassen: Even now in spite of immense international publicity, we are no where near the 50 percent requirement. While we have improved our facilities to meet the assistance, we still need to have the international community meet our 50 percent requirement.

Ali: The pledges so far since our appeal in October are to 190,000 metric tons of food. The shortfall is around 70 percent. The international community must rush in with more food. There is more sympathy than pledges.
Africa Report: Have Britain and the United States withheld aid for political reasons?
Wassen: It is all a problem of what is humanitarian aid, versus what is development aid. As clearly put by the Commissioner, if humanitarian aid means to let individuals continue begging, I don’t know where the humanity of it lies. But if by providing assistance, you are giving people the opportunity to supply themselves with food, then perhaps that is humanitarian. We hope that now those in need of food assistance will be given an opportunity to sustain and help themselves. It is very basic. Famine is not new to Ethiopia. Only the volume and the time changes. This has happened at a time when the world is capable of feeding the present population twice over.

Africa Report: Some say that the Eastern bloc has not really responded to your appeals for assistance.
Wassen: In terms of humanitarian development assistance, the socialist countries have been participating in the reconstruction process and in every aspect of economic development—something the West does not. We are saying that international assistance should come on a bilateral level, and on a development-oriented level, not perhaps for any immense economic development projects, which may have other connotations, but at least for people to be able to irrigate their land and make sure that they are secure for food, and in other areas that could save lives and make a qualitative change in people’s lives. In these aspects the socialist countries do participate in Ethiopia. Why do you overlook that? We chose a system which we think will serve for the development of Ethiopia. It doesn’t mean that we are better friends with the Soviet Union. Our foreign policy is non-aligned, and in that respect, we are open to everyone who does not interfere in our internal affairs.

Africa Report: The U.S. recently signed its first direct agreement with the Ethiopian government. Do you think the U.S. government is responding adequately enough to the crisis?
Wassen: We are conscious of the fact that the American government through third parties such as NGOs has given assistance to Ethiopia’s famine that cannot be overlooked. But there has not been direct government-to-government assistance given to the RRC or anything else. Therefore, this positive new change is one which is welcomed by both parties, certainly on the part of Ethiopia. On the other hand, if one is to look at Ethiopia’s current needs and the potential assets of the U.S., then the amount that has been given is minimal, particularly in view of the fact that we do have a Western tradition of assistance on the relief aspect. Nevertheless, this indicates a new direction and we welcome it.

Africa Report: The north, including Tigray and Eritrea, is the worst-affected region. How do you respond to charges that due to political considerations your government has failed to give adequate attention to those regions?
Wassen: It’s an equal responsibility to supply food—north, south, east, west. The only difference is this: When we do take aid to the north because there are some secessionist elements within that zone, inevitably we take protective mea-

"If one is to look at Ethiopia’s current needs, then the amount of aid that has been given is minimal"
Ethiopia’s Drought and Famine Crisis

Two officials of Ethiopia’s Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, Tafari Wassen, head of public relations and information, and Ahmed Ali, head of aid coordination and international relations, spoke to Africa Report in Addis Ababa in November about the government’s efforts to combat the famine and coordinate international assistance.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: Could you outline the current famine and drought crisis in Ethiopia?
Wassen: Ethiopia’s drought problem has had a long history. It became obvious and noticeable to the international community in 1973-74, when some 200,000 people died in what was known as the hidden famine. Soon after the exposure of that hidden famine, the socialist government of Ethiopia established the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), which is directly responsible for combating any problems that occur through natural or man-made disasters.

The drought which has attracted international attention today has been building up for the last two to three years, despite the fact that the RRC has continued to inform international organizations and donors of an impending catastrophe. Perhaps the most pronounced warning was made in March 1984, when the Commissioner [Dawit Wolde Giorgis] called a meeting of international donors and UN agencies, and emphasized that a catastrophe was looming if international donations at a mass scale were not forthcoming. In May, the Commissioner addressed the United Nations and warned again of a possible catastrophe that could only be averted through mass international assistance. Finally in October, when the situation had already become critical, despite some response from certain donors and all possible efforts made by the Ethiopian government, the international community was made aware of the crisis. Non-governmental organizations also played a major role in influencing the media to be conscious about the situation.

As of March 1984, we estimate that some 6.4 million Ethiopians are affected by drought. Of these, 5.2 million are directly affected, and 1.2 million displaced. We have reason to believe that this number could possibly increase within the next few months. Out of 15 administrative regions, 12 are affected by drought. The most serious are the northern ones, as they have had chronic drought problems throughout the ages, but which have been more vicious for the last three to four years.

Africa Report: What is the current level of donor assistance and actual needs?
Wassen: In March 1984, we estimated that 900,000 metric tons of foodstuffs were required. Out of that, we requested 50 percent partially because of the customary response that we get from international donors—not because we thought that this was sufficient. Then with the gravity of the situation, we concluded in October that 1.2 million tons were required and we asked for an immediate response from the international community to 50 percent of that. As of now, we have received 150-250,000 metric tons of food which is not sufficient. It is probably saving immediate life at the moment, but given our critical situation now, I don’t think it is a satisfactory level. But the international response has been encouraging.

Africa Report: Why is it that donors only began responding to the crisis in October, although the RRC had been making appeals for aid for the last two years? Critics have charged your government with masking the seriousness of the situation.
Wassen: I think the RRC is one of the very few, if not the only organization in Africa that is charged with the responsibility of checking and dealing with problems of drought. And we also have 31 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) functioning in various regions. Therefore, any thought to accuse and pinpoint the blame on Ethiopia is ridiculous. The very existence of the RRC shows that Ethiopia does not hide or cover up. The RRC has saved a lot of lives and it continues to serve people in need. The only liability it has is the financial and material limitations of the country. We are very poor and unable to deal with the level of need because of capacity, not because of intention.

What has brought our current crisis out into the open is the people. It is very clear that governments in Europe and the U.S. are under pressure from the public. The public has put its hand into its pockets and has come out with everything it can. We hear of women on pensions who are prepared to pay, children who have even been giving away their Christmas presents—such moving acts by the people. I would also like to give credit to a number of media people, as we now see a very conscious form of reporting on a truly humanitarian level.
The church has been closely monitoring the conduct of companies in its stock portfolio that have interests in South Africa. A church commissioner, Sir Douglas Lovelock, said that the 20 to 30 companies with South African holdings in which the church has invested know of the monitoring, "and now they'll know even more."

Growing opposition to the apartheid system is likely to be expressed in a variety of forms in the coming months. Black unions and civil rights organizations in South Africa were planning a "black Christmas" campaign—a nationwide boycott of consumer goods that would strike at the South African economy. The organizers of anti-apartheid demonstrations in the U.S. plan to continue their protests at the South African embassy and consulates. European trade union movements may also become involved in the campaign.

ZIMBABWE
ZANU-ZAPU rift widens

As the March 1985 national election approaches, tensions between Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) opposition party continue to mount, with the assassination of members and supporters of both parties.

On November 9, Moven Ndlovu, a state senator and ZANU central committee member was murdered in Beitbridge—allegedly by antigovernment dissidents. The assassination triggered off riots between ZANU and ZAPU supporters in the southern border town. Twenty ZAPU members were believed to have died, while another 200 people were injured. Mugabe openly accused ZAPU of supporting the dissidents, a claim which Nkomo rejected out of hand. He denied responsibility for the senator's death and called for an end to the violence: "We are not a party of killers. We abhor the murder of Senator Ndlovu."

In reaction to Ndlovu's death, Mugabe dismissed his two remaining ZAPU cabinet members—Minister of Water Resources Cephas Msipa and John Nkomo, Minister of State to the Deputy Prime Minister. Mugabe said that they belonged to a party which was "dedicated to a deliberate policy of violence and bandidry," and that ZAPU should now be declared "an enemy of the people."

Before they accepted high posts at ZAPU's national congress in October, the government had hoped that the two dismissed ministers could be lured away from ZAPU to join ZANU. Msipa subsequently resigned from ZAPU, stressing that his goal was unity, but said that he would not join the ruling party. The two remaining ZAPU members in government, the Deputy Minister of Manpower Jane Ngwenya and Provincial Governor of Matabeleland North Daniel Ngwenya, who has deputy minister status, were believed to be on the verge of defecting to ZANU.

In an attempt to rebuild ZAPU's weakened political momentum, Nkomo called for a united opposition front of all "progressive forces" against ZANU to be made up of Zimbabwe's minority political parties—ZAPU, Abel Muzorewa's United African National Council, Ndbaningi Sithole's ZANU, and Ian Smith's Conservative Alliance. Mugabe denounced the move as "an unholy alliance doomed to fail." He added that Nkomo wants "to band together his party and other parties including even Ian Smith. He does not want to leave out our former oppressors as long as this ensures a position for him."

The government recently stepped up its efforts to squelch dissident activity by producing a pamphlet called "Chronicle of Dissidency in Zimbabwe." The publication describes in detail the atrocities of the anti-government rebels whom it refers to as a collection of diverse elements of ZAPU members, South African agents, and "killers, rapists and saboteurs who masquerade as liberators when they have nothing from which to be liberated."

In late November, two dissidents, Gilbert Ngwenya and Austin Mpofu went on trial for their part in the July 1982 kidnapping of six foreign tourists. They claimed that the tourists were still alive but would only be freed if certain conditions were met. They asked that Mugabe meet with Nkomo and a British government representative to arrange for the release of ZAPU detainees. The defendants also demanded the return of ZAPU property and assets that the government had seized following the discovery of arms caches on ZAPU farms. However, they were found guilty and sentenced to death, confirming that Zimbabwe intends to deal very harshly with captured rebels in the future.

Smuggling work the "mandrax trail"

Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda has warned that Zambians involved in drug smuggling will lose their passports and face charges upon returning home, as well as in the country where they were arrested.

The warning followed the arrests in India of former Information Minister Sikota Wina and several Zambian businessmen, including a Zambian Airways executive, for trying to smuggle mandrax, a heroin-like drug that is becoming increasingly popular with affluent whites in South Africa. Another prominent Zambian businessman was arrested in London, and Zambian diplomats have been implicated abroad in drug smuggling. Two Zambians were caught trying to smuggle the drug into their country at a Zimbabwean border post.

Mandrax, which is often ground into powder and smoked with marijuana, or mixed with water and injected into the body, is highly addictive and potentially lethal.

Police investigations in half a dozen countries have uncovered the involvement of influential African politicians and businessmen as well as several South African "godfathers" who are allegedly linked to individuals in the South African police and a network of couriers.
against President Gaafar al-Nimeiry’s regime, and even claims to control large parts of the southern territory. Formed less than two years ago to oppose Nimeiry’s political and religious measures, the SPLA has grown into an effective and well-supported force.

“Radio SPLA,” which began regular radio broadcasts in early November, later reported that Sudanese troops had resorted to the widespread massacre of civilians in southern Kordofan, in an effort to undermine guerilla infiltration in the region. SPLA forces delivered a blow to the Nimeiry government when they ambushed two Nile steamships carrying platoons of government troops within a few days of each other.

The growth of the SPLA concerns Nimeiry because of its success in seriously hampering exploitation of the substantial oil potential, which is central to Sudan’s economic future. Earlier in 1984, the SPLA effectively forced Chevron, the U.S. oil company, to suspend its exploration activities and pipeline construction. Under increasing government pressure, Chevron reluctantly announced that it would resume work by mid-January.

The announcement came following an agreement between Nimeiry and Adnan Khashoggi—the influential Saudi Arabian multi-millionaire—to establish a state oil corporation, the National Oil Company of Sudan (NOCS). The 50-50 joint venture between the Sudanese government and Khashoggi’s company, Sigma International, provides NOCS with a wide range of rights, including developing and controlling Sudan’s oil and mineral resources. One of its first priorities is to start work on the pipeline from the southern oilfields of Bentiu to a terminal near Port Sudan, on the Red Sea.

Although Chevron has received written assurances from the government that the agreement would not threaten the company’s interests, there is a clause in the contract which entitles NOCS to acquire “at fair value” all rights, concessions, leases, and royalties of the state “in respect of any aspect of the petroleum business.” This poses an implicit threat to existing companies who may refuse to continue their normal operations, as their rights can then be forfeited to the government. Khashoggi, however, has denied that the agreement is a threat to Chevron. As he explained: “We need Chevron. We need them to come back to work.”

### SOUTHERNAFRICA

Dissent provokes concern in Pretoria

The South African government is growing increasingly concerned that growing dissent at home and abroad will bring about change in the U.S. policy of “constructive engagement” as well as in business investments in the country.

The government was clearly taken aback when South Africa’s businessmen demonstrated an unprecedented show of solidarity with black trade unions by condemning the November detentions of union leaders and other civil rights activists. Minister of Law and Order Louis le Grange said it was “an extremely serious matter which had left the government disappointed and saddened.” Representatives of the three main business organizations—the Association of South African Chambers of Commerce, the Federated Chamber of Industries, and the Afrikaanse Handelsinsti-tuut—met with le Grange but did not soften their criticism.

They were protesting the detention of the leaders of the largest general strike in South African history, which took place in early November in the Johannesburg region. From 75 to 100 percent of black workers in a dozen industrial centers went on strike for two days, with a disastrous effect on business.

The government’s heavy-handed response upset business leaders, who were reportedly in the midst of negotiations to dissuade the unions from further politically-oriented strikes when the security police swooped in on the unionists.

The Southern African Catholic Bishops’ Conference, in a report that assesses the recent months of unrest in South Africa, accuses the South African police of “reckless violence” against blacks, including beatings and rapes as well as indiscriminate use of firearms and tear gas. The bishops’ report also accuses police of specific cases of wanton killing of innocent victims in the yards of their homes and of savage attacks on black mourners after funerals.

Another group that publicly criti-cized the government’s reaction to black unrest was Lawyers for Human Rights, representing 800 South African lawyers. The group said the mass raids on the black townships by police in conjunction with the army “seriously undermined respect for law in the black commu-nity” and called on the government to confront the real grievances of the black community—“the failure of the government seriously to indicate a determination to abolish discriminatory laws and to provide for black participation in the central political process.”

Meanwhile, the Rev. Leon Sul-ivan has announced an expansion of his fair employment practices code for American firms in South Africa. New provisions in the code call for U.S. firms to use their influence to support the rights of black businesses to operate in the (white-only) urban areas; to persuade other companies to sign the principles; to support freedom for black workers to seek jobs wherever they exist (outlawed by the influx control reg-u-lations); and to support the abolition of all apartheid laws.

The Church of England has sold its $5.2 million worth of stock in the Carnation Co., one of the signato-ries to the Sullivan code, because Carnation employees continue to be paid below recommended levels. Only about one-third of U.S. firms doing business in South Africa have signed the code, and those that are signatories, like Carnation, often do not fully abide by its provisions.
even more as a result of the recent dispute over French imports of Algerian oil and gas and new French immigration control measures affecting Algerians in France.

**EGYPT**

**Libyan plot foiled**

President Hosni Mubarak scored a dramatic propaganda coup in October by tricking Libyan officials into believing that their "hit squad" had successfully completed a plot to kill former Libyan Prime Minister Abdul-Hamid Bakkush. Bakkush, who has been living in Cairo, is a strong opponent of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi.

According to Egypt's account of its sting operation, Egyptian security infiltrated the hit squad, which consisted of four men—two British and two Maltese. An Egyptian security officer carried fake photographs showing a blood-splattered security officer carried fake photo-and two Maltese. An Egyptian security officer carried fake photographs showing a blood-splattered and apparently dead Bakkush to the Libyan embassy in Malta. Libyan officials announced that they had engineered the execution of the former prime minister. Then the Egyptians revealed that Bakkush was alive and well in Cairo. Mubarak subsequently issued a warning that Libya was plotting similar schemes against various world leaders.

Earlier, Mubarak had accused Libya of laying mines in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez that had damaged a number of ships.

The charges are reportedly part of Mubarak's effort to isolate Qaddafi and undermine Libyan attempts to improve relations with Western Europe.

**LIBYA**

**Nuclear contract lost**

The Belgian government has confirmed that it will give up a potential nuclear technology agreement with Libya worth $1 billion. The U.S. had pressured Belgium to cancel the agreement, asserting that the Libyan leader would not keep his word about using the nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Belgium did not abandon the contract, however, until other European Economic Community (EEC) nations that compete for nuclear contracts agreed not to step into the void.

Libya had offered the contract for construction of the nuclear power station to Belgonucléaire, which is 50 percent owned by the Belgian government, apparently after becoming dissatisfied with plans that the Soviets were proposing for the project. Belgonucléaire has been a nuclear consultant to Libya for over a decade.

**Union leaders and Qaddafi meet**

Several weeks earlier, Qaddafi had met with leaders of striking British coal miners to offer aid for food, clothes, and transport of picketers. The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) struck last spring in protest over government plans to close 20 unprofitable mines, thus eliminating 20,000 jobs. Union President Arthur Scargill met with "people's committees," as they are called in Libya, are controlled by the government, so the distinction is not particularly meaningful.

The union has drawn considerable criticism in Great Britain for "cooperating with an unsavory dictator." However, observers have also pointed out that British businesses conduct considerable trade with Libya, as well as with South Africa, the Soviet Union, and other nations whose governments also draw strong criticism in the international community.

**Morocco**

**Military pact with Spain**

Morocco has signed an important military cooperation accord with Spain in an effort to bolster its military capability for the war in the Western Sahara. The agreement came on the heels of the first joint military exercise between the two countries in late October, code-named "Atlas 84." Held to increase "cooperation, friendship and understanding" between Morocco and Spain, the exercises included the joint deployment of air combat units and air defense units.

Spanish Defense Minister Narcis Serra attended the military display and met with King Hassan II to discuss the Moroccans' offer to provide Madrid with military bases and facilities. Serra's mission was also designed to gain official assurances from Morocco that the two Spanish-controlled enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, located on the northeast coast of Morocco, would not be threatened as a result of Hassan's August treaty with Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi.

In return, Morocco is believed to have pressed Spain for special armored vehicles, as well as helicopters of West German design, produced in Madrid. Spain already supplies Morocco with an assortment of lightweight military equipment.

**SUDAN**

**The south comes under fire**

The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), led by John Garang, has stepped up its guerrilla war
The Sozacom move, implemented in October though first announced in July, was due in large part to pressure from the International Monetary Fund, IMF, World Bank, and European Economic Community officials had observed that Zairian government officials were spending Sozacom’s earnings on expenses unrelated to the mineral sector as well as diverting funds for their own use, leaving Gecamines, the state mining company, severely short of cash.

In addition to the dissolution of Sozacom, the IMF economic program for Zaire included a major devaluation of the currency (by almost 80 percent in September 1983), introduction of a floating exchange rate, termination of controls and subsidies on food and other products, and major cuts in government spending. Mobutu is now said to be considering another devaluation of the zaire.

These and other aspects of the recovery program have been applied with a rigor unprecedented in this government, long known for its corrupt practices and debt defaulting. Among the consequences of the new effort have been a sharp decline in black market activity and a drop in inflation, which is expected to be under 20 percent in 1984 compared with 100 percent in 1983.

Recently, Mobutu has visited London, Paris, Bonn, and Rome to gain financial support for the IMF austerity plan. After meeting with Mobutu in October, President Reagan praised Zaire’s economic program, and Secretary of State George Shultz said the U.S. would explore additional ways of assisting the country. France signed four new financial agreements for various projects in Zaire in October.

Additional assistance is likely to be committed at a meeting of the Western donor community scheduled to take place in Paris in mid-1985. Mobutu is expected to request financing for projects in his new five-year development plan. In addition, the IMF will be negotiating soon to replace its current agreement with Zaire, which expires in March.

Rebels repulsed

Zairian forces killed 100 armed rebels during the second week of November in the process of recapturing the small town of Moba on the shores of Lake Tanganyika in Shaba Province.

The rebels are thought to be remnants of the supporters of former Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, who was assassinated in 1961.

Zairian Information Minister Sakombi maino said that both air and naval forces were used to defeat the invaders. He speculated that the purpose of the invasion was to demonstrate opposition to Mobutu and to create chaos prior to two events planned for early December—a visit from French President Francois Mitterrand and the planned swearing-in ceremonies for Mobutu, relocated last July.

NORTHERNAFRICA

Algerian celebration sparks public controversy in France

On November 1, President Chadli Benjedid’s government orchestrated a massive thirtieth anniversary ceremony to commemorate the outbreak of the Algerian revolution. The festivities served to honor those who had died in the struggle for independence, while promoting the country’s post-colonial achievements. The parade in Algiers was the showpiece of the anniversary—with floats and a display of Algeria’s military might.

Prior to the anniversary, the government granted amnesty to many members of the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) who had fought for independence but were later convicted of political offenses. Chadli also signed a decree offering posthumous pardons to 21 members of the FLN, including Krim Belkacem, the former foreign affairs minister of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, who had been condemned to death in absentia, and Mohammed Khider, the former treasurer of the FLN. Both were assassinated while in exile. Their bodies were repatriated from Europe and reburied with honors near Algiers.

Even Ahmed Ben Bella, Algeria’s first president, who was imprisoned until 1979, was told that he is welcome to return from self-exile in Europe. As the secretary of the FLN’s central committee, Mohammed Cherif Messadia said: “The generation that won independence is growing older. It’s time to forget past divisions.”

Despite these conciliatory overtures, Algeria’s anniversary did provoke a public controversy—in France. French President Francois Mitterrand ran into a barrage of domestic criticism for his decision to send Claude Cheysson, who was subsequently replaced as minister of foreign affairs, to attend the ceremonies in Algiers. French opposition parties and organizations representing the one million pieds noirs, the Algerian-born French who fled to France after independence in 1962, condemned Cheysson’s presence at a ceremony celebrating the beginning of France’s defeat in Algeria.

The Algerian government-owned El Moudjahid responded strongly to the political storm generated by the event in France, calling the French reaction “indecent and scandalous.” Chadli added, “It is unfortunate that 22 years after, some French citizens...still do not admit that Algeria is independent.”

The Mitterrand government, for its part, pointed out that in view of the “special relationship” between the two countries, France could ill afford to be absent from the ceremonies.

A snub by the Mitterrand government would most probably have further damaged relations between the two countries, which had been strained in recent months by Mitterrand’s visit to Morocco for talks with King Hassan, following the signing of the Libyan-Moroccan treaty of unity, and later France’s accord with Libya to withdraw troops from Chad. Relations cooled
France sent two fighter planes over the capital of Ndjamena into the northern region, probably to photograph Libyan troops, and prepared to send 250 paratroopers back into the country. France may also redeploy some or all of the 3,200 French troops that were withdrawn from Chad and stationed in the Central African Republic. But there has been no confirmation that the French intend to use force to break the deadlock. On November 22, Libyan Foreign Minister Ali Treki again promised that Libya would remove its forces from Chad, but one week later a western analyst said Libya still had 3,500 to 4,500 troops there.

The series of events has thrust the U.S. into a more prominent role in the Chadian war and has damaged Franco-American relations. The two countries have criticized each other on their respective policies toward Libya. France says the U.S. distorts the situation by viewing it solely in an East-West framework and that the U.S. is hypocritical in maintaining strong economic ties with Libya while urging other nations to break diplomatic ties.

The Mitterrand administration believes that it cannot ignore the fact that Qaddafi is a powerful force in the region with influence elsewhere in the world as well. French diplomatic efforts were reportedly based partly on the belief that Qaddafi's growing opposition at home could force him to moderate his aggressive international policies, especially against African nations that are closely allied with France. The failure to date of the French-Libyan agreement on Chad is a cause of concern to those nations which look to France for security and as a source of stability on the continent.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) is concerned that the current Chadian crisis will reappear elsewhere in the world as well. The meeting of Chadian factions in Addis Ababa early in 1984 broke down when Habré refused to attend because of the presidential-style welcome given to his rival, Goukouni Oueddei. In southern Chad, Habré's army is increasingly cracking down on rebel forces. Amnesty International has reported that the Chadian government has carried out hundreds of executions of prisoners and unarmed civilians in the southern region. Some 80 persons were reportedly burned alive in a church where they had taken refuge.

The spreading civil war in southern Chad is now becoming a major problem for the Central African Republic. On November 9, rebels opposed to Chadian President Hissène Habré for the first time launched a military operation beyond the Chadian border into Central African territory. The border town of Markounda in the northwest part of the country was attacked and occupied for several hours by 50 to 100 armed rebels who killed four people, including the police commissioner. By the time a unit of the presidential guard arrived from Bangui the following day, the rebels had already retreated across the border.

In recent weeks, communities along the border have also requested military reinforcements. Every day, some 400 Chadians flee the war zone and cross the frontier in hopes of finding food and safety. According to the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in Bangui, there are already about 25,000 Chadian refugees in the area.

Of particular concern to President André Kolingba's government is that the invasion of Markounda appears to have involved not only Chadian rebels but opponents of Kolingba's Military Committee for National Recovery as well. These included followers of General François Bozize and General Alphonse M'Baikoua, formerly ministers in the Kolingba government before they were implicated in the coup attempt of March 1982.

The conflict in Chad has created a further problem for the Kolingba government. As an important rear base for Operation Manta in Chad since August 1983, Bangui has accommodated a regular detachment of nearly 1,000 French troops. In recent months, tensions between the local people and French soldiers have been on the rise, and the atmosphere in Bangui has become reminiscent of colonial times.

In October, a group of about 15 Africans attempted to enter the French military camp in Bangui known as 'Deux Cents Villas.' Three civilians were hurt when a French soldier opened fire, leading to a siege of the military base by several hundred people from Bangui. They shouted anti-French slogans and hurled stones at the camp, injuring 11 French, including four civilians. Government forces were called in to put an end to the assault and to disperse the crowd.

**Zaire**

Economic reform attempted

Zaire is continuing to implement economic policy reform to restore its seriously ailing economy. The dissolution of Sozacom, the state operation that had marketed Zairian minerals for nearly a decade, is one of a series of economic measures that President Mobutu Sese Seko has taken recently.
SEYCHELLES
René denies Soviet base

President Albert René has denied reports that the Soviets are using the strategically placed islands as a military base. René said that he rejected a Soviet donation of $5 million worth of fuel but that some Somali military aid has been accepted because "it was free."

The aid includes Soviet-made missiles that have bolstered the Seychelles' defense system, the President said at a press conference in late November. The Soviets are reportedly using the Seychelles as a refueling base. However, the Seychelles allows limited use of its naval facilities to warships of all nations, provided they do not carry nuclear weapons.

René, a socialist who became president after a 1977 coup, has been instrumental in efforts to create an Indian Ocean peace zone. René stresses that the Seychelles is a non-aligned nation that has "struggled successfully to remain well-balanced between the two powers." The U.S. maintains good relations with the Seychelles, operating an Air Force satellite tracking system on the main island of Mahé.

Speculation about a Soviet base stems partly from the fact that the Soviets helped to fund a UNESCO-backed study of the islands' continental shelf. The purpose of the study was reportedly to develop marine resources, but it could also be used to plan a naval base. A base in the Seychelles would be especially useful to the Soviets in view of the loss of their base at the Mozambican port of Maputo, following the signing of the Nkomati agreement between Mozambique and South Africa.

SOMALIA
Hijackers release hostages

Dissidents who hijacked a Somali airliner on November 24 released 108 hostages four days later, after apparently securing a commitment that the Somali government would not execute seven students.

The hijackers, led by a Somali military officer, Capt. Awil Adan Bourhan, seized the Boeing 707 after it took off from the Somali capital of Mogadishu for Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. After being refused permission to land in Yemen, the plane arrived in Addis Ababa, where Ethiopian military forces guarded it. Nineteen women and children passengers were released, along with several crew members.

The hijackers threatened to blow up the plane if their demands for the release of the seven students and 14 other political prisoners being held by the Somali government were not met. They postponed the deadline several times.

The Somali government rejected their demands, but later the hijackers reportedly received assurances from the Italian government, which was acting as a go-between, that the executions would not take place. No date had been set for the executions, which were being reviewed by a Somali amnesty committee. There was no promise that the 21 would be released. Ethiopian authorities granted the hijackers political asylum.

The seven youths were sentenced to death in October for participating in anti-government activities. They were part of a group of high school students, teachers, and others arrested in July 1984 in connection with a bomb explosion in Hargeisa, a northern town where there have been many incidents of unrest. No fatalities or injuries were reported from the incident, according to Amnesty International, which is monitoring the case. In addition to the seven death sentences, eight members of the group were sentenced to life imprisonment, and others received shorter sentences.

The incidents in Hargeisa were preceded by a major trial in 1982 when some of the town's leading intellectuals were sentenced for activities relating to the formation of a local self-help group.

Opposition to the regime of President Siad Barre is particularly strong in the northwest region. The anti-government incidents are connected to guerrilla movements, including the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia (DFSS), both based in Ethiopia. The hijackers had identified themselves as members of the SNM.

CENTRAL AF RICA

Libya fails to remove troops from Chad

Libya's failure to remove its troops from northern Chad has caused considerable embarrassment to the French government.

Under the French-Libyan agreement for a simultaneous withdrawal, all troops were to be gone by November 15, except those in the Aouzou strip, a 60-mile wide piece of mineral-rich desert that Libya annexed in 1973.

French officials were insisting as late as November 11 that France and Libya had completed the withdrawal of their troops, but Libya had completed the withdrawal of their troops, U.S. intelligence, however, revealed that some 3,000 Libyan troops remained in Chad and that this information had been shared with the French government. Several sources even said that Libya had been increasing its troop strength.

Then, in a move that French powers have described as the worst foreign policy mistake of the three-year-old socialist administration, French President François Mitterrand met with Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi on the Greek island of Crete on November 16. Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, who had persuaded the two to get together, coordinated the meeting.

According to Mitterrand, Qaddafi recommitted himself to the September agreement. On the same day, Mitterrand publicly stated for the first time that Libyan troops remained in Chad, though he cited a figure of 1,000 troops, rather than the 3,000 that U.S. and Chadian sources had reported. Several days later, he finally acknowledged that the higher figure was accurate.

Two days after the meeting,
pian government. Previously, all U.S. famine relief to Ethiopia was channeled through relief agencies.

European governments including Britain, Sweden, West Germany and Italy, have also pledged substantial sums. Even the Soviet Union came through with assistance, primarily in the form of trucks, planes, and helicopters, and a shipment of rice, which is not normally eaten by Ethiopians. At first, the Soviets said that their aircraft could not be used to transport grain donated by Western nations, but later reports indicated that both Western grain and fuel were going into the Soviet planes.

Mengistu refused to compare the levels of aid donated by different governments and insisted that the U.S. assistance will make no difference in relations between the two countries. Mengistu has been criticized for allowing political considerations to interfere with his response to the famine. He seemed unable to focus on the mounting disaster until after the September ceremonies inaugurating the Ethiopian Workers' Party which cost the country an estimated $100 million. In addition, he has been sharply attacked for such policies as charging an import tax for donations of food, refusing to allow a commission headed by former West German chancellor Willy Brandt to distribute food in the northern war-torn provinces, and refusing to negotiate even a temporary truce with the guerrillas to ease famine relief. Widespread publicity on a shipment of half a million bottles of Scotch whiskey to Ethiopia at a time when the ports were clogged with shipments of relief supplies also embarrassed the Mengistu regime.

The relief effort is complicated by the wars of secession in Tigré and Eritrea, where the famine has reached the proportions of a holocaust, the AID spokesman said. Reports of the rebels seizing the relief center at Korem on the southern border of Tigré Province were denied by the Ethiopian government. In addition, traders are reportedly buying donated food supplies at the border between Eritrea and Sudan for resale in the rebel-held areas of Eritrea.

The Mengistu regime has recently significantly increased the allocation of its own fleet of lorries to distribute food and initiated a program to transfer 1.5 million people out of the drought areas in the northern war zones. The government said on December 7 that 70,000 people, all of them volunteers, had already been moved to southwest Ethiopia.

The Ethiopian famine will soon lose its place in the headlines, and the flood of aid may turn to a trickle. But the problems of overused farmland, desertification, and neglect of the agricultural sector, compounded by the current crisis, mean that the need for famine relief will continue for months or even years.

COMOROS
Mayotte referendum postponed

The referendum to determine whether the island of Mayotte is to be incorporated into the three islands of the Federal Republic of the Comoros or become a French "department" was recently postponed by the French government. An overwhelming vote in favor of maintaining the island's French connection had been anticipated in the election, which was scheduled for December 22.

Referenda in 1974 and 1976 had already reflected the Mahorais' position in favor of retaining their bond with France. However, the French government has recently come under pressure from Comoran President Ahmed Abdallah, as well as from the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, to relinquish its claims of sovereignty over the island.

The announcement by the council of ministers in Paris that it intended to introduce legislation effectively extending Mayotte's present status for at least two years, has put a damper on such hopes. While France remains committed to sponsoring a referendum, it is not clear when the issue will be resolved.

Kenyan protest London production

The London production of a play about a hero of the Mau Mau resistance sparked a strong protest from Kenya.

The Trial of Dedan Kimathi, written by Ngugi wa Thiong'o, who is self-exiled in London, and Micere Mugo, was produced at the Africa Centre in London in October as a highlight of a month of activities dedicated to Kenya. But Ngugi is an outspoken critic of the Kenyan government and the most radical of a small group of Kenyan dissidents in London.

The Kenya Embassy declined an invitation to participate in Kenya month and asked that the play be withdrawn, since the authors are "not representative of Kenya." Foreign Minister Elijah Mwangale charged that the dissidents are financed by Marxist and communist groups and by the embassies of communist countries. Politicians in Kenya lashed out at Ngugi and the London dissidents, who had already provoked anger in Kenya by declaring that Kenya Day, celebrated throughout the country on October 20, should be renamed Mau Mau Day. They reasoned that Kenya Day was not deeply involved with the Mau Mau movement and that, in any case, the movement itself was the greatest force in the achievement of Kenya's independence.

Ngugi, who is the best known of East African fiction writers, once headed the literature department at the University of Nairobi. Most Kenyan secondary and university students have studied his works, especially the early books about how colonialism affected the people of Kenya. But when he began to focus on his creative talents in current politics, he offended officials in the government of the late President Jomo Kenyatta. He was detained from 1977 to 1978.
gling. The president has closed a key post on the Liberian border and established a Precious Metals Marketing Company to fight smuggling.

Smuggling and other activities of the “parallel market” are a massive problem for Sierra Leone. According to New African columnist Jimoh Omo Fadaka, 80 percent of the country’s imports and 70 percent of its exports go through the parallel market, thus evading taxes, duties, and other government revenue raisers and profiting hugely from black market currency exchange rates. Diamond smuggling is the parallel market’s biggest activity, and the reason why official diamond exports dropped from $120 million in 1980 to $28 million in 1983, Fadaka said in an October column.

The anti-smuggling efforts have drawn no praise from the newly formed opposition party in London. Founders of the Sierra Leone Democratic Party (SLDP), organized in August, aim to remove the Stevens government from power, criticizing it for its “widespread corruption, inefficiency, and nepotism.” However, SLDP Chairman Edison Gorvie says the principal problem of Sierrra Leone today, aside from hunger, disease, and illiteracy, is the total denial of freedom.”

Gorvie and two other SLDP founders, Adewale John and Olufemi John, have been active in national politics in the past. The government has criticized the BBC for broadcasting interviews with the new party.

Ethiopians starve despite relief effort

Despite an outpouring of aid triggered by a BBC film of starving children, the famine relief effort in Ethiopia is not expected to be anywhere near sufficient. Aid workers returning from Korem, the largest relief camp, reported in early December that the supplies there would last only a few days. However, a Red Cross delegation that toured the country at about the same time reported that supplies on hand were enough to meet the demand for December and January.

Dawit Wolde Giorgis, head of Ethiopia’s Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), which coordinates the relief effort, said that Ethiopia needs 1.2 million tons of food, double what was earlier considered necessary. Donor nations have pledged less than half of that amount. A U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) spokesman said that the RRC figure is probably grossly underestimated.

The exact need is as difficult to calculate as the number of deaths. The UN estimated in November that more than 300,000 Ethiopians had died since last March, and 200 more were dying each day in the relief camps. And those who are too young, old, sick or weak to walk the long distances to the food distribution points die uncounted in the villages. Many others die along the way.

The British and American public reacted generously as a result of the BBC film, first aired in late October, and subsequent media coverage. Personnel at the various relief agencies have been astounded at the number of donations received and at the depth of feeling expressed by thousands of callers.

But the press and the public are fickle about the “causes” that capture their attention, and the current interest may wane before Ethiopian farmers are able to again produce sufficient food. The RRC first reported the impending famine in September 1982 and the international relief agencies have been working to raise public and private relief funds for almost two years. But the crisis received limited attention in the media, partly because of the difficulties involved in covering news in Ethiopia.

In addition, the Reagan administration opposed aid in the quantity that the relief agencies said was necessary to avert mass starvation. The Marxist orientation of Mengistu Haile Mariam’s government and its strong alliance with the Soviet Union were the unstated cause. In mid-1983, the Reagan administration even cancelled Ethiopia’s participation in the major U.S. food relief program, known as Food for Peace Title II, though it was reinstated after strong protests. In early 1984, the Reagan administration tied a $150 million package of famine relief to funding for covert military aid to Nicaragua. While Congress eventually approved the food aid, the administration’s action delayed the emergency funding for months. One famine relief official, the Reverend Charles Elliott, former head of a charity called Christian Aid, accused the U.S. and Britain of having blocked relief to Ethiopia in hopes that famine would help oust Mengistu, as it had helped to topple Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974.

Since October, however, the Reagan administration has given a total of $128 million or 222,000 tons in food and $13 million in non-food aid. In a sharp change of policy, it approved a direct grant to the Ethio-
declines in oil revenues forced the country to take this action, according to David-West, who said that Nigeria’s interests have to take precedence over OPEC’s. In late November, however, he predicted, that his country would soon be able to raise the price of its crude oil again.

Nigeria’s oil revenues, which were around $22 billion in 1980, had sunk to $10 billion by 1983. The country had continued to make expenditures based on the higher levels, however, resulting in a very high level of external debts that are now past due.

The agreement that Nigeria reached in October with its Western debtors for the refinancing of an estimated $2 billion in trade debts was an unusual move, because it preceded a formal debt restructurining with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The government has objected to the harsh measures that the IMF wants to impose on the economy, especially the devaluation of the naira, Nigeria’s currency.

Fela jailed

Afro-beat musician Fela Anikulapo Kuti was jailed for five years in November, convicted on charges of currency trafficking.

The popular Nigerian performer had been arrested in September as he left the country for a U.S. concert tour with his 40-member band. He was found with $2,000 in his possession, which government officials said exceeded the limit that individuals can take out of the country.

However, Fela said that he had declared the money, which was to be used for tour expenses for his band, and that in any case, it had been earned abroad and not on the black market. If the amount were divided by 40, the legal limit was not exceeded, he said.

Fela has repeatedly criticized the Buhari regime as well as past governments, which have retaliated in various ways. He remains immensely popular among Nigerians for his unrelenting spirit as well as for his music, in which the lyrics often take an anti-establishment stand.

SENEGAL
Local elections boycotted

The official Senegalese daily, Le Soleil, called the results of the municipal and rural elections of November 25 a great victory for the Socialist Party (PS) and for President Abdou Diouf. The PS made a clean sweep of the 37 municipalities and 318 rural districts, easily defeating their electoral opponents, the People’s Liberation Party (PLP), and the Democratic League/Movement for the Workers’ Party (I.D/MPT).

However, the 12 remaining opposition parties decided to boycott the elections, including the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) led by Abdoulaye Wade. The Independence and Labor Party (PIT) had originally declared its intention to participate, but withdrew a week before the vote, citing several electoral irregularities.

Diouf’s call for the elections to be held with “calm and justice” evidently failed to convince the opposition. As Wade said, “in the absence of guarantees of impartiality, we are leaving all the seats to the PS.”

SIERRA LEONE
Smuggling crackdown attempted

President Siaka Stevens has embarked on a new crackdown on smuggling, marked by the recent dismissal of Minister of State Chernor Maju.

Maju was found with gold dust and a bar of gold worth nearly $30,000 as he departed from Freetown for London recently. In addition to his dismissal, Maju was fined nearly $40,000.

The severe shortage of foreign exchange helped prompt the government’s measures against smugg-
Buhari has also encountered problems with the press outside of Nigeria. He denied a story in the London Observer in November that claimed "an attempt to assassinate the entire military leadership of Nigeria ended with the execution of 42 officers and men involved in the plot." The article said that the assassination was to have taken place on October 1, Nigerian Independence Day, and that celebrations were cancelled when the plot was uncovered.

However, the Nigerian government said that no such plot had been uncovered nor had any executions taken place. Government officials also denied the statement in the same article that there have been "repeated rumors of discontent among junior officers and NCOs" (non-commissioned officers) since Buhari seized power in a coup on December 31, 1983.

The Nigerian government described the article as part of the British media's "single-minded campaign," mounted last January, "to embarrass Nigeria and discredit her government before the rest of the world."

BURKINA FASO
Pursuing an independent path

Eleven members of the Patriotic League for Development (LIPAD) were detained for interrogation in Ouagadougou in late October, including Soumane Touré, who is also leader of Burkina's largest trade union. All were released the following day, except Arba Diallo and Adama Touré, formerly ministers of foreign affairs and information respectively.

The pro-Soviet LIPAD, which had previously played an important role in supporting President Thomas Sankara, has in recent months more openly criticized the ruling National Council of the Revolution (CNR). Since the sacking of four LIPAD members from the government in August, LIPAD has been placed under surveillance and warned against anti-government activity.

The Sankara government has been determined to maintain a strict policy of non-alignment. Following Sankara's speech at the United Nations in October, blasting the West's attitude toward the Third World, the official daily paper, Sidwaya, strongly criticized the Soviet Union's aid policies. The editorial, entitled "The Proletarian Spirit," remarked: "No matter how often we sing the Internationale, the policy of 'nothing for nothing' always gets the upper hand. If Lenin were still alive, he would have sent us tractors... and engineers for the Bagre and Kompienga dams along with agronomists to develop our farms. We should therefore rely on our strength, because to rely on a big brother or big brothers of similar ideological affinity nowadays no longer constitutes a guarantee."

Mauritania
Taya takes over in coup

Army Chief of Staff Col. Maaouya Ould Sid’ Ahmed Taya seized power in a bloodless coup December 13 while President Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla was attending the Franco-African summit in Bujumbura, Burundi.

The purpose of the coup was to stop the "growth of personal power" in the government and to "re-establish the state's credibility," according to a broadcast communiqué. Reports from the capital of Nouakchott indicated that the coup caused no disruption of business or other activities.

The new leader was prime minister from 1981 until last March when he was shifted to army chief of staff in an extensive cabinet reshuffle. Col. Taya had tried to remove the military governor of Nouakchott, a close friend of Haidalla's, on charges of financial mismanagement. He and others who lost positions were considered no longer "unconditionally loyal" to Haidalla. A major issue in the reshuffle was Mauritania's recognition of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), Polisario's self-proclaimed government, which Col. Taya opposed.

Col. Taya had helped to overthrow President Moktar Ould Daddah in July 1978.

NIGERIA
Extra oil to continue

The Nigerian government intends to maintain its oil production at above the OPEC quota as one strategy in its continuing effort to restore the country's balance of payments.

OPEC had granted Nigeria a two-month increase in its daily quota last July—from 1.3 million barrels a day to 1.45 million by September. But Nigerian Oil Minister Dr. Tam David-West explained on November 8 that the temporary exemption was not long enough and that Nigeria would continue producing at the higher level for the foreseeable future.

He announced the over-quota plans after OPEC's emergency meeting where it agreed to lower its overall production quota by 1.4 million barrels a day in an effort to boost prices and reduce the international oil glut.

Nigeria had actually forced OPEC to hold the emergency meeting by breaking ranks with the official price structure. The government had reduced its price for Bonny light crude oil from $30 to $28 a barrel, in reaction to price reductions by Norway and Great Britain who produce a type of oil that competes with Nigeria's. Serious
FOOD RELIEF continued

with normal crop planting, but it closes off relief supply routes. Activities of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) have been a key factor in turning drought into famine in the southern province of Inhambane. Relief officials in Maputo say that a famine as severe as that which killed an estimated 100,000 Mozambicans last year is virtually unavoidable in the critical December through February period. They add that the international focus on Ethiopia has sharply diminished shipments of food to Mozambique.

Famine and fighting have forced massive migrations of local populations into the capital cities and relief camps or across borders into countries that also face food shortages. Up to 100,000 drought victims have crowded into the Chadian capital of N'djamena. In recent weeks, thousands of Chadians have fled to the Central African Republic and 150,000 to Sudan. During November, some 50,000 Ethiopians arrived in western Sudan and 50,000 more were reportedly on the move towards the western border. In Mauritania, an estimated 800,000 people have left their homes for relief camps.

The food picture is not entirely bleak. A good harvest along the coast in West Africa has eased the need for food relief in countries such as Ghana and Togo. In Zimbabwe, there has been a striking increase in farmers' productivity during the past year, partly due to unexpected rainfall last spring. There are hopes that Zimbabwe could again become self-sufficient in food production in the near future. And Swaziland will no longer need exceptional food aid during the 1984-85 season.

However, the FAO forecasts that the countries on the critical list will continue to need food relief for many months, even if harvests improve in the near future. In many regions, seeds for planting the next harvest have been eaten and fields and farm implements have been abandoned, so that there will be no crops even if the drought eases.

While pledging has accelerated since the famine began to receive greater publicity in October, the lag time between announcement of a donation and the arrival of the food is up to three months. Much of the food is expected to arrive too late to save thousands of people in the worst hit countries, especially children who are the most vulnerable.

BUHARI CONTINUES PRESS CRACKDOWN

Maj. Gen. Muhammadu Buhari has intensified his efforts to control the press by temporarily detaining another journalist who criticized the government and limiting the amount of newsprint that private newspapers can import.

The journalist, Duro Onabule, editor of the prominent Nigerian daily, the National Concord, had written a column in November criticizing Information Minister Emeka Omeruah for asserting that the Nigerian press is afflicted with a "bring down the government syndrome." The National Security Organization released Onabule after two weeks' detention. The government did not reveal the charges against him, but the Information Minister said he objected to the tone of the column and the number of times his name was mentioned.

Buhari also placed a strict limit on the funds that private newspapers can use to import newsprint and other essential materials. Newspapers published by the federal government, however, were allowed 10 times more, and state newspapers, three times more. The ruling has forced a number of publishers to reduce the size of their newspapers, many of them cutting the number of pages by one-half or one-third. They are also laying off staff.

The import restriction supplemented Decree Number 4, an earlier government ruling which provides prison sentences for journalists who publish false information about a government official or information that brings an official into contempt. Two journalists from another leading Nigerian newspaper, the Guardian, are serving one-year sentences under this decree. They are Nduka Iraboh, the assistant news editor, and Tunde Thompson, the senior diplomatic correspondent.

The Information Ministry claims the Nigerian press has become more responsible since the decree was issued, and that both the public and the government have more confidence in the press.

However, many Nigerians criticize these measures as an anti-press campaign, and tension between the government and the press is mounting. The directors' council of the Union of African Journalists, meeting in Cairo in late November, has called on the Buhari regime to release all journalists being detained without trial and pleaded in particular for the two journalists from the Guardian.

The restriction on newsprint was described as "petty blackmail" and "a direct insult to Nigerians" by the president of the National Association of Nigerian Students, Lanre Arogundadi. And the national president of the Nigerian Bar Association, Bola Ajibola, said that Decree 4 runs "afoul of fundamental human...
Anti-apartheid effort prompts reaction

The well-organized, continuing campaign of anti-apartheid protests at the South African embassy and consulates in cities across the U.S. has prompted several significant responses. The demonstrations, which began November 21 in Washington, D.C., have caused the American public to focus on the issue of racism in South Africa. U.S. leaders have been motivated to at least restate their opposition to apartheid. And a coalition of U.S. civil rights, labor, and religious groups has been revitalized around a common cause.

On December 7, President Reagan met with Nobel Peace Prize winner Bishop Desmond Tutu, the outspoken South African anti-apartheid campaigner, at the White House. The President later said at a news conference that his administration would not change its policy toward South Africa, which he insisted has made "sizeable progress" in persuading Pretoria to make changes. He added that "it wouldn't be quiet diplomacy anymore if I started talking about things openly."

Several days later, however, Reagan departed from quiet diplomacy by calling on South Africa "to reach out to its black majority by ending the forced removal of blacks from their communities and the detention without trial and lengthy imprisonment of black leaders."

Pressure on the administration to modify its policy has come from leaders in Reagan's own party, however. Senator Richard Lugar, the new chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said that the administration "needs to do more" to change Pretoria's policies toward South African blacks. And in early December, 35 Republican members of Congress told the South African ambassador that they would support sanctions against South Africa unless rapid progress is made toward ending apartheid. (The administration opposes economic sanctions toward South Africa.)

On the same day that Reagan and Tutu met, Pretoria announced the release of 16 political prisoners, five of them on bail. Among the group were several of the 21 black trade union leaders whose release has been among the demands made by the demonstrators. Another group of 12 political prisoners were released on December 10, but six were immediately charged with treason.

The leaders of the protest, which they call the Free South Africa Movement, have orchestrated picketing activities at the embassy and consulates to ensure maximum publicity. The idea for the embassy demonstration was initially proposed by Randall Robinson, executive director of Transafrica, a Washington group that lobbies on African issues.

Among those arrested in the protests have been members of the Congressional Black Caucus, labor union leaders, New York City and Washington politicians, and other civil rights activists. The protests have been held in Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, Mobile, and Seattle—all cities that have South African consulates or "honorary" consuls, as well as in Washington, D.C. and New York.

Several recent events have helped thrust the anti-apartheid movement into the limelight after years of sporadic protests and quiet, but intensive lobbying: the unrest and tough measures used to quell it in South Africa; the Republican-controlled Senate's killing of a trade bill that would have applied sanctions toward South Africa.)

Need for food relief escalates

While the famine in Ethiopia has drawn the lion's share of world attention in recent months, 20 other African nations also face widespread starvation. Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, Mauritania, and Mozambique are the worst hit countries.

As of December 5, donor nations had pledged 3.7 million metric tons of food compared to a total need for the coming year estimated at 5.2 million metric tons, according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

Suffering is especially acute in the Sahelian countries of Chad, Niger and Mali, because they are landlocked and thus isolated from the seaports where relief supplies are offloaded, and because they lie in that arid region of the continent where desertification is destroying the arable land.

In Chad, where the entire population is short of food, the need is estimated at 320,000 tons, but only 125,000 can be delivered because of transport difficulties. Donors have pledged 52,000 tons, FAO said. The UN Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) reports that 2,000 Chadians died from acute malnutrition from September through November. Because the border with Nigeria is closed, food supplies have to come through Cameroon, an overland journey that takes about three weeks. The Red Cross is establishing feeding centers for 100,000 Chadians, but warfare between government and rebel forces could interfere with the food relief effort.

In Mali, 61,000 tons out of a real need of 560,000 tons had been pledged by early December. The amount that can be delivered is only 200,000 tons. In Niger, donors had pledged 11 percent of the 475,000 tons needed. And Mauritania had received pledges for 20 percent of the 100,000 tons needed, according to FAO.

Warfare has exacerbated famine conditions in several countries, especially Chad, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. Not only does it interfere
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shore holdings in 1985-86, thus opening up extensive tracts to exploration. Known recoverable reserves are estimated at some 85 million tons, a level which could be easily doubled during the next few years by new exploration drilling.

The expanding presence of American oil groups in Gabon was both welcomed and encouraged by President Bongo who is fond of saying that "Gabon is not a French game reserve." Gabonese authorities intensified efforts to diversify economic partners after President François Mitterrand’s Socialist administration took office in mid-1981. Relations between Paris and Libreville became testy as Africanists in the French Socialist Party and former Minister of Cooperation and Development Jean-Pierre Cot frowned on the special Franco-Gabonese relationship and criticized Bongo’s method of exercising power. The crisis came to a head in 1983 when a French journalist published a highly critical book on Gabon and a representative of the Mouvement pour le Redressement National (Morena) opposition movement was given time on French television. French authorities have made special efforts to smooth over this rift, inviting the Gabonese president for a state visit to France in October 1984, and giving him red carpet treatment.

France clearly intends to safeguard its vital economic and diplomatic interests in Gabon. In addition to Elf, French companies play a pivotal role in uranium and manganese mining consortiums, the forestry industry, banks, public works, and the commercial sector. Approximately 30,000 French citizens live and work in the country. Moreover, Gabon is a vital base for assuring strategic French interests throughout turbulent central Africa. There are 400 crack French paratroopers permanently stationed in Libreville, and the Gabonese capital served as a vital rear base for the French expeditionary force in Chad. France also maintains a number of jet fighters and observation aircraft at Libreville’s military airport.

President Bongo is also working to broaden diplomatic relations. He became the first African president welcomed by President Reagan in the White House during a 1981 trip to the United States. Plans are reportedly underway for another trip to Washington in 1985. A major purpose of his extensive travels in Western Europe and the Far East is to stimulate interest in Gabon’s investment opportunities. During the last months of 1984, for instance, the Gabonese leader visited West Germany, the Netherlands, South Korea, and Japan.

During these trips, discussions focused on development projects for the second half of the 1980s—a 300-megawatt nuclear power plant and a $1 billion iron ore mining scheme. Bongo has turned to other industrial powers with his demands for a small nuclear power plant, after the French proved reticent to arrange such a sale. Likewise, Gabon is competing with Senegal and Guinea for a new iron ore mine in the 1990s. The government is seeking to interest partners from the industrialized world to take equity participation in the future mining consortium and sign up for long-term supply contracts. Gabon, on its part, is prepared to finance a 200-mile extension of the trans-Gabon railway to reach the mines at Belinga. The ore would be exported through the planned minerals port at Owendo, close to the capital.

In the meantime, Gabon is counting on the completion of the second section of the trans-Gabon railway, from Boué to Franceville, at the end of 1986 to spur economic diversification. An immediate benefit will be to open virgin timberland for logging. In addition, Gabon’s manganese, currently exported through the Congolese port of Pointe Noir, will be gradually rerouted through Owendo. Another benefit will be the opportunity to upgrade agriculture, the weak spot in the economy, along the railroad line and in the Upper Ogooué plateau region around the town of Franceville, through agro-industrial and ranching activities.

“Gabon must learn to live more judiciously with its substantial oil and mineral wealth,” a Western economist in Libreville emphasizes, adding that many Gabonese do not fully grasp the implications of the fact that these are finite resources. While Gabon’s oil revenues are practically assured for the next few years, they must be assiduously transformed into economically viable, productive ventures outside the petroleum sector, for only in this way can the country’s prosperity be continued into the next century.
economic balance sheet. A memorandum from the government's financial advisors, the banking consortium of Kuhn Loeb Lehman Brothers, Lazard Frères, and S.G. Warburg, pegged Gabon's GDP growth in 1983 at 2.3 percent in real terms, with inflation easing and the employment situation continuing to recover. Overseas debt has also been reduced to manageable proportions. Confirming Gabon's liberal economic orientation, the development plan seeks to diversify the country's trade and investment partners. Achieving greater social justice is also a priority, as the government intends to assure a fairer sharing of national income among individuals and regions.

Gabon, however, still has far to go to overcome the structural weaknesses of its economy. Although the 1983 trade balance registered a massive $930 million surplus, the overall balance of payments was in deficit at $50 million. This was the result of a massive outflow of funds to pay for services, debt servicing remittances from expatriate workers, and the transfer of company profits. In addition, the lack of domestic investment opportunities, due to limited local markets and relatively costly production, caused the bulk of the petroleum-generated surplus to be transferred overseas. If oil revenues were to falter, Gabon's external accounts would suffer a severe setback and government revenues would dangerously contract.

State expenditures have recently shown a tendency to expand too fast, despite official calls for austerity. For example, state spending in 1983 was $980 million, up 27.6 percent from the previous year, while income dipped slightly to $1 billion. If this trend continues, the budget is liable to go into deficit. More troubling is the growing share of the budget being earmarked for non-productive activities—between 1980 and 1984, the cost of civil service salaries jumped from $60 million to $170 million. Many of the country's parastatal corporations continue to operate only because of generous subsidies, a situation which cannot be indefinitely prolonged.

Gabon's financial stability is therefore closely linked to the fluctuations of the oil industry and the evolution of the world petroleum market. Just a few years ago, the prevailing view was that the country's oil bubble would burst, with production dwindling to a trickle by the end of the 1980s. After reaching a peak of 11.3 million tons in 1976, output gradually slipped to a nadir of 7.6 million tons in 1981. With known reserves falling to hardly eight years' worth of production, it seemed that Gabon would soon face tough economic choices and a cutback in its high living style.

It was the foot-dragging of the French state-controlled Elf Aquitaine group, which accounts for some 80 percent of oil production and holds approximately 75 percent of all exploration acreage, that led to the dangerous depletion of Gabon's oil reserves at the end of the 1970s. Gabon was the lynchpin of Elf's international success, but the French company has downgraded the country in its revised strategy, assigning more priority to operations in the North Sea, the United States, and Angola. On its older holdings, Elf benefited from long-standing concession agreements, enabling it to chalk up profits which made it the envy of the other oil concerns working under production-sharing terms.

In an effort to expand and diversify the oil industry, President Omar Bongo turned to the United States to seek out new partners. Armand Hammer, the head of Occidental Petroleum, played an advisory role in the 1979 creation of the Gabonese state oil company, Petrogab. The availability of offshore acreage first attracted Standard Oil of Indiana (Amoco). The Chicago-based firm picked up permits formerly explored and abandoned by Elf. Since 1980, Amoco has achieved an impressive track record: Six of its first eight exploration wells hit oil. The company's West Oguedjo field came on stream during the summer of 1983 and should be producing at least 1.5 million tons a year by 1985. Amoco has other hydrocarbon possibilities which it will be exploring during the next few years.

Amoco's success kindled interest in Gabon's untapped potential. The Tenneco conglomerate of Houston was next to move onto the scene. It too discovered oil on a block abandoned by Elf. Its Obando Marine deposit could be brought into production by 1986 at around the output level of Amoco's field.

Thus, Gabon should be able, in 1984 and 1985, to keep production around 9 million tons per year. The eventual tapping of Tenneco's find will mean that capacity will rise above 10 million tons per year in 1986, for the first time since the end of the 1970s. The offensive of American companies has kept Elf and Shell on their toes: Both boosted investment to maintain productive capacity at 6 million tons per year and 1.5 million, respectively.

Industry sources in Libreville do not expect that large Middle Eastern-type discoveries will be made in Gabon because of the subsoil's geological characteristics. Numerous smaller fields tend to be situated in offshore salt domes. But the stringing together of these small deposits can mean profitable operations if companies have the technical capacity to operate under such conditions and are willing to take the risk. As new acreage becomes available in 1985, American oil companies are expected to be the main beneficiaries of government grants. This is probably only the start; Elf must relinquish about half its off-
The Economic Outlook

Over the last decade, Gabon has achieved a high rate of growth, thanks to its substantial oil and mineral wealth and liberal economic policies. Careful planning to manage revenues earned from its finite natural resources will be required, however, if Gabon's prosperity is to continue into the future.

BY HOWARD SCHISSEL

Gabon is a rare exception in Africa. On a continent where most economies are in severe crisis and the outlook is bleak for growth and improvement in the standard of living, the one million inhabitants of this central African state can look to the future with well-founded hope. Gabon's economic planners must, however, avoid a repetition of past economic miscalculations and pave the way for the approaching post-oil era.

The key to its fortune is a fabulously wealthy subsoil. Gabon is sub-Saharan Africa's third largest oil producer, behind Nigeria and Angola, and one of four African members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). It is the continent's second largest source of manganese after South Africa, holding about 25 percent of the world's known reserves of this key mineral. It ranks fourth in both uranium exports and tropical wood supplies, and second only to Zaire in untapped reserves of timber. These abundant resources provide sufficient income to give Gabon a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of about $3,000, the second highest in Africa.

Long considered an obscure colonial backwater, Gabon experienced an economic metamorphosis after the oil price boom of 1973-74. Oil revenues quadrupled, providing Gabon with the financial means to move its economic development plans into high gear. The sudden inflow of seemingly limitless petro-dollars apparently went to the heads of Gabonese economic planners. The country rushed into a highly speculative building boom as well as an excessive number of costly, ambitious development schemes, many of which had to be eventually abandoned.

The 1977 Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit conference in Libreville capped this spending spree, just as the fortunes of the oil market drastically shifted. The impressive 42 percent GDP growth rate of 1976 turned into declines of 18 percent the following year and 30.4 percent in 1978. Extravagant spending between 1974 and 1976 had accelerated inflation, distorted income distribution, and sent the foreign debt soaring.

As a result, the government had to implement a painful stabilization program in 1978 and 1979, slowing the pace of economic activity and reducing the imports of non-essential goods. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) supported Gabon's initiative with a one-year standby arrangement. The belt-tightening exercise helped the country improve its financial position. And the oil price rise of 1979-80 was a crucial fillip in Gabon's economic recovery, as GDP more than doubled between 1979 and 1983.

Gabon learned a bitter lesson from the economic pinch of the late 1970s. The authorities came to see that development could not be equated with expensive prestige projects that looked good on paper but were inappropriate for local economic and social realities. As austerity was cautiously loosened, an interim development plan was introduced for the 1980-82 period. Its goals were to diversify the economy and use the country's resources more efficiently, while maintaining price stability, reducing the external debt burden, reinforcing currency reserves, and closing the gap in income distribution. While the final touches were being made to the fifth five-year development plan (1984-88), the interim plan was extended for one more year into 1983.

On the eve of the launching of the new plan, Gabon presented a fairly solid...
President Mitterrand himself finally decided against it. In any case, ANC guerrillas cut short the debate by sabotaging the building site in Koeberg, delaying the completion of the plant, while South Africa’s own financial strains postponed any decision on building a second nuclear complex.

The French government is still divided on the issue of sanctions, and Cheysson, despite his opposition to the nuclear deal, did not favor a total economic boycott. He explained his stand in a recent speech to the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid in New York.

Referring to frequent calls in the UN for economic sanctions, Cheysson said: “I warn you against this attitude, as one must, on the contrary, talk to the South Africans, show them that their attitude is morally unacceptable, politically dangerous, spiritually scandalous. . . I must also stress that such measures would hardly be effective, and could even be counter-productive. . . History has shown that no embargo has succeeded when directed against countries with large resources, while their weaker neighbors which are affected suffer in a terrible way.” This was a moderate conclusion to an otherwise harsh and emotional speech against the apartheid regime.

In the same speech, the former minister also claimed that France’s condemnation of apartheid and its contacts with the liberation movements “have a direct bearing on our commercial and economic relations with South Africa.” He said trade went down by 27 percent in 1982 and 1983, with the same trend continuing in 1984. Economic sources in Paris point out, however, that this reduction is largely due to the completion of big contracts such as the nuclear plant and the delivery of Airbus planes, and to the South African and French recessions.

France remains South Africa’s fifth largest trading partner, and no official decision has been taken to discourage trade or even investments in South Africa—even from state-owned companies. “South Africa is a good credit risk, let’s be realists,” a French official commented. This attitude is shared by executives of the French nationalized banking sector, who still provide loans to South Africa.

Despite all these factors, the Socialist Party has not reduced its commitment to its political objectives. The party was the main driving force behind September’s meeting in Arusha, Tanzania, of a Socialist International conference in support of the frontline states. The meeting, attended by most frontline state presidents and leaders of southern Africa’s liberation movements, was aimed at rallying political support for the black-ruled states among Western Europe’s democratic socialist parties, some of which are in power (in Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, and Sweden).

The joint communiqué signed by “the Socialist International, the governing parties of the frontline states, and the national liberation movements of ANC and Swapo,” takes a hard line on the problems of southern Africa, contradicting the more conciliatory approach some of the frontline states have adopted in practice. It strongly condemns South Africa’s apartheid policy, which it says is “at the root of the problems in southern Africa,” and the destabilization of neighboring countries by the Pretoria regime.

It also “rejects the present U.S. policy of constructive engagement, which reinforces racist South Africa’s policy of a constellation of states in southern Africa,” and underscores that the “problems in the region should not be perceived in the context of the East-West conflict or super-power rivalry.” Finally, the top-level conference, which included several European prime ministers such as Mario Soares of Portugal and Olof Palme of Sweden, called for “increased pressure on South Africa in the form of comprehensive binding international sanctions, adopted by the UN Security Council.”

This tough line, supported by the French Socialist Party, whose southern Africa specialist, Jean-Bernard Curial, devoted much effort to getting the Arusha conference off the ground, is, however, far from a reflection of French government attitudes on those issues. Curial himself admitted in an interview that the government was doing “less than it should, but more than what is being said, on the South African problem.”

Undoubtedly, in over three years in power, the Socialists have moved away from the attitude of previous French governments, which was one of tacit collaboration with the Pretoria regime, even if they officially condemned apartheid. The Socialists’ condemnation of South Africa’s policies is genuine, as is their wish to demonstrate solidarity with the frontline states and the liberation movements.

But the combination of unfavorable economic conditions in France, the size of the country’s commitments in francophone Africa, as well as the lack of political determination at the governmental level and the absence of public pressure, have limited the impact of French moves in southern Africa. They have also limited the potential confrontation with the Reagan administration, whose approach to the region is radically different. Nevertheless, government and Socialist Party officials insist on being credited with a more progressive policy toward southern Africa than any other major Western country at present—a modest compensation for those who had hoped for stronger action from a left-wing government in Paris.
Cheysson announced with no advance warning that France was suspending its participation in the Contact Group which, he said, had been "hijacked" by the U.S. His statement apparently followed approaches by Angola, and was aimed at speeding up the tough negotiations on Namibia's future.

Angola and Swapo were quick to congratulate the French for their decision, even if Namibian nationalists privately complained that France's brave words did not really match its actions. In particular—contrary to electoral promises—France still imports uranium from Namibia's Rossing mine, in which the French state-owned Minatomé Company still holds a minority share.

After denouncing quite strongly the American and South African insistence on linkage between the Namibian and Cuban issues, French policy also evolved on that front. "We had three possible options," a French official explained. "One, we accept the status quo and we wait; two, we reject it; three, after stating our principles, we look for a way out of the deadlock, and that's what has been happening in the past two years. France has made proposals each time it has been asked."

Despite its denunciation of the Contact Group, France has maintained close liaison with U.S. officials, particularly with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Frank Wisner, the State Department's number-two man on African affairs. Once again, France is both a rival and a partner of the United States, an ambiguous status that often creates tensions and misunderstandings between the two capitals.

The main difference in analysis probably concerns South Africa itself, the biggest problem of the sub-continent. The present French government does not believe the Pretoria regime is moving away from apartheid. It therefore does not trust the policy of "constructive engagement" followed by Washington. The Socialist government has, however, developed no alternative policy, and has not been able to change the country's involvement in South Africa as much as initial statements would have suggested. This relative passivity is being helped by the fact that South Africa is not an issue of French public concern. A tiny anti-apartheid movement is trying to campaign against the Pretoria regime, and has been increasingly critical of the Socialist administration.

The two sensitive matters in Franco-South African relations are trade and sport. The French government moved swiftly on the second front, banning a rugby tour of South Africa by the "Tricolore" national team in 1982. The move was highly unpopular with the French public, eager to watch the confrontation between its own team and the famous Springboks, whatever moral or political considerations might have been involved. The government was also accused of "hypocrisy" for not taking the same strong action in the economic sector.

After his election in 1981, President Mitterrand decided to respect all contracts signed prior to his term in office, except for armaments. This meant the completion of South Africa's first nuclear plant in Koeberg, near Cape Town, by a French consortium of companies. Renouncing the contract, which had been severely condemned by the opposition Socialist Party at the time of its signing in 1976, would have cost France an estimated $1 billion, an amount no government can write off.

The issue became more complicated and discussion more heated a year later after unofficial South African approaches to France to build a second nuclear plant. The French cabinet was said to be deeply divided on the issue. Some Socialist ministers, including Jean-Pierre Chevènement, head of the ruling party's left wing, wanted to accept the contract because of the number of jobs it would have created for French citizens. Cheysson, however, was bitterly opposed, and made his opposition public in a letter to the French anti-apartheid movement which was rapidly leaked to the press. The Socialist Party also publicly opposed such a contract, which would have ruined the country's credibility in
liberation movements. The government, therefore, lacks a center of coordination and decision-making, and even information dissemination on the region. Its policy in southern Africa, beyond broad principles, is merely made up of diplomatic "coups," which are often due to personal initiatives. This was the case with Cheysson's announcement of France's suspension of its membership in the Contact Group on Namibia—a decision which took his own staff by surprise.

It is in policies toward the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique that the most spectacular changes have occurred during the past three years of Socialist government in Paris. A rapprochement had already been initiated during the latter days of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's mandate, particularly with the government in Luanda. France had previously been suspected—with ample evidence—of supporting Unita rebels against the government, as well as secessionist groups in the oil-rich Cabinda enclave.

Mitterrand, however, very rapidly established close working relations with the ruling MPLA, giving it a much-needed opening to the West at a time of strained relations with Portugal and hostility from the Reagan administration. A few months after Mitterrand's election, the Angolan head of state, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, was officially welcomed in Paris, and France increased its financial and diplomatic support.

The first two cooperation agreements signed by the new Socialist government with African countries were with Mozambique in December 1981 and Angola in July 1982. Commercial relations quickly developed with Angola, where the French state-owned oil company, Elf Aquitaine, made important offshore discoveries. France also supplied armed Alouette helicopters to the Angolan armed forces, and negotiated the sale of more advanced Ecureuil helicopters for anti-guerrilla operations. This move was bitterly denounced by Unita leader Jonas Savimbi.

France's own limitations were, however, quickly reached when Angola, whose finances are hard-pressed by its heavy military burden, started having payment difficulties. The French treasury refused to increase its commitments toward Angola, much to the dissatisfaction of French businessmen eager to keep their privileged positions in the potentially rich Angolan market.

When dos Santos visited Paris again last September, he was disappointed by France's inability to increase its financial involvement in his country. Dos Santos nevertheless praised Mitterrand's policies toward Angola and southern Africa in general, and there can be little doubt that he considers France to be Angola's strongest ally in the West. However, the Angolans have expressed their disappointment in Mitterrand's failure to visit Luanda—a trip that has not yet materialized.

The same undoubtedly applies to Mozambique. With less economic appeal than Angola, it took longer for Mozambique and France to improve their relations. In 1983, however, Mozambique asked France for aid in dealing with its increasing domestic difficulties—the South African-backed rebel movement, the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), and a devastating drought and famine. Contact was mainly established through Jean-Bernard Curial, the French Socialist Party's southern Africa specialist, who developed close relations with Jacinto Veloso, President Samora Machel's right-hand man.

France mobilized international support for Mozambique—particularly at the European level—at a time when the Soviet Union, upset by the obvious shifts in Maputo's policy, was putting pressure on the country. President Machel visited France for the first time in October 1983, and was promised support in all fields. Credit lines were opened to Mozambique, and shortly after, 20 million francs worth of military equipment was sent to Maputo.

During the same European tour, Machel announced his country's wish to join the Lomé Convention, which links the European Economic Community (EEC) to countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, illustrating a new sign of his willingness to establish closer relations with the West. This decision was the result of lengthy negotiations with the EEC Commissioner for Development, Edgar Pisani, a French Socialist. Mozambique also asked France to assist in coordinating talks aimed at rescheduling its external debt. Commenting on these actions, a French official recently claimed that France was currently the only country trusted by all the frontline states.

All this did not, however, prevent Mozambique from signing the Nkomati agreement with South Africa in March 1984, a move that created unease in French government circles. A Socialist official even blamed the signing of the pact, which humiliated the country without solving its problems, on France's inability to come fully to Mozambique's rescue. "If we had the means, Nkomati could have been a very different thing," the official commented.

This incapacity to back up diplomatic initiatives with financial muscle is seen in Paris as the main handicap in France's stated intention to influence events in southern Africa. In the case of both Angola and Mozambique, French Socialists have been enthusiastic supporters of their attempts to move away from Soviet influence and maintain a more strictly non-aligned stand. They also oppose what they see as an American obsession with viewing southern Africa in terms of the East-West confrontation, particularly on the Cuban issue.

But France was not able to play as big a role as it would have liked, particularly with American involvement in negotiating the Nkomati and Lusaka agreements between South Africa, and Mozambique and Angola respectively. This has created resentment in Paris where some officials feel their initial actions only paved the way for American diplomacy.

Namibia quickly became a minor bone of contention between Paris and Washington following the Socialist victory in France. The two countries have different starting points: France recognizes the "legitimacy" of Swapo's struggle for independence and feels any settlement will have to be made with the liberation movement at its center. It also fully supports UN resolution 435, and refuses in principle linkage between Namibia's independence and the Cuban presence in Angola.

In 1981, the new French government announced it would remain a member of the Western Contact Group on Namibia at the request of its "African friends," and that it would be their advocate in that U.S.-dominated club. Two years later, former External Affairs Minister
a UN conference on sanctions against South Africa, held at the UNESCO headquarters in Paris. Speaking to the same audience the following day, however, Claude Cheysson did not commit himself further than a vigorous condemnation of apartheid.

Southern Africa was seen by the French Socialist leadership as an “easy” problem, in the sense that it was an issue for which they had no difficulty in choosing sides. Furthermore, France’s image in the region was mainly that of South Africa’s supplier of weapons and nuclear technology, so the new government had an open field to demonstrate its progressive approach. This became all the more necessary as the rest of the government’s African policy—toward the francophone countries—would not change much.

Following its 1981 victory, the Socialist government decided officially that it would devote more attention to southern Africa as part of a redeployment of its interests on the continent. Very rapidly, however, President Mitterrand chose to concentrate instead on what he called the “green pastures” of French influence in Africa, namely the francophone countries. His southern Africa policy suffered, despite the sub-continent being the only region where France remains active outside of its former colonies.

The new government’s approach to southern Africa lacked two key elements: the means to back up any diplomatic initiative, and a clear definition of France’s objectives in the region. Heavily committed financially in francophone Africa—containing some of the poorest countries in the world—the government could not, in these times of economic crisis and budget austerity, increase its involvement in southern Africa as much as it would have. This has certainly handicapped its relations with Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, and has limited its capacity to give up its lucrative business with South Africa.

It has always been difficult to assess France’s Africa policy. Decision-making in that key sector of the country’s foreign policy comes from several different offices, even if the final word on major issues comes from Elysée Palace—the president himself. The ministries of external relations and of cooperation and development, and of course Elysée’s own “Africa Bureau” headed by Guy Penne and his deputy, Jean Christophe Mitterrand, the president’s son, have conflicting views, as was illustrated by the Chad conflict.

In the case of southern Africa, one must also add to the list the ruling Socialist Party, which plays a great role vis-à-vis the frontline states and the national
Analysis

Socialist France and the Frontline

With François Mitterrand’s election in 1981, the Socialists pledged to reorder French policy priorities in southern Africa. But have domestic financial constraints and existing commitments to francophone Africa limited the fulfillment of their goals?

BY PIERRE HASKI

Two prominent South Africans visited France in May and June of 1984. The first, Prime Minister P.W. Botha, received a cold-shouldered reception. He was not even allowed in Paris, his visit limited to a World War I veterans ceremony in northern France. The French government was represented by the Junior Minister for War Veterans, Jean Laurain, and no other cabinet minister met Botha during his brief stay. It was the South African prime minister’s worst reception during an otherwise rather successful European tour aimed at breaking his country’s international isolation.

A few weeks later, however, the French government gave red carpet treatment to another South African politician, this time a black leader, Oliver Tambo, head of the outlawed African National Congress (ANC). Tambo met with several high-ranking French officials, including former External Affairs Minister Claude Cheysson, and presidential adviser for African affairs Guy Penne. It was an astonishing reception in a Western country for the leader of a movement engaged in an armed struggle with Soviet support, whose representatives in a “brother” country, Mozambique, had just been asked to leave.

Has France so clearly chosen its side in the southern African conflict? Is the Socialist administration of President François Mitterrand, in power since May 1981, fully committed to the support of the black liberation movements in that key region of Africa? A superficial look at the government’s statements and policy might give that impression.

Since its election, the Mitterrand government has made a number of gestures in that direction, such as the opening in Paris of offices for both the ANC and Namibia’s South West Africa People’s Organization (Swapo) with Socialist Party funds, the suspension of France’s participation in the Western Contact Group on Namibia in reaction to American insistence on the “linkage” issue, and the first deliveries of limited supplies of French armaments to the governments of Angola and Mozambique.

More recently, Cheysson was given a warm welcome by the militant United Nations Committee Against Apartheid in New York, where he made a rather emotional speech against the Pretoria regime. He compared apartheid to Nazism, describing as “unacceptable” the recent constitutional reforms in South Africa.

However, the reality of French policy in southern Africa is more complex. Before his election, Mitterrand committed himself to “revise” French relations with South Africa. In an interview published two weeks before his election, the Socialist Party candidate specifically referred to two aspects of a “new policy toward South Africa: on one side, economic sanctions against that regime, notably a total ban on French public and semi-public investments, and on aid to private investments, and on the other, development and security assistance to the frontline states and political support for the liberation movements.”

The Socialist Party itself, in a policy document on sub-Saharan Africa published to coincide with the May 1981 presidential election, was very clear: “A left-wing government must take immediate decisions to stop supporting the Pretoria regime through its financial and technical contributions. It will impose a ban on all public or semi-public investments in South Africa and in occupied Namibia. It will associate itself with economic sanctions decided upon by the United Nations. It will reduce in the shortest possible period, in view of technical difficulties, its imports from South Africa... The United Nations is the only legitimate authority in Namibia. A left-wing government would implement its resolutions, and would, in particular, stop all uranium imports from that country.”

A few days after the May 10 election, Mitterrand’s successor as the head of the Socialist Party, Lionel Jospin, confirmed these options in a speech before
a congress of one of Swapo’s political rivals, the South West African National Union, and urged unity of all parties against South African rule. How is your role as Secretary-General defined?

Toivo: Well, we can cooperate with those patriotic forces in the country to get rid of the South African regime. But if there are those parties who want to join Swapo entirely, they are welcome. If they want to maintain their identity and cooperate with us in demanding the implementation of resolution 435, that’s also good, we appreciate that. What we detest is that some of the groups of the oppressed people collaborate with the enemy and they join the enemy exercise, the multiparty conference, which prevents our independence.

Africa Report: Do you think that South Africa has pretty much given up on the Multi-Party Conference?

Toivo: Well, if they don’t get the support, they will give it up. If they don’t get support from the local people, they’ll give it up. You can recall that they had a ministers’ council. This ministers’ council went to the elections in 1978, which they called a “free and fair” election—and that was democracy according to them. Subsequently, they dismantled it themselves. Why? Because they realized it was of no use to them. It wasn’t serving the purpose they set for it. A similar thing will also happen to the Multi-Party Conference.

Africa Report: This is a quote from an interview you gave: “Even if Namibia is free of the oppression of the South African government, we will not be free so long as our brothers and sisters are living in oppression in South Africa.”

Toivo: Quite right. I still reiterate it. What I mean is that even if we are free, as long as our brothers and sisters in South Africa are in bondage to the apartheid regime, our freedom will just be a sham. This is the position of all the independent African states today who are really committed to the freedom and decolonization of all the African colonies which have been under colonial domination for years. And we have benefited ourselves from these states. And who are we to forget our brothers and sisters when we get our independence?

Africa Report: What can people in the West do, particularly in the United States, to help further the liberation of Namibia?

Toivo: As far as the people in the United States are concerned, what they can do is continue condemning the “linkage” brought about by the Reagan administration, which is irrelevant to the question of Namibia. Also, they must demand that the Reagan administration withdraw the so-called “liaison officers” in Namibia. They have no business to be there.

Africa Report: That is to say, the U.S. liaison office in Windhoek?

Toivo: Yes. They have no business being there. They are there in violation of United Nations resolutions. Because after 1971, when the International Court of Justice said the South Africa is in Namibia illegally, all the member-states were asked to sever their relationships with South Africa and not to interfere with the Namibia issue. And they were also requested not to have embassies or consulates in Namibia. Furthermore, the Americans must also help us by mobilizing the American people to understand the Namibian situation. They can also assist us politically, diplomatically, and materially. By materially I mean that they can collect some money which we can use in our settlements—while we are fighting, we must also improve the living conditions of our people, the refugees in the camps. We must buy medicine for them, and they must eat. This is what we need the money for. For instance, the socialist countries and the Nordic countries are supporting us in that field. The American people must also do the same, if they are really concerned with humanity.

Africa Report: One final question. Would you have preferred to see a Democratic administration? And, if so, why?

Toivo: That’s a big if! If Mondale had won, we would look forward to the decolonization of Namibia, because the Carter administration adopted resolution 435. Mondale himself was the vice president, and I’m sure if he had come into power he would take it upon himself to see that resolution 435, of which he’s a signatory, must be implemented.
A U.S. ally. I think here Reagan was mistaken, or perhaps he doesn’t know his history. During the Second World War, the present regime in South Africa was supporting the Nazis in Germany. I can’t see how he can call them allies in the war. And they were detained, including Vorster, who later became the prime minister of South Africa. I can’t see how Reagan can call them U.S. allies. I was there in the war, defending the so-called democracy, and we were promised that when the war was over, we would get our land. And he is calling me a terrorist, with all my compatriots. We also fought the war to defend democracy, and so-called white civilization. And not the South Africans, whom he calls his allies today.

Africa Report: On the question of the multinational corporations and their interests—minerals, and so on—in Namibia, you said one time that once Namibia is free from South African rule that the “exploitative economic agreements” with the multinational corporations will have to be revised.

Toivo: Exactly.

Africa Report: Does this mean that the companies have reason to fear a Swapo government?

Toivo: Well, that is up to them. All I am saying is, once Namibia is independent and it has a Swapo government, the contracts with those multinational companies have to be revised. Because as it is now, those multinational companies are paying their taxes to the South African government. All that they are getting from our country is used for their own benefit and South Africa’s. We, as indigenous people of Namibia, are not benefiting from this. That’s why we must revise the contracts, so that they can also benefit our people. We are fighting to improve the living conditions of our people. Our people have no schools, they have no hospitals, they have no proper housing. These are our concerns.

Africa Report: What about the relations that a Swapo government will have with the Western countries that are perceived as supporting the South African regime, particularly Britain, France, and the U.S.? How will Swapo regard them?

Toivo: That also will depend on the way those countries are going to behave. We are prepared to have good relations with all the governments throughout the world, on an equal basis.

Africa Report: No matter what they’ve done in the past?

Toivo: Well, that we’ll have to forget, because that is the past and we cannot go on clinging to the past.

Africa Report: What about relations with South Africa itself?

Toivo: The relationship with South Africa also depends on how they will behave. Because as it is now, Namibia is virtually a fifth province of South Africa. Economically, we are linked to South Africa. As a result, we will have to trade with South Africa, but this will be conducted on an equal basis. And we are not going to allow them to use their economic muscles to twist our arms.

Africa Report: But Namibia might then find itself in the position of Lesotho or Swaziland, being forced to sign non-aggression pacts with South Africa?

Toivo: That we will not do, sign a non-aggression pact with South Africa—that we shall never do.

Africa Report: Swapo has met openly with the South Africans, most recently in August, and it’s been reported that there have also been some secret meetings. How would you describe these face-to-face talks? Are they helpful, useful, or not?

Toivo: No, it was not helpful at all. We think the South Africans just wanted—perhaps with the assistance of the Reagan administration—to show the world that there were talks going on. But in fact there was nothing. For instance, after the Lusaka talks, we also had talks with the South Africans in Cape Verde. We were made to understand the talks would be private, and we were surprised that on the eve of the talks, South Africa broadcast that there would be talks between South Africa and Swapo. When the talks started, the South African so-called “administrator general” said that he was only given a mandate to discuss the cessation of hostility, and not the signing of a ceasefire, which we have always been ready to sign with the South Africans.

Africa Report: What was your attitude toward that?

Toivo: It was useless.

Africa Report: Do you think there is any prospect for future meetings with the South Africans, and if so, what would be your conditions?

Toivo: If they come forward and they want to discuss with us—providing they are serious—we can have discussions with them, on condition that we are only going to discuss the signing of a ceasefire which would pave the way for the implementation of resolution 435, which would also provide the decolonization of Namibia. It’s only then we can have discussions with them. Otherwise, we are not prepared to waste our time.

Africa Report: What effect has the Lusaka accord between South Africa and Angola, for the withdrawal of South African troops, had on Swapo militarily and politically?

Toivo: The accord between Angola and South Africa, that has nothing to do with Namibia nor has it anything to do with Swapo. So our position is just as it has been before the signing of the accord.

Africa Report: The supposed aim of it was to reduce Swapo infiltration into Namibia from southern Angola.

Toivo: That might have been the aim, but what I’m saying is that our position hasn’t changed.

Africa Report: Some say that because of the Lusaka accord and the Nkomati agreement between South Africa and Mozambique, and the negotiations between South Africa and its other neighbors, that Swapo and the South African liberation movements have lost ground in terms of political support.

Toivo: Well, to a certain extent. But you can see yourself that the Nkomati accord had a serious effect on the African National Congress. We must remember, though, that the oppressed people of South Africa are inside the country and they are still being oppressed. The people of South Africa, they know how to handle this issue. It is for the ANC now to find new methods of fighting the South African regime.

Africa Report: Do you think that the accords have had any effect on Swapo in the sense that the frontline states and the OAU have not criticized Mozambique or Angola?

Toivo: No, we are still getting support from the OAU member-states. I’m hoping that support will also be endorsed in the Addis Ababa summit. Because they reiterated, or reaffirmed, their support for our course here in the General Assembly.

Africa Report: A question about your role as Secretary-General of Swapo. For example, in September you addressed
Interview

Andimba Toivo ya Toivo
Secretary-General
South West Africa People's Organization

Andimba Toivo ya Toivo spoke to Africa Report about the current status of negotiations to achieve Namibian independence and Swapo's view of American policy in southern Africa in light of President Reagan's re-election. The Swapo co-founder, charged under South Africa's Terrorism Act and imprisoned on Robben Island for more than 16 years, was released in February 1984.

INTERVIEWED BY JOSEPH MARGOLIS

Africa Report: The Reagan administration's negotiations with South Africa on the independence of Namibia have been going on for almost four years. What is your view of these negotiations?

Toivo: As far as we are concerned, the Reagan administration and South Africa were not serious in their negotiations. In fact, Reagan just came in to save the South Africans from the situation in which they were entangled. I think Reagan realized the South Africans were going to be humiliated and he went to their assistance; and in fact before Reagan came into power, after he was elected, the South Africans realized that they had an ally on whom they could rely, and they were dragging their feet—knowing that Reagan was their man. Once he was in power, they could delay the independence of Namibia, and this is exactly what happened. We are now told that there is a "linkage," which has been introduced by the Reagan administration. We totally reject this "linkage," because when resolution 435 was adopted in 1978, all the parties concerned, i.e. the Contact Group, as well as other parties including my own organization, Swapo, accepted resolution 435 as the only basis for the decolonization of Namibia. And the Cuban troops were already in Angola. None of the parties concerned raised the presence of the Cuban troops in Angola. The Cuban troops went to Angola on the invitation of the Angolan government to assist them—to beat back the invasion of South Africa and its allies. We therefore feel that the Cuban presence in Angola is an issue which concerns only Angola and Cuba.

Africa Report: Recently, the Americans have been negotiating with the Angolans again, and reportedly the Angolans have expressed willingness to phase out a good portion of the Cuban troop force. Are you optimistic that these negotiations might lead to a quick implementation of resolution 435?

Toivo: I have no text of the present negotiations. But what I know is that the Angolans haven't changed from their original position—which is that the Angolans would be prepared to let the Cuban troops withdraw from Angola in stages under four conditions. One, South Africa must stop supporting Unita; two, South African troops must be withdrawn from Angolan soil; three, the implementation of resolution 435 for the decolonization of Namibia must be set in process; and then the last one, the South African troops must start crossing the Orange River into South Africa. It's only then the Angolan government can consider letting the Cuban forces withdraw from Angola in stages.

Africa Report: What do you expect in the long-term from future negotiations with the Reagan administration and the other Contact Group members?

Toivo: With Reagan re-elected I think we are going to face another protracted negotiation. I don't see that these negotiations will bear tangible fruits at all, because with Reagan re-elected, that will embolden the South Africans once again. I don't think they will move, because we see that South Africa is not really prepared to leave Namibia. The alternative is that we will only continue with the fighting. That's all we can do.

Africa Report: Why do you think that the South Africans have been so intransigent over the decolonization of Namibia?

Toivo: There are various reasons, I think. Firstly, the Western countries, including the United States, have huge investments in both South Africa and Namibia. Secondly, Reagan, when he came into power in 1981, made it categorically clear that he was not going to abandon South Africa, which has been
effort to legitimize South Africa's occupation, that its officers are collaborating with Pretoria against Swapo , and that it is jeopardizing any rapid movement toward the implementation of resolution 435.

A study of USLO reveals that it was established to play a facilitative role with the Joint Monitoring Commission in Angola, but has engaged in activities beyond that mandate, meeting regularly with only South African defense personnel, other South African officials, and MFC representatives. The same mission could easily have been carried out by U.S. embassy personnel based in Lusaka, Gaborone, or Pretoria who could visit the JMC periodically when needed. USLO officers in Namibia have not met once with the JMC in their entire tenure. Swapo's persistent demands for the closure of this office have been ignored.

Members of Congress have also raised concerns over this office, which violates several Security Council resolutions, and are contemplating legislative action. At a symposium on Namibia at the UN in November 1984, a suggestion was made that the UN should have an office in Namibia, given that it has legal responsibility for the territory, not the United States.

The current U.S. policy on Namibia is based on working (almost exclusively) with South Africa toward an acceptable settlement that will not harm Pretoria's interests. This approach has led the U.S. into an ever closer embrace with the white minority regime in South Africa and has resulted in the joint obstruction of Namibia's independence because Pretoria views it as contrary to its interests and because the U.S. has a greater interest in holding Namibia hostage to a Cuban troop withdrawal. The sad reality of the current bilateral diplomacy on Namibia seems to be, as one State Department official said, "There is nothing any Namibian can do to change the situation; it's up to us and the South Africans."

In the final analysis, the Reagan administration's perception of South Africa—as a bulwark against communism, reliable producer of strategic minerals required by the U.S., protector of the Cape sea lanes, and the center of a free enterprise system encompassing all of southern Africa—will lead toward South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia and repression of its people. If the administration is unable to see it in the American national interest to support international law and the right of self-determination in Namibia, a peacefully negotiated settlement, initiated seven years ago, will rapidly slide toward an escalation of the protracted and costly military struggle.

If the administration is disinclined to pressure South Africa to accept an independent Namibia based on the implementation of resolution 435, then chances for a peaceful solution will be lost altogether. It will be unfortunate for the people of the United States to share the responsibility for the continued subjugation of Namibians, who simply aspire to the goals we as Americans have achieved and proclaim to universally endorse: the fundamental right of self-determination. It will be more than unfortunate for the people of Namibia.
bía and parts of southern Angola as well as its repeated invasions and its support for Unita anti-government attacks.

If Washington does indeed accept this Angolan viewpoint, it suggests that the U.S. is now willing to give more consideration to Angola's security needs than it has in the past. But it is questionable whether the Reagan administration can provide sufficient security guarantees to Angola to persuade them to significantly weaken their current position. Additional questions which could impede this process are: South Africa's continued support for Unita; Unita's demand to be involved in the negotiations; and, Washington's political support for Unita manifested in statements which argue that the Angolan government should seek some type of national reconciliation with that group. Unita itself may envision trying to take over southern Angola once the Cuban troops are redeployed to the north as outlined in the Angolan proposal. Clearly, the emphasis on the Cuban withdrawal has almost totally obscured the urgent call of the Namibian people for their independence.

Aside from the whole U.S. policy emphasis on Angola, South Africa has taken a number of steps inside Namibia itself, which continue to cast doubt on its willingness to settle regardless of a Cuban withdrawal agreement. South Africa has extended to Namibia the South African Defense Act by which all Namibian men between the ages of 17 to 55 are to be forcibly conscripted into the South African Defense Force (SADF), and its newer branch in Namibia, the South West African Territorial Force. The creation of this force itself is viewed as another tactic by which Pretoria will seek to alter the implementation of 435 by demanding that these troops can't be withdrawn to South Africa because they are "Namibian."

Congressional staffers in Namibia last summer learned that the South African military is vigorously opposing a variety of elements in the implementation plan for Namibia's independence. Principle among their objections is any presence of UN military troops in the northern "operational area" during the transition leading up to elections. South Africa has created a variety of other "ethnically" based surrogate forces in Namibia which are viewed by many as sowing the seeds of destruction for years following the country's independence.

Finally, South Africa has, over the past year, embarked on yet another elaborate internal settlement plan based on the creation of a Multi-Party Conference (MPC), led by the white National Party in Namibia and the old white-led Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), which is advocating the writing of a constitution prior to elections and claims that resolution 435 is outdated and unnecessary for a settlement.

In talks in Lusaka last summer among South Africa, Swappo, and the MPC, an effort was made to get Swappo to abandon armed struggle and join the MPC inside the country in a government of "national unity" which would develop its own governmental arrangement before any elections. At this conference, however, Swappo gained the alliance of a variety of internal parties which rejected the MPC collaboration with South Africa. South Africa is continuing to try to strengthen the MPC during the prolonged postponement of independence, despite its lack of credibility. This is the old game at which South Africa has become so adept: stall the implementation of 435 and coerce segments of the Namibian population to advocate a different approach to independence requiring alterations in the implementation process.

During the past four years of "constructive engagement" and linkage, the Namibian people have suffered tremendous atrocities at the hands of the South African army and police, and they are no closer to their freedom than they were in 1980. The Council of Churches of Namibia has condemned linkage and demanded the immediate implementation of resolution 435. Swappo has demanded the same and continues its low level armed struggle, which it feels is imposed upon it by South Africa's intransigence and the international community's inability to significantly pressure South Africa to acquiesce on resolution 435.

Swappo is eager to sign a cease-fire under 435 and proceed to elections, which it is convinced (as are most observers) it will win with a significant majority. Swappo's popularity among the people of Namibia appears to be growing, not diminishing, and the internal parties which are not collaborating with South Africa have thrown their support behind Swappo. In all likelihood, the armed struggle will escalate in the absence of the implementation of 435, and the systemic South African violence against the people of Namibia continues undeterred by quiet diplomacy from Washington.
In addition, South Africa invaded Angola again in 1982 and continued to occupy parts of southern Angola, underscoring Luanda's security assistance needs and fueling charges of U.S. duplicity in the negotiations. The Reagan administration's primary objective of achieving a Cuban withdrawal as part of the Namibian settlement prevented it from seeking the implementation of 435 following the supposed completion of negotiations in 1982. Once again, Namibia's independence was postponed, caught in the middle of East-West conflict.

For all practical purposes, this represented the end of the Contact Group in every respect save its name. The U.S. became the sole arbiter in the negotiations, which had moved from a focus on Namibia to an obsession with Cubans in Angola, a condition rejected by the other four Western countries. A major criticism from Namibians has been that the U.S. has failed to differentiate between the legality of the Cuban presence in Angola and the illegality of the South African occupation of Namibia.

For South Africa, the linkage issue was a godsend. It transferred the responsibility for a Namibian settlement from Pretoria to Luanda and provided Pretoria with yet another four years to continue the search for an alternative to a settlement based on 435.

Throughout 1983, little was achieved toward a Namibian settlement, as the U.S. continued without success to gain an Angolan acceptance of some form of linkage. The Angolans had stated consistently that the Cubans would be withdrawn once Namibia was independent and the South African threat was removed. In early December, South Africa launched yet another massive invasion deep into Angola. Pretoria subsequently offered to negotiate a cease-fire and a total withdrawal agreement with Luanda, which the U.S. helped to negotiate in mid-February 1984. South Africa and Angola agreed to form a Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) to oversee the South African withdrawal from Angola and to effect a cease-fire along the Angola-Namibia border. While the Reagan administration claimed this to be a significant success of "constructive engagement," at most it would produce a return to the status quo of 1980.

For the remainder of 1984, the U.S. continued talks with Angola aimed at securing some form of Cuban withdrawal agreement. In early November, the Angolan government offered a slightly new position regarding a Cuban withdrawal in an effort to achieve a Namibian settlement. It is this proposal that has caused so much optimism at the State Department. American officials believe that it represents the first time the Angolan government has accepted the principle of linkage.

But upon closer inspection, the Angolan offer does not differ substantially from its previously stated position. For the first time, however, it does go into great detail on how a successful Namibian settlement would facilitate the gradual withdrawal of 20,000 of the 25,000 Cuban troops in Angola over a three-year period. It also offers, as a goodwill gesture, a repatriation of 5,000 of these troops once South Africa has reduced its military presence in Namibia to 1,500 troops as required under resolution 435.

The details of the proposal were made public in a letter from Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos to UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar. The South Africans countered by demanding that all Cuban troops be withdrawn 12 weeks after UN troops arrive in Namibia.

While these developments can objectively be called progress toward the U.S. objective of a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, and the proposals and counter-proposals are likely to continue, it is difficult to accept the argument that they represent an "end game" on the Namibian negotiations. It would be more accurate to describe this development as a new game and one likely to take months if not years to complete. If Washington believes that the new Angolan position represents an acceptance of linkage, even though Luanda continues to emphatically reject that term, it is equally implied that Washington has come to accept the Angolan view of the Cuban troop presence. Luanda has always emphasized the relationship between the Cuban presence in Angola and South Africa's occupation of Namibia.
tional proposals to guarantee white minority privileges in Namibia. They further accepted a comprehensive program, offered by the U.S., of a three-phase approach to the negotiations. The constitutional proposals and decisions on the electoral system constituted Phase I. Phase II would require negotiations on issues directly related to the implementation process, such as questions of the make-up of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) and monitoring of the armed forces of the contesting sides during the implementation and elections. Phase III consisted of the actual implementation of resolution 435. A timetable was offered which suggested that elections could be achieved by the end of 1982.

In August 1981, South Africa launched a massive invasion of Angola with widespread air and ground assaults. The international community condemned the invasion and called for the South Africans to withdraw. The United States cast the sole veto against a UN Security Council resolution condemning the invasion. South Africa withdrew but only to a southern salient in Angola which they continued to occupy throughout 1984.

Negotiations on Phase I continued well into 1982, but in June of that year the State Department announced that significant progress had been made and that there was a basis for optimism that the "end game" was near at hand. In a document entitled "Informal Summary of Points Presented by Contact Group—June 1982," the Western Five set forth their claims to progress and an outline for a rapid completion of the negotiations. The document stated that all Phase I issues had been settled, with the choice of the electoral system being tabled temporarily. Negotiation began on Phase II issues and rapidly reached a general conclusion. Most of the nations designated to participate in the military component of UNTAG were named and an upper limit of 7,500 troops was confirmed. A military monitoring mechanism appeared to be confirmed, and the impartiality issue was to be resolved through the language used in the reports to the Security Council from the secretary-general and the Contact Group, reaffirming a neutral UN role.

The negotiations were said to be practically finished, aside from details being worked out by the UN Secretariat. All that remained was for South Africa to choose between the two electoral systems (proportional representation or single-member constituencies). The Contact Group had already prepared a draft letter calling on the Security Council "to set in motion the implementation of resolution 435." Yet, the letter, which stated that "agreement has been reached among all parties concerned" to begin implementation, was never delivered. Its conveyance had been bogged down in the wash of U.S. insistence on a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, an issue that is neither part of resolution 435 nor within the mandate of the Contact Group in negotiating the UN settlement plan.

Though there had been a flurry of shuttle diplomacy between Washington and Luanda, no bilateral agreement had been achieved regarding a Cuban with-
End Game or Old Game?

Although the Reagan administration is expressing optimism at the latest round of negotiations, the Namibian people see American policy as jeopardizing the implementation of UN resolution 435.

BY SALIH ABDUL-RAHIM

For the past one hundred years the people of Namibia have been fighting for independence against the colonial occupation and plunder of their country. Since 1884, they have been denied their freedom and their humanity, first by the Germans and then by white South Africans. A recent congressional staff study mission to this disputed territory found that many Namibians are increasingly holding the United States responsible for the continued postponement of their liberation. They argue that for the past four years their freedom has been sacrificed to the Reagan administration’s policy of linking the termination of South Africa’s illegal occupation of Namibia to the removal of the Cuban military presence from Angola.

The current diplomacy on Namibia suggests that the territory’s independence is solely dependent on a “parallel” withdrawal of Cuban troops. Recently, however, officials of the Reagan administration have expressed a good deal of optimism regarding prospects for a settlement which would end South Africa’s presence in Namibia and facilitate the departure of Cubans from Angola as well. One senior State Department official has gone so far as to say that recent developments could represent, “the beginning of what could become an end game.”

But when four years of U.S. policy of “constructive engagement” with South Africa and the linkage approach to Namibia have failed to produce any settlement, it is necessary to question whether this period of optimism (the fourth such period in as many years) is founded on anything more than a desire to avoid recognizing “constructive engagement” as a significant policy failure with devastating consequences for the people of Namibia and South Africa.

Secondly, it is useful to evaluate whether any package proposal which includes some form of a Cuban withdrawal acceptable to the Angolan government will not be met with additional obstacles raised by a South African government that is unprepared and unwilling to withdraw its troops from Namibia. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is imperative to challenge the assumption that U.S. bilateral diplomacy has a greater chance of gaining South Africa’s acceptance of a Namibian settlement, absent any serious international pressures, than previous efforts which have all failed.

The initial success of the Contact Group (Britain, Canada, France, West Germany, and the U.S.) in developing an independence plan continued to raise the expectations of the long-suffering Namibian people. The plan was accepted by both South Africa and the South West Africa People’s Organization (Swapo), in 1978, and is embodied in UN Security Council Resolution 435. It provides for the reduction of South Africa’s military presence to 1,500 troops and internationally supervised elections for a constituent assembly empowered to write the new nation’s constitution. Between 1978 and the present, however, South Africa has repeatedly demonstrated its commitment to avoid the implementation of resolu-
the insurgents would receive several ministerial posts—a demand Mozambique refused even to consider. For its part, Machel's government had to accept the equal billing given to the MNR at the signing ceremonies and the fact that at least one MNR member would serve on the commission to be formed to monitor the cease-fire and to guarantee amnesty to the insurgents. South Africa also benefited by being able to claim to the international community that it was serving as peacemaker.

To be sure, many problems remain. The actual role of the cease-fire commission is ill-defined. Moreover, unless Pretoria forcibly pressures the MNR, there is little reason to believe that its leadership will accept the agreement. Mozambican officials fear that the MNR will intensify its military operations in order to improve its influence on the commission and that Pretoria's representatives to that body will stall its work in order to give the MNR this opportunity.

This fear seems well-founded since, one day after the agreement, Evo Fernandes, the Portuguese Secretary General of the MNR, proclaimed, “The war continues.” Even if South Africa and the MNR leadership act in good faith, however, they are believed by Western analysts in Maputo to control only 30 to 50 percent of the several thousand guerrillas operating in Mozambique, and, at the moment, there is little incentive for the remainder, who move in small autonomous bands, to put down their arms. Moreover, Mozambican officials report that on several occasions in November, the South Africans have resupplied by air MNR forces in the critical province of Inhambane. These reports were confirmed by the Western press and senior State Department officials.

In the last analysis, an effective cessation of hostilities will probably require the involvement of South African troops at least to monitor the cease-fire. The presence of South African soldiers in Mozambique raises a number of questions. Is the South African military prepared to abandon the MNR and to help disarm the insurgents if they refuse to comply with the agreement? How can the Mozambican government limit the role of the South Africans and guarantee that they do not actively promote destabilization? If South Africa abandons the MNR, what message will it be sending to Unita, its ally in Angola, and to the anti-government forces it reportedly supports in Zimbabwe and Lesotho?

Whatever the ambiguities for South Africa, however, President Machel maintains that “South Africa must destroy the monster it created.” If Pretoria does not fulfill its obligations, Mozambican leaders have warned that they will scrap the Nkomati agreement. In late October, Minister Cabaco told the Harare Sunday Mail that “if there is no result, then there is no reason for us to keep the agreement, and that is the view we have expressed to South Africa.”

Finally, there is the problem of Frelimo's long-term relations with the African National Congress, an historic ally. As part of the Nkomati agreement, Mozambique could no longer allow the liberation movement to use its territory as a base from which to launch attacks against South Africa. The ANC presence was drastically reduced, and it was only permitted to maintain a political presence in the country. For Frelimo, it was a strategic, if painful, concession. For the ANC, it was a major setback which initially generated much criticism of Mozambique. According to the ANC representative in Maputo, Jacob Nzuma, however, quiet negotiations have considerably improved relations between Frelimo and the ANC. After all, he concluded, “we share a common long-term objective and a common enemy.”

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said that South African intelligence used Portuguese import-export firms as a conduit to supply arms to the MNR. The Mozambicans also contend that South African agents operate freely from Malawi, providing MNR forces in central and northern Mozambique with war material. These claims seem to be borne out by the fact that, since the Nkomati accord, the fighting has been heaviest in those areas adjacent to the Malawian border. To try to stem this flow of men and arms, President Machel flew to Blantyre in October of this year where he met with President Banda and high-level Malawian military officials.

These immediate violations posed serious problems for Mozambique. Although the military situation had improved in the central part of the country, the MNR offensive continued in the strategic Maputo province and for the first time the insurgents had entered into Cabo Delgado in the extreme north of Mozambique, near Malawi. This enabled the MNR to score a propaganda victory by claiming that it was now fighting in all 10 Mozambican provinces. In the face of this escalating hostility, the economic crisis worsened. There were serious food shortages throughout the southern half of the country where it is estimated that more than 100,000 Mozambicans died from the famine last year.

Pretoria, too, faced serious problems in the post-Nkomati period. Its failure to enforce the non-aggression pact created difficulties at home and undercut South Africa's credibility in the larger international community. As previously noted, the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference condemned the MNR for committing atrocities and demanded that the Botha government cease supporting the MNR.

More importantly, powerful industrial and financial interests, which had applauded the Nkomati agreement, criticized the continued policy of destabilization as counter-productive. They saw increased trade and investment possibilities with Mozambique as a way for South Africa to reverse its deteriorating economic situation (by 1983, South Africa's international debt had shot up to $15 billion). Several large multinational corporations based in South Africa—most notably the Anglo-American Corporation which had begun negotiations with the Mozambican government to revitalize the once lucrative tourist industry as well as the port of Maputo—were informed in the spring that Mozambique would not sign any formal agreements until the problems of security had been resolved.

Explaining his government's refusal to finalize negotiations, Minister of Information José Luís Cabaço was quite blunt: "Frankly, it is the only weapon we have." Major South African trading firms, which were anxious to once again realize the approximately $8 per ton savings by trading through Maputo rather than Durban, also demanded that their government stop supporting the MNR.

Moreover, energy-starved South Africa, had additional reasons for peace. For example, recently discovered deposits of natural gas at Pande in southern Mozambique could easily be consumed by South African industry. Indeed, immediately after the Nkomati accord, South Africa and Mozambique had begun discussing the possibility of constructing a pipeline to South Africa. A stable government in Mozambique could help South Africa substantially reduce its energy problems, not only by providing natural gas, but by ensuring the uninterrupted flow of electricity from the large dam at Caborra Bassa, which the MNR has regularly disrupted. In addition, it appears likely that Mozambique has oil, both in the far north and off the southern coast. Although potentially beneficial to South Africa, this resource would not become accessible to Pretoria until there is peace.

South Africa's Western allies also pressured Pretoria to curtail MNR activities. Great Britain and the United States were especially dismayed at South Africa's reluctance to adhere to the terms of the non-aggression pact. According to Peter Jon de Vos, the American Ambassador to Mozambique, "We considered Nkomati a courageous step in which we served as an intermediary facilitating negotiations and at times pressuring each side." The unraveling of the Nkomati agreement would destroy the only modest triumph that the Reagan administration could claim to date from its much heralded policy of "constructive engagement," since it was clear that Washington had yet to resolve the Namibian question or to remove the Cubans from Angola. Moreover, the Reagan administration, which had given Mozambique 187,000 tons of food aid over the past two years to encourage it to continue pursuing an independent line, feared that the failure of Machel's diplomatic initiative might ultimately force him to succumb to the Soviet Union's request for the military bases that it had long sought.

Although such a decision would represent a serious setback in Frelimo's long-term effort to formulate an autonomous foreign policy, President Machel emphasized that any action would be considered as a means of ending the South African-backed attacks which "posed a threat to our national survival." Joaquim Chissano, Mozambique's foreign minister, was unequivocal on this point. "If international measures are not taken to stop South Africa from escalating its aggression, Mozambique may require more and more assistance from countries belonging to the Warsaw Pact. We know that only the socialist countries are supporting us against South African aggression. We are going to remain a socialist country." [See Africa Report, January-February 1983.]

After a number of unproductive bilateral sessions, Jacinto Veloso, the head of the Mozambican delegation, warned on September 27 that continuous MNR activity "could seriously endanger the Nkomati accord." Apparently, the South Africans took him at his word because negotiations began in Pretoria the following week.

Although the meetings were tense, both sides made the necessary concessions. South Africa, which at first had refused to take public responsibility for the MNR, finally did so. It also seems to have dropped the MNR's insistence on a government of national unity in which...
ships, and SAM 7s—were out-of-date and costly, a fact not lost on the Mozambicans. Moreover, there was growing dissatisfaction with the quality of the conventional military training provided by Eastern bloc advisors, which proved ineffectual against the MNR guerrillas. A leading member of the Frelimo Politburo also expressed concern that the Soviet Union was using its socialist ideology to infiltrate the state and party apparatus and promote its own superpower objectives.

South Africa's undeclared campaign of economic strangulation, together with the escalating MNR attacks, made a shambles of Mozambique's economy. Between 1975 and 1982, Mozambique lost $3.2 billion because South Africa slashed the number of Mozambicans working in its gold mines from 120,000 to 45,000 and ceased its long-standing practice of remitting their wages to the Mozambican government in gold at a preferential rate. During the same period, the young nation also lost $250 million in fees as a result of South Africa's reduction in the level of commerce moving through the port of Maputo from approximately 600 million to 100 million tons. Added to these woes were a number of natural disasters, including a prolonged drought, and serious state mismanagement in the agricultural and marketing sectors of the economy.

Mozambican analysts concluded that South Africa's deepening economic crisis brought about by the steep decline in the price of gold and the skyrocketing costs of petroleum would make Pretoria more receptive to peace overtures. By 1982, South Africa's balance of payments deficit was $505.6 million and its foreign debt, $13 million. At the end of that year, Mozambican officials, dangling new markets and investment possibilities as an incentive to negotiate, raised the prospect of a non-aggression pact.

Initially, South Africa rejected the proposal, instead offering aid to revitalize the Mozambican economy in return for Frelimo's expulsion of the ANC, a condition which Frelimo rejected. Only after a year-long campaign by Mozambique, aimed at convincing NATO governments that it was not a pawn of the Soviet Union and that the interests of the West were not served by allowing Pretoria to transform southern Africa into a new zone of Cold War conflict, did the West put pressure on Pretoria to reconsider Machel's proposals.

Senior South African and Mozambican officials met secretly in Swaziland in December 1983. After some difficult negotiations, which included a South African walkout after the Mozambican delegation denounced the long history of racist aggression, Pretoria finally accepted the idea of a non-aggression pact. On March 16, 1984, each side formally promised "not to allow its territory to be used for acts of war, aggression, or violence against the other state."

It is clear in retrospect, however, that hardline members of the South African military and security forces had no intention of living up to the agreement. Reluctant to see the MNR weakened significantly as a threat to Marxist Mozambique, South African intelligence, just before the March Nkomati agreement, stockpiled the MNR with enough military equipment to last for two years. At the same time, according to Western diplomats, between 1,200 and 1,500 MNR soldiers and paratroopers were infiltrated into the area surrounding Maputo, the capital, to create havoc and to increase South Africa's bargaining power in the post-Nkomati period.

Six months after the agreement was signed, Mozambican Vice Minister of Security Teodato Hunguana charged that the South African military was still sending hundreds of MNR troops into Mozambique and was continuing to resupply the insurgents already fighting there. Another high-level Mozambican
After the Nkomati Accord

Both Mozambique and South Africa want and need peace for very different reasons. But major problems remain to be solved, not the least of which is South Africa’s willingness to control the MNR.

BY ALLEN ISAACMAN

Mozambique’s President Samora Machel had just been briefed by his negotiating team upon its return from Pretoria in early October when he turned and said, “The South Africans must destroy the monster they created.” He was referring to the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR)—monstrous in the destruction that it has wrought in Mozambique. His comment suggests that he might accept South Africa’s offer to station troops in Mozambique to monitor the cease-fire agreement between Mozambique and the South African-backed MNR. It also raises the awkward prospect of Pretoria having to disarm its surrogates who are reluctant to abide by the agreement.

That such discussions are underway between Mozambique and South Africa indicates that both governments, for very different reasons, not only want but need peace.

Long-time enemies with antagonistic racial and social philosophies, Frelimo, Mozambique’s ruling party, and South Africa have been in conflict since 1964 when Frelimo nationalists began their fight for independence. Tensions have escalated steadily since then. On the eve of Mozambique’s independence in 1975, powerful forces within the South African military and the right-wing of the ruling Nationalist Party promoted plans to invade Mozambique to prevent Samora Machel and his revolutionary Frelimo party from coming to power. For its part, the new Mozambican government bitterly attacked South Africa’s racist policies and provided sanctuary and support for members of the African National Congress (ANC), who were committed to overthrowing the South African regime.

Relations deteriorated still further in 1979 when South African military intelligence took over formal control of the then Rhodesian-backed MNR and transferred its headquarters to the Transvaal, a northern province of South Africa, adjacent to Mozambique. Organized in 1976, the MNR was a creature of South African and Rhodesian security. Its members included Portuguese settlers and mercenaries, black and white colonial secret police agents, African members of the elite Portuguese special forces, and dissident Frelimo soldiers. [See Africa Report, November-December 1982.]

Both the Rhodesian and South African governments have used the MNR to unleash a reign of terror which has reached “a horrific level,” according to the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference, which met in Pretoria in September 1984. Their sentiment was echoed by a Western ambassador in Maputo who recently characterized the MNR as “a disparate group of gunslingers, thugs, white Portuguese opportunists, and other assorted anti-Frelimo types who lack any vision or program for the future.”

Given this long history of animosity, what are the factors that drove Mozambique and South Africa to the peace table and what are the long-term implications of the recently signed non-aggression pact for this strategic and volatile area of the world?

By 1982 Frelimo realized that peace was possible only if it reached some sort of accommodation with South Africa. At a closed meeting of the Frelimo Central Committee, one of Machel’s closest advisors reported that Mozambique was unable to contain the South African-backed MNR offensive begun two years earlier. MNR guerrillas were burning villages, plundering agricultural cooperatives, attacking railroad lines, disrupting commerce, and intimidating peasants, who demanded that the government protect them.

Faced with a deteriorating military situation, the leaders came to the stark realization that the socialist countries were either unwilling or unable to provide the military assistance Mozambique had been led to expect. Soviet weapons—with the exception of a handful of MIG-21s, MI-24 helicopter gun-
hopes of expanding output. Efforts are also being made to resuscitate private retail trade which collapsed with the lightning flight of the Portuguese at independence, and rural markets are being encouraged where farmers can swap surplus produce for industrial goods and supplies.

Were it not for the burgeoning oil industry, which registered an increase in production from 140,000 barrels a day in 1982 to 220,000 in 1984, the Angolan economy would have likely collapsed under the weight of war-time expenditures, as production of the second and third largest exports—diamonds and coffee—have continued to decline. But increasing oil output—which has made Angola Africa's second largest producer after Nigeria, and the U.S. its leading trade partner—cutbacks in imports, and other austerity measures have enabled Luanda to turn a 1982 balance of payments deficit of $8.8 million into a 1983 surplus of $4.7 million.

“We have taken tough courageous measures,” said de Matos. “We want peace, we want to develop our country, but we have to defend our political independence and territorial sovereignty. Nevertheless, I am personally optimistic about the future and we are creating conditions to justify that optimism.”

For a country which had one Angolan doctor in 1975 and has spent its entire post-independence history fighting off external invasion and externally supported guerrilla war, that it has been able to survive at all is almost a miracle. “We never went to a school to learn how to govern,” says Bishop Emilio de Carvalho. “The mistakes we have made since 1975 are precisely due to the fact that we had never been educated to govern the country. We are facing tremendous problems in this country, plus the war. We took over this country from scratch. What the Portuguese left are these buildings that you see here falling apart.”

Indeed, in 1984, the “Year of Defense and Production,” Angola’s problems are glaringly evident in the run-down capital of Luanda, where rotting garbage heaps and potholes filled with rancid water line the Marginal, the once fashionable palm tree-lined avenue that curves along Luanda bay. A hopelessly overburdened and overly centralized bureaucracy and the lack of skilled cadres makes progress painfully at best, and to the casual observer, non-existent. But forged out of years of struggle against colonialism and external aggression, this government exhibits a determination to succeed against all odds, which makes a mockery of the predictions of its imminent collapse or of its submission to South African or American regional designs.

President dos Santos’ latest proposals to end the impasse over Namibian independence, contained in his November letter to UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, have been variously explained as the Angolan government’s acceptance of “linkage,” or as evidence of a new pragmatic pro-Western tilt. In fact, they are nothing more than a refinement of the position the Angolan government has taken ever since the “linkage” issue was introduced into the southern African equation—a position outlined in the joint Angolan-Cuban statement of March 19, 1984.

By providing a concrete timetable for the withdrawal of the Cuban troops—one of the issues that had allegedly blocked progress on implementation of UN Security Council resolution 435—the Angolan government has thrown the diplomatic ball directly back where it belongs—in the American and South African court. It is now up to the Reagan administration to apply the requisite pressure on Pretoria to undertake serious negotiations which will lead to Namibian independence and peace in southern Africa.

The Americans and the South Africans have been operating on their own strategic agendas in southern Africa—for the U.S., the ultimate goal is the removal of Cuban forces; for Pretoria, postponing an inevitable Swapo victory in Namibia. Angola has been the unfortunate victim in the ensuing diplomatic game. However, as President dos Santos said in his letter to the UN Secretary-General, “Angola cannot make concessions which would be suicidal to its national integrity and its political and social process, forgetting the sacrifices made by tens and thousands of its finest sons and daughters.” Surviving for ten years in which it has known barely a day of peace, the Angolan government is not about to sell out its future.
it is sacrificed in the current round of regional negotiations, and is no doubt stacking up on weaponry and materiel should South Africa agree, at least officially, to the Angolan terms.

Indeed, few Angolans make a distinction between the war against Savimbi's Unita and the war against South Africa. Said Bishop de Carvalho, "The war with Unita is the war with South Africa. Unita is trained in South Africa, it is equipped by South Africa. Without South African interference, there would be no war in this country."

All the Unita POWs and deserters acknowledged the South African role in supplying and training the guerrillas, and even in coordinating joint military operations in southern Angola. Lucino Calopa, a peasant farmer who claimed he was kidnapped by Unita forces in Caluquembe, Huila province, spent five months at the Jamba base, and then was sent to the "Dirty City" training camp in Namibia, where his instructors were Angolan and South African.

Jona, one of the Unita deserters, reported that in January 1984, his unit participated in a five-day battle for Caiundo, in Cunene province, which was launched by South African bombing of the town. And government sources maintain that the mining of two ships in Luanda harbor in July, for which Unita claimed responsibility, was carried out by submarine, an obvious South African act.

Two South African battalions remain on Angolan territory south of Ngiva, 25 miles from the Namibian border. The war-shattered capital of Cunene province now hosts the Angolan-South African Joint Monitoring Commission, set up as part of the February Lusaka agreement, but only a hundred or so of its former 15,000 residents, who fled South Africa's bombing raids, remain. Huila is now home to some 120,000 Cunene refugees.

Under the terms of the Lusaka accord, the South African invasion force that occupied a 24,000-square mile zone in southern Angola since 1981 was to have withdrawn completely by the end of March. But claiming that Angola had failed to uphold its side of the deal—halting Swapo incursions into northern Namibia—South Africa stopped short of a total retreat. In December 1984, few Angolan government officials expressed optimism that the South African pull-out would be completed any time soon, and some believe that Pretoria is delaying to buy time for Unita to replace its departing battalions.

FAPLA officers maintain that since February, South Africa has repeatedly violated the terms of the agreement by flying reconnaissance missions over Lubango. Huila's provincial capital, in a basin below mist-shrouded mountains, is the central staging area for FAPLA's military operations to the south, straddling the defense line which stretches westward to the coastal city of Namibe and east to Menongue. Deployed along this line are the 15,000 Cuban troops which President dos Santos recently offered to withdraw over the next three years as part of the Namibian independence package.

The strength of Angola's southern military front, which stopped South Africa's third major offensive in December 1983 and January 1984, is openly evident in Lubango. MiG-21s screech overhead; the Lubango airport is surrounded by heavily fortified bunkers. Cuban and Angolan military personnel dine with Soviet and East German advisers in the Grande Hotel de Huila, and armored personnel carriers and jeeps speed up and down the city's hilly streets.

In the fertile agricultural lands surrounding Lubango, heavy armaments are cached in mountain ravines. Here maize, vegetables, and fruits are grown in sufficient quantities to feed the province's expanding population, yet South Africa's punishing raids have eliminated any possibility of exporting the surplus to other regions. "Wealth creates enemies," said a Lubango government official, explaining that the South African incursions have been directed against Cuando Cubango, Cunene, Namibe, and Huila because of these provinces' substantial agricultural, livestock, industrial, and fishing resources.

A party official in Lubango ticks off a few examples of South African economic destabilization: the 1982 bombing of the railway bridge linking Lubango to the port of Namibe, and the 1979 destruction of a portion of the serpentine mountain road which carries imports from Namibe to Huila, Cuando Cubango, and Cunene, and agricultural produce to the sea.

Early one morning in September 1979, as 65 craftsmen were at work in one of Angola's finest furniture factories, four South African Mirages roared over the mountains into Lubango, dropping fragmentation bombs on the building, killing 26 and seriously wounding the rest. A government official, dismissing South African claims that they had bombed what they thought was a military installation, said the attack was part of a systematic effort to sabotage the Angolan economy.

Indeed, for the fragile, but potentially rich economy, the financial costs of the war are staggering. Augusto Teixeira de Matos, Minister of Finance and Governor of the National Bank of Angola, said that damages caused by South African invasions between 1975 and 1981 amounted to $7.6 billion—four times Angola's 1980 export revenues. Added to this are the costs of the incursions since 1981 and the material and human destruction and economic dislocations caused by Unita.

"As a result of the war," said de Matos, "we have had to allocate the financial and human resources, which could be used in new investment, to defense and to buying consumer goods to compensate for what we cannot produce here." The finance minister added that war has only exacerbated the economic problems stemming from the legacy of 500 years of Portuguese rule.

To cope with the war-induced economic crisis, the national economic development plan was transformed into a twelve-point emergency one in 1983, in order "to attack the decline in production," said de Matos. Food production, health, industry, the coffee sector, and the distribution system between cities and the countryside were among the priority sectors identified. Formerly a food exporter, Angola has had to import an increasing share of its requirements, partially because of the war's disruption of agricultural production, but also due to overly centralized economic policies.

"We underestimated the importance of the peasant farmer," said the finance minister. In a significant policy reversal, greater financial and technical support, as well as material incentives are being provided to the small-scale producers in
ganda issued from press conferences in Jamba and Lisbon, it is clear from the human costs of Unita tactics that Savimbi's movement cannot be said to be winning the hearts and minds of the people.

At "Commandante Nzaji Camp," an army farm about ten miles out of Lubango in Huila province, Jose Gomes, a 39-year-old farmer—one of a group of 46 Unita soldiers and 285 civilians that surrendered to the government in early November—explains why he decided to abandon the movement. "Unita does not have the will of the people," he began. A Cuanyama from the southern Cunene capital of Ngiva, Gomes said he joined Unita in 1976 because it was the dominant force in the region.

Calling Unita "a family of Ovimbundus," he related that although he and his co-workers on an Unita farm in Cunene were initially treated well, non-Ovimbundu are increasingly being victimized. Listing by name a number of Chokwe, Ganguela, and Cuanyama Unita officers who had been executed in front of their units since August, Antonio Jona, 27, who served in the Unita militia, said, "There is tribal war in Unita." A FAPLA lieutenant in Lubango confirmed the government's assessment that Unita is now riven not only by political division—citing Savimbi's recent arrest of his second-in-command—but along ethnic lines, adding, "We believe this is a generalized phenomenon in Unita."

Both the group of Unita defectors in Lubango and Unita prisoners of war in Huambo spoke of the troops' poor morale due to the harshness of life in the bush—lack of clothes and food, constant movement, rain and cold. None of these young soldiers demonstrated any awareness of the political complexities of the war in which they were enlisted. Gomes, in fact, was told that Unita was fighting for Angola's independence; only when he surrendered to FAPLA did he learn that Angola had become independent nine years earlier.

In 1978, the late President Neto issued an unconditional amnesty to Unita and FNLA deserters. The government has taken pains to publicize such defections in hopes of encouraging others. A significant victory for its reconciliation policy was the June surrender of some 1,500 soldiers and 20,000 civilians who belonged to the Military Committee of Resistance in Angola (Comira), a movement created in 1980 out of the remnants of Holden Roberto's FNLA in the northern province of Uige, bordering on Zaire.

Said Carlos Mouteco, ex-political commissar of Comira's central front, "We decided it was wrong to fight against FAPLA and the MPLA because in the end, we are all sons of the same mother and father." After three years of negotiations with the government, he and his men came out of the bush. Mouteco said they had been well-received by the MPLA authorities, including President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who met with the group in Uige on independence day in November. Comira's 1,500 soldiers have since been integrated into FAPLA.

Angolan government officials are visibly pleased at these large-scale defections, and seem to be relying on Unita's internal contradictions to weaken the movement. But until South Africa stops supplying, training, and providing logistical support for Unita—one of the four conditions laid down by President dos Santos in return for the withdrawal of Cuban forces—there is little likelihood of the movement crumbling solely from internal division. Of late, Unita has reportedly been building up alternate supply lines through Zaire in the event that...
the relative safety of the urban areas where food and basic goods are in short supply.

In Huambo’s provincial administration building—a Portuguese relic with wide marble stairs leading into a colonnaded hall decorated with a bust of Lenin and a portrait of Angola’s first president, Agostinho Neto—Commander José Ernesto dos Santos, provincial military commissar, says that the government’s primary task in this region is “to combat and completely destroy the Unita bands.” This is no easy task, however, for, as dos Santos explains, “The Unita puppets do not attack our military units. They attack civilian populations causing pain and death, and steal the goods of our people. Unita’s objective at this moment is to place explosives in all the principal economic centers to create human and material destruction.”

Fernando Marcelino, director of Angola’s premier agricultural research institute in Chiang, 11 miles from Huambo, confirms that the food shortages the once agriculturally prosperous province are now suffering are caused primarily by the war. On top of the rural population’s flight to the cities, distribution difficulties, and lack of seeds and fertilizers due to Unita’s disruption of the Benguela railway, he said, the harvests farmers do manage to produce are often stolen by Unita bandits. And in July, Marcelino’s institute was the target of Unita sabotage—a small band of guerrillas detonated explosives in five buildings, blowing out windows and destroying some precision equipment which will take years to replace.

Although Unita has not been able to take control of any major city in Angola, government officials acknowledge that the movement operates freely in the eastern provinces of Cuando Cubango and Moxico, populated by one person per 1.8 square miles. The sheer vastness of the area makes Angolan army (FAPLA) ground operations virtually impossible, and any FAPLA air assaults on Unita’s main Jamba base, located in the far south-eastern corner of the country only 70 miles from the Namibian border, would no doubt be met with swift reprisal from the South African air force.

While Unita’s guerrilla war is carried out mostly in the sparsely populated Angolan countryside, there are rare acts of urban sabotage as well. A recent example was the April explosion of a car bomb outside a Huambo apartment complex housing Cuban doctors and teachers, which killed 40-50 people, most of whom were passers-by. In late November, power lines were blown up in the Kwanza Norte province, about 120 miles from Luanda, cutting off electricity to the capital for five days.

These actions seem designed for their publicity value, as are Unita’s kidnapings of foreign workers, missionaries, and members of the Red Cross. More commonplace, however, are attacks on villages aimed at causing fear and insecurity among the population and disrupting economic activity. “They kidnap foreigners to bargain with, they don’t kill them,” says Bishop Emilio de Carvalho of the United Methodist Church of Angola. “Angolans, they simply kill.” Contrary to the prolific propa-
tion sets in quickly before such wounds can be treated. Domingues' arm was amputated above the elbow. Emilina Chipita had her leg amputated after stepping on a land mine on the way from her house to the field. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)—the only international agency operating "in the field"—there are 20,000 such amputees in Angola, primarily in the provinces of Huambo, Bie, Moxico, and northern Huila.

Nurse Chipita explains that villagers with these types of injuries are admitted weekly and that the 54 beds in his ward are occupied primarily by war victims. Indeed, upon leaving the hospital, a truck-cum-ambulance pulls up to the entrance, carrying two women—one shot in the head, the other in the stomach—from a village 90 miles away. Five others died in the attack. "Unita is only trying to kill people and cause unnecessary destruction," says Chipita.

The provinces of Huambo and its eastern neighbor, Bie, in Angola's verdant central plateau, comprise the fourth military region, one of the six districts covering 60 percent of the country that were brought under military rule in 1983. It is a region populated by the Ovimbundu, Savimbi's base of ethnic support, and ironically where Unita is concentrating its low-level guerrilla war. Unita's aims, says Pierre Gassman, chief of the ICRC Angolan delegation, are to empty the villages and force the terrorized peasants into the overcrowded, undersupplied cities.

On arrival in Huambo aboard an Angolan army Antonov-22, it is difficult to imagine that this city, which the Portuguese named Nova Lisboa, was once the pride of the colonialists for its temperate climate and surrounding rich agricultural land. It was also the seat of Savimbi's short-lived Democratic People's Republic of Angola in late 1975, but the MPLA chased Unita out of Huambo early the following year, during what is now known as "the second war of liberation."

Today, army helicopters and Red Cross planes taxi across the airport runway. Huambo town is a decrepit shell of uncompleted high rises, abandoned shops and restaurants, and faded, rundown Portuguese-style residences. The province of Huambo, once Angola's breadbasket, is now the center of the ICRC's relief operations in the country. Angola is host to the ICRC's largest delegation world-wide, operating with a $40 million annual budget of which one-third goes to air operations. Additional personnel are required in Angola because ambushes and land mines have made carrying out relief efforts by road too hazardous, and all internal transport is by air. Before ICRC planes land in remote villages, local workers check the dirt airstrips for Unita-planted land mines.

Gassman says his organization provides supplementary feeding for 20,000 in Huambo town, and supplies six other nutrition centers in the province. "There is a security-induced situation of malnutrition," he explains, noting that because of Unita attacks on villages, farmers abandon their plots and flee to
Against All Odds

Nearly ten years after independence, Angola is still at war with South Africa and Unita, diverting human and material resources from development of its substantial economic potential.

BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Two hundred and fifty miles north-west of Luanda, surrounded by dense forest on one side and a seemingly endless stretch of the Atlantic on the other, lies the compound of the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company (Cabgoc). An American-run oasis in the midst of equatorial Africa, Cabgoc pumps 165,000 barrels of oil per day out of Angola’s petroleum-rich offshore fields, and substantial revenue into the Angolan treasury. Over 50 percent of its output—last year, at its highest level since oil production began in 1968—goes to the United States, one of the only countries in the world that has not recognized the nine-year old Angolan government.

Cabgoc seems worlds away from the continued international wrangling over the fate of neighboring Namibia and the disposition of Angola’s 25,000 Cuban troops. In the Gulf canteen, relaxed, sun-tanned American employees share lunchtime breaks with their Angolan counterparts. During their 28-day work shifts, the 320 expatriate workers are housed in modest bungalows, and only venture outside the self-contained Gulf encampment into Cabinda town with permission from management. To fill up the little free time that their 6 am to 6 pm schedules on the oil rigs allow, there is the Mapongo Country Club—a tennis court, golf course, and baseball field.

Seventy-three percent of Angola’s total oil production of 220,000 barrels per day was produced from the Cabgoc facility last year. Prospects are bright for increasing output to 200,000 b/d by the end of 1985, according to Jack Agan, a 49-year-old Californian who is Cabgoc’s deputy director. Indeed, Gulf has planned $1 billion in capital investments over the next five years. To underscore the importance Gulf attaches to its lucrative Angolan operation, James Lee, president of Gulf Oil, and George Keller, president of Chevron, Gulf’s new parent company, visited the facility in late November.

In 1983, oil exports represented 84 percent of Angola’s total exports, earning the government $1.5 billion in revenues. Cabgoc’s relations with the Luanda government, which holds a 51 percent share in the Gulf operation, are “very good,” says Agan, and well they should be. The revenues Cabgoc provides—some $800 million yearly in taxes and royalties—are a critical linchpin in Angola’s war-shattered economy, where more than half of annual foreign exchange earnings are spent on defense.

In the idyllic setting of Gulf Cabinda, where offshore rigs and oil tankers dot the scenic coastal vista, it is easy to forget that Angola is a country at war. Two-man local police patrols provide the only on-site security for the compound, which is enclosed by nothing more threatening than a five-strand barbed wire fence. Four to five miles south, however, lies a military base housing 2,000 Cuban “internationalists,” a reminder of the American company’s strategic importance.

Only one incident of late has marred the smooth running of Angola’s most profitable foreign venture. Jonas Savimbi’s Unita claimed responsibility for the July sabotage of one of Gulf’s onshore pipelines. The damage was quickly repaired, however, and few Gulf employees seem to fear Savimbi’s threat to extend the war to the remote Cabinda province.

But 550 miles to the south, in a visit to the central hospital in the decaying, ghostly provincial capital of Huambo, two twelve-year-old girls tell a tale of another side of the war the Angolan government has been fighting for nearly ten years since independence. This is a war in which most victims are defenseless civilians, a war waged by South Africa and its “puppets,” the guerrillas of Unita, a war which has forced this young government to maintain one of the largest armies in sub-Saharan Africa, diverting scarce human and material resources from development of its substantial economic potential.

Lying in a bed in the women’s and children’s ward, Domingues Nakandi explains to nurse Jose Chipita that Unita soldiers attacked her village one night a week earlier, killing her father and shooting her in the arm. Because infec-
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