AMERICA'S LEADING MAGAZINE ON AFRICA

AFRICA REPORT

MAY-JUNE 1987 $4.50



Putting Pressure on Pretoria:

FROM CORPORATE BOARDROOM TO CAPITOL HILL

Our good taste isn't just in our beer.



At the Adolph Coors Company, our concern for good taste doesn't end with our beer.

By getting together with organizations like the Cleo Parker Robinson Dance Ensemble, we're helping to bring a refreshing taste of Black American culture to an ever-larger audience. In fact, maybe you've already noticed the Coors name at top concerts, sporting events—even on a national radio show bringing news for and about the Black community.

So watch for the high-quality events and programs Coors has in store for you. And the next time someone mentions the great taste of Coors, you'll know they've really said a mouthful.

Coors®

MAY-JUNE 1987

AFRICA REPORT

AMERICA'S LEADING MAGAZINE ON AFRICA

VOLUME 32, NUMBER 3

A Publication of the African-American Institute

Africa Report (ISSN 0001-9836), a nonpartisan magazine of African affairs, is published bimonthly and is scheduled to appear at the beginning of each date period at 833 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017. Editorial correspondence and advertising inquiries should be addressed to *Africa Report*, at the above address. Subscription rates: *Individuals*: U.S.A. $24, Canada $30, air rate overseas $48. *Institutions*: U.S.A. $31, Canada $37, air rate overseas $55. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: If this magazine is undeliverable, please send notice to *Africa Report* at the above address. Telephones: Publisher (212) 949-5719; Editor (212) 949-5731.

European Distribution by CLIO Distribution Service, 55 St. Thomas' Street, Oxford OX11JG, England.
U.S.A. Newsstand Distribution by FOUR STAR News Distributors, Inc., 33-30 57th Street, Woodside, New York 11377.

Note: Because we have recently changed our fulfillment company, subscribers may have experienced delays in receipt of copies. Please be advised that Transaction, Inc. is no longer handling any *Africa Report* business matters. Please direct subscription inquiries to *Africa Report* Subscription Services, P.O. Box 3000, Denville, N.J. 07834.

Photo Credit:
The cover photo of an anti-apartheid rally in New York City was taken by John Conn.

Divestment Strategies
Page 19

SADCC's Future
Page 30

Displaced People
Page 37

Sudan's Rebels
Page 53

Letters to the Editor

To the Editor:

Allen Isaacman's claim that Renamo guerrillas "invaded central Mozambique from bases in Malawi" ("Mozambique: In Machel's Footsteps," January-February 1987) around October 1986 is misleading and indicative of his over-reliance on Frelimo sources who first made this unfounded allegation.

Renamo guerrillas have been operating in the central Mozambique provinces bordering Malawi for nearly six years, reaching this region as they moved northwards from their traditional strongholds in the Manica and Sofala provinces.

In December 1981, a group of Renamo guerrillas moved from Manica province into Tete province, establishing bases along the south bank of the Zambesi River. Reports of Renamo activity to the north of the Zambesi river began to be made in early 1983.

In August 1982, another Renamo group, originating from their Gorongosa headquarters, crossed the Zambesi river in the Mutarara region of Sofala province, thus marking the beginning of the movement's operations in Zambezia province. Renamo war communiqués issued at the time reveal that its forces progressed on the terrain in a northerly (toward Niassa province) and northeasterly direction, toward Nampula province. In January 1983, Renamo announced that it had activated Nampula province, and in May the following year the anti-government guerrillas reached Cabo Delgado province through Nampula. Renamo activity in Niassa province was initially reported in 1982.

The steadfast progress of Renamo forces in Zambezia and Niassa provinces, however, owed much to the effective political mobilization of the local population by the Mozambique Revolutionary Party/PRM, the first anti-Frelimo movement to surface after independence which merged with Renamo in 1982.

As Renamo consolidated its positions throughout the central and northern provinces of Mozambique, the Frelimo government, acting so as to deny the existence of an internal conflict, promoted the erroneous concept of Malawi being used as a launching pad for the anti-government rebels. By the same token, Renamo guerrillas operating in areas bordering Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Tanzania should also be accused of using these countries as launching pads.

The fact is that Renamo, as opposed to other southern African liberation movements, has attained a permanent presence in the country it is operating in, making it its natural habitat. This has been confirmed by Frelimo itself which, during the 10-year-old conflict, has never reported military operations against Renamo as taking place outside Mozambican boundaries. It will be recalled that the four times that Frelimo announced the seizure of Renamo headquarters, these were all situated deep inside Mozambique.

The only confirmed reports of Mozambican forces moving in and out of Malawi are the ones related to Frelimo soldiers fleeing helter-skelter into that country after coming under Renamo fire. In September 1986 alone, more than 1,500 Frelimo soldiers had sought refuge in Malawi, but were officially handed over to Mozambique the following month.

Fabiao Massavanhane
Mbabane, Swaziland

To the Editor:

In his article, "In Machel's Footsteps" (January-February 1987), Allen Isaacman wrongly stated that the "Mozambican leaders [refrained] from any premature response" to the causes of the airplane crash which killed President Samora Machel. Evidence shows that long before an inquiry into the air crash had begun, the Frelimo leadership was already pointing a finger at South Africa.

Some six days after the crash, the then Mozambican Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joaquim Chissano, openly blamed South Africa for the disaster. A Radio Mozambique news report on 25 October 1986 quoted Mr. Chissano as having said that "armed banditry and apartheid were the main culprits for the tragic occurrence."

The following day, the Frelimo Party-controlled newspaper, *Domingo*, stated in an editorial that "Samora Machel died at the hands of his enemies."

The official Mozambique Information Agency reported on 27 October that the then most senior Frelimo Party figure, Marcelino dos Santos, had "declared that we know the death of President Samora Machel was the work of the enemy," whom he went on to identify as "apartheid."

On 29 October, Marcelino dos Santos stated in a communiqué jointly issued by the frontline heads of state in Maputo that "President Samora Machel fell victim to apartheid."

During a demonstration organized by the Frelimo Party youth wing outside the Malawi and South African missions in Maputo on 4 November, letters addressed to Presidents Banda and Botha openly stated that Samora Machel had been a "victim of the odious apartheid regime" and that he had been "assassinated."

While on a visit to Congo on 10 November, Marcelino dos Santos reiterated his views on the cause of the air crash. A report by the Congolese News Agency cited dos Santos as having stated "that whatever the conclusions of the inquiry being conducted on [Samora Machel's] death, South Africa should be held responsible."

It is worth mentioning that until this day, after preliminary investigations into the air crash have attributed it to human error, the Mozambican authorities are still declining to refer to it as an accident. "Tragic occurrence" has consistently been the term used by Frelimo.

Benedito Tomas Muianga
Nairobi, Kenya

The author responds:

Fabiao Massavanhane claims that my analysis was excessively dependent on Frelimo sources. He specifically takes issue with the assertion that Renamo guerrillas "invaded central Mozambique from bases in Malawi" charging that it is "an unfounded allegation" advanced by the Mozambican government. In August, a journalist for the London *Observer* reported that he had candid conversations with a Malawian commander at the frontier post of Muloza who acknowledged that "we are with them [Renamo] all the time and we help them against Frelimo." (The *Observer* August 24, 1986).

Subsequently, newspapers and journals reflecting a broad editorial spectrum including the *Weekly Mail*, *Africa Confidential*, the *Observer*, and the London *Times*, have confirmed this Malawian connection. These Western publications can hardly be accused of being pro-Frelimo.

As for Mr. Muianga's criticism, the record will show that the Mozambique government has made no formal charges that South Africa was responsible for the plane crash in which President Machel died. Many disturbing questions, however, remain unanswered. Whatever the outcome, who can doubt that apartheid is the enemy of all peace-loving people in southern Africa?

Allen Isaacman
Professor of African History
University of Minnesota

UPDATE

IN THE NEWS

So what else is new?

The contingent of U.S. Army Special Forces that took part in a two-week joint exercise with Zairean troops at Kamina air base in late April is an ominous sign for the Angolan government of President **José Eduardo dos Santos**. The exercise in Shaba Province—which a Pentagon spokesman claimed "does not relate in any way to current world problems or tensions"—shows that the Reagan administration is now prepared to raise the stakes and play a more direct role in the southern African conflict. The administration is presently debating a Pentagon proposal to spend $2 million this year to begin restoring the strategically located Kamina air base, should the U.S. decide to establish a permanent military foothold in Zaire.

A confidential document obtained by *Africa Report* describes in great detail the Reagan administration's long history of secret dealings with Zairean President **Mobutu Sese Seko**, providing covert financial, political, and military support for **Jonas Savimbi**'s Unita rebels—all carried out without the approval of the U.S. Congress and in violation of the now-repealed Clark Amendment. *The New York Times* revealed earlier this year that the CIA had been using the abandoned Kamina air base to arm Unita since 1985, but the document provides evidence that the U.S. has been supplying arms to the rebels since at least 1982. Mobutu, of course, has repeatedly denied accusations that U.S. aid to Unita passes through Zaire.

According to the document, the U.S. crusade to provide military assistance to Unita was organized with Israeli help. In June 1982, Saudi Arabia gave $30 million to the operation, while the U.S. began to supply the necessary weapons. In May 1983, a secret meeting took place in Kinshasa with representatives from the U.S., South Africa, Israel, Zaire, and Unita. Pretoria promised to intensify its military assaults on Angola to force Luanda to negotiate with Unita, and the U.S. offered military and financial assistance. By November, arms shipments for Unita were delivered by the U.S. navy at Boma and Matadi ports in Zaire.



Margaret A. Novicki

Dos Santos: Battling U.S. support for Unita

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs **Chester Crocker** visited Kinshasa in February 1984 seeking more Unita aid from Mobutu. It was agreed to use Ngungu as a Unita base camp, and arms were then sent through Israel. In October, Savimbi arrived in Kinshasa to receive a U.S. arms shipment designated for Shaba where Israeli soldiers reportedly train Unita rebels. Several more U.S. shipments arrived for Unita later that year.

By the beginning of 1985, Unita's main base camp in Zairean territory was located in Kamina region, from where it could make raids into northern Angola. In October, Mobutu met with South African delegates, a Moroccan official, top U.S. officers, and Savimbi to coordinate activities to support the repeal of the Clark Amendment. The Reagan administration subsequently admitted to having supplied Unita with $15 million in covert military assistance, including Stinger missiles, and the rest, as they say, is history. ■

Lifestyles of the poor and famous

Describing himself as the poorest head of state in the world, President **Thomas Sankara** recently appeared before Burkina Faso's newly formed People's Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (CPPC), which is empowered to call on all government officials to answer questions about their lifestyles and financial status.

Sankara set an example by attending the first session of the CPPC with his wife, and publicly declared his modest assets: an old car, four bicycles, three guitars, a refrigerator, and a broken freezer. He also told the Ouagadougou-based commission that his wife earned more than he—his monthly salary being $455 and his wife's $632.

The ruling National Council of the Revolution (CNR) has called on militants to bring any known cases of embezzlement and illegal enrichment to the attention of the mass-based Committees for the Defense of the Revolution so that the new body can fight "the gangrene of corruption." No government officials are expected to be spared an appearance before the CPPC in coming months. As the CNR points out, "It is not enough to clean a house, but it is more important always to keep that house clean." ■

Turning defection into an art

Ethiopian Defense Minister **Tesfaye Gabre Kidan** is out. He was the major casualty in Lt. Col. **Mengistu Haile Mariam**'s most profound cabinet reshuffle in seven years.

Defecting, on the other hand, is still in. **Abebe Kebede**, Ethiopian ambassador to Japan, and **Mesfin Makonnen**, first secretary of the Ethiopian embassy in Czechoslovakia, were recently added to the growing list of officials who have defected in the past year and a half. Their departure in late March, along with the defections of three Ethiopian artists—**Getachew Gebre Giorgis**, **Elias Arega**, and **Teka Guluma**—from the country's premier folk dance and music troupe in late March, struck yet another embarrassing blow to the Mengistu government.

While Mengistu has tried to stop the bleeding by reorganizing key government ministries and by surrounding himself with trusted allies, the steady stream of defectors who are speaking out against Addis Ababa's controversial policies continues. **Dawit Wolde-Giorgis**, the commissioner of relief and rehabilitation who directed the famine emergency effort, was the first high-ranking Ethiopian official to denounce the government's policies when he defected in late 1985. Authorities in Addis Ababa accused him of embezzling hundreds of thousands of dollars, and subsequently arrested the Ethiopian ambassador to the United Nations, **Berhanu Dinka**, in May 1986, for his alleged complicity in the misappropriation of international relief funds. Dinka, like **Paulos Dikin**, another government defector last spring, reportedly favored a political rather than military solution in Eritrea.

Defections gained momentum when **Berhane Deressa**, the deputy commissioner of relief and rehabilitation, joined his former boss Wolde-Giorgis in June, accusing the government of imposing a "foreign ideology and an alien socio-political system." He was followed in July by the number two Ethiopian diplomat in London, Counsellor **Hailu Teferra**, and later **Getachew Kebreth**, the Ethiopian ambassador to France, in September.

Cameraplix

Wolde-Giorgis: Paved the way for defectors

As the most senior official to defect, Foreign Minister **Goshu Wolde** made headlines in October, denouncing what he described as the government's "shortsighted and rigidly doctrinaire policies which are leading the country and people into misery and destruction." **Taye Telahun**, the Ethiopian ambassador to the Scandinavian countries, rounded out last year's exodus in December—following the defection of 10 players from the country's junior football team and a leading professor at the University of Addis Ababa, **Getachew Woldemeskel**. Said Telahun, "I cannot in good conscience any longer continue to condone and defend the policies of the government." ■

OBITUARY

The Chief passes away

Chief **Leabua Jonathan**, Lesotho's prime minister for 20 years before he was overthrown in a military coup in January 1986, died of stomach cancer in early April at the age of 72.

The controversial autocrat, who ruled Lesotho with an iron hand after it gained independence from Britain in 1966, had in recent years adopted an increasingly critical and on occasion, openly hostile attitude toward South Africa in a bid to develop a more popular base of support within the country. This ultimately led to his downfall, as Pretoria flexed its muscle and imposed a crippling three-week economic blockade on Lesotho in December 1985 in retaliation for Jonathan's refusal to expel members of the banned African National Congress (ANC). The new military government, led by Maj.-Gen **Justin Lekhanya**, promptly ordered dozens of ANC members and supporters out of the country and adopted a more conciliatory policy toward Pretoria.

Ironically, South Africa had been largely responsible for putting Jonathan in power, providing him with substantial financial and logistical support during Lesotho's pre-independence poll. Shortly thereafter, he became the first leader of an independent African state to visit Pretoria and hold talks with a South African prime minister. In 1970, Jonathan declared a state of emergency and suspended the constitution when it appeared that his ruling Basotholand National Party was about to lose the country's only post-independence election. He repressed all opposition parties and established a paramilitary youth league in the decade that followed, while at the same time weakening his relationship with South Africa in an effort to overcome his lack of popular legitimacy at home.

In September 1985, Jonathan called off Lesotho's first general election in 15 years when opposition parties boycotted the nomination register. They charged that they had not been allowed to inspect the voters' roll and said the election procedures had been rigged in the government's favor. Four months later, Pretoria helped bring Jonathan's rule to an abrupt end and gave the new government its stamp of approval. ■

Southern Africa: Behind the scenes at the UN

Does the United Nations run the risk of going the way of the League of Nations—paralyzed by an inability to take action on major issues which threaten "international peace and security?" Some African delegations clearly think so, and judging by the outcome of two recent Security Council debates on southern Africa, it well might.

Twice over the last four months, the United States—along with its sole ally among permanent Security Council members, Britain—has stood in the way of the collective will by vetoing resolutions which sought to impose sanctions against South Africa. Council meetings on southern Africa have become a routine display of both the powerlessness of the African and non-aligned bloc and of American disregard for its legal responsibilities under the UN Charter by its reflexive wielding of the veto.

In February, Argentina, Congo, Ghana, the United Arab Emirates, and Zambia—currently the informal coalition of African and non-aligned states on the 15-member Security Council—brought a draft resolution to a Council vote which sought to impose selective, mandatory sanctions against South Africa, in protest over its internal policies, similar to those adopted by the U.S. Congress last fall.

The thinking of the resolution's sponsors was that this time—despite its past veto record on southern African issues—the U.S. would be unable to oppose measures against South Africa at the international level which are, in effect, the law of the land.

Alas, the sponsors' logically conceived plan was torpedoed. Before the Council debate had even begun, the Swedish delegation—acting on the U.S.' behalf, said most observers—informed the sponsoring countries that their resolution would be vetoed. Sweden suggested that the group go ahead to a vote, but that after the veto, it would come forward with a lesser package of measures—voluntary sanctions—for approval.

"This did the disservice of taking the rug out from under our feet," said one African ambassador. "To say that there was something else in store was an invitation to veto our resolution." The final vote was hence predictable—10 in favor, three opposed (U.S., Britain, and West Germany), and two abstentions (France and Japan).

In April, South Africa was once more brought up for condemnation by the world forum, this time for its continued illegal occupation of Namibia, an issue over which there is a near universal consensus. Again, the U.S., Britain, and West Germany vetoed the resolution, which called for comprehensive, mandatory sanctions against Pretoria under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter—yet another example of the "capricious use of the veto when it comes to southern Africa," as one African delegate put it.



United Nations

U.S. & U.K. veto sanctions against Pretoria

"The U.S. is not opposing action because it will threaten international peace and security, but rather to prevent action from being taken against recalcitrant member-states, contrary to the purposes of the organization," he said.

After nearly seven years of a Reagan administration at odds with most of the continent, few African delegations are sanguine that relations with the U.S. at the UN will show any improvement. Yes, say some, at least the temperature of contacts with the current U.S. mission staff, led by Gen. Vernon Walters, has risen a few degrees from the icy days of his predecessor, Jeane Kirkpatrick.

But they add that even Gen. Walters' team disdains contact with the African Group as such, "realizing its corporate strength" and preferring to strike deals with individual countries with whom it feels a close affinity. Those few nations in turn often find a way of getting across to their African colleagues the "wisdom of a softer line." Threats to cut off aid to governments which fail to see things "the U.S. way" continue, albeit more discreetly than in the past.

The Security Council debates, however, throw the harshest of spotlights on American isolation in the international organization. No one was surprised at the outcome of the April Namibia debate, as the African delegations know all too well how the U.S. stands on this issue.

Explained one ambassador, "Soon after Jeane Kirkpatrick came to the UN, she told some frontline ambassadors that even if South Africa agrees to implement resolution 435 on Namibia's independence, the U.S. will raise objections because of the Cuban troops in Angola. This was six months before South Africa wrote to the UN Secretary-General citing this as an obstacle to its withdrawal from Namibia."

In fact, only Swapo's Theo-Ben Gurirab found anything good to say about the latest Security Council debacle, as the liberation movement's objective of dramatizing the question of Namibia was achieved. "We have a long view of the struggle," he said philosophically. "If we didn't believe that one day we will succeed in convincing a greater number of peoples of the world to support us, we would have given up. Reagan will go. Two years is not too long—we have waited a much longer time for our independence."

—Margaret A. Novicki

COMOROS

President Ahmed Abdallah was assured of victory in voting for the country's 42-member Federal Assembly in late March after opposition candidates were allowed to stand only in the main island. But unofficial poll results have credited the opposition with nothing at all, leading to widespread charges that the elections were rigged.

Abdallah's electoral campaign followed a similar pattern as the 1982 poll, despite promises by the ruling Unity Party to ensure a "free election" allowing "anyone to present himself as a candidate." In the run-up to the election, a number of opposition members were detained, several prospective candidates were turned down, and the main opposition party—the Democratic Front—was prevented from running.

ZIMBABWE

Harare's House of Assembly has suspended former Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith from Parliament for 12 months in response to inflammatory remarks he made while on a recent speaking tour of South Africa. Smith had encouraged white South Africans to follow Rhodesia's example by working together to fight international economic sanctions in order to maintain minority rule.

Following a heated debate in which Smith was accused of being a "traitor" and an "unrepentant racist," the House of Assembly voted to suspend him by a 38 to 10 margin, with the dissenters coming from his Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe. Several government ministers pointed out that Smith, who had been warned several times in the past for making anti-Zimbabwe statements, would have been tried for treason in many other African countries. Nevertheless, the suspension marks the end of Smith's political career, as Zimbabwe moves to abolish the 20 entrenched white seats in Parliament safeguarded for seven years by the Lancaster House constitution.

LIBYA

Maj. Abdul Salaam Jalloud's return to Tripoli in February put an end to speculation that Col. Muammar Qaddafy's number-two man had been dropped from power.

Jalloud, who helped Qaddafy overthrow King Idris in 1969, since remained one of the Jamahiriya's most influential leaders and is the architect of Libyan policy in Chad. He was sent to Syria on a Middle East mission last November and failed to return to Libya for several months, leading to rumors that Qaddafy might have forced him into exile as a result of the country's Chadian debacle.

In early March, however, speculation was put to rest when Jalloud made his first public appearance in four months, receiving Algerian and Ghanaian delegations in southern Libya who were attending the 10th anniversary celebrations marking the proclamation of the Jamahiriya.

POLITICAL POINTERS

UGANDA

Five people have been charged with the murder of former Energy Minister Andrew Kayiira who was shot dead in Kampala at the house of Ugandan journalist Henry Gombya in early March. Kayiira, the leader of the old Ugandan Freedom Movement's (UFM) military wing, who had fought against Milton Obote's regime and later joined Yoweri Museveni's government, had been cleared of treason and released from prison two weeks earlier.

Ugandan authorities revealed that one businessman and four deserters from the UFM had been arrested in connection with Kayiira's slaying and said they would be brought to trial as soon as police investigations had been completed. The assassination caused considerable embarrassment to the government, which has been at pains to prove not only that it was in no way implicated in the affair, but also that the country's security situation is under control. Gombya fled Uganda a week after the murder, claiming he feared for his life.

WESTERN SAHARA

The Polisario Front foiled an alleged plot by Moroccan intelligence services to assassinate President Mohamed Abdelaziz during the February 26 celebrations in Tindouf, southern Algeria, marking the 11th anniversary of the proclamation establishing the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. According to the Polisario representative in Algiers, Mahmoud Abdelfettah, the assassination attempt had been masterminded by Moroccan Interior Minister Driss Basri, but Rabat was quick to refute the allegations as a "campaign of defamation."

Bahi Mohamed Ahmed—a Moroccan working for the security services of King Hassan II, who infiltrated Polisario in 1982—together with a Saharawi trade unionist, Moulay Brahim, had reportedly recruited a Moroccan already based in Tindouf to assassinate Abdelaziz. However, Polisario security got wind of the scheme three days before the anniversary celebrations and detained the alleged plotters.

MOZAMBIQUE

Conservative supporters of the South African-backed Mozambique National Resistance Movement (Renamo) in the U.S. have suffered a setback in their campaign to "roll back communism" in Mozambique, as the Irangate scandal has put a temporary damper on the Reagan administration's enthusiasm for such moves. Only recently, right-wing pressure groups expected to take advantage of the momentum favoring a shift in policy to extend the Reagan doctrine to Mozambique, but a congressional hearing in March put these hopes on ice.

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker dismissed Renamo as a tool of the South African military and rejected Congressman Dan Burton's (R-IN) claim that the administration was backing a "Marxist" regime. "We do not consider the government of Mozambique to be, in the sense you use that term, a communist government," said Crocker.

AFRICAN OUTLOOK

U.S. takes direct control of Doe's bankrupt economy

The U.S. has taken the exceptional step of establishing what amounts to a shadow economic cabinet in Liberia, dispatching 17 financial advisers to Monrovia to take over the operation of the country's debt-ridden economy.

President Samuel K. Doe's government, which has increasingly relied on U.S. political and economic support for its survival since the former sergeant seized power in a bloody 1980 military coup, had little choice but to accept the terms of the new arrangement to avoid a cut-off of American assistance. Since 1980, the U.S. has provided Monrovia with $434 million in military and economic aid—almost double the amount given over the previous three decades—making Liberia the highest per capita recipient of American assistance in sub-Saharan Africa. Aid was suspended last year because Doe failed to make promised financial and economic reforms.

The U.S. experts are to have "joint authority" with their Liberian counterparts in key financial ministries and other institutions to monitor government spending, including disbursement of funds not provided by the Reagan administration. According to the agreement, American managers will be placed at the highest levels in areas controlling imports, exports, tax collection, foreign exchange, and computer operations. They will also help prepare the country's July 1987 budget. Explained one U.S. official, "The purpose of this program is to help Liberia get back on its feet and to make sure it is following economically sound policies to get there."

Although the accord reached between Doe and M. Peter McPherson, administrator of the Agency for International Development (USAID), technically enables the Liberian head of state to have "the final say" on all decisions, a senior State Department official admitted that the "joint financial management program" will give the U.S. authority to virtually run the economy for an indefinite period. The official compared the plan to the power that French advisers still have in several former colonies in West Africa. Jackson Doe, leader of the opposition Liberian Action Party, put the arrangement in a different light, denouncing the move as "almost an abandonment of sovereignty" and calling it an "offense to Africa and Liberia in particular."

The new deal with the U.S. had immediate repercussions within the Liberian government as Doe announced a sweeping cabinet shuffle in late March affecting the key posts of finance, economic planning, and information. Doe replaced Finance Minister Robert Tubman with former Governor of the National Bank, John Bestman and surrounded himself with loyal supporters in the wake of bitter opposition party criticism of the government for allowing the U.S. to take over the country's financial institutions.

Washington's decision to take these drastic measures followed a controversial audit by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) revealing that millions of dollars in American aid had been diverted to Doe government officials over the past six years. Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA), who had requested the audit last year, released a preliminary summary of the report in late February, disclosing that the GAO was unable to account for over $50 million in counterpart funds generated from U.S. aid in the 1980-85 period, as well as $16.5 million in commodity assistance support. The Liberian government also used $12 million in economic support fund grants earmarked for development projects to buy oil.

Said Kennedy, "It is clear that Gen. Doe has used his position to enrich himself and his associates at the expense of the American taxpayer." He added that he would work "to cut all economic and military assistance to the Doe regime

Continued on next page

Conservatives put the heat on U.S. oil giants but come up empty- handed

The recent announcement that Chevron Corporation, the main American oil company operating in Angola, intends to sell 9.8 percent of its shares in the Cabinda Gulf Oil Corporation (Cabgoc), and speculation that Texaco is also looking to partially withdraw its investment from the country has led pro-Unita conservative lobbyists in Washington to proclaim that their campaign to force the oil giants to disinvest is finally paying off.

With the Reagan administration's decision last year to provide "covert" military aid to Jonas Savimbi's South African-backed rebels, and the Conservative Caucus having joined forces with several other right-wing pressure groups to form the "Coalition to Restore a More Benevolent Order" (Rambo), the spotlight has been on U.S. companies operating in Angola. Chevron has been at the top of their hit-list, since it merged with Gulf Oil Corporation in 1984 to become the largest producer and main source of Luanda's $2 billion in annual oil revenues. In recent years, Angola has become increasingly dependent on oil, providing the government with 90 percent of its foreign exchange.

American conservatives argue that Angola uses the money it collects from U.S. firms to finance the Cuban and Soviet troops who are backing President José Eduardo dos Santos' government against

Continued on page 11

Liberia. . . continued

until this abuse of U.S. funds ends, and until free and fair presidential elections are held in Liberia."

Emmanuel Bowier, a spokesman at the Liberian embassy in Washington, castigated Kennedy for his criticisms of the Liberian government. Said Bowier, "The people of Liberia are not intimidated by threats regarding the possible reduction or abolition of U.S. aid to Liberia. Liberia is not a plantation or factory that Senator Kennedy or anyone else can close down by simply dismissing the employees and declaring bankruptcy."

Cameraphix

Doe: Gives U.S. the green light

Some U.S. diplomats have also sought to downplay the corruption charges against Doe's government by claiming that some of the report's statistical data is faulty and its conclusions questionable. Problems have existed in the past, admitted one official, but "we don't see tremendous problems as far as misuse of funds that we've given them."

While glossing over human rights abuses in Liberia, the Reagan administration has shown far greater concern to protect the U.S.'s key air force and navy bases in the country, the Omega navigational system that monitors the movement of ships and planes, and the Voice of America retransmitting station that broadcasts throughout Africa. But as Kennedy pointed out, such an approach can be counter-productive in the longer term. "The United States is increasingly viewed as blind to the needs of the people in Liberia and the corrupt ways of the Doe regime," warned Kennedy. "Unless we move decisively to put the U.S. on the side of democracy in Liberia, we run the risk of losing not simply our friendship, but also our significant interests in the country." ■

Bomb blast rocks Djibouti government

A bomb explosion, which left 11 dead and 45 injured, ripped through a crowded café in the Red Sea port of Djibouti in late March—ostensibly to protest the presence of the 3,800-strong French garrison in the former colony.

Although Djibouti has been independent since 1977, President Hassan Gouled Aptidon's government has allowed France to retain key air and naval bases in the country and has developed ever closer ties with Elysée in recent months. As a result, *l'Historil* café and other popular night spots for French servicemen stationed in this strategically vital territory have been repeated targets for Hassan Gouled's political opponents.

The first in a series of bomb attacks occurred in December 1977—only months after independence—when a grenade assault on *Palmier en zinc*, a popular rendezvous for the French community, killed 5 people and injured another 35. While no one claimed direct responsibility for the attack, the bombing was reportedly carried out to protest the signing of a defense pact with France which allowed it to secure a permanent military foothold in the country. Also part of the arrangement was a technical military assistance accord which enabled France to arm the government with a wide array of advanced weaponry and to train local military units.

Two weeks prior to the attack on *l'Historil*, French Defense Minister André Giraud had boasted during a visit to Djibouti that links between the two countries were closer than ever and if anything, would continue to grow even stronger. Giraud said that France intended to boost the capability of its military base by replacing the 13 Mirage 111-C fighter planes at its disposal with the new Mirage F-1, and by deploying additional French army helicopters.

A Tunisian allegedly recruited in Syria and a Kuwaiti were subsequently arrested for planning the bomb attack on *l'Historil* but the government said it suspected the plot was really the work of political dissidents based in Ethiopia aiming to disrupt progress toward peace in the Horn of Africa. Foreign Minister Moumin Bahdon Fareh described the incident as "an odious criminal act against innocents," which sought to undermine a growing rapprochement between countries in the region.

In particular, the government pointed an accusing finger at Aden Robleh Aweleh's banned National Djibouti Movement for Democracy (MNDID), a front which brings together exiled opponents of Hassan Gouled's ruling People's Rally for Progress (RPP). Aden Robleh, a former commerce minister who was sentenced to life imprisonment in absentia by a state security court in September 1986 for "attempting to destabilize the regime and murder senior officials," had fled the country after being forced out of the politburo and learning that he was about to be arrested. Until then considered a leading candidate to succeed Hassan Gouled in the upcoming presidential elections, Aden Robleh later announced the formation of the MNDID, based in Ethiopia—a traditional haven for the government's political opponents.

Aden Robleh, however, denied responsibility for the bombing, claiming that the local police need look no further than Hassan Gouled's immediate entourage. The bomb, he alleged, was palace-made, merely a gimmick to whip up sympathy for the government in the presidential and legislative elections scheduled for the end of April. ■

Angola. . . continued

Unita insurgents. Lost in their rhetoric is the irony that it is the Cubans who are defending U.S. oil installations in Cabinda from Unita incursions.

Chevron currently holds a 49 percent stake in the Cabinda oil field in northern Angola, with the majority share held by Sonangol—Angola's state-owned oil company. Through Cabgoc, its Angolan subsidiary, Chevron pays some $585 million a year to Luanda, according to company officials. Thanks to this partnership, production has jumped from 90,000 b/d in 1980 to 200,000 b/d last year—accounting for two-thirds of Angola's total production.

Chevron's general manager in Angola, Will Lewis, said the proposed sale was part of a cash-raising policy to reduce the company's $8 billion debt incurred by its takeover of Gulf Oil Corporation and was in no way a response to the Reagan administration's pressure to withdraw from Angola. "There are no political implications in the decision at all, although we realize that would be the first thing people would assume," explained Lewis.

In fact, Chevron appears set on further developing its high investment profile in Cabinda, having just signed three joint venture contracts on oil exploration and research with Sonangol. Under the terms of the agreement, Cabgoc will be responsible for the total expenditure on research operations and will be reimbursed by Sonangol only when commercially viable oil has been discovered.

As one oil industry analyst told *West Africa* magazine, "If anything, Chevron is increasing its exposure in the country. As a result of the expenditure which will be involved in exploring the deep waters portion of their concession, Chevron's exposure and investment in Angola may well double." Chevron's plan to go ahead with its deep waters exploration—which is much more expensive than its existing production fields located closer to shore—is likely to significantly increase its stake in Angola. Therefore, while selling a small share of Cabgoc, Chevron's enormous stake in the country will probably be at least a third more than before.

Rumors that Texaco is planning to sell part of its operation in Angola—aired well before it filed for bankruptcy in its much-publicized court case with Pennzoil—have also buoyed the confidence of U.S. conservatives. But once again, the principal motivation behind the pull-out is economic rather than political, with Texaco anticipating that it would need hard cash in the wake of its massive and drawn-out legal battle. As a result, the oil company has indicated that it intends to sell its 40 percent interest in Block 2, which is producing about 15,000 b/d from two off-shore fields.

The proposed sale is likely to go to the highest bidder. Some reports suggest that Texaco's 40 percent stake could go for as high as $500 million, as several European companies have shown a keen interest in securing a larger slice of the Angolan oil industry. In any case, Texaco's partial withdrawal is neither likely to hurt the dos Santos government nor help Savimbi, as other foreign companies are waiting on the sidelines to pick up the slack.

Despite the ongoing war with Unita and growing pressure by the Reagan administration and U.S. conservatives to withdraw, Angola remains a popular market for oil companies. As a recent study by the Economist Intelligence Unit concluded, Angola's high exploration success rate and low operating costs make it "one of the most important markets in the world for companies supplying oil equipment and services." ■

Sierra Leone puts down coup attempt

Loyal government forces thwarted an attempted coup in late March when they stormed two residences in Freetown and arrested several plotters who were conspiring to put the finishing touches on a plan that called for the assassination of President Joseph Saidu Momoh.

Working on an intelligence tip-off, a combined army and special branch squad fought a fierce one-hour gun battle before gaining the upper hand against a group of rebel senior police officers led by former anti-smuggling squad chief Gabriel Mohamed Tennyson Kaikai. More than 40 suspected plotters, composed largely of current or former policemen and soldiers, were captured in the aftermath of the government operation along with a vast arsenal of military hardware. One member of the country's paramilitary Special Security Division (SSD) was shot dead during the gunfire exchange.

A heavily armed contingent of military officers carried out a second raid on the residence of Amy Kaikai, a former junior minister of education and wife of the alleged ringleader. She was reportedly out of the country, however, undergoing medical treatment in England.

Large amounts of arms and ammunition including grenades, submachine guns, rocket launchers, and even ground-to-air missiles were said to have been unearthed. The quantity and sophistication of the weapons—valued according to one estimate at more than $1 million—raised many eyebrows. This spurred the government to investigate how they were smuggled into the country unnoticed, and to speculate that very influential people may have been behind the plot.

Among those detained were Mohamed Kaikai, two of his brothers, and Assistant Superintendent of Police Benjamin Taylor, who was until recently a senior aide and bodyguard to First Vice-President Francis Minah. But at a press conference called several days later, Momoh made clear that the security implications of the attempted coup went far beyond the core of plotters that had already been captured. He admitted that the armed forces remained on full alert and that about 100 people—including influential businessmen, politicians, and members of the military—had been taken in for questioning. The plotters, he said, were mere pawns in a larger political game.

The coup attempt, it would appear, was organized by supporters of former President Siaka Stevens and suspicions are mounting that he may even have personally inspired the plot. Both Stevens—who ruled the country for 17 years and had remained chairman of the ruling All People's Congress—and Vice-President Minah were placed under house arrest as police investigations proceeded.

Kaikai had risen through police ranks to wield enormous influence and power by becoming head of the special branch during the Stevens era, until Momoh took over and appointed him chief of the newly created anti-smuggling squad. Kaikai's relentless fight against smugglers won him praise within government circles, but he fell abruptly from power in mid-1986 amid allegations that he was less than even-handed in the way he worked. He was suspended on charges of insubordination and disobedience and subsequently demoted to assistant superintendent of police in a western district of Freetown.

More recently, Kaikai was accused of using bully tactics to help his wife win her re-election campaign in May 1986. She was relieved of her parliamentary seat in early March of this year after a petition by a former university secretary claimed that Kaikai and his anti-smuggling squad had mistreated voters.

Although the rebels' motives and designs are still a matter for speculation, some details of the plot have been disclosed. According to the government, the dissidents had assembled at Kaikai's house in what was to have been the last in a series of meetings to plan Momoh's assassination before taking control of the country. The following day, a group of plotters were to have ambushed Momoh on his way to work and opened fire on the president. Meanwhile, other groups of rebels were to have neutralized the country's two vice-presidents and as many senior cabinet ministers as possible. But Momoh got wind of the plot and instructed units of the SSD and the army to stage the preemptive strike against the dissidents. ■

Nigerian riots: A challenge to unity

A week of violent clashes in early March between Muslims and Christians in northern Nigeria produced one of the most important challenges to President Ibrahim Babangida's government since taking office in August 1985, seriously testing the country's unity and religious tolerance. The riots, which began in the northern state of Kaduna before spreading to several other regions, claimed the lives of more than a dozen people, left hundreds of injured, and caused millions of dollars in property damage.

The government responded firmly to the religious unrest, detaining an estimated 1,000 people and ordering all schools and colleges in Kaduna state to close. Federal authorities also imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew, banned all outdoor religious meetings, and warned that arsonists and rioters would be shot on sight.

The military governor of Kaduna state, Lt.-Col. Abudakar Umar, immediately announced amendments toughening a state edict on religious preaching introduced in 1984 following previous violence, and warned, "The state government is not in any way prepared to tolerate hypocritical religious fanaticism, tribal sentiments, and general acts of lawlessness."

Although the unrest was sparked by religious clashes between Christian and Muslim youths, Umar placed blame for the crisis squarely in the political arena, describing those behind the riots as "disgruntled politicians." Babangida pursued a similar theme in a nationwide broadcast, claiming, "We cannot stand by and allow a group of ambitious and mindless power-seekers to push us into yet another civil war." Concluded Babangida, "What we are dealing with, therefore, is not just a religious crisis but rather the civilian equivalent of an attempted coup d'état organized against the Federal Military Government and the Nigerian nation."

Babangida did not identify those he suspected of manipulating the rioters for their own ends but according to observers, he was pointing a finger at the so-called "Kaduna mafia"—wealthy northerners whose influence has waned since the government took drastic steps to devalue the naira and abolish import licences, which has limited their access to cheap foreign exchange and weakened their grip on the economy over the past year.

Clashes between militant Muslims and Christians began at the College of Education in the railway town of Kafanchan—one of the north's few Christian enclaves—when a preacher reportedly made uncomplimentary remarks about the Koran. Muslim youths went on a rampage, attacking Christians and destroying churches, police stations, and public establishments serving liquor. Gangs of Christians retaliated, killing several Muslim teachers at a hostel.

The violence quickly spread to five northern cities where Muslim mobs chanting "Islam only" and "Allah is great" burned down dozens of churches and attacked Christian businesses and homes. In Zaria, a university town of about 300,000, Muslim pupils assaulted other students with sticks and mounted roadblocks where cars were stoned. All of the city's churches were reportedly destroyed.

As the rioting extended to several other northern states, the government stepped in quickly to contain the threat of a religious pogrom. In neighboring Kano, authorities imposed a curfew following clashes between Christian and Muslim students at Bayero University and made sweeping arrests. Similarly, in the states of Borno and Bendel, the government banned preaching and the playing of religious music in public, while in Sokoto state all post-primary and tertiary educational establishments were closed down.

Babangida announced the formation of a federal tribunal under Justice Karibi-Whyte to investigate the disturbances and empowered to try those found guilty of criminal offenses, ranging from arson to murder. The real test for the government, however, will be its ability to guarantee religious equality and freedom of worship in the country once the tribunal pronounces its verdict, as hundreds of people have lost their lives in a succession of religious riots in the north over the past seven years. ■

NIGER

The mining industry's outlook is bleak for Africa's second largest uranium producer after Namibia and the fifth largest in the world, according to a survey in *Le Monde*.

Niamey's economy, which has relied heavily on uranium revenues since the boom years of 1979-80, is now battling the blues of the "post-uranium" era. Niger has had to contend not only with the depressed world price for partly processed uranium ore—known as yellow cake—which today sells for about $17 a pound compared with $24 in 1982, but also recent decisions by Italy and West Germany to end their purchase agreements with Niamey. Moreover, several others have drastically slashed their imports.

ZAMBIA

President Kenneth Kaunda's government—facing perhaps its most severe financial and political crisis since independence—has resumed weekly foreign exchange auctions after a two-month suspension. The auction, in which companies must bid for limited amounts of foreign exchange in order to import raw materials, is a key element in Zambia's four-year-old economic reform program favored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Kaunda's austerity measures ran into trouble last year after a drop in copper prices and food riots in December which forced the government to retreat from a decision to end food subsidies. Following mid-March negotiations with an IMF team in Lusaka, the Central Bank announced that auctions would be reintroduced, only this time within the context of a two-tier foreign exchange system—including a new favorable rate for government external debt servicing and procurement of educational and medical supplies.

A new package deal with the Fund, however, depends on the payment of more than $220 million in IMF arrears and on a Zambian commitment to control its budget deficit and money supply.

ZAIRE

President Mobutu Sese Seko's tiff with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is now history. Zaire—once considered the IMF's star pupil in Africa—had openly revolted against the Washington-based lender last fall and announced that it would limit the servicing of its $6 billion external debt to 10 percent of export earnings. But after a little fist-banging on the IMF's table and a visit with President Reagan in Washington, Mobutu has quickly returned to the fold, reaching a tentative agreement worth $126 million in new loans.

The new pact will reportedly include sharp rises in petroleum prices and tax increases designed to cut into Kinshasa's large budget deficit. In return, Zaire will be allowed to give small wage increases to its low-paid public sector workers.

BUSINESS BRIEFS

GUINEA

Following the renegotiation of the country's biggest bauxite export agreement, Guinea is steeling itself for a significant fall in government revenues and export earnings.

Guinea, which relies on bauxite for 95 percent of its foreign exchange earnings and ranks as the world's second largest exporter, finally agreed to a three-year deal with leading aluminum companies in late March, abolishing a $13 per ton export levy on supplies from the *Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée*. Halco Mining, a French-dominated consortium of aluminum producers with a 51 percent controlling interest in CBG, succeeded in securing an agreement whereby the presently depressed prices will more closely reflect the free market than in the recent past.

As a result of the tough new deal, the *Financial Times* predicts that government revenues from CBG—which accounts for 9 million tons of the national output of 14 million tons—could drop by as much as one-third from this year's guaranteed level of $150 million.

UGANDA

Despite the chaotic state of the world coffee market, the Ugandan government is confidently optimistic that its primary source of foreign exchange is back on track. The state-controlled Coffee Marketing Board (CMB) has forecast that during the 1986-87 season ending in September, it will export more than 180,000 tons of processed green coffee beans for the first time in more than a decade—a 25 percent increase over the 1985-86 season.

Since production reached its peak in 1972-73, Uganda's coffee exports have declined as a result of political upheaval and economic collapse, preventing the CMB from reaching its quota of 2.69 million (60 kilo) bags set by the International Coffee Organization (ICO). The transportation of coffee exports to Kenya and Tanzania by rail has improved considerably, providing Uganda with hopes that when the ICO re-introduces quotas, Kampala will have a 3 million bag ceiling.

ZIMBABWE

Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's government has secretly bought 12 Soviet MiG-29 interceptor aircraft to strengthen the country's air defenses against future South African incursions, according to London's *Sunday Telegraph*. The report said that Zimbabwe had spent $344 million and pledged various cash crops to pay for the Soviet Union's most advanced warplane, due to be delivered in mid-1988. The deal was apparently made during a visit to Moscow in mid-March by a high-powered delegation headed by Minister of Cooperative Development Maurice Nyagumbo.

If the deal is transacted, it would represent a major policy shift by the Soviet Union, which has never before sold sophisticated weapons to Zimbabwe. State Department spokesman Phyllis Oakley said the U.S. "would certainly have concerns about the military, political, and financial implications for Zimbabwe and for the southern Africa region as a whole."

In Washington

The Senate's New African Agenda

In this *Africa Report* exclusive, the chairman of the Africa subcommittee outlines a five-point program on southern Africa for the Democratic-controlled Senate, building on last year's sanctions legislation and launching new efforts to address southern Africa's political and economic needs.

BY PAUL SIMON

For the past six years, United States foreign policy toward South Africa has lingered with the forces of apartheid. At best, constructive engagement could be characterized as a process of abandonment, a policy that permitted strategy to overlook human tragedy, and one which chose to forsake, rather than promote, our ideals as a nation. Moreover, constructive engagement has resulted in increased intransigence by Pretoria.

Three years ago, no one could have imagined that a Democratic House of Representatives and a Republican Senate would together repudiate the administration's policy, override a presidential veto, and forge a new direction for U.S. policy in South Africa. Congress seized the mantle of leadership, took a moral stand, and rejected a policy that compromised on our commitment to individual rights and equivocated on our moral stand against apartheid. It was an historic moment for the Congress, and the beginning of our effort to correct our approach.

Passage of the Anti-Apartheid Act marked the long-awaited return to a policy that lends authority and substance to our official position against apartheid.

With the Anti-Apartheid Act now in place and a Democratic majority in the Senate, Congress has the opportunity to fashion a comprehensive approach to the South African problem, both inside and beyond the borders of South Africa. The momentum of the sanctions effort has brought a new awareness of the problems of the southern African region and has offered this Democratic Senate the challenge of fleshing out a more comprehensive U.S. approach toward the region.

As a new member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and its chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, I expect Congress to take serious and meaningful steps to educate and legislate, building on the principles of the Anti-Apartheid Act and ensuring its fullest implementation.

This involves five critical areas:

- Active oversight of the implementation of the Anti-Apartheid Act.
- Encouraging our allies to strengthen their sanctions against South Africa and working for multilateral coordination of efforts.
- Providing meaningful U.S. financial support for the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).
- Reinvigorating our efforts for Namibian independence in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 435.
- Reenactment of the Clark Amendment.

These endeavors mean more than just passing new legislation. Ideally, the Executive Branch also should move enthusiastically in the right direction, which it has not been doing. The new Congress may have to drag the administration in line with congressionally mandated policies.

Anti-Apartheid Act Oversight

Active and vigorous oversight of the implementation of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 is imperative. Oversight can be an effective mechanism for ensuring that the administration vigorously enforces the Act, as it has promised.

Already we have seen tension between the new approach of Congress and the old policies of the administration in the development of regulations implementing the Act. For example, ferrous alloys are not included in the prohibition in the interim regulations on the import of iron into the United States.

On uranium, the interim regulations allow imports of South African uranium for reprocessing and re-export. This means that we are helping to facilitate South Africa's sale and use of uranium. The point is that the administration, in many instances, has chosen a narrow interpretation of the Act's provisions. The administration is also unwilling to be bolder on the international front to coordinate sanctions.

The recent U.S. veto of a United Nations Security Council resolution which imposed selective sanctions against South Africa is a clear illustration of the tug-of-war between Congress and the administration. Although the resolution was patterned after our own sanctions plan, the administration failed to support it and in doing so disregarded a section of the Anti-Apartheid Act urging that the U.S. propose South African sanctions patterned after the Act at the UN.

Despite the flexibility demonstrated by African states in proposing selective

Senator Paul Simon, Democrat of Illinois, is chairman of the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs.

rather than comprehensive sanctions, the administration was more concerned that the sanctions would, in the words of U.S. Ambassador Vernon A. Walters, "tie our hands for the future" because if future improvements in the South African situation occur, "one person can veto the lifting of those sanctions."

Instead of exercising leadership, instead of using our influence and position to promote positive international efforts, we lost an opportunity to demonstrate that we are serious about bringing freedom to South Africa and loosening Pretoria's grip on the region.

International Sanctions

The administration would do well to heed the advice of its own Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa which, among other recommendations, requires U.S. negotiations with the industrialized democracies and South Africa's other trading partners to reach international cooperative arrangements imposing sanctions. The 12-member committee, in sounding the death knell for constructive engagement, recognized that "there is one overarching requirement for an effective U.S. policy toward South Africa: strong presidential leadership."

One of the first areas we can address is to help revive the European Community (EC) proposal, vetoed by the West Germans last August, to ban coal imports. According to *The Economist*, two-thirds of all South African coal exports go to the EC, valued at $1 billion in 1985. The 12 EC countries also account for approximately half of all foreign investments in South Africa.

Coal is a sector of tremendous importance to South African trade. The independent Johannesburg *Star* newspaper reported that South Africa's coal exports went up from 2.7 million tons in 1975 to a staggering 44.8 million tons in 1985. In addition, South Africa's foreign exchange earnings have multiplied almost 100 times over the same 10-year period from 37.4 million rands to more than 3 billion rands. And the *South African Foundation News* says that South Africa can make "fantastic" rand profits with its coal trade, which accounted for 16 percent of world sales in 1985, only behind the U.S. at 34.8 percent and Australia at 23.9 percent.

"Congress has the opportunity to fashion a comprehensive approach to the South African problem, both inside and beyond the borders of South Africa."

Southern African Development Coordination Conference

The problems and issues with respect to the South African situation extend directly to the frontline states. The repression within South Africa and destabilization outside work to the same ends. Thus, the logical, effective extension of sanctions is meaningful support for the SADCC states.

The U.S. and the international community must counter South Africa's campaign to establish regional dominance with an effective counter-strategy that pulls the frontline states loose from South Africa's economic grip and Pretoria's tactics of intimidation and destabilization.

Peace and stability in southern Africa depend in large part on reducing the economic dependence of frontline states on South Africa. Until all the SADCC states have good, operational transportation routes, the political reality is that these states are vulnerable to becoming South Africa's economic hostages. Economically, lack of a functional transportation infrastructure paralyzes the potential for an improved economic climate and severely limits any benefit that could be derived from economic reform measures.

"I expect Congress to take serious and meaningful steps to educate and legislate, building on the principles of the Anti-Apartheid Act and ensuring its fullest implementation"

At present, of the six outlets that access landlocked states to the sea, four are inoperative because of lack of maintenance and sabotage by South African-backed insurgents, and the remaining two are in poor shape.

What we have proposed in the Africa subcommittee—provisions which are included in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee foreign aid bill—is an earmark of $50 million for SADCC, of which 50 percent shall go to transportation.

The administration made a commitment, in the president's words, to "a multi-year program designed to promote economic reform and development in the black-ruled states of southern Africa." But it is unclear what resources the administration expects to commit. During early consideration of the plan, the administration was going to commit itself to a $500 million five-year program. Yet, that commitment is now uncertain, with the administration firm only on requesting $36 million in supplemental fiscal year 1987 funds and $57 million for FY 1988.

Moreover, the administration priorities on how to apply those resources do not adequately reflect the critical transportation needs of SADCC states. The administration breakdown, giving one-third of the funds respectively for trade and investment, economic reform, and transportation, assumed continued, unimpeded access to South Africa's transportation network. This cannot be assumed. The SADCC states need alternative lifelines. Past experience indicates that the South Africans will retaliate, as we have seen in the case of Zambia.

The goals of intra-regional trade, promotion of production and investment, and steady economic development must be undergirded by a basic transportation infrastructure which meets the import and export needs of landlocked coun-

tries and one which obviates the need for South African routes. Protection of the SADCC investment from military attacks by the South Africans and South African-backed guerrillas in Angola and Mozambique is a concern. However, more visible support from the West, and particularly the United States, would serve as both a positive U.S. symbol in black Africa and a meaningful and visible American presence.

Namibia

Namibian independence should be a high priority item on our agenda. In this Congress, it is very important to raise the visibility of the Namibian situation and focus on the resolution of the Namibian problem for two reasons: first, in order to secure independence for the Namibian people; and second, to provide a means to counter South Africa's regional strategy of support for Unita and the destabilization of Angola. The United States must use the greater influence it has to bring Namibian independence as a step toward securing freedom for South Africa.

It is ironic, and sadly unfortunate, that the United States—a member of the Contact Group that negotiated UN Security Council resolution 435, outlining steps for the implementation of Namibian independence—has failed to help bring about implementation of the resolution. The administration's policy of linkage with the Cuban troop issue has complicated that effort, brought the Angola/Unita conflict into play, and has strengthened Pretoria's hand in postponing Namibian independence. The linkage policy should be abandoned.

The Congress needs to highlight Namibia's position as a hostage of South Africa. And Congress needs to show that Namibia is one of the apartheid-imprisoned countries whose independence is in our hands. The administration must take an active role to resume negotiations between South Africa and truly representative leaders of the Namibian people. Namibia should be free today.

Secretary of State's Advisory Committee

The Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa is a welcome policy document coming from the administration. Of the recommendations the committee outlined, of particular importance was the full repudiation of constructive engagement and clear arguments demonstrating its negative impact on the South African situation; the critical need to implement a program of multilateral sanctions against the South African government; increased development for the frontline states; expanded contacts with South African opposition movements, such as the ANC; and the recognition that American military assistance to Unita presents "complications" for U.S. policy in the region.

IDAF

Coal miners, South Africa: "One of the first areas we can address is to help revive the EC proposal to ban coal imports"

Angola is critical to regional transportation, and with its oil resources could play an important role in supplying the region. It is important that our policy be consonant with a move toward peace in Angola. This we cannot do by supplying Stinger missiles and other aid to Savimbi.

The Unita issue is an extremely important factor. U.S. assistance to Unita promotes the destabilization of Angola and strengthens South Africa's occupation of Namibia. The United States should not be supporting a South African-backed guerrilla group or playing sides in the Unita/Angola conflict. Funding for Unita should be halted. And the United States should disengage itself from the Angolan war and let the Angolans resolve their differences.

Zimbabwe is key to any effort to stabilize and strengthen southern Africa, and it is therefore important to renew aid to this centrally located country. Zimbabwe has the industrial capacity and food to supply its neighbors. One cannot have a viable southern Africa policy without Zimbabwe.

Likewise, Mozambique, which has vital transportation corridors essential to the region's economic recovery, must also be a large part of any coherent policy.

Conclusions

The Secretary of State's report ended by stating: "U.S. policy-makers now face a situation markedly different from that which existed in 1981. A new policy is now urgently required."

Congress is ready. When the many oppressed in South Africa are free—as they will be some day—the United States should be remembered as a nation that, despite a period of abandonment, ultimately helped them to become free.

A promise of freedom is not the measure of freedom. Do we, as legislators, do we as Americans, cherish liberty enough to take the right steps for its universal application? The answer is yes. □

The Congress and SADCC

In the U.S. House of Representatives, Congressman Fauntroy is spearheading efforts to provide meaningful financial support to the Southern African Development Coordination Conference. Strengthening the organization's efforts to promote regional self-sufficiency offers the best defense against South African economic and military destabilization.

BY WALTER E. FAUNTROY

The 99th Congress focused its attention initially on the famine conditions in Africa, and then later on the need for sanctions as an anti-apartheid weapon. In the 100th Congress, now in its fifth month, Africa's legislative friends are affording priority to the need for assistance to the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) countries. These are the nine African nations whose proximity to South Africa renders their economies highly vulnerable to destabilization by the racist Afrikaner regime and which have banded together to resist such encroachments by their larger neighbor.

It is, in fact, this very vulnerability of the SADCC countries and the recognition that South Africa is not only actively exploiting this vulnerability but is also likely to escalate such activity as a form of retaliation against the sanctions imposed by the 99th Congress which has led Africa's congressional supporters to choose SADCC as the focus of their attention in the new Congress.

That the African-American Institute happened to have selected Botswana (site of SADCC's headquarters) as the location for its 1987 conference, and SADCC as a major topical focus for that conference, was indeed fortuitous. This meeting sensitized and informed a critical mass of influential Americans, including three key members of Congress, to the timeliness, content, and crucial nature of the SADCC effort.

Congressman Walter E. Fauntroy represents the District of Columbia. He is chairman of the Subcommittee on International Development Institutions and Finance of the House of Representatives Banking Committee.

It enabled some of us who had already been exploring the feasibility of an all-out effort on SADCC's behalf to refine our thinking, to expose our ideas to knowledgeable Africans who are daily living the SADCC experience, and to enlist, on the spot, the support of a number of concerned Americans who not only share our commitment to the full liberation of the continent but who now also have some first-hand familiarity with SADCC and southern African realities.

My own previous study and analysis of what the American contribution to the SADCC effort should be was invaluably enriched by discussions I was able to have with other conference participants. The result of these exchanges is the 100th Congress Plan of Action, a program catalyzed by the following three set of circumstances:

- The increasingly brutal and repressive actions being taken by the South African racist regime behind the veil of a press blackout;
- The readiness of the frontline nations to launch serious, long-term development projects through SADCC;
- The conditions in the United States that make possible increased support for development initiatives in the SADCC states and other forms of assistance that can hasten the dismantling of apartheid in the region.

This third condition is based on the thesis that while the American people are weary of our failed foreign policies in many regions of the world, they feel good about the role we have played in the last two years with respect to famine relief and the imposition of sanctions against South Africa over the objections of the president. Millions of Americans took a direct hand in meeting the emergency needs of a drought-stricken Africa, saving literally millions of lives.

Secretary of State George Shultz sensed the mood of the American people last year when he addressed the UN General Assembly's Special Session on the critical economic situation in Africa: "With an extraordinary outpouring of support, people from across the globe rallied to Africa's side and saved millions of lives. Today, we. . . [must] address a more fundamental and enduring task: the requirements of long-term development for Africa."

I believe, therefore, that the American people are now ready to assist Africa in feeding itself by providing long-term financial aid sufficient to enable the SADCC region to develop its infrastructure and therefore to render it economically independent of South Africa, and to enable it to protect its sovereignty.

Against this background, the 100th Congress Plan of Action sets out seven specific actions whose implementation are crucial to the success of the SADCC effort. These actions are:

- To introduce and work for passage of a legislative package of U.S. aid to SADCC and the frontline nations that includes $500 million over a five-year period for SADCC transportation and communications projects, and logistical support for Mozambique to provide security to those projects.
- To end U.S. aid to Unita and open diplomatic relations with Angola.
- To win the freedom of Namibia from South African domination and control.
- To implement existing sanctions on South Africa and add sanctions where

appropriate, pressuring the international community to do the same.

- To rally the American business sector to participate in the "investment in production" projects of SADCC.
- To deliver on commitments made by Treasury Secretary James Baker to increase contributions to the multilateral funds for concessional loans to Africa generally, and SADCC countries in particular.
- To end intelligence cooperation between the U.S. government and South Africa, and minimize our diplomatic relations.

The successful implementation of these seven actions will be no easy task, although I am pleased to report that concrete results are already emerging with respect to the first item.

A 1987 supplemental appropriations bill calling for $50 million in aid to the SADCC countries, to be used primarily for transportation and communications projects, has already been favorably received out of the House Appropriations Committee. This was a joint effort by Congressmen Julian Dixon (D-CA), Mickey Leland (D-TX), and myself.

Meanwhile, Congressman William Gray (D-PA) has introduced a FY 1988 bill calling for $700 million over five years for SADCC projects. This is distinct both from a $500 million bill for aid to Africa generally, led by Congressman Howard Wolpe (D-MI), and from my own bill calling for debt relief for the poorer countries in Africa. All of these bills will be wending their way through a Congress which is mesmerized by the massive budget deficit and determined to keep its spending as low as possible.

To insure favorable consideration of this legislation and to build receptivity to other items in the seven-point program, it is essential that the realities surrounding the situation in southern Africa be afforded maximum exposure in U.S. public attention—no easy task given the thin coverage by the American press of the SADCC region and the official blackout on news coming from South Africa itself. Every effort must be made to overcome this paucity of information.

The press must be encouraged not to abandon southern Africa in the face of the South African press restrictions, but to shift its news gathering efforts to the frontline states where a powerful story is daily unfolding: the rebuilding of the Beira corridor, an alternative transport lifeline for the landlocked SADCC nations; South Africa's continuing economic and political destabilization efforts in the frontline states; the atrocities perpetrated by South Africa's black surrogate terrorist organizations, Unita in Angola and Renamo in Mozambique; the South African Defence Force's (SADF) brazen incursions into the SADCC states and in the case of Angola, the SADF's outright, ongoing occupation of a substantial portion of Angola's territory.

Mozambique Information Agency

Mozambican peasant mutilated in Renamo attack: "If the American people could be made aware of the suffering that South Africa and its surrogates are visiting upon the SADCC nations, we could see some change in these practices"

If the American people could be made aware of the suffering that South Africa and its surrogates are visiting upon the SADCC nations, sometimes with financial help from the U.S. taxpayer, we could see some change in these practices. If the American people knew that conservative estimates place the damage visited on this region by the South African destabilization program in excess of $10 billion over the past five years, they would begin to raise questions which desperately need to be publicly aired.

At the height of the Mozambican independence struggle, filmmaker Robert van Lierop produced the classic documentary, *A Luta Continua*, which dramatized the epic battle Frelimo was waging against the Portuguese colonialists. This film captured the imagination of the American liberal and activist communities and mobilized crucial support for Mozambican liberation. There is clearly a need for another such film, telling the story of SADCC and its heroic efforts to enable the frontline states to withstand the destructive pressures of their powerful neighbor.

An information blitz focused on the SADCC states can serve another useful purpose: attracting to the frontline states U.S. capital which is disinvesting from South Africa. A principal factor behind South Africa's destabilization policy is to prevent its black neighbors from challenging Afrikaner economic hegemony over the whole of southern Africa—to maintain South Africa as the monopoly supplier of certain strategic minerals by frustrating the productive capacity of would-be competitors.

It is a drama for high stakes, and sooner or later the story will be understood. Our task is to see that it is sooner rather than later. □

The Corporate Connection

A coalition of American organizations has been working at the grassroots and national levels over the last decade to pressure U.S. companies and investors to break their ties with the apartheid regime. The continuing violence in South Africa has placed additional pressures on the private sector to re-examine its involvement in sustaining apartheid, as the list of American corporate withdrawals grows longer.

BY TIMOTHY H. SMITH

Over the past months, a number of corporations have dramatically announced plans to withdraw from the land of apartheid. Among those companies selling their South African assets and heading for the exit are Eastman Kodak, Coca-Cola, General Motors, IBM, Honeywell, Exxon, McGraw Hill, and Xerox, and more are expected to follow their lead. Over 80 companies have already left South Africa as the trickle of those withdrawing has become a flood.

Shell, Unisys, and many others are re-evaluating their presence. John Wilson, chairman of Shell South Africa, the biggest multinational investor there, has warned that apartheid leads to "ungovernability and chaos" and that "Shell's position is not comfortable. The threat of disinvestment is real."

The Tide Has Turned

Why is the U.S. business community making such a dramatic shift? Several factors make it wiser for companies to withdraw. Most significantly, it is evident that the corporate bottom line now is adversely affected by the South African connection.

Apartheid has had an extremely negative effect on the South African economy and South African subsidiaries of many companies operate in a sea of red ink. Increasingly, lack of profits is moving businesses to the conclusion that it is wiser to disengage.

Roger Smith, chief executive officer of General Motors, clearly stated the reasons for the company's sale of its South African operations in a *New York Times* opinion column, "Why GM Decided to Quit South Africa," on October 30, 1986. His comments reflect the thinking of many business leaders:

"The basic problem—one which all corporations must pay attention to—is the fact that our South African operations have been losing money for several years. Clearly, a major portion of our financial troubles was generated by the very existence of apartheid. . . We felt that as long as we could be a positive force for change in that country, our presence was merited—over and above what was happening to our balance sheet in the short-term. But earlier this year, the tide of political and economic events turned.

"It soon became clear that too little was happening too late. South Africa still lagged behind world opinion and unfolding events, and the country seemed unable to generate the momentum needed to produce the progress the times required. Without this progress, the opportunity for American businesses to contribute to a satisfactory resolution of South Africa's political problems was severely diminished. . .

"At that point, we had little choice but to leave. . . Economics was a major factor in our withdrawal. But we also hope by our action—and those of other like-minded American businesses—to send a signal that we are disappointed in the slow pace of progress."

Clearly, U.S. corporate attempts to act as a catalyst for reform in South Africa are in shambles; their hopes bankrupt. American companies have doggedly insisted to their critics that they are a "constructive force for change" in South Africa and that they are lobbying the Botha government for the abolition of apartheid. Yet, the South African government has responded to internal and international appeals for change with increased repression and a steadfast commitment to maintain white supremacy.

Pressures on the Domestic Front

Following Roger Smith's lead, it is likely that many American businesses will leave South Africa for twin reasons: lack of profitability and lack of movement in ending apartheid.

Since the 1985 state of emergency in South Africa, anti-apartheid pressures in the U.S. have risen astronomically. Altogether, institutional investors with combined worth of over $300 billion are holding companies accountable for their South Africa links. This accountability comes from divestment, shareholder advocacy, selective purchasing, and consumer boycotts.

Since the state of California decided to divest stock in companies with South African operations, investors with total holdings worth $160 billion are commit-

Timothy H. Smith, executive director of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, has been working on the issue of investment in South Africa for over 15 years.

ICCR

Protest at Citibank New York headquarters, January 1987: "Imaginative campaign strategies are being used to press corporations to sever their South Africa links"

ted to selling stock as anti-apartheid protests. Divesting institutions include a wide range of multi-billion dollar pension funds, such as those of the states of New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Michigan, and cities like Philadelphia, Washington, San Francisco, and Los Angeles; the University of California and Columbia University in New York; and hundreds of churches, trade unions, and foundations. The size and prestige of these divesting institutions cannot be ignored.

At the same time, institutions like the Teachers Insurance Annuity Association/College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF), the largest in the U.S.; the pension funds of New York state, New York City, Wisconsin, and Minnesota; and churches and universities with cumulative investments worth $150 billion, are sponsoring shareholder resolutions calling on corporations to withdraw from South Africa.

Virtually every company (over 150) with significant or strategic investments in South Africa has received these divestment resolutions for a vote by their stockholders, numbering in the hundreds of thousands. Already, sponsors have withdrawn a number of these resolutions, in light of the sale of those companies' South African assets.

Over 35 cities and states have adopted selective purchasing ordinances, which prohibit buying products from certain companies with South African links. Shell Oil faces a multinational consumer boycott, led in the U.S. by the Free South Africa movement, eight major labor unions, and numerous churches. These actions go right to the corporate bottom line. A number of companies have cited the loss of business from concerned customers, or fear of future losses, as a major factor in their decisions to quit South Africa.

"U.S. corporate attempts to act as a catalyst for reform in South Africa are in shambles; their hopes bankrupt."

Finally, many corporate leaders refer to the "hassle factor"—the growing time and energy that top executives and companies must put into the South African debate, as a significant factor in their decisions to disengage.

The call for sanctions is soon to get a major boost when Dr. Leon Sullivan, author of the Sullivan Principles, a code of conduct for businesses in South Africa, announces his support for corporate withdrawal and a total U.S. embargo if apartheid is not eliminated. One of the business world's best defenses will crumble with that announcement. Obviously, this will provide a further stimulus for companies to leave and will make companies deciding to stay much more isolated.

Other imaginative campaign strategies are also being used to press corporations to sever their South African links. Citibank is a case in point:

- Tens of thousands of postcards have

been sent to Citibank, protesting its South African connection.

- The city of New York pension funds voted to sell their $13 million in South African stock if Citibank continues its South African operations and lending.
- On two occasions, religious representatives have been arrested for civil disobedience and blocking the doors of Citibank headquarters.
- On April 21, the day of Citibank's stockholder meeting, a religious service for the suffering in South Africa was held in the company lobby as stockholders filed by.
- Over $125 million in church accounts have been withdrawn from Citibank in protest and the appeal for account withdrawals is expanding.
- Demonstrations and leafleting at Citibank branches have started urging individual customers to withdraw accounts.

The cumulative effect of these actions is to make it only marginally profitable for Citibank to stay in South Africa.

Beyond the Headlines: IBM's Withdrawal

For over 15 years, American churches have challenged IBM on its sales of technology to South Africa and its role in sustaining apartheid. Hence, pressure on the company has not ended with the announcement of its intention to sell its South African assets to a company owned by its former South African employees and committed to continuing sales of IBM products in South Africa.

IBM reassured anxious South African customers that the whole range of IBM products will continue to be sold there and IBM will remain a force to be reckoned with in the market. IBM is unable to insure that the spin-off company will not sell its products to the South African government or that they will not be used to sustain apartheid. Thus, IBM has not really cut its apartheid ties.

Nonetheless, churches gave cautious praise to IBM's announcement that it was selling its subsidiary due to "the deteriorating political and economic situation in South Africa" because the move sent a distress signal to the apartheid regime. But the last chapter on IBM and apartheid will not be written until the company makes a clean break and halts sales of its products in South Africa. Al-

Anti-Apartheid Guidelines for Companies Doing Business in South Africa

Five anti-apartheid groups have issued "Guidelines for Divestment" which they hope will clarify what the national anti-apartheid movement means by economic disengagement from South Africa and Namibia. The American Committee on Africa, American Friends Service Committee, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, TransAfrica, and the Washington Office on Africa have called for "an end to all corporate involvement in or with South Africa and Namibia" and have formulated three criteria which describe a "corporation...doing business in or with the Republic of South Africa or Namibia."

They are urging investors already committed to divestment "to consider these guidelines as the morally and legally correct interpretation of their divestment policy," and those considering divestment "to use these criteria as the basis for their policies." Following are the guidelines:

We support an end to all corporate involvement in or with South Africa and Namibia. A corporation is doing business in or with the Republic of South Africa or Namibia if it, its parent, or its subsidiaries;

- have direct investments in South Africa or Namibia, or have entered into franchise, licensing, or management agreements with or for any entity in those countries;
- are financial institutions that have not prohibited new investments, loans, credits or related services, or the renewal of existing financial agreements, including those for the purposes of trade, with any entity in those countries;
- have more than 5 percent of their common stock beneficially owned or controlled by a South African entity.

A company with operations in South Africa or Namibia for the sole purpose of reporting the news shall not be considered doing business in those countries.

Since the principles were released in January, endorsement has come from:

Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union

American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO

Arie R. Brouwer, General Secretary, National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.

Coalition of Black Trade Unionists, Executive Council

John G. Guffey, Jr., Executive Vice President, Calvert Investment Fund

National Education Association

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler, President, Union of American Hebrew Congregations

Assemblywoman Maxine Waters, California

William W. Winpinsinger, International President, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers

Judy Janda/Impact Visuals

June 1986 demonstration in Central Park, New York City: "Since the 1985 state of emergency in South Africa, anti-apartheid pressures in the U.S. have risen astronomically"

ready, major institutional investors, U.S. churches, and the Free South Africa movement have said that IBM must take the next step and stop all computer sales and service in South Africa.

The Impact of Sanctions and Corporate Withdrawal

The South African government is hard at work arguing that sanctions are failing miserably and blacks are being hurt by them. This is echoed by various media in the U.S., including *Forbes* and *Fortune*. Those opposed to white supremacy should obviously be suspicious from the start of any claims made by the South African government.

Why is it working so hard against economic sanctions, including the unprecedented step of Foreign Minister Botha calling senators on the Senate floor to oppose the sanctions vote? Why is it illegal in South Africa to advocate sanctions if the white minority government doesn't feel it is a threat to their power?

And on the other side, why are so many credible black leaders, including the African National Congress, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, and the Rev. Allan Boesak, supporting the call for economic disengagement as one of the last peaceful levers for change available?

Clearly, economic disengagement worries Pretoria's policy-makers a great deal. The withdrawal of flagship companies like Barclays, IBM, GM, Coca-Cola, and Xerox is as much a blow to South Africa's prestige as a form of economic pressure. The pragmatic South African business community is deeply troubled, and points to sanctions and international isolation as a prime reason for the need to end apartheid.

In that sense, sanctions and the threat of sanctions have already had a clear and demonstrable effect. The white political scene is in real flux, and the black movement for democracy feels further empowered by growing international support in the West.

The convenient corporate claim that company withdrawals hurt blacks first also deserves careful scrutiny. This standard defense implies that American companies employ tens of thousands of blacks. Yet Citibank employs approximately 40 Africans, IBM 285, Unisys 50, Control Data 25, and the larger employers like Mobil, 1,000. In addition, when these companies sell their assets, their employees often continue working in the new enterprise. I believe that white employees and customers are much more significantly affected by U.S. companies leaving South Africa than their black workers.

Authentic Disengagement

The limited sanctions being applied are having the effect of isolating white South Africa, shaking up the white business community, and encouraging the movements for change.

The goal of these economic campaigns is to put concrete pressure on the white supremacist government of South Africa. We believe, along with Archbishop Tutu and other black South African leaders, that economic pressure is one of the few remaining peaceful levers for change. Perhaps having ignored decades of moral appeals, the Nationalist government will negotiate with the black South African leadership when apartheid becomes less profitable.

It is time for Mobil, Shell, Chevron, and Texaco to stop selling in South Africa, particularly to the police and military. Citibank must end all loans. Hewlett Packard and Burroughs (now Unisys) must exit immediately. Eastman Kodak's withdrawal and pledge that Kodak products will no longer be sold in South Africa serves as a commendable example of authentic disengagement.

As American companies plan to sell their South African operations, the anti-apartheid movement is working to insure that authentic disengagement occurs, and all supportive links to apartheid are cut. American companies should read the signs of the times. Profits and morality demand that they leave apartheid South Africa, and that they do so in a clean break. □

Case Study

Behind Barclays' Pull-out

Barclays Bank was faced with an increasingly unprofitable future due to mounting criticism of its investment in South Africa and the downward trend in the apartheid economy. The general manager of Barclays—the first major British company to withdraw from South Africa—explains the moral and economic forces behind the Bank's decision.

BY GORDON ADAM

Just over seven weeks ago, Barclays Bank announced its decision to sell its remaining investment in its South African associate, Barclays National Bank, and so became the first major British company to follow in the steps of American corporations. The decision to sell was emphatically not a cosmetic one.

For the past few years, I have been the focal point in Barclays head office in London for what one might call the consequences of Barclays' political involvement in South Africa, a challenging if not a tranquil assignment. About 15 months ago, I went to protest to the United Nations at what we in Barclays perceived to be unfair discrimination against the Bank. Our good friends at the African-American Institute knew exactly where to direct me, and needless to say they opened doors which might otherwise have remained shut.

I was received with exquisite courtesy by a very senior member of the United Nations Secretariat with these words: "Mr. Adam, if you have come to tell me that within six months, Barclays will have reduced its shareholding in Barclays National Bank to below 10 percent, we can do business; otherwise we can spend the next 20 minutes talking about the weather."

Gordon Adam is general manager of the Barclays Group and a director of Barclays Bank U.K. This is excerpted from a presentation he made at the African-American Institute conference in Gaborone, Botswana, in January 1987.

It would be wrong to infer that Barclays' decision to sell had then been taken, although it was not as sudden as it may have appeared last November in the extensive coverage in the world press. It was neither a quick nor an easy decision. It has upset some of our friends who claim we have given way to pressure. Others thought that we ought to have stayed in South Africa in order to go on fostering more liberal attitudes there, in furtherance of our reputation of being robust campaigners against apartheid, and of taking far more positive action against that evil than some of those who have criticized us for being there.

To this, we reply that Barclays' policies have not changed. The directors and management of Barclays National, exemplified by Tony Bloom [a director of Barclays National in South Africa], have over many years been in the forefront of South African business leadership, in promoting multi-racial equality of opportunity and treatment among their staff. We see no reason for those policies to change either. What has changed are the commercial reasons for staying in South Africa.

For the last two years and more, South Africa has suffered such widespread unrest as to shake economic confidence in its future. There has been a complete turnabout from the climate of three years ago, when the Nkomati accord was signed—a now almost forgotten name—when President Botha rather tentatively toured Europe and there was cautious international encouragement for the South African government's then proclaimed program of reform.

A year later, and South Africa had unilaterally declared a repayment standstill on international debt of $24 billion, no less than $13 billion of which was due within a year. The causes are well-known, but the fact remained that in the blunt parlance of bankers, South Africa had defaulted.

Since 1973, Barclays' shareholding in Barclays National Bank had fallen from 100 percent to around 40 percent, which it reached just before that national default, and we made no secret that we expected our interest in the South African bank to lessen over time. But we hoped, through the rest of 1985 and even into 1986, that there might be real and genuine movement toward fairness and freedom, some true response to the mounting pressure of world opinion to justify continuing our investment.

Our chairman chided South Africa for its slowness in dismantling apartheid and he called on the government to stop wasting time, to act before it was too late. One year on and it became too late for us. Our board concluded that it was no longer in the long-term interest of Barclays and its shareholders that we should stay in South Africa.

When I went back to London from that visit to the United Nations, I was confronted by the full impact of the unjust and unjustified campaign against Barclays in the United Kingdom, especially among students. To us, the unacceptable irony was of being dubbed the

"apartheid bank" simply because we were in South Africa—no discussion whether we were or were not a force for good—while our associate, Barclays National, was losing business because of its reputation as the "anti-apartheid bank" in South Africa.

We suffered not merely loss of accounts, but physical damage to many of our branches. On one day of concerted action in Britain, 125 branches were vandalized, windows broken, paint thrown, customers jostled and subjected to verbal abuse, simply because they were customers of Barclays Bank. Our share of the new student market fell from around 30 percent to less than half—that for the most important of the British commercial banks.

"I believe it is impossible to expect the present South African government to have the will to satisfy even part of the world's demands."

This strikes at the root of our business for years to come. We also saw a steady drain of municipal accounts, accounts of colleges and charities. Overseas and in the United States in particular, we were increasingly exposed to threat to our business if we stayed in South Africa. These factors, none decisive in itself, nevertheless together contributed to the Bank's decision. So also did the fact that Barclays National's once-significant contribution to our group post-tax profits was less than three percent in 1985 and even less last half-year, June 1986.

But I am not talking just about profits, nor about loss of business, nor about student picketing at the Bank's branches, nor the refusal to accept Barclays checks in universities and other educational institutions. I am also thinking about outside factors, such as the impact upon us in London of the action of the U.S. Congress in overturning President Reagan's veto against sanctions last fall.

What, we asked ourselves, were the consequences of this for our American business, our assets there of some $17 billion, our staff numbering over 8,000, and our plans for further expansion in North America? What also about our involvement, going back over 70 years, in the rest of Africa, where we have 10,000 staff, some 230 offices, and where 99 percent of our staff are locally employed? In short, we faced a choice, and we chose America and Africa and elsewhere in preference to South Africa; or as Thabo Mbeki [ANC Secretary for Information, a conference delegate] put it, Barclays "has taken sides."

Someone once wrote, "The architects of apartheid correctly perceived

Barclays Bank branch, South Africa: "In short, we faced a choice, and we chose America and Africa and elsewhere in preference to South Africa"



Sue Dorfman

that free enterprise was a most dangerous and direct threat to their ideology." Amid all the talk of international sanctions, I believe this is true. I also suggest that what has been described as "private sanctions"—from banks, international corporations, universities, labor unions, and church groups—represents a real threat to South Africa's future. In an economically dependent world, South Africa must be vulnerable.

Each of us should ask himself the question: What do we actually want to happen in South Africa? We should also try to spell out what we mean when we use that familiar formula—the peaceful evolution of South Africa into a prosperous multi-racial society. By the term "dismantling apartheid," I personally mean the repeal of the two fundamentals, the Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act, as well as the unification of education, the abolition of the homelands, and the winding up of the tricameral parliamentary system or its expansion to include the black majority.

Faced with that, President Botha would be tempted to retort that he could do nothing to satisfy even his moderate international critics, and that if only South Africa could be self-sufficient in oil, he could yield to the siren voices urging him to "pull up the drawbridge."

I believe it is impossible to expect the present South African government to have the will to satisfy even part of the world's demands. Even when they may have been genuinely intent on reform, to give them the benefit of the doubt, the majority of their critics at home and overseas require a more fundamental change in the system.

I believe that the unrest is endemic, that there will be no early return to national solvency, that the negative factors combined with the view that the rest of the world has taken about South Africa, make it impossible for South Africa, as now constituted, to become an economy of such stature, whatever its inherent qualities, to be able to draw in foreign investment and link up with the economies of the rest of southern Africa.

As Abraham Lincoln said, "Let us have faith that right makes might, and in that faith let us to the end dare to do our duty as we understand it." □

Economies

African Debt: A Light at the End of the Tunnel?

Recent initiatives by Western creditors and governments to address Africa's mounting debt burden have represented only piecemeal approaches to a problem which, unlike in Latin America, is developmental in nature. New proposals by the IMF, World Bank, and Paris Club must be supported by substantial capital inflows from Western governments if Africa is to survive its current financial crisis.

BY ANTONIO-GABRIEL M. CUNHA

On February 20, 1987, President José Sarney startled his compatriots with the solemn declaration that Brazil, after having paid $55.8 billion in interest alone in the last five years, was suspending interest payments on $68 billion of its $106 billion external debt. In his words, "it was a matter of defending democracy, of not repaying debt with the people's hunger."

This dramatic statement gives a new twist to the old "guns versus butter" scarcity dilemma, highlighting increasing polarization over a pressing issue which for debtor nations represents a choice between meeting payments obligations on a heavy external debt overhang and maintaining an equitable domestic economy where sturdy growth is a sine qua non.

Like Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa's debt crisis has its roots in a chronic lack of capital which motivated the region's nations—particularly Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, Zaire, Zambia, and Kenya—to take on an increasingly larger debt burden. Such a burden, which expanded in excess of 20 percent per annum in the decade of the 1970s, notwithstanding the savings brought about by the recent drop in interest rates, has been made even heavier by the fall of the U.S. dollar since mid-1985. But the region's $100 billion in total external public and publicly guaranteed debt at the end of 1986 is not large; in fact, it is less than Brazil's.

Even though much of it is of a concessional nature—owed to bilateral (Western governments) and multilateral (IMF, World Bank) sources—the cost of servicing it has become increasingly onerous in terms of exports of goods and services receipts (over 40 percent in 1986). Further, unlike Latin American debt, which is seen more as a liquidity crisis, Africa's debt takes on the dimension of a developmental—i.e. poverty—problem. While Latin America exports manufactures, Africa, which has suffered a sharp decline in the terms of trade, exports primary commodities.

The crisis, which has been characterized by external debt service payments absorbing a growing share of Africa's falling export earnings, has been exacerbated by a net capital outflow over the last three years. The deteriorating trend in total debt service payments up to 1985 will be aggravated in 1987, as projected total public and publicly guaranteed debt service alone is estimated to have jumped 52 percent from the $8 billion shown in 1985 to over $12 billion in 1986, a burden which is clearly unsustainable.

Net financial tranfers in 1985 were a negative $1.9 billion—i.e. the region as a whole paid out more than it received—due not only to a decline in net multilateral flows, but also to a precipitous drop in net bilateral sources. Net private lending has been deeply in the red since 1984.

For their part, commercial banks, whose willingness to provide additional financing depends on a variety of factors, foremost among which are sound macroeconomic and structural policies in borrowing countries—i.e. an IMF "seal of approval"—and a healthy and growing economy, have reined in their overall exposures in Africa. They have not been overly impressed by substantial Fund withdrawals from some countries and the Fund's net repayments position in its compensatory financing facility at a time when commodity prices are very depressed. Alas, 45 percent of the SDR 5.2 billion in sub-Saharan Africa's outstandings with the Fund (as of February 28, 1987) are due for payment during the next two years.

It is no surprise that the IMF has not only become sub-Saharan Africa's chief economic architect, but has transformed itself, together with the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA), into its lender of last resort. Over the last four years, however, the Fund's largesse has diminished markedly, mostly due to non-compliance with the Fund's strictures on the part of the region's borrowers.

In early 1987, of the 42 countries worldwide with Fund arrangements, 25 were from sub-Saharan Africa, compared to late 1984, when 14 out of 45 countries belonged to the region. The total IMF loan facilities extended to the region as of early 1987 amounted to $1.8 billion (versus $2 billion in late 1984), while undrawn balances on such facilities amounted to $1.4 billion (versus $1 billion in late 1984).

Another revealing fact: Since 1975, while over $12 billion were accumulated in payments arrears, 22 African nations were forced to reschedule their debt on 85 different occasions in what has con-

Antonio-Gabriel M. Cunha is an economist with a major New York-based bank.

IMF STANDBY AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT FACILITY (SAF) ARRANGEMENTS IN EFFECT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, AS OF FEBRUARY 28, 1987

(million SDRs)

Member	Date of Arrangement	Expiration Date	Total Amount	Undrawn Balance
Standby arrangements				
Burundi	August 8, 1986	March 31, 1988	21	21
Central African Republic	September 23, 1985	April 28, 1988	15	8
Congo	August 29, 1986	April 28, 1988	22	13
Côte d'Ivoire	June 23, 1986	June 22, 1988	100	76
Gabon	December 22, 1986	December 31, 1988	99	71
Gambia, The	September 17, 1986	October 16, 1987	5	4
Ghana	October 15, 1986	October 14, 1987	82	49
Guinea	February 3, 1986	April 2, 1987	27	12
Madagascar	September 17, 1986	February 16, 1988	30	25
Mali	November 8, 1985	March 31, 1987	23	7
Mauritania	April 26, 1986	April 25, 1987	12	3
Niger	December 5, 1986	December 4, 1987	10	8
Nigeria	January 30, 1987	January 31, 1988	650	650
Senegal	November 10, 1986	November 9, 1987	34	23
Sierra Leone	November 14, 1986	November 13, 1987	23	15
Tanzania	August 28, 1986	February 27, 1988	64	31
Togo	June 9, 1986	April 8, 1988	23	14
Zaire	May 28, 1986	March 27, 1988	214	167
Zambia	February 21, 1986	February 28, 1988	230	195
Total Sub-Saharan Africa			1684	1392
As percent of all Standby			(33.5)	(45.6)
SAF arrangements				
Burundi	August 8, 1986	August 7, 1989	20	12
Gambia, The	September 17, 1986	September 16, 1989	8	12
Mauritania	September 22, 1986	September 21, 1989	16	9
Niger	November 17, 1986	November 16, 1989	16	9
Senegal	November 10, 1986	October 31, 1989	40	23
Sierra Leone	November 14, 1986	November 13, 1989	27	16
Total Sub-Saharan Africa			127	74
As percent of all SAF			(38.8)	(39.4)
	SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA – TOTAL ARRANGEMENTS		1811	1466
	AS PERCENTAGE OF GRAND TOTAL		(29.6)	(41.3)

Source: International Monetary Fund

stituted an almost continuous exercise with London Club private creditors. Constant reschedulings and arrearages, although they reduce debt service payments in the short-run, hinder economic development in the long-run because they use up the scarce management resources of the region and create an atmosphere of economic uncertainty. Indeed, arrearages discourage spontaneous new loans and/or further disbursement of existing loans, particularly when they were contracted with multilateral financial institutions.

This deterioration, together with continued conflicts over the conditionality of Fund-supported corrective programs, raises serious questions about the economic and political viability of IMF-inspired adjustment programs—a short-term and piecemeal approach which has been ineffective and counterproductive.

The benefits to the external accounts of sub-Saharan African countries provided by a relatively drought-free 1986, together with the implementation of structural adjustment programs, were more than outweighed by the costs associated with slowing world trade, depressed world commodity prices, contracting aid inflows, and disappointing growth in industrialized countries. These factors have limited and continue to limit the region's exports and thus the capacity of these countries to service their debt. Payments arrearages are likely to continue to persist in the near future.

The crash of oil prices in particular has created special problems for African oil exporters whose combined exports earnings are estimated to have fallen by over 40 percent in 1986; overall export earnings fell by an estimated 29 percent, the steepest drop in a single year since World War II. The future outlook remains equally clouded.

"The 'Baker initiative,' although well-intended in its signalling of a change in governmental thinking, becomes almost irrelevant in the context of Africa's problems."

The Swiss-based General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) recently forecast that world trade will expand only 2.5 percent in 1987, contrasted against average annual growth rates of 5.5 percent during the 1970s and 8.5 percent in the 1960s. By the same token, sobering analyses by the IMF have resulted in two downward revisions in its forecast of economic growth for the OECD countries for this year, now set at an anemic 2-2.5 percent.

In a recently published document, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America found that Latin American nations can only return to viable economic growth levels by limiting the amount of capital they export via the

Cameraplix

Market in Lagos, Nigeria: "Africa's debt takes on the dimension of a developmental, i.e. poverty, problem"

servicing of their external debt. The idea of a maximum limit on outflows of financial resources is extremely pertinent for sub-Saharan Africa because of the need for the simultaneous resolution of both the debt and growth crises afflicting the region. So far, economic adjustment under the tutelage of the IMF has been partially achieved at the expense of growth. (Alas, in some instances, collaboration between the Fund and the World Bank has produced cross-confidentiality which has proven rather harsh and myopic in the case of Africa.)

The anti-investment bias of the IMF's adjustment approach and its supervision process is one of its most serious shortcomings in the debt strategy. It therefore follows that the most effective means of dealing with the immediate difficulties without endangering growth is to alleviate the debt overhang through a cooperative approach between creditors and debtors.

The "Baker initiative," presented in late 1985, which would make $29 billion in extra resources available to 15 selected countries over a three-year period, although well-intended in its signalling of a fundamental change in governmental thinking, becomes almost irrelevant in the context of Africa's problems, notwithstanding its targeting of two countries (Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire) in the region.

This is so because the Baker Plan is based on three essential and mutually reinforcing (and/or defeating) premises which caused it to self-destruct before there was a chance for implementation:

- The adoption by the recipient countries of sound macroeconomic policies under the tutelage of the IMF to stimulate growth and reduce inflation.
- A reinforced role for multilateral development institutions.
- Higher lending activity by Western commercial banks to financially back up the debtor countries' corrective efforts.

Other more radical plans, like the "Bradley proposal" being discussed by the U.S. Congress, would cut interest rates on international loans by 3 percentage points and cancel 9 percent of the principal that the debtor countries owe over three years. This latter provision would most certainly cause capital inflows to LDCs, particularly as they relate to trade financing, to dry up almost immediately, because private lending institutions would be forced to think twice before they committed new funds. The mere precedent of debt forgiveness—even if adequate economic reforms were to follow—is anathema to private lenders, because it would cause uncertainty, which in turn could shatter confidence in global financial stability.

A more encouraging prospect came recently from the major industrialized countries under the aegis of the Paris Club. They have agreed in principle to reschedule the official debt owed by sub-Saharan countries on easier terms. Although details are still to be worked out, it is expected that African debtors will be offered multi-year rescheduling agreements (MYRAs) stretched out over 15 to 20 years, with generous grace periods. This would be accompanied by serious and workable economic adjustment programs. However, although the lengthening of the repayment period will be helpful in alleviating the debt overhang, additional relief may be needed in the form of interest rate cuts—a step that West Germany and the U.S., among others, have opposed in the past.

The Lawson Plan, named after the United Kingdom's Chancellor of the Exchequer, which was recently presented

at a meeting of the IMF's policy-making interim committee, overlaps with the Paris Club proposal to a certain extent in that it aims to convert bilateral aid loans into outright grants; provide MYRAs up to 20 years with long grace periods; and peg interest rates at 3 percentage points below market levels.

Most sub-Saharan African countries would benefit from the translation of aid loans into grants and from the interest rate remissions which are estimated by British Treasury officials to be worth $250 million a year in savings. In order to qualify, debtors would have to implement structural adjustment policies to overhaul their economies. The major stumbling block, however, is the condition that for the plan to be implemented, it would have to be unanimously approved by Paris Club members.

Other measures to alleviate the debt overhang include debt-to-equity swaps through a secondary market in discounted claims, which could focus attention on private investment flows and attract them to economies where foreign investment has been absent since the beginning of the debt crisis. So far, about $4-5 billion worth of swaps are reckoned to have taken place worldwide since 1982, most of them in the last year and a half.

Foreign ownership has lost its standing as a major visceral issue in the Third World and expropriation is increasingly rare. Foreign firms are now seen as helpful vehicles to bring about much needed technology and capital inflows, which in turn, create new jobs, a new tax base, and the means to boost the share of manufactures in exports.

Another interesting idea came from the French Minister of Economy, Finance, and Privatization, Edouard Balladur, who proposed that in the future, the IMF compensatory financing facility, which was created to help countries afflicted by a sudden loss of export receipts because of slumping prices for raw materials, should be used to aid the poorest countries.

This proposal is less far-fetched than it seems, because although the IMF suffers an image problem that has had major consequences for its global operations—in sub-Saharan Africa the Fund has been accused of being too rigid with its "one size fits all" approach and unwillingness to give debtor countries enough leeway to grow—there is increasing evidence that its new managing director, Michel Camdessus, who believes that economic adjustment must be an essential element in the restoration of growth in the Third World, is determined to broaden the IMF's role and to reshape its operations to adapt to changing global economic conditions.

On the other hand, it has also become increasingly evident that the IMF is being pressured to cede some of its role in managing the debt situation to its sister organization, the World Bank. Such a dramatic reversal of roles, causing both institutions to revert more to their original concepts—the Fund as the principal insurer of currency rate stability and balance of payments adjustments, the Bank as the insurer of long-term Third World development—is likely to change the manner in which sub-Saharan countries obtain the funds needed to fuel their economic development for years to come.

STS Steel Mill, Lomé: "Foreign firms are now seen as helpful vehicles to bring about much needed technology and capital inflows"



Paula Hirschoff

Under the Baker plan, which failed to address the question of the onerous debt overhang, debtor countries adopting corrective measures and market-oriented reforms were promised adequate capital to finance economic growth. But although most countries have adopted structural adjustment programs, net financial transfers to sub-Saharan Africa have been negative since 1984. Net private lending has been negative since 1984 and official creditor flows, particularly from bilateral sources, have fallen precipitously in the last three years.

Sub-Saharan Africa's external debt, although not unduly large, is becoming increasingly onerous, whereby external debt service payments are absorbing an increasingly larger share of Africa's falling export earnings, which in turn, have been aggravated by depressed commodity prices. Concurrently, as the prescriptions of the IMF have proven powerless to reverse these forces, the crisis, far from abating, has deepened.

It is time for a new "Marshall Plan" for sub-Saharan Africa, financed by the industrialized countries, to help the region out of the quagmire of debt and poverty which together with rapid population growth is threatening to overwhelm its noteworthy accomplishments in education, health, and other public services. The Paris Club proposal, together with recent welcoming developments at the IMF and World Bank, shows the greatest promise in answering such a need.

The import absorption capacity of the region's countries in the second half of the decade is forecast to be lower than in 1980-85 period, even allowing for some beneficial impact of the anticipated reschedulings. Without additional capital inflows—at least $10 billion a year for the rest of the decade in net resource inflows is needed—import absorption capability will deteriorate further in the years ahead. By their inaction, the U.S., Japan, the EEC, and the other trading nations of the world are writing off markets of more than 450 million people who simply cannot afford their goods. It makes good business sense to give Africa a helping hand. □

Economies

SADCC's New Strategy

SADCC's executive secretary describes how the organization, now in its seventh year, is pursuing its new theme, "Investment in Production," and outlines the role to be played by domestic and foreign enterprise sector. He also assesses the level of American support to SADCC in light of regional needs and continued South African destabilization.

BY SIMBA MAKONI

The origins of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) go back to the attainment of independence of a number of states in the southern African region in the mid-1970s. At the time, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia, expressed the wish that a belt of independent states stretching from Dar es Salaam and Maputo in the east to Luanda in the west could join hands in a new struggle, no longer for political liberation, but for economic independence.

Toward the late 1970s, as the budding group of frontline states—then Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia—was experiencing the fruits of coordinated action in support of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, its leadership started asking themselves: After political independence, what next? The answer emerged at a meeting of frontline state foreign ministers in Gaborone, Botswana, in May 1979—economic cooperation.

That was followed shortly after by the first Southern African Development Coordination Conference, a meeting which convened in Arusha, Tanzania, in July 1979, where the foundation of SADCC, the organization, was laid. The independence of Zimbabwe soon followed, and Prime Minister Mugabe of Zimbabwe joined eight other heads of the region to inaugurate SADCC on April 1, 1980.

Since then, our nine countries have worked strenuously to pursue four very broad but highly pragmatic objectives which constitute the basis of the SADCC Program of Action: to work together to reduce the dependence of our economies particularly, but not only, on the Republic of South Africa; to forge links to create a genuinely equitably regional integrated economy; to mobilize the resources of our countries toward implementation of projects and programs both at national and regional levels; and to coordinate our efforts in securing international support and cooperation in pursuit of those objectives.

The pursuit of our objectives is predicated on a very simple strategy—focusing on those policies and priorities which are dictated by the national interests of our member-states. SADCC is not a supra-national organ which dishes out dictates to its member-states, but rather a service organization which responds to the needs and priorities of its countries.

The other element of the strategy is the coordination of our activities. SADCC is not aiming at creating a common market or an economic community in southern Africa, in recognition of the fact that at this point under the circumstances prevailing in our region, this goal is not yet achievable. Hence our pragmatic and limited objectives of coordinated, synchronized, and balanced regional cooperation.

SADCC operates with a simple organizational structure and a very small central secretariat based in Gaborone. We allocate responsibility to each one of our member-states to coordinate the functions in the different sectors which constitute the regional program of action. SADCC is not bound by a formal treaty or convention, but rather by the political will and commitment of its member-states. Our survival doesn't depend as much on obligations enumerated in legal documents as on the recognition of the need to work together.

The SADCC program of action constitutes activities across seven broad economic sectors, each coordinated by a designated country: energy (Angola); food, agriculture, and natural resources, with five sub-sectors (agricultural research coordinated by Botswana; fisheries, forestry, and wildlife coordinated by Malawi; food security coordinated by Zimbabwe; livestock production and animal disease control coordinated by Botswana; soil and water conservation and land utilization coordinated by Lesotho); industry and trade (Tanzania); mining (Zambia); manpower development (Swaziland); tourism (Lesotho); and transport and communications (Mozambique).

As of now, the SADCC program of action constitutes about 400 individual projects, costed in mid-1986 at about $5.4 billion. These range from small feasibility studies to large multi-million dollar port and railway projects, distributed equitably throughout the nine member-states. For the first six years, SADCC concentrated on the infrastructure sector, particularly in transport and communications.

But over the last year, it became clear that rehabilitating ports, railways and roads, interconnecting power lines, building more power stations, and training people would not necessarily in and of themselves improve the standards of living of our people, nor strengthen the economic capacities of our countries. In other words, they are not an end in themselves, but rather a means toward strengthening the productive capacity of our economies.

Dr. Simba Makoni is executive secretary of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference.

Therefore, with effect from June 1986, the SADCC council of ministers and thereafter the summit of heads of state and governments directed that emphasis should now be placed on the productive sector. The sectors of industry, agriculture, mining and mineral processing, and trade should now become the centerpieces of the cooperative effort. It was recognized that whereas infrastructure and services could be developed and managed by governmental and parastatal bodies, for the major business of production and investment, the enterprise community, private or public, is the main actor. To that extent, therefore, our program of action is now embracing the activities of the enterprise sector.

To initiate this new phase in our regional program of action, we designated the theme of January's SADCC conference "Investment in Production." Side by side, for the first time, we organized a meeting of businessmen, both from within and outside the SADCC region, to discuss this theme. As part of that process, a document has been produced—not an investment code, nor a compilation of projects in which to invest, but the first step in a process of consultation and dialogue on what needs to be done to generate the necessary investment in the productive sectors of this region, how to put together the technology, know-how, and the financial and other resources of the developed world with the resources of this region toward its meaningful development.

How does SADCC look at South Africa? SADCC was not created to be *against* South Africa, but rather as a positive initiative for the benefit of the independent states of the region. Obviously, the question of our historical dependence on South Africa and more particularly our abhorrence of the system of apartheid feature prominently in influencing the policies and activities of the SADCC member-states at both national and regional levels.

Our member-states' dependence on South Africa, particularly in the economic field, is not the result of a free market system. It is the result of deliberate, conscious actions by the colonial governments both in South Africa and in our now-independent countries, as well as the region's economic forces, particularly the major foreign companies which are operating in the regional economy.

From 1980 on, South Africa has formulated all sorts of strategies to undermine SADCC."

This is why all the railways lead to Durban, Port Elizabeth, and Cape Town. This is also why all the major economic development has taken place in South Africa with us at the periphery. Geologists would confirm that the gold belt which dominates the Rand does not abruptly end at the Limpopo River, nor does the diamond and coal belt which dominates part of the Vaal Triangle end suddenly at the Chokwe border post. We already know that there is coal in Botswana, there is gold in Zimbabwe, there are diamonds in Angola.

But for certain basic political reasons, going back to the Boer Republic through the British colonial period in South Africa, and more particularly after the Nationalist government took power in 1948, it was decided that Anglo American Corporation, De Beers, Rand Barlow and others and the political powers would establish a structure pointed toward South Africa. That is the basis upon which SADCC and its member-states formulate and implement policies vis-à-vis South Africa.

We are not working to reverse the current order of events from a purely emotional or irrational political perspective, but from logical and rational economic realities. Many people ask, "What will happen if apartheid is eliminated today and there is a democratic government in South Africa?" The basic

Simba Makoni: "SADCC is a logical, rational, and viable economic proposition, with or without apartheid in South Africa"



Victoria Kaufman

issue of dependence and domination, although a function of politics, is also very strongly economic. It would be equally unacceptable tomorrow when the ANC is in power in South Africa for the nine states of southern Africa which constitute SADCC at the moment to be as dependent on South Africa as they are today. We have made it clear that the relevance and validity of SADCC will not end the day that a people's flag is raised in Pretoria.

But the nature and format of the post-apartheid relationship will obviously have to change. We had such a situation on a smaller scale before Zimbabwe's independence. The current relationship between Zimbabwe, which at the moment has the most advanced and diversified economy in the region, and the other members of the SADCC family is the format upon which our relationship with post-apartheid South Africa will be developed.

We will definitely want to take advantage of the strength and the advances achieved in the South African economy to act as a motor for spurring development in Botswana, Swaziland, Mozambique, and Tanzania, where that level of development has not yet been achieved. In an equitable balance of regional development, the strengths of the Angolan or Tanzanian economy, which at the moment are not being fully realized, would then be helped to full maturation by the infusion of the resources and expertise of the post-apartheid South African economy.

We have made it clear at various levels that our first act upon the termination of apartheid will be to admit an independent and democratic South Africa into the SADCC family, along with an independent Namibia.

SADCC is a logical, rational, and viable economic proposition—with or without apartheid in South Africa. Therefore, our efforts to establish greater self-reliance within our economies and to disengage from our reliance on South Africa are based more strongly on economics than on a political or emotional basis. To quote a few statistics, it makes no sense for Zimbabwe or Zambia to incur expenses of $100-$150 per ton of copper or tobacco to send it to Port Elizabeth, compared with $42 for the same ton if it is sent to Beira or $72 to Maputo, Mozambique. This economic logic would apply even for SADCC post-apartheid.

"SADCC citizens are being murdered day and night, and people say that by not imposing sanctions, we will be spared hardship."

The South African response to SADCC has been very clear. The moment SADCC was launched, South Africa designated it enemy number-one, not only because SADCC undercuts the "constellation of states" concept, but also because SADCC represents the one force which can take away from South Africa its strongest weapon of subjugation and domination—economic dependence.

From 1980 on, South Africa has formulated all sorts of strategies to undermine SADCC. We broadly call it destabilization, but it comes in various forms, including the dramatic commando raids on the capitals of our member-states, attacks on economic installations—the Malongo oil installations in Cabinda, the oil refinery and oil terminal in Luanda and Beira, the Limpopo and Benguela railway lines—and subtle economic moves like the withdrawal of locomotives from the railways of Zimbabwe or the total blockade of Lesotho, denying its citizens eggs, vegetables, and fresh milk. All these are part of South Africa's total strategy against the SADCC member-states with the political aim of the subjugation and total domination of the region.

But the equation is not entirely one-sided, a point many of our friends fail to appreciate. South Africa is also very dependent on us. For example, between 1982 and 1984, the total volume of trade between SADCC states and South Africa was $2 billion; of that South Africa bought $400 million from us, therefore enjoying a trade surplus of about $1.6 billion. There are 350,000 officially recognized SADCC citizens employed in the South African economy, responsible for mining the gold, coal, ferrochrome, and iron and steel which Western countries, including the United States, consider vital and strategic.

If today, the 150,000 Basotho miners are repatriated and retrenched, we would certainly see the beginning of, if not the actual, collapse of the gold industry. In January, 4,000 workers from one of Gencor's mines resigned, and it was estimated that replacement of those 4,000 workers will take up to about six months. And within that period, it is estimated that production from that one mine will go down by $14 million. This is an example of the South African economy's dependence on the SADCC citizens who are there. The railway system in South Africa earns $200 million per year in railway freight tariffs from Zimbabwe alone; from the SADCC region as a whole a minimum of $350 million.

So South Africa is also dependent on us, and therefore it is not a one-sided affair. There are strengths in this region which we can invoke, which would be felt. The only problem is that these are factors which would have a bearing on a rational and logical authority, but the Botha regime is irrational and illogical, and will do things that harm itself if only to demonstrate a point—that it is more powerful.

On the question of sanctions, the countries and the people of this region have already made their views clear. In mid-1985, we estimated that the costs of South Africa's destabilization campaign to SADCC member-states' economies amounted to a conservative $10 billion over a five-year period, or $2 billion annually. That figure represents more than the total official development assistance all nine countries received from outside the region in the same period. Put differently, the figure equals one-third of the total foreign exchange earnings from the SADCC region's exports, whether Botswana diamonds, Zimbabwean tobacco, Angolan oil, Tanzanian coffee, or Mozambican corn.

To those who argue economic hardships from sanctions, we ask: Are we not suffering already? Can the poor economies of this region—of Tanzania, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland, some of whom are among the "least developed countries in the world"—bear a

loss of $2 billion per year? SADCC citizens are being murdered day and night, and people say that by not imposing sanctions, we will be spared hardship. As King Moshoeshoe of Lesotho put it, our answer is: Sanctions, if they ensure us of the elimination of the scourge of apartheid, are a sacrifice worth making, in the interests not only of democracy and freedom in South Africa, but in the interests of peace and stability in the region.

As the independent states of the region see it, there is an economic case for sanctions against South Africa over and above the political case. It is not without costs, it is not without suffering. But what good comes without cost and suffering? And the people of this region say they are prepared to pay that cost if it assures us of long-term peace, stability, and economic development.

Margaret A. Novicki

Benguela railroad, Huambo, Angola: Rehabilitating transport routes are not an end in themselves, but rather a means toward strengthening the productive capacity of our economies

Although the U.S. has been one of the countries with the earliest association with SADCC, the U.S. government has shown very little commitment to and belief in the objectives of SADCC. On my first mission to Washington as executive secretary of SADCC in November 1984, I was told by a high-ranking State Department official that it is not viable to talk about economic development in southern Africa without South Africa.

That has been the basis of U.S. policy toward SADCC and southern African economic development which regretfully prevails even now, although we have begun to see certain signs of a change. Secretary of State Shultz's July 23, 1986, statement did give hopeful indications, as it was the first time a high-ranking American official spoke of the economic rationale of developing Beira as against Richards Bay and Port Elizabeth. But there is still a long way to go.

The second problem area is the level of resources that the U.S. administration has extended toward the activities of our organization and its member-states. In the five-year period in which SADCC has been in operation, the United States has committed at the very most $50 million to our $5.4 billion program. That compares with $100 million extended to the Nicaraguan contras in a nine-month period and $15 million extended to the Unita bandits in a 12-month period.

In 1986, U.S. AID committed a program of $30 million for southern Africa, split between $17 million for the victims of apartheid and $13 million for the nine independent states of southern Africa. Put $13 million for the rest of the SADCC member-states side-by-side with $15 million for the Unita bandits, and you can begin to understand the perspective of the U.S. administration toward SADCC and its activities.

There are countries such as Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Belgium with much smaller populations and economic endowments, whose commitments to SADCC are much more significant than that of the U.S. Our colleagues in the State Department and U.S. AID are quick to add that we are only quoting the figure for the regional program, but that the U.S. also has bilateral aid programs with Botswana, Mozambique, Malawi, and so on. But the Swedes also have bilateral aid programs with these countries. It is basically a problem of lack of political will on the part of the U.S.

"Our efforts to establish greater self-reliance within our economies and disengage from South Africa are based more strongly on economics than on a political and emotional basis."

The other problem which we have encountered with the U.S. is what we call discriminatory funding. The U.S. has problems with Angola, therefore regional programs which benefit not only Angola, but Zambia and Malawi, but are located in Angola cannot benefit from American support because the U.S. has no diplomatic relations with Angola. I would like to echo the words of our heads of state and governments who met in Botswana in 1984 in saying that if you want to deal with southern Africa in the field of economic development, you deal with SADCC as a family of nine, or you don't deal with us at all. This problem will continue to hinder the improvement of the relationship between the United States and SADCC as an organization in the economic field.

All of us together, and even some of us individually, can do a lot to influence changes in U.S. policy. We in SADCC will obviously do our best. The first and major objective of our joint endeavor must be a public education and information campaign. Even within the limitations of our resources, we are ready to assist those of you in the U.S. with basic information on our organization so that we can work cooperatively to further SADCC's goals. □

Economies

SADCC and the Private Sector

February's SADCC meeting in Gaborone brought regional officials together with the foreign and local private sector for the first time to examine avenues for the channeling of resources to the organization's priority projects. A new consensus has developed among southern Africa's leadership on the role of private investment in regional economic development.

BY COLLEEN LOWE MORNA

After seven years of a tenuous relationship, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) has invited the private sector into its fold. For the first time since the formation of the nine-member group in 1980, 200 local and foreign businessmen met with SADCC officials in February to discuss their role in its program of action.

The meeting preceded the annual consultative conference with some 34 donor countries and 17 donor agencies in the Botswana capital, Gaborone, where SADCC officially launched its 1987 theme: "Investment and Production."

According to Zimbabwean businessman Denis Norman—a prominent figure at the business meeting—the talks were largely "exploratory," and to the disappointment of some "did not yield any definitive statements or contracts." But in his view, the main purpose was achieved—to "open the door" for a more meaningful relationship between the private sector and the regional group which aims to ease economic dependence "particularly, but not only" on white-ruled South Africa.

Up to now, the former Zimbabwe agriculture minister told *Africa Report*, SADCC had been seen by businessmen as a government-to-government institution. There are reasons for this, SADCC officials say, but they are not a result of any hostility on the part of SADCC or its members toward the private sector.

In their founding declaration, SADCC heads of state asserted that the region's dependence on South Africa "is not a natural phenomenon nor is it simply a result of a free market economy." Thus, they argued, this imbalance could not simply be redressed by liberalizing trade between the nine members.

First, the argument ran, transport and communication networks had to be reoriented away from South Africa. Next, the region—which is largely an exporter of primary products and importer of manufactured goods—had to start producing a variety of goods with which to trade. With all this in place, trade would follow, SADCC's founders reasoned.

The group's youthful and well-respected executive secretary, Simba Makoni, is the first to concede that as a result of South African destabilization, SADCC is more dependent on South Africa for transport than it was at the start. But, he points out, SADCC is actively working on rehabilitating the routes to and the ports of Dar es Salaam and Beira. Moreover, there has been a vast improvement in telecommunications since SADCC's inception. "Our activities in the infrastructural field have attained a certain self-sustaining momentum, which make it possible to move on to production," he argues, adding: "Production is not the primary pursuit of governments."

SADCC documents are careful to refer to the "enterprise" as opposed to "private" sector, stressing that parastatals and public concerns also have a role to play. But clearly the private sector is the main focus, and conference background documents took pains to show that it is increasingly being welcomed in member-states.

Despite the widely divergent ideological perspectives in the region, each country has a mixed economy, states the main working document, "SADCC: Investment in Production." Member-states, the paper adds, "are in the process of developing and implementing economic policies which, though consistent with their distinctive national political and social objectives, are more clearly designed to encourage enterprise and investment. Specifically, there is a much more realistic understanding of the importance of the market, and much greater attention is being given to the need to provide incentives to producers."

This, says Angolan Trade Minister Ismael Gaspar Martins, is something of a trend in developing countries. "When Africa became independent," the minister told *Africa Report*, "there was no private sector to speak of. Only the state was equipped to run the economy. It is only normal that now that an indigenous entrepreneurial class has emerged, it is being asked to play a role. The only problem is to ensure that it plays a positive role, in the interests of the people and the nation."

In 1979, the Luanda government enacted a law securing all foreign investments against nationalization for 10 to 15 years and granting full compensation in the currency of origin if nationalization did take place. "Angola has not argued against national or international capital," Martins said. "To the contrary, the law provides for that. Why should the state run things like bakeries, taxis, and barber shops?"

In a separate interview, Mozambican Transport Minister Armando Guebuza said it had become increasingly evident to his government over the last four years that "we were not taking the cor-

Colleen Lowe Morna is a Zimbabwean freelance journalist based in Harare.

rect economic measures to respond to the growing crisis in our country." In 1984, Mozambique passed a law stating that foreign enterprises would only be nationalized under "exceptional circumstances," and would be granted full compensation. Asked if he saw any dangers in SADCC's current drive to increase private investment, the former military officer looked slightly taken aback. "The more it comes the better," he said.

Although SADCC's "international cooperating partners" (as they are officially called) are wary of being seen as exerting too much influence on the group, they clearly applaud this view, and the 1987 theme added considerably to the more friendly atmsophere at this year's annual consultative conference.

The 1986 Harare conference was largely clouded by the concurrent official visit to Washington of Angolan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi, leading to a harshly worded statement against U.S. policy in the region at the close of the conference. This year, however, U.S.AID Chief Peter McPherson unveiled—amid great fanfare—a proposed increase in aid to the region of $93 million over an 18-month period.

Declaring that the private sector "is not only an important player in economic growth—it must play the leading role," McPherson explained that roughly one-third each of the money would go toward "private sector-oriented policy reform," and boosting regional trade and transport networks.

Although this "new initiative" was clearly designed more to help SADCC along the free enterprise road than to overcome the effects of South African destabilization (as some had hoped), it was nonetheless welcomed. "All states act out of their own interest," Mozambique's Guebuza commented philosophically. "And in this case, there happens to be a coincidence of interests."

But naturally regional tension was an underlying concern. "The mounting crisis in the region," noted a confidential report, "makes it imperative for the SADCC states to strive urgently for greater self-sufficiency in production and trade in the region."

"As frontline states," Zimbabwe's President Canaan Banana declared at a preparatory SADCC conference in



Harare shortly before the Gaborone meeting, "we are duty bound to play our role in bringing pressure to bear on the South African regime, in the context of international action. Naturally, the vacuum that will be created by the non-availability of a wide-range of commodities in our region in the event of total sanctions against South Africa offers opportunities for new investment. We call on new investors to fill this gap."

This, the president said, "will not only be a simple business investment, but an investment with a moral force, as it would put the investor on the side of those struggling for justice."

Cognizant, however, that businessmen respond more to economic than political imperatives, the point was not overstressed at the Gaborone conference. Several businessmen pointed out that political tension only makes the region a high risk area. "In many respects," added Norman Reynolds, chief executive of the Zimbabwe Promotion Council, "we are not an alternative. South Africa is a far more complex and sophisticated market."

Indeed, according to one of the conference organizers, only a sprinkling of those who attended the conference represented companies which have sold off their operations in South Africa and are looking for greener pastures next door. The most visible was General Motors which, after selling out to local interests in South Africa, is putting out feelers in the rest of Africa, especially Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and Mozambique.

About half the participants, according to the source, already had investments in the region, but wanted to find out "if the scene is really changing," while "a large group of foreign and local companies were looking to exploit opportunities provided by donor funds." Several foreign interests were represented by embassies, and foreign companies which already have operations in the region tended to send local representatives, according to conference participants. "Very few," Norman said, "were totally new."

In its background paper on investment in production, SADCC concedes that there is, of late, an "international investment drought." Net non-concessional receipts from OECD countries to the SADCC region fell by 70 percent from $1.1 billion in 1981, to $381 million in 1984, largely as a result of the world recession, the paper notes.

Taking up this point in a speech at the opening ceremony of the consultative conference, Commonwealth Secretary-General Sir Shridath Ramphal warned that encouraging the private sector should not be taken to mean just "increasing emphasis on private foreign investment." In view of the decline in foreign investment—particularly in developing countries—member-countries needed to "give primary encouragement to the more stable business environment that could come from a vibrant indigenous private sector," he said.

Throughout the region, it is argued in SADCC documents, there are efforts to check government expenditure and revise exchange rates, thus improving the prospects for domestic investment, which SADCC sees as a primary concern. "Foreign investors," the documents state, "are more likely to come to a country which already has a thriving local enterprise sector. The optimism of the local business community will be a crucial factor in attracting foreign investment."

For both local and foreign businessmen attending the seminar, however, there were four key areas of concern, in which SADCC could potentially play a role.

First, despite all the reassurances, the businessmen, in a final report, felt that more could be done to welcome private enterprise. Sal Marzullo, Mobil

Oil's manager of international government relations, compared the private sector to a potential bride who needed excessive wooing. The word "profit," Norman said in an opening speech at the business seminar, still tends to be shunned. Yet, as he put it in his simple but telling way: "The opposite of making a profit is making a loss, and nobody wants to be on the losing side."

Several measures, the businessmen added, could be taken to help back the claim that the private sector is welcome. So far, SADCC has published a hefty document outlining the investment policies of individual countries. However, it is working on harmonizing these policies, and that, businessmen say, will be a big step forward.

As it is, says David Long, president of the Zimbabwe Confederation of Industries, the different levels of development and the different incentives toward private investment open up the possibility of "jealousy and rivalry." He believes that there are key incentives which all the countries can agree on, forming a kind of "common investment code," which would then have its local variations. This would also help to facilitate a "one-stop service" where potential investors could make all their inquiries, thus considerably reducing the red tape involved in setting up a regional operation.

This, however, will also depend largely on the extent to which greater intra-regional trade can be assured. "There has got to be that regional perspective," says Long, "otherwise the numbers just won't stack up in terms of scale."

SADCC officials admit that at the moment, intra-regional trade only comprises 5 percent of the total, partly due to foreign currency constraints and the longer credit periods extended by South Africa to its neighbors, to ensure that they trade with the regional economic giant instead. Although trade is envisaged as the final stage in the SADCC program of action, officials recognize that action on this front has to be taken concurrently if production is to flourish.

Thus Tanzania, which oversees the industry sector in SADCC, has also been charged with setting in motion measures to increase intra-regional trade. These include systems of direct

Camerapix

Angolan Trade Minister Ismael Gaspar Martins: "Angola has not argued against national or international capital"

trade measures and bilateral trade agreements such as multi-year purchase agreements and counter-trade, the establishment of a regional export credit facility to help ease foreign currency constraints, and a comprehensive trade promotion program, to help bridge the information gap.

Finally—and allied to the issue of trade—is the need to ensure alternate transport routes, as pressure for sanctions against South Africa and the likelihood of retaliatory South African sanctions increases.

There are six major transport corridors in the region. Two of these run through South Africa (through Botswana and Zimbabwe), and currently carry some 4 million tons of cargo annually, or half of the region's overseas trade.

Another two are basically out of operation as a result of South African destabilization activities. Attacks by the South African-backed Mozambique National Resistance Movement led to the closure of the line from Zimbabwe to the Mozambican port capital of Maputo. Similarly, the South African and U.S.-backed Unita in Angola has shut off the Benguela line which once serviced Zambia and southern Zaire.

Recent improvements in the security situation in Mozambique have led to widespread reports that work is soon to start on the Maputo line, where only about 48 of the 534-kilometer-long line is in a critical state of disrepair. However, this is not an immediate option.

The more active projects are along the lines to the Mozambican port of Beira and Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam, which last year carried the other half of the region's trade.

Some 64 percent of the funding required for the Tanzania-Zambia (TAZARA) railway line has been secured, though SADCC is still seeking funding for the purchase of additional rolling stock and handling equipment at the port.

But Beira remains the higher profile of the two projects because of the sudden upsurge of interest in the port—the closest for Zimbabwe and a reasonable option for both Zambia and Botswana. The Beira Corridor project, as it has come to be called, also assumed special significance at the Gaborone conference because it illustrates in microcosm the possibilities for increased cooperation between donors, member governments, and the private sector.

Over the last year—with the growing political significance attached to the port—some $200 million of the $280 million required for the first two phases of the rehabilitation project have been raised, mostly from the Nordic and Netherlands governments. These phases, which cover a five-year period, are designed to raise the capacity of the port from 3 million to 5 million tons.

This has naturally provided several opportunities for the private sector—foreign and local—and three groups have been formed: the Oslo-based International Beira Group, Maputo-based Beira Corridor Authority, and Harare-based Beira Coordinating Group.

Last year, the corridor handled some 30 percent of Zimbabwe's cargo, compared to 15 percent the year before, and it is hoped that some 45 percent will be pushed through this year. But the building of specialized bulk handling facilities for goods like sugar and grain and refrigerated commodities, like beef, will take another two years. And problems of inefficiency have yet to be overcome.

But the managing director-designate of the Beira Coordinating Group, Eddie Cross, insists that the best way to get the port functioning is to use it. "What we are saying to business people," he told *Africa Report*, "is: Look, don't sit on the sidelines and snipe. Come down on the playing field and help us play the game." □

BY CAROLINE ALLEN

Refugees

Brothers and Neighbors

Southern Africa's swelling refugee population is straining already tight governmental budgets and social infrastructure. Since 1981, war and unrest, rooted in the apartheid system, have transformed a trickle of displaced persons into a flood across the region's borders.

"There are two things you cannot choose, brothers and neighbors," Mozambique's late President Samora Machel was fond of saying. "We cannot move our country."

Mozambique's proximity to South Africa has rendered it particularly vulnerable militarily and economically to insurgence from the Rhodesian-created Mozambique National Resistance Movement (alternately known as Renamo or MNR), now supported by Pretoria.

Southern Africa is no stranger to the natural disasters which have shattered whole sectors of the economies of every country in the region. Seemingly endless cycles of floods and droughts have driven thousands from their homes into internal exile in their own countries or across national borders, leading emaciated livestock which they hope to trade for food in more prosperous places.

But the root cause of the present ebb and flow of the estimated 350,000 refugees across the subcontinent is heightened political, economic, and military strains. U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs Jonathan Moore visited Mozambique in early March and pinpointed the problem: "We can't keep dealing with Band Aid. Sooner or later we have got to tackle the root of the problem."

Although all countries in the region hosting refugee populations have signed international agreements on their protection and welfare with the exception of Malawi, the very term "refugee" is contentious.

Given the political solidarity between left-leaning countries like Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Angola, refugees imply some sort of political persecution. The term has therefore been rejected for "displaced person."

Within these frontline states, the plight of Mozambicans fleeing the activities of Renamo is sympathetically broadcast, while for example, the situation of the 4,000 or so Zimbabweans in Dukwe camp in northern Botswana, who maintain that as members of the minority Ndebele people, they fear persecution from the Shona majority, is not.

There are South Africans who have fled the internal strife living in Botswana, Angola, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, Swaziland, and until recently, the tiny mountain kingdom of Lesotho.

Malawians are exiled in Zambia and Zimbabwe until Life President Kamuzu Banda, whose last known birthday was his 88th, dies.

And Angolans avoiding the anti-government Unita action have settled in northwest and northern Zambia side by side with exiled Ugandans led by former President Milton Obote.

The sensitivity of the refugee issue is reflected in host governments' tight control over access to and decision-making by aid agencies involved in refugee relief. However welcoming their official policies, overshadowing all, especially for those countries with South African refugees, is a direct military threat from Pretoria which the white minority government has never been shy of using.

The simultaneous attacks by ground and air against alleged African National Congress targets in Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Zambia on May 25 last year were hardly showpieces of military precision, but it is an open secret they were not meant to be.

The calculated aim and effect of the raids was to rattle the nerves of host countries and their people who are invariably hit more often than any refugees in the attacks.

In Botswana, subsequent public demands that refugees be confined to remote camps only died down when it was explained that this would make the refugees an even more compact target politically and militarily.

Quite apart from political considerations, many countries in the region, however seriously they take their commitment as hosts to displaced persons, stagger under the burden of additional thousands to care for in what are usually marginal subsistence areas along their borders.

The trickle of refugees from Mozambique to Zimbabwe first began in 1981 in the wake of damage by cyclones that flooded the southern part of the country, while the north remained parched and dry. In the last stages of exhaustion and starvation they walked hundreds of miles, trading off their last few possessions—clothes or implements—for food. Many left their aged, women, and children dead along the way.

The Zimbabwe-Mozambique border has always been unusually porous. During the years of the liberation struggle which brought about Zimbabwean independence in 1980, Mozambicans received thousands of Zimbabweans in exile and for training with ZANLA, the armed wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), now the ruling party.

Caroline Allen, a Zimbabwean journalist based in Harare, reports on southern Africa for Agence France-Presse, The Sunday Times *of London, and the BBC Africa Service.*

Now, they can certainly expect that support to be reciprocal, not only because of political solidarity, but because as one community worker noted: "We are all Ndau [people] from here to the coast."

Through what Ambassador Moore described as "an absorption tradition among African nations not replicated in other parts of the world," the first-comers were cared for by the Zimbabwean peasants themselves. As they recovered, thousands found work on the vast tea, coffee, and fruit estates in the eastern highlands along the border where they were paid less than Zimbabwean workers who have a legally enforced minimum wage.

However, local authorities are concerned with the health hazard. Cholera is now endemic in the Chipinge area, and living conditions on the estates are notoriously bad. Clinics and schools took in displaced families and children, but it was only when the trickle swelled to thousands that Zimbabwean authorities realized how these facilities might become overstretched. Now four camps in the area receive refugees—from Mazoe River Bridge and Nyamatikiti in the far northeast, to Nyangombe further south and Tongogara, the biggest, near the small border town of Chipinge.

Tongogara, named for former ZANLA commander Josiah Tongogara, killed in an untimely car crash as he returned home at independence, was converted from Assembly Point X-tra, one of the demobilization centers set up for the liberation forces in the cease-fire period. It is the only closed (fenced and monitored) camp, holding about 17,000 people.

"Many countries in the region, however seriously they take their commitment as hosts to displaced persons, stagger under the burden of additional thousands to care for."

Figures on how many refugees are in the camps and how many arrive weekly are diverse, but there are not less than 63,000 overall—a conservative estimate, notes Deputy Commissioner Sanda Kimbimbi at Harare's United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) office.

UNHCR coordinates relief work with agencies like World Vision, Oxfam (UK), the International Red Cross, Christian Care, and others, but the "implementing agency" which controls access to camps and all activities there is the Zimbabwean government under its Commission for Refugees, consisting of government officials and non-governmental organizations.

As many refugees as possible are "screened" by intelligence officers to ensure that the camps are not being used by Renamo sympathizers or members. In response to charges that this near impossible task might be open to abuse, aid workers are sympathetic to the sensitive security question. "Sure, they screen them. They don't want these places to become safe cross-border rest and recreation centers for Renamo," said one.

"Anyway, it's very difficult for the [Zimbabwe] army. They are fed up with these people roaming around."

Linked to the security threat caused by Renamo activity is disrupted food production, meaning that nearly 4 million people in Mozambique are facing starvation.

There is massive internal upheaval in Mozambique as starved peasants crowd into the already hard-pushed towns. The port of Beira has added more than 50,000 to its population in the last two years, while the capital, Maputo, has spawned a huge shanty-town known as the "city of reeds" on its outskirts. Regional centers like Moatize in Tete hold thousands living in disused railway wagons in old sidings.

Organizations such as World Vision and Oxfam provide food aid and medical supplies to the Zimbabwe camps, which are exceptionally well run with adequate shelter, water supplies, and organized activities, according to World Vision's Mozambique coordinator, Chuck Stevens.

In March, Zimbabwe's refugees commission announced that it intends to supervise the opening of another camp called Chibuta in the southeast corner of the country where about 15,000 Mozambicans have already gathered.

Although Zimbabwe took in the first Mozambicans, it is now Malawi which is bearing the full brunt of up to 120,000 refugees from the war-torn provinces of Zambezia and Tete across its borders.

Ironically, that human harvest is the indirect result of Life President Banda's blind eye to Renamo's use of the narrow

Zimbabwean refugees in Dukwe camp, Botswana, "maintain that as members of the minority Ndebele people, they fear persecution from the Shona majority"

H. Gloaguen/UNHCR

pedicel of Malawi, which dips hundreds of miles into Mozambique, as a springboard for attacks.

A Renamo offensive just after President Samora Machel's death last year pushed thousands of desperate Mozambicans into Malawi, where aid organizations were denied access to the reportedly miserable conditions until very recently, after a special delegation from ICRC headquarters in Geneva visited President Banda.

Simultaneously, heads of frontline states made it clear to Banda that his landlocked country would be blockaded unless he actively helped put a stop to Renamo destabilization.

The rate of cross-border flights by refugees continues to relate directly to the intensity of fighting in the Mozambique provinces, doubling the number in the six settlements around Nsange since October last year.

Neighboring Zambia, meanwhile, has had to cope with a new development which so far has not appeared elsewhere. In the early afternoon of November 29, 1986, six uniformed and armed men appeared in the border refugee hamlet of Pinye in Petauke district in the eastern province. When they couldn't find the fugitive administrators they were seeking from the Mozambican districts, they torched 12 huts and took two hostages back with them, neither of whom have been heard of since.

The tiny settlement at Pinye has already been moved seven kilometers from another site closer to the border. Now there is the prospect of another upheaval 100 kilometers away to Ukwimi, out of easy reach of raiders.

There were 3,000 refugees in Petauke in October last year, part of the 20,000 Mozambicans in Zambia, the country hosting the most refugees in the region. In the western and northwestern provinces, up to 76,000 Angolans have fled the fighting between government forces and Jonas Savimbi's Unita movement.

The Zambian government sympathizes with their plight, but like others, cannot always find enough agriculturally suitable land for the large, dense populations to work.

While Mozambican refugees from the northern provinces find safety in the frontline states, the ICRC, temporarily thrown out of South Africa at the end of last year, has registered 20,000 Mozambicans in Transvaal and eastern areas of South Africa since October 1985. Fifteen thousand and 5,000 are located in the "homelands" of Gazankulu and Kangwane, respectively.

M. Vanappelghem

"Angolans avoiding the anti-government action have settled in northwest and northern Zambia"

If they make it across the border and the huge Kruger National Park, where not a few weak from the long walk have been taken by lions, they are looked after by the ICRC, the local Red Cross, and a private South African agency called Operation Hunger.

Oxfam estimates that there may be as many as 60,000 more who are never registered with any agency and merge into the vast reservoir of labor in rural areas.

Pretoria acknowledges that it turns away about 1,500 Mozambicans a month from its border posts, but many of these are likely to be work-seekers, say Oxfam workers.

The Swaziland option for Mozambican and indeed South African refugees going the other way has become less attractive in the last two years or so as evidence of Swazi collaboration, unwitting or not, with South African security units has come to light.

"There is massive internal upheaval in Mozambique as starved peasants crowd into the already hard-pushed towns."

Malindiza reception center has a capacity of 112 but now holds 845 people. They are being transferred to the already overcrowded Ndzevane camp in the southeast to join 6,900 South Africans and 5,000 Mozambicans.

Southern Africa's 350,000 refugees are relatively well cared for and do not present the formidable problems posed by the 1.2 million refugees in Sudan, the 700,000 in Somalia, or even the 212,000 in Tanzania. But responsibility for them comes on top of other economic constraints and political pressures which are unlikely to be resolved in the near future.

In the settlements across the region, the refugees are taught in their own languages and encouraged to cultivate skills which will help them on their return, a gentle reminder that they are not welcome permanently.

For their part, the refugees are ready to comply. "In some areas, people quickly find others from their home villages and work together. They want to carry that organization back with them," says Chuck Stevens. "There isn't one that doesn't want to go home." □

Letter from South Africa

Apartheid in the Classroom

"Indian" members of South Africa's tricameral parliament recently failed a test of their commitment to fight apartheid from within. The issue of allowing black pupils to enroll in "Indian" schools was the latest in a series of confrontations over the volatile issue of education, a focal point for unrest since 1976.

BY AMEEN AKHALWAYA

In 1984, when the white South African government created the three-chamber Parliament, "Coloured" and "Indian" candidates claimed they wanted to be elected to it so that they could fight apartheid.

The "Coloured" and "Indian" communities didn't believe them. In the first elections for the two new chambers, the issue was simple: A vote for any candidate would be construed as a vote for apartheid; a boycott of the elections would be a rejection of apartheid.

When elections were held, the turnout at the polls was derisively low. It was a massive rejection of apartheid, yet the new members of Parliament kept insisting they would fight apartheid at every turn.

Their communities again didn't believe them, and recently, the MPs were put to the test in the "Indian" chamber, the House of Delegates. It was over education, one of the single most significant factors in the unrest in South Africa since 1976.

More than 300 pupils from Soweto applied to be enrolled at schools in neighboring Lenasia, Johannesburg's official "group area" for those classified "Indian." The Lenasia schools are controlled by the House of Delegates' Department of Indian Affairs.

When the school year started in January, not one Soweto pupil had been accepted. Educators and anti-apartheid political groups such as the United Democratic Front (UDF) accused the authorities of stalling.

The education department then issued a confidential circular to headmasters setting out guidelines for the admission of black African pupils.

And the contents of that circular proved, if anyone needed proof, that far from fighting apartheid, the new MPs were becoming voluntary partners in implementing racism. The circular did not deal with the admission of white and "Coloured" pupils to "Indian" schools. It dealt only with Africans, hence the charge of racism leveled at the authorities.

Headmasters were asked to give a pledge that the education department's instructions would be carried out, and to apply certain "principles and conditions" when admitting African (black) pupils.

Among these were:

- The character of the school must not be prejudiced as a result of the admission of any "African" pupil.
- Preference at all times must be given to Indian pupils.
- Accommodation and other facilities for "African" pupils must be available—but only after provision for Indian pupils has been made.
- Pupils must reside within reasonable traveling distance of the school where admission is sought. Available schooling facilities in the area where the pupil resides must also be taken into account before consideration for admission is given.
- The principal must decide whether the pupil is easily assimilated into the relevant class, taking into account the pupil's physical stature.
- The principal must also establish whether the pupil is adequately prepared for placement in the correct standard in order to ensure that the pupil is not disadvantaged in any way.
- If a principal considers it necessary to retard a pupil, the parent of such pupil must be consulted.
- A pupil must not be more than two years older than the average age of his prospective classmates or shall not be above the "upper age limit" as prescribed by the handbook for principals.
- Additional teaching staff will not be provided as a result of the admission of "African" pupils.
- Pupils admitted shall be catered for out of the annual monetary allocations of the schools concerned.

Headmasters were further warned: "Under no circumstances must a black (African) pupil be admitted, even provisionally, without prior approval from the department."

As a storm of outrage greeted what political and teachers' organizations described as a racist document, the "Indian" Minister of Education, Kassie Ramduth, insisted that the real problem was a question of funds. His department did not have sufficient funds allocated to it to unconditionally admit pupils of other races.

However, a few months earlier, the department sacked about 300 teachers, and scores of newly qualified teachers could not find posts, because the government had decided to cut spending on "Indian" education. The government claimed that the budgets for "white" and

Ameen Akhalwaya, a Nieman Fellow, is editor of The Indicator *in Johannesburg.*

John Conn

School girl, Soweto: "More than 300 pupils from Soweto applied to be enrolled in neighboring Lenasia"

"Indian" education were being trimmed in order to boost spending on African education.

The UDF-affiliated Natal and Transvaal Indian Congresses described the government's move as "robbing Peter to pay Paul," and demanded that all schools be opened to pupils of all races.

In Johannesburg, the demand was repeated in newspaper advertisements placed by the Transvaal Indian Congress and signed by some 40 other political, religious, welfare, labor, sports, and community organizations, based mainly in the Lenasia area.

In mid-February, *The Indicator* newspaper asked Ramduth: How many African, "Coloured," and white children had applied to be enrolled at "Indian" schools in the Johannesburg area and throughout South Africa? How many were accepted? What were the criteria for their acceptance? How many applications were turned down? What were the reasons? If schools under Ramduth's department are non-racial (as the authorities had claimed), why are guidelines laid down for the admission of pupils of other races?

Ramduth replied: "The department is not in a position at this stage to furnish details in respect of applications for admission of black pupils. Headmasters in several schools were required to resubmit their applications in terms of the guidelines formulated by the department."

On March 24, one school in Lenasia confirmed that the department had accepted four of the six applications submitted on behalf of African pupils. The other two had been referred back for the pupils to get clearance from the "homelands" schools they had previously attended.

"The contents of that circular proved, if anyone needed proof, that far from fighting apartheid, the new MPs were becoming voluntary partners in implementing racism."

Meanwhile, Lenasia's three largest schools had not heard about the outcome of applications they had submitted. *The Indicator* again asked Ramduth if he was in a position to respond to its earlier questions. By March 31, he had still not replied.

Those pupils whose applications were successful could enroll for the second of the school year's four terms. But teachers at the other schools said they feared that by the time the department gave the go-ahead to other pupils, it would be too late in the year for them to catch up with studies.

Ramduth's department has again been accused of stalling—and of implementing apartheid by setting out guidelines for the admission of pupils of other races.

And the department has continued to plead that it is not practicing apartheid.

As in the 1984 elections, the vast majority of "Indian" people don't believe it—nor do those African pupils and their parents who have had to suffer the humiliation of the conditions set out in the confidential circular. □

Profile

Simon Tshenuwani Farisani: A "Political Priest"

Detained four times but never charged with a crime, Lutheran pastor Simon Farisani has suffered torture and prolonged imprisonment for his continuing belief that the Church must serve the needs of the oppressed. Weakened but undaunted, Farisani, along with his fellow "political priests," continues to challenge apartheid through his ministry, one of the only avenues for expression of dissent.

BY DENIS HERBSTEIN

The fourth time Simon Tshenuwani Farisani was detained by the South African security police, they spared him the physical abuse to which he had become accustomed. For this unusual treatment, the Lutheran pastor from Venda could thank his rising stature as a churchman both inside South Africa and abroad, and the fact that he was weakening fast after a month-long hunger strike, which he vowed would last until he was "charged or released."

Farisani was released without charge at the end of January after a mere two months in solitary confinement, but his problems are by no means over. While in London en route to the United States, he telephoned a contact at the U.S. embassy in Pretoria, as a hasty departure from South Africa had made it impossible to collect his American visa. They touched on the Botha government's evident desire to force Farisani into exile. An Afrikaans-accented voice cut in. . . "Oh, so you are going to stay in exile, heh. I'll hand you over to my superiors." Asked who he was, the man replied: "Home Affairs, Pretoria."

It might have been a nosy parker on a crossed line, but then one would have expected the South African police to be more careful about seeming to bug a foreign embassy. The incident illustrates how Farisani, who was among the frontrunners for the sensitive job of general secretary of the South African Council of Churches, is a marked man. Not for nothing is he known by his admirers as "Venda public enemy number one."

The 39-year-old Farisani is what conservative South Africa sourly refers to as a "political priest." Desmond Tutu, Allen Boesak, Smangaliso Mkhatshwa, Frank Chikane, and other clerics have often had to stand in for the orthodox black leadership outlawed by a shortsighted government. It happens because South Africans, and not only the Afrikaners among them, are profoundly religious. For Farisani, the Bible, rather than the *Communist Manifesto*, has guided his actions since he was baptized at the age of 12.

In South Africa, the black political awakening comes earlier than whites realize. Before Tshenu was born, his father, a prosperous farmer (as well as a traditional "witch doctor"), had already been forced to move his farm three times. As a small boy, Tshenu remembers the large gardens and orchards from which surplus produce was sold to hotels and shops in the nearby white town. When in 1951 the community was uprooted by the government for causing "soil erosion," Farisani's father lost much of his wealth. "There was no compensation," the son recalls. "And suddenly we were hungry."

At his new home, the youthful Tshenu watched the construction of a road through the cemetery on its way to then Southern Rhodesia. "We felt that the god of the whites destroyed even the graves of our ancestors. We threw stones at the vehicles and ran into the bush and watched." In 1959, the family was moved again, forced to sell off the few cattle his father had carefully raised. For his elder brothers and sisters, it was the fifth or sixth move.

The wounds left their mark. In the 19th century missionary scramble for Africa, German Lutherans had cornered this obscure but fertile region of tropical South Africa, to be followed by the Boer trekkers who progressively grabbed the best land through conquest and stealth. "When people say the whites gave us the Bible with one hand and stole our land with the other, it is not an empty slogan," says Farisani. "We have evidence of many instances where missionaries actually prepared the way for the conquerers."

Farisani sees the process of dispossessing the blacks of their land as an attempt to dehumanize them. "They have created a population without property and turned them into migratory laborers in white industry and on white farms."

At least the newest dumping ground

Denis Herbstein, a South African exile, is a journalist and author living in London. He writes regularly for The Observer, International Herald Tribune, *and the* New Statesman.

brought him near a school and a new type of god. He struck up a friendship with a German woman missionary and soon was baptized, acquiring the Christian name "Simon." The eager student whizzed through classes, winning prizes and bursaries, and coming second in South Africa in his school-leaving exams. That, for a boy who started school at 12. Simon insisted on the ministry, though his father wanted him to become a (modern) doctor.

The black consciousness ferment was spreading like wildfire among the country's black students. At his Lutheran seminary in Natal, he edited the college magazine, causing a huge row by exposing the treatment of black teachers by white colleagues. Despite winning distinctions in several subjects, his passionate oratory and student political activities ended in his expulsion. His career appeared to be in shreds. Back in Venda, the church council was angry with its star student, but he asked for time to explain himself. "I put my case and at the end there was no discussion, the bishop was just hitting the table saying he didn't understand why this man was kicked out of college."

The bishop provided him with a congregation and the financial help to finish his studies. "They gave me just one congregation because they did not trust my philosophy and what I would be preaching." By the end of the year, he had founded two more congregations, with 77 converts thrown in. And he obtained a degree by correspondence at the University of South Africa in Pretoria.

Then, Farisani became president of the Black People's Convention, the main black consciousness organization inspired by his friend, Steve Biko, who was to die in a South African prison cell. Farisani traveled around his country, spreading the word, seeing for himself the way black people were forced to live.

It was after his ordination that he was arrested and driven 600 miles from Venda to Howick in Natal. The security police hung him upside down out of a window. They made him dance barefoot on a floor of nails. Handcuffed, in leg-irons, a stick pushed through his knees, he was suspended and interrogated.

John Evenson

Simon Tshenuwani Farisani, sourly referred to by conservative South Africa as a "political priest"

For three days and three nights he had no food, water, or sleep. When the doctor was called to tend to the unconscious detainee, he prescribed pills!

Farisani is not easily cowed. By now, Pretoria was well advanced with plans to grant "independence" to Venda, despite the lack of interest of its 750,000 impoverished inhabitants. In elections in 1973 and 1978, the party favoring independence was roundly defeated. But when 11 opposition members were arrested, the minority party was able to opt for independence (Farisani quotes the white South African "commissioner-general" as saying: "Today Venda has shown the whole of Africa what democracy is about. . . "). As the three separated segments making up Venda approached "independence" in 1979, the opposition was being wiped out by arrests, deaths, bribery, flight, or simply fear.

Venda has little claim to viability. One in three adults is unemployed, and many of those lucky enough to have a job work hundreds of miles away in the "white" cities. South Africa provides 90 percent of the bantustan's budget, while hundreds of whites are employed by the Venda government. Venda is the most strategically sensitive of the bantustans, and Pretoria takes no chances. It is separated from the Zimbabwe border by a *cordon sanitaire* manned by white troops. For its part, Venda plays a role in the defense of apartheid by sending a contingent of black soldiers to fight against Angola and the Swapo liberation movement in northern Namibia.

"For Farisani, the Bible, rather than the Communist Manifesto, has guided his actions since he was baptized at the age of 12."

Venda sometimes manages to out-do its master's voice. While Pretoria has repealed its Terrorism Act, the government of President-for-Life Chief Patrick Mphephu has retained this law, which allows a senior policeman to detain a suspect without a warrant and to imprison him or her indefinitely.

In 1981, the African National Congress attacked a police station in Venda. In the round-up that followed, a Lutheran lay preacher (not involved in the incident) died of wounds while in police custody. When Farisani tried to obtain legal help for the man, he too was picked up and accused of participating in the attack. Patently untrue, but as the most coherent critic of the state-let, Farisani was an obvious target for official anger.

He describes what happened. "I was made to squat in an imaginary chair, kicked in the genitals, karate-chopped, before losing consciousness several times." That was the beginning. "If you are still alive tomorrow," they told him, "we are not doing our job properly." The pastor was taken to a cell, the curtains were closed, he was made to undress, a canvas bag was tied over his head, a sticky substance sprayed on his spine, and electric wires connected to his ear lobes. Then, after water was poured on the bag, the current was turned on.

It was, he recalled, "the worst experience of my life. And it went on for several hours. I screamed like a baby, begging for mercy, but they just laughed, and sang 'Hallelujah, praise the Lord, Hallelujah, why doesn't God comes and help you?' White South African policeman supervised the proceedings."

That night a belt was left in his cell, but he refused to commit suicide. The bogus confession he made the next day was not even believed by his torturers. Farisani suffered two heart attacks after his release. The Venda government later paid him damages of 6,500 rands (then worth $3,000).

The police warned him to keep quiet about his treatment. But he spoke out at every opportunity, at home and overseas. He has close ties with America, particularly in the Lutheran hierarchy. There he met Edward Meese, then a presidential adviser to Ronald Reagan, and members of both houses of Congress heard this forceful, persuasive speaker talk about political prisoners and human rights under the "reforming" Botha presidency. Trinity Lutheran Seminary in Columbus, Ohio, awarded him an honorary doctorate in divinity. Last year, Amnesty International sent him on a speaking tour of Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.

In Venda, where he is now the deputy bishop of the Lutheran Church, the largest denomination in northern Transvaal, he keeps his 121 congregations informed of events, good and evil. He talks about human rights at United Democratic Front meetings, to Venda University students, churches, and women's groups. Sunday sermons follow the church almanac, which prescribes texts for the whole year, but "they can be spiritual or about life in South Africa." None of which makes him popular in Pretoria or in the Venda capital, Thohoyandou (meaning "elephant's head").

Under Farisani, the local confessing church has opened advice offices all over the circuit—in Venda, in the South African sections, and in two other neighboring bantustans. Here a family threatened with removal from a "white" area or a woman whose husband has been detained will get help.

These offices are a threat to the established order. Last year, a group of leading Venda officials attempted to have Farisani and two fellow pastors expelled from the church for being anti-government (it is treason not to recognize "independence"). But the great mass of parishioners would have no truck with the move.

Farisani is a proponent of "contextual theology," whereby the church is called upon to address the issues affecting people's everyday lives. "You can't divorce theology from historical realities," he says. "If you read the Afrikaner theologies at the time of British rule, they could have been the work of black theologians, except they were white liberation theologians. Today, they don't understand why we have to have our black liberation theology."

Last November, they came for him for the fourth time. As he was being driven away, he was warned: "This time we shall close your mouth once and for all." The security captain who issued the warning had orchestrated his torture on the previous occasion. It was disquieting that the captain, together with the other torturers, had since been promoted.

At the police station in Sibisa, "I was served soft porridge for breakfast, hard porridge for lunch, and soft porridge at night. I told the police it was not fit for human consumption. I was not a convicted prisoner and insisted on food from home. On the third day, they relented and my wife was allowed to send me a good meal. You might say it was a psychological victory."

As the first interrogation loomed, Farisani pondered his predicament. "I realized that if they tortured me, they would never let me out alive. They knew I would not keep quiet, would sue them again, and so they would have to kill me. But that would have been difficult to explain away in light of my previous treatment, which is probably why I got a different team of interrogators."

There was a particularly ghoulish reason why he objected to the old team. One of them was an assistant in his church in Messina. "On Sundays he conducted the liturgy before my sermon. We thought he worked for the municipality. But when they picked me up in 1981, he was there. He even ordered the uniformed police to treat me badly. And he took part in all the tortures.

"Since then he has stopped coming to church. He probably does not feel comfortable there any more. But just imagine, he receives Holy Communion from my hand and the next moment he is killing me."

"In South Africa, the black political awakening comes earlier than whites realize"



John Conn

Paul Weinberg/Afrapix/Impact Visuals

"Farisani is a proponent of contextual theology, whereby the church is called upon to address the issues of people's everyday lives"

Farisani was now given a different, less violent team. He has a good memory for names, dates, and places. So it was with horror that he found himself in the same room where he had once almost been electrocuted. Again the curtains were closed, but now there was a chair to sit on.

His questioners were interested in a trip he had made with a church delegation to Lusaka to meet the African National Congress. "They showed me a photo album of so-called terrorists. Had I met any of them in Zambia? The only ones I recognized were Oliver Tambo, the ANC president, whom I have never met but whose picture is in all the papers, and a young Venda man who was once a member of my church and who had died in a shoot-out with the South African police."

He was questioned about a conference he had attended in New York, which he told them was also attended by representatives of the Ford Foundation and a Professor De Lange of the Afrikaner secret society, the Broederbond. "They also wanted to know about my contribution to the debate on the sanctions bill in the United States Congress last October, when I briefed senators and State Department officials."

These sessions lasted up to 10 hours a day. He was not physically abused, but menace was in the air. The style oscillated between the deferential: "Dear Doctor Dean Farisani, please be so kind as to answer the following questions . . . " and the threatening: "Farisani, you son of a witch doctor, answer the questions in detail, failing which we will give you the worst 'VIP' treatment ever. . . "

Fearing for his life, he tried to enlist the aid of the magistrate who had to make occasional visits. "He was a former white Rhodesian whom I told about the threat to my life and that the last time I was tortured the magistrate had not come for two months. He said, 'Dear Dean, I am not at your beck and call.' "

On New Year's Day, Farisani began a hunger strike which would last until he was either charged or released. He wrote a detailed letter addressed to his wife and threw it out the cell. "I shall never commit suicide," he wrote ominously, "unless I die in the process of fasting." A sympathetic hand passed it on and soon his plight was known to the outside world. All the while, box-loads of protest letters from Lutherans and Amnesty International groups around the world poured in to the family home and to the offices of the Venda and South African presidents. There were regular phone calls from the American embassy in Pretoria (no country other than South Africa recognizes Venda).

Out of the blue, his guards brought a telex message from a Lutheran organization in New York offering him a job in the United States. "The government obviously wanted me to accept, and it was clear that I would then soon be released. I am sure the offer was well-meaning, as my friends feared for my life, but I was not prepared to go into voluntary exile. Besides, using me as a hostage was a dangerous precedent. I wrote thanking them, but said I could not decide without consulting my bishop and my wife."

One day he was taken to the police commissioner's office to find two senior white officers from South Africa. He was released the next day, 35 pounds lighter, not quite his usual buoyant self. In all, he has served 441 days in South African prisons without appearing in a court of law. He and his wife, who was suffering from extreme stress, went to Johannesburg for treatment. On their return, Farisani found that the Pretoria government had banned him from entering South Africa. The order had been issued two days before his release, "further proof," he says, "were it needed, that Venda is manipulated by South Africa."

Unless his lawyers get the ban lifted, he will be cut off from half his parishioners. He would even need a visa to visit his mother's house, which is separated from the Farisani home by a South Africa corridor.

Dean Farisani is conscious of Western concern about violence in the liberation struggle. "We have used the non-violent method, and the government's reaction was more repression. It is entirely different from Martin Luther King and Gandhi, who had constitutional means to win their struggle. We are asked about the church's attitude to violence, but we see the clergy in the white army, and the Christians in the Afrikaner Dutch Reformed Church who are fully involved with the government. Their positions are never questioned."

"The problem is that blood is thicker than water. If 5 million blacks were oppressing 25 million whites, we have no doubt that the U.S. would long ago have invaded South Africa to 'free' them. Instead, we are told that blacks will be hurt by sanctions. But we do have to accept sacrifices. It is a racist insult to say that blacks do not have the capacity to suffer."

Tshenuwani Farisani would feel like a traitor if he were forced into exile. "I am not aware from the biblical point of view of the prophets having it easy. Jesus did not have it very easy, so who am I to complain?" □

BY ANDREW MELDRUM

Malawi

Banda in a Bind

Malawi's agricultural successes belie a high rate of poverty and malnutrition and an economy controlled by Life President Banda and his political cronies. The aged leader and whoever succeeds him will face increasing pressure from frontline colleagues to sever links with the South African government and its surrogates.

As a livried aide held an umbrella to protect him from the tropical rains, Malawi Life President Hastings Kamuzu Banda walked into a muddy field of tobacco plants. After inspecting several leaves, Banda pronounced the crop a good one and briefly complimented the farmer, a tenant on one of Banda's own estates.

As his considerable entourage stood in the drizzle, Banda repeated what he had said to the three other farmers he visited that morning. "It pleases me to see my people farming. All Malawians must be farmers, that is what I have taught my people," he said, shaking his ever-present traditional chief's fly-whisk, a symbol of his authority.

"I want all my people to have three things: enough food to eat, decent clothes to wear, and a house that does not leak when it rains," said Banda. "That to me means independence for Malawians."

Others in the group stated the three necessities along with Banda; the goals are well-known because the life president has been making that statement since the country's independence in 1964.

This is Banda's annual crop inspection tour, a colorful yearly rite in which he travels throughout the tiny southern African country to view agricultural production. The purpose of the tour is twofold: to encourage continued development of the poor country's agriculture and to bring all the regal trappings of Banda's rule to the rural areas where close to 90 percent of Malawi's 7.3 million people live.

Malawi's agricultural and economic policies are widely praised in the West as successful models of capitalism applied to Third World farming conditions. And Banda is hailed as an effective, if somewhat dictatorial, leader who has made his country a peaceful island of stability amid the turmoil of southern Africa.

But a closer look reveals flaws in that analysis. Malawi's much-vaunted agricultural policies sustain startlingly high levels of rural poverty and malnutrition. And Banda's strongman rule may soon be threatened because his long-time friendship with apartheid-ruled South Africa has alienated the frontline states surrounding Malawi.

Banda has made agriculture the economic mainstay of landlocked, resource-poor Malawi. In many ways, Banda's emphasis on farming has paid off: Agricultural output products account for 90 percent of the country's annual export earnings of about $270 million, with tobacco alone earning half that total. Malawi is one of the few African countries that can claim to be self-sufficient in food and manages to export corn, the region's staple food.

But there is another, more troubling side to Banda's agricultural policies. Malawi's agricultural and economic successes are not reflected in the health and nutritional status of its people. The boast of self-sufficiency rings hollow alongside statistics which show Malawi as having one of the world's highest malnutrition rates, estimated by the United Nations Children's Fund (Unicef) to be more than 50 percent among children under five.

According to Unicef, Malawi's infant mortality rate of 151 deaths per 1,000 births in the first year is the fourth highest in the world. The average lifespan from birth is 42 years for men and 44 years for women.

In comparison, neighboring Zambia and Tanzania, both with serious economic problems, have significantly better infant mortality rates at about 124 per 1,000 births and their average lifespans are both in the 50-year-plus category.

Even though Malawi is one of the world's 20 poorest countries, it should be able to provide a better standard of living for the majority of rural poor, according to economists and agricultural specialists.

The grim realities of life in rural Malawi are not acknowledged by Banda, especially on his triumphal crop tours.

"I have seen your crops and they are good," said the life president at a rally of 6,000 people early this year. "There can be no question of starvation here, unlike other African countries."

One of Africa's longest ruling and most colorful leaders, Banda left rural Malawi early this century to work in what was then Rhodesia and in South Africa's gold mines before finding his way to the United States where in 1937, he qualified as a medical doctor in Memphis, Tennessee. After practicing as a family doctor in Britain for 17 years, Banda returned to his country, then called the British Protectorate of Nyasaland, to lead the African nationalist agitation that brought Malawi to independence and majority rule.

But the contemporary and friend of the likes of Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere in the 1950s had ideas quite different from those pan-African socialists.

At the crop tour rally in the Machinga area of central Malawi, Banda sat impassively on the dais, decorated with the large heraldic lions that are his personal symbol, as pledges from the local people were read out. The gathering contrib-

Andrew Meldrum, an American journalist who has been based in Zimbabwe for six years, reports on southern Africa for The Guardian *of London, Agence France-Presse, and the Voice of America.*

uted a total of 12,000 kwachas (about $6,500) to Banda, a considerable sum for a group made up largely of peasant farmers. When asked if the money perhaps goes to a development fund for the area, government officials say, "No," the money goes to the life president.

"Some people get nervous when it is announced that the crop tour will come to their area, because they don't know where they will get the money for the presidential contributions," said one international aid worker who has been in Malawi for several years.

Banda's speech in Machinga highlighted the priorities of his brand of rural development. He castigated the tenants on his estates for selling their tobacco to a different merchant. According to Malawian regulations, small-holding farmers and tenants cannot sell their cash crops on the open market, but rather to the larger estate owners or to the parastatal Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), at prices generally well below market value.

Banda had learned that some of his tenants sold their tobacco to someone who had offered a higher price. "That is stealing from your Nqwazi [leader]," he told the crowd. He called up two managers of his estates and made them vow never to let the tenants sell to someone else again.

It is this pursuit of profits by Banda and the ruling clique in his Malawi Congress Party that the life president's critics say is the cause of malnutrition in rural Malawi. The system is weighted in favor of the large commercial estate owners and the relatively rich peasants who own more than one hectare of land.

At the bottom are peasants who own less than a hectare, and according to the government's figures, represent more than 50 percent of the small-holding farmers. It is they who cannot quite grow enough for their families and yet must sell some of the corn crop to ADMARC for needed cash. These are the families where malnutrition is rife.

Even the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are attempting to change the agricultural structure in Malawi, not because it is inequitable but because it does not allow the free market system to set the "right" price for corn and other crops.

International aid workers and the few Malawians who dare to question say that Banda has willfully refused to deal with the question of the rural poor, whose plight could be improved by efforts to teach people how to grow a mix of crops to make a balanced diet and by ending the economic policies which require them to sell food for cash. For 23 years, Banda's government has concentrated on creating wealth, but not on redistributing it, they say. As a result, Malawi's health and education services are considered sub-standard, even compared to other poor African countries.

"Banda's agricultural policies have been growth-oriented, rather than equity-oriented," said a Malawian agricultural specialist. "In other words, agriculture has been emphasized not as a means of alleviating poverty but as a means of promoting economic growth. This has earned it praise from the World Bank but wretched poverty in the rural areas."

Malawi has developed a civil service with able technocrats who see changes that need to be made, but they fear that Banda will not be followed by any leaders in favor of such reforms.

In addition to being life president, Banda holds four ministries: agriculture, external affairs, justice, and works and supplies. He has been the country's president since 1964 and was declared president for life in 1971 by the rubber-stamp Parliament controlled by his Malawi Congress Party, the country's only legal political party.

Banda's good health is legendary but he is not ageless. Officially, he is 80 years old, but historians who spoke to his family members place his age more at 88. With increased age, his iron grip on the country has slipped somewhat and is now in the hands of those closest to him, two people with unusual titles—the official hostess, Cecilia Kadzamira, and her uncle, the official interpreter, John Tembo.

Kadzamira has been Banda's constant companion since 1958 when she became his receptionist for his medical practice in Malawi. A handsome woman with an imposing presence, she tends to the needs of the bachelor Banda. With his rise, Kadzamira rose too, to the extent that during Banda's state visit to Britain in 1986, Kadzamira rode in a carriage with Prince Philip and was received by Queen Elizabeth II.

Kadzamira controls all access to Banda. Until recently, diplomats have belittled suggestions that she has any political aspirations of her own. But they altered that view last year after she founded a nation-wide women's organization, Chama Cha Amai M'Malawi (CCAM). "It is a charity group which takes advantage of the party's structure. So far we're not sure where the money goes," said a Western diplomat in Lilongwe. "Essentially it is Kadzamira's effort to establish her own grassroots support."

Others say Kadzamira's political aspirations account for why she never married Banda. "Malawi is a very traditional society and as Dr. Banda's wife she would have had a very subservient position. Instead, she has her own position," said an African diplomat.

Kadzamira's bid for power is especially strong when seen in tandem with that of her uncle, John Tembo. Banda makes his speeches in English and Tembo translates them into Chichewa, the language understood by the majority of Malawians. On the surface, that does not look like such a powerful position, but he is also the senior member of the Malawi Congress Party's national executive.

The savvy Tembo was Banda's first finance minister in 1964 and later served as head of Malawi's Reserve Bank for 13 years. Although widely respected as sharp and able, Tembo was removed from that key economic position in the early 1980s by the IMF and the World Bank, amid reports of misallocation of funds. Although Banda professes to be an advocate of free enterprise, the IMF team found his control of the economy to be excessive and throughout the 1980s has moved to reduce the concentration of the country's resources in the possession of Banda, his deputies, and his conglomerate Press Corporation, the country's largest company.

In any case, Tembo survived that setback to retain his position of influence, as evidenced by his recent appointment as Banda's special representative to

Mozambique to set up a joint security commission to sort out the problem of continued activity of the South African-backed Mozambique National Resistance Movement (alternately called Renamo or MNR) along the Malawian border.

The late Mozambican President Samora Machel and other frontline leaders repeatedly accused Banda's government of allowing Renamo to use bases in Malawi for their offensives against Mozambique. Althouth Western diplomats have dismissed those claims, they have allowed that Malawi probably serves as a supply route for South Africa to channel material to Renamo. And John Tembo is most often mentioned by Mozambicans and diplomats alike as the Malawian most likely to be involved in such nefarious dealings with the South Africans.

With Kadzamira and Tembo firmly in place to succeed Banda, it is not so much the life president's age that is the threat to his form of government, but regional events that threaten to upset Malawi's status quo. It is Banda's long-standing association with Pretoria that is endangering Malawi's current cozy ruling clique.

As far back as 1964, just six months after leading Malawi to independence, Banda faced a rebellion by six of his cabinet members over his friendly policies toward South Africa and the Portuguese rulers of Mozambique. He promptly dropped them from his government, including well-respected Justice Minister Orton Chirwa.

Chirwa soon left the country and formed an exiled opposition group, the Malawi Freedom Movement (Mafremo). In December 1982, Chirwa and his wife, Vera, were captured by Malawian authorities (some say abducted from Zambia) and later sentenced to death. Their sentences were commuted to life imprisonment and the two currently languish in detention.

Banda paid a state visit to South Africa in 1971 and Malawi is the only black African country to have full diplomatic relations with the Pretoria regime. The South African military has a permanent representative in Malawi. In return for such rare international recognition, the Pretoria government has financed and constructed the modern buildings of Banda's new capital, Lilongwe.

Andrew Meldrum

Banda with Official Hostess Cecilia Kadzamira: "Kadzamira controls all access to Banda"

No wonder that Mozambique and other frontline states looked suspiciously at Malawi as the South African-backed Renamo became more and more active in northern Mozambique, along the border.

Shortly before his death in a mysterious plane crash in South Africa on October 19, 1986, Mozambican President Machel joined frontline leaders Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda in an unprecedented trip to Malawi. The three leaders warned Banda that he must stop siding with South Africa or they would impose an economic blockade on Malawi, a move that would quickly strangle the landlocked country.

A further threat came in January this year when a group of armed men overtook a Malawian police station in Kapora, a small post on the border with Tanzania. Three policemen were killed, according to a statement issued from Tanzania, which said that the attack was the first from Mafremo's newly formed armed wing which vows to overthrow the "brutal and murderous Banda regime." The statement came from new deputies elected during Chirwa's imprisonment and was also released in Zimbabwe and Mozambique, a clear signal, according to observers, that Mafremo might operate from those neighboring countries.

The Banda government clearly took those worrying signs seriously and has taken pains to improve relations with Mozambique. The most dramatic of these steps was Banda's pledge that Malawian troops will safeguard Mozambique's 300-mile railway line linking Malawi to the northern Mozambican port of Nacala. Both Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano and Banda have stated that this surprising deployment of Malawian troops will take place later this year.

Nacala is Malawi's best access to the sea, but has been closed for about four years because of Renamo attacks. Malawi has been forced to use the much longer transport route through South Africa for its imports and exports, costing the country some $100 million a year, according to government officials.

Tiny, backward Malawi does not have the might of Zimbabwe which is keeping the 180-mile transport corridor to the Beira port open. But the mere deployment of Malawian troops could ward off Renamo attacks on the Nacala railway, which would be a boon for both Mozambique and Malawi.

Of course, the stability of the northern corner of Mozambique will not ensure peace anywhere else in that war-torn country, but the involvement of Malawian troops shows Banda's desire to be seen as a more friendly neighbor to the frontline states. It also shows the ominous development of South Africa spreading its unabated crisis throughout the entire southern African region. □

Madagascar

Ratsiraka's Volte-Face

One of the first of Africa's socialist countries to reorient its economic policies toward the West, Madagascar has not escaped the domestic unrest which often accompanies adoption of the IMF's austerity regimen. Over the coming months, Ratsiraka—considered essential to the success of the recovery program—faces increasing political isolation and an economy teetering on the brink of disaster.

BY MICHAEL GRIFFIN

Long considered the *enfant terrible* of the francophone world, Madagascar is now more usually referred to as one of the International Monetary Fund's favorite pupils, an indication of the profound reappraisal that has taken place in the Indian Ocean island since the government first appealed to the IMF back in 1980.

President Didier Ratsiraka, head of state since 1974, now espouses policies that were once ideological anathema to him. His volte-face on the road to Damascus was caused by the acute decline that has dogged the island since it adopted an economic model based on state ownership and the ensuing exhaustion of commercial credit lines.

Madagascar has become one of the first of Africa's socialist states to shift the axis of its development back toward the West and to tailor its economy to the requirements of overseas donors and investors. The transition, in personal terms at least, has invoked more than a hint of hubris for President Ratsiraka, who has sacrificed a cherished place at the helm of the anti-colonial debate for a bench in the debtors' galley. But as he embarks on his second decade in office, it is neither left nor right, but the price of rice which holds the key both to Malagasy recovery and political power.

Though officially independent in 1958, Madagascar continued under French military and economic domination until 1973 when President Philibert Tsiranana resigned following a rebellion in the deep south and unrest in the cities. The rupture with France began the same year with the eviction of the colonial power from its military and naval bases in Ivato and Diego Suarez.

The Great Red Island as it is known—more for the color of its soil than its political complexion—also withdrew from the franc zone and under Ratsiraka, the former foreign affairs minister, embarked upon a program of nationalization which reduced French investment to a minimum and effectively checked the growth of a legitimate private sector for the best part of a decade.

The government made considerable progress in the fields of education and health care, but capital investments were ill-timed and often poorly planned. Millions of dollars were borrowed to finance an import-dependent industrialization program, but few plants operated at above 30 percent of actual capacity, and agriculture, the backbone of Malagasy prosperity, lagged conspicuously.

The Soviet Union, seeking a protégé in the Indian Ocean, quickly filled the vacuum left by the French and Ratsiraka built up a formidable arsenal, given the island's innocuous spice economy and its geographical isolation. While GDP remained stagnant for much of the decade, debt service climbed mercilessly from 4 percent of exports in 1978 to 78 percent four years later.

Madagascar had little bargaining power left when in 1980 the IMF took up the familiar refrain of austerity. Mainland states have balked at taking the "cold turkey" route out of debt recommended by the Fund, but in the space of three years, Madagascar has laid aside costly rhetoric and begun to implement an economic regime that embraced successive devaluations, the liberalization of agriculture, and strict import controls.

The program has forced the Malagasy even deeper into penury and the plunder of Asian property in late February and early March seemed to signal that a life of quiet desperation is no longer considered acceptable. Angry crowds burned or looted more than 200 homes and stores in Antsirabe, 75 miles south of Antananarivo, and there were racial attacks in Toliary, Fianarantsoa, and Farafangana. The "karanas," as the 17,000-strong Indian and Pakistani community is known, dominate Madagascar's retail sector and are widely resented for speculation in the rice trade and in the black market for other scarce items, such as cooking oil and sugar.

The Asians are an easy target for popular frustration, but what distinguished the recent unrest from, for instance, the food riots that swept Zambia before Christmas, was the absence of an immediate trigger for the outburst. Food prices had actually fallen and were at their lowest levels for several months. Malagasy observers are unanimous that the riots were orchestrated and as proof, point to the careful avoidance of bloodshed. No Asians were killed, and of the three dead, two were looters and the other a soldier. With presidential and national elections now brought forward to 1988, the attacks could be the opening shot in a tough electoral campaign. But like many events in Malagasy politics, the rumor of responsibility takes the place of hard facts.

Madagascar is not quite the passive IMF client that its reputation suggests. With debt service in 1987 consuming 98 percent of current exports before rescheduling, the island desperately

Michael Griffin is a London-based freelance writer specializing in East Africa and the Indian Ocean.

needs supplementary financing and that depends upon continuing endorsement by the IMF. But the government is also waging a rear-guard, delaying action that is designed to shore up its domestic credibility.

In theory, the private sector has been allowed to engage in rice marketing since 1984, but in practice, it was only in 1986 that state-owned corporations renounced their monopoly over the massive plantations in Lake Alaotra and Maravoay. Control of these two key regions lessened the impact on urban consumers of the liberalization program which has driven food prices up. The factor which caused the government to decide in favor of full implementation was the positive outcome of the Consultative Group Meeting held in Paris last April.

A similar air of quid pro quo surrounds other commitments to the austerity program. The 20 percent devaluation last August—the IMF reportedly pressed for 30 percent—swung a $36.2 million standby facility in September, and an IMF review in October is likely to be a prelude to the relaxation of import controls. An important element in the recovery program is the private investment code which was finally ratified last June after nearly two years of debate and delay.

The IMF had urged the government to publish new guidelines as a means of erasing the stigma of nationalization and French investors in particular have responded promptly to the code. Foreigners are now permitted to engage in most economic sectors and incentives include up to eight years' exemption from import duties and taxes as well as a liberal allowance for remittance of profits and employment of expatriates. But reactions inside the country were less cordial.

"Madagascar for the Malagasy" is still a potent rallying cry even 30 years after independence. Objections, within and outside the National Assembly, hinged upon two clauses: First, the code does not maintain the state's monopoly on foreign trade, which in principle leaves non-Malagasy free to "hijack" a share of exports and in the view of the left, to "recolonize" the economy.

Secondly—and more controversial—were the advantages that the



Michael Griffin

Peasant farmers: "Most of Madagascar's 1.5 million farming families till less than half a hectare"

Asian community would enjoy under the new provisions. The code does not distinguish between overseas investors and foreign passport holders who are resident. Many Asians have held onto their French passports and thus are entitled to remit profits, a right which the Malagasy entrepreneur does not enjoy.

Such an initiative pleased neither the harder-line socialists in the Conseil Suprême de la Revolution (CSR, whose powers are discretionary) or the Merina bourgeoisie, upon whose votes Ratsiraka depends if his ruling Arema party is to successfully bridge the traditional gulf between coastal dweller and highlander, which runs like a faultline beneath Madagascar's volatile political landscape.

The island's seven parties range from the center right through to neo-Maoist. Speculation over who is behind the attacks on Asian property have focused on Monima or the MFM—both leftist parties which had argued vigorously against the investment code—and on the pro-Moscow AKFM in a hypothetical and certainly belated bid to turn the clock back on Madagascar's switch to the right.

In 1985, Ratsiraka tried to steer the CSR (two-thirds of whose members he nominates) into accepting a one-party state. They fought off the plan successfully. Although Ratsiraka has never been popular in Antananarivo, he remains without rival as head of state. Monja Jaona, the elderly but still vitriolic chairman of Monima, is the only other Malagasy with an island-wide profile, but members of his party admit he makes a better critic than a chief executive.

In the view of Western diplomats, the "born-again" Ratsiraka is an essential component if the recovery program is to run its course. But this in turn has led to his increasing isolation. A large reservoir of nostalgia exists for living standards in pre-1973, neo-colonial Madagascar. But the economic cure and the long road home is proving far more toxic than the poison it attempts to remedy.

On paper at least, the bankers' craft appears to be paying off. Despite unfavorable commodity prices, exports of coffee, cloves, and vanilla have grown at between 6 and 8 percent in the past two years, and the trade deficit was cut from $90 million in 1983 to $10.7 million in 1985. Imports were reduced from $557 million in 1980 to $140 million in 1985.

Donors at the Paris conference responded to these figures and a fulsome World Bank endorsement with pledges of $630 million in aid and balance of payments support during the first two years of the government's new investment program. Awards from two discretionary funds—the World Bank's Special Facility for Sub-Saharan Africa and the United States' "Food for Progress" program—further emphasized Madagascar's status as a "favorite pupil."

But this is on paper. Since implementing the structural adjustment program, the government has taken onboard considerable new loans and the "bad news" from Paris was that such donor confidence had added nearly 20 percent to an already unmanageable debt of $2.8 billion. Exports also fell from $518 million in 1980 to $348 million in 1985.

The bottom line in these calculations

remains the island's agricultural performance, but economists foresee only limited growth in traditional exports, all of which compete in over-supplied markets. Hopes of an oil strike have faded and a strict embargo of South African minerals, which would transform Malagasy chrome deposits into a strategic commodity, is unlikely. The hostage against foreclosure and the sole motor of short-term growth in Madagascar, therefore, is the impoverished rice farmer.

The rice factor has played a critical role in the Malagasy economy since 1973 when Madagascar was a net exporter. It is the island's staple and the Malagasy have the highest annual rate of rice consumption in the world at 156 kilograms per head. Demand is now increasing at 30,000 tons per year, but for most of the 1970s, output stagnated as a result of the official marketing system which was weighted in favor of the influential, urban constituencies.

Faced with prices that no longer reflected production costs and shelves bare of essentials, the peasant retreated into a sullen subsistence farming. The ensuing shortfall was made up by purchases on the world market and is still distributed through the *fokontany*, the basic unit of local government. In 1982, rice imports peaked at 350,000 tons, thus challenging oil as the greatest drain on foreign exchange.

In a bid to lure growers back to the marketplace, the government has doubled producer base prices and swept away state-owned monopolies, leaving private businessmen to handle collection, haulage, and distribution for the first time in a decade. Meanwhile, food imports have been steadily reduced to 106,000 tons, less than a third of the 1982 level, a measure which has compelled the urban poor to seek out rice substitutes such as potatoes, maize, and cassava.

But despite higher prices, farmers have not responded as forecast and over the past five years, output has increased at least 1 percent per annum. In 1985, the 2.3 million ton harvest equalled the 1980 peak but in the following year, a late cyclone disrupted the Lake Alaotra region and the harvest fell short of FAO estimates. Meanwhile, in the city markets, traders carve out monumental profits from speculation and a year ago, prices rose to $1,200 per ton compared to $160 per ton on the world market.

The donor community maintains that it could take between three to five years before cultivators begin to find their feet and pump out the grain that the towns require. Certainly higher prices have brought windfall profits to larger landowners who are responding by cutting more rice terraces and hiring new labor. But most of Madagascar's 1.5 million farming families till less than half a hectare and are lucky to harvest a ton of grain, sufficient for only a four-month supply.

They are further impoverished by gangs of armed bandits, or *dahalo*, who terrorize the countryside, preying on livestock, poultry, and rice. In such circumstances, few can hope to grow more food without fertilizer, but all need money to pay debts, replace stock, or hire labor. The danger is that farmers will sell their own meager rations to cash in on the current boom, only to fall deeper in debt when they run out later in the year.

Several close observers of Malagasy affairs privately warned of imminent famine in the countryside where even at harvest, as many as 60 percent of children under five are likely to suffer from malnutrition caused by poor feeding habits. In November, Monja Jaona called on the government to launch an appeal for international aid following disclosures of serious food shortages in the south, which has had no rain for more than two years.

In principle, the liberalization program is part of an attempt to halt the historical drift of wealth and manpower to the urban areas, a movement that was encouraged by low profits for farmers and cheap food for city workers. But in practice, conditions in the towns are not so comfortable as to permit the transfer of wealth—in the form of higher rice prices—back to the rural areas. The free market system has brought insurmountable hardship to low income groups and such impoverishment, as the government recognizes, breeds recklessness.

By late 1985, Antananarivo resembled a city at the end of a bitter siege. By June 25, the entire year's allocation of imported rice, some 250,000 tons, had already been distributed and in November, scores of women descended on the Zoma market to sell their children to the highest bidder. It was a grim episode that was only relieved by the timely arrival of 15,000 tons of EEC wheatflour which allowed Antananarivo's *sans culottes* for once to eat cake.

Last year, rice imports were slashed by a further 58 percent to 106,000 tons (out of an estimated demand of 350,000 tons), but import management has improved since the grim winter of 1985. *Fokontany* rations are now permitted to slide when free market rice is cheaply available, as occurs between April and November. Nevertheless, according to a government report, some 400,000 people in the capital can no longer afford to eat what the FAO regards as the minimal nutritional requirements and donors have begun to worry that the government may not be able to brazen out the effects of the liberalization program much longer.

Despite its customary intransigence on the economic evils of food subsidies, the IMF has taken the unusual step of permitting an emergency food stockpile, composed of aid from the World Food Programme, the World Bank, U.S.AID, and the EEC. This stock would be released to the poor when free market prices rise above a secret "high-water mark" and it would therefore lower rice prices across the board. Aid workers in the capital report that the buffer stock is now operating smoothly: Rice sells at less than 400 Malagasy francs per kilo and there is a large enough supply to permit traders to market by grade.

In the wake of the recent riots, numerous Asians applied to migrate to Europe and elsewhere, but there is no evidence as yet that this will turn into an exodus. Their departure would certainly have a catastrophic effect on Madagascar's productive economic sectors, as well as frightening away the foreign investment the island so desperately needs.

If the existence of an emergency food stock is a mark of Madagascar's special relationship with the IMF, however, it is also recognition that the recovery program has now entered a critical phase and that its future success rests upon a hair-trigger. □

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Interview

Lam Akol Ajawin and Justin Yaac Arop

During a recent trip to the United States, Dr. Lam Akol Ajawin, member of the political/military high command of the Sudan People's Liberation Army, and Dr. Justin Yaac Arop, secretary-general of the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association, spoke to *Africa Report* about the ongoing civil war, prospects for negotiations with the Sudanese government, and the continuing need for emergency assistance to the famine-stricken southern population.

Africa Report: How much of Sudanese territory does the Sudan People's Liberation Army [SPLA] control at the moment?

Akol: The SPLA controls all the countryside in the south, apart from a very small strip north of Zaire. The government forces are confined to big garrison towns like Malakal, Wau, and Juba. But even these towns are besieged by the movement, so there is no communication, no transport by road or river. Sometimes the military sneaks in by air, because it's very hard to control the air space completely. In March, we captured another town called Pibor, which is very strategic in terms of government supply lines. When the government knew the fall was imminent, they said they had captured the town from us, when it had been theirs all the time, to prepare public opinion on receiving the news.

The people in Sudan don't believe what Radio Omdurman, the government's radio, says. The fact is that the SPLM [Sudan People's Liberation Movement] controls 95 percent of the south—the whole countryside, with the exception of a few army garrisons which are under siege by the forces of the SPLA.

Africa Report: How are the government forces able to resupply their garrisons in the south?

Akol: They have been stockpiling food for a long time. In addition, most of the food which is given by the aid agencies and flown to the south to the cities eventually ends up with the army. This is why the Sudan government always insists on having food taken to the towns rather than to the countryside where the population is.

Africa Report: What is the morale like among the government forces serving in the south?

Akol: Morale is low for a number of reasons. First, the army is unsure of the reason it is fighting. They are told all sorts of things—that they are fighting to defend the unity and territorial integrity of Sudan—when in fact nobody questions Sudan's unity or territorial integrity! They know that the SPLA fights for the same objectives. The only difference is that we are fighting for *real* unity among the Sudanese people, not merely in slogans, but in practical terms. We want to fuse the different nationalities into a Sudanese nation proud of itself rather than looking to the Middle East one day or Africa the next, and in the process Sudan is torn apart.

The second reason is that since the SPLA was founded in 1983, it has consistently been winning battles. Naturally this is bound to reflect on the other side. Third, the top military brass does not care about the suffering of the army rank and file. Further, the population in the south knows that there are genuine grievances which led the SPLA to take up arms and unless those are addressed, there will be no end to the war situation. All these factors lead to the army becoming very much demoralized, as they are looked at as an invading army.

Africa Report: To what extent do you engage each others' forces on the ground, or is it a stalemate with the army entrenched in garrison towns, and you in the countryside?

Akol: In 1983, in the early stages of the war, the army tried to go on the offensive. In the first battles when the SPLA attacked, the Sudanese army would pursue the attacking force. But as the battles increased and the army was always losing, not only did they have to entrench themselves in garrisons, but they had to abandon small garrisons which they could not hold. Right now only the garrisons with a capacity of up to one battalion are still intact. They don't really get out to attack the SPLA, they hold on.

There are a few exceptions to this. When Rumbek town fell to the SPLA in March 1986, Libya brought in Soviet-made Tupolev-22 aircraft to bomb the city. This was coordinated with the Sudanese army, which flew a large number of forces into Wau, in order to recapture Rumbek. They moved from Wau toward Rumbek and that took them a month and a half, so that is one case where they were on the offensive. The second was when they ferried a number of troops to Juba using civilian aircraft of the Transarabian Air Transport Company—a Saudi company with Boeing planes. They gathered about a 10,000-strong force in Juba, which moved toward Bor and again it took them two months. A few of them did manage to reach Bor town, but it was a military disaster because most of their equipment was demobilized and a number of them were killed on the way. Still Khartoum celebrated the fact that they managed to reach Bor, and it was a big success for them. At least it was one of the few occasions where they were on the offensive. They made a lot of noise that they captured the town from us, but the truth is we had never captured Bor from them! It was one of the besieged towns.

Africa Report: On the political front, there has been no contact between you and the government since the downing of the Sudan Airways plane last August. Is there any prospect for renewing discussions? What would it take from your point

of view for the government to show a serious commitment to negotiate?

Akol: Essentially the contacts were broken by the government. It was the government which announced that it would no longer be on talking terms with the SPLM/SPLA, so as far as we are concerned, if the government reverses that position, we are ready to continue the talks. Secondly, we have an agreement between us and the government—a document binding us together—the Koka Dam declaration. The Koka Dam declaration spells out clearly the requisites for all the political parties in Sudan to sit in a constitutional conference to solve the problems. Among these issues is the question of sharia law, which must be cancelled so that we have a secular state. This is the only way to guarantee the coexistence of these diverse groups in terms of cultural identity and religion. This was agreed to at Koka Dam in March 1986 and the prime minister's party signed it. We believe that this is the basis for any peaceful settlement of the problems in Sudan. So if the prime minister is serious about peace, then he should put into practice the provisions of Koka Dam and we will be the first to honor it. There is always a misconception that Koka Dam is a document of the SPLA, however, it was signed by the political forces in the country including the SPLM, in order to set the agenda for the peace process to be initiated. But the government did not honor its side.

Africa Report: There was some talk that Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi was going to introduce a watered-down version of the sharia laws.

Akol: The prime minister said he's going to bring in the true Islamic sharia law, so that is certainly not watering it down! He will be strengthening it! It is important for people to understand that sharia law is not compatible with constitutionality. Sharia by its very nature does not espouse equality, it is divisive, even among Muslims themselves. A male Muslim is a first-class citizen, followed by the female Muslim, then by Christians and Jews, and then the infidels, who believe in other religions.

The punishments which Nimeiry meted out are those contained in the Koran—so if you want to apply sharia, whether or not it is watered down, still a thief will have his hand chopped off. Someone who commits adultery if he is married will be stoned to death. If he is not, he will be lashed—these are provisions from the Koran, Nimeiry did not invent them. So those who apply the sharia will be hypocrites if they don't apply those punishments. The question is: Are these inhumane actions compatible with modern society which calls for human rights? So when Sadiq talks of another version of sharia, these are just empty words which cannot stand up to realities.

Africa Report: The expectations were that after Nimeiry was overthrown, first the Sawar-Dahab government and then the Mahdi government would finally deal with the southern problem. Why hasn't either government shown any serious commitment toward doing so?

Akol: You would be making a mistake if you were to separate Sawar-Dahab's period from the present one. To us, they are different sides of the same coin. What happened is that the masses truly wanted to change Nimeiry's regime. Given the SPLA's efforts, the system was shown to be economically bankrupt and did not have any credibility with the Sudanese people. Blows from the SPLA made the system weak and vulnerable and when the people went to the streets, Nimeiry was overthrown by peaceful demonstrations. A truly revolutionary movement overthrew Nimeiry and if it were to go to its logical conclusion, the SPLA and the popular masses could have sat down together and charted a new course for Sudan. But what happened on April 6, 1985 is that Nimeiry's Minister of Defense, Gen. Sawar-Dahab, took over power and stopped the tide of popular uprising from reaching its logical conclusion.Therefore we had a year of Nimeiry's regime without him.

But the people were not fighting against Nimeiry as a person, they were fighting against him as a system. The transitional government was preparing a smooth transition from itself to the people of the same political outlook—the Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist Party—since their interests coincided in preserving the sharia law. They were not as neutral as they claimed. It was also in their interest to carry out partial elections in the country, because most of the constituencies in the south would have returned secularists. So to stop this from happening, they insisted on carrying out elections while the war was going on so that they would win a majority in a partial election run in the north. The Sawar-Dahab regime in fact was preparing the ground for these sectarian parties to take over from it. They used Islamic slogans to further their political monopoly. Now people are beginning to awaken because of the message of the SPLA. The SPLA is fighting for equal development. We want the least developed parts of Sudan to be given priority so that they can at least catch up with the small part of the country which is developed. This message is getting across and it is worrying Sadiq because this is his powerbase. A newly restructured Sudan where power is shared by all the people as we want will be to the detriment of the sectarian political parties. And out of political expediency, they do not want to erode their own powerbase.

Africa Report: What is your relationship with the southern political parties and the southern administrative council, recently created by the government?

Akol: We are basically a Sudanese political party, but we are a national movement in the sense that we don't identify ourselves only with the south. Yes, the movement started in the south—it had to start somewhere—with southerners in the leadership. But it is not a southern movement. It is a national movement which tries to encompass all the Sudanese people behind it. Therefore our appeal is not directed toward southerners only, but toward all the Sudanese people. However, since we are also calling for regionalization in Sudan—because Sudan cannot be ruled centrally—the interests of the south are also of our concern.

Africa Report: What do you mean by regionalization?

Akol: We believe Sudan is a big country of plurality in terms of culture and languages. The only way to run it is to devolve power. It cannot be run centrally, so you must have power delegated to regions, federally or confederally. What is important is that certain powers are given to the regions so that they can run their own affairs, their development, whether cultural or political. But they should also have a say in the central power.



Margaret A. Novicki

Dr. Lam Akol (left) and Dr. Justin Yaac Arop

Africa Report: Do you agree with the principles of the Addis Ababa agreement?

Akol: The Addis Ababa agreement only addressed itself to a partial solution. It was only talking about the south as such. It lacked checks and balances in the sense that it addressed one region facing the northern part which identified itself with the central government, so there was a very unclear definition of what a region is. The north was always identified as the national government. So this is why it couldn't work. What we are saying is that regionalism should be all-encompassing to embrace the entire Sudan because there are areas in the north which are as underdeveloped as the south is. Power should be exercised by the people in the localities. As for the administrative council, the people chosen to it don't have a political base behind them. They cannot run the south. The south is being run by the SPLA.

Africa Report: What kind of support does the SPLA have in the north?

Akol: As I said before, we are a national democratic movement. Our program has gotten acceptance in the north. Right now we have people in our ranks who are from what used to be called the north and people from the north itself, those who were in power before. Second, we are in close cooperation with the Alliance for National Salvation, we have been holding meetings together, and we consider ourselves the forces which brought about the uprising against Nimeiry.

Africa Report: What is the balance of external forces vis-à-vis both the Sudanese government and the SPLA? The U.S., a strong supporter of Nimeiry, was somewhat put off by the Mahdi government's Libyan connection. Sadiq accuses you of being an agent of the Ethiopian government.

Akol: To start with, we have always been accused of being an agent of some force—the church, Ethiopia, Israel, even the United States! So you can see from the cocktail that you need to be some chameleon to be able to satisfy all these masters! The truth is there is nothing like that. The SPLM sprang from the grievances of the people and if the people were not with us, the movement would have collapsed a long time ago. There is no guerrilla movement which can succeed and achieve those military victories in so short a time. We are now just over three years old, so our real support is with the people. Maybe people are talking about why refugees have fled to Ethiopia. This is because our first battles in 1983 were in eastern upper Nile, the area bordering Ethiopia, so naturally the people went to the nearest border. That is one of the reasons they accuse the SPLA of being supported by Ethiopia, because Ethiopia is supporting the Sudanese refugees, almost a quarter of a million of whom are now in those Ethiopian camps.

Secondly, all the opposition groups which fought against the government of Khartoum, whether during Nimeiry or after, sought refuge in Ethiopia. In 1970, the Muslim Imam of the Ansar was fleeing to Ethiopia when he was killed at the borders. Sadiq al-Mahdi himself was in Ethiopia until 1976 when he staged an attack on Khartoum. His forces attacked from Libya and he was in Ethiopia—after Col. Mengistu had taken over power. But then he was not an agent of Mengistu's!

Africa Report: Sadiq is saying now that unless you disassociate yourselves from Ethiopia, he will not enter into any discussions with you.

Akol: That is his imagination. He thinks that we are controlled by Ethiopia and therefore we have to disentangle ourselves. But facts can prove our position very clearly. First of all, Ethiopia does not supply us with any support which would give it leverage on us. Second, we have been faithful to all the documents agreed upon by all the political forces in the country. If those documents were put into practice and we had refused to support them, that could have been proof that we

Camerapix

Col. John Garang holding SPLA flag: "The SPLM sprang from the grievances of the people and if the people were not with us, the movement would have collapsed a long time ago"

are controlled by somebody. But it is the Khartoum regime which is running away from its commitments. So who is in the pocket of other forces? It is convenient for Sadiq to use the Ethiopian factor because that enables him to bring the United States into the situation. This was also used effectively by Nimeiry before—that we are communists and our intention is to destabilize the Horn of Africa. If Sudan falls to communism, then the scenario is that you'll have Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, South Yemen in the eastern/Moscow axis, hence the Horn of Africa is threatened, the Red Sea is threatened, Egypt is cut to the north, and American interests are finished. That was the scare Nimeiry used and it worked because the United States supplied him with weaponry, F5 planes, which he was told was for his defense against Libya. But the F5 planes were not used against Libya—they were shot down in southern Sudan fighting against the SPLA!

The other foreign factor is that Sadiq has been roving in the Arab countries saying that Arabism is under threat from the SPLA and therefore the Arabs must support him. He is racializing the war and has managed to deceive the Arabs, some of whom are helping him. Libya uses its own planes and pilots to bomb us. Saudi Arabia supplies him and this is also the tactic he is using with Egypt. Egypt and Libya are competing over Sudan. Each of them must show it supports Sudan more, so that Sudan can lean towards its side. Now who is in the pocket of another foreign power? Khartoum or us? We are for the unity of Sudan, and if Sadiq has the interests of Sudan at heart, he should address himself to the root causes, which are internal in nature. Unless the root causes are addressed, the war will continue with or without the help of foreign countries.

Africa Report: Where do you get your arms, supplies, etc.?

Akol: You will remember that the war started in 1983 when the Khartoum government sent a force from Juba to attack our force in Bor. Nimeiry was preparing to abrogate the Addis Ababa agreement. He wanted to dissolve the regional government and impose Islamic law. As a result of the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972, the composition of the army in the south was 50 percent southerners and 50 percent northerners. At the back of his mind, Nimeiry knew that if he divided the south and imposed sharia law with the composition of the army intact, there would be trouble. He expected the southern group in the army to rebel against him, so he started transferring them from the south to the north. The battalions had a unified command so when the orders came that they should go to the north, they sensed that Nimeiry was trying to make them ineffective and they refused transfer. Literally this was mutiny. Nimeiry took the course of attacking them. So he sent a force from Juba commanded by a colonel, but it was ambushed and defeated. The soldiers withdrew to the bush in May 1983, and that was the start of the SPLM. They went to the bush with all their weapons, equipment, supplies intact.

A few days after, the army was sent from Malakal to attack the force in Ayout, just a small distance from Bor, whose commander was a close friend of the commander in Bor and was suspected of having participated in the mutiny. He found out and he also withdrew to join the other forces. After reorganization, the SPLA started its operations in November 1983 and captured more weapons and ammunition.

Apart from the weaponry we had when we withdrew to the bush, the next source of weapons was defectors to our side. A third source was Libya, who at that time, was at odds with Nimeiry and was ready to support anyone who was fighting against him. Libya supplied us with most of the weapons which we have now—the Kalashnikovs, the Soviet-made weapons. That was the biggest store and we haven't yet exhausted it.

The last source is that when we capture towns, the army usually leaves its heavy weaponry behind. They cannot withdraw with these anti-aircraft, mortars, and artillery when they are running away. So we come and capture these weapons and they become part of our armory. I can tell you we have no shortage of arms, so we don't need to look to any other source because we are very particular about our independence. When the people first rebelled, they didn't first evaluate who would help them. A guerrilla must depend on his own resources. Our main supplier is the Sudanese army because we are always on the offensive and winning battles. Don't forget also that in the Sudanese army, there is a lot of black-marketeering—they even sell bullets and ammunition to us!

Africa Report: So what exactly is the nature of the your relationship with the Ethiopian government?

Akol: The Ethiopian government has helped Sudan in a number of respects. First, it is hosting about a quarter of a million refugees mainly from the south. That is a big burden for a country which is already troubled with other problems. The SPLA is not a government in the conventional sense, and as the war goes on in the south, there are always people caught in the crossfire, especially foreigners who either work for their own governments or for agencies. There must be a place

where you can hand them over and to do that you have to have passage through that country. This Ethiopia has willingly given to the SPLA. We have released people in Addis Ababa a number of times. If the government of Ethiopia were unwilling to cooperate, this could not have happened.

Further, the Ethiopian government footed the entire bill for the Koka Dam conference, which was held in Ethiopia between the Sudanese people. It allowed us to use its territory so that we could have a free atmosphere to reach something concrete as regards our problems. This is the sort of help the Ethiopian government has given, but there is no other special assistance that it has never given to any Sudanese.

Africa Report: What is the U.S. position in all of this, given its traditionally close ties with Sudan and given the Libyan factor which has caused some disquiet in the administration? What is the SPLA's relationship with the American government?

Akol: The Libyan factor doesn't seem to work in the case of Khartoum because right now the U.S. government, Libya, and Iran are all supporting Khartoum! Perhaps it is the only case in American foreign policy where there is this exception. We find it unfortunate that the Khartoum regime has not changed from the direction of the previous governments in its view that a solution will always come from outside, by isolating the SPLM. Khartoum believes that if it talks to foreign countries, the movement will be isolated, nobody will support it, and hence it will disappear. It is important to stress that the movement will not disappear as long as there are genuine grievances and injustices. The population will always rise up with or without the SPLA.

Following the incident when an American diplomat was shot in Khartoum last year, the U.S. government withdrew most of its personnel, but now it is back to business as usual. It is amazing how Sadiq has succeeded in bringing together all these strange bedfellows, using obvious tactics. As far as we are concerned, the U.S. government should play a more positive role, as it is in the interests of both the American and Sudanese people to have a lasting relationship. Cooperation should be based on mutual respect and understanding. Superficial strategic considerations which are short-lived should no longer be a basis for policy in the U.S. government. This mistake happened at the time of Nimeiry and it took a long time for the relationship to be restored. Then Nimeiry was seen as a bulwark against communism and so on, but he wasn't! So a policy based on understanding the sentiments of the people is more important than one supporting whoever is in power in Khartoum. The United States claims to be an advocate of human rights in the world. And what we are fighting for in Sudan is simple human rights. If you support a regime which is not respecting human rights in its own country, how credible will the U.S. look? We are saying that any country's policy toward Sudan should be a balanced policy, encouraging the Sudanese to solve their problems.

Africa Report: However, the U.S. often tries to play both sides of the fence at least discreetly if not overtly. So has the U.S. made any kind of approach to you to at least initiate some kind of discussion?

Akol: On the contrary, we haven't heard anything from the U.S. Last October, we heard a statement from Assistant Secretary of State Crocker when he was in Nairobi that the

"The SPLA is fighting for equal development"



Caroline Penn

U.S. would mediate between the two parties. To us that was news because for someone to mediate, he must have a relationship with both sides! It has been our policy to have contact with all countries in the world if possible. We have been trying ever since to come to the United States to explain our position to the people, but this has not been possible. It just happened now that there was a conference to which we were invited as individuals and we came. We have tried to meet the State Department, but they have declined.

Africa Report: There were reports late last year that southern Sudan in particular was facing a near famine. What is the food situation in the south now and to what extent is relief aid, if it is required, getting through?

Yaac: I think it would be useful to go back a little to explain how this situation was caused in southern Sudan. In 1984 and 1985, Sudan was one of the countries hit by the disaster that affected most of the African countries south of the Sahara. At that time, Sudan contained a lot of refugees from Ethiopia, Chad, Uganda, and Zaire, adding to our own problems, and the dictator Nimeiry didn't want publicity about the hunger situation. However, the world community responded in a very generous way, contributing a lot of food to Sudan. The year before, 1983, civil war had broken out in the south because of Nimeiry's cancellation of the Addis Ababa agreement, his introduction of sharia law, etc. The government in Khartoum was preoccupied with putting down the rebellion, *therefore the south was totally ignored. The south did not* benefit from the international relief effort in 1984 and 1985.

From that disaster until today, the south has not recovered because of the war, the fighting between the two armies—the SPLA and the government—and the destabilization of the tribes by some tribes armed by the government. So there has never been any stability for the people in the southern region to allow them to cultivate. In 1986, fortunately enough, some journalists went to the south and saw the situation for themselves and reported that about 2-4 million people were starving. That was a true picture of the situation and it is still true today.

With that publicity, relief agencies and governments responded to see what could be done. But the war was on. Roads and river transport were closed because of the war. I don't think it is correct to say that Col. Garang or the SPLA stood in the way of anybody trying to bring food to the southern region. On the contrary, Dr. Garang is on record calling for the relief agencies to bring food to the southern region and to enhance the efforts of the SRRA [Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association] which is based in Nairobi. In March 1986, Dr. Garang went on SPLA radio and called all the relief agencies to come to Rumbek, a town that was captured by the SPLA where the situation was very desperate. Nobody paid heed to him until Rumbek was recaptured again from the SPLA. After that, some of the agencies got interested in going to Rumbek, but then the town was being contested and some people lost their lives.

Secondly, some agencies had gone to the south. Unicef for instance sought permission from the SPLA, it was granted, and it took food to Malakal, in March last year. The boats were loaded at Kosti, but then the army came and loaded the boats with some military hardware to supply its garrisons in the southern region. We took note of that. Most of the rural areas in southern Sudan are under the control of the SPLA. If a relief agency wants to take food to the southern region, I think it must seek the permission of whoever is in control. So when Col. Garang says he would like to be informed, it is to avoid any incident that might happen. Permission will definitely be granted.

A case in point was "Operation Rainbow" in September last year. When the emergency was on, there was a lot of talk about it in the world media, and the UN World Food Programme got interested. They sought the permission of the SPLM/SPLA and this was granted accordingly with the proviso that food which comes to the southern region must go to those who need it—not only to the armies of Sadiq, but to the people in the rural areas.

It was necessary for the SPLA to give an OK for Operation Rainbow to proceed. It was called "Rainbow" because the plane that was to be used to ferry food to the south was going to be painted with rainbow colors so that no one would attack it. However, the Khartoum government denied it permission. It didn't even turn it down quietly, it declared a UN official persona non grata. So here was a case where the SPLA had given permission for them to come and serve the people and the Khartoum government said no because it would be tantamount to recognition of the SPLA.

I don't think Khartoum can mention a single example whereby the SPLA denied organizations the right to bring food to the people. Even in August last year, the SPLA gave permission to the International Committee of the Red Cross to fly food to Wau, which was hard-hit. They allowed the plane to go. But the army took over the food and said it would be in charge of food distribution to the civilians. Then there was a shoot-out over the food in Wau, and this is a really clear example whereby government soldiers actually took food and stored it in their garrison. I don't think it is really fair to say the SPLA is using food as a weapon.

Africa Report: The government won a public relations coup from the shooting down of the Sudan Airways plane by saying that the SPLA is attacking civilian aircraft and putting conditions on getting food aid to the south.

Akol: This is an opportunity for me to explain this plane incident because we also had our side of the story which nobody listened to. As I said before, the Sudanese government has used whatever means possible to subjugate the people in the south and force them into submission, including the Sudanese air force. I was telling you that Nimeiry used the communist scare to get F5 planes from the U.S. The conditions given by the U.S. were that they should be used for defensive purposes, but the reality is that they were used in the south. They were fortunately shot down by the SPLA. The Khartoum government then resorted to using civilian aircraft which is a very immoral act because civilian aircraft have their own rules. They used Transarabian Air Transport Company for taking arms and military personnel to Juba for that offensive in July. They also used Sudan Airways to take military hardware and personnel to Malakal.

When we noticed that they were using civilian planes for transporting military hardware, we issued a warning last July

to the airlines that if they allow themselves to be used for military purposes, then they render themselves legitimate targets. Again civilian aircraft were used and again we issued a warning which was broadcast on SPLA radio on August 15 and was picked up by the BBC and VOA, so it was fairly well-known. Despite this warning, Sadiq went ahead taking the Sudan Airways plane to the south. People talk about the civilians who were in the plane, but nobody talked about what it carried to Malakal. It was clear that it was taking military equipment and hardware to Malakal, so that is why as a matter of self-defense it was shot down. The SPLA is on record regretting the loss of the few civilians who were on the plane when it was shot down. But the responsibility is entirely that of the Khartoum government for using civilian aircraft for military purposes against IATA laws. The personnel of Sudan Airways in Khartoum went on strike because they held the government responsible for this action, that it was done deliberately and they might be right, because afterwards, Sadiq used this occasion to stop dialogue with the SPLA. He was looking for excuses, human life didn't matter to him.

Africa Report: You said the food situation is as bad now as it was in 1984-85, however, I've read reports that the harvest was fairly decent at the end of last year, beginning of this year. Is it a question of not being able to transport the food?

Yaac: First of all, there was no harvest in the south. The harvest was in the northern part of the country in a place called Gedarif, an area where sorghum, the staple food in Sudan, is cultivated with mechanization. Sadiq is on record saying that there is no food problem in Sudan, although his government has asked for food to be brought in the name of refugees, but we know it is really for the civilian population. In the south there was no harvest for three reasons: first, because of war. Most of the population have been destabilized and have left their homes and retreated into the bush for safety. Secondly, tribes have been pitted against one another. It is common knowledge that there is Anya-Nya II, and tribes in the north called the Mandari and Marahallin, who are traditional cattle owners. They used to go with their cattle during the dry season to the south where there are waterpoints and pastures. When Nimeiry saw that there was a rebellion in the south and the SPLA was being successful, he thought that the southern tribes were giving sanctuary to the SPLA so he wanted to destabilize them. This is the area where oil was discovered. The government wanted to exploit the oil, but with the presence of the people, it was difficult. So it encouraged the northern tribes, it gave them weapons, reinforced them with military personnel, and they went to the south to destabilize these tribes who had left their homes, retreated into the bush, without seeds, tools, etc. So this was the second factor, and this destabilization of the tribes was very severe in 1986.

The third reason why there was no harvest in the south was that rains had failed east of the Nile up to the eastern part of Equatoria and part of Bor. That area is a plain, an extension of the desert from northern Kenya. Rains had come early in May and June, and they stopped in the middle. Some of the crops that were cultivated died in the field. The fourth reason was locusts, which are now threatening eastern and central Africa and the Horn of Africa. Nobody went to southern Sudan to



Caroline Penn

"The [food] situation is still acute, and there is no hope of food reaching the people in the south"

control them. I was there about four weeks ago to see the camps we are operating. There were no harvests at all, there was no greenery, there were no stalks of dura in the fields. The fifth reason is that most of the people have withdrawn to the rural areas. People in town are not agriculturalists—they buy food in the market that is produced in the countryside. But if the countryside is destabilized, there is nowhere to get the food. So people from the towns withdrew to the countryside, back to their villages, and they became an extra burden on the population which was already impoverished by lack of cultivation. The situation is very acute in the southern region. Our last estimate from our own people in the field is about 2-4 million of southern Sudan's total population of 6 million are faced with starvation.

We have drawn up a program of relief based upon the practicality of what we can do. We think we can reach about three-quarters of a million to 1 million people, mainly in eastern Equatoria and eastern Upper Nile. But most of the population is in the western part of the Nile—Lakes province and Bahr el Ghazal province. There is no way we can reach them from the base we are operating from Kenya. We have been calling for people to come and do surveys because there is now security, you can come behind the lines of the SPLA and see the people. One of the camps we are operating near the Sudan-Kenya border contains about 50,000, mainly people who could walk there. I challenge anyone to come and see for himself the actual situation on the ground. The situation is still acute, and there is no hope of food reaching the people in the south for very obvious reasons—there is no will on the part of government and it refuses permission to those who do want

to do something. The government does not want the agencies to bring the food!

The SPLA recognizes three positions: the areas entirely under the control of the SPLA, the areas where the government is in control, and those being contested. The SPLA said we can bring food to the areas it controls and will provide security. As for the areas under government control in the southern region, there is no sense in asking the SPLA because the government should organize convoys and take the food there. As for the contested areas, the SPLA says there must be some kind of tripartite agreement, between them, the government, and the third party, the agency. In this situation, however, the government will say no and that was the fate of Rainbow.

Africa Report: So the relief agencies are not doing anything in the south now?

Yaac: No, nothing.

Africa Report: When and how was the SRRA set up?

Yaac: When some of us realized that there was a food problem in the south, intellectuals began to come together and ask what we could do to help these people. So we got together and formed this relief organization. After we formed it, we had to look for a neutral country to accept us. The Kenyan government kindly agreed to charter it in September 1985. Then, we began to lay down our program and talk to organizations. It took us some time before people knew of us, that there is something through which they could help the people, the SRRA, so from September 1985 until mid-1986 was the formative phase whereby we were organizing the structures in Nairobi. After June, we got a little help but then the problem arose of the Khartoum government coming to frighten off these agencies from working behind our lines because they said they were supporting the effort of the SPLA. This was propaganda and it tended to frighten off people. Nobody asked how the SPLA would benefit from clothes, agricultural tools, seeds, food that we are asking for. We don't just ask for money. We said if you bring money, we invite you to follow it up and see how we use it. If you bring us food, we welcome it. If you bring us seeds, we welcome it. Old clothes, new clothes, medicines, we welcome this.

Africa Report: What is the future both for the SRRA and how you intend to cope with the food situation over the next few months, and for the SPLA, as regards the political outlook for Sudan?

Yaac: The future for relief is very dark, pessimistic. If there is any hope, it may be in interviews like this, with information, with exposure of the problems to the people. The more people know about it, the brighter the future because people will be brave enough to take a step to help in this situation. This is the only solution I can see. The needs are there, unless something is done about it, it is very gloomy. I hope with explanation and understanding, people will come to realize that there is every reason for people to help on the other side of the line through the SRRA, while the political problems are left to those who can solve them.

Akol: As regards the future of Sudan, I think it needs to be reemphasized that what we want at this stage is basic human rights to be accorded to all the Sudanese—equality, justice, and freedom. The Sudanese are not far from reaching a lasting peace because we are tired of oscillating between peace and war. This time we want a lasting peace, the foundation for which has already been set at Koka Dam. The Koka Dam declaration is the basis for all the political parties to sit down in a constitutional conference and agree on a social contract which will determine the future of the country. The hopes of the Sudanese people for reaching that point were very high and in fact Koka Dam fixed a date for the conference. The only obstacle in the way of achieving this is unfortunately the government in Khartoum, which has used all sorts of tricks to disassociate itself from its commitment to Koka Dam, to complicate the situation in its mistaken belief that if it continues in power, it continues to monopolize the fate of the Sudanese people. We believe that all necessary pressure must be brought to bear on the Khartoum government in order for it to respect its own agreement and in order to bring about peace in the country.

Those countries which have the leverage and are supporting Sadiq economically and militarily should convince him to listen to the voice of reason and respect Koka Dam. If today Sadiq puts the provisions of Koka Dam into practice, the SPLA will be the first to respect a cease fire. Then the peace process will start. But as long as Sadiq still has some hopes of some other countries supplying him with aid, military or disguised military aid in the form of economic aid, he will always be intransigent. Sadiq is the obstacle to peace and the Sudanese people know this, but they have no way of controlling him because other forces outside the country have interests in seeing that the situation continues. But I have confidence in the Sudanese people that they will eventually get rid of any dictator who imposes himself on them, whether he is a military dictator or a civilian one. Our history has shown this very clearly. □

Ethiopia

On the Razor's Edge

American opposition to Ethiopia's Marxist government continues to hamper efforts to provide the development aid the country requires if it is to survive its ongoing environmental crisis. Western donors balk at his collectivization and villagization policies, but does Col. Mengistu have any other options if a repeat of the 1984-85 famine is to be avoided?

BY MARY KAY MAGISTAD

When American Congressman Mickey Leland (D-TX), chairman of the House of Representatives Select Committee on Hunger, recently paid a visit to Chairman Mengistu Haile-Mariam in Addis Ababa, his message was a plea that Ethiopia send more positive signals to Washington. As it stands, relations between the two countries are strained—with Ethiopia's continuing emphasis on what are criticized as neo-Stalinist collectivization policies and Marxist-Leninist social engineering—making it difficult for even Ethiopia's friends to help.

Leland is one such friend. Besides visiting Ethiopia several times, he is one of the few voices in Congress that keeps the issue of continuing aid to Ethiopia alive, urging the U.S. government to look beyond a strict political assessment of Ethiopia's government in favor of helping its population—still desperately in need of recovery aid if it is going to avoid an even worse famine in the next three to four years.

Little such aid is now coming from the United States—despite its defenses of "humanitarianism" in its aid program. As many as 5 million Ethiopians will need food aid this year to survive, more if the rains fail. This means that about 600,000 tons of grain must come from foreign donors. But the U.S. has allocated only 40,000 tons.

This compares with the 400,000 tons of food plus $50 million in non-food assistance such as trucks, seeds, and tools that the U.S. gave Ethiopia in 1985—when the media spotlight was focused on the famine. And congressional sources say it was difficult to get even 40,000 tons of grains approved—as President Reagan had more or less arbitrarily announced that he planned to stop relief assistance to Ethiopia at the end of December 1986. Only after it became clear that millions of people were still at risk was this nominal amount approved.

Normally, the U.S. Agency for International Development provides between one-third and one-half of a Third World country's emergency food needs. During the 1985 famine in Sudan, U.S.AID supplied 80 percent of the requested amount. But Ethiopia comes out on the short end of the political stick, largely because of its military links with the Soviet Union and its Marxist-Leninist ideology.

The U.S. government also completely bans development assistance to Ethiopia, ostensibly because the Mengistu government nationalized American property without compensation when it took over in 1974. According to the Hickenlooper Amendment, development aid will not be allocated until such claims are settled.

Ironically, however, all private claims *were* settled by December 1985. They totaled about $5.5 million, with the largest settlement going to a spice company in Kalamazoo, Michigan.

So the official reason for refusing development aid to Ethiopia has now become the fact that both the American and Ethiopian governments owe each other money. This excuse is likely to last for some time, because the debts cannot easily be resolved. The Ethiopian government is being asked to foot the bill for military equipment that Haile Selassie received 13 years ago—just before the current military regime overthrew him. Meanwhile, the U.S. never delivered a shipment of arms that the Ethiopians had ordered and paid for in advance just before the 1977 Ogaden war. By the time the arms were to have been delivered, the U.S. had switched alliances from Ethiopia to Somalia, while the Soviet Union had swapped Somalia for Ethiopia.

The real reason why the United States bans development aid to Ethiopia has much more to do with political priorities than with IOU's. Particularly since the Gramm-Rudman amendment put a finite ceiling on foreign aid, American foreign policy-makers are now thinking twice before starting new aid programs—especially to countries they think will use the money unwisely.

"If we've got scarce money to put into aid, why put it into Ethiopia? They're not a pal," says one American official. "Why should we be helping out a country that's trying to set itself up as the first true African Marxist state?"

Considering political differences, budget constrictions, and Ethiopia's relatively low position on the geopolitical totem pole, the U.S. is not likely to even consider giving Ethiopia development aid unless and until the Mengistu government starts putting less emphasis on state farms and collectivization, and more on giving farmers incentives and allowing free trade across regional borders.

Mary Kay Magistad is a freelance foreign correspondent based in London specializing in African affairs. She recently spent six weeks traveling through Ethiopia.

Both the World Bank and the EEC have been negotiating with the Ethiopian government on these points, and have found some flexibility on the latter two. Already, restrictions on trade between regions in Ethiopia have eased. But the Mengistu government's commitment to collectivization continues at full force—causing several Western donors to back off from bilateral agricultural aid.

Ethiopian collectivization has taken on a new face since the famine—but not one that the U.S. government is likely to find any more palatable than the old one.

Ever since the provisional military government nationalized all land in 1975, the majority of Ethiopia's agricultural budget has gone to funding large state farms. The problem has been that these state farms, which account for only about 5 percent of total agricultural production, have proven notoriously inefficient despite their favored status. The government has thus broadened its base by creating thousands of smaller, community-based producer cooperatives.

Villagization is a key step toward increasing the scope and number of these cooperatives. Started in earnest about two years ago, the program involves moving the rural population—75 percent of whom live in areas so remote that they must walk two or three days to reach any road—into centralized villages near accessible roads. So far, about 9,000 new villages have been built—and 2,000 producer cooperatives formed. The two processes are not synonymous, but they are closely linked.

The scope of this program is huge, and its speed alarming. Already, 6 million people have been villagized—10 times more than were ever resettled—and the program has even fewer apparent benefits than resettlement. Three to four million more people will be moved this year.

To get people to move to villagized areas, local party officials promise easy access to clean water, schools, clinics, and even electricity. Peasants are then instructed to tear down their own houses, heave the poles onto their shoulders, and trek up to six or seven miles to the designated site. There, they must build a new hut in the regimented row pattern laid out by the party planners.

But when the people arrive at the new sites, they often find that none of the promised social services are there. Instead, they find that they are required to attend frequent political meetings to hear the latest party communiques, and that they are more closely controlled by local party officials.

The reason for the lack of services is simple. Although the Mengistu government plans to villagize 30 million to 35 million people by 1991, it has allocated little or no money to doing so. Peasants bear the expense of moving themselves and as one Relief and Rehabilitation Commission official candidly admitted, the government is largely expecting aid agencies to donate the needed social services.

Most aid agencies are steering clear of this political hot potato for now, just as all but four or five out of 49 in Ethiopia have refused to fund projects in resettlement areas. But considering the size of the villagization program, it may soon become impossible to give any rural aid to Ethiopia without helping villagized sites. And, says one British aid official, agencies that are committed to the humanitarian purpose of helping people have to go to the people they're trying to help. "If they're in villages, then eventually we'll all be helping them in villages—or leaving the country."

The fierce pace of villagization has compounded its inherent problems, such as destroying cultural diversity, increasing the already steep rate of deforestation because of the huge extra demand for building materials, and creating a health risk by cramming people into villages in a country riddled with contagious diseases.

"Even in the best of times, the country balances on the razor-edge of disaster and can be pushed over the brink by even one minor factor going amiss."

On top of all this, a senior UN official estimates that this year's harvest will decrease by 30 percent because of villagization. Time is lost both in having to move and hiking every day to and from distant fields—back where farmers' old homes used to be. One Addis-based Western economist calls villagization "a real time bomb in Ethiopian planning. It will make or break all future potential for agricultural growth."

Thus far, the Mengistu government has ignored the lessons of Tanzania's catastrophic failure with villagization, just as it has ignored Western criticism of the program.

But the government does listen to Western criticism at times—such as during the 1984-85 resettlement program. Following scathing criticism for human rights abuses during the resettlement, when famine victims were often forcibly moved from their homes in the northern highlands to the relatively more fertile south, the government shut down the program for a year of "consolidation."

During and since that period, resettlement has received a huge amount of bad press, some of it deserved, some of it completely inaccurate. Most Western aid officials and diplomats in Ethiopia say they can see an argument for resettlement as part of a larger recovery program for Ethiopia's severely eroded highlands.

It's not a matter of *whether* resettlement is done, but how it is done, many aid officials say. They point to the fact that the idea of moving people away from eroded land to allow it to regenerate was first introduced by U.S.AID in the early 1970s—but was not put into practice by Haile Selassie.

The Mengistu government itself admits that it made mistakes in the last round of resettlement, placing the blame on "overzealous local officials" who sometimes used force to move enough people to meet their quotas. Those officials have been given strict orders that in future resettlement efforts, people are only to be moved if they want to go.

Resettlement is scheduled to resume this spring, with 200,000 to 300,000 being moved, assuming that many people volunteer. This new round of resettle-

Henk Schut

Producers cooperative, Gojam province: "Ethiopian collectivization has taken on a new face since the famine"

ment is being greeted with cautious optimism by Western aid officials who would like to help make resettlement sites more livable, once the heat from the Western media is off.

"There's no question that in some cases people who have been resettled are now in an improved survival situation," says David McDonald, Canadian Ambassador to Ethiopia, who supported Canadian aid agency involvement in resettlement site projects in Wollega province. "We're in a position of saying, look, we didn't have anything to do with moving these people—but now that they're in a place where they *could* have a better life than in the north—why don't we help them achieve it? If you look at it, the resettled people who are in the best condition now *are* those who have received some type of outside assistance."

Despite these moderate views coming from Westerners within Ethiopia, reports condemning the program have completely shaken its international credibility. One such report, from Jason Clay of Cultural Survival in Boston, compared the Mengistu regime with Pol Pot. Another, by *Médecins sans frontières* (MSF) in France, comparing Mengistu with Stalin, claims that more than 100,000 people died or were outright killed in the 1984-85 resettlement, after being forced at gunpoint into trucks and planes heading south.

This figure has been picked up by the international media and used widely. But it is only a guess, and the feeling among aid workers in Ethiopia who were there at the time is that it is much too high. Certainly, the myth that more people died in resettlement than in the famine is completely unfounded. The famine death toll reached an estimated 500,000. It is likely that not even a tenth that many died in the resettlement process.

This is not to excuse the fact that thousands did die unnecessarily in resettlement. But many of the "facts" used as justification for condemning the Ethiopian government and withholding aid have not been carefully enough analyzed.

Even prestigious media like the *Wall Street Journal* have picked up on some of the dubious findings of these reports as though they were indisputable. This in turn has swayed a sector of public—and governmental—opinion against continuing all but the most urgent "humanitarian" aid to Ethiopia, now that the most severe part of the crisis is over.

Two American congressmen have taken this stance to an even greater extreme. Toby Roth (R-WI) and William Gray (D-PA) introduced a bill in February calling for severe economic sanctions against the Mengistu government until it improves its human rights record, loosens its authoritarian rule, relaxes collectivization, and completely stops resettlement.

"The Promotion of Democracy in Ethiopia Act of 1987" has thus far made little headway in Congress. Many representatives reportedly consider its measures too extreme for a country barely crawling out from the most devastating famine in its history.

If passed, the bill would ban all new U.S. investments in Ethiopia and loans to the Ethiopian government. It would

Margaret A. Novicki

Mengistu Haile-Mariam: "The U.S. government completely bans development assistance to Ethiopia, ostensibly because the Mengistu government nationalized American property in 1974"

also ban Ethiopian coffee imports to the United States, and would require the U.S. to use its vote in international financial institutions like the World Bank to oppose giving any kind of economic assistance to Ethiopia.

Others in Congress question whether it wouldn't be the Ethiopian people rather than the government who would end up suffering because of these sanctions.

"The Ethiopian government has a lot of shortcomings. . . no one would deny that," says one congressional source. "But that's no excuse to refuse help to the people of Ethiopia."

For the Ethiopian people, the crisis is anything but over. Even in the best of times, the country balances on the razor-edge of disaster, and can be pushed over the brink by even one minor factor going amiss.

History shows that Ethiopia can expect at least seven major droughts each century. But the droughts and resulting famines have been coming more frequently in recent years, each leaving the country a little weaker and a little more vulnerable to the next.

Part of the reason for more frequent droughts is that massive deforestation has actually started to change Ethiopia's weather. At the turn of the century, 40 percent of the country was covered by lush tropical forests. Now, only 3.5 percent cover remains, with current reafforestation projects keeping up with only about one-third the rate of deforestation.

And without trees, the soil deteriorates. Soil that was once held together by roots and biological matter becomes loose and is eventually washed away by the annual monsoons. All told, Ethiopia loses about 3.5 billion tons of topsoil per year.

"Resettlement has received a huge amount of bad press, some of it deserved, some of it completely inaccurate."

At the same time, the population is expanding at a rate of 3 percent per year—putting an ever-tighter squeeze on land that is already over-cultivated and over-grazed.

The UN Food and Agriculture Organization's "Highlands Reclamation Report"—a three-year study completed in 1985—gives a chilling forecast of what could happen to Ethiopia if significant conservation steps aren't taken now.

The report found that Ethiopia's highlands contain more than 88 percent of its 45 million people, 95 percent of its regularly cropped land, and about two-thirds of its 70 million livestock, the largest herd in Africa.

The area is so overcrowded that the average farmer cultivates only 0.8 hectares of land—barely enough for subsistence—often on mountain slopes where erosion and deforestation have reduced topsoil cover from 20 feet to a couple of inches deep.

"Over half this critical base, however, is severely eroded," the report states. "If present trends continue, today's children could see over one-third of the highlands become incapable of sustaining cropping, while the population trebles within their lifetimes."

Considering the emergency nature of even this "development" work, aid workers in Ethiopia have become supremely frustrated with Western governments like the United States that draw the distinction between humanitarian and development aid. "In the case of Ethiopia, the only humanitarian thing to do is to help counter these environmental problems," an American aid worker in Addis insists.

"After the 1974 famine, everyone agreed that poverty was at the root of the problem—not lack of rain—and that development was the cure," says Michael Priestly, former head of the UN Emergency Operations Office in Ethiopia and current head of its replacement, the UN Famine Prevention and Preparedness Group. "The books and articles that have come out of the 1984-85 famine are now saying the same thing. Do we have to learn these lessons for a third time through failure to take necessary preventative action now?" □

BY RICHARD GREENFIELD

Somalia

An Embattled Barre

Parallels with the last days of Haile Selassie are emerging in Mogadishu. Interclan conflict over the uncertainty of presidential succession, an economy in severe crisis, human rights violations, and continued military clashes have left President Mohamed Siad Barre in a weakened political position.

Internal affairs in Somalia largely reflect the reactions of a unity and security-conscious government to interclan rivalries and stresses between the north, formerly a British protectorate, and the once Italian-administered south.

Anti-government guerrillas have made several recent incursions; Ethiopian air raids, on occasion synchronized with such attacks, have continued; and the Ethiopian army is still entrenched around two Somali townships—Balambale and Guldogob—which they occupied in June 1982. On February 12 this year, an Ethiopian armored column crossed into northern Somalia, but was routed by the Somali army.

Since coming to power in a coup d'état in October 1969, Maj.-Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre has remained the dominant figure in Somali politics, despite the startling military, diplomatic, and economic setbacks that followed his ill-advised decision to intervene in the Ogaden in 1977-78 to support the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) in its struggle with Ethiopian forces.

Now in his late 70s, the president faces mounting unrest. Speculation on an inevitable change of leadership began well before the serious road accident which incapacitated him late last May. Since then, factions have proliferated and natural divisions have widened.

According to the current constitution, introduced some 10 years after Barre's coup disposed of laws adopted at independence in 1960, the first vice-president must step in temporarily when the president is unable to rule, until elections can be held. Accordingly, following the accident, Lt.-Gen. Muhammed Ali Samatur, also minister of defense, declared a state of national emergency and stepped into the breach.

Gen. Samatur, however, is not a Marehan—the minority clan which has dominated the government since the coup. In fact, the General has no significant clan ties, coming from a traditionally depressed class among southern agriculturalists. That is not to say that he is unpopular, except perhaps with the powerful aristocratic leaders of the major clans and members of Siad's family, some of whom have grown very rich and would prefer to have the presidency and the defense ministry in the hands of their own relatives.

Another astute non-Marehan officer is Brig.-Gen. Ahmed Sulayman Abdullah, a Dolbahante from the north, who trained at Sandhurst. Although Siad's son-in-law, he currently supports the "constitutional" position of his colleague, Vice-President Samatur. The two are on good terms. Minister of the Interior, Abdullah is best remembered as chairman of the National Intelligence Committee and longstanding head of the National Security Service (NSS).

The powerful NSS, built up with considerable advice from the KGB, is feared throughout Somalia. There was much glee in the north, for example, when Somali National Movement (SNM) guerrillas shot and killed the NSS commander of the northern provinces in January. Yet curiously, the harsh reputation of the NSS has never been transferred to Gen. Abdullah.

While Siad has publicly opposed an emphasis on clan politics and has even blamed "tribalism" for the country's ailing economy, he has proven a master at the game. Not only did he enlist his clansmen in the military to guard against a possible coup d'état, but he did not hesitate to distort the command structure to this end.

Small wonder then that certain Marehan members of the president's immediate family—apparently putting "dynasty" before "legality"—initiated a series of crisis meetings to attempt to block the vice-president's ascendancy.

One of the most powerful "family" members is the eldest and wealthiest of Siad's many sons, Brig.-Gen. Masla Mohamed Siad, head of the public works department of the Ministry of Defense. Another somewhat alarming figure is Siad's son-in-law, Brig.-Gen. Mohamed Siyad, known as "Morgan." Sector Commander in Hargeisa, he has a reputation for eccentric and even violent behavior.

Certain other Marehan officers were also possible candidates for family leadership. Particularly powerful is Osman Ano-del, the wealthy commander of the Police Criminal Investigation Department, who has previously been responsible for the security of the president.

Many family members would have preferred an older and more experienced Marehan to lead them, Gen. Omar Haji Mohamed, former acting minister of defense. The problem in his case is that he has been in detention since 1982, along with other competent leading politicians. His "crime" was that he had been prepared to suggest that Siad relinquish some power in order to mitigate the very succession crisis that has since developed. Yet another forcefully promulgated candidature was that of Maj.-Gen. Mohamed Hashi Ganni, another close relative who succeeded "Morgan" as sector commander in the north.

Richard Greenfield, a member of Oxford University's Centre for International and Development Studies, was political adviser to the Somali government for nine years. His services were discontinued last year following a dispute over the right of long-term detainees to trial.

Surprisingly and after considerable infighting, the president's half-brother, the foreign minister, was chosen to lead the family. Not a popular man, he is widely known as "Buloq-buloq," a rather shapeless skin container for milk or water. After Siad's coup in 1969, he emerged from a somewhat obscure position in the ministry of foreign affairs to become director-general. During the war with Ethiopia, he was made foreign minister. He has successfully clung to his position, but there remains an almost universal consensus, both at home and abroad, that his appointment has not been a fortunate one.

Last September, the central committee of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party duly proposed Siad, despite his injuries, as president for a further seven years. His sole candidacy was then confirmed in November by a party congress. The presidential "election" on December 23 was a formality. According to official results, Siad received a convincing 99.9 percent majority. Although the president's effectiveness and his power-base are in almost total disarray, the "election" cleared the way for him to resume office—a necessary step before any changes could be effected.

Soon after, 25 officers were raised to the rank of general. While most clans were represented, the mass promotion brought nine members of the comparatively small Marehan clan closer to the crucial appointment of minister of defense. Then a considerable snag arose. All members of the existing politburo warned that they would jointly and publicly resign if the Marehan candidates were elevated to their status.

Meantime, talk of promoting Buloq-buloq to the then non-existent office of prime minister subsided. A deadlock arose between army support for the vice-president and Gen. Ahmed and concern within the family members of the Marehan clan to safeguard and consolidate their considerable economic advantages. The other clans remain an unknown but potentially very significant factor.

When the reorganization finally took place in late January, Lt.-Gen. Samatur was appointed prime minister. The other two former vice-presidents, Maj.-Gen. Hussein Kulmie Afrah and Brig.-Gen. Ahmed Sulayman Abdullah, settled down as first and second vice prime ministers with Col. Ahmed Mohamud Farah, the minister of mineral and water resources, as third vice prime minister. Conflicting press releases suggest that there were disagreements over precedents. The position of minister of defense was not mentioned, but the three vice ministers listed significantly include the Marehan Maj.-Gen. Mohamed Hashi Gani.

An added complication for Siad is that the EEC has offered his government aid, probably in excess of $40 million, if it settles its disputes with Ethiopia, to whom a similar offer has been made. Talks with Ethiopia were initiated in Djibouti at a meeting between the respective heads of state in January 1986. A factor in Siad's calculations was his anger with certain Ogadeen officers who had been involved in conspiracies within Somalia. The president considers himself entitled to eternal gratitude for his efforts on behalf of that clan in 1977-78, despite having lost the war. Military clashes notwithstanding, rounds of talks have continued into 1987.

Somalia is bordered on all its frontiers by other ethnic Somalis and it has developed peaceful relations with both Djibouti and Kenya. If Siad's regime has no territorial ambitions and is merely concerned for the welfare of Somalis resident in the Ogaden and adjacent areas, then shouldn't it be pleased with a determined EEC effort to develop that region?

Mohamed Siad Barre: "The president's effectiveness and power-base are in almost total disarray"

Camerapix

The Somali government has chosen to negotiate at a time of weakened support, influence, and military power. In several meetings which have ensued, the Ethiopian government has therefore insisted that the Somalis give up everything at the start of negotiations and is on the verge of success according to recently defected Foreign Minister Goshu Wolde. Ethiopia wants Siad (or his successor) "merely" to confirm that he adheres to the OAU Charter's provisions on territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and in particular a subsequent majority decision at the 1964 meeting of heads of state and governments that the boundaries between Africa's sovereign states existing at the time of independence are sacrosanct.

For Somalia to concede these points would be unpopular at home and would appear to preempt any further discussion. The Ogadeen clan and the WSLF would oppose it, nor—to say the least—have the Somali people as a whole been educated to accept such a compromise. Ethiopia has a powerful card in its support for the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and more importantly, the SNM guerrilla movement, which increasingly threatens Siad's government. The faltering Somali regime clearly regards the ending of Ethiopian support for the SNM, even at the expense of its outlawing the WSLF, as a major priority.

The diplomatic options still open to the Somali government will depend in great measure on the degree of economic recovery that can be achieved. Unfortunately, the fairly rapid development of the last two decades has not continued into the 1980s.

Indeed most economic activity in Somalia—hit by unprecedented refugee flows, drought and food shortages, unexpected trading difficulties, frequent incursions by Ethiopian troops and warplanes and opposition SSDF and SNM commando forces—has all but stagnated. The balance of payments position has long been quite desperate. An ever increasing budget deficit—2 billion Somali shillings in 1984 and rising—has



Michael Maren

Market at Belet Weyne, near Ethiopian border: "Most economic activity in Somalia has all but stagnated"

continued to be financed, in the government's words, "through the banking system"—by printing more and more currency notes. Rampant inflation has been the inevitable consequence.

In 1984, the national currency depreciated in value by 77 percent. Total collapse seemed possible, even imminent—an impression reinforced by poor rains and the cumulative effect of an almost total ban by Saudi Arabia on imports of Somali livestock. This ban was not lifted for many months, despite a clean bill of health from United Nations officials.

The Somali government was forced to recognize that despite two earlier standby arrangements with the IMF, it was unable to meet even the service charges on the colossal external debts which it had rather indiscriminately accumulated in happier times. There were arrears of $214 million in such charges at the end of 1984 with principal and interest charges amounting to $338 million, which could not be met. Drastic action therefore had to be taken.

"Economic considerations alone are not enough to build confidence in a stable future for the country."

A major adjustment program began to be negotiated with the IMF that year. In addition to food aid, Somalia sought cash grants, incremental debt relief, a commodity import program, and perhaps some reprogramming of project aid. IMF and World Bank officials made clear that inefficiency and waste, especially in the so-called "public enterprises"—not to mention corruption—could continue to deplete both foreign reserves and the national treasury.

When Siad's military junta took over in 1969, he claimed that it would transform the economy through "scientific socialism." Admittedly, this rhetoric was closely linked to a Soviet offer of military equipment and advice on a scale denied by the West, but it nevertheless led to the establishment of state enterprises in key sectors as a fundamental policy principle.

Employment in the public sector mushroomed, with obvious political advantages. Jobs were often rewards for loyalty rather than ability or productivity. But in Somalia as elsewhere in Africa, the state enterprises flopped. Almost at once, commodity production began to stagnate. Export earnings declined drastically. Management, particularly of the public sector, has long left much to be desired. Nevertheless, it is difficult today for the regime to lay off large numbers of unproductive officials and clerks, since they are all somebody's relatives.

The livestock industry is the key to the Somali economy and the area with the greatest potential for improvement. Significantly, it has remained in private hands. It employs 60 percent of the population, accounts for 50 percent of the gross national product, and in normal circumstances, 80-85 percent of export earnings. Even so, business is largely conducted by indigenous Somali or Arab traders who lack modern training. The established institutions that might help herders and traders cry out for improvement. The UN and voluntary agencies have schemes to help combat desertification and improve the rangelands, but the environment imposes certain finite limits which cannot be ignored.

Somali ministers and top civil ser-

vants regard as some sort of panacea yet another vast development scheme in the Juba River Valley and in particular the Bardheere Dam. Intended to control floods, produce power, and irrigate vast areas, it too has run into problems. The cost of the dam project as tabled was to reach $370 million, but there is little doubt that this figure would be exceeded even if the 1990 deadline for completion was met, which is also doubtful.

Both the World Bank and the EEC have reservations about the scale of the proposal. When cuts or smaller alternative projects seemed a real possibility, Siad and his beleaguered advisers reacted by appointing a former minister of economic planning, the competent and respected Habib Ahmed Habib, as minister for Juba Valley development. The question also arises as to whether so much investment should be concentrated in the south when dissent in the already unfavored north, the source of most foreign exchange earnings, is mounting rapidly.

The Somali government hesitated for months over the proposed economic package, conscious that much future sovereignty would be forfeited in the proposed arrangements—a standard IMF "Third World prescription." Surviving ideologues, though never particularly pro-Soviet, began to look back on better times almost with nostalgia, yet they had nothing to offer by way of alternative. Therefore, in March 1985, an agreement was reached under which the government received yet another one-year standby of $21.2 million with an additional $31.3 million compensatory financing facility, to make up for the loss of export earnings from livestock.

"The Somali government has chosen to negotiate with Ethiopia at a time of weakened support, influence, and military power."

Planned expenditures in the areas of transportation, communications, etc. would have to be abandoned. Despite inflation, wage increases would have to be limited to a maximum of 15 percent, together with the implementation of a U.S. AID report advocating the termination of 1,000 posts in the civil service in 1985 alone. With the assistance of EEC-appointed consultants, the banking system was to be overhauled and several public enterprises closed down or privatized.

As a direct consequence of these negotiations, the Somali shilling was again substantially devalued. Moreover, a temporary and adjustable open market rate of conversion was established for the shilling in addition to the new official rate of 36 shillings to the U.S. dollar. The Mogadishu consumer price index increased eleven-fold between 1977 and early 1985.

Under the new agreement, the official rate was scheduled to be increased monthly until it reached the market-determined rate. The rate opened at around 75-80 shillings to the U.S. dollar and the intention was to unify the two rates in a minimum period. Problems of which rate to apply at once arose with UN agencies, but they were eventually settled and foreign currency was auctioned starting in autumn of 1986. The Somali shilling however slipped to an all-time low of one U.S. cent.

The adjustments are clearly not having the desired effect, in part owing to the business community's lack of confidence in the stability and integrity of the

Somali demonstrators in Washington protesting the regime's human rights abuses

Richard Greenfield

present regime. The nomadic majority may not be greatly affected, but what do such figures mean to the elite and politically important urban dwellers?

A secondary school graduate, if he can obtain work, may expect to earn some 800 shillings a month; even the salary of a minister is only 4,000 shillings—at least from official sources. Yet a soft drink now costs 200 shillings, a kilo of meat 180, a three or four kilo fish 500, or for that matter a single issue of *Time* or *Newsweek* 250 shillings. The cost of air travel has spiraled.

The balance of payments was also short by an estimated $100 million at the beginning of 1985. The Paris Club pledged a further $80 million in January 1985. In March, the United Kingdom pledged a further $1.5 million and the Club agreed to reschedule $120 million of the external bilateral debt over 10 years. The Paris Club, however, does not account for the majority of Somalia's debt. While $15 million was rescheduled by the Islamic Development Bank, the outcome of negotiations with other Arab funders is still unclear. Somalia is thus still very much in economic crisis.

But economic considerations alone are not enough to build confidence in a stable future for the country. The regime's neglect of human rights is currently a major issue with Somalis at home and abroad. Clearly, the U.S. and the EEC would gain great respect among Somalis world-wide should they urge the release of all those imprisoned—often under appalling conditions—for years without charge or trial.

Such a process could well begin with Ismail Ali Abokor, former vice president; Omar Arteh Ghalib, former vice-speaker of the National Assembly, foreign minister, minister of higher education, and one-time candidate for the secretary-general of the OAU; Maj.-Gen. Omar Haji Mohamed, former minister of health; Dr. Mohamed Adan Sheikh, former minister of health, culture and higher education, and information, and a president of the Somali Academy of Science; Mohamed Yusuf Weirah, former minister of finance; and Abdi Ismail Yunis, former dean of education at the Somali National University. Amnesty International's long list of detainees includes schoolchildren, as well as religious leaders, professionals, and parliamentarians.

In the 1970s, excessive military concern over the Kagnew communications base in an Eritrea torn by guerrilla warfare played a significant role in diverting U.S. attention from the imminent collapse of the late Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie's regime.

Today the area surrounding the Berbera port and airstrip, both important facilities for the Rapid Deployment Force, is similarly subject to considerable unrest. The Somali government has felt obliged to withdraw its forces from several northern posts and garrison towns in the face of increasing activity by Somali National Movement guerrillas. Even in Mogadishu itself, the Somali capital, clear parallels with the last days of Emperor Haile Selassie in nearby Addis Ababa are daily emerging. □

Book Briefs

Sennen Andriamirado, **Sankara Le Rebelle.** *Paris: Jeune Afrique Livres, 1987,* 237pp.

The second of *Jeune Afrique*'s new pocket book series on African leaders, this account of President Thomas Sankara's rise to power is a highly readable examination of the political transformation wrought by Burkina Faso's youthful and dynamic government over the last four years. Written in French by a journalist who openly expresses his affection for and friendship with the charismatic Sankara, this book is an entertaining and personal narrative of the thinking and policies of one of Africa's new generation of leadership.

Myles F. Harris, **Breakfast in Hell: A Doctor's Eyewitness Account of the Politics of Hunger in Ethiopia.** New York: Poseidon Press, 1987, 271pp., $18.95.

Leader of one of the first Red Cross teams into famine-stricken country in 1984, Dr. Harris has written a harrowing description of the bureaucratic bungling and competition for influence which hampered the relief effort in rural Ethiopia. Unfortunately however, the validity of his criticisms become submerged by his highly embittered, vitriolic prose. What should have been a compelling history lesson ends as an angry polemic which lays bare Dr. Harris' lack of compassion for the victims of the famine and his superficial understanding of Third World realities.

Wayne S. Smith, **The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic History of the Castro Years.** New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987, 308pp., $19.95.

Head of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, Wayne Smith ended a 25-year career in the foreign service when he resigned in 1982 in disagreement over President Reagan's Latin American policy. This engrossing, behind-the-scenes account of the formulation of American policy toward Cuba, from Castro's 1959 victory onwards, offers a rare perspective on 28 years of lost opportunities in the U.S.-Cuban relationship. Especially valuable is Mr. Smith's discussion of the dynamics of Cuban and American policy-making during the Angola and Ethiopia-Somalia conflicts.

Maryse Condé, **Segu.** New York: Viking, 1987, 499pp., $18.95.

This reviewer was mesmerized from start to finish by Ms. Condé's story-telling skills in this grand historical novel set in the late 18th century in the West African kingdom of Segu. The author portrays generations of a family swept up in crises emanating from the conflicting influences of Islam, Christianity, and slavery, as well as tradition and modernity, while remaining true to historical and cultural detail.

Nicholas Haysom, **Apartheid's Private Army: The Rise of Right-Wing Vigilantes in South Africa.** London: CIIR, 1986, 141pp., £2.50.

An armed gang led by a homeland MP surrounds a young man's home and sets fire to it. As the family flees, his brother and sister are shot. A popular community leader is dragged from his home and hacked to death within view of the police station. The police are notified but do nothing. . . These and other cases documented in Haysom's account add up to a widespread pattern of vigilante attacks which have the tacit or express blessing of the South African regime. Overwhelmingly, the victims have this in common: they actively oppose the apartheid system. This book successfully places the emergence of vigilantes in the context of massive social upheaval and popular resistance. In exposing a common prejudice of "black-on-black violence" with its tribal and ethnic assumptions, it points clearly to the real criminal—apartheid.

Mohamed El-Khawas, **Qaddafi: His Ideology in Theory and Practice.** Brattleboro: Amana Books, 1986, 222pp., $9.95.

While most books have focused on limited aspects of Qaddafy's controversial policies, this study provides an extensive account of his ideas and politics, as well as the circumstances that have shaped his character and political evolution. The author provides a useful examination of Qaddafy's Third Universal Theory and the changes it has brought to Libyan society. He also assesses the substance and direction of his foreign policy, the export of his ideology, his challenge to the West, and the U.S.'s response.

Heribert Adam & Kogila Moodley, **South Africa without Apartheid: Dismantling Racial Domination.** Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986, 315pp., $22.50.

Yet another in the long stream of recently published books on South Africa with few original ideas. To outsiders, South Africa seems caught in an endless cycle of brutal repression by the state, ethnic violence, and black frustration, but there is hope for an end to apartheid, argue the authors, because the economic interdependence of blacks and whites can overpower ideology: "In short, an equilibrium of violence can exist in the separate service economies of Lebanon but not in an interdependent South Africa, where blacks and whites have to work together in the same place." This leads the authors to the naive conclusion that the financial incentives for whites to abandon apartheid peacefully are greater than ever because even among blacks espousing non-violence, "the socialization for patience has ended."

Julie Frederikse's new book, **South Africa: A Different Kind of War, From Soweto to Pretoria**, reviewed by Gail M. Gerhart in the January-February 1987 issue of *Africa Report*, now has an American publisher. The book is available in the U.S. from Beacon Press, 25 Beacon St., Boston, Massachusetts 02108, for $12.95.

This issue's book briefs were provided by Margaret A. Novicki and Clyde Davis.

The roots of American soul food go back to West Africa. When you go there you'll find greens, yams and barbecue galore.

A typical dinner from *Chez Valentin* in Treichville, Ivory Coast, might offer an appetizer of country pate, smoked salmon, or a mound of chunked lobster in a delicious cream sauce. For an entree you might enjoy a rack of baby lamb or "Veal Africain," which is a veal cutlet wrapped around a banana and topped with a delicate curry sauce. As for dessert, perhaps a flaming rum omelette filled with fruit, or a baked Alaska. As you can see, the pleasures of the palate prevail in West Africa. Bon Appetit!

In many of the West African countries, women dominate the retail-distribution business. Many of these "market women" have considerable wealth and exercise important political influence.

Baked Alaska in Africa?

Hunger for shrimps and prawns? Then take Air Afrique to West Africa. Our coasts yield prawns in abundance. In fact, the name for Cameroon comes from the Portuguese word for prawns: *camarões*.



West African cooks took the versatile okra plant to the heights of culinary excellence and gave the world a soup called gumbo.

If your experience of the peanut is limited to an occasional handful of roasted goobers or the fond memory of a peanut butter and jelly sandwich, you've got new worlds to discover in West Africa. Start with a flavorful chicken groundnut stew, then move on to a score or more of delicious dishes that feature these luscious legumes.

Since the beginning of time, West African mothers have been teaching their daughters the secrets of good cooking. For example, to tenderize tough meat the young cook merely wrapped it in papaya leaves. They're nature's own tenderizer.

Now what are you waiting for? Isn't it time you discovered West Africa? Just call your Travel Agent or your Air Afrique/Air France office today. Hurry!

AIR AFRIQUE

Africa begins with Air Afrique.
And it's just seven hours to the New Sun...
West Africa.