# Africa Report

MAGAZINE FOR THE NEW AFRICA

JANUARY—FEBRUARY 1974

F-13. Mask w/antelope and human face.
Kurumba, Pobé region, Upper Volta.
Wood, hide, stone. 39" high. Coll. T. Wheelock.

# ART FROM THE SAHEL

**An exhibition of traditional art and crafts from the Sahelian states of Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta**

**FEBRUARY**
**MARCH**
**APRIL**
**1974**

**The African-American Institute**
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# Africa Report

MAGAZINE FOR THE NEW AFRICA

A Publication of the African-American Institute



**Bringing it all back home.** The most important African art no longer resides in Africa. *Africa Report* examines whether the growth of African museums will help stem the flow of art out of the Continent. Author Susan Blumenthal carefully documents the movement of the world's best traveled art. What keeps all the art moving? You guessed it: Money. Page 4.

**Guinea-Bissau votes for freedom.** In September, the tiny Portuguese territory unilaterally declared statehood. Whether the U.S. comes to recognize this statehood may depend on how the crisis in the Middle East is *resolved. If the U.S. is denied* access to Israel through the Portuguese Azores, American retaliation just might consist of recognition of Guinea-Bissau. Correspondent Bruce Oudes weighs the possibilities. Page 11.

**What makes the Kenyans run?** Despite meager training facilities and an athletic infrastructure that is relatively recent in origin, Kenya's runners have taken the track world by storm. Few other countries have compiled Olympic records as quickly, although no one's sure exactly why. John Manners takes a look at the phenomenal success of some of the world's greatest athletes. Page 14.


**From pinups to politics.** A new breed of magazine for a new breed of Nigerian, NewBreed is a fascinating reflection of the new Nigeria. From women's liberation to local politics to education, the publication seems to touch the interests of those who are in or who aspire to be in the money economy. Page 36.



Cover photograph: Nate Silverstein. Airplane courtesy of Air Afrique.




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The opportunity for big profit, the increasing recognition of its importance and a thriving international chain of middlemen make African sculpture . . .

# The World's Best Traveled Art

By SUSAN BLUMENTHAL

A brief glance at the illustrations adorning nearly any comprehensive book on African art forces one to the reluctant conclusion that Africa may be the least likely place to view important African art. If one is serious about seeing major pieces of Africana, one might start by purchasing a ticket to some European capital — Paris, London, or Berlin. Here the British Museum, the Musee de l'Homme and the Museum für Völkerkunde, among others, feature displays of major pieces. (Budget-conscious Americans who can get to the Field Museum of Natural History in Chicago or the Museum of Primitive Art in New York will also find exciting collections.)

Another way of getting to see major pieces of African art is to somehow gain entrée to some of the exquisite private collections that have been amassed by wealthy individuals over the past century. This is not nearly so easy as museum-hopping, and most students of art must simply wait until some beneficent collector lends his pieces to a museum before getting a firsthand look.

The point is obvious. A good deal of Africa's most important art no longer resides in the continent, having been spirited away to museums and private collections all over the world. Of relatively recent origin is the concern over this phenomenon, and African countries are beginning to take steps (establishing their own museums and monitoring foreign art purchases, for example) to help to stem the outflow of art and perhaps even to bring some of the last objects home. For all this, African art remains the world's most traveled art, moving steadily if not always conspicuously along paths well marked by dollar signs.

Smuggling may not be the accurate term to describe how African art—mainly masks and statues—leaves the continent because most countries are just beginning to think about halting the drainage of their art to America and Europe. A few countries (Cameroun, Central African Republic, Niger and Nigeria) have ratified a 1970 Unesco treaty prohibiting the export of cultural property, alias national treasures, alias art.

The disappearance in 1966 of the Afo-A-Kom, a beaded lifesize statue of inestimable social, political, and religious value to the Kom people of Cameroun, and its return in 1973 by its New York owner-dealer, breathed new life into concerns about the widespread trafficking in art. The Kom incident, reported with painstaking completeness by the New York *Times*, recalled earlier investigations by the newspaper of the pillaging of ancient monuments in Guatemala. It also refueled the fires of controversy, among museums at least, over the ethics of acquiring art. Whether the Kom incident will have any lasting impact on the African art scene is not yet clear.

Although most African nations have no restrictions concerning their art, there is often something not quite cricket about the way it is bought in bush villages or in the capital cities by African, European and American dealers for air-freighting out of Africa.

Although many experts caution us that African art is no different from other art and should be judged by universal standards of aesthetic excellence, traditional African art has religious and social functions that have been missing from most western art since the Renaissance. In most African traditions, a mask is a tangible symbol of a suprahuman spirit force, a god intermediate to the single supreme god. An individual wearing the mask in a ceremonial dance becomes possessed by the mask's spirit. Unlike western art, which is generally individualistic and decorative, African art has a function vital to the order and survival of the community.

Most of the current store of African art comes from the rain forests and


AIR
soleil

Of the major art-producing Black African countries, only Ghana and Nigeria have any semblance of export prohibitions on art.

savannas of West and Central Africa and is carved from wood. These pieces, under heavy attack from termites, mosses, moisture and fungi, have a short lifespan (relatively little predates the 19th century) and wear their age poorly. Masks and statues are frequently purchased complete with woodlice that resist even the most serious attempts at extermination. (The woodlice in a Dogon mask in my own meager collection have survived repeated treatments in the freezer and thrive despite having been sealed in a plastic bag doused inside with roach bomb.) The vulnerability of wood to the tropical climate virtually ensures built-in obsolescence. As a result, each new generation must create a new art.

Ironically, the very sculptures that command thousands of dollars abroad are the ones that are often discarded by Africans. A worn mask is thought to lose its power, and if a trader does not buy it from the owner or the village headman, it will simply be thrown away. Except for sacrificial pieces that have accretions of, say, blood and feathers, a new piece is preferred to an old one.

The real watershed in the collectability of African art occurred in 1966, when the Helena Rubinstein collection of African art was auctioned off, with some pieces going for five-figure prices. Demand for Africana rose in the late '60s, and prices increased tenfold from what they were in the late '40s. Most recently, people who otherwise do not collect art have swelled the ranks of African art buyers. One reason is that modern interiors with their Lucite and stainless steel furniture seem to complement the nubby burlap and worm-eaten wood of African masks. Although smooth-surfaced pieces were formerly considered the most desirable, rough pieces and fetish figures covered with straw, beads and monkey skulls are now popular.

Prices have doubled many times since the Rubinstein sale, and New York art dealers expect that in five years they will treble. And yet, African art is still relatively cheap and undervalued, partly because the bulk of museum-quality art is not yet frozen in private collections. "With no other kind of art can you buy something wonderful for $10,000," says Susan Vogel, curator of African art at New York's Museum of Primitive Art.

If something "wonderful" costs merely $10,000, the masks selling at Bloomingdale's, Gimbels and Brentano's must be less than wonderful; they are far cheaper, usually selling for around $200. In a recent ad, Alexander's offered a Senufo mask for the amazingly low price of $35.

By the time a major piece ends up in a private or public collection, it might have been sold as many as 20 times. A Baulé piece sold in a recent Paris auction for $55,000—quite a few rungs above the Bloomingdale's-Gimbels-Brentano's class. The same piece might have been bought from a villager, the original seller, for $200. But the movement of African art involves lots of middlemen, each boosting the asking price. The network of dealers in Africa—most often they are Muslim, Hausa, Wolof or Mossi—is thick. African dealers in America are called "runners"; they buy art from their suppliers in Africa (who buy from their middlemen) and bring it abroad, where it ends up in posh Madison Avenue galleries, tawdry Manhattan hotel suites, and neon-lit motel rooms outside Chicago, Phoenix and Detroit. The hundreds of runners and their families who have settled in the once-fashionable hotels on Manhattan's West Side enjoy a camaraderie unmarred by competition. Returning Peace Corps volunteers and even U.S. embassy personnel have been known to bring back art that they too sell at tremendous markups.

"The only difference between the runners and the Madison Avenue dealers," says curator Susan Vogel, "is that the dealer has more money, a reputation to live up to, and he probably won't stick you with anything too terrible." With a Madison Avenue dealer, a dissatisfied customer can return the piece for a full refund. With a runner, a buyer can expect no certificate of origin and no refund if he is dissatisfied. Roughly 90 per cent of a runner's sales are to private, minor collectors as opposed to museums. A typical runner's stock might include five real pieces and 90 copies, the kind of mask often sold in department stores that can be bought for less than $10 in Africa.

Professor Roy Sieber, an authority on African art at the University of Indiana, explains that "the trouble with buying from a runner is that you have to make up your mind fast, usually within 24 hours. You don't have the time to discuss the purchase with museum colleagues."

An American dealer can buy from European and American estates or he might go to Africa himself, where he has several options. He can buy from traders in the cities. He can rent a Land-Rover or hop a mammywagon and sail out into the bush, stopping in any village that looks as if it might have some treasures. "I approach the village headman, who can usually tell me what a piece was used for and how old it is," explains Alfred Scheinberg, part owner of African Arts Gallery in New York. "On my next buying trip I'm going to Cameroun; with all the publicity on the Kom thing, everyone's been asking for beaded statues." Scheinberg says he describes himself as a "student" on visa forms to avoid any hassle he might receive as an art collector.

Although it is likely that much of the African art in museums here and in Europe was originally stolen, it now seems that a museum will not touch a piece if it was obviously taken out of its functional tribal context. The policy of the Museum of Primitive Art, accord-

*Tuaregs–known as the desert's blue people because of the indigo-dyed cloth they wear–look at traditional robes and other items from their culture that are on display at the Musée National de Niger in Niamey. Until recent drought ravished their herds, the proud Tuaregs roamed the vast Sahara desert as their ancestors had done for centuries. Photo by Bernard Pierre Wolff.*

ing to Susan Vogel, is that no African art is acquired unless it can be unequivocally identified, which usually limits acquisitions to those pieces that have been published in catalogues. So while private collectors and museums in the Midwest are buying, the most venerable institutions—the Metropolitan Museum of Art and the Museum of Primitive Art—cannot. The Unesco treaty, which is open to ratification by any country, requires a dealer to record a description of each piece, its origin, names and addresses of the suppliers, price at which it was sold, and to "inform the purchaser . . . of the export prohibition to which [the item] may be subject."

When considering a piece for purchase, the Metropolitan Museum of Art sends a letter to the antiquities board of the country of origin (or if there is no such board, to the Ministry of Education) asking for provenance, a piece of paper attesting to the piece's legality and proving it has been reviewed in the country of origin. If there is no reply within 60 days, the museum feels free to buy the piece. The letter is sent with the permission of the dealer; if the dealer objects, the purchase is off.

Of the major art-producing Black African countries, only Ghana and Nigeria have any semblance of export prohibitions on art. Nigeria's restrictions are only partially effective. Technically, any object has to be given to the Department of Antiquities in Lagos or to the curator of the Jos Museum for review. If the piece is deemed too valuable, it will be bought at a reasonable valuation. Sierra Leone has a restrictive law that is all but ornamental. The Ivory Coast requires export permission papers, but these are issued almost automatically. Meanwhile, Banjul, Dakar, Lomé, and Abidjan remain free ports for art dealers. Thus, pieces can be purchased in Nigeria, taken overland into Dahomey and Togo and shipped from there.

Professor Sieber recommends that a federation of African nations be formed in which each country is responsible for the export of African art, regardless of its national origin. But if even one country is lax in enforcing the law, art can be smuggled into and out of that country. Ultimately, even the best laws are not completely effective. As long as there are villagers and village chiefs willing to sell ceremonial art, it will find a way out of Africa. "With the right incentive," notes one silver-haired dealer in Manhattan, "all chiefs will sell their art." George Preston, art historian at Rutgers University, says, "When a $2,500-per-capita annual income is reached in Africa, you'll see a decline in the flight of antiquities. The legal and illegal sale of art grows out of poverty. You notice, when the price of cocoa goes up, the sale of art levels off. Too many people

are making too much money from the sale of art. For these people to stop would be starvation." Other Africanists have intimated that even government officials are participants in the sale of national treasures.

One comparatively new element in the international equation determining the movement of African art is the African museum. The plunder of African art by the 19th-century colonizers stocked the museums of London, Paris, Stuttgart and Antwerp. Some of what was not spirited off now forms the collections of African museums. These museums range from grim, under-financed repositories such as the Sierra Leone Museum in Freetown to the always-crowded, sprawling complexes of the Musée National in Niamey, Niger and the Jos Museum in Nigeria.

In broad terms, the function of museums is to preserve and present a nation's cultural property. (Africanists point out that the preservation of art is especially important in Africa where there are few historical documents.) The Unesco manifesto of 1970 prohibiting the illicit trafficking of cultural property states that "cultural property constitutes one of the basic elements of civilization and national culture," that its interchange among nations "increases the knowledge of the civilization of man, enriches the cultural life of all peoples and inspires mutual respect and appreciation among nations," and that every country has a moral obligation to protect its cultural property from theft and illicit export. The treaty asks its ratifiers to inventory public and private cultural property, develop its museums, draft laws preventing export and require export-authorization certificates for any piece of art leaving the country.

The point is not to keep a nation's cultural property at home—an isolationist act unbecoming to the '70s—but to control its flow abroad and have it take place legally. Had the Afo-A-Kom been officially lent via diplomatic missions to the Metropolitan Museum of Art, and had it been accompanied by the same publicity as its disappearance, the queues might have rivaled those

## The Reaction Is Chemical

*Art need not be stolen or otherwise removed from its "home continent" in order to be lost forever. Obvious testament to this is the decaying state of much of the world's monumental art. While man has been busy carving out a record of his existence, nature has been creeping along behind him, trying to erase his message. Some who have read the message from our ancestors have done more than nodded and passed on their way; such a man is Seymour Z. Lewin, a professor of chemistry at New York University, who is helping to find ways of preserving the world's monumental art.*

*Professor Lewin has worked on three continents, and his current work includes the famed Buddhist sanctuary of Borobudur, Indonesia and the mysterious Maya ruins at Tikal, Guatemala. In Africa, the soft-spoken, 52-year-old art doctor has made a house call to Egypt to check up on the condition of the Sphinx. The problem was not that monument's face, which, according to Lewin, has long provided target practice for admirers, but its neck. "Over the centuries, the Sphinx has been continually battered by tiny particles of sand picked up by forceful winds," the professor says. "The wearing away of stone from the statue's neck has weakened the structure to the point now where we fear the head will topple off." The professor is currently teaming with other chemists to keep the lion's body from losing its manly head.*

Lalibelans apply chemical to church. A few days' work will preserve churches indefinitely.

*But Professor Lewin's preeminent African triumph has been in treating the rock-hewn churches of Lalibela, Ethiopia against corrosion, preserving them as a tourist attraction and a center of worship. In constant use as Coptic churches for the last 700 to 800 years, the 11 churches of Lalibela were carved-their roofs at ground level, their bases far beneath the earth-from red volcanic lava. Situated in a semi-arid area of Ethiopia, this rock -particularly susceptible to the effects of water, according to Professor Lewin-might seem in little danger. But during the interior's short rainy season, during which the small community is cut off from all tourist traffic, daily rains pelt the edifices, pools of water gathering on their roofs and at their bases.*

*If the erosion caused by 700 to 800 years of rain goes unnoticed by the casual tourist or even the more observant art lover, the effects of age did not escape the watchful eye of the Ethiopian Government. Aware of Lalibela's lure for travelers and wanting to build his country's tourist trade, Emperor Haile Selassie approached the United Nations to ask if Unesco's Department for Cultural Heritage would sponsor the preservation of his empire's treasure. Unesco in turn contacted the International Fund for Monuments, a private organization that was aware of Professor Lewin's experiments in stone preservation.*

of the Mona Lisa's visit, and Cameroun, as the donor country, would have gained in prestige.

It would also help if art objects temporarily leaving a country were no longer in use as religious objects. The story of the famous Tada bronze, an ancestor figure from Nigeria, serves as a lesson. Several years ago, the figure was borrowed and brought to the United States for exhibition. Later, while it was at the British Museum for copying, a drought devastated the region. The people blamed the absence of the Tada figure; they are not liable to let it out of their hands again.

Although a piece of such significance to a community should not be put in a museum, it can be declared a national treasure. Its owner would then be responsible for its safekeeping and preservation and would be answerable to government authorities for its loss. The owner would be obliged to surrender a piece of art to the authorities if he could not ensure its well-being. Had the Afo-A-Kom been a national monument, it probably would not have been sold.

The British colonial administrators laid firmer foundations for museums in Africa than did their French counterparts. Nigeria, to take one example, not only has a department of antiquities and the only museum technician-training center in Africa, but Nigerian legislation controlling the export of art dates back to the 1950s. A report on the museums and galleries of British Africa published in 1932 states that only those territories that had a large enough white expatriate population warranted the setting up of museums. Thus, South Africa, Kenya and Zanzibar were blessed with presentable museums, while Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and The Gambia were deprived. At the time of the report, the only proto-museums in British West Africa were in Jos, Nigeria and Achimota, Ghana—each of whose running costs totaled £20 a year. If modern African nations have been a bit reluctant to set aside funds for museums, it may be partly because they were hardly set a good example under colonialism.

It is also difficult to expect develop-

*Working with a staff from NYU's Conservation Center of Fine Arts, a part of the university's Institute of Fine Arts, Professor Lewin visited Lalibela, returning to his chemistry lab with samples of its rock. The chemical that resulted from Dr. Lewin's research has two effects. First, it strengthens the stone particles enabling them to withstand chemical interaction with salts deposited by rainwater. Second, it reduces the stone's porosity, and the evaporation rate, for evaporation—and the subsequent salt residue—has caused Lalibela's erosion, not the moistening of the stone or the accumulation of water.*

*In a way, preserving Lalibela might have been easier than tending monuments that stand side by side with modern edifices, in modern settings. "At Lalibela, we knew exactly what we were dealing with," Professor Lewin says. "There is no industrial pollution, no automobile fumes, no modern industry to complicate the atmosphere around the churches. We knew the damage was caused by the salt and were able to treat it. This isn't the Colosseum in Rome where traffic vibrations cause blocks of stone to tumble and automobile exhaust eats away at the rock."*

*It might have been a relatively easy task, but synthesizing the chemical still required five years of testing rock samples. Applying the chemical to the stone churches was far simpler. "With money from the International Fund for Monuments and local Ethiopian patrons, we set up a small chemical plant at Lalibela. We imported most chemicals from the U.S. because they were unavailable locally. But once we had the formula, the actual synthesis was done in Lalibela," says Professor Lewin.*

Professor Lewin tests his formula at Lalibela. Preservative took five years to develop.

*The crew was international: the organizers and workmen were Ethiopian, the chemists who produced the formula were American and the architect and crew were Italians. "We definitely had the support of the local people," Professor Lewin reports. "Of course, we were a source of income for them, but the townspeople, as well as the elders of the Coptic Church, were all in favor of the project."*

*In their makeshift factory, the chemists made several hundred gallons of the preservative, enough to cover the 50,000 square feet of Lalibela's churches. Applying the chemical like paint, Lalibelans worked for only a few days on the project. How long will this application last? "Indefinitely," says Professor Lewin.*

*Four visits to Lalibela later, Professor Lewin has finished its preservation. The chemist has never visited anywhere else in Africa, explaining it was his interest in stone preservation—not Africa—that brought him to Lalibela. But he has had, and may continue to have, an effect on the continent. "And vice-versa," the professor adds.*

*—McK*

ing nations with annual trade deficits and budget imbalances to spend much money on museums. (Chronic lack of funds may be a major reason why more nations have not signed the Unesco treaty.) Unlike schools, roads and hospitals, museums seem to be considered a somewhat frivolous investment. Yet museums do have some economic value. Aside from boosting the collective national ego, winning respect abroad and promoting national consciousness, in many cases they draw tourists. East Africa's national treasures are her game parks and wildlife, and tourists drawn by these attractions provide the major source of revenue in Kenya. The art of West Africa, in museums and *in situ*, has the same money-earning potential. The restor royal palaces in Abomey (Dahome and Foumban (Cameroun), to ta only two examples, are at least as fascinating as the resorts of Kenya.

Despite the financial obstacles, there are some splendid museums in Africa. Among the most popular are the Ghana National Cultural Centre in Kumasi, Jos Museum in Nigeria and the Musée National in Niamey, Niger. Jos Museum consists of a series of thatched-roof buildings (with about 20 guest chalets that can be rented for the night). The Musée National is a compound of buildings in a hodgepodge of forgettable styles. The museums in Kumasi and Niamey have craftsmen at work on the premises, and the one in Niamey has a zoo and replicas of living compounds of half a dozen different ethnic groups in the country. At Jos, at least 30 reproductions of Nigerian architecture are planned for the near future.

In the Niamey museum, it is possible to see a Tuareg nomad just in from the desert gape in disbelief at his mannequin double revolving in a showcase. And in the best African museums, there is an abundance of indigenous visitors—illiterate farmers, myopic old women and barefoot mothers with infants dozing on their backs.

Preeminent among Africa's more traditional, European gallery-style museums are the National Museum in Accra, Musée National in Abidjan, the National Museum in Lagos and the new Benin Museum in Benin City. These museums have remarkably fine collections that are well displayed. The Musée de Douala de l'I.F.A.N., Cameroun's present national museum, occupies the second floor of the town hall. The material is spellbinding, but the exhibit badly needs reorganizing. The Musée Boganda in Bangui, Central African Republic has piped-in mood music—drums and balafons.

*Nigeriens view animals (not visible in the photo) that are part of the zoo that surrounds the Musée National de Niger in Niamey. In the background is one of the buildings in the museum compound.*

But the single most exciting thing about African museums is their immediacy. A lot of what you see inside them is what you see outside them. Clothing and utensils on exhibit are identical to what can be seen seconds later on the street, in someone's mud-and-wattle house, in the market or (if you are lucky) during a ceremonial dance. Functional items such as calabashes, pottery, headrests, weaving bobbins and the like are so aesthetically pleasing that they are put in museums, where they can be marveled at by Africans and tourists alike. It is difficult to imagine the American counterparts—Teflon pans, Acrylic sweaters and plastic shopping bags—attracting similar attention here.

In addition to working with what they have around them, the museums of Africa are also beginning to look abroad to what they think rightfully belongs in Africa. In this, as in illicit art traffic, Africa does not stand alone in the world. Italy, Turkey and Guatemala, three countries whose national heritages have long borne a high price tag in the freewheeling art marketplace, have begun to make demands for return of specific treasures, usually when the items are about to change hands, from private collector to museum.

Although British expeditionary forces failed to capture the Golden Stool symbolizing the unity of the Ashanti people of Ghana, regalia attached to the stool were seized in February 1874. In anticipation of the 100th anniversary of the regalia's removal to Britain this month, the Kumasi Traditional Council has petitioned the British Government for the return of its cultural property.

It is not yet clear whether African museums will be able to play a significant role in slowing the movement of art out of the continent or in bringing major pieces back to Africa. For the immediate future, the name of the game is still likely to be profit. And there are few indications that the African art business—African museums notwithstanding—is heading in any direction but up. □

# In the Wake of the Middle East War

U.S. Africa policy is more and more being influenced by a complicated series of developments in *U.S.-Portuguese relations.*

By BRUCE OUDES

In the weeks following the October cease-fire, a joke made the rounds among the troops west of Suez, in what is unquestionably Israeli-occupied Africa. "This is the only place in Africa that still recognizes Israel," the barb contended, only slightly stretching the truth.

In just two months, African states as far south as Botswana had broken relations with Israel. The display of that elusive thing called African unity was the most important since independence, begging for comparison with the disorganized retreat from the Organization of African Unity's emotional pledge in 1965 to break relations with Britain over Rhodesia.

As a statement of fact, however, the joke was not quite true. Four OAU members—Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi and Mauritius—still recognize Israel, as does South Africa. Israel's Africa policy, long based on the premise that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," was taking on a new meaning—for the moment, at least, Israel's most important friend in Africa was South Africa. During the Yom Kippur war, South Africa relaxed its foreign-exchange controls to permit $30-million worth of South African rand to flow to Israel from South Africa's Jewish community.

Concerned about the growing impression that the U.S. is an alterego for Israel, Washington asked the Israelis, according to an informed U.S. official, at least to ask governments other than the U.S. to serve as Israel's "protecting power" in the 22 countries that broke relations with Jerusalem.

Despite the furor over the new African stance toward Israel, the real key to understanding America's response to growing Arab-African ties lay not in Africa itself but in Portugal. Increasingly, settlement in the Middle East is being linked to settlement in Guinea-Bissau (Portuguese Guinea), which, while still fighting to liberate itself from Portugal, declared its independence last September 24.

Immune to any Arab oil boycott because of the oil production in another African colony, Angola, Portugal gave the U.S. carte blanche during the recent war to use the Portuguese Azores as a supply line to Israel. But the fact that the U.S. apparently had to make as yet undisclosed concessions during the first days of the airlift in order to keep Prime Minister Caetano happy showed that, even in the Administration's own terms, the 1971 Azores agreement did not do what White House planners had hoped—it did not automatically guarantee U.S. access to Israel during a period of fighting in the Middle East. It now seems clear that during the 1971 negotiations the U.S. and Portugal must have talked past each other, not frankly discussing their non-NATO motives—the protection of Israel and Portugal's three African colonies—in renewing the Azores bases agreement.

It is also apparent that, however temporary the circumstances, Africa is, for the first time in more than a decade, back in the mainstream of high-level U.S. diplomacy. To Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, African favor is worth currying to the extent that it can be helpful in urging Arab moderation. But the price Portugal wants the U.S. to pay for the use of its bases would win no favor with African states. Kissinger's dilemma is that Portugal's price for the Azores is precisely the denial of what is, in addition to the Middle East, Africa's other immediate foreign policy goal: an in-place cease-fire in Guinea-Bissau, followed by a negotiated settlement between Lisbon and the African nationalists. Lisbon's stance was clear: anything but American support for Portugal's colonial policy in Africa could tempt Dr. Caetano to deny the U.S. its Azores-Israel link.

If Portugal were to deny the U.S. access to Israel during a period of Israeli intransigence at the Geneva peace talks, the Arabs might be

The real key to understanding America's response to growing Arab-African ties lies not in Africa itself but in Portugal.

tempted into a new round of fighting: If such fighting were already underway, the Arabs would be at least as appreciative of assistance from the Portuguese.

Portugal will support the U.S. on the Middle East only so long as it thinks it can get more help from Washington than from the Arabs. An about-face by Portugal on the Middle East at a carefully chosen moment could crystallize earlier ambiguities in Arab opinion about Portugal. Until the Middle East war, the Portuguese had quietly, but with some effect, cultivated economic and political contact in the Arab world. Lisbon, for its part, must weigh the probability that in the long run U.S. support or at least neutrality on Portuguese African questions is uncertain against the chance that a bold move (out-Kissingering Kissinger) might cut into the new Arab-African solidarity, keeping the flow of Arab aid to the African guerrillas at its present low level. Although an early Middle East settlement may be in the interest of those party to the negotiations, it is not necessarily in what Dr. Caetano perceives as the best interests of Portuguese Africa.

What Secretary of State Kissinger faces in these critical months then is the cold fact that a change of heart in Lisbon could jeopardize Israeli security. Working in his favor is Lisbon's awareness that if it pulled the rug out from under Kissinger on the Middle East, the U.S. could retaliate by getting tough on Guinea-Bissau. Whatever the long-term advantages for Portugal in trying to court the Arabs, the most credible short-term deterrent to a pro-Arab tilt by Portugal is the fact that the U.S. might retaliate by leaning toward Africa. (It is the credibility of the PAIGC's claim to nationhood, and Africa's increasing pressure on Portugal, that perhaps persuades Lisbon not to interrupt the U.S. supply line to Israel. Although Israel has not recognized Guinea-Bissau, which itself opposes "Zionist expansion," Guinea-Bissau is inadvertently performing a real political service for Israel.)

The Arab-African tie has yet other implications. The significance of the agreement sending Israeli troops back east of the canal is that it raises a problem for governments, such as Nigeria, that predicated their break with Israel on the Israeli presence west of Suez. Here the potentially open-ended Arab-African commitment could be important. In order to obtain the most favorable possible settlement, the Arabs are eager to maintain solid African support. In return, the Arabs promised at the December Algiers summit to make $125 million available for African development assistance, to hold African-Arab summit meetings, and to institute an oil boycott against Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal. (The Rhodesia boycott promise comes eight years after a mandatory boycott was voted by the U.N. Security Council.)

It is difficult to know for sure how much more the Arab nations could offer Africa in return for African support. African nations could ask the Arabs to join them in asking the U.S., Europe, and Japan to halt their flagrant violations of Rhodesian sanctions. Beyond that lies the more difficult problem of European arms sales to Portugal and South Africa. A European halt of such sales in response to Arab pressure would be more significant; but it is not the kind of short-term diplomatic question that can be resolved as part of a Middle East package. The focus, then, boils down to an in-place Guinea-Bissau cease-fire.

The prospects for such a development are not as farfetched as they seem. Any Middle East settlement acceptable to the U.S. must involve Europe's participation; American supplies must be assured access to Israel through Europe. (European disagreement on this point would jeopardize a Middle East settlement and would furnish those in the U.S. who favor unilateral troop cuts with a powerful argument.)

Presumably Kissinger would not be averse to having another feather in his peacemaker cap. Guinea-Bissau may be only twice the size of New Jersey with fewer than a million inhabitants, but a settlement there could have a profound impact on reshaping Portuguese thinking about Mozambique and Angola and would improve U.S. relations with independent Africa. Given that Africa's only alternative to a cease-fire appears to be escalating violence, bringing peace to Guinea-Bissau might capture even a Kissinger's imagination, providing that the newly independent country continues to be a key factor in the Middle East equation.

If all else fails, tiny Guinea-Bissau can still take the initiative by taking its membership application to the Security Council at the time a Middle East settlement is being signed. Guinea-Bissau and West Africa would have nothing to lose at that point in finding out whether even without its "Azores-is-vital-to-Israel excuse" the U.S. still would be willing to veto, supporting Portugal over Africa. A U.S. veto could do no permanent damage to Guinea-Bissau; it could only focus more international attention on the situation. Given their important interests in West Africa, France and Britain may resist even the strongest U.S. pressure for a triple veto of Guinea-Bissau. The U.S. then, instead of following its traditional policy of taking its cue in West Africa from France and Britain, would be taking the diplomatic initiative by backing Lisbon.

Meanwhile, all the U.S. and Portugal can do is to discuss the "Azores," the catchword for the raft of issues that both join and separate them. On December 17, Kissinger visited Lisbon. Publicly he said the U.S. was "extremely grateful" for Portugal's sup-

The price Portugal wants the U.S. to pay for use of its bases would win no favor with African states, who want an in-place cease-fire in Guinea-Bissau.

port; privately he and Caetano sized each other up. Although it seems the most prudent course for the U.S. to delay hard decisions on a new base agreement until the Middle East situation is sorted out, it is clear that Portugal is not anxious to permit the U.S. a long-term agreement. Secure in even a five-year agreement, there is no telling how much the U.S. might press Lisbon on Guinea-Bissau if it served Washington's purposes.

Beyond that, what kind of trade-off could the negotiators devise that would be acceptable to Lisbon without at the same time helping Portugal in Africa? A further question, one that must be answered first, is: To what extent is U.S. aid to Portugal morally justifiable in defense of U.S. moral commitments to Israel? The current answer seems to be that if an Azores agreement can be linked to a settlement in Guinea-Bissau, there can be little objection to U.S. economic assistance that cements a West African peace.

Portugal has been seeking P-3 long-range naval reconnaissance aircraft. Credit food sales under P.L. 480 are possible, but availability is limited and demand for its use in drought-stricken areas are high. The U.S. sold Portugal $15 million in P.L. 480 foodstuffs for the year ending June 30, 1973. In that year, the total P.L. 480 program for all of Africa was $87 million.

The 1971 technique of linking the Export-Import Bank to an Azores package would only invite another round of needless controversy since the U.S. has no ceiling on the amount of Exim business it might do with metropolitan Portugal. (Exim policy in Portuguese Africa is one of "restraint.")

Recently, the Administration disclosed that it would not submit any new Azores agreement to Congress for formal approval. Apparently the Administration has not yet resolved the question of whether to ask Congress to appropriate funds for a new Azores package. (Use of Exim and P.L. 480 does not require specific Congressional approval.)

Certainly, there can be no doubt that as long as the Azores are linked to Israel, Congress will vote whatever the Administration asks for Portugal. This was made clear by the way in which liberals such as Senator Hubert Humphrey, Senate Africa subcommittee chairman, moved to change a Tunney-Young Amendment on Portugal in conference as soon as the Middle East war broke out. Abandoned was the Tunney version that would have given legislative support to the long-standing executive embargo on U.S. arms shipments to Portugal for use in Africa. The shell that remained simply required a report by the Administration on its dealings with Portugal. Attempts in Congress to reinstate the Tunney provisions will have to wait until the U.S. is no longer dependent on the Azores route to Israel. During his confirmation hearings in November, the new U.S. ambassador to Portugal, Stuart Nash Scott, acknowledged that Israel was the primary focus of the Azores. When justifying the Azores renewal in 1971 the Administration had contended the bases were necessary solely to meet American NATO obligations.

One task confronting Washington policymakers is to assess the long-term implications of the Arab-African link, while a wide range of American public opinion has criticized it, urging each side to back away. Although working hard for Sahelian drought relief and repeal of the Byrd Amendment—a provision permitting U.S. import of certain Rhodesian minerals—Senator Humphrey nevertheless suggested in a recent speech that unless the oil boycott were lifted, U.S. farmers might not be able to produce enough food next year to meet African relief needs. He predicated his contention on a possible shortage of fertilizer—a petroleum product—that would inhibit food surpluses traditionally earmarked for Africa.

The Arab embargo on the U.S. "will lash back upon millions of the poor in Africa and Asia, those who have received from America over the past decade billions of dollars in food relief. . . . Thus, the Arab states stick their daggers not into the heart of America but into the hearts of those whom they say they love," Humphrey said. Meanwhile Senator James McClure, an Idaho Republican who generally supports white Rhodesia, said after returning from the Middle East that, although he could understand the Arab oil producers' position, he could not see why they wanted to boycott South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia.

Among members of the Africa lobby, the reaction was split between those, like Imamu Baraka, who welcomed the Arab-African tie and others, like Michael Lofchie and Thomas Franck, who were alarmed by it. Writing in the Los Angeles *Times*, Lofchie, an American academic who has written on African questions, said African countries "could have done much better by themselves intellectually" by not taking sides in the Middle East "and it would have given them a degree of pride in not being dependent on oil dollars."

A New York University law professor who has supported the African guerrilla groups, Franck asked in the New York *Times* of December 6, "If we continue to work for the liberation of southern Africa, are we in reality only strengthening Israel's enemies?"

Others point to the fact that the Arabs chose to set up a separate development bank for Africa rather than contribute to the well-established African Development Bank. Still others note that short-run oil shortages in some parts of Black Africa have been

(continued on page 35)

With less training than nearly all other track stars, Kenya's athletes run with astonishing poise, determination and success.

# Masters of Men's Track

By JOHN MANNERS

On a muggy evening in August 1966, Ron Clarke, the Australian runner, sat exhausted and dejected in the high-jump pit of the National Stadium in Kingston, Jamaica. Then holder of the world's record in every distance running event from three miles to 20 kilometers, Clarke had just lost what he'd earlier called "the most important race of my life." The six miles of the eighth British Empire and Commonwealth Games was the best chance Clarke would ever have to win the "big games" gold medal that had eluded him throughout his long record-setting career.

Clarke was beaten not by an opponent of equal renown, nor even by a likely underdog; there had been none in the race. He was beaten by an inexperienced, unknown Kenyan named Naftali Temu, who had dogged the Australian's footsteps for the first 20 grueling laps of the race and had then sped past him, covering the last mile in four minutes and 17 seconds. He finished in the third-fastest time ever recorded.

Clarke sat looking out on the dusty cinder oval that had been the scene of his recent six-mile ordeal; he seemed to sense the futility of having run 150 miles a week, 52 weeks a year, for nearly 10 years, only to be humiliated by a gifted novice. "It's impossible to run against these blokes," he said. "They train and live up in those high altitudes, and even someone you've never heard of can beat you."

The Kenyans' track triumphs that so dispirited competitors like Clarke would soon emerge as an international phenomenon that would transcend sport.

The 1966 Commonwealth Games were the first major international competition in which Kenya's highland runners had distinguished themselves as a group. The year before, Kipchoge Keino, the most famous of the East African stars, set two world records and ran half a dozen four-minute miles, and at the first Pan-African Games in Brazzaville, in the Congo, members of the Kenya team had won



every event from 400 meters up. But the Commonwealth Games were the big time, and the Kenyans did their newly independent country proud by winning gold medals in the one, three and six miles, and by taking the silver and bronze medals in the half mile and the steeplechase, respectively.

Two years later, Kenyans won eight Olympic track medals in Mexico but skeptics tended to dismiss their achievements as flukish by-products of Mexico City's altitude, just as the Kenyans' Jamaican successes had been ascribed by many to Kingston's tropical heat. There were no such "explanations" for 10 track medals won by the Kenyans at the Edinburgh Commonwealth Games, or for their six track medals two years ago in Munich. Kenya, a country of 12 million people —more than half of whom are less than 17 years old—has now established itself indisputably as one of the world's two or three major powers in men's track. In fact, since independence, Kenyans have won more Commonwealth Games medals in men's track than any other country, and more Olympic medals in the same category than any country except the U.S.

Other small countries have enjoyed spectacular successes in particular sports. Panama, for example, has produced four world-champion professional boxers and four jockeys who rank among the top 10 winners in the U.S., all since 1972. Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic were represented by 34 players in major league baseball last season. And, of course, there is the disproportionate number of U.S. Blacks in practically every major American professional sport. Such extraordinary figures are most convincingly explained in terms of cultural incentives: the athletes generally come from environments of grinding poverty and sport offers one of few available avenues to money and status.

No such explanation holds for track. Until recently, track was strictly an amateur sport. Although some money changed hands, there were probably never more than half a dozen runners in the world at any one time who could make a living on the track. But there are other incentives. In Finland, track and field is the national sport, and great Finnish distance runners like Paavo Nurmi were national heroes. In the six Olympics between 1912 and 1936, Finnish distance runners won 46 medals, almost totally dominating events from 3,000 meters up. But after World War II, Finnish runners won only one other till 1972.

Is Kenya any different? Kipchoge Keino is indeed a national hero, but track and field—or athletics as it's called in Kenya—is far from the national sport. At best, it is a distant second to soccer. The government takes little interest in athletics except for the Olympics or the Commonwealth

# Kenya's Star Runner

*Kipchoge Keino was recruited into the Kenya police largely because he had shown running promise. Once a member of the police force, he was given a disciplined routine and some encouragement, but no expert coaching. By 1962, Keino was winning Kenya national championships. But it wasn't until 1964 that Keino made an international impact, placing a close fifth in the 5,000 meters at the Tokyo Olympics.*

*The next year was the peak of Keino's astounding career. On August 27, in Halsingborg, Sweden, he obliterated the world record for the 3,000 meters by six and one-half seconds. Three days later in London, he became the first Black man to break the four-minute mile, a task accomplished in only three minutes, 54.2 seconds, then the third-fastest mile time ever recorded. Three months later in New Zealand, Keino broke the world's record for the 5,000 meters.*

*At first, the western press was somewhat baffled by Keino. After his impressive showing in London, Neil Allen of the London Times wrote of Keino's "primeval joy and strength." Peter Wilson of the Daily Mirror called Keino a "superman" who turned great runners into midgets.*

*When Keino ran in America for the first time in January 1966, the late Arthur Daley of the New York Times called Africa a "reservoir of talent . . . so enormous that the flow will reach flood tide in the future." Like a lot of American writers, Daley compared Keino to former baseball great Willie Mays. The Christian Science Monitor, not known for its sports coverage, summed up Keino's running style rather poetically. He runs with "joy" and without "agony," the Monitor noted. Sports Illustrated, mixing athletics and politics, called Keino "that self-taught Kenyan distance runner who emerged suddenly from equatorial Africa and began running fast races and breaking world records as if his country's independence depended on him."*

*Keino was often accused of being an unsophisticated runner, lacking tactical style. Style or no, Keino won races, compiling a series of impressive times in a staggering variety of events. In February 1973, Kip Keino turned professional, having become one of the world's best-known sports figures. With his amateur career over, his reputation remains secure. Though he no longer holds either of the two world records he set in 1965, he still holds the Olympic records in the 1,500 meters and the grueling steeplechase.*

*When Keino arrived in the U.S. in 1966, newsmen were anxious to know if he had any special feelings about being the first Black man to break the four-minute-mile barrier. Keino's answer: "There is nothing special about me. There will soon be many in Kenya as good as me."*

*Some serious enthusiasts would not entirely agree with this modest assessment. Yet there is a grain of truth to it. Witness the accomplishments of some of Kenya's lesser-known athletes:*

- *Ben Jipcho emerged from under Keino's shadow almost as soon as*

Games. Also, in comparison to Finland, East Germany or most other European countries, Kenya has practically no money to spend on sport.

Perhaps the strangest thing about Kenya's running success is that every Olympic or Commonwealth Games track medal won by Kenya since independence has been taken by members of just two of Kenya's 30-odd ethnic groups, the Kalenjin and the Kisii. Together these groups number about two million people, less than 20 per cent of Kenya's population, and they live in an area of just a few thousand square miles in the highlands between the eastern shores of Lake Victoria and the western escarpment of the Great Rift Valley.

This running talent, then, is concentrated not just in one country but in two small groups within that country, leading both serious and pop-anthropologists into complicated speculations that try in vain to tell why so much running talent is found in such a relatively small group. Sometimes these discussions sound much the same as American arguments over why so many football players come from the coal-mine regions of Pennsylvania or why basketball players come mostly from urban environments or why the state of California has turned out so many good swimmers.

The Kalenjin and Kisii live at altitudes between 6,000 and 8,000 feet. Over the centuries they may have adapted to survival at high altitudes, perhaps developing in the process skills important to running. But most other Kenyans live at similarly high altitudes, as do most Ecuadorians, Tibetans and Nepalese, not to mention many Peruvians, Mexicans, Colombians and Ethiopians. Only the last have made any mark in the track world, with three gold medals and one bronze in the last four Olympic marathons.

Teams of German physiologists, according to *Sports Illustrated*, made exhaustive studies of Kenyan and Ethiopian distance runners around the time of the 1968 Olympics. Apparently all they could establish was that the runners had the same high aerobic capacity (the ability of the heart and lungs to make efficient use of available oxygen) as any well-conditioned athlete or, for that matter, anyone who has lived a strenuous life at high altitudes.

Speculation has been most intense about the running ability of Kipchoge Keino's people, the Nandi, one of the components of the Kalenjin group. Though they number only about 250,000 (more than half less than 17 years old), the Nandi have produced runners who have won more than half of Kenya's Olympic and Commonwealth Games medals.

The Nandi live at high altitudes,

*the great man turned pro, winning the silver medal behind Keino's gold in the steeplechase at the Munich Olympics. He has also supplanted Keino as history's second-fastest miler with a 3:52.0 clocking. Jipcho, although 30 years old, is being hailed as Keino's heir apparent.*

- *Mike Boit is one of nine Kenyan runners so far recruited by U.S. colleges. Boit won the bronze medal in the Munich 800 meters and finished a close fourth in the 1,500. He was the only runner to reach the finals in both events.*
- *Julius Sang, 26, is a bronze medalist in the 400 meters in Munich and brilliant anchor man on Kenya's gold medal 1,600-meter relay team.*
- *Wilson Kiprugut Chuma, a contemporary of Keino's was Kenya's first Olympic medal winner with a bronze in the 800 meters in Tokyo.*

*The list could go on, but the point is already clear. There are many in Kenya who may attain the sustained excellence of a Kip Keino, the man who has come to symbolize one of the most remarkable dynasties in sports history.*

*Naftali Temu, right, Kenya's distance runner who won the 10,000-meter race and the first gold medal of the 1968 Olympics, is embraced by Kipchoge Keino after Temu won the race at Mexico City. AP Wirephoto.*

and spend much of their youth chasing up and down hills after cattle and goats. Their diet is spare but contains a rather high proportion of protein relative to the diets of other African people. As pastoralists, the Nandi drink a lot of milk; on special occasions, such as the annual circumcision rites, the milk may be mixed with blood drawn from the jugular of a young heifer. Not surprisingly, when Kipchoge Keino mentioned on his first trip to the U.S. that his people occasionally drank blood, sensation-hungry journalists immediately began attributing his extraordinary performances to the custom, characterizing the bewildered Kenyan as a cross between Superman and Dracula.

In addition to the altitude at which they live, the activity of the herd boys and the relatively protein-rich diet—all of which are common to groups around the world that have not produced runners—anthropologists point to several features of Nandi culture that may contribute to the development of runners. Middle- and long-distance running, they suggest, is a solitary ordeal requiring self-control and the ability to endure pain. Young Nandi men are early conditioned to such endurance. Initiation into manhood means a slow and painful circumcision in front of watchful elders. If a young man so much as blinks in pain, he is denied his full rights as a Nandi adult.

Some years after his initiation a young Nandi reaches warrior status. In precolonial and early colonial times this meant he could join raiding parties that ventured into neighboring territory to "repossess" cattle the Nandi believed were theirs by divine right. Raids often ranged over distances as great as 100 miles. According to Samuel K. arap Ngeny, a Nandi historian, "No warrior was worthy of his name unless he had distinguished himself in one of these raids."

But the fact remains that neither the public circumcision nor the act of cattle-raiding is a feature unique to the Nandi. Both of them are practiced by many cultures throughout Kenya, throughout Africa, indeed, throughout the world. However, the concentration of running talent seems to be unique to the Nandi.

Although theories (both cultural and physiological) about the source of Nandi running superiority will doubtless continue to be raised, and rebutted, by interested social scientists, the development of Kenya's athletic infrastructure can be more easily and definitively described.

As a replacement for cattle-raiding, Oxbridge-educated colonial administrators, early in the colonial period, marked out scores of uneven grass tracks on pasture land all over Kenya. A pyramid of regional athletic meetings was soon constructed and, following World War II, Kenya began to compete with the neighboring British protectorates of Uganda and Tanganyika. The prizes at local meets were small—cooking pots, blankets, lamps—but many young Kenyans soon found that participation in athletics soon led to the security of army and police jobs, with regular cash incomes—already a necessity in the fast-changing society.

**Why have Kenya's runners been so successful? The answer is likely to remain a mystery. But there is no question that a self-perpetuating athletic tradition has been firmly established.**

Opportunities for successful athletes increased after independence. Strong athletic rivalries have developed between Kenya's armed services, so that athletes are sought by army, police and prison services. Moreover, in a country whose first development priority is education, many schools offer inducements to athletes. Primary schools often allow outstanding athletes to repeat a year in order to get just one more chance to pass the highly competitive exam and quality for secondary school. Secondary-school athletes are in demand at teachers colleges, and so on up the line, a syndrome not unfamiliar to Americans.

To involve people in athletics, the British administration appointed a sport officer, based in Nairobi, who promoted athletics throughout the colony. Even this early encouragement, however, was soon concentrated in the Kalenjin and Kisii areas, 200 miles west of the capital. Perhaps the sport officer found more talent there from the start, but, at least in the case of the Kalenjin, it was partly because the British liked them.

Once in the armed services, athletes got the encouragement, discipline and training needed to develop their running talents. Since early colonial times the Kalenjin and Kisii have dominated athletic competitions, perhaps in part because of the example of the early army and police athletes recruited from among the people.

There is no question that a self-perpetuating tradition of athletic achievement was firmly established in Kalenjin and Kisii areas by the time of independence. So it can be argued that the athletic dominance of these two groups was due at least in part to self-fulfilling expectations that they have about their own ability. Similar expectations about the Kalenjin and the Kisii are also held by people elsewhere in Kenya.

Probably, the spectacular success of Kenya's runners will remain a mystery—yet it is one of the world's truly magnificent mysteries. Anyone who has watched the Kenyan runners at work has seen the grace and poise they bring to the track. They are also international ambassadors for all of Africa. Thousands of people who may never have heard of Kenya's President Jomo Kenyatta have watched Kip Keino on television. In addition to being seen in the Olympics, Keino was the subject of a recent network special and has been featured in sports and general-interest magazines.

Whether the long-distance run speaks as loudly as the diplomatic message is a moot point; there is little doubt though that, in its own way, it is at least as eloquent. □

# african update

**Monitoring economic and political developments around the Continent**

## 19 Firms Challenged on Southern Africa; First Disclosure Already Negotiated

As Proxy Season '74 headed toward the spring annual meeting season, this year's round of southern Africa proxies has already been reduced by two companies. **Texaco Inc.** and **Bethlehem Steel Corporation,** both of which were to be faced with resolutions pertaining to their operations in the Portuguese colonies, were not presented with resolutions because the church groups involved missed the filing dates for the proposals.

The resolutions will be raised at the companies' annual meetings but will not circulate on the companies' printed proxy material. Bethlehem will be asked to withdraw from Mozambique, where it is currently engaged in mineral explorations, and Texaco will be asked to stop drilling in Angola.

The remaining companies being challenged for their involvement in the Portuguese colonies are **Gulf Oil Corporation** and **Exxon.** Gulf is being asked to disclose details of an alleged oil find off Angola, where the company has been operating since the 1950s. (See page 30.) Exxon is being asked to withdraw from Guinea-Bissau. Liberation forces in Guinea-Bissau declared the territory independent of Portugal last September and have declared all present corporate contracts null and void. (See page 29.)

Thus far, one firm has agreed to disclose information about its southern Africa operations and two companies have held meetings with representatives from the Church Project on U.S. Investments in Southern Africa.

**International Harvester** decided early to disclose details of its South Africa operation and both **Union Carbide** and **Pfizer** are discussing disclosure with the churches. Carbide is expected to offer to disclose its response to a questionnaire sent to firms operating in South Africa by Congressman Charles C. Diggs Jr. (D-Mich.), chairman of the House Africa Subcommittee. It is not yet clear whether the churches will be satisfied with Carbide's response.

Other companies being asked to disclose details of their South Africa operations are **Chrysler, Weyerhaeuser, Engelhard Miner-**

*(continued on page 20)*

## African Oil Resources Not Likely To Relieve U.S. Shortages

The present energy crisis, real or manufactured, has focused fresh interest on oil resources available in Africa. With Libya out of the picture because of Arab cutbacks of oil sales, the two biggest African sources of oil are Nigeria and the Portuguese territory of Angola; it now seems clear that, for very different reasons, neither of them can be expected to relieve the oil pressure faced by the U.S.

Observers who have listened to corporate oilmen invoke the energy crisis as a rationale for exploration and operation in the Portuguese territories waited in late 1973 to see if this vestige of white colonial Africa would help ease oil shortages in the U.S. But late in November, the word was out that Gulf Oil Corporation's Angolan operation, Cabinda Gulf, would actually cut the amount of oil available to the U.S. from the Cabinda exclave.

"It is understood," the Johannesburg *Star* reported, "the needs of metropolitan Portugal and the Portuguese provinces will be given priority during the fuel crisis." (November 24, 1973.) Through agreements with Cabinda Gulf, Portugal has title to half Cabinda's output—about nine million tons per year. In addition, Gulf has agreed to meet the needs of the Portuguese territory Mozambique, thus freeing it from dependence on Persian Gulf sources. "The decision to supply Mozambique from Cabinda will mean a reduction in oil sales to the United States, Canada and other buyers," the *Star* said.

Daily producing 2.3-million barrels of crude oil, Nigeria now, because of Libya's cutback, produces more oil than any African nation. As bidding for available oil gets more competitive and prices shoot up, experts calculate that the West African giant will make an extra $220 million in 1974 alone. But if Nigeria is willing to accept the extra revenue, it is not, according to Radio Nigeria, ready to step into the gap left by the Arabs to make even more money. Nigerian Commissioner for Mines and Power Shetima Ali Monguno announced November 6 that "it would be an act of bad faith" for Nigeria to increase its production in order to benefit from the production cutback decided by the members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC). He explained that such a move would be contrary to the aims of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The Arab states and Nigeria all belong to the latter group, along with oil producers in Latin America and elsewhere. According to the *Africa Research Bulletin*, OPEC's cardinal rule is, "Member countries should not benefit from each other's misfortunes." (November 14, 1973.)

The big political payoff for Africa in joining the Arab states in

*(continued on page 20)*

**African Update,** a report on political and economic developments in Africa, is prepared by the Africa Policy Information Center of the African-American Institute, 833 U.N. Plaza, New York, New York 10017. The African-American Institute, the major American private organization working to further African development and to help inform Americans about Africa is not a position-taking organization but is dedicated to the dissemination of nonpartisan information, covering all sides of issues.

## U.S. Firms Challenged *continued*

**als & Chemicals, John Deere, Colgate-Palmolive,** and **Gillette.** In a new wrinkle that appeared on this year's South Africa front, two corporations—**Alcan** of Canada and **Foote Mineral**—are being asked to withdraw from their joint venture in a South African border area. Border areas are white areas that abut the Black Bantustans to which Africans are being relocated. South African policy encourages firms to establish themselves in these areas, using the Bantustans as labor pools.

An interesting footnote to the coalition's campaign with Alcan emerged in November, when the Wall Street *Journal* reported that the Canadian company was negotiating with a South African firm to buy Alcan's 60-per cent interest in Alcan Aluminum of South Africa Ltd. (November 5, 1973.) Also, 1974 marks the church coalition's first campaign with a non-American firm.

**General Electric,** a 1973 target, will be a focus of attention again this year, as will another repeater, **IBM.** Both firms are being asked to establish committees to evaluate company performance in South Africa and, where appropriate, to make recommendations for policy changes regarding employment practices. The committees would study the extent to which the companies' presence supports apartheid, by the payment of taxes, and would assess the benefits to the Black population of the firms' operations. Both companies have faced disclosure resolutions in the past; neither has made disclosures that have satisfied church questioners, however.

Because of deliberations and a reversed decision at the Securities and Exchange Commission last year, a resolution asking **Newmont Mining** to adopt equal opportunity as a principle worldwide, with special reference to Namibia, was not included in the proxy material but was simply read at the annual meeting. The resolution has been resubmitted to the company and will, presumably, appear on 1974 proxy material.

Of the 21 companies originally designated by the churches as this year's targets, companies with South African operations remain the most numerous. The toughest resolutions, however, were reserved for six companies operating in the Portuguese territories and Namibia (South West Africa).

Resolutions demanding withdrawal from Namibia have been filed by various church agencies with **Phillips Petroleum, Getty Oil** and **Standard Oil of California.** A similar resolution filed with Phillips last year won 4.2 per cent of the shareholder vote, permitting it, under SEC rules, to be submitted again by the company. The United Church of Christ later announced it would also refile with **Continental Oil Company.**

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## African Oil *continued*

their solid stance against Israel is the oil embargo imposed by Arab producers against South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal. As the Cabinda agreement shows, the embargo was fated to be less than successful as regards Portugal. An Arab minister acknowledged that it would also be difficult to ensure that South Africa was blocked too, because the oil was in the hands of multinational corporations once it left the Arab states.

Reaction to the embargo announcement in South Africa was swift but tempered. An editorial in the *Rand Daily Mail* reflected, "Well, what South Africa has feared for the past 15 years has at last happened. A total oil boycott has been declared against us and our allies—ironically just at a time when the Arab producers look like easing their restrictions on European countries. . . . One must add that there is no need for panic. The situation may be serious, but it is not desperate. . . ."

The *Mail* continued, "We shall need an effective strategy of our own. Part of this counterstrategy should be to endeavour to present a joint front with the Black states in our midst—Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana—who are threatened just as much as we are by the boycott. . . ." (November 29, 1973.)

But the BLS countries, long embarrassed at being considered mere satellites of powerful South Africa, refused to join South Africa's "front" against the Arabs, even after one of South Africa's Black homeland leaders, Chief Lucas Mangope of Bophutatswana, urged their cooperation. The boycott "is South Africa's problem," retorted Lesotho's Minister of Finance, Commerce and Industry.

By the end of the year, South Africa had cut Botswana's oil supplies by 30 per cent. (*Times of Zambia*, January 2, 1974.) While representatives of the BLS countries were talking to the Arabs, trying to ensure vital oil supplies, there was talk of concern for Botswana's entire economy, and Swaziland's vital tourist industry was in a notable slump because it depends on tourists from South Africa who now do not have enough gasoline for weekend jaunts. (Johannesburg *Star*, December 22, 1973.)

The Black and white nations of southern Africa are not the only ones that have been suffering on the Continent. *Africa Confidential* (January 18, 1974) predicts that the most fragile of the African economies will be the worst affected. And the African states themselves have been among the first to acknowledge this.

A plea to the Arabs not to let their African brothers suffer for their political solidarity was the subject of an editorial in the *Pioneer* of Ghana (November 14, 1973.) "The current 'oil politics,'" the paper's editors wrote, "though ostensibly directed against the West . . . would hit African countries hardest." A new round of African-Arab talks followed this plea, echoed in newspapers across the Continent. Ghana sent a delegation to Libya to try to ensure supplies, and the *Times of Zambia* reported that a three-man Arab team had promised a regular supply of crude oil for Zambia's Indeni refinery. Even Sierra Leone, after contracting with the Nigerians for crude oil for the Freetown refinery, was faced with the possibility that a shortage of gasoline for transport would keep the crude in Nigeria.

But nations with neither oil of their own nor refining capabilities seemed to be left out in the cold. By the middle of November, food costs had risen because the price of gasoline had shot up (*West Africa*, November 19, 1973) and cocoa farmers were expected to suffer because of a general decline in world economic activity. *West Africa* reported (November 26, 1973) that the USSR, which supplies Ghana with oil in return for cocoa, had reduced its order for the season that began in October, from 30,000 to 20,000 tons. In addition, the oil shortage also posed the possibility that Africa would not have enough fertilizer for the next planting season. International fertilizer producers declared *force majeure* in late 1973, thus rendering null and void all current contracts. (*Times of Zambia*, November 27, 1973.)

Even oil-rich Nigeria has not been immune from shortages. This African nation, which produces 2.3-million barrels of oil a day, now faces a gasoline shortage, stemming from insufficient refining capacity. With only one refinery, at Port Harcourt, Nigeria produces 90 per cent of the nation's requirements. Some experts believe the most populous nation in Black Africa may soon have to import as much as 20 to 30 per cent of its gasoline at skyhigh prices if domestic consumption continues to grow at the present rate. (*Christian Science Monitor*, January 18, 1974.)

*The Ottawa Journal* (December 15, 1973) described the African nations' plight when it pointed out, "The rise in the underdeveloped countries' oil bill will just about wipe out the whole official aid effort of the United States, equal to 25 per cent of the foreign currency that the rich world now hands over to the poor."

In Africa, the jest was that the money allocated to a new African development bank devised by the Arabs—another part of the payoff for African-Arab solidarity—would have to be sent right back to the Arabs to pay for oil. Reporting from Nairobi, *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent Henry S. Hayward wrote, "Concern persists in African circles about the unilateral 70 per cent increase in oil announced by the Arabs. This boost is already causing retail price increases in petroleum products in African countries. And the fear is that this soon will affect other prices, too." (December 12, 1973.)

The development bank negotiated by the Arabs and Africans will be capitalized initially at $117 million. Such a bank continues a process begun several years ago by Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi, who first attempted to use oil monies to win African friends.

*African Development*, a London-based business monthly, sniped at the initial ceiling on the development bank. Citing the "high price of Arab friendship," the magazine's editors counseled readers to compare the monies offered by the Arabs with the World Bank's commitment for more than $1 billion next year. (January 1974.)

The question of recompense was stated perhaps most bluntly in an editorial in *The Liberian Age* (November 20, 1973), which charged that "most Arabs, except for those in North Africa, have shown nothing but indifference to the Liberation Cause on the African Continent. . . . Israel carried out a big diplomatic offensive in Africa to win friends; though a small country, she never hesitated to offer aid and technical assistance in the field of farming, medical training and paramilitary training. Many African countries are grateful to Israel for her assistance; but of course, no one could stomach her arrogance and obvious expansionist scheme.

"Africans know the Arabs only through the Lebanese and Syrian traders who, in any case, export the bulk of their earnings back into the Middle East. We think the time is ripe that the Arabs be reciprocal and identify themselves with our needs and aspirations. Let them pour some of that oil money into Africa."

## Foreign Investors Keep a Close Watch On Nigeria's Indigenization Program

In mid-January, the Wall Street *Journal* reported that the Republic of Zaire was nationalizing its oil industry. (January 16, 1973.) Although the Zairean announcement caused little stir, it is one of the latest pieces of an evolving story that is taking place all over Africa.

The impact of Zaire's nationalization on foreign companies was expected to be minimal since there are no petroleum refineries in the country nor is there any current onshore oil production. At the time of the announcement, the Associated Press reported from the capital, Kinshasa, that a new state-owned company, Petrozaire, would take over all distribution properties of the Royal Dutch-Shell group, **Texaco, Mobil Oil,** British Petroleum and Petrofina S.A. of Belgium. **Gulf Oil Corporation,** operator of Zaire's only major oil production facility, reported it had received no word from the government regarding a field that is expected to produce around 25,000 barrels daily sometime this year. (Wall Street *Journal*, January 16, 1974.)

Earlier, announcing Zaire's future oil prospects, the Kinshasa daily *Elima* reported (November 29, 1973), "Research and exploration indicate deposits that will soon surpass [Zaire's] present needs. Thus, not only will our country be able to cover its own motor-fuel needs, but then we will be able to sell the product of our wells outside."

Texaco and the Royal Dutch-Shell group recently announced a joint venture for exploration of 136 million acres onshore in Zaire. This venture is not expected to be involved in the nationalization.

Although government takeovers usually attract considerable interest in economic circles, most attention these days is focused on Nigeria, where an indigenization plan is in full swing. Indigenization programs—Ghana, Gabon and others have them—attempt to deal with both ownership and employment, encouraging increased African participation in both areas. Businesses involved in indigenization programs, however, remain in private hands.

The feeling among most observers (*Black Enterprise*, December 1973) is that Nigeria's indigenization plan deserves close watching because "if the Nigerians can't manage it, nobody can." These observers note that Nigeria's oil production—about two million barrels per day—makes it easier for the country to risk a drop in efficiency while new owners adjust to their tasks.

Nigeria's regulations on indigenization date back to 1972. At that time, the government listed various types of industry that either had to be wholly owned by Nigerians or in which indigenous ownership had to reach at least 40 per cent. The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, as the rules were called, is slated to take full effect at the end of March.

In November, with the effective date looming less than four months away, *West Africa* (November 26, 1973) reported that the pace of indigenization was moving slowly. Many affected firms were not yet sold to Nigerians, the magazine reported. The *West Africa* report further noted that the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board, set up to carry out the transfer of foreign-owned business to local hands, had limited its activity mainly to introducing "potential buyers to potential sellers." (After the March 31 deadline, the board will be empowered to effect transfers if it finds that owners are not making genuine efforts to sell.)

Nigerian Government officials have emphasized all along that indigenization is not synonymous with nationalization. They say Nigeria will still welcome those industries that are willing to adhere to the new rules. They also feel that many foreign owners of businesses in the service, distribution and light manufacturing sectors—those affected by the decree—will simply sell out and buy into businesses where foreign ownership is not restricted.

Government calls to the public to buy shares in foreign-owned firms are not always heeded. In Liberia, it is admitted, the large number of shares on offer are not being snapped up by Liberians. The late President Tubman forcefully urged his countrymen to buy shares, but many, having complied, simply made rapid resales. (*Africa*, December 1973.)

Besides Nigerian indigenization, the other major recent development in the general area of Africanization came in Zambia. Last August, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda announced that Zambia would redeem bonds that the state held for its 50 per cent of the Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines and Roan Consolidated Mines, thus giving the state effective control of the industry for the first time. (*Africa*, December 1973.) In effect, the move means that the government can revise questions of taxes, exchange controls and recruitment without the mining firms' having what amounts to a veto. According to the decree, non-Zambians will no longer be operators and sales representatives of the nation's copper mines, Zambia's biggest source of revenue.

Until this move, management and sales services for Nchanga had been supplied by Anglo-American and RST under 10-year contracts. Roan Consolidated has been managed and partially owned by **American Metal Climax.** Kaunda charged that the companies sent all monies out of the country and put nothing back to provide for expansion.

Management agreements (such as the ones described above) have been common in Africa. Newly independent countries have often entered into partnership with expatriate concerns. These agreements have often been criticized as benefiting the expatriate company while enabling it, as a minority shareholder, to duck responsibilities.

Kaunda's announcement came shortly before the nonaligned conference in Algiers. At that meeting a resolution was adopted affirming the right of developing countries to nationalize foreign industry and to pay indemnities however they choose.

While Nigeria and Zambia, each in its own way, were coming to grips with the task of Africanizing their economies, they, and other countries, were also actively seeking more foreign investment. Even Zaire, despite its recent nationalization moves, is still hospitable to foreign investment. Recently President Mobutu traveled to Britain as part of a move to develop ties with other industrialized nations besides Belgium. (London *Times*, December 11, 1973.) It was reported at the time of Mobutu's trip that the Zairean leader was particularly anxious to encourage British investment.

Present British investment is worth about $50 million—with the largest share accounted for by Unilever. During a speech, Mobutu praised Unilever's Zairean operations. All in all, Mobutu left an impression that British interests would be largely unaffected by Africanization measures announced by Mobutu in November. These included the progressive takeover of non-Zairean interests in copper and diamond mining and in foreign plantations.

Somalia (*Africa*, November 1973)—a country founded on Marxist principles—reported it was considering new ways of attracting foreign private investment. The country's present investment code, which restricts the right of transfer from the country of profits in any one year to 15 per cent of capital initially invested in a business, was written in 1968. According to the report, an improved balance-of-

payments picture may allow for easing of repatriation rules.

The Ivory Coast, a country long known for its receptivity to foreign investment, recently made it clear that no changes in its policy were forthcoming. In a speech in London, Konan Bedie, Ivory Coast minister of finance, noted that foreign investment in the Ivory Coast was given every encouragement. Some 50,000 expatriates live in the Ivory Coast and there will be no "authoritarian" replacement of foreigners by local people, Bedie said. (*West Africa*, November 12, 1973.)

Not nearly so cordial an attitude to foreign capital is found in Senegal, another French-speaking African country. Recently President Léopold Senghor warned Frenchmen that their "honeymoon" in his country was over. Senghor's announcement came in a speech in which he also announced the beginning of a policy called "participating socialism." Under the policy, Senghor said localization of work would begin immediately. (Africa Institute *Bulletin*.) Senegal also announced that it would levy special taxes on companies employing foreign workers.

## Aid to Poor Nations Jeopardized By Congress' Rejection of IDA Funding

The prospect for increasing or even maintaining the present level of aid to Africa's poorest nations grew increasingly dim as the U.S. House of Representatives in late January rejected proposed U.S. participation in replenishment of the International Development Association, the soft-loan arm of the World Bank.

IDA's money derives from the subscriptions of developed countries. This means that failure of the U.S. to appropriate its share of the funding could prove disastrous to World Bank aid plans.

IDA loans are extended for 50 years with 10 years of grace. They carry service charges (¾ of one per cent), but recipients are not charged interest. The U.S. share of the total IDA loan complement (about $4.5 million for the next three years) was supposed to be $1.5 billion. Nearly 112 countries belong to IDA, but the U.S. obviously is of paramount importance to the bank's health. U.S. officials at the September World Bank meeting in Nairobi negotiated a reduction of U.S. contributions to IDA, from 40 per cent down to 33 per cent of the total.

According to a recent statement by Robert S. McNamara, President of the World Bank and of IDA, IDA is the major source of development assistance for some 21 countries classified by the U.N. as "least developed." These include such African areas as Niger, Upper Volta, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal and Chad, the nations composing the Sahel Zone of West Africa where one of the worst droughts in history is still ravaging people, crops and cattle.

Upon learning of the congressional rejection of the IDA proposal, McNamara said, "I cannot believe it was the intent of the Congress to abandon agreement on a fourth replenishment for IDA at a time when the need of developing nations is greater than ever."

According to McNamara, a major part of the proposed increase in the U.S. contribution to IDA (from $320 to $500 million per year) has been eroded by inflation in recent years. McNamara also noted that the United States' total development effort today ranks 14th among the world's 16 principal donor countries and in relation to its national income is only one-tenth of what it was 25 years ago.

The lack of U.S. interest in IDA is generally attributed to an increasing concern in Congress for inflation and commodity shortages in the U.S. (*African Development*, January 1974.) It is also noted by some observers that the majority of congressmen are interested in such projects as IDA only to the extent that they can be used as levelers to achieve American objectives in international financial negotiations.

# West Africa

## News from Nigeria Confirms Boom

In November, the Central Bank of Nigeria released first-half statistics that underscored the country's continuing prosperity. According to the report, the West African giant not only continued to score gains in the oil sector but managed to reverse a "persistent downtrend" in the non-oil sectors of the economy. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, November 14, 1973.)

According to the bank's study, non-oil exports rose by about 300 per cent over the year earlier. Nigeria's total foreign trade for the first half was $2.187 billion, up almost 22 per cent from the previous year's first half. Crude petroleum exports accounted for about 80 per cent of the country's total exports in the period.

The picture was not as rosy as it might have been, however. Drought conditions throughout West Africa had adverse effects on the production of cocoa, cotton and groundnuts in Nigeria, as well as in other West African nations. Short supplies, coupled with an unusual rise in the demand for agricultural export commodities, led to an increase in world prices. But while increased production of cotton and groundnuts—Nigeria's major export crops from the disaster area—allowed the nation to cash in on the higher prices, agricultural output was still far below expectations. (*Afriscope*, December 1973.) The Central Bank said the full effects of the drought on agriculture have yet to be fully assessed.

The bank's first-half report also showed that Nigeria more than doubled its reserve holdings. Latest figures put total reserves at about $349.4 million, compared to about $137.2 million in the year earlier.

The Sahelian drought took its toll on coffee from the Ivory Coast, also. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has predicted that total African coffee production would drop by about five per cent during the 1973-74 year—mostly because the loss of drought-damaged crops in the Ivory Coast offset a slight increase in Angola's harvest.

The Ivory Coast is expected to produce about four million bags of coffee, down 20 per cent from the year earlier. Kenya, another coffee producer, is expected to produce about 950,000, a decline from the year earlier when production topped one million bags.

In the midst of an increased demand for commodities, the world's coffee producers have decided to withhold from the market about 10 per cent of the usual annual production, in an effort to raise prices. *African Development's* commodities reporters have predicted (October 1973) that the plan, plus the predicted 1973-74 deficit, should help prices to recover. The African coffee-producing countries' major priorities are recouping losses from dollar devaluations and raising the price of African Robusta coffee to meet that of the Arabica coffee more favored by buyers.

### Dahomey

• Establishing and expanding small and medium-size African businesses is the purpose of an U.S. AID fund set up last year for the Entente Council of Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger and Togo. AID made a total of $7.5 million available to the Council with the intent of distributing $1 million to each of the Entente countries and developing the remaining part of the loan into a revolving fund. (*To the Point*, October 6, 1973.)

### Ghana

• Ghanaians have expressed concern about the unfair interests of expatriates in their country's resources. The Ghana Timber Marketing Board last fall appealed to the government to reconsider some of its timber concession agreements with big expatriate firms. General manager of the Timber Marketing Board, P.E.K. Boateng, declared that the potential of Ghanaian loggers was not acknowledged and that the machinery of local timber producers was unused for lack of government concessions. Boateng urged greater cooperation between

Ghanaian and overseas investors in sawmills, ply mills and veneer plants. (*West Africa*, October 15, 1973.)

Ghanaian chiefs, also concerned about the timber business, asked the government to set a quarterly quota for timber exports and to require timber merchants to replace any trees felled for export. The chiefs pointed out that not only are trees rotting by the side of the road while awaiting transport to seaports but also that the overabundance of cut trees has caused a shortage of timber for local use and has inflated local prices. (*West Africa*, October 15, 1973.)

• In a joint venture with Agrob of Munich, the Ghanaian Government recently opened Saltpond Ceramics, which will make wall tiles and other products. The West German Reconstruction Loan Corporation provided about $2 million in a loan toward total costs of about $2.5 million. Plans for Saltpond Ceramics include production of insulation and dinnerware. This expansion would involve an additional investment of $4 million and an increase in the labor force from 200 to 300 people. (*West Africa*, December 17, 1973.)

• Ghana will establish a $2.8-million satellite communications project to improve the country's telecommunications. A Japanese firm has been engaged to supervise construction of the project, which will be sited 17 miles north of Accra, the capital of Ghana. It is reported that a number of Ghanaians have already been trained for positions at the center. (*West Africa*, October 15, 1973.)

• The International Development Association, soft loan affiliate of the World Bank, has approved a credit of $13 million to help finance a Ghanaian highway project that will rehabilitate and improve trunk-road sections totaling 345 miles.

The trunk roads are located along four major routes in the densely populated southern regions of the country where agricultural activity—transport of cocoa, fish, maize and other foodstuffs—is high.

According to the IDA, Ghana is presently facing the major task of restructuring its economy. In 1960, Ghana's road network was considered the finest in tropical Africa, but during the last decade the 20,000-mile road system has deteriorated. Part of the trunk-road system, totaling about 6,300 miles, is now inadequate to handle increased traffic.

The IDA-financed project will involve widening, base reconstruction and resurfacing of 13 sections of trunks. Total cost of the project is about $19.5 million. The IDA credit will finance the foreign exchange and contribute to local costs. The balance of local costs, about 33 per cent of the total, will be supplied by the Ghanaian Government. The loan is for a term of 50 years, including a 10-year grace period. It will be interest free, but a service charge of ¾ of one per cent will be levied to cover IDA's administrative expenses.

• Ghana continued to show an interest in the development of tourism when the country recently established the Ghana Tourist Development Company to promote investment in projects that would help increase tourism. (*African Development*, January 1974.)

The development company is designed to seek equity participation in joint ventures with Ghanaians as well as with foreign companies. It is also expected that the new organization will assume control of such operations as tourist coaches, duty-free shops and casinos. These were formerly run by the now-defunct Ghana Tourist Corporation.

In 1972, Ghana approved a five-year development plan for the tourist industry. Last year, Ghana earned a total of $6,809,759 in tourism, up from $4,580,976 in 1971. Americans continued to top the list of visitors to Ghana.

• The Ghana Government and the **First International Natura Corporation** (FINCO) have concluded an agreement by which FINCO has been awarded the right to prospect for diamonds in the Birim and Pra River basins. FINCO, a New York-based concern is evidently prepared to invest $25 million for diamond prospecting in the two main rivers. (*African Development*, January 1974.) Ghana will own 55 per cent of the diamond project, and FINCO is committed to developing the diamond area into a tourist center.

## Ivory Coast

• The Ivory Coast may become known for its fine silk, if a Japanese investment pays off. During the next four years, a leading Japanese trading house based in Osaka will invest about $748,000 in Abidjan for everything from the cultivation of mulberry bushes to the drying of silkworm cocoons.

Nichimen Company will first form a subsidiary, Sericultural Industry Company of Ivory Coast, with an interest-free loan from the Overseas Trade Development Association, recently established by the Japanese Government.

If the silkworms adapt to life in Abidjan, Nichimen will consider turning the subsidiary into a joint enterprise with the Ivory Coast Government to create a local silk-spinning plant. (*West Africa*, December 17, 1973.)

• One of the world's largest pineapple processors is the Ivory Coast Pineapple Company (SALCI), which controls a large chunk of the European market. Production of canned pineapple and pineapple juice reached about 120,000 tons in 1973. All but one per cent was exported to France, Italy, West Germany, the Benelux countries, as well as to Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the U.S. Other African nations such as Senegal, Nigeria and Morocco also import canned pineapple products from the Ivory Coast. (*To the Point*, October 6, 1973.)

• During a visit to Great Britain at the end of last year, Finance Minister Konan Bedie spoke about the potential for growth of both Anglo-Ivoirian trade and of British investments in the Ivory Coast. He noted that in the past Britain has played "only a minor part" in his country's foreign trade, buying only 2.8 per cent of Ivory Coast exports and supplying only two per cent of imports. (*Financial Times*, October 30, 1973.)

Lack of trained Ivoirians to fill positions created by the country's expanding economy is another problem for the Ivory Coast. President Felix Houphouet-Boigny proclaimed a 25-per cent rise in the basic guaranteed minimum wage during Independence Day celebrations last October. But as long as the Ivory Coast needs foreign investors to develop the country's industries and agriculture, a wide range of jobs will continue to be filled by expatriates. (*To the Point*, November 17, 1973.)

## Liberia

• Liberia's Roberts International Airport has been selected as the center for a cooperative effort among Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. The airport will become the flight-information center for the three-nation Civil Aviation Technical Commission.

The Commission urged Liberian authorities to provide weather radar for Robertsfield since it has become the center of the meteorological network of the three countries. (Liberian *Star*, January 4, 1974.)

• The Argentinian Government has agreed to participate in development of the cattle industry in Liberia. (Liberian *Star*, December 17, 1973.) According to reports in the Liberian press, Argentina will provide the necessary capital and expertise for the venture and will also train Liberians. No further details of the agreement were disclosed.

• The Liberian Government recently concluded negotiations for the purchase of the controlling interest in Liberia Hotels, Inc., owner of the Ducor Intercontinental Hotel in Monrovia.

Finance Minister Stephen Tolbert disclosed that plans are being made for the renovation of the hotel as well as the addition of facilities necessary to encourage tourism.

Other shareholders in the Liberia Hotels Inc. are **Chase Investment International**, IBEC, **Philadelphia National Bank** and Intercontinental Hotels Corporation. Intercontinental will continue to manage the Ducor. (Liberian *Star*, November 19, 1973.)

## Mali

• Three U.S. oil companies—**Murphy Mali Oil Company, Sunningdale Oils Limited** and **Comoro Exploration Limited**—will prospect for oil in Mali. An agreement authorizing gas and oil exploration for a five-year period with a minimum investment of $500,000 was signed October 27 in Bamako. It is the basis for a long-term association of the companies with the Government of Mali for joint exploitation of any gas and oil discovered. (*West Africa*, November 12, 1973.)

## Niger

• The industrialized nations need uranium and Niger has it. Reserves of natural uranium in Niger's Akhuta fields are estimated at 72,000 tons. Japan currently gets its uranium supplies from the U.S., South Africa and Canada, but it has no direct stake in the producing companies.

However, Japan's Overseas Uranium Resources Development Company will own 25 per cent of a corporation to be set up with the French Atomic Energy Commissariat which will own 55 per cent. The Niger Government will own the remaining 20 per cent.

Over the next five years, Japan and France will contribute to a $100-million project to develop Niger's resources in Akhuta. The uranium will be processed into enriched uranium in the U.S., and Japan has already promised to buy at least 1,000 tons—14 per cent of its total uranium needs—when production starts in 1979. (*To the Point*, October 20, 1973.)

## Nigeria

•**Phillips Petroleum** of Bartlesville, Oklahoma was part of a group that recently discovered a field in Nigeria with a well that the Wall Street *Journal* reported tested at a combined total of 14,000 barrels per day from four zones. (October 29, 1973.)

Phillips has a one-third interest in the new field, with the operator, Nigerian AGIP Oil Company, holding a third and the Nigerian National Oil Company owning a third.

• The Nigerian Government has approved plans for installation of a cement plant by West African Portland Cement Company Ltd., a subsidiary of Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd. (APCM). The new plant will be designed with an initial capacity of 600,000 tons per year and is estimated to cost about $35 million.

The plant is scheduled for completion in 1976. It will be located in the Western State, near where another cement plant is already producing 800,000 tons per year. The Nigerian Government holds 40-per cent interest in these cement works and is negotiating with APCM for construction of plants in other areas of the country. (*West Africa*, November 5, 1973.)

The government also hopes to develop the seafood sector of its economy. Nearly one-quarter of the fish consumed in Nigeria each year is imported. In order to lower domestic prices on fish and save foreign exchange, Nigeria has announced formation of two companies joining with American and Norwegian firms to increase and improve Nigeria's fishing industry.

The American firm, **Continental Sea Food,** will own 35 per cent of the Nigerian National Shrimp Company, which will engage in coastal fishing and shrimping. The Norwegian Akers Trading Company will own 30 per cent of the Nigerian National Fish Company, which will catch and market deep-sea fish. The Nigerian Government will hold remaining shares in both companies. (*West Africa*, November 19, 1973.)

• Prosperous Nigerians are buying more cars, so the government has signed agreements for construction of car-assembly plants with Volkswagen and Peugeot. The French firm has begun to build a plant in Kaduna which is scheduled for completion in 1975. Work on the Volkswagen plant was scheduled to begin in Lagos last April, but rising costs postponed construction. A $7.75-million contract has just been signed with the West German firm Julius Berger to build the 10,000-car-capacity plant. (*West Africa*, December 3, 1973.)

## Senegal

• The European Economic Community is to provide $1 million to help finance a $3-million study of the feasibility of building a dry dock in Dakar, Senegal's capital. Senegal, desirous of creating jobs and increasing its foreign exchange, has long sought to build Africa's biggest dry dock. (*To the Point*, October 6, 1973.)

• A proposed Senegalese rural-irrigation and agricultural-development program received a lift when the country received a $48-million, 25-year loan from China. It was also disclosed that in addition to the interest-free loan, a Chinese technical mission would soon make a West Africa swing, visiting Mali, Mauritania and Senegal, to study problems in construction of the proposed Manatali Dam on the Senegal River.

Senegal has placed a great emphasis on diversifying its agriculture. The country hopes to lessen its dependence on a peanut crop that has not always been as good as hoped.

## Sierra Leone

• A Sierra Leone diamond-mining official warned his government that the country may run out of diamonds in less than three years. *He has advised the government to nationalize the diamond industry* to avoid losing any remaining profits to the expatriates now controlling the mines.

In the 1950s Sierra Leone provided 20 per cent of the world's diamond needs. Now the country provides less than half that amount, although diamonds still account for some 60 per cent of Sierra Leone's export earnings. (*Africa*, September 1973.)

## Togo

• Heavy trucks carry nearly all of Togo's freight from Lomé on the coast to villages up-country and to landlocked African nations farther north. The trucks, as well as tropical storms and droughts, have done their share of damage to Togo's 4,370 miles of roads. Consequently, the International Development Association has approved an $8.7-million credit to the country to help finance a project for road reconstruction and maintenance.

Total cost of the project is estimated at $12.5 million. Plans concentrate on improving roads linking major markets in Togo's south and central regions and include a feasibility study for future road projects.

• According to an Associated Press dispatch from Lomé, President Etienne Eyadéma has taken full control of the Compagnie Togolaise des Mines du Bénin in retaliation for what he claims was an attempt by **W.R. Grace & Company** to kill him in a plane crash on January 24. W.R. Grace owns nearly 20 percent of the phosphate mining operation.

A spokesman from the Togolese mission in New York told **African Update** that the president was not badly injured, but that two Frenchmen and two Togolese on the government's plane were killed.

A New York representative of W.R. Grace said the assassination charge was "obviously untrue." (*Wall Street Journal*, February 5, 1974.) Another company spokesman told **African Update** that Togo was still negotiating with W.R. Grace for full ownership of the phosphate operations. But according to the Togolese mission spokesman, the mines have already been nationalized.

• Togo joined other African nations in breaking relations with Israel and has received a delegation from Libya in an effort to develop its relations with North Africa. After a meeting in Lomé at the end of last year, Togo and Libya announced formation of a common bank, as well as plans for cultural exchanges in the areas of education and entertainment. The University of Benin in Lomé will begin teaching Arabic to encourage future development of Togolese-Libyan contacts. (*Moniteur Africain*, December 27, 1973.)

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# Eastern Africa

## Fear Ethiopian Famine Will Worsen in 1974

As bad as the current famine is in Ethiopia, experts are predicting that the worst is yet to come—probably within the next couple of months. But even as foodstuffs pour into the parched northern region of this ancient empire, and while government employees have been obliged to donate five per cent of their salaries to relief efforts for an indefinite period, Ethiopian officials—perhaps out of national pride, perhaps out of fear of criticism—continue to keep a veil of secrecy over the entire affair. (Christian Science *Monitor*, November 30, 1973; *Africa Research Bulletin*, November 14, 1973.)

U.S. Government aid arrived in Ethiopia in the form of 18,000 tons of corn and wheat; Ethiopia's neighbor to the south, Kenya, came through with 10,000 tons of maize and 10 tons of milk powder. The Canadian International Development Agency, by the end of December, had contributed $1.55 million, mainly for purchase of foodstuffs. Donations from the British totaled $230,000, from the West Germans, almost $100,000. One relief coordinator estimated that some $25 million would be needed by June in order to avert a "real" catastrophe.

With government reluctance to discuss the issue, figures are hard to come by. An October 23, 1973 report, cited by the *Africa Research Bulletin*, maintained that 1,000 people were dying weekly at government-run famine camps. A United Nations report estimates that between 50,000 and 100,000 people have died of starvation, since the drought began. In some areas, the drought has affected harvests for three years, in other areas, for seven. The Ethiopian situation is now seen as the eastward extension of the drought gripping the Sahelian countries of West and Central Africa.

• The British economic magazine *African Development* reports (December 1973) that East Africa's regional airline, long beset by financial difficulties, is beginning to recover, thanks to a tough management team contracted from **Eastern Airlines.** New top management appointments, vastly improved accounting procedures and negotiations to reschedule the airline's biggest outstanding debt, all form parts of East African Airways' improving picture.

The airline—owned by the Governments of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda—owes the British Aircraft Corporation almost $11 million for Super VC-10s; nothing has been paid on this debt for three years. The British firm has agreed to sign a rescheduling contract extending payments for another five years.

After months of probing, numerous management changes and a 13 per cent staff cut, East African's new chairman, Arnold Kilewo, sees inflation as the airline's real remaining enemy. (*Africa*, November 1973.)

East African Airways first approached Eastern Airlines back in 1972, when too-rapid expansion and management problems made profit prospects look particularly dismal. One priority set by the Eastern team was to increase the airline's capital to $10 million. Far Eastern and New York expansion have been postponed. The airline, currently operating its not-yet-paid-for VC-10s (two on credit, two leased), is said to be considering the purchase of jumbo aircraft in order to stay competitive and perhaps turn the profits corner.

### Ethiopia

• Ethiopia, which now has two telephones for every 1,000 inhabitants (one of the lowest telephone ratios in the world), has received a $21.4-million development credit from the World Bank to improve its telecommunications system. The Ethiopian project would install automatic telephone lines and manual switchboards and would extend the local cable-distribution networks.

Difficult topography and scarcity of good all-weather roads make it imperative to link the ancient empire's remote areas by telephone so agricultural marketing and distribution can be coordinated. Also, manufacturing, tourism and commerce are making increasing demands on national and international telecommunications.

The loan, announced in late November, will be interest-free, except for ¾ of one per cent service charge, and will be repayable in 50 years, including a 10-year grace period.

### Kenya

• As the price of beef throughout the world skyrockets, Kenya, perhaps more than any other African nation, is intensifying efforts to develop its domestic cattle industry. A $36-million aid project, expected to be approved this month, could make the East African country a major beef exporter.

The proposed livestock project is being undertaken by the World Bank's aid arm, the International Development Association, together with the U.S., Britain and Canada, and would enable Kenya to develop the 80 per cent of its land that is suitable only for raising cattle.

The project should increase Kenya's beef production by 50 per cent in the next decade. According to Dan Campbell, marketing adviser to the Kenya Meat Commission, the additional meat will probably not go to meat-shy Europe. "We are quite happy with the markets that we have and they are already crying out for more. Besides, it gives Kenya a degree of political prestige to be exporting to places like Libya, the Middle East and Zambia," he said. (*To the Point*, October 20, 1973.)

Of the total project cost, the IDA is putting up $21.5 million; the remaining $14.2 million comes from Canada, the U.S. and Britain, according to a U.S. Government representative to the World Bank.

• A relatively new exploration company, **Oceanic Exploration** of Denver, Colorado, will begin searching for oil off the southeast coast of Kenya within the next three months, a company official told **African Update.** Exploration has already begun in the onshore portion of the five-year-old company's 6,900-square-kilometer concession. The four-year license to explore is being operated by the company's subsidiary, Oceanic Exploration (East Africa) Ltd.

Another concession—offshore Cameroun—was announced last spring by the company, which has various oil interests concentrated in independent Africa, particularly Ghana, Mauritania, Nigeria, Gabon, Sudan and Madagascar. Oceanic has applied for an exploration license off Somalia, north of Kenya.

• Various new exchange-control regulations, designed to encourage the sale of shares to Kenyans by foreign firms, went into effect at the beginning of November, the Central Bank of Kenya has announced. The new regulations cover local borrowing by foreign-controlled companies and nonresidents. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, November 14, 1973.)

• **General Motors** is currently competing for a concession to join the Government of Kenya in a commercial vehicle-assembly plant, the company has confirmed. The venture is still under discussion, the Kenyans having not yet responded to a proposal submitted by GM.

According to a report in the *Financial Times* of London (December 4, 1973), the plant, which will assemble trucks and minibuses, is scheduled to be ready for production by the end of 1974 and is expected to produce 2,700 vehicles by 1975. The Kenyan Government has received a number of proposals for such a plant.

*Financial Times* reporter John Worrall says Kenyan Government participation will be an initial 49 per cent, the balance coming from the company that wins the concession, the usual arrangement "when industries of vital importance to the economy are set up in Kenya." One of the conditions laid down by the government in discussion with motor manufacturers seeking this concession is that they must inaugurate a training center for African personnel. In return for this, the company will be allowed to import specialized technical experts.

According to a GM spokesman, the Government was also expected to insist on a certain percentage of "local content," that is, parts that have been made in Kenya.

General Motors' assembly plant in Zaire is just now nearing completion. The company has been assembling automobiles in South Africa since 1926. GM also sells kits to firms elsewhere in Africa for assembly by independent operators.

Currently, there are no vehicle-assembly plants in Kenya.

• The **Gillette Company**, producer of safety razors and blades, will soon open a blade-manufacturing plant in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital. According to a Gillette spokesman, the new factory will make both carbon and stainless blades and will be known as Interproducts Kenya Limited. (*African Development*, September, November 1973.)

Gillette has another manufacturing subsidiary in South Africa. In 1972, foreign operations (except Canada) accounted for 51 per cent of the company's net income.

• Kenya has one of the strongest economies on the continent, and one indication of this is the declining share of agriculture in the gross national product. (*To the Point*, October 6, 1973.) The percentage of agriculture in the Kenya GNP declined from 38 per cent in 1961 to 34 per cent in 1969. Nevertheless, the agricultural sector continues to grow in dollar value. Production in 1973 is expected to exceed the previous year's level by $57 million, or more than 20 per cent. (*To the Point*, January 12, 1974.)

Statistics released in Nairobi show that for the first seven months of 1973, the deficit in Kenya's overall balance of trade was $29 million, compared with $89 million for the same period in 1972. Foreign-exchange reserves have reached the highest level ever, now standing at $300 million, enabling the government to relax restrictions on imports.

The sector that did not produce in 1973 was tourism because of a significant reduction in the number of visitors to the East African nation. The decline had been predicted because of turmoil in Uganda and the closing of that neighbor's borders. Most tourists usually combine visits to the two countries during their East African trips.

### Mauritius

• Mauritius, in the Indian Ocean, has received a grant of almost $8 million from Britain to develop its Port Louis harbor. In the Export Free Zone, 40 new applications from industrialists, many of them foreigners, have been approved. They will treble the number of enterprises in the area. (*To the Point*, January 12, 1974.)

### Uganda

• The London *Times* (November 10, 1973) reports that Uganda has received a large consignment of Soviet arms, the first such shipment since the unpredictable General Idi Amin seized power three years ago last month. Delivery followed the visit of a Soviet general to the East African nation earlier in 1973. Unofficial sources at the Kenyan port Mombasa, where the Russian cargo vessel delivered the goods, said the consignment included 50 light tanks and seven helicopters.

• Ninety Ghanaian teachers arrived in Uganda in the fall to fill vacancies made by departed Asian and British teachers in secondary schools and teacher-training colleges. As initiator of a contract for technical assistance, whereby the two nations would exchange experts and advisers, Uganda made the first request of the West African nation. (*Barclays International Review*, September 1973.)

There is no particular surplus of Ghanaian teachers, according to a Ugandan spokesman. "It's just a matter of when a brother is in need. . . ."

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## Northern Africa

### Libya-Tunisia Merger Proves Short-Lived; Pact Dissolves Shortly After Its Disclosure

Libyan Head of State Muammar al-Qaddafi woke up from his longtime dream of North African unity last month to find that his latest bedfellow, Tunisia, had walked out during the night. (New York *Times*, January 17, 1974.) It was the second rebuff for the 31-year-old Libyan leader, who has been criticized as a religious fanatic, coming as it did less than six months after the deadline for Libyan-Egyptian unification passed without notice, that merger having been quietly dropped. (*Africa Confidential*, January 18, 1974.)

Both Tunisia and Egypt had gone so far as to sign agreements in principle favoring confederation, but the idea cooled for both countries and referenda that would have sounded out local opinion were postponed indefinitely.

Tunisia, like Egypt, is dissimilar in many ways to its oil-rich neighbor. Moderately pro-western and in favor of a negotiated settlement with Israel, Tunisia currently suffers a foreign debt exceeding $1 billion, has five million inhabitants and few natural resources. Libya's labor shortage and surplus revenue seemed to make the federation mutually advantageous, even though Tunisia would have been abandoning its traditional "Maghreb state" partner, Morocco, in joining Libya. According to some reports, the third Maghreb nation, Algeria, was to have been included in the initial confederation. (*To the Point*, December 1, 1973.)

As tension built in the Tunisian capital, political gossip began to call the merger a plot in which Colonel Qaddafi took advantage of the ailing 70-year-old Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, "not so alert as he used to be" (New York *Times*, January 18, 1974), perhaps with an eye toward acceding to the helm of both countries upon the Tunisian leader's demise. Bourguiba would have been president of the new Arab Islamic Republic, the name for the now-defunct Libya-Tunisia confederation.

Libya evidently took the latest blow to Arab unity on the chin, making no immediate comment. Libyan radio, monitored in Tunis, for example, continued to use the designation Arab Islamic Republic in its broadcasts. (New York *Times*, January 16, 1974.)

### Algeria

• Due to the rapid growth of its oil and gas industry, Algeria is reportedly considering ordering as many as 23 methane and oil tankers. (*To the Point*, October 6, 1973.) The tankers evidently would be used to transport natural gas from Algeria to the U.S. and to Western Europe.

• According to a new publication, *Africa Briefing International*, Sonatrach, Algeria's state-owned energy company, has canceled a contract to sell large quantities of liquefied natural gas to **El Paso Natural Gas Company.** The American firm has another contract with Sonatrach that is unaffected.

Algeria gave no official reason for the cancellation, but conjecture has it the government wants a higher price than was originally negotiated.

## Egypt

• The International Development Association, an affiliate of the World Bank, recently approved a credit of $400,000 to Egypt to help finance technical advisory services necessary for preparation of engineering work on a fertilizer project.

According to the IDA, the credit will finance the first phase—about 12 months—of the services of a consulting firm that will serve as Egypt's technical adviser for the project. The IDA had earlier announced a $5-million credit to help finance an Egyptian population project.

The population project, the IDA said, would provide for constructing, equipping and furnishing of 22 general health centers, 12 clinics, three centers for training nursing teachers and three centers for in-service training. The total cost of the project is estimated at about $10.5 million.

Egypt's current population is about 35 million. If its present annual growth rate continues, the population will double by the year 2000. "This will add strains on a country whose population density quadrupled during the last century and which stands today at 950 persons per square kilometer of inhabitable land, a density rivaled only by two or three other countries in the world," the IDA said.

• President Anwar Sadat of Egypt has recently decided that the SUMED oil pipeline, on the drawing tables since 1971, will no longer be financed by a western consortium. (*African Development*, December 1973.)

According to recent press reports, Sadat has said he will get Arab backing for the project, which was originally proposed as an alternative revenue earner to the Suez Canal. The western consortium was to be composed of French, English, West German, Dutch, Belgium, Greek and Japanese interests.

After negotiating with a variety of Arab states, Egypt finally arrived at a 50-50 agreement with Kuwait for financing SUMED. The proposal for SUMED first came up in 1967 after the Israelis seized the Suez Canal in the Six Day War of that year.

## Libya

• Oil-rich Libya, in addition to amassing nearly $3 billion in gold and currency reserves each year, is plowing large amounts of money into economic and social developments, with a heavy emphasis on agriculture.

The November issue of *Africa* magazine notes that Libya's oil revenues—a staggering $2 billion per year—have enabled the country to concentrate on development. The Libyans have reportedly been experimenting with cloud seeding, and the country has established an Atomic Energy Authority that is charged with harnessing nuclear energy for use in farming. Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi has already said he aims to make Libya as green as it was during the time of the Romans.

*Africa* also conjectures that Libya's battle with oil companies operating in that country will eventually prove self-defeating—"tantamount to killing the goose that lays the golden egg." The magazine notes, however, that this point appears to be remote, pointing out that Libya marked the fourth anniversary of its revolution by taking control of 51 per cent of all foreign oil firms.

## Morocco

• The World Bank announced last December that it had approved a $29-million loan to the Government of Morocco to help finance a highway project.

The project, the World Bank reported, aims at rehabilitation and modernization of the country's important roads, including construction of part of the Casablanca-Rabat highway, improvement of various road sections and replacement of highway-maintenance equipment.

The World Bank said the road project was in line with the Bank's current lending strategy because it is geared toward institution-building and improving road transportation for both agricultural exports and tourism. Total cost of the project is estimated at $43 million; the World Bank loan covers 67 per cent of these costs.

In September, a U.S. AID loan agreement for $10 million was signed in Rabat. The loan, repayable over 40 years, will finance the import of American goods for small and medium water projects. It was the fifth U.S. AID loan to Morocco since 1968, bringing to $41 million the amount that AID has lent Morocco over the last five years. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, October-November 1973.)

## Sudan

• Sudan Airways has received a loan of $27.5 million from the U.S. Export-Import Bank for purchase of two Boeing jet airliners, the Sudan News Agency reported in Khartoum recently. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, October-November 1973.) The airliners are expected to be delivered in June of this year.

• The International Development Association has approved a $4-million credit for Sudan to meet the Industrial Bank of Sudan's requirements to finance the foreign-exchange component of its investments for a two-year period through 1975. According to the IDA, the credit is essential to enable the Industrial Bank to carry out its projected program of financing industrial development.

Sudan's Industrial Development Bank was established in 1961 and was originally limited to financing private industrial enterprise; it is now allowed to participate in the financing of public-sector projects.

# Central Africa

## Zaire Seeks to Bypass Angola In Shipping Copper to Coast

Zaire's southeastern region, rich in copper, may become even more productive with proposed construction of a transmission line from the Inga hydroelectric generating plant in western Zaire to the country's copperbelt.

Copper is already Zaire's chief export, but production has been somewhat hindered by difficulties in mining the mineral and getting it to the world market.

Financing for the new power project is being supplied in part by a U.S. Export-Import Bank loan of $102.24 million, with a guarantee of an equal-size loan from **First National City** and other banks. Purchases from the U.S. for construction of the power line are expected to amount to nearly $250 million. (New York *Times*, January 16, 1974.)

Getting copper out of Zaire has presented a bit of a political problem for Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko. Crossing the Portuguese territory of Angola is increasingly at odds with Zaire's condemnation of the white-run governments of southern Africa. But now, developments at Lonrho, Ltd. suggest that it is becoming increasingly possible that Zaire may be able to bypass Angola on the way to the coast. (*Africa*, November 1973.)

Litho Moboti, an uncle of the Zaire president, follows Udi Gecaga, son-in-law of Kenya's President Kenyatta, into a key position with Lonrho, the giant pan-African conglomerate with mining and trading interests. Moboti will join the board of Lonrho's 60 per cent-owned Belgian subsidiary, Cominière, and will also become vice-president of a new firm Lonrho is forming in Zaire. Cominière has assets in Africa ranging from motor dealerships and agricultural machinery to insurance and travel agencies.

The new Zairean company Lonrho is forming is expected to pursue railway and mining interests with a focus on construction of a 1,000-mile railway from Shaba province, formerly Katanga, in the landlocked copperbelt to Banane, a port city located at the mouth of the Zaire River. Such a rail link would allow Zairean copper direct access to a port, without depending on the Angolan transport system. (*Africa*, November 1973.)

## Congo Republic

• In November 1973 the Congo Republic (Brazzaville) announced its withdrawal from the French Community and denounced cooperation agreements signed in 1960 and readjusted in 1963. The decision came after a meeting in Paris between Congolese Foreign Minister Charles David Ganao and French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert. (*West Africa*, November 5, 1973.)

As a result, France has reexamined her policies toward former colonies and is now drawing up new agreements with Gabon and the Congo Republic. Congolese President Marien Ngouabi, commenting on the agreements, said the French awareness of the "realities of the Congo's evolution" was a good indication that a new kind of Franco-Congolese cooperation was now possible. (*To the Point*, January 12, 1974.) Despite a Marxist orientation, the Congo still does much of its trading with the West.

Only four countries remain members of the community created in 1958 by French General Charles de Gaulle—Gabon, the Central African Republic, Senegal and Chad.

## Gabon

• President Omar Bongo of Gabon has made several declarations that will give his country greater control over its resources. At the end of last year, Bongo announced that 10 per cent of the shares of new companies to be established in Gabon will be held by the State. (*African Development*, December 1973.)

Bongo also announced an increase in the price of oil retroactive to October 20, 1973. Prices per barrel of oil vary from region to region in Gabon. But taxes will now be augmented annually on a fixed-percentage basis. Last year, Gabon produced about eight million tons of crude oil. The country's Port Gentil refinery can process only one million tons of oil, but it will be enlarged in 1974 to double its production capacity.

President Bongo has also demanded control of COMUF, the French-owned firm that is mining Gabon's supply of uranium. He said Gabon's uranium belongs to Gabon, not to the French atomic energy commission. (*Jeune Afrique*, December 15, 1973.)

## Rwanda

• The International Development Association, has approved a $3.8-million credit to Rwanda to help finance an agricultural project in the country's northeastern region. Scheduled for completion in June 1979, the project will cost a total of $4.3 million. The difference between the total cost and the IDA loan will be provided by the Government of Rwanda and local participants in the project.

Due to heavy population pressure and a scarcity of arable land, Rwanda has been establishing farming settlements, where improved agricultural methods are supposed to increase production. The project being assisted by the IDA will establish a settlement of 4,250 plots and 120 group ranches for graziers who are prepared to manage their cattle collectively. Two cash crops—groundnuts and coffee—have been selected for cultivation. The project will also include establishment and operation of a bull-breeding ranch.

## Zaire

• Lonrho Ltd. is one of the British firms not expected to be greatly *affected by Zaire's Africanization program. (See* **African Update,** p. 21.) President Mobutu Sese Seko made it clear that the program is aimed mainly at Belgian investors, who don't share enough profits with Zaire, and at Asians, Portuguese and Cypriots, who dominate commercial interests. Mobutu Sese Seko's visits during 1973 to Great Britain, the United States and China are evidence that the President does not wish to discourage all foreign investment. (London *Times*, December 11, 1973.)

British Leyland showed confidence in its relationship with Mobutu by opening its first car-assembly plant in Zaire at the end of last year. The British firm owns 60 per cent of the Zaire National Industry of Leyland Automobiles (INZAL). The Zaire Government and private Zairean investors own the remaining 40 per cent.

Cars produced in the Zaire plant will be cheaper than models assembled in Europe, said an INZAL spokesman. In the past, British Leyland's Zairean subsidiary has manufactured only buses, heavy-duty Land-Rovers and Range Rovers. (*West Africa*, December 3, 1973.)

General Motors' automobile-assembly plant in Zaire is just now nearing completion.

• An American firm, the **Continental Grain Company** of New York City, last June opened a long-planned flour mill in Matadi, Zaire's major port. Continental invested $9 million in the project and plans to finance construction of a malthouse in Zaire's capital city, Kinshasa, at a cost of $15 million.

The Zairean Government holds a minority interest in the flour-mill complex, which is operated by Continental Milling Corporation, a subsidiary of the New York firm. Production of flour in Zaire is expected to save the country $3 million annually in foreign exchange when the mill's production reaches an estimated 160,000 tons per year in 1976. The country should also have enough flour to export to neighboring African countries, once the mill is completed. (*Barclays International Review*, September 1973.)

Foreign investments will also help improve Zaire's air network. Scheduled for delivery to the central African nation in 1974 are the second of two DC-10s from McDonnell Douglas Corporation and three Boeing 737s. A loan of $31.9 million for the purchase was extended by the U.S. Export-Import Bank; additional financing for the $70.8-million package will come from U.S. commercial banks and non-U.S. lenders. (Wall Street *Journal*, July 17, 1973.)

Some observors think the jets will never be delivered unless the Zairean Government meets outstanding debts of Air Zaire, which is so chronically short of money that routine repairs at airports outside Zaire have to be paid for in cash. (*African Development*, December 1973.)

With or without the new planes, Air Zaire plans to inaugurate this year service to Peking via the Persian Gulf. Mobutu discussed arrangements for the regular flights to China during his visit to the Orient in 1973. Air Zaire will be the second African airline, following the example of Ethiopian Air Lines, to fly to China. (*Jeune Afrique*, November 10, 1973.)

Another result of Mobutu's Peking visit is the arrival in Kinshasa of 13 Chinese engineers to study possibilities for construction of a "people's palace" in Zaire's capital city. A 15-member Chinese agricultural mission also arrived in Zaire to continue a technical-aid program negotiated with China. (*Moniteur Africain*, January 1974.)

• The Mitsui Bank Ltd. of Tokyo has agreed to acquire a participation in the **First National City Bank** Zaire. A Citibank official noted that it is the first time a U.S. and a Japanese bank have collaborated in Africa in a commercial banking venture. (*West Africa*, November 5, 1973.)

• Brazil has sent trade missions to a number of Black African nations and has entertained Africans visiting Brazil in a determined effort to increase its trade and political influence in Africa. (London *Times*, November 13, 1973.)

Though Zaire is not happy with Brazil's close ties to Portugal, the *African nation will receive a boost for its agricultural sector from a* $14-million Brazilian investment in a new sugar mill. (*Bolsa Review*,

December 1973.) According to sources at the Brazilian Government Trade Bureau in New York, Brazil, which has one of the world's largest sugar industries, will make the mill machinery and set it up in Zaire.

Construction of a new sugar mill will help Zaire meet internal demands for sugar that are estimated as high as 115,000 tons by 1980. Zaire already has two other sugar companies, but together they are expected to produce only 76,000 tons by 1980. (London *Times*, November 24, 1972.)

## Southern Africa

### Guinea-Bissau Statehood Declaration Appears to Have Little Impact on Exxon

It is not yet clear what impact Guinea-Bissau's declaration of statehood last September will have on the only American company doing business there, **Exxon Corporation.**

Exxon has been exploring for oil in Guinea-Bissau since the late 1950s and was, last year, granted a concession to begin deepwater drilling. Although the PAIGC, the liberation force/government, has declared all current corporate contracts null and void, PAIGC officials confirmed to **African Update** that they had not consulted with Exxon about the matter.

The issue of Exxon's involvement in Guinea-Bissau will be raised this spring by the Church Project on U.S. Investment in Southern Africa. That agency has filed a proxy resolution asking that the company suspend operations in Guinea-Bissau until it negotiates new exploration rights with the National Assembly of Guinea-Bissau.

Although Guinea-Bissau has proclaimed its statehood, Portugal is still insisting that it is part of their territories. Yet, Guinea-Bissau has gained entry into a United Nations agency. A secret ballot at the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) biannual conference in Rome recently accepted the newly proclaimed republic as a member. (*Christian Science Monitor*, November 28, 1973.)

Earlier, the U.N. General Assembly voted to recognize Guinea-Bissau's independence. The vote was a strong propaganda victory for the new African nation, but it does not mean that Guinea-Bissau will be admitted to the U.N. Candidates for U.N. membership have to be approved by the Security Council; it is at present expected that Britain and the U.S. would veto Guinea-Bissau's admission. (*Christian Science Monitor*, November 7, 1973.)

Since the declaration of independence, Portuguese troops and liberation forces have continued to clash. Liberation forces say they are ready to meet Portuguese representatives to negotiate a solution for their departure from the country and that they see the country's primary task as completing its liberation. (London *Times*, November 22, 1973.)

### Botswana

• After much controversy and debate, Botswana has begun to build a highway that will give the landlocked country a major access road to independent Africa. Formerly dependent on the white-controlled states around it, the new highway will link Botswana with a northern neighbor, Zambia.

The $14.5-million project, which is being constructed by **Grove International Corporation,** a contracting firm based in New York City, was at one point in danger of being scuttled because critics, among them the South African Government, contended that Botswana lacked a legitimate border with Zambia. Zambia, Rhodesia, Botswana and Namibia (South West Africa) all meet at the Zambezi River.

The Zambia section of the highway has already been built. The two sections of road will be joined by pontoons over the Zambezi River. (*Times of Zambia*, November 24, 1973.)

The road has been financed mainly by a long-term low-interest loan by U.S. AID and, according to the South African press, is proceeding "in spite of opposition from South Africa. . . . Hundreds of refugees from South Africa have crossed to Zambia on the 'Freedom Ferry,' and South Africa fears the new road could be used to bring arms and rebels to within striking distance of South Africa," the Johannesburg *Star* reported from Gaberone, the Botswana capital. (November 10, 1973.) The paper also reported that Botswana's president, Sir Seretse Khama, has stated the road will have nothing to do with infiltration of the south.

### Lesotho

• Early in January an attempt was made to topple Chief Leabua Jonathan's government just four years after his Basutoland National Party came to power during the general elections. The government blamed the opposition Basutoland Congress Party for attacks on five police stations in the northwestern area of Lesotho. (*Rand Daily Mail*, January 8, 1974.)

Reports differed on the number of people killed in the coup attempt. Deaths were estimated to number anywhere from five to 25. (*Rand Daily Mail*, January 11, 1974; Johannesburg *Star*, January 12, 1974.) Widespread arrests and intensive police investigations have apparently prevented a successful revolt. (Johannesburg *Star*, January 19, 1974.)

The BCP was reported to be angry about government interference with plans for the first BCP annual conference in four years. The government says BCP leaders are now hiding on farms outside Lesotho. (Johannesburg *Star*, January 19, 1974.)

### Namibia

• More than 300 people have been arrested in Namibia in what appears to be a police effort to rid the territory of the dissident South West People's Organization (SWAPO) Youth League. On January 13 police set up a roadblock between Windhoek and Rehoboth where the Youth League was planning to hold a meeting. Police arrested 155 people on their way to the meeting for lack of travel documents and insufficient identification.

Among those arrested but later released along with 34 others was D.H. Meroro, national chairman of SWAPO in Namibia. Also in the procession but not arrested was Clemens Kapuuo, chief of the Herero. (Windhoek *Advertiser*, January 14, 1974.)

Early in the morning on January 18 police searched the Ovambo section of the African Katutura township and arrested 186 people. Observers say the police action is not only aimed at cleaning out illegal residents of the township, but is also an attempt to locate documents and office-bearers of political organizations such as the SWAPO Youth League. (Windhoek *Advertiser*, January 18, 1974.)

Besides mass arrests, police also apprehended David Shikomba, fugitive chairman of the Youth League. His arrest after a four-month-long search, as well as the arrests of other SWAPO leaders, has effectively wiped out Youth League leadership. (Windhoek *Advertiser*, January 21, 1974.)

The arrests contrasted with another effort by administration officials to placate Africans in the Ovambo compound. The South African Government will lend Windhoek nearly $6 million to expand and improve the compound that has been the scene of frequent incidents causing near riots and uprisings during the past four years. Expansion plans include provisions for housing 15,000 Blacks. (Windhoek *Advertiser*, January 11, 1974.)

• On the way home from his November visit to the U.S., Herero Chief Kapuuo told a London press conference that Americans "do not exert sufficient pressure on the Government of South Africa to change its policies in Namibia." (*Rand Daily Mail*, December 13, 1973.)

Kapuuo supports the presence of foreign firms in Namibia but said they should increase wages paid to African employees and pay taxes to the U.N. until Namibia has "a government elected by the people of Namibia."

A spokesman for **American Metal Climax** said a case calling for AMAX to pay taxes to the U. N. Council for Namibia was recently dismissed in a San Francisco court. AMAX owns 29.2 per cent of Tsumeb copper mine in Namibia. Descendants of the Max Schott family, which helped found the Tsumeb mine prior to World War I, filed suit against the company last year, challenging the legality of AMAX's presence in Namibia and asking that company taxes be paid to the U.N.

While in New York, Chief Kapuuo discussed Namibia's political status with representatives from AMAX, as well as from another heavy investor in Namibia—**Continental Oil Company. Newmont Mining Corporation,** another concern with important Namibian interests, refused to meet with Chief Kapuuo.

## The Portuguese Territories

• Frelimo liberation forces have denied responsibility for this year's January 9 massacre of 17 Africans in the village of Nhacambo, in the Matara region about 40 miles northwest of Tete. Eye-witness accounts, however, say a band of about 60 Frelimo soldiers attacked Nhacambo's 500 inhabitants with machine guns, mortars and bayonets in retaliation for supporting the Portuguese regime. Most of the village huts were burned to the ground and 31 Africans were hospitalized. (Johannesburg *Star*, January 12, 1974; *Rand Daily Mail*, January 14, 1974.)

The allegation of a Frelimo massacre follows reports of intensified Frelimo attacks on civilian villages. Portuguese authorities claim Frelimo assassinated 258 civilians and wounded another 554 last year. (*Financial Times*, January 11, 1974.)

Meanwhile, Frelimo's accusations of Portuguese atrocities were given added credibility with the first authoritative statement from the Mozambique Roman Catholic Church hierarchy agreeing that Portuguese troops were involved in "incidents" of atrocities in Mozambique. (Johannesburg *Star*, December 22, 1973.) But in a booklet, "Wiriyamu or a mare's nest," published at the end of last year, Portuguese authorities condemned London *Times* reports of an alleged 1972 massacre in Wiriyamu and asserted that the priests who reported the massacre were working for Frelimo. (London *Times*, October 31, 1973; *Rand Daily Mail*, November 5, 1973.)

The two Spanish priests who smuggled accounts of the Wiriyamu massacre out of Mozambique went to Madrid after being released late last year from a Lourenço Marques jail where they were held without trial by Portuguese authorities for nearly two years. Although the priests said they were never badly treated, they claimed that torture of Black prisoners was widespread and brutal. The priests said starvation and beatings were methods commonly used by the Portuguese to force Blacks to admit they had collaborated with Frelimo. (Johannesburg *Star*, December 1, 1973.)

The Portuguese, on the other hand, claim they are so confident of "winning the battle for men's minds" that political offenders at Machava Prison in Lourenço Marques spend only the nights in jail. During the day, prisoners are released to go about their normal business as cooks, gardeners and house servants, the Portuguese claim. They return at night to the jail to continue their "recuperation" program with the Portuguese. (Johannesburg *Star*, December 8, 1973.)

• Some observers believe the liberal position supporting a gradual Portuguese pullout from Africa is growing stronger in Portugal. They see the appointment of General Antonio Sebastião Ribeiro da Spinola to deputy chief of staff for all armed forces as a move in this direction. General Spinola reportedly favors giving the African territories autonomy and eventually independence. (Johannesburg *Star*, January 12, 1974.)

Several massive development projects are being pursued by the Portuguese in Mozambique. Fifty bridges and a stretch of highway nearly 500 miles long, costing a total of $39 million, should be completed in the next four years.

In the southern region of Mozambique, two dams will be constructed to control the flow of southern rivers and irrigate hundreds of acres in the Limpopo Valley. The scheme is second in size in southern Africa to the giant Cabora Bassa dam project and will cost a total of $75 million. (*To the Point*, December 1, 1973.)

Frelimo demonstrated its distrust of Portuguese development plans by allegedly blowing up three trains and an airplane on New Year's Eve. Six people died in a plane reportedly shot down by a Frelimo rocket launcher. (*Rand Daily Mail*, January 4, 1974.) A freight train was derailed by a land-mine explosion on the line to Tete. Two other trains near the Rhodesian border were also derailed by land mines.

Apparently, Frelimo claimed last year it would push its war against the Portuguese south of the Mozambican port, Beira. Indeed, the attack on the busy Rhodesian-Beira railway line is the farthest south Frelimo has ever gone. The line is an artery for Rhodesia to export and import goods and is a popular route for Rhodesian tourists traveling to Mozambique's port city. (*Rand Daily Mail*, January 3, 1974.)

As **African Update** went to press, whites in Beira were reported to be demonstrating against Portuguese army officials for not taking adequate measures to stop advancing Frelimo forces. A white woman was killed near the Rhodesian border the second week in January, drawing attention to the increasing threat of Frelimo attacks. (*Financial Times*, January 21, 1974.)

• Newspapers in London and South Africa have reported a major new oil find by the **Gulf Oil Corporation** off the coast of Cabinda. (London *Observer*, November 25, 1973, *Rand Daily Mail*, November 26, 1973.) Cabinda is an exclave of Angola.

A Gulf representative from the company's headquarters in Pittsburgh, however, denied newspaper accounts of new oil discoveries in Cabinda. He said there was nothing to back up the reports, although he acknowledged that the company has been active in the area for a number of years. (Washington *Star-News*, November 26, 1973.)

The presence of Gulf in Angolan territory has been the subject of disputes with organizations supporting the liberation of Angola from Portuguese rule. (London *Observer*, November 25, 1973.) The company has been a target in the past for shareholder resolutions submitted by the Church Project on U.S. Investments in Southern Africa and this year is being asked by the church coalition to disclose details of the alleged Cabinda oil find.

Gulf is reported to be collaborating with the Portuguese in trying to keep liberation forces from interfering with oil projects in Cabinda. (London *Observer*, November 25, 1973.) Observers differ on their analyses of how active and how successful liberation forces are in Angola. *To the Point*, a South African newsmagazine, reports that the war in Angola reached its peak in 1970 and since then splintering liberation forces have nearly been wiped out. (*To the Point*, January 25, 1974.)

The London *Observer*, however, says secret Portuguese military maps, made available to the newspaper by a deserting Portuguese officer, give evidence that the Movimento Popular de Liberação de Angola (MPLA) is much more successful than Portuguese statements admit. (London *Observer*, November 25, 1973.)

Another account by a Washington *Post* reporter who traveled with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) for 10 weeks said this band of the liberation forces "appeared to move at will in a vast domain of virtually trackless forest and plain." He said the forces "run their own hospitals, schools, military-training camps and collective farms in the forests and administer, apparently effectively, what appears to be a substantial area in eastern Angola." (Washington *Post*, December 23, 1973.)

President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire is also involved in the Cabinda-Gulf affair. *To the Point* reports that Mobutu wants to help liberation forces free Angola from the Portuguese in an effort to promote his popularity as an African leader. (*To the Point*, January 25, 1974.) But the Gulf Oil Corporation has reportedly persuaded Mobutu that pipelines must be constructed to carry oil from offshore discoveries to onshore servicing terminals in northern Cabinda. The pipelines will pass through Zairean territory and will also be used to

transfer oil from a joint **Shell-Mobil** discovery in the strip of Zaire between Cabinda and the rest of Angola. (London *Observer*, November 25, 1973.)

• A federal district judge dismissed an indictment against **Chrysler Corporation** that charged the company with illegally exporting military engines to Portugal without U.S. Government clearance.

The indictment was faulted for not charging Chrysler with "willfully" making the allegedly illegal shipments. The Justice Department has not yet decided whether to appeal the ruling, reword the indictment or drop the case. (Wall Street *Journal*, January 31, 1974.)

Last September, **Libbey-Owens-Ford** Company of Toledo, Ohio was indicted by a federal grand jury on charges of illegally exporting to Portugal bulletproof windows for armored vehicles. Since then, some of the 10 counts in the indictment have been dropped, but the case is still in the courts, according to a company spokesman.

The indictment against Libbey-Owens said the company shipped 2,140 laminated-glass vision blocks for armored personnel carriers to a Portuguese importer in 1970. These items are on a U.S. munitions list, which means that a State Department license is required for exporting. The government has accused Libbey-Owens of not clearing the items and incorrectly labeling them "laminated safety glass" instead of "direct-view vision blocks."

At the time of the indictment, Libbey-Owens stated that company officials believed clearance for export had been obtained and the company did not intend "to circumvent the law or to mislabel the products shipped."

According to government spokesmen, both cases—against Libbey-Owens and Chrysler—developed from a 1971 investigation of a Detroit freight-forwarding company for illegally shipping military parts to Portugal. The investigation also led to the 1972 indictment of two Detroit men and a Portuguese army major for plotting to give Portugal blueprints and a prototype of an armored amphibious vehicle called the XM-706, built by Cadillac Gage, a unit of **Ex-Cell-O Corporation.** (Wall Street *Journal*, September 27, 1973.)

• At the end of 1973, the U.N. General Assembly voted 94 to 14, with 21 abstentions, to approve an African proposal rejecting the credentials of members of the Portuguese delegation who came from African states and provinces.

The resolution was passed after an amendment was added by Tanzania which said the Assembly approved "the credentials of the representatives of Portugal on the clear understanding that they represented Portugal as it exists within its frontiers in Europe."

Portuguese Ambassador Antonio Patricio replied, "The Portuguese delegation wishes to make it clear beyond all possibility of doubt that the members that constitute it represent the Portuguese nation as a whole, and that no member in it represents particularly any specific part or parcel of it." (*Rand Daily Mail*, December 19, 1973.)

• Holland's right-wing opposition parties attacked a government plan to give nearly $3 million to liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique for "humanitarian and development projects" in 1974.

The opposition parties said financial support would stimulate fighting in Portuguese territories and there was no way of checking whether the money was used to buy arms. (Johannesburg *Star*, December 8, 1973.)

## Rhodesia

• As the new year began, the U.S. moved closer to repealing the controversial Byrd Amendment, a two-year-old measure allowing the U.S. to import certain Rhodesian minerals, particularly chrome, in violation of U.N. sanctions against the former British colony.

The Byrd Amendment has already been voted by the Senate, which in December recorded a solid margin of 54 to 37 votes against continuing the much-criticized law. As **African Update** went to press, it was not clear how the measure would fare in the House, although most observers were predicting a close vote.

The Senate vote was seen as a triumph for Senator Hubert Humphrey and Senator Gale McGee; both legislators failed to push a similar measure through the Senate in 1972. According to the Johannesburg *Star*, the Senate vote also represented a "surprising" amount of arm-twisting by the White House and the influence of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who has now publicly stated that Rhodesian trade has severely damaged American diplomatic efforts in independent Africa. (Johannesburg *Star*, December 12, 1973.)

Anti-Rhodesian forces in the Senate hope the solid Senate vote will bolster efforts to persuade congressmen in the House to vote for repeal. Some lobbyists calculate that about 40 votes—out of 435—will have to be swung if the Byrd Amendment is to be repealed. In two previous efforts, liberal forces in the House failed to muster enough support for repeal.

• A **Reynolds Metals Company** subsidiary, Reynolds International Inc., was fined $5,000 after pleading guilty in U.S. District Court in New Orleans to a charge of having violated sanctions against importing from Rhodesia.

The Reynolds unit had been indicted by a federal grand jury on charges that it imported last July from South Africa 197 tons of petalite ore that originated in Rhodesia. The ore is used in making aluminum and was falsely described on customs documents as feldspar of South African origin, the indictment noted.

In addition to the fine, the petalite shipment, valued at $18,000, was retained by the government. (Wall Street *Journal*, November 2, 1973.)

• Rhodesia began the new year with a "Settlers '74" campaign to encourage immigration to the former British colony. Observers say the government's plan to entice skilled white workers stems from the fact that the net inflow of whites in 1973 was the lowest since 1967.

In the first 11 months of 1973 there was a net flow of 2,130 whites into Rhodesia, compared with 8,440 in the same period of 1972. Nearly 7,000 whites left Rhodesia last year, the largest number to emigrate in seven years.

Edson Sithole, publicity secretary for the banned African National Congress, said Africans were not fooled by government claims that increasing immigration means more jobs for Africans. He noted the government was urging Africans to cut their birth rate at the same time it was calling for one million white immigrants. Sithole also pointed out, "Hundreds of Africans are roaming the streets because they are not given the opportunity to train for skilled jobs. Why should the government campaign for immigrants instead of campaigning for the training of Africans?" (*Rand Daily Mail*, January 3, 1974; *Financial Times*, January 1, 1974.)

In crisis-burdened England, meanwhile, the call to Rhodesia was being heeded. An organization with close Rhodesian connections began monitoring its telephone calls during the second week of January and estimated it was receiving 30 calls per hour asking for general information on Rhodesia. (Johannesburg *Star*, January 19, 1974.)

Whites leaving Rhodesia say one reason for their exodus is the increasing danger of attack by liberation forces. The government claims to be winning the war against the liberation forces, but in November 1973 legislation was passed to continue Rhodesia's nine-year-long state of emergency. (London *Times*, November 6, 1973.)

Land mines have destroyed trucks carrying freight in and out of the country along Rhodesia's route to the sea through Mozambique and Malawi (*Rand Daily Mail*, November 27, 1973), and Rhodesian tourists headed for the coast through southern Mozambique have been frightened by recent Frelimo attacks on the railway. (*Rand Daily Mail*, January 3, 1974.)

Gerald Hawksworth, a British land inspector, was released at the end of last year, after nine months' imprisonment in a ZANU prisoner-of-war camp in Tanzania. ZANU is the Zimbabwe African National Union, one branch of the liberation forces fighting in Rhodesia. About the same time, a Central African Power Corporation official, Donald Coles, was kidnaped and beaten before being released by Zambian soldiers along the Rhodesian border. (*Rand Daily Mail*, November 21, 1973.)

In Rhodesia's northeastern war zone, 8,000 people have been moved to government-protected villages in order to create a "no-go" area where security forces could shoot any stranger on sight. Moving the villagers also prevented sympathetic Africans from harboring and

helping soldiers in the liberation forces. (Johannesburg *Star*, January 12, 1974.)

Whites have also said they are leaving Rhodesia because of its uncertain political future. Meetings held between African leaders and Rhodesian government members in the hope of reaching an agreement for settlement with Great Britain appear deadlocked. Prime Minister Ian Smith said in his New Year's broadcast that talks had made some progress "but it was slow." Abel Muzorewa, president of the African National Council, the group that organized the overwhelming African "No" vote on the 1971 settlement terms, told the ANC executive committee, "We have come a long way and everything now depends on Mr. Smith's goodwill and whether he will meet us halfway, as we have met him." (*Rand Daily Mail*, January 14, 1974.)

• Jet Aviation, a Swiss firm that broke U.N. Security Council sanctions against Rhodesia last year by selling the renegade colony three American Boeing jets, has lost its station license in the U.S.

According to State Department officials, loss of the license means the Swiss firm can no longer buy planes or spare parts from U.S. suppliers without strict supervision by the U.S. Department of Commerce.

Some observers say Carl Hirschmann, the Swiss banker who owns Jet Aviation, will create a new company to get around the licensing cut-off.

Jet Aviation bought the three used jets in the U.S. in 1970. In April 1973 the company sold the Boeings, along with $500,000 worth of parts, to Mervyn Eyett, assistant general manager of Air Rhodesia. Eyett claimed to be a Johannesburg businessman buying the planes for a South African company that U.S. officials later discovered did not exist.

The Boeings were put into service last September and are credited with increasing the number of passengers on Air Rhodesia's Salisbury-Johannesburg run by 62 per cent in November.

The U.S. Government is investigating reports that United Air Lines and Boeing trained pilots and crews for the planes. (*Rand Daily Mail*, January 26, 1974; Washington *Post*, January 25, 1974.)

## South Africa

• A natural gas deposit discovered off South Africa's Plettenberg Bay five years ago will not be exploited until the energy crunch predicted for the 1980s makes it worth about $750 million in foreign earnings to the Republic, according to a South African oil official.

Predicting that there will be a ready market for liquefied natural gas in the next decade, Dr. F. W. Quass, managing director of the government-backed oil-exploration body Soekor, said, "Relatively moderate reserves do not justify the development for a local market at present, but I feel that the gas will be marketable both locally and in America in the '80s."

Soekor has orchestrated the South African Government's eight-year search for oil. Dr. Quass claims that by the time the gas pocket is tapped the 500 billion cubic feet of gas will be worth about $750 million. (Johannesburg *Star*, November 24, 1973.)

The U.S. already imports some of its energy needs from South Africa. According to a coal industry spokesman, the U.S. will buy about two million tons of bituminous coal, worth about $47.2 million over the next three years. To be used for generating electric power, the coal will be shipped to Mobile, Alabama. The first half-million-ton shipment will arrive in April. (Christian Science *Monitor*, December 18, 1973.)

• **American Motors** has taken over the assembly and sales of Jeeps in South Africa, representing a slight increase in southern African involvement for the "other" American automobile maker. Although American Motors in South Africa remains controlled by Toyota South Africa and Wesco Investments, it had previously let the Jeep franchise be handled by the Hugh Parker company, which at one time also handled the South African BMW franchise.

In slowly disengaging itself from the Jeep franchise, Hugh Parker had sold only 23 Jeeps in 1972. Previously that many Jeeps had been sold in a single month.

Initially, at least, Jeeps will be imported and assembled in South Africa. The first will be available by June 1974.

A *Rand Daily Mail* business reporter predicts that Jeep's success will depend much on Toyota's "powerful sales machine to cut the Jeep in on a good slice of the commercial market. Its military use will also clearly help." (*Rand Daily Mail*, October 8, 1973.)

• Top management of **Ford South Africa** has predicted that only six or seven automobile manufacturers will remain in South Africa out of the present 17, but Ford will "remain one of the biggest among the surviving manufacturers." (*Rand Daily Mail*, December 18, 1973.) Giving their 1974 forecast at Port Elizabeth, South Africa's Detroit, Ford brass ascribed the coming crunch to the fuel crisis and to the South African Government's local-content program.

Phase 3 of the local-content program has required automobile makers to ensure that 66 per cent of their automotive products, by weight, are made in South Africa by the end of 1976. It is expected that Phase 5—following a Phase 4 standstill of two years—would increase the local content to 90 per cent, by the end of 1978.

Ford's managers estimated that meeting Phase 3's goal had required a $150-million investment by motor manufacturers and a $315-million investment by component manufacturers. The investment needed to step from 66 per cent to 90 per cent would probably equal this previous investment, they said.

• The National Council of Churches' Corporate Information Center released a report last month entitled *Church Investments, Corporations and Southern Africa*. Compiled over an 18-month period, the report contains detailed information on 53 U.S. companies operating in South Africa, Namibia, Rhodesia and the Portuguese African territories.

Complete profiles of the 15 largest companies are included, as well as a list of $48.7-million worth of church-owned stock in these companies.

The report cites contentions by some observers that American investments in southern Africa will promote economic progress and progressive change but concludes that thorough analysis shows "foreign investment has brought no substantial improvement in the standard of living for Blacks and in fact has contributed to the worsening of their condition."

• As **African Update** went to press, South African police arrested some 250 African textile workers during strikes that spread through eight factories in three cities in Natal.

About 8,000 workers were involved in the strikes, which have virtually halted production at the mills. (*Rand Daily Mail*, January 22, 1974.)

• The near collapse of South Africa's tea agreement with the tiny island of Mauritius illustrates the difficulty of conducting an apartheid foreign policy. In September, South Africa agreed to buy seven million pounds of tea from Mauritius but threatened to cancel the agreement shortly after the Mauritius delegate to the U.N. voted to oust South Africa from the world body. *African Development* (January 1974) notes that the storm has momentarily subsided but that it will likely blow up again soon. Chinese aid is being used to rebuild Mauritius' main airport, which—*African Development* notes—raises the prospect that South African aircraft will be denied landing rights. The magazine points out that unless an alternate fueling point is found, closure of the airport to South African traffic would mean that South African Airways could not fly its Australian schedule.

• The Johannesburg City Council has announced measures to rid the city of petty apartheid, the raft of strictures that segregate South Africa's races in daily life. J.F. Oberholzer, chairman of the council's management committee and a United Party leader, said, "When we think of the future of this country, it is a matter of dialogue or

death." (*Rand Daily Mail*, January 31, 1974.)

The United Party, South Africa's largest opposition party, controls the city governments of Johannesburg and Durban. Durban is expected to announce similar antiapartheid measures. Cape Town and Pietermaritzburg are also reported to be considering moves to eliminate petty apartheid. Petty apartheid regulations are customary throughout South Africa but are not legal government requirements. Grand apartheid, the scheme of separate development, is a national priority unaffected by the council's move.

In Johannesburg, recommendations adopted by the city council would open museums, parks, libraries, art galleries and the zoo to all races; public benches in parks and bus shelters would no longer be reserved for whites. City buses would remain segregated.

The council will encourage restaurants to provide better facilities for nonwhites and will recommend that Civic Theater shows allow multiracial audiences, at least on certain nights.

The city council plans to interview the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development on the question of home ownership by Africans and is also studying labor grievances of the Indian and Coloured communities.

A *Rand Daily Mail* editorial praised the actions of the Johannesburg City Council but added "it would be wrong to regard the removal of offensive racial signs and the opening up of municipal institutions such as libraries as anything but the important first steps." (*Rand Daily Mail*, February 1, 1974.)

When a *Mail* reporter asked 25-year-old Johannesburg resident John Klopper his opinion of the council's moves, he replied, "I think it's terrible, maybe because we're not used to it." (*Rand Daily Mail*, February 1, 1974.)

• Japan has become South Africa's fourth largest trading partner, much to the embarrassment of Japanese Government officials who have spent the past couple of years trying to woo the Afro-Asian bloc.

According to official statistics released by the Bank of Japan, Japanese exports to South Africa rose by 72 per cent in the first six months of 1973; imports for the same period jumped 30 per cent. This means that Japan's imports from South Africa now total 51 per cent of her purchases from the rest of Black Africa.

Reacting to the trade statistics, an Asian diplomat in Tokyo declared that Japan has been trying to "fool" the rest of the nonwhite world by putting its "pride in its pocket" for the sake of trade.

While Japan has admittedly restrained its eager businessmen from investing in South Africa, it has refused to curtail trade despite the requests of other African and Asian states. In recent years, the Japanese Government has dismissed these demands by saying that its trade ties with Black Africa were increasing rapidly while the volume of trade with Pretoria grew only marginally between 1971 and 1972.

Adding to the anger of Afro-Asian diplomats, a prominent Japanese research organization, acting on the advice of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, announced it would reprint a booklet that advises Japanese businessmen how to behave as "honorary whites" when traveling in South Africa. "Honorary white" status was granted Japanese by race-conscious South Africa when Pretoria realized the important trade role the Asian country would play in South Africa's economic life. (London *Times*, December 4, 1973; Johannesburg *Star*, December 8, 1973.)

• The U.S. church campaign on southern African issues, directed mainly at American corporations, seems to be having a spillover effect on South African firms. Although no American churches are known to hold stock in Impala Platinum, a South African mining company that supplies General Motors with platinum for automobile-exhaust pollution-control devices, Impala's managing director, K. A. Byng Jackson, asked to meet with church leaders when he was in New York in September.

Impala's move apparently stemmed from a trip made to the South African mine last spring by Dr. Howard Schomer, World Issues and Europe Secretary of the United Church of Christ's gboard for World Ministries. Dr. Schomer visited Impala while in South Africa for talks with General Motors and other companies, according to a source at the UCC. "Impala's management wanted to answer our questions more fully," the source said. The UCC's newsletter reported, "It was evident that the company's management was troubled by the questions raised by [Dr. Schomer] at the mining camp last spring."

In New York, Jackson discussed South Africa's pass laws, wages and the government policy that does not permit workers' families to live with them during their contract period at the mines, with representatives of the church coalition that has again this year filed resolutions with American companies with investments in southern Africa.

• Merck, Sharp and Dohme (MSD), the third-largest pharmaceutical firm in South Africa and a subsidiary of the U.S. **Merck Corporation,** has announced plans to move its Johannesburg headquarters to a site 16 miles north of that city. The expanded facilities are scheduled to be completed by mid-1975 at a cost of between $5 million and $6 million. (Johannesburg *Star*, October 20, 1973.)

Present plans do not call for any increase in the firm's labor force of about 200 people, including 40 Africans. But MSD's vice-chairman, H.C. McGarity, told the *Star* (September 15, 1973) that the company believes that the "vital southern African market" will continue to grow.

The pharmaceutical and ethical drug industry is one of the fastest growing industries in South Africa. Industry sales were expected to top $120 million last year. (*Southern Africa*, December 1973.)

• The first sign that the fuel crisis has hit motor companies in South Africa came in the second week of January when **Chrysler South Africa** announced it would lay off 375 assembly workers—15 per cent of its labor force. The company said it could not say which workers would be laid off, but the majority were expected to be nonwhite. (Johannesburg *Star*, January 12, 1974.)

Although **General Motors** officials and spokesmen for Datsun-Nissan said their firms were proceeding normally for the time being, a **Ford South Africa** spokesman said production schedules were being rearranged to cut overtime, meaning some loss of earnings for their 4,000 hourly workers. Chrysler also reported shorter working hours.

The Chrysler spokesman noted a downturn in automotive sales in December, usually one of the best months of the year for the motor industry. A Ford official said new car sales were expected to remain low in January and February but predicted that March would see an improvement.

• South Africa has devised a mechanism for channeling private funds into foreign development, mostly to nearby Black African nations.

The Economic Development of Equatorial and Southern Africa—known as EDESA—is a new organization funded by 20 corporate contributors, including **General Motors, Ford** and **IBM.**

With about $10 million in hand, EDESA will undertake its first projects later this year, probably concentrating on Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. EDESA projects will be directed by its board, including the contributing companies' representatives and the board chairman, Karl Schiller, the former West German economics and finance minister. (New York *Times*, January 27, 1974.)

• **Hewlett-Packard,** subsidiary of the giant $560-million-a-year American electronics company, will double its South African investment over the next five years to $15 million.

According to managing director Tienie Steyn, growth of Hewlett-Packard South Africa has been tenfold since 1969, with growth in all five major divisions—calculators, data systems, analytical instruments, measuring instruments and medical monitoring systems. The calculator section has been particularly successful.

Steyn anticipates further gains in calculator sales. South Africa suffers from an acute shortage of trained manpower; calculators help to relieve this. (Johannesburg *Star*, November 24, 1973.)

• **Mobil Oil Corporation** has told **African Update** that "effective December 1973, Mobil's commitment to pay its employees above the local MEL wage level is now in effect."

The Minimum Effective Level is a South African calculation of the cash income needed by an African family of six to survive; this calculation, higher than the almost starvation-level Poverty Datum Line, allots some money for medicines, books, entertainment and school fees.

One-quarter of Mobil's work force is in Durban, where the MEL has been variously given as between $175 and $210 per month. The MEL also varies from area to area, as does the PDL. Mobil declined to indicate what amount it was using as the MEL figure.

• **Piper Aircraft Corporation** is attempting to boost its aircraft sales in South Africa. Two senior executives—the sales director and the director of customer services—visited South Africa in September to prepare for the launching of the new Piper turboprop Cheyenne airplane in January. (*Southern Africa*, November 1973.)

Piper officials told South African newsmen that the Republic was "becoming increasingly important to aircraft manufacturers." (Johannesburg *Star*, September 8, 1973.) Within the past two years, according to the Southern Africa Committee in this country, the Nixon Administration has relaxed the conditions of the arms embargo against South Africa to allow sales of small civilian aircraft to private persons and corporations in South Africa. The Committee has criticized the move, arguing that such craft can be altered for use in counterinsurgency warfare in southern Africa.

• Even now that the South African Government has finally decided to allow television to come to the Republic, it is still taking its time in deciding the shape of the future television-manufacturing industry. In this deal the government seems to hold all the strong cards: it alone holds licensing power over manufacturers.

Because of this, companies may have to comply with government specifications in order to cash in on the long-awaited industry boom. Mainly, the government wants the television industry to decentralize, to move itself to border areas. These areas skirt the Black homelands that have been established according to South Africa's policy of separate development of the races. The major ramifications of such a move are that the huge labor pool in the homeland, or Bantustan, can be dipped into at will by a budding industry that is already using a very high number of skilled and semiskilled Blacks. Also, a border-industry plant itself is situated in a white area and would pay its taxes to the South African Government. An industry that locates inside a homeland will one day, in theory, pay its taxes to the homeland government, if and when the homeland is granted independence.

Critical observers of business in South Africa have generally reserved their most scathing criticism for the border operation, charging that the very system is designed to continue using Africans in a labor role only, with no possible accrual of other benefits.

A spokesman for South Africa's opposition United Party told the *Rand Daily Mail* (August 8, 1973) that the television industry was a prime example of South Africa's dependence on Black labor. "I challenge the Cabinet to see for themselves to what extent we depend on nonwhites," he said. "One thing is certain: TV cannot do without them." The official said he had seen factories where 90 per cent of the staff was Black.

The South African Department of Industries deputy secretary, Philip Theron, has said the government did not give the television manufacturers an "ultimatum," but he acknowledged that in August 1973 a letter was sent to the six companies licensed to make televisions, asking them for their proposals on moving out of metropolitan areas. Among the six consortiums chosen to produce televisions is **International Telephone and Telegraph Company**, in association with Thorn and Pretorius Furniture.

The ITT-Thorn group will manufacture television sets, radios and record players at its plant in Pietersburg, which was declared a border industrial area in 1960.

The South African business magazine *Financial Mail* has pointed out that the television industry has not really been singled out for decentralization pressure, that moving to border areas is policy for all new industries. (June 29, 1973.)

## Zambia

• Zambia's attempts to face north—to align through trade routes, as well as politics, with Black Africa—are beginning to bear fruit, but the price to the landlocked nation is expected to be greatest in the crucial period ahead, from now until 1975, before the TanZam Railway, Zambia's lifeline to the independent east, is completed. (*Times of Zambia*, December 2, 1973.)

A special U.N. report released in November appealed to member-states for aid to the Black African nation and stated Zambia would need about $41 million to cover recurrent costs that have been incurred during the rerouting exercise that followed the closing of Zambia's border with Rhodesia last year.

While capital costs of the about-face have been covered, the U.N. report stated, additional costs caused by soft loans have not.

Although construction of the TanZam Railway passed over into Zambia in August, until the line is completed Zambians will depend largely on the major road that links the copper producer with Dar es Salaam, the port capital of Tanzania. (*Rand Daily Mail*, August 28, 1973.) Already in July there were reports of shortages in a wide range of consumer items in the Zambian capital Lusaka (London *Times*, July 16, 1973), and by October signs of congestion were again appearing at the Dar docks. (*Times of Zambia*, October 12, 1973.)

The problem was a shortage of vehicles to transport the goods to Zambia, but in early December 24 giant Japanese trucks arrived in Zambia and another 36 American trucks were being offloaded at Dar. The heavy-duty vehicles were part of an eventual fleet of 600 ordered by Zambia's National Transport Corporation. An NTC spokesman declined to say whether 34 trucks leased from **TAW Leasing Corporation** in New York would still be needed after all purchased trucks had been delivered. (*Times of Zambia*, December 3, 1973.)

Meanwhile, Norway has offered Zambia a $1.5-million grant to help finance the rerouting project. (*Zambia Daily Mail*, September 21, 1973.)

• Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. is in the process of negotiating a contract to supply additional Zambian copper to the People's Republic of China in 1974. Roan Consolidated Mines, Zambia's other major copper mine, is in the third year of a contract that calls for the sale of 12,000 tons of copper per year to China. (*African Development*, January 1974.)

Zambia's biggest customers are Japan and the countries of the Common Market.

• Zambia's balance of payments for the second half of 1973 was expected to continue the improvement shown during the second quarter of the year when the country reported a $14-million surplus. The June 1973 figure showed the third surplus in a row since the nation decided to tighten its foreign-exchange "belt." (*Zambia Daily Mail*, November 30, 1973.)

For the second quarter of 1972, the copper-producing nation faced a balance-of-payments deficit of about $70 million.

Another move toward self-sufficiency was announced in December by the Zambia Sugar Company. The country, a spokesman reported, will stop importing sugar by the end of 1974 because of a new sugar refinery that is scheduled to be completed by April. (*Times of Zambia*, December 13, 1973.)

The nation saved about $55 million in foreign exchange in 1973 on coal imports because of increased coal production in Maamba coal mine. A spokesman for the mine company predicted the mine, which currently produces 800,000 tons of coal annually, would produce one million tons beginning in 1975 or 1976.

The opening of the mine had proved wrong those cynics who "wanted to see Zambia's continued dependence on coal from rebel Rhodesia's Wankie colliery," the spokesman said. (*Zambia Daily Mail*, January 9, 1974.)

## THE MIDEAST WAR

(continued from page 13)

caused by the Arab decisions. Others cite the paradox in a monarch like King Faisal's being a champion of human rights in southern Africa.

A prudent analyst, however, might concentrate more on the underlying reasons that brought about the Arab-African alliance although all alliances are imperfect, the reasons behind this one are at least understandable. To one degree or another, it apparently will be a geo-political factor for some time to come. And it should be realized that there may be times when the Arab-African tie works to U.S. advantage. American economists, jittery that the Arabs might jeopardize the world monetary system by putting their oil money into gold, can rest more easily knowing Black Africa would also counsel against massive Arab gold purchases, which, of course, would benefit South Africa.

In December, Dr. Kissinger selected his man in Ouagadougou, Ambassador Donald B. Easum, to be launched into this maelstrom, replacing David Newsom as Assistant Secretary for Africa; Newsom became U.S. ambassador to Indonesia.

Easum, 50, an energetic and thoughtful foreign service officer and historian by training, is the first Assistant Secretary for Africa with extensive experience in French-speaking West Africa. Before Upper Volta, Easum was Deputy Chief of Mission in Niamey, Niger. A decade ago, he was political officer in Dakar, Senegal, where, significantly enough, one of his responsibilities was reporting to Washington on Portuguese Guinea.

Besides the Portuguese question, Easum will have to contend with two residual matters that were also affected by the October war—U.S. military relations with Ethiopia and Morocco. Easum will be responsible for selling Congress an idea, endorsed by both the Pentagon and Emperor Haile Selassie, that the temporary Arab blockade of the Straits of Bab el Mandeb

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# Publisher's Message

With this issue, *Africa Report* is happy to announce a new feature in our magazine: *African Update*. *African Update* is prepared by the Africa Policy Information Center of the African-American Institute, the publisher of *Africa Report*. *African Update's* editors will be working to bring you lively and extensive monitoring of important issues in African-American relations and of economic and political developments around the Continent.

For the past two years, *Africa Report* has been capably edited by John Storm Roberts. Probably no other editor of the magazine has done so much to point it in the direction of broader reader involvement. During Roberts' tenure, *Africa Report* took shape as *the* general-interest magazine about Africa. Like so many good journalists, John is an adventurous sort and when he, with the last issue of *Africa Report*, announced that he wanted to try his hand at something new (a forthcoming newspaper on international topics), we were not surprised. We shall miss John and we think the magazine will long bear the impact of his editorship. We'll be announcing the appointment of a new editor in our next issue.

Now for a few words about the articles in this issue. Inspired by newspaper coverage given to the return of the sacred Afo-A-Kom statue to Cameroun, *Africa Report's* editors began puzzling over what we saw as an important question: Would the growth of museums in Africa stem the outflow of art from the Continent? **Susan Blumenthal,** a gifted free-lance writer whose guide to African travel will be published by Doubleday in the fall, set to work on the story. Susan not only answered our question but turned up a lot of intriguing information that carefully documents how the bulk of African art leaves the Continent.

It may seem a long way from art to track, but we were delighted when **John Manners,** a serious young man and free-lance journalist, contacted us about doing a piece on Kenya's star runners. A longtime track fan who lived in Kenya for four years, John, who knows perhaps as many records as the Guinness people, attempted to find out why so many of Kenya's runners are truly great. He also shows what kind of athletic infrastructure exists in the country and talks about how it developed.

**Bonnie Schultz,** a former Peace Corps volunteer who is now a member of the AAI staff, presents a sensitive account of her work in maternity clinics in Togo. **Bruce Oudes,** *Africa Report's* Washington correspondent, offers a story on what's likely to happen to America's Africa policy in the wake of the Middle East War.

Several other things about this issue deserve at least a brief mention. We are indebted to Charles Librader, general manager of North American marketing operations for Air Afrique. Mr. Librader, with a little help from his employer, managed to loan us an airplane—no small accomplishment. He even accompanied three members of the *Africa Report* staff and photographer **Nate Silverstein** aboard the plane so Nate could take the art photos that appear in this issue, notably on the cover. We thank Air Afrique for its cooperation and Mr. Librader for his personal attention.

Finally, special thanks are due to **Nancy McKeon,** *Africa Report's* travel editor, without whose help this issue would never have seen the light of day. We hope you enjoy reading it as much as we enjoyed putting it together.

—RLD

# The Press in Africa

# Future Shock-Nigerian Style

## New Breed: Do the Politics and Pinups Really Mix?


*From time to time* Africa Report *in a new feature will introduce its readers to various African periodicals that mirror the changing life styles of people throughout the Continent. These features will provide a brief description of a periodical's focus and style in order to acquaint* Africa Report *readers with African sources of information about Africa and her people.*

One of the most prosperous countries in Africa is Nigeria, where government earnings from oil production alone are reported to exceed $4 million per day. Some observers charge that not many of Nigeria's nearly 60 million people share this income, but some people are undoubtedly better off financially than their ancestors ever thought possible. The affluence of Nigeria's nouveau riche is reflected in the increasing number of children able to go to school. About 40,000 young Nigerians are presently studying at institutions of higher education, the highest number for any African country.

*NewBreed*, a magazine published monthly in Lagos, seems to reach for the well-educated and well-off young men of this younger generation. These men evidently have money to spend and choices to make about their future. The magazine combines elements of American magazines such as *Newsweek* and *Playboy* to entice emotions and provoke thought at the same time.

Serious articles ranging from an analysis of Nigeria's 1973 census to editorial comments on "the curse" of indigenization—trying to Africanize local industry—are interspersed with centerfold pinups and numerous advertisements. Smiling faces and slick slogans encourage *NewBreed* readers to buy a range of products from toothpaste and skin conditioners to radios and vacuum cleaners. The products advertised in this magazine have come to be considered necessities by many in the United States, but in a country catching up with technology these products are still regarded as luxuries.

A Western audience may see a strong pull towards consumerism in *NewBreed's* glossy style. But Editor-in-Chief Chris F. M. Okolie says, "The objective of the magazine is to help create a just and international society and to project the new Nigerian society. In fact, we could be described as a campaign magazine for a fair, free and progressive society." He estimates that *NewBreed*, which was first published in June 1972, has a current audience of 90,000 Nigerians with about 5,000 readers in the United States and 5,000 more throughout Africa and other parts of the world.

*NewBreed* offers readers outside of Nigeria a perspective on what some Nigerians are thinking about subjects currently in vogue throughout the world—women's liberation, birth control and even something called "godfatherism."

In the September issue of *NewBreed*, a 40-year-old-woman, Dora Miller, is questioned about her marital status. The interviewer shows little in-

terest in her duties as North Central Commissioner for Trade, Industries and Cooperatives. But in the same issue, another author praises women's liberation "African Style in Guinea." The author cites examples of Guinean women who have combined traditional roles as wife and mother with progressive roles as leading political figures at home and abroad, and also quotes Guinean President Ahmed Sekou Toure, who relates the women's movement to the struggle of all African people from oppression. "We can say, therefore," explains Toure, "that the human condition of womanhood in Africa will grow better as the principles of freedom, equality and democracy in the political, economic and social life of African nations are realized."

Birth control and sterilization are controversial subjects among Americans. *NewBreed's* "Sex Forum" is a monthly feature. In a recent issue, the magazine discussed techniques of sterilization, reviewing their psychological and social implications.

Another controversy that *NewBreed* comments on is the practice of offering women opportunities for higher education and lucrative jobs in exchange for sexual relationships. Editor Okolie condemns this aspect of "godfatherism" and points out the inequities of a society based on favoritism.

A political perspective on Nigeria's future can also be gained by readers of *NewBreed*. Reflections on "Greece —From Democracy to Dictatorship" and an essay on "The Military in Politics" reveal viewpoints that the editor says may instruct the governments of developing African nations. Nigerians have been promised a civilian government in 1976. The careful planning that is going into Nigeria's future constitution is apparent in an October 1973 *NewBreed* interview with one of Nigeria's foremost constitutionalists, Professor Babatunde Williams. In the same issue, Okolie expresses concern about the arrest of five Nigerian journalists and urges Nigerian Head of State Yakubu Gowon to clarify official national policy toward the press.

From pinups to politics, *NewBreed* shows the difficulties of choosing between options that sometimes conflict. Affluent Nigerians want their children to be well educated, but an article explores the disturbing side effects of a European education for some Africans —the breeding of a subtle contempt for traditional values. *NewBreed* has advertisements for cars, but the October 1973 issue featured an article on "road monsters and killer drivers." Young men like to gape at centerfolds of partially clothed or unclothed young women, but *NewBreed* also includes modest pictures with captions praising the beauty and dignity of Nigeria's more traditional women.


*NewBreed is definitely consumer-oriented as these ads, selected from recent issues, show.*

Sports and entertainment present no problems of indecision for young Nigerians. Everybody likes the excitement of African football (soccer) and the rough-tough fantasies at the local cinema. *NewBreed* covers both. But even the jokes on *NewBreed's* humor page reflect an element of Nigerian future shock:

> A man said to psychiatrist "the trouble with me is that I have dual personality." Psychiatrist: "Well, that will cost you five pounds each."

Birth, like nearly everything else, comes hard in a small Togolese village. Yet each new life is greeted with . . .

# A Joyous Celebration of Existence Itself

By BONNIE J. SCHULTZ

It was dark by the time the baby was born. In the soft and smoky light of the kerosene-lit delivery room, I held my breath as the straining mother forced the child from her body—first the crown of matted hair, then the flattened face and curled-up body. The baby squirmed and stretched, curled up again, stretched again and breathed for the first time, crying involuntarily as the new air filled his gasping lungs. He opened his eyes momentarily and then closed them as if to ease himself gradually into his new environment.

I was astonished and exhilarated by the birth of this child, in contrast with the mother who lay exhausted on the flat metal delivery table with its hole that allowed wastes to fall into a bucket on the floor. Her name was Ama and she already had two children. She had miscarried when she was 18 and several years later a daughter died of measles. She knew the pain, as well as the joy, of childbirth.

As a Peace Corps volunteer, I worked in five villages along the paved road between Atakpame and Palime in south central and southwestern Togo. The villages, located in a strip of rain forest that continued into Dahomey and Ghana, were bordered by mountains rising to a plateau in the north and savanna to the south. It was in the village of Amou-oblo, meaning on the river Amou, that I watched Ama struggle to give life. It was my first dispensary birth.

When Ama's labor began earlier that day, she had walked to the maternity clinic with her mother. She had climbed up on the delivery table for the midwife to check the fetus' movement. Then she walked around and around the delivery room. For a while the pains came infrequently and she sat on the steps outside the clinic where other pregnant women gathered for prenatal consultations.

Women came to the maternity once a week, usually on market day, for these consultations. They had no appointments. Instead, the midwife waited until 10 or 15 women had gathered before beginning to examine them. If one woman were in labor, the others waited until after the delivery or missed their consultation.

Ama's pains became more frequent as she paced around the small delivery room in the darkened Amou-oblo maternity. Green-painted shutters on

Unicef photo by Charlotte Kahler

windows without glass panes were closed to allow Ama privacy. Patients sick with malaria and intestinal parasites or suffering from abscesses waited for treatment on a porch adjoining the maternity. Fragile *deux chevaux* taxis and monstrous trucks long past their prime revved their motors to go home loaded with fat, bickering ladies and their baskets full of produce from the Amou-oblo market.

Inside the delivery room, the midwife's two-year-old daughter chased a friend around the white-tiled consultation table. Eventually she grew tired of waiting for her mother and began to whimper grouchily. The midwife hoisted her onto her back, wrapping a cloth around the child and under her own arms, to carry her daughter in the traditional fashion of African women.

I was eating a mango on the dispensary porch when the midwife called me to help her. I wiped my sticky hands on my African-print dress, went inside and began to tickle Ama's stomach to encourage the fetus to keep moving. I tried to tell Ama to breathe deeply and push hard while I held her ankles against her hips and placed an arm beneath her strained back.

Throughout Ama's labor, the midwife was visibly fatigued. She herself was pregnant and was rapidly losing the strength to care for her young daughter, plus handle prenatal consultations, plus be on call for deliveries day and night. When Ama was finally on the verge of delivery, the exhausted midwide declared she just could not finish her task. Fortunately, the nurse from the dispensary next door—an arrogant, highly professional man frustrated by the limitations of village service—came in time to help.

No sooner had the baby been born than the nurse and the woman's relatives began to heap abuse on the midwife. While Ama's mother brought in buckets of hot water from the wood fire in the dispensary's backyard, a strawlike sponge and market soap to scrub the baby, the nurse ranted about the midwife's irresponsibility. Ama lay momentarily forgotten on the cold metal delivery table still in pain from post-partum contractions. The tumultuous argument continued as Ama was given a tetanus shot and helped to bed in a stifling room behind the maternity. The baby got his tetanus shot, some eyedrops and a bandage on his umbilical cord before he was carried to his mother's side.

The maternity was often the scene of noisy commotion after a delivery. But usually the nurse and family were congratulating the midwife and dancing around the delivery room in joyous celebration. News of a child's birth spread quickly through the village and within minutes friends and family would be gathered at the mother's bedside to toast her health. A Johnnie Walker Red Label bottle, discarded from the local bistro, was filled with "Togo Gin," a fiery concoction distilled from palm wine called *sodoby*. Mother and friends would pass around a shot glass of the potent drink, never forgetting to spill a little on the ground in honor of the ancestors.

Sometimes family, nurse and midwife agreed that a delivery was going to be too difficult or complicated for the midwife to handle. In such cases, women were taken by taxi—a canvas-roofed *deux chevaux* about the size of a Volkswagen—to the nearest hospital. Here, one or two doctors cared for pregnant women, children with massive burns or serious malnutrition and men with hernias. The hospitals had operating rooms, equipment and medicine not available to village midwives. Sometimes, however, a delivery was too difficult for these doctors, especially if they had not specialized in obstetrics. In such cases, a woman was sent again by taxi, to the medical center in the

A Johnnie Walker Red Label bottle, discarded from the local bistro, was filled with "Togo Gin," a fiery concoction distilled from palm wine. Mother and friends would pass around a shot glass of the potent drink, never forgetting to spill a little on the ground in honor of the ancestors.

capital city, Lomé, several hours away.

Women often died in hospitals because they waited until the last stages of a complicated pregnancy before finally agreeing to be taken away from their homes. Generally, villagers associated hospitals with death and resisted any advice to seek help there.

One young woman from a farm near Patatoukou refused to listen to the midwife's advice to go to the hospital. Her periods of labor had always been difficult, she argued, but her other children had survived. After more than two days in labor she was brought to the maternity by her middle-aged husband. Tough-skinned and taut-muscled from years of hard labor in the fields, he stood outside the delivery-room door while the midwife tried to help his wife.

When it became apparent that the midwife could no longer help her, the woman called for her husband and, like a ballerina, arched herself over his shoulder. He placed his calloused hands on the sides of her abdomen, bent his knees and helped her to push, their form silhouetted in the light of a golden sunset visible through the delivery-room door. After more persuasion from the midwife, the woman finally agreed to go to the hospital, where her baby was stillborn.

Most women in the Togolese villages where I worked waited until the last few months of their pregnancies to come for prenatal consultations and to have the midwife measure their expanding abdomens, check their weight and look for irregularities such as an unusual fetal position or for danger signs such as anemia. Some women never came for consultations but appeared at the very last minute to climb up on the table and deliver a child. I remember at least one woman desperately trying to give birth while an angry nurse scolded her vehemently for waiting until the last moment to come to the maternity.

Another woman who had to walk to the village from a farm several kilometers away had no choice but to squat by the side of the road to bear a son. The midwife and I rode on motor bikes to where she sat on a piece of cloth with the newborn infant cradled on her thigh. The midwife clamped the umbilical cord and tied it with black thread bought in the market and sterilized in a bottle of alcohol. She then cut the cord and dropped the placenta in a basin to be carried away and buried in commemoration of the birth. Then mother and midwife walked to the maternity for a tetanus shot while a friend carried the baby on his bike.

Of course, some women never came to the maternity at all. Village women were often more comfortable at home where their own beds were more pleasant to recuperate on than the straw-filled burlap mattresses on the maternity's army-style metal beds. If a woman had only mats at home, she was at least surrounded by family and friends who could care for her more easily than an overworked and underpaid midwife in a poorly equipped maternity.

Midwives were usually young women with an elementary school education, who had asked for government permission to work for free in hospitals where they were trained to become midwives. After a year or so at the hospital they could apply for assignment to a village maternity in the region of their family home. In most cases, they worked alongside a male nurse who acted as a kind of general practitioner in the village dispensary. Sometimes a village had only a maternity, so the midwife would treat injured or ill patients as well as pregnant women. They had few supplies —aspirin, purges for intestinal parasites, quinine to treat malaria, a few capsules for tetanus or vitamin shots, some cotton, gauze and alcohol. Often supplies ran out before the designated time to reorder from the regional health center. So illnesses were untreated and gauze bandages that were used to bind a wound or wrap the end of an umbilical cord were washed out,

*The backyard of the Amou-oblo maternity clinic.*

**The child watches the mother pacing around the delivery room, shaking her head, snapping her fingers and clicking her tongue to relieve the pain. Togolese children do not need to make an effort to remember the details of such scenes because they occur in the children's presence every day.**

dried in the tropical sun and used again.

Midwives earned about $16 to $24 a month. They worked from 7:30 a.m. until noon and from 2:30 p.m. until 5 p.m. Often they delivered babies at night or sat up until dawn with a woman in false labor. Frequently, their husbands worked in other villages or larger towns, so the midwives saw them only on weekends or in some cases every few months.

Yet they had special status in the village. Although they were not as well educated as schoolteachers and were often made to feel inferior to the university-educated nurses, they were respected by most villagers because of the service they provided and also because they were government employees.

A midwife's status, as well as her urban experiences, showed in the way she treated women who came to the maternity from farms outside the village. Farm women worked hard and smelled of dirt and sweat. They spoke different dialects, so they didn't understand instructions from the mid vife. They couldn't read or write because there were no schools in outlying farm areas. During a delivery or during prenatal consultations or while shopping in the market, farm women were often laughed at and cruelly insulted. But to the townspeople, their remarks were evidence of a greater sophistication and superiority to the backward bush people.

Expecting this treatment in a village maternity, many pregnant farm women stayed at home. They continued chores until labor began and relied on the herbs of local medicine men to help them through the frightening and painful moments of their deliveries. When I made home visits to farms outside Amou-oblo, I was often led to a small darkened room where a woman lay resting on a handwoven grass mat with a one- or two-day-old child at her breast. I would tell her to go to the maternity for a checkup and a tetanus shot to prevent an infection in the umbilical cord. But the farm women seldom listened to my advice.

I never saw a child born until I went to Togo. All I had was the memory of my sister cringing in pain and clutching her frantic husband's arm on the way to the hospital to give birth to her son. I grew up seeing efficient doctors and sterile delivery-room scenes on television.

But in Togo a pregnant woman often has a two-year-old child still nursing until the birth of the second baby. The older child is often in the delivery room while the mother is in labor. The child watches the mother pacing around the delivery room, shaking her head, snapping her fingers and clicking her tongue to relieve the pain. The child sees a brother or sister born then and other siblings born later. Togolese children do not need to make a special effort to remember the details of such scenes because they occur in the children's presence nearly every day.

The women used to ask me how many children I had. None, I would reply sheepishly. But after a delivery, they would hold my hand and smile. A smile of thanks? For what? A smile of relief? Probably. But I will guard these images with care:

*Silently*
*she pushes with all her strength*
*and energy*
*and*
*force*
*till gasping she is free of*
*the child*
*silently*
*struggling*
*to live*
*to breathe*
*and scream*
*and breathe*
*and scream again*
*to live*
*rejoiced with hands upraised*
*by family*
*waiting*
*silently*
*to hear the sounds*
*of birth.*

*A Patatoukou midwife awaits women for prenatal consultations.*

# In Washington

## Intrigue over the Friendly Skies of Rhodesia

By BRUCE OUDES

The New Year brings with it some hope that America's Watergate-tainted *Rhodesia policy can at last be* mopped up. In the few months that Henry Kissinger has been at its helm, the State Department appears to be beginning to reassume a primacy on Rhodesia sanctions questions that it has not had since the Johnson Administration. Such a development is vital if the U.S. is to get its house in order on sanctions—not just by completing repeal of the Byrd Amendment, which allows import of "strategic" Rhodesian minerals, but also by clearing up questions of other sanctions violations.

The 54-to-37 Senate vote to repeal the Byrd Amendment in mid-December set the stage for what undoubtedly will be a close House vote this year.

Sources with long experience on Rhodesian questions, however, already are wondering whether repeal of the Byrd Amendment would have any early effect in reducing mineral imports from Rhodesia. In 1966, Union Carbide, principal beneficiary of the Byrd Amendment, successfully pressed for the loosest possible interpretation of Rhodesia sanctions regulations. The expectation now is that Carbide will press even harder on several fronts—one of them being to pay now for chrome still under the ground so that even if the Byrd Amendment is repealed the company may continue to import ferrochrome and chrome from Rhodesia for years to come.

*Meanwhile, attention on non-Byrd* questions centers on controversial export licenses issued by the Commerce Department in 1972 and 1973 to American firms dealing with Rhodesia. These licenses were instrumental in enabling Rhodesia to bolster its sagging—and outdated—air fleet by acquiring three Boeing 720s and one DC-8 cargo plane.

After minerals, tourism is Rhodesia's most important source of foreign exchange. Tourism is also an important avenue through which the British colony hopes to convince the U.S. that its policy is misguided. It was this increasing emphasis on tourism that made the expansion and modernization of Air Rhodesia economically feasible.

Evidence that the U.S. has decided to close the door on Rhodesian aviation consists of the denial in late 1973 of a license to Jack Malloch, a Rhodesian, to purchase spares for the sanctions-busting DC-8 he had acquired in 1972 and the denial of a license to United Aircraft to ship spare parts to Salisbury for the three Air Rhodesia Boeings. Clark MacGregor, a United Aircraft vice-president, visited Rhodesia in late 1972 after managing President Nixon's election campaign.

The U.S., in mid-1972, had issued an export license to Malloch enabling him to buy a used DC-8 from a subsidiary of the Flying Tiger Corporation at a price of $5.45 million. The Export-Import Bank, however, turned down Malloch's application for a loan to support the purchase.

Qualified sources say *the person or* persons who authorized the license did so with full knowledge of documented intelligence data showing that the "cover story" given by Malloch—citing his transparent Gabon connection—was patently false. For several years prior to his application to export the jet, Malloch had been using prop aircraft to fly Rhodesian beef to Gabon, a fact amply documented at the time. The jet enabled Malloch to extend his sanctions-busting to Europe, via Libreville, the Gabonese capital. Malloch and his air crews were trained in handling the DC-8 by United Airlines in Denver in the late summer of *1972, an airline spokesman confirms.*

Malloch's success inspired fresh and ultimately successful initiatives by Mervyn Eyett, deputy general manager of Air Rhodesia, to acquire passenger jets for the airline. During his many visits to the U.S. in 1972 and 1973 Eyett was in touch with McDonnell Douglas Corporation; United Airlines, which had used Boeing 720s for sale; Boeing itself; and Hank Wharton, the Miami-based aviation entrepreneur, who had known Malloch at least since the late 1960s when both were airlifting supplies into secessionist Biafra from Gabon.

In November 1972, Clark MacGregor discussed Rhodesia's aviation needs with officials in Salisbury. United Aircraft makes Pratt & Whitney engines, standard equipment on all Boeings. No later than December 1972, Air Rhodesia decided to train its crews in handling Boeing jets. The crews took a short course from United Airlines in Denver in January 1973. Wharton has acknowledged in a telephone interview that at about the same time as the training was taking place, he was in contact with United Airlines about the proposed purchase of used Boeings. Wharton denies, however, that these were intended for Rhodesia.

Meanwhile, Eyett's principal European connection, Carl Hirschmann, a

wealthy Swiss businessman, negotiated with Boeing to lift a three-year-old lien on some 720s he owned. (Hirschmann, a co-owner, along with actor William Holden and Texas oilman Ray Ryan, of the Mt. Kenya Safari Club, also owns machine tool-importing firms in Roslyn Heights, New York and El Monte, California.) At the same time, Boeing and Hirschmann obtained from the Commerce Department a license to export $500,000 in spare parts for Hirschmann's 720s. Wharton acknowledges knowing Hirschmann. The letter of credit he presented United Airlines was from Handelskredit, a Swiss bank Hirschmann owns. MacGregor denies knowing Hirschmann.

Eyett paid his last visit to the U.S. in late February 1973. Whether one or more of Eyett's American connections were refused an export license to complete the sale to him is at this point still a matter of conjecture, along with the question of whether United Airlines turned down Eyett or vice-versa.

In mid-April 1973, Hirschmann confirms, he sold three 720s to Eyett, who had them flown—together with the $500,000 in spares—from Switzerland to Rhodesia via Portugal. Hirschmann, who has known Eyett for at least six years, has said he did not know Eyett worked for Air Rhodesia. A Boeing spokesman says his firm did not press Hirschmann when he refused to disclose how he was planning to dispose of the Boeings. Airline industry sources say it is most unusual for a U.S. aircraft maker not to insist that a broker disclose the ultimate destination of planes he handles.

Air Rhodesia placed the Boeings in service in southern Africa in September, proudly featuring them in all its promotional material, and Eyett received the Rhodesian government's Legion of Merit Award for his success.

"Mandatory" U.N. sanctions firmly bar establishment of interline agreements with Air Rhodesia; that is, reciprocal courtesies such as free air passage common to the airlines industry and exchange of ticketing services. Yet, nearly a score of U.S. airlines, including Flying Tiger and United Airlines, have such agreements with Air Rhodesia. Many of these pacts have been established within the past three years. Among other things, the agreements enabled Eyett to travel gratis around the U.S. on courtesy tickets. A special report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace last September called attention to these agreements, but the Federal Aviation Agency has taken no action.

Another requirement of the "mandatory" sanctions since 1968 is that states bar entry to persons "likely to further or encourage the unlawful actions" of the Rhodesian regime. Yet Eyett, Malloch and several other Rhodesian businessmen have been granted U.S. visas annually. State Department sources say the practice is hard to stop because Rhodesians often travel on South African passports.

Despite his promise in May to support repeal of the Byrd Amendment—after the White House made a decision to do so—informed sources say Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush, former Union Carbide president, still refuses the suggestion of subordinates that he keep his pledge.

Meanwhile, the Executive Protection Service rather than the Metropolitan Police, continues to guard the offices of the Rhodesia Information Office here. The office is still being investigated by Representative Charles Diggs' House Africa subcommittee. The FBI visited the RIO office following a round of hearings held by Diggs last June, investigating it and the Air Rhodesia office in New York. The investigation apparently disturbed Rhodesian officials, informed sources say, and for the time being the office has curtailed some of its activities that are expressly banned by the sanctions—processing American immigrants to Rhodesia, for example. These sources add, however, that the Justice Department's Immigration and Naturalization Service continues to conduct routine consular business with the RIO.

The Justice Department reported to the Diggs committee that Rhodesia "is a foreign government within the meaning of the [Foreign Agents Registration] Act no matter how it may style itself." Although the RIO must register under the FARA, Justice found that Air Rhodesia does not have to do so because "a government-owned airline operating in the United States is not required to register under the Act." Air Rhodesia's New York office, meanwhile, continues to profit from a license issued by the Treasury in November 1971 permitting it to facilitate package tours by North Americans to Rhodesia, ensuring the further growth of the important Rhodesian industry.



*One of the Air Rhodesia Boeings at the Salisbury Airport*

Meanwhile, U.S. relations on the other side of the Zambezi, with Zambia, have been, virtually interrupted since September when the Justice Department arrested Marshall Soghoian, an American employed by Zambia as a purchasing agent. The arrest apparently grew out of concern that Zambia had exported goods from the U.S. without the required licenses. Sogohian is to be tried in late March on two counts of illegal possession of electronic interception devices and one count of conspiracy.

An important question in Soghoian's arrest is why the FBI press release announcing it cited by name Soghoian's foreign employer, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, without checking with the State Department. State apparently had no knowledge

whatsoever of the FBI investigation while it was in process. Zambia has formally protested the incident which it reportedly believes to be a politically inspired vendetta.

A report by Tad Szulc in the *New Republic* of December 29 suggests that in the fall of 1970 the White House dispatched "unidentified agents" to Zambia to help Kaunda thwart an attempted overthrow. White House attention reportedly was focused on Zambia after the election of Marxist President Allende in Chile. This, however, was precisely the time when another wing of the White House had decided Mr. Nixon should snub Dr. Kaunda during the latter's visit to the U.S. in his capacity as chairman of the OAU. Szulc predicts that more about the incident is likely to emerge in the trials of the White House Plumbers.

The parallel or perhaps intertwined threads of all this intrigue are sharply hindering the token U.S. effort to help Zambia implement its decision last January to sever its residual trade links with Rhodesia. Outstanding are questions involving a $5-million transportation loan made available to Zambia in June and the Export-Import Bank's preliminary financial commitment for more than $25 million in truck leasing and truck and locomotive procurement.

In sum, at least for the time being, Leon Jaworski, the Watergate special prosecutor, should be, in so far as U.S. policy toward Zambia and Rhodesia are concerned, Secretary of State Kissinger's ombudsman.

The apparent failure thus far of the Justice Department to show equal concern about inconsistencies in the Commerce Department's licensing procedures regarding Rhodesia leads to the reluctant conclusion that the only way this mess—and mess is a mild word—can be sorted out is through an investigation by the office of the Watergate special prosecutor.

• • •

Meanwhile, President Nixon put in an appearance at the "Desert Ball" for Sahel drought relief on November 30. Nixon told the throng, referring of course to the African drought, that Americans "have a big heart." Some applauded; many didn't. What the President didn't tell the partygoers was that, according to the latest in a series of Carnegie Endowment reports on U.S. Africa policy, in the spring of 1973 the White House rejected a request from AID that the President publicly sponsor the special request for Sahel relief funds then being prepared. Such a move would have been inappropriate, the President's advisers concluded, since Nixon had just vetoed a bill on domestic disaster relief. Democrats in Congress looking for a handle on the situation anyway readily accepted AID's proposal that they initiate the legislation, which eventually earmarked $25 million for the Sahel in the AID bill signed by the President this January.

According to the Carnegie study, at least some of the relief shipped to West Africa by the Agriculture Department was not sorghum of a grade fit for human consumption. □

# Education

## Getting into *Orbit*

A Zambian children's magazine provides a glimpse into an emerging value system

By ROBERT L. DENERSTEIN

*Generally,* Africa Report's *education column deals with how Africa is taught in American schools. From time to time, however, we think it is important to take a look at education in Africa. In this issue,* Africa Report *reviews the Zambian education magazine* Orbit. *Single copies of* Orbit, *with suggestions on how to use the magazine in the classroom, can be obtained from the School Services Division of AAI for 25 cents.*

From inside the small space shuttle, Marion signals Robert, her co-astronaut and fellow adventurer. Robert, his arms extended as if he were treading water, is busy conducting a vital extravehicular exercise. As he approaches a small, mysterious satellite that is emitting an infrared light, Robert's space suit takes on a reddish tint, causing him to glow like neon in the purple void of deep space. Marion and Robert speak in the laconic style that has come to characterize space talk. "TV tape recording has started," Marion says. "O.K., Marion, colour TV on," replies Robert.

O.K., so this isn't great science fiction and Robert and Marion aren't much at conversation, but there are some unusual things about this particular scenario, despite the clichés. For one thing, Robert and Marion are African. They report to a headquarters operation known as the Pan-African Survey and together the pair eventually becomes involved in a technological triumph bordering on the miraculous: stopping the thunderous flow of Victoria Falls—a neat trick accomplished with lots of liquid oxygen. Of course, if you're going to stop Victoria Falls or otherwise fool with Mother Nature, you better have a pretty good reason. Would you believe Robert and Marion recover a time capsule that was placed under the falls by aliens who visited Africa thousands of years ago?

Oh, one more thing. Robert and Marion are cartoon characters whose adventures are serialized each month on the cover of *Orbit*, a fascinating little magazine distributed to some 250,000 Zambian schoolchildren in the equivalents of grades five through eight. The magazine, complete with high-quality four-color printing, is something of a joint venture between the Zambians and a British firm known as Geminiscan.

The Zambian Government (the Commission for Vocational and Technical Education, to be more precise) controls editorial policy and generates nearly all the written material. Manuscripts are sent to Geminiscan, which does the artwork, layouts and final copy-editing. All of this is shipped back to Zambia where the actual printing takes place. (The three-year-old project has already been noticed by other African countries, and Geminiscan is reportedly planning a new international children's magazine that would feature material generated in other African countries.)

*Orbit* is no exception to the rule that most governments use their educational systems to prepare young students to participate in the political, economic and social life of their nation. The magazine—with its Buck Rogers-Flash Gordon-Star Trek aura—is a conscious hard sell of the modernization process, encouraging young Zambians to "buy" the values and aspirations associated with technological advancement.

Besides the cover science story (the educational value is evidently in the bits of data slipped into the story line; *i.e.*, ordinary oxygen turns to liquid at temperatures of 185° Centigrade) the magazine features material on current events, nature, sports, careers and pop culture.

A recent issue—in the "Orbit pop" section—offered a short take on the Osmonds, five American teenagers who sing about as well as you can expect relatives to do anything together. "The Osmonds," *Orbit* noted, "were born in Utah, USA, where they sang in family gatherings in the traditional close harmony barber-shop style, taught by their mother." Of course, the magazine does not neglect local talent. Also featured was a group called Musi O Tunya, a Zambian rock group. "Musi's style of music is 'Zam Rock' and it relies heavily on the power of drums. . . . Musi is a very special group for Zambia in that they compose a lot of their own music. Their stage show is original too, as they are very colorful in traditional dress."

Another issue featured a cartoon about a fisheries officer named Peter Nawa. Nawa instructs local fishermen in new curing methods and also arbitrates disputes among fishermen. The same issue contained a color spread on the Sahara desert, part of a series of articles on nature.

For Americans, the most fascinating thing about *Orbit* may well be its ability to shatter stereotypes. America's Africa-watchers—educators and the like—seldom speak of explorer David Livingstone in glowing terms. Yet, the Scottish missionary presumably occupies an important place in Zambia's recent history. *Orbit* notes: "Today, we remember Livingstone as a fighter for freedom, as a Christian, and as a man who by his life and his writings showed

*(continued on page 50)*

# Travel

# Souvenirs or objets d'art?

*A look at art buying in the African market place*

By NANCY McKEON

It seems that everyone who travels to Africa wants to take a souvenir, however small, of the continent home with him. From safari-circuiters grabbing up wooden elephant-handle salad servers to high-powered collectors beating the bush for ritual masks, visitors have always seen Africa as a continent rich in art that has function and where functional items are an art.

But for the thoughtful traveler concerned with the one-way traffic in African art (see *The World's Most Traveled Art*, this issue), an acquisitive nature can produce a dilemma; happily, it can be resolved. Although viable ritual pieces like the Afo-A-Kom make newspaper headlines, all African art is not of the value or significance of that beaded, beleaguered statue. Many art historians contend that production of traditional African art ended at the beginning of the century; nevertheless, carvers continue to make objects that are wholly traditional in style, method and material. These masks and statues are eminently accessible to the casual visitor of modest means.

Modern creations are often lumped together under the heading "airport art," that raft of artifacts that seems to line the tourist's path from airport to first-class hotel to game park and back. But the spectrum of crafts that art historian Marshall Ward Mount has more generously dubbed "souvenir art" shows great variety and, at times, fresh ideas. In at least one case, tourist demand has revived a craft. As Mount recounts in his new book, *African Art: The Years Since 1920*, Ashanti brass gold weights are once again being produced by the lost-wax technique, a method that had disappeared by the late 1930s. Although the present-day weights still depict proverbs, they are simpler than the old figures, their casting is cruder and their purpose is sale to tourists, not weighing gold dust. Still, they are handcrafted along traditional lines and are readily available to the visitor to Ghana in shops and hotels or from the ubiquitous Hausa traders.

One African craftsman Mount cites acknowledges, "We find out what they [Westerners] like. We make what they like when we are hungry." But airport art is far older than airports. Afro-Portuguese ivories—carved salt cellars and dagger handles—were produced as early as 1505 for sale as souvenirs to Portuguese sailors who plied the west coast of Africa. Historian William Fagg has noted that modern African craftsmen have indeed found out "what they like." Carvers saw that reasonably knowledgeable amateur collectors were examining masks for signs of ceremonial use—remnants of raffia, oil or sweat stains, rough edges smoothed by manure. This led to a new ceremony, he related, in which a batch of new antelope headdresses "became genuine . . . by being used in a revived ceremony, a kind of Blessing of the Exports."

Marketplaces throughout Africa are rife with artificially aged masks, and the buyer's best weapons are suspicion and common sense. A giant Epa helmet mask being hawked for $10 in a stall in the market simply cannot be an authentic ceremonial piece. It is also helpful to have a general idea of what forms traditional African art takes. Knowing that sculpted busts (that is, head and shoulders) have no place in most African traditions may keep the buyer from spending a lot of money under the misapprehension that his acquisition has significance for Africans in any sense but the economic.

All of this omits the question of aesthetics. If a piece of art holds great appeal, if the price is right, if getting it home will not cause undue problems, buy it. What difference does it make that the piece is not of museum quality? Unless a person aspires to be a collector, what matters is how he feels about his purchase as a memento of his African trip. And even souvenirs of the most common sort—little Wakamba carved figures, tall ebony Masai warriors with spears—will cost much more in the United States.

The real pleasure of going to an African marketplace, of course, has nothing to do with buying, although the latter may be hard to avoid. Enjoying the sights and sounds of people doing business, anywhere in the world, has appeal, and to western eyes the colorful jumble of an African trading place seems to hold particular charm. A friendly attitude and a willingness to enter into animated bargaining—if only to bring the asking price down, maybe 10 times, to what you're willing to pay—can make the visit worthwhile, whether or not you make a purchase.

For all its charm, the marketplace—with its sellers shouting com-




*Street vendors hawk their wares in the crafts market at Kinshasa, Zaïre. Photo, The New York Times.*

peting sales pitches, usually at the same time—places perhaps too much pressure on the serious browser. A better first step is a long, leisurely trip to the local museum, if there is one, or to the expensive art galleries in town. At either place, one can examine works of art carefully and can get an idea of what forms the very best art takes. In many African museums, there are shops that sell local art products; in fact, sculptors retained by the museum at Abidjan, Ivory Coast will duplicate, for a commission fee, any carving from the museum's collection of traditional Ivory Coast material.

Professor Daniel J. Crowley, of the University of California at Davis, cites the galleries in and around the most expensive hotel in town as often having the "best pieces of 'old' art available in Africa, plus much ordinary new art." Professor Crowley maintains, in an article in *African Arts*, that, even with their tremendous markup, such galleries can provide excellent buys. "The wives of otherwise taciturn museum directors have had forcibly to drag their protesting husbands out of the basement galleries of the Ivoire Hotel in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, perhaps the best of the lot, lest they convert next year's janitorial budget into Senufo iron lamps and Baulé portrait figures," he writes.

Talking only about sculpture and masks leaves out a whole range of African arts and crafts that provide beautiful, useful remembrances of a trip. Markets abound in lengths of beautiful cloth—from the traditional Kente strip cloth of Ghana to the modern cottons, sometimes with funny sayings, sometimes with political slogans, found in East Africa. Decorated calabashes—as useful in an American home as in an African one—are everywhere in the continent, as are jewelry, basketry and other crafts.

Naturally, what you see depends on where you go. The modern Makonde sculptors that line the dusty road from Tanzania's current capital, Dar es Salaam, to its German colonial capital, Bagamoyo, will not be seen even in neighboring Kenya. Huge orange leather satchels with braided handles mark the traveler as having been to Kano, Northern Nigeria. The gold filigree of Dakar, Senegal, the coin jewelry of Niamey, Niger, the satin tie-dyes of Freetown, Sierra Leone, the *fugu* cloth smocks of Bolgatanga, Ghana—all add to what Professor Crowley calls the "full range of aesthetic expression" in Africa, and each element is peculiar to its own region.

Often neglected by tourists are the modern African artists, working sometimes in traditional media, sometimes in modern. Mostly found in the big cities and represented in European-style galleries, these artists provide contemporary expressions of the African viewpoint. Whether a person seeks art or craft, in Africa he finds ample amounts of both.

# Books

## Spring publishing '74: The Outlook is Dismal

After a less-than-splendid fall, U.S. publishing about Africa is headed for a sour spring. Although exact figures are difficult to compile, it seems clear that the number of African titles due this spring is drastically reduced—by perhaps as much as three-quarters—from what it was just a few short years ago when the African Studies/Black Studies boom was in full swing.

Several factors help to explain the decline. For one thing, libraries—the biggest consumers of most books and certainly of African titles—simply have less money to spend than they did a few years back. Leon King, an editor at Praeger Publishers, points out that the last two years have seen library budgets grow increasingly tight.

A second reason for the lag in Africa publishing is the broad decline in interest in things African, notably in academic circles. Although precise figures are hard to come by, nearly all publishers lament the dwindling number of African course offerings at American universities. (Books that are required for courses have predetermined markets. For such books it is relatively easy to estimate the size of a printing and a price, thus ensuring a profit or at least limiting losses.)

A third trend that has hurt Africa publishing is the increasing tendency, among scholars and general audiences, to separate Black studies from African studies. Praeger's King notes that Black Americans are interested in the African roots of their heritage but that books dealing with such matters account for only a small portion of publishing activity about Africa. Clearly, a book dealing with South Eastern Nigeria during the years 1841-1906 (a recent Northwestern University Press offering) can hardly be expected to ride the coattails of excitement created by books about and by Black Americans.

A final reason for the overall decline in publishing is that during the great boom days of the '60s, there was an overabundance of books. Leon King says that although the quality of much that was published was dubious, the quantity was staggering. At the University of California Press, perhaps the granddaddy of American scholarly publishing about Africa, Al Henon confirms this impression. "Commercial publishers really overestimated the market for African books, and a lot of them got burned pretty badly." Other industry sources note that even some of the best publishing—Doubleday's Africana series, which includes paperback versions of some of Chinua Achebe's work—has not sold as well as might have been expected. Perhaps reflecting a majority view among editors, Henon believes that the current decline really represents a return to normalcy rather than a major cutback.

Whether or not Henon is correct, the prospects for even a sustained level of moderate, but high-quality, publishing seems questionable. Many editors—although most prefer anonymity on the subject—point to the absence of good material about Africa, noting that the emphasis among authors on historical rehash is particularly strong. "What we don't need is another general history of East Africa. What we do need is a great infusion of material on topical matters," one editor says. Another suggests that even the available scholarly material includes a lot of work that must be characterized as second-rate.

In a random survey of some 20 to 30 major publishing firms, *Africa Report found a surprisingly low number of* books due for publication this spring. Some of the survey findings: Praeger has one new African title due for spring; Cambridge University Press has about five new titles; Oxford University Press' spring catalogue lists six new titles; Thomas Y. Crowell has no new African titles planned for spring; Columbia University Press has no new titles; Harcourt Brace Jovanovich said it plans no new African titles for the spring. The point is clear. Indeed, it seems almost silly to discuss the general quality of books about Africa when so few are being published.

Of the publishing activity that is going on, there tends to be two broad types—general and scholarly. The general books (Stein & Day's *The Vanishing Herds* and *The White Rhino Saga*, Little Brown's *Look a Lion in the Eye*, New York Graphic Society's *Eyelids of Morning* and Doubleday's *There's a Rhinoceros in the Rosebed, Mother)* are typical fare—animals, animals (even if some now have a heavy overlay of ecology). If one extreme of the business is excessively myth-oriented (the continent of mystery and big game) the other is exceedingly myopic. Scholarly books continue on such topics as Cambridge's *Marriage Among a Matrilineal Elite*. Clearly, such titles are geared to a narrow audience of scholars.

The grandmaster of U.S.-based scholarly publishing on Africa—and indeed one of the few academic presses that still has a thriving African program—is the University of California Press. UCLA's African studies center is still *the* major African studies program, and its influence on the University of California Press is great. In addition, the University of California

Press received recent assistance from The Ford Foundation to launch its important southern African series, now in its 13th book. Al Henon, UC's Africa editor, reports that the press plans to publish 10 to 12 African books each year on a whole range of subjects —from a lavish forthcoming art book to a book on the religions in Nyasaland. UC's output has actually increased over the past few years and Henon maintains that for those publishers who have realistically appraised the market, there continues to be a reasonable economic basis for publishing about Africa. (Henon notes that sales expectations for a scholarly work on Africa range from 1,000 to 2,000 copies.)

Africana Publishing Corporation, another house known for its realistic appraisal of the market, has been publishing texts and scholarly monographs since its founding in 1969. Although Africana has been able, in the opinion of most editors, to maintain its quality, its list is quite small. The company published only 28 titles in all of 1972. (A larger trade publisher will publish anywhere from 400 to 800 titles in a single year.) Both Africana and the University of California Press sometimes publish in conjunction with British firms, thus expanding the market for their books.

Abe Goldman of Africana notes that there is currently something of a hiatus even among those who have special African interests. He feels it will be a few more years before the major texts "wear out" and a new generation of scholars produce a new set of fundamental works.

Most publishers believe that the market for books about Africa will never be large and that expected increases over the next few years will be modest. The Third Press, a steady contributor to the Africa publishing scene, is working on a solution to this problem. The Third Press' editor, Joseph Okpaku, notes that the company is planning (somewhere from 12 to 18 months in the future) to open an African division. "Here in New York, we're still a small operation. In 1972, The Third Press published 11 titles. When our Africa division gets going, we'll be among the top 10 per cent. After all, Africa is the primary market for

## BOOKS

(continued from page 49)

books about Africa." Meanwhile, The Third Press uses some of its general titles to help carry its Africa books. Among the 20 titles The Third Press plans this spring is a novel by Robin Moore *(The French Connection)* called *Phase of Darkness*. Moore's novel is set in Africa, the beginning of a trend for popular novelists, Okpaku thinks. Okpaku acknowledges that there has been something of a void in the middle ground when it comes to African publishing. He suggests that The Third Press is an attempt to help fill this void. Is such a course economically feasible? Okpaku says the firm needs to expand but notes that raising money for expansion is difficult in the present economy. In response to a question about the firm's financial position, Okpaku notes, "It's rough, but we're doing O.K."



## GETTING INTO ORBIT

(continued from page 45)

a deep interest and respect and love for other people." Not a bad review for a colonialist. (In fact, the magazine even ran a contest called the "Livingstone competition" in which young people were invited to draw or paint one scene from the life of the explorer.) *Of course, the magazine runs plenty of* material on African leaders (Kenya's Kenyatta, for example). Clearly, part of the magazine's intention is to introduce students to African history and to broaden their horizon about the entire world.

But it is in its blending of the seemingly contradictory that *Orbit* finds its charm and its real utility for Americans. It is always astounding to remember that two of Zambia's most popular singers are James Brown, soul singer, and Jim Reeves, country & western singer. In America, the audiences for soul music and country and western sounds are usually thought to be separate and distinct. Apparently, Zambians—able to hear each man without the kinds of cultural interference that operate on American ears—find pleasure in both.

*For all its slickness and its simplicities* (has there ever really been a children's magazine anywhere that really portrayed the world?) *Orbit* provides a key to the kinds of aspirations Zambia wishes her young people to have. In *Orbit*, and perhaps in reality, things African and things western mingle without strain. All in all, *Orbit* affords an intriguing look at an emerging value system.

## THE MIDEAST WAR

(continued from page 35)

aimed at Israeli shipping is adequate justification for continuing U.S. military aid to Ethiopia.

Meanwhile, the Azores-Tel Aviv airlift aroused suspicions that the U.S. Navy communications station in Morocco furnished navigational fixes to aircraft flying to Israel. U.S. officials deny this, but Assistant Secretary Newsom, who visited Rabat with Secretary Kissinger, returned there for four days after a visit to Ethiopia. The purpose *of the second visit, the State Department* says, was to discuss how the U.S. might assist Morocco's new five-year development plan. Port rights at Massawa, the U.S. argues, are important in assuring that the Red Sea remains open to U.S. shipping; as an observation post from which to watch Soviet shipping entering the Indian Ocean should the Suez Canal be reopened; and as a watering-hole near a part of the Indian Ocean where the U.S. has few installations.

Nevertheless, these questions and all other bilateral matters confronting the U.S. in Africa—at least for 1974—take a back seat to and will be influenced by developments in U.S.-Portuguese relations. Although there is no evidence that Kissinger appreciates southern Africa as having important implications for U.S. policy and although he seems to have no desire or inclination to face an African question squarely, it must also be said that until now there has not been an African question cast in such a way that he could not easily side-step it. Kissinger, of course, could deflect this one as well, but at a price that ultimately Africa will determine in conjunction with its Arab, Soviet and Chinese friends.

Dr. Kissinger has recognized publicly that the U.S. during the past six *years was not as active as it might have* been in promoting a Middle East settlement. If he has recognized the parallel failure of the U.S., especially during the past six years, to be as active as it might have been in promoting a settlement in West Africa, he has not yet said so.

In 1870, U.S. President Ulysses S. Grant arbitrated in favor of Portugal a century-old dispute between Lisbon and London pertaining to the title to Bolama Island in Portuguese Guinea. A century later a title dispute over the whole territory is before the U.S. It won't be long before the whole world knows whether at heart Henry Kissinger is really a 20th century Ulysses Grant. □


| | *Population* | *Growth Rate 1965-1970* | *Population Density* | *Area* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Northern Africa** | 42,616,000 | 3.3% | 7/km² | 5,751,930 |
| **Western Africa** | 104,538,000 | 2.3% | 16/km² | 6,415,401 |
| **Central Africa** | 58,728,000 | 2.4% | 6/km² | 8,652,031 |
| **Eastern Africa** | 82,742,000 | 2.2% | 18/km² | 4,293,649 |
| **Southern Africa** | 58,882,000 | 2.8% | 10/km² | 5,322,214 |
| **Africa Total** | 344,000,000 | 2.6% | 11/km² | 30,435,000 |
| **World Total** | 3,362,000,000 | 2.0% | 27/km² | 135,781,000 |

# TOMORROW IS TOO LATE!

For five long years, 6 million people in six countries have raised their eyes heavenward, imploring rain.

For five long years, 6 million people in six African countries have helplessly watched the drought devastate their crops and decimate their herds.

## FIVE LONG, TEDIOUS, ARDUOUS YEARS!

Recently, the first drops of rain fell in the Sahel—the sub-Saharan African region. Eyes again turned heavenward, in thanks . . . reflecting the soaring hopes of six million people.

In the fall, perhaps crops will once again be ready for harvest and there will be food enough for subsistence.

## BUT WHAT ABOUT NOW?

NOW—these 6 million people are starving. Governments, including our own are rushing food to them. Agencies like Catholic Relief Services and Church World Service are desperately trying to reach as many of them as possible with vitally needed supplies, vitamins and specialized food supplements to ward off disease, as well as precious vaccines and antibiotics to save those whose bodies can no longer resist.

Meanwhile emaciated humans dot the landscape in a kaleidoscope of horror that should stagger the conscience of the world's well fed nations.

The rain that will nourish next fall's crops is tomorrow's hope.

# YOU ARE TODAY'S HOPE.

*Send your tax deductible dollars through your church or mail to:*

**CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES**
West African Famine Fund
350 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10001

*Contribution* _____
Name _____
Address _____
City _____ State _____ Zip _____

**CHURCH WORLD SERVICE**
West African Famine Fund
P.O. Box 898, Madison Square Station
New York, N. Y. 10010

*Contribution* _____
Name _____
Address _____
City _____ State _____ Zip _____

# Africa Report

MAGAZINE FOR THE NEW AFRICA

$1.75 MARCH-APRIL 1974



## Special Review: Tourism in Africa

Zanzibar in the Shadow of Karume

Lonrho: Notable Successes, Embarrassing Failures


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# Africa Report

MAGAZINE FOR THE NEW AFRICA

A Publication of the African-American Institute


**Africa's Dream Industry.** Travel to Africa is the dream of a growing number of Americans, who want to visit the Continent. And until now, most African governments have tended to view the flood of tourists as a panacea for persistent foreign exchange problems. Two distinguished writers with long experience in the travel field attempt to penetrate the myths associated with Africa travel. On page 6, Ben F. Carruthers surveys American travel to Africa. On page 12, Patrick Rivers takes a hard look at the relationship of tourism to development.



Cover photo: Bernard Pierre Wolff.

**Exclusive in Africa Report.** Behind the current upheavals in Portugal is a book written by General Antonio de Spinola. Spinola's book, *Portugal and the Future*, sent shock waves through war-weary Portugal. The General's contention: Portugal cannot win in Africa. In a place of current colonial arrangements, Spinola is calling for a federation of Portuguese territories.

**Karume's Ghost.** Still haunting the now-empty palaces of tiny Zanzibar is the spirit of the country's assassinated dictator, Sheikh Abeid Karume. But the little island is beginning to reap the benefits of revolution. All in all, Zanzibaris are looking ahead to their second decade of independence with optimism.




MARCH-APRIL 1974 VOLUME 19 NUMBER 2

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# News Analysis

## Britain's Africa Policy

From London, Africa Report's Editor Probes the Impact of England's Swing to Labor

By ANTHONY J. HUGHES

If Britain's Conservative Party has been the party of Empire, Labor has distinguished itself as the party of the Commonwealth. Traditionally Labor's egalitarian principles directed it toward a policy of international brotherhood. Paradoxically it was during a long period of Conservative government that most British colonies in Africa achieved independence.

This underlines the basic continuity of British foreign policy, irrespective of government. The "mandarins" of the Foreign Office—the permanent civil servants—are second only to the treasury officials in their reputation for ensuring that their "masters"—the political ministers—follow a bipartisan course.

Britain's February election will reinforce the tendency toward continuity, particularly since Labor won only four seats more than the Conservatives. The Liberal Party—and two Welsh Nationalists—will generally support a progressive, internationalist foreign policy, but the Scottish Nationalists in Parliament make less reliable allies in this area. And right-wingers elected from Northern Ireland favor a more conservative approach to international relations.

Bearing these factors in mind, what are the points in Labor's election platform and in the Party's position that diverge from the African policy of the previous administration?

As part of its program to renegotiate its position in the European Economic Community (EEC), Labor would like to reestablish commodity and free-trade agreements that were

key aspects of the British Empire and of the Commonwealth.

Labor's election manifesto states: "The economic interests of the Commonwealth and of the developing countries must be better safeguarded. This involves securing continued access to the British market and, more generally, the adoption by an enlarged community of trade and aid policies designed not to benefit just 'associated overseas territories' in Africa, but developing countries throughout the world."

There is an indication of the new government's intentions with regard to development assistance in the return of the overseas development responsibility to a separate ministry. Overseas development had been merely a department under the Conservatives. But the Conservative record on aid, using the criterion of proportion of GNP, was virtually the same as that of the previous Labor government.

In the Middle East, the Labor Party has been viewed as pro-Israel, especially when compared with the even-handed or marginally pro-Arab position toward which the Conservatives gradually moved. It is not, as in American politics, Jewish voters and fund-givers who foster a pro-Israeli position in the Labor Party. Jewish voting patterns probably reflect those of the British community as a whole. What is important is the relatively large number of Jews in the Parliamentary Labor Party plus the fact that Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir's party is affiliated with the social-democratic Socialist International, whose secretariat is in London and of which the British Labor Party is a member.

If the rapprochement between the United States and the Arabs continues, there are prospects of closer harmonization of British and American positions in this area. This understanding might be enhanced by the fact that in renegotiating its position within Europe, Britain will need to strengthen its "Atlantic" option. (Counter to this there is the fact that the Labor Party intends to reduce its defense spending and will seek removal of American Polaris bases from Great Britain. Also, and of direct importance to Africa, the Labor government is reconsidering the proposal for an Anglo-American

# Publisher's Message

With this issue, AFRICA REPORT is proud to announce the appointment of its fourth editor, **Anthony J. Hughes.** Tony's experience in Africa journalism is extensive and rich. Since 1971, he has been editor of *Africa Magazine* published in London. From 1959 until 1963, he worked as political correspondent for newspapers in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. In 1963, he was press and public relations officer of Jomo Kenyatta's Kenya Africa National Union. Tony subsequently held a number of information positions in the post-independence Kenya government. In 1969-70, he was executive secretary of the Ariel Foundation, a British organization dealing primarily with African affairs. His book, *East Africa*, was published by Penguin in 1963 and reprinted in 1968.

The theme of this issue is African tourism. In the past, we have tried to give our readers the kind of travel information that helps enhance an African experience—whether real or of the armchair variety. In a slight departure from what journalists commonly refer to as "destination pieces," we decided it was time for AFRICA REPORT to take an overall look at tourism, assessing American travel to Africa as well as the role of tourism in African development. Essentially, we remain convinced that the best way to learn about Africa is to go see for yourself.

Our authors this month include some new and welcome faces:

**Benjamin F. Carruthers** is travel editor of *Essence* and *Contact* magazines as well as the author of a newspaper column called "New Departures." He has visited Africa six times over the past five years. He is national secretary of the Society of American Travel Writers and a board member of that organization.

**Alan Hutchison** is a former Reuters correspondent who worked out of Lagos and Dar es Salaam. He is now a freelance writer based in London and traveling half the year in Africa. His book, *China's Africa Revolution*, about Chinese activities on the Continent from 1955 to the present, is to be published this fall.

**Patrick Rivers** is the author of the *Restless Generation* (Davis-Poynter, London, 1972) and *Politics by Pressure*, to be published by Harraps (London) in June. Now a freelance writer, he has been a farmer, a journalist, editor and marketing executive, as well as an extensive traveler.

**Coleman Lollar** is a travel writer and editor who taught geography in Sierra Leone for two years.

The photographs unifying the travel section of this issue were taken primarily by **Bernard Pierre Wolff,** who is responsible for the cover photo as well. Mr. Wolff has traveled extensively in Africa, often on photographic assignments for the U.N. His photographs on the Sahelian region have been exhibited at the African-American Institute. He has another New York exhibit opening soon.

To those of you who wrote to congratulate us on the addition of *African Update* to our last issue, we extend our thanks and hope you will continue to enjoy this new regular feature. —RLD

# Tourism: Africa's



# Dream Industry



Travel to Africa is the dream of a growing number of Americans who want to visit the Continent. And until now, most African governments have tended to view the flood of tourists as a panacea for persistent foreign exchange problems. In a special look at Africa travel, Africa Report tries to find out where the myth and reality meet.

A distinguished travel writer surveys U.S. travel to Africa and finds that more and more Americans are seeking out Africa's diversity by . . .

# Jumping Off the Safari Circuit

By BEN F. CARRUTHERS

Although Africa's approach to the U.S. tourist market has been, on the whole, timid and disorganized, some progress is being made, and travel wholesalers generally report steady progress in the growth of bookings. Such really important tourism as there has been has come from Europe; but the American contingent, Black as well as white, grows slowly but consistently.

Granted that few African states have the economic means or professional know-how to compete in the fierce and crowded U.S. international-travel marketplace. Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean and Western Europe have long been established with professionally staffed tourist offices entirely separate from diplomatic missions. They have launched expensive advertising campaigns, have hired sales experts with U.S. experience and have drawn upon the seemingly inexhaustible promotional resources of international airlines, hotel organizations and steamship companies in order to encourage continued support of these favored travel destinations.

Like South America, Africa is a "debutante" in the U.S. market. To compete with established destinations in other parts of the world, she might well adopt a regional approach, with North African, West African and East African states joining forces, first locally and, later on, in a Continent-wide effort. With individual countries' promotional funds scarce, this pooling of resources may provide a solution. Furthermore, U.S. visitors to Africa, whether first-timers or repeaters, will probably choose to visit more than one country. This is especially true in West Africa, where the countries are smaller and easier to reach from the U.S. gateways.

The U.S. travel industry recognizes that there are many "publics" to be approached professionally. Witness the Italian and Greek tourist offices in the U.S. which have launched successful campaigns among Italian-Americans and Greek-Americans. Israel, too, has drawn heavily upon U.S. Jews to build tourism to that country. Except for West Africa and the Black American, Africa has no such potent ethnic resource upon which to draw. But many Black Americans are interested and economically capable of international travel; special promotional efforts to Black Americans should certainly be made by West African states.

Logically, American tourism approaches Africa regionally, the way it approaches South America. For touristic purposes, then, Africa divides into North, West and East Africa, where certain leaders emerge. In the northern part of the Continent these leaders are Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, all of which now have established tourist offices in the U.S. and have facilitated entry of American citizens as tourists.

Morocco is the farthest west of the North African Arab states and has cordial ties with the U.S. She has just announced an intention to create an annual tourist capacity of 2.5 million and the addition of 98,000 hotel rooms by 1977. Her own statistics reveal reception of 1.3 million visitors during the first 10 months of 1973, still minuscule when compared with the 35 million tourists who visited her next-door neighbor Spain during the same period. A substantial proportion of Moroccan tourists visited only Tangier —the city directly across the narrow Strait of Gibraltar from Spain—which, of course, is hardly the "real" Morocco. Nevertheless, an educated guess is that one-tenth of last year's visitors to Morocco were U.S. citizens, by far the largest tally on the Continent. For the most part, American travelers, except for the connoisseurs among them, are still unaware of the excellent accommodations in such cities as Marrakesh, Rabat, Meknès and Fez where the Government-sponsored hotels are excellent and where Hilton International and Holiday Inn are also represented. Another strong selling point for Morocco is her excellent road system with adequate bus service between principal cities and good trains that carry dining or snack facilities in air-conditioned splendor.

As for Tunisia, the estimate is that there were 800,000 visitors from abroad in 1973 but that only 16,000 of them were U.S. citizens. Here is a country with an ultramodern capital; excellent hotel accommodations, including a stately Hilton; lovely Mediterranean resorts such as Sidi-Bou-




Photo by Beryl Goldberg

Said and the lotus-eaters' island of Djerba, plus the ruins of imperial Carthage. Easily reached from Italy or southern France, Tunisia is understandably Europe-oriented, but it is a potential magnet for U.S. visitors to the Mediterranean area.

Now emerging from her most recent armed conflict with Israel, Egypt seems happy to have entered an era of more cordial diplomatic relations with the U.S. with reestablishment of embassies in Cairo and Washington. Despite politics, however, American tourists who have been there have nearly always been captivated with the vestiges of ancient Egyptian civilization.

From Alexandria and the Nile Delta, southward through the entire length of the Egyptian Nile, visitors can only be amazed at the grandeur of the pyramids, temples, cities and citadels, palaces and tombs belonging to those empires and kingdoms that held sway here for three millennia before Jesus Christ. In addition to these creations of the dynasties of Upper (southern) and Lower (northern) Egypt, there are also vestiges of Coptic Christianity, whose present capital is Cairo, and early Arab and mediaeval Turkish cultures that give one pause, especially in Cairo, largest city in Africa.

On the extreme western edge of the vast Continent, "serious" tourism begins with the Republic of Senegal. Its capital Dakar, with a population of half a million, is the real gateway from the Americas to this part of Africa. Entirely surrounded by Senegal, The Gambia follows the valley of the Gambia River. To the south along the bulge one finds Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, which are of lesser importance touristically, due more to lack of promotional effort than to potential. Then comes Ivory Coast, now probably the leader in West Africa's touristic sweepstakes. Next door, to the east on the Continent's lower curve facing the Gulf of Guinea are Ghana (the former Gold Coast) and tiny Togo and Dahomey wedged like slivers between Ghana and huge Nigeria, whose potential is probably greatest of all. Further south and east, Cameroun, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Congo and Zaïre complete the coastal repertory.

Landlocked states such as Mauritania, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad and the Central African Republic have suffered so seriously from the merciless Saharan drought over the past few

years that their very existence has been threatened. Nevertheless, 11 of the 12 former French colonies in this group support Air Afrique, a modern carrier furnishing intercontinental as well as intracontinental services. In 1973 the line carried 356,000 passengers while its trans-Atlantic service from New York transported 5,000 to Africa, of whom at least 3,000 were U.S. citizens. This represented a 20 per cent increase over 1972.

Senegal, though suffering from the Saharan drought, is a natural tourist leader in West Africa with admirable beaches, a pleasant capital and a handsome and industrious people whose principal languages are Wolof and French. Dakar has more than 800 good hotel rooms, attractive public buildings and fascinating markets. Its French-oriented restaurants are among the best in West Africa.

The Gambia, whose capital is Banjul, draws mainly Swedes during the winter and is easily reached from almost any point in Senegal. There have been few U.S. visitors so far, but the results of one celebrated visit—that of author Alex Haley, who traced his ancestry to The Gambia—will be published as *Roots*, by Doubleday, in the summer of 1975 (for a preview, see *Africa Report*, May-June 1973).

Guinea next door is still virtually closed to American tourists. Politically isolated since independence, Guinea *still* has an undoubtedly exceptional tourist potential for U.S. visitors. The other Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, declared her independence from Portugal in September 1973, but the war for liberation continues.

Sierra Leone has a glowing potential centering on her natural beaches. "Creoles," descendants of free British Blacks, are the rulers of the country, site of an early successful British abolitionist recolonization movement. Its capital, Freetown, has a dramatic com-

*Whether at a parade in Abidjan (far left) or in a Ghanaian marketplace or while crossing Ghana's Lake Volta aboard the Yeji Ferry, contact with people is the most rewarding part of a West African trip.*

Photo far left by Bernard Pierre Wolff, others by Beryl Goldberg

bination of harbor and steeply rising hills.

Liberia is of great sentimental importance to Afro-Americans because the country was settled by free Black men from the States under the auspices of the American Colonization Society in 1822. Today some 36,000 of their descendants are still largely the rulers of the country although some progress is being made to bring the people of the interior into the mainstream of Liberian affairs. Still primarily concerned with revenues from vast deposits of iron, rubber exports and ship licensing under "flag-of-necessity" arrangements, Liberia has far to go to reach touristic leadership or even prominence among U.S. visitors to West Africa.

Next door, to the east, Ivory Coast is today the undisputed leader in building tourism from Europe to West Africa. Word of the luxurious physical facilities and of the industry, charm and hospitality of the Ivoirian people has reached American shores, and the number of U.S. visitors increases apace. Abidjan, the resplendent capital of the country, is endowed with splendid hotels including the huge complex of the Hotel Ivoire, kingpin of a projected "African Riviera." Abidjan has wide boulevards and parkways, modern homes and office buildings, parks and recreational areas while the whole is interwoven with waterways and canals, making Abidjan a modern, tropical, African Venice. The country is rapidly developing its dramatic interior and one may visit such places as Man and Bouaké with surprising ease and find, in most resort areas, modern, comfortable hotel accommodations.

Still farther east, the Ivory Coast's English-speaking neighbor Ghana was formed from the British Gold Coast colony and the territory of British Togoland. Her independence in 1957 pointed the way for most of Africa. Nearly one-tenth of all Ghanaians live in the capital, Accra, a fun-loving, sophisticated city that may be expected to enlarge and improve its hotel facilities in the near future. Ghana has had to face up to severe economic difficulties over the past decade and has therefore not been able to develop her tourist program with the same speed as her French-speaking neighbor.

Accra is dotted with fine administrative and office buildings and housing developments, and enjoys a beautiful waterfront, one of the most impressive in Africa. Home of West Africa's "high life," the popular dance music, Ghana seems determined to make herself a real leader in West African affairs. The Ashanti country in the center is famous for its arts, crafts and folklore as well as for the bulk of the cash cocoa crop that helps to nourish the country's economy. To date, Ghana is probably the most

*The Kilimanjaro Hotel in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania is typical of the modern accommodations Africa offers to tourists.*

favored West African destination for U.S. Blacks, and reliable estimates are that more than 10,000 U.S. visitors made up one-quarter of the total foreigners who visited Ghana last year.

Togo, some 400 miles long and only 90 miles wide at its broadest, has a history of German (pre-World War I) and later French colonization, winning independence in 1960. The main attraction Lomé, the capital, has held for Americans has long been Edith's Inn, a small hostelry run by Black American Edith Simpson. With a Togolese Government takeover of the Inn, and Edith's subsequent return to the U.S., the Peace Corps Volunteers and other visitors who craved the Inn's American-style food will no longer find Lomé the magnet it once was.

Dahomey achieved independence at the same time as neighboring Togo. Western Hemisphere Blacks, especially many of those in Brazil and in the French- and Spanish-speaking Caribbean are descendants of Dahomeans who were enslaved and transported to the Americas by traders who were mostly Dutch and British. Despite these New World ties, the country cannot be said to have taken a prominent place in the travel plans of U.S. visitors.

Nigeria, the enormous "hinge" of western Africa, is, of course, another matter. Here, the desire to visit has far outrun the facilities or tourist-mindedness of Nigerian authorities. With an estimated one-sixth of the population of the entire Continent, Nigeria became autonomous in 1960 and fully independent in 1963. It is the largest Black country in the world and potentially the wealthiest and most influential in world affairs. With natural resources of incalculable value, such as enormous deposits of petroleum, the country's economic orientation has largely neglected tourism. But the day cannot be far distant when Nigeria will take her rightful place as the prime tourist destination in all West Africa for U.S. visitors.

Moving south and east, Zaïre, another giant, is also a potentially important magnet for U.S. visitors, but tourism will probably not be a major factor for another decade. Between Nigeria and Zaïre are Cameroun, Gabon and the Congo Republic which also have their touristic potentials but cannot yet be considered important attractions for U.S. tourists.

In Central Africa, landlocked Zambia and Malawi lie north of white-supremacist Rhodesia, which Africans call Zimbabwe. West of Zambia and southwest of Zaïre, the huge Portuguese "overseas territory" of Angola continues to struggle for independence as does Mozambique on the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese insist that it is safe for U.S. visitors to travel to these territories as tourists, but thus far travelers have been confined pretty much to big-game hunters with little interest in the political aspirations of the local people.

Zambia has made a notable effort in the U.S. travel market. The country is, as most Americans are aware, the site of Victoria Falls, most spectacular in Africa, and is endowed with beautiful beaches on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. Oriented more toward the north than toward the racist south of the Continent, Zambia is linked to its northeastern neighbor, Tanzania, which will provide much-needed road and rail outlets to the ocean, especially for Zambia's all-important copper exports.

The Zambian Government actively sponsors a national parks system where Central and East African animals and birds have sanctuary. More than tourists, Zambia boasts many Americans who work in the country's educational system and with the huge mining sector of the economy.

A Black-ruled country closely associated with South Africa, Malawi is a beautiful sliver of a state with a magnificent lakefront well endowed with beaches. There are two important towns, Zomba and Blantyre, and some impressive game parks. Not many Americans travel to Malawi, but the British, many of whose relatives

have settled here quite comfortably, abound.

Of the three leaders in East African tourism, Kenya is *numero uno* in the area if not in all Africa. Furthermore, Kenya has met with considerable success in its tourist-promotional program in the U.S. Since 1963, when full independence came, President Jomo Kenyatta, in many respects the grand old man of Black Africa, has encouraged the construction of modern hotel facilities in the capital at Nairobi, at the port city of Mombasa and in and around the many fine national parks of the country. Nairobi is also the aviation "turntable" for all of East Africa. Ethnic conflicts have largely subsided, and the rich cultural and folkloric heritages of not fewer than 50 ethnic groups, including Kikuyu, Luo and the nomadic Masai, are to be seen in Kenya. Tourism statistics for Kenya in 1973 indicate 438,000 arrivals of which 79,000 were Americans. That's almost 20 per cent.

Kenya's neighbor Tanzania is larger than France and Germany together. It has the Continent's highest mountain, Kilimanjaro, awarded by Queen Victoria to her rapacious grandson, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, in the days when Britain and Germany were carving up this part of Africa between them. Tanzania, like Kenya, is national parks-minded and, while its capital Dar es Salaam cannot compare in size or mild climate with plateau-situated Nairobi, Tanzania has some 100 ethnic groups and an appreciable number of people of Arab and Indian descent in her polyglot population. Swahili and English are the most widely spoken languages here as they are in the rest of East Africa, except for Ethiopia. Considering the importance given by the country's government to the preservation of wildlife and to ecological matters in general, it is surprising that there is, as yet, no Tanzanian tourist office in the U.S. Many tourists from Europe and America now visiting Tanzania are "spillovers" from Kenya.

Uganda has, for political reasons, temporarily fallen from prominence in the tourist picture. It is to be hoped that the hiatus can soon be bridged and that the country, one of the most well endowed in Africa, can regain the attraction it had for visitors only a few years ago.

The completion of the East African circuit brings the visitor to the ancient empire of Ethiopia, a growing favorite among Americans. Recent political and social unrest and severe disquiet in the federated province of Eritrea may be assumed to be only temporary impediments to the advance of tourism from the U.S. While the mountain-high, motley capital of Addis Ababa holds little allure, certainly the historic cities of the "imperial route," including Gondar, Lalibela and, above all, Axum—legendary home of the Queen of Sheba—will in future attract thousands of American visitors once the domestic scene becomes tranquil and new hotels and modern tourist installations are undertaken.



*The churches at Lalibela, Ethiopia are carved out of solid rock and are an important torurist attraction for East Africa visitors.*

South Africa draws thousands of U.S. businessmen each year and has, for some time, spent considerable money and effort to bring *bona fide* tourists as well. While the effort has brought many white, game park-oriented Americans on safari to the subcontinent, South Africa continues to repel politically aware U.S. citizens. The rigid system of racial separation, apartheid, has separated the beautiful land, its unhappy Black majority and white minority not only from their African neighbors but also from acceptance by fair-minded U.S. tourists.

With the European vacation fast becoming commonplace and the Caribbean no more than a weekend jaunt for travel-minded Americans, Africa will soon be called upon to play a travel-destination role for the average visitor, no longer for only the American interested specifically in the Continent. With its vivid contrasts of peoples, religions and cultures, Africa already boasts the attractions needed to lure these tourists. In so doing, it can only be hoped that she will herself reap cultural and economic benefits. □

# Unwrapping the Africa Tourist Package

## After some early disappointments, African governments are carefully reassessing the role of tourism in national development

By PATRICK RIVERS

From traditional, affluent playgrounds, mass tourism has now spilled copiously into the fresh markets presented to its advocates by the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America.

It has been no accidental spill. The tourist industry's bankers, developers, hoteliers and transporters were keen to maintain their phenomenal postwar growth and boost profits still further. So they put together an attractive package of benefits, guaranteed to appeal to tourist ministers and leaders of most countries desperate to find a cure for crippling economic ills.

The package proved not too hard to sell. High-powered teams would explain that a country in trouble needed little more than the basic elements of sun, sand, sea or scenery, plus a readiness to accept foreign capital and expertise. A team would stress how package tours had pushed down long-haul air fares so that distance was no longer a major handicap; it would explain that after the country's own master plan had been implemented, good things would start happening.

Impressive statistics, mustered by the industry's economists, show that once enough oven-ready tourists are coming off the end of the aerial assembly line, faltering economies begin to liven up: foreign currency pours in and helps create new jobs, incomes rise and Gross National Product soars; thanks to tourism, much-needed roads and airports get built and essential services like electricity, telephones, water and sewerage schemes appear like magic. But this is not all: The ordinary people of the country, who may have lost hope of betterment, start shaking off their traditional backwardness and seek for themselves the goodies and lifestyles that the tourists display—part of the well-known "demonstration effect." And all the while the economy continues to grow.

The concept has been easy to sell, at least until recently.

Three or four years ago, however, a few people and organizations began looking more closely into what was happening in countries being "developed" with the help of mass tourism. They were a mixed bunch: individuals such as ecologists, economists, sociologists, writers and politicians; agencies such as the World Council of Churches, the Caribbean Travel Association and UNESCO. They didn't always like what they unearthed, and they said so.

At a consultation in Nairobi in 1970, the African operators pointed out how little spin-off there was for the host country: The beneficiaries of tourism, they claimed, were chiefly investors, air-charter companies and foreign hotel owners, who shipped most of the profits to Europe. And two years later at the first World Congress on Air Transport and Tourism, Knut Hammarskjöld, director general of the International Air Transport Association, was warning that "the essential objective is not the easy head count and 'statistical victory' but the real contribution which tourism should make to the national economies of the countries involved." And he quoted from an earlier report from the Association of African Airlines that "very little revenue is left in Africa by the cheap charters. The tickets are paid for in Europe, the hotels are mostly owned by Europeans and even the fuel used by the charters has to be imported with only a small bit of the revenue remaining in Africa."

Now at least such warnings are being remembered—not least because of



the present worldwide threat of recession. For it is becoming apparent that countries that have put most of their eggs in the tourist shopping basket are the countries that will be most affected by economic setbacks in the tourist-generating countries; and those at the end of the longer air hauls, especially away from the main aerial highways, will be hardest hit by fuel shortages and the recurring swinging fair rises. The countries of Africa are especially vulnerable, and most of all those that have pinned too much faith in this one fickle industry.

From the experience of other countries, longer in the game and displaying visible scars, lessons can be learned.

Tourism is powerful stuff—the only "export" industry where the customer calls in person to collect what he has paid for. Largely because of this, it is more potentially disruptive than other industries of comparative size, even when its vaunted economic benefits turn out to be real. Countries such as Tanzania, Zambia and Tunisia learned early that there is a limit to how much tourism a country can take: The industry can get into the wrong hands; the customers don't come—or they're the wrong type. But then the damage is done, for hotels have few other uses. Unlike the tourists, they're there for keeps.

If the tourist invasion is not carefully stage-managed, things go wrong from the start. Although cash inflows generate encouraging statistics, too few of the dollars may stay in the country. Instead they "leak away" as tourists demand luxuries that must be imported, as foreign investors repatriate their profits and workers remit their earnings. If the developing country has settled for the usual unimaginative and alien "air-conditioned" pattern of tourism, a high degree of such "leakage" is almost inevitable. For usually only foreigners will have the resources to build, operate, own and run hotels and other services on the scale and in the style that devotees of this kind of tourism have come to expect. As has happened in the Ivory Coast, most of the building material will have to be imported; and—as the Sudan has found—so will much of the food and drink.

It would be comforting to know that hotels will be staffed by local people, but too often foreign entrepreneurs are far more concerned with cutting costs by labor-saving technologies than in providing much-needed jobs; a lot more are ready to import skilled workers than train local people for anything more than menial tasks.

To attract foreign investors, developers and hoteliers, the developing country may have to offer costly baits —such as exemption from import duty and value-added tax. Moreover the government may be obliged to provide much of the infrastructure of roads and other services, paid for out of loans and taxes. When this happens, the economic benefits are diluted by the ensuing inflation and higher import bill.

A grave danger is that a country may find itself too deeply committed to the huge, chiefly American-based multinational companies that dominate the field. These are the shipping and air lines with their hotel chains, conglomerates with their car-hire firms, as well as banks that own tour operators. Annual sales of any one of these giants will exceed the national budget of many of the developing countries in which it has a stake. Whenever the interests of such a company and its shareholders run counter to those of a government or its people, the company will invariably look after its own. It is then that the government wakes up to find that it has accepted "tied" aid in its severest form.

Certainly under the influx of tourism a country's GNP is likely to rise,



but this crude statistic—so beloved by economists—too often masks what people at the grassroots know well: that the elite grow fatter at the poor's expense; for the benefits of mass tourism, unlike water, tend to flow uphill. Not everyone lives close enough to the tourist centers to benefit even indirectly, and they suffer in the inflation that ill-managed tourism exacerbates —none more than those on lowest incomes.

The cherished "demonstration effect," moreover, can easily backfire. Instead of spurring lazy *indigènes* to work it may merely fire the embers of discontent. In the cities people learn that they can never hope to possess the new affluence the tourists so tantalizingly parade in front of them; in the country small farmers have to learn that the new markets are not for them. For visitors demand not local fare, but an "international cuisine" and this can come only from blemish-free, graded produce, delivered in quantity from big farmers, or imported.

Discontent can be the industry's biggest threat. To attract and hold tourists in quantity, governments must preserve at least the illusion of peace and calm. Sometimes it takes strong measures to do so, sometimes an elaborate smokescreen or evasive action. During the height of the drought in Ethiopia last year, when thousands of men, women and children had already died, plane loads of travel writers were arriving at the unruffled Addis Hilton en route for tours that studiously missed the famine areas.

Nothing more dramatically underlines the endemic gap between ruler and ruled in Africa than such exercises in public relations. So long as the ruling elite identify more closely with the lifestyle of the international set—as symbolized by tourism—than with their own people—as symbolized by hunger—tourism will continue to hinder rather than help true development.

Despite all this, tourism can and does bring economic benefit to countries where sensible constraints are built into its growth. Too often, however, such prudence is lacking, and even when it is not, there is always

*Kenya, No. 1 in East African tourism, has attracted travelers and traders for hundreds of years. Thus, Kenya offers a much more varied face to visitors, particularly along the coast, than run-of-the-mill travel brochures would indicate. The Portuguese influence is shown in the 384-year-old Fort Jesus (far left). Photo second from left shows a trader taking a piece of ivory to the Government Treasury House for cataloguing in Mombasa. Most likely the ivory will be shipped to Hong Kong for carving and will then find its way back to Africa for sale as souvenirs. Photo at top shows a Muslim bookseller in Mombasa's Old Town. Merchants from India have made their stamp on East African commerce. Arab influence in East Africa goes back centuries. Bottom photo shows Gedi, an abandoned 19th-century Arab coastal town.*

Photos by Nancy McKeon

the risk that such benefits will be canceled out by disrupted lifestyles, the loss of stabilizing customs and traditions, and by damage to the natural environment.

People in a host country soon learn that the tourist finds the ordinary strangely fascinating. Any shred of culture can command its price, be it a carving, a ruin or a custom. Tunisia has admitted to a shortage of "animations," as it quaintly describes tourist entertainment; the demand to see a local wedding has so outstripped supply that mock ceremonies—at a price—are staged for the unsuspecting.

The disruption can take bizarre forms. Well-dressed tourists may excite envy, but at least they represent the old colonialism, and so slip neatly into a psychological slot. In contrast, scruffy ones, swapping simplicity for their own consumer society, spark off bewilderment—and swift official reaction. Numbers have risen, and "hippie" is now a catchword in East Africa especially, where it has come to signify rejection of the very values that "developing" countries have come to cherish: values symbolized by cars, smartness and all the other trappings of elitism. In 1972 Kenya closed its frontiers to "hippies" and forbade nude bathing on the island of Lamu as "against the Kenyan way of life." In The Gambia, where a tiny population fears being swamped by visitors, tourists—especially zealous Swedes—have reportedly been reprimanded for nude bathing, even though the local populace does so regularly.

Mini-skirts, shorts and trousers on women have also been cited as corrupting. Malawi, which banned abbreviated clothing on visitors, relaxed a little last year to permit it in restricted zones and in transit, while still insisting on proper attire for any sortie to meet the people . . . elaborate contortions to safeguard morals while raking in the dollars.

Not so long ago, conquered Africans shed traditional lifestyles for new ones imposed from outside. Now they are meeting increasing numbers of outsiders who visibly reject the new standards to which Africans aspire: instead they seek the old ones, now deemed backward. Confronted by such a paradox, official confusion is understandable—as are the measures taken to contain the new threat.

Tourism's material benefits may also be offset by damage to the environment. In many a country, tourists have been disappointed to find the same pollution they left behind—noise, foul air, dirty rivers and unhealthy seas. Fishing, which once lured them, vanishes as coastlines are developed and breeding grounds for fish succumb. Scenery is defiled by indiscriminate clearing, ill-planned building, advertising and power lines. Yet perhaps the most serious of all pollution is the tourist himself: for the nature of the game is such that it carries the seeds of its own destruction. As each destination becomes more accessible, its worth diminishes. In the end the developers will run out of world. Every host country has its own inbuilt threshold before cultural and environmental damage becomes critical. In less developed countries the threshold will be lower than in historically stable and prosperous countries—such as saturated Switzerland.

In most African countries the danger point has not yet been reached, though signs of lessons learned the hard way abound. The Ivory Coast Government, for example, not only paid in full for Club Méditerranée's impressive holiday village but also agreed not to charge rent for it until a 50 per cent occupancy rate had been achieved. Tanzania diverted sorely needed development funds from socially beneficial projects to build Kilimanjaro International Airport especially to steal Nairobi's traffic. Designed to take jumbo jets direct from Europe, it was opened in 1970. To date not even regular-sized aircraft make the direct flight.

> **Today, African governments are more realistically assessing the capacity of tourism to cure economic ills.**

Tanzania—which devotes an astonishing three per cent of its national budget to conservation (the highest in Africa, higher even than America)—still faces the problem of growing environmental damage. Each minibus destroys the Serengeti grassland in long swathes as it careens in pursuit of game—just one of the dangers to ecosystems that are worrying conservationists. With a tenfold increase in tourists in East Africa within a decade, their concern may be justified.

Yet Tanzania has been the forefront of general measures to anticipate and prevent the ravages of rampant tourism. Most of its own infrastructure has been paid for, not by foreign investors, but out of development funds. Its five-year contract with the British company Hallway Hotels Ltd. expired this February, and the job of running and marketing hotels now lies with Tanzanian Hotels Ltd., a subsidiary of the Tanzanian Tourist Corporation. This parastatal organization owns some 60 per cent of the country's accommodations, and the rest are mostly owned by Tanzanians. Although a combination of the country's socialist image, rumblings from Uganda and the poor reputation of its locally run coastal hotels is temporarily keeping the number of visitors down, President Nyerere is determined not to become overdependent on tourism, however tempting it may be to a country in need and with such an untapped potential. As a result, tourism ranks tenth as an earner of foreign exchange.

Tunisia, also with a big potential, has a cautious approach to letting in tourists. With a wary eye on Spain—smarting from the realization that too much of the cream has gone abroad—the government has tried not to let its early rapid growth get out of hand. Land prices are controlled, local participation is enforced, and no hotel can be higher than its surrounding palms. And to prevent undue importations of labor, authorities try to keep hotel growth at a rate that matches the industry's ability to train local staff.

For every country, the threshold will be different. In today's more sober assessment of the industry's capacity to cure economic ills, there is a better chance that governments will set their limits on its growth rate, nature and eventual size. Tourism is an industry built on dreams: the sun must always shine, the "natives" must always be friendly, the reality at the end of the journey must resemble the fantasy so expensively created at the beginning. Governments and businessmen who learn to work together so that reality more closely resembles the dream will be doing everyone a good turn. □

Photo by Bernard Pierre Wolff

# Books

## Two More Aids for the American Traveler

By COLEMAN LOLLAR

One of the problems with travel books has always been a lack of consensus by writers, publishers and readers as to what these biographies of places are intended to do. Does a good travel book introduce and interpret unseen lands for the reader, or does it point the way with maps and suggested itineraries so the reader/tourist can make his own discoveries?

The great Victorian travel writers took the *former approach*, assured that most of the reading public lacked funds, leisure time and appreciation for the classics required to discover very much on their own. If you weren't hosted for tea by the British consul in every town, you were more of a transient than a true traveler.

More recently we have seen the turn-left-at-the-monument theory of travel writing reach disturbing levels of success. The Frommers, Fodors and Fieldings have championed the idea that the traveler's world is one without history, spirit or even a population. Now we are asked to judge a civilization by its devalued $5-a-day *pensiones* and multichannel audio-equipped sightseeing buses.

For travelers to Africa the problem has been far more complex. We were left out of the debate because guides to Africa were so scarce that *we were grateful for what we could* find. For about a decade now the tourist who wanted primarily to see wild game could locate fairly good guides to the South and East African parks but he had scant chance of finding anything valuable on the parts of Africa where people live.

Only during the last couple of years has the African travel book situation taken a turn for the better. Most major publishing houses now have titles on their shelves or in preparation. The results have been mixed, but even this is good news, for traditionally a guide to African travels would have been so rare and the publisher's risk so pronounced that criticism would have been almost unthinkable.

Still, annoying problems persist. *Recently I found the year-old Traveler's Africa*, by Philip Allen and Aaron Segal (see review, *Africa Report*, May-June 1973), shelved under anthropology in a New York bookstore, while the African travel section was nearly bare. Bookstore clerks may be the last holdouts. But the time has come for them to move "Asia and the Far East" over a bit on travel shelves to make way for some worthwhile, and some wearisome, volumes on Africa.

Two of the newest books out illustrate what has been needed as well as what could have been left unsaid.

*The Traveler's Guide to Africa* (Rand McNally, $11.95. Editor-in-chief: Colin Legum; Editor: Richard Synge) is a large-format authoritative and colorful work by 30 "African travelers, Africans and Africanists." The book is a highly readable en*cyclopedia of facts and impressions*, with the two exercises kept scrupulously apart. Points of view are always attributed, and the editors don't hesitate to send readers off to other sources, even from competing publishers, for more information.

*The Traveler's Guide* is divided into four parts: "African Panorama," a collection of bylined essays (here are L. S. B. Leakey discussing the dawn of mankind and Basil Davidson on African history); "Travel Hints"; "Africa Region by Region" and country by country; and finally a 17-page full color atlas. The whole makes an impressive package.




After dispensing admirably with information that applies to all of Africa (or to vast areas of it) in the first two parts, the book delves into individual countries with skill and perception. Information is generally as current as could be hoped for, and countries' tourist snares are included with a minimum of gloss.

With 30 writers, it was inevitable that some sections would turn out stronger than others. Backpackers may be disappointed in this work, for only the most expensive hotels and restaurants are listed. Locations of restaurants, nightspots and other attractions tend to be somewhat vague, and it is usually left to the reader to decide which sights he should insist upon seeing and which should be omitted on a short trip.

Keeping a travel guide updated is a formidable challenge, and with currency revaluations running rampant throughout the world and hotel-building booming throughout Africa, some information in the best of books will be out of date or incomplete by publication date. Rand McNally includes a questionnaire at the end of *The Traveler's Guide* so readers can suggest revisions. It will be interesting to see how successful the plan is when the next edition reaches us. For now, we can be thankful for a new comprehensive and comprehensible guide—one that will certainly increase the reader's awareness of modern Africa and enhance the joy of thousands of trips this year.

With tourist interest in West Africa aroused to new heights, many people have anxiously awaited Sylvia Ardyn Boone's guide to the region. *West Africa Travels: A Guide to People and Places* (Random House, $8.95) serves well as a testament to one woman's love for West Africa and its people. It is a sensitive rebuttal to the *African Creeks I've Been Up* look at the Continent's most populous region.

But we're talking about travel guides here, and as a source of useful information for the Africa-bound traveler, Ms. Boone's book falls short of expectation. She has produced a work heavy on expostulation and weak on tourist specifics.

From the first paragraph, the reader senses a rather odd defensiveness. The author seems to suspect some racist motive lurking behind every tourist visa. Need we be instructed that Africans are people like you and me? That a young man is not "a buck," his father is not a "boy," and his mother is not a "mammy"?

"Most of the words used to refer to Africa and Africans are insulting and pejorative," Ms. Boone writes. "Most" is a terribly big word. I have seen dozens of brochures announcing this year's Africa tour programs, and none of them seems laden with threatening nomenclature.

Some of Ms. Boone's sensitivities are purely personal, and African understanding is hardly enhanced when these are offered to the unsuspecting reader as universal truths. I would challenge her contention that the traveler is "putting an African person into a subhuman position" by passing over some local dishes, though he is certainly denying himself a delightful experience. There is a great deal of difference.

Personal bias can add spice and a touch of acceptable distortion to travel writing, but it should not interfere with the delivery of fact. The author is probably right in recommending Air Afrique as a first choice of air carriers to the Continent, es-


pecially for the traveler who wants to immerse himself in African surroundings and pump a few extra dollars into a West African enterprise. Unfortunately, the text leaves the impression that no other airlines compete on the route. Pan Am, with seven times as many flights as Air Afrique, is not mentioned.

*West African Travels* covers 14 countries, offering for each a thorough listing of accommodations and restaurants in all price ranges. Sights and "things to do" are accurately described and assigned appropriate priorities.

When her personalized approach does not distort fact or saddle the would-be traveler with undue guilt, Ms. Boone's prose can be a delight. In a final alphabetized checklist of African travel tips, wedged between "Measurements" and "Money," she offers this paragraph:

"When you are traveling, it is so easy to get into a thing worrying about whether or not a certain something is 'worth it,' or whether 'it can be shipped back to the United States.' In a local market, 50 francs (around 20 cents) will buy you, for example, a beautiful, fragile, artistic hand-molded earthenware bowl, so fragile there is no question of shipping it back. Buy it. Put it in your room. Fill it with your beads, or sea shells, or soap, or fruit, or some of the stuff in your pockets. In a couple of days or a week when you move on, leave it behind. Your host will enjoy it, or the hotel cleaner will be pleased to take it home, and you, you will have been living nicely *for the moment.*" □

africanupdate

*Monitoring economic and political* developments around the Continent

## Portugal's Coup Raises Questions for Africa But Junta Says It Won't Make Independence Offer

Although all the ramifications of Portugal's recent coup are not yet clear, it was apparent as **African Update** went to press that the new, more liberal, government was not prepared to end the African wars by granting independence to Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.

According to all news reports, however, it was clear that seething dissatisfaction with Portugal's Africa policies (bitter wars have been fought with liberation movements in the territories since 1961) was responsible for the coup.

The 67-year-old Caetano surrendered to leaders of the coup and was unconditionally exiled to the Portuguese island of Madeira, off the North African coast. Emerging as a key figure in the rebellion was General António de Spinola, the 63-year-old former commander of Portuguese forces in Guinea-Bissau.

Spinola's controversial book—*Portugal and the Future*—had about a month ago cost him his job as Portugal's top military leader. The book, which called for a political solution to Portugal's Africa problems, seemed to strike a nerve with the war-weary Portuguese and highlighted, perhaps for the first time, how deep Portuguese dissatisfaction with the wars really was.

Spinola's book provided clues to the direction Portuguese policies would be likely to take. The dissident general had called for establishment of a federation of Portuguese territories with Portugal, all members being on an equal footing. On April 27—two days after the coup—General Spinola made it clear that federation was not tantamount to independence. In the proposal outlined in his book, the general had said the people in the African areas would be allowed to express freely their allegiance to the federation by a referendum. The general also said the people were not yet ready for such a vote.

According to the New York *Times*, liberation group leaders—and many in Portugal—have already rejected this approach. There are also questions as to whether white Portuguese in the African territories would find such an arrangement agreeable. As more than one analyst has suggested, there is a possibility that the white Portuguese

*(continued on page 22)*

## $38-Million Plant Proposal Refocuses Attention On Union Carbide's South African Involvement

Union Carbide, facing a late-April proxy challenge over its South African involvement, recently disclosed intentions to expand that involvement by agreeing in principle to build a $38-million ferrochrome plant in the Transvaal.

The giant chemical and mining company said it will have 49 per cent interest in the new plant. A South African firm, General Milling & Finance Corporation of Johannesburg, will hold 51 per cent equity in the venture.

The Carbide announcement, coming 12 days before the company's April 24th annual meeting, touched a nerve with various groups that pay particular attention to American business in southern Africa. Among these groups, two questions predominated: Would the company eventually use the South African facility to bypass Rhodesian sanctions (if the controversial Byrd Amendment is repealed), and will construction of the facility mean a loss of American jobs?

Perhaps anticipating such questions, the company was careful to note in its announcement that General Milling, the South African partner, would supply the plant with ore. In response to later questioning, a Carbide spokesman told **African Update,** "There are no plans at present to use any Rhodesian ore in the plant."

The company also noted that once the foreign facility is completed, it would convert its two charge-chrome furnaces in Marietta, Ohio over to making ferromanganese for the steel industry, presumably involving no loss of American jobs. The South African facility will have the capacity to produce 120,000 tons annually of high-carbon ferrochrome (charge chrome). Such ferrochrome is a growing source of chromium for stainless steel and high-carbon chromium steels.

Critics could find no special fault in the Union Carbide announcement. The Washington Office on Africa, a major force in lobbying for repeal of the Byrd Amendment which has allowed Union Carbide and other companies once again to import Rhodesian chrome, noted that at present no allegation can be made against the company with regard to possible use of the South African plant as a bypass of Rhodesian sanctions. A Washington Office spokesman noted, however, that should the Byrd Amendment be repealed, there will be a need for inspection and enforcement mechanisms to ensure that no Rhodesian ore is processed in the facility.

Repeal of the Byrd Amendment was voted by the Senate last December. A similar bill is expected to be reported out of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee in May.

Union Carbide's announcement refocused attention on the com-

*(continued on page 22)*

**African Update,** a report on political and economic developments in Africa, is prepared by the Africa Policy Information Center of the African-American Institute, 833 U.N. Plaza, New York, New York 10017. The African-American Institute, the major American private organization working to further African development and to help inform Americans about Africa is not a position-taking organization but is dedicated to the dissemination of nonpartisan information, covering all sides of issues.

## Portugal's Coup *continued*

will be tempted to take matters into their own hands and announce a Rhodesia-style unilateral declaration of independence.

As these and other variables were being pondered, power in Portugal passed to a seven-man military junta dominated by General Spinola and by General da Costa Gomes. Gomes had also been fired by Caetano. He had been heading up the Portuguese war effort in Angola.

Prior to the coup, Caetano had been attempting to walk a thin line between the conservatives in charge and the liberals struggling for political control. By firing Spinola and Costa Gomes, he appeared to have succumbed to pressures from what seemed to be an increasingly influential group of conservative Portuguese led by President Americo Thomaz and including General Kaulza de Arriaga, recently returned from Mozambique where he commanded forces accused last year of committing atrocities in several African villages. (*Financial Times*, March 22, 1974.)

The successful coup was the second open rebellion in Portugal within the last few months. Several weeks after Spinola's book was published, an attempted coup fizzled when about 200 armed soldiers attempted to march on Lisbon but were forced to surrender. Apparently the arrest of an honored war hero, Almeida Bruno, a close friend of Spinola's, triggered the rebellion.

African observers, while supporting Portugal's reappraisal of her Africa policies, had not come out in agreement with the Spinola point of view. One officer of the liberation forces in Guinea-Bissau had commented prior to the coup that "Spinola's solution, of course, is not our solution, and our great concern is how these events in Portugal will be reflected on the battlefields of Africa. (New York *Times*, March 19, 1974.)

This comment seems all the more urgent now that Spinola and his supporters are in a position to make major revisions in Portuguese policies. The next few months will be telling indeed.

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## Union Carbide *continued*

pany's South African operations, which date back to the 1920s. The target of a church-sponsored resolution, Union Carbide at its annual meeting was scheduled to test its position that it has already made sufficient disclosure by agreeing to make available to shareholders who request it the company's response to a questionnaire from Rep. Charles Diggs (D.-Mich.). Results from the company's annual meeting were not available as **African Update** went to press.

In addition, the company promised in its proxy material that it would publish a general document covering a broad range of social-responsibility issues before the end of 1974.

The challenging church group contends the company's response to the Diggs questionnaire is "totally inadequate," failing to deal with such critical matters as wages paid by Union Carbide to Black employees. Union Carbide, reacting against the idea of a single South African disclosure, argues in its proxy material that because of the company's "very broad" involvement in South Africa (ranging from mining activities in remote areas to milling and production operations in semi-urban areas to sales and clerical operations in urban areas), a report prepared in the format and detail requested by the church resolution "would not provide a suitable basis for evaluating Union Carbide's operations in South Africa."

A church spokesman notes that the church had responded to this company argument by informing Union Carbide that it was willing to settle for a detailed report on just one South African subsidiary—something of a test case.

Still, the company has stuck to its guns, reiterating that its response to the Diggs questionnaire is enough. A company spokesman recently affirmed this position, telling **African Update** that Union Carbide had nothing more to say about the proxy resolution than what it had already said in its official proxy material.

One source, a longtime observer of the southern Africa scene, noted that the company's reluctance to talk about wages was perfectly understandable. "Hell, why should Union Carbide disclose anything about its South African wages? They're in the mining sector, and wages there are low."

The company, in response to the Diggs questionnaire (supplied to **African Update** by the church group), says that the remoteness of mining operations and the almost total dependence of mine employees on the employer for their basic needs has led to development of compensation packages markedly different from those of urban workers. These fundamental differences in non-cash benefits between mining operations and other industrial operations, the report argues, makes broad wage comparisons not only "meaningless but misleading."

Carbide also told the Diggs researchers that its southern African operations are confined to Rhodesia and South Africa. (The company says its Rhodesian operations have been under the control of the Rhodesian government since the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions in early 1967.)

In addition, Union Carbide mines and processes vanadium ore in South Africa, has a "small" sales subsidiary that markets Union Carbide products in southern Africa, has a 50 per cent interest in a South African carbon-products plant and maintains a regional administrative office for the area.

The company further contends that over the past several years, "the rate of return on investment for South Africa has been significantly lower than that for the Corporation as a whole. For example, the average return on the chrome-mining operations in South Africa has been less than three per cent over the past five years."

In its proxy material, the company characterizes its South African operations as "relatively small, representing about one-half of one per cent of total sales and a much smaller per cent of total profit." In 1973, Union Carbide reported sales of $3.94 billion and net income of $291 million.

## U.S. Accused of Neglect and Inertia in Dealing with West African Drought

In a study prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Roger Morris, a former aide to Secretary of State Kissinger, and his assistant Hal Sheets have accused the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization of "neglect and inertia" in dealing last year with the effects of widespread drought in West Africa.

"Exaggerated, unfair and unscholarly" was the reply to the study from newly appointed Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Donald Easum. But both AID and FAO have acknowledged that the relief program was not a "model operation" and that a lack of emergency plans slowed last year's efforts even though field teams from Atlanta's Center for Disease Control had reported acute malnutrition and rampant disease in the Sahel to the international agencies in 1973.

The two agencies pointed out, however, that without last year's expensive airlift of sorghum to outlying desert regions in the six Sahelian countries, many more people would have died. The Carnegie study said the people needed more nourishing food, such as powdered milk, and that sorghum was better fit for cattle feed.

Both the Carnegie report and the international agencies cited supply-distribution problems and local government policies that discriminated against rural inhabitants. (New York *Times*, March 5, 1974; *Africa News*, March 14, 1974; *Jeune Afrique*, March 30, 1974.)

While accusations and rebuttals are thrown about among American officials, Congressmen Charles Diggs and Louis Stokes are among prominent Black Americans demanding attention for the thousands of Africans throughout the Continent who face hunger, disease and possible death again this year. U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, who recently returned from West Africa, said the suffering is the worst he has ever seen. (Boston *Globe*, March 9, 1974.)

The U.S. has already provided $141 million to the Sahel and to Ethiopia, about 40 per cent of all international relief aid promised

to the countries. American voluntary agencies have raised several millions of dollars. Another $50 million is likely to be approved by Congress this spring for continuing drought-relief efforts. (Washington *Post*, February 12, 1974; *Christian Science Monitor*, April 4, 1974.)

AID is awaiting the results of an additional study, this one by the *Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which is expected to run for* two years. An interim report has produced several recommendations, citing the need for more cooperation among local and international organizations, the need for long-term technical assistance and training programs and not just massive material relief, the need to control the cattle industry, the need to recruit Africans who have emigrated to Europe and America to replace Americans and Europeans in aid programs, and the need for tsetse fly eradication. (*Christian Science Monitor*, April 4, 1974.)

The seven-nation Niger Basin Commission, recognizing the need for more cooperation among African countries, announced that documentation centers to collect necessary data on effects of the drought would be established in member-states—Cameroun, Dahomey, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger and Nigeria. Possibilities for increasing the water supply, irrigation and fisheries would also be examined. (*New Nigerian*, February 15, 1974.)

## Annual Meeting Season In Full Swing As Church Group Awaits Exxon Voting

Having declared the 1974 proxy season the "year of Guinea-Bissau independence," the Church Project on U.S. Investments in Southern Africa is anxiously awaiting the May 16 **Exxon** annual meeting for a vote on the company's operations in the Portuguese territory. Exxon has been exploring for oil in Guinea-Bissau since the late 1950s, although its latest license was granted in 1973. Guinea-Bissau declared itself independent of Portugal on September 24, 1973.

The Church Project does not expect to receive three per cent of the Exxon vote—the watermark necessary for repetition next year—but it does anticipate a certain amount of support from institutional investors, whose proxies have been actively sought by the churches. "Exxon has so much stock outstanding," a Church Project spokesman said, "that we really can't hope to touch much of it. But given the fact that seven churches got together to sponsor this resolution and the fact that many nations at the U.N. have supported an independent Guinea-Bissau, we do expect to get some support from those institutional investors who are aware of the issues."

A resolution filed with Exxon in 1973, urging the company not to explore for oil in another Portuguese territory, Angola, received 1.4 per cent of the stockholder vote.

As in the past, a great deal of the Church Project's effort goes into keeping resolutions off the proxy statement, by hammering out an agreement with the corporation. Of nine companies with whom the Project had filed South African disclosure resolutions, only two have decided to oppose the resolution before the stockholders, **Engelhard Minerals and Chemicals** and **Union Carbide.** Carbide submitted to the churches a copy of information it made available to Congressman Charles C. Diggs Jr. (D-Mich.) in the hope of satisfying the requirements of the proposed resolution. The church declined to accept the information.

Seven other companies—**Chrysler, Deere & Co., Gillette, International Harvester, Pfizer** and **Weyerhaeuser**—agreed to disclose the details of their South African operations to all their shareholders. The Church Project withdrew these resolutions.

Although the southern African proxy resolutions had to share the spotlight this year with "hotter" issues—illegal campaign contributions by corporations, strip mining, the "energy crisis," etc.—they *accrued some benefits from a year of Watergate revelations that have* made many corporations shy of any more unflattering attention. **Texaco,** according to one source, made a settlement with the Church Project on a resolution that had been filed with the company too late—evidently just to keep the Project from raising the issue from the floor of the annual meeting. In its resolution, the United Methodist Church called on Texaco to withdraw its exploration operations from the Portuguese territory of Angola. Rather than raise the ques*tion from the floor, the Church Project will submit to the Texaco Star*, the company publication, either a copy of the resolution or an article explaining the reasons for filing it. For its part, the company will give the reasons why such a policy ought not to be adopted.

After a few years of filing southern African proxy resolutions, the Church Project recognizes it is easier to get support for some resolutions than others. Having already formed their guidelines on requests for information, many institutional investors quite readily vote for disclosure resolutions. As one Church Project member put it, "It's easy to get people to vote for disclosure. How can they vote against information?"

The type of resolution institutional investors have more difficulty with, according to some, is the one that has been filed with **IBM** and **General Electric** this year, asking that a review committee be set up to monitor the company's South African operation. Here, evidently, some shareholders feel they are beginning to tread on management's toes, to interfere with its prerogatives.

Backed as it is by a U.S. Government's policy, a resolution calling for American firms to withdraw their operations from Namibia had great success last year, and it is on this resolution—filed with **Continental Oil Company, Getty Oil, Phillips Petroleum** and **Standard Oil Company of California**—that the Church Project is pinning its hopes for high percentages this year.

Phillips and Conoco are facing this resolution for the second time. Last year, it received 4.2 per cent of the Phillips vote, 5.3 per cent from Conoco shareholders, meaning it could be reintroduced this year. It is expected that the percentages will be slightly higher this year and that the pattern should carry over to the other firms facing the resolution.

The major factor cited by shareholders who voted for the Namibian withdrawal resolution in 1973 is the U.S. Government policy that discourages new investment in the territory. It was this position that influenced such investors as Harvard, The Ford Foundation and Aetna Life and Casualty to vote for the 1973 resolution.

If disclosure resolutions and those calling for withdrawal from Namibia fall at the top of the scale (easiest for shareholders to vote for) and resolutions like the South African review committee fall somewhere near the bottom (the most difficult), it is as yet unclear how far down resolutions involving the Portuguese territories fall. But the *Church Project is making a concerted effort to find out. In addition* to the Exxon Guinea-Bissau resolution and the negotiated Texaco Angola question, church agencies have also filed a resolution asking for information about an alleged oil find in Angola with **Gulf Oil.** A Mozambique-withdrawal resolution was filed too late with **Bethlehem Steel** but was to be raised from the floor.

It is only on the Portuguese territory and Namibian resolutions that the Church Project has actively solicited the proxies of institutional investors this year. Given limited time and staff, coalition members say, energy had to be channeled most effectively. Active solicitation involves the printing of the Church Project's own proxy statement officially asking for proxies.

At the third annual institutional investor seminar sponsored by the Africa Policy Information Center, Tim Smith, executive director of the Church Project, announced the breakdown of negotiations between the United Church of Christ and Conoco, which had been prepared to issue a statement saying that if the company found oil in Namibia it would then reassess its investment there, ensuring that all the people of the territory would benefit from the find—something impossible to ensure, he said, under South African rule. Smith *charged that under pressure from Getty Oil and Phillips, Conoco had in* the end found it infeasible to finalize the agreement.

## Independent African Nations Wary Over U.S. Plans For Indian Ocean Naval Base

The U.S. Senate has postponed until later this year a vote on appropriations for a U.S. fueling station on Diego Garcia, a tiny British-owned coral speck in the Indian Ocean. In putting off the vote, some say, the Congress has bought itself time to contemplate what some have charged might be a "small step by small step" escalation eventually leading to confrontation with the Soviets in an area declared by the U.N. in 1971 to be a "zone of peace." (Wall Street *Journal*, April 4, 1974; *To the Point*, February 22, 1974.)

Opposition to the Pentagon's plans has been widespread. Many Third World countries—particularly Tanzania and India—have denounced the plan; the U.N., Australia and New Zealand have agreed that the plan violates "the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, free from great-power rivalry." (*East African Standard*, March 29, 1974.) And, for the most part, independent African nations are skeptical about the U.S. proposal.

Three major events seem to have sparked U.S. interest in Diego Garcia. First, although the Soviet Union has no official base in the area, it has been noted that it has increased the number of frigates currently plying the Indian Ocean area, and that these ships have "special arrangements" for servicing at 29 ports in 16 countries along the Indian Ocean littoral.

Second, America this year is closing its outmoded base at Kagnew, Ethiopia. In addition, a small U.S. naval contingent may soon be thrown out of the Persian Gulf State of Bahrain—the only port available to the U.S. in the area. During the heat of the October Mideast war, Bahrain's ruling emir exercised his right not to renew the American lease on the port. (*East African Standard*, March 29, 1974.)

Third, some optimists are predicting that the Suez Canal will reopen as soon as June 1974, although it will take British and American teams almost a year to clear many of the mines and other dangerous obstructions left behind by years of war. A reopened Canal, American military men note, will mean easier access to the Indian Ocean by Soviet ships coming from their Black Sea ports.

Although many African states—particularly those, like Tanzania and Malagasy Republic, on the eastern half of the continent—have denounced U.S. plans to establish its first permanent military base in their area, opinion is not unanimous.

Writing in the Nigerian monthly newsmagazine *Afriscope*, journalist Thomas Akhigbe Imobighe, recognizing the Pentagon's desire to counterbalance what amounts to a Soviet buildup in the area, says, "The refusal by the African States to provide this amenity [American bases] will likely draw the West more closely to the racist regimes bordering the South and East African coasts." (*Afriscope*, April 1974.)

Indeed, during preliminary negotiations regarding the U.S. base in the Portuguese-owned Azores, Portugal urged the U.S. to consider the port of Nacala, in the Portuguese territory of Mozambique, as an alternative to Diego Garcia. According to some reports, the tradeoff was brought out in the open: the U.S. would get its base, and Portugal would get moral and political support for its African policies at the U.N. (Johannesburg *Star*, February 9, 1974; *Rand Daily Mail*, January 30, 1974.)

Although the Pentagon recognizes that Nacala is potentially the most important harbor on Africa's east coast, the State Department has tempered the military's enthusiasm for the base for fear of alienating Black African nations who support the liberation struggles that are going on in Mozambique and in other Portuguese territories.

For the moment the argument has been silenced, since the Senate Foreign Armed Services Committee voted April 3 to delay the action until later in the year. The first vote is over, though, with the House voting 255 to 94 to provide the Navy with $29 million to construct new docking and fueling facilities on Diego Garcia. The project was resisted by those members of the House who warned of the implications of such a buildup. "For God's sake, let's not go down the same road we went down 10 years ago in Southeast Asia," declared Robert Giaimo (D., Conn.).

A majority in the House, however, were swayed by such speakers as Robert Sikes (D., Fla.) who said the Diego Garcia base would increase "our ability to show the flag wherever we need to show the flag." (Wall Street *Journal*, April 5, 1974.)

# West Africa

## Chad

● The **Continental Oil Company** is racing against the clock to finish three exploratory drillings before Chad's rainy season sets in in an effort to find petroleum deposits. Chad President Ngartat Tombalbaye inaugurated the first borehole in mid-December; a fortnight later the drilling had reached 1,000 meters.

Although the American technicians working at the exploration site, about 250 miles south of the capital of N'Djamena, say they cannot comment on the possibilities for petroleum until the results of all three drilling operations are known, a "well-placed optimism" has sparked the technical team in their effort to beat the heavy rains.

Conoco has been testing for oil in Chad since 1970. Shell Oil in 1973 gained a 50 per cent interest in Conoco's exclusive exploration operations in Chad. (*Moniteur Africain*, January 17, 1974.)

## Dahomey

● Facilities of neighboring Nigeria's satellite station—vital to developing telecommunications—are being extended to Dahomey as part of a growing effort to expand West African regional cooperation. The link between the countries will cover telephone, telegraph and Telex communications through the satellite station. (Nigeria *Daily Times*, February 26, 1974.)

Talks covering the agreement began February 25 in Lagos, the Nigerian capital, between Nigeria's Federal Commissioner for Communications Joseph Tarka and his Dahomean counterpart Captain Charles Bebada. Both men acknowledged that such links were vital to the development of a West African Economic Community.

Nigeria has been a prime mover in the direction of economic cooperation in recent years, in a region where countries are divided by adopted colonial languages as well as by the disparity of their resources. Oil-rich Nigeria is prepared to help other African nations in telecommunications, Tarka said, pointing to the Nigerian belief that "if our neighbors have stability, we would have safe borders."

● Dahomey has nullified an agreement made in 1964 with the **Union Oil Company**, charging that the oil prospectors had stalled and "used every subterfuge" to avoid bringing a deposit of oil into production, despite the government's wishes.

Dahomey declared that the company had notified the government of its desire to pull out in June 1973. This, according to Dahomey, terminated their contract. Sometime later the company came back, saying the oil deposit had become economically feasible to exploit, according to Dahomean officials.

The company acknowledged it had been in discussion with the Government of Dahomey about the oil find but said the government now wanted to modify the contract under which the prospecting had taken place. (*Moniteur Africain*, January 17, 24, 1974.)

## Ghana

● Residents of Ghana's Volta Region calling themselves members of an "underground movement" are demanding secession from Ghana to join French-speaking Togo to the east. Ghana has announced it has no intention of ceding any territory, and the Govern-

ment of Togo has declared it will not allow its country to be used as a "subversion ground" against any neighboring country. (Nigeria *Daily Times*, March 11, 1974.)

The Volta Region of Ghana and the present Republic of Togo form what was, before World War I, the German protectorate of Togoland. The two victorious European powers divided the German territory following the war. In 1957, the British colony Gold Coast and the British Togoland trusteeship territory joined to form independent Ghana.

Speaking in the Togo capital Lomé following a secessionist demonstration at Lomé's Tokoi Airport, the Ghanaian ambassador to Togo reminded critics that a plebiscite held in 1956 under U.N. auspices determined that British Togoland should form an integral part of the new Ghanaian nation.

● The Ghanaian Government wants Soviet technical-aid teams to pick up where they left off following the overthrow of Ghana's charismatic President Kwame Nkrumah in 1966. Colonel I.K. Acheampong, the Ghana Head of State, recently received a report from a Soviet team of experts covering such abandoned projects as a gold refinery at Tarkwa and a fish complex at Tema. The report followed a Soviet visit to Ghana in June 1973 to review the projects. (*African Development*, February 1974.)

News of the renewal of Soviet technical aid came at around the same time that documents smuggled out of Ghana alleged that Moscow backed the Ghanaian coup that put Colonel "Ike" Acheampong in power in 1972. (London *Times*, February 17, 1974.)

A Ghanaian journalist, recently sentenced to 30 years in jail for allegedly being part of an attempt to overthrow the current government, disclosed, according to the document, that he was a member of Ghana's military intelligence. At Acheampong's request, he said, he made contact with the Soviets immediately after the 1972 coup. The Soviets responded by sending two internal-security experts to protect Acheampong from counter-coup attempts. The document also alleges that the Russians gave Acheampong close to $100,000 to pay the troops who had backed his coup.

The smuggled document is a copy of the final statement made by the accused journalist, Albert Owusu Boateng, at his secret hearing before the Ghana military tribunal. At the end of the hearings, four prominent Ghanaian politicians were sentenced to death for the coup plot. Although Acheampong has in the past exercised his prerogative of mercy, his latest comments raise the possibility that this time he will allow the men to be executed. (*Christian Science Monitor*, February 1, 1974.) Some observers feel, however, that the length of time that has passed since the sentencing indicates that the sentences will be commuted. (*Africa Confidential*, March 22, 1974.)

## Guinea-Conakry

● Guinea, grown increasingly isolated from her West African neighbors, has agreed to withdraw her long-standing dispute with Senegal and Ivory Coast from the U.N. Security Council, where she had brought charges of political intervention, and allow the Organization of African Unity to settle the case.

The agreement followed a visit by OAU Chairman General Yakubu Gowon, Nigeria's Head of State, to Conakry, the Guinean capital. General Gowon said Guinean President Sékou Touré's agreement represented a breakthrough that might end the situation that had for many years badly affected relations between Guinea on the one hand and Senegal and Ivory Coast on the other. It showed, he added, that Africa was capable of solving her own intracontinental problems without recourse to outside sources.

Arriving back in Nigeria, General Gowon said the next step was for the OAU to determine how best to settle the dispute in a traditional African way. (Nigeria *Daily Times*, February 21, 1974.)

Guinea's relations with Senegal and Ivory Coast have deteriorated over the years since independence was granted, with President Touré charging that both countries were party to plots by dissident Guineans to topple his regime.

All three nations are former French colonies. At the time of independence, Senegal and Ivory Coast opted for continued association with France in a Franco-African economic union. Guinea demurred, calling for economic as well as political independence, and struck out on a path of African socialism, sometimes strident, often isolationist. With their capitalist economies and conservative politics, Senegal and Ivory Coast have long distrusted the Guinean regime and, most observers contend, would not be unhappy if that regime were to topple.

## Niger

● *The drought that has taken its toll in human lives for the past six* years in West Africa has begun to make itself felt politically. First the military overthrew the government in Upper Volta (see **African Update,** page 27); then on April 15 it was announced that a 12-man military junta had taken over in Niger, deposing President Hamani Diori, the head of state who had brought Niger to independence in 1960.

Niger's new chief of state, Lieut. Col. Seyni Kountche, blamed the former government for its "indifference" to the six-year drought and said the new government had taken over distribution of relief supplies to nomads and farmers. The colonel emphasized there had been no foreign influence in the coup. (New York *Times*, April 23, 1974.) Apparently disagreeing with this interpretation, a New York *Times* editorial writer cited French displeasure with Hamani Diori's outward-looking investment policy—which looked beyond France for economic involvement—and called the coup "one of particularly dubious origins." (New York *Times*, April 20, 1974.)

## Nigeria

● Nigeria early declared itself in the controversy that raged last month over the British multinational company, Lonrho, nearly causing a major rift between the Organization of African Unity and a number of its most influential member-states.

In a statement delivered at Ikeja Airport prior to flying to Addis Ababa for a five-day OAU ministers meeting, Nigerian External Affairs Commissioner Dr. Okoj Arikpo said Nigeria would not accept Lonrho as a consultant to the OAU on African-Arab oil relations. (Nigeria *Daily Times*, February 28, 1974.) In making the announcement, Arikpo noted that it was regrettable that despite Lonrho's in*terests in South Africa, more than 20 African governments had busi*ness agreements with the company.

Nzo Ekangaki, Secretary-General of the OAU, had taken quite a different stance, noting that Lonrho's views on southern Africa were "entirely" coincidental with those of the OAU.

Lonrho (a contraction of the London Rhodesia Company) began in Rhodesia and still conducts a heavy business in southern Africa. The possibility of a major blow to the OAU was averted when Lonrho's President Roland "Tiny" Rowland requested that the agreement be canceled. Ekangaki had threatened to resign if his decision on Lonrho was not accepted. In addition to Nigeria, a number of other countries had protested the Lonrho agreement.

● General Yakubu Gowon, Nigerian Head of State, dismissed student unrest on university campuses throughout the country in February as "silly aggression." But a government decree stated that "lawlessness, arson, kidnaping and assault on law-enforcing agents" would not be tolerated. (*Financial Times*, February 8, 1974; Nigerian *Daily Times*, February 15, 1974.)

Student rioting began at the University of Ibadan when police attempted to curb a memorial demonstration for a student killed in a confrontation with police three years ago. At Lagos University protesting students sealed off the campus, seized about a dozen government vehicles and took six policemen as hostages. Joining the rebellion, students at Ife and Ahmadu Bello universities burned down two nearby police stations. Students at the University of Benin and Nsukka University agreed to boycott classes in sympathy with their fellow students. (*Financial Times*, February 5, 1974; *New Nigerian*, February 12, 1974.)

All university campuses were closed, and vice-chancellors met to discuss the disturbances. In a radio interview later in the week, Professor Ishaya Audu of Zaria's Ahmadu Bello University warned that

university vice-chancellors and lecturers should not be too closely connected with political activities in the country. He noted that vice-chancellors appointed by the head of state were not always the best qualified people for these posts. (*Daily Times*, February 23, 1974.)

Police arrested 150 students during February's riots; all were subsequently released. When university campuses were reopened at the end of the month, vice-chancellors required students to sign agreements of good behavior. The National Union of Nigerian Students urged students not to sign the pledge, but many were anxious to return to classes and did so. (*Daily Times*, February 15 and 19, 1974.)

● In February, Nigeria sent official representatives to the U.S. to entice the 5,000 to 10,000 Nigerians living, working and studying here to return home and share the profits of a booming economy.

The delegation headed by Professor Adebayo Adedeji, Commissioner for Economic Development and Reconstruction, met with Nigerians in cities throughout the U.S. to convince them that their skills were absolutely essential to Nigeria's continuing development. He assured them many jobs were available.

The delegation learned that some Nigerians remained in the U.S. because they had married Americans. Some were Ibos who feared political reprisals if they returned home. Some Nigerians did not want to give up lucrative positions in the U.S. to go back to less prestigious posts in rural areas of their own country. (New York *Times*, February 17, 1974; Nigerian *Daily Sketch*, March 9, 1974.)

Adedeji reminded graduate students studying abroad of their obligation to return to Nigeria and serve in rural areas as part of the year-old National Youth Service Corps. Two purposes of the program are to provide skilled labor in rural areas where it is most needed and to promote national unity by breaking down ethnic barriers. Service Corps draftees are paid about $200 a month, comparable to the beginning salary of a Nigerian government official.

Officials and students who have already contributed their skills to rural health, education and development projects consider the VISTA-type program a success. Statistics show that 30 per cent of the young people who have served one year with the Youth Corps are willing to remain in the same region, even though it is not their home state. Nearly two-thirds of the students who complete their service seek jobs with the country's Public Service Commission. (*Africa News*, March 7, 1974.)

● Foreign oil companies will not be partners with the state-owned Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) in a 5,500-square-mile offshore area now being explored. Philip Asidou, Permanent Secretary in the Federal Ministry of Mines and Power, announced that two international geophysical contractors, Worldwide Surveys and Seismograph Service, have been commissioned to conduct seismic surveys of the area. Overseas firms will act as consultants in interpreting the data. But NNOC will work the concessions on its own, Asidou said. (*Financial Times*, March 28, 1974.)

● Nigeria's oil boom is enabling the country to plan a variety of extensive construction projects. It was recently disclosed, for example, that the Federal Government plans to build a new airport at Wari and to relocate the airports of Ibadan and Jos. Other proposed projects include a housing complex in Lagos, a $7.7-million stadium in Kano and a cement factory in North Eastern State. Road construction is scheduled to receive additional funding, and some $56 million in extra funds have been allotted to improving the country's telephone network, bringing to $124 million the amount the government intends to spend on modernizing telecommunications. (*Africa*, Volume 6, 1973.)

In other economic news, the Nigerian Ministry of Labor recently announced the country's total unemployment dropped from 21,318 in August to 20,907 in September. The statement noted that craftsmen, production process workers and laborers showed the highest percentage (47 per cent) of unemployment. (Nigeria *Daily Times*, February 28, 1974.)

● Oil-rich Nigeria, like oil-poor countries, has not been immune to the impact of the "energy crisis." In March, the *Daily Times* reported a serious gasoline shortage had peaked in Lagos. The *Times* (March 3, 1974) noted that hundreds of motorists had abandoned their cars at their jobs, attempting to make other arrangements for their trips home. In language familiar to American motorists, the *Times* noted, "Scenes at petrol stations in major areas of the city were chaotic as so many vehicles jammed filling stations in a desperate bid to get fuel."

Meanwhile, the latest available figures show that Nigeria's crude-oil production declined sharply in September when some 64,144,500 barrels were produced as compared with 64,364,109 barrels in August. The figures were released as part of a Central Bank monthly report. (Nigerian *Daily Sketch*, March 14, 1974.)

● **Gulf Oil** recently submitted a bid to invest more than $1 billion in a proposed Nigerian gas liquefaction project. The announcement came when Gulf Oil President James Lee visited Nigeria in February. The company is competing with three others for the contract.

Gulf, already prospecting for oil in Nigeria, said it is proposing to invest the bulk of the money in the Escravos area, while the rest would be used for equipment. Talking to Nigerian newsmen, Lee estimated the project would produce some 500 million cubic feet of gas daily, with the gas finding its main market in the U.S. Lee also said his visit to Nigeria had nothing to do with the energy crisis but that he was in the country to get firsthand reports on Gulf Oil operations. (Nigeria *Daily Times*, February 2, 1974.)

## Senegal

● Preserving Africa's rich cultural heritage is also a concern of President Leopold Sédar Senghor. He recently decided to hire Mexican architect Pedro Ramirez Vasquez to design a new museum for 26,000 pieces of African art. The museum complex will also include a library and a national art institute. (*To the Point*, February 8, 1974.)

● The U.S. Government recently granted $8.4 million in credit to Senegal to purchase three tuna boats from the Tacoma Building Company. To encourage continuing growth in Senegal's fishing industry, the country's fourth five-year plan included a budget of $34 million to buy ships, set up repair and service facilities and improve port services. (*To the Point*, January 25, 1974, February 8, 1974.)

## Togo

● The repercussions of a presidential plane crash, in which four people died but President Etienne Gnasingbe Eyadéma escaped, are still being felt in tiny Togo, where the incident has been linked to the nationalization of a giant multinational phosphate company.

After the crash last January, a jubilant crowd of some 150,000 white-clad Togolese turned out to welcome the president back to Lomé. His plane crashed in the northern villiage of Sarakawa.

The president, who has attributed his survival to an "act of God," promptly accused the partly French- and American-owned Compagnie Togolaise des Mines du Bénin (CTMB) of plotting to kill him. The plane crash occurred shortly after the president announced an increase of the Togolese share in the company to 51 per cent from 35 per cent. **W.R. Grace & Company** owns nearly 20 per cent of the mining operation.

After the crash, Eyadéma announced Togo would take complete control of the company. The president did not disclose exactly how he thought the company arranged the plane crash (a charge W.R. Grace has branded as "obviously untrue"), but within Togo, his explanation of the crash is readily accepted.

In a special analysis, *Africa* magazine notes that "Togo, the tiny ant of West Africa, has looked a giant multinational company in the eye and has spat. . . . Eyadéma deserves all Africa's support and admiration." (*Africa*, April 1974.)

The Togolese Government has felt slighted by the phosphate company ever since CTMB was first established in 1957, giving the Togolese only one per cent ownership. Eyadéma says the company has tried to thwart every effort of his country to increase its share, even offering him a bribe to reconsider expansion of Togolese interests in the company.

Even though 70 per cent of the country's budget from 1960 to 1971 came from external aid, Eyadéma states that Togo is "determined to become master of her own destiny." Because of the decision of principal African phosphate producers to triple their prices as of last January 1, Togo will undoubtedly benefit from owning 100 per cent of CTMB. Assistance in running the company may come from Zaire which sent a technical-cooperation team to Togo earlier this year. Eyadéma also hopes for technical and financial aid from Ghana and Nigeria, as well as from North African millionaires. (*Africa*, April 1974; *Moniteur Africain*, February 7, 1974.)

So far, CTMB itself has had little to say. An official investigation into the causes of the crash is pending.

## Upper Volta

● On February 8, General Sangoulé Lamizana, president of Upper Volta, announced that the 1,750-man army had taken over the government, suspended the constitution and dissolved parliament. Lamizana remained as president, but the prime minister and the president of the National Assembly were deposed. (Los Angeles *Times*, February 10, 1974.)

According to Lamizana, who wanted to establish a full civilian government by 1975, the two deposed politicians were disrupting the government with their squabbles and were incapable of handling the responsibilities of power he had offered them "on a silver platter since 1971." (*Afrique Nouvelle*, March 6-12, 1974.)

Since the coup, Lamizana has set up a new government structure with 10 out of 14 posts assigned to military officials and the rest in civilian hands. Lamizana says his primary concern was unifying the country to promote its economic growth. He pointed out that "politicians playing politics" interfered with the serious work necessary to strengthen Upper Volta's economy, devastated by years of drought and widespread disease. Though the president noted possibilities for exploitation of mineral resources, he said Upper Volta's priorities were improving agricultural and cattle-raising techniques. (*Moniteur Africain*, February 14, 1974; *Afrique Nouvelle*, March 6-12, 1974.)

# Eastern Africa

## Ethiopia

● After two months of civil and military unrest, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie prepared to alter his role from absolute monarch to that of constitutional monarch as he handed over the day-to-day affairs of the Hidden Empire to a new premier, named a successor to the throne and granted mounting demands to military and labor interests.

The changes came rapidly, too rapidly to interpret intelligently at this time, and the only consensus among Ethiopians seemed to be a sense of relief that change was coming at all. Competing demands—higher wages for the army, a new cabinet, dismissal of "corrupt bishops" in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church—reflected the nature of the unrest: this was not a controlled, tightly organized junta, but layer upon layer of long-harbored discontent.

The new premier Endalkachew Makonnen, a young progressive, is already being labeled too conservative. The heir designate is Haile Selassie's grandson, Prince Zara Yacob, the eldest son of the Emperor's son, who was stricken by a major stroke more than a year ago and is now an invalid in Switzerland.

The naming of an eventual successor at this time came as a surprise and was said to reflect the Emperor's concern for a peaceful transition of power at his death. In a land where the Emperor still ventures into the marketplace on occasion to distribute bank notes, it would seem that the steps toward a progressive future would of necessity be small. But with the "winds of change" blowing at gale force, it is hard to see how the path to constitutional monarchy can be trod at the pace to which the ancient empire is accustomed.

## Kenya

● An African-owned company has been named the sole agent of hospital equipment in Kenya by **Abbott Laboratories** of Chicago. (*East African Standard*, March 1, 1974.)

Abbott's Middle East and African Hospital Products Marketing Manager, Anthony Pamment, said the firm, Commercial and Industrial Holdings (E.A.) Ltd., Mombasa, was the first African company to be appointed as an Abbott agent. "The company will be responsible for handling our entire range of hospital products and equipment," he said.

The African firm's offices are in Mombasa and Nairobi. The company is also the sole agent for **Philip Morris** and **Lorillard,** American cigarette manufacturers, and Dunhill cigarettes of London. Other overseas-agent accounts the company holds include wines and spirits and hardware.

● A **Texas Instruments Inc.** terminal installed in Nairobi has made it possible for the United Nations Environmental Program, which has its headquarters in the Kenyan capital, to utilize, on a time-sharing basis, the services of giant computers in other parts of the world. This makes available now the services of sophisticated equipment to the U.N. agency—or any organization or government anywhere in the world—at a relatively low cost, and without waiting until computers with comparable capacity are located in Nairobi.

## Mauritius

● According to the South African business magazine *Financial Mail*, at least six or seven South African companies are considering setting up light industry or assembly shops in Mauritius to produce exports to Europe and Black Africa. (February 22, 1974.)

South Africa investment on the island is already found in the hotel and tourist industry, diamond cutting and polishing and furniture manufacture.

The magazine cites several advantages to South African business in Mauritius: 1) a Certificate of Origin from Mauritius allows the goods entry into the Common Market through the island's associate membership and permits entry into Black African nations that would not buy South African-produced goods; 2) Mauritius is a source of abundant and cheap labor, "often with better mechanical aptitudes than can be found in the Republic." Rates of pay, the article said, are said to be under a quarter of those paid in South Africa; and 3) the Government of Mauritius offers tax breaks and other incentives to foreign industries.

The *Financial Mail* points out, however, that trade unions are on the rise and that foreign participation is nominally limited to 20 per cent of the total investment making it necessary to take on a local partner.

## Seychelles

● The majority party of this British colony in the Indian Ocean has declared it will begin to campaign for independence. James Mancham, the Chief Minister of the islands, said in a BBC broadcast that the British Government has shown no interest in integration and that independence is inevitable. (London *Times*, March 20, 1974.)

The current administration's stand is a turnabout. Until Chief Minister Mancham's recent announcement, independence had been espoused only by the opposition Seychelles Peoples United Party. Mancham told the BBC his about-face had come about because of pressure from the Organization of African Unity, which opposes colonialism anywhere in Africa. Some observers have noted that it may

also have been prompted by recent American designs on another British island in the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia (see **African Update,** page 24) and the fear that the Seychelles might be the next target for an American base. (*Africa News*, April 4, 1974.) The London *Times* has suggested, however, that an independent Seychelles might seek advantages for itself by offering naval facilities to the Soviet Union.

## Somalia

● Oil has been discovered in a border area that Somalia and Ethiopia both claim, suggesting to many that Somalia will try to resurrect a liberation movement that in 1968-1969 controlled most of the disputed province, which is assigned on most maps to Ethiopia.

Although the quantity of the oil discovered has not been announced by Ethiopia, a French offer to build a pipeline from the area to Dibouti (the French Territory of the Afars and Issas) on the sea suggests the find was substantial. (*Africa Briefing International*, February 9, 1974.)

Perhaps stimulated by the oil find, Somalia also offered early in February to support a revolutionary government in the northern province of Eritrea, which Ethiopia also claims and whose liberation movement she has been fighting for almost 10 years.

Under the strain of current civil strife and army truculence, the Ethiopian empire probably could not withstand attacks on its north and its south at the same time. Further, if Eritrea were forfeited, Ethiopia would lose its access to the sea, making the French pipeline offer a type of insurance policy.

Diplomatic initiatives by the Organization of African Unity to heal the rift between Somalia and Ethiopia seem to have had little effect, and many observers feel that, with oil in the balance, the Somalis will continue to chip away at the status quo.

Both of Somalia's neighbors, Ethiopia and Kenya, are reported to be alarmed at the extension of military aid by the Soviet Union to Somalia. But while President Siad Barre has admitted openly that Somali people are dreaming of a greater Somalia—one that will include Somalis living in currently disputed areas—he has also said, "What cannot be resolved by discussion cannot be resolved by the gun, because guns kill." (*Africa Institute Bulletin*, No. 7, 1973.) Kenya also holds territory that is claimed by the Somali Republic.

## Tanzania

● Zanzibar inaugurated Africa's first color-television network early in January, using 3,500 British televisions that were installed in community centers and schools throughout the island by British technicians about a year ago. Transmission is limited to about four or five hours each day, with education sessions in the morning and education and dance-music programs at night. (Johannesburg *Star*, January 14, 1974.)

Zanzibar paid for the expensive (upwards of $2.5 million) education tool with the huge reserves it has amassed from the island's lucrative clove exports. Although linked by federation with mainland Tanganyika, only Zanzibar and the neighboring clove-producing island Pemba see the fruits of this booming trade. The mainland has no television system at all, although certain towns near the Kenyan border can pick up emissions from Tanzania's neighbor to the north.

● An acute shortage of natural fiber and the recent scarcity of synthetic substitutes caused by the oil boycott and soaring petroleum prices have combined to revive the lagging sisal industry in Tanzania and Kenya. (*Financial Times*, January 30, 1974.)

Early in January, the fiber—used mainly for agricultural twine and cordage—was selling for $1,000 a pound on the London market. (*To the Point*, January 25, 1974.)

Although sisal was once a major foreign-exchange earner in East Africa, particularly Tanzania, it has in recent years been in a slump.

● **Amoco** and Agip—an American and an Italian oil company—have begun a $36-million drilling program 15 miles off the coast of Tanzania, about 25 miles north of Dar es Salaam.

Amoco joined Agip in the venture in December 1973, having been beaten out by the Italians in 1969. The two companies are committed to drilling two test wells in the area; on the basis of the results they have the option to drill two more, which may be onshore.

So far the seismic results of testing carried out by Agip, stretching from Kilwa in the south north almost to Tanga, have brought a mood of guarded optimism to the Tanzanian Government. (*Daily Nation*, January 1, 1974.)

## Uganda

● President Amin purged at least 50 officers from the army after a weekend clash between military units in the Ugandan capital, Kampala, according to *The Times* of London. (March 26, 1974.)

Radio Uganda, broadcasting an official government statement, said troops opened fire after being misled into thinking the country had been invaded. A BBC correspondent reporting from neighboring Tanzania, David Martin, suggested, however, the action was caused by warring factions—divided along ethnic lines—within the army itself. He speculated it might have been a purge directed against the Lugbara-speaking people in the army. The Lugbara troops may have attempted a takeover because of recent disappearances of prominent Lugbara. Or, Martin offers, Amin may have acted first to kill the suspected dissidents. (*Africa News*, March 28, 1974.)

In the aftermath of the army trouble, journalist Martin found himself in difficulty: Tanzania asked him to leave the country on 24 hours' notice. No official reason for the expulsion was given, but Martin said a Tanzanian Government minister told him Tanzania, Uganda's East African Community neighbor to the south, was embarrassed by his reporting of Amin's situation. At the time of the alleged coup, Martin, who is a free-lance journalist and has filed reports about Ugandan affairs with the BBC, the Washington *Post* and a score of British newspapers, was the first reporter to suggest that the shooting was a purge, not a coup.

In London, Martin said he believes Uganda's East African neighbors are afraid of what the unpredictable Amin might do next. Tanzania has already suffered several invasions from Uganda, although relations between the two countries are currently improving. (*Africa News*, April 8, 1974.)

# Northern Africa

## Egypt

● Egypt and Zambia are investigating the possibility of setting up a copper manufacturing company in the free zone of the Suez Canal. Such a facility would permit Zambian copper—now exported largely to Europe for manufacture—to be made into wire, and other goods, closer to its source. Egypt would also provide a source of manual labor that is cheaper than Europe's. (Zambia *Daily Mail*, March 19, 1974.)

The idea for the manufacturing facility came from Egypt, according to Egyptian Ambassador to Zambia Ahmed Elzahid, and the copper-producing nation expressed interest in the joint venture, which would be operative within the next two years. Details of the venture were discussed when Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda visited Egypt early in 1974.

The move apparently foresees the day when Zambian copper will find easy passage, via the TanZam Railway, to the Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam and from there to Egypt through a reopened Suez Canal.

The two nations also signed a cultural agreement designed to provide more technical assistance to Zambia. Egypt will reportedly supply Zambia with agricultural experts who will help to establish irri-

gation systems in the country. This is the type of project for which Israel was once well known throughout Africa.

● Two American oil companies—**Continental Oil Company** and **Pexamin Inc.**—have signed exploration and development contracts with the Egyptian Government. The move was taken to mean that permission of the Egyptian Parliament is almost certain to be granted. Each company signed a separate contract and was assigned a different area for exploration—Conoco the south delta region; Pexamin, a privately held Houston company, the area west of Cairo.

Conoco operated in Egypt years ago as part of a consortium known as Sahara Oil. (Wall Street *Journal*, March 5, 1974.)

● Egypt has accepted an $80-million medium-term loan from the **Chase Manhattan Bank** for development projects, the Egyptian newspaper *Al Ahram* has announced. (London *Times*, February 5, 1974.)

The offer—to be used on projects of Egypt's choice—was made by Chase Chairman David Rockefeller during a February visit to Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat.

### Libya

● In September 1973, Libya announced a 51 per cent nationalization of major oil companies, including **Texaco,** California Asiatic (an affiliate of the **Standard Oil Company of California**) Libyan-American (an offshoot of **Atlantic Richfield), Chevron,** British Petroleum, Shell, **Mobil** and **Exxon.** The major companies disputed the decree because of the precedent it would set and the major implication it would have for oil-prospecting in the Gulf states. (*Financial Times*, February 12, 1974.)

In retaliation against the noncompliance of the oil companies, Libya's oil minister Ezzedin Mabrouk, announced on February 11 the complete takeover of three of the majors. Singled out were the Texaco, Atlantic Richfield and Standard Oil of California operations. The move was not extended to all the others that had stood fast against the majority-interest takeover.

The most surprising thing about Libya's February move was that it did not happen sooner. During the six months that passed between the initial Libyan announcement and the retaliatory move of total nationalization, there had existed a curious de facto situation, with the noncomplying taking 49 per cent of the oil produced in their operations—when the Libyans have permitted it. (*Financial Times*, February 12, 1974).

Mobil Oil was the first major oil company to accede to the 51 per cent demands, following Libya's February announcement. Libya's oil minister announced receipt of a letter indicating Mobil's acceptance of the nationalization decree on March 15. The minister said he expected other companies affected by the decree to follow suit shortly. (London *Times*, March 16, 1974.)

### Morocco

● Morocco has purchased 14 diesel electric locomotives from **General Motors** with the assistance of a $2.44-million loan from the Export-Import Bank. The equipment—totaling $5.44 million—will be used on the Moroccan Government Railways and will be delivered in September. (*Middle East and African Economist*, January 1974.)

## Central Africa

### Burundi

● Roger Morris, the gadfly who recently criticized international organizations for their inefficient drought-relief programs, has stirred up more muddy water with publication of an article in the New York *Times* revealing that the U.S. has quietly resumed full diplomatic relations with Burundi, scene of recent massacres of a rebellious ethnic group. Morris—a former aide to Secretary of State Kissinger—says Burundi's ruling Tutsi group is still carrying out a policy of genocide against the Hutus, the country's most populous ethnic group.

Morris claims, however, that the U.S. is interested in reestablishing normal relations with the country so that U.S. businessmen can exploit rich mineral reserves.

A U.N. survey discovered a $14-million nickel deposit in Burundi last summer. Corporate agents from **Kennecott, Bethlehem Steel** and **American Metal Climax** have visited Burundi to inspect the discoveries. Jack Anderson reports in his syndicated column that American companies also "smell oil in Burundi," possibly on the eastern shore of Lake Tanganyika.

A spokesman for American Metal Climax recently noted that there has been no attempt by the company to influence U.S. policy in Burundi. The AMAX official said a company representative went to Burundi because "it is normal practice for the geological departments of large mining companies to attempt to assess the variety of reports on new ore bodies."

According to Morris, economics is the reason the U.S. decided to actively support relations with Burundi instead of continuing the policy of minimal relations that began during the 1972 massacre of thousands of Hutus. The New York *Times* has estimated that 10,000 ffutus were killed in 1973.

U.S. Ambassador to Burundi Robert L. Yost assured Washington, however, that Tutsi rulers had decided "not to proceed further with organized killing." Muckraker Anderson discovered a document in which Yost recommends resuming normal relations with Burundi, citing as a new U.S. policy objective the promotion of viable U.S. investment.

The U.S. is planning to reinstitute cultural exchanges with Burundi, to give $52,500 to establish three maternity clinics and to renew an aid fund for $100,000 suspended in 1972. Morris is particularly concerned about the population-control programs of the maternity clinics, which he says will be used against the Hutus.

The renewed aid to Burundi is useful and necessary, according to U.S. officials who say the large U.S. diplomatic establishment in Burundi needs a reason for being there. A January 11 State Department memorandum to President Nixon says public concern about massacres still reported to be occurring in Burundi is a "continuing complication." But the memorandum concludes that "the U.S. has proved its point (i.e., its repugnance toward what has happened in Burundi) for both domestic and Burundian consumption."

Meanwhile, Morris says, arms are flowing into Burundi from Egypt, Algeria, China, North Korea and Libya, while military training is being offered to Burundian troops by the Soviet Union and Greece. He adds that efforts by the Organization of African Unity to stop the violence that continues in Burundi have not been successful. (New York *Times*, March 5, 1974; *Africa News*, March 7, 1974; Washington *Post*, March 14, 1974.)

### Congo-Brazzaville

● Congo's President Marien Ngouabi reacted quickly and firmly to a militant speech by a university student claiming to represent the General Union of the Congolese School and University Students (UGEEC). The student attacked the government's education policies, saying they were designed for an elite, that grants were increasingly used as a means of pressure on the students and that more money was spent on the army than on education. The student struck a nerve when he concluded that the university in Brazzaville should be "decolonized and democratized."

University officials immediately banned all UGEEC activities on campus and expelled 22 students. The students were conscripted into the armed forces, and police were ordered onto the campus to ensure normal class attendance.

Ngouabi claims that 25 per cent of the Congo's budget is used for education. Furthermore, he says, students receive about $100 per month, more than most Congolese workers earn.

The Congolese Government fears the student unrest is evidence of a new left-wing threat to Ngouabi's rule. Ange Diawara, leader of

a coup attempt in 1972, is still a popular figure among students. He was killed last year by the Congolese army, after attempting to go underground. Several UGEEC members participated in another attempt to topple Ngouabi in 1973.

Ngouabi's opponents accuse the government of misusing revenues and complain about foreign firms still operating in the Congo. Recent nationalization of some foreign oil and insurance companies has not satisfied the opposition. Ngouabi himself recognizes that the state-owned companies are not working well.

Apparently, Congolese have not been prepared to run the businesses. Ngouabi has warned that employees of the state-owned firms may be paid according to productivity and that anyone caught embezzling funds will be punished. (*Africa*, May 1974.)

● Canada will provide the Congo with $5.7 million in loan and grant funds to help develop the west-central African country's civil aviation. Funds from Canada's International Development Agency will be used to overhaul Lina Congo, the state-owned airlines.

The World Bank recommended that funds were better spent on airlines than on roads or railways because of the Congo's impenetrable forests and marshlands surrounding northern population centers.

The Congo's rivers have long been the country's only viable means of transport. Recently, the African Development Bank lent the Congo about $3.3 million to purchase barges and motorboats for improving timber transport from Cameroun, the Central African Republic and northern Congo. (*African Development*, March 1974.)

## Zaire

● President Mobutu is threatening to denounce the treaty of friendship that now exists between Zaire and Belgium because of a recently published book, *The Rise of Mobutu*.

According to some reviews, the book is a bitter work filled with ambiguous statements and remarks quoted out of context. One reader describes the book as a personal attack on Mobutu, as if the author had some particular grievance with the Zairean Head of State.

The book was published in Paris but banned in France because of a French law that foreign Heads of State can invoke to protect them from slander. The Belgian Government, however, upheld the author's right to freedom of speech and allowed the book to be sold, despite Zaire's official request to ban it there. (*Jeune Afrique*, April 13, 1974.)

● Zaire is also having diplomatic problems with Greece. During recent months, Mobutu has encouraged Zaireans to take control of local businesses and plantations. Among those affected are numerous Greek settlers, who say the government is seizing their property and forbidding them to leave the country.

The Greek President, General Phaidon Gizikis, has appealed to Mobutu on the settlers' behalf to reconsider his government's actions and to recall the tradition of friendship between the two countries.

Most Greeks in Zaire are shopkeepers, but a few own coffee plantations or run manufacturing, construction and import-export businesses.

Upon informing the Greeks of the loss of their assets, Mobutu said it would be in their interest to assign the new owner all the expatriate personnel necessary to maintain a profitable business. Mobutu added that payment for the takeovers will be made within 10 years, "depending on the satisfactory progress of the business." (New York *Times*, February 17, 1974.)

● The Zaire Government has agreed to pay the Belgian company Société Générale des Minerals about $960 million by March next year in compensation for mining assets taken over by Zaire. (Johannesburg *Star*, February 23, 1974.)

● A law passed this year requires foreigners to have work permits renewed every two or three years if they want to work in Zaire. Any expatriate who interferes with the Zaireanization program faces a fine of $5,000 to $10,000 and a two-to-three-year prison term. Some Zaireans have been accused of helping expatriates avoid the stringent takeover measures. (*Africa*, May 1974.)

But Mobutu's Zaireanization program has not dampened prospects for foreign investment in the country's booming copper industry. Zaire is the world's fifth-largest producer of copper.

During 1973, copper prices reached record highs. Production of copper, manganese, cobalt and other minerals accounted for two-thirds of Zaire's trade, gross production and government revenues last year.

Mobutu explains that Zaire will retain control of its resources, but nonetheless he is courting Japan, Britain, China, the Soviet Union and the U.S. to increase their interests in developing Zaire's resources. (New York *Times*, January 27, 1974; *Africa*, March 1974.)

● The energy crisis may be an advantage for Zaire and Rwanda if plans to exploit an unusual occurrence of natural gas are carried out. The two countries share claims on the occurrence, which is found in the slightly salty bottom layer of Lake Kivu.

The overlying freshwater body has no gas, and extraction of the bottom layer's resources has been thought economically unfeasible until now. But rising prices during the energy crisis mean developers are taking a new look at Lake Kivu's potential wealth. (*Africa Confidential*, March 8, 1974.)

## Zambia

● Early opening of the TanZam Railway between Tanzania's capital of Dar es Salaam and Mwenza in northern Zambia has focused attention on Zambia's transportation problems, which recently have come to include a complicated disagreement with an American truck-leasing firm.

The April 7th completion of the rail line from Tanzania's coast to Zambia's border is particularly significant because of Zambia's closed southern border with Rhodesia. Since the border shutdown in 1973, Zambians have suffered from a lack of vital supplies that at one time were shipped through Rhodesia from South Africa and Mozambique.

On February 28, a month after the border was closed last year, the Zambian Government signed a contract with an American firm, **TAW International Leasing, Inc.**, to supply trucks to transport goods from the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam to Zambia. The company had promised to deliver 300 trucks and trailers by August 1973 to move supplies that were steadily backing up in Dar.

But by February this year only 62 trucks, brought from West Africa where they were temporarily out service, had been brought to Zambia. Thomas A. Wood, chairman of TAW, said at a press conference in Lusaka this March that **General Motors**, which was to provide the 300 trucks and trailers to TAW, stopped its production line for 1973 at the end of April. (*Times of Zambia*, March 22, March 29, 1974.)

Wood said the delay in getting vehicles to Zambia was beyond his company's control. He said the delay was due to the worldwide energy crisis, manufacturers who could not provide necessary parts and the lack of available ships to transport the trucks to Zambia. (Zambia *Daily Mail*, March 29, 1974.)

The Zambian Government canceled its contract in February this year. Government officials said TAW had already been paid about $2.5 million and that the government was losing millions more because goods were continuing to pile up in Dar es Salaam.

Zambia attempted to deal with the situation by restricting import licenses and diverting about 25,000 tons of supplies to an Angolan port. With the TanZam Railway completed from Dar es Salaam to Mwenza, supplies can now be taken by rail as far as that Zambian border town and brought the rest of the way by truck.

A state-owned trucking firm, Contract Haulage, is organizing Zambian truckers to carry out the huge project of transporting months of piled-up goods from the border town to Zambian cities. The spotlight on Contract Haulage has to the company's dismay revealed some conflicts with government policy on Zambianization.

The post of chief executive, formerly held by a Zambian, has temporarily gone to an expatriate. Two other Zambians have been demoted from key posts. A company official said the Zambians who lost their positions were incompetent. But some Zambians have criticized the company for not moving fast enough to place Zambians in high-level jobs, particularly in the accounting and engineering departments. (*Zambia Daily Mail*, March 22, 1974.)

Meanwhile, Thomas A. Wood has taken his case to a London court of arbitration and is asking for about $25 million as compensation for the broken contract. The Zambian Government has been advised by U.N. representatives in Lusaka to seek advice from an international lawyer. (*Times of Zambia*, March 28, March 29, 1974.)

● China has offered Zambia $50 million to develop the country's communications systems and to support rural development programs. The offer was made to Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda in late February during an official visit to the People's Republic, which is one of Zambia's largest development partners. (Johannesburg *Star*, March 9, 1974.)

Supplementing this loan offer is China's promise to increase technical and economic cooperation, as well as provide scholarships for undergraduate study in Chinese universities. (Zambia *Daily Mail*, February 25, 1974.)

Kaunda first visited China in 1967 when he was offered $400 million to be shared with Tanzania for construction of the now nearly completed TanZam Railway. (Baltimore *Sun*, February 23, 1974.)

A trade mission that accompanied Kaunda to China has also arranged for Zambians to buy some $12-million worth of Chinese goods, including canned foods, machine tools, timber, steel, footwear and textiles. Such goods will be paid for in Zambian kwache, which will be used by Chinese resident in Zambia to pay salaries and other expenses of their employees helping to construct the TanZam Railway. Payment in kwache frees Zambia's foreign-exchange reserves for other development needs. (Zambia *Daily Mail*, March 26, 1974.)

## Southern Africa

### Botswana

● Botswana's big nickel-copper project at Selebi-Pikwe has delivered its first 40-ton carload of nickel-copper matte to the **American Metal Climax** (AMAX) nickel refinery near New Orleans. The project, Bamangwato Concessions Ltd., was right on schedule, 33 months after initiation of construction, according to information released February 6 by AMAX.

The Botswana Government owns 15 per cent of Bamangwato, the operating company. Of the 85 per cent that is owned by Botswana RST Ltd., a Botswana holding company, 30 per cent is held by AMAX and 30 per cent by the Anglo American Corporation/Charter Consolidated Group. The remainder is publicly held.

The project at Selebi-Pikwe required an $82-million infrastructure, including a town of 12,000 people, a dam, a coal-fired power station, a water pipeline and a spur railroad track to the mine. Establishment of the infrastructure was undertaken by the Botswana Government.

Total financing of the project—$268 million—came from the World Bank, the U.S., West Germany, Canada, South Africa and Botswana sources.

AMAX plans to purchase 55 per cent of the nickel for sale in West Germany. A West German firm will purchase most of the copper. The 127,000 tons of byproduct sulfur produced annually at Selebi-Pikwe will be sold in southern Africa.

● Botswana has asked the Taiwanese to close their embassy because the Government now recognizes the People's Republic of China. Botswana voted to recognize Mainland China in the U.N. in 1971.

The Taiwanese have had a group of about 15 agriculture experts in Botswana since 1968 teaching scientific farming. It is not known whether these experts will also leave.

Although politicians in strongly anti-Communist South Africa acknowledged that Botswana's recognition of Mainland China and subsequent expulsion of Taiwan were a logical outgrowth of the southern African nation's stand at the U.N., it was clear there was some concern over the announcement. Establishment of an embassy by the People's Republic—and possibly a policy of technical assistance—would be the nearest the Red Chinese have yet got to South Africa.

Progressive Party leader Colin Eglin perhaps best expressed the concern of white South Africa when he said, "I would hope this does not foreshadow an increase in Chinese presence in southern Africa." South Africa still recognizes the Taiwan Government. (*Rand Daily Mail*, March 26, 1974.)

● Energy companies will soon converge on Botswana in search of coal, and chances are good they will find it.

The companies, in association with Anglo American, will be awarded coal-prospecting rights over large portions of the Kalahari Desert border, where a vast undelineated field of coal has long been known to exist.

The problem facing the companies, should they discover coal, is that industry spokesmen feel only coking coal has a market beyond Botswana at the moment. The Botswana coal is not believed to be of coking quality. Although the companies will not be able simply to hold onto their licenses for a lengthy period, intending to develop prospecting areas at a later time, the Botswana Government is said to appreciate that large-scale development of the coal industry may not yet be feasible.

Speculation is that Botswana's coal would not be exported in raw form: first, because of the logistics involved in moving it from the landlocked country; and, second, because exportation of gasified coal or coal converted to synthetic oil would necessitate the erection of conversion plants in Botswana—creating more jobs and a whole new industry—a point that is not lost on the Botswana Government. (*Rand Daily Mail*, March 5, 1974.)

### Lesotho

● Taking a page from South Africa's book (see **African Update,** page 35), Lesotho has introduced legislation that would stop outside funds from reaching political organizations inside the country. The new Internal Security Amendment Bill would also allow people to be held for 60 days without access to family or lawyers. The provisions of the new legislation would be retroactive to January 30, 1970. (*Rand Daily Mail*, February 26, 1974.)

Although the bill was angrily denounced in the National Assembly by the leader of the opposition United Democratic Party, it was apparently aimed more specifically at the Basotho Congress Party, which was held responsible for a January coup attempt against the increasingly unpopular regime of Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan.

The *Africa News* service, produced by the Southern Africa Committee in this country, says official Lesotho sources are claiming that the Basotho Congress Party is backed by South Africa. But observers have noted, *Africa News* continues, that "many independent African states have had closer relations with the BCP than with the Lesotho Government, which has been seen as too friendly to South Africa." (*Africa News*, March 11, 1974.)

In addition to controversial legislation, the January coup attempt has led to a wave of political killings. According to Stan Maher, a South African journalist writing for the *Rand Daily Mail*, "Only the Lesotho Government denies the reign of terror in the country. Some of the most influential people in Lesotho, of all political beliefs, see the administration as corrupt and unpopular, its power bolstered by repressive laws, forced recruiting drives, frequent detentions without trial, intimidation and violence." (*Rand Daily Mail*, March 22, 1974.)

● A diamond mine—the biggest single project yet in Lesotho—will be brought into production by De Beers, the South African mining

company, within the next two years.

Having reached agreement with the Lesotho Government in principle, De Beers has stipulated that 60 out of the 460 people initially employed on the project will be expatriates—presumably South African whites—but that the company will train local personnel for senior positions.

The Lesotho Government will have a 25 per cent participation in the equity of the mining company that De Beers will form to run the mine. De Beers estimates the capital cost of the project at just over $30 million. (*Rand Daily Mail*, March 2, 1974.)

## Namibia

● A group identifying itself as the "Friends of the U.N. Executive" has threatened to kidnap and imprison heads of 31 European companies operating in Namibia unless the corporations agree to reexamine their relationship with the South African Government.

A deadline of August 1 was set by the group, which sent letters to executives of French, German and British companies, demanding that they improve working conditions in Namibia and pay taxes to the U.N. instead of to South Africa.

The group, reported to be composed of young European intellectuals, says foreign companies are violating international law by operating in Namibia. Letters sent to the 31 corporate heads say further information about South Africa's illegal presence in Namibia can be obtained from the U.N. Council for Namibia, London's Anti-Apartheid Movement, West Germany's International Fellowship of Reconciliation and from Bishop Colin Winter, who was expelled from his Windhoek post in 1972.

In Windhoek, the Namibian capital, police are said to be ignoring the warnings, and in London, Scotland Yard has denied making any investigation of the threats. (Windhoek *Advertiser*, March 18, 1974.)

Barclays Bank is one of the targets cited by "Friends of the U.N. Executive." But at the annual shareholder meeting in London recently, the bank emphasized its determination to stay in Namibia. After lengthy questioning by shareholders, the bank remained firmly committed to its position that it plays a "plus-role rather than . . . a minus-role in the progress of African advancement." (Windhoek *Advertiser*, April 5, 1974.)

Presently, 61 per cent of the mining and manufacturing capital in mineral-rich Namibia is supplied by American and European companies. (*Africa News*, March 21, 1974.) The South Africa Department of Mines has encouraged continuing investment by amending conditions for mining and prospecting grants to overseas companies. Participation of foreign companies in mining grants has increased from 50 per cent to 75 per cent. Local participation in the grants can begin at the prospecting stage. (*Africa Digest*, February 1974.)

Scientists from 17 countries cruising off the coast of Africa on the research ship *Atlantis II* report that promising sites for offshore oil and gas production have been found along the Namibian coast. The ship is financed by the National Science Foundation in the U.S. (Windhoek *Advertiser*, March 11, 1974.)

● The recently elected British Labor government is reviewing its relations with the South African Government. Last year the Labor party agreed that a Labor government would adhere to the 1971 World Court advisory opinion that South Africa's administration of Namibia is illegal.

A letter from a new pressure group, the Namibian Action Committee, has urged Foreign Secretary James Callaghan to stick to the Labor party's pledge to oppose the South African Government's presence in Namibia and to support South West Africa People's Organization representatives as the legal and official leaders of Namibia. (Windhoek *Advertiser*, April 1, 1974.)

The British House of Commons is reported to be considering British membership in the U.N. Council for Namibia. Represented by new U.N. Ambassador Ivor Richardson, Britain will strengthen its support of U.N. resolutions opposing South Africa, according to some. (Windhoek *Advertiser*, March 26, 1974, April 4, 1974.)

In reply to Foreign Secretary Callaghan's announcement that Britain would reimpose an arms embargo on South Africa, South African Prime Minister Vorster said he "wanted neither from Britain nor anyone else weapons to suppress people, for the simple reason that South Africa has never suppressed anyone nor is it her plan to do so." (Windhoek *Advertiser*, March 20, 1974.)

● After a 14-nation tour of Africa, U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim is advocating "quiet diplomacy" in dealing with the problem of South Africa's presence in Namibia. (Nigeria *Daily Times*, March 11, 1974.)

But the tough new U.N. Commissioner for Namibia, Sean MacBride, has declared, "We have to break new ground in this struggle for Namibia, so that the world and South Africa will understand that neither the African people nor the U.N. are prepared to tolerate the continued illegal occupation of Namibia." (*Times of Zambia*, February 20, 1974.)

MacBride told newsmen in Zambia that if the Security Council approved, he would consider the use of force in removing South Africa from Namibian territory. (Windhoek *Advertiser*, February 21, 1974.)

The outspoken commissioner condemned the world press's "conspiracy of silence" on Namibian issues and promised to stir up more publicity despite what he calls South Africa's financial and strategic influence on the Western world. (Zambia *Daily Mail*, February 20, 1974.)

MacBride has urged a tightening of the Arab oil embargo on South Africa and believes pressure on companies to reexamine their investments in Namibia should be increased. (Johannesburg *Star*, February 23, 1974.) He is also making plans with Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda to set up facilities for the training of potential administrators of an independent Namibia. (*Times of Zambia*, March 23, 1974.)

● Douglas Wachholz, representing the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and Theo-Ben Gurirab, chief representative for the South West Africa People's Organization at the U.N., have accused South Africa of violating international law by allowing public floggings without trial in the Ovambo homeland, by making mass arrests in Windhoek's Katatura township and by detaining Black political leaders without trial.

Wachholz and Gurirab were testifying in hearings before Congressman Charles Diggs's House Subcommittee on Africa. Their protest was sparked by the arrest of SWAPO's national chairman, David Meroro, in Katatura last February. Meroro has been detained without a warrant for his arrest and without provisions for a trial. (Washington *Afro-American*, March 2, 1974; Johannesburg *Star*, March 2, 1974.)

U.N. Secretary-General Waldheim and South African Prime Minister Vorster have received letters requesting investigation of recent arrests in Namibia. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions urged Waldheim to guarantee impartial trials for anyone arrested. Thirty organizations and movements from Amsterdam demanded the immediate release of Meroro and nine other men. (Windhoek *Advertiser*, March 26, 1974.)

● A report disclosing details of the operation of the Tsumeb Corporation Limited in Namibia has been made available by **American Metal Climax,** which holds 29.6 per cent interest in the mining company. The report may be obtained from AMAX, at 1270 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York 10020.

## Portuguese Territories

● In Angola, liberation forces are apparently mustering a spring offensive to disrupt the heavy traffic caused by foreign oil companies in Angola's petroleum-rich northern province of Cabinda. (*Rand Daily Mail*, February 12, 1974; *Guardian*, March 7, 1974.)

A Lagos, Nigeria radio station reported that liberation forces had wiped out a 36-man Portuguese patrol heading for Mikonji in northeast Cabinda on February 23. (*Facts and Reports*, March 30, 1974.)

Last fall, President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire ordered Por-

tuguese soldiers away from Angola's border with Zaire. Mobutu has increasingly demonstrated his support for the Angola National Liberation Front (SLNA), which operates from Zairean territory. Splintered liberation groups are also rallying to the support of the SLNA, despite its rivalry with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

Portugal has taken note and has sent military reinforcements to guard against probable attacks on Cabinda's oil installations. (Johannesburg *Star*, March 9, 1974.)

The crisis in world energy supplies has led numerous companies to ignore the threat of attack by Angola liberation forces and to continue to seek exploration concessions from Portugal. In response to criticism of its Angolan operation, **Exxon Corporation,** which was this year awarded a concession to explore offshore Angola, was quoted as saying that seldom were the risks and conditions ideal, and companies had to look for oil where it was likely to be, not where they preferred it to be. (*Objective: Justice*, March 1974.)

In contrast to recurrent statements by oil companies that they were sure they would be welcome to continue exploration in the Portuguese territories if the liberation forces expelled the Portuguese, Angola's MPLA announced, "With the inevitable independence of Angola, all companies operating on land and sea will be chased out and their equipment and property will be seized." (Windhoek *Advertiser*, February 20, 1974.)

Most recently, **Occidental Petroleum Corporation, Standard Oil Company of Indiana** and **Continental Oil Company** have agreed to share oil exploration in Angola with two Portuguese companies, Petrangol and Angol. Other companies granted concessions both offshore and onshore in Angola this year include **Texas International Petroleum Company,** Shell Oil Company, **Chevron Overseas Petroleum, Inc., Sun Oil, Amerada Hess** and **Cities Service.** (Wall Street *Journal*, February 25, 1974, March 29, 1974.)

Luis Felipe Moura Vicente, director general of the Portuguese Fuel Board, said, "We have commitments for 40 offshore wells within the next three years, and a total of more than $120 million will be invested."

In contracts with foreign oil companies, Portugal usually claims 50 per cent interest once production from new wells starts and can claim 100 per cent in case of emergency. So far Portugal's interest in Cabinda wells have apparently kept the country well supplied with oil during the current energy crisis, although it is reported that oil is still being leaked to Portugal from the Middle East despite the Arab embargo.

American companies investing in Angola are exempt from 18 per cent industrial tax for offshore installations. But the companies need no extra incentives to scramble for concessions in an area that produced eight million tons of oil last year. (*Business Week*, March 23, 1974; *Guardian*, March 7, 1974.)

● The U.S. Export-Import Bank has approved a loan of about $2 million to Angola for the purchase of 12 diesel-electric locomotives from the **General Electric Company.** Eximbank also guaranteed a similar loan from the **Chase Manhattan Bank** that will be used toward purchase of the locomotives for a railway linking Zambia and Angolan ports. (*Bolsa Review*, March 1974.)

● According to a nun who says she was deported from Mozambique for "defending human rights," a priest is preparing evidence of more atrocities in Mozambique, this time at Inhaminga, 100 miles north of the seaport of Beira. (London *Times*, March 22, 1974.) Frelimo has accused the Portuguese of intensifying a campaign of terror "against our people" in retaliation for successful Frelimo attacks since the new year. (Nigeria *Daily Times*, March 15, 1974.)

Portuguese officials say the nun was not deported, rather that her residence visa had not been renewed because of a letter linking her with Frelimo. Officials also deny reports that the Bishop of Nampula and six priests being expelled from Mozambique for sympathy with Frelimo were beaten up by an angry mob at the airport. The officials said that the crowd, angered by the bishop's call for Portugal to rethink its African policies, attacked the wrong group of priests. The accused priests are still in detention and awaiting final decision on their case, it was reported. (Johannesburg *Star*, March 23, 1974; London *Times*, March 25, 1974.)

The Portuguese have not denied that infiltration of Frelimo forces into the heart of Mozambique is proving to be more than a minor headache. But Beira's governor has been dismissed and sent to Lisbon, apparently for admitting Frelimo's strength in his district. According to the district governor, liberation forces are making six or seven sorties each night into resettlement villages in the Beira district to try to persuade resettled villagers to return to their former homes and help Frelimo. The dismissed official also noted that cholera is killing many Africans in Frelimo-controlled areas of the district. (London *Times*, February 12, 1974; Johannesburg *Star*, March 9, 1974.)

At Inhaminga, the town where new massacres are alleged to have occurred, Portuguese forces have been trying to dislodge a stronghold of liberation forces that have provoked nearly 30 incidents on the Beira-Malawi rail line this year. (Johannesburg *Star*, March 9, 1974.)

Allegations of past massacres have popped into international headlines in the past couple of years. The London *Times* printed extensive accounts of a massacre in the village of Wiriyamu, laid to Portuguese forces in 1972. In turn, the Portuguese charged Frelimo with the January 9, 1974 massacre of 17 Africans in the village of Nhacambo. Both sides denied the allegations against them.

Some say a Frelimo military victory seems no more certain than a Portuguese victory in Mozambique. But observers note that Frelimo is successfully disrupting the economic development of the country.

Since the beginning of 1974, liberation forces have infiltrated south of the Cabora Bassa dam area, where they were first concentrated, and have caught Portuguese soldiers off guard. They have attacked rail lines isolating Beira and breaking the port city's link to inland countries—Rhodesia, Malawi and Zambia. Frelimo successes are said to be opening paths for ZANU and ANC liberation forces to penetrate into Rhodesia and South Africa. Observers conclude that Frelimo is not winning the war, but that the Portuguese are well aware of Frelimo's "formidable strides." (Johannesburg *Star*, February 23, 1974.)

● In Dakar recently, Luis Cabral, President of Guinea-Bissau, warned, "We have always refused to carry out terrorism, but our struggle is developing and we must show the Portuguese colonialists that we are capable of taking the war where we wish—even to Portugal, if necessary." (*New Nigerian*, March 11, 1974.)

Having gained entrance to the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization at the end of last year, Guinea-Bissau has now been granted observer status at the U.N. by Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim.

Getting a U.S. visa for the newly established observer mission could have been a problem, because the U.S. does not have to grant visas to delegations it does not recognize unless they have full U.N. membership status. But the U.S. granted visas to the Guinea-Bissauans on the basis of the country's membership in FAO. (Los Angeles *Times*, March 16, 1974.)

Meanwhile, Portugal was encouraging residents of the areas it controls in Guinea-Bissau to air their complaints during the first 10 days of April. About 200 delegates, selected by ethnic group, were meeting with Portuguese officials in what Portugal has described as the fifth annual congress of the people. (*Africa News*, April 8, 1974.)

● Two bomb blasts ripped holes in the hull of a troopship carrying more than 1,000 soldiers to Guinea-Bissau. A left-wing guerrilla group claimed responsibility for the attack, which injured four men, and called it "an anticolonialist action in solidarity with the fight of the people of Guinea-Bissau." (*Christian Science Monitor*, April 11, 1974.)

## Rhodesia

● Kenneth McIntosh, a British citizen and former Rhodesian banking official, has been convicted in Salisbury of obtaining information that showed how sanctions were being circumvented. The U.N. imposed comprehensive economic sanctions against Rhodesia in 1968.

McIntosh pleaded not guilty, however, to the main charge brought against him by the Rhodesian government. Under the Official Secrets Act, the government alleged that from May 1973 to January of this year, McIntosh "willfully and for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of Rhodesia obtained or collected and recorded information which might be useful directly, or indirectly, to an enemy."

In presenting the charges to the judge, the director of public prosecutions recommended that evidence against McIntosh be heard *in camera*, because it was "not in the economic interests" of the state to have open evidence. (London *Times*, March 25, 1974; Johannesburg *Star*, March 30, 1974.)

Details of the Ellsberg-like drama began unfolding when McIntosh was threatened with arrest on currency-related charges last November. McIntosh believed the charges to be unfounded and fled to Malawi. But police in Malawi detained him and sent him back to Rhodesian authorities. Some observers believe Malawi cooperated with Rhodesian police because of their own role in sanctions-busting schemes.

While in Malawi, McIntosh says he was not allowed access to the British High Commission, although he holds a British passport. Questioning Rhodesia's motives for detaining McIntosh, observers also noted that when charges were brought against him in court at the end of March the prosecutor did not include the original charge relating to currency violations.

According to reports, McIntosh was exposed to Rhodesian schemes to penetrate the U.N. economic blockade during the past nine years while he was working for a Rhodesian merchant bank. (*Africa News*, April 1, 1974.)

According to a document released last month by the U.N. committee on Rhodesian sanctions, more than $300-million worth of Rhodesian exports were smuggled onto world markets through South Africa and Mozambique in 1972. The document states that of Rhodesia's estimated $500-million worth of exports listed in 1972, only about $60-million worth of goods could be accounted for officially. The remaining amount did not show up in world trade figures.

The U.N. committee further alleges that during the six years following imposition of sanctions, Rhodesia has been smuggling out between 12,000 and 17,000 tons of tobacco annually. The committee also says goods have been smuggled *into* Rhodesia. The report notes that motor vehicles, for example, appear to be reaching Rhodesia through South Africa at a level well above the pre-sanctions imports. (Johannesburg *Star*, March 16, 1974.)

● Japan has still not settled the controversy arising from last August's memo from the U.N. sanctions committee pointing out that for the last two years, Japan's official figures for imports of chrome from South Africa were considerably larger than the amount of chrome South Africa claims to have exported to Japan.

A Foreign Ministry spokesman said, "We are studying the different figures, but so far we have not had time to check why the differences occurred."

Both the Japanese Government and the Japanese companies allegedly involved in sanctions-busting schemes have denied the charges and insist they are strictly obeying the U.N. embargo. One government official said the discrepancy in trade figures may be the result of "certain technical differences" between the way Japan and South Africa compile trade statistics.

A senior official in Japan's Foreign Ministry plans to fly to South Africa in April to investigate allegations of sanctions-busting. But according to some sources, South Africa will not supply any additional documents to help Japan straighten out the confusion.

Japan appears to be caught in a tricky bind between its need for chrome from southern African markets and its fear of censure by the African-Asian bloc at the U.N. (New York *Times*, April 5, 1974.) Even if Japan successfully answers the charges relating to Rhodesian trade, the country faces pressure from Black African nations to stop trading with South Africa. In the past Japan has had no official policy on what has amounted to an estimated $900-million worth of trade with South Africa, although the government has discouraged Japanese businessmen from making capital investments there. (*Rand Daily Mail*, March 11, 1974.)

The Foreign Ministry announced that all Japanese ambassadors in Africa would soon be called to Tokyo to attend an annual conference. According to official spokesmen, a major topic of discussion would be continuing trade with southern Africa.

Meanwhile in the U.S. the House of Representatives is preparing for a vote this summer on repeal of the controversial Byrd amendment, which has allowed the U.S. to import chrome and other strategic materials from Rhodesia despite U.N. sanctions.

According to U.S. Government figures, 1973 imports from Rhodesia to the U.S. included $11.6-million worth of nickel cathodes, just over $10-million worth of high-carbon ferrochrome, $3.3-million worth of low-carbon ferrochrome, $1.9-million worth of silicon ferrochrome, $1.2-million worth of asbestos and $2-million worth of chrome ore. (*African Development*, March 1974.)

● Disastrous by-election results have made it clear to opposition leader Pat Bashford that the Center Party, Rhodesia's only multiracial party, is doomed. Bashford, president and founder of the party, has resigned from his post because he says, "Mistrust of the intentions and motives of the government transcends all considerations."

He notes that young African nationalists have deliberately rejected the advice of white moderates and declared, "We must stand on our own feet." (*Rand Daily Mail*, March 26, 1974.)

● Zambian Foreign Minister Vernon Mwaanga claims that Ian Smith's campaign to attract immigrants to Rhodesia is a cover to recruit mercenaries. Mwaanga warns that mercenaries will pose as farmers and be given land along the Rhodesia-Zambia border. The Foreign Minister urged Britain to regulate strictly emigration of any British citizen to Rhodesia. (*Times of Zambia*, February 19, 1974.)

Other reports say that although the Rhodesian prime minister does want to increase the size of his army to combat liberation forces, he is not looking for mercenaries in Britain. But these reports add that Rhodesian agents are trying to recruit British officers and even Vietnam war veterans from the U.S. (*Jeune Afrique*, March 16, 1974.)

The Rhodesian government says new white immigrants to the country will not be required to enter national service for the first five years, although immigrants who want to volunteer for military service may do so.

Rhodesia recently announced plans to increase the size of its army by doubling the draft and by forming a second battalion of Black troops to augment its 3,500-man standing army. According to a government statement, school graduates would be called up as soon as possible for a year's service and men over 25 would be called up for periods of up to a month for "protective military duties." (New York *Times*, February 10, 1974.)

Meanwhile, from Rhodesia's embattled northeastern border come reports of drunken officers and soldiers unprepared for combat. But the Ministry of Defense has rejected claims by dozens of soldiers on the front that officers are leading a soft life and that morale is low. (*Rand Daily Mail*, March 16, 1974.)

The Rhodesian Minister of Justice, Law and Order, Desmond Lardner-Burke declared that critics are trying to affect troop morale by charging that Africans in border areas are being tortured. A Black Rhodesian Member of Parliament, however, urged the government to investigate reports that two South African policemen killed a baby after unsuccessfully interrogating the baby's mother. (London *Times*,

March 28, 1974.)

Prime Minister Ian Smith denies that the South African Government offered to send troops to Rhodesia to help fight liberation forces. But he says the two countries are faced with the same challenge and adds, "There are a number of countries in southern Africa trying to preserve the Western civilization which we brought here. When this is affected, then it is necessary for us to work together." (*Rand Daily Mail*, March 22, 1974.)

Smith has justified the presence of South African police in Rhodesia by noting that liberation forces are trying to get to South Africa through Rhodesia. Some reports estimate that the South African Government is giving Rhodesia $10-million worth of aid for Rhodesia's security programs. (*Africa News*, March 14, 1974.)

## South Africa

● Demand for South African platinum could receive a substantial boost if a European Economic Community commission recommendation to cut motor vehicle pollution is accepted. (Johannesburg *Star*, March 23, 1974.)

The Common Market plan calls for the permissible level of carbon-monoxide emissions to be reduced by 20 per cent and that of unburnt hydrocarbons by 15 per cent.

Should the Council of Ministers accept the proposal, it would become effective in EEC countries next year. It is generally acknowledged that the most efficient devices for dealing with carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon emissions are those using platinum-palladium catalysts.

Meanwhile, South Africa has said demand for platinum would not be affected by a recent Nixon Administration request that Congress lower clean-air standards because of U.S. energy needs. (*Rand Daily Mail*, March 25, 1974.)

● The New York City Commission on Human Rights recently concluded hearings on a complaint brought by several organizations charging the New York *Times* with discriminatory practices.

The complainants—the American Committee on Africa, the African Heritage Studies Association, One Hundred Black Men, Inc. and Judge William H. Booth, former chairman of the City Human Rights Commission—charged that the *Times* violated and continues to violate provisions of the New York City human rights law by publishing advertisements for jobs in South Africa, jobs that are limited to white applicants.

As **African Update** went to press, it was not clear when the Commission would announce its decision.

● Holland, known for its progressive "Scandinavian" attitude about South Africa, recently sent a delegation of 22 Dutch employers to Johannesburg to investigate labor conditions in South Africa.

The employers, the *Rand Daily Mail* noted, hoped to find evidence that would help them counter pressures from the World Council of Churches and Dutch labor unions for withdrawal of investment from South Africa.

Dutch trade unions are demanding that five conditions be met if Dutch investment is to continue: the right of every worker to belong to a trade union and the right to establish trade unions, the end of job reservation, payment of adequate minimum wages, equal pay for equal work, and vocational training for employees of all races.

Black workers are currently prohibited from joining legally registered labor unions, but labor unrest among African workers has been increasing steadily in recent months.

In mid-March, for example, work at a Leyland Motor Company plant in the port city of Durban was halted after more than 200 of the British company's African workers were fired. The firings came after a dispute over labor representation.

Leyland's African workers wanted to vote on joining the Metal and Allied Workers Union, a group of African workers that claims a membership of nearly 3,000. Many African workers have joined such "unofficial" unions even though they are not recognized as bargaining agents.

The Leyland dispute ended with a victory for Black workers when, after two weeks of dispute, the company acknowledged the right of African workers to trade-union membership. (*Africa News*, March 14, 1974.)

● South African Prime Minister John Vorster recently agreed that a panel of economic experts would examine "allegations" that Blacks are not receiving a fair share of South Africa's revenues. (*Rand Daily Mail*, March 7, 1974.)

The announcement came after Vorster met with leaders of the African homelands in a gathering described by the *Rand Daily Mail* as "historic."

After the talks, Vorster and the homeland leaders agreed to hold another "summit" to deal with problems of the urban African, to continue investigations of charges of racial discrimination and to look into the questions of influx control and pass laws.

● Petty apartheid, those measures affecting day-to-day relations between whites and Blacks in South Africa, continued to come under increasing scrutiny during February.

Early in the month, the Pretoria Executive Committee voted to scrap a 70-year-old law that prevented Africans from entering parks in suburban Pretoria. (*Rand Daily Mail*, February 6, 1974.)

A few days later, the Transvaal Provincial Council agreed Blacks would be allowed to enter the public gallery of the building where the Council holds its meetings. (Johannesburg *Star*, February 9, 1974.)

When the Johannesburg City Council last January announced measures to rid the city of petty apartheid, Prime Minister Vorster responded by noting that the government would intervene to "rectify" any situation deemed to cause friction between the races or disturb the peace. (Johannesburg *Star*, February 9, 1974.) Johannesburg's city government is controlled by the United Party, South Africa's largest opposition party.

● The U.S. has taken what the South African press has called "another important step towards restoring more normal relations with South Africa" by dismantling President Lyndon Johnson's controls on direct capital investments overseas. (Johannesburg *Star*, February 9, 1974.)

According to the Johnson rulings, new U.S. investment was cut off from most of the developed nations, particularly in western Europe, and American firms were asked to repatriate much of their foreign income.

The Johannesburg *Star* noted that the Johnson ruling had limited new American investment in South Africa to about $7.45 million in 1969 from about $57 million per year in the years prior to 1969.

● Just before Parliament was dissolved prior to general elections, the House rushed through an Affected Organizations Act, making it an offense for organizations to receive funds from abroad and use the funds to engage in politics. The national president will designate the affected organizations and determine whether they are engaging in political activity. (London *Times*, March 22, 1974.)

Other legislation proposed by the Nationalist Party included a revision of the Riotous Assemblies Act. The new legislation will restrict any public gatherings, not just gatherings of 12 or more people. (New York *Times*, February 20, 1974.)

Charges were dropped against five people who refused to testify before the Schlebusch Commission, established by Parliament to investigate the activities of certain organizations. The five people are the Rev. Brian Brown, administrative director of the Christian Institute; the Rev. Roelf Meyer, editor of the *Christian Institute Journal*; the Rev. Danie van Zyl, a staff member of the Programme for Social Change; Clive Nettleton, director of the Institute of Race Relations, Youth Programme; Dudley Horner, a research worker with the Institute of Race Relations.

Charges against the five were dismissed shortly after Dr. C.F.

Beyers Naude of the Christian Institute won his appeal in the Pretoria Supreme Court against an earlier conviction for refusing to testify before the Schlebusch Commission. The court decided that the commission was not properly constituted. (*Rand Daily Mail*, March 13, 1974.)

● **General Electric's** South African affiliate plans to build a $466,000 factory in the Bophuthatswana homeland.

In announcing the plan, the company's South African chairman noted that the decision to transfer some of the company's activities to the homeland reflected the belief that businesses should assist in the development of the homelands and that it represented a sound business growth opportunity.

According to the announcement (Johannesburg *Star*, March 9, 1974), the plant will employ about 200 Africans.

● Blacks in Maryland's Montgomery County recently protested the maintenance of county payroll and general accounts at the Maryland National Bank, a participant in consortium loans to the Government of South Africa. (Washington *Star-News*, March 6, 1974.)

A spokesman for the Task Force on Southern Africa of the Potomac Association of the United Church of Christ, which has been talking with the bank in an attempt to stop the loans, noted that the Association seriously questioned whether county residents wanted public funds invested in a bank that "supports the apartheid government of South Africa."

Bank officials confirmed to the *Star-News* that the bank is a participant in two South African loans—one to Iscor (the government-owned iron and steel company) and another to South African Railways.

County officials noted that Montgomery County had about half a million dollars on deposit with the bank.

Meanwhile, church leaders in New York protested against the multinational bank that had arranged the loans to South Africa. Dr. W. Sterling Cary, President of the National Council of Churches, recently released an open letter to the European-American Banking Corporation. The letter, signed by prominent national Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox leaders, noted that the $1.1-billion bank had arranged loans of "unprecedented magnitude" to South Africa since 1970.

The bank—supported by its participating institutions—has arranged more than $200 million in loans to the South African Government. The letter noted, however, that some American banks, in particular Merchants National Bank of Indianapolis, had decided to cancel their participation in EABC-arranged loans to South Africa. (Washington *Afro-American*, March 12, 1974.)

● **Phelps Dodge Corporation,** America's second-largest domestic producer of copper, plans to open a large South African mine to exploit copper, zinc, lead and silver. (*Rand Daily Mail*, March 21, 1974.) South African partners are expected to join the undertaking. Company estimates see the mine opening in 1977.

● South African attitudes toward Black visitors recently sparked an incident involving a Black American employee of the U.S. Information Agency.

The U.S., through its Ambassador to South Africa John Hurd, in late March protested the treatment Richard Saunders, the USIA employee, and his wife received in Durban. The couple was asked to leave the Blue Waters Hotel nightclub when, as the *Rand Daily Mail* put it, "they were mistaken for Black South Africans." (*Rand Daily Mail*, March 20, 1974.)

Saunders is a writer-photographer on assignment in Africa in connection with a photo exhibit.

Dr. Hilgard Muller, South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, said he was "sorry" about the treatment Saunders received but noted that the American did not have diplomatic status, that "proper" arrangements should have been made beforehand and that similar things have happened in the U.S. (Johannesburg *Star*, March 23, 1974.) The Johannesburg *Star* called Muller's statement "a string of justifications" that "rather spoiled" the effect of his apology.

Under South African law, Black diplomats are exempted from conditions applying to Blacks in South Africa's white hotels.

● The energy crisis provided a convenient peg for the January visit of South Africa's Minister of Information Connie Mulder to the U.S.

It was reported that in a meeting with Vice-President Gerald Ford Mulder said South Africa was ready to help the U.S. adopt a South African process for producing coal-based synthetic fuels.

After meeting with Ford, Mulder also made the rounds of some key congressional leaders, particularly those from oil and metal states. According to *American Metal Market*, which reported the gas-from-coal story, most of the Congressmen were receptive to the possibility of closer cooperation between the U.S. and mineral-rich South Africa.

In early January, it had been reported that South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation (Sasol) was chosen as a consultant for planning, designing and building the first large-scale U.S. plant to produce gas from coal. According to an announcement in the *Financial Times* (January 17, 1974), **El Paso Natural Gas** is building the plant. Sasol operates what industry sources call the world's only commercially viable oil-from-coal plant.

January also saw the announcement of a $37-million contract to export coal to the U.S. from South Africa. The energy deal was made by the Transvaal Coal Owners Association with an Alabama power company and was seen in South Africa as important in establishing South African coal in the American market. (*African Research Bulletin*, December 15, 1974.)

● In an effort to boost sagging port traffic, the city of New Orleans sent a representative to South Africa on a fact-finding tour. Robert Pundsack, managing director for the New Orleans Board of Commissioners, told the South African press the reason for his visit was to discover the main causes for the decline of traffic between South Africa and the Louisiana port city. (*Rand Daily Mail*, March 18, 1974.)

Earlier it had been reported (*Rand Daily Mail*, March 14, 1974) that South African foundries could look for a growing export trade with the U.S. A South African firm, Unifront Founders (Pty.) recently reported receipt of a $1.49-million order from the U.S. motor industry. The press report of the order sited no specific U.S. company.

## Swaziland

● Swaziland hopes to sweeten its foreign-exchange reserves by constructing, with a British firm, a third sugar mill. The country's two existing sugar mills currently produce about 200,000 metric tons of sugar annually. Of this, the Swazis consume about 15,000 tons, exporting the remainder. The British import about half of the exported sugar; the U.S., Canada and Zambia most of the remainder.

The income from sugar provides the tiny landlocked country with the bulk of its foreign exchange. It is expected the creation of a third mill can be made without market risks. (*Foreign Agriculture*, March 18, 1974.)

● The Swaziland operations of Barclays Bank International and Standard Bank became 40 per cent Swazi-owned on April 1. The two banks' parent organizations in London will each retain a 60 per cent holding in the operations and say they have amicably agreed to the Swaziland Government's shareholding.

The Swaziland operations of the two banks were, until April 1, controlled from London and were not part of the South African operations. The action of the Swaziland Ministry of Finance had been anticipated by observers who knew the Swazi Government was keen to localize operations to the nation's benefit.

The local operations are now called Barclays Bank of Swaziland and Standard Bank of Swaziland. (Johannesburg *Star*, March 23, 1974.)

# A Soldier Dissents: Portugal Cannot Win in Africa

## Excerpts from the Explosive New Book by Portuguese General António de Spínola

*Publication of Portuguese General António de Spínola's book* Portugal and the Future *in February sent broad shock waves through a war-weary Portugal. Spínola, a key figure in the Portuguese military establishment, was formerly governor and commander-in-chief of Guinea-Bissau. Thus, it is particularly significant that he should attack the Portuguese war effort in Africa, asserting essentially that military activities in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau are bound to result in the loss of Portugal's African presence. Although most pessimistic about a continued war effort, Spínola does not advocate abandonment of the Portuguese colonies. Rather he suggests that a federation be formed in which Portugal and her territories would be on an equal footing.*

*The Spínola book, which has been widely read in Portugal, is thought to represent a variety of heretofore suppressed opinion. Evidently, the Spínola position is one that is influential in all quarters of Portuguese society—the army, business, the Catholic Church, the universities, the professions and even the government.*

*After the publication of the book, the 63-year-old general was dismissed from his post. Subsequently an army junta—Spínola at its head—toppled the Caetano regime. The Spínola book has already come to symbolize for many the first big public crack in the Portuguese armor of determination to continue the African wars. Because of its importance AFRICA REPORT publishes here the fullest extracts thus far available to English-speaking readers. We have indicated the topics under which each of the following excerpts appeared.*

*From the introduction:*

". . . It would be more convenient, and more in keeping with normal behavior, to remain silent. But I felt a higher moral obligation to bring into open debate the ideas that have formed solutions already practiced with undeniable success."

"The overseas question has been elected as the primary national problem of the present, since, in fact, the future of Portugal depends on an adequate resolution of the issues that arise from the war with which we are confronted, which is consuming lives, resources and capabilities. . . ."

"To polarize the overseas question —to present the country with the dilemma of either perpetuating the war or betraying the past—is a stance that will not lead to the greatness and unity to which we legitimately aspire. However, this is the dilemma that is implied in the obsolete theses expounded by those who are like old hermits, isolated to the end of their days, cocooned in a halo of sanctity, but weak and impoverished."

*Opening remark of the book itself:*

"Portugal is living today, without doubt, one of the gravest hours, if not the gravest, of her history, since never before have the prospects faced by the new generation been as clouded. . . ."

*On the military situation:*

"To want to win a subversive war with a military solution is to accept defeat in advance, unless one possesses unlimited capability to prolong the war indefinitely, turning it into an institution. Is this our case? Obviously not."

"Any strategy based on the rigid pursuit of a policy that imposes such a heavy defense burden (nearly 50 per cent of the State budget is devoted to military expenses without production receiving an equivalent increase) will end up jeopardizing the very goals of national survival to which such expense is dedicated.

"How can we, therefore, put an end to a war of this type? In other words, how would a military victory of the forces of order materialize in a war of subversion? Let us analyze the possibilities.

"Let us consider whether the conflict would end with the annihilation of the guerrilla forces. We must admit at once the unlikelihood of this hypothesis, at least in the short term. Unlikely, first, because until the forces of order manage to attain the relative potential established by the military

*Frelimo forces in Mozambique. Spinola believes that the Portuguese "forces of order" can never achieve victory.*

experts for this type of war—potential that the United States failed to attain in Vietnam—their disadvantage is manifest. Second, because of their dispersive type of military action, the guerrillas do not need large numbers of personnel to carry out their war of attrition; thus, recruitment of soldiers by the forces of subversion among the population, however small in number and whether the recruitment be voluntary or coerced, will always be adequate.

"Third, the natural fluidity of the frontiers along the areas of guerrilla warfare make possible an inexhaustible source of recruitment, without possibilities of exposure.

"Therefore, it looks as if we have to exclude the possibility of the physical annihilation of the enemy, owing to his capacity for constant renewal.

"One could accept the hypothesis that the end of the war could come through the forced curbing of guerrilla activities, once we managed to deprive them of their sources of food, matériel and ammunition. But experience has shown that the forces of subversion can count on inexhaustible external support and this fact, together with the permeability of the frontier regions and the ideological support of neighboring countries, makes it utopian to hope for success in any attempt to isolate the guerrillas. But even if, by fortuitous circumstances, it were to be possible to achieve their isolation, the forces of subversion would disperse into the extensive areas of refuge, to be reactivated as soon as the activities of the forces of order along the lines of infiltration were relaxed. It is not possible to deprive the guerrillas of their sources of supply indefinitely by military means. We think, therefore, that we must also exclude this second hypothesis.

"We could attempt a victory by winning over the population, leading it to an active collaboration against the enemy and engaging the African people in the struggle against the guerrillas. But in that case . . . enemy action would be diverted to violence against the population with a view to obtaining, with or without their support, the complicity of silence. The population yields to violence and identifies itself with the stronger side. In such a hypothesis, one must either exceed the violence of the forces of subversion in order to render a psychological balance—which cannot be acceptable in any way whatsoever—or one must ensure the effective protection of the population, which implies a number of forces beyond the resources of any country. Thus, whether by persuasion or by violence, one cannot win over the population.

"One could also attain victory by discouraging the guerrillas, either by *winning the mass of the population to* the cause of the established order, or by leading those who support the forces of subversion to withdraw their assistance. But in either of these cases the victory would be political and not military. And since it is utopian to think that such supporters would withdraw as long as the masses reveal a will to fight on, there is only one solution for the conflict—and that is eminently political."

"We can thus conclude that in any war of this type an exclusively military victory is untenable. The duty of the armed forces is, therefore, limited to promoting and retaining for the necessary period of time—naturally not very long—the security conditions that may enable the application of the political-social solutions that alone are capable of bringing an end to the conflict.

"The forces of order can always lose a subversive war; they can never win it for the simple reason that it is not in their camp that victory can be built."

*On pragmatism:*

"We watch the sterile dialogue between factions situated in two extreme camps, which try to impose opposite concepts both of recent origin. On one hand, the defense of a political monopolism in the name of distorted 'national unity'; on the other, the defense of the 'winds of history' against such monopolism. These are both radical theses that do not represent the true interests of the country, as seen by the people. The people, realistic in their thinking, albeit naïve, emigrate. This is clear proof that something must be devised in a new spirit. It is in the people that the moral reserves of the nation must be found."

*On liberalization inside Portugal:*

"For the solution of the problem there are three alternatives: either follow the course of increasing concessions, a path that must reach a limit; or adopt a course of totalitarian repression that will only accelerate the violence; or opt for the way of liberalization, which also has its drawbacks but which, nevertheless, we believe to be the solution, provided it is developed progressively, within discipline and under a firm authority strengthened through legitimate means."

"We uphold the concept that the character of the 'Portuguese community' provides great opportunity for its historical continuity but only if there is an evolution toward a decentralized political situation that respects the autonomy of all its territories, without breaking national solidarity—all this in terms, alas, defined by the [present] constitution. . . . The political integration of a country as multiracial and intercontinental as ours is possible, therefore, only in the context of a federation cemented by solidarity. Any form based upon a stifling monopolism is untenable."

*On federation by referendum:*

"Some might argue that in our case, with a war brought upon us by alien

interests, referenda will always be questioned, however honestly they might have been conducted, and that there would be no advantage in holding them. To this we say that, in the first place, referenda are not made only because there are advantages to be gained; they are fundamentally an answer to imperatives, and they are a course of action for those who, in a moment of crisis, seeing their intentions questioned, want to ascertain whether they have correctly interpreted the will of the nation. Second, we would point out that we must not be afraid to consult the will of the peoples under the Portuguese flag, because it is in our respect for that will that the indestructible force of our nation must reside. And if, faced with results that favor us, our enemies did not then give up, it is not less certain that those who are friendly toward us, or those who are neutral, would depart from their present skepticism and/or lack of support to adopt a more militant attitude. We have no doubt that the Free World would be on our side if, after a period of adequate preparation, consultation with the Portuguese Africans revealed unequivocally their will to remain Portuguese under a statute of their own choice."

"Someone comparing British and Portuguese colonial attitudes toward Africans once summed up the first attitude in the following phrase: 'Rise up, but do not get near,' and the second in the expression: 'Get near, but do not rise up.' But the time has arrived to give substance, direction and vigor to a new attitude that might lead, through a renewed Portuguese identity, to true integration: "Rise up and get near."

"And it must not be thought that the integration of the African, through the total sharing by Africans in national life at the top level or through their autonomy on a regional level, is a stage requiring great preparation. One remembers the bitter irony with which a Manding (Guinean) tribal chief referred to his qualifications—his 10 years of Koranic studies, his perfect knowledge of written Arabic, his foundation in Islamic theological studies—in spite of which he was officially classified as illiterate. It is at these facts that one must look, because such men, who are African and are proud of it, wish nonetheless to be integrated into the vast Lusitanian community, whose advantages they acknowledge. The experience of five years of government in Guinea shows that it is not by rejecting the participation of valid men on the pretext that they are, by legal definition, illiterate that we will build up the solidarity that will be the mainstay of our support."

*On mass emigration from Portugal:*

"Hundreds of thousands of emigrants grow roots in their new communities, integrating themselves or adapting their ways, and end up by being assimilated. The efforts to retain the link with the mother land produce doubtful results; some return after many years, more as tourists than as prodigal sons, revealing in their habits and in their way of life that, deep down, they are no longer Portuguese because the traces of the nation are already lost in them. This picture is very revealing of the crisis of social survival we are currently going through, a crisis that touches the very essence of the nation.

"In Africa . . . we will have to protect the position of Europeans who have settled there, who have their property there and who built their life and their dreams there, looking to the future of their children. These people live in a stifling situation that results from conditions imposed by a political structure that does not allow for the full harnessing of the real potential of the various parts of the Portuguese whole.

"The *belle amitié* enjoyed in Katanga [Shaba Province, Zaïre] would be, in this connection, an attractive precedent on which the Europeans in Portuguese Africa could base their hopes; but nothing can guarantee that in an atmosphere of intransigence that this possibility may one day materialize. The outcome is therefore foreseeable: It may well be that, in defending those Europeans, future Rhodesias might occur. Therefore, from the point of view of the European sector of the overseas territories, there is the prospect of a dangerous sliding toward desegregation by the white revolutionary, à la Rhodesia, an outcome that can and must be avoided." □

# The Strange Case of Lonrho

Abandoning the questionable approach of traditional British companies, Lonrho chooses a more flambouyant style while trying to identify with African aspirations. The company's efforts have brought notable successes and embarrassing failures.

By A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

Lonrho, the British mining and trading conglomerate, is in the center of a major political row —again. The company's recent appointment as consultant to the Organization of African Unity on matters concerning refining, storage and distribution of petroleum, as well as on Arab-African oil relations, brought forth a chorus of complaints from a number of OAU members, and induced the OAU Secretary-General, Nzo Ekangaki, who authorized the appointment, to threaten resignation if his decision was not accepted. As a result of the uproar, the agreement was canceled at Lonrho's request.

The cause of the row is summarized in the company's name. General Mobutu Sese Seko, President of Zaïre, is reputed to have asked the company's Chief Executive Roland Rowland on one occasion: "Le Lon, oui, Monsieur Rowland— mais qu'est-ce que c'est le Rho?" (Mobutu was questioning the origin of the company's name, especially the second syllable, "Rho.") The answer is to be found in the company's southern African antecedents *for the name is a contraction of the* London Rhodesian Company. To certain Black African states, therefore, the "Rho" is a political red flag.

Lonrho's investments in South Africa and Rhodesia include platinum, copper and coal mines, ranching businesses and general trade. The two countries contribute about 10 per cent of the group's overall profits; and it has even been alleged that Lonhro subsidiaries have helped Rhodesia bust sanctions.

But Rowland himself has won a reputation for being a friend of Black Africa, and he rarely visits the white south. Ekangaki defended Lonrho's OAU appointment in these words: "Before entering into agreement the General Secretariat conducted an exhaustive inquiry into the activities of Lonrho in southern Africa and the relationship of the firm with the racist minority regimes of that region.

"The General Secretariat is satisfied that although the firm had historical connections with southern Africa dating back to the 1890s, its present orientation and views concerning that region entirely coincide with those of the Organization of African Unity."

*Lonrho is seldom out of the news.* Its payment of large sums to directors in such tax havens as the Cayman Islands was branded last year by the then British Prime Minister Edward Heath as the "unacceptable face of capitalism," a phrase now firmly established in the political vocabulary of British labor leaders, employers and politicians alike. The "Boardroom Battle" to oust Rowland, during which knowledge of these ex-gratia payments became public, occupied the attention of the British and international press for weeks, especially since Rowland's closest aide—since resigned—was Angus Ogilvy, husband of Princess Alexandra, a first cousin of Queen Elizabeth.

All this publicity is not without irony since the company has a penchant for the low profile. Lonrho once offered to employ a public relations officer to keep its name out of newspapers, and financial journalists complain that for an organization controlling over 250 assorted firms, Lonrho releases information that is at best sketchy, and at times misleading. Under the heading "Still the same old Lonrho," the influential British publication, *Investors*

*An overhead view of a Lonrho enterprise in Ghana, this one is called the Ashanti Gold Fields.*

**While Britain's older firms sat around waiting to be nationalized, Lonrho offered participation to Africans—either to private local interests or to governments.**

*Chronicle*, recently reviewed the company's 1973 annual report: "Lonrho's annual report provides its customary tantalizingly incomplete picture of the operations of a most complex group of companies. . . . Of the Rhodesian operations we learn nothing while there is no hint that the copper operation in Mozambique even exists."

Lonrho started in Rhodesia in 1909 as a small company primarily interested in ranching. Over the next 50 years it built up a modest empire based on ranching and mining, expanding through acquisition in the 1940s into South Africa where it bought a majority holding in a number of companies, mainly connected with coal mining. Lonrho was transformed in 1961 with the arrival of Rowland, who sold his own interests in mining and motor distribution, took a seat on the board and assumed management of Lonrho's affairs in Central Africa. His abilities were quickly recognized, and in a short time he was promoted to chief executive, with responsibilities for Lonrho's overall interests.

Lonrho's extraordinary growth over the last 13 years is directly attributable to Rowland and his style of operating Roland "Tiny" Rowland (he is called Tiny, predictably because he stands 6'2") was born the son of a prosperous German merchant living in India. He served part of the Second World War as a medical orderly in Norway, part as an internee—because of his German background—on the Isle of Man. When the war ended, he worked as a railway porter in London, the hardships of which he still likes to recall, perhaps to emphasize the rags-to-riches element of his career. He later moved to Rhodesia, first as a maize farmer, later as an entrepreneur, building up the business that he sold to Lonrho in 1961.

Unlike most European business executives, Rowland saw African independence as an opportunity. Most of the traditional British firms had gone to Africa along with the British flag. If they were mining concerns they were given generous concessions by the British government; if they were trading companies they enjoyed a monopolistic position. The same was true of the plantation companies, which were ceded vast tracts of territory on concessionary terms. To many Africans these private concerns appeared to be simply an arm of the colonial power. Anxiety that the wave of nationalism in the 1960s would have commercial repercussions was therefore understandable, and in many cases justified. For the majority of the old-line British companies the immediate post-independence years were worrisome; it was a time for keeping their heads down and for retrenchment. In addition, shares of companies operating in Africa were regarded as risky by British investors; the yields on Zambian copper mining companies prior to the partial takeover by the government in 1969, were around 20 per cent, suggesting that investors had little faith in their future.

In this situation there were advantages for Lonrho. Despite its name, the company was not tarred with the same colonial brush as many of its competitors and was therefore treated with less suspicion by African governments. The relative timidity of the older companies when it came to new investments also created openings in what Rowland perceived to be high growth areas. (It must be said, however, that in his challenges to the established firms, Rowland has lost as many battles as he has won, and in so doing has made enemies of such powerful companies as South Africa's De Beers, Belgium's Union Minière and Britain's Charter Consolidated, all of which he has been at odds with at one time or another.)

Rowland perceptively drew the right commercial conclusions from African nationalism. He saw that African countries still needed Western technicians, skills and even entrepreneurs, but that national pride dictated a new kind of relationship. While older companies tended to sit around waiting to be nationalized, Lonrho offered participation either to private local interests or to the government.

The reputation it acquired of being a "partner in progress" was enhanced by Rowland's excellent personal relations with a number of African leaders, notably Presidents Banda of Malawi, Kaunda of Zambia, and Kenyatta of Kenya. Rowland's "feel" for Africa and Africans has often been commented on; certainly he exudes a charismatic charm, although the more cynical would say that this could have more to do with a fascination with power than with feelings of genuine friendship. Nevertheless, both Lonrho's partnership schemes and his personal relations with Africans represented a departure from previous practices, under which foreign companies, especially mining and plantation concerns, tended to be isolated expatriate communities associated only with local people through their workforce.

From the moment Rowland took over, Lonrho grew quickly—from a small company making around $1 million on a turnover of a few million dollars to the $66 million profit registered in 1973 on sales of $550 million. Rowland bought aggressively—textile companies, shipping groups, sugar plantations, tea estates, newspapers, real estate companies, and gold mines. The majority of Lonrho's acquisitions were made in East and Central Africa, with some in West Africa. Despite a few acquisitions made outside Africa and continuing company attempts to diversify away from the Continent, Africa still accounts for 80 per cent of Lonrho's earnings. Rowland was also helped by the glamour status of Lonrho's shares on the London stock exchange. The company's per-share price rose from a few pence in 1961 to a "high" of over £3 in 1969. This led critics to say that Rowland was buying solid assets with Lonrho "paper," for many of the company's acquisitions were made in the form of share exchanges. Critics further charged that although Lonrho's growth was spectacular it was not particularly creative. Rowland was buying already established businesses, in some cases improving management performance, in others indulging in asset-stripping. Apart from constructing an oil pipeline from Rhodesia to the Mozambique port of Beira, Lonrho was not particularly imaginative in its early business activities, although purchase of an interest in 1970 in the then revolutionary Wankel rotary engine was a less traditional and fresher-seeming activity.

*Roland "Tiny" Rowland, Lonrho's Chief Executive Officer, is shown in his London office last May. The picture was taken after an announcement that the British Government was to investigate the company's affairs.*

What *was* new, however, was Rowland's method of doing business. He traveled, and still travels, tirelessly around Africa, spending more than half the year visiting Lonrho's interests, cultivating high-level contacts and looking for new ideas. His airplane, first a conventional American twin-propeller craft, now a white Mystère jet, has become a familiar sight on the tarmacs of Lusaka, Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, Lagos, Kinshasa, Khartoum and other African airports. He has given rides to heads of state, once even racing Libya's leader, Colonel Qaddafi, who owns a similar plane, from Cairo to Tripoli. Rowland has also pursued, albeit to a lesser extent than he has encouraged people to believe, his philosophy of African participation in Lonrho inerests. The Government of Malawi, for example, participated in Lonrho's textile and various other interests in that country, and there have been participatory agreements, either with private or government sources, in Zambia, Kenya, Nigeria and elsewhere. Socialist Tanzania helped itself to certain of Lonrho's interests when it nationalized, first sisal estates and then other property, but the company and the Dar es Salaam city council still jointly own a brewery, surely one of the oddest commercial alliances in Africa today.

These acquisitions turned Lonrho into a holding company; even today its headquarters in London, a stone's throw away from the Bank of England, occupy just two floors and are basically only an administrative complex. Lonrho in fact *is* Tiny Rowland; its

headquarters is Rowland's London office. During the recent boardroom row, the directors trying to get rid of Rowland complained that he never consulted them, was secretive, sprang surprises on them, sometimes misled them and in general ran a one-man show. This state of affairs is partly explained by Rowland's personal stake in the company. The latest company report shows that he owns 14,068,562 shares (currently worth more than $25 million) or 21 per cent of the entire company. Clearly he has a considerable interest in Lonrho's prosperity and his temperament disposes him to trust only himself.

It was inevitable that the rise of Lonrho during the '60s in the most politically sensitive continent in the world would eventually come up against unexpected difficulties. An episode in Zaïre illustrates perfectly the skein of Lonrho's conflicting interests.

In 1968 Rowland wished to expand into the Congo (now Zaïre). He had his eye on the management contract for the Congo's copper mines, worth an estimated $22 million a year, and apparently available following the sequestration by the government of the mining interests of the giant Belgian company Union Minière. As an ally, Rowland chose a singular character, Martin Theves, President of the Cominière group, whose asests included an 800-mile railway in the north of the country. Theves was a longtime opponent of the Belgian mining establishment and was particularly critical of their protracted negotiations with the government over compensation for the copper mines.

Rowland and Theves, two loners, joined forces. The deal was typical of the complicated operation that was fast becoming Rowland's specialty. Theves agreed to create a company, Loncom S.A., registered in Luxemburg, to which he transferred 140,537 shares in Cominière, whose total capital was represented by 250,887 shares. He then transferred 51 per cent of the shares in Loncom to Lonrho in exchange for $2¼ million, 200,000 shares in Lonrho (worth $500,000 at the time) and a seat on Lonrho's board.

Theves then advised Rowland that the way to President Mobutu's heart would be to conduct a survey of a proposed $250 million trans-Congo railway from the copper mines to the Atlantic coast. Rowland wasted no time: He persuaded a somewhat reluctant Japanese company to put up 30 per cent of the estimated cost of the survey, and announced that it would be completed for the government at no cost. Rowland was hoping either to be reimbursed by the eventual contractors, or possibly be awarded the railway contract himself. And at the end of the line was the enticing possibility of being awarded the management contract for the mines. The honeymoon lasted two years. Then on July 23, 1970 Mobutu announced that he would have no further dealings with Lonrho and in vitriolic language advised other Black African nations to do the same. He castigated the British company for its Rhodesian links and for what he called dubious business methods.

What went wrong? First, Lonrho became overconfident, announcing too soon that it was hopeful of signing a protocol agreement concerning the trans-Zaïre railway. This did not go down well in protocol-conscious Kinshasa; the Congolese felt that if anyone was to make an announcement it *should have been them. Compounding* this was the fact that the Lonrho announcement was probably too optimistic because Theves was engaged in activities that further lowered the company's status among senior Congolese officials. He proposed establishing a foundation to help Congolese students, but said that Lonrho was obstructing the project. (Lonrho later said it had raised no objection to the project in principle but that the shares Theves had intended to transfer to the foundation had already been paid for in full by Lonhro.)

In any case, the complicated row culminated in a letter to Theves from L. Namwisi, the finance minister, and B. Bisengimana, director of the President's office: ". . . We have heard that your praiseworthy initiative [in proposing the establishment of the foundation] was not appreciated by your partners of Lonrho Ltd. Such an attitude makes it clear that this group does not work, like you do, for the good of the Congolese people.

"It is the reason why the President has decided that the Congo shall take again all the shares detained by Lonrho in the Cominière Company. . . ." Clearly, Theves' version of the story had been put more eloquently than Lonrho's.

THE PRINCIPAL INTERESTS OF THE GROUP




Another contributing factor was a visit at this time by President Mobutu to Zambia, coincidental with increased raids on Zambian territory by marauding Congolese bands. During his stay in Zambia, Mobutu's eye was caught by a headline in the *Times of Zambia* reading: "Congolese criminals crossing the border into Zambia." The hypersensitive Congolese leader regarded this as a personal insult. Upon further inquiry, he learned that the newspaper was owned by Lonrho. The company's ejection from the Congo was then only a matter of time.

In fact the Congolese story has ended happily for Lonrho. The company's operations there were only put "under surveillance," they retained control of Cominière, Theves died and last year relations with Mobutu were patched up. (Rowland met personally with Mobutu in Brussels and other company officials conducted meetings in Zaïre. Today, there are some 18 Lonrho subsidiaries in Zaïre.) Lonrho executives are now optimistic, although not publicly so, about being given the contract to build the railway.

There were more crises in 1971. Rowland's expansionist ambitions had finally outrun the company's resources.




*The long arm of Lonrho. The principal interests of Lonrho are shown in this diagram from the company's annual report. Lonrho's activities include mining, industrial operations and agriculture.*

His expenditure of around $25 million on developing a new South African acquisition, Western Platinum, and a down payment of at least $15 million on some patent rights on the Wankel engine, stretched Lonrho's resources almost to the breaking point. A liquidity crisis loomed and two directors resigned, as did S. G. Warburg, Lonrho's financial advisers. To make matters worse, a Lonrho director and three directors of a Lonrho subsidiary in South Africa were arrested on *charges of fraud (subsequently withdrawn)*. An air of gloom settled on the company, and its shares slumped in London to about a dollar, one sixth of the high registered two years earlier.

The London board decided to invite a firm of international accountants, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Co., to report on the company's position and *make recommendations for its improvement*. The nub of this report was that "The group is currently managed in effectively the same manner as it was in the early 1960s. Due to the rapid expansion of the group in recent years the existing management organization is now unsuitable for administering the complex and diversified group that Lonrho has become."

Changes were made in the board, including the appointment of Sir Basil Smallpiece, who was considered to be acceptable to the British financial establishment, which had always been suspicious of Rowland's business methods. A year later, Smallpiece—in the name of that same financial establishment—along with seven other directors tried unsuccessfully to oust Rowland. More than $20 million was also raised by means of a rights issue, which helped the company get *over its immediate liquidity problems*.

Financially, Lonrho is now sailing in calmer waters. Its large investments in commodities, such as sugar, gold, copper and platinum, all of which have shown substantial gains in the last year, have helped it turn in record profits. Rowland's dream now is, in his own words, to marry Western technology with Arab finance and African resources, a combination that finds peculiar favor at this time, and which led to Lonrho's controversial appointment as OAU consultant. In explaining his decision to the committee appointed by the OAU to consider the effect of the oil embargo on member countries, the OAU's Ekangaki said, "We consider that the OAU needed to appoint a consultant, in order to be of maximum utility to member states at the present conjuncture of Arab-African relations, a firm that is not only technically competent but politically well introduced both in Africa and in the Arab world."

A further twist of political drama was given to the whole issue when the meeting called in Addis Ababa to consider Lonrho's appointment had to be postponed because of the army mutiny. The strange conglomerate, with its *forceful chief, cannot it seems be separated* from controversy, however hard it tries.

Lonrho's withdrawal from the OAU agreement was as typical as its signing. Having succeeded in getting the deal through by means of his personal contact with Ekangaki, Rowland decided that he would rather lose face, and the contract, than be seen as the man responsible for a split in the OAU. In that way, he hopes to maintain Lonrho's intimate links with the leaders of those countries where the company is already well established. We have not heard the last of Lonrho's links with Africa, the Arabs and oil. □

# Exorcising the Ghost of Karume

As Zanzibar enters her second decade of independence, the Island government is gradually moving out of the shadow cast by its assassinated dictator.

By ALAN HUTCHISON

At the celebrations in January to mark the 10th anniversary of the Zanzibar revolution a statue in memory of the Island's late ruler, Sheikh Abeid Karume, was unveiled. On a plaque underneath it were inscribed the words: "Assassinated and buried, but only his body is dead and buried. The party and the Revolutionary Council continue; and his thoughts, philosophy and pronouncements are still with us and will continue forever."




Any account of Zanzibar's 10 years of independence must start with Karume, the moody dictator whose wayward excesses earned for the Island a reputation second only to Haiti. A former merchant seaman, he headed the mass Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) which in the elections prior to independence had hoped to gain power constitutionally from the Zanzibar National Party, the (mainly) Arab party associated with the Sultanate and the traditional Arab ruling hierarchy. In the voting, Karume's party polled 87,402 votes against the 47,943 recorded for the ZNP, yet gained only 13 of the 31 Assembly seats. Africans referred to Independence simply as Arab Independence; less than a month later the ASP was swept to power in the wake of a bloody revolution.

Karume emerged as a strongman, claiming he was a socialist but behaving like a bizarre autocrat. He introduced the death penalty for clove smuggling and for performing abortions and tonsillectomies; he made it illegal to possess contraceptives; in an effort to make the Island self-sufficient in food he forbade the importation of foreign foodstuffs, causing starvation; he threw the World Health Organization off the Island, claiming Zanzibaris were naturally healthy; to achieve "racial harmony" he forced girls of Persian origin to marry African members of his Revolutionary Council governing body. His method of rule, which included summary execution of suspected opponents, a ubiquitous secret police network and the promise that Zanzibar would not enjoy elections "for at least 60 years"' made it likely that one day he would be killed. That day was April 7, 1972. Four men burst into a room in the ASP headquarters, where Karume was playing cards with four political cronies. The leader, a soldier called Hamisi, saluted his President and announced: "I have come to kill you." He sprayed a round of machine gun bullets into Karume and left him bleeding to death on the floor. Subsequently Hamisi and two others were killed in a gun fight with the army in the old quarter of Zanzibar Town, and the fourth man committed suicide.

Immediately after the assassination hundreds of suspected malcontents were rounded up and imprisoned. In the ensuing months, the state elaborated an alleged plot to topple the government. Eighty-six people (18 of them in absentia), including former ministers, civil servants, army and police officers, were put on trial, accused of treason. The final outcome of the trial is still awaited today.

The substance of the government case is that the accused were involved in a treasonous plot, the first part of which was to kill Karume, the second to replace him with Abdulrahman

*The late Sheikh Abeid Karume.*

Babu, a founder of the Umma Party, a Marxist party that entered into an uneasy alliance with the ASP at the time of Independence. Babu fell out with Karume and subsequently became a minister in Tanganyika, which became known as Tanzania when Julius Nyerere and Karume formed a loose union of the two countries in 1964. Babu is one of the 18 being tried in absentia; he is currently being held in prison on the mainland. Nyerere has refused a Zanzibar request to return him to the Island for trial.

Nyerere's reluctance is understandable. In 1968 he complied with a request from Karume to return, for questioning, two senior Zanzibaris who were living in exile on the mainland. They were Kassim Hanga, formerly Karume's vice-president and his predecessor as head of the ASP, and Othman Shariff, formerly Zanzibar ambassador to the United States. Both men immediately disappeared, but allegedly drowned on Karume's orders. Nyerere could not afford to be similarly embarrassed again. In addition, since all the accused belonged to a party fundamentally opposed to the ASP, the trial has the hallmarks of a witch-hunt. It would appear to be a device for eliminating political opponents by semi-legal means. Finally there are the mechanics of the trial itself. Six years ago Karume dispensed with the judicial system, a legacy of British rule, and replaced it with People's Courts, presided over by three laymen. In these courts, accused persons must defend themselves without benefit of counsel.

The present trial has some other unusual features. Early on, nine of the accused, including Badawi Qullatein, a former junior minister, pleaded guilty and were sentenced to death; their evidence has been used by the prosecution, led by the London-trained Attorney-General, Wolfgang Dourado, to support the case against the other accused. The belief that the nine indulged in some form of plea bargaining—a reduction of the death sentence in exchange for cooperation—seems well-founded.

Other irregularities have emerged during the proceedings. Many of the accused claimed they were tortured, and when Dourado announced during his summing-up that one of the defendants had died "naturally" in prison, the other accused shouted: "Never." Even Dourado himself felt

*Shirazi (of Persian origin) girls like these were forced to marry members of Karume's Revolutionary Council.*

constrained to admit to the chairman of the court that "I am conceding that some form of arm twisting was adopted in order to obtain these statements. It would be dishonest on my part if I were to submit otherwise."

Dourado has found himself in an unusual position. As Attorney-General he has led the prosecution case. But as the only trained lawyer in the court he has felt obliged to point out to the untrained laymen trying the case some of the weaknesses in the state's submissions—for example, he said in his own summation, "Your honor might come to the conclusion that in some cases the prosecution case falls short of proving the offense of treason." And he has consistently reminded the three "judges" that it is up to the state to prove guilt, and not up to the accused to prove innocence.

*President Aboud Jumbe of Zanzibar. Jumbe is First Vice President of Tanzania.*

The treason trial has held center stage in Zanzibar for over a year, serving to perpetuate the memory of Karume. He is remembered in other ways too—institutions and roads are named after him, his portrait still hangs in public buildings, and in government offices placards proclaim that his thoughts will live forever. It would be surprising if his death had been followed by a swift period of "destalinization," for his successor, Aboud Jumbe, was formerly his right-hand man, and criticism of Karume would also reflect on him. There is also possibly another reason: Karume could never be described as having been popular; he was too feared for that. But he was a populist and some of his projects, poorly conceived as they were, nevertheless showed that he had the welfare of his people at heart.

His grand design was to house the entire population in East European-style apartment blocks. Many of these apartments are now empty because their inhabitants could not reconcile themselves to the loss of a patch of land. "Where do I keep my chickens?" asked one old lady as she left her rent-free, refrigerator-equipped apartment to return to a mud-and-wattle hut in the country. All the same, Karume is remembered as having made a start on some desirable social improvements; above all he is remembered by Africans as the man who ended centuries of harsh Arab rule, even if he did reintroduce a tyranny as great.

Jumbe, although serving loyally under Karume as his minister for state, is of a different mold. Aged 53, he was for 14 years a teacher, and he brings to bear on Zanzibar's problems a far more intelligent approach and a less volatile temperament than Karume's. Since the latter's death he has been quietly introducing changes, which if not qualifying as radical anywhere else, in the Zanzibar context are considerable. These changes certainly make life better for the estimated 200,000-odd people left on the Island (many thousands escaped during the Karume regime to exile on the mainland, in Kenya and farther afield, notably England where the Sultan fled after the revolution). One of Jumbe's first actions was to lift the Karume ban on the importation of foodstuffs. He has also initiated a large public works program and has tempered the formerly unbridled power of the Revolutionary Council by promoting the executive of the ASP. In addition, Jumbe has brought into the government a number of people from Pemba, Zanzibar's sister island, which although producing about 90 per cent of the clove crop, the basis of the Island's wealth, has been administratively neglected up to now (possibly a blessing for its inhabitants). Although three prominent Sultanate ministers remain imprisoned in mainland Tanzania, Jumbe did—in celebration of the 10th anniversary of the revolution—release three former Sultanate ministers who had been imprisoned since 1964. Some 542 minor offenders were also released.

Ironically, Jumbe has been able to effect his improvements by drawing on Karume's major legacy to Zanzibar: about $88 million of reserves, held in London. Zanzibar's fortunes took a sudden turn for the better in 1968 when the world price for cloves suddenly trebled from about $550 per ton to over $1,500, and then nearly doubled again the following year. A peculiar combination of soil and climate make Zanzibar the world's most important producer of cloves; cloves from Madagascar, the only other producer of note, are considered inferior and are often mixed with Zanzibar

cloves. The boom was initiated by an American commodity firm that offered Karume a previously undreamt-of price for a consignment. Karume immediately canceled all existing contracts, including one with the Soviet Union. The major buyers—for the most part Far Eastern agents who bought, and still buy, Zanzibar cloves to put into clove cigarettes, popular in Indonesia—had to pay the new price. Perhaps as a mark of gratitude, Karume shortly afterward ordered that the words of a popular ASP song be changed from "Down with Americans and British imperialists" to "Down with all imperialists and neo-colonialists."

In the manner of a peasant burying his savings under his hut, Karume insisted that the new wealth be stored and looked after, in London, by the Moscow Harodny Bank and the British National and Grindlays Bank. His refusal to import anything of substance meant that Zanzibar's balance of trade recorded higher and higher surpluses; the money in London kept piling up. On a per-capita basis Zanzibar was one of the richest countries in the developing world, yet villagers a few miles outside Zanzibar Town were without electricity, pumped water and often without essential foods.

Jumbe has dipped into the reserves, and used the money to pay for Africa's first color television service, for extensions to the airport runways on both Pemba and Zanzibar, for partial rural electrification, road improvements, purchase of a new inter-island ship and for establishment of a small industrial area.

The new regime has also inherited Karume's peasant fear of outside forces, notably the world price of such commodities as rice and sugar, which have risen dramatically in the last two years. Like Karume, Jumbe also sees that the encouragement of agricultural self-sufficiency is the obvious answer; unlike his former master he has not "encouraged" this solution by simply banning importation of food and then keeping his fingers crossed that this would lead to an increase in domestic production. Agricultural machinery has been brought in, and special encouragement given to farmers to diversify away from the monocrop pattern of the past. Programs on television are teaching farmers how to grow chilis and tobacco, two cash crops the government would like to encourage. A

*Zanzibar's People's Court, scene of the treason trial.*

great deal more needs to be done, however, in agriculture, particularly in the pricing system for crops. Most small farmers believe, with justification, that it is simply not worth their while to increase production because, in their words, the government "steals" most of the proceeds and domestic foodstuffs are still in very short supply. The government's pricing structure on cloves, under which the farmer receives about a 10th of the world price, inevitably leads to smuggling, conducted somewhat romantically by dhow on darkened nights across the Indian Ocean. Less romantically, Jumbe has not repealed Karume's decree that anyone caught automatically receives the death sentence.

Efforts to achieve food self-sufficiency have been assisted by the Chinese, Zanzibar's main, and virtually only, aid donor. They are currently engaged on a large sugar scheme, as well as a state rice farm. They have built Zanzibar a sports stadium, a shoe factory, a small farm implements factory and a cigarette factory. Chinese medical teams have been particularly appreciated; even bad-tempered Zanzibaris are told to visit the Chinese as "they have a cure for everything." China has also given military training to the army.

When China showed such an immediate interest in the new Zanzibar regime the Island became dubbed in the West as "Africa's Cuba" and was widely regarded as China's stepping stone to the Continent. Commentators confidently predicted that once China had, as they put it, a "firm foothold" on the mainland she would soon forget Zanzibar. China in her friendship with, and assistance to, Zanzibar has, however, shown a remarkable loyalty, possibly just *because* it was believed she would soon lose interest.

The benefits to China of this friendship are few. She uses Pemba as a training ground for guerrilla fighters belonging to southern African liberation movements that she supports, and it was rumored, wrongly, by *Time* magazine two years ago that the Chinese might use Zanzibar to monitor a putative ICMB launch from Sinkiang into the Indian Ocean. It could also be argued that long-term strategic considerations make friendly relations with a country in the Indian Ocean attractive to China. Her navy has yet to venture out of the China Seas, but when it does, allies such as

*Wolfgang Dourado, Zanzibar's Attorney General.*

Zanzibar, Mauritius, Sri Lanka and the African riparian nations will be an asset.

From Zanzibar China also seeks a trading advantage, a chance—however long-term—to generate a foreign exchange surplus with which to pay for imports of Western technology. Chinese exports which are cheap but unsophisticated do not find a ready market in the Western world, but they are appreciated in developing countries. Zanzibar's relatively small imports—consisting of rice, probably tobacco, bicycles and other consumer goods—nevertheless contribute to the healthy trade surplus China enjoys in its overall commercial dealings with Africa.

On the Island itself there are certainly few chances to score important political points: Apart from the Chinese consulate, four other nations contribute to the bizarre diplomatic corps —Egypt, the U.S., the Soviet Union and East Germany. In the early 1960s the U.S. maintained a tracking station on Zanzibar, politely dismantled at Karume's request after one of his periodic anti-Western fevers.

The cold war, or more accurately the "Communist cold war," the Sino-Soviet dispute played an important role in Zanzibar's post-independence history. In the West, China was widely, and wrongly, believed to have played a major role in Zanzibar's revolution, mainly because Babu, who became the first post-revolution foreign minister, had been the Zanzibar correspondent of the New China News Agency and had close Chinese links. China immediately recognized the revolutionary government, as did the Soviet Union. It seemed likely that Zanzibar would become a battleground for the Sino-Soviet dispute, then being bitterly prosecuted, especially in Africa. The West watched anxiously, but so too did President Julius Nyerere in Dar es Salaam, just 25 miles from Zanzibar across a narrow channel. He acted quickly, and to forestall internecine Communist rivalry, or West-Communist rivalry, on his door step proposed a union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar just three months after the revolution. Karume accepted, and so was born Tanzania, Africa's only political union.

It was a fateful decision for Nyerere to make, because although the Act of Union gave him no power to interfere in the internal affairs of the Island, it was widely assumed in the outside world that it did, or that at least it gave him scope to influence Karume considerably. As Karume's excesses became weirder and wilder, Nyerere was urged by wellwishers to do one of two things, one of which he found himself unable to do, the other unwilling to do. The first was to bring real economic, or possibly even military, pressure on Karume; the second was to dissolve the Union. He was reluctant to do the latter because as a committed Pan-Africanist he would be admitting the inability of two small African entities to work out a common policy. As regards economic pressure, the mainland had no weight at all, and in fact with the clove boom, Zanzibar became more prosperous than the former Tanganyika. Militarily, Zanzibar's armed forces were considered efficient, well equipped and well able to withstand any invasion by sea. And in any case that was not a solution that appealed to someone of

Nyerere's temperament. The only answer was to sweat it out. Karume's assassination must clearly have come as something of a relief to Nyerere.

Certainly, the personal relationship between Nyerere and his new First Vice-President, as the leader of Zanzibar automatically becomes, is a great deal better than that between Nyerere and Karume. Karume did not wish to travel outside Tanzania, nor would Nyerere have wished to have him as an envoy. Already, however, Jumbe has traveled a number of times, to India, Sudan, Congo-Brazzaville and Uganda, as a representative of the Union. In a recent interview with this writer he said: "Our Union is a manifestation of our aspiration toward [the ideal of regional and continental cooperation], and was born as the result of the desire of our peoples to come together. Our goal can only be achieved with experience, and quite frankly I believe people must accept the Union we have formed rather than try to push us into a kind of union they would like to see us form. Each country or group of states has the right to try for a kind of union most suitable to them.

". . . I do not accept that the Act envisages a full sovereign union, although that might be the ultimate aim. The Act itself reserves separate powers to the Union government and to the Zanzibar Executive—that is in the constitution as it is now. These powers are reviewed and changed according to our needs from time to time, and that represents actually the fairest future for the Union. It is something that grows, and it has been growing. I think the union between Zanzibar and Tanganyika is a great achievement particularly when we think of the difference in the size of our populations and the size of the two countries . . . I think the present formula is very suitable and has created confidence on both sides."

In its short independent history, Zanzibar has become virtually a microcosm of the whole turbulent Continent: It has had a Sultan, a dictator, a revolution, a political assassination, a two-party parliamentary system, a one-party state; it has been a battleground in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and was involved in the East-West cold war; it has had a political union, a commodity boom . . . the list is endless. It has never, however, been free from fear. Even at the time of this writing, reports are circulating that arrests have been made of people found listening to Radio Free Zanzibar, the "pirate" station broadcasting to the Island from the Persian Gulf on behalf of the Sultan's supporters.

But there are some small signs that conditions are improving. Jumbe is no Dubcek, but he is no Stalin either. Reforms will come, but they will be slow; gradually the Revolutionary Council political hacks will be phased out and the shadow of Karume over the brilliantly colored, sweet-smelling island will become less dark. Sometime during Zanzibar's second decade of independence, contrary to the plaque on Karume's statue, his "thoughts and philosophy," like his body, will be dead and buried. And Zanzibar will breathe a great sigh of relief. □


*China's aid to Zanzibar, which arrives in ships like this, was first seen as an attempt to gain entree to the Continent.*

# In Washington

## Crocodile Tears Over American Aid

By BRUCE OUDES

One of the enduring American myths about Africa—one now undergoing a new round of popularity spurred by the Sahel relief operation—is that over the years the old reliable U.S.A. could always be counted on to feed Black Africa's starving masses with giant food giveaway programs.

It is true, to be sure, that the U.S. has given away a lot of food around the world in the past 19 years—some $6.3 billion worth. But only five per cent of that—$334 million worth—has gone to sub-Saharan Africa. Taken as a whole the current Sahel operation, although modest compared to the major U.S. programs in Asia, is the most important ever undertaken by the U.S. in independent Africa. It has now surpassed, for instance, the $39 million in free food that the U.S. has donated to Nigeria, mainly during the civil war, and it has even surpassed the $52.3 million given to Portugal in the 1950s. For the current fiscal year the total is expected to be in the $60- to $70-million range which, together with transport costs and medical supplies, brings this sum up to the $100-million-plus figure that AID cites.

AID's Title I program which supports food exports at lower than commercial rates has a similar record. Of the $16.3 billion in food sold around the world in that fashion through the end of 1972, $1.4 billion went to Africa and all but $312 million of that went to the Maghreb.

While the U.S. thus has never "fed" Africa, it is, of course, also true that the U.S. has never had any major commitment to seriously help develop Africa. In 1965, the U.S technical assistance program in Nigeria was the largest anywhere, but that was before Vietnam got hot and the Nigerian war intervened. Aid to Zaire was substantial for largely anti-Communist motives, and aid to Liberia and Ethiopia has been significant for historical reasons. It is fair to generalize, however, that overall U.S. aid to Africa has consisted of no more than "presence programs," as they are called in bureaucratic jargon.

In 1966, the U.S. opted to focus what aid it gave to Africa on what it called the "countries of concentration," meaning the richer of the poor. The poorest of the poor were to be ignored. Over the past seven years or so, these concentration countries have received modest flows of U.S. bilateral assistance. Of greater significance has been the World Bank decision to devote a sharply higher proportion of its funds to Africa. Since the U.S. has contributed 40 per cent of the Bank's funds, the atrophying of the bilateral program has been compensated for by the growth in Africa's access to World Bank funds.

The events of the past several months, however, have dramatically knocked this established equilibrium for a loop. First of all, the sharp rise in commodity prices, including oil, and the rapid inflation in the industrialized world, particularly the U.S., means that, according to the State Department estimates, the poorest of the poor countries in Africa (drought or no drought), which have somehow managed to scrape along for the past decade with Europe's help, face, by the end of 1974, a devastating financial crisis.

The crocodile tears emanating from many Americans, however, about how much Africa has been hurt by Arab oil policy are the manifestations of an inadequately articulated policy goal of driving a wedge in the Arab-African alliance. To be sure, the Arabs and Africans do have many problems to discuss, but those who say that the Arab oil policy has undermined all of the plentiful development work the U.S. has done in Africa are substantially overstating the case and are ignoring the cold fact of the long-standing minimal U.S. official interest in Africa and African development.

Meanwhile, Africa's richer states, particularly those with mineral rather than agricultural exports, apparently are going to be able to hold the line and in some cases (Nigeria with its oil, for instance) even do quite well. Morocco has benefited from a tripling in the price of phosphate in the past year; Zaire's foreign-exchange reserves are large enough at present to buy four years' supply of oil.

U.S.-Africa trade, meanwhile, has been rising dramatically largely thanks to Nigerian oil. Within the next few months, if it has not happened already, there is no longer any doubt that Nigeria will replace South Africa as America's most important trade and investment partner in Africa.

In 1973, the U.S. ran its second consecutive deficit in the balance of trade with Africa with total trade approaching $5 billion, an increase of around 70 per cent over 1972. U.S.-Africa trade undoubtedly will register another dramatic increase this year.

How, then, is the U.S. responding to this new reality in Africa? To begin with, the administration started the year by chopping $50 million from the $160 million in development assistance it had earlier said Africa would receive, under the current AID bill. Latin America and South Asia received substantial cuts as well. About half of the funds cut from aid to Africa are slated to be redirected to South Vietnam. AID attempted to cover up the cut by lumping the special $25-million Sahel appropriation with its regular development funds

so that the drop would not look so large.

Meanwhile, AID disclosed that revised figures show that U.S. food aid for Africa during the fiscal year that ended last June 30 was actually $50 million instead of the $87 million that it had reported earlier. The cuts came from the food credit sales program (Title I) which was cut to $12.2 million for all of Africa. In comparison, Portugal was permitted to buy $18.8 million in feed grains under the same program.

During the current fiscal year the figures will look somewhat different as Title I sales to Portugal will drop to $10.4 million. AID originally proposed $49.8 million in Title I funds to Africa. According to cuts announced this spring, however, Africa will get only $25.9 million in Title I food this fiscal year. The $24-million difference, $9.5 million of which was planned for Ghana, will go instead to South Vietnam.

Ghana was also the principal African victim of AID's January axing of development loans. Of the $50 million cut, Ghana had been due to receive $10 million, Zaire $5 million, Morocco $5.5 million, and Tunisia $6.5 million. Other cuts came in smaller hunks.

What all this means in macro terms is that the White House has not digested and begun to appropriate the significance of Nigerian oil and other African minerals juxtaposed against the growing crisis in the poorest of Africa's poor countries. Cutting aid to Africa's richer countries is one thing; reducing it even further to Africa's poorest countries when they face a financial squeeze of unprecedented proportions is spiteful.

Nevertheless, such U.S. behavior is not unprecedented as regards Africa, and it is not limited to the administration. The 248-to-155 vote by the House in January against the World Bank replenishment bill could cost Africa $500 million or more in development loans. Among the Liberal Democrats who voted against the replenishment were Reps. Shirley Chisholm (D-N.Y.), James Symington (D-Mo.), Jerome Waldie (D-Calif.) and Lester Wolff (D-N.Y.).

Given this mood in Congress and the administration, this is a good time to ask anew that old question about the future direction of U.S. aid in Africa. For most Africans, U.S. aid has not been a life-and-death matter. (For some, tragically, it has.) Some Africans would welcome an immediate end to U.S. aid; others would regret it. Few, however, will really be upset about it one way or the other. As one African diplomat said after the World Bank vote in the House, "Well, if the Americans don't want to help us, that's their business."

For the U.S., then, the decision on aid depends on America's perception of its self-interest in Africa. What is likely are some redefinitions and some sharper distinctions between bilateral programs for Africa's "rich" countries and for its poor ones. Developmental economists call this phenomenon "disaggregation." To the extent the U.S. decides not to forsake the World Bank, that institution will increasingly be the prime source of all U.S. aid flows to both rich Africa and poor Africa.

In bilateral terms, however, Africa's rich countries can expect few if any development loans from the U.S. They will have to rely increasingly, as some already are, on the Export-Import Bank to finance their purchases of American products. Ex-Im, for example, has announced that it is financing the $241-million construction of the power line from Zaire's Inga Dam to the existing grids in Shaba (Katanga) Province. In addition, Africa's rich nations will also benefit from modest U.S. technical assistance programs (including Peace Corps) to the extent they find them useful. One sign of these times is that the Nigerian foreign ministry is casting covetous eyes on acquiring for its own growing needs the sizable office building in Lagos that has for years been the home of the USAID mission.

**U.S. food assistance this year is unprecedented. Mali, which will get $12.5 million worth, received only $9.6 million worth in the last 19 years.**

For Africa's poor, however, the need for foreign aid, including American, is growing. For the U.S. to meet that need will require a deliberate decision by the President and Congress—stated much more clearly and forcefully than at present—that the poorest of the poor countries are no longer to be simply written off.

This it appears will require renewed emphasis on the concept of development grants which AID has resurrected in the past year or so. Grant aid has been an anathema to Congress, but it is also unrealistic to saddle a country with a per-capita income of less than $100 annually with a debt-servicing burden that it probably won't be able to meet anyway. Grants of a few million dollars a year would supplement the long-standing program of European grant aid. A token grant aid program was approved by Congress last year, but the low ceiling on it will have to be removed if it is to amount to anything.

The second source of increased aid for Africa's poor countries should be food assistance—also on a grant basis (Title II). In the past two years, U.S. food grants worldwide declined by one-third from $403 million to $267 million. In 1972 and 1973, Africa received about 12 per cent of the food the U.S. gave away. Because of the Sahel, however, the figure for Africa during this fiscal year has jumped to $97 million, about 39 per cent of the worldwide figure and a much more respectable total. The question the U.S. must now ask itself is, "Do Africa's poor countries actually have to be suffering calamity before they can qualify for U.S. grant food assistance?"

This year the amount of Title II food being shipped to the Sahel will about equal the total of Title II food they have received in the previous 19 years. Mali, which is to get $12.5 million in free food this fiscal year received only $9.6 million in the past 19 years combined. Niger is getting $13.8 million compared with $5.6 million. Mauritania ($4 million in the past) will get $6.3 million this year. Chad ($1.8 million) is due for $3 million. Upper Volta ($11.4 million) will get $7.9 million; and Senegal ($18.3 million) will get $6.9 million.

Much Title II food aid has been tied to political more than humanitarian purposes over the years. Morocco, where the U.S. military happens to have an important communications facility, has received $261 million in free food over the past two decades. In fiscal 1973, Morocco received $9.4 million under Title II,

while the Sahel states combined received only $7.2 million.

According to testimony to Congress this spring AID expects to revert to that pattern in fiscal 1975 during which a total of only about $5 million in Title II funds is planned for the Sahel. In fiscal 1975, AID is planning to make available on Title I credit terms $160 million in food for South Vietnam, $77 million for Cambodia, $35 million for Chile, $26.4 million for Israel, but only $18.8 million for Africa.

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There is, of course, no uniform method for assisting Africa's poor countries. A particularly difficult case is Burundi where the enduring issue is the laxity of the government in protecting the lives of its citizens. A new dimension, however, has been added with the recent discovery by U.N. experts of a significant nickel deposit. Some critics have expressed shock at the administration's decision in January to resume its low-key "self-help" program in Burundi. Burundi hopes to develop hydroelectric power in order to exploit its nickel. That will require World Bank assistance over which the U.S. has substantial leverage. (In February the World Bank announced a $5-million credit to Burundi for highway maintenance.) With Burundi obviously in mind, Rep. Donald Fraser (D-Minn.) has urged the U.S. to convene the Security Council "whenever massacre occurs or appears likely to occur" even when no other Council member is willing to join in the move.

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While many Africans and some Americans have condemned the Pentagon for its eagerness to complete its long-planned expansion of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean into a full-scale military base, it is worth pointing out that the development of Diego will eliminate any residual validity in the argument put forth by some in the Pentagon that the U.S. should take up Portugal's offer to permit unrestricted U.S. development for military purposes of one or more of its excellent harbors in Mozambique.

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Botswana, another of Africa's poorest countries, also has substantial mineral wealth, but its problem is of course geographic. It is a stated aim of the administration to especially emphasize aid to Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland because of their proximity to the white minority-ruled states of southern Africa. Therefore, it was unfortunate, although regrettably predictable, that the U.S. in February turned down Botswana's request for a loan to pave the road to the ferry crossing to Zambia that is being developed as a result of a first-stage loan. The U.S. reasons that a gravel road is adequate to meet Botswana's needs. Paving the road would cost $12 million if done in conjunction with the $16.6-million first stage, somewhat more if done later. Informed sources say the U.S. opted to spend the limited funds available for development of a road from Lilongwe, the new Malawian capital, to the Zambian border. U.S. officials maintain this project will help Zambia bypass Rhodesia in developing access to the Indian Ocean via Mozambique.

While U.S. aid and trade in Africa are in transition, other issues influencing U.S. relations with the Continent are changing as well. Given the outlook for protracted negotiations in the Middle East, Guinea-Bissau has announced its intention to apply to the Security Council this year for U.N. membership, thus setting the stage for the first U.S. veto of a membership application. If present thinking holds, the U.S. will veto a Guinea-Bissau application annually. By 1976, the time of the third such U.S. veto, it is, however, possible that the President might appreciate the irony in such a Tory stance by America. One can only speculate on what might be the state of Nigerian public opinion toward the U.S. Government and perhaps Gulf Oil (which is also active in Portuguese Africa) by that time.

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Dr. Connie Mulder, South Africa's minister for information and internal security, is using to his advantage in the current South African electoral campaign the results of his generally successful two-week semi-private visit to the U.S. in January. Because Mulder is widely touted as the likely successor to Prime Minister Vorster, his visit must be regarded as the most important one to the U.S. by a South African political figure in years. The highlight of his trip was a 25-minute call on Vice President Gerald Ford, during which South Africa's coal gasification process was discussed. Mulder was the first important visitor from Africa to call on Ford after he became Vice President. A spokesman for the Vice President said that a "mutual acquaintance," a Michigan newspaper publisher whom he declined to name, had arranged the meeting.

During his visit, Mulder called on numerous members of Congress including Senators Hugh Scott (R-Penn.) and John Tower (R-Texas) and Reps. Thomas Morgan (D-Penn.) and Tip O'Neill (D-Mass.). Mulder also called on Vice Admiral Ray Peet, a deputy assistant secretary in the Pentagon's international security division. In California the previous week, Mulder met with newspaper editors and called on Los Angeles Mayor Thomas Bradley and Governor Ronald Reagan among others.

Both South African and American diplomats were unhappy about having little notice of his visit and were generally bypassed in arranging his schedule. An unpublicized trip to promote the exchange of information appeared to observers to be paradoxical. □

## NEWS ANALYSIS

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military base on the British-owned Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia.)

It is clearly on the issue of southern Africa that new British policies are expected. But if Africans are hoping for dramatic moves now they will be disappointed as were the white minority and colonial rulers who expected sudden changes when the Conservatives came to power three years ago.

The Labor Manifesto states: "We shall oppose all forms of racial discrimination and colonialism. This will mean support for the liberation movements of southern Africa and a disengagement from Britain's unhealthy involvement with apartheid. We shall intensify the policy of sanctions against Rhodesia and agree to no settlement which does not have the whole-hearted consent of the African majority."

The one controversial item here is the promise of support for liberation movements. It remains to be seen what form this support will take. The Government will probably find it advisable to channel any support for the liberation movements through those U.N. agencies that are providing medical, educational and agricultural assistance to liberated areas. Anything more direct could lead to Conservative allegations that the Government was "arming Black terrorists to slaughter our kith and kin in Rhodesia and South Africa." This is hardly the sort of issue on which the Labor Government would want to risk a fresh election.

Few initiatives are likely on Rhodesia. It was Harold Wilson who in 1965 answered Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence with sanctions, hoping they would be effective "in weeks, not months." The Conservatives found upholding sanctions was a safe alternative to taking any real policy initiative. Of course, they did consult the African majority on settlement terms negotiated with the Smith regime in 1971, and, to their credit, accepted the resounding "no" that Africans voiced.

Since Britain has always upheld sanctions, the main possibilities here lie in putting pressure on third parties (such as France, Japan and the United States) to do the same. Relations with these and other offending countries are interwoven with policy decision closer to Britain's vital interests and little change can be expected. Even if (through British pressure or for other reasons) these countries were to observe the boycott, it would not solve the problem. Britain and the other Western countries are not prepared to move against South Africa and Portugal, whose cooperation with Rhodesia is what is really crucial to sanctions-busting.

A Labor Government with a more secure majority could use the stick of threatened support for freedom fighters and the carrot of closer integration with the democratic West to coax Portugal from its colonial hold on Africa.

There may be some diplomatic gestures made, although while Royal Navy visits to Greece and Chile were recently called off, an operational call at the Azores went quitely ahead. In any case, as other progressive European governments have found, as long as Portugal is useful to NATO, she will use her membership to reinforce her position in Africa.

It is likely that under Labor, Britain will take a more pro-African stand at the United Nations. Britain's example at the U.N. may lead other Western and Commonwealth countries to take a similar line—if only not to stand out as lonely supporters of racism and colonialism.

Such a shift in position could further isolate Portugal and South Africa on questions such as Guinea-Bissau and Namibia. If these topics come before the Security Council some extremely interesting votes could result. Such diplomatic shadow-boxing has some effect on world opinion and on the morale and determination of the colonial and minority regimes. In the absence of political will in the West to act against what are seen as national military and economic interests, such gestures are the most that can be expected.

While the recent election was in progress, an inter-party committee of the House of Commons issued a report on wages paid to African workers by British firms operating in South Africa. The report noted that although heavy publicity in the

*(continued on page 56)*

*In 1960, the Queen Mother visited Southern Rhodesia. Since then, much has happened. Since Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in 1965, official British visitors to Rhodesia have been limited to those involved in attempts to negotiate a settlement. Under the new Labor government, few fresh Rhodesia initiatives are expected.*

*(continued from page 55)*

British press last year about the dealings of British industry in South Africa had led to some wage increases, 63 British companies were still paying below the Poverty Datum Line—a sum that has frequently been called a starvation wage.

The committee proposed a Code of Practice for British firms in South Africa, covering the encouragement of work committees and trade unions, acceptance of the higher Minimum Effective Level (MEL) rather than the PDL as a basis for minimum wages, improvement of fringe benefits such as housing and education for employees and their families, acceptance of "equal pay for equal work" and the advancement of Africans by getting round racial job reservation laws when possible.

A large lobby in Britain, including many active members of the Labor Party, believes Britain should boycott South Africa and that all business and trade contacts with South Africa should be terminated. Such a drastic policy would not commend itself to the Labor Government, particularly when it has no overall Parliamentary majority. On the other hand, there would be widespread support from all sides of the House for moves to press for adoption of the Code of Practice.

On defense, the Labor government has already expressed its intention of reimposing the ban on the export of arms to South Africa. Against considerable opposition, the Conservative government had lifted an earlier ban.

The Labor government has no plans to give up its use of the South African naval base at Simonstown, which is said to have been newly rebuilt to withstand nuclear and germ warfare. There might be a conflict here as to whether Britain's political and strategic interests point to a need for both Simonstown and Diego Garcia. If only one is needed, there is still a difficult choice to be made.

In sum, the advent of a Labor government, especially as a minority government, means that there will be few dramatic changes in Britain's African policies. Nevertheless the shifts that can be expected will all be in one direction, towards the party's conception of fostering the brotherhood of man. It remains to be seen how far that concept is trimmed by the realities of international and domestic politics. □

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Africa Report
MAGAZINE FOR THE NEW AFRICA
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

Amin's Economic War

Portugal and Africa: Unresolved Conflict

Ethiopia: The Struggle Yet to Come


| | *Population* | *Growth Rate 1965-1970* | *Population Density* | *Area* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Northern Africa** | 42,616,000 | 3.3% | 7/km² | 5,751,930 |
| **Western Africa** | 104,538,000 | 2.3% | 16/km² | 6,415,401 |
| **Central Africa** | 58,728,000 | 2.4% | 6/km² | 8,652,031 |
| **Eastern Africa** | 82,742,000 | 2.2% | 18/km² | 4,293,649 |
| **Southern Africa** | 58,882,000 | 2.8% | 10/km² | 5,322,214 |
| **Africa Total** | 344,000,000 | 2.6% | 11/km² | 30,435,000 |
| **World Total** | 3,362,000,000 | 2.0% | 27/km² | 135,781,000 |

# Africa Report

MAGAZINE FOR THE NEW AFRICA

A Publication of the African-American Institute


**The Place of the African Artist.** How far is the rhetoric of support for indigenous culture translated into practice in Africa today? Is there a place for western techniques and forms? Is art relevant to Africa's needs? How do you become an artist in Africa? There are a few of the issues to which Sudanese sculptor Amir I. M. Nour addresses himself in our interview. See page 12.

**When President Amin** of Uganda made the expulsion of his country's Asian population a first priority after his coup there was widespread interest because of the international repercussions of his policies. Since then he has been known for his undiplomatic wit, for his unpredictable moves and for the violence of his military rule. In this issue we examine the impact of the "Economic War" that was heralded by the Asian expulsion. See page 36.

**In its tourist publicity** Ethiopia projects itself as "the Hidden Empire." The political turmoil of the past months has lifted the curtain a little on one of Africa's least understood countries, but the kaleidoscopic events mean little without a knowledge of the underlying structures. We take the investigation a stage further by looking at the social, political and ethnic forces whose interplay will determine the future. See page 33.



Cover photos: Bernard Pierre Wolff


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# Letters

### Attitudes to Africa

I read Coleman Lollar's review of African travel books ("Two More Aids for the American Traveler," *March-April 1974*) *with interest.* Generally I found his observations helpful and perceptive. For this reason I was surprised at his phrase oddly defensive" in referring to the opening chapter of Sylvia Ardyn Boone's book, *West African Travels.* Perhaps he has lived in some rare environment and has therefore never heard some of the frequently expressed negative attitudes about Africa of which Ms. Boone speaks. Certainly he has not lived in Europe *or America.*

I recently mentioned in the office where I work (a rather typical, "liberal" New York office) that I was going to Africa on vacation. After I heard about the apes swing through the trees (good-humored ribbing), I heard, "But why did you decide to go to Africa? There's really not very much to do there; I mean, how many animals can you look at?" This is rather typical of the attitudes produced by textbooks and Hollywood movies, which play up the "primitive" aspect of Africa, without informing people that there are indeed civilized people, not so different from *Europeans or Americans, living there.*

I don't think Ms. Boone's observations are odd at all. I think they are necessary, especially since none of the other brochures Mr. Lollar mentions even attempt to deal with the unfortunate and ever-present reality of racial prejudice. The Ugly American still exists, and I don't think Ms. Boone created him.

*All the same, congratulations on a* fine publication. *African Update* is tremendous!

Sincerely,
Freida Chapman
New York City

### Americans in West Africa

Few travelers can hope to achieve *the wise and careful observations of* a foreign land as did de Tocqueville in his essays on America. But Professor W. Sherman Jackson ("Letter From West Africa," Nov.-Dec. 1973) falls far short in his impressions of Lagos.

Nigeria can hardly be blamed for Jackson's uncomfortable flight or arrival in unseasonable weather.

*The term "dash" is derived from* the Portuguese *doacao* (gift, bribe) and is a vestige of the first explorations of the Gulf of Guinea by the

Portuguese. The custom was perpetuated by the British and continues after Nigeria's independence from the U.K. in 1960. Similar customs exist in the history of America, notably the large land grants awarded railroads by the U.S. Government, and recently the millions spent by private corporations in seeking political favor in Washington. "Tipping" is a universal example of "dash."

It is inaccurate to label the heterogeneous Lagos as a typical African city when a much better example is nearby Ibadan (89 miles from Lagos). It is Black Africa's largest native city of more than one million.

Contrary to Professor Jackson's optimism, Nigeria's new oil wealth has not benefited its citizens. Chief Awolowo, former Minister of Finance, reports in *West Africa* magazine (Oct. 27, 1973) that skyrocketing inflation and the expense of a 250,000-man army have blunted economic gains. Of Nigeria's 12 states, the most affluent is the Western State, where 78 per cent of its population earn less than $140 and 28 per cent earn less than $40 a year. While Jackson reports traditional food is inexpensive, 70 per cent of a Nigerian's income is spent on food, and over half of her people suffer from nutritional anemia.

Professor Jackson's remarks about Nigerian bureaucracy and shortcomings are minor faults when compared to the obstructionist attitudes of some USAID officials in Lagos. It was the British embassy, not the U.S. ambassador, who provided safety for Americans caught in Nigeria's civil war.

Many American Blacks travel to Lagos, sit in the lobby of the Bristol or Federal Palace and leave Nigeria without seeing the wide spectrum of Nigerian culture, climates, museums, shrines, national parks and festivals of more than 200 tribes. Black Americans remain uninformed on Nigerian history, though many can trace their ancestry to the Niger Delta. The American press continues to ignore Africa, so it is important to travel to Nigeria via London where the best English writings on Africa are published, and to see the British Museum's outstanding collection of Nigerian art.

Peter Mustell
Berkeley, California

# Editor's Message

Our cover this month features craftsmen whose cultural environment and techniques contain traditional African elements and cosmopolitan features. One of the artists depicted is the Sudanese sculptor Amir I.M. Nour, who is also interviewed in this issue by our publisher, **Bob Denerstein.** Amir believes that "you can't have a culture isolated from the rest of the world".

Developments in Portugal and their effects upon Africa have been constantly in the news since the April 25 coup. We take the opportunity of stepping back from immediate events in order to present an analysis of the underlying power structures that are relevant to the whole future of southern Africa. Meanwhile in the **African Update** section readers will find an up-to-the-minute report on how the story has unfolded so far, as well as full reports of economic and political developments throughout the Continent.

We hope that those who have been following the changes taking place in Ethiopia will find that the assessment we carry of the strength, influence and importance of the various groups aids them in understanding developments.

We believe it is equally important to keep in touch with issues and areas that may not attract the current attention of the general media. In this respect the magazine contains articles on General Amin's "Economic War" in Uganda and on further unrest in Burundi.

Our regular and occasional features include **Bruce Oudes'** roundup of how African issues have been treated in Washington and an East African Notebook selection from a Nairobi journalist that takes a personal look at some social issues.

**David Martin,** who writes for the London *Observer* on African affairs, has more than a decade of journalistic experience on the African continent. Based in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania until earlier this year, he has closely watched the operations of Frelimo and the other southern African nationalist movements. The analysis that appears in this issue was written after a visit to Portugal and Mozambique.

**Paul Amina,** who writes our East African Notebook this month, is a well-known Kenya journalist. He writes regularly for the Nairobi *Sunday Post* and also contributes to a wide range of publications in his own country and overseas.

**Jonathan Rollow,** a free-lance writer on international affairs, also contributes to the Washington *Post* and other leading journals. He recently returned from a seven-month tour of African countries, among which was Uganda. He is a political science major at Vanderbilt University.

**Zdenek Cervenka** was educated in Prague and Cambridge. His African experience includes five years in the Ghana Civil Service where he served with the Ministry of Justice and in the Office of the President. Since 1968 he has been a research fellow at the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies at Uppsala, Sweden, which published his latest book "Land-locked Countries of Africa."

**Patrick Gilkes** lived in Ethiopia between 1964 and 1972, teaching and doing research. He was expelled for interference in political affairs. Since then he has been a journalist specializing in Africa and has just finished a book on Ethiopia, *Feudalism and Modernization: Politics in Ethiopia*, to be published by Julian Friedmann later this year.

In this issue we once again acknowledge the photographic work of Bernard Pierre Wolff, who is responsible for the pictures used in the cover montage and in the interview with Amir I.M. Nour.

—AJH

# News Analysis

## Burundi's Tutsi Fall Out

It has been several months since Burundi was in the news. In late 1973, Hutu guerrilla attacks against the minority Tutsi regime led to small-scale reprisals against local Hutu civilians. One rebel attack, in the region to the north of Bujumbura, Burundi's capital, led Burundian Tutsi leaders to increase pressure on neighboring Zaire to clamp down on the 40,000 Hutu refugees who fled to that country in 1972 and 1973. At least one eyewitness account, however, submits that in southern Burundi, and in the region north of Bujumbura, the rebels are not "invading" but are local Hutu reacting against the increasing oppression directed against them by the Tutsi government.

The main arena for political movement in Burundi at this time is not the Hutu guerrillas who have carried on a war of attrition since the aborted revolt by their fellow ethnics in late April 1972. It was in the wake of that revolt that as many as, if not more than, 200,000 Hutu were killed and more than 150,000 fled the country. The initial killing of more than 2,000 Tutsi officials and civilians triggered this reaction. Since late 1973, subsequent to the brutal repression against all Hutu, the dominant political activity in Burundi has centered about the reemergence of a split among the Tutsi themselves. The Burundian Tutsi are viewed as a single group by almost everyone but themselves.

Just before the aborted Hutu revolt in 1972, the southern Tutsi—known as the Bururi group—were on the verge of a violent clash with Tutsi from central and northern Burundi (known as the Muramvya and Ijenda groups). This conflict has historical roots. Southern Tutsi have been kept out of the political system in traditional Burundi, and under 60-odd years of European colonial rule, these same southern Tutsi were kept from the more important posts made available to Africans. Even in the colonial schools and mission establishments, the southern Tutsi felt themselves at a disadvantage in contrast to those Tutsi from the central and northern provinces. In 1966, when the army seized control of the state, its commander and many officers and regular troops were southerners. As a result, Bururi Tutsi found themselves in a position of potential advantage.

Since 1867, the southern Tutsi have schemed to displace Muramvya Tutsi. Toward the end of 1970 this intrigue took an ugly turn when the southern Tutsi engineered a kangaroo court in which all major Muramvya Tutsi were accused and found guilty of plotting to overthrow the regime. The President of the Republic, Michel Micombero, and his army chief, Colonel Ndabameye, participated in this trial, which ended with severe sentences. These sentences were later dropped as tensions among Tutsi threatened to break into a bloody intraethnic civil war. The 1972 Hutu revolt, however, provided southern Tutsi leaders with an opportunity to kill off all potential Hutu leaders who might one day threaten minority Tutsi rule and to take up the struggle for power against Muramvya Tutsi. Some of the post-revolt repression in northern Burundi was reported to have been directed against all the inhabitants without distinction. There are reports that a number of local Tutsi were among those killed.

The renewed southern struggle against the Muramvya Tutsi occurred in several stages. In late 1973, the Muramvya Prime Minister was removed: The real reason was his decision to pursue a moderate line and try to heal the ethnic divisions of 1972. Then, key Bururi Tutsi were brought into the government cabinet, while Muramvya Tutsi were dropped. This process was consummated by early 1974. The southern Tutsi now control the vital ministries—foreign affairs, internal affairs and justice. They have managed to get their men into the key posts within President Michel Micombero's personal cabinet and within the army general staff. During the period leading to the 1970 clash in the trial of Muramvya Tutsi, the southerners gained control over almost all provincial administrative posts. At this moment, southerners control the judiciary, the provincial administration, the cabinet and the army. They have also gained control over the important parapolitical organizations like the country's single party and its youth movement.

Although the actual head of Burundi's armed forces is himself not a southerner, he has been surrounded by southerners, and those closest to Burundian afffairs doubt he can command the loyalty of the armed forces. He was placed in command by President Micombero who distrusts most others in the army, but the southerners have managed to work around both men in consolidating their hold over the armed forces.

The chief architect of this southern strategy is the present Foreign Minister, Artemon Simbananiye. In 1965, as Minister of Justice, he organized the first witch hunt against Burundi's Hutu intellectuals after an aborted coup. He led the repression again in 1972. Simbananiye has allied himself with southerners in the armed forces, like majors Shibura and Rwuri (presently Minister of the Interior). Although in and out of of-

*Burundi villagers: waiting for an end to turmoil.* *United Press International.*[1]

fice because President Micombero was unwilling to accept the southern strategy completely. Simbananiye's star rose like a meteor after the 1972 revolt by Hutu. He alone could say, "I told you so!" President Micombero, Commander-in-Chief of the army, who led a coup against the then monarchy in 1966, is also a southerner. It was only a matter of finding the right opportunity for Simbananiye to convince him that all Bururi Tutsi had to band together and remove all other potential opposition. The Muramvya Tutsi were implicated in the 1972 violence because the deposed king, Ntare V, returned to the country in late March 1972. This event has been interpreted by Bururi Tutsi as the trigger that set off the revolt in 1972. The Muramvya Tutsi have been closely identified with the traditional monarchy overthrown in 1966.

After the revolt in April/May 1972 most traditional providers of aid to Burundi were unwilling to continue their programs in the face of semi-official support for a genocidal campaign against the country's majority Hutu ethnic group. It was at this moment that Simbananiye moved to secure influence at the top of the regime, with President Micombero personally. Belgium, the traditional supplier of arms to Burundi also cut off the flow of materiel and withdrew its military advisers from the country. Simbananiye turned immediately to the mainland Chinese and to the Arabs. In a barnstorming secret trip he visited Libya and secured promises of military aid in the form of materiel and personnel to train Burundi's armed forces. Even the Soviet Union, at first reticent, kicked in by fall 1972. The Burundians received this aid in return for early support of the Arab cause against Israel. Although there have been some rough spots in the Burundi-Arab connection, supplies have continued to arrive. Moreover, Simbananiye was able to win over French officials, and France has sold helicopters to Burundi and is providing other aid to the country.

In the midst of all this, a U.N. team uncovered what may be one of the world's richest deposits of nickel, and possibly hydrocarbons, off Burundi's Lake Tanganyika shores. Simbananiye quickly organized parastatal committees over which he has control to supervise the mineral exploitation and future trade. All in all, Burundi's economic and aid picture was improving and Simbananiye earned credit for this.

The rise of the Bururi Tutsi has been a side effect of other unrelated events. President Micombero's health has been failing since 1972. Individuals close to the President say he drinks too much and sleeps too little. Some have suggested that the President is being influenced by Foreign Minister Simbananiye and his coterie in order to reduce the President to a state of physical exhaustion in which he would be unable to govern but would remain as a figurehead. At this time, a struggle is shaping up as the Muramvya Tutsi attempt to stop Simbananiye. No one knows what to expect, but Burundi is once again a tinderbox. This time the tinder is all Tutsi, and the potential for intra-Tutsi violence is not to be precluded. Simbananiye is also working feverishly to prevent any backsliding away from Bururi dominance.

Hutu refugee groups are well aware of this and they might either try to take advantage of Tutsi weakness or wait and let Tutsi factions exhaust themselves sufficiently to allow for a Hutu success.

There are still those groups and individuals who hope for compromise and national reconciliation, but they are losing ground. Ethnic violence within Burundi has taken on its own momentum. □

# Portugal: The Real Structure of Power

By DAVID MARTIN

On Sunday, September 9, last year about 150 officers, mostly captains, made their way in small groups to a barn on the outskirts of the garrison town of Evora in Southern Portugal. Sitting on bales of hay and farm machinery they discussed a range of complaints including the slowness of promotion (particularly from captain to major) and the standards of military academy courses.

Subversive as the meeting may have been at that point the officers' words and thoughts were far from treason. Yet the meeting in the barn at Evora was the first in a series of events that led to the military *coup d'état* in Portugal on April 25.

All of the soldiers were veterans of the wars in Portugal's three African colonies—Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. They had spent between two and four tours of duty fighting against the "wind of change" to which Dr. Salazar and his successor, Dr. Caetano, obdurately refused to bend. Another common denominator among these officers was their background. Most were the sons of peasant farmers or laborers; their parents numbered among the 57 per cent of Portuguese who are illiterate and are therefore denied the right to vote.

At the Evora barn, a coordinating committee was elected and a memorandum of complaint was sent to the government. Unwittingly the officers had set in motion a *coup d'état* that will profoundly affect events in southern Africa and will also remold Portugal, Europe's most backward nation.

Two reasons have been given for the coup—increasing disgruntlement over realizations that a military solution was not possible in the African wars and a growing awareness that there was a need to democratize Portuguese society after 50 years of repression. It is necessary to analyze the three main forces that have emerged in Portugal before considering what will now happen in Lisbon and her African colonies.

The first group to gain broad public recognition after the coup was the Junta consisting of generals who were appointed by the Movement of the Armed Forces. Led by General Antonio de Spinola, the Junta appeared to be the major force in the "new" Portugal. In point of fact, at the moment at least, the Junta is not the major political force in Portugal. The views of its members do not coincide with those of the men who made the Portuguese *coup d'état*. To these key men in the Movement of the Armed Forces, the views of the Junta (such as the concept of a Lusitanian Federation) are at least 15 years out of date.

Next among the groups that seem to have political importance is the Provisional Government, which has been cast in a caretaker role prior to elections that are supposed to take place in about a year. Including figures like Dr. Mario Soares, the Portuguese socialist leader who returned from exile in Paris after the coup, Dr. Almeida Santos, generally cast as leader of Mozambique's so-called liberal settler wing, and at least one Communist, the Provisional Government reflects the disparate viewpoints of Lisbon's new politics. But here again, as in the case of the Junta, this group has limited political clout. When Dr. Santos flew to Mozambique to review the situation three weeks after the coup, a major from the Movement who acted as a kind of political commissar was continuously at his shoulder. When Dr. Soares traveled to London

to negotiate with the PAIGC he had a colonel with him.

The reality of the new politics is that the one group that is not in the public eye, the coordinating committee of the Movement of the Armed Forces, is today the most powerful element in Portugal's three-pronged power structure.

Alliances among Portugal's power groups are uneasy and fraught with danger. How these groups are able to live together (or which one survives should they clash) will determine the future of Portuguese politics, as well as the future of Portugal's African colonies.

Members of the Movement of the Armed Forces in Portugal and Mozambique immediately after the coup told *Africa Report* that they had been forced to act so that they would not be blamed for the failure to win the African wars in the same way that their colleagues had been blamed for the defeat in Goa in 1961. General Spinola and the Commander of the Armed Forces, General Costa Gomes, both sacked a month before the coup over Spinola's controversial book *Portugal and the Future*, had not been involved in the plan and had only been brought in when the deposed Prime Minister, Dr. Marcello Caetano, gave in with surprising ease.

Members of the Movement of the Armed Forces viewed Spinola with disquiet. They agreed with him that a military solution to the African wars was not possible, but where Spinola advocated a federation of all Portugal's possessions, the key men in the Movement believed that independence for each colony, based on adult suffrage, was the only solution to seemingly endless African woes.

This divergence is important in viewing the future. The Movement of the Armed Forces could decide to try to remove General Spinola as President and disband the Junta. But this might prove beyond their capacity since the general has been cast as a national hero and, erroneously, as the man who ended repression. Alternatively General Spinola, whose support among civilians is considerable, might decide that the Movement of the Armed Forces and in particular its coordinating committee has become an intolerable millstone around his neck. He might then use the extensive conservative group in the armed forces,



who are not members of the Movement, to remove them.

Behind these three major Portuguese power groups come a bewildering array of political associations (political parties are still constitutionally banned). On the left, there are the Communists and the Socialists, with greater influence and organization than anyone else. They will inevitably emerge as powerful forces via the ballot box. But there remain deeply entrenched conservative interests headed by what are often called the "100 families," a Portuguese economic Mafia that controls virtually the entire economy at home and in the African colonies. Wisely for the moment, in the euphoric carnival atmosphere of Portugal, the 100 families are playing their cards close to the vest. Even if they cannot prevent the changes that are taking place, they remain capable of trying to stop the pendulum of reform from swinging too far.

In Portugal, 53 political associations were formed within three weeks of the coup, and in the colonies the story was much the same. But many of these associations are so ephemeral that they are of little consequence. In the Mozambique capital, Lourenco Marques, *Africa Report* witnessed one citrus farmer form an association that he called "The Movement of Free Men." He was the only member and still is. Nonetheless his "movement" got three stories in the city's newspapers. Another association, formed at Port Amelia in northern Mozambique, was set up by Lazaro Nkavandame, a chief of the Makonde tribe and defector to the Portuguese from the central committee of the liberation front, Frelimo. Nkavandame is wanted for questioning by Tanzanian police in connection with the April 1969 book-bomb assassination in Dar es Salaam of Frelimo President, Dr. Eduardo Mondlane.

From the initial political free-for-all in Mozambique, only two associations worth mentioning emerged. The first was Fico which in Portuguese means "I stay." It drew support from the less educated white settlers who had fought in the wars and who were determined to protect their privileged positions. Dangerously reminiscent of the Algerian OAS, Fico—which stands for the Independent Front for Western Continuity—attracted 5,000 whites to its first rally in Lourenco Marques. But within a fortnight, another Fico rally in the same city attracted less than 1,000 people. Fears that Mozambique's 220,000 white settlers might make a unilateral declaration of independence along Rhodesian lines then receded.

A Mozambique UDI is not really practical. Rhodesia at the time of its 1965 illegal declaration of independence had experienced internal self-government for more than 40 years. It had a capable administration and a standing army. Mozambique has none of these things. The officer corps of the 65,000-man army in the colony is almost entirely from Metropolitan Portugal, and half the troops come from Portugal. Of the remainder, almost all are African conscripts whose willingness to establish and protect a white bastion is in considerable doubt, to put it mildly.

Mozambique's second major association—and even this group appears to be on the wane already—is the United Group of Mozambique (Gumo) whose main leader is Mrs. Joanna Simiao, a personable foreign languages teacher. Largely an African organization, supporting the demands for independence from Lisbon and deferring to Frelimo, Gumo has failed to gather momentum.

The fact is that in Mozambique Frelimo, after almost a decade of fighting for independence, and in Guinea-Bissau PAIGC, cannot be challenged as the nationalist movements that have opened the door to independence and that will become the governments of their respective territories. The PAIGC last year declared independence for Guinea-Bissau and the strategic Cape Verde Islands and has already been recognized by more than 80 governments in the Third and Communist worlds. For a long time it has been believed that mainland Guinea-Bissau, with only 2,000 settlers and little economic value, was an encumbrance Portugal would gladly dispose of if it were not for the psychological uplift this would provide to liberation forces in the other two colonies. The speed with which Lisbon opened talks with the PAIGC in London indicates the truth of this belief and talks with Frelimo were a logical sequence.

One of the facts that must be remembered, if the position of Frelimo is to be understood is that whatever differences the *coup d'état* has made in Portugal, changes in the African colonies are still limited. Frelimo and the other fronts have been fighting for independence on the basis of one man, one vote. Portugal has done no more to date than suggest a referendum with five questions to be put to an electroate "more-or-less on the basis of one man one vote." Options that would be considered in such a referendum are:



*An early picture of the new Portuguese junta. Standing from left: General Diogo Neto; Capt. Rosa Coutinho; and Col. Galvao de Melo. Seated, from left, are: General Costa Gomes; General Antonio de Spinola; Vice-Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo and General Jaime Silverio Margues. United Press International.*

(1) continuation of the status quo, (2) greater autonomy from Lisbon, (3) a Lusitanian Federation, (4) Portuguese Commonwealth, and (5) total independence.

General Gomes in Mozambique expressed the hope that the people would choose somewhere between what he described as "the extremes" of the status quo and total independence. From that remark it is clear where the Junta stands. Given these circumstances, Frelimo has predictably said it will discuss nothing but the date of independence and the mechanics of achieving it. Since it was the efforts of Frelimo, more than any other factor, that convinced the soldiers that the wars could not be won by military means (which in turn led to the *coup d'état*) it would be foolhardy for the nationalist movement to do otherwise since its guerrilla strength and political support are very clear.

In 1970 Portugal's then military commander in the colony, General Kaulza da Arriaga (one of the many sacked since the coup) launched his much publicized "Operation Gordian Knot." By October of that year,

*The war seems remote from the beaches of Luanda, Angola.*

*Friends and relatives of political prisoners gather outside Caxias prison in Portugal to sing patriotic songs as they await the release of prisoners by the new junta. United Press International.*

Kaulza had declared, "The war is won."

Frelimo countered by pushing through the western Tete Province to Manica e Sofala Province into the white farming heartlands around Manica near the Rhodesian frontier. Frelimo then moved to Vila Gouveia, which has been under a state of siege for two months and then to Vila Pery on Rhodesia's main road. In addition, Frelimo fighters attacked rail communication lines leading to the Indian Ocean port of Beira.

Today in these areas, ideal for guerrilla warfare, tough, fast-moving Frelimo groups operate almost at will, harassing communications by means of mine and machine-gun attacks, and raiding shops, canteens and farms. The 1,000 white farmers who grow cotton, citrus, sugar and a range of other crops are badly frightened and some are already leaving. A clear indicator of Frelimo's psychological impact is that in 1973 almost 22,000 Portuguese settlers left the colony. Yet most of the rest are resigned to Frelimo attaining power in a year or two. They do not welcome the idea. Many regard themselves as Mozambicans and given the choice (which they certainly will be) between retaining Portuguese citizenship and adopting Mozambican nationality a large number will choose the latter. Many of the farmers have little love for the Metropolitan power. Last year when world sugar prices were about $480 a ton, they received only $150 a ton from Portugal. They got less than half the value of their cotton and two-fifths the value of cashew nuts of which Mozambique is the world's main producer.

These farmers openly laugh at suggestions that the war has cost Portugal dearly. This year the Metropolitan share of costs for the war in Mozambique is $120 million out of a total of about $320 million. But Portugal gets the $120 million back. Under a contract with South Africa 100,000 Mozambique Africans are supplied each year to work in the mines. They receive about 60 per cent of their salaries and the remainder (worth about $35 million) is paid to Lisbon by Pretoria in gold at the official rate. This gold is then sold on the open market at four times that value with Lisbon keeping the difference, a sum equivalent to about $120 million.

In Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique it is fairly clear who will come to power and thus who should participate in negotiations. Angola poses different problems because there are three nationalist guerrilla movements: the MPLA led by Dr. Agostinho Neto; the FNLA led by Holden Roberto and UNITA led by Jonas Savimbi. Repeated efforts to form a united front between the first two groups have resulted in only limited success. Now it is necessary for African leaders such as Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere, Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda and Zaire's General Mobutu Sese Seko to forge some form of cooperative to strengthen the negotiating position of the Angolans. Moreover, the enormous wealth of Angola, particularly in oil and diamonds, makes it vulnerable to pressures and external interference.

*Revenues from Angola's rich oil deposits may make the Portuguese reluctant to negotiate total independence for the territory. Observers feel negotiations with Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau will be smoother.*

Foreign interests represent an important facet of the Portuguese *coup d'état* particularly as far as Rhodesia and South Africa and to some extent Malawi are concerned. Mozambique is heavily dependent upon the white bastions with an estimated 40 per cent of its current revenue deriving from Rhodesia and South Africa through earnings from port and rail charges and tourism. In addition, several million dollars a year are remitted to Mozambique from South Africa by mine workers.

Despite this, there can be little doubt that a Frelimo government would sever all economic and diplomatic links with Rhodesia and South Africa as a matter of principle and would support nationalist movements in those two countries. It is inconceivable that Frelimo, after fighting for 10 years to win its own independence, would turn its back on others demanding the same right. Rhodesian and South African interests—and they are extensive in banking, farming, industry and tourism—would be nationalized. So when South African Premier, John Vorster, and his Rhodesian counterpart, Ian Smith, after a meeting in Pretoria, talked blandly about not worrying if there is Black rule in Mozambique, they were not referring to Frelimo.

For Rhodesia in particular the implications of Mozambique independence are serious. Such independence would leave Rhodesia almost entirely surrounded by Black-ruled states hostile to her racial ethic and minority government. Rhodesia's army is small and has been able after 18 months of operations to push out the Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu) guerrillas who have been operating in the Zambezi Valley. In the Umtali area, Rhodesia has alienated the Tangwana by displacing them from their traditional lands, thus giving guerrillas more major grass-root support.

The young, comparatively apolitical captains who met in that barn at Evora last September have unleashed a chain of events which will profoundly affect Portugal, Southern Africa and the world not only in the coming months but for the next decade. Many imponderables remain as the new power groups take shape. What is clear and irrevocable is that, to paraphrase the words of a poem by Frelimo's publicity secretary, Jorge Robello, "Bullets are beginning to flower." □

# East African Notebook

## On Retaining Traditional Culture

From PAUL AMINA, Nairobi

Even after political independence, Africa remains a land of many contrasts, blessings and curses. Some independent nations once under British rule are busy doing away with British traditions while others are nursing them. Today an African nation can remove a historical monument to make way for a Hilton hotel.

The member of the African elite who has so far misled his fellow-countrymen is an interesting creature who hardly means what he preaches. He is more theoretical and paradoxical than his former master, "the Colonialists."

It is the African elite that can stand up to support ideologies like capitalism, communism, materialism, imperialism—all the "isms" that have little relevance to an African in this continent. Karl Marx and Lenin are great authors of ideologies, but they were not born in Arusha, Lagos, Nairobi or Accra; their writings do not mention Africa.

The Kenyan elite, for instance, are obsessed with British traditional rules and values more than the elite of any other country on the east coast of Africa. More than three-quarters of the firms in Kenya, including the civil service offices, force their staff to wear a tie and jacket while at work.

A recent showdown at the Kenya coast against a ministerial directive to organize a beauty contest reflects how much hypocrisy is accommodated in the Kenyan philosophy of retaining African cultures. The Lamu district beauty contest—to select a winner to appear at the provincial contests and thereafter in a national contest on the eve of Kenya's 10th anniversary of Independence—was abortive.

Is a beauty contest within the African culture that the elite talk about? No. But the Minister for Cooperatives and Social Services, Masinde Muliro, whose portfolio includes beauty contests, said when announcing the plan that the contest is part of the social emancipation attained as a result of Independence.

The minister said the minimum academic qualifications for the contestants would be a Certificate of Primary Education. Innovations to last year's contest were intelligence, poise and dress, as well as beauty. The minister's directive neglected one thing—a beautiful, intelligent and illiterate orphan might be in Kenya today. She cannot afford a dress and other aids required by a beauty contestant.

A Kenya News Agency (KNA) story attributed a report to the Lamu District Development Officer, Johnson Obaga, that all attempts to stage a beauty contest in the district were abortive because of the rigid conservative customs and the traditions of the people. Only one contestant showed up for the contest and she was an outsider working in the district. Persuasion failed, and the day passed without the contest being held. This meant that the national contest would take place with one district abstaining.

Obaga said that one major condition put forward by the parents in his district was that the beauty contest (had it been organized at all) would have been private with attendance restricted to females. "The mothers had also pointed out that participants were to be decently dressed without having to wear swimming costumes. As is always the case with such contests, scanty attire of that nature was regarded as immoral by the parents," Obaga said.

President Kenyatta has emphasized that Africans must be culturally minded. Even his cabinet ministers have underlined his desire to retain and rejuvenate existing customs and cultures.

After a strict sampling of its population on whether the beauty contest was valid, Tanzania discovered that beauty contests did not conform with the customs of its people. In 1968, the state outlawed such contests while at the same time searching for more meaningful cultural outlets.

Many people here in Kenya feel that a beauty contest is not in line with the highly publicized political philosophy of retaining cultures and age-old customs. It is generally felt that beauty contests discriminate and can seriously injure the feelings of the less fortunate who cannot submit to the lavish requirements of the contest.

* * * *

In the next decade or so, most of the delicate customs of Kenya's tribes will have faded into oblivion. Most of Kenya's Black Africans and the Asian population are imitating the white man's tradition, simultaneously branding their own as primitive.

It is also believed that Africans are becoming "civilized" fast and that the present political systems—which are carbon copies of the French or English systems—cannot accommodate some of the customary African laws, which are thought to be controversial, contradictory and out of date.

Even members of the so-called pseudo-elite, who are attempting to revive or rejuvenate the traditional cultures, face challenges from such sources as their own wives. They have been reduced to hypocrisy. The children of some highly learned people, like lecturers and historians, do not even know a word in their parents' vernacular.

The children of the elite attend former white schools where English is the only language in which they can com-

(continued on page 48)

# Interview: Amir I. M. Nour

Amir I. M. Nour, Sudanese sculptor, writer, philosopher and critic, began his interview with AFRICA REPORT by taking off his shoes, a gesture that speaks of the man's informality and relaxed style. Talking to Nour can hardly be called an interview; he leans back and quietly expounds, and after a few moments one gets the feeling of chatting with him under the vast desert sky of the Sudan as the sun sets and night sounds creep into the air.

*Nour, who began winning broad recognition in the American art world when he took the 1968* African Arts/Arts d'Afrique *prize for graphic and plastic arts, while still a student at Yale, was in New York for the opening of a show at the African-American Institute. Nour's work—sculpture, drawings and lithographs—are currently on display at the Institute in a show entitled* African Art Today: Four Major Artists. *In the show, Nour's art is being displayed with that of other such notables as Ethiopia's Skunder Boghossian, Mozambique's Valente Malangatana and Nigeria's Twins Seven Seven.*

*In the AFRICA REPORT interview, Nour sounds several important notes. But first and foremost, he provides a sensitive picture of life in the emptiness of the desert, explaining the frightening impact of seemingly endless space. Nour, now 35 years old and resident in Chicago where he teaches at the Olive Harvey College of Chicago's City Colleges, was born and raised in the tiny Sudanese village of Shendi; he is still fascinated by the images of rural desert life—images that he says have left deep emotional marks on him.*

*Nour's descriptions of his education are perhaps typical of the vagaries of education in the developing world. He received a diploma in Fine Arts from the Khartoum School of Fine and Applied Art in 1957. He later went on to take a Bachelor of Fine Arts and Master of Fine Arts from Yale's School of Art and Architecture and to study at the Royal College of Art and the Slade School of Fine Art in London. Nour then is very much the child of a mixed marriage of Afro-Islamic culture and western education.*

*Contrary to what one might expect, Nour seems at ease with that part of himself that bears the stamp of western influence. Ultimately, he sees himself as a transitional man, the African artist who is no longer a village artisan but who still operates somewhere between his traditional origins and some new art form that has yet to be born. Presumably, this view influences Nour's teaching, which began with a stint (1957 to 1959) at the School of Fine and Applied Art in Khartoum. He headed the sculpture department at Khartoum from 1963 to 1965.*

*Although he compares his teaching in the Sudan to service in the military and does not seem to recall these years with any special fondness, Nour is obviously concerned about articulating standards of taste and sophistication among the people of developing countries. He contends that it is partly a prevalent lack of interest in the development of new tastes that made it imperative for him to leave the Sudan. He objects vigorously to the wholesale importation of the worst aesthetic standards of the west (symbolized by forbidding concrete high-rise apartments) and finds it paradoxical that he has had to come to the United States to pursue a sculpture that he believes springs directly from Afro-Islamic traditions.*

*For all of his convictions (no one will ever accuse Nour of failing to speak his mind), the Sudanese sculptor seems better characterized by the shrug than the salute, and his personal style mirrors the easy grace of his art. As he talks, his voice shifts over a broad range of tones that seem to correspond to the complexity of his interests and motivations. He begins in normal conversational tones, but at times his voice finds a high register that is nearly musical. His hands move in gestures of consternation, joy and explanation, but always with smoothness. In the end, he seems a man captivated by mysterious and romantic images rather than driven by the frenzy of internal conflict.*

*Nour was generally at ease during the interview but did tighten up somewhat when it came to taking pictures. It was almost as if he sensed there was more at stake with his visual rendering of himself than there was in conversation. Still, at one point, as photographer Bernard Pierre Wolff was snapping pictures, Nour seemed to lose his self-consciousness about being photographed. Bending over his prize-winning sculpture,* Ancestor, *Nour examined it carefully. He noted that the base of the piece—now in the collection of Mr. and Mrs. Sandy Zuckerman—had been solidly glued into a stand. "It used to swivel," he said. Then, as his hands ran over the reddish-brown bronze, it was as if he were alone in his studio. "You know, I really love this thing," he said, mostly to himself. The camera clicked and he looked up, seemingly surprised.*

*—RLD*

**AFRICA REPORT:** We'd like to try to get some perspective on how you see your work fitting into an African context. So we thought we'd begin by asking you why you are working here in the United States.

**NOUR:** That's a difficult question; I really can't answer that question. I taught in the art school at Khartoum [the School of Fine and Applied Art] for about five years and I think that's just about enough. I mean, if I was in the army I would have only done two years. Also I feel I am free and that as a free man I can live anywhere I like in this world. The thing I didn't like about the Sudan was that they really try to control your life—in terms of where you stay and what you do. That's one thing I just couldn't take, and that's why I left. This is the first time that I really feel free, and now I'm happy because I can do what I like to do. If I don't want to be in the United States I can leave.

But at the same time, I am trying to be fair. I did my share. Five years of teaching in the Sudan—that's enough. Besides, I quit because I wanted to give the younger generation a chance; I think a place like that needs to change its staff every two or three years. That way things keep moving. . . .

**AFRICA REPORT:** But you think a school of fine arts is the only place to develop artists in an African context?

**NOUR:** Yes. In the Sudan the art school is the only place that is actually established to teach the students art. I don't approve of that place, but that's a personal matter. What they're doing is westernizing.

When I was there, they weren't teaching, for example, the history of the Sudan, and they never tried to examine the crafts or the history of Africa or the history of Islamic culture. The Sudan is Afro-Islamic culturally; so they ought to give more time to these two cultures than to others. But they were teaching Giotto, the Renaissance, Leonardo and Michelangelo—things like that. And they were still insisting that students get

# on the Place of the African Artist



*Amir I. M. Nour with his sculpture,* Grazing at Shendi. *Photo by Bernard Pierre Wolff.*

**"You can't have a culture isolated from the rest of the world. Cultures have always developed by being fertilized by new elements from other cultures. I mean the whole modern art movement came about because some artists saw African art."**

models . . . in a country that wouldn't even approve of having nude models. I did that sort of routine when I was a student myself. And, well, I resent it now because when I look at it, I say, "Wow, what a waste of time." It could have been exciting.

**AFRICA REPORT:** But the art school is the only place in the Sudan that's teaching a nontraditional art. Where does that come into Afro-Islamic tradition?

**NOUR:** Well, you see, the problem is that the art school was started by the British. All education in the Sudan was established under the British system and it hasn't changed yet. I left for all these reasons. I happen to be in the United States just by chance, not planning. Just like I became an artist just by chance.

**AFRICA REPORT:** How do you become an artist just by chance?

**NOUR:** Well, you know, I never really meant to be an artist. When I was in elementary school, we never had art. When I went to intermediate school, we only had a small society for art, and the teacher had to select those he thought were talented. He selected me, but I never really went. But in the last year of intermediate school, we had this big day in school. As part of it, we made maps and portraits of historical figures. I won a prize for it. And that was the first time I started to realize I really might have talent.

**AFRICA REPORT:** So what happened next?

**NOUR:** Well, I applied to the technical secondary school and I concentrated in art. When I finished, I was going to go into architecture. A cousin of mine was selected to go to England to study architecture and I was influenced by the fact that he was beginning to understand and know architecture. Also I was very good in mathematics and science, and I thought mathematics, science and art skills would make for a good architect. That's how I tried to rationalize it, but . . . well . . . I guess I couldn't get to the university because I wasn't good in English. I only missed it by about four marks. In the Sudan at that time, they had about 3,000 applicants and they selected about 200 to 300 to go to the university. I think the percentage at that time was 65 in English. If you got over 65 per cent out of 100 in English and if you were good in other things and made a score of 80 or 90, then you may have been one of the 200 or 300 lucky ones chosen. At that time, I must say, I resented it but now I don't. (*laughing*) I'm happy not being an architect.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Maybe as a sculptor you are an architect in some ways.

**NOUR:** I think so, but architecture is something that can be very, very tough. You build houses for people to live in, and if they don't like them, it's a crime. Sometimes I see architects making apartments that are just like boxes. I really wouldn't like to be in that situation—to impose something. But in sculpture, you can do anything you like. It's architecture but it's sort of a fantasy, too. And that's what I like about it. I do it when I feel like I want to do it. If I don't want to do it, I don't. I just relax and do something else.

**AFRICA REPORT:** In Africa, is there an audience for the kind of nonrepresentational work you do? Are people exposed to it enough?

**NOUR:** Well, I can't really say. When I worked there I was doing a different art. People always wanted me to do portraits for them. I did a lot of work that people really liked and enjoyed, but it was sort of landscaping. When it came to my own ideas, it was really difficult. Anyway, people in the Sudan are not geared for art. And, of course, buying art has something to do with economics, and people there are not wealthy enough to buy art.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Is there any reaction against art as something that isn't of primary importance in a developing country?

**NOUR:** At one time, we had a symposium about how we could make Khartoum look beautiful. I was talking about how we could make sculpture that would reflect the type of culture we have. One of the guys who was in chemistry said to me, "Don't you know about the people who are dying from hunger in our homeland? How can you think about making sculpture?" So what can you do? And this was considered one of the cream of the country in terms of education and sophistication. If you want to test that, you can ask anybody you like from the Sudan around here: they're all educated. They are responsible and they are the people who are actually on top.

**AFRICA REPORT:** That's pretty pessimistic.

**NOUR:** Well, let me say something about that. In the Sudan in 1963 I was asked to make a statue of liberty by a wealthy man who was doing many projects for the government. He came to me through the art school and the head of the college. And this will also help answer your earlier question about why I'm not in the Sudan. This man came and said, "I want you to make a statue of justice." The statue we had at that time was of General Gordon, and when independence came they took the statue and gave it back to the British—which is sad. They should have kept it because you just can't cut off that part of your history and throw it away. It was part of that damn country. Besides, I would have kept it just for the metal alone. (*laugh*) But anyway, he asked for a statue of justice and I said, "Fine." I told him I would do some sketches and make some small maquettes and that I would let him choose. And he said, "No. No. I've got something all ready for you." He put his hand in his pocket and took out a clipping from a newspaper. It happened to be that at one

**"Art is very important for a developing country but the people who are responsible don't think so. The funny thing is most of them are trying to modernize themselves but in the wrong way."**

time a Sudanese newspaper picked up a picture from the London *Times*. It was the statue of justice on top of the courthouse at Old Bailey. In the picture a workman was sitting on the arm cleaning the statue. It was of a Greek goddess with a scale in one hand and a sword in the other. So I said, "But this is stealing; it's not Sudanese." And do you know what the head of the school said to me? "Oh, you can Sudanize it." (*laughing*) And that day I started to think about leaving.

**AFRICA REPORT:** That's quite a story.

**NOUR:** Yes, but that's not all. I wanted to test the knowledge of the man who brought the clipping. The statue was shown in silhouette in the clipping. It had been picked up from another newspaper and the printing in the Sudan wasn't that great; the whole thing was just like a dark image on the paper. Anyway, the man who showed me the clipping thought the guy who was sitting on the arm cleaning the statue was part of the statue itself. "Just do it like that," he said. And that's the type of market they have there. The sad thing is that some of the people in the art school go for that sort of thing because, I think, they need the money.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Well, *is* there any place for independent art in a developing country?

**NOUR:** I don't think so. But if you asked me whether it is necessary to have a place for art, I would say yes. Art is very important for a developing country. But the people who are responsible don't think so. The funny thing is most of them are trying to modernize themselves but in the wrong way. In my hometown, we used to have these carved beds made out of nice wood and ropes. Now if you go there, you won't find any wooden beds; all of them are metal. This is the type of thing; there's no selection. If they spent a little bit of money on art or supported it, then people would develop some sort of taste. I think it's important to have artists go abroad and learn about other cultures. When you really learn about another culture, you develop taste and you're able to select and reject. What we really need at this point are people who are sophisticated enough to select or reject things and to control what's happening. Besides, people are deserting tradition in most places just because they think things like plastics—plastic chairs, plastic tables, things like this—are fantastic. I nearly died when they built the new Khartoum Technical Institute and they spent about £10 million on it and it's all concrete. In that hot weather! Out of the 10 million, they could have given one million to a Sudanese architect to do some research in local materials. But they're going crazy about concrete. It's not just sad; it's a tragedy.

**AFRICA REPORT:** You mentioned before that you work when you feel like working. Is that literally true? Do you go for long periods without doing anything?

**NOUR:** Yes, I do.

**AFRICA REPORT:** How long?

**NOUR:** Oh, sometimes a year. Sometimes even two.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Do you feel uneasy during those times?

**NOUR:** Sometimes I feel uneasy, sometimes I don't. But when I'm not sculpting, I do watercolors, paintings or I draw. Sometimes I write—my ideas about art, or ideas in general. I'm doing some writing now, recalling how I started in art and how I developed. I can never be like the people who are in my hometown sitting under a tree carving; I departed from that. And now I'm a different person. That's a fact and I'm not going to deny it. I was born in an Afro-Islamic culture but I was educated in the west. I don't regret that. It's part of me. Thank God that I got to the stage where I know what I like about the west and what I don't like about it. But about the writing. In the Sudan, we don't have art critics; we don't have philosophers; we don't have anything to feed you. As an artist, you have to give and take. So most of the time you are really your own critic. So I don't mean that I stop working completely. I feel sick when I stop like that, you know. Maybe that's why I am developing cholesterol and high blood pressure!

**AFRICA REPORT:** More western influences. Anyway, we were talking about artists as writers yesterday. We had this terrible dread that you'd answer questions by saying, "Go look at my work. The answer is there."

**NOUR:** Well, that's one way. But you can get frustrated. Sometimes I get frustrated doing a scuplture. I can't always put everything I have in mind into a piece. What can I do about it? Maybe the best thing is to write it down.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Can you tell us a little about what inspires you?

**NOUR:** Well, let me go back to when I was a kid in my hometown on the river. On the other side of the river was an empty horizon—sand and desert. And in a way, that's inspiring to me now. I have certain feelings when I go there. Like when I'm on my own and I walk two or three miles from town. My God, you get overwhelmed by the space. And it's a scary type of feeling too because there's nothing there to enhance your mind. So you go back into yourself and you think about your physical existence. You tend to feel yourself more as an object—something existing physically. And that, sometimes, is very, very scary. When you live in a city—say like Manhattan—you run around and you do things and you don't actually get tired. But if you're in a small place and you don't have lots to do, you start to think, "Oh, wow, what am I doing?" You get bored. O.K. So I felt, "Gee, how beautiful it would be to break that monotonous horizon and

**"They weren't teaching the history of the Sudan and they never tried to examine the crafts or the history of Africa or the history of Islamic culture. The Sudan is Afro-Islamic so they ought to give more time to these two cultures than to others. But they were teaching Giotto, the Renaissance, Leonardo and Michelangelo."**

create sculpture that at least will enhance people's minds." That piece of sculpture down there [here Nour was referring to his famous *Grazing at Shendi*, which is part of the African-American Institute exhibit] comes from that kind of idea. As kids, we used to play outside and a man would come around collecting the goats and sheep, and he would take them out of town. Then at sunset he would let them run free and they would scatter all over the *place, rushing back to the farms.*

**AFRICA REPORT:** That was the image that inspired that piece?

**NOUR:** When you see them from the distance, you don't see details. You don't see them like animals; you just see dots on the space and that's a pure experience in how you see. You see a camel—an enormous thing—just like a tiny spot in an empty space. It looks like a box—a small cigarette box, way away from you. You don't see details. I tried to put that type of visual experience into metal to see how it worked. And, of course, there's a lot left for the viewer's mind. Some people see it differently, but that's how I got the idea. It was from that space.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Somewhere we read that you once said you see dome shapes everywhere. Is that overstated?

**NOUR:** Well, when you move away from my hometown and you look at it from the desert side, facing the river, you see that all the houses are square-shaped. Everything tends to be in straight lines. But there are two domes —one is the mosque and the other is a church. They break the straight line. And the third dome is the sun; at sunset, it becomes big and red and looks flat. I have always had these three domes in mind.

**AFRICA REPORT:** There's also a sketch in this current show—a pen-and-ink drawing of Moslems at prayer —that seems to use dome-like shapes too.

**NOUR:** Well, you see, my art has something to do with how I feel about things. The people at prayer have something to do with *Grazing at Shendi*. In the Moslem celebration that is equivalent to Christmas, people don't pray in the mosque. It's the only day when they pray outside, really. They all go out in the open space and they're all dressed in white. The kids are always dressed in new material with starch in it. They come from all directions to get together in this one area. *That's a very strange feeling, when* you see all these people coming to one place. And, of course, when I was a kid, I read in the Koran that one day people would rise from the dead. And that sight of everyone coming to pray had that kind of feeling to it. People were just popping out of the ground, coming toward this place. And then when they got there, they had to stand in straight lines. And then they prayed. And they bent down. And they were all in white. And when you saw them from a distance, it was just like white dots in space or just like the sheep coming down from the hills. It's the same visual idea. It used to overwhelm me.

**AFRICA REPORT:** You seem to view your village and your work at a distance.

**NOUR:** No. I don't see it at a distance when I'm there; I just become part of it. I don't even see it. That's natural. When you're in an environment, you become part of it. That goes back to what we were talking about earlier. Maybe I see more of the Sudan here than when I'm there because here I see it in perspective.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Are all the images that tend to preoccupy you from the Sudan? Do they change because you're here?

**NOUR:** Well, there are things that I love here. But when I come to do my art, I think it all has to do with my background and my childhood.

**AFRICA REPORT:** What about abstraction? Is that a western phenomenon?

**NOUR:** Abstracting is an international thing. You see it everywhere. Lots of traditional artists in Africa are very abstract. I don't like it when people come up to me and say, "Oh, this is very abstract, it's western." As if abstract thinking is only western! A human being can abstract. Abstract thinking is not just a western thing. Look at Islamic art; look at African *art. Islamic art became abstract* because of the religious taboos on worshipping idols and statues. So Islamic art was mostly geometrical shapes; it came out of calligraphy. And African art? There's plenty of abstraction in it, too. If a carver makes a carving of the spirit of his ancestor, how can he help but be abstract? Who is to say what a spirit looks like? *(laughs)* So if I do something abstract, I have every right to do it.

**AFRICA REPORT:** It does seem hard to understand how a school of fine art that teaches Giotto and the Renaissance as models can exist in an Islamic culture.

**NOUR:** *That's* what *I* was saying. They should really be teaching Islamic art and African art. And they should teach western art, too. Students should be exposed to all sorts of culture. But the main concentration should be in the Afro-Islamic tradition. You can't have a culture isolated from the rest of the world. Cultures have always developed by being fertilized by new elements from other cultures. I mean the whole modern art movement came about because some artists saw African art. This triggered all sorts of things. A new element came in and fertilized western culture and something new developed. I can't see Africa being isolated and creating a dynamic art by itself. It has been isolated for so many years. Now, I think, because of communication and because of people go-

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# african update

**Monitoring economic and political developments around the Continent**

## Lisbon Faces Long Negotiating Process in Africa As Dust From April's Coup Begins To Settle

As low-level fighting and high-level talks continue between Africans and Portuguese, observers of the potentially volatile Luso-African situation are straining to keep one eye on the overseas territories and the other on metropolitan Portugal, shifting their attention from one continent to the other like spectators at a tennis match.

Since the opening volley was served up by the Armed Forces Movement with its coup in Lisbon on April 25, most of the action has been gentlemanly, each player seemingly as aware of the stolid march of history as of the hectic pace of current events. Talks between Portuguese junta representatives and the African rebels have been characterized by politeness laced with caution. Even the Organization of African Unity, long a vociferous opponent of the Portuguese colonial presence on the African continent, urged its liberation-movement members to negotiate in an atmosphere of quiet determination, recommending that they consider a cease fire possibly even before hammering out an independence agreement that would bring to an end 500 years of Portuguese control in Africa.

The Portuguese people themselves have been the first to benefit from the decade-long struggles of the African nationalist movements, for it was disgust and fatigue from Portugal's untenable military position in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau that led the young majors and captains of the Armed Forces Movement to set in motion the machinery that ultimately unleashed their country from the ever-tightening collar of Salazar/Caetano control.

But while the Portuguese revel in their newfound freedom there have been, in the eyes of some, excesses that have led most recently to a military takeover of television and radio transmission. What began as ebullient reaction to a suddenly unstructured situation is now seen by some as anarchic behavior that may elicit increasingly repressive measures from General Antonio de Spinola's government.

It is not yet clear what impact such measures would have on the Portuguese negotiating position in Africa, nor is it clear what would happen if the military—supposedly increasingly unhappy with Spinola—were to stage another coup. Generally, though, the position of the young military officers in the Portuguese army is considered to be to the left of the Spinola call for a Lusitanian Federation.

Those who think the key to settlement lies in the mother country should realize, however, that it was Frelimo, the liberation movement

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## Nigeria Sets New Oil Participation Policy; Plan Is First To Fix Uniform Standards

Nigeria has moved to increase its share in its billion-dollar petroleum industry. A 55 per cent participation agreement with all foreign firms producing in Nigeria was announced May 19 and is retroactive to April 1. The across-the-board policy replaces a variety of agreements made on a bilateral basis between each company and Nigeria. (*Financial Times*, May 20, 1974.)

The first hint of the new policy came May 3 when the chairman of British Petroleum told BP shareholders in London that Anglo-Dutch Shell-BP had made the 55 per cent agreement with the Nigerians. (Nigeria *Daily Times*, May 19, 1974.) The agreement was also made in principle with the Italian Agip, the French Safrap (now Elf Nigeria Limited) and the American **Gulf** and **Mobil**. The Nigerian Government held no interest in either Gulf or Mobil until the May agreement. (Africa News, May 23, 1974.)

The Nigerians last year negotiated a participation agreement with Shell-BP under which the government was to get an immediate 35 per cent interest; the stake was to move up to 51 per cent by 1982. Nigeria already holds a 33½ per cent participation in Agip's operations and a 35 per cent interest in Elf's business. (Wall Street *Journal*, May 20, 1974; Nigeria *Daily Times*, May 19, 1974.)

By equalizing the participation agreements with all foreign companies, the West African nation has become the first of the world's major oil-producing states to create a complete formula for participation in such operations. (London *Times*, May 7, 1974.) In settling for 55 per cent, though, Nigeria seems to be settling for somewhat less than some other oil-rich nations. Early in May, Kuwait's parliament endorsed a participation accord that gave the Persian Gulf state a 60 per cent interest in a joint venture of Gulf and British Petroleum. Qatar has also taken a 60 per cent share of oil companies operating there. (Wall Street *Journal*, May 20, 1974.)

Observers in Nigeria believe the government's participation move was designed to bring the West African nation—the third-largest supplier of oil to the U.S., the world's fifth-largest producer in 1974—in line with other members of the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries. Although the minimum participation suggested by OPEC was 25 per cent, many members of the 12-member organization have acquired equity in foreign oil companies ranging from 51 per cent to outright nationalization. (Nigeria *Daily Times*, May 19, 1974.)

While nationalization—as in Libya—has been ruled out by Nigeria, the government evidently feels that earlier agreements—providing for a progressive 51 per cent shareholding—were outdated and unrealistic compared with more radical moves elsewhere. Oil currently accounts for 85 per cent of Nigeria's foreign-exchange earnings. (*Financial Times*, May 20, 1974.)

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## South Africa Wages Intensive Campaign To Improve Relations with the U.S.

- South Africa's Minister of Information Connie Mulder visits the U.S. in January and has a top-level meeting with Vice-President Gerald Ford.
- Hugo Biermann, South Africa's Chief of Defense, visits the U.S. in May and talks with officials at the Pentagon.

Given the fact that U.S. foreign policy encourages contact with South Africa, neither of these two visits seems especially striking. A recent series of press disclosures, however, has shown that the visits were part of an ongoing, low-profile campaign that has been intensely focused on improving South Africa's relations with the U.S.

And in a move not even the South Africans can agree on, Pretoria has been using the services of an American law firm to help it to win friends and influence policy in Washington.

The role of the American firm came to light recently with reports that South Africa in March hired a Washington law firm (one whose ties to the Republican party were reportedly "close") to represent South African positions to U.S. Government officials. According to Africa News, an American news service, the firm of Collier, Shannon, Rill and Edwards was receiving $50 per hour to handle a variety of matters for Pretoria.

Within Collier, Shannon, Rill and Edwards, Attorney Donald DeKieffer was singled out as the man most responsible for South African affairs. Also working on South African issues is Thomas Shannon, a partner in the firm.

The Johannesburg *Star* (May 28, 1974) describes the 28-year-old DeKieffer as a "political mercenary" who fights for those causes that pay him. The *Star* further notes that DeKieffer's firm is known among Washington insiders as having worked for U.S. sugar interests to help bring about a government ban on cyclamates, a sugar substitute.

Rebutting the *Star's* description of him, DeKieffer told **African Update,** "I suppose any lawyer can be charged as a mercenary. As a lawyer you defend all kinds of people. But I don't think I can be characterized as a political hired gun."

DeKieffer says he became involved with South Africa during the January visit of Information Minister Mulder. He says he was contacted about doing some work on the visit and subsequently made a trip to South Africa where his firm was retained on an ongoing basis. Upon returning from Pretoria, DeKieffer says, his firm registered with the Foreign Agents Office of the Department of Justice.

Although DeKieffer says his firm's agreement with South Africa postdated the Mulder visit, he is generally credited with having made at least some of the arrangements for the minister's trip—a trip that has come to be regarded in South African circles as something of a diplomatic coup. (Johannesburg *Star*, May 11, 1974.)

In reporting the agreement with the Washington lobbying firm, Johannesburg *Star* correspondent Ken Owen suggested there was a certain irony in DeKieffer's taking on the South African cause. (The firm is officially registered to lobby for a reassessment of American policy toward South Africa, with particular regard to energy, mutual security and investment.) "It does not seem to bother him to know that if he were a South African he would . . . have to live in exile because of his marriage to a Hawaiian of Japanese descent," Owen wrote.

DeKieffer calls this reference to his wife "a cheap shot." He says he plans to take his wife with him on an upcoming trip to South Africa and says he doesn't believe the South African Government would have retained his firm if they had any objections to his marriage. He characterizes South African treatment of both him and his wife as "exemplary." Under official South African designation by race, Japanese are considered "honorary whites."

DeKieffer has evidently employed the usual run of lobbying techniques in advocating South African positions. These techniques have included making political contributions, usually in the form of buying tickets to congressional fund-raising dinners. The *Star*, in checking Department of Justice records, found that last January DeKieffer contributed about $250 to Congressman Thomas E. Morgan (D.-Penn.). The *Star's* Ken Owen suggested that the political motivation for such a contribution was related to Morgan's chairmanship of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. In that post, the *Star* contended, Morgan exercises a good deal of control over Rep. Charles C. Diggs (D.-Mich.), a vocal and active critic of South Africa's apartheid government and head of the House Africa Subcommittee.

DeKieffer bridles at suggestions that his contributions are anything but completely legal and ethical. He says such contributions are entirely personal and that he receives no reimbursement from the South Africans and that such reimbursement would in fact be illegal.

"My personal contributions are mostly small. They are all reported and they total maybe 30 or 40, with none exceeding $300," he says.

The *Star* also disclosed (May 18, 1974) that DeKieffer contributed $100 to Congressman Gus Yatron (D.-Penn.), another member of the House Africa Subcommittee.

Disclosure of DeKieffer's Washington activities caused a considerable stir in Pretoria where the employment of U.S. lobbyists was seen by many as part of foreign policy efforts being conducted without the knowledge of South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs. DeKieffer evidently reports to the Department of Information.

The who's-in-charge-here controversy began to take shape with reports that the South African embassy in Washington was unaware of DeKieffer's political maneuvering, particularly with regard to his role in arranging the visit of Defense Chief Biermann.

DeKieffer was reportedly instrumental in enlisting White House support in Biermann's efforts to obtain a U.S. visa. Evidently, initial rumblings within the State Department were against issuing the visa on the ground that any Biermann visits with high-level U.S. military personnel could be in violation of the U.S. arms-embargo policy toward South Africa.

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### **Nigerian Oil** *continued from page 17*

Although Gulf and Mobil spokesmen acknowledged the agreement in principle to the Wall Street *Journal*, they both said details of compensation had to be worked out, plus provisions for management and supervision and the amount of oil accruing to the African nation that could be bought back by the producing companies.

Mobil, of late, has been producing about 245,000 barrels of oil daily in Nigeria. Gulf's Nigerian facility has been producing some 400,000 barrels a day.

Although there was no word on whether the 55 per cent participation agreement had been discussed with **Texaco's** operators in Nigeria, a June 6 report in the Wall Street *Journal* cited Nigerian newspaper reports that the Nigerian Government had asked the firm to cease oil production. According to the Lagos *Daily Express*, Texaco was reportedly pumping crude oil into a tanker anchored offshore and was shipping the oil directly abroad without first taking it ashore where the usual charges are levied.

According to the *Journal* account of an Associated Press dispatch from Lagos, the Nigerian capital, Nigerian Government officials confirmed the report, although Texaco officials in Lagos denied it. A New York spokesman for Texaco later confirmed to the *Journal* that production has been halted since May 8 under Nigerian Government orders. The oil company representative denied, however, that there was any question of illegal exportation of crude oil. Nigeria halted Texaco's production, he said, because "it believed Texaco's production was too low and they weren't willing to let us continue producing while it was that low."

The Lagos *Daily Express* had reported that the government said Texaco could resume production if it would boost its output to 50,000 barrels a day and if it would construct an onshore terminal.

Prior to the halt, Texaco's production was around 4,000 barrels a day, all from the offshore Pennington field. The Texaco spokesman also reported that Texaco's partner in the field, **Standard Oil Company of California,** whose production was also running at 4,000 barrels daily in Nigeria, had been ordered to cease production. (Wall Street *Journal*, June 7, 1974.)

DeKieffer says his firm did not make a political end run around the State Department to arrange the visa. He admits, however, that his office did make an "appeal" about the visa when they heard there was sentiment against it in the State Department.

The Johannesburg *Star* (May 18, 1974) readily acknowledged DeKieffer's role in arranging the trip. The *Star* said DeKieffer rounded up formidable congressional support from both senators and representatives.

"This led to General Brent Scowcroft, a top White House aide, taking the matter up with the office of Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger and, in short order, the Africa Bureau was told to give Admiral Biermann his visa," the *Star* noted.

Once in the U.S. Biermann met with J. William Middendorf, Acting Secretary of the Navy. Middendorf later told the press that the visit was "personal and informal" and that it was not official. (Washington *Post*, May 14, 1974.)

Although the flap over the DeKieffer story has died down in recent days, DeKieffer himself is still hard at work for South African interests. He says he is not at liberty to disclose the exact nature of his present work because the South Africans have asked him to be discreet. He did tell **African Update,** however, that he has not intensified his efforts since the Portuguese coup.

Many political observers believe the Biermann trip was specifically motivated by political events in Portugal, with the big South African objective being procurement of pledges of U.S. assistance in the event of a South African offensive against independent Portuguese territories.

"I don't know what Biermann did at the Pentagon," DeKieffer notes. "I wasn't at the meeting."

All in all, DeKieffer seems to feel that reassessment of U.S. policy toward South Africa is in order. He says the South Africans feel that the U.S. is reacting to internal conditions in South Africa that existed 15 years ago. He further notes that in his travels in South Africa he saw nothing that was so repugnant that he could not continue to represent the country.

"Sure, I didn't agree with everything I saw, but I don't have to go very far here [in the U.S.] to see things I disagree with. . . . South Africa is not a country of unalloyed venom as it has been portrayed in this country."

Meanwhile, South Africa's U.S. public relations campaign has taken a variety of other shapes. Additional lobbying work for the South Africans is being handled by the firm of Casey, Lane and Mittendorf. The New York firm is working to retain the sugar quota—an agreement that commits the U.S. to buy a set quantity of South African sugar at amounts well above world market prices. Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D.-Mass.) has introduced legislation to end the subsidy.

South Africa has also supplemented its lobbying work with a campaign in the U.S. press. The press campaign has involved advertisements placed by the South African Government in major newspapers. This advertising campaign was climaxed in late May when South African Minister of Information Mulder had an article on the Op-Ed Page of the New York *Times*. (Africa News, May 20, 1974.)

## Voting of 1974 Proxies Shows No Impact From Portuguese Coup or Other External Factors

Despite warnings of conflicting priorities and loss of interest, southern Africa proxy voting in 1974—the year of the energy crisis and the Portuguese coup—seems to have been unaffected by external factors. And at least one resolution—a repeater from last year asking **Continental Oil** to withdraw from Namibia—is qualified to go on to yet a third round, if proponents choose to refile for Proxy Season 1975.

The 1974 tally shows that enthusiasm for antimanagement voting is increasing slightly. Of the dozen southern Africa resolutions proposed this year, three received more than the three per cent total needed to carry a first-time resolution over to a second proxy season. **Phillips Petroleum's** Namibian-withdrawal resolution also topped three per cent. The Phillips resolution, however, was already in its second incarnation and failed to achieve the six per cent vote it needed to be repeated next year.

And all but three resolutions received at least two per cent, showing that the "Wall Street rule"—either vote with management or sell the stock—has probably been done irreparable harm. In fact, of about 90 shareholder resolutions filed with American corporations, on all issues, in 1974 almost half got a three per cent vote.

A 13th southern Africa resolution—raised with **Bethlehem Steel**—received a vote of only 0.005 per cent. The small vote resulted from the fact that only those shares held by the church group that raised the issue from the floor of the annual meeting were voted against management. The resolution—to withdraw from Mozambique—was not carried in the company's proxy material, having been filed too late.

Going into Proxy Season 1974, many observers wondered exactly how the energy crisis would affect voting on various oil-related resolutions. There seemed to be two possibilities. Some felt that shareholders would be loath to deter their company from exploring wherever necessary—*e.g.*, Namibia or Angola—to discover new energy sources. Others argued that resentment over long fuel lines and skyrocketing prices would create a vindictiveness that would make itself felt at proxy time.

When the oil-related votes were tallied, however, neither of these extreme reactions seemed manifest. The resolution that called on oil companies to cease exploration in Namibia had already in 1973 demonstrated a certain level of support among shareholders: 5.2 per cent for Continental Oil, 4.4 per cent for Phillips. In 1974, Conoco received a 7.2 per cent vote, Phillips got 4.9 per cent and a new target, the **Standard Oil Company of California,** got 4.3 per cent. The only departure from this pattern was the 1.36 per cent vote garnered by the **Getty Oil Company** resolution.

A resolution asking **Exxon Corporation** to withdraw from the Portuguese territory of Guinea-Bissau received a 2.15 per cent vote; in 1973 a similar resolution, asking the company not to begin exploration in another Portuguese territory, Angola, got 1.4 per cent of the vote—certainly not a large enough difference to indicate any concern either over the energy crisis or over strife in Portugal and its possible implications. The Exxon annual meeting was held May 16, almost a month after the *coup d'état* in Portugal.

Response to a resolution asking **Gulf Oil** to disclose information about an alleged oil find in Angola also showed no particular relation to shareholder feelings about the oil crisis. The resolution captured only 1.6 per cent of the vote. (Gulf's meeting was held two days before the Portuguese coup.)

None of the other management-opposed resolutions facing Gulf stockholders fared much better; the big winner was a 2.8 per cent vote for a resolution prohibiting the use of corporate funds for political purposes. For Gulf, as for many other companies, 1974 was quite vividly the year of Watergate, and Gulf shareholders found themselves faced with a total of 11 stockholder proxy questions, more than twice the number any company had to face either this year or last.

Another Portugal-related resolution asked Bethlehem Steel to withdraw from Mozambique. Management's response elicited the news that the company had not been able to send mineral-exploration people into the war-torn area, had no plans to do so and had refused to pay the Portuguese any taxes.

There were in 1974 two South Africa disclosure resolutions—a staple of the campaign run by the Church Project on Investments in Southern Africa—and two follow-ups on last year's disclosure proxies.

The request to **Union Carbide** for South African information received 2.78 per cent of the vote, approximately what disclosure votes have received from most other companies in the past. A similar request of **Engelhard Minerals** captured only 1.2 per cent of the vote; the only disclosure vote lower than that in 1973 was that of **First National City Bank.**

The resolutions that asked **IBM** and **General Electric** to establish committees to monitor their South African operations—follow-ups on

the 1973 disclosure resolutions—received just about what the 1973 questions did: 2.4 per cent for GE, compared with 2.3 per cent in 1973; 2.31 per cent for IBM, down slightly from 2.6 per cent in 1973.

*A resolution filed with* **Foote Mineral Company** *in a new—and* possibly future—tack asked the company to cease its "border area" investment plans. In South Africa, a border area is one that abuts an African "homeland," paying taxes and royalties to the white South African Government and, critics charge, using the homeland as a labor pool. The resolution received 2.5 per cent of the vote.

A controversial resolution filed with **Newmont Mining** in 1973 and finally included in 1974, requesting that the company establish equal opportunity as a worldwide principle, with special reference to Namibia, received 3.6 per cent of the vote.

The resolution had been omitted from 1973 proxy material after Newmont appealed to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC later reversed its decision, thus paving the way for this year's vote.

Although many observers in the press have been calling Proxy Season 1974 the Church Project's "most successful" year to date —citing the fact that more resolutions were filed and more than ever received over three per cent of the vote—Tim Smith, the executive director of the church coalition, is reluctant to measure success in terms of votes. The proxy process is still, according to Smith, an educational device to get exposure for the issues. "And we are just as proud of our bank victories and of our new campaign to oppose the importation of South African coal by The Southern Company." (Church groups in 1973-74 have rallied around the issue of U.S. banks' making money available to a consortium that lends money to South Africa.)

## Portugal and Africa *continued from page 17*

of Mozambique, that temporarily adjourned the settlement talks in Lusaka, Zambia in what the New York *Times* called a "victorious" mood. Frelimo that has pronounced its readiness to step up incursions in its usual areas of activity—entire regions now virtually unguarded by Portuguese troops. And it was Guinea-Bissau's nationalist movement, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde, that refused even to discuss a cease-fire without talking about independence terms.

Clearly, the superior strength of the African negotiating position stems in part from the fact that Portugal is still feeling its way toward a *position, attempting to reconcile disparate power blocs within the* country itself.

Also on the credit side of a quick and early independence—as early as 1975, many are saying—is the sentiment of the young officers who have put General Spinola in his present position and on whose loyalty it is said that his primacy rests. These war-weary military men seem to want an independence move that is quick and decisive.

Weighed against the pro-independence sentiment among the military are the pressures on the Portuguese junta from the white settler populations of Mozambique and, chiefly, Angola. These are the major vested interests in the status quo of Portuguese Africa. Europeans who transplanted themselves to carve new lives out of a colonial situation ripe with opportunity. Tensions between whites and Blacks in the territories *have risen since the coup, and in Angola's capital* Luanda there have already been racial encounters on the streets. Perhaps any Portuguese attempt to govern in Angola rests on whether the declared policy of "assimilation" has any meaning at all.

Any hint of a Rhodesia-type unilateral declaration of independence in Mozambique would give rise to an immediate armed response from Frelimo. Such a threat in Angola, however, could seriously hamper prospects for a Portuguese-African settlement; Angola's liberation forces are splintered, small and frequently at odds with one another.

A fourth variable relates back to metropolitan Portugal itself. How long can Portugal remain economically viable if it loses Angola—the chief source of its foreign exchange through its rich oil deposits and agricultural products, chiefly coffee? How can Portugal, itself a struggling, semi-industrialized nation with a largely peasant population, turn its entire economy around after having geared itself for 500 years to the colonial mercantile system?

It will take some time before the answers to all the questions begin to emerge and the exact shape of the future for Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola is discernible. One thing is already clear, though: the *coup irrevocably shattered the status quo; things will not be the same* again.

What follows is **African Update's** effort to capsulize conditions in the three African territories as we go to press.

**Mozambique: A Capsule View. Mozambique covers some 302,250 square miles of terrain along Africa's southeast coast; it is thought to represent a difficult negotiating area for the Portuguese because of the toughness and persistence of Mozambique's principal liberation movement, Frelimo (Liberation Front of Mozambique). The country's population of nearly eight million includes some 200,000 people of European origin—mostly Portuguese—and some 60,000 Asians. This relatively small number of settlers may be a plus in the *eventual negotiation of the territory's independence. The territory* is not considered a wealthy one; its main exports are agricultural, and the mineral resources identified up until the present are considered small. Complicating the independence picture is the fact that the Portuguese have geared the territory's economy toward an increasing dependence on South Africa. Nearly half the country's 800,000-man work force is employed in South Africa's mines; these workers are a major source of Mozambique's foreign exchange, as are South African tourists. In addition, the highly touted Cabora Bassa dam on the Zambezi River was designed with a view toward selling most of its power to South Africa. In general, however, a Portuguese withdrawal from Mozambique is considered to be relatively simple compared with Angola.**

Despite some encouraging and dramatic signs, few observers are looking for rapid progress in the negotiations between Portugal and Frelimo.

When the second round of talks resumes in Lusaka, Zambia in July, the jubilation that greeted the first contacts of June will probably have given way to an overall mood of grim determination. Clearly, Frelimo, in its steadfast refusal to discuss anything until the basic principle of independence is recognized, holds most of the trump cards.

Still, the pictures that flooded African newspapers of Portugal's Socialist Foreign Minister Mario Soares embracing Frelimo President Samora Machel remain a testimony to the apparent quickness with which a seemingly unalterable situation can shift. Five months ago, the suggestion that a Socialist Portuguese Government official would meet with a Frelimo freedom fighter in an independent African country would have seemed barely plausible.

The tone of the early Lusaka meetings, which were held with urging from Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda and Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere, was essentially friendly. Both sides left with expressions of hope for the end of colonialism in Mozambique. (Zambia *Daily Mail*, June 7, 1974.)

Soares' language at the meeting was considered by some a sign that there is flexibility in the Portuguese position—which to date seems to be a call for a referendum within a year. Before flying out of Lusaka on his return trip to Lisbon, Soares said he considered Portugal's main goals to be "peace and liquidation of colonialism."

If Soares left the talks somewhat less buoyed than the Frelimo contingent, it may be because the prime Portuguese objective —immediate cease-fire—was not achieved. Frelimo, it was made clear, had no interest in a cessation of hostilities unaccompanied by full independence.

(Frelimo's 10,000 troops are spread throughout Mozambique's north and northeast. They have managed—even at the present low level of fighting—to keep Portugal's 65,000-man force in a state of continuing uneasiness.) (New York *Times*, June 19, 1974.)

Perhaps the main accomplishment of the talks was summed up by Zambia's Kaunda who told the press shortly after it was announced that the meetings would take place, "For the first time, the Portuguese authorities have recognized that without Frelimo there can be no peace in Mozambique." (Washington *Post*, June 3, 1974.)

An earlier Portuguese recognition of Frelimo's legitimacy came in days following the coup when some 554 prisoners were freed from

Machava jail, the prison on the outskirts of Lourenço Marques that was noted for housing political offenders. The released prisoners were all Africans detained for nonviolent collaboration with Frelimo. The London *Times* (May 2, 1974) noted that some of the prisoners had been in jail for as many as 11 years and that some were accused of having done nothing other than listen to Frelimo radio broadcasts.

In the period just prior to the initiation of talks, Frelimo continued to wage successful guerrilla operations against Portuguese forces. Some of the country's white settler population, tense with the uncertainties of the new situation, formed an organization called Fico and vowed they would fight Frelimo forces on their own if necessary. (London *Times*, May 6, 1974.) Other small groups also began to spring up—some were multiracial; each advocated a course slightly different from the next group.

Generally, observers do not seem to feel that any of these groups will have any long-range impact. Their existence is seen more as a consequence of the uncertainties unleashed by the change of government in Lisbon than anything else.

The coup in Portugal, of course, set off other kinds of reactions within Mozambique. It was only after a week-long walkout that most of Mozambique's workers returned to their jobs in late May; the workers were promised a pay increase.

The strikes, however, were costly, involving both dock workers at the port of Lourenço Marques and laborers at the Cabora Bassa dam site. The walkout disrupted home industries and export activity to South Africa. Rhodesia was forced to cancel all its rail traffic with Mozambique during the labor action. (*Financial Times*, May 23, 1974.)

In visiting the territory, Portuguese Overseas Minister Antonio de Almeida Santos said the walkouts were so serious that it might be necessary to impose restrictions on the freedom to strike.

The overseas minister was only one of a parade of high-level Portuguese officials to visit Mozambique in the days following the coup. The No. 2 man in the Lisbon junta, General Francisco da Costa Gomes, toured the territory, noting in an interview that he was pessimistic about the possibility of Mozambique's remaining a Portuguese colony.

It is difficult to find anyone who does not believe that independence will come to Mozambique. As for now, the big question remains when the Portuguese will withdraw.

**Angola: A Capsule View. Prospects for Angolan independence seem more clouded than for any of the other Portuguese territories. Angola's population totals about six million; 450,000 of its people are white; 100,000 are *mesticos*. The country's relatively large white population (there are as many whites in Luanda, the capital, as there are in all of Mozambique) provides a base of support for a continued Portuguese presence that does not exist in either Guinea-Bissau or Mozambique. Even more of an inducement for the Portuguese to linger in Angola is the territory's wealth. Fourteen times the size of Portugal, Angola is a ripe field for international investment—including several American oil companies. Angola is also a rich coffee-producing territory and has a fair supply of mineral resources. Angola's gross national product is exceeded by those of only a handful of African nations; its earnings from exports total nearly $1 billion per year.**

**Further clouding the prospects for independence are divisions within Angola's rebel ranks. The territory has three major liberation movements. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) is the most important group, but it is split into pro-Soviet and pro-China factions. Other movements are the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA).**

As yet, there have been no negotiations between Angolan liberation movements and the Portuguese. Although talks between Lisbon and rebels in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique are stalled, the fact that contacts have been initiated at all has been interpreted by many as an encouraging sign. Since the April coup, Lisbon has been asking all three Angolan movements to lay down their arms and come to the bargaining table. (Africa News, May 30, 1974.)

So far, the three movements have taken different stands on the Portuguese offer. FNLA and UNITA have both indicated some willingness to talk with the Portuguese. Indeed, UNITA has already declared a cease-fire, but it is perhaps the least significant of the Angolan freedom movements, having only a reported 200 active members. (New York *Times*, June 18, 1974.)

FNLA leader Holden Roberto and his principal backer, Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko, have conferred with leaders of neighboring African countries on the Angolan situation, but so far FNLA has not reached any accord with the other movements or with the Portuguese.

It had been hoped that a recent Organization of African Unity conference in Mogadishu, Somalia would place the OAU in a leadership role with regard to the Angolan liberation movements. That meeting, however, ended without a strong initiative on the Angolan question and only mild statements about the Portuguese in general. The OAU seems determined to give the Portuguese "the widest possible latitude in ironing out her colonial problems." (New York *Times*, June 17, 1974.)

The OAU also appeared willing to advise liberation forces to accept a cease-fire, if it appeared that such acceptance would lead to a settlement.

Meanwhile, the widely recognized MPLA has consistently rejected cease-fire proposals, emphasizing that it wants total independence prior to any negotiations.

On a fact-finding mission to Angola shortly after the coup, Portuguese junta member General Francisco da Costa Gomes noted that he felt Angola, which he claimed was making strides toward racial harmony, might indeed remain part of a proposed Portuguese federation. Events since the coup, however, cast doubt on some of Gomes' contentions.

In a bar in Luanda in mid-June, a Black Angolan cried out, "Viva Spinola." A white Angolan, overhearing the remark, pulled out a pistol and shot the Black man. (*Christian Science Monitor*, June 17, 1974.) And in late May, clashes between Blacks and whites at demonstrations led to the banning of all street demonstrations. (New York *Times*, May 28, 1974.)

According to the *Christian Science Monitor*, the white Angolans' violent reaction indicates the strength with which a large portion of the white population opposes giving control to Black Africans.

Even the Portuguese plan for an Angolan referendum within a year seems to be the subject of grave doubts. In early June, Lieut. General Joaquim Antonio Franco Pinheiro, commander of the Portuguese forces in Angola, told reporters it would be "a little difficult" to create the conditions (an end to fighting) for a referendum on the territory's future. (New York *Times*, June 2, 1974.)

Still, a unification of liberation forces could alter the picture dramatically. In late May, representatives of all three groups met in Lusaka to talk about unity. (Zambia *Daily Mail*, May 27, 1974.) Perhaps the key to Angola's future lies in the ability of these groups to go beyond the talking stage.

**Guinea-Bissau: A Capsule View. Tiny Guinea-Bissau may represent Portugal's easiest negotiating problem. First, the territory has already declared its independence, a move that has been recognized by some 80 countries. Also, Guinea-Bissau is not wealthy, containing mostly small processing industries for rice, coconuts and groundnuts; oil exploration to date has not turned up any major deposits. The Portuguese have already held talks with the African Party for the Liberation of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), and although the discussions were suspended in mid-June, the outlook for independence is considered good. The Portuguese seem to regard the timing of a settlement with Guinea-Bissau as crucial, feeling that an early independence agreement here could upset Portugal's negotiating tactics in the rest of its colonies.**

A week of talks in London at the end of May and a day's discussions in Algiers in mid-June failed to produce a cease-fire agreement between Lisbon and the PAIGC. Because PAIGC has been able to gain

fairly wide recognition of its sovereignty, the liberation movement says it will not relinquish at the bargaining table what it has already won in world diplomacy. (Africa News, June 20, 1974.)

Although PAIGC officials have said that they would like to maintain friendly relations with Portugal, they insist they have no interest in continuing any political bonds. (*Africa*, June 1974.) And PAIGC representative Pedro Pires left the Algiers talks stating that any future discussions would be held in Guinea-Bissau itself.

To strengthen their claims to sovereignty, PAIGC has carried out extensive programs to establish a viable political structure with elected officials and a People's National Assembly. (*Ifco News*, June 11, 1974.) The liberation movement has also built six hospitals, more than 100 dispensaries and health centers and 200 primary schools in liberated areas, reported to be about four-fifths of the country's 13,600 square miles. (*Africa*, June 1974.)

A further stumbling block in the talks between Lisbon and PAIGC is the status of Cape Verde, tiny islands several hundred miles off the coast of Senegal. Portugal is anxious to maintain control of the islands for strategic air and telecommunications links. (London *Times*, May 25, 1974.)

PAIGC's position on Cape Verde may be more flexible than its position on Guinea-Bissau. According to *Le Monde* (June 3, 1974), PAIGC seems willing to negotiate a referendum for Cape Verde, while continuing efforts to gain support on the islands. At least some of the populace of Cape Verde seems uncertain about casting its lot with Guinea-Bissau, preferring to remain under Portugal's protective sphere. (*West Africa*, May 27, 1974.)

Meanwhile, PAIGC's military position seems to be steadily gaining strength. Prior to the May talks in London, PAIGC guerrillas bombarded the capital city of Bissau—a Portuguese enclave. It has also been reported that Portugal's African commandos, the core of Lisbon's counterinsurgency efforts, are now openly supporting the PAIGC. (Africa News, June 2, 1974.)

Senegal recently denied reports that two ships of African mercenaries were heading for Guinea-Bissau from Dakar. The PAIGC has warned Lisbon not to let the mercenaries land in Bissau and join forces with Portuguese troops.

One report says the mercenaries may be former members of a nationalist group that broke away from PAIGC in 1959. PAIGC has accused Senegal of directing their operations. But Senegalese officials, who have been actively promoting independence discussions between Portugal and Guinea-Bissau, say they have nothing to do with the rival nationalist group. (Africa News, June 12, 1974.)

## Western Africa

### Chad

● In the latest confrontation in a 14-year conflict between Chad's ruling Christian southern people and its defiant Muslim north, rebels *overran a northern outpost and abducted two Chadians and four Europeans*. The Chadians and one European woman were evidently killed in the struggle.

The remaining three Europeans—a male German physician, a female French archaeologist and a male French technical-assistance expert—are being held hostage, to be exchanged, the rebels say, for 30 northern political prisoners being held by the government of President Ngartat Tombalbaye. (*Christian Science Monitor*, May 14, 1974.)

The struggle between the Christian and animist south and the Muslim north began as early as independence, in 1960; by 1967-68 the internal situation had deteriorated to such a degree that President Tombalbaye called in French troops to control the northern outposts. The Chadian conflict is almost the mirror image of the recent situation in the Sudan, Chad's neighbor to the east, where southern Sudanese Christians were rebelling against the Muslim north until two years ago.

The rebels of the Chad's north—FROLINAT—are known to have the support of various Arab states, including Libya, the Sudan and Algeria. FROLINAT's chief, Dr. Abba Siddick, has his headquarters in Algiers. (*Moniteur Africain*, May 2, 1974.)

● With the assistance of the International Development Association (the soft-loan arm of the World Bank), the African Development Fund (an affiliate of the African Development Bank) and technical experts from Taiwan, some 1,900 families in southeast Chad will benefit from *a rice irrigation project*.

Rice growing is already being undertaken by families in the Satégui-Déressia plain, and financing will be directed at improving conditions. IDA financing comes to $7.5 million, interest-free; the ADF contribution is equivalent to a little more than $4 million.

Taiwan, which will provide the rice-growing expertise, is still a member of the World Bank, which is a body of the United Nations.

### Ghana

● Ghana's billion-dollar debt, long a source of tension between the West African nation and its many creditors, came under intensive scrutiny again as the military-dominated government of Colonel I.K. Acheampong moved to reschedule additional portions of what the country owes.

In early May, the Ghana Government announced it had negotiated with its creditors a rescheduling of medium-term debts valued at some $294 billion. (*Financial Times*, May 1, 1974.)

The agreement followed the line taken by Acheampong in 1972 shortly after his government came to power and repudiated a sizable *portion of Ghana's debt—debt that had exceeded the country's ability* to pay by as early as 1966. (*West Africa*, April 1, 1974.)

According to the new agreement, Ghana will pay no debts that have already been repudiated nor will it honor any debts that are repudiated in the future. Ghana did agree, however, that all payments due after February 1, 1972 would be paid over 28 years at 2½ per cent interest. Payments are scheduled to begin after a 10-year grace period.

The United States, although only a small creditor to Ghana, is particularly concerned about the Ghanaian attitude toward international debts. (*Africa Confidential*, May 3, 1974.) As a major creditor to poor nations, the U.S. is not anxious to appear to be endorsing the principle of debt repudiation.

By now, nearly all observers agree that there are substantial grounds for repudiation of some of Ghana's debt. Most of this debt is in the form of supplier credits, and it has been estimated that many of the contracts that the newly independent Ghana entered into resulted in only 70 to 75 per cent value. The many problems associated with these contracts, which covered a variety of equipment purchases and construction projects, ranged from the sale of obsolete equipment to overpricing.

Although many of the supplier-extended credits were backed by government guarantees (Britain, the biggest creditor to Ghana, has already repaid most of the British firms in question) the issue continues as a hot one.

And for Acheampong, who has used the debt issue as a propaganda *weapon inside his own country, debt has important domestic as well as* international implications. When the National Redemption Council (the Acheampong-led military group) took over in January 1972, Ghana was preoccupied with economic problems. The NRC pledge to restore Ghana's economic viability in no small way depends on how successful Acheampong is in handling the debt issue.

Meanwhile, other press reports (*New Nigerian*, April 15, 1974) indicate that in some foreign quarters the NRC's monetary policies are winning favor. Evidently impressed by Ghana's economic policies since the ousting of the Busia regime in 1972, the Soviet Union has been viewing relations with Ghana with increasing cordiality as the two countries begin a resumption of trade and economic ties that were all but severed after the 1966 ouster of Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah. In recent months there have been allegations (London *Times*, February

17, 1974) that Soviet backing helped to put the Acheampong regime in power.

● **Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.** plans to participate in the $160-million development of a bauxite and chemical project in Ghana.

The company's plan was disclosed when Kaiser signed, along with the Bauxite Aluminum Study Company, a letter of intent with the Ghanaian Government. (*West Africa*, May 13, 1974.) The Bauxite Aluminum Study Company is registered in Ghana and has as shareholders Kaiser and a Japanese firm.

The project is expected to have an initial annual capacity of some 600,000 tons of aluminum processed from bauxite. Half of the project's output is slated for use in Ghana.

● According to the *New Nigerian* (April 15, 1974), Ghana's student population is at odds with the ruling National Redemption Council over alleged army brutality.

According to press reports, all three of Ghana's universities closed after widespread demonstrations in March. The closings prompted formation of a committee to investigate student complaints.

The demonstrations were triggered by reports from a student at the University of Ghana in Legon about a beating he said he sustained while visiting the Volta region of southeastern Ghana. The student reportedly asked a policeman to stop soldiers from drilling a group of civilians. According to the student, the soldiers heard his remark and beat him.

## Guinea-Conakry

● Guinea recently announced a 54 per cent increase in the price of aluminum oxide. The price jump from $60 to $92.50 per ton will mean a substantial increase from current annual revenues of about $7.5 million.

In order to reap more benefits from the price increase, the Guinean Government plans to exercise greater control over Friguia, the company that produces nearly 660,000 tons of the mineral each year.

Under the new arrangement, the government plans to allocate funds to Friguia for production costs rather than allow the company to retain two-thirds of its profits. Friguia will also be required to turn over an additional $2.4 million to the government as it continues the semi-nationalization.

President Ahmed Sekou Toure, who announced his government's plans to increase control of the company that produces half of Guinea's exports, noted that production of aluminum oxide has increased nine per cent since more Africans have been added to the staff. Of 2,000 Friguia employees, 34 are expatriates.

Meanwhile, Guinea has agreed to split the cost of developing its bauxite industry with Romania. Romania has offered $80 million worth of credit to Guinea for a share of the bauxite industry, as well as financial aid for a hydroelectric project, a railroad and a port to serve the mining industry.

Romania has also expressed interest in a joint project to mine iron about 300 miles south of Conakry in the mountains near Liberia. (*Afrique-Asie*, April 1, 1974.)

## Ivory Coast

● Francophone Africa can no longer be considered the "private preserve" of French investors, according to Senegalese business weekly *Le Moniteur Africain*. (May 16, 1974.)

Citing the diminishing percentage of French investment in the total foreign investment picture of Senegal and Ivory Coast, *Moniteur Africain* editor Kafoumba Fadiga says the trend "is a happy one from the African point of view. In effect, our real interests, in the long run, demand that we open our borders equally from now on to all commercial channels."

Although the former French colonies are traditionally thought to be locked into an economic dependence on the former mother country while presenting a closed door to investment from other countries, Senegalese President Léopold Sédar Senghor, addressing a meeting of the Overseas Journalists Association of Paris, said the picture was changing. Senghor told the journalists that "French investments in Africa are relatively more and more feeble and repatriated profits greater and greater."

In Senegal, from 1960 to 1971, 53 per cent of total investment was from sources outside France and Senegal; French capital investment diminished in this period to represent only 26 per cent of Senegal's foreign investment. In 1963, the Franc Zone—essentially France—absorbed 56 per cent of Ivorian exports, compared to 37 per cent in 1973. (*Le Moniteur Africain*, May 16, 1974.)

As francophone nations court other markets for their exports, however, they discover that the advantages that make Ivory Coast fruit, for example, so attractive to the French market do not exist for other countries. When the Ivory Coast foreign trade center representative urged businessmen at the British Importers' Confederation to import Ivorian fresh produce he was confronted by a major English complaint. British importers do not have the advantage of the heavily subsidized direct link between Abidjan, the Ivory Coast capital, and Paris that French importers enjoy. Freight to Britain is subjected to transshipment delays in Europe, and importers have to pay extra airfreight charges between Paris or any other European capital and London.

Ivorians have told the British they will be glad to establish a direct Abidjan-London link; but the British businessmen say that unless they get preferential airfreight rates like the French they do not see any reason to develop a substantial trade with Ivory Coast and will continue to concentrate on their present suppliers of fresh fruit—South Africa, Israel and Kenya.

At least one distinguished French journalist, Danielle Hunnebelle, predicts, however, that avocados from Ivory Coast will have replaced those from Israel on the European market in five years' time. (*Jeune Afrique*, May 11, 1974.)

In spite of a recent franc devaluation that makes commercial deals between Franc Zone partners more profitable, and despite France's continued absorption of 63 per cent of Senegal's exports, President Senghor has renegotiated the terms under which Senegal and France will extend their alliance.

Although France is likely to remain the former colony's main trading partner, there are other signs that the preferential relationship is winding down: the French military presence, prominent in Senegal since the 18th century, is likely to be cut back, though not entirely eliminated; French citizens will no longer be allowed to establish themselves freely in Senegal, and vice versa, as Africanization covers more and more jobs; and the number of French residents—half now what it was at independence—is expected to continue to drop as Senegalese take over more of the education sector. (*To the Point International*, April 20, 1974.)

## Liberia

● In early May, Liberia's President William Tolbert defended his proposal to amend the country's constitution to allow for presidential terms of eight years.

The proposal, according to the Liberia *Star* (May 1, 1974), has drawn criticism from those who believe the eight-year term is too long. Tolbert, in requesting the longer term, argued that two four-year terms would be inadequate because the president would have to spend at least half of his first term running for office.

The *Daily Times*, a Nigerian paper, suggested that Tolbert's proposal could best be understood in light of the fact that the political climate in Liberia is not presently favorable for the president. (April 24, 1974.)

● **Page Communications Engineers,** an American firm, has signed a three-year contract for a communications project that AID is financing with a $8-million loan.

The project calls for establishment of telecommunications links

between Monrovia, Harper Port and Tabou in the Ivory Coast. (Liberia *Star*, May 10, 1970.)

## Mali/Mauritania

● **Exxon Corporation** and **Texaco Inc.** have said they will participate jointly in oil and gas exploration in Mali and Mauritania through an agreement that has allowed Esso Exploration & Production Inc. to acquire a 50 per cent interest in an exploration permit that Texaco's subsidiary has held since October 1970 in Mali and since December 1971 in Mauritania.

The work will be done in the Taoudeni Basin—an area that extends from the eastern section of Mauritania to the northwestern sector of Mali. The permit covers almost 100,000 square miles in Mali and 38,600 square miles in Mauritania.

Texaco has conducted extensive geophysical work in the area and says additional exploration operations will be carried out jointly with the Exxon unit. (Wall Street *Journal*, May 2, 1974; *Moniteur Africain*, May 16, 1974.)

● Although no date has yet been announced for a return to civilian rule, Malians voted June 2 on a constitution that will provide for an elected president, a national legislature, a supreme court and a single national political party. (Africa News, May 9, 1974.)

The constitution was written by the government of Colonel Moussa Traore, whose regime has ruled the drought-stricken West African nation since a *coup d'etat* in November 1968. Following the unveiling of the constitution on April 25, the Traore government campaigned throughout Mali's six regions to familiarize citizens—many isolated from the central government by their nomadic way of life or by illiteracy—with the provisions of the proposed constitution.

The preamble of the new constitution affirms the "rights and liberties" of people, especially the right to unionize and the right to strike. (*Afrique Nouvelle*, May 7, 1974.)

Urging Malians to vote in favor of the new constitution, Colonel Traore told the nation, "To vote 'yes' is to vote for democracy, that is to say, the sovereignty of the people. It is to vote for the reinforcement of the expression of national unity."

Acknowledging that the 1960 constitution, created at the time of independence, had in theory guaranteed several political parties and had placed supremacy in the parliament, Colonel Traore said in fact all decisions had been made by the ruling party, which soon became a private club. The new party will be "democratic, open and single," he said. (*Africa Confidential*, May 3, 1974.)

It is not known whether Colonel Traore will be an eventual candidate for the presidency.

## *Niger*

● The 11-man Supreme Military Council now governing Niger has ordered French troops to leave the country without delay saying their presence is a threat to Niger's sovereignty. (*Afrique Nouvelle*, May 28, 1974.)

After the April 15 coup that toppled Hamani Diori's government, military leaders said they would review defense agreements signed in 1960 between France and Niger. Some observers believe Niger's officers were miffed at Diori for not trusting the skills of his own soldiers.

Besides the 270 French troops in Niger, Diori's personal bodyguard was a Frenchman. Shortly before the coup Diori also signed a mutual defense pact with Libya. (*Africa Confidential*, April 19, 1974.)

Minister of Foreign Affairs Moumouni Djermakoye Adamou explained the decision to get rid of the French soldiers by saying that their presence presupposed the existence of an enemy. The foreign minister declared that Niger has no intention of attacking any of its neighbors and does not fear any outside enemy attack. (*Afrique Nouvelle*, May 28, 1974.)

The foreign minister added, however, that cooperation between France and Niger would continue in other ways. A mission headed by Sani Souna Siddo, vice-president of the Supreme Military Council and minister of mines and the interior, met with representatives of the new French Government in mid-May to reopen negotiations for development of Niger's uranium industry. (*Afrique Nouvelle*, May 21, 1974.)

Uranium accounts for about half of Niger's export earnings. Niger has the world's fifth-largest uranium deposits, estimated at about 40,000 tons. (*Africa*, June 1974.)

Observers have hinted that France may have played a part in the recent coup because of French annoyance at Diori's efforts to lure other countries into Niger's uranium industry. In addition, France may have been disturbed by the Nigerien-Libyan defense pact which reportedly included a clause calling for Libya to protect Niger's interests in uranium mines near the Libyan border. (Africa News, April 25, 1974.)

Amid continued speculation about the causes of last month's coup, coup leaders have cited only the drastic effects of prolonged drought.

Lieut. Colonel Seyni Kountche, new Head of State and Minister of Development, plans to set up a commission to probe misuse of public funds in all sectors of the country's economy, but particularly in areas relating to drought relief. According to Colonel Kountche, no accurate records were kept of relief supplies coming into the country while Diori was in power. (*Africa Confidential*, May 17, 1974.)

In response to questions from Nigerian journalists about the fate of former President Diori, Kountche offered assurances that "all ex-ministers and other officials are in good condition and are being well treated." (Nigerian *Daily Times*, April 24, 1974.)

Reports vary about how many people were actually killed in last month's coup. A Nigerian source says 100 people died during an hour of fighting. (*Financial Times*, April 26, 1974.) The Nigeriens themselves report that 10 people died resisting the takeover, including Mme. Hamani Diori. Coup leaders expressed regret that Mme. Diori was killed but said she shot at them first. (*Afrique Nouvelle*, April 30, 1974.)

## Nigeria

● Nigeria recently announced provisional results of last year's census. According to the figures, which Head of State General Yakubu Gowon emphasized would be rechecked in post-census surveys, nearly 80 million people now live in Nigeria, an increase of about 24 million people over the last census in 1963.

With the survey, Nigeria continued as the most populous nation in Africa and moved from 11th to eighth among the world's most populous countries.

The figures support General Gowon's claims that despite estimated 1974-75 oil revenues of more than $12 billion, Nigeria is still a poor country. World Bank statistics compiled in 1971 show that Nigeria, with a per-capita income of $140 even then had fallen behind its tiny neighbor Togo, with a population of about two million and a per-capita income of $150.

Results of the 1973 census are causing headaches for Nigeria's budgetary planners who distribute funds according to population size and derivation of revenue. The main oil-producing states, the Mid-West and Rivers states, claim their high revenue should earn them a bigger chunk of government funds than poorer states in the north will get.

The northern states, however, are demanding a larger portion of the federal budget on the basis of population figures. According to 1973 statistics, the Northeastern and Kano states nearly doubled in size since the last census in 1963. Observers wonder where all these people came from, although they point out that many refugees have fled to Nigeria from drought-stricken areas of Niger. (*West Africa*, May 20, 1974; *Africa Confidential*, May 17, 1974.) It has also been contended that the 1963 census, due to widespread irregularities, greatly underestimated the number of northerners.

Nigerians are also using census figures to urge the government to examine possibilities for the formation of new states. The military has promised to turn over government reins to civilians in 1976. State

representation in an elected parliament will depend upon accurate population figures and fixed state boundaries.

General Gowon recently said that toward the end of military rule there would be a Constituent Assembly set up to consider a new constitution and to study state boundaries. He warned against destroying the essence of the nation by creating states on the basis of ethnicity. (Nigeria *Daily Times*, May 3, 1974.)

Some observers believe that with all the discussion of civilian rule being restored in 1976, little attention is being given to exactly how the new government will work. These observers fear a political and economic crisis unless the present government determines state boundaries and decides on a new system for allocation of federal funds before a Constituent Assembly is established. (*African Development*, April 1974; *West Africa*, May 13, 1974.)

● General Yakubu Gowon, Nigerian Head of State and Chairman of the Organization of African Unity, made an official visit to the Soviet Union at the end of May. It was Gowon's first visit to a Communist country since he came to power in 1966.

General Gowon reportedly urged the Russians to increase their supply of arms to liberation movements in southern Africa. He also thanked the Russians for their aid to the federal government during Nigeria's civil war and called for continuing good relations between the two countries. (Africa News, May 30, 1974.)

The Soviet Union is currently helping Nigeria to look for iron-ore deposits to decide where to develop a steel industry. Plans for a one-to two-million-ton capacity steel complex were included in Nigeria's 1970-74 Development Plan but have been delayed during extensive feasibility studies. (Nigerian *Daily Times*, May 18, 1974.)

The Soviet Union is also conducting offshore seismic studies and exploring for oil with the Nigerian National Oil Corporation. In the area of educational development, Gowon expressed gratitude for the thousands of scholarships Nigerian students have received for study in Russian technical-training institutes and universities. (*African Development*, May 1974.)

● About 10,000 dockworkers demanded a 50 per cent wage increase during a week-long strike in Lagos in May. The government at first reacted harshly, reportedly using dogs and tear gas to break up picketing and demonstrating.

The strike was considered illegal because Nigeria is currently under a wage freeze to try to control mounting inflation. But dockworkers returned to work only after receiving assurances that wage negotiations would begin. (Africa News, May 27, 1974.)

● The Federal Military Government has decided to set up motor vehicle plants in Ibadan, Enugu and Kano. Selection of the foreign industrial concerns that will complete the projects have been narrowed from the 21 that originally applied to seven that have been invited for further negotiations.

Volkswagen and Peugeot assembly plants are already under construction in Lagos and Kaduna. (*New Nigerian*, May 17, 1974.)

● Rocketing rent costs in Lagos make even the dramatic rise in U.S. housing costs seem more tolerable. Many companies that send employees overseas include more than $30,000 for each employee's yearly rent. An average three-bedroom accommodation in areas where most expatriates prefer to live costs about $20,000 per year, payable five years in advance. (*African Development*, May 1974.)

● The Nigerian Government is proposing to make primary education job-oriented in order to give vocational and technical courses prominence in the nation's school system.

Speaking to principals of Nigeria's technical trade schools, the Federal Commissioner for Education, Chief A. Y. Eke, said such emphasis would "prepare students for admission to trade centers." New national policy on education would also establish uniform requirements for entrance to the country's trade schools, he added. (Nigeria *Daily Sketch*, May 23, 1974.)

# Eastern Africa

## Ethiopia

● Deep and widespread discontent with Ethiopia's social system continued into July with a steady stream of developments in nearly every problem area the country faces.

Internal divisions within Ethiopia surfaced dramatically in June with press reports of the kidnaping of an American nurse by guerrilla forces. According to Africa News (June 6, 1974) the Eritrean Liberation Front—the guerrilla movement struggling for independence in the northern province of Eritrea—denied any responsibility for the kidnaping or for the killing of a Dutch nurse at a mission hospital in northern Ethiopia. The American woman, Deborah Dortzbach, pregnant and reportedly in delicate condition, was released in late June.

*Earlier press reports had blamed the Eritrean Liberation Front for the* incident, with the New York *Times* reporting that the U.S. consulate in Asmara had received three ransom notes demanding medical supplies in exchange for the hostage. Two of the notes, it was reported, were signed by the kidnap victim; the third was signed by the ELF.

The ELF does admit to holding three American and two Canadian employees of the **Tenneco** oil company. They say they want to exchange the oil company employees, abducted two months ago, for political prisoners held by the Ethiopian Government.

The Ethiopian Government blames the incident involving the two nurses on the ELF.

Meanwhile, dissatisfaction with Ethiopia's economy was manifested by a short strike of telecommunications workers. The strike was *halted after about nine hours when the army intervened, reportedly* dragging strikers from their homes and forcing them back to work at gunpoint. The BBC reported in early May that the strikers were being kept on the job by soldiers. (Africa News, May 6, 1974.)

The strikers were demanding higher pay to match raises granted other Ethiopian workers since unrest erupted in the country nearly five months ago.

Amid the turmoil, the government of Premier Endalkachew Makonnen attempted to establish its authority but was having little luck in attaining a position of true control.

The resignation of Foreign Minister Menassie Haile in early May was considered a blow to that authority. (New York *Times*, May 9, 1974.) It was reported that Dr. Menassie left the cabinet as a result of *disagreement with the premier*.

As a final note, even Ethiopia's drought problem—a problem that might have been viewed in purely humanitarian terms—has come to represent a heated political issue, with some sources contending that government negligence with regard to the drought is symptomatic of all of the 3,000-year-old kingdom's ills.

Premier Endalkachew Makonnen recently allowed the arrest of 25 officials of the former government by the armed forces. Those arrested face investigation on charges of enriching themselves at public expense. Involved are the former premier and the ministers of justice, police and commerce.

In sanctioning the arrests, the premier yielded to longstanding pressure from the military. In return the head of the Armed Forces Coordinating Council has firmly backed a government appeal for order and a return to work by strikers.

In early May, army units quelled the street riots in Addis Ababa and most businesses are now reportedly open. Meanwhile the drought continues to afflict several Ethiopian provinces. According to the Manchester *Guardian*, hundreds of tons of relief grain are rotting due to inaction by local Ethiopian officials. (Africa News, May 2, 1974.)

● Although political analysts disagree as to the precise authority of Emperor Haile Selassie in the shifting power alignments that are emerging in Ethiopia, nearly everyone concedes that the Emperor's person is the only force that can bring about any alliance between the country's many interest groups.

In a move to solidify his role as a stabilizing force, the Emperor in early April appointed his grandson, Prince Zere Yakob, as acting

crown prince and heir to the throne. (*Africa Confidential*, April 14, 1974.)

It is expected that the Ethiopian Constitutional Congress—now in session—will preserve some form of monarchy.

## Kenya

● Citing an acute shortage of foodstuffs, the Kenyan Government has forbidden any companies or individuals from exporting maize, rice and maizemeal. Where surpluses become available, grain maize and rice will continue to be sold outside the country, but such transactions will be handled by the Kenya Maize and Produce Board, acting as sole agent of the Kenya Government.

Previously the Kenya board was responsible only for the storage of rice and maize while retailing was handled privately. Unscrupulous traders, accused of hoarding or smuggling maize and rice out of the country, were blamed for the new measure.

Minister of Agriculture J. J. Nyagah assured Kenyans the country had enough grain in storage to avert any crisis. "As for maize," he said, "unless an unforeseen calamity occurs, our food . . . capacity is safe. Given good weather, Kenya will continue to have . . . reserves in her stores." (*African Development*, May 1974.)

A drought-caused downturn in food production will leave Kenya hard pressed to achieve "even half of its usual" economic growth rate this year, according to a recent **Chase Manhattan** report. East Africa is anticipating its driest year in a decade, as the drought that has ravaged much of West Africa and Ethiopia wends its way southward from the Sahelian belt.

Prior to the drought, Kenya's economy had grown at an annual average rate of seven per cent for more than 10 years. (Africa News, May 13, 1974.)

● Kenya has severed sporting links with Great Britain in protest over a tour of South Africa made by a British rugby team, and instructions have gone out to Kenyan athletes around the world not to take part in events staged in Britain or in which British sportsmen are scheduled to participate. (London *Times*, May 9, 1974.) By June 3, Tanzania, Zambia, Ghana and Nigeria had joined the boycott. (Africa News, June 3, 1974.)

Although Kenya's National Sports Council is already reported to be having second thoughts about the ramifications of its decision, the immediate cries of dismay came from British athletic promoters who see their hopes of bringing top world runners to Britain dashed. In the Commonwealth Games held in New Zealand in January, Kenyan runners won 14 medals and have, in general, brought new excitement to middle- and long-distance running.

There was speculation that there might be a unified African boycott, which might affect the 1976 Olympics. It was a similar protest by Black African nations that caused Rhodesia to be excluded from the Summer Olympics in Munich in 1972.

The first sporting event canceled due to the protest seems to be a tour of Kenya that was to have taken place late in June, by Norwich City, a British soccer club. Club chairman Arthur South reacted by saying, "I'm not really surprised at the news but I am very disappointed."

British Foreign Office Minister of State and Member of Parliament for Norwich (North) David Ennals, who broke the cancellation news to the British soccer club, said, "Everyone should know that the British Government were against the [British Lions rugby club] tour. The Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Minister for Sport all asked them not to go ahead. But, of course, we had no means of stopping it. You simply cannot stop people leaving the country."

● Reports out of London indicate that Kenyan authorities are prepared to offer the British Royal Navy expanded facilities at Mombasa if British frigates operating the "Beira patrol" do not use the South African port Simonstown. The British maintain a patrol off the coast of Beira, the Mozambican port city linked by rail with landlocked Rhodesia, to monitor efforts to break U.N. economic sanctions imposed on the breakaway colony.

British use of the Simonstown port is part of the Simonstown Agreement, one of many matters under consideration in a major review of relations with South Africa by the new Labor government in Britain. Now that the Labor government has canceled a Cape Town visit by the royal yacht Britannia, speculation is growing that Britain will lose, or abandon, the Simonstown Agreement.

Western powers have recently begun searching for permanent berths in the Indian Ocean to counter what has been described as a Soviet buildup in the area. While Britain has been eyeing its former colony, the U.S. has been looking at the small British-owned coral island of Diego Garcia (see **African Update,** March-April 1974).

Citing reports carried in the London *Daily Telegraph*, a South African newspaper said government sources in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, indicated that since the royal navy had enjoyed "long-standing and hospitable arrangements for bunkering, the authorities would favorably consider increasing facilities." (*Rand Daily Mail*, April 8, 1974.)

Such an occurrence might go a long way toward meeting the problem outlined by journalist Thomas Akhigbe in Nigeria's *Afriscope*: "The refusal by the African states to provide this amenity will likely draw the West more closely to the regimes bordering the South and East African coasts." (*Afriscope*, April 1974.)

● The once detained and still charismatic former opposition leader Oginga Odinga is making a bid for a Kenyan parliamentary seat despite what are seen as moves by the administration of Jomo Kenyatta to thwart his return to the political arena.

The Kenyan Government has ruled that Odinga may not run for parliament until he has been a member of the single ruling party—the Kenya African National Union—for three years. With no date yet fixed for the upcoming elections, Odinga will be eligible to run only if the voting is held in September or after.

Although one of the founders of KANU and its first vice-president, Odinga broke with the party and with President Kenyatta in April 1966 and formed the opposition Kenya People's Union. He was detained following the banning of the KPU and rejoined KANU in 1971, upon his release.

Odinga led the effort to release Jomo Kenyatta and other nationalist leaders from British colonial prisons in the early 1960s and formed, with Kenyatta—now said to be 85 years old—Kenya's first independent government.

The upcoming election is thought to be of particular importance. In view of Kenyatta's age, some observers feel it may determine the future leader of the country. Odinga, still a powerful figure, is thought to be a sure winner in a parliamentary race. According to the Kenyan constitution, a presidential candidate must have a parliamentary constituency.

Voter registration is under way in Kenya, and the number of eligible voters will be greater than ever this year because the voting age has been lowered to 18. There are reports, however, that registration cards are being illegally sold by government registrars, paving the way for ballot-box stuffing. Incumbent members of parliament have been accused of organizing this practice. (Africa News, May 20, 1974.)

● The World Bank has made its first family-planning loan in sub-Saharan Africa with an International Development Association credit for $12 million to Kenya. IDA is the soft-loan arm of the World Bank.

Maternal and child health care are key features of the project, which is designed to assist Kenya's five-year family-planning program, 1975-79. Money will be used to train field personnel to man existing facilities and will go to construction of community nurse-training schools and rural health centers and toward studies on how these institutions can best be used.

Another World Bank loan to Kenya, announced in mid-May, will provide $10.4 million to help develop the Kenyan tea industry. A labor-intensive activity, the tea industry could do much to alleviate rural unemployment, according to the World Bank. The money will be used by the Kenya Tea Development Authority to construct and equip 17 KTDA tea factories that will process the increasingly large output by smallholder tea farmers, already encouraged by KTDA's interest in getting away from traditional large estate domination of the tea industry.

## Seychelles

● The Seychelles will hold a constitutional conference with the British Government this fall, with independence scheduled for the following year. (East African *Standard*, May 10, 1974.)

The announcement came after a surprise move in which the Seychelles majority party—the Seychelles Democratic Party (SDP)—won a slim victory in a late-April election. In a last-minute move, the SDP endorsed an independence proposal.

Seychellian Chief Minister James Mancham recently told the U.N. Committee on Colonialism that pressure on the committee and other "meddling" by the Organization of African Unity had left the Seychelles people with no option but to accept independence. (New York *Times*, May 19, 1974.) Mancham told the committee that he personally would have preferred that the tiny Indian Ocean island remain under British administration.

The recent elections evidently left some sore spots on the Island, with clashes and demonstrations following the vote. (*Africa Confidential*, May 17, 1974.) According to a report in the London *Times* (April 27, 1974) police used tear gas to disperse demonstrators—chiefly supporters of the Seychelles People's United Party, the group that first advocated independence for the Island. The rioting broke out after the losing party learned that winning nearly 48 per cent of the vote entitled it to only two seats in the 15-seat Seychelles assembly.

## Somalia

● In a surprise move on February 14, Somalia joined the Arab League, thus assuming full membership in the Arab community. The Arab League nations now stretch from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, on which Somalia is located. Although Somalia is the first non-Arab nation to join the League, it joins part-Arab African states, including Mauritania, which joined in late November of 1973.

One of the 25 poorest countries in the world, Somalia was partitioned by French, British and Italian colonial regimes in northeast Africa. Today it still faces problems of national unity, and one part of the country, usually called French Somalia, continues to be administered by France.

Although Somalia's entrance into the Arab League baffled some observers, the move appears largely motivated by the country's need for allies in its territorial disputes with Ethiopia and Kenya. Somalia has for some time laid claim to stretches of the Ogaden Desert, which is presently controlled by neighboring Ethiopia. Many residents of the disputed area—Somali in culture and language—are nomads who find themselves under Ethiopian jurisdiction.

In the March-April issue, **African Update** reported that oil had been discovered in a border area claimed by both Somalia and Ethiopia.

Tensions also exist between Somalia and Kenya, where there are also a large number of Somali people. (Africa News, April 25, 1974.)

## Tanzania

● Tanzania's relations with China, long a much-discussed subject in international diplomatic circles, again became a hot topic when Tanzania in late May protested what it called slurs against the Chinese Government in a U.N. report on the military presence of major powers in the Indian Ocean. (Africa News, May 20, 1974.)

In the main, both China and Tanzania were irked at a part of the report that indicated that China has a military base on Tanzanian territory.

In response to the protest, U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim ordered the three independent authors of the study to review it and make the necessary corrections. (New York *Times*, May 19, 1974.)

In general, the report—which also annoyed the U.S. because of the heavy emphasis on American installations—focused not on the Chinese but on U.S. and Soviet buildups in the Indian Ocean area. The report suggested that an increase of U.S. military facilities on the British island of Diego Garcia would prompt the Soviets to also seek a facility in the area.

The Tanzanians said the report of a Chinese base in Tanzania was "totally false and without foundation." The Tanzanian Government says that the Chinese presence in Tanzania is limited to technological assistance, such as the workers who are helping to build the Tanzania-Zambia railroad.

Meanwhile, press reports in South Africa—long preoccupied with what it deems a potentially dangerous Chinese presence in Tanzania—noted that Communist China is "busy" seeking new ways to maintain its Tanzanian presence, even after the planned October completion date of the TanZam Railway.

The Johannesburg *Star* (May 11, 1974) reported that the Chinese were approaching their objective by offering Tanzania other development programs made possible by the railway.

According to the *Star*, this approach puts China well in the lead in an international competition for contracts to develop mineral resources in the country. While Chinese workers worked on the line, the *Star* reports, they also surveyed mineral deposits along its route.

● After a prolonged drought through winter and spring, parts of Tanzania now suffer from flooding. Where incessant rains have washed out roads, airlift is the only means of assistance for flood victims.

Particularly serious is the situation in southern Tanzania. Due to food shortages after the failure of seasonal rains last fall, the Tanzanian Government was forced to spend $19 million on imported foodstuffs. Now more crops are being destroyed, as the floods damage rice paddies in southern Tanzania. Excess grains purchased by the government can not be transported to the needy, since the floodwaters have made roads impassable. (Africa News, May 9, 1974.)

● At the end of a year-long trial, 34 people were sentenced by a three-man people's tribunal to death in connection with a 1972 plot that led to the assassination of the island's leader, Sheikh Abeid Karume. (London *Times*, May 20, 1974.)

Originally 81 people had been charged with treason, but some were acquitted; others pleaded guilty. Among those sentenced to death were 14 men who are being held on the Tanzanian mainland because Tanzanian authorities refused to send them to Zanzibar for trial.

Tanzania and Zanzibar together form a united republic, although each retains a large degree of autonomy. Tanzanian authorities have refused to surrender a total of 18 of the accused because they say they have not received assurances that they would be allowed defense lawyers. (London *Times*, May 16, 1974.)

## Uganda

● General Idi Amin's relations with Great Britain continued to sour as the Ugandan president threatened in mid-June to break diplomatic relations with Great Britain and expel all British citizens from the East African country.

Amin's angry statement came in reaction to BBC coverage of an International Commission of Jurists report on political repression in Uganda. (Africa News, June 10, 1974.)

The report is an overall indictment of General Amin's government. It charges that basic freedoms of association and speech have been trampled in Uganda as the military has assumed increasing power.

The International Commission of Jurists exposé also documents a series of purges in the armed forces—purges revealed by 23 political prisoners who escaped from Ugandan prisons to tell their story in Tanzania. In numerous incidents, the report states, soldiers of certain ethnic backgrounds have been lined up by the hundreds and shot or hanged.

General Amin claims that the state-owned British Broadcasting Corporation—widely listened to in Africa—publicized the report to discredit him on the eve of the Organization of African Unity summit meeting.

Prior to the release of the report, Amin appointed a commission to look into the disappearance of several political figures allegedly purged by the government. Radio Uganda quoted General Amin as promising the commission government backing.

BBC reporting has rubbed General Amin the wrong way before. BBC correspondent David Martin was forced to leave neighboring Tanzania because of his unfavorable coverage of a reported coup attempt in March. Martin claimed the incident was yet another purge.

The recent turn of events (Amin also announced the banning of four British newspapers as well as all Kenyan papers) followed a period in which Amin's relations with Britain were proceeding in a somewhat lighter vein.

"Bananas for Britain" may not be the most moving slogan for a relief campaign, but it would seem to fit one of the latest programs Amin had devised.

Perhaps calling on his gift for irony, Amin had announced a neat role reversal in which Uganda would seek to help its former colonial master. The project—which Amin calls the Save Britain Fund—is designed to collect vegetables and bananas to help feed the British during these days of economic strife in the United Kingdom.

According to reports by freelance journalist Jonathan Rollow, Amin kicked off the Save Britain Fund project with ceremonies on old Kampala Hill, the site where the British flag was first raised in Uganda. (Washington *Post*, May 5, 1974.)

Meanwhile, Amin's more flamboyant actions continued to attract a good deal of world press attention. The London *Observer* (April 14, 1974) reported that Amin arrested one of the three wives whom he recently divorced.

The spate of divorces was evidently related to a recent purge of dissidents from the army; all three wives were related to opponents of Amin.

● For Uganda labor, recent months have been marked by some surprising successes, as well as a continuation of some basic tensions between organized labor and the government.

The surprise came when Uganda set a precedent in employee relations with the announcement that a labor union negotiating with two Uganda firms had won the right of maternity leave for male workers. (Africa News, June 3, 1974.)

The agreement was reached between the Uganda Printers, Journalists, Paper and Allied Workers Union and the two companies and calls for men employed at the firms to receive seven days' leave when their babies are born.

Labor did not fare so well on other fronts. In mid-May, President Amin warned union leaders against what he called "playing politics." According to *Africa Confidential* (May 17, 1974), Amin was referring to reports that trade union leaders were telling people in hotels that the government did not have the money to raise salaries.

The *Africa Confidential* report also noted that Humphrey Luande, chairman of the National Organization of Trades Unions, criticized the government for not allowing unions access to the media. Luande also denounced Ugandans who had assumed control of Asian businesses and were overcharging their customers.

In criticizing the newly indigenized businesses, labor was following a precedent set by Amin himself. In early May, Amin had announced that many Africans were indulging in the same malpractices as Asians. Included in Amin's list were hoarding essential goods, overcharging, smuggling and banking outside Uganda. (Johannesburg *Star*, May 11, 1974.)

# Central Africa

## Cameroun

● A controversy over potentially rich oil deposits has the Camerounian Government keeping a close watch on both foreign oil explorers in the country and her oil-rich neighbors, Gabon and Nigeria.

Spurred by ever-increasing oil prices and pressing internal fuel needs, the Camerounian Government in mid-May moved to clarify its position with regard to foreign oil firms by putting five companies on notice that any attempts to keep the country's oil deposits in reserve would result in revocation of their exploration licenses.

Most of the companies—one French, the others American and Dutch—have been exploring for oil in Cameroun for several years. More than a year ago, President Ahmadou Ahidjo announced preliminary exploration results that seemed promising, but since then nothing has been heard, and Cameroun remains the only coastal Central African nation whose petroleum deposits are not being exploited.

According to the Camerounian embassy in Washington, oil companies prospecting in Cameroun include the French Elf Serapca, the Dutch Shell Camrex and the American firms—**Gulf Oil, Mobil Exploration** and **Oceanic Exploration.**

Oceanic Exploration, a five-year-old exploration firm based in Denver, Colorado, told **African Update** it believed work on the company's "very promising" Camerounian concessions is proceeding rapidly. The Oceanic spokesman further noted that the company hopes to begin drilling by the summer of 1975, a date Oceanic feels is based on a realistic schedule that takes into account the high cost of drilling and problems in obtaining drilling equipment due to a worldwide shortage.

The Oceanic spokesman also noted that the reason oil companies operating in Cameroun are not as active as firms in Nigeria is that Cameroun has not shown any oil yet. (Oceanic has no Nigerian operations.) Not all companies, the Oceanic spokesman noted, are convinced that Cameroun has any exploitable oil deposits.

Cameroun's position as "poor relation" to neighboring Congo, Gabon and Nigeria evidently began to tankle Camerounians as oil prices began to rise. Dependent upon Gabon for 70 per cent of its oil, Cameroun has been among the nations that most resent soaring oil prices. According to Henry Elangwe, minister of mining and power, "Cameroun's difficulties are not due to the Arab decision to raise prices but to the capitalist administration of the petroleum industry."

Elangwe's statement seemed to reflect the prevailing view among authorities in Yaoundé, the capital, that foreign firms are looking to reserve Cameroun's oil for future tapping despite Cameroun's urgent domestic production needs.

The exploration for oil in Cameroun is not without other problems. The French firm Elf Serapca is determining the extent and potential production of a deposit in the area of Rio del Rey—a small peninsula and inlet next to Nigeria—and offshore searches are taking place near the seaport Victoria. While the proximity of both areas to oil-rich Nigeria might make them seem promising, nearness to the giant neighbor is not entirely reassuring to Cameroun because of frequent border incidents between Camerounians and Nigerians. In addition, Nigeria is currently in the process of defining more precisely its territorial waters.

The question of the borders—land and sea—is far from resolved, and many observers believe that Nigeria's General Yakubu Gowon is allowing himself to be overwhelmed by "hawks" in the southeastern region of his country, where the oil deposits are.

Cameroun, however, has not allowed territorial-water disputes to stop it from dreaming of a self-sufficient, oil-rich future. Already there are plans to construct a refinery in Victoria. (*Jeune Afrique*, May 11, 1974.)

## Gabon

● In the beginning of May President Omar Bongo of Gabon visited Algeria and Zaire to drum up finances for completion of a railroad across his country. He is also interested in finding African funding for development of his country's forests and oil reserves.

Though some western technicians say it is not worth building a crosscountry railroad in Gabon, Algeria has agreed to study possibilities for mutual-assistance programs with the dapper President Bongo.

Zaire is already helping to produce railroad ties in Gabon and has offered credit toward completion of the crosscountry line. (*Moniteur Africain*, May 16, 1974.)

## Zaire

● Some reports say Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko believes the heavyweight-title boxing match between George Foreman and Muhammad Ali to be held in Kinshasa on September 24 will put Zaire on the map.

Risnalia Investment, Inc., which has investments in Zaire, stipulated that the fight be held in Kinshasa when it provided $9 million of the $11.2-million front money for the bout.

The fight is scheduled to be shown in the U.S. via satellite at 10 p.m. EDT, but it will be 3 a.m. in Zaire when Foreman and Ali meet in the ring.

Despite the inconvenience for Zaireans, promoters expect a sellout crowd in Kinshasa's 100,000-seat Stadium of the 20th May. The stadium, named in honor of a local political anniversary, is being renovated to accommodate the expected crowds.

Some observers think the Zairean Government may lose money because of unforeseen expenses while preparing for the boxing extravaganza. But promoters and government officials still think the match offers Zaire a great opportunity to advertise itself.

It is also reported that Zaire is Ali country. An official in Zaire's Washington embassy says that Zaireans respect Foreman's abilits. But they love Muhammad Ali, he adds, because he is fighting for the cause of Black people. (Washington *Star-News*, April 28, 1974; *Business Week*, May 18, 1974.)

● The Government of Zaire recently canceled a four-year-old friendship treaty with Belgium because the newly formed Belgian Government refused to ban publication of a derogatory book about Zairean President Mobutu.

In *The Rise of Mobutu*, a Belgian defense lawyer, Jules Chome, accuses Mobutu of working as a double agent for the Belgian Government and the then-Belgian Congo's independence movement. Furthermore, he says Mobutu was backed by the CIA and that he treacherously murdered his political rivals. (Africa News, May 16, 1974.)

The strained relations between Zaire and Belgium over the book are delaying construction of the Trans-African highway. According to Mohammad Aw, deputy executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, the Belgian Government promised to supply aid for a feasibility survey that is needed to determine the highway's path across Zaire.

One report says Belgium will go through with the feasibility study, although a draft proposal for the study sent to governments of both Belgium and Zaire in October 1973 has not yet been approved. (Zambia *Daily Mail*, May 27, 1974.)

● George Wimpey contractors have won a $60-million contract, the largest ever awarded to a British company by Zaire, to expand Zaire's airport system.

Plans call for renovation of existing facilities and construction of all-weather asphalt runways, parking aprons and new airport buildings in seven places—Kananga, Kindu, Mbandaka, Kisangani, Gemena, Mbuji-Mayi and Kalemie.

Wimpey is already working on three of the fields and has shipped about $14-million worth of equipment to Matadi. Because of rapids on the Zaire River, above Matadi, supplies will have to be shipped by rail from the port to Kinshasa. From there, supplies will continue into the interior by rail, river and road. Contracts are due for completion in three years. (*Africa*, June 1974.)

● Seven West German firms visited Zaire in April and May and created the International Association for the Industrialization of Northeastern Zaire, intent on developing the country's rich interior. The Zairean Government will control 51 per cent of the association with the German companies owning the rest.

Twenty projects in upper Zaire and around Lake Kivu have already been planned at a cost of more than $400 million over the next 10 years. Projects include exploitation of iron ore and methane gas resources, construction of cement factories, glass factories and refrigeration plants for conserving fresh fish. (*Jeune Afrique*, June 1, 1974.)

● The two-year-old **Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company** factory in Kinshasa recently produced its 250,000th tire. While production has been climbing, however, the number of American personnel at the plant has been decreasing. Zaireans are filling positions formerly held by Americans, and of the 40 people from the U.S. who worked at the factory when it first opened, only 12 remain. (*Afrique Nouvelle*, May 28, 1974.)

## Zambia

● In April Zambia celebrated early completion of part of the TanZam Railway linking Zambia's northern border region to the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam. But the East African Harbors Corporation has put a damper on the euphoria by unexpectedly increasing handling charges as much as 400 per cent for Zambian exports and imports passing through East African ports.

Zambia has charged EAHC with economic blackmail and is refusing to pay the charges, which would burden Zambia with an estimated $85-million bill during the coming year.

Latest reports say that EAHC, facing protests from officials of the Zambian, Kenyan and Tanzanian Governments, has agreed to negotiate new handling charges.

Opening of the TanZam Railway between Dar es Salaam and Zambia was hailed as a solution that would enable landlocked Zambia to avoid exporting copper through the white-ruled south. Zambia last year refused to export goods through Rhodesia after a prolonged border dispute.

But EAHC's price boost would force Zambia to continue exporting copper through Portuguese African ports. Zambia sees the recent coup in Portugal as a good sign for Portugal's African territories. If EAHC won't budge on its price demands, Zambia will shift its business to Lobito in Angola and to Mozambique ports via Malawi.

Some observers think EAHC wants a share of the profits from copper prices that have quadrupled in the last seven years. EAHC says rising costs mean it can no longer give Zambia preferential treatment once offered in sympathy with Zambia's efforts to avoid using ports of its white-ruled neighbors. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, May 14, 1974; *Times of Zambia*, May 22, 1974; *Africa News*, May 27, 1974.)

Landlocked Zambia depends upon good-neighbor policies to get its copper to international markets. With the threat of heavy port charges straining relations to the east, Zambia is mending other fences in hopes of keeping its export lines open.

Recently, President Kenneth Kaunda visited Malawi's President Kamuzu Banda to strengthen relations that have been weakened by differing policies toward southern Africa. Malawi has tended to favor continued contact with South Africa on the ground that such interchange can result in change in South Africa's apartheid policies. Zambia, on the other hand, has never been a proponent of dialogue with South Africa. (Zambia *Daily Mail*, May 8, 1974.)

● The Zambian Government is seeking the advice and assistance of attorney Clarence B. Jones, publisher of New York's *Amsterdam News*, regarding Zambia's cancellation of a contract to lease 300 trucks and 400 trailers from **TAW International Leasing Corporation.**

In the March-April issue of **African Update** it was reported that TAW President Thomas A. Wood is suing Zambia for $26 million in a London court of arbitration.

According to a report in the *Amsterdam News*, TAW has $15-million worth of truck and trailer equipment waiting to be shipped to Zambia from a Baltimore port.

The same report, however, said that **General Motors** is planning to sell the trucks and trailers originally slated for TAW, while asking TAW to pay the difference between what the equipment originally cost and what GM can get for it now. (*Amsterdam News*, April 13, 1974.)

● Volkswagen is pulling out of a $7-million deal it made with Zambia's state motor enterprise, Indeco, to set up an automobile-assembly plant. Before expanding investments, Volkswagen has decided to get the bugs out of its European and American operations.

which have been suffering from decreasing sales and climbing production costs.

It is reported that Toyota has been approached to replace Volkswagen in the deal with Indeco, the Zambians evidently not wanting to lose the potential 400 jobs that would be provided by a new motor industry. (*Africa*, June 1974.)

## Northern Africa

### Algeria

● Although buoyed by rapidly rising oil revenues, Algeria has tempered its new four-year development plan with a strain of conservatism.

The new plan was recently approved with emphasis on industrialization and economic self-sufficiency. But President Houari Boumediene, as part of the plan, urged Algerians to continue to establish small and medium-sized industries using local resources. Presumably Boumediene is anxious to avoid an overdependence on benefits from the country's oil deposits. (Africa News, May 20, 1974.)

In pursuit of economic self-sufficiency, Algerians are currently using about $10-million worth of advisory services a year from a variety of American firms.

Among the American consultants working in Algeria are **Arthur D. Little**, the **Hudson Institute**, **McKinsey & Co.** and **Booz, Allen & Hamilton.** U.S. accountants **Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.** are also operating in Algeria. (*Middle East and African Economist*, April 1974.)

Three recent World Bank loans totaling $157.5 million are also designed to help speed Algeria's development. A loan of $70 million will help to finance construction of a new port at Bethiona for export of liquefied natural gas and its byproducts to the U.S. and Europe. A loan of $49 million will be applied toward a $127-million investment plan for rehabilitation of Algeria's railway system. A third loan of $38.5 million will finance an electric power project.

### Egypt

● Washington observers believe that the $250 million requested as foreign aid to Egypt this year is meant to be large enough to convince Cairo of U.S. goodwill. (*Middle East and African Economist*, April 1974.) Some members of Congress are wondering whether the Nixon Administration may have made some secret Middle East commitments in connection with the proposed aid program, which constitutes about five per cent of a $5.2-billion aid proposal.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who had just returned from marathon negotiations for a cease-fire in the Middle East, recently told a skeptical Congress they should not place too many restrictions on aid to the Middle East. He said future cooperation between Arab countries and the U.S. is an important rationale for a generous aid program. (New York *Times*, June 5, 1974.)

If approved by Congress, the foreign-aid bill would include the first authorization of aid to Egypt since the 1967 war. The proposed aid would be used to help clear the Suez Canal and reconstruct cities along the waterway. Reports estimate that 500 U.S. personnel will join British teams to try to clear the canal within a year. The U.S. Navy has already conducted preliminary surveys on the canal-clearing project. (*The Middle East*, May/June 1974.)

U.S. foreign aid would also provide Egypt credit for buying U.S. farm and industrial goods. Last year the U.S. became Egypt's No. 1 supplier of agricultural goods. Egypt imported $123-million worth of U.S. wheat, fats and oils, corn and tobacco. This year Egypt is expected to import an estimated $191-million worth of these U.S. goods.

Egypt apparently has no plans for becoming self-sufficient in food production. Instead, Egypt intends to boost its foreign-exchange earnings by attracting investments, providing services and increasing non-food exports. (*Foreign Agriculture*, May 6, 1974.)

● **Bechtel Corporation** recently turned over its contract to construct the 200-mile SUMED oil pipeline between the Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean to a consortium of Italian companies. Bechtel originally outbid the European consortium for the project.

Bechtel bowed out after Egypt rejected its demand for a large increase in the price of construction. In its new role—largely a "face-saving arrangement," according to diplomatic sources (New York *Times*, April 13, 1974)—the American firm has decided to relinquish its contract to the Italian companies and act as consulting engineer, with a management contract, to the newly created Arab Petroleum Pipeline Company (APPC), which is financing the project. Egypt owns half interest in APPC. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Qatar own the remaining shares. (*Middle East and African Economist*, April 1974.)

### Libya

● Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi hasn't been winning many friends lately, although he has been charged with attempting to influence all sorts of people. Both Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Sudanese President Mohamed Gaafer al-Numeiri have accused the Libyan leader of plotting with revolutionaries to overthrow their governments.

Observers suspect that the Arab nations' increasing irritation with Colonel Qaddafi precipitated his removal from the political spotlight by Libya's ruling Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). The RCC announced that Chairman Qaddafi would now devote his time to theoretical and ideological work and to mass organization "to bolster the march of the Arab revolution." (*Africa Research Bulletin*, April 30, 1974.)

No one seems sure how much power Qaddafi now has. But his changed status indicates that Libya may agree with other Arab nations seeking foreign-policy positions less radical than those Qaddafi advocates.

Apparently Qaddafi views Sadat's increasingly friendly relations with the U.S. as a threat to Arab solidarity. In May, Qaddafi sent Libya's prime minister, Major Abdel Salam Jalloud, to the Soviet Union to reaffirm strong Libyan ties with Moscow and condemn U.S. influence in Egypt. (*Financial Times*, April 28, 1974.)

Meanwhile, Sadat has accused Qaddafi of encouraging subversive incidents in Egypt. Saleh Abdallah Sarreya, currently on trial for leading an attack on the Cairo military academy in mid-April, says he talked with Qaddafi about plans for the attack. He also says Qaddafi encouraged him to mount "commando action" with the aim of launching a popular revolution. (London *Times*, April 25, 1974; *Africa Research Bulletin*, April 30, 1974.)

● **Bunker Hunt Oil Company,** a Texas-based firm, is suing **Mobil Oil Corporation** for $13 billion and demanding several million barrels of oil from Mobil in connection with the company's Libyan operations.

**Bunker Hunt** claims to have signed in 1971 an agreement with officials of 16 other oil firms operating in Libya to protect each other in case of Libyan nationalization measures.

According to Bunker Hunt, Mobil refused to help make up some of the company's losses when it was 50 per cent nationalized last June.

Africa News (May 9, 1974) reports that all the signers of the agreement (with the exception of **Exxon**) reneged on the pact. Twelve firms in all are named as co-conspirators in the suit, but damages are being sought exclusively from Mobil. A lawyer for the Hunt company explained to the *Wall Street Journal* that Mobil had been singled out because "they began the trend to deprive us of our oil."

A Mobil spokesman said there is no legal or factual basis for the suit and termed the action "simply incredible."

### Morocco

● A World Bank loan of $50 million to help finance a $155.5-million phosphate fertilizer project was awarded to Morocco in early June.

The project consists of construction of a plant near the port of Safi to

produce for export some 371,250 tons of phosphoric acid and 225,780 tons of monoammonium phosphate per year.

## Sudan

● Without the vast natural resources of its Arab neighbors, the Sudan has not had much success attracting foreign investors. But President Mohamed Gaafar al-Numeiri recently announced that Sudan had been promised a $200-million loan from Saudi Arabia to be used for agricultural development.

The Sudan also wants financial backing from Arab nations to increase its production of sugar. An agreement between the Sudan and Lonrho Ltd. of London calls for expansion of the Sudan's present sugar-refining capacity to one-third of a million tons a year. The venture would provide employment for 25,000 Sudanese. (*Africa Confidential*, April 19, 1974; *Financial Times*, April 23, 1974.)

## Tunisia

● The U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) is encouraging American investment in Tunisia. According to OPIC, Tunisia's political climate and economic policies offer possibilities for growth mutually beneficial to Tunisia and U.S. business.

So far Tunisia has primarily attracted financial backing for its textile industry. The country's chemical, mechanical and electrical industries are looking for investors, as are businesses relating to rubber, construction materials, ceramics, glass, food production and processing and agriculture. (*Middle East and African Economist*, April 1974.)

# Southern Africa

## Lesotho

● **Hilton International Company** has signed a $6-million agreement with Lesotho to construct a 250-bed luxury hotel in the capital, Maseru. Work on the hotel will begin in August and is scheduled for completion in mid-1976. (*Africa*, June 1974.)

## Namibia

● Senator Walter F. Mondale (D.-Minn.) has introduced legislation to deny tax credits to American companies operating in Namibia.

Mondale's announcement, which came at a June 5 joint news conference with Lutheran Bishop Leonard Auala of Namibia, cited U.S. supported U.N. resolutions declaring South Africa's occupation of Namibia to be illegal.

"It is three years since the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion concurring with the United Nations ruling," Mondale added. "Yet South Africa remains in defiance of the United Nations," he said.

Mondale charged that U.S. policy on Namibia is not consistent. He said the U.S. discourages investment in Namibia, denies Export-Import Bank credit guarantees and says it will not protect U.S. investments in the territory. But at the same time, Mondale said, American firms are allowed tax credits for taxes paid to the South African Government on Namibian holdings.

Mondale said important U.S. interests were at stake in his amendments. He said that other African nations are seriously concerned over Namibia.

"Nigeria, a country whose government is a vigorous critic of South Africa's illegal administration of Namibia, is a growing supplier of all U.S. oil imports," Mondale said.

## Rhodesia

● On June 2 the African National Council, Rhodesia's only legal African political movement, voted unanimously to reject the latest proposals from Prime Minister Ian Smith to settle his country's independence dispute with Britain.

The ANC's 25-member central committee refused to accept Smith's offer of six additional seats to represent Rhodesia's five million Africans in Parliament. The ANC pointed out that even with six additional seats Africans would hold only 22 seats, while the country's 250,000 whites would still hold a majority with 48 parliamentary seats. (Africa News, June 6, 1974.)

(As **African Update** went to press, it was reported that Smith had issued a call for national elections in July. In light of recent events in the Portuguese territories it was believed that Smith wants a new mandate from the six million Rhodesians who are permitted to vote. Shortly after his announcement, the Smith government, arrested Dr. Edson Sithole, a senior official of the ANC. Bishop Muzorewa responded by declaring he would have no further discussions with the prime minister.)

ANC hardliners plan to hold out for at least one-third of the seats in Parliament so they can block constitutional amendments. Some observers say, however, that no matter how many seats are reserved for Africans in Parliament, they will probably remain unfilled because existing Rhodesian laws prevent Africans from campaigning in rural areas. (Zambia *Daily Mail*, June 4, 1974.)

Meanwhile, Smith is trying hard not to let on that political changes in neighboring countries might influence settlement terms with the ANC. Says the prime minister, "If there are any people from outside who believe they can pressure us to change our chosen course, then they have made very serious miscalculations." (*Sunday Times of Zambia*, May 19, 1974.)

But Smith's recent visit to South Africa indicates he has some worries about the effects of Portugal's coup on its African territories. Reports from Zambia say Smith and South African Prime Minister John Vorster discussed the current political situation in southern Africa and made plans to speed up construction of a rail link between Rhodesia and the sea via South Africa. Rhodesia's rail line to ports in Mozambique has come under increasing attack by liberation forces. (Zambia *Daily Mail*, June 10, 1974.)

Recognizing the possibility that Blacks may soon control neighboring Angola and Mozambique, the leaders said, "We are prepared to work with anybody provided we are working constructively in the interests of southern Africa. We do not query the color of the people concerned." (New York *Times*, May 30, 1974.)

● Kenneth McIntosh, a British citizen and former Rhodesian banking official, is currently serving a five-year term in Salisbury for obtaining information that showed how economic sanctions against Rhodesia were being circumvented. (See **African Update,** March-April 1974.)

McIntosh sent duplicates of the documents he had gathered to his brother in Britain, who released them to the British press. The documents revealed that 13 organizations gathered in Paris on April 18, 1972 to make secret arrangements for financing the expansion of Rhodesia's Iron and Steel Company. (Johannesburg *Star*, April 20, 1974.)

According to the documents, a consortium—European-American Banking Corporation—lent a Swiss company about $50 million on behalf of German-Austrian steel groups. EABC shareholders say now that the money was "for a Swiss borrower for a Swiss purpose." One report noted, however, that Switzerland was not bound by U.N. economic sanctions imposed against Rhodesia because Switzerland is not a U.N. member. (*Financial Times*, April 16, 1974.)

A memorandum intercepted by McIntosh revealed that the money EABC claims it lent to a Swiss company was loaned by the Swiss company to Rhodesia to increase its steel-producing capacity from 410,000 tons to one million tons per year.

The McIntosh documents further reveal that an Austrian company was going to build the new steel plant and that a German steel manufacturer was going to buy the extra steel Rhodesia produced.

Reports say officials of West Germany, Austria and at the U.N. are studying the documents to decide what action to take against the sanction breakers. (Johannesburg *Star*, May 4, 1974.)

● From the U.S. comes news of another sanction-busting scheme. The Rev. Donald Morton, consultant to the United Church of Christ's

Center for Social Action, presented the U.N. Sanctions Committee with evidence that international airlines and travel agencies are breaking sanctions by arranging for tourist flights to Rhodesia.

Morton reported that American travel agencies had sent an estimated 16,406 people on package tours that included Rhodesia. The tourists were flown there on at least 90 airlines with Air Rhodesia interline agreements.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Treasury Department responded to evidence against Air Rhodesia by blocking funds of its New York office on May 17. But it is reported that the office is still open and managed by Renton Cowley, a citizen of Rhodesia traveling on a South African passport. According to reports, Cowley's U.S. visa lapsed in April.

Apparently, the Treasury Department has granted Cowley's request for a personal account to use Rhodesian funds in the U.S. Treasury Department official Stanley Sommerfield claims Cowley has promised to discontinue Air Rhodesia's U.S. operation. Sommerfield says the Treasury Department does not think sanctions violations involving Cowley warrant prosecution. (Africa News, June 10, 1974.)

## South Africa

● Late-April jubilation over a landslide victory for the Nationalist Party of Prime Minister John Vorster was marred when reports of the Portuguese coup reached Pretoria.

But despite the fact that the coup stole most of South Africa's headlines during the last weeks of April, official government reaction has been limited to date.

In one of the few statements by a government official, Dr. Connie Mulder, South Africa's Minister of Information, told the press that South Africa would be prepared to enter into "friendly relationships" with Black majority governments in Angola and Mozambique. (London *Observer*, May 27, 1974.)

Mulder said it was not necessary for the new governments to support South Africa's policies but that there should be a willingness to accept them "on merit." Mulder said South African offers of cordial relations would not stand if the governments in Mozambique and Angola were not friendly.

For South Africa, the Portuguese coup has other ramifications. As the Johannesburg *Star* noted in a recent edition (May 29, 1974), Portuguese attempts to shore up relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China were causing Pretoria a good deal of concern.

● Fearful of jeopardizing future trade relations with Black Africa, the Japanese Government is currently deciding whether it will ask its businessmen to cut down their purchases of South African commodities that are equally obtainable elsewhere. (Johannesburg *Star*, June 1, 1974.) Added to a list that includes maize, wool and sugar are a handful of minerals for which there are no satisfactory alternative sources—platinum, manganese and iron ore. (*Financial Times*, June 6, 1974.)

The possibility of such action was discussed at an annual meeting of Japanese envoys to African nations and, while it would not really have much effect on the South African economy, it would go a long way to *quelling African complaints about the embarrassingly robust trade* between Japan and South Africa. Two-way trade passed the $1 billion mark for the first time in 1973.

Although import-restriction information was said to have been leaked from the diplomatic meeting, the only official announcement made was that Japan would no longer allow South Africans to enter the country to take part in sporting events or cultural and educational activities. This, according to the London *Times*, was an apparent "sop to the Afro-Asian bloc." (June 6, 1974.)

Import-dependent Japan is particularly nervous about cutting itself off from Black Africa. Some Japanese diplomats believe that the Arab disallowal of oil sales to Japan was the result of a Japanese foreign policy that neglected the Middle East. Japanese officials seem anxious not to repeat such a mistake in Africa.

Despite Japanese concern about Africa, not all opinion within Japan—even within the government—is unanimous. Suggestions that Japan-South Africa trade be curtailed have pitted Japan's Foreign Ministry against the powerful Ministry for International Trade and Industry, which is firmly against the diminution of trade.

This is the second time in the past couple of months that the two ministries have clashed. The first confrontation occurred when Japanese businessmen were charged with importing chrome and asbestos from Rhodesia through South Africa, in violation of mandatory U.N. economic sanctions. The accusation was made because Japan's import figures did not jibe with South Africa's export figures.

● O'okiep Copper Ltd. and Tsumeb Corporation have announced plans to build an electrolytic copper refinery at a cost of more than $40 million. Scheduled for completion by late 1976 or early 1977, the facility will be built in the Cape Town area and will be operated as a joint venture of the two companies.

**Newmont Mining** owns a 57.5 per cent interest in O'okiep, in South Africa, and a 29.6 per cent interest in Tsumeb, which is in Namibia. ***American Metal Climax*** *owns a 17.3 per cent interest in O'okiep and* a 29.6 per cent interest in Tsumeb. O'okiep also owns 9.5 per cent of Tsumeb.

Church activists who oppose the Namibian mining activity recently claimed in a Wall Street *Journal* ad that the Tsumeb Mine earned $367 million on sales of $1 billion between 1947 and 1971, while labor costs amounted to only $91 million for the period. (Wall Street *Journal*, May 3, 1974; Windhoek *Advertiser*, May 6, 1974.)

● A British Labor Government decision to halt further arms supplies to South Africa—including a Westland Wasp helicopter already promised—has touched off a series of protests in England and in South Africa. (*Financial Times*, May 22, 1974.)

South Africa's reaction may be to terminate the Simonstown Agreement with Britain—called "one of the most advantageous agreements ever signed by Britain"—whereby the British acquired free access to a strategic base paid for by South Africa. (Johannesburg *Star*, May 25, 1974.)

After hearing that the helicopter export license—issued by the Conservative Government—had been canceled, South African Minister of Defense P. W. Botha said, "We will have to consider as soon as possible whether under the circumstances, where Britain does not fulfill her obligations, she can continue to demand privileges."

Reaction among influential trade groups in Britain was equally forceful and prompt.

In a letter to the British secretary for industry, the president of the Shipbuilders' and Repairers' National Association warned that France was ready to take South African orders for warships and other equipment if Britain did not. (Johannesburg *Star*, May 25, 1974.)

Prime Minister Harold Wilson called this argument "the traditional apology of the prostitute through the ages—if I don't do it, someone else will." With Labor Members of Parliament rallying round him during a furious Conservative attack in the House of Commons on May 21, Wilson said the Labor Party had always made it clear it would not stick by arms contracts that were permitted by the Conservatives, saying they had been made in defiance of U.N. agreements. (*Financial Times*, May 22, 1974.)

The controversial decision has come at a time when South African trade is making up an increasingly smaller percentage of total British trade. While British exports to the former Commonwealth country were, in 1973, 21 per cent greater than in 1972, they were overshadowed by leaps in the growth rate of trade with European countries—57 per cent greater in Luxembourg and Belgium, 33 per cent each in France, West Germany and Ireland.

Much of this is due to Britain's greater involvement with Europe as a member of the European Economic Community. (Johannesburg *Star*, May 25, 1974.)

# The Coming Struggle for Ethiopia

By PATRICK GILKES

The events of the last months in Ethiopia have ended the total identification of Emperor Haile Selassie with the central power of the empire. Under pressure from all sides, the Emperor has agreed to a constitutional conference, which is scheduled to report by the end of September. This will almost certainly produce a constitutional monarchy, with political parties and ministers responsible to Parliament rather than to the Emperor. Although this will be a significant change, it is also true that Haile Selassie has never been as much of an absolute monarch as is usually supposed. His power has derived from his manipulation of various traditional forces as well as from his personality, the prestige of his position and his own wealth. In steadily trying to increase centralization, he has had to make many concessions to many groups and to move slowly.

The most prominent traditional Ethiopian groups with independent authority are the church and the aristocracy, both of which base their power on extensive landholdings. Although the church has shown tentative moves toward modernization in the last few years, it remains largely unchanged. It is the established church of the empire and its teaching are geared to maintenance of the feudal system. Since the war there has been a significant increase in both Islam and spirit-possession cults, especially in the southern provinces, as a protest against Christian Amhara rule.

The aristocratic land-owning elite have retained more importance than the church, although they are by no means a united force. And Haile Selassie has made it a practice to encourage loyalty among the officers of the armed forces by making considerable land grants, thus binding them into the system. It is not unknown for colonels to retire with 16,000 hectares of granted land. Such people are in a good position to transfer these grants into private ownership, for the process is long, complex and costly; but even these grants pale into insignificance beside the enormous amounts of land acquired by some of the aristocracy.

*H.I.M. Haile Selassie*
*John Moss / Black Star*

Ras Mesfin Sileshi, who lost his position as governor-general of Shoa Province in April, managed to obtain estates estimated at two million hectares during his tenure as governor-general of the provinces of Kaffa and Illubabor in the 1940s and 1950s. Another landowner in Hararge Province has taken over 900,000 hectares since the war. More the norm is the landowner in Sidamo Province who seized some 20,000 hectares in the last few years, using his retainers as a private army to enforce land sales to him. Such men have virtual autonomy on their own lands and control the appointment of local officials. As a result, there is little or no external interference with traditional prerogatives, such as control of rents, taxes passed on to tenants, and eviction. The rights of judicial control and tax collection were taken away from such landowners in 1966, but in practice many landlords still exercise such prerogatives, not least on the imperial estates.

The provincial land-owning class is the most conservative element of the ruling classes. They have a virtual monopoly on sub-provincial and district governorships, judicial and other official functions. In Shoa, the Emperor's own province, landowners have been used extensively in the central government. There is no doubt that such land-holding families, together with the church and the imperial family, own a majority of the land—a reasonable estimate would be 55 per cent; another 30 per cent is land from which the government freely makes grants. Some 20 per cent of aristocratic landholdings are actually under forms of tenure that were officially abolished in 1966, but there is little sign that this has had any effect yet.

The aristocracy does contain a progressive element, and it is this element that has come to the fore under the present prime minister, Lij Endalkachew Makonnen, the leading member of one of the most important Shoan noble families. This group has a commitment to reform and can count on




*This World Bank photo shows a street in Ethiopia's capital city, Addis Ababa. The placid scene recalls quiter days.*

considerable support from the bureaucracy, which has also made efforts to encourage change. The Ministries of Finance and Land Reform, for example, have tried to get laws through Parliament that would increase tax revenue and assess lands for taxation. Such laws, however, even when passed, have virtually excluded the larger landowners. The agricultural income-tax law of 1967 was supposed to tax all landowners, but 75 per cent of the revenue obtained actually comes from those landowners whose incomes are at the lowest level—under $140 per year.

The new council of ministers is most dependent on support of the armed forces. The military has recently shown that it is prepared to give such support and it has acted to control demands for much wider reform from both labor and unions and from intellectuals. The armed forces are, however, anything but a united block. Haile Selassie has kept them loyal over the years by using traditional methods of control—land grants, promotions, advantageous marriages and pay increases. At the same time, divisive factors—conflicting family, regional and educational loyalties—that operate throughout the society have been encouraged. Indeed, the whole imperial approach to the armed forces has been characterized by encouraging differences between units.

The most general division is between what may be loosely called the traditional and the modern, which correlates to a large degree with age. The traditional element corresponds with the older, more senior officers, many of whom fought in the resistance to the Italian occupation or went into exile during the late 1930s. Many of these officers are substantial landowners through inheritance or through imperial and government grants. They are generally loyal to the system and to a lesser extent to the Emperor himself. Their attitude to reform is that it ought to come through imperial auspices or through the central government's established procedures.

The great majority of the officer corps has been educated at either the Holeta Military Academy (founded

*As Ethiopia's recent troubles have unfolded it has become clear that the military is hardly a united bloc.*

before the war) or the Harar Academy. When the Harar Academy was founded in 1958, it took over Holeta's functions. Since then, Holeta has been reserved for training soldiers for short-service commissions and for preparing NCOs for commissions. Holeta graduates seldom rise above the level of captain or major and tend to be older and more conservative in outlook. Harar, which until recently was staffed by Indian officers (Israelis provided the instruction at Holeta), has relatively high academic standards. For several years in the late 1950s and early 1960s the top group of secondary-school graduates was conscripted directly into Harar. These men are now mostly majors and colonels. Although Harar is less conservative in outlook, a recent survey showed that more than 70 per cent of the cadets came from families that had some land. Twenty-one per cent were from aristocratic families; 58 per cent were Amhara.

There are several groupings among the more modern officers. Some are loyal to the Emperor, although occasionally they may be critical of certain policies or of certain ministers. A larger group feels that a constitutional monarchy is the appropriate form of government for present-day Ethiopia. These officers tended to support the Crown Prince until his illness last year and would have been prepared to see him succeed his father.

The Crown Prince's son, Prince Zara Yacob, recently designated by Emperor Haile Selassie as his successor, does not, however, command the same degree of support from the army. Another substantial group within the military is the "Nasserites." They are strongly nationalistic but have little commitment to the imperial line, regarding it as a hindrance to necessary social change. Although some would certainly support the emergence of a republic or a military regime, others appreciate the value of an imperial unifying factor.

This is not to imply that such groupings within the military are particularly cohesive. By no means are all those with similar ideas in contact with each other. The network of connection that each senior officer has built up is as significant as any factor governing military behavior and perhaps plays the most important role in influencing internal army politics.

One additional factor affects groupings of officers within the military—overseas service or training. Various Ethiopian units were involved in Korea and in the Congo, and some officers have also had training abroad. A wide variety of foreign missions have also influenced groupings within the army. The preponderant foreign influence has come from the U.S., which has equipped the army, and from the Israelis, who have helped especially with counterinsurgency training; British, Indian, Swedish and Norwegian missions have also been involved with different sectors of the armed forces. To some degree those who have received similar training have tended to stick together. This factionalism, of course, has been encouraged by the regime in the interests of security, if not efficiency.

Although there is no equivalent today to the homogeneity of the Imperial Bodyguard of pre-1960, certain army units do have elite status. The Emperor's present Bodyguard constitutes an elite unit, but more important in this context are smaller units like the tank battalion and the airborne battalion, both of which tend to keep a watch on other units. Airborne units are stationed close to the main air base at Debre Zeit, and ill feeling between the units runs high, with frequent fights erupting between both officers and men in the nearby town. When there was a rumor that the air force was going to move against the new government in March (because it was not radical enough), it was airborne units that moved into the air base to stop planes from taking off.

*In fact, the most elite unit today is*

*(continued on page 43)*

# Uganda's Amin's Economic Revolution

Despite a variety of problems and some hardships, Amin's programs still seem to enjoy a deep-rooted popular support.

By JONATHAN ROLLOW

A year and a half ago Uganda's President Idi Amin captured the interest of Africa—and the attention of much of the world—by expelling on 90 days' notice more than 50,000 Asians—businessmen, professionals and their families—in Phase I of an Economic War to turn over control of his nation's economy to the "people of Uganda." Ironically, the latest casualties of the Economic War, at least in the short run, are the African Ugandans themselves.

Since the Asians left, Ugandans have been plagued with soaring prices and bothersome shortages of essential commodities. The allegedly "exploitive" Asians have been replaced in many cases by far more unscrupulous African traders who are taking advantage of the scarce supply of products by charging two to three times as much as the Asians did. Despite the current problems, there has not been the general economic collapse that many observers were predicting a year and a half ago, and most Ugandans would probably agree with a farmer-businessman from Musoka who remarked, "We prefer to suffer for the moment than have the Asians come back. Amin's brought the common man into the [economic] picture."

General Amin's government—or more exactly his army—has been quite selective, however, about which common men have benefited. Aside from the humanitarian question that troubles the rest of the world, and many Ugandans as well, the speed with which the Asians were expelled virtually eliminated any chance of a smooth transfer of the businesses, factories and property they left behind. The allocation of businesses was to be handled by ministerial committees composed of military, police, prison and civil service personnel and headed by a cabinet minister. A few days after they had begun intensive interviewing in the capital city of Kampala, Amin suddenly sent the committees up-country to distribute shops there. Allocation of businesses in Kampala was turned over to military committees that in turn handed out many of the firms to friends, relatives and fellow soldiers. A disproportionate number of shops went to members of Amin's own ethnic group, the Nubians, who come from the West Nile region. Amin is a Muslim, and so the Muslims were also a privileged group when the spoils were divided; the plum was rent-rich Kampala Hill.

Outside Kampala, the average Ugandan did not fare much better. Ministerial committees worked up-country for only a few weeks before military committees took over. Typically, today, the Abdu Juma & Khadavi Economic War Store on Gulu's main shopping street is owned by a man who comes from the West Nile region. A framed photograph of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia hangs on the store's wall alongside the required picture of President Amin. One local resident who wanted that store, and a number of others, complained, "I didn't have a chance." Juma, meanwhile, was allocated another store in Kampla. In addition, he owns one-third of another store in the West Nile region. Most of the shops in Gulu went to Nubians and Muslims. The response has been a quiet resentment mixed with resignation. "Well, of course," shrugged one local resident, "charity begins at home. In Africa we have such big families, and families expect something from a relative who's done well."

Ugandan's impressions and certain outside press reports, however, about a wholesale takeover of businesses by soldiers, Muslims and Nubians (who are often all three combined) are at least somewhat exaggerated. The bulk of the major industrial plants and corporations left behind, such as the massive Madhvani holdings in everything from sugar to metals, were transferred to the parastatal Uganda Development Corporation and not to private individuals. Since 1964, the UDC has been directed by a professional economist from the Acholi tribe, and as a professionally staffed bureaucracy it is not known to practice tribal or religious favoritism. There are also about 200 European businessmen living in Kampala. "It's amazing how many old-timers are still tucked away around here," one of them observed. As for the shops and larger private businesses, there are no statistics on the distribution, and, even if there were, they could be misleading. In Kampala, one happy farmer-turned-businessman from the largest tribe, the Baganda—whose own guess was that half the businesses in Kampala went to the military and their relatives—remarked that when one Mugandan was given a shop it mean that all his relatives shared the benefits.

To the Ugandan consumer, the expulsion of the Asians and the turnover of businesses to Africans have mainly meant shortages and sharp increases in prices. During the first four months after the Asians were ordered out, imports declined more than 50 per cent, and many Africans who were allocated

shops found themselves with little or no stock and unpaid bills left by their predecessors. The few Africans who already had businesses were able to charge exorbitant prices since they had virtually no competition until the Asian stores were allocated. But even now that the distribution of businesses is completed, prices remain inflated and intermittent shortages continue.

Mechanical breakdowns and technical inexperience are major reasons for the continued high prices. Generally, the Asians did not teach their African employees about the mechanics of plant operation, and there are now many factories in Uganda producing less than when the Asians ran them. Some technicians have come in from abroad, notably from Egypt and even from India, but they have not been enough to make any real difference. Meanwhile, many Ugandans trained in one field have found themselves in charge of plants that demand another type of expertise. One chemical engineer, for example, was handed the keys to an abandoned textile factory, although he had never dealt with textiles before. Now the factory is operating at about three-fourths of the pre-Economic War level. If oil consumption is any indication, however, there has not been a marked reduction in industrial activity. Since March of last year, after a temporary drop in the wake of the Asian expulsion, oil consumption has been at mid-1972 levels.

Many of the spare parts required to repair breakdowns must be imported from Britain, which has traditionally been, and still is, Uganda's largest trading partner. There is no British embargo, formal or informal, on exportation to Uganda, but sources in the ministries in Kampala maintain that the British have not always filled orders for needed spare parts. British sources deny this and complain about how difficult it is for Ugandan importers to get foreign-exchange allocations to buy British products. Other European countries do not encounter such difficulties, partly because they do not export as much to Uganda but also because, they speculate, there seems to be a political bias working against the British when the Bank of

*Uganda's Idi Amin joins in a vigorous dance at a military exercise.*

Uganda decides on foreign-exchange applications. Relations between the two Commonwealth countries have been intermittently strained since Amin came to power. British businessmen are now particularly touchy since Amin refuses to begin negotiations on compensation to British citizens (mainly Asians) whose businesses were taken over by the government until either Britain's Prime Minister or the Queen, comes to Uganda to talk to him about it personally.

Mechanical breakdowns have particularly affected transportation, which has been inadequate and unreliable, contributing to shortages, especially outside Kampala. When the Asians left, they smuggled out many of their best trucks by bribing customs officials at the borders or by paying Africans to drive them into Kenya on false registrations. The shortages on automotive spare parts is particularly severe. A car battery costs more than $140, when one can be found.

But Ugandans are hoping the transportation problem will be solved by a recent purchase of 100 trucks and 30 trailers from Yugoslavia; and Uganda plans to buy another 115 lorries (85 Fiats and 30 Mercedes-Benzes) for transporting the coffee and cotton crops. The Ugandans have bought 500 Yugoslavian tractors and a number of buses as well, and there are three Yugoslavian experts spending eight months in Uganda training Ugandans in the repair and maintenance of the vehicles.

Many of the new African traders themselves have been contributing to the shortages to make more profit. Last fall the government began a crackdown on the widespread hoarding of essential commodities. In one raid, government security officers found shopkeepers hoarding maize and maize-flour, groundnuts, cooking oils, millet, yeast, sugar and a number of other essentials of the Ugandan diet. One unfortunate store owner sold a government undercover agent a bag of sugar for $27, more than twice the controlled price. Most people are convinced that the government is really trying to bring prices down and supplies up. A private economist called the antihoarding campaign "high powered," and General Amin, whose threats are not to be taken lightly, has put "exploiters" on notice that they will face "severe penalties." He has even singled out offending army officers (who own shops) in public statements.

Reports from Ugandans on the effectiveness of the antihoarding campaign vary. One Ugandan, for example, said it was easier to find sugar now because only one reputable shopkeeper in his village was now designated by the government to distribute it; another replied that she was going to report a certain shopkeeper for hoarding but then decided against it. She was afraid the shop was owned by an army man; in Uganda it is not wise to displease a soldier.


*General Amin chatting with his entourage as he walks through the streets of Uganda's capital city, Kampala. Camerapix.*

Some African businessmen are doing what the Asians were accused of—smuggling foreign currency out of the country by sending more funds abroad with prepaid, pro forma invoices than they receive back in goods. They bank the balance overseas or in Kenya while the consumer is left with fewer products to buy. Orders for imports must be reviewed by the State Trading Corporation, but the STC never checks on how many products are actually ordered. Because of the speed and the way in which businesses were allocated, there are also many businessmen, inexperienced and unfamiliar with complicated import procedures, who inadvertently add to the shortages by not knowing how to import merchandise efficiently.

The biggest question mark in the Ugandan economy, and a major reason for certain shortages, is the allocation of foreign exchange, which is made exclusively by the Bank of Uganda. In the first nine months of 1973, Uganda enjoyed a trade surplus of more than $200 million. It was an unusually good year. Unlike most industries, coffee processing had been run by Africans prior to the Asian expulsion. Coffee production almost doubled in the first half of 1973, and the price of coffee rose on the world market.

No statistics have been published on the current balance of payments, but it is doubtful that a probable deficit will cancel the trade surplus. The Bank of Uganda, however, is extremely conservative in granting foreign-exchange allocations to importers, and, according to one diplomatic observer, "We are beating our heads against the wall trying to figure out where the money is going." The government economists know, but they are not telling. One typical explanation—corruption—probably does not apply. For General Amin to be lining his pockets would be, one informed foreign observer noted, "out of keeping with his character. He's basically honest." Increased military allotments account for some of the expenditures. The Ugandans recently bought about $7 million worth of Soviet tanks (old ones, according to diplomatic sources). But a report on one of the largest purchases, 80 French personnel carriers armed with surface-to-surface missiles, was denied in Paris. So the foreign-exchange riddle continues.

For the majority of Ugandans, the foreign-exchange mystery doesn't matter very much. High prices and shortages have hit the people in the cities and towns, especially those on salaries who were not allocated a business. But more than 90 per cent of the people live on shambas (small farms) growing their own food in the lush countryside. Land rents in the Buganda region, the largest area, are regulated by a law passed in 1928, and, in any case, only about half of

*(continued on page 42)*

# Scandinavia: A Friend Indeed for Africa?

Generosity and widespread acceptance place Scandinavian development assistance programs far ahead of these of the rest of the world.

By ZDENEK CERVENKA

Scandinavia, consisting of Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland, is often regarded as one happy family of countries bound together by the cold climate of northern Europe and noted for the similarity of their affluence, social welfare policies, and their common stand at the United Nations. But the differences among the Scandinavian countries are as many as the similarities. The Swedes are richer, have the highest proportion of cars, self-service stores, televisions and telephones—in short, they have everything better "including their neighbors," as the Danes, Norwegians and Finns would agree. Norway is less pretentious and more puritan (no drinks on Sundays and no sex films at any time) but Norwegians are as principle-minded as the Swedes and their promotion of human rights and social justice matches that of Sweden. Denmark, the Scandinavian gate to Europe, is more international, more business-like and, unlike Sweden, less concerned about what the world thinks and says. Finland, a labor reservoir for Swedish industry, is a poor but proud little country bravely bearing her burden of being both a neighbor and friend of the Soviet Union.

The Scandinavian countries, for all their diversity, enjoy better relations with most African countries than they do with most other countries—West or East. They have no colonial past (except for some slave trading on the West Coast of Africa), and they all excel in espousing U.N. rhetoric on the evils of apartheid and colonialism. But more significantly, they alone have taken seriously the United Nations goal of one per cent of GNP for development, thus setting an example for the whole community of industrialized nations. Sweden this year will be the first country in the world to reach the U.N. target when the amount of her aid to the Third World will exceed $300 million. Norway is expected to meet her one per cent pledge in 1978, with development assistance moving from the present $124 million to $230 million. Denmark, a little less idealistic and a member of the EEC, hopes to reach the 0.7 per cent mark in 1979. The amount allocated by Denmark for development aid in 1973 is nearly $112 million. Finland, with more economic problems than her neighbors, has not committed herself to any exact date yet. Against the background of continuous aid declines from Western Europe to developing countries (overall such aid dropped from 0.53 per cent in 1961 to less than 0.35 per cent in 1971 and hit bottom in 1973 when the "oil crisis" provided a convenient excuse for further reductions) the achievements of the Scandinavian countries are really impressive.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Scandinavian policies on development aid is that they are accepted by the majority of the people in each Scandinavian country, particularly in Sweden. During a Swedish election campaign last fall not a single politician of the three opposition parties raised even a feeble voice against the Government's spending on aid despite the fact that the central issue of the election was the fate of 50,000 unemployed Swedes. The press, including the opposition evening paper *Expressen*, with a circulation of almost one million, has been equally disciplined on the matter of aid. True, occasional questions are raised about whether it is really a good idea to pour money into Ethiopia (until recently Sweden's number one recipient of development aid in Africa, but now fifth, receiving $6.5 million in 1974) a country wtih a feudal-like regime. Another question that is sometimes raised in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, as well as in Finland, is whether aid should be channeled through the United Nations rather than given directly. But aid itself and the amount spent on it are seldom questioned.

Explanations for this unusual generosity are readily found in the high-sounding phrases of each country's politicians. Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme regards development aid as a corollary to the Swedish policy of social justice, social security, free medical care and free education, in short: as an extension of the Swedish welfare system and affluence. "A subscription to the basic principles of

**Scandinavian development aid to Africa (bilateral) in 1973 (in million US$)**

| Country | Total volume | Principal recipeints |
|---|---|---|
| Sweden | 71, 9 | Tanzania 27,0<br>Kenya 13, 5<br>Tunisia 7, 9<br>Zambia 6, 7<br>Ethiopia 6, 7<br>Botswana 4, 5<br>East African Community 3, 4<br>Lesotho 1, 3<br>Swaziland 1, 3 |
| Norway | 22, 6 | Tanzania 7, 2<br>Zambia 4, 7<br>Kenya 4, 4<br>Madagascar 1, 1<br>Botswana 0, 2 |
| Denmark | 24, 5 | Tanzania 7, 0<br>Uganda 6, 2<br>Malawi 5, 0<br>Zambia 3, 3<br>Kenya 2, 6 |
| Finland | 10, 6 | Tanzania 3, 7<br>Nigeria 0, 7<br>Ethiopia 0, 4<br>Kenya 0, 4<br>Zambia 0, 2 |

human rights, of freedom, equality and right of determination," says the Swedish premier, "is meaningless unless it is linked with the material assistance to achieve or help its implementation."

The Swedish commitment to development aid, however, has other motivations. First, it has much to do with a feeling of guilt among Swedes about becoming so rich on the wars of others. Secondly, Swedish friendship with the Third World has become an important component of Swedish neutrality and has strengthened her position *vis-à-vis* the Great Powers, which tend to be sensitive to such expressions of Sweden's neutrality as her stand on the Vietnam War or her condemnation of the intervention of Warsaw Pact forces in Czechoslovakia.

In Norway, the "moral duty" of helping Africans originates from the traditional influence of the Church on Norwegian foreign policies. It is not by coincidence that one of the recipients of Norwegian development aid in Africa, Madagascar, happens to be the same country "discovered" by Norwegian missionaries in the last century. Norway regards development aid as an integral and unquestionable part of its role as a small, good country—a true champion of human rights relentlessly fighting for a better world. Norway's attitude toward development is best illustrated by a recent statement by Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli that Norway plans to use revenues from the North Sea oil bonanza to substantially increase her development aid.

In line with this attitude, Norway has been one of the most outspoken critics of Portuguese colonial policies and of South Africa's apartheid. She has also displayed an admirable initiative on behalf of Africa at the United Nations. In 1963, for example, Norway was instrumental in getting the Security Council to establish a group of experts to examine methods of solving problems in South Africa. Eleven years later, the U.N. report stands as one of the most important documents dealing with the relationship between South Africa and the world community. More recently, Norway hosted the Oslo Conference of Experts for the Support of Victims of Apartheid in Southern Africa. The meeting was held in April 1973 under joint U.N.-OAU auspices and was financed by Norway and other Scandinavian countries.

The origins of Danish policies on development are more the result of pressure groups within the ruling Social Democratic Party than of national enthusiasm for sharing Denmark's wealth with the peoples of Africa. As a result, Danish development aid has always been tied to the purchase of Danish equipment and goods and to the employment of Danish experts. The Danes soon discovered that aid to developing countries could also be turned into aid to their own export industries. Africa remains the principal recipient of Danish aid because the Danes see the Continent as more neutral than Latin America (which they deem an economic appendage of the U.S.) and Asia (which they see as a battleground for the contending interests of Russia, the U.S. and China).

Finnish development aid has been motivated mostly by the example set by her Scandinavian neighbors and stimulated by Finnish participation in U.N. development-assistance activities. The volume of Finnish development aid is understandably small and has followed the pattern of Denmark. Finland's aid is also tied to Finnish products and personnel, thus becoming simultaneously an aid to her own firms. Only the Norwegians continue to have "untied aid" and prefer to leave the responsibility for deciding how to use the assistance they provide to local development banks and credit institutions. There is of course a practical aspect to Norway's "untied aid." Should all international aid be untied, Norwegian shippers would make their share in transporting it.

Scandinavian aid is concentrated on African countries with socialist ideologies (Tanzania is the top recipient of Scandinavian aid) and also focuses on countries engaged in the confrontation with the white minority regimes of southern Africa—Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. The highlight of Scandinavian aid to Africa has been

support of the African liberation movements. This support is frowned upon by Scandinavia's Western friends but is highly praised by Africans who hope other nations will follow the Scandinavian example. So far, only Holland has done so.

Sweden's contribution to African liberation movements in 1974 will total $10.9 million. Norway's allotment totals almost $1.24 million, and Denmark's $1.04 million. The Finnish Parliament has adopted a policy of providing aid to liberation movements recognized by the OAU. Pär Stenbäck, a member of the Finnish Parliament, announced at the Oslo conference that assistance to the liberation movements will consist of food, transportation, and medical and educational facilities.

Finland will give about $120,000 for that purpose in 1974.

Contrary to the general belief that the decision to aid African freedom fighters indicates militancy on the part of the Scandinavian countries, the motives can be found in the United Nations resolutions inviting member states to provide material support to the liberation movements. In accordance with these resolutions, Scandinavian aid to the liberation movements is strictly "humanitarian," consisting of medical supplies, clothing, food, tools and machines for farming, building materials, as well as educational assistance to civilians in the war-stricken areas and to refugees. Great precautions are taken to prevent the use of aid for purchasing what the liberation movements need most—arms. The Scandinavian countries, although voting unanimously for General Assembly resolutions recognizing the legitimacy of the armed struggle of the liberation movements, are equally unanimous in their abhorrence of violence. This stance is in line with Sweden's neutrality, Norway's moral standards, Denmark's respect for her NATO allies and Finland's anxiety not to step out of the Scandinavian line. It also makes the aid to the liberation movements easier to explain to Portugal and South Africa, as well as to Western allies—namely Britain and the United States. In 1973, the Norwegian trade with South Africa and Portugal reached $124 million, exceeding total aid to liberation movements by about $35 million.

The glorification of Scandinavian development aid, as well as its administration, takes a large slice from the amount allocated for assistance. The Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) with an administrative budget of $10.9 million in 1974, spends $1.74 million on publicity alone. This publicity helps obscure the fact that apart from an interest in development, Africa is essentially marginal to Scandinavian international relations.

The volume of African trade of each Scandinavian country illustrates the point. For Sweden, trade with Africa represents only 1.7 per cent of Swedish exports and 3.3 per cent of imports. In the case of Norway, African trade constitutes 2.2 per cent of Norwegian constitutes and 2.1 per cent of imports. For Denmark the figures are 1.6 per cent of imports and 3.7 of exports. Finland's trade with Africa accounts for two percent of its total exports and 1.1 per cent of its imports.

Accordingly, Scandinavian public interest in Africa is low. Ola Ullsten, a dynamic member of the Swedish Parliament for the opposition party *Folkpartiet* and one of the few MPs with an interest in international affairs, says, "The Nigerian Civil War was the last African issue which captured the interest of the Swedish public. Then Vietnam took over and when that came to an end we had Chile. The Swedes simply cannot take more than one issue at one time."

Those who pursue an interest in Africa are mostly young people whose illusions have not yet been destroyed. They are dissatisfied with their government's policies of aiding the liberation movements on one hand and increasing trade with the very countries these movements are fighting against on the other. They find it difficult to understand why PAIGC (the liberation movement in Guinea-Bissau, which declared its independence in September 1973) could qualify for development aid but not for diplomatic recognition. They refuse to accept their government's explanation of dealings with Portugal and South Africa. Typically the governments contend that they have no control over the private companies that carry out such business.

The attitude of Swedish, Danish, Norwegian and Finnish "Africanists" is best shown by the way in which they answered this question: "What stand does your country take on the confrontation between independent Africa and the white minority regimes in southern Africa?" A Danish university teacher told me: "The new liberal Danish Government that took over from the Social Democrats last autumn will probably make things even worse. Of course they will continue to pay lip service to the cause of the people of South Africa, Mozambique and Angola, but they are already seriously considering reducing not only the aid to MPLA and Frelimo and the refugees from South Africa but also cutting—or at least slowing down—the total aid program. At the same time, they will also make sure that oil from Angola continues to flow and business with South Africa will be as usual."

A Norwegian scholar told me he did not believe in the Norwegian policy of dialogue with South Africa, which Norwegian churches and diplomats continue in the "hope that they will

**Scandinavian trade with South Africa in 1973 (in millions US$)**

| Country | Export to Africa incl South Africa | Import from Africa incl South Africa | Export to South Africa | Import from South Africa | Total volume of exports | Total volume of imports | Percentage of trade with Africa export | Percentage of trade with Africa import |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sweden | 184,0 | 276,8 | 72,8 | 26,2 | 11,914,4 | 10,404,9 | 1,7% | 3,3% |
| Norway | 86,6 | 114,4 | 17,8 | 30,8 | 3,941,2 | 5,384,1 | 2,2% | 2,1% |
| Denmark | 184,2 | 93,8 | 17,6 | 8,2 | 4,916,5 | 5,726,7 | 3,7% | 1,6% |
| Finland | 78,1 | 49,2 | 18,1 | 12,3 | 3,874,0 | 4,402,6 | 2,02% | 1,6% |

eventually persuade the South African whites to be as good as we are." He was also very critical of Norwegian disapproval of the use of arms by liberation movements. "The same people, who are preaching that the oppressed people of Africa should use only peaceful means sit on the top of the biggest war machine in the world: NATO. Some of them had themselves been engaged in the armed resistance against the German occupation of Norway during the Second World War."

A Finnish journalist and keen student of African affairs illustrated what he called the double moral policy of his country by citing a confidential letter written by the Chief of the Foreign Ministry's Political Department, Risto Hyvärien, to the Finnish Legation in Pretoria in 1968. "To Finland, the South African problem is not a moral question but a question of practical policy. Sometimes, it may be practical for Finland to behave as if we were morally upset, but for most of the time the essence of our policy is to keep and expand Finnish relations with South Africa especially in the economic field." The letter was published by the Finnish radical magazine *TRICONT* in March 1972; its authenticity has been confirmed by Finland's Foreign Minister in Parliament.

Finally, the Director of the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies answered the question as follows: "The Swedish stand will continue to be palatable for home consumption and noncommital for all other practical purposes. Besides, South Africa is very far away."

It would not be fair, however, to conclude an article on Scandinavian policies on Africa with criticism, no matter how justified. Whatever the motives for giving aid to Africa and to the liberation movements, the fact remains that by so doing the Scandinavian countries are far ahead of all other countries in the world. Although the total volume of their development assistance may be too small to meet the needs of Africa as a whole, it does play an important part in the countries that receive it. But its greatest value is in proving that the guideline of one per cent of GNP for development is realistic. There is no doubt that should their example be followed by the United States, Germany, Japan, France and Britain, Africa would be spared many of the economic problems that hinder its progress. □

## UGANDA'S AMIN

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the farmers in the region are tenants. In the large areas to the north, when a man needs some land to cultivate he either inherits it from his family, or he goes, as he has gone for centuries, to the clan head of the area to ask permission to settle. "If the clan head decides he is a good man and not a troublemaker," one farmer near Lira explained, "then the desired land is his." The introduction of cash crops, though, is commercializing traditional land-distribution methods.

Uganda has a personal government tax of nearly $10 a year, but it has not been raised significantly since the Economic War was declared. The same is true of school fees. The rising price of clothing has affected the farmers, but they usually do not buy much clothing. Entertainment is free, for it costs nothing to dance, and the local beer is made from home-grown fermented maize-flour. The only real problems so far for the farmers are the sugar and salt shortages, although in the cotton-growing areas farmers have been apprehensive that mechanical breakdowns and poor transport facilities may catch up with them this season. Few farmers use any machines themselves in their work but they do depend upon local cotton gins to process their main cash crop. There have been local cotton-gin breakdowns, and last fall the government was not buying any more cotton because storage areas are jammed.

In another up-country district the farmers sold all of last year's crop but fear they will not be able to sell this year's because last year's is still stacked up at a railway station. Some farmers who were relying on small plots of cotton for income are turning to tobacco, which is bringing higher prices now. With the recent arrival of new lorries, the farmers hope their transport troubles will end or at least be substantially reduced.

The uncertain security situation in Uganda over the past three years caused a number of western countries to withdraw their aid missions, but now the Canadians and Scandinavians are "watching the situation" and are interested in giving aid again—probably next year, according to informed sources in Kampala. Meanwhile there is revitalized interest in development within the Ugandan Government, following more than a year of indecision caused by personnel shifts after the Asian exodus. Many government development experts were sent to fill gaps left by the Asians in enterprises taken over by the Uganda Development Corporation and were in turn replaced by inexperienced civil servants. But a new Permanent Secretary for Planning has recently been appointed who is, according to a development expert in Kampala, "dynamic and making decisions." The priority is currently for education, especially vocational and technical training.

For the Ugandan businessman, however, the security situation is not quite as good. Although there has not been widespread slaughter since the abortive invasion by ex-President Obote's forces from Tanzania in September 1972, arrests and "disappearances" continue; this tends to dampen business spirit. Businessmen making too much money feel like marked men. In December President Amin announced the Ugandan Government was launching an investigation into the "mysterious disappearance" of some of the country's prosperous businessmen, killed because of "jealousies." "This is a very bad thing," Amin said. "How can the country grow if such successful businessmen are killed?" Those found guilty will face the firing squad.

It is easy to point out the defects and failings of Uganda's Economic War, but, as one long-time diplomatic observer noted, "He [Amin] has done what he set out to do. He's created an African middle class, and the Africans now control their own economy." The hardships of the transition period continue, and although opinion is mixed and sometimes pessimistic, many Ugandans are accepting the present difficulties with a certain spirit. "We are pioneers," a law student reflected. "Other African states are looking to see if we can make it. If we do, then they'll do just like us." □

## STRUGGLE FOR ETHIOPIA

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the air force. It is also the most radical. At a meeting among representatives from various units in early March to decide how far the armed forces should be prepared to go in expressing dissent, air force personnel tried to hold out for the immediate removal of the Emperor and a takeover by the military as a whole. The air force is not large—2,250 men to the army's 40,940. In 1973, it had only 37 combat aircraft. The elitist factor stems from its long involvement with foreign personnel, and its radicalism from contact with university students. Air force personnel attend courses at the university as well as having their own courses at the flying school at the air base. The air force also insists on a higher standard of education and technological expertise and has more involvement, man for man, than the army in nation-building civil action programs.

Besides the army and the air force (the navy is insignificant) there are two other groups that hold a certain amount of power—the Territorial Army and the police. The Territorials are organized on a provincial basis and have an active strength of 10,000, with reserves reported at two million, but more realistically numbering about 50,000. Their training and armament levels are not high, and where the force has been used in provincial disturbances (in Bale, 1963-70, and Gojjam, 1967-68) it has not been very successful. Its significance lies in its supposed loyalty to the Emperor and in the fact that much of its active strength is concentrated in Shoa, along the main roads leading out of Addis Ababa.

There are two parts to the police force—the national police, numbering about 30,000, and the emergency police, numbering about 10,000 men. The latter is the elite unit of the police and is substantially equipped with armored cars. This group has been trained by Israelis, has been extensively employed in Eritrea and is oriented toward counterinsurgency. The emergency police is resented to a certain degree by the police as a whole for its privileged position and advanced weaponry. In general, the police have been considerably upgraded in the last few years; more officers have been sent overseas, and the standards of the police college have been raised. This has increased professionalism as well as social and political awareness.

In the last few years, two significant movements have appeared—the Eritrean Liberation Front in the northern province of Eritrea, with recent extensions into Tigre; and the Ethiopian

*In the countryside, Ethiopia's people await a resolution of the country's social tensions.*

National Liberation Front, which is essentially an Oromo (Galla) movement, operating in the southern provinces of Bale, Arussi and Haraghe. Both these movements claim substantial support among the peasantry, and at least the ELF has considerable forces in the field—about 3,000 to 4,000 men. Such movements may be reflected, in certain circumstances, in the armed forces. It is maintained officially that recruitment of both officers and men is without consideration of origin. But there is no doubt that Amharas are predominant in the officer corps. An analysis of appointments, at the level of divisional chief of staff and above, over the period 1941–1966 produces the following figures: 62 per cent Amhara; 15 per cent Oromo; nine per cent Eritrean; five per cent Tigre; nine per cent others. One estimate for the officer corps as a whole in 1972 shows the following breakdown—62 per cent Amhara; 25 per cent Oromo; 13 per cent others. For the ordinary soldiers the main ethnic representations come from the Amhara and the Oromo in about equal proportions of 40 per cent. The numbers of Oromo in the police are, however, higher. The growth in regional and national feelings, and the attitude of resentment towards Amhara officials especially in the south, may thus affect the unity of the armed forces.

The increase in the political awareness of the military, both officers and men, was demonstrated clearly in the crisis of February and March this year. Equally it is clear that there was no unanimous view within the army. Although it now seems that those who prefer a constitutional solution are on top, there is no guarantee that they will remain so. The fact that the crisis appears to have started with a spontaneous movement among NCOs and ordinary soldiers, although quickly including radical officers, suggests that further rifts will occur.

Ultimately, of course, the military holds the key to political power as has now been made clear. Although they may pledge loyalty to the Emperor, as they have done, a substantial section of the army wants changes that will destroy the old system of authority. The changes that have so far occurred, however, have been limited to the removal of 20-odd ministers, allegedly corrupt. The traditional power structures still remain intact, especially in the provinces. The government of Lij Endalkachew Makonnen has promised considerable reforms, but the radical opposition now includes some sections of the army, the labor unions, intellectuals, students and liberation movements. For the first time Ethiopia has a potential grouping of political forces that are outside the traditional powers. It will be difficult to satisfy them unless the promised reforms are truly far-reaching and unless they involve limitations on the Emperor, the Church and the landed aristocracy. □

# In Washington

## Portugal's Coup: Good fortune for the U.S.

By BRUCE OUDES

The Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, is so lucky that he has had lucky breaks he doesn't even know of. Who could have guessed that when he promised Portugal in Lisbon last December that "we will be even better friends than we are now" that his words would relate to a government that was to come to power in April under General Antonio de Spinola? No one, I would suspect, least of all the Secretary of State.

Some in the State Department bemoan the fact that the coup stopped cold the negotiations for a new U.S. lease on the Azores base. After the unsuccessful first attempt at a coup in Portugal this year, Secretary Kissinger rejected the recommendations of some of his advisers that the U.S. pull back from the Azores negotiations. Kissinger, informed sources say, would countenance no foot-dragging on the Azores talks.

Some U.S. officials apparently were telling the Portuguese in the weeks before the coup that Congress would not approve a significant program of military aid for Portugal, but this was simply a negotiating ploy to persuade Lisbon to accept a smaller package. The real discussions, it seems, were over how much and what kind of "excess" equipment from Pentagon stocks (material over which Congress has no control) Portugal was to receive. In fact just days before the Portuguese coup Senator Clifford Case (R.-N.J.), the champion of requiring the administration to submit Executive Agreements to Congress, had taken steps which clearly indicated he was prepared to exclude the Azores from the scope of his effort.

So although there was and still remains a solid Congressional majority in favor of a new Azores agreement, one of the numerous ironies resulting from the coup is that it is not certain that the new government in Lisbon, which undoubtedly wants to repair its relations with the Arabs, is interested in allowing the U.S. to use the Azores in the event of another round of full-scale fighting in the Middle East. Thus the U.S. had to launch the long overdue search for alternatives to the Azores in the Middle East context.

However we have not heard the last of the Azores as a source of Portuguese leverage on the U.S. If and when the new era of negotiation between Portugal and Africa breaks down the Azores and other strategic considerations will be the umbrella under which Lisbon will seek U.S. support for its efforts to isolate the "extremists" in Africa. Meanwhile, of course, the Azores will remain open to the U.S. for NATO purposes —without a rental agreement.

The April 25 coup was graphic evidence that on its own terms the Nixon Administration's policy toward the Caetano Government was a failure. It is impossible to say with certainty that had Washington leaned strongly on Caetano on the question of Guinea-Bissau that his government might have bent enough on the issue so that the military would have decided against a coup. However, that is the direction in which the weight of the evidence points. So now, thanks in part at least to the "clientitis" of Nixon Administration policy Caetano is in exile in Brazil, U.S. Air Force C-5 and C-141 transport plane crews are brushing up on mid-air refueling techniques, Portugal's foreign minister is a Socialist, and Spinola's cabinet includes Communists.

The coup was an outstanding piece of good fortune which may make it possible for the U.S. and Kissinger to survive the Nixon years without a major U.S. upset in Africa. Historians may one day point to the Portuguese coup and the African street demonstrations in early 1972 in Rhodesia as the two events of the era that steered a largely unthinking American foreign policy away from some very unwise directions in Southern Africa before any major damage was done.

While as late as May 16, the United States was the *only* state to vote against the admission of Guinea-Bissau to the World Health Organization (Portugal did not participate in the 92 to one vote), there seemed every likelihood that the PAIGC negotiations with Lisbon would let the U.S. off the hook on the question of a veto against Guinea-Bissau's U.N. membership application.

Assuming that this is the case, then perhaps it is time for a sigh of relief. While U.S. policy errors with regard to Portugal and Portuguese colonies have been numerous, short-sighted, and significant, they were not in fact blunders which would irreparably damage long-term U.S. relations with Africa. Now, at least for as long as the honeymoon continues between the Portuguese left and the Portuguese military and as long as the negotiations between Portugal and Africa continue, it might be possible to develop a bit of national reconciliation in America itself on the issue of southern Africa policy.

In addition to demonstrating that persistent and determined guerrilla warfare by Black Africans could trigger events leading to the fall of a European government, the Portuguese coup was a most important vindication of those in the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs who for years have had their judgment questioned because of their insistence on the credibility of African guerrillas.

A most critical juncture for U.S. policy in "Portuguese" Africa could arise if the Organization of African Unity—upon the recommendation of the guerrilla groups—rejects as inadequate the brand of "self-determination" accorded to Angola and/or

Mozambique. This type of impasse would seem to be a particular possibility in Angola where it is possible that the three guerrilla groups will be divided in their attitude to Portugal's settlement proposals. The U.S. could find itself under strong pressure from Lisbon to recognize an "independent" Angola, lacking full support among the guerrilla movements. In strictly legal terms the case for doing so would be excellent—a formal grant of independence emanating from the recognized sovereign (Lisbon). This would not be a fly-by-night "unilateral" declaration of independence.

In Mozambique there is if anything an even greater possibility that the "self-determination" process will not be concluded smoothly. It is difficult to believe that the battle-hardened Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo), flushed with the success of having helped overthrow one Portuguese government, would be anything but cautious in its approach to the new Lisbon regime. It is well aware of South African sensitivity to the proximity of Mozambique to the Transvaal, the center of South African industry and the heartland of Afrikaner culture. In Mozambique, then, Portugal in a very real sense is little more than a broker (seeking to salvage what cultural and economic ties it can) between two determined brands of nationalism—one Black and one white. Even if Portugal conducts itself in Mozambique in the most prudent possible manner, there is a danger some significant aspects of the Vietnam syndrome could be repeated.

If this present era of negotiation, Phase Two of Portugal's decolonization epoch, degenerates into Phase Three with a level of fighting more intense than in the past, it is likely that China and therefore the Soviets will be continuing their support for Frelimo. The Portuguese coup, in China's eyes, has proved the wisdom of its Africa policy. Peking has earned a good deal of prestige in Africa in recent years in return for a relatively small amount of military assistance. Washington analysts estimate that Africa is in general becoming more receptive toward the idea of Chinese military assistance not just because of the relative detente between the U.S. and China, but also, because Peking is demonstrating an interest in helping the economic development of Black Africa, even some of its most politically conservative governments. This is a far cry from China's rhetoric of a decade ago which tended to support the overthrow of governments in Black Africa.

In a few months the completion of the Tan-Zam railway may help throw the spotlight on the fact that three-fourths of China's foreign aid in the past two years has been extended to Africa. Depending on how one does the arithmetic and leaving aside assistance to Africa from the World Bank, it is possible to show that China is replacing the U.S. as the most significant non-European source of foreign economic assistance for Africa. While Nixon-Kissinger have been preoccupied with anything but Africa, a steady stream of African leaders has been making the pilgrimage to Peking, many for the first time. China is becoming increasingly involved in technical assistance programs. In some cases it has directly taken over Taiwan's agricultural demonstration projects in Africa, ones originally begun with U.S. funds under the then secret Project Vanguard program.

(Meanwhile, the U.S. in April announced one new direction in aid to Africa, namely that Egypt is to receive $250 million in U.S. assistance during the fiscal year starting in July. At the same time the administration also announced that it is asking Congress for a total of $169 million in economic assistance for the rest of Africa during the forthcoming fiscal year.)

If the Portuguese coup and China's intensified interest in Africa are making South Africa's white leadership more nervous, it is not without reason. Another of the many ironies implicit in the Portuguese coup is that Lisbon is now, in effect, applying more pressure for change on the Rhodesian regime than the entire U.N. Security Council with its ineffective economic "sanctions" program. At the same time, however, the simple fact that no nation has recognized the Rhodesian rebellion does not exactly encourage South Africa to sponsor indirectly or otherwise a UDI in southern Mozambique by the whites there.

Since it is no longer possible for South Africa to fudge critical decisions in the most vital aspect of its foreign policy—the extent to which it is willing to commit itself in Rhodesia and Mozambique—it is to be expected that South African officials will be even more frequent visitors to Washington. Finance Minister Nicholas Diedrichs and Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller, both of whom usually come here each fall, managed to find an excuse to pay the U.S. a special visit a few weeks after the Portuguese coup.

However, Admiral Hugo Biermann, commander of the South African armed forces, allowed himself to be used to add an essentially amusing touch to this high level "cultural exchange" program. Admiral Biermann's visit in May, like that of Information Minister Connie Mulder in January, was arranged through the Washington public relations firm of Collier, Shannon, Rill, and Edwards which is employed by the South African Information Department. Reportedly South African diplomatic channels were by-passed.

The State Department's Africa Bureau sought to deny Biermann a visa, but it was overruled at higher levels after the lobbying firm contacted several white Southern members of Congress, among them Sen. Harry Byrd (D.-Va.) who in turn was in touch with former Virginia Governor Linwood Holton who is now the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

According to its Foreign Agents Registration report, members of the Collier, Shannon firm have this year been making small campaign contributions. Among them was $100 to Rep. Louis Wymann (R.-N.H.) who arranged for Biermann to meet U.S. Navy Secretary William Middendorf. Biermann also met Admiral Thomas Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—less than a week before Moorer was replaced. Other contributions by the lobbying firm include $250 to Rep. Thomas Morgan (D.-Pa.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs committee, and $100 to Rep. Gus Yatron (D.-Pa.), a member of the House Africa subcommittee. The image conjured up by this under the table activity is of a South Africa somewhat behind the times; payola, for the time being, is not "in" in Washington. Although government information agencies from time to time think they can run foreign policy

better than professional diplomats (the U.S. Information Agency is occasionally rambunctious), their amateur efforts invariably fail sooner or later.

While Biermann's visit to the Pentagon over State's objection was a minor violation of the spirit of the U.S. arms embargo, it does not appear as some have suggested to presage a new shift in U.S. policy. Until the Watergate disclosures of last year halted back-door meddling by the President's aides, there was every reason to be concerned for the integrity of the arms embargo. But that era appears to have passed.

What is pathetic—and amusing—about the Mulder and Biermann visits is that so much effort is wasted simply on renewing contacts with right-wingers here who are solidly in South Africa's camp. While these forces can stop U.S. policy from becoming sharply anti-South African, they alone cannot nudge the U.S. in a demonstrably pro-South African direction. Both the Mulder and Biermann episodes were a variety of diplomatic streaking—a run through Washington to shake hands with one's supporters. (For that matter Black African diplomats often make a similar mistake—keeping in touch only with the liberals rather than trying to win new converts from among the conservatives.) When South African Government officials return home under the impression that they have broad and strong support in the U.S., this could contribute to miscalculation on especially critical policy decisions. And for South Africa the pressures are building such that decisions once taken will be increasingly difficult to reverse in the future.

One of those decisions ultimately will be whether to pull out all stops in the military defense of Rhodesia or to accept a responsible Black majority government in Rhodesia—one that Moscow and Peking will not veto—with perhaps some non-amendable minority rights written into the constitution as a tranquilizer for white fears. It is because these alternatives are becoming clearer for Pretoria and Salisbury that the Smith regime seems to be showing increased interest in a settlement with Bishop Abel Muzorewa's African National Council, one that undoubtedly Smith would use to exclude ZANU and ZAPU as "extremists."

In this climate an all-out drive by Britain and the U.S. on sanctions enforcement perhaps could be decisive in convincing Pretoria to urge Smith to negotiate seriously with representatives of *all* Black Rhodesian groups. However, the likelihood of anything more than token activity on sanctions enforcement is slim indeed. The Wilson Government back in power in Britain is the one that in late 1966 when "mandatory" sanctions were being considered refused a strong U.S. pitch to the effect that the sanctions should be written so as to prevent U.S. and British firms in South Africa from exporting their products to Rhodesia, a major loophole indeed. This discussion was, of course, private, but now that it is publicly known, it becomes understandable why U.S. officials with full access to classified materials have always taken a rather skeptical view of sanctions.

Meanwhile, the prospect that State under Kissinger would be more able and willing to get the U.S. in order on sanctions adherence seems substantially exaggerated. Rep. Thomas Morgan has kept the measure which would repeal the Byrd Amendment pigeon-holed in the House Foreign Affairs Committee for six months, and State has made no perceptible move to pry it loose.

In Senate testimony in March Dr. Kissinger indicated during a brilliant piece of interrogation by Sen. Harry Byrd that he doesn't really understand the fundamental basis on which the Security Council imposed sanctions on Rhodesia. Kissinger told Byrd that he did not believe Rhodesia was a threat to "world peace," and armed with that concession, Byrd grilled the floundering Kissinger for ten minutes on the question. At no point did Kissinger indicate that the U.S. and the Security Council regard Rhodesia as a threat to "international peace" which can be, and in this instance is, substantially different from "world" peace. Byrd quickly placed the transcript of that exchange in the Congressional Record and every pro-Rhodesia organization in the country has been flogging it as evidence supporting the retention of the Byrd Amendment.

Going beyond the Byrd Amendment, it increasingly appears that for all practical purposes the U.S. sanctions on Rhodesia simply do not exist. There is no bar on the exchange of services between the U.S. and Rhodesia, and as for goods one only needs to lie about their origin or destination. U.S. officials are making no visible efforts to unmask the Rhodesian deception. In fact if Rhodesian tobacco is not in fact entering the U.S., it is only because Sen. Byrd and others from tobacco growing states don't want it here to compete with American tobacco.

The State Department and other elements of the Federal bureaucracy are organized in such a way as to give virtually an open invitation to quiet violations of sanctions. Instead of having a "task force" of officials monitoring sanctions, State for the past six months has not even had a full-time Rhodesian desk officer. Responsibility for sanctions questions in State is shared by a half dozen or so officials, none of whom can spare more than a few hours here and there for the task.

Further, when evidence of a sanctions violation is handed over to State, under the very loosely and poorly written Executive Orders on sanctions promulgated by the Johnson Administration, State must turn the matter over to either Commerce, Treasury, the Federal Aviation Agency, or the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for enforcement; in the hands of these agencies which know how the White House feels about sanctions, the investigation is certain to be aborted. This in turn does not help to create enthusiasm in State for pursuing a sanctions question. Numerous sources confirm that INS, for instance, takes its cue on Rhodesian visa questions from Sen. James Eastland (D.-Miss.), chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee which has responsibility within the Senate for handling INS questions.

All of these statements on Rhodesian sanctions can be made with a great deal of certainty as a result of an especially intensive look into the situation during the past six months touched off by the willingness of a concerned employee of the Air Rhodesia office in New York, Gerd Stamnes, to provide me an extended look into that center of Rhodesian operations in the U.S.

Ms. Stamnes, a fundamentally apolitical Norwegian who is a perma-

nent resident of the U.S., was the sole office staff of Renton Cowley, Air Rhodesia's New York manager, until she resigned in March after more than three years of service.

She first became alarmed about the legality of Air Rhodesia's activities in 1971 when Cowley had her "go up the back stairs" of the Standard Bank in New York to withdraw funds that he thought Treasury was about to freeze. Her concern about the climate of law enforcement in Washington grew a few weeks later when Treasury, without penalizing Cowley for having imported Rhodesian funds illegally into the U.S. for three previous years, issued him a license covering future transactions without his having to fill out a formal application. According to a letter Cowley wrote to Salisbury at the time, the intervention of a senator (whom he did not name) with Stanley Sommerfield, chief of the office of Foreign Assets Control in the Treasury, was enough to do the trick.

In early March I helped Stamnes decide to turn over the more than 1,000 documents she had shown me to U.S. authorities. The issues at stake go beyond Rhodesian sanctions. For instance one of the letters she turned over to U.S. investigators was a copy of a handwritten note by Cowley to the Rhodesian Front last December 11 asking to be withdrawn from the voters' rolls. However, according to a sworn affidavit Cowley had submitted to INS in support of his application for permanent resident status in the U.S., he had been an official resident and citizen of South Africa for several years.

The first U.S. reaction to the pile of documents (which provides evidence, among other things, of shipments of technical data of military value from a Los Angeles firm to Salisbury via Air Rhodesia in New York) came in mid-May when Sommerfield announced the withdrawal of the license to import funds issued to Cowley in 1971. Sommerfield said that "as far as I'm concerned" the investigation into the documents was closed. "We did not regard the violations as terribly, terribly serious," Sommerfield commented.

Ms. Stamnes, however, said she felt Treasury was "trying to cover its tracks."

For Air Rhodesia the loss of Cowley's license is simply a nuisance. Sommerfield admitted that it might be proper to issue a similar license to some other Air Rhodesia employee. Otherwise under present interpretations of U.S. law it would be legal for the Air Rhodesia office simply to become a New York branch of the Rhodesian information office in Washington, D.C.

These documents are in sum the final undoing of the myth promoted by David Newsom, the then Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, when he told Congress in February, 1973, "We have enforced sanctions as vigorously as any nation."

Liberal members of Congress, for their part, have not been anxious to extensively pursue this massive evidence of wholesale sanctions violations by the U.S. for fear of losing the tenuous Administration support they now have in favor of repeal of the Byrd Amendment. In so doing they fail to appreciate fully the fact that regardless of whether Nixon or Ford is in the White House, there simply is no way in which U.S. performance on sanctions adherence will be responsible and adequate before 1977. As one cautious State Department official finally acknowledged after long study of the Rhodesia question, "The President just has a 'thing' about Rhodesia." Vice President Ford voted for the Byrd Amendment when he was in the House.

Ms. Stamnes says that Robin Fynn, a visiting Rhodesian tour operator, recounted to her in late February a conversation he had had a few days earlier with William Saxbe, the new Attorney General. Fynn, she said, quoted Saxbe as apologizing for present U.S. policy on Rhodesia adding that Rhodesia is "far more democratic" than the states to the north of it. Fynn told her that Saxbe said he should "hang in there" because the Administration in Washington is doing "everything possible to rectify the situation."

Saxbe's office denies the statement, but Stamnes says she can't come up with any reason that Fynn would have distorted to her his account of the conversation with Saxbe. Naturally this episode did not reassure Stamnes that the questions she was raising would receive a fair hearing at the Justice Department, but she did so anyway. And yet because of that courageous step, Gerd Stamnes emerges as one of the few heroes of an otherwise sordid and demeaning era.

It is possible at one and the same time to regard Rhodesia sanctions as a grotesque outrage, a monumental bore, and as uproariously funny. What do you say when you discover that Air Rhodesia has interline agreements not only with 21 U.S. air carriers but also with the Polish and Czech national airlines as well as the Syrian, Saudi, Kuwaiti, Moroccan, and Lebanese national airlines plus Air Afrique? Or when you read in the San Francisco *Examiner* that Lions International is looking forward to having a delegation from Rhodesia at its San Francisco convention in July? Or when you learn that after obtaining one sanctions-busting DC-8, Gabon has had the gall to ask the U.S. for a license to purchase another?

The best conclusion would seem to be that over the next three years this entire issue has to be fully aired not so much necessarily for foreign policy motives as for reasons of probity in domestic law enforcement. At some point serious students of international law are going to write dissertations on why and how Britain and ultimately the U.S. made the most abortive and cynical use of one of the gravest powers of the Security Council. They will study the Security Council's closed-door Sanctions Committee for the charade and farce that it was. They deserve to have the full story of what happened in Washington to chew over.

For the short term, perhaps at least the knowledge that in the end all this dirty Rhodesian linen is going to be eventually aired publicly may persuade Mr. Smith that his confidence in the Nixon Administration was misplaced and that ultimately he will have to come to terms with the 20th Century—before it ends.

Rhodesia's friendly contacts in Washington with Spiro Agnew, Maurice Stans, William Saxbe, Kenneth Rush, Clark MacGregor and other Nixon aides ultimately are meaningless; small men wind up with a small place in history. In the final analysis even Renton Cowley's use of a lawyer connected with Mudge, Rose, Guthrie, and Alexander—the Nixon-Mitchell law firm—to represent him before the INS turns out to be not particularly astute—only amusing. □

## EAST AFRICA NOTEBOOK

*(continued from page 11)*

municate. They have little time with their parents, who spend most of their evenings attending juicy dinners and cocktail parties; by the time they return home the children are asleep. This is the child who knows little about tribal customs and would dare say "to hell with the customs."

One of the most controversial aspects of Luo culture is the custom that allows a son to inherit one of his father's younger wives. The Luos like many other groups of African peoples are essentially polygamous. The educated and the Christians are strongly against the inheritance of widows for economic and moral reasons. The elders (the reservoir of knowledge on customs) submit reluctantly to the abolition of these customs.

The educated say that economic circumstances do not allow for supporting polygamous families or inheriting sisters-in-law. One controversial figure attributed the resistance to tribal customs to politics and Christianity. He says that the state constitution does not recognize polygamy as a social convenience and also limits benefits and tax allowances to a monogamous level.

There are two kinds of inheritance of widows—the most common is that of a brother or kinsman taking over sisters-in-law in the event of the death of their husband. Another is the case where a son takes over his father's younger wives or wife; though not his own mother, or wives married before his mother.

This age-old custom ensured continuity in the life of a woman in the event of the death of a husband. It also took care of the social, physical and economic security of a woman, allowing her to remain in the neighborhood she knew best.

A point that cannot be overemphasized is that all these customs are not mandatory. Sometimes when many people are bidding to inherit, a committee of elders meets to decide who is to be appointed heir. This has been the case when the wives were young and the late husband affluent.

A woman remains in a social limbo until remarried so taking over a widow (which involves sexual intercourse on the night a woman is taken over) is a must, regardless of age. A wife not formally taken over resembles a prisoner. She cannot share a dish or a meal with any person or shake hands with relatives or friends. A widow is normally identified with the late husband, whose clothes she wears, until she is formally taken over.

In the case of a person failing to come forward, an heir must be hired. This involves offering bulls numbering about six or more. The widow who remarries cannot be removed from her house or home, and the children bear the legacy of the dead man. □

## NOUR INTERVIEW

*(continued from page 16)*

ing out of Africa, there's something new coming. This is a transitional period we're in. I'm sure in the future new generations are going to look at my art and say, "How crazy this guy is. This is all garbage." By that time, they will have developed a new art.

**AFRICA REPORT:** It seems that the traditional African artist worked within his community for a community purpose. You have become a man apart. You could be in the Sudan or in Chicago. Doesn't that make for an artist who is already quite different and for an art that is new?

**NOUR:** Sure. But Africa isn't like before. I mean the whole structure of African society is changing. Look at Nairobi; look at Khartoum; look at Dakar. These cities are just like Chicago in many ways. You find big high-rise buildings and things like that. But this is what I am trying to say. Why do we have to have high-rises? And if we do have to have them, why don't we develop them from within. There's nothing wrong with using the technology; we need it. But the forms and shapes have to come from within the society itself—from the tradition and background we have.

**AFRICA REPORT:** You have mentioned several times that you think about images from your childhood—the men praying, the sheep running down a hill. Why do you think these childhood images are so powerful?

**NOUR:** Because at the time I saw them I couldn't understand why they made me feel the way they did. I'll tell you, when I was a kid and I used to see the kind of things I was talking about, I'd cry. My family thought I was religious. They were going to send me to Cairo to be a priest. At the time I was nine years old or something. I escaped, but there *were* childhood experiences that I couldn't find an answer for. In my hometown, for example, all the houses had doors and windows painted green—all except one house. It was painted red—sort of an earthy crimson color—and I always admired that house. I can't tell you why, but I always thought that I would buy it when I grew up and became a man. There was a very old tree standing in front of the house. I used to dream about the shadows of that house. I used to love the fact that it had a veranda with an arch and this tree next to it. I was fascinated by that and I don't know why. I can't even tell you now why I like the place; maybe because it was the only one. Could be.

**AFRICA REPORT:** What else do you remember from your childhood?

**NOUR:** Well, getting up early in the morning and seeing people at dawn going to the mosque. There's some mysterious quality about that. And also when you go to the river at night, you see the moonlight and you hear the silence of the place. There's nothing but insects and frogs and the sound of waterwheels turning. That kind of atmosphere sticks with you. Playing in the sand; I remember that, too. And, you know, evening there was the best time; it's cooler. People go out and lie on the sand and look at the moon and the stars. They chat for three or four hours. At about 10 o'clock they go back to their houses and sit outside; they share food together. Then they will say their prayers and go home. That's the type of thing. When I'm not there, I have a nostalgia for it. There's a romanticism about it. □

# AFRICAN ART TODAY:
# Four Major Artists



## May 14-August 31, 1974

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# Africa Report

MAGAZINE FOR THE NEW AFRICA

$1.75 JULY-AUGUST 1974

World Population Year

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# Africa Report

MAGAZINE FOR THE NEW AFRICA

A Publication of the African-American Institute


The World Population Conference in Bucharest this August presents an opportunity to look at some of the controversial issues that will be raised, in an African context. While Pierre Pradervand takes up the question of our cover, *Too many children—for whom?*, Takawira Shumba Mafukidze examines the allegation that family planning is a white plot aimed at peaceful genocide in Africa.

Elsewhere in the magazine two of our contributors consider the relations of France and the EEC to Africa and come up with different forecasts. Still in France, we carry an investigation into the scandal of illegal African immigrants.

From Washington **Bruce Oudes** takes the recent book, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, as a starting point for a look at the Agency's operations in Africa, while elsewhere Uganda's former Foreign Minister, Wanume Kibedi, presents his own revelations about Uganda's recent history.

**Wanume Kibedi**, after legal training in Britain practiced in Uganda from 1968 to 1971, when he was also active in politics. After the January, 1971 coup he was appointed by General Amin to be Foreign Minister. He resigned in 1973 and subsequently explained that his resignation was a protest against the disappearances in his country. He is currently living in exile in Europe.

**Guy Arnold** is a freelance writer and lecturer based in London and specializing in African and Commonwealth affairs. From 1968 to 1972 he was Director of the Africa Bureau (London). He is the author of a number of books, the latest published in April, 1974 was *Kenyatta and the Politics of Kenya*.

**Colin Legum** is Associate Editor of *The Observer* (London) which he joined as Commonwealth and Africa correspondent in 1949. He is editor of the annuals, *Africa Contemporary Record* and *Traveler's Guide to Africa*, as well as the author of numerous books on African and international affairs.

**Pierre Pradervand** has studied and worked in the field of world population for more than eight years and is a leading opponent of conventional views on birth control. He is presently attached to the International Development Research Center in Ottawa, Canada.

**David Fouquet** worked for ten years as a journalist in Washington on the staff of the *Washington Post*, *The Wall Street Journal* and other newspapers. He subsequently served as an information officer for the European Community Commission in Brussels and for the past year has been a freelance writer in Europe primarily for *Newsweek* and the *Baltimore Sun* on European economic and political affairs.

**Takawira Shumba Mafukidze** is Rhodesian, currently studying ancient and medieval history at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh. He is a student of African Affairs, in which he has a Master's degree. His articles have been published in *Black World*, the *Hindustan Times*, the *Jerusalem Post* and elsewhere.

**P-Kiven Tunteng** is a Cameroonian, who carried out his undergraduate work and part of his graduate studies at York University and the University of Ottawa. He was awarded his Doctorate degree by the University of Geneva in 1972. His articles have been published in a number of scholarly journals and he is the author of a forthcoming book, *From Pan-Negroism to African Paramountcy: the Role of Kwame Nkrumah*. He is currently assistant professor of political science at the Institute of International Studies, University of Yaoundé, Cameroun.

—AJH



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# France-Africa: Plus ça change...

Many commentators have hailed Giscard d'Estaing's election as President of France as marking the end of Gaullist foreign policies. The author analyses the prospects for change and arrives at the conclusion that, in the absence of effective action from the African side, Franco-African relations will be the mixture as before.

By P-KIVEN TUNTENG

When General Charles de Gaulle departed from the French political scene in 1969, there were predictions that Franco-African relations would undergo a marked transformation. The forecasts proved wrong. In the last five years, certain aspects of these relations have indeed changed, but this should be viewed more as an effort to create the appearance of transformation than as evidence of a determination to bring about substantial modification. This was the pattern followed by Georges Pompidou during his presidency, and expectations that Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the new French president, might drastically alter these arrangements may be premature.

The Franco-African bond transcends individual efforts. It includes cultural, economic and political activities and is, furthermore, reinforced by two psychological factors—the French belief in their inherent right to control and, if possible, direct their former African colonies; and the apparent acceptance by Africans of the thesis that there is no alternative to dependence on France in their development strategy. Notwithstanding the impression of imminent change in French-speaking Africa indicated by some events of the last four years, it is likely that for the most part France will remain a preponderant power in the region. There will of course be changes, but they will consist of minor adjustments designed to guarantee preservation of the larger framework.

### Ideological Foundation

It would be wrong to expect sudden alterations in Franco-African relations just because the presidency of the republic has shifted from Gaullist hands to those of the aristocratic and non-Gaullist d'Estaing. While de Gaulle certainly added a special touch to these dealings, the foundation had been laid much before his arrival in the presidency.The ideological basis for the Franco-African bond was implicit in the nature of French colonialism. In the eyes of Frenchmen, colonialism was an extension of their national destiny. By spreading the French language and culture abroad, *la mission civilatrice* was in effect creating a new breed of Frenchmen, who despite pigmentational differences, were entitled to the same rights and benefits enjoyed in the motherland. In considerable measure, language and culture were held to be more symbols of French citizenship *than the mere fact of pigmentation.* Africans who approximated French cultural standards were generally accepted by the French on the basis of official equality. When Africans such as Blaise Diagne, Léopold Senghor and Felix Houphouët-Boigny held enviable positions in Paris, the French did not embark on a national crusade to resist this "Black invasion." The Black élites in turn fought to advance French interests with determination that equaled that of any Frenchman.

*A bond forged over a long time and* nourished by emotional and psychological ties is not likely to be severed with one stroke. Each new French leader may demonstrate a different style, or emphasize new areas of cooperative endeavor, but the basic structure will resist drastic alteration for some time. Francophone Africa is of enormous economic and psychological importance to France. Should major French interests be threatened, there will always be a readiness to concede *minor adjustments.* It is against this background that we must view de Gaulle's decision to grant independence *en masse* to the former French African colonies in 1960, despite the fact that two years earlier most of these states had opted for juridical control from Paris, and his *volte face* on the Algerian issue in 1962. He had made these minor concessions in order to guarantee preservation of larger French interests, such as influence through economic domination. Ably assisted by Foccart, Pompidou found similar adjustments necessary, and no doubt d'Estaing will do the same.

### Imbalance of Agreements

The juridical framework for French involvement in post-independent Africa is contained in cooperation agreements signed on the eve of independence in 1960. While these agreements widened the scope of French policies in francophone Africa, they considerably restricted the ability of these states to assert their independence. Although specifics of most of

these agreements remain secret, it is known that they granted France the right to retain military bases and soldiers in these countries and to establish monetary control from Paris, and gave unusually preferential treatment of French nationals. Economic control of these countries remained in the hands of the French Government and French companies. After more than a decade of independence, it was hardly revolutionary for these states to demand changes that would at least give them the appearance of effective sovereignty over their national affairs.

Although there has been substantial rhetoric about the renegotiation of cooperation agreements, the whole exercise remains unclear. What is being negotiated? To what extent is francophone Africa ready for change? All we have had during the last few years are declarations that both sides are ready to negotiate in a spirit of "mutual cooperation"—a euphemism for French hegemony. As recently as during his spring 1972 African visit, Pompidou announced that "La France occupe dans cette partie du continent africain une position privilégiée qu'il est de *son devoir moral comme de son intérêt économique et politique de ne pas se laisser* dégrader." (Emphasis added) This was a firm resolve to strengthen French control in the region, not an invitation to discuss disengagement.

It is generally conceded that France reaps considerable political and economic benefits from its relations with francophone Africa. But to justify this arrangement as a moral necessity suggests that France is still embarked on its "civilizing mission." Legitimized by dated agreements, costly French technical assistants are retained in positions that could easily be filled by Africans—grade-school and high-school teachers, nurses, typists, cashiers and ordinary administrators. In addition to salaries paid by the French Government, each technical assistant receives free accommodations from the host country and a basic allowance that in some cases could pay the salaries of as many as three local workers doing similar jobs.

Meanwhile, Africans, including the younger generation, have not formu-

de Gaulle in Brazzaville, 1958

Pompidou in Gabon, 1971

lated a clear strategy in their relations with France; a kind of love-hate attitude persists. They resent the French for ignoring African interests, but their attraction to French beliefs and practices shows little sign of abatement.

The evolving French strategy seems based on a willingness to withdraw to the background, especially when the issues are sensitive. Thus the decline of a conspicuous *présence francaise* will be more than compensated for by its continuing influence in the background. One noticeable change has to do with the fact that in the 1960 accords, the French ambassador in French-speaking African states was to be the dean of the diplomatic corps. In return, ambassadors from the African states were to be granted a "special" position in the French capital. The latter concession was perhaps deliberately ambiguous because, in effect, it was intended to mean nothing, certainly in comparison to the honor given to the French ambassadors. But this symbol of diplomatic inequality proved to be more of an irritant than the larger question of domination and economic control from Paris. In recent negotiations with Camerounian officials, for example, the French easily agreed to abrogate the right of their ambassador in Yaoundé to be the automatic dean of the diplomatic corps. As would have been the case elsewhere in francophone Africa, Camerounian officials dutifully publicized this development as evidence of the country's independence from France.

In a sense, the simple correction of a diplomatic abnormality had become a demonstration of independence. Because appearances count for more than substance in the Franco-African community, changes of this nature will occupy a prominent position in the renegotiated agreements with France. The intricate but carefully connected economic factor is likely to be preserved intact with only peripheral changes.

### Economic Constraints and Dependency

Poorer in both human and natural resources than their anglophone counterparts, francophone African countries have been considerably limited in taking independent action by economic considerations. The Sahel states—Niger, Mail, Chad, Upper Volta, Mauritania and Senegal—which have recently been faced with unprecedented famine and are threatened by the possibility of anniliation, are all francophone and among the poorest in the continent. With few economic options, they are only too happy at the readiness of the French Treasury to come to their assistance.

Although figures often publicized as French foreign aid include items that cannot properly be considered as such, the fact remains that French

President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing

financial assistance to its former colonies *has* been rather generous. The backlash that has led to drastic reductions in foreign aid in most western countries (notably the U.S.) has not surfaced in France. The French seem to accept financial assistance to their former colonies as a national responsibility, whereas Americans have been inclined to view it as a humanitarian gesture. In this regard, the French have seemed willing to shoulder the financial burden of their preponderant influence in francophone Africa. The fact that they have paid the price of control in the region has tended to escape those who create the impression that any country could enjoy comparable influence at no cost.

With their relatively fragile economies, only the guarantee of the French Treasury has made the currencies of these countries worthy of some acceptance in international transactions. This is neither to suggest approval for the political implications of this arrangement nor the economic benefits that it brings to France. The point is merely that without the French guarantee, the currencies of some of these countries would be worth little in foreign-exchange markets. The problems that confronted Guinea when it rejected the French community in 1958 and created its own currency, and Mali's flirtation with its own currency before rejoining the Franc Zone in 1967, all point to the likely consequences of pursuing independent monetary policies.

The more independent course being pursued by leaders of the Malagasy Republic could be attributed to momentum generated by student demonstrations and strikes in May 1972. The conservative regime of Philibert Tsiranana was apparently more concerned with demonstrating its attachment to French ideals than with tackling urgent national problems. In the process, it became a willing client of French neocolonialism. Lack of enthusiasm for the Organization of African Unity, development of closer ties with South Africa and indifference to African liberation movements were all policies reflecting the preferences of French officials. The reversal of these policies by the present military regime demonstrates to some degree its desire to exercise a degree of independence from France, but this is far from implying that the country is about to sever its ties with France.

One major effect of the Madagascar and Mauritania crises of May and November 1972, respectively, has been withdrawal of both countries from the Franc Zone in order to create their own national currencies and to renegotiate the 1960 agreements with France. Largely because of sentiments expressed during the events of May 1972, Madagascar has shown a more determined spirit of independence than Mauritania. To create its new currency—which was presumably an expression of independence from France—Mauritania asked for French financial and techni-

cal assistance. In the same vein, the country's leadership expressed the desire "d'entretenir avec elle [France] les relations les plus étroites possibles," an intimation that any mention of disengagement was premature. The preservation of closer relations with France circumvents the scope for independent action. In a speech marking the 13th anniversary of Mauritania's independence, President Moktar Ould Daddah praised the quality of French technical assistance and looked forward to the continuance of French economic aid.

Reforms introduced in the monetary unions of Central and West Africa, respectively, in November 1972 did grant member states some small measure of monetary autonomy. But fundamental problems, such as control from the French Treasury, free movement of currencies within the Franc Zone and fixed exchange rates between all CFA francs and the French franc, remain unchanged. Thus fluctuations in the French franc will continue to have an automatic effect on francophone African currencies, as was seen in the January 1974 floating of the franc.

Notwithstanding the French guarantee that CFA currencies can at any time be converted to French francs, many countries, even including France's allies in the European Economic Community, seem firm in their treatment of the CFA as a worthless currency. In drawing attention to this situation on November 22, 1972, President Eyadéma of Togo was said to have shocked Paris officials. What became known as *bombe Eyadéma* was not due to any startling revelations—the difficulty in converting CFA francs outside the Franc Zone is well known—but rather resulted from President Eyadéma's violation of an important feature of Franco-African relations: tackling appearances while avoiding matters of substance, concealing genuine difficulties under the façade of unanimity. Rarely are disagreements permitted to disturb this illusion of perpetual tranquillity.

It is this illusion that the November 1973 Franco-African mini-summit in Paris sought to sustain. President Senghor, given his enthusiasm for a Commonwealth *à la francaise* or "Eurafrique" must have viewed the summit as the fulfillment of his dream. Not surprisingly, Hamani Diori, the subsequently deposed Niger president, announced that the summit was indeed "la création d'une structure permanente de concertation franco africaine." But the permanence of any such body was already undermined by the fact that four countries ignored the meeting—Cameroun, Madagascar, Mauritania and Chad. These four states have been the most articulate in their rhetoric of disengagement. Their rhetoric, however, has by far surpassed practical efforts to initiate major alterations in their relations with France.

French technical assistance in Senegal

Not to be left behind, President Senghor has attempted to join those francophone leaders professing independence from Paris. But his admiration for France is a matter of record, and he must have felt reluctant to renegotiate the accords that his country concluded with Paris in 1960. Under a recent agreement, France has handed over its military base in Dakar to the Senegalese Government. French troops in the base will be repatriated, but of the 2,259 who are there at the moment, 1,300 will remain in Senegal indefinitely. The transfer of formal control of the base to Senegal is not incompatible with continued French use of its facilities.

As part of an overall strategy, a policy of Africanization can contribute significantly toward bringing matters of major importance under African control. In itself, such a policy may do no more than create the illusion of change while the fundamental framework and basic principles remain unchanged. This strategy has gained increasing attraction in all of Africa. The most significant element of the November 1972 accords between France and five Central African states—Chad, Cameroun, Congo, Central African Republic and Gabon seems to have been the issue of Africanization. Changes in these agreements included the appointment of an African as head and director of the Bank of Central African States (BEAC). To put Blacks in positions previously held by whites is a relatively easy task, and it may mean no more than that—a change of faces in front offices. It is the structures and principles guiding these relations that need reappraisal. If preceded by such a reexamination, a policy of Africanization can constitute a significant advance. To be meaningful, however, such a policy must concentrate on the search for the right men.

It is now generally conceded that many educated Africans identify more with the former colonial powers than with their own brethren, and when placed in responsible positions they have turned out to be more ardent

defenders of foreign interests than those of national concern. This is particularly true of French-speaking Africa; for the influence that France enjoys in these countries is frequently due less to French machinations than to the commitment of Africans to French ideals. Their vision of development is often limited to the belief that their progress is inherent in the advancement of French objectives. Herein may lie a potent explanation for neocolonialism: the *need* for outside direction invites foreign domination.

The Franco-African relationship is such that Frenchmen do not have to occupy sensitive positions in these countries in order to guarantee the advancement of their national interests. A more prudent strategy has been to replace white with "reliable" Africans. This creates the impression of change while permitting the continuation of long-established policies. To some degree, recent changes in the University of Yaoundé underscore this dilemma. Founded 12 years ago and dominated by the French, the institution underwent several personnel changes in 1973. The university chancellor, vice-chancellor and registrar are now Camerounians, as are most of the deans, heads of departments and administrators. In substantive terms, these changes have meant relatively little. The structure of the university, curriculum, examinations, staff and student behavior all show an unmistakable identity with the French system. Moreover, the French still possess enormous leverage to force their will. As the body responsible for administering French aid to higher education in Cameroun, *la fondation francaise d'enseignement supérieur* makes grants directly to university professors for research purposes and participation in seminars and also provides vehicles (which are registered as French property) to senior university officials. Through all these practices, the foundation exercises direct control over academic and non-academic matters. In short, though French equipment and facilities are available to the university, they remain French property.

As the most French of all universities in French-speaking Africa, similar, but largely peripheral, efforts have been made to effect reforms in the University of Dakar. Unlike the University of Yaoundé, where Camerounians constitute a large proportion of the teaching staff, less than half the staff at Dakar is Senegalese. Despite pressures for Senegalization, President Senghor insists that at least 25 per cent of the university staff consist of foreigners. President Senghor's attachment to the French system virtually guarantees that the University of Dakar will remain welded to the French tradition for some time to come.

### Prospects of Future Evolution

This generally pessimistic assessment of the probability of change in Franco-African relations should not be interpreted as suggesting a static relationship devoid of dynamism. There will continue to be changes but these will revolve around tactical and strategical adjustments rather than transformation of the existing framework. Because of increasing African sensitivity to foreign involvement in continental matters, blatant acts such as the French intervention to save the Gabonese regime of Leon M'ba in 1964 are not likely to be repeated. But more discreet tactics could still be utilized to achieve similar objectives. When the Chad regime of President Ngartat Tombalbaye faced imminent collapse in 1969 as a result of a determined rebellion, French troops fought alongside Chadian soldiers and ultimately succeeded in neutralizing the domestic situation in that country. The French justified their action on the ground that a dangerous precedent would be set if an ally were not aided, as provided for by the military and political accords of 1960. To the extent that the French avoid overt military intervention, their eminence in the economic affairs of these countries constitutes sufficient leverage that can be used to force the acceptance of favored measures.

Apart from his vague promise not to export arms to regimes that use them to retard the goals of self-determination, President Giscard d'Estaing has had little to say about Franco-African relations. Although there may be changes in French policies toward European integration and the Atlantic alliance, there is a more than even chance that African policies will veer along the status quo. Since d'Estaing's Independent Republican Party constitutes a minority in the National Assembly, he will continue to seek Gaullist support to push his measures through. The dismissal of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, leader of the Radical Party, from the Reform Ministry, which he held for less than two weeks, and d'Estaing's failure to appoint Mme. Françoise Giroud of *L'Express* as a junior minister as he had promised, point to Gaullist pressures. Gaullist officials are understandably delighted with their early successes and are likely to play a major role in formulating d'Estaing's "liberal" policies.

More importantly, it is not up to the French president alone to change his country's relations with French-speaking Africa. Since complaints tend to come from France's African partners, it is up to them to define their objectives and indicate areas of desired reform. With such important leaders as Senghor of Senegal and Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast showing apparent satisfaction with the exisiting arrangements, no major changes should be expected.

The feeling of dependency that the French have over the years instilled in African political behavior will for the foreseeable future mitigate against evolution of an independent spirit in French-speaking Africa. This attitude has fostered the view that changes in Franco-African relations must be initiated from Paris. Thus, each time the French presidency changes hands, expectations of new developments engulf francophone Africa. Preoccupied with the short term, the French presence has made it relatively easier for Africans to ignore the sacrifices that must be made in the long run for their own development. Together with the French determination to preserve their hegemony, this dependence on the French Treasury will continue to make Africans reluctant to consider genuine disengagement from the French system as an attractive development strategy. □

# African Unity– In Europe

Association with the European Economic Community was once an issue that divided Africa. But in the negotiations now hammering out a new relationship the African states have forged a new common approach.

By DAVID FOUQUET

The old order in European-African relations may be radically altered as a result of some tough bargaining now underway between the European Common Market and 44 of the world's developing countries.

The setting for this probable transition is the negotiation between the nine-member European Economic Community on one side and most of developing Africa, accompanied by several small Pacific and Caribbean countries, on the other side. These talks got started in July 1973 ostensibly to renew the pact that has linked the Community with 18 former African colonies and the island of Mauritius.

But from the very beginning it was obvious that there was to be a clean break with the past. First, the formerly French-dominated EEC Association accord was to be enlarged by a number of former British Commonwealth states not only from Africa but from other parts of the world. From the start there was also a remarkably united front of both francophone and anglophone African states confronting a Europe in disarray. Out of this situation has emerged a tough African delegation paced by a demanding Nigerian team that has virtually called the shots against the squabbling Community. This situation, along with the appearance of new governments in Europe, has already resulted in major concessions from the European side, concessions that could pave the way for a historic accord.

The shape of this new order is still unclear and remains to be painfully hammered out at the negotiating table. Some observers feel the resulting treaty could become a model for mature relations between the developing and the industrial worlds. But there is also the fear that the talks could degenerate into a stalemate, resulting in a document filled with thinly veiled platitudes or one that perpetuates a crypto-colonial link between Europe and Africa. The latter fears, however, seem unlikely in view of the African delegations' militant all-or-nothing stance. They seem determined to replace the worn-out fabric of a system that has largely lost its meaning with something that can be of real benefit to them.

If the future seems still unclear, it is no more ambiguous than the old pattern. The existing European-African relations, which spanned the first phases of the post-colonial period, contained both benefits and disadvantages for Africans and Europeans alike.

These links are a direct outgrowth of the colonial era and French foreign policy. They date back to 1957 when the terms of the European Community were being drawn up and France convinced its hesitant partners that the EEC should jointly accept responsibility for aiding members' colonies. Of the six EEC countries, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy still had colonies or trusteeships. When the colonies achieved independence, they were allowed to continue their trade and aid connections with the EEC, a choice accepted by all except Guinea. In addition to the 18 countries linked to the EEC through a convention signed at Yaoundé, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda also negotiated a looser system of trade preferences with the Community in 1969. In recent years, the European Community has also established trade agreements with Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and Egypt in North Africa.

At first, Germany and Holland were reluctant to go along with this French-inspired system. They opposed the concentration of aid and trade preferences on former colonies, which discriminated against other developing countries and reinforced the suspicion of neocolonialism. They were also interested in continuing to use their purchases of tropical products as leverage for sales of industrial products and for investment in more promising countries, such as Brazil and Nigeria.

This system did, however, result in significant benefits to this so-called magic circle of African associated states. The free-trade accord gave the African states preferential entry for their products into a rich European market and enabled them to break their sale reliance on French purchases. They also received financial aid and loans from the EEC as well as

bilateral aid from France and the other members. More than $2 billion was channeled without strings through EEC institutions. This assistance has funded hospitals, wells and irrigation projects and has financed programs in such fields as health and agriculture. A recent Community study surveyed export and industrialization potential of African countries and could point the way for productive activity in the future. Community programs are also administered by dedicated officials relatively free from national or private pressures.

The reverse side of the coin is also evident in political pressure and discrimination in favor of established firms, most of them French. One recent example was the intervention of former President Pompidou in obtaining funds for a railway in Gabon that seemed destined to service mostly the international timber and mining companies in that country. There were also limits to European generosity when African products competed with domestic items. An unseemly row erupted in 1972 when Italian pressure succeeded in limiting incoming African agricultural products that competed with Italian output. In other cases, duty-free entry has been a myth masking the obstacles of nontariff *barriers, such as health requirements,* additional taxes or licensing procedures.

And for many years the price of most products exported by the African states to Europe either stagnated or declined while the cost of the finished products they imported from the Europeans climbed endlessly. In some instances the latter were products made in Europe from raw materials supplied from Africa but not processed on the spot because there were no processing or manufacturing plants.

Another harsh reality was the contradiction between the Community's avowed aim of concentrating its assistance on these former colonies and its stated desire to aid the developing world in general. This second goal led to other competing associations or trade agreements and to the EEC's implementation of the U.N.-proposed system of generalized tariff preferences for all developing countries. This considerably watered down the advantage once held by the Yaoundé associated countries.

The Yaoundé association has also become a political liability to the Europeans. It was an inviting target for critics charging it was a neocolonialist arrangement to enrich the Europeans and their handpicked African élites. There was also the American criticism of the "reverse preferences" the associated countries had to grant to European Community products under the accords. The Community argued that such reciprocity was necessary to comply with the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which the United States had been instrumental in drafting. Although the impact on U.S. trade was regarded as negligible, it was not until 1973, when the EEC emphasized that African associates were free to apply other levies and taxes, that the U.S. relented. In any event, the reverse-preferences system did discourage the Africans from buying in the cheapest markets.

Another drawback of the system for the Africans has also been attacked by Robert K. A. Gardiner of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa. Gardiner has charged that the *Yaoundé framework hindered African* economic cooperative ventures, especially between Community-associated countries and nonassociated countries. Under the existing accords, he notes, Yaoundé treaty adherents cannot give nonassociated countries more preferential treatment than that granted to the EEC. "An African economic grouping will be meaningless," he observes, "if it is virtually forbidden to compete with Community activities and interests."

Mercifully, the much-discussed Yaoundé convention is scheduled to expire in February 1975. This will enable the Community to seek suitable treatment for Britain's former colonies at the same time it is negotiating with the existing associates. Great Britain borrowed a page from French policy when it negotiated its entry into the Common Market and at the same time secured a promise of special treatment for former British colonies.

FED-financed clinic

They were at first offered a choice between extension of the existing accords, new trade pacts or nonparticipation. But it quickly became evident that the developing countries involved wanted a new deal economically and not just continuation of the present system.

After several strategy sessions, leadership of the 44 nations involved seemed to have been seized by the hard-liners, particularly Nigeria, which had already negotiated a link with the EEC at the time the East African countries worked out the *1969 Arusha Declaration. The Nigeri*an pact became a dead letter after the civil war, but emboldened by its new oil-based power, Nigeria is now assuming a new leadership role in Africa through various aid projects with neighbors, advocacy of a West African Economic Community and its performance in the EEC negotiations.

Nigeria and the other states supporting its position have told the Community they would not be party to an accord that did not substantially improve economic benefits to the associates. Nigeria's ambassador in Brussels, Olu Sanu, has become the spokesman for the negotiating team. Throughout the sessions with the EEC, he has bluntly informed the Europeans that he rejects the concept of developing countries' giving reciprocal preferences to European trade, that the developing countries want unrestricted entry for their agricultural products and that they want industrial-



EEC-Africa negotiations in Brussels

FED-financed drainage scheme —*photos courtesy EEC*

development aid as well as stronger guarantees on prices and purchases of their commodity exports from the EEC. They are also seeking a larger aid fund. These demands have been initiated at strategy sessions that have shown a remarkable degree of unity and negotiating savvy. At one point the African countries agreed to negotiate with the Community only on the points they were united on. This unity and toughness now seems to be running throughout the 44 nations involved and cuts across the former barrier between francophone and English-speaking African states. "The current exercise has brought Francophones and Anglophones together in a way that has not happened since the creation of the OAU itself," Ambassador Sanu noted recently.

Across the bargaining table, the developing countries have found a relatively willing negotiator in the Common Market's executive commission and especially Commissioner Claude Cheysson. The Commission originally proposed the important plan for income stabilization for commodity-exporting countries. The negotiators for the 44 liked the plan so much they now want it expanded. But beyond the EEC Commission was a dispirited and disunited array of member states unwilling to give it a broad-enough negotiating mandate. For a long time France and Belgium held out for reciprocity in trade preferences from the associates. And Italy wanted to protect its tropical products. Exasperated at a recent meeting, Sanu told the EEC negotiator, "You . . . mainly restated your old position which has been known to us for some time."

Like many other major international negotiations, these give all appearances of being long and difficult. At this stage it even appears doubtful that they can be completed by the 1975 target date. This could prove to be a problem for both the EEC and the 44 developing countries. By then the long-awaited multilateral round of trade negotiations within the GATT might get underway in earnest. This could in turn distract and divert the attention of both the EEC and the developing countries from the Yaoundé-type talks, even though both have a lot at stake in both forums. And these encounters might test the patience and unity of both sides, unity that will be needed, especially by the Africans and other developing countries, in order to reach mutually satisfactory conclusions in Brussels. Time will also weigh heavily in Europe as the industrialized countries either shake themselves out of their potential economic tailspin or sink deeper.

But at the moment, there is a new atmosphere on both sides. The incoming French administration of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing seems to have swept out some of the older African policy makers like master fixer Jacques Foccart and, along with its EEC partners, seems to be willing to help. African unity and boldness also seems to grow with each success or strong stand. Despite the always ominous threat of economic danger in Africa, there are also signs of a new economic and industrial spirit in countries like Nigeria and Zaire. Significantly, the Kenyan newspaper *East African Standard* recently called for not only toughness at the bargaining table but also a constructive program in African industry. "A failure to be tough during the bargaining could leave these developing nations wide open to all sorts of expoitation which could only be classified as economic colonialism," the paper noted. But it also observed that the African states should increasingly turn toward trade and industry within the African continent. "Why should nations in Africa have to buy commodities or raw materials from the other side of the world if, in fact, these are available on their own doorstep?"

This along with the new order in Europe might be a new design for Africa. And the time is ripe for a change. The biggest criticism that can be leveled at the past European-African relationship is that it has been inadequate. Despite its aim of concentrating on 18 African states, efforts simply have not been sufficient. After years of association with Europe, these 18 countries are still among the poorest and neediest in the world. Whatever advantages were derived from the association, the overall record is not good and should be replaced by one that is more satisfactory to both partners. □

Since the research for this article was carried out, the French government has clamped tighter controls on the illegal immigrant traffic. It remains to be seen what effect the official measures will have.

# The New Slave Trade

"Two Africans drowned while attempting to cross border river" *France-Soir*, April 3, 1974. "Four Africans found frozen to death in Pyrenean pass"—*France-Soir*, November 22, 1973. "A sealed lorry broke down in France. It has led to the discovery of an organized international traffic in African slaves"—*London Evening Standard*, July 18, 1972.

To find out what truth there was in these news headlines, we travelled 3,000 miles by plane, train, lorry and moped to one of the remotest parts of Africa—to the desert scrub interior of the former French West African colonies of Mauritania, Mali and Senegal. We visited slum African hostels in Paris and bidonville halfway houses in Dakar. We talked to police officials in Rome and senior civil servants in Paris and Dakar.

We have also looked at a confidential report prepared by a research unit of the United Nations for the Economic Commission for Africa. This critically important report was the work of a team of six and involved close and detailed research projects both in Africa and France.

By EDIMA N'GOUMOU AND JONATHAN POWER

There are 10 million immigrant workers and family members in Common Market Europe alone. France itself has more than three-and-a-half million, more than any other European country. Herman Kahn, interviewed after the publication of his startling report to the French Government *The Take off of France in the '80s* said "France has only been able to develop its economy with the speed it has because she's been able to make use of three-million foreigners."

The number of Black African workers in this total is disputed. Official government estimates are around 50,000. The General Union of Senegalese Workers, sensitive to talk of a "black invasion," gives out a figure of 26,000. Jean-Claude Guillebaud, of *Le Monde*, reckons it is probably about 70,000 and increasing by 5,000 a year. This figure is made up of 21,000 Senegalese, 10,000 Mauritanians and 35,000 Malians. The rest come from other French-speaking states like Dahomey, Ivory Coast and Guinea. The spread of nationalities hides the ethnic concentration. Seventy-five per cent of these African migrants are Soninkes who live in the dried-out drought-ridden territory of the upper Senegal river.

The United Nations report states on page 20: "There were for the year 1971, 103 regular introductions of African nationals from countries south of the Sahara, that is introductions controlled by the National Immigration Office." This means that the vast majority of the Africans in France sweeping its streets, emptying its trash cans and working in filthy and dangerous jobs in factories and construction sites are *illegal* immigrants. They have paid at least $1,000 to get to France, twice the cost of regular air tickets. They have come by a variety of routes, many of them dangerous. In the last decade more than a hundred Africans have lost their lives trying to reach what they regard as the promised land.

The oldest and most established route is through Morocco and Spain, by boat to Agadir or Casablanca and then a change of boats for Bilbao or Barcelona. Alternatively, plane to Las Palmas, Madrid or Barcelona. Then nights of waiting at down-at-heel hotels. Perhaps the Hotel Lincoln in Casablanca, the Hotel Los Arcos in Barcelona or the Bar Patxi at Irun. Waiting for Spanish traffickers who will take them in a series of night-time journeys across the Pyrenees, through the valleys of Lizarieta, Etchalar or Dantcharia and into France. Once over the border the Basque guides say: "Walk straight on, you're in France."

In 1972, 600 of them walked straight into the arms of the French police and were turned back. Many of these returned migrants are to be found working as laborers on the Hendaye-Béhobie Autoroute in Spain. One of the migrants now in Paris inter-

# Rhodesia Under Pressure

**Developments in Africa arising from the changes in Portugal represent a decisive shift in the politico-military situation in southern Africa. The Rhodesian authorities do not appear to have appreciated the significance for their own position in what is happening.**

By GUY ARNOLD

The Smith regime still acts as though it will retain power for the foreseeable future; in fact, it should now be asking whether it has two or five years to run. There is little sign, however, that the white hierarchy in Salisbury realizes just how precarious its tenure has become. Without South Africa's military, economic and moral support the Rhodesian white minority would be close to collapse already; now it appears South African support may shortly be withdrawn. Like the French Bourbons, the Rhodesia Front learns nothing and forgets nothing; there is no indication it will seriously attempt to come to terms with African nationalism before being swamped by it.

There are six groups that must play a crucial part in the Rhodesia question in the months and years ahead—three inside the country and three outside. First, there is Prime Minister Smith's Rhodesia Front, and it would appear they intend to continue behaving toward the African majority as though there had been no coup in Portugal and as though there was no possibility of a change of government in Mozambique. It is doubtful that the Rhodesia Front is capable of coming to terms with a new reality. It will fight a rearguard action to the end, which may be very soon. Second, there is the African National Council, (ANC) which with skill and patience has maneuvered itself into a position of reasonable strength: it talks with Smith, is still legitimate, has widespread African backing and is now being recognized officially as a potential negotiating factor by the British Government—the first African group to obtain such treatment from Whitehall since Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in 1964. Third are the liberation movements, especially the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), whose guerrilla successes in the northeast over the last 18 months have done more than anything since the Pearce Report to speed the pace toward change in Rhodesia and start the Europeans facing the reality of their long-term position.

Outside pressures come from Mozambique, South Africa and Britain. As a result of the coup in Lisbon, there is likely to be a Frelimo government in Mozambique within two years, with all the consequences for Salisbury that this will entail. South Africa is now seriously contemplating a withdrawal into a protective *laager* that would involve ending its support for Rhodesia. In Britain, even a minority Labor Government will in-

answer rests with the *marchands de sommeils* (sleep sellers) who rent beds by the hour, or with the foyers—often converted factories and cellars. Take 45 rue Gabriel Peri, Ivry-sur-Seine, a disused factory:

541 Africans:
Average Room size: 17 x 12.80 x 2.57 meters
Average vertical space between beds: 1.17 meters
Average horizontal space between beds: 0.65 meters

*Ground floor*
1st room, 13 beds
2nd room, 10 beds

*First floor* (without windows)
70 beds

*Second floor*
1st room, 93 beds, 17 campbeds
2nd room, 58 beds, 3 campbeds
3rd room, 40 beds, 3 campbeds (without windows)
4th room, 19 beds
5th room, 3 beds

*Third floor*
1st room, 100 beds, 4 campbeds
2nd room, 60 beds, 4 campbeds
3rd room, 22 beds (without windows)
*Water:* On second and third floors one tap of non-drinkable water.
*Drinking water:* Two taps in kitchen on ground floor.
*Toilets:* Five WCs on ground floor, and one on second and third floors.
*Bed clothes:* One sheet 1.50 meters long per person; cleaned once every 40 days. Blankets provided: not cleaned once in four years.
*Price:* (i) Entrance fee $33 (ii) Price of bed per month $9.50.
*Revenue per month:* $4,897.

We visited more than a dozen slum foyers in Paris. They were all more or less the same. Indeed, when one adds up the totality of problems and sets them against the gains one wonders what prompts these young African men to migrate. If they are turned back two or three times, as quite a number are, they can pay as much as seven months' wages for the privilege of three years of the above—the average length of stay.

Yet the migration continues, and grows despite all its illogicalities and

despite all the impediments put in its path. Even if the Sahelian drought ended tomorrow, they would still come, for years of neglect of the agricultural base of Soninke society has taken its toll. A whole generation of young men have grown up regarding agriculture as an inferior hobby. Their remittances have not gone, by and large, into agricultural improvement, but into new mosques, pilgrimages to Mecca, more wives and cattle, and new houses.

"If France did find a way of cutting off this migration, the villages on the Senegal river would collapse practically overnight," says Papa Kane, a Soninke himself and Director of Dakar's famous Ecole Superieur d'Economie Appliquée.

But France, even if there is an economic recession, is not going to stop this clandestine inflow. For in recession, as Germany found in 1966-67, the demand for dirty jobs decreases relatively little. This flotsant and jetsam of manpower supply provides too crucial a role in the economy for there to be any immediate thought of doing without it. Malleable, flexible, it can like putty be pushed into the unpleasant gaps created by French economic advance.

It is not surprising that many French officials are worried by the exploitation involved in importing clandestine African labor. But they feel trapped. Some policy makers have toyed with the idea of going back to the old pre-1964 system of free mobility of labor, which would at least remove the blackmailing syndrome. But this is just not on politically. The fear is that without the deterrent of the hazards of the illegal route even more Africans would come. Given the enormous cultural and racial differences between the French and the Africans, this would only create immense social problems.

Indeed, it is almost as if employers, traffickers, migrants and government were all playing in a fortressed theater. Only if the walls themselves were taken down could they escape.

We have focused on the African illegal migration into France because it is the most graphic. But large numbers of clandestine workers live in all the high growth European economies—Germany, Switzerland, Holland and Sweden. And in France, too, there are thousands of clandestine Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians, Turks and Portuguese.

A report published recently by the European Churches Committee on Migrant Workers makes "a cautious estimate, that there are about half a million illegally employed migrants in Europe." The fact is that wherever there is economic growth, labor demand and restrictive or discriminatory immigration practices, this clandestine traffic will exist. As one European critic said: "We have seen the enemy and it seems to be us." □

**Their remittances have not gone, by and large, into agricultural improvement but into new mosques, pilgrimages to Mecca, more wives and cattle, and new houses.**

that the Africans, because they came without their families, were the most mobile of all the immigrants. Moreover, they were the least demanding of housing space since they were prepared to live in hostels, flop houses and barracks.

Inevitably their continuing illegal status made them ready meat for any vulture that wanted to swoop. Even if they can be regularized—and there is nothing in the 1964 bilateral agreements which says they have a *right* to be—they can only go through the formal motions if they have a job and pass a medical examination.

So the tendency is to take any job, at any rate of pay, in any conditions. But it is the medical examiniation that seems to be the real stumbling block. Since many arrive with tropical ailments and then soon catch temperate ones (the TB rate among Africans in France in the slum houses varies between 15 and 23 per cent) they know that if examined they stand a high chance of being sent home. Yet if they are not regularized they can be deported at a moment's notice; they can be blackmailed by unscrupulous employers; and they are not eligible for unemployment, sickness benefits and family allowances.

In short, a high proportion of Africans in France are living in a terrifying limbo of fear and uncertainty. Michel Wagner, director of the Church agency CIMADE which works with immigrants in Paris, Lyons and Marseilles, says: "Their precarious position turns them into a kind of subproletariat filling the crevices and cracks that no one else will touch."

African workers are found in a wide range of jobs and enterprises, although 65 per cent of them are concentrated in the automobile and textile industries. According to the statistics of the Seine Prefecture, 73.8 per cent in the Paris region work in firms employing more than a hundred wage earners.

In these bigger firms, even if they are doing the more unpleasant jobs, there is less room for the cruder exploitation that goes on in the smaller firms. At the very least there is usually some kind of trade union representation, albeit less effective than it might be because of racist feelings among the union officials. But in the smaller enterprises, there is not even this and Africans are often forced to work excessive hours at cut-throat wages.

The building industry is particularly notorious. The UN report singled it out for special attention:

"The building sector is one of the rare sectors which has evolved complete networks of organization, from the recruitment of the workers in Africa to their work and their housing on construction sites, sites which have all the aspects of real camps and where the laws are openly flouted: ridiculously low wages (sometimes agreed on in Africa when the employee does not yet have any benchmark to assess the pay offered); food and transport provided by the firm which charges excessively for its poor quality services; housing in huts; limitation of visits to certain hours, and the prohibition of women; suppression of all rights of trade unions and political expression . . .

". . . These practices are in force in the Oise at Armentiere, in the Seine Maritime at Elbeuf and the Lyons regions . . . In Seine et Marne, at Mesmil Amelot, when the airport of Roissy-en-France was being built, men were sleeping in huts on folding beds smaller than themselves and with no room to stand up. From their pay of 900 to 1,000 Francs per month ($190 to $210), 120F ($25) is deducted when they are eight men to a room and 190F ($39) when they are two men to a room."

We ourselves investigated the working conditions at some of the big oil company plants at Roissy-en-France. Outside one of them the newly arrived assembled on the pavement outside the Esso plant at 8:30 in the morning. They were then met by a young Moroccan known as Mustapha who is in fact working for a French employment agency.

Those immigrants we talked to told us they did not have to show either papers or an address. Mustapha merely gave them a piece of paper with a number and they were sent on to one of the oil companies. Those who ended up on a conveyor belt making petrol drums were paid 750 francs a month ($160) for a nine-hour day.

Needless to say this is not the rate paid to the employment agency. We estimated this at 1800 Fr a month for every man supplied. According to Michel Bosquet of the French journal *Le Nouvel Observateur*, who has carried out an intensive investigation of fly by night employment bureaus, this kind of arrangement is not uncommon. Given the African's lack of official status such abuses are all too easy.

But if the wage figures are startling, the industrial accident rate makes them almost pale into insignificance. According to a memorandum written by the Commissariat au Plan there are 1.8 per cent work accidents per month among African workers. Assuming an 11-month working year, this adds up to an annual accident rate of 19.8 per cent. One third of the persons interviewed by the United Nations team were victims of accidents at work. "The most frequent injuries are to the hand—crushed under a press, cut on a grinding wheel or burnt."

Strictly speaking, there are practically no unemployed workers from sub-Saharan Africa. In reality, unemployment is hidden by both the regularization procedure and by the requirement of French law which says that only those who have been employed for six continuous months can register as unemployed.

Since many Africans are used as stop-gaps for short term work—as at Roissy-en-France—they cannot register. The Ministry of Labor has measured their *non-employment*, that is the number of migrants without work as a percentage of the total number of migrants. The figure is 30 per cent.

It is when we come to housing, however, that the situation is most unpleasant. Who wants to house an illegal migrant with no job security? The

routes. Then came French colonial policy with its taxes which forced men to with its taxes which forced men to leave home and seek work as far afield as the diamond mines of the Congo, the peanut harvests of the coast, the French Merchant Navy and the infantry regiments of the French Army. Later came independence, the drought and the long journey to seek work in France. The spirit of the village had gone to Paris, Lyons or Bordeaux. But the irregular visits of the spirit and the modern mystery of the postal services and the money order makes it possible for the corpse to be preserved. The spirit is in the young men of the village: over 50 per cent are away at any one time. *Paris est Paradis* they say in the village.

When Senegal, Mali and Mauritania were given their independence in 1962, the migration to France had been going only a couple of years. De Gaulle's vision of independent French-speaking Africa involved a special relationship with France; he had no intention of allowing the umbilical cord to be completely severed. A multitude of reciprocal agreements were made that were meant to preserve many of the arrangements and privileges of the old colonial status. Free trade and free movement of labor were two of these.

At about the same time, France's postwar economic recovery was moving into its stride; France began to run out of its native labor. Attention swivelled outwards to Spain, Portugal, Italy and also, but with some reticence, to Algeria and Black Africa. The latter immigration was always of ambiguous status. The French Government saw immigration, not merely as a tool for solving short-term manpower need, but as a key element in its population policy. Here was the paradox. Perhaps understandably the government felt that its population policy had to be based on "easily assimilable" immigrants, yet France was being inundated by people of a sharply different race and culture.

The result was that in 1964 France negotiated a special agreement with Algeria which gave Algerian immigration a quota of 35,000 workers a year. And she negotiated a series of bilateral agreements with Mali, Senegal and Mauritania. The key clause in these sub-Saharan African agreements was article five, section two, which said that France would accept only immigrants who had a work permit issued by the Ministry of Labor. And that is when all the trouble began.

The introduction of this new rule for Black Africa was not matched by the introduction of any formal system of getting the work permits to those who wanted to come—as there was for Algeria. Probably the French government's hope was that the African migration would dry up.

Theoretically employers wanting to employ African labor could make arrangements through the French consulates to send out the necessary papers, but if they did that, under the laws of the National Office for Immigration, the employer would be responsible for paying the immigrant's passage and for his medical examination. Since in practice employers soon found that they could recruit African labor by merely waiting for it to arrive—vacancies were quickly notified to relatives back home by those already in France—they did not feel any need to waste scarce money formally recruiting it.

Many employers knew the labor was coming illegally, but because the French Government made it possible for illegal immigrants to "regularize" their position once they were in France and in a steady job, it was only "theoretically illegal" as one employer put it to us. This regularization policy was introduced formally in 1964 because of the vast clandestine inflow of Portuguese workers.

France badly wanted these European workers, but as Portugal did not allow emigration they were compelled to come, like the Africans, through the Pyrenees at night-time. A few came with tourist passports. In 1968, 82 per cent of all new immigrant workers in France were technically illegal.

The French Government was, in fact, trapped by its own conflicting needs. To accept the Portuguese meant turning a blind eye to the Africans.

Since 1970, however, there has been an agreement with Portugal that allows immigration into France to be formally controlled. Clearly France could now deal with the clandestine African entry more straightforwardly. It was at about this time that Africans found it increasingly difficult to penetrate by the old traditional routes. But policing, although strict, was never thorough. After all, France—with a sea frontier on only two sides—is fairly easy game for any determined migrant.

And there were the undeniable labor shortages, ever increasing, as France's economy blazed ahead. Many employers found they could not do without African labor. There was also the fact, all the more real for never being publicly talked about,



Marseilles crook. In order to unearth gate-crashers, a strict control is made on board . . . The police of the Port of Marseilles complete the work done by their colleagues in Dakar and those whose tickets do not bear the necessary sign or who do not have the password, are not allowed to disembark."

The general increase in policing on all these old traditional routes has resulted in a major switch to routes that go through Eastern Europe. The most important are through Yugoslavia, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Other routes mentioned to us were via Amsterdam, Brussels, Luxembourg and Geneva. The frontiers are crossed at night, often only after long and tiring night marches through the countryside.

There are also a multitude of minor routes—fishing vessels to small French ports, pilgrimages to Mecca with "stopovers" in Paris, and members of African folk dance troupes with "engagements" in Paris. We were even told, although we had no way of checking this information, that certain airline stewards and stewardesses would "arrange" entry for a fee.

It is in the villages on the southwestern edge of the Sahara that the origins of this traffic are to be found. There are no roads worth the name. The only assured access is by the ramshackle, twice-weekly night train from Dakar to Bamako, the Malian capital. Dropped at 8 a.m. at what on the map had looked like a town, we found ourselves in a searing wasteland of desert scrub. There was a single building beside the tracks—a dilapidated corrugated iron shack which turned out to be the station.

An hour later we had negotiated a ride with the one motorized vehicle that appeared—a brightly painted taxi-brousse (bush taxi) that ran us and 30 other jammed-in passengers along the only road there is in this 120,000 square mile wilderness. The road ran for 30 miles to Bakel and then it ended. Bakel, the capital of the region, although once a fortress town and the base of French penetration towards Mali, looks today as if it has never changed through the ages of man. It reminds one of the sketches of Timbuctoo made by the early explorers of "the dark continent."

The half dried out, slow-moving Senegal River sweeps in a broad arc around its perimeter. Long, gently sloping banks, baked in the sun, with drowsing donkeys waiting for their owners, who wash themselves in the river. A town of narrow, winding streets. Men in blue and grey robes. Women with splendid cottons and multi-colored turbans, fashioned by traditional weavers who sit under grass-thatched parasols with their yarn stretched out before them like a long Swiss mountain alphorn.

Yet Bakel, for all its ancient drowsiness, is the center of the emigration industry. Bakel post office pays out postal orders received from France to the tune of 8m CFA francs a month ($40,000). Senegal post offices pay out $14 million a year in remittances.

To get out of Bakel and into the surrounding villages is only possible with one of us on the back of the Agricultural Demonstrator's moped and the other hitching a ride with the Shell oil tanker that had just made its monthly pilgrimage to fuel the taxis-brousses and mopeds. The tanker, without warning, turns off the road that leads to the railway station and plunges into the scrubland.

I can see a faint track that the driver seems to be following. The temperature is 105°F in the shade. Nothing except thorns and briars. Rainfall, which should be 700mm a year, is down to 80mm. There have been no proper rains for six years. The desert is advancing. Is there human life? We have driven for two hours and seen neither man nor beast. I begin to wonder what happens if we break down. I finger in my bag for the small Vichy water bottle given to me on my journey out by Air France.

Then suddenly before us is a scene out of the Arabian Nights. First the twin towers of a mosque, shaped, turned and glittering white in the sun. Its silvered crescent upended points to a cloudless sky. Then as we peer forward I see a line of donkeys and traps advancing towards us in convoy through the thorn bushes. A woman walks along a path, spangled in red damask, an umbrella gently held aloft. Behind them are the traditional thatched houses interspersed with gleaming white replicas of Cote d'Azur summer cottages; only the corrugated iron roofs inhibit total deception. But around us as if to persuade us that we are the victims of hallucinations brought on by the unbearable heat, are the carcasses of dead cattle.

And then I understand. Here, like a mummied corpse, is the body of a bygone culture that had flourished with some degree of extravagance in the days of the gold, leather, and ivory trade across the Sahara. Now it was the sad victim of successive disasters. First came the invasion of the French that destroyed the old caravan

The movie, **Shaft in Africa** was a fictional presentation based upon the situation which is revealed in this investigation. We are grateful to MGM for permission to reproduce the stills which appear alongside the article.

viewed by the United Nations investigating team said: "I am 19, I come from Selibaby in Mauritania. I have just arrived in Paris. When I finished studying the Koran, I thought of coming to make some money in France. I first went to Dakar where I obtained a visa after paying 25,000 CFA francs ($120), thanks to a friend. From Senegal, I went to Spain where I spent three months waiting for some money to be sent to me. I spent a total of 500,000 CFA francs ($2,500) before reaching Paris and I do not know how I will succeed in paying it back. I think I'll not see Africa again and that I shall have to work for the whole of my life to pay it back."

The second well-established route is through Algiers, Tunis and Italy. This involves first a journey by bush taxi, lorry and a clandestine ride on the Mauritanian iron ore train. It is desert most of the way. If luck is on your side, you can get to Tunis in two weeks. From there you head up through Sicily to Rome or Milan. Italian taxi drivers demand $275 for the illicit journey from Milan to Paris.

In the past year and a half or so, following the discovery of the 59 Malians in the sealed lorry, there has been some attempt to clamp down on these two routes. Not very effectively however. A senior police official at the Rome headquarters of the Ministry of Interior told us that it was impossible to discriminate between tourists and illegal transients.

The third well-established route is through Marseilles. On the face of it, it sounds the simplest. You buy your ticket and board the packet boat in Dakar and you jump ship on arrival in Marseilles. In practice it is not so straightforward. The United Nations report records: "The African who wishes to go to France cannot buy his ticket directly from shipping companies such as Fane or Frayssinet or Chargeurs Réunis. He must necessarily go through the representative of some

crease sanctions against Rhodesia and Prime Minister Wilson has the satisfaction of knowing that the longer Whitehall does nothing, the greater the likelihood of a collapse in Salisbury. Altogether the prospects for the Rhodesia Front are grim.

The first considerations about the current situation in Rhodesia must center on Mozambique. Whatever the hesitations and setbacks in Lisbon there can be no going back now; no doubt there will be crises and attempts to stem the advance of independence, but in broad terms it is not unreasonable to predict that in two years Mozambique will be independent under Frelimo rule. This is likely to have a number of consequences for Rhodesia. First, it will treble the length of hostile border across which guerrillas can enter the country—from the present Zambezi River border with Zambia to the whole eastern border of Rhodesia, from Beira on the Zambezi to the Limpopo and South Africa—and there will be no Portuguese military forces with whom the Rhodesian forces will be able to coordinate operations. Second, a newly independent regime in Mozambique will almost certainly apply sanctions to Rhodesia, both by closing the railway lines from Umtali to Beira and from Salisbury to Lourenço Marques and by ceasing to supply Salisbury with so many of its false certificates of origin for export purposes. Third, by presenting South Africa for the first time with some 500 kilometers of hostile border with Mozambique—as well as enabling Swaziland (with its main communications

Ian Smith at Victoria Falls

then passing through a friendly Black state to Lourenço Marques) to become economically detached from the Republic—the change must make Pretoria far more wary of any continuing commitment to defend Rhodesia to the north.

Even more important, however, are the repercussions of the coup in South Africa and the effects upon its general policy. For some time Rhodesia has been an embarrassment to Pretoria anyway: South Africa would have preferred no UDI in the first place and subsequently has often put pressure upon Salisbury to settle with Britain. Since 1967, South African paramilitary units have been stationed in Rhodesia in increasing numbers, principally along the Zambezi. Without this support, economic backing and the machinery to break sanctions, the Salisbury regime would long ago have collapsed. Now South Africa is undoubtedly reviewing its commitments to Rhodesia. Support for Rhodesia undermines Pretoria's so-called outward-looking policy of friendliness with Black African states. When Smith visited South African Prime Minister Vorster at the end of May, it is almost certain that the latter told Smith bluntly to come to terms with his African majority while he still had a few cards left in his hand. Since Rhodesia's most important card must be South African support, Vorster's advice will go unheeded at Salisbury's expense. An indication of the changing South African mood is the fact that early in June the press in the Republic began telling Rhodesia to settle, saying South Africa should exert pressure to make her do so. This time (unlike earlier occasions when the *Rand Daily Mail* adopted such a line) there were no Vorster recriminations against the press and no apologies to Smith because the articles had appeared. For once, the press and Vorster appeared to be in tune. In accepting the loss of Mozambique and Angola as buffers between itself and independent Black Africa, South Africa may be prepared to ditch Rhodesia as well. The Rhodesian military position will be outflanked by an independent Mozambique. In that case the 4,000 to 5,000 South African paramilitary forces along the Zambezi would no longer provide the effective shield, as they do now, behind which Rhodesian security forces combat the guerrillas within Rhodesia. Instead, for the Republic's military commitment to Rhodesia to make any sense, Pretoria would have to commit twice as many men to Rhodesia and probably an even higher number in order effectively to guard both the Zambezi and the Rhodesia-Mozambique borders against infiltration. Smith simply does not have the resources to do so and military cooperation from the Portuguese must now be regarded as a diminishing factor. Now such a vast increase in her military commitment to Rhodesia by Pretoria is unthinkable and would certainly be suicidal folly. The alternative is for South Africa to withdraw its forces to the Limpopo and ditch the defense of Rhodesia altogether. This appears increasingly probable. Indeed, Vorster may already have warned Smith that it will happen. Then Rhodesia would be in dire trouble from the liberation movements.



Central Salisbury: changes due?

White Rhodesian troops

Kariba Dam

What appears to have emerged in South African thinking since the coup in Lisbon is the following: First, the Republic will not attempt to intervene in Mozambique and will accept whatever Black government comes to power there. Second, it will withdraw into the *laager*, writing off the possibility of intervention in either the Portuguese territories or Rhodesia. Third, and following from this, South Africa will soon withdraw its forces from Rhodesia and will tell Smith that he is on his own and should settle if he can. Finally, South Africa will base its new policy upon a defense of South African territory only.

As though these possibilities are not enough to daunt Smith, there is a new political mood to contend with from Britain. Although there will almost certainly be another British general election before the end of the year, the most likely outcome would appear to be a Labor victory. But whatever the result, a new British Government could not ignore events in Portugal or retract the new approach to Rhodesia that is now emerging. Indeed, before the Heath government fell from power earlier this year, it had demonstrated a considerable toughening of attitude toward Salisbury; now the means at Smith's disposal for exerting pressures on London are dwindling.

On March 19 in the House of Commons, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary James Callaghan said that any settlement with Rhodesia "must be one we are satisfied enjoys the support of the African majority." Subsequently British Prime Minister Harold Wilson met with members of the ANC in London, marking the first time since UDI that a British Government has met representatives of Rhodesia's Africans as a potential alternative to negotiating with the regime itself.

The current examination of its African policies by the Labor Government is likely to produce a general tightening of sanctions all round. Foreign Secretary Callaghan has already pressured the European Economic Community to this end, insisting that if negotiations take place in future they include the ANC—at least—in addition to the white-minority government. Perhaps most important of all, Callaghan has pressured Portugal's new junta (even before it has come to terms with Frelimo) to close the two railways through its territory to Rhodesia and to apply sanctions. Were this to happen, Rhodesia would be thrown back entirely upon South Africa. From now on both Britain and the African majority in Rhodesia can affort to wait; Smith cannot.

The astonishing thing about Rhodesia is the apparent blindness of its white minority. They cannot, or will not, see what is happening around them and appear determined to continue in a dream world of white supremacy until the whole structure crashes down around their heads. There are, it is true, a few voices raised in warning, but they go unheeded. When the National Council of the ANC last May rejected Smith's offer of an increase from 16 to 22 African seats in the Rhodesian Parliament, Sir Roy Welensky, a now-discredited white politician, said the time for whites was running out and that they should be prepared to offer "significant concessions"—but no one these days takes any notice of Sir Roy. Even before the Portuguese coup, however, there were a few whites reluctantly concluding that they had to talk seriously with the African majority. The trouble is always the same: Whenever any serious suggestion along these lines is made—as when Allan Savory, former leader of

the Rhodesia Party, suggested talks with ZANU and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)—such a cry of horror is raised on the right that nothing is done. Savory (who, whatever his faults has the sense to see what is needed) has become progressively more unpopular as he insists that talks with representative Africans, including the guerrillas, are the only sensible thing to do.

Smith, on the other hand, after talking with Bishop Muzorewa over the course of a whole year, could only bring himself to make the ludicrous offer of two extra African seats, bringing the total in the Assembly from 16 to 18 (as opposed to 50 white seats). At present the 16 African seats are held by the pro-government African Progressive Party led by Chad Chipunza; they are not a serious factor in Rhodesian polities. After the Portuguese coup, Smith still only thought fit to increase his offer from two to six seats, bringing the African total to 22 in all. Since the Africans must have at least 25 seats to block changes in the constituton, the offer was politically meaningless.

The majority of whites in Rhodesia seem not to have begun to face up to the true implications the coup in Portugal or coming changes in Mozambique; until they do so and exert pressure upon the regime to change its attitude, Smith is unlikely to make any attempt to come to terms with the ANC—let alone with ZANU or ZAPU. Probably it is already too late. Apart from the Rhodesia Front, the other white parties—the Rhodesia Party and the Center Party—are hardly significant.

Meanwhile the only thing that appears immediately likely as a result of recent events in the Portuguese territories is the speeded-up building of a new rail link from West Nicholson to Beit Bridge, giving Rhodesia a vital second line out to South Africa (in addition to the present one through Botswana). This will be crucial in the event that the Mozambique lines are denied to Salisbury.

Smith appears as obdurate as ever. His ludicrously small offer of seats to the ANC was flying in the face of fortune when he might have made a genuine breakthrough. When these talks broke down, he resorted to his habitual expedient of calling an election. As usual, the Rhodesia Front will win, but it is unlikely that the electorate will so readily believe what Smith tells them any more. The white position is becoming too serious for even so single-minded a community not to see increasing difficulties ahead. The election will alter little, and may even harm Smith, by showing that his old magic is tarnished among his followers. After the breakdown of the talks with the ANC,


Smith had Edson Sithole, who has spent most of the time since UDI in detention, arrested again, a gratuitously provocative gesture showing he has not altered his thinking at all. Sithole, the most highly qualified lawyer in the country, was a member of the ANC negotiating team.

As a result, Bishop Muzorewa and the ANC announced they would boycott the proposed round-table conference called by Smith for July to discuss the constitutional issue. Even to his supporters, Smith must appear heavy-handed. In any case, talks with Africans about the future of Rhodesia that do not include ZANU and ZAPU make little sense.

As the new factor in the Rhodesian situation, the ANC should be neither overestimated nor underrated. It is regarded by outsiders as more important than it is because it can negotiate with Smith and has been doing so. But if Smith thought the ANC had real power he would have banned it long ago. Instead, it suits him to allow the ANC to exist since it gives the appearance of a dialogue between the regime and the Africans. On the other hand, Edson Sithole was quite right when he said in early June that the Rhodesia Government had to settle with the Africans now under peaceful conditions or do so under duress in two or three years.

In all recent maneuvers, however, ZANU and ZAPU have been left aside. This is foolish. Both movements dissociated themselves from the ANC-Smith talks, and ZANU has made clear that it rejects all forms of negotiations with Smith. Indeed a letter was smuggled out of a Salisbury prison signed by six leading members of ZANU, attacking the ANC negotiations with Smith and dissociating ZANU from them. This may or may not be good tactics, but certainly ZANU cannot, and should not, be ignored. No possible settlement could have much meaning without their participation and consent. Only the ANC may be able to operate legally inside Rhodesia, but this is all the more reason it should resolve its quarrels with ZANU. Events in the northeast during the last two years show not only that ZANU has learned effective guerrilla warfare but also that the movement has won the support of a large part of the population.

There are indications of generally tougher attitudes toward Salisbury from the world community: Rhodesian offices in Wahington and Lisbon have recently been closed (with Australia to follow) while there are clear signs that the worst breakers of sanctions—Japan and the EEC countries—are about to tighten their attitudes toward Rhodesia.

The net result of all these events shows that time is running out for Smith and the white minority: Britain can increase the pressure and wait; the ANC can wait; ZANU can maintain its guerrilla activity and keep the regime extended; and if Mozambique does close the railways, then at last Salisbury will be totally dependent upon South Africa and obliged to take her advice. Once that happens, the Rhodesia Front's continuing grip on power will be limited indeed. □

africanupdate

Monitoring economic and political developments around the Continent

July - August 1974

## Lisbon Sponsors Guinea-Bissau in U.N., Unveils Plan for Angolan Independence

**As African Update went to press, the U.N. Security Council recommended, on August 12, Guinea-Bissau's admission to the world body. The move, sponsored by Portugal, will be voted at the General Assembly this fall. On August 10, Portugal published a two-year plan for granting Angolan independence. The plan calls for a provisional government, following a cease-fire, to include whites and members of all the liberation movements. The government would formulate a constitution within two years, after which it would dissolve and elections for a legislature would be held. In Mozambique, there is said to have been an unofficial cease-fire since the first of August. The following report details the events that led to these developments.**

The pace of change accelerated in the Portuguese territories as the military took over from civilian authorities in Angola and Mozambique and as Portuguese officials began to speak with certainty about independence for Guinea-Bissau.

In a speech on July 27 in which he pledged Portugal to the principle of colonial independence, President Antonio de Spinola gave the most definite assurance thus far that Portugal's new leaders are prepared to accept the idea of outright independence.

"We are ready from this moment to initiate the transfer of power to the people of the overseas territories considered suitable for this development, namely Guinea, Angola and Mozambique," he said.

The statement was taken as a hint that Portugal would not relinquish the Cape Verde Islands, claimed by Guinea-Bissau's independence movement as part of Guinea.

Spinola's televised broadcast seemed to represent an about-face for the general—if not for the more radical elements in the military government that had long espoused total independence. In his book *Portugal and the Future*, Spinola had advocated granting the colonies a wide measure of autonomy under the Portuguese flag—a concept of federation that has been rejected by all the African liberation movements.

Skeptics, weighing Angola's economic importance to Portugal because of its rich oil deposits, continued to doubt that the terri-

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## Arab-African Tensions Emerge In OAU Dispute Over Secretary-General's Post

The 11th Summit of the Organization of African Unity in Mogadishu, Somalia highlighted what may be a growing tension between African and Arab countries.

Indeed, the most strongly contested issue at June's meeting was the election of a new secretary-general, with much of the bitter dispute over that office involving African wariness of what many interpreted as an increasing Arab influence within the OAU. (London *Times*, June 17, 1974.)

The secretary-generalship became vacant when Nzo Ekangaki of Cameroun resigned after serving only two years of his four-year term. Ekangaki gave up the post following repudiation by the OAU of an agreement he had negotiated with the giant British conglomerate Lonrho, whereby Lonrho would have served as an agent for African states in organizing supplies of Arab oil.

Initially, there were two strong contenders for the OAU post—Omar Arteh, Foreign Minister of Somalia, and Vernon Mwaanga, Foreign Minister of Zambia.

The nomination of a Somali seemed to ignite strong feelings among some delegates that the influence of oil-rich North African states and members of the Arab League was becoming too strong. The *Times of Zambia* argued that African leaders were apprehensive about making the OAU an "appendage of other organizations pursuing interests different to the true African cause." (June 19, 1974.)

Other objections to the Somali candidate centered on disputes between Somalia and Ethiopia over land, now controlled by Ethiopia, to which Somalia claims rights. (Although no progress was made by the OAU in resolving the border dispute, it was noted that for the first time Somali President Siad Barre and Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie personally discussed their differences.)

After some 16 hours of debate, involving 18 ballots, there was still a deadlock with neither of the two contenders receiving the necessary two-thirds majority for election. It was then that 43-year-old William Eteki Mboumoua, a special assistant to President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroun, was unanimously elected—a compromise candidate emerging after behind-the-scenes negotiations had led to withdrawal of the two front runners. *Jeune Afrique*, July 6, 1974.)

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## Portugal and Africa *continued from page 21*

tory would win a quick, total independence, feeling that, instead, Portugal would find some way of tying the southern African region to the metropolitan country.

The replacement of a provisional civilian government in Angola and Mozambique was viewed by some observers as an indicator of the worsening security situation in both Portuguese territories. (New York *Times*, July 26, 1974.) Angola and Mozambique have been the scene of interracial urban clashes, and Mozambique has seen an intensified struggle on the part of Frelimo.

In Guinea-Bissau, where the path to independence has always seemed less complicated, rumors flew that an agreement had been reached.

Upon his arrival at the U.N. in mid-July, Portugal's new ambassador to the world body, Veiga Simão, said his government would almost certainly recognize the Republic of Guinea-Bissau before the General Assembly convenes this fall. Supporting that statement was Portuguese Foreign Minister Mario Soares, the leader of the Portuguese Socialist Party and head of the Portuguese delegation to the Luso-African talks. (Africa News, July 25, 1974.)

The Portuguese statements followed an announcement by Gil Fernandes, an official of the Guinea-Bissau government that declared itself independent of Portugal last September, that Guinea-Bissau will seek admission to the U.N. at the fall session.

Guinea-Bissau has been admitted to several U.N. agencies, but officials of the new government had hesitated to apply for admission to the General Assembly for fear of being vetoed by a Portuguese ally in the Security Council—the U.S., Britain or France. Given Portugal's apparent change of attitude, the way should be clear for admittance, U.S. objections, at least, having been based on Portugal's. (Africa News, July 4, 1974.)

In a candid moment, one Portuguese official told **African Update**, perhaps facetiously, that he had been fully prepared to advocate pulling out of Guinea-Bissau "in the middle of the night" at a point when the London talks were going badly. Military activity between Portuguese troops and guerrillas of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde has been limited, and stories have circulated about soldiers on both sides sitting down together, fraternizing, waiting for the war to end.

Despite occasional, unconfirmed reports of Portuguese soldiers refusing to fight in Mozambique, military activity has escalated in the past month, and the territory's independence movement has scored some singular successes in its long-fought campaign against the controversial Cabora Bassa hydroelectric power project in the Tete province. In late June, Frelimo blew up the vital rail link from the dam project to Beira on the Indian Ocean, halting the flow of supplies to the interior. (Johannesburg *Star*, June 29, 1974.)

Meanwhile, the Portuguese have closed six army garrisons in northern Mozambique in order to redeploy troops farther south, where Frelimo activity is building up.

Outbreaks of right-wing violence in Mozambique's urban centers, directed against supporters of Frelimo's 12-year war of independence, indicate that at least a number of whites are willing to use force to prevent an independent African government from assuming power in the territory. (Africa News, June 22, 1974.) Yet Frelimo has already been recognized *de facto* in Mozambique—as has the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau—by virtue of its negotiations with Portugal.

Much more perplexing, according to a Portuguese Government official, is the situation in Angola, where there is no one group to which the Portuguese can turn over the territory.

Rivalry among the major groups fighting for Angolan independence has also distressed the Organization of African Unity. Nigerian leader General Yakubu Gowon, outgoing chairman of the OAU, said at the OAU summit in June, "A situation in which various liberation movements struggle instead of devoting their combined efforts to combatting the common enemy is bound to lead to disappointment and regret."

At the meeting, Gowon announced receipt of a letter from Portugal's President Spínola and said developments in relations between Portugal and Africa could lead to the Continent's "long-desired objective" of total independence. (*East African Standard*, June 14, 1974.)

African Heads of State at the OAU meeting transmitted to Portugal their conditions for proof of Portuguese sincerity regarding African independence: first, immediate recognition of Guinea-Bissau under a PAIGC government; second, a declaration of intent to grant independence; negotiation to take place only with OAU-recognized liberation movements. (*Toward Freedom*, July 1974.)

This last condition refers quite obviously to Angola, where three groups—UNITA, FNLA and MPLA—have been fighting for independence. The largest and most radical, MPLA, is itself fragmented into three groups that recently gathered in Lusaka, Zambia to try to reunite before confronting Portugal. (Zambia *Daily Mail*, July 12, 1974.)

According to a report in the London *Observer* by Gavin Young, few in Angola think of the MPLA as the only representative political movement. Moderates, black and white, throughout Angola are hastily forming political parties, he says. "Each one has a manifesto saying it is multiracial. Most proclaim social democracy. Most, if not all, call for independence." (London *Observer*, June 9, 1974.)

Meanwhile, sporadic military activity and increasing urban interracial tension do not seem to be driving many white Angolan settlers out of the territory. A spokesman for TAP, the Portuguese airline, claims there were 3,000 empty seats from Luanda to Lisbon during the past couple of months.

Plane seats on TAP's daily flight to Portugal from Mozambique are, however, at a premium, with the airline reporting that it is fully booked through September. Some 20,000 to 30,000 of the territory's 180,000 European population are estimated to have left Mozambique since negotiations were opened between Frelimo and the Spínola government.

## OAU Summit *continued from page 21*

The Zambia *Daily Mail* called the result "a resounding success for Black Africa and a demoralizing defeat for the Arab world and its sympathizers." (June 19, 1974.)

The whole issue of Afro-Arab relations unfolded against a backdrop of spiraling oil prices. Many African countries are still smarting from higher oil prices and believe that they are due special price concessions from the Arabs, particularly in light of near-unanimous African support for the Arabs during the recent Middle East war.

Although some of the questions involved in Arab-African relations emerged at a conference of ministers that preceded the OAU summit, no real resolution of the oil issue was reached at Mogadishu. To date, the Arab countries have been unwilling to grant special price concessions to African nations.

The key political issue to emerge at the conference wa decolonization and, more particularly, the question of independence for the Portuguese territories.

The OAU endorsed liberation-movement negotiations with the Portuguese but decided that African states should withhold diplomatic relations with Portugal until it had proved its good faith regarding decolonization.

Portugal was called upon by the OAU to recognize the independence of Guinea-Bissau and to negotiate with guerrilla leaders for total independence of Mozambique and Angola. (London *Observer*, June 16, 1974.)

The meeting also called for intensification of economic sanctions against white-ruled Rhodesia, following reports of sanctions-breaking, particularly by western nations. (Zambia *Daily Mail*, June 13, 1974.)

## Congress Votes $85 Million in Emergency Relief Amid Controversy over Handling of Drought Aid

The U.S. Congress recently voted $85-million worth of aid for emergency relief in Africa this year, an increase of $55 million over last year's allocation.

Some $50 million of the proposed assistance is earmarked for the Sahel region, including Mali, Mauritania, Chad, Niger, Upper Volta and Senegal. Remaining funds will be used in Ethiopia and in countries that have not yet appealed for help although they are affected by increasingly severe drought conditions.

The congressional allocation comes at a time when the State Department is embroiled in controversy over how the U.S. handled last year's drought-relief funds.

Press stories recently cited a 67-page report completed last December by the auditor-general of the U.S. Agency for International Development The report was never made public, but it evidently criticized AID's attempts to distribute supplies and financial assistance to drought-stricken countries last year. (Boston *Sunday Globe*, June 30, 1974.)

AID's auditor-general said last year's American aid program to West Africa was plagued by inept management, misspent funds, sloppy bookkeeping, an absence of financial records, overcharges by contractors, illegal billing, spoilage through carelessness and, in one case, loss of 1,000 tons of corn that never arrived in Niger.

Earlier this year, a report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace advanced similar criticisms of the U.S. aid effort. In a recent *Village Voice* article, reporter Jeffrey Hodes made several disclosures about a report by former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia Edward M. Korry. Much of the Carnegie study cited the Korry report as typical of the attitudes responsible for the inadequacy of U.S. response to the drought.

Hodes notes that Korry favored regional self-help projects that required minimal U.S. funding. Hodes also noted that the Korry report referred to Africa as more conglomerates of tribes than independent nations.

According to the Hodes article, Korry also advised the U.S. to stay out of the Sahel because "it is not desirable at this time to challenge the special position of France in tropical Africa." Korry apparently believed French influence on political organization within the Sahelian countries was beneficial. (*Village Voice*, July 4, 1974.)

Washington observers do not all agree with these critical reports of AID's handling of drought relief. Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.), a sponsor of the new aid effort, is evidently among those who feel criticism of AID management may have been overblown.

Sen. Humphrey's office told **African Update** that the drought-relief program went as well as could be expected, given the limited time and personnel available during last year's crisis.

Humphrey believes the $85-million allocation should meet emergency needs this year but also notes that plans for recovery programs extending beyond immediate relief are also needed.

Sen. Edward Kennedy (D.-Mass.) seems to take issue with Humphrey's suggestion that the emergency relief for this year is sufficient. Sen. Kennedy's office told **African Update** that the $85-million allocation is not enough and also indicated that there was legitimacy in criticism of AID's handling of last year's funds.

African governments too have incurred criticism from newspeople, international relief organizations and their own citizens for poor responses to the drought disaster. But at a press conference in Bamako, Mali earlier this year, Malian Minister of Production Sidi Coulibaly said, "It is slanderous to claim that there was any attempt to impede the speedy dispatch of relief to the victims."

The minister joined in criticism of international relief efforts by pointing out that western aid representatives were sometimes disrespectful of local government structures. He condemned the paternalistic attitudes of some representatives who thought they knew more than Africans about Africa.

While thanking other countries for their contributions to the Sahel last year, however, Sidi Coulibaly stressed that programs this year must go beyond emergency relief measures and become full-scale, well-organized, long-range projects.

Meanwhile, from West Africa come reports that this year's shipments of grains to drought victims are again piling up in the ports of Abidjan, Accra, Lome and Cotonou. Finding trucks and space on freight trains is an unsolved problem for relief workers, who fear high humidity in port cities will ruin unprotected grain supplies at the docks. (Philadelphia *Inquirer*, June 30, 1974.)

Last November, Upper Volta's Minister of Agriculture, and coordinator in the Sahel region for relief efforts, Antoine Dakoure, warned countries and international relief organizations to make their financial commitments early to avoid the problems of grain shipments arriving at the same time in African ports.

Other reports indicate that in some areas that receive only six to eight inches of rain in a good year, last year's rainfall totaled two inches. Cities such as Nouakchott, Mauritania have doubled in size with the influx of nomads who lost their herds of cattle last year.

Observers believe that relief supplies kept people alive during the last dry season, but that this year rampant disease from vitamin and protein deficiencies—beri-beri, scurvy, kwashiorkor—will take their toll of weakened survivors in the crowded relief camps scattered across the Sahel. (Philadelphia *Inquirer*, July 7, 1974.)

# Western Africa

## Chad

• One of three hostages abducted earlier this year by FROLINAT, a group of rebels in northern Chad, has been released. Dr. Christoph Staewen, a West German physician, was freed after West Germany agreed to pay a ransom of $750,000 to the chief of the rebelling Toubous, Issene Habre.

Chadian President Ngartat Tombalbaye broke diplomatic relations with Bonn to protest the West German ransom agreement with rebel forces. Tombalbaye immediately ordered all 35 to 40 Germans working in Chad to leave the country.

The other two hostages still held by FROLINAT are French, but their freedom may not be negotiated as easily. France supports the Tombalbaye government and may be unwilling to risk damaging relations by paying for the remaining hostages. (Washington *Post*, June 15, 1974; *Afrique Nouvelle*, June 25, 1974.)

## Dahomey

• Dahomey's Revolutionary Military Government recently banned 180 of the country's 300 youth associations. Interior and Security Minister Captain Michel Aikpe described the banned groups as "petty bourgeois intellectuals who are mostly cut off from the working masses" and condemned their "verbalism and infantile left-wingism, which benefit reaction."

Two of the organizations with national aims—the National League of Patriotic Youth and the United Anti-Imperialist Youth of Dahomey—were dissolved because of continuing clashes with each other. It is reported, however, that two other groups were the main target of the ban—the General Union of Students and Pupils in Dahomey and the Northern Students' Front.

Dahomey's military government will now require all student groups to merge into one organization, devoted strictly to educational purposes and under the jurisdiction of the education minister. (*Africa*, July 1974.)

## Liberia

• A local Liberian organization, the Movement for Justice in Africa, has asked the government to establish strict origin-labeling requirements for packaged foods. MOJA believes certain products now marked "Foreign Products" are actually imports from South Africa.

A Liberian executive order prohibits Liberian trade with South Africa.

MOJA's campaign was sparked by the discovery of packaged raisins in a local grocery store clearly marked "Product of South Africa." The general manager of the Abi-Jaoudi and Azar Trading Corporation argued the company did not specifically import the raisins from South Africa, but from England where they were packaged.

MOJA has asked that the trading corporation be fined. (Liberian *Star*, July 9, 1974.)

• Liberia has asked the Soviet Union for technical assistance to improve its fishing industry following a recent meeting between officials of the Russian Ministry of Fisheries and Liberia's Ministry of Agriculture.

The Russian delegation agreed to begin research on waters adjacent to Liberia, as well as to provide fellowships to Liberians who wish to study the fishing industry in the Soviet Union. (Liberian *Age*, July 11, 1974.)

## Mali

• The International Development Association has extended $8-million worth of credit to Mali for the second phase of a rural development project.

The program, begun in 1967, will this time involve 107,000 families, or about one million people, whose income, IDA says, could be tripled by their participation in the project to cultivate groundnuts and cereals. Mali's per-capita income, according to World Bank statistics, is $70 per year. The total amount the families are expected to earn is $5 million per year, if all produce is sold.

The project calls for supplying farm equipment to participating farmers, improving 750 miles of railroad tracks in the project area, expanding the functional literacy program, implementing a program of agricultural research, improving medical and veterinary services and establishing a project-evaluation unit.

## Ghana

• Huge debts devastated Ghana's economy during former President Nkrumah's administration, but rising world prices for cocoa, gold, timber and sugar have helped Ghana develop a fragile trade balance in recent years. Now, once again, Ghana's delicate economy is threatened, this time by soaring oil prices.

In order to find the money to supply the developing country with much-needed oil and oil-based products, the National Redemption Council announced in June that it would withdraw subsidies on other imports that had cost the government about $42 million since 1972.

The withdrawal of government subsidies on standard consumer items such as milk, rice, sardines and soap is certain to be an unpopular move. But NRC Chairman Col. I.K. Acheampong had been advised for months that consumers would have to bear the burden of spiraling inflation in order for the government to continue long-range development projects requiring a continuing supply of fuel.

The end of subsidies may also help curtail smuggling of imported goods out of Ghana into neighboring countries, a practice that deprived Ghana of much-needed foreign exchange reserves. Smuggling also causes shortages of some items in Ghana, which means traders can raise Ghanaian prices for these goods.

Col. Acheampong is hoping that withdrawal of subsidies and subsequent price increases on imported goods will focus Ghanaian attention on the government's "Operation Feed Yourself." Improving agricultural production of foodstuffs, as well as palm oil and cotton for making soap and textiles, remains a priority of Acheampong's administration. (*West Africa*, June 24, 1974; *Africa Confidential*, June 28, 1974.)

• The International Development Association, the soft-loan arm of the World Bank, has extended a $10.4-million credit to Ghana to improve the water supply in the Accra/Tema area.

The area of the capital city and the chief port city, with its population of 900,000, has been plagued in the past by water shortages. The project will also extend a safe water supply to 200,000 people in adjacent rural areas.

## Ivory Coast

• The World Bank recently approved a $25-million loan to help extend and improve the Ivory Coast's local and long-distance telecommunications services.

Total cost of the project will be $53.6 million. Grants and loans worth $2.8 million from French Government agencies and from the Ivory Coast Government, as well as $2.9-million worth of suppliers' credits, will also finance the project. The remaining 43 per cent of funds will come from internal cash generation by the Ivory Coast's Post and Telecommunications Administration (APT).

The purpose of the program is to provide Abidjan and numerous local communities with an adequate level of service to meet demand through 1980; to improve the facilities in rural communities and provide necessary support for the government's regional development efforts; to improve the quality of speech and speed of connection in both the local and long-distance services, and to establish the telecommunications service on a technically and financially sound basis for future operations and development.

## Niger

• France will hold interest in two new corporations recently formed to exploit Niger's uranium deposits. In May, the Djado Mining Company was formed to study the significance of a deposit discovered by France's Atomic Energy Commission (CEA). Besides French interests, a German firm and possibly a Japanese firm will become partners with the Nigerien Government in the new company.

In June, the Mining Company of Akouta (COMINAK) was

formed by the Niger Government, France's CEA and a Japanese consortium, Ourd. It is expected that a Spanish company will join the operation as well. Reports say COMINAK's uranium concession could produce 2,000 tons a year by 1980.

France already holds interest in SOMAIR, along with German and Italian firms, to exploit a mine capable of producing 1,500 tons of uranium next year.

An unnamed American group has been granted permission to look for uranium in the region of Imouraren just north of Agadez. France's CEA will be participating in this search. (*Afrique Nouvelle*, June 25, 1974.)

Some observers of Niger's coup earlier this year suspected France may have played a role in toppling the government of Hamani Diori. It had been reported that Diori had been trying to draw other countries into negotiations for exploiting Niger's vast uranium resources.

• Long-range planes will be able to land more safely and economically in Niamey airport when a project to improve the airport's facilities is completed in December 1976.

Niger's Agency for the Security of Air Navigation will be responsible for the project, made possible by a $5-million loan from the World Bank's International Development Association.

## Nigeria

• The International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based research organization, recently issued a report naming Nigeria as the country with the largest armed forces in all of Africa.

The Institute's study, reported in the Zambia *Daily Mail* of July 12, sets total Nigerian troop strength at 259,000. The size of Nigeria's military dictated the allotment of some $556,800,000 in the 1974-75 defense budget, the report noted.

Much of Nigeria's troop strength is a result of the Nigerian civil war. In 1967, when the war erupted, Nigeria had only 8,000 soldiers.

Although military expenditures continue to constitute a substantial portion of the Nigerian budget, the overall amount spent on troop maintenance has declined in recent years, as has actual troop strength. During 1971-72, total Nigerian troop strength was estimated at 274,000, and defense expenditures totaled more than $757 million.

Demobilizing the army since the civil war ended in 1970 has been a problem for Nigeria, and troop size has been kept up as much as a means of employment as for defense purposes. Critics of this policy, however, have complained that to date no significant move has been made to employ the troops in public-works projects.

Zaire, with 50,000 troops, ranks second to Nigeria in overall military manpower. Ethiopia, with 44,570 soldiers, ranks third. Next comes Ghana with 18,000 soldiers.

Although South Africa's army, numbering 18,000 regulars and 92,000 reserves, is not nearly as large as Nigeria's, Pretoria continued to lead the continent in military expenditures with a total of $716 million budgeted for 1973-74. South African military equipment is the most modern and the most extensive in Africa.

• Nigeria's new oil participation agreement, which raised the country's share in foreign firms to 55 per cent, is estimated to yield the country some $8 billion in net receipts—$5.5 billion from direct participation and $3 billion from royalties and other traditional sources. (Nigeria *Daily Times*, June 18, 1974.)

The agreement, which affected Shell/BP, **Gulf, Mobil, Agip/Phillips,** Elf and **Texaco,** stipulates that between April and December the oil companies will have the right to buy back 40 per cent of the government's share of crude oil.

The amount that the companies may repurchase is expected to diminish steadily until January 1975 when the Nigerian Government is scheduled to take all its participation crude.

Meanwhile, Nigeria joined with Algeria, Libya, Kuwait and Venezuela at a recent meeting of the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries in fighting for a larger increase in posted oil prices.

Posted prices, which the OPEC meeting in Quito, Uruguay raised by two per cent, are used in calculating taxes and royalties that producer governments charge foreign producers for extracting oil.

The OPEC price increase, which has been called symbolic by OPEC officials, was also opposed by Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, however, said it would not associate itself with any royalty increase. (Nigeria *Daily Times*, June 19, 1974.)

• As construction continues as a high priority of the Federal Military Government, particularly in the eastern region, Nigeria has faced an increasingly perplexing cement shortage.

It is anticipated that this year Nigeria will import more than two million tons of cement, nearly all of it from Russia, Romania and the U.S. (*Financial Times*, June 27, 1974.)

Nigeria has only five local cement mills.

• Higher prices and lower-than-expected production should reduce 1973-74 textile exports to minimal levels, according to the U.S. agricultural attaché in Lagos. (*Foreign Agriculture*, June 24, 1974.)

Overall Nigerian cotton production in 1973-74 is estimated by the State Department at about 140,000 bales. Official figures place the 1972-73 crop at 215,000 bales.

During marketing year 1972-73, Nigeria exported only 30,000 bales of cotton valued at $5.5 million, some $400,000 under the prior year's sum.

## Senegal

• The World Bank recently approved a $3-million loan to Senegal to finance establishment, expansion and modernization of enterprises in the industrial and tourism sectors.

Senegal's Financial Society for the Development of Industry and Tourism will administer the loan. Although agricultural development dominates Senegal's economy, prospects for increasing international tourism to Senegal have become favorable during recent years.

# Eastern Africa

## Ethiopia

• Caught between powerful Parliament members who thought him too revolutionary and radical elements of the officer corps who felt he was too conservative, Ethiopian Prime Minister Endalkachew Makonnen found himself dismissed and arrested on July 23 as the pace of change in the feudal empire picked up speed. (New York *Times*, July 24, 1974; Wall Street *Journal*, July 23, 1974.)

Endalkachew Makonnen's arrest followed those of many former government officials. The detentions, and the call for an inquiry into official corruption, were the results of a takeover of the country by the armed forces on June 30. Prior to that, the armed forces had been the major impetus behind change in Ethiopia but had left administration of such change to a civilian government.

Although the crisis that has gripped Ethiopia since February has severely shaken the throne of the Lion of Judah, Emperor

Haile Selassie, the radical elements of the officer corps have throughout pledged their allegiance to the octogenarian potentate. Although Haile Selassie had charged the prime minister with calling a constitutional conference in order to enact reforms in the country's feudal system, it was he who dismissed Endalkachew Makonnen, presumably at the behest of the armed forces, which had become increasingly dissatisfied with the slow pace of change under his leadership in Parliament.

Following the army takeover, the emperor met with the Supreme Military Committee and reportedly agreed to implement their requests. These included amnesty for political prisoners and exiled government opponents, swift action on constitutional reform and closer military participation in governmental affairs. (Africa News, July 8, 1974.)

In its manifesto for national reform, the Ethiopian military said it wanted to transfer most of the traditional powers of the emperor to a Parliament that would be part of a system modeled on the English constitutional monarchy.

The manifesto makes no mention of land reform, which is the country's most volatile issue because more than 90 per cent of the land is held by absentee landlords. (Africa News, July 11, 1974.)

In what was reported to be the first international move of the Ethiopian Supreme Military Committee, the new chief of staff of the Ethiopian armed forces met with a high-ranking U.S. military officer, reportedly to request additional assistance for his country's army, navy and air force.

Ethiopian General Aman Andom is thought to have asked the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group chief, General Yow, for aid in excess of the $16 million already promised for the next fiscal year. Ethiopia is the largest recipient of U.S. military aid in Africa, having received more than $150 million in the past 15 years.

A State Department official told the American news service Africa News that no new request had yet been received in Washington. (Africa News, July 15, 1974.)

## Kenya

• A Kenyan Government assistant minister has voiced loudly a sentiment being whispered increasingly around Africa: It is time to review relations with Israel.

Saying Kenya had lost by severing relations with Israel in favor of supporting the Arabs last fall, Assistant Minister for Home Affairs Martin Shikuku charged, "We are not getting any aid from Arab countries nor are we getting oil at cheaper prices. We will continue to lose as long as we maintain hostility to Israel."

African nations seemed to lose both ways in their show of African-Arab solidarity. All technical aid and development assistance from Israel were withdrawn, and Arab countries refused to sell oil at concessionary rates to African nations. (Nigeria *Daily Times*, June 20, 1974.)

The Arab oil policy was the subject of much critical comment in the Kenyan Parliament and in a meeting of the East African Community legislature, which met in Nairobi in June. A Tanzanian delegate to the legislature, Joseph Nyerere, suggested the EAC control the waters of Lake Victoria and the rivers that feed the Nile and set up a body to sell the water to friendly states.

The Sudan and Egypt rely heavily, if not entirely, on the Nile waters to cultivate their land. Speaking to the Arabs on an equal basis, the delegate said, this would mean "a gallon of water for a gallon of oil, a barrel for a barrel." (*Times of Zambia*, June 13, 1974.)

• Kenya has joined its East African Community neighbors, Tanzania and Uganda, in making Swahili its official national language. Until the recent announcement, Swahili and English had shared official sanction.

All official and parliamentary business will be conducted in Swahili from now on.

• Kenya has resumed all sporting ties with Great Britain, with the exception of rugby. The East African nation had, with several other African states, broken links with England in protest over a British team's South African tour.

Explaining the resumption of ties, Kenya Sports Council Commissioner Isaac Lugonzo said the council was satisfied that the British Government had done its best to prevent sports contact with nations that practice racial discrimination.

The Kenya Sports Council will continue to boycott those events in which South Africa or Rhodesia participates. (Africa News, July 22, 1974.)

## Somalia

• Somalia's 30,000 high school students will not go to school next semester. Instead, they will leave their towns and cities and travel to Somalia's desert lands to teach nomadic people to read and write Somali.

Following instruction throughout the month of July, the students were to begin a national health and literacy census, to be combined with instruction. Reading and writing instruction will be supplemented by classes in health care, nutrition and cooking.

Somalia's schools will remain closed for a year while the project is carried out. Some 95 per cent of those who live outside the country's few urban centers are thought to be illiterate. By means of the census, "we will find out just how many people we have, how many animals they have and just where we should put our domestic priorities," says Ibrahim Abyan, chairman of the *National Committee for the Eradication of Illiteracy*. (*New York Times*, June 23, 1974.)

## Tanzania

• Ending nine years of strained relations, Britain and Tanzania have agreed on a rural-aid program to the former protectorate and a schedule of compensation to British farmers whose holdings were nationalized. (London *Times*, June 24, 1974.)

The agreement comes at a time when Tanzania is being accused of being too heavily influenced by mainland China, whose largest foreign-aid project, the TanZam Railway, is being constructed in Tanzania and Zambia, by way of a $400-million interest-free loan. Another interest-free loan—of $77.5 million to develop coal and iron-ore mines in the south of the country—was announced April 1 and will be given over the next five years. (London *Times*, April 2, 1974.)

The British agreement, the product of week-long talks between Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and British Minister of Overseas Development Judith Hart, provides Tanzania with about $27.5 million over the next three to five years. Forty-five per cent will be given as a grant, 55 per cent as an interest-free loan to be repaid over the next 25 years. About $25 million will be in the form of capital aid and $2.5 million in technical assistance.

For its part, Tanzania has agreed to compensate Britons and other foreign absentee landowners for property that was nationalized. The property will be bought for an agreed valuation with funds to be loaned to Tanzania by Britain. Approximately $6.25-million worth of farms and businesses are thought to be involved. Of this total, about $2.8-million worth was originally not compensated by Tanzania, under its April 1971 Acquisition of Buildings Act, because it was designated as rental property

more than 10 years old that had presumably already provided an adequate return on investment. (*Financial Times*, March 7, 1973.)

There had been rumors since early February 1974 that Tanzania and Britain would come to terms.

British aid to its former protectorate was interrupted in December 1965 after the white minority government of Rhodesia unilaterally declared its independence, prompting Tanzanian protests. Tanzania charged that Britain, as the colonial power, had a responsibility to ensure rule by the African majority. Along with other African nations, Tanzania called on Britain to send in troops, if necessary, as England later did to maintain control of the Caribbean island of Anguilla. (Africa News, July 1, 1974.)

In 1971, Tanzania refused aid from Britain on the ground that aid packages were an attempt to force the compensation issue. In the past few years there have been attempts by the British to hold up World Bank loans to Tanzania by pointing to the provision in such loan agreements that the recipient must have no compensation disagreements outstanding.

Meanwhile, Tanzania has received two loans from the International Development Association, an affiliate of the World Bank. One credit of $8.5 million will assist the Tanzanian Government's low-cost housing program; the other, for $21 million, will help to finance the government's $30-million program to increase production and domestic processing of cashew nuts.

• Having declared 1974 African liberation year, Tanzania has donated almost $700,000 to Frelimo, the nationalist movement of neighboring Mozambique. In addition, the country also offered 1,648 pints of blood and made gifts of blankets, shoes and clothing.

Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, a guest at the presentation ceremony to Frelimo President Samora Machel, which took place at the annual founding-day celebration of the ruling Tanzanian African National Union, praised Tanzania as "a poor country that raises money from poor pockets of a humble villager to a sophisticated man in town." Such a gift to the liberation group was "not an empty praise. . . . This is true pan-Africanism," he said. (*Times of Zambia*, July 8, 1974.)

• Hinting that past sabotage attempts were engineered by Rhodesia, South Africa or Portugal, Tanzania has announced that militia units are being recruited and trained along the strategic TanZam Railway line, now nearing completion.

Tanzania openly supports the liberation movements of Rhodesia, South Africa and the Portuguese territories.

The railroad will link the copper-producing region of Zambia with Tanzania's port facilities on the Indian Ocean. According to the Tanzanian defense minister, several attempts to dynamite sections of track have been foiled in the past. (Africa News, July 22, 1974.)

Threats from the white-controlled south may not be the only reason for the sudden Tanzanian concern for security. In recent months, Ugandan President Idi Amin has been making vaguely threatening noises, at the same time accusing Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda of attempting to assassinate him.

Uganda has also requested increased military aid from the Soviet Union, including long-range fighter bombers and missiles, and has in the past received substantial amounts of Soviet weaponry.

The first tangible manifestation of Tanzanian awareness of the increasingly uncertain situation with its East African Community neighbor came July 7, at the celebration of the 20th anniversary of TANU, the ruling party. For the first time, a massive military parade was staged along with other festivities.

Relations between Tanzania and Uganda have not been entirely friendly since General Idi Amin overthrew President Milton Obote in January 1971. Tanzania refused to recognize the new regime and gave sanctuary to Obote, who is said to be still living in Tanzania.

The current sword rattling on both sides of the border is not new. In September 1972, Nyerere is said to have given tacit approval to an invasion of Uganda by a force of Ugandan exiles. For its part, Uganda has carried out air strikes against Tanzanian border towns, seemingly in an effort to eliminate Ugandans who had taken refuge there. (New York *Times*, September 26, 1972.)

## Uganda

• A guarded endorsement of Uganda's President Idi Amin, often characterized by the western press as erratic and ruthless, has come from Amin's old company commander in the King's African Rifles.

Major Iain Grahame, now a farmer in Suffolk, England, is said to be closer to the Ugandan president than any other European. Following a recent meeting with Amin, Grahame called Amin the "most natural-born leader that I've ever met." But, the retired commander added, "he has been also limited by his African education, and the two formed a fairly explosive combination." (Chicago *Tribune*, June 12, 1974.)

Grahame's defense of the general comes at a time when a combination of disclosures and events are once again putting the Ugandan ex-corporal in an unenviable spotlight. Speaking to David Martin, a journalist recently ousted from Tanzania under pressure from Uganda, former Ugandan Foreign Minister Wanume Kibedi has charged that many more persons were killed in Uganda during the first two years of Amin's reign than the 80,000 to 90,000 that has been estimated.

Kibedi fled into exile 17 months ago but had kept silent, he said, in order to protect relatives he left behind, including his sister, whom Amin recently divorced.

Kibedi criticized the foreign diplomatic community in Kampala, the Ugandan capital, for not intervening during the months of massacre and murder that followed the coup. "They must have known what was going on," he said. (London *Observer*, June 22, 1974.)

The other event that has thrust the Ugandan general into public view is the recent release in Europe of a French-made film, *General Amin*, which was made with the president's permission but now displeases him.

Reviewing the film in the London *Times*, Philip French says, "But the underlying belief is that . . . just give Amin enough film footage and he will hang himself in the best *cinéma vérité* tradition. In a sense he does. Nevertheless the evidence paraded before us is misleading in a number of ways. . . ." (London *Times*, June 28, 1974.)

Audiences have reportedly reacted to the film with mirth as they listen to the general's overblown but broken English and watch him join his people dancing. Amin was evidently happy about the film until he heard that the audiences were laughing at him. Another of Amin's objections was to the suggestion made by the film that he had ordered the deaths of thousands of citizens.

French producer Jean-Francois Chavel flew to Uganda to hear the president's complaints, and several offending passages have reportedly been cut from the film. (Baltimore *Sun*, July 7, 1974.)

Former commander Grahame confirms that Amin has "an incredibly refreshing sense of humor. He can laugh not only at himself but at others, and a lot of these extraordinary telegrams that fly around the world are merely an outward manifestation of his incredibly uninhibited sense of humor."

Amin even thinks western press cartoons satirizing him are funny, Grahame says, but, he adds, "he does feel resentful at

being ostracized by the West."

But evidently Amin will let the joke go just so far. Infuriated by the "malicious propaganda" being broadcast about him over the British Broadcasting Corporation's overseas service, the Ugandan leader has decided to buy a $4-million radio transmitter so the Voice of Uganda can be beamed all over Africa, North America and Europe to present Uganda's story in its own way.

The transmitter, which the Ugandan Government bought from Switzerland for cash, is said to be the same size as those used by the BBC and the Voice of America. (*Financial Times*, June 17, 1974; Washington *Post*, June 16, 1974.)

• Uganda will be the next chairman of the Organization of African Unity, and at least one African voice is questioning what harm Idi Amin, as head of Uganda, may do to Africa by his behavior in such a position.

Calling his actions "eccentric," an editorial in the Zambia *Daily Mail* lambastes Amin for "ruling on rumor" and calling in officials of the OAU to investigate an alleged plot by Tanzania and Zambia to invade his country.

"For a man who has just returned from the conference of the Organization of African Unity, his rantings do not give the impression that he believes in genuine unity of African states," the editorial says. "Have his own people in the Foreign Ministry not told him that Zambia is too busy fighting for its own survival with undeclared wars which have been raging for years now between Zambia and the white-ruled south?" (Zambia *Daily Mail*, July 16, 1974.)

## Central Africa

### Cameroun

• Despite the vast resources of its forests, Cameroun is suffering from the impact of a paper shortage that has become so severe that the Cameroonian Press Agency has been forced to suspend publication of its daily bulletins. In addition, the Cameroun *Tribune*, a daily newspaper scheduled to make its debut in July, did not go to press.

The Cameroonian Government has taken some steps to alleviate the paper shortage. A recent contract with an Austrian firm, Voest Alpine, called for construction of a mill to produce paper and paper products using eucalyptus trees. Government studies indicate that the eucalyptus tree is the country's best resource for paper production.

The project is expected to take about three years to complete and will cost about $120,000. The mill is expected to employ 800 people.

Cameroun also plans to make increasing use of its rubber trees. At the end of May, the government signed a contract with a German and American consortium to build a tire factory in Yaoundé, the country's capital. Companies participating in the consortium were not disclosed.

The consortium will hold a 51 per cent controlling interest in the $30,000 factory with the Cameroonian Government owning the remaining 49 per cent. After two years, the factory is expected to produce 50,000 tires. According to market needs, production will increase up to an estimated 300,000 tires.

Although anxious to exploit the country's resources, Cameroonian officials are also aware of the danger of abusing their forests. The government plans to control the number of licenses issued to commercial interests. Officials will also ensure that new trees are planted to replace the ones that are removed. (*Jeune Afrique*, June 22, 1974.)

### Gabon

• Gabon is taking a controlling interest in a proposed iron-ore project that has been half owned by the **Bethlehem Steel Corporation.** (Wall Street *Journal*, July 15, 1974.) The Gabonese Government said it moved in to help speed up the work of the project.

The Société des Mines de Fer de Mékambo—known as Somifer—was formed in 1963 to exploit a major iron-ore deposit at Belinga. Bethlehem had held a 50 per cent share, French interests held 34 per cent, German steelmakers 10 per cent, and other Europeans shared the rest. According to the agreement signed by Gabonese President Omar Bongo and Somifer president Gerald de l'Épine, Gabon will obtain a 60 per cent interest.

Somifer will seek additional capital to build a 350-mile railway from Belinga to a deep-sea harbor at Santa Clara, about 17 miles north of the Gabonese capital, Libreville. First shipments are expected in 1982 or 1983.

### Zaire

• Zaire, the world's fifth-largest copper producer, continues to increase governmental authority over the economy. (*Middle East and African Economist*, June 1974.)

Among measures recently announced was the declaration that all Zairean copper will have to be refined within Zaire by 1980. In addition, it was announced that all mining concessions will provide for a 50 per cent government participation.

By 1975, the government has stated, all businesses that have operated within Zaire for more than five years will be required to have a Zairean managing director and chairman. And all plantations, farms, ranches and forested areas must soon revert to indigenous ownership, according to Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko, who also recently announced that he will henceforth be known as Citizen Mobutu. (New York *Times*, July 1, 1974.) Foreigners will also be barred from exporting timber.

• Mandugu Bula, a 39-year-old Zairean who was once a press information officer for President Mobutu Sese Seko, recently visited the U.S. with a promotional package that used the forthcoming Ali-Foreman fight as a hook for attracting "partners" in the country's development.

Bula, whose visit was reported on the country's sports pages, told the press that Zaire was capable of feeding all of Africa if it cultivated only one-third of its land. He also rattled off other statistics attesting to Zaire's economic viability. (New York *Times*, July 17, 1974.)

Americans, however, seemed more interested in the upcoming fight for which Bula is serving as organizer. Bula reported that demand for fight tickets had already exceeded 100,000 and that people in Zaire were putting money aside for the fight. Ticket prices for the September bout range from a record $250 for ringside seats—of which there are a reported 4,000—to $10 for the least expensive seats in the 120,000-seat soccer stadium in Kinshasa.

Bula also noted that Zaire plans to have another stadium, equipped with a giant television screen, to take care of overflow from the fight. In addition, the country is planning a three-day festival, which will feature such entertainers as American soul singer James Brown.

### Zambia

• A three-day meeting of the Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC) further underlined the organization's apparent inability to control copper prices on the world market.

Still smarting from rising oil prices and perhaps a bit envious of the recent successes of the OPEC oil-producing nations in boosting petroleum prices, the late June CIPEC parley gathered in Lusaka in an atmosphere that seemed tinged with at least some skepticism.

Zambian Prime Minister Mainza Chona began the meeting by

noting in his opening address that Zambia would find it difficult to continue "pouring money into an organization that existed to churn out butter-and-sugar-coated communiques, bulletins and denial statements."

Exhorting the delegates from Zaïre, Chile and Peru to take action on fixing prices, Chona said Zambians were tired of the uncertainties attached to copper prices that are determined by a complicated bargaining process on the London Metal Exchange.

At the end of the three-day parley, a communique was issued saying the CIPEC nations had arrived at an agreement on price stabilization and control. No additional details were disclosed, however. (Africa News, July 1, 1974.)

During speeches at the conference's opening sessions, several delegates referred to the successful price increases by oil-producing nations, but it was not considered likely that such pricing would be instituted by the CIPEC countries, two of which—Zambia and Chile—do not even have diplomatic relations.

Zambia depends on copper for more than 90 per cent of its export earnings and is not likely to cut back its output in favor of higher prices. Besides, any attempts at copper price controls would be made considerably less effective by the fact that the U.S., the world's largest consumer of copper, is also the world's largest producer of the metal. The U.S. is not a member of CIPEC.

## Northern Africa

### Egypt

• During President Nixon's stop in Cairo during his recent Middle East trip, he and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat signed an official communique reported to place a high priority on possible American investments in Egypt. The value of potential U.S. investments in Egypt has been estimated at $2 billion. Should commitments to invest in Egypt reach this figure, Egypt could replace South Africa as the African country with the largest share of U.S. capital investment.

Shortly before Nixon's arrival, the Egyptian Parliament adopted new regulations easing restrictions on foreign investors after nearly a year's discussion on investment policy. During the late President Nasser's administration, Egypt's emphasis on collectivizing agricultural and industrial production discouraged western businesses from investing in the country.

U.S. investors are said to worry that socialist policies in Egypt could threaten their holdings, but U.S. and Egyptian officials have agreed to negotiate an investment-guarantee pact. (Africa News, June 24, 1974.)

An Egyptian economist, Dr. Sherif Lutfy, is helping to set up an Agency for Arab and International Economic Cooperation. It is expected that the new agency will have three departments: Arab-African Economic Cooperation; International Economic Cooperation; and International Organizations and Economic Cooperation for Investment and Financing. Western businessmen hope the agency can eliminate the heavy bureaucracy that has impeded international deals in Egypt until now. (*African Development*, June 1974.)

### Spanish Sahara

• Independence groups in the Spanish Sahara and the Canary Islands have caught the freedom fervor sweeping the neighboring Portuguese territories and are now intensifying their struggle for recognition of their independence from Spain.

Reports say that the liberation movement in Spanish Sahara is gaining more support from other African countries since the recent coup in Portugal focused attention on colonial powers in Africa.

Reports also indicate that prospects for peace in the Middle East mean Spain's alliance with Arab nations against Israel is not important enough to warrant its continuing presence in North Africa. (Zambia *Daily Times*, June 17, 1974.)

Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria share historical, cultural and economic interests in neighboring Spanish Sahara. Liberation groups apparently want a U.N. referendum on the territory and are reported to favor union with Mauritania. (*Le Monde*, June 24, 1974; Africa News, March 28, 1974.)

Spain, however, is as reluctant as Portugal to abandon the rich resources of its African territories. The Spanish Sahara is currently the world's second-largest producer of phosphate, a material used for fertilizers that has increased in value with petroleum-based fertilizers in short supply.

A military victory for liberation movements in the Spanish territories seems out of the question. It is reported that Spain uses the Spanish Sahara as a training base for its armed forces and has stationed more than 50,000 soldiers there.

The liberation movement from the Canary Islands announced at the recent OAU summit meeting in Mogadishu that the U.S. is helping Spain to set up missile bases on the islands. A State Department official denied that Spain is receiving any missiles from the U.S., although he pointed out that restrictions on military aid to Portugal for use in its African wars do not apply to Spain. He said military assistance to Spain from the U.S. has included aircraft, artillery, tanks and personnel training in exchange for use of Spanish military bases. (Africa News, July 4, 1974.)

### Sudan

• U.S.-Sudanese relations took a definite downturn when Sudanese President Gaafar al-Nimeiry in late June released eight men convicted of slaying two American diplomats in a siege of the Saudi Arabian embassy in Khartoum more than a year ago. (New York *Times*, June 25, 1974.)

The convicted men, members of the Palestinian Liberation Movement, had been sentenced to life imprisonment, but Nimeiry commuted the sentences to seven years and released the guerrillas into the custody of the Palestinian organization.

Reports indicate that the Sudanese Government believes it went as far as it could by trying and convicting the eight guerrillas. Observers say Egypt influenced the Sudan's decision to try the men. Egypt later reported the men were being held in an Egyptian prison. (New York *Times*, June 29, 1974.)

Apparently, Egypt also played a role in influencing the decision to release the men. Both countries were caught between Arab sympathy for the Palestinian movement and their public condemnation of terrorist tactics. (New York *Times*, June 29, 1974.)

In response to the Sudanese action, the U.S. recalled its Sudanese ambassador, William D. Brewer. Some Black African nations were also reported to be distressed by the men's release.

A Nairobi newspaper termed the trial a "mockery of justice." Other sources in independent Africa expressed concern that freeing the men would encourage further atrocities. (*Christian Science Monitor*, June 28, 1974.)

### Tunisia

• The World Bank will loan Tunisia $23 million for a water-supply project in Sfax, Tunisia's second-largest city. Rapid urban development has outstripped the capacity of the city's present water sources.

The Sfax project is one of three water-supply schemes scheduled for completion by Tunisia's National Society for the Exploitation and Distribution of Water as part of its 1974-78 investment program.

## Namibia

• The South African Government says at least 100 young Namibians, reported to be members of the South West Africa People's Organization, have secretly fled across the Namibian border to neighboring Angola. South African officials believe the Namibians are heading north to join exiled SWAPO members in Zambia and prepare for an attack on South Africa's northern border. (Windhoek *Advertiser*, June 24, 1974; Africa News, July 4, 1974.)

Unofficial sources, however, estimate that 400 people have left Namibia. Among those reported to have crossed the border into Angola is John ya Otto, SWAPO chairman in Namibia's northern Ovamboland. (Windhoek *Advertiser*, July 4, 1974.) Before he left Namibia, Otto told reporters, "Barbarism of the rulers and suppression of political expression" were forcing people to flee.

Otto charged that South African-appointed traditional Ovambo authorities planned to draft dissident SWAPO members into an army to fight against SWAPO forces trying to liberate Namibia from without. He said anyone refusing to fight with the Ovambo chiefs would be interned in concentration camps. (Johannesburg *Star*, June 22, 1974.)

Otto's explanation for the recent border crossings caused some international organizations to renew their demands for an end to public floggings and mass arrests of political dissidents in Namibia. For the past several months, the U.N. Council for Namibia and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights have urged Ovambo authorities to stop the harsh treatment and detention without trial of people accused of participating in illegal political activities.

During a June visit to New York, Bishop Leonard Auala of the Ovambo-Kavango Evangelical Lutheran Church told the U.N. Council for Namibia that public floggings in Ovamboland were done at the request of the South African security police. He said flogging was not a local custom among the Ovambo people. But Ovambo authorities claimed it was customary punishment and thwarted church efforts to seek a court injunction to stop the flogging. (Johannesburg *Star*, June 22, 1974.)

One South African newspaper editor urged Ovambo authorities to ease restraints on political dissidents. But another writer said the exodus across the border proved SWAPO members in Namibia were operating "in cahoots with SWAPO-in-exile, which is waging a guerrilla war in Eastern Caprivi." The writer concluded that the South African Government had a good excuse to ban what was left of SWAPO's Namibian contingent. (Johannesburg *Star*, June 22, 1974.)

Meanwhile, Portuguese officials are pondering what to do with the nearly 200 Namibians they have detained in Angola. A few have asked for political asylum as victims of apartheid. But the majority are reported to be seeking passage to Zambia via the Benguela railway linking Zambia's copper-mining district to the sea by way of Zaire.

Reports say Lisbon is negotiating with the governments of Zaire and Zambia over the fate of the Namibians. Since the Namibians have no travel documents, they will have to get Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko's permission to go through his country to enter Zambia. In Zambia, the Namibians are expected to join SWAPO members in exile or to seek admission to the proposed U.N. center for administrative training in Lusaka. (Johannesburg *Star*, July 13, 1974.)

Observers believe the South African Government does not expect Lisbon to extradite the Namibians detained in Angola. Forcing the Namibians to return to Ovamboland could jeopardize Lisbon's peace talks with liberation forces in its own African territories.

Furthermore, Sean MacBride, commissioner for the U.N. Council for Namibia, pointed out, "Under international law no government can extradite or hand over anyone for political reasons or for any matter arising from a political event." (*Times of Zambia*, July 9, 1974.)

But South Africa is reported to be wary of encouraging more Namibians to flee and join SWAPO members in Zambia. The Ovambo minister of justice, Chief Jefta Mukundi, told reporters that instigators of the exodus to Angola would be caught and punished severely. (Johannesburg *Star*, June 29, 1974.)

• Charges of possessing banned literature have recently been brought against David Meroro, national chairman of the South West Africa People's Organization. Meroro, a wealthy merchant from Windhoek's Katutura township, was detained incommunicado for five months before the charges against him were announced.

He was arrested earlier this year when it was reported that Windhoek police were trying to rid the area of dissident SWAPO members by arresting SWAPO leaders and breaking up mass political demonstrations. (See **African Update**, January-February, March-April 1974.)

After being accused of unlawfully possessing eight editions of the *African Communist*, Meroro was granted bail of $150 on the condition that he report to Katutura police twice a day. He must remain in the area of Windhoek and cannot hold or attend any public meeting. (Windhoek *Advertiser*, July 16, 1974.)

• A coalition of environmental-protection and anti-apartheid groups is trying to prevent the **Fouke Company** of Greenville, South Carolina from importing 70,000 Namibian sealskins.

It is reported that Fouke, the nation's largest processor of sealskins, asked Senator Strom Thurmond (D.-S.C.) and U.S. Commerce Secretary Frederick Dent, also a South Carolinian, to help the company obtain a 10-year exemption from earlier legislation banning the importation of skins from baby seals.

The U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act forbids the killing of nursing seals or seals less than eight months old for commercial use.

Fouke reportedly wants the Commerce Department to send representatives to southern Africa to see if legislation can be waived to allow Fouke to import the skins of young seals killed along the Namibian coast. Fouke justifies its request by explaining the young seals are only "casually nursing."

Anti-apartheid groups charge that importing the sealskins would violate international law, as well as U.S. environmental-protection laws. Douglas P. Wachholz, staff attorney of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights, says Fouke would have to make a deal with the South African Government to import the Namibian sealskins.

Wachholz claims a Commerce Department waiver of legislation to allow Fouke to import the sealskins would indicate U.S. support for the South African Government's illegal administration of Namibia. (Africa News, July 22, 1974.)

## Rhodesia

• The move to restore U.S. compliance with U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia passed another hurdle June 27 when the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted its approval. By a vote of 22 to 6, the committee endorsed a bill that will repeal the so-called Byrd Amendment.

That legislation, passed in 1971, allowed U.S. firms to purchase "strategic" materials from Rhodesia, in violation of U.N. sanctions. The sanctions were enacted in 1966 in an attempt to cripple the white-minority regime, which had declared its unilateral independence from Great Britain.

The Senate has already passed the measure, and a vote by the full House may come at any time. Progress on the move had been impeded by the House's preoccupation with impeachment proceedings against former President Nixon.

• Tourists will have a harder time flying to Rhodesia since the International Air Travel Association advised member airlines it is nullifying multicarrier interline agreements with Air Rhodesia.

IATA's advisory is in response to recent criticism of the travel industry's disregard for U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia since 1966. Earlier this year the Reverend Donald Morton of the United Church of Christ Center for Social Action reported to the U.N. Security Council numerous examples of sanctions violations by airlines and travel agencies. (see **African Update**, May-June 1974.)

**Pan Am, TWA,** KLM and Air France indicated they have dropped interline agreements with Air Rhodesia. But New York representatives of Belgium's Sabena, the Portuguese airline TAP and South African Airways said they received no notice from IATA. According to an SAA official, "We're doing business as usual until we hear otherwise."

Some travel agents are trying to conduct business as usual, too. They fly tourists to southern Africa via Zambia Airways or SAA and arrange for them to travel overland to Rhodesia. An executive of one tour operation explained, "It's just ludicrous to consider Rhodesia a menace to world peace. This won't stop people from coming—but it will cost the client more, and you'll just have to put it in with the land costs."

Car-rental companies are divided on the Rhodesian issue. **Hertz** has already terminated an independent African rental-car operator's license to conduct business under the Hertz name in Rhodesia. But an **Avis** representative refused to comment on its Rhodesian sub-licensee. (*Travel Weekly*, July 18, 1974.)

• Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith's ruling Rhodesian Front has won all 50 white parliamentary seats for the third successive time since 1962. (New York *Times*, August 1, 1974.) Smith called the elections on July 30 "to end the state of uncertainty" in the country. (Zambia *Daily Mail*, June 20, 1974.) But reports indicate Rhodesia's future will be far from settled by election results.

The African National Council refused to participate in the elections to protest the detention since late June of ANC publicity secretary Edson Sithole. Observers believe Sithole's detention, ordered for no apparent reason, is the beginning of moves by Smith's government to get rid of the ANC's outspoken leaders and ultimately to ban the organization. (*Times of Zambia*, June 21, 1974.)

It is reported that Smith has given up hope of coming to any agreement on settlement with ANC representatives since they rejected government proposals to add six African seats to Parliament in early June. The ANC will not meet with Smith as long as Sithole is detained, but Smith has called for a "round-table conference at which different African opinion groups can be heard."

Some white Rhodesians have expressed regret that Smith is apparently ignoring the mood of Africans in his country. They note that negotiations between Portugal and its African territories, which surround Rhodesia, have encouraged Rhodesian Blacks to settle for nothing less than equal government representation. (*East African Standard*, July 5, 1974.)

British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan also warned Smith to "aim at a more realistic accommodation of African views than has been the case thus far." The foreign secretary reiterated Britain's claim that there would be no settlement agreement without the support of the African majority. (Zambia *Daily Mail*, July 3, 1974.)

It is reported that Britain is interested in ANC President Bishop Abel Muzorewa's call for a full-scale constitutional conference that would include detained ANC leaders, as well as representatives of the British Government.

Since the Pearce Commission report in 1972, Britain has at least publicly left the settlement dispute to Smith and the ANC. But with Smith and the ANC apparently unable to reach a solution, Britain is expected to take a more active role in settlement discussions. Foreign Secretary Callaghan recently met in London with a five-member ANC delegation led by Dr. Elliot Gabellah, ANC vice-president. (*Financial Times*, July 10, 1974.) Callaghan denied, however, claims by the Organization of African Unity that he had been communicating secretly with Ian Smith. (Johannesburg *Star*, July 6, 1974.)

• A singing group of 25 young Mormons from Utah's **Brigham Young University** is currently on tour in South Africa and Rhodesia. The group's manager, Terry Hyde, says the main purpose of the visit is to provide entertainment.

It is reported, however, that concert proceeds are being donated to relief funds for victims of skirmishes with African liberation forces in southern Africa. The Mormons' trip was arranged by Rhodesian businessman Reginald Neild.

The group, which sang in 10 cities and at Simonstown military base in South Africa, had to get a special license from the U.S. Treasury Department to perform in Rhodesia. Since 1968 U.S. citizens have needed Treasury Department licenses to transfer funds to or from Rhodesia in compliance with U.N. sanctions against the country's white-minority government.

According to Treasury official George Hazard, the group received a routine tourist license to pay for travel, room and board in Rhodesia. No license was needed for contributions to Rhodesia's "Terrorist Victims Relief Fund," he pointed out, because it did not involve a transfer of U.S. money. (Africa News, July 18, 1974.)

## South Africa

• Protestors were expected to greet the arrival of an initial shipment of low-sulphur-content South African coal in Mobile, Alabama in early August.

The coal, which is being imported by **Southern Company** as part of a three-year, two-million-ton purchase agreement, already sparked a controversial demonstration at the company's annual meeting in late May. (Washington *Post*, May 23, 1974.)

At the company's shareholder meeting, the United Mine Workers argued that Southern should not import coal from South Africa where, the UMW said, Black miners earn about $3 per day.

For its part, Southern contends that strict environmental legislation that will be in force in Florida next year necessitated the purchase. Southern also says the amount of coal purchased from South Africa amounts to only 1/30th of the company's overall annual requirements.

Southern Company is a holding company that owns utilities serving Alabama and Georgia, as well as parts of Florida and Mississippi.

• In a long-awaited decision, the New York *Times* has been enjoined by the New York City Commission on Human Rights from running classified advertisements for employment in South Africa. (New York *Times*, July 24, 1974.) The Commission agreed, however, to stay the order until an August 27 hearing when, as a result of a *Times* appeal to the State Supreme Court, it will have to show cause for the order. (New York *Times*, July 27, 1974.)

The case was originally brought before the commission by various groups charging that the practice was racially discriminatory since Blacks would not receive the same consideration as whites.

• South Africa is reported to be quietly jubilant over a recent decision in the U.S. House of Representatives to discontinue the system of subsidies and quotas required by the U.S. Sugar Act of 1934.

Until now South Africa has been one of 30 nations allowed to sell sugar to the U.S. at fixed prices. But defeat of the bill to extend the U.S. Sugar Act means South Africa can now compete freely to supply the U.S. market.

Observers note that superior marketing capabilities and automated shipping procedures will probably give South Africa an edge over other less-developed African nations—such as Swaziland, Mauritius, Madagascar and Malawi—in the competition to supply the U.S. with sugar.

Some members of Congress, who did not expect defeat of the entire Sugar Act legislation, are doubly disgruntled. Anticipating renewal of the Sugar Act, Rep. Parren J. Mitchell (D.-Md.) proposed an amendment to eliminate South Africa from the quota system because of its apartheid policies. Not only did the House reject the amendment, but its subsequent termination of the whole bill lifted all restrictions on South African sugar shipments to the U.S. (Johannesburg *Star*, June 15, 1974; Washington *Afro-American*, June 15, 1974.)

• South Africa is making an all-out effort to become a nuclear power, and France is expected to offer the technical equipment the plan needs, according to a report in the Zambia *Daily Mail*. (July 3, 1974.)

An official of the South African Department of Foreign Trade announced in early July that South Africa had asked for international tenders for a 1,000 megawatt power station. France is expected to respond.

In turn, France is interested in importing uranium from South Africa, possibly in enriched form. While no final agreement has been made, the project was reportedly the topic of talks between French Secretary of State for Foreign Trade Norbert Segard and South African Finance Minister Owen Horgood.

The French have also just won a contract to build South Africa's first communications satellite earth station.

Writing in the London *Financial Times*, a special correspondent suggested that Israel and South Africa, which are actively trying to become the world's seventh and eighth nuclear powers, may be among the least dangerous owners of such weaponry.

The reporter suggested that this is because they are far more vulnerable to nuclear strikes and had "little incentive" to initiate the use of nuclear weapons.

The correspondent pointed out, however, that South Africa's use of them "would be credible . . . if the alternative for . . . South Africa was to be physically overrun by invaders using conventional weapons." (Johannesburg *Star*, June 22, 1974.)

• Perhaps with an eye on recent developments in the Portuguese territories, South Africa has been anxious to publicize what it considers to be bright prospects for improved relations with independent Africa.

In late June, Foreign Minister Dr. Hilgard Muller noted that fast-moving developments in South Africa and what he termed a growing "realism" among Black African leaders could begin a new stage in Pretoria's relationships with the rest of the Continent. (*Rand Daily Mail*, June 22, 1974.)

Muller said South Africa was continuing its policy of making confidential contacts with the rest of Africa. In early June (*Times of Zambia*, June 14, 1974), Muller was quoted as having said that South Africa had recently had "confidential" contacts with a central African country.

• Some 12,000 Bapedi Africans are challenging South Africa's efforts to remove them from a large tract of land in the Eastern Transvaal.

The Bapedi say they have a deed for the land, which they say they purchased from a white farmer in 1905. (London *Times*, July 2, 1974.)

White South African security forces have already moved into the area with demolition crews to destroy Bapedi settlements and move the inhabitants to a homeland area 120 miles to the north.

The South African Government says the Bapedi are being allocated 12-foot-by-12-foot corrugated iron huts, as well as tents, in the homeland.

The African homelands are part of the government's apartheid policy, which calls for the eventual settlement of the country's 16 million Africans onto about 13 per cent of South Africa's land.

The homelands are arranged by ethnic group, and the Bapedi are being resettled in the area allotted to the Lebowa people, an area that is already overcrowded, according to many observers.

• Although the Afro-Arab oil embargo of South Africa is still in effect, Pretoria's oil shortage has eased considerably over the past month.

As more and more countries are taken off the embargo list, oil companies have been able to arrange a complicated series of swaps through which more Iranian oil has been channeled to South Africa. (Johannesburg *Star*, July 6, 1974.)

Despite the increases in oil supplies, South Africa has continued to enforce restrictions on the sale of gasoline and has also maintained lower speed limits for automobiles. In addition, the embargo has prompted the government to encourage industries to convert their power-generating facilities from oil to coal systems.

• Since February 1973, when labor unrest began in the local textile industry, strikes and work stoppages have become commonplace in the Durban area, with hardly a month going by without some group of laborers downing their tools.

In the latest action to hit Durban, white mechanics and engineers joined ranks with some 400 Black and Coloured workers at the local transport company's workshops. The workers were demanding pay increases of between 14 and 18 per cent.

At the same time, 60 of some 400 striking Indian and African workers at a nearby pharmaceutical factory returned to work after several days' strike. Management has threatened to fire all workers who do not return, according to a company spokesman. (Zambia *Daily Mail*, July 13, 1974.)

In 1973, Black South Africans won the right to strike—if they had exhausted all means of petitioning and bargaining with management. Neither of these two strikes met the requirements of that edict.

• The South African business weekly *Financial Mail* says that poverty datum line and minimum effective level statistics are gaining wider acceptance as minimum-wage yardsticks. The poverty datum line is a figure calculated to show the amount of money needed by a family to survive in a given area; the minimum effective level, thought to be more realistic, is 50 per cent higher than the p.d.l.

**Ford of South Africa** responded to the October 1973 issuance of p.d.l. statistics for the Port Elizabeth area by raising its wage targets, according to the magazine. Now it uses the higher figure—the m.e.l.—as its yardstick, and it ignores the lower figure issued for Africans and uses the higher wage calculated for Coloureds, applying it to Africans as well.

Ford has more than 4,000 workers in Port Elizabeth—815 whites, 1,005 Africans and 2,214 Coloureds. The starting wage in the lowest category is $169 per month. The area's m.e.l. is $208 per month. (*Financial Mail*, June 7, 1974.)


TOO
MANY
CHILDREN
FOR
WHOM?
World
Population
Year

# The Neo-Malthusian Myth

Why is the rich world so worried about population growth in the poor world? Is it love or fear? The author takes a hard look at the population control movement and argues that family-planning should be part of a movement for justice and development—not part of a campaign for reactionary social control.

By PIERRE PRADERVAND

The father of the modern debate on population was Thomas Robert Malthus. His famous *Essay on the Principle of Population* first appeared in 1789 and was an overnight best-seller. Since that date, his essay has sired thousands of children and today the descendants of Malthus are the dominant race in the world of birth-control literature.

The great appeal of Malthus was that he made the poor responsible for their poverty. The poor, said Malthus, insist on indulging in large families. And as population grows in the ratio of 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, whilst food production can only grow in the ratio of 1,2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, the numbers of people will always outrun the amount of food. Starvation and poverty are the "natural" result.

All this was, of course, ordained by God on High. The only escape, said Malthus, was for the poor to practise sexual restraint.

But Malthus's ideas did not go unchallenged. William Godwin, an early socialist and father-in-law of the poet Shelley, was to contest the Malthusian analysis. He claimed that the real cause of poverty and starvation was the unjust organization of society and the unfair distribution of wealth. The solution, he said, was not sexual restraint, but social change. If we substitute contraception for sexual restraint, the same debate rages today.

Rising living standards, trade unions, social welfare and the acceptance of family planning have cut the ground from under the modern Malthusian's feet. But the Malthusians have simply shifted to new ground—the Third World. From now on the poor classes slowly took on a darker hue and a more distant position. They came to be situated less and less in Manchester and New York and more and more in India, China, Africa, and Latin America.

So, by 1917, Dr. A. Robinson could write in a preface to a book called "*Uncontrolled Procreation or Fertility Against Civilization*:"

*"It is our duty to preach birth control in our own countries, the countries we like to call civilized. But we have an equal, if not greater duty, to disseminate the principle and practice of birth control in the backward nations, the nations with a higher birth rate. It is of the greatest importance for the future of mankind that the gospel of birth control be preached incessantly to the peoples of Russia, China, Japan, India, Mexico, etc. It is not good for the civilized nations to reduce their birth rate to the desired minimum, and the rather backward races to breed without restriction. Troubles would certainly ensue in the following years. It behooves us to communicate with minds that understand us in different countries and to exort them to become apostles of the religion of birth control. If we cannot find indigenous apostles we shall have to send our own."*

And this is precisely what has happened. Family planning the world over has come through the influence and intervention of Western apostles.

The modern Malthusian speaks of dependency ratios and KAP surveys but underneath the veneer of scientific jargon there is still the Malthusian motive: the will to control the population of the poor rather than the consumption of the rich, the desire to eliminate poverty by reducing the numbers of the poor rather than the inequalities of society.

As the death rate began its dramatic fall in the poor world, the fears of the rich world began to rise. The "stirring masses" of the "population explosion" could become a threat—especially if they were hungry or jobless. They might even "go Communist," upset the balance of power, raise their prices, reduce access to cheap raw materials, and the whole basis of Western affluence might begin to crumble.

Few would seriously deny that fears like this were the mainspring of Western involvement in population control. It started in the most conservative circles of American society, where a small group of people began

pressing the urgency of population control in the poor world. So, in a book entitled *"Too Many Asians,"* published in 1959, J. Robbins candidly wrote: *"There are too many Asians for their own good. They have been breeding trouble for themselves—and for the world as a whole. . . . When the sun goes down on an Indian village, the people are left in darkness. They have no books, no movies, no television. There is only one thing to do—go to bed. There they find their sole source of recreation and amusement, their brief escape from the hours of hard work of the day. At th root of Asia's problem of population is copulation."* Not poverty, not drought, not poor government, not the colonial hangover, not land reform, not cheap prices for raw materials . . . no, the problem was too much sex and not enough television.

During the 1960's, the population issue really caught fire. Foundations pumped millions of dollars into universities and institutes for the study of the problem and the training of specialists to combat it. The United States Government, along with other rich nations, began earmarking aid for population control. The media took up the message and soon the general public in the rich nations were being told that the Africans, Asians and Latin Americans were poor because they have too many kids.

Anyone who has studied the literature of population—as I have done almost daily for the last eight years—cannot but be struck by the amazing uniformity of the concepts and the language. Some radicals see the whole thing as a world-wide capitalist conspiracy. This strikes me as ridiculous. The whole thing has happened completely openly. The facts are there for anyone—with the time and the funds—to research. Given the immense weight of the U.S. in world scientific research, given the dominance of the English language in scientific publishing, given the abundance of scholarships in the field of population studies, given the possibility of almost instantaneous world-wide communication, it is not in the least bit surprising that this neo-Malthusian way of thinking has been quickly spread to most of the world.

A rural family in Gorgora, Ethiopia

*(all photographs in this section are by courtesy of UNITED NATIONS)*

And so it came about that by the late 1960s population was pinpointed as the number one obstacle to world development. The prestigious Pearson Report, published in 1969, concluded that *"no other phenomenon casts a darker shadow on the prospects for international development than the staggering growth of population"* and the President of the World Bank, Robert MacNamara, went on record as saying that *"to put it simply: the greatest single obstacle to the economic and social advancement of the majority of the peoples in the underdeveloped world is rampant population growth."*

The solution seemed simple—birth control. And the means seemed readily at hand—the Pill and the Loop. In 1964, a leading family planner held up "the Loop" and declared it would *"change the history of the world."*

"Scientific" surveys showed that most of the women in the poor countries were eager to limit their families. Western experts, who often knew nothing of the poor countries except their luxury air-conditioned villas, drew up large-scale programs to promote low-cost contraceptives. When the first results began to come in, it appeared that the women were not adopting these methods as rapidly as the surveys showed that they should have done. The reaction was more experts, better administrative methods, more surveys, more efficient contraceptives, and better mass communications programs. In some cases, programs were designed with the sole aim of getting women to adopt family planning without changing a single thing in their environment of dismal poverty (Tegucigalpa, late 1960s); or experts were dropped via helicopters on unsuspecting Himalayian Villages (Nepal, 1970); or Moslem women were coerced into buses to have loops inserted without any explanations (Tunisia, mid 1960s); or young women were given contraceptive injections against their husbands' wills (various African countries).

The results were a dismal and expensive failure. The "history of the world" has not been changed. Many millions are much poorer and the radical, political, and social changes, which the population controllers hope to avoid, are drawing much nearer.

Even in countries like Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, where birth control is working, a growing number of specialists concede that the success has little to do with family planning programs. In the countries where it is not working, like India and Pakistan, poverty is at last becoming recognized as a real problem to be tackled.

More and more recent studies (many of them American) have demonstrated that the lowering of population growth rates is dependent on

such things as higher living standards, more equal income distribution, higher levels of employment, education, health care—and not by pills and loops alone.

On top of all this evidence, there is one country that has not used a single Western expert, that has roundly condemned Western neo-Malthusian theories, that has taken the old Godwin road as opposed to the Malthusian way, and that has largely solved its problem. The country is China.

And the experience of China finally demolishes the Malthusian case. For what were the neo-Malthusians saying about China? As late as 1960, W. Vogt was writing: *"China quite literally cannot feed more people . . . the greatest tragedy that China could suffer, at the present time, would be a reduction in her death rate. We have watched Wang die, his agony passed, by the side of the road . . . millions are going to die in the same way. There can be no way out. These men and women, boys and girls, must starve as tragic sacrifices on the twin altars of uncontrolled reproduction and uncontrolled abuse of the land resources."*

Yet today, China feeds a hundred million more people—and feeds them well. Clearly something was very wrong in Western prophecies.

The answer is that China succeeded because she first carried through fundamental reforms leading to a rise in living standards, abolition of unemployment, spectacular drop in mortality, increasing emancipation of women, remarkably efficient sanitary infrastructure, social security, one hundred per cent school attendance, and that by this means she has lowered her birth rate far beyond any other large country in the Third World. The lesson to be drawn seems clear enough.

As someone with wide international experience in the field of population problems, I do not hesitate to write that the population problem, as traditionally defined, is the greatest red-herring in the field of world development. By stressing population in such an isolated, simplistic manner, neo-Malthusian thinking might have lost the world twenty precious years in solving its number one problem—poverty. If twenty years ago, India had undertaken massive structural changes, a real land reform program, and distributed services and resources more equally among its people instead of trying to persuade illiterate women to adopt the rhythm method by bribing them with colored beads, it would probably not now be sterlizing people at the rate of 63,000 in two weeks (a goal achieved not long ago in a much-publicized family planning festival). Nor would it have to admit that millions of its people are worse off than they were 15 years ago (as was shown recently by the Dandekar study on poverty in India). At the root of India's population problem is not "copulation" but an alliance of national and Western vested interests which is opposed to radical change.

Aaron Segal, in his book *"The Rich, the Poor and Population,"* has told us that *"the road back to population sanity involves a few simple, unpleasant truths."*

- That people are not poor because they have too many children.
- That any decision to reduce the birth rate of a given society can only be taken by the members of that society in response to their needs. Outsiders can play only a marginal role.
- That trade, aid, immigration, income distribution, education, maternal health, all have much more to do with reducing the birth rate than visitors arriving to give away pills and loops.
- That the rich world could really help by paying fairer prices for raw materials and buying more cheap labor-intensive manufactured goods from the poor world.
- That it would also be helpful if the population foundations, with all

## NOT "HOW MANY?" BUT HOW?"

By ANTONIO CARRILLO-FLORES

Secretary-General, World Population Conference

The big question at the World Population Conference in Bucharest this August will not be "How many?" but "How?"

This is a point I have been making repeatedly in speeches and articles for over a year now, and I continue to do so because people are still under the impression that the World Population Conference will be devoted exclusively to family planning.

When discussing people, the question of "How many?" has meaning only as it bears on the larger question of *how* they live. Quantity gives way to the profounder question of quality. We must ask: What is the state of social and economic development? Is the environment pleasant? What can be done with the "urban explosion?" Is the role and structure of the family supportive of the individual and society? Are basic human rights protected? How will history judge our use of the resources of land and sea?

In thus spreading the scope of our discussions we will not be neglecting what many people see as the main issue—slowing the current unprecedented rate of population growth. Over the last two decades there has been mounting evidence that economic and social development, the changing role and structure of the family caused by modernization, and the individual security that comes from the observance of basic human rights, all have an impact on population growth rates. In fact, if we go by the historical experience of Europe and the United States, it is social transformation and a better standard of living that slows population growth rates. None of the countries that now have low rates of population growth had government-sponsored birth control programmes.

Another important *"How"* to be considered at Bucharest will be the achieving of international concert on a problem that presents a different face in every country. For this purpose the Conference will be better suited than any before it, being the first intergovernmental approach to the problem under the United Nations system. How can countries differing not only socially, economically and politically, but in their broadest cultural traditions and most intimate behaviour patterns, reach agreement on a world plan to deal with population problems? Partly the question is solved by recognizing that each country has the sovereign right to formulate its own policy, to partake as much or as little as it wants in the international endeavour.

I firmly believe that we shall emerge from Bucharest with international cooperation much strengthened, but the details of how to co-operate have to be agreed upon. How much of a nation's experience can be shared? How can international inequalities that act now as a barrier to development be removed? The answers to these—and a variety of other Hows—will be the hallmark of the Bucharest Conference. And on them will depend the historical significance of the meeting. □

their ample funds for publicity, would mention some of these urgent things in their dialogue with the American public and its leaders.

• That the rich countries should concern themselves with the real causes of poverty, in their own countries as well as in the Third World, rather than relying on population control as a form of conservative social control.

• That the rich countries should not ask poor countries to "do what we say and not what we do."

• That if we cannot help create conditions in which individuals will want to reduce their fertility then we have absolutely no moral right to coerce by any means whatsoever.

If the World Population Conference to be held in Bucharest this August does not face these problems—and many people desperately want to avoid them—then it will be an utter waste of time, money and effort. This must be stated clearly and forcefully.

The basic motivation behind the Western drive to "control" the population of the Third World is fear. Graphs depict the burgeoning population of the Third World as a Hiroshima-like, A bomb cloud, and even such superb scientists as Nobel Prize winner Norman Borlaug can write of *"staring over his shoulder at the relentless frightening advance of the population monster."* Speaking of Indians, he even writes about *"the population monster growling behind them."*

In my whole life, I have never seen a population monster. As I look over my shoulder at West Africa, where I recently lived, I hear silence rather than "growling." The silence of the Berber tribe from north Mali who, between January and May last year, were reduced by drought and famine from 8,000 to 16. Today, it may well be that not one single one is left. Twice before that, the Malian Minister of Agriculture, Sidi Coulibaly, had been to Europe to try to alert Western governments and institutions about the impending disaster. Nobody took him seriously. The Africans were just faraway statistics.

Yes—in all this talk about population it seems that one basic truth has been forgotten. Population is people. If we claim that there are too many people on the earth, then why are we so sure that we are not the excess ones? We Westerners who individually consume and pollute as much as 50 or more African or Indian peasants? In all my years in the field of population, I have never one single time heard a member of the population establishment say that there were too many upper-middle class, white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants in the world, but two such people have openly told me that there were too many Blacks, and countless others have implied this be it in their writings or conversation.

Yet fearful attitudes have never helped build a better world. Fear has never built cathedrals, or empires, created art, fed the poor, opened the doors of prisons, cared for those in need, started revolutions—and there are many types of revolution.

We live in a world of growing economic, social and political interdependency, as the energy crisis has only too aptly shown. One of the greatest dangers of today is parochial, selfish, ethnocentric attitudes which blind us to the realities of the world. Ultimately, our fate is bound to that of the Bengali rickshaw driver or Congolese peasant women as much as to our own job or country. We forget this at our peril.

We need a broader, clearer vision. We need to see people as infinitely precious, infinitely beautiful, and not in terms of "negative dependency ratios," "frightening growth rates," and other similar heartless expressions. Are we afraid of our mother, or child, or neighbor or husband? Then why are we afraid of Mohamed, Vijeya, Liu, or Carita?

In the world of Genesis, Cain could say about Abel *"Am I the guardian of my brother?"* and at least hope to get away with it. In today's world of globalized economies and thinking, the Western Cains can no longer say the same. Today Cain will have to learn that he can only guard himself if he guards his brother. The future of humanity rests upon this realization more than any other one.

If we want to survive, clearer vision and greater compassion, not better pills, are most urgently needed. □

Drawing water at a village in the Tara region of Togo

# Africa's Need for Planning: Conspiracy or Myth?

It is unlikely that the White man has a machiavellian motive in supporting family planning in independent Black Africa. But in southern Africa birth control projects could be seen as a conspiracy to halt Black population growth relative to White.

By TAKAWIRA SHUMBA MAFUKIDZE

For some time there has been a myth that Africa does not have a population problem. Family planning has been attacked as part of a white man's conspiracy, aimed at a peaceful elimination of the Black race. This myth is now faced with new realities that suggest that population pressure in Africa is already an extensive and serious challenge.

Some African countries are already feeling the strains of increasing population, which involve, among other problems, increasing urban and rural unemployment, low levels of subsistence in rural areas, increasing claims on government resources for social services in education and health, and increasing drift to urban areas.

One African country that has felt such population strains in Kenya, which is to receive a $12 million International Development Association credit to help finance a population project. The IDA, an affiliate of the World Bank, has announced that the credit is designed to assist Kenya's Five-Year Family-Planning Program 1975-79. It is the first World Bank population project in Africa south of the Sahara and the first in Kenya. The population of Kenya is estimated at more than 12.5 million. About 80 per cent of the people live on the 17 per cent of the land area considered suitable for cultivation. Population growth rate is estimated at about 3.3 per cent per year.

Kenya's project focuses on training field personnel to extend existing family planning and maternal and child health services, strengthening the rural health system and developing an appropriate institution to support family-planning services. The IDA credit will cover about 30 per cent of the cost of the five-year program. The project also includes construction of five community nurse-training schools, 27 rural health-training centers, a National Family Welfare Family Center, with a family-planning clinic attached, and a health education unit. The project emphasizes the role of the multipurpose community nurse. Overall responsibility for implementation of family-planning programs is under the National Welfare Center. The population project in Kenya raises important questions. Are African attitudes toward birth control changing? Don't African countries with less technological know-how need a larger population to foster economic development?

The population of Africa is estimated to be around 267 million. The average density per square mile is about 32 people. The total land area of sub-Sahara Africa is about 16 per cent of the earth's surface and has about seven per cent of the world's population. United Nations statistics suggest that the birth rate for the area is around 45 to 50 children per 1,000 people. The total fertility rate or the average number of births per woman is in excess of six children. The Princeton Office of Population Research suggests that this is one of the highest levels of regional fertility in the world. Not all areas of Africa or all groups within the African population are part of this alarming pattern.

Those countries that have high birthrates may have to revise their thinking on birth control. Even those African countries that have low births per woman should not rejoice because low fertility in such areas is generally not due to deliberate family planning, modern contraception or economic development. Instead, low birthrates may be due to traditional cultural and biological factors. There are cases of childless women despite the desire of virtually all African women for children. This in itself seems to suggest a physical disability rather than a personal unwillingness to have offspring.

As African population has soared it has complicated the already challenging process of economic development. This has resulted in some parts of Africa in difficulties in maintaining a stable political order. For example, Ethiopia, with a population of about 26 million and growing at the rate of 2.5 per cent a year, has been faced with inflation escalating faster than at any other time in the last decade. The Ethiopian authorities as any other African government will have to make


Having more children means finding more money for schools

qualitative and quantitative changes in the economy. In addition to any changes in the economy, African states that wish to survive will need to initiate population projects similar to that of Kenya.

While it is true that there are some African countries, such as Gabon, with shortages of labor, it is equally true that such countries are not yet willing to accept massive permanent immigration of labor from neighboring states. Even if such countries were to allow immigration, the effects would only be temporary.

As the circumstances in which people live change more rapidly, so their attitudes and actions with regard to family size and family planning also develop. By documenting fertility differentials along residential, socioeconomic and educational lines, one finds that urban, educated and higher-status women have significantly lower fertility rates than their rural, uneducated and lower-status counterparts.

While there are no registration systems in some African countries, mortality estimates can be derived from census and survey data. Such estimates at least suggest the general level of mortality. The crude death rate ranges from about 18 to 20 people per 1,000 in Kenya, Uganda and Zambia, to 35 to 40 people per 1,000 in Upper Volta and Guinea. For Africa as a whole, the United Nations suggests a death rate of approximately 21 people per 1,000. This does not take into account the recent devastating effect of drought in the Sahelian countries and Ethiopia, where many of the dying and starving children are under six years.

The decline in sub-Sahara African mortality can be attributed primarily to broad public-health programs that have reduced major infectious diseases such as smallpox, measles and malaria. This was accomplished without a major transformation in the traditional social and economic life of the people. In spite of this control of major diseases, Africa has the world's highest mortality rate, and some people argue that it is absurd to institute

Child care clinic in Gabon

Children at an FAO-assisted ranching scheme in Dahomey

birth-control programs in the light of such statistics.

Among the most outspoken critics of birth-control programs have been the Zimbabwe nationalists in Rhodesia. In that territory, the consolidation of white power has significantly influenced African attitudes toward family planning. African nationalists consider any birth-control efforts as part of a conspiracy by a white minority who have shown themselves absolutely determined to maintain power and retain for their own use half of Rhodesia's land. Recently, the Rhodesian regime has been alarmed by an increasingly impoverished Black majority whose numbers are growing at the demographic rate of 3.7 per cent per year. The regime of Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith has created a special ministerial post to deal with African birth control. At the same time, the Rhodesian Government has been campaigning vigorously to attract white immigrants. If there is population pressure, the African nationalists argue, why is the Rhodesian regime spending so much to lure more white immigrants? One result of the Rhodesian situation is that it is virtually impossible to initiate birth-control programs except by force.

In the eyes of the whites, Rhodesia has no room for more Africans. This is true, perhaps, according to the rules under which Blacks occupy less than half the country. This implies a situation of land use in which few whites inhabit relatively large areas of low population density, while many Africans occupy relatively small areas at high density. The African section of the land is characterized by soil deterioration, excessively steep slopes, declining crop yields and land fragmentation. The problem, from the African point of view, is not overpopulation but uneven distribution of the land. The solution there seems to be land reform, not birth control.

In general, the widely held myth that Africa does not have a demographic problem is primarily based upon an analysis of population distribution in specific African states. Population pressures in countries like Ethiopia, for example, are attributed to the feudal system in which only a few people own the bulk of the fertile land with much of the population living as serfs.

Africa's average density of 29.8 persons per square mile is lower than that of any other continent except Australia, a fact that has been advanced to prove that Africa suffers from underpopulation rather than overpopulation. Of course, density figures obscure the true situation in which either many people live in a small area or in which a few landlords control the most productive part of the land at the expense of the majority of the people. It is possible in some African states to reduce population pressures by extending agriculture to lands not now being used, improving agriculture in present areas and absorbing adequate numbers of people in nonagricultural activities. Such possibilities, however, have some limitations.

One limitation is that the rate of urban development in Africa is not sufficient to absorb surplus rural population. Population growth in towns and cities is not only more visible but creates even greater problems than it would in the countryside. Secondly, the possibility of extending areas used for agriculture will be severely limited by the availability of good soils. The third problem is that the local economy in most African countries can't provide the costly inputs required for modification and intensification of agriculture. These limitations suggest that there are no simple solutions to the problem of population pressures in sub-Sahara Africa. Of course, many people take heart in the eventual improvements implicit in the long-term process of modernization. Even this is cancelled out by present and prospective levels of population growth. Even countries that achieve satisfactory global growth rates may find their *per-capita* standard of living falling.

Most African countries realize that rapid population growth tends to limit the rate of social and economic development. Such expansion forces the state to spend a disproportionate amount of wealth on goods and services to be consumed by its growing population, with the result that little money is left for investment or for improving living standards. For example, an African country that increases its product by four per cent per year, and whose population is growing at three per cent a year, will have only one per cent for improvement of the standard of living. The remaining surplus is eaten up by the demands of the increased population. In such a situation, it would take such an African country 70 years to double its per-capita income.

It is no good to say that the increased population will mean more working hands. Present patterns will always result in more (nonworking) children than (working) adults. In any case, the one input Africa already has in abundance is unskilled labor.

Fewer people are needed in order to have enough to invest in educating them and, once they are skilled, enough savings are needed to produce the capital investment for them to work with.

A lower rate of population growth would change the age structure in such a way as to permit higher levels of savings, investment and economic growth. There would be fewer dependent children and proportionately more workers. There would be a rapid increase in national product and an even greater share of wealth for each individual.

These principles are logical and pertinent not only in the case of Kenya, but also in Africa as a whole, where the rapid population growth of 2.5 per cent per year cancels out the strenuous efforts the countries are making to improve individual living standards.

Under these circumstances, it is

useful to examine the prospects for significant efforts to reduce the rate of population growth. There is no doubt that African herbal potions, used in traditional anti-natal practices, are well known in many parts of Africa. It is likely that if Africans had used some of their birth-control methods there would have been a decline in fertility.

The problem in instituting birth-control plans in Africa is that some methods, such as abortion, are not considered appropriate within stable marriages. It is almost unheard of in many parts of Africa for a married woman to perform or be party to abortion. In most cases, abortion is considered appropriate only in situations where the birth of a child would not be socially approved. Under traditional conditions, such situations are relatively infrequent. In general, overall attempts to reduce marital fertility have not been common in Africa, but there are indications that this pattern is changing.

Recent figures show that substantial numbers of African women in urban areas are eager to receive information about contraception and are anxious to avoid pregnancy. Urbanization and modernization tend to increase contraceptive use, but this is negligible in most parts of Africa. Perhaps this is an indication that urbanization has not reached its peak or that cultural factors are too strong to allow for the voluntary reduction of family size. High birthrates in Africa were, and still are, a reflection of traditional cultural values that continue to exercise a dominant influence in the lives of most Africans.

In much of Africa, women who had many children were valued, whereas those that could not produce offspring were looked down upon. For the vast majority of the African population, the effect of modernization has been slight. Western culture tends to alter the circumstances of people's lives, and sometimes the values they live by. If we assume that this western "civilization" is both desirable and inevitable, family planning will be accepted on a larger scale in most African states.

Furthermore, should the population growth rate increase to three per cent or more per year, most development efforts would be neutralized. Under the resulting conditions of general frustration, it would be hard to maintain a stable political order.

The Kenya Government evidently believes that the alteration of the previous growth equation demands vigorous national action to develop and expand the substantial birth-control potential. Most African governments, however, do not think like Kenya and are unenthusiastic about family planning. Perhaps the experience of the Sahelian countries where thousands of people have died of drought-induced starvation will influence African thinking on family planning. Most of the children who are dying in the drought-stricken areas are under six years old, which means they were conceived and born during the drought. Surely children should be brought into this world to live, and not to die horribly before they are mature.

Each African state has its own specific circumstances and problems. Each country needs to determine whether certain factors that usually indicate excess population are present. According to some experts, these factors include degradation or outright destruction of soil, declining crop yields, breakdown of the indigenous farming system, food shortages, hunger, malnutrition, unemployment and underemployment in rural and urban areas.

Never has Africa been so critically dependent on the weather. It means the difference between life and death. Although Africa's population is over 250 million, it is estimated that there are only food grains in store to cover less than seven per cent of the Continent's requirements.

It has also been suggested that there are now more deaths among Africans from one to six years old than from birth through the first year of life. Most of these deaths, have been attributed to environmental rather than hereditary or birth-related factors. These factors can be ameliorated by social, economic and medical developments. But this is not possible if a small country with a poor economy is faced with population strains.

Although it might be true that family-planning projects are part of the white man's conspiracy to halt Black population growth relative to white in southern Africa, it is doubtful that the white man has much to gain in any population-planning programs in independent African states. □

# News Analysis

African-Arab misunderstandings, the Somali-Ethiopian confrontation, how to deal with the new Portugal, the split over the secretary-generalship; these and other issues that arose at the recent OAU Summit are discussed by the doyen of foreign press writers on Africa, who asks:

# What Really Happened at Mogadishu?

By Colin Legum

As one of the few regular press people who attend the annual summit meetings of the Organization of African Unity I must confess that I would not have recognized the Mogadishu meeting from most of the reporting I saw come out of the Somali capital in June 1974. This is not necessarily all the fault of the press; much of it was because of the failure of the OAU Information Division; not even the generous helpfulness of the host country's Press Section could produce sets of resolutions or adequate briefings. In fact, we had to leave Mogadishu without getting a final look at the whole set of resolutions. The result was inevitably a partly balanced picture—depending on who was doing the briefing.

Contributing to the OAU's information failure was the crisis within the Secretariat over the future of Secretary-General Nzo Ekangaki.

Nzo Ekangaki's tenure in the post was brief and stormy. He failed to carry his senior staff with him and was engaged, for much of his two years in office, in coping with staff problems, as well as in resisting pressures from the governments of his senior staff. In his emotional speech of resignation at Mogadishu, Ekangaki described briefly but vividly the nature of the crisis within the Secretariat and explained the need for new thinking about the responsibilities of the chief executive.

Although Ekangaki's resignation is generally associated with the decision to engage the controversial Lonrho firm as consultants for the OAU's energy planning, this idea did not originate with him and he never acted independently. His resignation, in fact, was forced on him by his own president's decision to call on him to quit—for reasons of Camerounian politics that had nothing to do with the OAU itself.

Having forced Ekangaki's resignation, President Ahmadou Ahidjo thought he was entitled to propose a Camerounian successor for the remaining period of Ekangaki's office. He put forward several names, including that of one of his most experienced ministers, William Eteki Mboumoua; but his suggestion was rejected out of hand. Then came the drama.

Somalia decided to nominate its foreign minister, Omer Arteh, an experienced, popular and energetic diplomat who, under circumstances different from those existing between his country and Ethiopia, might have made an outstanding leader. But the Somalia-Ethiopia dispute (which had become one of the two seriously contentious issues during the 10th summit in 1973—the other being Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi's challenge to the Ethiopians) was in a difficult stage at that moment. The Good Offices Committee, which was chaired by Nigeria's General Yakubu Gowon and which had been appointed the year before, had not made any serious attempt to reconcile the two parties beyond reinvoking the 1964 Khartoum Agreement to get the two respective armies to withdraw to 25 kilometers from the frontier. Now, with the meeting in Mogadishu and with the Somalis ready to use their position as host country to gain the maximum leverage, the Ethiopians were in no mood for gentle diplomacy. The Somali case in defense of their proposal was that since the OAU headquarters was in Addis Ababa, it would balance things if the key executive post were in the hands of a Somali.

It was an argument that did not win general support other than from the Arab members of the OAU. They made it clear that their full support would go to Omer Arteh. But this produced a reaction from those African countries that had already been expressing doubts about the policies of the Arab oil producers in their dealings with Third World countries. This group's feelings were particularly ruffled by an editorial in the official Somali paper suggesting that Somalia's recent admittance to the Arab League would ensure a useful link between the League and the OAU if Omer Arteh were elected.

However, the real opposition to the Somali candidate was not prompted by any "anti-Arab feelings." The leaders of the opposition—Tanzania's Julius Nyerere and Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda—have never been part of any "anti-Arab" group. On the contrary, Nyerere especially was always a close supporter of the late President Nasser and is conspicuously well disposed to the moderate Arab position rather than to Israel. The reason Nyerere and Kaunda took their stand (after strong private urgings by Kenya and Ethiopia) was that they felt the election of Somalia's foreign minister would transfer into the OAU central machinery one of the least tractable of all the disputes that African leaders must face—and this, at a time when Ethiopia's whole future is in the melting

pot. They, therefore, saw the issue not as pro-Somali or anti-Arab but strictly from the viewpoint of pan-Africanists concerned with preserving the still fragile unity within the OAU. They produced as their candidate Zambia's foreign minister, Vernon Mwaanga.

Unfortunately the nomination of an anglophone candidate inserted a different factor into the contest: the francophones, who did not want to support Omer Arteh, also did not want to support what some of them described as "a British [sic] Commonwealth nominee." Although only two candidates were officially nominated, the lobbying always allowed for a third dark horse to win in the end.

The African and OAU "tradition" of voting by consensus, once a clear majority has been established in favor of a particular viewpoint or candidate, significantly did not operate on this occasion. This was principally because of Nyerere's obstinacy. Having once announced as the reason for his opposition to Omer Arteh the overriding importance he attached to safeguarding the future of the OAU, nothing could move him. The Commonwealth knows him in this mood over the issue of NIBMAR (No Independence Before Majority Rule in Rhodesia); now the OAU saw how inflexible he can be over questions of deep conviction.

The crisis lasted through two days and almost one whole night; over 20 separate roll calls were taken, with the voting pattern changing only slightly; an average 21 to 23 votes going to the Somali and 18 to the Zambian. The hard-core vote for Omer Arteh was: Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, Chad, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Burundi, Mali, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, Madagascar, Niger and Congo People's Republic. For the opposition, the solid core was made up of Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Malawi, Mauritius, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zaïre, Nigeria, Liberia, The Gambia, Ghana and the Ivory Coast.

One interesting facet of this voting pattern is that on this occasion the Commonwealth members—for reasons that have nothing to do with Britain or the Commonwealth—were for once largely united. Two members "defected"—Uganda and Sierra Leone. Two major non-Commonwealth countries voting with the anglophones were Zaïre and the Ivory Coast. At the maximum of his voting strength, Omer Arteh was robbed of his clear two-thirds majority by only one vote. But in the end the two sides remained fixed in deadlock, and the dark horse was allowed to slip in as the unanimous choice. William Eteki, as will be recalled, was President Ahidjo's original nominee: But although it would have saved a great deal of valuable time and avoided straining relations within the organization if it had not taken place, the contest was undoubtedly of crucial importance for the evolution of the OAU. It showed, *inter alia*, that consensus is not always the "African way of doing things"; it is often resorted to only after the real issues have been fought out with considerable tenacity on both sides. It also brought back into focus the unclear and sensitive role of the secretary-general which, in the past, has been a major cause of weakening loyalties within the OAU. Finally it mirrored the feelings of some OAU members about what they claim is an attempt by Arabs to dominate the African body and incidentally, which Arabs feel is an attempt by pro-Israeli Africans to undermine the OAU's commitment to the Arab cause.

Much of the reporting out of Mogadishu reflected these two viewpoints. Most of the western reporting suggested the growth of strong anti-Arab resentments among Africans; such strike me as being exaggerated in their way as much as the Arab, and some of the African, reporting has been in labeling other African states as stalking horses for Israel; when Tanzania is put into this category the misinterpretation is total.

While much of the reporting about the supposed degree of anti-Arab hostility developing in Africa is greatly exaggerated, there is some element of justification in these reports; but the perspective seems to me to be wrong. I would suggest that the tensions being manifested between a number of African countries and a number of Arab states—mainly the bigger oil producers, but excluding Algeria and, in a different category, also excluding Egypt and Sudan—must be seen as a reflection of growing African concern about the failure of their supposed friends in the Arab part of the Third World to make any practical contribution toward alleviating the groaning financial problems caused by higher fuel prices. Having taken the Arab side, sometimes reluctantly, some African leaders feel they deserve to be helped. Seen in this perspective the African feeling is not anti-Arab or pro-Israel; it is simply what most countries feel when their interests are affected by the actions of an identifiable set of states. What has happened is that the major Arab oil producers have now joined the ranks of "the West" and the "socialist bloc" in terms of African trading interests.

There is no doubt that the feeling of being let down by the Arab oil producers would, by now, have been much greater were it not for the sensitive and influential role played by Algerian President Houari Boumediéne—who is rapidly becoming one of the most respected members of the African family—and by the Sudanese. Nobody has better gauged the danger of an African backlash over Arab oil policies than the Sudanese foreign minister, Dr. Mansour Khalid, and his advisers.

Although there was considerable discussion, involving a number of heated "anti-Arab remarks" (including some from Uganda's General Amin), the Council of Ministers was able to produce a consensus resolution, which was unanimously accepted by the Heads of State, on Africa's energy crisis. But the OAU's general declaration of policy—covering such questions as ensuring an adequate flow of supplies to all African countries (including Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland); the use of the initial $200 million allocated to alleviate the burdens of countries least able to bear the higher costs, and for other development purposes; and the structure of the new Arab Bank for the Development of African Countries—can by no means be regarded as offering either a short-term or long-term solution for the problems caused by higher fuel prices. A valuable report by the

Economic Commission for Africa drew attention to the fact that African economies will suffer more heavily because of the 200 to 300 per cent rise in the cost of petrochemicals and fertilizers than because of the cost of fuel for transport and heating purposes.

The report of the negotiations by the OAU Committee of Seven with the Arab League to achieve an agreed and effective policy is especially illuminating. Perhaps the most valuable document among those submitted by this Committee to the Council of Ministers was a *statement by Louis Negre*, vice president of the African Development Bank and Mali's former finance minister, in which he establishes very clearly the conflict of views between the ADB and the architects of the new Arab Bank for African Development. These problems are not insoluble; the fact that they are being constructively discussed makes solutions possible. But they have not yet been solved and until they are the possibility of an anti-Arab backlash remains in Black Africa. This personal view is not, I gather, very different from what the Algerian and Sudanese leaders are telling the Arab League. (As a sideline comment, it seems that, as at the Mogadishu conference, the only major Arab oil producer that had not yet contributed to the emergency Arab fund to help Africans was Libya.)

The Mogadishu summit's view of the new opportunities offered by the recent changes in Portugal can be summed up as being soberly realistic. The African Liberation Committee, under Colonel Mbita, had prepared the ground for the discussions at their meeting in Yaoundé (May 13 to 18, 1974) where they drafted a statement that, in its essence, became the Declaration of Mogadishu. While welcoming the end of Portuguese fascism it insists that the only acceptable solution for Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau is complete independence and that terms for this can be negotiated only with those liberation movements recognized by the OAU.

While the Declaration of Mogadishu names Frelimo and PAIGC as the two legitimate heirs of the Portuguese in *Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, it is* silent on whom it regards as the legitimate negotiating body for Angola. The reason for this is obvious. Instead of dividing as between Zaïre's nominee, Holden Roberto of FNLA and the more generally favored MPLA, the Heads of State agreed privately among themselves that negotiations between Angolans and the Portuguese should be delayed until the Angolans had first been helped to form a national front among themselves. They recognized that this required first achieving a reunification of the forces of MPLA itself; at Mogadishu it was clear that it was *divided into three: the Neto wing, the* Daniel Chipenda wing and the Brazzaville wing led by Dr. Eduardo Santos which favors the national leadership of Father Pinto Andrade. Once the MPLA has had a chance to sort out the terms on which it might be able to unite itself, the African Liberation Committee will be involved in negotiations to help establish a viable front between the MPLA and the FNLA; this will not necessarily involve the merging of the two bodies. Although UNITA had its observers at Mogadishu and although they had lengthy negotiations with Chipenda, no formal acknowledgement was made of their place, if any, in a national front. However, since Mogadishu there have been disclosures in the magazine *Afrique-Asie* about direct communications between Portuguese officers and Jonas Savimbi, and these are likely to cast some doubts on UNITA's future—especially among those who had previously formed strong suspicions about the movement's role.

Broadly speaking, the view of those African leaders most immediately concerned with the problems of the Portuguese colonies (especially Zaïre, Zambia, Tanzania, Congo and Swaziland) can be summed up as generally hopeful about the early achievement of independence for Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique; but they fear that Portuguese interests, having got rid of their two most difficult problems and their least profitable colonies, will maneuver to prevent Angola breaking all its ties with Lisbon, or from getting a truly independent Black government — a strategy which, they say, will be greatly *helped by the present divisions* within the liberation movement. The only effective way of countering such a possibility is to ensure an effective anti-Portuguese national front before any negotiations begin.

Whether Holden Roberto, now sitting confidently perched to negotiate—having for the time being eliminated divisions in his own ranks and enjoying the full backing of Zaïre's President Mobutu Sese Seko as well as the promise of 250 commando trainers from Peking—will refrain from starting any talks until the MPLA puts its own house in order, remains moot. *Meanwhile, if the MPLA fails to get* effective internal unity, one cannot rule out the possibility of a Roberto-Chipenda lineup—with or without the pro-Andrade wing in Brazzaville.

During a recent visit to Lisbon, it became clear to me that the Portuguese are still deeply mistrustful of Holden Roberto (because of his role in the 1961 massacres) and still look to Agostinho Neto as the leader among the liberation movements they would most like to do business with.

Senior African leaders do not dismiss the idea of Angola's becoming a "second Congo" unless African unity can be achieved fairly quickly; but there is a total rejection among them of any suggestion that either the U.N. or the OAU should be invited to establish a presence in Angola during the necessarily prolonged negotiations that lie ahead. Their reason for refusing to consider this proposal is that they fear that any group of OAU or U.N. members introduced into Angola will inevitably strengthen the divisive forces inside the country—and may even promote them, as some U.N. members did in the Congo in 1960.

This brief survey of the Mogadishu summit suffers from a number of the usual defects of reporting international gatherings: It concentrates on the more controversial matters which, in this case, but not always, also happen to be the most important issues that arose during the meeting; but there is no mention at all of the huge volume of decisions taken in the economic, social, technical and communications fields. Several valuable surveys of the OAU's increasingly sophisticated handling *of its functional cooperation* could—and should—be written. □

# Kibedi Speaks Out

Taking David Martin's recent biography, **General Amin** as a starting point, Wanume Kibedi, who served as Amin's Foreign Minister for two years, reveals the inside story behind recent events in Uganda and explains why he continued to serve in a government whose rule was, in his own words, "bloody, brutal and repressive".

By WANUME KIBEDI

David Martin's view on Ugandan President Idi Amin are as predictable as anything can be. Indeed they are so predictable that Amin denounced Martin's book *General Amin*, as soon as he heard it was in the offing—even before it went to press. Amin had a good idea of what the book would contain, and, in a classic example of international blackmail, threatened to take retaliatory measures against the British community in Uganda if the book were published. The publishers called Amin's bluff, and the book is now on the stands.

Amin's three and one-half years in power have been stormy, and they have been bloody. That will be the pattern of Amin's rule as long as he remains in power because violence breeds violence, and Amin has made repression and brutality cornerstones of his power structure.

President Amin at the Malire Regiment barracks

Observers who look at the excesses of Amin's misrule often ask how anybody with a conscience and a sense of feeling could serve under Amin. I have sometimes been asked how it came that I ever worked as a minister in Amin's Government, and for two long years.

In respect to my own position, it is necessary to go back to January 25, 1971, the day of Amin's coup. That day saw the culmination of a year-long battle of wits that soon developed into a desperate struggle for power between two erstwhile friends—ex-President Milton Obote and General Amin. The coup was a deliberate and preconceived venture, planned and (with the help of the Malire Mechanized Regiment) executed by Amin. In the face of expected moves from Obote to dismiss him, it was carried out with the aim of preserving his position as Commander of the Uganda Armed Forces—the effective depository of power in Uganda.

The coup d'état saved Amin's position, and also bestowed on him the last say in all affairs affecting the country. After the coup's success, Amin held power but did not know what to do with it. He did not have policies of any kind—political, economic or social. The coup had not been organized by any committee, council or group (military or civilian), contrary to the usual situation when the armed forces overthrow a civilian government. Hence at a most crucial time, Amin had no policy or consultative committees to guide

him. The coup thus ushered in an enormous policy vacuum, and different forces in Uganda vied with one another to fill it.

For 10 days Amin could not even make up his mind as to who he wanted to serve in the first military government. His original idea was to retain Obote's cabinet ministers, or at least most of them, with himself becoming head of government. Popular sentiment was, however, firmly against any such idea, and it soon dawned on Amin that the people did not wish to see any of the former ministers remain in government.

The deposed Uganda Peoples Congress Government had, rightly or wrongly, been associated with socialist or left-wing policies. Obote's downfall was, therefore, considered by his traditional political opponents on the right as an opportunity to reverse everything he had stood for. Reactionary politicians of the right were a dominant force around Amin in those early days, and even before the cabinet was appointed they were pressing him to revoke the republican constitution and to revert to the 1962 post-independence constitution, notably by restoring the monarchies.

I went to see Amin at his command post on January 26, 1971, intending to go back to Jinja (where I had a law practice) the same day. This was not to be. The vacuum that I have mentioned was all-pervasive at the command post, and I quickly sensed that the situation required constant vigilance, otherwise the self-seekers would turn the country's clock of development back several years. I thus became involved in the Amin Government in its early stages.

The coup had been widely acclaimed, and it was obvious that the people had definite expectations. The 18 points announced by the soldiers to justify the military seizure of power were a blueprint for a better future, and I considered participation in the military government as a way of providing greater service to the people. (Incidentally, the nature of the 18 points prove conclusively that the coup was premeditated, and not merely a countercoup as Amin has stated.)

As far as consultative government was concerned Amin at first began to learn well. In the months following the coup, he was apt to listen patiently to the views expressed by his ministers, and often followed their recommendations. However, within a comparatively short time he became bored with the consultative processes, and began handing down orders, directives and decrees without consulting anybody.

Before the first year was out he was publicly upbrading his ministers, individually or collectively as a cabinet. We had entered the era of one-man government, which has now become a permanent feature of Amin's rule. The expulsion of the Israelis in March 1972 and of the Asians in Augus 1972 are just two examples of policy decisions that Amin reached along, confronting his ministers and civil servants with *faits accomplis* that they had to implement.

From the start, external defense and internal security were Amin's special preserves. The ministries concerned with security came under his close control, up to the departmental level. Accurate and up-to-date information on the security situation in the country was hard to come by, since there was no systematic collation and dissemination of such information. Thus even as members of government, ministers normally got such information from town talk, verbal reports from the villages, or from the foreign press. In this aspect the foreign news media performed a useful function, informing Ugandans of what was going on in their own country. Of course, such reports were not always accurate as to details.

The extensive liquidation of innocent Ugandans, first in the security forces and later among civilians, perpetually caused me a great deal of anguish and much distress. I persistently appealed to Amin to put an end to the excesses, but more often than not he reacted with callous indifference and, at times, with hostility. The thought of leaving Amin's Government often occurred to me, but there was a dilemma. As Amin's Minister of Foreign Affairs and brother in law, I was in a position to speak frankly, forthrightly and fearlessly to him, urging him to correct what was going wrong. The problem was whether I could serve the people of Uganda better by remaining near Amin and trying to restrain his aberrations and other excesses or whether it would be preferable to disassociate myself from his government and denounce it. So long as I had any hope of influencing Amin for the good of the people of Uganda, I elected to stay.

In September, 1972, an invasion force of about 1,200 Ugandan exiles resident in Tanzania made an incursion into the southwestern part of the country, in an effort to restore the rule of ex-President Obote. The incursion was never a threat to the military gov-

Two men on their way to execution

ernment, and it was quickly neutralized.

In the aftermath of the invasion, thousands of Ugandans who had had nothing to do with the abortive venture were liquidated. Some of the victims like the Chief Justice, Benedicto Kiwanuka, and the Vice Chancellor of Makerere University, Frank Kalimuzo, were figures of international repute. However, there were thousands of less elevated Ugandans who were similarly liquidated. In that month of September, 1972, at least five of my closest friends and associates were liquidated, and, later on, an uncle of mine was murdered.

I took issue with Amin over this wholesale liquidation of the innocent, but, in his usual way, he was uninterested. His standard answer was that whoever had been liquidated had been a guerrilla. The abductions of September 1972, which involved people like Kiwanuka, Kalimuzo and many others, finally led me to decide quite firmly to leave the Amin Government. I knew my resignation would also mean exile, unless I in turn wanted to be liquidated. I therefore had to make careful plans for departure, and those plans started taking shape in September 1972.

In mid-February 1973, Amin sent me on a mission to Kenya. It was the nature of this mission that ended my patience with him. He asked me to deliver a message to the Kenya authorities which, among other matters, requested that several Ugandan refugees, who Amin believed were in Nairobi, be handed over to him. This was most distasteful to me, since I knew the Ugandans concerned were innocent of any anti-state activities. The circumstances were such that I had to deliver the message, but I then remained in Kenya and urged the Kenyans not to hand over any Ugandan exiles to Amin. None were handed over. Next I sent Amin my resignation by mail.

In discussing the invasion of the Uganda exiles, David Martin remarks that it was "undoubtedly a major blunder." He is able to say that with the benefit of hindsight. His own reports (which he filed from Dar es Salaam) at the time of the invasion reflect the

The body of an alleged guerrilla is cut down after execution by firing squad

"It must not be forgotten that Amin has a dual personality. He can be extremely pleasant, especially to foreigners. But he can also be vicious and brutal."

opposite view—indeed they suggest that he expected the incursion to succeed.

Disappearances have now become a permanent feature in Uganda. Everyday they become more and more blatant. As time passes, Amin's aberrations become more outrageous. In June 1974, the International Commission of Jurists denounced Amin's excesses. At the time I also issued an open letter to him stating that he was personally liable for the liquidation of thousands of innocent people in Uganda. He has set up a commission to inquire into the disappearances, but since he is the main culprit, the position of the commission (as long as Amin remains in power) is clearly an impossible one. As matters now stand in Uganda, I could not contemplate serving in Amin's government for one day.

Martin fully brings out the vicious aspect of Amin's nature. However, it must not be forgotten that Amin has a dual personality. He can be extremely pleasant—particularly to foreigners. But he can also be vicious and brutal. Ugandans who have to put up with him are fully aware of this duality.

Having said that, I must make it clear that Martin gets a number of facts wrong in his book. Firstly, contrary to popular myth, Felix Onama, Defense Minister in Obote's Government, was not in any way involved in the coup. In fact, on the night of the coup, Onama twice telephoned Amin urging him to order the troops to return to their barracks and to remain loyal to Obote's Government. The first time Amin put Onama off with some vague promises. The second time Amin threatened him with detention if he did not "stop interfering." The inspector general of police and the commissioner of prisons were coopted into the new government simply because Amin wanted to present an image of solidarity among the security forces and to further demoralize Obote. The police and prison services were not involved in the coup. Regarding my resignation from Nairobi: No one sent me any message saying that I would be killed if I returned to Kampala. Before my departure from Kampala, I had already decided to resign from abroad.

I find Martin's assessment of the events leading up to the coup of January 1971 inadequate. In this respect, several developments that occurred in 1970 were indicative of things to come. For example, in September of that year, Amin was interviewed on Uganda television and said that the Uganda armed forces were ready to back any government that had the support of the people, even if such a government were formed by the opposition parties, the Democratic Party and Kabaka Yekka. He added that he did not fear anybody but God.

Previously Amin had consistently maintained that the Uganda armed forces would always faithfully uphold the Uganda Peoples Congress Government. Now he was saying that, in certain situations, the Armed Forces could support political parties that had been banned, and whose leaders were either in exile or in detention. In the tense atmosphere of 1970, Obote could have ignored such words only at his peril. By that time Amin had in fact already decided to seize power.

Martin's "reportage" on the efforts of my delegation to take the Uganda seat at the O.A.U. Conference in Addis Ababa in January 1971 shows clearly that he supported the Tanzania-led moves to seat the Obote delegation. The same applies to his discussion of the Mogadishu Conference after the invasion of September 1972. This is understandable, since he was then living in Dar es Salaam, where he had been resident for a number of years.

Martin says in the preface that his book is "not intended to be a historical or academic work," but only "a piece of reportage." This may explain some of the shortcomings of the book. Let us hope that one of these days somebody will write a historical and academic book on recent events in Uganda, when, hopefully, importance will be placed on verification of the facts and identification of sources and materials.

One parting observation: Martin says of Amin's coup: "Amin and his supporters from Malire had seized the capital, and as in all African coups that was critical." The seizure of the capital is important and decisive not only in African coups but in all coups. If evidence were needed, the recent military coups in Greece, Chile, and Portugal put the matter beyond debate or speculation. Here Martin joins the ranks of those people who make sweeping generalizations about Africa that are uncalled for. □

**Africa Report** welcomes comments from its readers on issues raised in the magazine and on matters relating to Africa and its people. For reasons of space a contribution sent in the form of a letter to the editor stands a much greater chance of publication than one submitted as an article. Letters should be as brief as possible, normally between 100 and 400 words.

The editor retains the right to abridge or otherwise alter letters for reasons of space or other editorial requirement.

All letters should bear the name and address of the sender. Requests for anonymity and non-divulgence will be respected but such a requirement may render the letter less likely to be published.

Individuals, governments and institutions who consider themselves directly criticised or otherwise aggrieved by material in the magazine may be granted the right of reply, at the editor's discretion.—AJH

# In Washington

## The CIA and Africa

By BRUCE OUDES

When anything about the Central Intelligence Agency appears in print, the inevitable reaction of CIA employees is to find a way to dismiss the significance of what the author has disclosed.

Certainly that has been and will continue to be the CIA reaction to *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (Knopf, $8.95), the blockbuster by Victor Marchetti and John Marks, the first public study of the agency ever to propose seriously that its "clandestine services"—its spying, counterspying and dirty-tricks operations—be abolished, at least in the Third World.

Buttressed by their instinct for bureaucratic survival, CIA hands stress that Marchetti, a former CIA official, and Marks, a former State Department officer, never worked in the clandestine division. Yet the Marchetti-Marks case is sufficiently compelling that it seems certain to play a part in the debate on post-Watergate and post-Kissinger foreign-policy building between now and the 1976 elections.

Marchetti and Marks, for that matter, have little detailed familiarity with U.S. diplomacy in Africa, but the snippets of information about the CIA and Africa that remain, even after the court-ordered, CIA-directed censorship of the book, make the volume the most significant one in several years to deal with U.S.-African governmental relations. It is at least as significant for what is not there: The transparent cuts eliminate all reference to the U.S. communications installations in Ethiopia and Morocco; some aspects of the U.S. operations in Zaïre in the 1960s; and the National Security Council debate of December 9, 1969 on NSSM 39, which established the Nixon Administration's southern Africa policy. (It has been known around Washington for several years that CIA Director Richard Helms, at least in part miffed because Rhodesian security had recently blown the cover of CIA agents in Rhodesia, argued strongly at that meeting that the U.S. should resist pressure from Britain to close the U.S. consulate in Salisbury.)

Also purged, at least from the early editions of the book, is the Marchetti-Marks list of African leaders who have received CIA payments at one time or another; unlike that of other, partial lists compiled by journalists over the years, the accuracy of this one—if and when it comes out—will now have official CIA-bestowed cachet.

Certainly the CIA is the most difficult aspect of Washington's foreign-affairs Establishment to report on. It craves anonymity, and since, except for incidents like the one involving Helms, it remains well in the background in the policy-making process, one is generally prone not to spend too much time prying into the CIA lair. However, spurred by the first sharp critique of the CIA ever published by a former CIA employee, aghast at the arrogant censorship of the book and outraged by the continuing CIA practice of employing American newspeople as agents in Africa and elsewhere, one is able to paint at least a general picture of the CIA and Africa.

To begin with, the CIA's Africa division consists, according to Marchetti-Marks (M&M), of only 300 of the 4,800 employees of the CIA's clandestine-services operation, making it the smallest of the CIA's geographic regions in terms of personnel, with about six per cent of the total. The CIA, M&M suggest, is not in any real sense an equal-opportunity employer since it has one of—if not *the*—smallest percentages of Blacks of any federal agency. About half of those 300 are assigned to Washington; the rest are posted to U.S. embassies in Africa. All but the smallest U.S. diplomatic installations in Africa have at least one or two CIA personnel.

Using some figures cited by M&M and making the reasonable guess that these 300 will spend not too much more or less than six per cent of CIA's overall clandestine budget, one can assume that the CIA Africa budget is in the vicinity of $25 to $30 million a year. Thus no more than a handful, if that, of CIA "stations," as the agency calls them, in Africa could have a budget running $1 million or more. The rule of thumb is that about three-fourths of a CIA station's budget goes for salaries and administrative expenses, including real-estate rentals, leaving only 25 per cent for payments to informants.

Most CIA personnel abroad operate under the cover of being employed by the State Department or, in some cases, AID. Contrary to widespread myth, it is not particularly difficult to determine who in any given U.S. embassy works for the CIA. Two publications available from the U.S. Government Printing Office for a modest fee—the Foreign Service List and the Biographic Register, both of which are updated periodically—are all one needs. The List contains the names of U.S. personnel according to their post of assignment abroad. Those officials whose rank begins with the letter "R" (for Foreign Service Reserve officer) are sometimes CIA. Many are not, but usually enough additional information is available about a given official in the Biographic Register for even the neophyte CIA-watcher to discern who is who. Generally there will be one to three "R" officers nominally assigned to the embassy's political, economic or consular section, plus one or two in the

"The debate over the U.S. role in Nkrumah's overthrow revolves around whether the CIA had advance knowledge of the Ghanaian army's intentions and therefore must be regarded as an accomplice because of its failure to inform Nkrumah in time."

communications section.

Much CIA work in Africa is remarkably routine. The CIA personnel generally are not only known to the security section of the host government but they frequently cooperate on matters ranging from questions involving visiting Americans sought by U.S. authorities on criminal charges to, depending on the degree of cooperation between the U.S. and the host government, questions relating to technological developments in the security field and the activities of locally posted Communist diplomats. Many African governments buy at least some of their electronic security equipment in the U.S. Since export licenses are needed for such purchases, the U.S. has a good idea of what kind of equipment such governments have.

CIA's main function worldwide, including Africa, is to keep track of the activities of Communist governments, particularly those of the "hard targets," the Soviets and Chinese. In order to evaluate what the "hard targets" are doing, a CIA station chief in Africa has to be familiar with local politics. This, however, is also the responsibility of the State Department, and—depending on the mix of personalities involved—the results range from State and CIA duplicating each other's work to a situation in which State and CIA are competing with one another. In this competition, CIA has the edge because it can pay for its information.

The names of the CIA's "assets," its paid informers, are the agency's most closely guarded secret, a much bigger secret than the identities of those staff employees not operating under "deep" cover. There are several different types of "assets." One is a host-country national who may or may not be a supporter of the local government. Another is a locally recruited U.S. or third-country national who is not a direct participant in local politics. Both these types of informers are risking a great deal, including blackmail, in return for a modest supplement to their regular, legitimate income. Exposure could cost them their careers and could be engineered by any one of a number of sources—including the CIA itself.

Ex-President Tsiranana: believed himself victim of CIA plot

A third type of asset is the individual, usually American, recruited in Washington and sent to Africa not camouflaged as a regular U.S. embassy employee but under the cover of being a businessman, student, etc. Sometimes after a tour of duty in one African country, the individual will turn up in another nation, this time as a regular U.S. embassy employee. In other words, the individual will have gone from "deep" cover to more routine cover. Since a CIA agent under "deep" cover is not known to host-country security officials, however, exposure could harm U.S. bilateral relations just as much as exposure of any of the CIA's part-time, locally recruited assets.

A central problem with CIA payola for host-country nationals in Africa is that the practice encourages élitism and corruption. Thus, for reasons allegedly involving overriding "national security" considerations, it works against the aims of stated U.S. policy in Africa, which is to urge democracy and honest government as the best way to stability and prosperity.

Meanwhile, payments to host-country nationals in opposition to the government of the day create the additional problem that those who know or find out about the practice all too easily jump to conclusions about the interest of the U.S. in overthrowing the current government. The CIA sometimes finds itself handling political reporting chores on the local opposition elements as much because of the reluctance of State's political officers to seriously probe so sensitive a subject as because of its own proclivities.

Leaving aside the Byzantine complexities of Zaïre in the 1960-65 period, there is—despite the millions of words written about it—absolutely no reliable evidence that the CIA has overthrown an African government. Secretary of State Dean Rusk wore a broad smile when he learned of Nkrumah's overthrow (rooting for one side or another in the Third World was fashionable in the U.S. during the Vietnam era); but there is no serious support for the accusation that the U.S. "overthrew" Nkrumah.

The debate about the U.S. role in Nkrumah's overthrow revolves around whether—because of its payments system—the CIA had advance knowledge of the Ghanaian army's *intentions* and therefore must be regarded as an accomplice because of its failure to inform Nkrumah in time. A similar charge was made last fall at the time of the overthrow of Allende in Chile.

"The names of the CIA's paid informers are its most closely guarded secret, a much bigger secret than the identities of those staff employees not operating under deep cover."

Any government—whether or not it pays for the data—is faced with an agonizing choice if it obtains hard information about plans to overthrow another government. In so far as the U.S. is concerned, however, one way to reduce suspicions about America's "nefarious" purposes in Africa is to halt the sleazy payola practice of the CIA. It should furthermore continue the present trend toward being less obsessed with the internal politics of African governments.

M&M make the convincing argument that, given the high state of the CIA's technology, the agency's poor record of learning *intentions*, and the limited value of this knowledge anyway as long as the U.S. is not in the business of overthrowing governments, that it is high time to abolish most of CIA's budget for clandestine services.

Technology is, of course, a major factor in arguments that the U.S. can afford to dispense with the human element in clandestine intelligence gathering. M&M underscore the impression that, whether from fixed bases, submerged or surface naval vessels or from satellites, the U.S. can monitor most forms of electronic communication anywhere in the world. The biggest logjam is the cost-benefit ratio of deciphering and evaluating all that verbiage.

The American diplomatic communications network is by far the most efficient and extensive system operative in Africa today; African governments have long acknowledged U.S. superiority in the communications field. The U.S. frequently fulfills requests from African governments and the OAU itself to transmit urgent and sensitive messages via the U.S. labyrinth.

On the rare occasions when African governments have uncovered the CIA's clandestine activities, it must be assumed that in the interest of continuing overall good relations with the U.S. these governments have handled the situation without publicity. An exception came in 1969 when the white Rhodesian regime imprisoned two CIA informants and crowed about it. At the time, Rhodesia viewed the U.S. Government as hostile, and it must be assumed that the incident was made public as a means of reassuring white Rhodesia of the effectiveness of their own Special Branch and discouraging Black Rhodesia from attempting to succeed in clandestine activities where the vaunted CIA had failed. The CIA, however, had long been an established part of the American mission in Salisbury.

One theory that gained currency in Washington to explain the Salisbury episode was that British intelligence leaked the scope of CIA's activities in Rhodesia to the Rhodesian Special Branch in order to embarrass the U.S. into closing its consulate in Salisbury, which was the Wilson government's objective at the time.

While Rhodesian authorities are now less prone to believe that the CIA, under the Nixon Administration, would have agents in the territory gathering information to be used against the regime, this Rhodesian concern is still the greatest obstacle confronting white Americans entering Rhodesia with the idea of joining the Rhodesian military. Obsessed with the possibility that the CIA might have agents operating in the country, Rhodesian security scrutinizes particularly closely all whites who enter the country for any purpose except short-term tourism.

Another kind of incident took place in 1971 when the then faltering Tsiranana government in Malagasy expelled U.S. Ambassador Anthony Marshall and several of his key staff. To date this has been the only instance in the history of African diplomacy in which an African government has *publicly* asked for the recall of an American ambassador while continuing to maintain diplomatic relations with the U.S. Tsiranana charged that the U.S. embassy was too close to the opposition and was plotting his overthrow.

One of the less-publicized elements of the murky intelligence business in Africa was the cold war between French and American intelligence operatives during the Gaullist era. De Gaulle's view of the U.S. touched off the competition that was fanned by the attitude of large numbers of Frenchmen resident in Africa. The local French community in Libreville, Gabon did much to originate and then keep alive the idea that the U.S. was behind the attempted overthrow of President Leon Mba in 1964. It frequently seemed during the 1960s that CIA operatives in Africa spent more time countering alleged French espionage activities directed against the U.S. than they were studying the Soviets and Chinese.

The incident in Madagascar appears to have been the last major anti-American operation of the Gaullist intelligence apparatus, and ironically one of its victims was the American who was closest to de Gaulle. This was John F. "Jack" Hasey, the CIA station chief in Tananarive, who is now retired. Hasey fought with the Free French during World War II in the same division with General Sangoxule Lamizana of Upper Volta and others of the "Senegalese" contingent. During the 1950s while de Gaulle was awaiting the call to lead France out of political chaos, Hasey was in regular contact with the General on behalf of the CIA. Later Hasey was in Elisabethville during the Katangan

"A central problem with CIA payola for host-country nationals in Africa is that the practice encourages elitism and corruption."

secession and then in Ouagadougou after Lamizana had become the Voltaique leader.

Hasey's ambassador in the Malagasy Republic was Anthony Marshall, an independently wealthy political contributor to the Nixon campaigns, who himself had been a CIA employee in the 1950s. (This fact, incidentally, was known by the Malagasy Government at the time of Marshall's assignment there.) Marshall, who contributed at least $48,500 to the President's 1972 campaign, is now the U.S. ambassador to Kenya.

Marshall's problems began when he helped the Malagasy economy by attracting American investors to the island, thus upsetting the local French business people who regard Madagascar as their own private preserve. According to a reliable account, local French intelligence operatives were particularly jealous and resentful of Hasey's network of high-level connections in Paris and were most unhappy when Hasey sought permission from Paris to visit the Comoro Islands on a political reporting tour. Therefore they concocted for Tsiranana a dossier—which he accepted at face value—alleging that Marshall and Hasey were plotting his overthrow. Included in the "evidence" was the fact that some new American investment was to be located in a region dominated by Tsiranana's rival, then Vice-President André Resampa. The mass expulsion from Tananarive followed. Months later Tsiranana retracted the accusations, but, an informed source says, the CIA has yet to re-open its station at Tananarive. What is at yet unclear is the degree of involvement— if any —of Jacques Foccart, the *eminence grise* of French covert manipulation in Africa under de Gaulle and Pompidou.

The CIA's most significant pratfall on an African issue in recent years was to be caught flat-footed by the Portuguese coup this April because—either on its own initiative or under White House instruction—it had for the past four years limited its dealings to the ruling elements of the Portuguese military and government. One of the cardinal rules of the intelligence trade is to follow closely what the younger military officers are saying, but in 1970 the CIA cut its contacts with Portuguese officers in the field by closing the small intelligence operations assigned to the U.S. missions in Luanda and Lourenço Marques. What most disturbs students of U.S. foreign policy is that in this situation intelligence collection seems to have been *based on policy dictates rather than* the reverse.

One of the current ironies is that if the fiasco is to be reviewed by the body normally charged with doing so, the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the investigation will be headed by Admiral George Anderson, FIAB chairman. A decade ago Admiral Anderson was the U.S. ambassador to Lisbon. The admiral, a strong believer in Portugal's "civilizing" mission in Africa, is chairman of the Portuguese-*American Friendship Society*.

But despite the broad—if limited—CIA presence throughout Africa, the CIA is and perhaps always will be associated around the world with Zaïre more than any other country. Yet the heyday of CIA activity in then Congo-Leopoldville now seems so long ago that the CIA censors apparently thought few would notice their attempt to scrub extensive portions of it from the Marchetti-Marks book. That is unfortunate because while the CIA and others in the American mission did tend to practice "cowboy diplomacy" in the Congo in the 1960-65 era, the fact remains that the U.S. worked with singular determination from the day of Zaïre's independence onward to support the territorial integrity of the country despite sporadic efforts of the Soviets, Chinese, indigenous political figures and European commercial interests to dismember it.

It seems remarkable that there is no mention in the Marks-Marchetti book of WIGMO, the CIA's own airline in Zaïre—or, for that matter, the CIA's airline in West Africa, which audaciously uses the name Pan Africa. Perhaps one reason the CIA would rather not have its Zaïre operations remembered is because of its close identification with the white mercenaries, particularly in the 1964-66 period after the U.N. troops pulled out.

CIA aircraft flew bombing and strafing missions in support of the successful mercenary drive to bring down the Simba rebellion for the Zaïre Government. □

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# AFRICAN ART TODAY: Four Major Artists



## May 14-August 31, 1974

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African Update

# Africa Report

MAGAZINE FOR THE NEW AFRICA

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


## THE POLITICS OF STARVATION

Nyerere on Black Consciousness
New Directions for U.S.-Africa Relations
The Big Fight: What Profit for Zaire?

# POPULATION

## Population by sex, rate of population increase, area and density for Africa: latest census, and mid-year estimates for 1963 and 1972.

[Unless otherwise specified, population figures are present-in-area estimates for the present territory; area estimates include inland waters.]

| Country | Population: Latest census (in units) | | | | Population: Mid-year estimates (in thousands) | | Annual rate of increase 1963—72 (%) | Area (km²) | Density 1972 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Date | Both sexes | Male | Female | 1963 | 1972 | | | |
| *Algeria* | *4-IV-66* | *11 821 679* | *5 817 145* | *6 004 534* | *11 205* | *15 279* | *3.5* | 2 381 741 | 6 |
| Angola | 15-XII-70 | *5 673 046 | | | *5 015* | *5 842* | | 1 246 700 | 5 |
| Botswana | 31-VIII-71 | 608 656 | | | *547* | *688* | *3.8* | 600 372 | 1 |
| British Indian Ocean Territory | | | | | | *2 | | 78 | 26 |
| Burundi | 1970—71 | *3 350 000 | | | *3 080* | *3 403* | | 27 834 | 122 |
| Cameroon | 1960—65 | 5 017 000 | | | *5 008* | | | 475 442 | |
| Cape Verde Islands | 15-XII-70 | *272 071 | | | *216* | *285* | *3.1* | 4 033 | 71 |
| Central African Republic | 1959—60 | 1 202 910 | 485 820 | 531 090 | *1 376* | | | | |
| Chad | XII-63—VIII-64 | 3 254 000 | | | *3 167* | *3 791* | *2.0* | 622 984<br>1 284 000 | 3 |
| Comoro Islands | VII—IX-66 | 243 948 | 119 909 | 124 039 | | *275* | | 2 171 | 127 |
| Congo | IX-60—II-61 | 581 600 | 267 800 | 313 800 | *807* | *981* | *2.2* | 342 000 | 3 |
| Dahomey | 25-V—30-IX-61 | 2 106 000 | 1 020 558 | 1 061 953 | *2 257* | *2 869* | *2.7* | 112 622 | 25 |
| Egypt | 30-V-66 | 30 075 858 | 15 175 554 | 14 900 304 | *27 947* | *34 839* | *2.5* | 1 001 449 | 35 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 31-XII-60 | 245 989 | 132 293 | 113 696 | *258* | *293* | *1.4* | 28 051 | 10 |
| Macias Nguema Biyago | 31-XII-60 | 62 612 | 41 378 | 21 234 | *68* | *81* | *2.0* | 2 034 | 40 |
| Rio Muni | 31-XII-60 | 183 377 | 90 915 | 92 462 | *190* | *212* | *1.2* | 26 017 | 8 |
| Ethiopia | | | | | *21 909* | *25 933* | *1.9* | 1 221 900 | 21 |
| French Territory of the Afars and the Issas | *1960—61* | *81 200* | | | *83* | *98* | *2.0* | *22 000* | *5* |
| Gabon | 8-X-60—V-61 | 448 564 | 211 350 | 237 214 | *456* | | | 267 667 | |
| Gambia | 22-IV-73 | *494 279 | | | *318* | *383* | *2.1* | 11 295 | 34 |
| Ghana | 1-III-70 | 8 559 313 | | | *7 012* | *9 087* | *2.9* | 238 537 | 38 |
| Guinea | 15-1—31-V-55 | 2 570 219 | 1 223 298 | 1 346 921 | *3 360* | *4 109* | *2.3* | 245 857 | 17 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 15-XII-70 | *487 448 | *237 293 | *250 155 | *524* | *479* | | 36 125 | 13 |
| Ivory Coast | XI-1957—58 | 3 100 000 | | | *3 665* | *4 526* | *2.4* | 322 463 | 14 |
| Kenya | 24—25-VIII-69 | 10 942 705 | 5 482 381 | 5 460 324 | | *12 067* | | 582 646 | 21 |
| Lesotho | 14-24-IV-66 | 852 361 | 368 255 | 484 106 | *790* | *972* | *2.3* | 30 355 | 32 |
| Liberia | 2-IV-62 | 1 016 443 | 503 588 | 512 855 | *1 038* | | | 111 369 | |
| Libyan Arab Republic | 31-VII-64 | 1 564 369 | 813 386 | 750 983 | *1 504* | *2 084* | *3.7* | 1 759 540 | 1 |
| Madagascar | 9-V—11-XI-66 | 6 200 000 | 3 049 000 | 3 151 000 | *5 763* | | | 587 041 | |
| Malawi | 9-VIII-66 | 4 039 583 | 1 913 262 | 2 126 321 | | *4 666* | | 118 484 | 39 |
| Mali | 15-VI-60—V-61 | 3 484 500 | 1 733 400 | 1 751 100 | *4 394* | *5 257* | *2.0* | 1 240 000 | 4 |
| Mauritania | XII-64—XII-65 | 1 030 000 | 515 989 | 514 011 | *1 008* | *1 227* | *2.2* | 1 030 700 | 1 |
| Mauritius | 30-VI-62 | 701 016 | *351 968 | *349 086 | 721 | *858 | 2.0 | 2 045 | 420 |
| Island of Mauritius | 30-VI-62 | 681 619 | 342 306 | 339 313 | 701 | *832 | 1.9 | 1 865 | 446 |
| Rodrigues | 30-VI-62 | 18 335 | 9 062 | 9 273 | 19 | *25 | 3.3 | 109 | 229 |
| Others | 30-VI-62 | 1 062 | *600 | *500 | *1 | *1 | | 71 | 7 |

*Italics* indicate estimates of questionable reliability.
* Provisional. ² United Nations estimate.

(to be continued)

# Africa Report

MAGAZINE FOR THE NEW AFRICA

A Publication of the African-American Institute


## THE POLITICS OF STARVATION

The cover of this issue draws attention to the Sahelian drought situation which is dealt with in two articles. The three youngsters portrayed are dipping into their bowl of high-protein porridge at a refugee camp at Tchin Tabaraden in the Republic of Niger.

Major disasters such as the Sahelian and Ethiopian famines of the past years attract world attention and the resultant publicity prompts relief measures. There is a danger that the alleviation of the most dramatic suffering, as a result of international assistance and some better weather, could quickly drive news of drought and starvation off the front pages of the newspapers and out of world concern.

The symbol at the top of this column has been designed for the World Food Conference. In an assessment of the present food situation and future outlook the Conference Secretary-General, Mr. S. Marei of Egypt has written, "In addition to the accumulating problems of food production there is the equally vital issue of the nutritional adequacy of available supplies within countries and the extent of under- or malnutrition. Scientists differ on how to define malnutrition, but taking a conservative view of the definitions currently in use it would appear that out of 97 developing countries, 61 had a deficit in food energy supplies in 1970. In the Far East, Near East and Africa 20 to 25 per cent of the population is estimated to suffer from significant under-nutrition. This is not just a cold statistic among statistics; it describes the daily physical privation of fellow human beings, adversely affecting health and physical growth and seriously reducing the capacity of children to learn and adults to work.

"As might be expected, under- or malnutrition is strongly correlated with poverty. In such widely dispersed countries as Brazil, India and Tunisia, the 20 per cent of the population with lowest income has half the per caput energy intake of the top 10 per cent. Moreover within families it is the children and women who receive the lesser share of what food is available, in order to maintain the wage-earner's capacity to work."

That is the human dimension of the problem, which is enough to justify concern among those of us who are more fortunate. Equally, self-interest dictates that we should be involved. Hunger also has economic and political dimensions. Malnutrition prevents a nation from developing to play its full part in international trade. It breeds political discontent, creating tensions which may have international ramifications.

President Ford and Secretary Kissinger have recently indicated that they are aware of the issue. It remains to be seen how this appreciation will be translated into positive policy decisions. □



Front cover photo courtesy AID




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DOCUMENT

# Black Unity and Human Freedom

***"When Black people have attained self-government, the racialists do not stop their hostility. For their own purposes they are quick to attack injustices in Black-ruled states. That fact does not excuse the injustices; it only makes them more embarrassing."***

BY PRESIDENT JULIUS NYERERE

The Pan-African Congresses of the past laid foundations on which all the independence movements of Africa South of the Sahara were able to build. Even more important, these Pan-African Congresses of Black men and women laid the foundation for the Organization of African Unity. It was they who first learned, applied, and taught, the lesson of unity. The people of Africa absorbed that lesson; the O.A.U. is one of its fruits. And the O.A.U. is not a Black men's organization; it is an organization including men of all colors.

It is worth emphasizing this development, for its reflects the fundamental unity of man's struggle for liberation. The Pan-African Congress movement was formed to promote freedom and justice for Black men and women. It was led by the logic of that demand to work for the liberation of Africa from colonialism, oppression, and racialism. That, in its turn, requires the unity of Africa—including the non-Black Africans of North Africa and elsewhere. So the independent African states formed the O.A.U. in 1963; as a consequence this Pan-African Congress has Non-Black participants, and has to concern itself with oppression affecting any man, of any color.

But it is not only in the geographical spread of its delegates that this Congress is different from those preceding it. Past Congresses had to be held outside Africa. For in this continent there were until 1957 only two states in which Black people were rulers as well as ruled. Neither of these—nor the one Black-ruled sovereign state in the Caribbean—was in a position to give positive leadership to the Black liberation movement.

Thus it was at meetings in Europe that the demands for justice to Africa and to Africans had to be expressed. And it is worth noting that they always were expressed. The tone of the demands changed over the years, but the demands have been consistent. It is both an illustration of this, and an indication of the work which remains to be done, to recall that in 1900 the Pan-African Conference submitted a Memorial to Queen Victoria of Britain protesting against the treatment of Africans in South Africa and Rhodesia. By 1945 the 5th Pan African Congress was expressing the same concern more forthrightly. For it ended "We demand for Black Africa autonomy and independence, so far and no further than it is possible in this one world for groups and peoples to rule themselves subject to inevitable world unity and federation."

Now we can meet in Africa. For although we do not yet have unity and federation, at least the independence aspect of the 1945 demand has been made a reality in large parts of our continent.

And the final difference between this and previous Congresses also arises because of our partial success. The first five Congresses could only be held because they were promoted and attended by concerned individuals. Some few of the participants had the backing of trade union or political or social organisations. But the status of Black people in the world was such that the individuals could only be representatives in the sense that a suffering and aware man can always speak for others in the same condition. These men and women acted because they could no longer accept without protest the almost sub-human status which had been assigned to them by the world's dominant political and economic forces. It is in part because of their work that we are here today, and that so many delegates to this Congress can be representative of the peoples in their nations.

For most delegates here have been sent by the people's governments of African and Caribbean states—governments which only exist because of the earlier work of individuals, like those who founded the Congress movement. Other delegates from Africa are representatives of national liberation movements, whose credentials are vouched for by the fact that a struggle which does not have the people's support is doomed to rapid extinction. And in addition, we have with us representatives of popular organizations from countries where people of African descent are a minority of the national population.

*This is the substantive text of President Nyerere's opening address to the Sixth Pan-African Congress, without his opening remarks on the history of the movement.*


A TANU procession in Dar es Salaam

Let me, at this point, make it clear that I believe that the participation in the Pan-African Congress of concerned individuals and groups is as important now as it has been in the past. For it is already only too clear that the governments of Africa and the Caribbean are no more composed of angels than any other governments. Certainly independent Africa cannot claim to have been free from the sort of oppression and injustices which Pan-African Congresses have condemned in the past. All of our governments, and all of our people, could therefore benefit from listening to the comments of responsible and sympathetic individuals and groups who are concerned with human rights and human justice in general. This Congress is not a forum for attacks on particular governments. But it would be failing in its duty if it did not recognise the need for a demand that justice be done within the newly independent nations as well as in the older countries.

These facts about the composition of this Congress mean that Congress participation is not based on geography, nor on the present or potential achievement of governmental power, nor on international economic linkages. Our presence here is not even a matter of political ideology. Not everyone here, and not every government or organization represented, would be pleased to be described as 'socialist' however vague in meaning that word has become. What, then, is it that links us together and causes us to meet in this Congress?

As I hope I have already made clear, the answer to that question lies in history, and in history's legacy to the present. But it is important for us to understand the full implications of that answer in order to ensure that this Congress does not subvert the cause of liberation which past Pan-African Congresses have been serving.

For the composition of the early Pan-African Congresses was determined by men's need to respond in unison to a common suffering. From the very beginnings of this movement, until now, men and women of Africa, and of African descent, have had one thing in common—an experience of discrimination and humiliation imposed upon them because of their African origins. Their color was made into both a badge, and a cause of their poverty, their humiliation, and the oppression.

Peoples of the Americas, and of Europe, were even by 1900 citizens of developed and rich nations. But those who had some African ancestry were not allowed to share equally in this development or these riches. They were—and are—Americans, or West Indians, as much as any of the other immigrant peoples who inhabit those lands. The fact that their ancestors had been taken to those countries as slaves did not alter that. Indeed it made their nationality more important to them because their ancestal languages, cultures, and traditions, had been torn from their heritage by the act of slavery. Yet despite this, the continuing technological and political backwardness of Africa was used as a psychological weapon to undermine their self-confidence. And the color which they inherited became the means of enforcing the segrated and unequal treatment from which they suffered.

Some individuals did manage to break through the educational barriers around their color, and were able to analyse their own position and that of their fellow-sufferers.

State House, Dar es Salaam

They then realized that, although they were Americans or West Indians, their demand for dignity and equality was bound up with the status of people in another continent. Their own experience, in other words, forced them to be internationalist, and to be concerned with the condition of men elsewhere in the world.

And the Africa with which their fellow country men persisted in associating them was, in modern terms, not a continent to inspire pride in a people wishing to assert their equality. Its people had lost the fight for freedom against technologically superior forces, and were living under various forms of colonial rule. Their culture and way of life were mocked and derided; their technological backwardness remained. Politically and economically they lived as inferiors in their ancestral homelands. The forces of freedom appeared to be—indeed were—almost everywhere in disarray or smarting from a succession of defeats. Only in a few areas were organizations and individuals still openly and actively asserting their rights as Africans to govern Africa.

The Pan-African Congresses were thus a recognition by the peoples of African descent, and those of Africa, that only by proclaiming the human rights and dignity of all Black men could any of them defend their humanity. They all had to fight against policies and attitudes which made blackness or African ancestry into a social, economic, and political disadvantage everywhere in the world. And they all had to fight for the freedom of nations inhabited by African people. Thus color became a uniting factor among peoples otherwise divided by nationality, political creed, religion, and culture.

The Pan African movement was born as a reaction to racialism. And racialism still exists. Nowhere has it been completely defeated. In large areas in Africa it is now proclaimed as a state philosophy, and imposed ruthlessly on the Black majority of the population. The evil which required the birth of the Pan-African movement has not yet made meetings like this irrelevant.

Let us make it quite clear. We oppose racial thinking. But as long as Black people anywhere continue to be oppressed on the grounds of their color. Black people everywhere will stand together in opposition to that oppression, in the future as in the past. As they do that they will demand the support of all men of good will—and past experience, as well as the composition of this Conference, shows that they will receive it.

For although this Congress movement was made necessary by racialism, and was itself originally confined to Black people, our particular struggle for dignity has always been one aspect of the world wide struggle for human liberation. And many men and women who are not Black are quite as active and involved in that struggle as those who are Black. Many at this Conference have been sent by independent governments which include people, and are supported by people, of different colors and different ancestry. That fact is both an example, and a measure, of the partial success so far achieved in the struggle against racialism. We must not jeopardise that advance now.

For if we react to the continued need to defend our position as Black men by regarding ourselves as different from the rest of mankind we shall weaken ourselves, and the racialists of the world will have scored their highest triumph. The struggle for human equality is now world wide. Oppression is not always based on color; the humiliations of enforced social inequalities are not only practised against men for their blackness.

And we who learned to oppose oppression because we suffered from it will be expected—and rightly expected—to give full support to others who band together to fight for their rights. We have demanded support. We have to be ready to give support.

Our history means that our capacity to help others is limited in practical terms. But that same history means that we must respond positively to the cry of the oppressed anywhere in the world.

And in particular we have a duty to examine ourselves, and how we are using the advances we have made. When Black people have attained self-government, the racialists do not stop their hostility; for their

own purposes they are quick to attack injustices in Black-ruled states. But that fact does not excuse the injustices. It only makes them more embarrassing. Those Black people who have been fighting against oppression have an even greater responsibility to fight against it when it is done by those who have benefitted from our past struggles. We must look at ourselves, at our own governments, and our own progress; we must ask ourselves whether there is evidence that Black people, wherever they are self-governing, are everywhere trying really hard to establish just societies. If this is not the case, can we remain quiet and still continue to demand support for our fight against racialism and oppression when it is practised against us by others?

In my opinion, therefore, the purpose of this Conference is to discuss the means, and further the progress, of opposition to racialism, colonialism, oppression and exploitation everywhere. Our discussions will have special reference to our own experience—past and present. But they must take place in the context of a world wide movement for human equality and national self-determination.

For despite all that remains to be done, our struggle against colonialism and racialism has made great progress since 1945. Political independence is a fact for large areas of Africa and the Caribbean. Colonialism has begun its journey out of life and into the museums of history. We now have to recognise that an end to colonialism is not an end to the oppression of man, even if it means an end to oppression based solely on color. And we now have to work against oppression by the leaders of those countries which have recently attained freedom, whether this is directed against other Black men and women, or against people of different races.

The last 29 years have also seen great progress in the Human Rights movement. People are now conscious of racialism; it is no longer accepted as part of the natural order of things. Indeed, the very bitterness of current controversies is itself an indication of our progress. For the struggle has been joined; the victims no longer acquiesce in their own degradation, and many people are no longer willing to be identified with the humiliation of other men just because their skin color is different.

House-building in a Tanzanian ujamaa village

In economic matters our advance has been much slower. It is true that Black people have, in many countries, been incorporated into the prevailing capitalist system; they are no longer always excluded just because of their color. And in Africa and the Caribbean Black people now occupy the whole range of jobs; they are no longer confined to low-paid laboring and clerical tasks.

Yet it is also true that within nations, and in the world taken as a whole, it is an economic disadvantage to have a Black skin. The average level of income, and the average level of employment, is lower for Black citizens in the United States, Canada, and Europe, than it is for non-Black citizens. The struggle to be accepted as a worker, and valued as a worker, has to continue. And it is also true that the Black nations of the world are all listed among the world's poor states; sixteen of the 25 poorest nations are in Africa.

Yet in economic matters the real problem is not color. Both within nations, and between nations, the problem is basically that of oppression arising from an exploitative system. We are neither poor, nor are we kept poor, because we are Black. We remain poor because of the world trading and monetary systems—and these, whatever their other disadvantages, are color blind. They adversely affect the whole of the Third World. This means that, in order to overcome its economic problems, Africa has to act in unity within the continent, and in cooperation with other poor nations of the world. Pan-Africanism is important here when it causes the people of this continent to work for unity. It could be disastrous if it resulted in a division between, say, Black Africa and Arab Africa. And Pan-Africanism would be doing a great disservice to human liberation if it caused Africa and the Caribbean to try to isolate themselves from the rest of the Third World—or if it provoked other parts of the Third World into isolating Africa and the Caribbean.

These things are being learned.

Within Africa and the Caribbean economic cooperation between states has made some headway, and work to that end continues. At the same time wider groups of Third World countries are working together on an ad hoc basis—at UNCTAD Conferences, in negotiations with the European Economic Community, and in other necessary centers. Thus, even in this area, the struggle for human equality and dignity continues, and is beginning to show the first signs of progress.

We have, in other words, made advances in all fields. But that must be an inspiration to further effort; it must not make us complacent. For the obstacles which have yet to be overcome are the most difficult of any, and unless we continue to advance the whole cause of human freedom and equality could be pushed back again. Our gains are not only grossly insufficient; they are also insecure until racialism is overcome everywhere and injustice is being challenged in all fields.

*South Africa, Namibia, Rhodesia,* Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Spanish Sahara, the Territory of the Afars and Issas: all those countries have yet to be won for the cause of freedom.

Until a few weeks ago it would have been necessary to expect that at least the first six of these would have had to be won through further years of bitter and bloody struggle, as Freedom Fighters inched their way forward against strong and ruthless enemies.

That may still be true. But since the coup d'etat in Portugal a new possibility has arisen for Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Angola. In these territories it may now be possible to achieve independence for the people without continuing the wars of liberation which have been waged for the past ten years. At this moment we cannot be sure. But there are certain things about which we can be certain.

The Liberation Movements want peace, just as Africa wants peace in the Portuguese colonies. We hope that it will now be possible to achieve that peace, together with the freedom which we demand, and for which we will—if necessary—continue to sacrifice peace. And while the Liberation Movements enter into this new phase of their struggle, they need full support from this Pan-African Congress. They have not flinched in the struggle of the past; they will not falter now. But they, and their people, are alone qualified to judge their next steps forward, just as they have been the ones who have suffered the agonies of modern warfare—and who will suffer it again if their military struggle has to be continued. We would be doing a terrible thing if any words of ours, here at Dar es Salaam, should make their taks more difficult.

But whatever happens as regards the Portuguese colonies, the fight for freedom in Rhodesia, Nan bia, and South Africa will go on. The free states of Africa and the Caribbean could not stop it even if they wanted to do so.

For one fact is fundamental to the future of this continent and of the world. Humanity is indivisible. No *man can live with self-respect, or* deserve the respect of others, if he acquiesces in the humiliation of human beings on the grounds of color or race. This is true in Southern Africa, where White people are oppressing non-White peoples. It is true also in the rest of Africa, and in the Caribbean, where power is held by non-White peoples. Whoever imposes it, however large or small the number of victims, and however understandable the feelings of fear or revenge which promote it, racial discrimination is the mother of war, and suffering, and loss of freedom for everyone. For if men cannot live as men they will at least die as men.

This Congress will be discussing questions affecting the liberation of men who have suffered, or are suffering, by virtue of their blackness, and their African ancestry. But men cannot become free by enslaving other men. Therefore the Congress will be discussing matters affecting the liberation of mankind.

This means that many items are on the Agenda of the Congress, dealing with oppression and exploitation over most parts of the globe. But this Congress is not the Organization of African Unity, nor the Non-Aligned Conference, nor a gathering of the Group of 77, and it would be a serious mistake for us to act as if it were. Instead I hope that we shall concentrate on those matters to which we, as members of a group, and as individuals, can make a positive contribution wherever we live, whatever our religion or political beliefs, and whatever our nationality. For we are not only men linked to Africa by birth and history. We are also citizens of our own nations; we are also Christians or Moslems, socialists, conservatives, capitalists or communists. And these other things are more truly a reflection of ourselves than is our color or ancestry. That we inherit and cannot change even if we wish. These others are matters of choice and decision—thus reflecting what we really are as individuals. It is by the manner in which we carry out our responsibilities to the cause of justice in groups unrelated to our parentage that we shall show the practical meaning of this *Pan-African Congress.*

For one thing is very important. If this Congress issues declarations of support for the Liberation Movement of Africa, those declarations must be supported by a commitment to action in future months and years. The words must be backed by political and material support as the struggle continues.

And if this Congress recognises the need for unity in the Third World in order to overcome the economic injustice from which so many people now suffer, this too must be followed by work to that end. The same is true for any demand to an end to racialism; it must be followed by individual and group actions against racialism of any kind, and anywhere.

Our tasks are clear. We have to play our full part as world citizens in development of humanity; to do that we have to shake off the mental effects upon ourselves of colonialism and discrimination. We have to fight color prejudice and discrimination everywhere; and we have to assert—and where possible promote—the rights of all the world's citizens for an equal share of the world's resources. □

# Africa and Afro-America

Our correspondent sees some dissappointments that permanent institutions were not established in this first Congress since 1945 but also sees it as a "fertile meeting ground that will bear fruit for years to come".

By ALMA ROBINSON

A disappointed group of Black Americans, exasperated and somewhat bewildered by what happened and what did not happen at the Sixth Pan-African Congress, returned home in July from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to continue to press for solutions to the worldwide problems of Black people.

Resolution after resolution rang out at the close of the conference, recommending that the Continent shed its dependence on multinational corporations and imperialist powers. The strongest demand was for liberation of all territories still locked into colonialism. But the Congress did not establish any permanent institutions—not even the scientific research organization sought by the Americans—linking Africa and Africans in the Diaspora. As a body, the Congress failed to make a commitment to finding the resources to carry out its resolutions, deferring to the already established Organization of African Unity.

Yet the Congress was not unsuccessful. From the point of view of the host government of Tanzania, which has perhaps been more vigorous in its pursuit of pan-African goals than any oth-

**Delegates standing and clapping, in rhythmic unison, at the conclusion of a speech, in Nkrumah Auditorium.**

**Aboud Jumbe and Courtland Cox, the Secretary General, seated at the secretariat's table in Nkrumah Hall. Jumbe, the vice-president of Tanzania, was chairman of the Congress.**

er African nation, the Congress was a great resurrection of the pan-African dream. Few African or Caribbean governments were unrepresented, and all of the major liberation movements were present. The conference also served Tanzania's more narrow interest of recruiting trained Blacks from the United States, according to Tanzanian leaders.

The Congress, which last met in Manchester, England, in 1945 under the leadership of Dr. W. E. B. DuBois, was once again a fertile connection of political minds from diverse backgrounds. In 1945, before the independence of most African states, all of the African and Caribbean delegates were from colonized territories. Now there was a new element, the representatives of about 40 independent Caribbean and African governments. They symbolized powerfully the progress and achievement of the Pan-African movement. But as governmental officials, these delegates also tended to be, as a group, among the most conservative forces at the Congress. Some were badmouthed as neo-colonialists.

It was the conservative governments who voted against setting a date for a seventh Pan-African Congress and who vetoed the idea of establishing pan-African health organizations and scientific institutes. These government representatives also shelved any proposal that would have required a commitment towards a pan-African future, until they could return home to consult. No use duplicating the OAU, it was argued. The capstone dream that Kwame Nkrumah, the now-deceased former president of Ghana, and others had nursed of pan-African political unity, was barely mentioned. The idea of welcoming home to Africa all Blacks in the Diaspora received little serious attention.

The would-be liberators, including the groups from Great Britain and North America, had not prepared for such a struggle with the liberated, who outnumbered them in absolute terms and outweighed them in authority. A continuing embarassment to the International Secretariat, headed by Courtland Cox of Washington, D.C., was the way the Caribbean governments elbowed out the non-governmental delegates chosen by the Caribbean Steering Committee. The problem was partially resolved by seating two delegations from Jamaica, one from the government and the other composed of non-governmental people. The governments apparently reasoned that uncontrolled representatives, many from the socialist fringe, would go abroad and foment revolution.

Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere reminded the frustrated Americans at a press conference of the old political saw that all governments are conservative and that any organization of governments will have certain limitations.

"Africans are very timid about making decisions because they represent governments. When we meet, we agree to the very minimum; we haven't agreed to the maximum," Nyerere said, explaining that the OAU has met few expectations for radical change. The Americans had bold expectations, he implied, because they represented no one. In fact, one of the disappointments of the Tanzanian organizers of the Congress was that no Black elected officials from the U.S. attended.

As president of the Congress, Nyerere said he would ask the OAU to embrace the goals of the Congress and to accept responsibility for keeping *alive pan-African connections, perhaps* by establishing a special secretariat. Meanwhile, he told a group of Howard University scientists and technologists that he is ready to commit Tanzania to the establishment of a pan-African institute for scientific research. "I'm not going to wait until Africa makes up its mind to make up my mind," he said, encouraging them to "develop your ideas in Dar es Salaam."

While that group returned with some enthusiasm for building their Association of Scientists and Technologists for Pan-African Development, even without the explicit sanction of the Congress, others who were more politically minded felt distressed. Delegate Owusa Sadaukai, whose speech describing the oppression of Blacks in the United States fired up the Congress, said that the meeting had made no difference in his approach to problems. He would continue doing the same work that occupied him before—organizing workers in North Carolina—in the same way. Others expressed disappointment with the results of the Congress and with the way the North American delegation handled itself.

The problems of the American group, stemmed from its large size, about 200, and its lack of strategy, organization and effective leadership. The latter problem was underscored when a Tanzanian regional party official asked a group of touring Black Americans to name their leader: "We are all leaders," came the response. "That can be very dangerous," he replied.

In contrast to the government representatives, the North American delegation was a collection of individuals who barely trusted each other from the very beginning of the trip, when char-

ter travel plans seemed to dissolve as a result of loose contractual arrangements between the airlines and the group's travel agency. Fragmentation showed in the nightly meetings of the delegation, sessions at which attempts at openminded discussion took second place to loud bickering. Some Africans found it incredible. "You people are too disorganized," Lucy Lameck, a member of the Tanzanian delegation, told a group of American women at a reception. "I heard them at a meeting. I thought they were going to kill each other the way they were at each other's throats."

Certainly the American delegation was largest, loudest and best dressed: While sisters changed their matching wrap-around African skirts and geles everyday, brothers profiled in brand-new dashikis. "They look more African than the Africans," someone commented. At the end of the Congress, the group indulged in an orgy of consumption, raiding nearby Makonde road stands for carvings and boasting about bargains.

Little that happened during the deliberations gave the group cause for celebration. On first arriving, the official U.S. delegation was reduced from 80 to 10 members, a number more in parity with that of other delegations. Soon after, the decision by the International Secretariat not to establish any permanent institutions filtered down.

Finally, Africans in the Diaspora were not encouraged to return to Africa en masse, although Nyerere and the Tanzanians made it clear that they'd welcome skilled workers, and especially trained technologists. "A small initiating step," commented the American writer, Imamu Baraka, in a speech to the general Congress. The U.S. delegation had sought a more general resolution from the whole Congress aiming at a return home—somewhat on the order of the Israeli plea to dispersed Jews. Some mumbled about the moral obligation of Africans to "take us back since they sold us into slavery."

Meanwhile, an estimated 14 American Blacks were detained without charges in the Dar es Salaam jail, pending investigation of a mysterious gun-smuggling incident that occurred early in June. As guests of the Tanzanian government, the Americans attending the Congress were unsure how to handle that problem, although Nyerere invited them to discuss it openly. Instead, they swept it under the rug and left with little information about the matter and no assurances of speedy release of the prisoners.

As the Congress progressed, the Blacks from the United States felt increasingly second class and out of place in the somewhat staid atmosphere of slow-paced meetings set in a forum that might have been a conference hall at the United Nations. Every session opened with the crisply white-uniformed Tanzanian Police Band, some 50-men strong, playing music that could have sounded in royalty as the chairman of the conference, Tanzanian Vice-President Aboud Jumbe, strode into Nkrumah Hall.

It is likely that the most useful and pleasant times occurred during the long waiting periods between sessions, when the delegates from different countries, the guests, the onlookers and the press had a chance to mingle in front of the auditorium. The small tribe of Warejeaji, Black Americans who have returned to the motherland, came down every evening after work in Dar to investigate for themselves the cross currents of Africans.

A doctor from Washington, D.C., got a chance to talk to a nuclear physicist from Zimbabwe who works in Kenya. Tom Johnson, a bureau chief from the *New York Times*, crossed paths with Peter Onu of the OAU. Malik Chaka, a freelance writer from the States who works in Dar es Salaam, talked publishing with Wole Soyinka, the exiled Nigerian writer. T. Ras Makonnen, of Guyanese origin, Ethiopian name and Kenyan residence, was able to assert his identity as one of the chief founders and organizers of the Fifth Pan African Con-

**T. Ras Makonnen, who helped organize the 1945 Congress, now lives in Kenya working for the government in a wildlife preserve. He was talking to a number of Americans about his role in the Fifth Congress.**

gress. Sophie Maka of the Women's Committee of the Democratic Party of Guinea got a chance to talk to Sybil Patterson, a teacher at the University of Guyana, about the role of women in the pan-African movement. David Sebeko of the Azanian liberation movement (South Africa) organized a dinner party with Darryl Gatlin, a student in Los Angeles, and Zanaib Abbas from the British delegation. Mae Mallory, a school nurse in Mwanza, in the northern part of Tanzania near Lake Victoria, made some new friends and got a chance to see some of her old ones from Brooklyn.

Spirits ran high because, in spite of everything, everyone knew that it was a great event, this crossing of minds from a diverse number of directions for a common focal point. At the people-to-people level, the Congress was a fertile meeting ground that may bear fruit for years to come. "This is the first time that representatives of the government are exposed to non-representatives, unfortunately, so I hope you don't make yourselves too unpopular," Nyerere said at the press conference. He was handing out not-too-subtle advice on diplomacy, an art that most Blacks in America have had little experience in.

Nyerere, whose affectionate title, Mwalimu, means teachers, had a lesson for that kind of thinking, delivered through the 40 to 50 members of the Black press who assembled at his State House one noontime:

"I can't pretend that as soon as Black people take over, all is well," he opened. "We have to do two things—one, accept other allies, and two, fight against racial discrimination."

"The white man belongs to the ruling class," he continued. "The Black man belongs to the ruled class. It is no use pretending he has graduated . . . White represents a class, the ruler. Black represents a class, the ruled. You are very suspicious of the white worker. You say he is a boss. It's true he belongs to the ruling class because the white is ruling class, but it is also true that he is not in the ruling class."

As his hand swept across his body, he went on: "This creates a confusion in your case—in the United States—because fighting requires clarity. You want to define clearly who your enemy is and who your friend is. If you define it in racial terms, it is very clear. But look at your Black capitalist. Your Black capitalist is in the ruling class at one level yet he is not. When you are fighting on two fronts you don't have that clarity."

When he drew to a close, he was gentle, slightly mocking and still teaching: "I should be as modest as yourselves and say I don't know the answer."

Nyerere, whose presence was felt

**Sculpture at the University of Dar es Salaam where the conference was held.**

throughout the Congress as he met with different national delegations, did not participate in its routine affairs after delivering the opening address. During the first two days of the conference, which was held June 19 to 27 at the airy campus of the University of Dar es Salaam, procedural issues were battled back and forth. During the next four days, each delegation took an opportunity to speak to the entire forum. A cascade of words, eulogizing pan-African heroes, encouraging the Southern African liberation movements and extolling the pan-African philosophy, drowned out the substantive issues facing the Congress.

The 50-plus resolutions that finally emerged from the three committees, politics, economics, and culture science and technology, were broad in scope but limited in substance. On the problem of the Sahelian drought, for instance, which affects an estimated 17 African nations south of the Sahara, the Congress resolved to study the efforts of the U.N. and the OAU. The obvious questions of who would conduct the studies and how were neglected. Similarly, the delegates resolved to modernize traditional medicine and to make African languages written, but no methods were developed to effect these goals. Instead of voting to establish a pan-African research institute, which was a high priority for the American scientists, the culture science and technology committee, seconded by the full Congress, recommended "that pan-African scientists and technologists be strongly encouraged to exchange and coordinate scientific information." That language emerged as a compromise with some governmental representatives who expressed strong fears that a pan-African research institute would become a breeding ground for CIA-type spying.

The expectation that the Congress should have established itself as a permanent entity may have been unrealistic. Certainly none of the delegates there, whether representatives of governments or not, had authority to vote on a budget for the establishment of a permanent bureaucracy. The Congress itself cost the Tanzanian Government almost half a million dollars, according to one party official. The bill included supplies, transportation, food and housing for guests, and two side trips at the end of the Congress.

Certainly the Congress, with about 500 official and unofficial participants, had mushroomed from the affair of 1945, which drew about 125 delegates. Some of the participants in the Fifth Pan-African Congress were students recruited at the last minute from various parts of Europe, according to Makonnen, one of the few early organizers able to come to the Sixth Congress. The 1945 Congress was given credit for spearheading the wave of peoples' movements that succeeded in liberating most of the African Continent during the 1960's. Previous Congresses were held at Paris in 1919, at London, Brussels and Paris in 1921, at London, Paris and Lisbon in 1923 and at New York in 1927. □

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All photographs in this section courtesy of UNICEF



# Refugees from Africa's Famines

It is now almost 18 months since the world first became aware of the drought in West Africa and a year since the victims of famine first came to public notice across the continent in Ethiopia. In that time an estimated 400,000 people have died, millions more have been reduced to destitution, national economies have been crippled and whole peoples have seen their traditional ways of life all but destroyed.

By a Special Correspondent

In all, about 50 million people live in *this devastated swathe of Africa.* About one third of them are directly affected by the drought and, of these, perhaps 10 million are facing the possibility of starvation.

A large international effort, co-ordinating with the governments of the affected countries, is channeling aid, despite administrative difficulties and enormous transport problems.

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) for example, which was already working in most of the countries when the drought struck, was one of the first to help . . . transporting and distributing 15,000 tons of protein-rich food to combat the malnutrition among young children and weaning mothers, along with intravenous fluids and medical supplies for the worst-affected. Now its major efforts are being made in the longer-term rehabilitation measures, helping to dig and bore wells, to restore local water supplies, and supporting health services—particularly with the transport they need to reach victims in remote areas.

Both in West Africa and Ethiopia, the relief efforts are concentrating on the refugee camps which have sprung up around centres of population which can be reached by road.

In these camps the problems can be seen in all their pathetic simplicity; shortages of vital necessities such as food and water, absence of basic services such as health care and elementary hygiene.

Here are glimpses of the situation surrounding two of these camps on opposite sides of the continent; the first in the tiny hamlet of Bistima in Ethiopia's Wollo province, the second in the sprawling tent-city of Tevrakzena, outside the Mauritanian capital of Nouakchott.

Beginning in Bistima, which became a way-station for refugees, the water supply problem is being tackled by Ethiopia's Water Resources Commission with supplies and help from UNICEF. In three months Bistima will have enough clean water for everyone, the 20 lorry-loads of UNICEF equipment are being installed in other townships and two giant drilling rigs are being brought in to drill deep wells—48 in the next two years.

Four thousand miles west, in Mauritania's capital, Nouakchott, Tevrakenza camp is a static symbol of loss for its inhabitants—nomads who can no longer move. When the drought trebled the population of Nouakchott from 45,000 to 120,000, most of the increase was in this camp. Now ragged tents stretch as far as the eye can see.

The children of Tevrakzena have little time for play. Thanks to the drought, they are already part of the struggle for life—distributing and carrying grain, endlessly coming and going to the camp's drinking-water pump—where both humans and animals congregate.

The basic diet of Mauritania is a little meat or milk mixed with millet flour, but today they eat anything which the international relief effort can offer.

In recent weeks there has been welcome news of rain in the affected areas. Even if this means an end to the drought, relief measures will be necessary for a long time yet. The process of rebuilding the shattered economies of the regions will be a longer process, requiring a still higher level of international concern and action. □

**A well that has not dried up—yet—in Mauritania's Sahel.**

**Still too weak from the effects of starvation to walk without aid, this youngster gets a helping hand from a doctor at Camp Tevrekzena in Mauritania. At the camp he is being fed CSM, a high-protein food mixture.**

**National Water Resources workmen unload generators in Dessye, capital of drought-devastated Wollo Province, Ethiopia. These generators, which power submersible deep well pumps, will be used to upgrade the water systems in 14 Wollo towns and provide pure water to the refugee shelters that have grown up near them.**

# Easing the Transport Bottleneck

## Transportation continues to be a major problem for Sahelian relief efforts – improvement is necessary for survival

From a Correspondent

The resumption of a U.S. Air Force airlift in Mali earlier this year pointed up one of the great problems of the Sahel—the lack of transportation. The absence of good roads and modern means of moving goods efficiently not only has made the emergency relief effort complicated and expensive, but places a severe restraint on the economic development of the area.

Last year, when the ravages of the drought became known to the world, and emergency food and supplies were rushed to Senegal, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Mali, Niger, and Chad, airlifts were imperative to thwart starvation. Food brought to the ports of Dakar, Abidjan, Lagos, and other seacoast cities were transported inland by rail and by truck. When the food reached the terminals of the railroad lines or the ends of passable roads, the only way some refugees could receive food in time to prevent starvation was by air. The Agency for International Development provided more than $2.6 million in 1973 to compensate the Air Force for airlifting food to outlying distribution points in Mali, Chad, and Mauritania. Large sums of money were expended also for airlifts by Belgium, Canada, France, West Germany, Libya, Spain, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.

Strenuous efforts were made by such donors over the past year to avoid as much as possible the resumption of airlifts because of the tremendous expense—about $400-$500 per ton. Grain from the United States was rushed early to Africa to enable the over-taxed surface transportation system to spread the burden.

### *Bottlenecks Cause Back Up*

Problems arose, however. The unprecedented flow of food and goods

**U.S. sorghum for destitute nomad families arrives by camelback.**

would have taxed the ports' capacities at any time. Late deliveries of food from other donors, plus the limited capacities of the railroads, labor difficulties, and an early strained trucking capability resulted in more than 70,000 tons of food backed up at the ports at the end of May. The logjam eventually was eased considerably, but the airlift was resumed to insure that enough food—up to 5,000 tons—would be available during the rainy season in outlying areas of Mali which otherwise would be cut off from assistance.

Ali Saibou, Niger's chief of drought relief and development, pointed out to an interviewer the problem of furnishing food to Agadez, the outpost town in the drought-stricken area of the country where thousands of impoverished nomads have congregated in refugee camps.

"Stocks are low in Agadez now," he said, "and the rains, if they come, will be soon. This means that the road from Niamey will become unusable.

"We are looking into the possibility of bringing the food down by truck from Algeria across the desert. This would cost $200 a ton, cheaper than air."

The feasibility of truck convoys crossing 1,000 miles of some of the world's most forbidding terrain to Niger and Mali has been proven. AID has been financing convoys from Oran, Algeria, to Gao and Tessalit in Mali. The trucks are being driven by desert-hardened Algerian drivers.

Travel time may take up to three weeks, with the driving usually done from 4 p.m. through the night to escape the intense daytime heat. Most drivers of long-haul trucks in the Sahel carry mats for bedding and sleep in the shade of their vehicles during the day.

Only three of the drought-stricken countries have access to rail transportation. A rail line runs from Dakar in Senegal to Bamako, capital of Mali. Another, called the Abidjan-Niger Railroad, doesn't go to Niger at all, but does provide transportation as far as Ouagadougou, the capital of Upper Volta. The two railroads together, however, can transport only a part of what is needed. The rest must be hauled by truck or barge, or by air. Chad receives its relief food from Cameroon and Nigerian seaports, thence by rail and truck.

In Mauritania, the death of camels has made it necessary to rely on trucks or air drops to isolated settlements.

Good maintenance is essential. Sand and dust choke fuel lines, infiltrate carburetors, and clog air filters. Tires and radiators overheat. Well-equipped vehicles carry a complete set of tools, extra fan belts, spark plugs, and essential spare parts. Sections of metal track which can be spread to bridge deep sand and mud are hung along the truck bodies. Shovels are standard accessories. Extra tanks of gasoline and cans of water are imperative.

Compounding the vehicle problem is the cost of fuel. Gasoline in the Sahel in May had soared to $1.20 per gallon or more and was not always available. As in the United States, the presence of a service station in a town (most of the pumps are hand operated) does not always mean that it has gas.

The lack of bridges to cross rivers also slows transportation. Ferries are inadequate and overworked. At Rosso, Mauritania, where the single road connecting Senegal and Mauritania is interrupted by the Senegal River, only one ferry was operating in May. A second one had broken down. At Ndjamena in Chad, a single ferry was operating across the Chari River. The West German Government had flown in a knock-down craft powered by outboard motors. It had been assembled and was being tested in May.

*Soaring Costs Compound Difficulties*

The transportation problem affects the economies and development of all the countries. Firms in Niger, for example, in normal times before the costs of fuel skyrocketed and the importation of emergency food became an urgent necessity, paid an estimated $100 a ton to bring goods from coastal ports to the landlocked country. The cost now is estimated at twice that.

The transportation problem frustrates development of resources. Mali



is known to have sizable deposits of bauxite, iron ore, uranium, copper, manganese, and phosphates. But they have not been developed, mainly because of the lack of transportation.

A high-grade deposit of manganese has been discovered near Tambao in the northeast section of Upper Volta, but there is no extension of the railroad which would be needed to make extraction feasible. Mauritania also has iron ore and copper, but exploitation is hampered by poor transportation facilities. Senegal, which boasts about 1,500 miles of paved roads, is deficient nevertheless in farm-to-market roads.

Transportation is recognized as one of the key problems of the Sahel—both in providing emergency relief and for middle- and long-range development. In Senegal, AID is furnishing 60 vehicles to permit expansion of a rural development program. AID provided three tank trucks, each of 7,500-gallon capacity, to the Malian Government for use in bringing fuel to distant distribution points.

El Hadji Vera Ousmane Diallo, Director of the Office Produits Agricole Mali (OPAM), the Malian grain agency, pointed out in May that the transport situation in the country had improved over last year. He noted that AID has provided 36 trucks for transporting food which made available 95 trucks in all in the country to be used in food delivery and distribution. He took the occasion to express his appreciation of U.S. assistance.

"Because of what the United States has done," he said, "many families have survived who would otherwise have perished. For someone who is hungry, the appearance of the food truck is a great joy."

The Niger is navigable during the rainy season from mid-August to mid-January and offers a cheap, feasible means of moving food and goods from Koulikoro to Mopti, Timbuktu, and Gao, the principal distribution centers. Roads to these towns are generally impassable during the rainy season.

The barge system, however, has been plagued with slow turnaround time, excessive time needed for repairs and maintenance, and low-powered tugs. Assistance is aimed at speeding up the turnaround time by providing new weighing scales at the ports and new mobile cranes at Timbuktu and Gao. It will help re-equip the repair headquarters at Koulikoro, the rail terminal outside Bamako, and establish a maintenance facility at Mopti. Four new diesel engines have arrived from the United States.

**Airlifts have been avoided when possible because of the tremendous expense.**

A problem that the activity hopes to correct is a vexatious loss of time during the navigation season due to maintenance and repairs. The Mali agency operates 13 tugs and 52 barges. When the river drops in late winter or early spring, the tugs and barges are scattered up and down the river where maintenance and repairs cannot be performed. As a result, when the river becomes navigable, they must return to Koulikoro for the work, losing valuable time that should be devoted to transporting food and goods.

A recent study shows that a round trip of a barge from Mopti to Gao takes 20 to 26 days. The time is broken down as follows: loading, five to seven days; travel down-river, five to seven days; unloading, three to four days; and the return trip up-river seven to eight days. One barge can move only 600 tons per month. The new weighing equipment and cranes, they said in their study, would slice the round trip time by at least two to three days, while 350 h.p. engines—presently 250 h.p.—would cut another three to seven days. The result would be an increase in tonnage to 700 to 2,000 tons per month.

**Trucks and trees must be tough to survive in the Sahel.**

A recent visit to the main repair and maintenance facility at Koulikoro provided graphic evidence of the problem. Here, with the rainy season approaching and the Niger River beginning to inch up from its 27-inch depth —lowest level in history—the yard should have been filled with barges and tugs being readied by the 150 employes for service. Instead, there was one barge in the yard and two excursion boats aground 30 feet below the dock level. Most of the fleet, Salif Konake, Director of the Mali agency, said, is stranded at Mopti and repair and maintenance won't be extensively carried out until the river is deep enough—at least 3½ feet—to float them.

The single barge being repaired at the Koulikoro yard, was typical, Mr. Konake said. A 60-ton craft, it looked rusted and dented. When a visitor remarked about its condition, Mr. Konake replied, with a smile:

"We consider this one almost new."

While awaiting work on the barges and tugs, the Koulikoro yard was manufacturing water tanks which would be placed on trailer truck bodies to be used to transport water to villages where wells had run dry.

Closely allied to the transportation bottleneck is the storage problem. In Mali, for example, AID is planning to assist in constructing the necessary storage facilities associated with the marine transport activity. Better warehousing will help expedite the movement of grain on the river.

As in Mali, it is assisting a road repair and maintenance project in Chad, providing $328,000 to purchase spare parts for idled road-maintenance equipment; several new vehicles, and a technical advisor. Also, in Chad, the Fonds de Developpement et d'Action Rural (FDAR) has undertaken a store-house construction program. The objective is to increase the grain storage capacity in Ndjamena to 10,000 tons, and eventually 45,000 tons for the whole country.

Mahomat N'Guekitebaye, Director of the FDAR, pointed out that storage was essential to the grain stabilization program in Chad. The FDAR buys up rice, sorghum, and millet and, if storage facilities are available, the supplies and prices can be kept stable. The Office des Produits Vivriers du Niger (OPVN) is a similar government agency in Niger. It is planning warehousing facilities in Agadez, Tanout, and Tanhoua, which, with road improvements, would help insure adequate food supplies for the nomadic population.

An AID Food for Peace administrative advisor from Tunis, Tahar Ben Salem, made a survey of Niger's storage facilities in May. He reported that, from a storage capacity of 5,500 tons in the country in 1972, there would be available this year a capacity of 34,500 tons. One of the new warehouses is being constructed at Tchin Tabaraden, a settlement where several thousand nomads have congregated. It has a 500-ton capacity.

**Limited port facilities sometimes mean that stevedores must be transported from wharf to barge and back again by loading nets.**

In addition to expanding storage capacity, AID is providing up to $300,000 to assist the Ministry of Public Works in Upper Volta in a major road repair project. The objective is to assure food supplies throughout the year to the nomads and farmers hit by the drought in the northern part of the country.

During much of the three-month rainy season, nearly one million persons in this area are cut off from the rest of the country because of floods and washouts. This has made it impossible to deliver food to the principal refugee center of Gorom-Gorom during the rainy season. Last year, an airlift was necessary to prevent starvation.

The work is being done on the road leading from Dori to Gorom-Gorom. Here, with the help of the Association Freres des Hommes, an international non-governmental agency, concrete culverts and river fords are being constructed to support trucks. Drainage ditches are being dug.

At the time of a visit in May, the six-member team of Freres des Hommes were making their headquarters in an oasis several miles north of Dori. It is a delightful spot, known as Dionga, and looks as an oasis should look—with tall palms and cottonwoods mingling with acacia and lime trees. Pure water comes from five deep wells.

But the oasis is far from being just an exotic spa. Under the trees are sections of cement culverts waiting to be trucked to ravines and ditches. Also under the trees are stacks of reinforcing steel, piles of gravel and laterite rock, bags of cement, and maintenance vehicles. Huge grading and earth-moving machines move back and forth along the road in and out of the oasis.

Working on the road are 250 to 300 men from the nearby villages. They are paid 100 francs per day—roughly 40 cents—along with a ration of eight pounds of high protein food.

The Freres des Hommes team, consisting of Philippe Cornichon, Yves Potin, Georges Guiavarch, Jacques Petitjean, Bernard Eichwald, and Georges Tilkin, all from France, were hopeful they could have the road in shape by the time of the rainy season starting in late June so that an airlift would not be necessary.

They had finished two of the three major culvert and ford sections in May. They expected to have the third finished by the time the rains came.

"The year before last, no vehicle could make the trip from Dori to Gorom-Gorom during the rains," Mr. Cornichon said. "Last year, a few high-bodied trucks might have made it. When we're finished, any vehicle will be able to make the trip in all kinds of weather." □

# America's New Opportunity

The Ford administration took over at a turning point in Africa. Juxtaposed with the beginning of the final throes of minority rule in southern Africa is the growing awareness of U.S. dependance on African raw materials. It is imperative that the new administration seize the opportunity presented by new political realities and economic realizations to mandate a complete overhaul of policy towards Africa.

By GOLER TEAL BUTCHER

Present portents for wisdom in policy-making beyond the big-power and crisis circuits are not favorable. Secretary Kissinger's assurance to African Ambassadors, following the change of administration, that there would be a continuation of the same policy towards Africa exhibits a naiveté the United States can ill afford respecting a continent politically, economically and strategically important. Nor was President Ford's address to Congress in a session to which the African as well as other ambassadors had been invited auspicious, since his naming of major areas of the world lacked any reference to Africa thus precipitating concern over such "bad manners, bad protocol as well as bad policies."

The forces loosed in southern Africa by the liberation struggles will not play themselves out by the recognition of Guinea-Bissau's independence, nor by the transfer of administrative power to Frelimo in Mozambique (with independence set for early next summer), nor by the completion of the countdown to independence in Angola. The lid is coming off the cauldron in southern Africa and the inevitable reckoning, which our policy has done little to ameliorate, is drawing nigh in South Africa itself, with the United States unable to stem the unfolding of events.

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United States interference, openly or *sub silentio*, to enable the 18% South African white minority to maintain itself in power should be unthinkable not only because of the incipient Great Power difficulties which would thereby be set in motion, but because of its certain potential for racial conflagration in the United States itself. With the consequent blurring of the line between U.S. short and long-term interests U.S. foreign policy must take into immediate account the implications for its interests which are contained in the radical restructuring of the security situation in southern Africa. The status quo, so comfortably protected hitherto by oral abhorrence of apartheid on the part of the U.S., has been shattered.

The raw materials crunch has brought home for the first time Africa's economic importance both in terms of supplies of crucial raw materials and availability of African markets. Nigeria is now the second source of imported oil. U.S. direct investment in Nigeria alone is passing the billion dollar mark and her vast gas resources and petrochemical by-product capacity remain untapped. And yet, as the United States becomes a have-not nation in minerals, the new President's advisers are so ill-posted that Africa, a main source of critical minerals, is not even thought of when listing major world areas. It is not malfeasnace, but ignorance, that is the curse here.

Secretary Kissinger's single-minded focus on preserving access to Arab oil has resulted in the administration's carving of North Africa out of the African continent; and, notwithstanding Rockefeller's vaunted expertise in foreign policy, the Rockefeller Commission on Critical Choices (when it finally followed the Democratic lead of having a study group on Africa) took similar action. Such attempted geographical surgery could be dismissed as silly, if it were not so completely out of step with what is happening on the continent itself. The U.S. veto solo against Guinea-Bissau's admission to the World Health Organization—when even Portugal absented itself from the vote—dramatizes policy ineptitude. Following the Portuguese coup the U.S. notably failed to make any pronouncements reiterating its support for self-determination in Africa, until after the Portuguese had reached agreement with Guinea-Bissau. Lack of leadership is bad for a great power. But we have not even played as accompaniment to the march of events. We have come limping behind. Nor does such a performance stem from lack of competent foreign service personnel. The "personalization of foreign policy" has been disastrous for Africa. This was pitifully emphasized by the fiasco of the Secretary's negative response to the question whether Rhodesia is a threat to the peace during a congressional appearance following his endorsement of the repeal of the Byrd Amendment; for a finding of threat to the peace or aggression is a prerequisite to sanctions. The lack of attention to Africa is demonstrated by the absence of almost any policy statement by Secretary Kissinger on Africa in an entire year at the helm of State. Exceptions are the letter to Congressmen Diggs and Fraser supporting Byrd Amendment repeal, the guarded August 12th statement on Guinea-Bissau and President Ford's August 22 position on the Byrd

President Eisenhower with Ghana Finance Minister Gbedmah Wide World Photos Inc.

Mr. Nixon, when Vice President and Mrs. Nixon with President Nkrumah of Ghana

President Kennedy with President Olympio of Togo (both these leaders were assassinated in office) Maurice Sorrell

Amendment. The sorry result of crisis-oriented policy is that it is not lost on other countries that the way to command U.S. attention is by non-cooperation and institution of boycotts and violence. Nor is it lost on domestic groups that the one African topic of which the Administration is aware of—the drought—is the result of unprecedented, unrelenting pressure on the administration by a coalition of interests groups and by continued critical press attention. Surely, the new administration will want to address the deficiencies of a foreign ministry which responds not to cooperation, but to kicks.

Admittedly, after the initial errors in tact, a commendable start has been made by the President's switch to support repeal of the Byrd amendment. But U.S. interests require that this presage not just a new look at our chrome policy and its disastrous effects on U.S. foreign and domestic interest but radical revision of African policy, one related to the realities of U.S. interests in Africa. The enormous successes of the Kissinger foreign policy in certain key areas must be discounted by the damage accruing from policy in other areas. For the personalization of foreign policy, the emphasis on crisis-response and the cloak and dagger atmosphere of secrecy, even within the foreign policy orbit, are scuttling U.S. interests. This was demonstrated by the failure in the Portuguese held areas to have any policy *realistically designed* to minimize our losses, when the liberation movements triumphed.

What is needed is the turning around of U.S. policy. Critical to this is an ending to the dichotomy between stated and actual policy towards southern Africa. It is little short of of disgraceful that the country with the most to lose from promoting disrespect for treaty obligations has become, by its violations of UN sanctions, a legal renegade. Our policy towards Namibia was characterized by respect for law and human rights until the time for action. While reciting support for self-determination, the United States backed Portugal in its antediluvian stance; but the policy underlying the Azores pact objective to provide substantial political support not only backfired; it so blinded policymakers that officials testified early this year that there was no reason to believe that the domestic effect on Portugal of the African wars was overly significant. It is obvious that the total U.S. public and private presence in South Africa undergirds apartheid. Yet, the United States continues to recite its efforts towards peaceful, evolutionary change. So forceful is the catechism of abhorrence of apartheid that it has confounded even those concerned with African policy. U.S. officials argue no doubt sincerely our negative votes on U.N. resolutions because of insistence on "realistic and practical resolutions designed to achieve self-determination." The effect of the one concrete action respecting South Africa, the arms embargo, *has been largely obliterated* by the failure of France to end military sales to South Africa. (The term, failure, is used advisedly, because if France persisted, notwithstanding strong U.S. efforts her intransigeance should have been deplored aloud.) Even credit for U.S. implementation of the embargo has tended to be dissipated by manipulation both of the "pre-existing contracts" exception and of the rules on "multi-purpose items". Also disturbing is the narrowing of emphasis away from our original 1963 commitment so that we no longer ban all sales to the South African military. Credibility for U.S. incantations of support for majority rule has suffered by our refusal to provide even humanitarian assistance to the liberation movements or to the people in liberated areas. Such a policy whereby the United States permits the Soviets and the Chinese to gain a monopoly of goodwill is sheer folly. That our policymakers operate with so narrow a strategy is incredible. Finally, the U.S. refusal to attend the U.N./OAU-sponsored Oslo Conference on apartheid evidences indifference, if not contempt, for measures designed to mobilize global concern.

So excited have officials become over the way in which Bantustan leaders have seized the "separate development" platform that their minds have been befuddled into thinking that these government appointed spokesmen represent the Black opposition in South Africa. Similarly, officials fail to make *their way through the touted "exciting* possibilities for improving the life of



President Johnson with African Ambassadors

President Ford with the Ghanaian Ambassador, Mr. S. E. Quarm

Secretary of State Kissinger

the African majority" heralded by the Polaroid experiment. In fact, it is doubtful that there is any position paper analysing the actual meaning of U.S. investment to South Africa and its implication for the prospects for the evolutionary change so devoutly wished for in policy pronouncements. (Granted wage increases, however inadequate, are better than no raise, but a foreign policy based on palliatives is perilous). Cloak and dagger secrecy is maintained regarding Defense interest in a cooperative working relationship with South Africa. Thus, State "stonewalled" cross-examination over the sobering revelations of NATO interest in the sea lanes around the Cape.

The dilemma posed by this conflict between stated and implemented policy is that there is no real analysis of policy or of U.S. interests. Even with Vietnam and the propaganda surrounding U.S. purposes there, the intention to prop up that government was generally acknowledged and therefore, debated. But, with southern Africa the Executive, by resorting to shibboleths, avoids joining in needed critical dissection of U.S. interests in this area and of where present policy is taking us. Even defense of past actions is averted. State never had to defend the unrestricted sale of troop carriers to Portugal because the Department sidestepped the issue by disputing the contention that the Boeing 707's had been sold with insight into intended Portugueses use. This seeming cleverness is the undoing of those in the Administration who seek a rational African policy. Such dissimulation not only confounds them, it obviates needed public debate and constructive analysis. Worse, even meaningful debate within the executive is thwarted. It is almost tragic that at a time when all but Ian Smith see the handwriting on the wall in Rhodesia as Mozambique becomes free, the U.S. government is still debating the Byrd Amendment.

The speeter of South Africa, no longer protected by buffer states, armed to the teeth against 90% of its own people, is not a pleasant one, especially given the Afrikaner larger mentality and the centuries of repression of the African majority. The threat to intertional peace of the global reverberations of eruptions in south Africa cannot be faced with indifference. The overriding imperative is that high-level attention be directed towards southern Africa before a crisis arises. There must be a confrontation of ideas to force out into the open the issues, *as all sides see them*, towards a hard assessment of where U.S. interests lie. We need a confrontation designed to bring into the open the facts on U.S. policy and to force the government to open its eyes to the costs of present policy and the basics of a rational policy.

Any rational assessment must conclude that it is in U.S. interests that the people of southern Africa be friendly. It would question the present unspoken premise that prospects for majority rule are so remote that we can continue to profit from complicity with apartheid without jeopardizing vital interests through alienation of the majority. Failures of present policy must be faced frankly; and the perils of refuge in following the lead of the European metropoles recognized. There must be honest admission that the policy of "communication" with the White minority regimes, however sincerely conceived, must be abandoned. This policy was enunciated as intended to improve U.S. communication with all sectors of South African society. In fact, the "communication" policy has given aid and comfort to the minority during a relatively dynamic period on the South African political scene: the emergence of SASO on one hand and the unexpected boldness of homeland leader-appointees; the confrontation between government and white liberals, students and churchmen and the shocking baton charge by the police against peaceful protecters in a church; inhuman removals under the Group Areas Laws, bannings, deaths in detention and the murder of Abram Tiro; African strikes and labor unrest, culminating in the Carletonville shooting. Throughout it all, the United States maintained a discreet public stance amidst our continued protestations of seeing forward movement in South Africa. Thereby it strengthened the SA Government's evaluation that the accelerated flow of U.S. public and private financing would not be adversely affected by its moving to clamp down on all Black or White opposition. U.S. nuclear research cooperation, augmented by the transfer to

South Africa of technological capability has done nothing to cause that government to count the cost of its internal policies, other than to step up its public relations campaign. The United States has even stooped to the legal nonsense of making noises that apartheid is shielded by the domestic jurisdiction principle. Reception of key South African officials by the then Vice-President Ford and other top U.S. officials, including high naval brass, can only serve to reenforce the commitment of the South African minority to its suicidal course.

But time is running out. We have no choice but to face the facts. The course on which South Africa, where a tiny majority has arrogated unto itself sole political power and rules with arbitrary despotism over the rightless majority, is set can bring only misfortune to her friends and suffering to South Africa. U.S. dependence upon the minority for needed economic cooperation is clearly unwise. Failure to comprehend the measure of the negative impact on the rest of Africa of U.S. policy towards southern Africa has serious implications for our interests in Africa generally—interests which are considerably greater than our interests in South Africa. We cannot afford official assessments that other African countries are not concerned with southern Africa policy because they do not express such concerns to American officials known to be steeped in platitudes and policy justifications.

Out of the hatreds, repressions, and deprivations so long imposed by the minority, there looms a holocaust. South Africa may be able to stave off the accounting momentarily. But the longer she fails to come to grips with reality, the less likely it is that the Whites will be able to salvage not just a respectable position in South Africa but a future at all in that land. We have no choice. A firm course must be set. The United States must end its support of South Africa; and our deeds must match our words.

The following proposals for policy are put forth here. In the United Nations, the United States must take the lead in working out a resolution advising South Africa that the international community will not permit her to interfere beyond her borders in Mozambique, Angola or Rhodesia.

The resolution should indicate that we are prepared to join an international community effort to put economic pressures on South Africa, through *pro tanto* sanctions, if necessary, to cause South Africa to end its illegal occupation of Namibia.

In Angola, the United States should offer its good offices towards the speedy and orderly transfer to majority rule.

The United States must take the lead in devising practical UN resolutions to place pressure on South Africa through the numerous economic means which are possible. Domestically, the United States should discourage investment in South Africa by the imposition of tax disentives and other regulatory measures. The United States should further make it clear that, if in a reasonable period, South Africa does not restore fundamental rights to movement, to work, to family life, to political participation and to due process of law, the United States will consider support for a finding that South Africa is a threat to international peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to be followed by necessary action.

*U.S. collaboration with South Africa*, notably through the Export-Import Bank, and in nuclear and scientific cooperation must be ended. Above all, the sleight-of-hand approach where the State Department recites one policy while Defense, Commerce, the CAB, Interior, NASA and the CIA follow another, must be replaced by a policy where all government agencies are charged with implementing foreign policy in their respective domains. Executive integrity must be established.

In another sphere, the Executive should stop hiding behind the "due process" defense on the UN Convention on Apartheid and take the lead in securing an international agreement comporting with the process and serving notice on South Africa that the international community will utilize every appropriate legal and political weapon to bring home to the leaders of South Africa the unacceptability of apartheid. At a minimum, the United States should advise South Africa that it will no longer act as the protagonist defending South Africa's continuing to sit in international organizations.

South Africa must be further advised that her desperate hope for saving the situation by granting independence to the homelands will not suffice. Nor, in the end will proposals for a South African federation where the political weight of the 18% white minority is equal to or greater than that of the Africans. The only answer is a free South Africa, in which all citizens enjoy equally political, economic and human rights. We must refuse to be decoyed to any other goals, because in the end, the best protection for U.S. interests is a free society.

The foregoing are the type of actions some would recommend to be instituted in an overhaul of U.S. southern African policy. They are proposals with which to start the debate; for the *important thing is that the President* and the Secretary comes to grips with the reality for U.S. interests of the grim prospects ahead in southern Africa. □

**Africa Report** welcomes comments from its readers on issues raised in the magazine and on matters relating to Africa and its people. For reasons of space a contribution sent in the form of a letter to the editor stands a much greater chance of publication than one submitted as an article. Letters should be as brief as possible, normally between 100 and 400 words.

The editor retains the right to abridge or otherwise alter letters for reasons of space or other editorial requirement. It is editorial policy to maintain a balance of views on controversial issues.

All letters should bear the name and address of the sender. Requests for anonymity and non-divulgence will be respected but such a requirement may render the letter less likely to be published.

Individuals, governments and institutions who consider themselves directly criticised or otherwise aggrieved by material in the magazine will be granted the right of reply.

# african update

Monitoring economic and political developments around the Continent

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## Haile Selassie's 58-Year Reign Ended As Military Assumes Power in Ethiopia

### Tensions Abound in Wake of Revolt

Six decades of East African history reached its inevitable end when Emperor Haile Selassie's reign over the "hidden kingdom" of Ethiopia ground to a halt on September 12. The slow-motion revolution that overthrew the venerable Lion of Judah had begun eight months earlier, with the military cautiously gathering strength and support among different interest groups before taking the final step into the 20th century. (New York *Times*, September 13, 1974.)

Over the years, observers have more often said "when," not "if," in talking about an Ethiopian revolution. The feudal land, run absolutely by an 82-year-old monarch, had all the requisites: land in the grip of an entrenched aristocracy, an emperor desirous of basic change but seemingly reluctant to antagonize his power bases, an increasingly vocal student body and a military that heard lip service paid to progress but saw no concrete changes.

In the end it was the shrinking pocketbook of the military that sparked the gradual takeover. Faced with rampant inflation, citydwellers soon joined the armed forces in their calls for measures to reverse economic disaster.

A continent as large and as diverse as Africa is bound to have paradoxes, and Emperor Haile Selassie has always been one of the greatest of these. Returning to Ethiopia after the collapse of Mussolini's short-lived African empire, he was seen as a hero. Soon entrenched in the second half of his 58-year reign, he became, in the eyes of progressive elements, a feudal lord content with the status quo. If he was seen as an anachronism in a modern, post-independence Africa, he was nonetheless a prestigious elder statesman, a spokesman for African unity. His capital was made the seat of the Organization of African Unity.

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### Spinola Resigns

As **African Update** went to press, Portuguese President Antonio de Spinola resigned as leftist pressure within Portugal intensified. Implications of the Spinola resignation for the African territories were not immediately clear. Some sources think it will mean a hastening of the independence process. Others believe that should Portugal continue to be torn by dissension, possibly even civil war, Portuguese troops would be of little help in keeping order in Mozambique and, particularly, Angola, where a Rhodesia-style unilateral declaration of independence among the country's whites is thought by some to be possible. Spinola was succeeded, after only six months at the head of the government, by Gen. Francisco da Costa Gomes, a close associate of his.

## Lisbon/Frelimo Reach Accord on Mozambique; Guinea-Bissau Independence Pact Signed

As Portugal's 500-year-old African empire moved toward dissolution, only tiny Guinea-Bissau was enjoying a smooth transfer of power. The new West African nation was formally granted its independence on September 10, an action that by then was little more than a gesture concluding what was already a *fait accompli*.

In Mozambique and Angola, things were not progressing so smoothly, and it was becoming apparent that both territories might move toward nationhood carrying the burden of internal conflict on their already beleaguered backs.

In Mozambique, rioting and violence erupted as whites protested the newly signed peace and independence pact that is expected to bring Frelimo President Samora Machel to the country's presidency in June.

Angola, like Mozambique, was torn by racial tension as riots tore through the slums of the capital city, Luanda. And it was becoming clear that no progress had been made in resolving conflicts between the country's three principal liberation movements, leaving the status of Lisbon's two-year independence plan for the country under question.

A rundown of principal events at the time **African Update** went to press follows.

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*It was in deference to Haile Selassie's great authority and pre-*eminence that his removal from power was gradual and quiet. When the young military officers began on the road to reform they were careful to reaffirm publicly their loyalty to the aging emperor. But it was not their deposing him that led to civilian stirrings in late September. Rather it was the announcement that the low-key Armed Forces Coordinating Committee was proclaiming a Provincial Military Government, without naming a date for turning over ultimate power to civilians.

Fearing new repression, civilians also sounded the alarm when, on the day the emperor was dethroned—quietly taken away in a blue police Volkswagen—the military instituted press censorship and denied the right to strike and hold demonstrations. The people had been denied these rights under the emperor's rule also, but in the euphoria that marked his gradual eclipse they had taken them upon themselves, demanding things they had theretofore been too timid even to suggest. (New York *Times*, September 20, 1974.)

Another blow to Haile Selassie's pride must have been the Armed Forces' request that the emperor's son, Asfa Wossen, return to Ethiopia as a figurehead king with no powers. The 57-year-old crown prince, living in Geneva after a partly paralyzing stroke, had been involved—most say involuntarily—in a 1960 attempt to depose his father. In the spring, Haile Selassie had passed over his son, naming instead as his eventual successor his grandson.

The military man who has emerged from the anonymity of the Armed Forces Coordinating Committee is General Aman Michael Andom, who was named head of the new cabinet. It is not yet known if he is simply a figurehead for a group within the military group that retains the real power. The answers to this and other questions will doubtless emerge as slowly as the changeover itself took place.

But the most telling event of all took place in mid-August when the army distributed copies of the country's historic new draft constitution the document that ended 3,000 years of absolute, feudal rule in Ethiopia.

The new constitution leaves the emperor little more than a titular head of the state and, although it did provide for retention of the reputed Solomic dynasty, some observers felt chances were improving daily that the monarchy would not outlast Haile Selassie himself. (London *Times*, August 26, 1974.)

Among other things, the document, radical for the embroiled East African nation, is a call for the complete separation of church and state, a daring move in a country in which the Coptic Christian Church is a vital institution and the emperor is thought by some to be divine.

The constitution also calls for a differentiation among the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government and establishes a bicameral legislative body, which will choose a prime minister.

The judiciary, perhaps in reaction to what is viewed as the capriciousness of the emperor's Crown Court, will be independent of any other branch of government and is to be headed *by a chief legal officer who will be elected by Parliament for life.* (*Financial Times*, August 8, 1974.)

Although not precise on the vital subject of land reform, the draft constitution suggests that there will be subsequent legislation aimed at dealing with this issue, potentially the thorniest of all the country must face. For the time being, however, the constitution does suggest laws for limiting the maximum size of landholdings.

In another of its revolutionary aspects, the constitution allows for freedom of political association, thus opening the way for the first time for the formation of political parties.

When the Ethiopian air force buzzed the imperial palace of Emperor Haile Selassie in mid-August, it was clear that it was sending the emperor a message in tones that were as loud as the roar of the planes flying over Addis Ababa: his power was dissolved. (*Financial Times*, August 8, 1974.)

Still, it seems difficult to imagine that the emperor's name will disappear entirely from the headlines for quite some time, and the exact shape of Ethiopian life seems uncertain over the next few months. At the rate that events have been accelerating in the "hidden empire," almost any prediction runs the risk of being overtaken by the sweep of events.

As **African Update** was going to press, the BBC in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, announced that a 50-member civilian advisory group was to be elected by various government agencies and by professional groups to draft a constitution and to help implement a policy of "Ethiopia First." The Provisional Military Council announced the civilian group would work closely with the military men who are in charge of the government.

Beyond working for Ethiopia Tegdem—Ethiopia First—the advisory committee will recommend to the military council guidelines for the Ethiopian people to choose the type of government they want and the reforms in social and economic systems necessary. The military will retain right of approval. (September 23, 1974.)

Portuguese Territories continued from page 21

## Guinea-Bissau

While trouble flared in Portugal's East African colonies of Mozambique and Angola, the transfer of power in Guinea-Bissau continued smoothly.

Both Portugal and Guinea's independence party (the PAIGC) maintained a low-key approach to formal independence. Official recognition of the new state by Portugal was marked in both Bissau and Lisbon with a minimum of ceremony.

Despite the absence of pageantry, there seemed to be no lack of goodwill between the two sides. Portuguese troops and guerrilla soldiers embraced in the streets and were believed to be cooperating to assure an easy transition. (Africa News, September 12, 1974.)

Although the official declaration of independence on September 10th ended more than 11 years of fighting, a de facto cease-*fire had existed since shortly after the military coup that toppled* the Caetano government in Lisbon on April 24. (New York *Times*, August 25, 1974.)

All Portuguese forces are slated to withdraw from Guinea-Bissau by October 31, and the initial announcement of the independence agreement also noted that both sides intended to maintain "a relationship of active cooperation" in the economic, cultural and technical areas. (London *Times*, August 26, 1974.)

The text of the accord also made it clear that the strategic Cape Verde Islands, off the West African coast, would not immediately become part of the new state. Portugal pledged to hold a referendum on the islands at some time in the future.

Observers believe that Guinea-Bissau's transition to independence was made easy by a variety of factors. The colony is smaller than Mozambique or Angola and has only a tiny white population. In addition, its economic significance to Portugal is minimal. It is also noted by observers that African nationalists in the territory were united and had made considerable territorial gains during the 11-year struggle. (*Financial Times*, August 28, 1974.)

The new state has already been recommended for U.N. membership and has been recognized by some 90 nations as an independent country. The U.S. recognized the new government on September 10.

The fact that the U.S. was one of the last major nations to recognize the new state, some critics charge, will be viewed as part of the already widely held belief that African issues receive

a low priority in Washington.

The U.S. did support Guinea-Bissau's U.N. application, but State Department sources claimed in August that official recognition was being withheld pending completion of negotiations on the transfer of power. (Africa News, August 15, 1974.)

Guinea-Bissau, for its part, dates independence from last September, when a national assembly declared statehood. To the PAIGC, Portugal's formal recognition merely underscored an already established fact.

In their public statements, PAIGC officials have been stressing the problems the nation faces, particularly the need for improving living standards in the rural areas. Rural electrification and running water for villages are PAIGC's first major goals.

PAIGC intends to build its economy outward from the liberated zones. In the south, rich rice paddies have been in PAIGC hands since 1962 and food production has proceeded at a rate that has allowed for substantial accumulation of stocks. (*Financial Times*, August 28, 1974.)

By contrast, the northern part of the country is said to be in much worse condition. Nearly 80,000 people crossed the border into Senegal during heavy Portuguese bombing of the north, leaving behind them a decimated landscape that has all but reverted to bushland.

The Government of Guinea-Bissau has announced that the country's **new capital** will be Medina de Boa, in the far eastern hills. The town was the site of a guerrilla encampent, and it was there that a national assembly met to declare independence in September of 1973.

The announcement was made by the mayor-designate of the west coast town of Bissau, which was the capital when Guinea was under Portuguese rule. Portugal formally handed over power in September.

Moving the capital is in line with the new nation's policy of decentralization and the development of rural areas. Bissau is already the country's largest town and is sure to remain important because of its port.

Naming Medina de Boa the capital will help stimulate the development of the eastern part of the small country, which is about the size of The Netherlands. The choice is also a symbolic one, as it was in the east that control was first taken from the Portuguese and the establishment of an independent state begun. (Africa News, September 23, 1974.)

## Mozambique

As the rapid flow of events continued to sweep over Portugal and her former colonies in the waning days of the nearly 500-year-old Lusitanian empire, Portuguese troops were helping Frelimo liberation forces to take over Mozambique.

As **African Update** went to press it seemed that whites in the soon-to-be-independent territory had grudgingly halted their violent defiance of a Black government under Frelimo. (*Christian Science Monitor*, September 12, 1974.)

The abortive rebellion, which included the four-day seizure of the radio station and other key installations in Lourenço Marques and the thronging of streets by thousands of whites, followed almost immediately on the heels of the final agreement between Frelimo and Lisbon. (New York *Times*, September 8, 1974.)

Outbursts were not, however, confined to Lourenço Marques. In the port of Beira, Mozambique's second-largest city, white resistance to a Frelimo government resulted in the deaths of 30 persons, and the city's main radio station was taken over by whites. (*Christian Science Monitor*, September 10, 1974.)

Although the countryside was mostly quiet by the end of September, the big question for the provisional government was whether the outbursts had been final convulsions of the embittered white group or whether they were an ominous indication of problems that would continue to plague the early days of the new government.

In the third week of September, it was reported that the arrival of some 50 officials of the Mozambique Liberation Front in Lourenço Marques from Dar es Salaam was marked by a line of Portuguese whites applying for visas at the South African embassy. According to some reports, at least half the capital's 70,000 whites were expected to leave the country rather than face a Black government (New York *Times*, September 17, 1974), even though the cabinet of the interim government is multiracial.

Saying there was a "place for everybody in Mozambique," Joaquim A. Chissano, premier of the new interim government, tried, with some success, to stem the flow of whites. Estimates have as much as 10 per cent of the white population already gone. (New York *Times*, September 23, 1974.) But in late September, a highly placed Frelimo source told **African Update** that many whites who had fled the country were returning.

South Africa, evidently a sanctuary for those whites who wish to leave Mozambique, was also cited by some as having played a role in aiding the recent rebellion, perhaps along with Rhodesia. (Africa News, September 12, 1974.) Those who advance this argument note that the handful of Blacks who joined the outburst were members of a group known as the National Coalition Party and that, only weeks before the turmoil, the group had been nonfunctional, thus leading some to speculate that outside support had led to the group's revival.

The newly unveiled pact between Frelimo and Lisbon calls for operation of a provisional government and for granting of total independence on June 25, 1975, the 13th anniversary of the founding of Frelimo. (New York *Times*, September 8, 1974.) A formal cease-fire between Portuguese and Frelimo forces took effect on September 8, although it had been reported that prior to the agreement Portuguese troops and Frelimo guerrillas were already fraternizing.

The peace and independence accord followed nearly three months of quiet contacts between Frelimo and Lisbon, concluding at a historic meeting in Lusaka, Zambia. The outcome of the Zambia parley was virtually assured and it had been widely expected that a final independence agreement would be announced. (*Financial Times*, August 14, 1974; *Rand Daily Mail*, August 31, 1974.)

Right up until the last round of talks began, Frelimo President Samora Machel maintained that his party was not negotiating for independence but was only working out details of the transfer of power from Lisbon.

It was reported that internal power shifts within Portugal may have been responsible for Portuguese willingness to deal exclusively with Frelimo. According to the London *Observer*, Portugal's former head of state, Antonio de Spinola, may have agreed to recognize Frelimo in return for concessions from his younger army officers. (London *Observer*, July 28, 1974.) In the weeks preceding the settlement, Portugal announced a restructuring of the armed forces with command coming under the chief of state. Evidently, prior to his resignation Spinola gave in on Frelimo in order to keep a closer watch on the army, which had been under the authority of the cabinet.

## Angola

In the months since the coup that brought sweeping changes in Portugal's Africa policies it has become increasingly clear that, of all Portugal's possessions, Angola represents the most difficult problem.

It had been hoped that when Lisbon announced a two-year plan for granting Angolan independence prospects for the beleaguered territory would brighten. The plan, disclosed in early

August, called for establishment of a provisional government following a general cease-fire.

Clearly, Portugal's intention seems to have been twofold: to buy time to ease Lisbon's transition out of this richest of all her territories and to allow the many conflicting passions within Angola to cool.

Instead of being a prelude to peace, however, the new plan was followed by 12 days of bloody race rioting. Reports as to the number of dead vary, but it seems that at least 50 were killed and 250 wounded in the violence that tore through the slums of Luanda, the territory's capital. (*Africa Confidential*, August 23, 1974.)

There are a variety of explanations being offered for how the violence began, and blame for the rioting has been lodged with factions on the right and the left, as well as with the shopkeepers of Luanda, whose racial antagonisms are said to be among the country's most severe.

As the turmoil in Angola's streets subsided, it still appeared as if the country's divided liberation forces were no closer to resolving their differences than they had been months earlier.

MPLA, considered by many the most likely movement to mount an effective party with national appeal, continued to be split into three factions. A party congress, held in Zambia in August, failed to produce any reconciliation among the three groups, which are divided among MPLA's president, Agostinho Neto, and two rival factions, one led by Daniel Chipenda and the other by Mario de Andrade. (*Financial Times*, August 29, 1974.)

Although some observers believe the MPLA problem involves personality clashes rather than ideological confrontation, the interparty dispute remains unresolved. So far, no initiatives have been able to bring about the unity that is believed vital for a hasty settlement with Lisbon.

It had been hoped that MPLA would resolve its differences, form a pact with FNLA (still another of the country's liberation movements and apparently the only one still actively pursuing guerrilla activity) and present a united front to the Portuguese. (London *Times*, August 21, 1974.)

UNITA, another of Angola's liberation groups, has reportedly reached an unofficial agreement with the Portuguese for a cease-fire, as has MPLA. Neither the MPLA or FNLA has approved of the recent Portuguese independence proposal that would put the territory's ultimate fate in the hands of a constituent assembly.

Out of Africa:

## *White Africa Cautious About New Black Neighbor*

The countries that have proved themselves to be most interested in Mozambique's shift from white colonialism to Black independence are, of course, neighboring Rhodesia and South Africa. Despite private meetings that have had Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith flying to Pretoria frequently during the past six months or so, the public responses of both countries have been guarded. As the following radio broadcasts show, the first overtures have been diplomatic and cautious.

The BBC broadcast of September 20 from Johannesburg, for dissemination abroad, said in part: "Politically, the challenge to Black Africa is to resist the encroachment of communist or capitalist neocolonialism. Politically, the challenge to us, white Africa, is to devise and implement a *modus vivendi* with the countries about us. These two sets of requirements are not in conflict but complementary, and there have been signs in the past few days of a general recognition of this. . . .

"In his weekend statement, Prime Minister [John] Vorster said the Republic [of South Africa] was ready to give financial and other aid to Mozambique's new government, whatever its color and however it was constituted. . . . On Tuesday [September 17] the prime minister of the interim government in Mozambique, Mr. Joaquim Chissano, No. 3 man in Frelimo, responded. He said in Lourenço Marques that Frelimo did not propose to interfere in the internal affairs of any country, including the Republic and Rhodesia, that it had firm convictions about how Mozambique should be run but that this did not mean that others were obliged to follow them. He said that the new government would take due account of what he called 'the actual relations of Mozambique with the Republic and all its other neighbors.'

"Mozambique could play a decisive role in a pattern of subcontinental cooperation. The rewards would be enormous. . . . The prospect of cooperation has been advanced by Mr. Chissano's statement. If it is realized, it will bring great benefits to the free world also—economic, political and strategic."

The commentary from Salisbury, Rhodesia broadcast on September 19, said: "When new neighbors move into the house next door their advent is watched with close interest. For good neighbors are a joy to everybody around them, but bad neighbors are a source of friction and unhappiness. The same applies when a new government takes over a neighboring country. And so it is that the first public statement by Mr. Joaquim Chissano, named as prime minister-designate to the new Frelimo government in Mozambique, will be studied with careful attention in both South Africa and Rhodesia.

"Certainly, encouragement is to be drawn from his declaration that the new government's policy will be one of noninterference in the affairs of its neighbors. Beyond that he would not be drawn on the subject of relations with South Africa and Rhodesia or on the movement of Rhodesian goods through the ports of Beira and Lourenço Marques. All he would say was that the new government would have to study existing relationships with all surrounding states. But when Mr. Chissano added: 'We do not want to provoke anyone because this is not the way to defend our achievements and we will not create any reasons to start a new war,' he was talking like a man who recognizes the advantages to be gained from a good neighbor. He must indeed be well aware of the importance to the economy of Mozambique of the traffic generated by Rhodesia and South Africa. He must also know of the parlous state of the Mozambique economy after four months without decisive government and with mounting chaos in all sectors. . . .

"The South African and Rhodesian governments—like the prime minister-designate of Mozambique—are wedded to a policy of noninterference in the affairs of others, which is the only acceptable rule of conduct between neighbors. Nevertheless, if the developments in the coming months, especially in Mozambique, result in closer economic ties, there will be incalculable benefit to the whole of the subcontinent, particularly to Mozambique itself. The key to it all lies in maintaining a neighborly goodwill."

## South Africa Deploys Troops in Border Areas; Keeps Close Watch on Events in Mozambique

Despite conciliatory language on the part of the new Black leaders of Mozambique and warnings from white South African political moderates, South Africa is beefing up its border defenses against possible terrorist attacks and, in general, seems to be developing a "war psychosis."

Warning against just such a "war psychosis," Colin Eglin, leader of South Africa's Progressive Party, has cautioned that public concern over loyalty—as mirrored in a new defense bill—indicates to South Africa's enemies that there might be reason to doubt the loyalty of all South Africans, white or Black. The new defense bill calls for a $15,000 fine, or up to 10 years in jail, to be levied against any person who refuses to perform national military service or who urges others not to. Big penalties, Eglin warned, could indicate to South Africa's enemies "that we need a big stick." (*Rand Daily Mail*, August 16, 1974.)

In addition to passing legislation to plug certain loopholes against conscientious objection to military service, South African officials have been deploying increasing numbers of military men and policemen to border areas and to Rhodesia, the white-controlled state to South Africa's northeast. One result of this has been a watering-down of law enforcement in the South African interior.

Lieutenant General Nolan Loxton, chief deputy commissioner of the South African police, told the Johannesburg *Star* in Pretoria, "I cannot reveal how many police are on the borders but it will be understood that their presence there [has] caused a considerable drain on law-enforcement sections in South Africa." Women and Black policemen are filling in for the dispersed white male forces, the deputy commissioner added. (Johannesburg *Star*, August 10, 1974.)

Spokesmen for the South African defense forces confirmed that Black homeland leaders have been approached by South African Government officials to set up defense forces in the homelands. (*Rand Daily Mail*, August 3, 1974.)

All the while, spokesmen for Frelimo, which will assume control of Mozambique soon, have been cautious in their language regarding South Africa. Asked repeatedly what Frelimo's stance would be toward the white regime to Mozambique's south, Joaquim A. Chissano, third-ranking Frelimo leader who is expected to become premier of the interim government, remarked, "We do not pretend to be the saviors of the world. We will not be the saviors or reformers of South Africa. That belongs to the people of South Africa." (New York *Times*, September 18, 1974.)

South African officials do not seem to believe such language. Afrikaner military experts have outlined scenarios whereby terrorists, presumably coming from an independent Mozambique, would infiltrate Black homelands and use them as operational bases from which to attack white South Africa. (*Rand Daily Mail*, August 5, 1974.)

One effect of the "war psychosis" is that South Africa will spend in five years what it had budgeted for defense over the next 10 years. As a result, the country's annual defense budget will soon double present levels, reaching more than $1.5 billion within the next few years. (Johannesburg *Star*, August 17, 1974; *Rand Daily Mail*, July 31, 1974.)

*Also seemingly in preparation for a Black-controlled government* in the former Portuguese territories, South African Airways has ordered three special-performance Boeing jets—B747 SPs—at a cost of about $85 million. Delivery of the jets is expected in the first half of 1976. (Johannesburg *Star*, July 20, 1974.)

Although the airline's present jumbo jets are able to reach Johannesburg from London without making stops, the new SP is designed for maximum performance out of high-altitude airports and would enable flights from Johannesburg to reach London without stopovers in the former Portuguese territories. (*Jeune Afrique*, August 3, 1974.)

## Ford Foundation Austerity Program Likely To Reduce Levels of Grants to Africa

The Ford Foundation, one of America's largest private supporters of African interests, will probably substantially reduce its Africa-related grants as a mood of general austerity sweeps that nation's wealthiest foundation.

Although the precise nature of any cuts has not yet been determined, a Ford spokesman told **African Update** that Africa would experience substantial cuts.

**African Update** checked with the Foundation after an interview with Ford president McGeorge Bundy appeared in the New York *Times* on September 22. Bundy told the *Times* that an *overall reduction of grants by as much as 50 per cent was being* weighed by the Foundation and that a dipping securities market and inflation had forced the Foundation's trustees at least to discuss the possibility of dissolution. The Foundation's assets fell from $3 billion to $2 billion in 1973.

Most observers seem to think it unlikely that the Foundation will actually dissolve itself, distributing its assets in a process that could take several years. Most analysts do feel, however, that some cutback policy is inevitable.

At present budgetary levels, about $12.5 million to $13 million of the Middle East and Africa Division's annual budget goes to Africa, with about $8 million to $9 million of that going to sub-Saharan Africa. The Foundation's overall annual budget totals approximately $202 million a year.

As **African Update** went to press, Ford trustees discussed the Foundation's various alternatives. The board evidently decided against dissolution and also set no specific budget levels.

The Ford spokesman said that the allocation of funds, whatever the level, between Asia, Africa and Latin America would probably not be worked out by trustees but would emerge from staff discussions within the Foundation.

Ford operates on a two-year budget cycle with the present period ending on September 30, 1975.

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# Western Africa

## Chad

- Chad recently received a loan of $3.5 million from the International Development Association to improve about 400 miles of **roadways** in the southern part of the country.

Plans for the five-year project include a study for another 60 miles of roads leading to major export routes, training and technical assistance for reorganizing the road transport ministry and a two-year traffic count on 1,000 miles of roads already existing in the country.

Besides road improvements, the loan will be used to recondition and maintain nine ferryboats and to study possibilities for replacing the ferryboats and for improving dock facilities.

Chad's economic development has been slowed by its landlocked position in the middle of the drought-stricken Sahel region. Improving the country's simple road and water transport system is a major priority of officials hoping to make Chad more accessible to incoming relief supplies.

## Ghana

• Ghana plans to beef up its **livestock industry** with help from the U.S. and Canada. Agricultural experts believe Ghana could become one of Africa's prime cattle countries, although cattle farming now contributes less than five per cent of the overall value of Ghanaian agricultural output.

Recently, 45 Canadian cattle were brought from Toronto to the University of Science and Technology at Kumasi to be used in demonstrations for students and local farmers. The cattle will be bred with each other and then crossbred with African stock.

Ghana was also granted a $2-million loan from the International Development Association as part of a $4.5-million pilot project to modernize the Ghanaian cattle industry and provide training and technical assistance to local ranch managers.

• The U.S. Senate recently confirmed President Ford's nomination for ambassador to Ghana, **Shirley Temple Black.** Now observers are anxious to see whether the new ambassador will become a gadfly or a butterfly on the African diplomatic scene.

Black's lingering image as a sweet little girl with big dimples is making it difficult for some people to imagine her as an effective ambassador to Ghana. But the erstwhile movie star is trying to convince her critics that she has matured into a sensitive adult capable of handling an important diplomatic position.

Career diplomats complain that the prestigious Ghanaian post has been given to a relative newcomer to international affairs. They note that Black's diplomatic experience consists of representing the U.S. at the U.N. and of short-term assignments overseas.

Some critics are distressed that Black has been to only one country in Africa—Egypt. They argue that U.S. representatives to African posts should be better acquainted with African affairs.

But a Ghanaian observer pointed out, "If she's a woman and a former movie star, maybe people in the U.S. will listen to what she has to say about us. What's important is that she be well disposed toward Africa and capable of providing reasonable and sensible advice to her own country." (Washington *Post*, August 30, 1974; Wall Street *Journal*, September 13, 1974.)

• At 6 a.m. on August 4, church bells, sirens, clock-tower chimes, drums, horns and other noisemakers signaled the introduction of Ghana's new law requiring all traffic to move to **the right side of the road.**

Ghana was the last West African country to change from driving on the left to driving on the right. The switch was hailed by leaders as another step in lifting the artificial barriers set up between French- and English-speaking African nations by former colonial powers.

Ghana prepared for the move during a year-long campaign called Operation Keep Right, in which driving courses were offered and new road signs were printed. Radio and TV broadcasters made sure that drivers who could not read were alerted to the new law.

Vehicles with only left-side doors were required to have new ones made on the right. Even exhaust pipes had to be switched so that fumes from vehicles with right-hand steering wheels would not bother drivers in vehicles with wheels on the left. (*West Africa*, August 5, 1974; *To the Point International*, August 10, 1974.)

## Guinea

• Prolonged negotiations between Bonn, U.N. headquarters in New York and Conakry finally resulted in the **release of three West Germans** from a Guinean prison at the end of July.

One of the released men was Adolph Marx, who had served more than three years of a life sentence for participating in what President Sékou Touré called a French-, Portuguese-, and West German-backed invasion attempt in November 1970.

When Marx was sentenced, another 100 West Germans were expelled from Guinea, and diplomatic relations with West Germany were broken.

A ransom for Marx's release was refused, and pressure from European and African countries was ignored before Touré finally agreed to free Marx on condition that West Germany admit, and condemn, his role in the attempted coup.

The Guinean president also released Josef Schmultz and Ulrich Stegmann, who were imprisoned in 1973. The two West Germans were first accused of being spies but were finally charged with traveling in Guinea without visas.

•Observers expect that Guinea and West Germany will resume diplomatic relations in October or November. (*West Africa*, August 5, 1974; *Jeune Afrique*, August 31, 1974.)

## Ivory Coast

• U.S. blue jeans are one of the most sought-after items in used-clothing stalls throughout Africa. Two American firms have recognized the potential market for denim fashions and are setting up a blue-jean factory in the Ivory Coast to cater to the growing demands of West African youth.

The American companies that will own stock in Blue Bell Côte d'Ivoire are **Blue Bell Incorporated,** which will hold 51 per cent of the shares, and **Riegel Textile Corporation,** which will hold 19 per cent. An Ivorian firm, Icodi, will own the remaining 30 per cent.

The blue-jean factory is scheduled to begin production in January 1975. It is slated to be built in Yopougon, near Abidjan, and will employ 1,000 people. (*Jeune Afrique*, July 27, 1974.)

• **First National Bank of Chicago** is lending the Ivory Coast $3.5 million to dig wells in Zahto. New York **First Empire Bank** is lending the country $3 million to build 120 country homes. (*Jeune Afrique*, August 3, 1974; *Afrique Nouvelle*, September 3, 1974.)

## Liberia

• A national scheme to make Liberia self-sufficient in **rice** has the government offering cash prizes to the county that produces the greatest amount of the grain. Winner of the second annual rice contest, announced in late August, was Lofa County; second prize was won by Bong County. (Liberian *Star*, August 21, 1974, August 26, 1974.)

Although rice is the main crop of Liberia and the country's staple food, the nation nonetheless imported one-third its supply in 1974. Planners hope Liberia will grow all rice consumed domestically by 1980. (Africa News, August 15, 1974.)

The first prize for a county is $5,000, second prize $2,500. Each of 10 highest-producing individual farmers receives $100.

## Liberia/Sierra Leone

• The Mano River, which separates Liberia and Sierra Leone, has become a symbol of unification and cooperation in a scheme to reorder **economic and cultural cooperation** between the countries.

Under the Mano River Union Treaty, Sierra Leone and Liberia will expand trade and gradually eliminate tariff barriers. Construction of a road between the two politically moderate nations was begun in September, and a bridge across the Mano River will be completed by February 1976. (Liberian *Star*, August 1, 1974.)

During a revenue symposium, an adviser from the International Monetary Fund, Dr. George E. Lent, recommended that the two nations revise their investment codes so as to adopt a common approach in attracting new industries. Tax incentives should provide the key element in a coordinated effort to promote capital investment in the region, he said. (Liberian *Star*, August 23, 1974.)

## Mauritania

• Mauritania has granted Ghana **fishing rights** in its territorial waters. Under the recent agreement, Ghana can have a maximum of 10 fishing vessels, each weighing not more than 20,000 tons, off Mauritanian shores.

Ghana's fishing waters extend into the Gulf of Guinea; Mauritania, far north and west of Ghana, borders on the Atlantic Ocean. (*Standard Bank Review*, July 1974.)

• Two loans, for a total of about $8.6 million, have been made *to Mauritania by the U.S. Export-Import Bank and the* **Bankers Trust Company.** The money will cover costs of goods and services, to be purchased in the U.S., of a planned **suagr refinery**, designed to refine 160 metric tons of sugar per day. (African-American Chamber of Commerce *News*, July 1974.)

An example of increased American bank interest in Africa, Bankers Trust Company opened a representative office in Lagos, Nigeria in March 1974. Its purpose, according to the bank, is to increase the bank's involvement in sub-Saharan Africa. Bankers Trust also has affiliate banks in the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Cameroun, the Congo (Brazzaville) and Tunisia.

## Nigeria

• Between 2.5 and three million children are expected to be enrolled in primary schools in Nigeria in 1976, the first year of the **Universal Primary Education** scheme. (Nigeria *Daily Times*, August 26, 1974.)

Federal Education Commissioner Abdul Eke called January 15, 1970 the date of birth of the new Nigeria, because all children born on or after that date will benefit from the universal education program. Eke said about $300 million will be spent each year educating the initial group of children in the plan.

In face of the great increase in students, the country launched a teacher-training program in September. Some 44,000 teachers are being trained under the crash program. (Nigeria *Daily Times*, September 2, 1974.)

• Nigeria achieved its **largest trade surplus** ever in the first half of 1974. Accounting for 90 per cent of national revenue, crude oil boosted export values to $4.5 billion.

The surplus for the first half of 1974 was $3 billion. (*Financial Times*, August 22, 1974.)

• Nigeria will export 1,400 tons of shrimp yearly to the U.S. beginning in 1976 through an agreement between the Nigerian National Shrimp Company and the American firm **Continental Sea Foods.** The NNSC is 65 per cent held by the Nigerian Government, 35 per cent by Continental. (*West Africa*, July 29, 1974.)

The shrimp products will be exported to the U.S. and Europe after processing in Nigeria.

• Nigeria's plans to rehabilitate its **cocoa** industry will be assisted by a $20-million loan from the World Bank. Some 27,000 farmers will benefit. Nigeria is the second-largest producer of cocoa in the world.

• *Lagos, the Nigerian capital, is to have a 500-bed luxury hotel,* built by **Holiday Inns International, Occidental Petroleum** and the Lagos State Government. The $23-million building is scheduled for completion before the second World Black Arts Festival, to be held in Lagos in November 1975. (*African Development*, July 1974.)

• Nigeria has decided to sell its **crude oil at a minimum price** to other African states, all of whom have been adversely affected by the hike in oil prices imposed by the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (*Le Moniteur Africain*, August 8, 1974.)

Other countries will have to pay nearly 25 per cent more than the minimum because the inflationary spiral has nudged export prices upward. (*Muhammad Speaks*, August 23, 1974.) Philip Asiodu, permanent secretary to the federal ministry of mines, said the decision was made in spite of the fact that primary commodities such as cocoa, copper and coffee had also enjoyed a boom—the implication being that other African states had also enjoyed a hike in revenues from these price increases on the world market. (*Africa Confidential*, August 9, 1974.)

Asiodu, also chairman of the Nigerian National Oil Corporation, did not give any specific prices but said, "We have gone out of our way to sell at minimum price." (*West Africa*, August 5, 1974.)

• The U.S. and Nigeria have signed an **investment-guarantee** agreement. The accord should provide " immense opportunities for Americans to invest in a way they understand," according to Nigerian Industries Commissioner J. E. Adetoro.

No details of the new agreement were given. It replaces one signed in 1962 that "did not yield the expected results." (*Africa Research Bulletin*, August 14, 1974.)

• A **mini-census** has been called by Nigerian Head of State Yakubu Gowon in what appears to be an attempt to quiet the controversy over earlier census results. Ten years ago similar disputes helped to precipitate a political upheaval and a 30-month civil war, most familiar to Americans as the Biafra secession.

The second polling is an attempt to double-check figures obtained in a carefully planned 1973 census. The 1973 effort showed populations in several of Nigeria's 12 states greatly altered from a decade ago. (Africa News, July 29, 1974.)

Calling the 1973 census one of the most significant events in Nigerian history, a Nigerian national monthly magazine, *The People*, has outlined the current controversy for readers, even though informed sources have alleged that Gowon himself called the press together to warn them not to reveal the exact dimensions of what have repeatedly been called "only provisional" figures.

According to *The People*, two of Lagos' daily newspapers, the *Daily Sketch* and the *New Nigerian* have come out on different sides of the issue, the first questioning the statistics. The *New Nigerian* is owned by the northern states' governments, *The People* points out, and has welcomed the new census figures. In the census, one of the northern provinces, Northeastern State, more than doubled in population. Western State, which owns the *Daily Sketch*, actually lost population, according to the new figures.

All political and revenue-sharing plans will be based on the figures that finally emerge as the official breakdown in population of the most populous nation in Africa. (*The People*, May 1974.)

## Sierra Leone

• Some members of Sierra Leone's ruling All Peoples Congress believe a recent **bomb attack** on the country's minister of finance *and APC secretary-general, C.A. Kamara-Taylor, was a* calculated attempt to undermine the party.

At the end of July, while President Siaka Stevens was away on state visits to Hungary and Romania, explosives were set up around Kamara-Taylor's house. The finance minister and his family escaped without injury, but the house was heavily damaged.

Police are searching for Habib Lansana Kamara, a former lieutenant in Sierra Leone's military forces; Abdul Kamara, a politician and trader; and Keindekeh Seisay, a soldier; in connection with the bomb attack.

Vice-President and Prime Minister Sorie Ibrahim Koroma, who was responsible for last year's victory which gave the APC all the seats in Parliament, says there is evidence that he too was marked for assassination. (*West Africa*, August 12, August 19, 1974.)

## Togo

• General Gnassingbe Eyadema told an audience during last April's independence day celebrations in Togo that industrial development was secondary to **agricultural development.** With this in mind, Togo's rural economy minister, Saibou Dermane Fofana, and the minister of planning, Koudjalou Dogo, traveled to Washington, D.C. this summer to ask for financial assistance to develop Togo's coffee and cocoa industries.

The International Development Association recently approved a $6-million loan to Togo for the rehabilitation, planting and maintenance of about 11,000 acres of cacao trees and about 10,000 acres of coffee trees.

The loan will be supplemented by a $1.7-million grant from the French Fund for Aid and Cooperation and by $2.8 million from the Togolese Government.

The project is expected to bring Togo foreign-exchange earnings of $10 million annually by 1986. Besides planting more coffee and cacao trees, plans call for strengthening the National Society for the Renovation and Development of Togolese Coffee and Cacao Plantations and the National Fund for Agriculture Credit.

Feeder roads in plantation areas will be rehabilitated and 25 to 50 miles of new roads constructed. Coffee and cocoa research will also be carried out. (*Jeune Afrique*, September 7, 1974.)

• General Eyadema, Togolese head of state, began an official five-day visit to Peking on September 2. The visit followed a week-long exhibit last August in Lomé of 500 Chinese art objects from the province of Tchekiang. The pieces represent periods of Chinese art ranging from ancient times to the present. (*Le Moniteur Africain*, September 5, 1974; *Jeune Afrque*, September 7, 1974.)

## Upper Volta

• The World Bank has established a resident mission in Ouagadougou, the capital of Upper Volta. The mission's most immediate purpose will be to provide a direct link between the Bank and the African nations' Inter-State Committee for Sahelian **Drought Relief**, also headquartered there.

The mission will also develop and coordinate the World Bank group's programs in Upper Volta and will maintain close contact with the World Health Organization unit recently established in the West African nation to help control river blindness, endemic to the area. The World Bank is helping to attract outside funding for the WHO project.

# Eastern Africa

## Comoro Islands

• The 290,000 inhabitants of the four Comoro Islands will soon be able to decide the question of **independence from France**, but there is a chance that the Indian Ocean islands, which lie between the Malagasy Republic and Mozambique, will not be united in their decision. (*Africa*, September 1974.)

One island, Mayotte, more feudal than the others, may not get independence because the island's leaders are against it. The bulk of Mayotte's population are peasants, and powerful elements, led by the French firm Marcel-Henry, are voicing separatist intentions.

Such an outcome would not sadden France unduly. Denied a naval base by a change of heart, and the termination of an agreement, by the neighboring Malagasy Republic, the French are said to have been eyeing Mayotte as a viable alternative. Such a move would help to rekindle East African fears about the Indian Ocean's becoming a theater for East-West saber-rattling. (See **African Update**, May-June 1974.)

## East African Community

• The consultant to the Canadian National Railways, Canac, has been asked to reorganize the **East African Railways** system. (*Financial Times*, August 12, 1974.)

The move, aimed at giving the ailing rail system a new lease on life, was approved by the finance ministers of the three East African Community nations and by the World Bank, which said it would use its influence to ensure that spare parts from abroad would be available to the railway.

For the past few years, Canac has been active in Zambia, reorganizing that country's rail system.

The Governments of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda are injecting a total of almost $19 million for the improvement of the railway's financial, management and operational performance. The World Bank is to provide $8.7 million toward the East African Railways' emergency investment plan.

• The financial position of ailing **East African Airways** is improving, according to the airline's director-general, with revenues in the first five months of 1974 27.5 per cent higher than in the corresponding period of 1973. (East African *Standard*, August 2, 1974.)

But not all the airline's news was good. The line, which appeared to face bankruptcy last year, was hit with an eight-day strike in August by workers objecting to a new clocking system. (*Africa*, August 1974; East African *Standard*, August 16, 1974.)

Expatriate personnel working for East African Airways have been accused of trying to hinder Africanization of the airline. The charges were made during proceedings in which an expatriate is suing East African Airways for wrongful dismissal.

A former director-general testified that the expatriate, a former director of operations, said on a number of occasions that African pilots would take six to seven years before they would be able to command even the smallest aircraft.

The former director-general charged that African pilots' lack of progress reflected a paucity of opportunity not ability. He said the airline's board of directors was itself dissatisfied with the pace of pilot-training. (East African *Standard*, July 26, 1974.)

• The East African Harbors Corporation has agreed to a freeze on **tariffs** for Zambian goods at the port of Dar es Salaam, the Tanzanian capital. The temporary staying order was requested by Tanzanian Foreign Minister John Malecela after discussions with a Zambian delegation.

Charges acceptable to Zambia and to the EAHC have yet to be determined. The increase in tariffs would have cost Zambia an additional $80 million a year in import-export charges. Use of

the port at Dar is an integral part of Zambia's desire to turn its economy northward, away from any dependence on Rhodesian trade routes.

The Dar port is a source of potential friction to the East African Community. The Tanzanian harbor comes under the jurisdiction of the EAHC, a body of the three-nation economic union, but the ruling Tanzanian party, TANU, would like to take control.

The development and enlargement of port facilities at Dar and at Mombasa, in Kenya, have been an EAHC priority for years, and in the 1972-76 development program alone some $54 million has been allocated to improvement, especially at Dar. (*Africa*, August 1974.)

## Ethiopia

• Although Ethiopia has been suffering the traumas of internal turmoil, it has been anxious to show its neighbors that its essential policies toward the rest of the world have not changed.

Thus it was hardly surprising when the State Department confirmed that **new U.S. arms** had arrived in Ethiopia in response to pleas that there have been Soviet-aided military buildups in neighboring Somalia. (Africa News, September 2, 1974.)

According to American diplomatic sources, Somalia has acquired sophisticated weapons from the Soviet Union over the past year. The recent arms shipments to Ethiopia consisted of several dozen M-60 tanks.

The Ethiopian-Somali dispute hinges on rival claims to the Ogaden Desert between the two nations. Ogaden, although populated by Somali-speaking people, currently comes under Ethiopia's jurisdiction.

• The Ethiopian provinces of Tigre and Wollo—hardest hit by recent **drought and famine**—will be assisted by a $10-million credit from the International Development Association.

The drought rehabilitation project is geared to the immediate problem of resumption of cultivation and the long-range rehabilitation of drought areas within the two provinces, which have a combined population of 4.2 million people, two million of whom live in drought areas.

In another move, the IDA, the soft-loan arm of the World Bank, announced that Ethiopia would also receive a credit of $12 million to help finance the second phase of an agricultural project in the Walamo district. The $17.3-million project is expected to help increase production of food grains, vegetables and cash crops, as well as livestock and dairy products.

• Ethiopia may have moved a bit closer to a solution of its problem with the northern province of **Eritrea** when Prime Minister Michael Imru told Parliament in a recent speech that he was determined to bring peace to the area, the scene of 12 years of intermittent fighting between government forces and guerrillas. (*Financial Times*, August 21, 1974.)

Although the prime minister stopped short of actually pledging negotiations with the outlawed Eritrean Liberation Front, he did say that Eritrea could only gain its wishes through "dialogue and negotiation."

Without Eritrea and its Red Sea ports of Massawa and Assab, the prime minister said, the Ethiopian economy would be doomed. The prime minister's speech may have been prompted by an earlier development which saw 23 Eritrean Parliamentarians resign their posts amid accusations that the government was taking no interest in the province and was continuing to massacre civilians there.

## Indian Ocean

• The director of the Central Intelligence Agency has warned the U.S. not to go ahead with a major naval and air buildup on the Indian Ocean island of **Diego Garcia** (see **African Update**, May-June 1974). Such a move would ensure a Soviet buildup along the East African littoral, he said. (*Financial Times*, August 5, 1974.)

The U.S. now has minimal facilities on the British-owned island, and the Pentagon has requested $29 million to deepen the harbor, install shore facilities and construct a 12,000-foot runway.

The CIA director, William Colby, assured the Senate armed services subcommittee, which was considering the Pentagon request, that the Soviet buildup in the Indian Ocean is minimal and represents no real threat to western interests.

Meanwhile, it is reported the French have joined in the Indian Ocean competition. The Paris newspaper *Le Monde* reports that 10,000 French troops in the French Territory of the Afars and Issas were scheduled to receive reinforcements and modern weapons in September. Located at the tip of the Red Sea, Djibouti, as the territory is commonly called, is strategically located and could control access to the Suez Canal.

France's interest in the area, as the American and Soviet interest, came with the announcement that the canal will reopen. (Africa News, August 1, 1974.)

## Kenya

• **Tourists** in Kenya must now pay for hotel accommodations and for local sightseeing tours in foreign exchange. The control was announced by the Kenya Government as a measure to retain foreign exchange.

Hotels and local tour companies will be required to conduct all foreign-exchange and financial transactions through a single bank account that will be open for inspection by the Exchange Control Authority.

Tourism lagged in 1973, earning $55.2 million compared with $62.1 million in 1972. (*Standard Bank Review*, July 1974.)

• **Cyanamid International** and the **First National Bank of Chicago** are joining the growing ranks of American firms with East African branches based in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital.

Cyanamid, worldwide supplier of medical, industrial, agricultural and building consumer products, will serve the Ethiopian, Ugandan, Tanzanian, Malawian and Zambian markets from its Kenyan base.

First National Bank of Chicago has been licensed by the Kenya Government as the first U.S. bank to open a full-service branch in Nairobi. The bank will also operate a wholly-owned merchant bank in Kenya. (African-American Chamber of Commerce *News*, July 1974.)

**Firestone East Africa**, the Nairobi-based automobile-tire maker will spend some $3 million in an expansion that will be completed by the end of 1974.

Citing the high quality of tires produced by the plant, the managing director notes that heavy orders are being received from many African countries. The Kenya Government holds a 40 per cent interest in the company, which employs about 350 people and produces around 40,000 tires and tubes monthly. The remainder of the company is a subsidiary of the American Firestone Tire & Rubber Company. (*African Development*, August 1974.)

• The Governments of Kenya and West Germany have signed a series of agreements through which Kenya will receive a $6.7-million **loan for development** projects.

The projects include water and sewage development and smallholder credit schemes. The 30-year loan will be untied—the Kenya Government will not be obliged to buy German goods and services with the money. The loan will be repaid at an interest rate of two per cent per year. (East African *Standard*, August 16, 1974.)

• The campaign for the **general election** scheduled for October 14 got off to a controversial start when Kenya President Jomo Kenyatta declared his former rival, the once-detained Oginga Odinga, ineligible to run for a parliamentary seat as a candidate of the ruling party, KANU. The decision, it was later reported, was made by a KANU convention, not personally by the president.

Kenyatta had previously established ground rules whereby those once considered subversive might join mainstream politics. These included membership in KANU for at least three years since detention and full identification with "Government and party policies of development programs." Odinga and others were also required to apply formally to the president, as head of KANU, for permission to run.

The ruling does not prohibit Odinga, or 10 of his former supporters, from running for Parliament as independent candidates, but such a move was not given much chance of success.

Hearing the announcement of his ineligibility, Odinga commented, "That is politics. I was asked to stand [run for office] by my constituency and it is not me who has been suppressed but members of the public." (*Financial Times*, August 22, 1974.)

Odinga, of the Luo people, had been expected to do well in his home district of Bondo, near Lake Victoria. The Luo are the second-largest ethnic group in Kenya; the Kikuyu, Kenyatta's people, are the largest. (East African *Standard*, August 16, 1974, August 23, 1974; London *Times*, August 22, 1974.)

• The Government of Kenya has declared an indefinite **ban on all strikes.**

The presidential directive announcing the ban comes after a wave of strike activity by both worker and student groups as the country prepared for the October general election.

Earlier this summer, workers in the railway industry struck, charging irregularities in receiving their pay. At the international airport in Nairobi, tourists had to carry their own gear when workers walked off the job.

The porters' strike was especially embarrassing to the Kenya Government, as tourism is an important source of foreign exchange. And tourists had other problems when bank employees recently went on strike for three days.

Students have also been complaining. There has been a rash of strikes at high schools around the country. And at Kenyatta University students recently struck over what they called poor teaching and inadequate living conditions. The government responded by closing the university.

President Kenyatta warned that his government has lost patience with the walk-outs. "Severe disciplinary action will be taken," he said, "against anybody who incites, or organizes, or takes part in such strikes." The president said there is established machinery to handle grievances. (Africa News, August 22, 1974.)

• The New York-based **Oil Ventures International Incorporated** and Western Oil Company, a Kenyan firm, are exploring the cost of exploiting deposits of nickel and chromium that have been discovered in the West Pokot region of Kenya.

The managing director of Western Oil announced that the area contained nearly 14 million tons of nickel ore. (*Financial Times*, August 22, 1974.)

• **A 1,000-mile road** linking the Kenyan capital and the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, is nearing completion after eight years of work by the Kenya National Youth Service and an Italian construction company. In early August only about 30 miles of road had to be built to link the two countries.

Using the new road, motorists can now travel from Nairobi to Moyale, Kenya, on the Ethiopian border, in 10 hours; in the past the trip took three days. The new Nairobi-Addis road has an all-weather surface. (East African *Standard*, August 2, 1974.)

• High-grade cooking and salad oil will soon be available to Kenyan households when Elianto Kenya's **$1.5-million vegetable-oil factory** goes into production at Nakuru. The current worldwide shortage of cooking oils makes the opening of the plant timely, and the output is expected to be of better quality than imported brands.

The project was begun two years ago by Dr. Lorenzo Bertolli, a famous name in Italian olive oils, with 30 per cent participation by the African Development Corporation. Bertolli, managing director of Elianto, arranged with the Kenya ministry of agriculture for two Italian experts to work at the ministry's research stations to develop sunflower seed varieties suitable for local cultivation.

First harvests of the sunflowers are due soon, and the new variety, which shortens time from planting to harvesting, enables Kenya farmers to grow a quick cash crop on any size farm. (*African Development*, September 1974.)

## Seychelles

• All trade between the Seychelles and South Africa has been terminated in a bid to patch up differences between the islands' ruling party and the Organization of African Unity. The islands have in the past imported most of their essential commodities from South Africa. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, July 14, 1974.)

## Sudan

• Construction has begun on a 300-room Hilton **hotel** in Khartoum, capital of the Sudan. Designed by Ali Kolsal, the building is expected to be completed by the end of 1976. The contractor is Constock International. (*Africa*, September 1974.)

## Tanzania

• Tanzania and Ethiopia will receive the lion's share of the **$191-million Arab Fund** set up to help African countries combat oil-price increases. The tentative allocations were drawn up by the Organization of African Unity.

In determining priorities, the OAU ministerial committee considered economic prospects and balance-of-payments difficulties resulting from oil-price increases. The committee also gave special attention to landlocked countries and those affected by drought.

Tanzania and Ethiopia will each receive $13.3 million. (East African *Standard*, August 16, 1974.)

• The Canadian International Development Agency is making three loans to Tanzania for a total of $5.5 million. A $2.5-million grant will improve rural water supplies, and two grants totaling $3 million will be used to train middle- and senior-management personnel.

## Uganda

• Among the prominent guests at celebrations marking the 20th anniversary of the founding of Tanzania's ruling party was the former president of Uganda **Milton Obote.** Although Obote was known to be residing in Tanzania, he had not been seen in public—and certainly not on such an official occasion—since the coup in January 1971, in which General Idi Amin, Uganda's current ruler, overthrew his regime.

With President Kenneth Kaunda and Obote guests of President Nyerere of Tanzania, the TANU celebrations brought together once more three leaders who have long been close personal friends.

It was Obote's seeking refuge in Tanzania that triggered the steadily deteriorating relations between the two East African Community partners. Tanzania only reluctantly, and after much

delay, recognized Amin's government. (*Africa*, September 1974.)

Although the appearance of Obote in such a seemingly official capacity was not given as a reason, his return from self-imposed seclusion on such an important occasion may well have contributed to Amin's July threat to invade Tanzania.

After allegedly working for two days preparing a declaration of war on Tanzania, Amin abandoned his plans, telegramming President William Tolbert of Liberia to say Uganda had "no intention of invading one inch of any sister African country." The telegram followed the massing of Ugandan troops on the Tanzanian border. Amin blamed Tanzania for precipitating the crisis. (London *Times*, August 3, 1974.)

The weekend following the invasion threat, Amin took a "friendship tour" of a border market town, buying gifts for his wife. (*Rand Daily Mail*, August 5, 1974.)

## Central Africa

### Cameroun

- Cameroun received a **$16-million loan** from the World Bank to improve its railroad's track and telecommunications systems and to purchase additional rolling stock to meet increasing freight demands.

The project, which will be carried out during the next three years by Regie Nationale des Chemins de Fer du Cameroun, includes construction of a new bridge at Japoma, installation of a radio-link system, track renewal over about 20 miles and purchase of 225 freight cars, boxcars and flatcars, four main-line and three shunting locomotives.

Track improvements will focus on the Douala-Yaoundé line. The new cars and locomotives will be used to transport increasing supplies of timber from regions east and north of Yaoundé.

### Congo

- Congolese Minister for Water and Forests Xavier Katali recently outlined new government policies that reflect the important role of **timber** in the Congo's economy.

According to Katali, 60 per cent of all Congolese exports come from the forests that cover at least two-thirds of the country.

Katali warned against exhausting the resources in the southern part of the Congo and encouraged measures to open the forests in the north. (*West Africa*, August 5, 1974.)

Congolese efforts to exploit timber resources while preventing their abuse follow similar moves in neighboring Cameroun, where officials recently announced restraints on commercial exploitation of Cameroonian forests but also described projects to make further use of timber resources to curb a severe paper shortage. (See **African Update**, July-August 1974.)

### Gabon

- A **Japanese loan of $10 million** will help President Omar Bongo make some headway in his efforts to construct a Trans-Gabon railway.

Neither western technicians nor rich African nations to the north have offered much encouragement to Bongo, but increasing interest among foreign investors in Gabon's oil, uranium, manganese and iron ore has given the president a bargaining tool to gain financial backing for the railroad.

Construction of the first part of the railway has already begun and is scheduled for completion in 1978. Foreign investors see little economic gain in building this 150-mile stretch linking Owende on the sea to inland Booue. But Bongo expects that the first section of the new railroad will foster agricultural development along the line and will help ease supply-and-distribution problems in inland towns.

Bongo also wants to make more of Gabon's forests accessible to developers. Gabon's supply of okoume trees is diminishing, but 50 other species of tropical hardwoods cover nearly 80 per cent of the country.

Although interest in the first section of the railway has been minimal, investors have shown greater enthusiasm for Phases 2 and 3 of Gabon's rail project. Phase 2, scheduled for completion in 1979, will link Booue to uranium and manganese mines in the southern part of Gabon. The third phase will link Booue to untapped iron-ore reserves in the northern town of Belinga.

Gabon's manganese mines in Moanda have a production capacity of about five million tons per year. Moanda's reserves of 230 million tons make it one of the world's largest sources of manganese. A uranium mine at Mounana has a capacity of about 1,500 tons of concentrate per year. Iron-ore reserves at Belinga are reported to be one billion tons.

Both Bongo and foreign investors are anxious to take advantage of these vast mineral resources. But while construction of the railroad, and a new port at Santa Clara, is underway, Bongo does not want to disturb current arrangements, which call for the mining of two million tons of manganese out of Moanda each year.

Until now, the manganese has been transported by overhead cable cars to the Congolese port of Pointe-Noire. Gabonese mining officials are reportedly concerned that too great a show of interest in the new routes could be damaging in the short run. Evidently, they believe that the Congo might act to cut off Gabon's access to the sea if it appears that future arrangements could result in decreased revenue for the Congo. (*African Development*, August 1974.)

### Zaire

- President Mobutu Sese Seko met in August with the political bureau of Zaire's only political party, the People's Revolutionary Movement (MPR), to propose **amendments to Zaire's 1967 constitution**. If approved by the National Legislative Council, the amendments would make "Mobutism" the official doctrine of the MPR.

President Mobutu recently opened a training school, Makanda Kaboba Institute, about 30 miles from Kinshasa, to teach "Mobutism" to members of the MPR.

Mobutu described the Institute as "a school of life as it is lived in Zaire." He explained that the school's lessons on "Mobutism" should not be considered as "the consecration of a man, Citizen Mobutu."

But observers noted that limitations on presidential power included in the recently proposed constitutional amendments would not apply to Mobutu. According to the amendments, which also ensure continuation of a one-party system in Zaire, the president of the MPR would automatically become president of the republic.The president of the MPR would be elected for a five-year term by direct universal suffrage and would be allowed to serve only one additional term.

The amendments stated, however, that the "founder of Mobutism," i.e. Mobutu Sese Seko, would have "unlimited duration of office." (*West Africa*, August 26, 1974; *Africa*, September 1974.)

- Ever since the **superfight in Zaire** was postponed because of a cut over the left eye of heavyweight champion George Foreman, observers have been wondering whether President Mobutu Sese Seko will emerge victorious from the much-touted battle.

Mobutu, who has staked some of his personal prestige on the fight by billing it as his "gift" to the people of Zaire, on September 23 emerged from the chaos that surrounded what up until then was a nonfight. As 100,000 spectators watched and cheered Mobutu dedicated another gift to the people—the revamped, multimillion-dollar 20th of May Stadium. The facility is evidently ready for Ali and Foreman to batter each other on October 29, for a purse that reportedly exceeds $5 million each.

Promoters, hoping for a big cash haul from the fight, may be sweating out Foreman's postponement of the bout. From the outset, boxing fans have not shown much enthusiasm for spending nearly $2,000 for a ringside seat, a plane ride to Kinshasa and the dormitory-style accommodations that will be available. Promoters fear customers may be even less willing to commit themselves now that the fight has been tainted even faintly by the possibility that it may not take place.

Although everyone connected with the superfight insists it will go on as rescheduled, and in Zaire, no one has dared to hint what could happen should Foreman be unable or unwilling to fight by the end of October. What could happen, of course, is that Foreman and Ali will go home.

The delay left many American journalists (mostly sportswriters) in Kinshasa with nothing much to do. The stories they turned out (full of tales of inadequate facilities for filing copy and hinting at censorship of their more sensitive stories) have probably caused Mobutu more than a few frowns.

Besides knocking the facilities, journalists also took to print criticizing Zaire for spending so much public money on the fight and also noting, with something less than wholehearted support, that Mobutu's hold on Zaire is authoritative and based on a one-party system.

Yet, Mobutu's intentions in hosting the fight in the first place may have had less to do with inspiring international confidence than with bolstering his support within the country.

Officials of Zaire's ruling People's Revolutionary Movement (MPR) have countered criticism of Mobutu's strength by pointing out that "the concept of a strong central figure, or chief, around whom all will rally and who, in turn, will decide the best interests of the collective family" is vital to the health of the nation.

MPR members believe the diversity of Zaire's 21 million people means a western-style parliamentary government cannot work there. The emphasis on Mobutu and "Mobutism" is a way of stressing unity, according to the MPR. (Philadelphia *Inquirer*, August 19, 1974; New York *Times*, September 23, 1974.)

Of course, should the fight fail to come off a second time, "Mobutism" could be dealt a severe blow. Some observers feel that as conscious as Mobutu is about his image he's likely to do everything within his considerable power not to take it on the chin.

## Zambia

• Washington observers are not yet sure whether President Ford will take a **greater interest in Africa** than his predecessor. But a recent meeting between Zambia's foreign minister, Vernon Mwaanga, and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger may indicate that the U.S. is paying more attention to events on the Continent.

Observers noted that neither three South African cabinet ministers nor the South African defense chief, all of whom have visited the U.S. since January, saw Kissinger during their stay.

Mwaanga met with Kissinger during a five-day visit to the U.S. He also talked with high-ranking members of both the Senate and the House.

After the meetings, Mwaanga told reporters that Zambia wants the U.S. to play a role in helping the Portuguese territories move toward independence. Zambia has played a significant diplomatic role in trying to settle disputes among liberation movements from Angola and in bringing liberation forces together with Portuguese officials. (Africa News, August 22, 1974.)

• The Zambian Mineworkers' Union urged President Kenneth Kaunda to **terminate all Anglo-American Corporation dealings** in Zambia without compensation if the group does not help liberate southern Africa from the control of racist governments.

The Mineworkers' Union also called for better housing conditions for Anglo-American miners in Zambia and condemned Anglo-American's "deliberate delay in Zambianizing jobs that could easily be done by Zambians." (*Rand Daily Mail*, September 2, 1974.)

The rebuke came on the heels of a recent settlement giving the Zambian Government full control of Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines, formerly managed by Anglo-American. Anglo-American negotiated for almost a year to gain some compensation for Zambia's takeover of the mines.

The Nchanga mines account for 12 per cent of world copper exports and also produce 8,300 tons of lead and zinc each year. No figures were disclosed on how much compensation Anglo-American would receive. But observers estimate the corporation will get about $52 million. (Wall Street *Journal*, August 16, 1974.)

• Zambia, once totally dependent on politically unacceptable or physically inadequate means for exporting its foreign exchange-earning copper, was scheduled to receive even more goods news in September, when a heavy-duty extension to the **Benguela Railway** was to be completed.

The Benguela Railway at one time carried about 15,000 tons of Zambian copper monthly to the Angolan port; after the Zambians sealed off the Rhodesian border in January 1973, the tonnage was upped to 43,000 a month.

The new stretch of track, being blasted out of solid rock and four months behind schedule, is called the Cubal variant and is built of heavy-duty 90-pound rails that will be sufficiently strong for prolonged use by 10 new diesel engines bought from **General Electric** a year ago. The old track, with its 60-pound rails, was inadequate for long-term heavy duty.

Twelve more diesels have been ordered from General Electric, and the entire line will be dieselized by 1985.

Guerrilla activity by Angola's liberation movements has not to any great extent endangered the passage of Zambian and Zairean copper from those countries' copperbelts. In the last two and a half years there have been only three attacks on the line, and Jonas Savimbi of the UNITA movement, which claims to control a significant portion of the area through which track runs, has assured the managing director of the Benguela Railway company that his group will not bother the trains' movement.

The improvement of Benguela, and the completion of the TanZam Railway, give Zambia, once the "landlocked Cinderella of Central Africa," according to *African Development* editor Alan Rake, a variety of attractive routes for moving out its chief export. By January 1975, when both lines are scheduled for regular operations, Zambia may in fact have done what it set out to do at independence: to look northward to independent Black Africa, turning its back on the white-dominated south on which it has considered itself too long dependent. (*African Development*, September 1974.)

• Figures just released for the 1974 **tobacco crop** in Zambia show that the country had yet another disappointing year.

Despite government programs to improve tobacco-farming methods and an increase in acreage under cultivation, Zambia's 1974 crop weighed in at a mere 10 million pounds—several thousand pounds less than last year's yield. The crop, which brought roughly $10 million at auction in Lusaka, had been damaged by continuous rains.

Like its tobacco-producing neighbors, Malawi and Rhodesia, Zambia grows high-quality Virginia tobacco. And experts say that Zambian production could exceed the 300 million pounds annually grown in Rhodesia. But the high mark of production in Zambia—in 1963—was only 24 million pounds.

In an effort to make tobacco a big foreign-exchange earner, the Zambia Government is trying to introduce the crop in areas never before cultivated. With the help of funding from the

World Bank, Zambia's tobacco board buys up and then clears large plots of land which are turned over to aspiring farmers. Training and supervision continue for four years; then, a farmer may be eligible to take complete charge of his operation.

The World Bank's participation in tobacco development in Zambia has drawn opposition from U.S. tobacco farmers. The Bank is heavily subsidized by the U.S., and domestic tobacco growers are against encouraging what they call "competitive industries" in other countries.

In any case, the World Bank schemes have met with only limited success in Zambia. There is some increase in new production, but this progress is offset by a continuing exodus of the foreign tobacco farmers who have in the past grown the bulk of the nation's crop.

As a result, Zambia's production has stagnated in recent years, and the hoped-for tobacco boom appears a long way off. (Africa News, September 16, 1974.)

• American geologists who discovered copper deposits near the dusty Zairean village of Moliro have unwittingly set off a **border dispute** between Zaire and neighboring Zambia.

Until the discovery of copper, Zambia was content to let world maps depict Moliro as lying about one kilometer within Zaire's borders.

But newly discovered copper revenues have prompted Zambian officials to support claims by Moliro residents that their traditional links are closer to Zambia than to Zaire.

It may not be easy for a joint Zambian-Zairean permanent commission to settle the border dispute. Documents dating back 100 years reportedly support Zaire's claim to the territory. Zambia has also set a precedent, observers note, by ignoring residents of one town within its borders who claim traditional links with Zaire.

Nevertheless, Zambia contends that boundaries drawn up by colonial governments when Zambia and Zaire became independent are not relevant to the division of ethnic groups today. (Johannesburg *Star*, July 17, 1974.)

• Disease and drought will claim about two-fifths of Zambia's **maize crop** this year and may force Zambia to turn to Rhodesia for help.

Zambia had hoped to harvest 5.2 million bags of maize to meet both internal demands and export requests from Tanzania, the Sahel countries of Africa and Japan. But experts are now counting on 3.5 million bags at best.

When Zambia's crop plummeted from an annual yield of four million bags of maize to 1.5 million bags in 1970, Zambia reluctantly broke U.N. sanctions by ordering maize from Rhodesia. This year Zambia may ask Rhodesia for a new maize hybrid to counteract the failure of this season's disease-ridden crop.

Zambia is currently using maize hybrid SR52, developed in Southern Rhodesia in 1952. But farmers say the strain has weakened since then and is more susceptible to disease. The disease now infecting Zambian maize is fusarium, which turns the cob pink and can make maize unfit for either animal or human consumption.

Both Zambian and Rhodesian researchers have been developing new maize hybrids since 1952. But Rhodesian hybrids have been more successful than the ones developed in Zambia. Rhodesia and South Africa are expecting record crops from Rhodesian hybrids this year.

Zambian farmers are urging the government to set up better agricultural research facilities and to increase incentives to keep researchers in Zambia. The farmers have pointed out that young researchers often come from Europe for short stays but leave before they have gained enough experience to benefit Zambian development. (*Financial Times*, September 4, 1974.)

• Sir Robert Jackson, coordinator for U.N. assistance to Zambia, told the Economic and Social Council for the U.N. in Geneva that Zambia's decision to close its **border with Rhodesia** will cost Zambia $291 million from 1973 to the end of 1975.

Jackson urged member states of the U.N. to contribute more generously to the heavy costs incurred by Zambia while honoring U.N. policy of economic sanctions against Rhodesia.

Jackson pointed out that despite increasing Zambian revenues from mineral exports, Zambian national development "has undoubtedly been delayed by the necessity to devote resources, which would normally be spent on economic development, to meeting the costs resulting from the border closure." (Johannesburg *Star*, July 20, 1974; *Standard Bank Review*, August 1974.)

Earlier this summer, President Kenneth Kaunda announced sweeping cuts in food imports, particularly luxury canned foods used by only a small group of local residents. Kaunda wants to reduce a food-import bill that cost Zambia $36 million last year. (*Standard Bank Review*, July 1974.)

## Northern Africa

### Egypt

• In early August the World Bank approved an Egyptian request to help finance a number of projects. The money will help to make good Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's promise that life will return to normal in the country's three war-torn **Suez Canal towns** by the end of 1975.

Of the $200-million loan, $165 million is being provided by the International Development Association, the soft-loan arm of the Bank. The remaining $35 million, given by the Bank, will be repaid over long periods at 7¼ per cent interest.

According to Egyptian Reconstruction Minister Osman Ahmed Osman, two of the Suez Canal towns, Port Said and Ismailia, have been 65 per cent destroyed by Israeli air raids and artillery. Suez has been 85 per cent destroyed, he said.

Thus far, $50 million is earmarked for developing the Suez Canal, which is slated for reopening next year. Sadat recently said he saw no problem in obtaining all necessary funds.

In what was called a remark aimed at both Moscow and Washington Sadat also announced, "We shall deal with all [donor countries], regardless of social systems."

Sadat's confidence seems well placed. The Paris-based Union de Banques Arabes et Françaises, along with half a dozen Arab, European and U.S. banks including **Bank of America**, is planning a $100-million Eurodollar loan to the Central Bank of Egypt, the second such loan in recent months. Until recently, Egypt lacked the credit-worthiness to borrow on the Eurodollar market. But the infusion of oil money from Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia has changed all that. (*Business Week*, August 31, 1974.)

Included in the 18-month economic plan announced by Sadat in late July are $37.5 million for railway improvements and a similar amount for a cement factory near Cairo. In June the World Bank also announced extension of a $20-million IDA credit as partial financing for an ammonia/urea fertilizer plant. The rest of the money for the fertilizer plant has been put up by a group of Arab lenders and the Government of Egypt. (London *Times*, July 29, 1974; *Financial Times*, August 7, 1974.)

• Egypt has announced its "greatest **oil discovery** ever," accordcording to Egyptian newspaper *Al Akhbar*. The large offshore oilfield in the Gulf of Suez has been named Ramadan, after the Muslim holy month of fasting. (*Christian Science Monitor*, September 6, 1974.)

Meanwhile, **Union Oil** of California plans to invest some $30 million over seven years to search for oil off the Red Sea coast.

The company will take 40 per cent of any output, to recoup development and operating costs; the remaining 60 per cent will be divided between Union Oil and the Egyptian General Petroleum Company on a 20-80 basis. (*African Development*, July 1974.)

## Libya

• Following more than six months of severely **strained relations**, Libya and Egypt in August took one more step toward a total break in relations, with Libya beginning to unravel ties between the two North African nations.

Calling new Libyan measures an economic war against his country, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat told other Arab leaders Libya had asked for the withdrawal of Libyan investment in joint Libyan-Egyptian projects, withdrawal of Libyan deposits in Egyptian banks, the recall of Egyptian naval units at Libyan ports and the return home of Libyan Mirage jets from Egyptian bases. The report was carried in the Lebanese daily *Al Bayraq*. (*Financial Times*, August 24, 1974.) According to the report, Sadat said he would comply with all the stipulations and was sending a delegation to Tripoli in early September to discuss the "liquidation" of economic cooperation between the countries.

In an earlier interview with Lebanese weekly magazine *Al-Usbu al-Arabi*, Libya's leader, Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi, charged, "Brotherly dialogue has been interrupted between our countries because Egypt has slammed every door in our face."

In the past year Libya's leader has been outspokenly critical of Egypt's conduct during the October Mideast war and its willingness to engage in peace negotiations. Libya has also nervously cast an eye on Egypt's increasingly good relations with the U.S., referring to the recent rapprochement as Egypt's "Babylonian captivity." (London *Times*, August 13, 1974.)

Disclosure of the presence of Mirage jets in Egypt has caused additional flap. The French-made aircraft were sold to Libya, under the French system of selective embargoes, with the stipulation that they never leave Libyan territory.

On hearing an Egyptian announcement that the fighters had taken part in the October war with Israel, France announced urgent plans to revise the ground rules for its $1.7-billion annual arms sales to Libya. The selective-embargoes system, French officials commented privately, was a complete shambles.

The number of Libyan Mirages present in Egypt was not released, but 110 have been sold to Qaddafi's country. The French Government had repeatedly rejected accusations by Israel and domestic critics that Libya would break its word not to send the jets beyond its borders. (Wall Street *Journal*, August 8, 1974.)

According to recent news reports, the inter-Arab squabbling is taking its toll on Qaddafi's spirits. In early September, the revolutionary leader appeared in public for the first time since April when he was relieved of day-to-day political functions. (New York *Times*, September 9, 1974.)

Although reporters noted that Qaddafi is still Libya's strongest leader, they commented that diplomats found him "wary and troubled." Diplomatic sources, according to the New York *Times*, attribute Qaddafi's gloomy mood to his increasing isolation in the Arab world and to the fact that his "cultural revolution" has been stalled by Libyan national lethargy.

## Spanish Sahara

• High-level talks began in August between Morocco and Spain over the long-ignored Spanish colony Spanish Sahara. The talks took place in an increasingly hostile atmosphere, with Morocco declaring 1974 "the year of **mobilization** for the liberation of our Sahara." On September 17, Morocco declared that in the interests of Spanish-Moroccan friendship the status of the territory—no-man's land, as Spain claims, or legitimate Moroccan territory occupied by Spain—should be decided by the World Court. (New York *Times*, September 18, 1974.)

The Spanish-Moroccan talks indicate the seriousness with which the Spanish regard saber-rattling being done by Morocco's King Hassan. Spanish Sahara has also been claimed by Mauritania, to the territory's south, and Algeria, to its east.

Some observers contend that Spain muted Mauritania's claims to the territory by providing considerable economic aid to that poor country and that Algeria stopped complaining about the Spanish colonial presence after signing a number of lucrative natural gas and oil deals with the Franco regime. (London *Times*, August 2, 1974.)

Questioning what he called Morocco's sudden sensitivity to colonialism, a correspondent in the Senegalese weekly *Le Moniteur Africain* (August 1, 1974) asked if these protestations were not a little late, "especially when one knows that, in addition to the Sahara, Spain currently occupies two little cities on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco: Ceuta and Melilla."

The reason for wanting the underpopulated, arid stretch of land on the Atlantic would seem to be a strip 46 miles long and three miles wide that may contain the world's richest phosphate deposits. (See **African Update**, May-June 1974.) The discovery, in 1962, of the high-quality "white gold" sparked renewed claims to the Sahara by all three of the neighboring Arab League countries.

Spanish Sahara's phosphate deposits have already given rise to a $150-million German, Spanish and American investment in the territory, including the world's largest conveyor belt, for moving the phosphates from the interior. If the deposits are fully exploited, Spain will replace Morocco as the world's largest exporter of phosphates, currently in great demand because they are used to make fertilizer, replacing petroleum-based fertilizers that are in such short supply.

In pressing its claim to Spanish Sahara, Morocco has rejected the independence referendum to be held in the territory during the first six months of 1975 under U.N. supervision. The referendum will offer the Saharaouis a choice of independence, annexation to one of the three Arab countries that border it or provincial Spanish status with internal autonomy.

Hassan reacted to the referendum announcement saying, "We are not against a referendum as such, since we sanctioned the idea some years ago. We only have reservations on the kind of question that will be asked. In this connection we are categorically opposed to the question of the independence of the Sahara being asked." (*West Africa*, September 2, 1974.)

Hassan charged that the result of the referendum will be a puppet government controlled by Spain. The nomadic peoples of the Sahara, the Moroccan argument goes, will ignore the referendum as easily as they ignore the national borders they cross in their traditional roving way of life. The issue, then, will be resolved by voters in the few coastal cities, composed mostly of people of Spanish stock, the Moroccans contend.

Morocco has spent the past two months in a diplomatic offensive designed to win other nations to its way of thinking. The exercise has not been without success: Senegalese President Senghor has announced that "Morocco's cause is our own" and has said he will intervene on Morocco's behalf with Mauritania, Senegal's neighbor to the north. (*West Africa*, September 2, 1974.)

While not withdrawing its claim to the Sahara, Mauritania's President Mokhtar Ould Daddah has backed self-determination for the Saharaouis, a position that has also been adopted by the Organization of African Unity. He added, "From the geographical point of view, it is incontestable that our country has the longest border with the territory. From the human point of view, it is impossible to make any distinction between the Saharaouis and the Mauritanians. The same tribes, even the same families, were divided at random by the colonialists, who drew the frontiers to suit their own interests." (*West Africa*, September 2, 1974.)

Thus far, all lines of communication are still open. Morocco's prime minister and foreign minister have had talks with Spanish leaders in Madrid. Morocco and Mauritania have agreed to keep in contact over the issue. The Spanish have recently been in touch with the Algerians, the third claimant to the territory, who seem to have dropped out of the competition.

But the signs for potential conflict are there, and the Nigerian *Daily Times* has called on the OAU to settle the dispute before war breaks out, meaning a war between Morocco and Mauritania. But observers claim the Spanish are also gathering *strength to combat either Morocco or Mauritania—or both, if* necessary. Spain already has an army of 12,000 men in Spanish Sahara, including 4,000 in the Spanish Legion. And marines are said to be concentrated at the naval base at Rota, on Spain's south Atlantic coast, on standby alert. (London *Observers*, August 11, 1974.)

## Tunisia

• In an atmosphere of unprecedented prosperity and optimism, Tunisia's ruling socialist party has named President Habib Bourguiba party **president for life.** Under forthcoming constitutional changes he will automatically accede to Tunisia's life presidency.

Bourguiba has several times in the past refused a life presidency; he has been elected by popular vote every five years and in 15 years has not faced a serious challenge to his authority in the nation's one-party system. (New York *Times*, September 16, 1974.)

The proclamation of Bourguiba's life presidency marks a change in outlook for Tunisia. Since 1971, when the 71-year-old president was reported ailing, Tunisia seemed to be marking time, waiting for Bourguiba's passing, looking ahead to an uneasy transition. At one point, federation with Libya was even being discussed. (See **African Update,** January-February 1974.) This idea was soon abandoned and was seen by some as a Libyan attempt at Arab unity by wrenching Tunisia away from the moderate, pro-West Bourguiba, though, on the face of it, Tunisia's burgeoning population seemed a perfect match for Libya's seemingly limitless oil money and lack of manpower.

Now, with Bourguiba and the Tunisian economy increasingly strong, prospects look bright. Three years of good crops, high prices for oil, phosphate and olive oil exports and an influx of tourists, have enabled the North African nation to show a nine per cent growth rate for 1971-73. (Washington *Post*, September 15, 1974.)

# Southern Africa

## Malawi

• In the aftermath of a tragic air crash in which more than 70 Malawian workers were killed, the "land of the lake" has suspended the **recruitment of Malawians** for the South African and Rhodesian mines. The killed workers were returning to Malawi after completing their labor contracts in the South African mines when the crash occurred in Botswana.

Since March, workers who have completed their contracts have been flown back to Malawi aboard Air Malawi flights. The crash took place on a flight run by Wenela, the South African recruitment organization.

Some observers feel that the air crash, and the investigation that has been ordered, are a pretext for stopping altogether the labor recruitment that has for so long been an important component of the Malawian economy. Imminent change in Mozambique and an expanding agricultural sector at home may have combined to make it better, politically and economically, for Malawians to work on domestic development.

Although other African states, notably Gabon and Ivory Coast, have in the past made conciliatory or at least exploratory noises toward the white south, none of them has had the close relations Malawi has. Except for the satellites surrounded and dominated by South Africa, Malawi is the only Black African nation to cooperate with South Africa's self-defined civilization-preserving mission. South African police boats have long patrolled Lake Malawi, searching for evidences of guerrilla activity from Mozambique. And Malawi President Banda helped Pretoria make a diplomatic coup when he made a state visit to South Africa, the first by an African head of state.

Now, with the possibility that it will be surrounded by Black states hostile to the white-minority regimes of southern Africa, Malawi's future attitudes—not its workers—are up in the air. (*African Development*, September 1974.)

## Namibia

• The U.S. State Department has cracked down on the **sale of arms** to southern Africa in an apparent move to support U.N. resolutions and the World Court opinion condemning South Africa's occupation of Namibia.

Two American gun manufacturers said the State Department ban was the reason for their refusals to fill orders from Namibia.

**Weatherby Incorporated** said it would not send 15 hunting rifles to William Claudin, an American safari leader and big-game hunter in Namibia. **Smith & Wesson** also said it was no longer filling orders from Namibia.

A London representative of the South West African People's Organization praised the companies' compliance with the arms ban and noted, "White hunters and farmers constitute a potential militia to help the South African police and army maintain the South African presence in Namibia." (Windhoek *Advertiser*, August 7, August 10, 1974.)

## Rhodesia

• Rhodesia **plans to move 60,000 Africans** into 21 new "protected villages" reported to be within walking distance of their fields and former compounds. Rhodesian officials assert the move is intended "to give maximum security to the people, who have been constantly harassed by terrorists within the area." (*Times of Zambia*, July 26, 1974.)

But, according to Philemon Makonese, a Zambian representative of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, the "protected villages" are actually concentration camps, and removal to them is designed to keep Africans from cooperating with liberation forces infiltrating Rhodesia.

Makonese claims Africans are kept under heavy guard in the fenced and floodlit villages. Africans suspected of helping liberation forces are tortured and shot, he has charged. (*Times of Zambia*, July 27, 1974.)

Apparently, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith is no longer trying to play down the extent of incursions by liberation forces into Rhodesia. Rhodesians can now watch the **war on television.**

A program, called "Hurricane" after the government code name for operations against liberation forces, gives viewers on-the-spot reports of the latest attacks and skirmishes.

The government has announced a 10 per cent surcharge on taxes paid by companies and individuals in the last fiscal year. Finance Minister John Wrathall explained the extra tax, which should amount to about $30 million, is necessary to fight the war against liberation forces.

But critics of the war tax claim it will encourage more Rhodesians to leave the country and will discourage skilled immigrants from coming in. Worried observers note Rhodesia's army is already approaching an even ratio of Blacks to whites, because many young Rhodesians have left the country to avoid conscription. (Africa News, September 19, 1974; Johannesburg

*Star*, August 31, 1974.)

The Rhodesian government recently released figures estimating a $64-million loss of revenues by June next year because of the country's closed border with Zambia. Gloomy economists **expect more trade losses** from the disruption of supply lines to Mozambique ports.

Victorious Frelimo forces have blocked rail links from Rhodesia to Beira and Lourenço Marques. Sanction-busting Rhodesian exporters do not expect an independent Mozambique to cater to their business.

Because of this, Rhodesia has, seemingly frantically, built a railway to the South African coast, completing it 21 months ahead of schedule. But jammed South African ports may not be able to handle the extra burden of Rhodesian supplies.

Prime Minister Smith acknowledged the danger of losing trade routes through Mozambique, but he pointed out that 98 per cent of traffic through Lourenço Marques and 80 per cent of traffic through Beira came from Rhodesia and South Africa. He said, "If they cut these lines, they are cutting their own throats." (*Rand Daily Mail*, July 27, 1974, August 22, 1974; Johannesburg *Star*, August 27, 1974.)

## South Africa

• Perhaps in an effort to assuage bruised sensitivities in South Africa over the seeming one-sidedness of the Simonstown Agreement (see **African Update**, May-June 1974), British Navy warships joined the South African Navy for **naval exercises** off Cape Town in late August. (London *Times*, August 29, 1974.)

The move was not made without notice being taken, however. According to the *Times*, critics in both countries did not fail to observe the anomaly of a situation in which the British Government disapproved of a rugby tour but allowed military maneuvers. (London *Times*, August 26, 1974.)

Black Africa voiced its disapproval also. Uganda's President Idi Amin called the sending of warships "a direct threat to Africa's integrity, sovereignty and independence." (Nigeria *Daily Times*, September 4, 1974.)

Under the Simonstown Agreement, the British Navy participates periodically in exercises with the South African Navy in return for port facilities.

• Following public protest, a South African police athletic team has been asked not to come to the U.S. for the 1974 Police Olympics. The **San Francisco Police Department**, which had extended the invitation as hosts of the event, advised the South African consulate of the withdrawal.

Police Chief Donald Scott said the withdrawal of the invitation was based on a consensus within the Police Department. He advised the South Africans that the change was the result "of difficulties expected and implications that would be drawn" from their participation.

The SFPD received complaints about the invitation from the Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa and the American Committee on Africa, both activist organizations. (Africa News, August 22, 1974.)

• Legendary Black American boxing champion **Archie Moore** met apartheid close up in Durban's airport, following a flight from Johannesburg. Unlike the international section of Johannesburg's Jan Smuts Airport, where Blacks are accorded equal service and treatment on international territory, Durban's Louis Botha Airport does not extend its facilities to all races.

Sitting at the airport restaurant with three white friends for breakfast, Moore was told he could not be served. A restaurant official explained that, being Archie Moore, he could be served in the airport's VIP lounge, but Moore declined.

In Johannesburg, according to South African newspaper reports, there are two white security police who accompany the boxer, smoothing his way; they were not in evidence in Durban.

Moore was reluctant to comment on the incident, saying he had been treated wonderfully during his stay in South Africa. "It's like a puppy barking at your heels. You pat him and say 'down, boy' before walking on. Then you don't remember what it was that stopped you for a moment," the former light-heavyweight champion said. (*Rand Daily Mail*, August 19, 1974.)

• Two novels by internationally acclaimed Nigerian writer Chinua Achebe will be included in the **syllabus** for white South African schoolchildren starting in 1975.

This will be the first time books written by an African will be used in the South African school system, according to a BBC report aired in Lagos. The novels that will be used are *Things Fall Apart* and *No Longer at Ease*.

• African workers were scheduled to be involved for the first time in **wage talks** in the car industry, according to a spokesman for **General Motors South African.** Alan de Kock, assistant to the managing director of GMSA and chairman of the automotive industry's industrial council in the Port Elizabeth area, announced that a representative of each car company's liaison committee would be present. Involved are GMSA, **Ford**, Volkswagen and Citroen. (*Rand Daily Mail*, July 31, 1974.)

GM's managing director in South Africa, John Rhame, has also announced that capital investment in the automobile manufacturer's South African subsidiary is two-thirds higher in 1974 than in 1973. Physical improvements are being made in order to exceed the 66 per cent local-content requirement for cars. (*Rand Daily Mail*, July 26, 1974.)

GM is also developing a small **low-cost utility vehicle** for the South African market, the company has announced. Production was scheduled for the last quarter of 1974. The "Pug," as the car is called, will be designed for farm and recreational use. It is believed its cost will be under $3,000. (Johannesburg *Star*, August 10, 1974.)

• South Africa's State Oil Exploration Corporation has contracted with **Chevron** to provide equipment for joint offshore oil probes to begin late in 1975. In its efforts to lessen the country's dependence an Iranian crude oil, South Africa has increased SOEKOR's budget from $11.25 million to $30 million. Pretoria has been encouraged by discoveries of natural gas north of the mouth of the Orange River and near Plattenberg Bay on the southern coast. (*Newsweek International*, July 8, 1974.)

• The first **silk industry** in South Africa is to be established in the Shangaan homeland, Gazankulu, as a joint venture of the Gazankulu government and the South African Bantu Investment Corporation. The project could develop into an industry of several million dollars.

An annual income of about $150,000 is expected from the industry, which will cover a little less than 500 acres. The BIC and the Gazankulu government, 50-50 partners in the project, imported 1,000 mulberry bushes from Japan in September to begin the industry. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, July 14, 1974.)

• The London-based Japan International Bank Limited has announced it will **no longer make loans** to the South African Government or to private interests in the country. Since its founding in 1970, the bank has supplied loans totaling more than $24 million in the republic.

According to a Reuter dispatch carried in the Zambia *Daily Mail* (September 12, 1974), the decision was made in compliance with Japanese Government requests to private business to limit contacts with South Africa. The Japanese Government request followed increased criticism of Japanese-South African trade by Black African nations.

# The View from Zambia

"We urge the United States to include Africa, and in particular, southern Africa, in its list of priorities. Wise and firm actions on your part could bring about the genuine stability which we all desire."

By VERNON MWAANGA
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Zambia

I recently visited the United States in order to discuss the entire Southern African situation with top American officials. My main objectives were (1) to clarify the nature of the problems, and in the process, correct some official and popular misconceptions about what is taking place there; (2) to explain why Southern Africa is important to the United States, and deserves more careful attention than it has thus far been accorded (3) to explain Zambia's role in this troubled area; and (4) to express our hopes and fears concerning future developments.

Secretary Kissinger himself, as I reminded him, long ago stated that it is necessary to understand the *roots* of a conflict in order to deal with it effectively. We Zambians share this viewpoint completely. We therefore consider it vital that Americans comprehend that the roots of the Southern African confrontation are not merely political or economic, but *racial*, stemming from the systematic, systematized oppression of one race by another within South Africa, Rhodesia, and, until now, the territories controlled by Portugal.



Mr. Mwaanga addressing the General Assembly

This institutionalized oppression has existed for generations, and for many years Africans sought to end it *through basically peaceful means*. But legalized political activities by Africans, which might have produced gradual improvements by non-violent methods, were sharply curtailed or precluded entirely by the regimes increasingly bent on consolidating the privileged status of the small minorities they represent. Finding it impossible to work within the law to bring about fundamental changes—and lacking even channels for meaningful communication and discussion with white minority government leaders—the Africans concluded they had no choice other than to organize liberation movements, and to take up arms in order to obtain their basic human and political rights.

Even after the armed struggle had begun, however, Africans tried to find an alternative to arms. Thus the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969, unanimously approved by the OAU and adopted by the UN General Assembly, clearly specified that Africans prefer peaceful change to bloodshed.

To this end, the Manifesto offerred the minority regimes an opportunity to negotiate peaceful change with the leaders of the liberation movements. The White racist governments, however, refused this hand of friendship. They refused categorically to negotiate. Our brothers therefore concluded that the armed struggle must continue.

Having been rejected in their efforts to negotiate, the liberation fighters needed arms. Their first choice was Western arms—but the western powers refused to assist them. They therefore had to look elsewhere, and they found the Eastern countries willing to help supply their needs. The Western countries must understand this, and should not proclaim the familiar argument to the effect that these movements are "pro-communist": they turned to the East simply because the West refused to help them. The liberation movements are pro-liberation—pro-African—not pro-communist or anything else alien to them. These people are not going to risk everything in the struggle against one form of colonialism in order to become puppets of another!

The nature of this struggle should be better appreciated in the United States, not only because you have a sizeable Black population, but also, because you have always stood for freedom and equal opportunity for all—as a matter of principle and of law. You have done much in recent years to guarantee equal opportunities for all people within your own country. How, then, can you continue to endorse racial oppression elsewhere?

In addition to the question of morality, there is the matter of America's strategic interests. We understand your desire to have stable regimes within Southern Africa, governments with whom you can cooperate politically, and which will guarantee you access to vital mineral and other resources. But so long as unpopular minority regimes remain in power in several countries, there can be nothing but growing *instability* throughout the region, and with it, the possibility of racial war between the White-ruled states and those governed by Black majorities. Surely Americans can understand that their short-range and long-range interest would be better served by having representative governments in these countries rather than the present unrepresentative ones?

American policy, however, has thus far failed to accurately assess these factors. United States policy has been strictly negative—it has supported the White regimes, and often on such minor matters as Rhodesian chrome, which is hardly a matter of life and death for you! Furthermore, as I indicated to Secretary Kissinger, NATO members have actively supported South Africa by supplying it with military, economic and

President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia

psychological assistance. This will scarcely contribute to resolving the Southern African situation! For although you say the arms given to Pretoria are intended for external defense, they are instead used mainly for internal repression, since South Africa uses them to crush progressive forces within her borders. The other use to which these arms are put is to hit at Pretoria's enemies within neighboring black African states. All this means that if NATO arms continue to flow into South Africa, America could one day find itself fighting alongside South Africa against the Black Africans—something we as well as you surely wish to avoid.

Zambia has been particularly active in trying to alert the world to the perils inherent in the present situation, for several reasons. For one thing, our geographical position and our political orientation are such that we are compelled to be involved in the problems around us. We are a small country, but we border almost every White-ruled state in the area. We are therefore constantly made aware of the injustices taking place within neighboring countries, and are continually affected by the resulting instability there. We have therefore concluded that our own stability depends, in large part, upon regional stability—and that there can be genuine stability in Southern Africa only when minority rule is everywhere replaced by majority rule.

But there is another reason for our strong commitment to freedom. We Zambians have also experienced racism and colonialism, and we came to understand its debilitating effects on the human spirit. When we became independent in 1964, we therefore committed ourselves as a nation to build a society based on **non**-racism. Our Zambian philosophy of Humanism, as often expounded by President Kenneth Kaunda, is as far apart from the apartheid philosophy of South Africa as the North Pole is from the South Pole. For whereas apartheid decrees that people are to be artificially separated from one another *by race, because* of race, we hold that there must be no barriers whatsoever separating one human being from another. We believe it is possible—indeed it is necessary—for people of all races to work together harmoniously in order to better the human condition, and we feel we have a duty to help promote the construction of non-racial, humanistic societies elsewhere.

Our opposition to racism has not been without some sacrifice. Several years ago, for example, when South Africa initiated its *verlichte* approach of trying to woo support among Black Africans, Pretoria made gestures in-

dicating that it would make developmental aid available to us if we so desired. We thereupon made a *political* rather than economic decision not to accept it. For although internal economic development is of great importance to us, we felt it would be morally wrong and politically unwise to establish ties with a regime which is committed to things which we find repulsive and repugnant. We prefer to remain clearly and uncompromisingly committed to the cause of freedom, while simultaneously trying to facilitate the peaceful resolution of conflict wherever possible.

Our efforts in this direction have, after many disappointments, begun to bear some fruit. After the new Portuguese regime announced its intention to decolonize Mozambique, for example, we offered our good offices, in June, so as to permit the concerned parties to talk. Our offer was accepted, and I myself played host to Portuguese Foreign Minister Soares during several meetings he held with the President of Frelimo. During their talks, we frequently mediated, making suggestions, after listening to both sides, as to what we thought constituted reasonable and acceptable positions. One thing we stressed to the Portuguese, however, is that there are to be no referendums or elections concerning independence, and no confederation between Mozambique and Portugal. This is because we feel a people is entitled to independence as a birthright—it is not something you have to negotiate or vote upon. What *is* negotiable is the mechanism for the transfer of power to an independent Mozambiquan regime, and we are confident that both sides will reach a final agreement based on this principle. Such arrangements have been negotiated for Guinea-Bissau, and can also be worked out for Angola.

With the Portuguese-African situation seemingly on the path to resolution, and with liberation activities growing within Rhodesia, the pivotal problem, of course, is South Africa. The situation here is eventually bound to change through one means or another—the forces of change are simply too powerful to be stopped.




Labor leaders, student groups, the World Council of Churches and others have been able to speak out, and to bring some betterment in terms of job opportunities, wages and general living conditions for Blacks. A landmark victory for progress occurred on August 15, when the Johannesburg Mining Company and the Anglo-American Corporation recognized Black South African trade unions for the first time in history. And even though we find the bantustan system highly objectionable in principle, since it has the objectives of fragmenting the country and of perpetuating racism, the system has nonetheless produced a few Black leaders such as Gatsha Buthelezi (of Kwazulu), who share our basic beliefs, and who are playing a useful role in maintaining a minimum level of political consciousness among Blacks. Encouraging, too, is the fact that many young Whites, such as the student activists, are becoming impatient with the old ways.

In order for these forces to succeed in effecting fundamental political changes, however, they will have to be helped. The question is who will help and how. As I have indicated, we remain prepared to assist in any way the process of peaceful change, but if substantial changes are not forthcoming soon, we stand prepared to assist by other means. And when majority regimes come to power in the former Portuguese territories, they too will be willing and able to provide whatever help seems necessary—perhaps even to launch the racial war we all hope to prevent.

With events moving so rapidly in Southern Africa, it is of critical importance that the United States comprehend the facts and their significance, and re-assess its attitudes and policies towards the region. We understand your preoccupation with such matters as disarmament and relations with China. But for the moral, political, economic and military reasons I have outlined, we urge you to include Africa, and in particular Southern Africa, in your list of priorities. Wise and firm actions on your part could bring about the genuine stability within Southern Africa which we all desire; continued reluctance to cope effectively with our problems could bring about the increased instability and strife we all wish to avert. □

# Who Will Win at Kinshasa?

A lot of people are spending a lot of money in connection with the World Heavyweight Title fight in Zaire's capital. Win or lose, each of the contestants will receive some $5 million, as long as the bout takes place. The promoters and holders of the various franchises are expecting a good return on their investment. The government and people of Zaire have expended much time and energy, too. What's in it for them?

By ANTHONY HUGHES




Poster for the fight, issued before the postponement

For the promoters and for the contestants the decision to stage the Ali-Foreman fight in Zaire was a gimmick. Ali himself, in one of his pieces of calculated buffoonery, said as much. It was money, not sentiment, he declared, that took him back to Africa for the contest. Yet Zaire, for its part, considered it worthwhile to go to great lengths to attract the bout, just as other African states have fought hard to host other international events. Indeed it was reported that Nigeria had at one time been in the running to provide a venue for the World Heavyweight fight. Perhaps General Gowon's sober approach did not jell with the whizzkid operators of the boxing industry.

Be that as may, as far as Zaire is concerned the story began in Paris earlier this year. Among the usual retinue of PR people, backers and media representatives, all of whose function it is to transform sport into business, were Mandungu Bula of Zaire and an American boxing promoter, Don King.

On behalf of President Mobutu Sese Seko, Bula was seeking schemes to help project Zaire's image. King was still looking for a proportion of the initial financing and for a means of clinching George Foreman's participation. The decision to stage the fight in Africa helped to coax Foreman into the package deal. With the help of an investment group having extensive in-

terest in its mining industry, Zaire put up a sum reported to be more than $10 million. For its participation, in addition to the expected repayment of its money plus a share of the profits, Zaire has had the publicity.

All African states are conscious of the need to break out of the stereotype image implanted in Western minds through centuries of colonialism and racism. The perception has not changed greatly during the years since most of them achieved their independence. In part this is the fault of the crisis-oriented Western media. Some of it is due to the slant of their own tourist publicity, which plays up the exotic, the quaint and the "primitive" in Africa. Even sympathetic reporting on topics such as drought, famine or development can reinforce a patronizing attitude which confuses technology with civilization.

One way to change Western attitudes, it is suggested, is for the developing states to play host to international sporting events, trade fairs, conferences and institutions. Clearly, the argument runs, a country that has the resources to organize an international gathering will be perceived as technologically modern.

Such meetings will demonstrate to the world the country's possession of airports, passenger surface transportation, hotels, conference halls, stadiums and telecommunications. They will indicate to the thoughtful observer that the country in question must also have modern power supplies, drainage and sewers, banking, insurance and legal services. Implicitly all these facilities depend upon a functioning political and governmental system, capable of maintaining law and order, with the backing—or at the very least, the acquiescence—of the governed.

Of course, if the event and its facilities do not come up to expectations, the result could be the opposite of what is sought. Even in the United States some city fathers have found that the hosting of the major party conventions does not always provide the desired effect. Demonstrations and possible violence associated with the main meeting may actually harm the city's image and reduce profitability.

As it turned out much of the publicity surrounding the fight in Kinshasa was negative. Ali's own jokes about cannibalism fostered just the kind of image and reinforced just the kind of attitudes which the staged event was supposed to dispel.

The uncertainty and confusion caused by the postponement which followed Foreman's eye injury in training was a piece of bad luck that must have reduced the profitability of the exercise for Zaire as well as for the other sponsors. Some of the downbeat publicity arising from the postponement rubbed off on Zaire and, however unfairly, worked against the image of efficiency which the nation hoped to foster.

Understandably most of the press corps members present are sports writers rather than analysts of political, economic and international affairs. For many of them, as for most of their readers, the big fight was the occasion to discover that this strange-named country was the same place they remembered as the Belgian Congo, and hadn't there been some kind of trouble there a few years back? Their reporting of events outside the stadium has sometimes been irrelevant and superficial to the point of triviality.

Nevertheless the fight has provided an opportunity for the commissioning of some more serious reports. The trouble was that many of these were far from glowing. Some of them pointed to the contrast they believe exists between the political slogans and the life-styles of the élite. A writer in the *New York Times* described Zaire as "A country of great disparities of income, both between regions and between classes, and if nothing is done to spread the country's wealth more evenly, there will undoubtedly be trouble."

The *Philadelphia Inquirer* wrote, "The promotion of the Ali-Foreman fight has been full of rhetoric about 'the return of two Afro-Americans to the continent of their ancestors' and about the 'uniting' of African and Afro-American culture. But there are a lot of things the press releases will not say about Zaire because they are matters that Zaire would rather not talk about." The article goes on to allege anti-White prejudice, suppression of the Churches and political opposition and conspicuous consumption by the élite.

King, the promoter didn't always help, either, with remarks like, "The fight will create so much interest and enthusiasm about Africa. People can go and see what it's really like, witness its mysteries and intrigue."

Another of the promoters, John Daly, whose company Hemdale is one of the backers, displayed a similar glib tactlessness. Speculating on the risks taken by the promoters he said, "There is the danger that one of the fighters could crack up. There's the


How the *New York Times* viewed the significance of the fight

danger Zaire could have a revolution on the eve of the fight and the tanks would roll into town instead of limousines."

"Then you could sell rights to the revolution," a reporter said.

"Right, we'd just turn the cameras around," Daly replied.

Ali himself made a jocular remark about getting some of his friends in Zaire to cook Foreman in a big pot if he didn't behave himself.

Aside from revealing the extent to which the Zaire venue is just a stunt for the commercial interests involved,

such cynical remarks indicate just how deeply entrenched are the prejudices and stereotyped attitudes about Zaire and about Africa in general.

If those who are supposed to be in partnership with Zaire see the country in this way, how can one expect the public at large to perceive it any more positively?

Much of the press comment about the arrangements went into the details of the wheeling and dealing which preceded the fight. Boxing operates very close to the shadier fringes of the economic system and the reporting showed that this fight is no exception. Evidently secret arrangements were made to circumvent problems with tax authorities. A monopoly was extended to one organization to handle all the transportation and accommodation. Authorities and individuals in Zaire must clearly have been parties to these deals and the reporting of them cannot have benefitted the national image.

Some of the background dispatches out of Kinshasa have been based on the personal frustrations and inconveniences suffered by fans and reporters. It is evident that countries which do not already have a well-developed tourist industry may find that the sudden influx caused by a major event will overstrain their resources. There was much criticism of the arrangements in Kinshasa because fans paying luxury-class prices were to be accommodated in University dormitories without high quality facilities. Others were to be shuttling for miles back and forth to accommodations far from the stadium. Although much foreign exchange was expended on the importation of two hundred buses and scores of extra taxis and limousines to cope with the fight, there are still transportation problems.

### Benefits

In spite of these criticisms, it is almost certain that on balance the staging of the bout will be beneficial to the long term promotion and development of the country's tourist industry. In any case, the encouragement of tourism was not envisaged as the major benefit to be drawn from the contest.

Hosting international events also draws attention to a country as a potential trading partner, as a market, as a source of supply or as an appropriate area for investment, aid or technical assistance.

These benefits are by their very nature impossible to quantify. Individual holiday choices, investment decisions, government aid policies; all these are determined by a multitude of factors.

In speeches and interviews Bula spoke constantly of Zaire's search for partners in developing its mineral and other natural resources. No doubt some mining and investment companies and institutions planned to send executives to the fight as a public relations gesture. But it seems hardly likely that many of the ordinary fans would also be mining financiers. In any case investors are likely to be as hard-headed in their own interests as the fight backers are in their field. Are they likely to let the Kinshasa extravaganza influence their business decisions?

Then there are the immediate economic benefits. No official figures have been published but newspaper reports put Zaire's expected *gross* takings from the event at $20 million. It is not clear, assuming this figure is correct, how much will reach the national Treasury and how much will flow into private hands, perhaps into foreign bank accounts. In the latter case there would be neither a revenue gain nor a foreign exchange benefit to Zaire.

From the official income, the Zaire authorities have had to pay not only the infrastructure expenses but also the fee to the two boxers. This was stated to be as much as $5 million each.

### Expenditure

As to the overall government expenditure, even the figures which may ultimately be published in official statistics may not be very revealing. The extra public works, such as stadium improvements, will be of long term benefit, so how do you cost them? Clearly the organization of the event has taken officials away from their normal duties, has diverted services such as transport and communications from normal development and administration. None of this is quantifiable.

On the balance of payments account it is unlikely that the fans who attend the fight from abroad bring much of a foreign exchange inflow to Zaire. Even with ordinary tourism to Africa, less than a quarter of the total cost benefits the country of destination. Half goes to the air carrier and to the agent and tour operator. About one quarter goes to buying the imported goods and services which the tourist requires. With a one-shot event, the imported element will be even higher. A European catering organization was appointed to provide meals for the fans accommodated elsewhere than in hotels. This increased the foreign element in the provision of food and services, reducing still further the balance of payments gain.

### Wisdom Questioned

Many observers questioned the wisdom of using the flashy razzamatazz of a boxing tournament as a means of projection. Other countries have chosen to host trade fairs or cultural institutions. Ghana, under Nkrumah, established itself as a political center; Ethiopia gained in prestige by being the headquarters of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and of the Organization of African Unity. Nigeria hopes to enhance its image by means of the forthcoming cultural festival. Kenya has its international conference center.

The boxing industry cannot be said to bring an aura of high moral tone. Few would hold it forth as a shining example of the free enterprise system. There is a risk for Zaire in being seen in company with the wheeling-dealing world of professional boxing.

Obviously Zaire's policy-makers gave thought to these questions. Evidently they came to the conclusion that the prestige to be gained from providing the stage for such a major international event outweighed the dangers of associating with the seamier side of sport.

Finally it is only fair to remember that a lot of people from Kinshasa and from elsewhere in Zaire believed that there would be a lot of fun and pleasure in sharing appreciation of the fight and its associated attractions with their foreign visitors. □

# Getting Around Zaire



Zaïre, the former Belgian Congo, is Africa pitched to an orgasmic crescendo: it is the Africa of dream images and Henri Rousseau's paintings, the Africa of frightful colonization and ineffable chaos. Zaïre is the ovum of every cliché—and truth—that has been spoken about Africa. In many ways, Zaïre is still a hole in the map. Darkest Africa? A note attached to Zaïre on the latest edition of the Michelin map warns the traveler that "some data concerning this country may not be absolutely accurate." Joseph Conrad wrote *Heart of Darkness* in 1890, and it is a tale of man's degeneration in isolation as much as it is a story of a journey up the great Congo—now Zaïre—River. Zaïre was, perhaps, the best of the white man's fantasies about Africa.

Zaïre is a huge country, the second largest in Africa after Sudan, 80 times the size of Belgium, and as large as the United States east of the Mississippi River. It occupies

**Currency**

1 Zaïre (Z)=100 Makuta (k)=U.S. $0.50; U.S. $1.00=50k Each likuta—singular for makuta—is further divided into 100 sengi(s). There is a raging black market for hard currency, but penalties are stiff.




The Zaire river

most of the Zaïre (Congo) Basin, that vast portion of middle Africa that is drained by the Zaïre River and its tributaries and was once the bottom of an inland sea. In 1967 it was divided into eight provinces and the federal district of Kinshasa. The country is landlocked except for a 25-mile-long coastline on the Atlantic Ocean. The myth-shrouded Zaïre River is the second largest in Africa (after the Nile) and slinks through the country in the shape of Captain Hook's claw, as vital to the country's communications as any highway or railway.

Unfurling the banner of "authenticity" in 1971—a kind of Black-is-Beautiful campaign—President Mobutu Sese Seko changed the name of the country from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Republic of Zaïre. Place names were changed, and Zaïrians were required to take African-sounding names: Mobutu dropped his Christian name Joseph-Désiré and became Mobutu Sese Seko ("the fearless land"). Pre-authenticity, the daily French-language newspapers had names like *Le Progès* and *Le Renouveau;* afterward they became, respectively, *Salongo* and *Monano*. Stanley Pool, the shallow "lake" on the Zaïre River at Kinshasa, is now called Malebo Pool; Stanley Falls is now Boyoma Falls.

If music is cleansing, then Zaïre must be as pure as a vestal virgin. "Congo music"—a lilting variant of Latin and highlife—is the country's most popular export. It is marked by a heavy use of political names and phrases; one song I heard mentioned five African presidents. Another included a line from one of Mobutu Sese Seko's speeches: . . . *lango likambo liyaki nodongo* . . .—"when the situation becomes difficult." Among the many dance styles to become chic in Zaïre, one was the Apollo, in which dancers imitated Neil Armstrong's 1969 moon walk.

But before you notice the music in Kinshasa, the capital, you'll notice the prices. They are astronomical. A pizza in an Italian restaurant costs $8, and a bargain is considered the buffet lunch at the Inter•Continental Kinshasa for $10 per person. It is not unusual for a couple to spend $60 for a full dinner: a bottle of Pouilly Fuissé costs $10; whiskey, $22. Still, the restaurants are packed. "Who can afford these prices?" I asked an American official at the embassy. "Well," he answered, "the retail shops make at least 100 per cent profit, and the restaurants are jammed with the people who own those shops." A Swiss expatriate working for an airline told me she spends $300 a month on groceries, and the rent on her studio apartment is $200. A new apartment building going up in downtown Kinshasa at the time of my visit would, I was told, have apartments renting for $800.

For tourists, this situation is disastrous, and the problem was compounded in 1972, when visitors were ordered to spend a minimum of $40 a day and prove it with receipts at the end of the visit. This rule seems doomed to failure, but at least at the outset it was enforced.

Because Kinshasa is expensive, and because it is a tough-skinned business-oriented city, for casual visitors it is more an ordeal than an inspiration. Other African capitals, I feel, have more to offer for less money. One senses that this city of 1.5 million, the largest in Black Africa,

Aerial view of Kinshasa

Kinshasa market scene

exists because it is making some people wealthy.

The next thing you'll notice about Kinshasa is that it has a unique flavor. It is definitely not a former *British colony—there are too many* tree-lined streets—and it is not French: although the language is there, the razzmatazz is missing. Instead, Kinshasa has a Flemish, potatoey texture: the Belgians were fond of squat buildings in beige and shell pink, and some of them have red-tiled roofs. Fallen leaves cover parts of the Boulevard du 30 Juin sidewalk and trigger a sudden lust for crisp autumn weather. The best season to visit Kinshasa is June through September, when the temperature stays about 80 degrees Fahrenheit, and it's not too humid. The rainy months are February through April and October and November.

Brazzaville lies directly across the Zaïre River, and if people there admire and envy the expanding Kinshasa skyline, people in Kinshasa think wistfully of the looseness and *joie de vivre* that Brazza is said to have. The ferry service between the two capitals is currently only for nationals of either country. Meanwhile, Brazzaville television is beamed across the river, and with such programs as *"Mission Impossible"* and "Daktari" (socialism and anti-West politics notwithstanding), most Kinois—as the inhabitants of Kinshasa are known—recognize it as a better station than their own.

The Zaïre River at Kinshasa is 2½ miles wide and flows with the viscosity of thick tomato juice, strangled by water hyacinths that appeared in 1950 and have to be periodically routed.

### Travel

Buses ply the main routes: they are crowded, cheap (3 k), fast and very seldom used by Whites. There are two bus companies, STK (Société de Transport Kinois), and OTCC, and I don't know what the difference is. The taxis belonging to STK have meters and can be ordered by phone (tel. 77160). Others work on a bargaining basis: 50 k is the minimum for most runs within the city and as far as the Inter-Continental Kinshasa, but drivers often ask for 1 Z. There is a taxi station near the Hotel Regina and in front of the Hotel Memling. *From the city center to Ndjili* Airport (16 miles) is normally 3 Z. Ndolo Airport, used by private and charter planes, is three miles from the city center.

Cars may be rented from Autoloc (11 Avenue des Aviateurs), STK (14ème Rue Limete), Renault Congo and Station Shell de Binza. Autoloc charges 6 Z per day, 6 k per kilometer. STK rents Mercedes, the cheapest model costing 10 Z per day, 10 k per kilometer. An international driver's license and either cash or a plane ticket as deposit are required.

**Day Excursions.** N'Sele, about 37 miles from town on the tarred road to Kenge, is the site of the President's very elaborate retreat, with some extras. There are long malls and buildings done in pagoda style, and a swimming pool; part of the complex is an experimental agricultural project. Adjacent is the Cité du MPR;


some picnic areas are just outside N'Sele. At dusk, when the humidity coagulates into fog, and the sun sets in a yellowish glow over the Zaïre River, N'Sele turns into a phantasmagorical dream-machine.

In the vicinity of N'Sele is Kinkole, a fishing village in which President Mobutu Sese Seko announced the creation of the new Zaïre currency.

### Restaurants

The national dish is moamba—chicken cooked in palm oil with a very spicy sauce, eaten with rice. *Capitaine*, the ubiquitous African river fish, is another specialty, and it is delectable fried or grilled. These dishes are served in Kinshasa at La Pergola (closed Monday), the Restaurant du Zoo (Avenue Kasavubu; closed Monday), Le Palace (Avenue Paul Hauzeur), and at Lac de ma Vallée out of town.

The most expensive restaurants happen also to be very good, but you can expect to spend an average of 4 Z to 8 Z per person. They include: OAU Village restaurant (Continental), La Divinière (Continental) in Binza, Le Grill (Belgian cuisine) at Place Population Noire in the Cité, and Mini Club (Continental, closed Sunday) in the Building Royal. Au Plein Vent is a Swiss restaurant (fondue) on top of the Astrid Building; Le Paul Hauzeur has a restaurant and Salon de Thé. Nicola (a.k.a. Petit Pont, closed Wednesday) on Avenue Colonel Lukusa serves pizza and brochettes (shish-kabob); a pizza is 4 Z but nourishes two people.

**Nightlife.** There are five main movie theaters that show French-language films: Albertum (Boulevard du 30 Juin), MPR (Avenue Kasavubu), Palace (Avenue Charles de Gaulle), RAC (Avenue des Aviateurs) and Cambrinus.

In the Cité south of the white-collared downtown area are scores of nightclubs, most with the bands that made "Congo music" famous. The fanciest ones include Club Richelieu and Les Anges Noirs off Avenue Gambella, Vis à Vis, and Le Petit Bois. There are also Vatican Club (Rue Doruma), Bibiana (Quartier Matonge), Le Grisbi (Rue Tshela, *commune* de Kinshasa), and Le Cacadou (Avenue Ikelemba, Matonge). Downtown clubs include Chez Jeff (Au Beach), Show Boat, Scotch Club, Le Paddock, Olympic Club, and Le Colibri.

A weekly entertainment guide, *Kin 7 Jours*, is given away gratis at hotels.

### Getting Around Zaïre

Nine out of 10 of your standard and-there-I-was-stranded-in-this-village-with-the-next-boat/bus/truck-due-in-two-weeks stories occur in Zaïre. The distance between Kinshasa and Lubumbashi is 1,680 miles. The car trip in good weather takes about 10 days. It is roughly 1,504 miles by rail (Lubumbashi to Ilebo) and river (Ilebo to Kinshasa). Traveling in the interior, even by the relatively luxurious means of plane, should not be attempted by those with limited time and/or a low frustration threshold.

The most interesting way to travel upcountry (upriver) is by Onatra steamers, the better known of which are the *Colonel Kokolo*, *Colonel Ebeya* and *Colonel Lukusa*. The Zaïre River is by no means the only highway into the interior, but it is the one most often used by adventurous visitors. Many of the Zaïre's tributaries (perhaps some are affluents or confluents—all of them eventually flow into the Zaïre) also have regular boat services.

The trip from Kinshasa to Kisangani takes 10 days; downriver, five days, and boats leave every week and every two weeks alternately. Visions of Joseph Conrad? Actually, the novelty of retracing the narrator's steps in *Heart of Darkness* palls after the second day on the river, the sauna heat begins to attack your temperament, and you can't wait to reach your goal.

Other riverboats run by Onatra are from Kinshasa: on the Busira River to Boende via Mbandaka (every two weeks), six days upriver to Boende, four days downriver to Kinshasa; on the Kasai River to Ilebo (weekly), six days upriver to Ilebo, four days downriver to Kinshasa; on the Kwilu River to Kikwit (every two weeks), five days upriver to Kikwit, three days downriver to Kinshasa; on the Lukenie River to Oshwe; on the Sankuru River from Ilebo to Lusambo; and on the Wamba River from Bandundu to Kenge and beyond to Mukila-Mokamba. □

# Mind Your Language

"As teachers and scholars of African Studies we perpetuate the myths of the inferiority of the Continent by the terms we use. What is more, we resist efforts to change."

By EVELYN JONES RICH

*Dogs and slaves are named by their masters but free men name themselves*
*Richard B. Moore*

To acknowledge the existence of other cultures is to embrace the reality of the present. To affirm the equality of other cultures is to dream the dreams of the future. To understand and accept other cultures is the task of mad men and far-out individuals—rarely, yet sometimes, scholars and teachers.

With Africa and other Third World cultures, we have a long, long way to go. Scholars, teachers, journalists, readers, soldiers of fortune, et al. continue to resist some of the fundamental changes which must come if Americans and other Westerners are to begin to appreciate Africa and Africans.

Nowhere is the need for change more evident than in the terms we all use when referring to Africa. A language is a living thing—it provides insights into a culture which both shape and reflect basic attitudes. These attitudes, in turn, are held by those who live in the culture and those who live apart from it.

Gradually new terms creep into the vocabulary of Americans which mirror deep-seated changes which are occurring in our society. The question is no longer whether or not to use the word, *Black*, when referring to those of us who were formerly termed "Negroes." The question is, rather, whether or not to spell it with a small B or a capital. This debate is heated and on-going but this is not the time or place in which to pursue it. The change in terminology when referring to Afro-Americans is the point and it has been made and accepted—loudly and clearly. (I prefer the term "Afro-American." "Black" describes how we look—not who we are!)

*So, too, for the term "woman."* Lady, is for many of us an unacceptable, if not a dirty, word. Gradually, though grudgingly, it is being superseded by other terms which meet the demands of certain females, perhaps, set the tone for others.

Neither of these two examples is meant to imply that the former words which have been pre-empted have been expunged from the English language or that they are not perfectly good terms to use in some situations. But it is the aura which the terms—Negro and lady—connote which is challenged. It is *how* they are used in 1974 which makes them unacceptable. From my perspective both of them have become pejoratives—used by those very much out of touch with the reality of our times and the expressions of that reality.

These are but two examples of changes in language which have won increasing acceptance by large numbers of Americans. There are many others. To use these terms is not, necessarily, to accept their new meanings but it is to show an openness to change which is a welcome step to those who advocate it.

*These changes have been* resisted: by both the powerful and the powerless, for the impact of their acceptance—the rearrangement of power relationships—becomes more and more clear. Blacks and women are divided and the acrimony is often bitter as charges and counter-charges abound. And so it goes.

Imagine then the opposition which arises when changes in terms used to describe other cultures—

"These terms provide the parameters within which Americans learn about Africa, in elementary and secondary schools, as well as colleges and universities. They also reflect a point of view which militates against respect, appreciation, and understanding of other cultures."

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particularly non-Western cultures—occur. It is not enough to make the point that some of the basic terms used to describe African people and African societies have also assumed a pejorative connotation. Their use implies a value judgment which is negative. It is not enough to insist that Africans, themselves, are divided over the use of some of these terms. Aren't we all! Debate becomes even more heated when non-Africans insist that some of the terms currently challenged are appropriate descriptions of the diverse cultures and societies of Africa. Some non-Africans even reject the assertion that the terms are part both of a larger attitude which aptly describes the low esteem and lack of respect afforded to African societies and the pattern of oppression.

The term "tribe" is an example. It is a word, coined by European anthropologists to describe the organization of groups sharing a common lineage and language. It is no longer used to describe similar European groups. It is almost always used to refer to Third World People and it implies a stage of development which is, in short a "put down." "Tribal" warfare was waged in Nigeria but a civil war persists in Northern Ireland. There are no "tribes" in New York City—only New Yorkers, or more specifically, Italians, Jews, et al. Why not Africans in Africa or a specific reference to the ethnic group (Ibo, Kikuyu, etc.).

Take, as another example, the word, "native." On those occasions when we use this term, we tend to use it as an adjective. Yet the media and others use it as a noun, to refer to individuals and groups of people—again living in Africa and other Third World areas.

Or take the forms of address. Many novelists refer to African characters by their first names or some other designation, such as Mother . . . or Father . . . References to Westerners almost always use the term Mr. and/or Mrs.

"Primitive" is a special term. It frequently appears in conversations with the general public in reference to Africa. Part of the problem is the absence of a substitute which is generally acceptable to the community of individuals whose work embraces the Continent. Among the terms used, however, are "traditional" and "classical." The other part of the problem is that the term—primitive—is most often used as an antonym for "modern." Try dealing with that one!

These are a few of the old terms which are under fire. Others include "jungle," "pagan," "hut," "Bantu," "race," "Black Africa," "Africa: South of the Sahara."

"Jungle" is part of the Tarzan syndrome. It recalls the countless episodes of the dominant European and the large numbers of subordinate Africans who served him. Unfortunately this myth is still the truth for many Westerners. It is a graphic media in shaping the attitudes of dramatization of the impact of the millions over generations—not simply years. Though scholars and teachers often assert that less than 20% of Africa is "rainforest", we have convinced few that "jungle" is unacceptable. Once again, it is a perfectly good word, but is used today in a startingly bad way.

So, too, the term "hut". It does not convey the same meaning as the terms "house" and "home". Its use bothers me a great deal, especially because I understand that many think of "hut" as meaning a crude dwelling. The point is that we not call the crude dwellings in which we spend our summer vacations, "huts". They are our "country homes". Interestingly enough, one definition of "hut" which the Oxford English Dictionary suggests is "a temporary dwelling". Few Africans see their homes either as crude or temporary. African homes are seldom temporary. Some are poor but many are not.

Consider further the term "Bantu". I, too, am confused about its meaning. It is used so differently by so many! For me, Bantu describes one of the family of African languages. To call an individual a Bantu, is to describe him/her, inadequately and incorrectly.

Often texts and occasionally articles in scholarly journals refer to the "Bantu race". The concept of "race" is for increasing numbers of us, obsolete. It belongs in the same category as the term "tribe". Its use is indefensible and to be taken in by it is to bow to racism rather than to resist it. There was a time when the classifications within which the term "race" has significance found wide acceptance. Variations within these categories are so prevalent that, from my perspective, the term is challenged—and rejected—both scientifically and morally.

Let's consider the word, "pagan". The religions of African people have always intrigued my students. For many of them the universe was divided into those who are Christian and those who are not! Not to be a Christian is to be "pagan". It is indeed difficult for them to grasp the idea that Islam is a major religion—and perhaps the fastest-growing religion—in Africa. They resist the idea that those Africans—and there are large numbers of them—who practice traditional African religions believe in a supreme God. To call their religion "animism" is also to do it an injustice. Rather one ought to substitute "traditional religions".

Now it is easier to deal with the term "Africa: South of the Sahara",

one which many teachers and scholars of Africa use and accept. Its origins lie in the very conscious, deliberate—and for many years successful—effort to take Egypt—now the Arab Republic of Egypt—out of Africa and to put it into the "Middle East". The designation, "The Middle East and North Africa" is a political statement which Africans in Africa and in the diaspora have begun increasingly to challenge. The Moslem civilizations and people of Africa live not only in the North but in large parts of the eastern and western areas of the Continent. The ties and contacts between and among the various parts of Africa have persisted for centuries and millenia.

As a final example, let me suggest that use of the term "Black Africa", implies that there is also a "White Africa"—as opposed to an Arab Africa. The controversy which the term "Black Africa" engenders is fantastic and the arguments it stimulates complex. Let me simply say that we do not talk about "White America". We say, rather, "America."

All over the Continent Africans increasingly are defining themselves in their own terms. Changes in the names of cities and bodies of water as well as the names of individuals are further examples of a new sense of self and society which Africans feel.

The above are but a few of the old terms which are under fire. There are, of course, others. For example "developing" and "under-developed" are extremely controversial.

All these terms provide the parameters within which Americans learn about Africa, in elementary and secondary schools as well as colleges and universities. They also reflect a point of view which is implicit and in my opinion, this view militates against increased respect and *appreciation*, as well as understanding of other cultures.

Unfortunately, we are all guilty! As teachers and scholars of African Studies, we perpetuate the myths of the inferiority of the Continent by the "terms" *we* use. What is more disturbing, we resist efforts to change—ourselves and others.

Some scholars are so immersed in their own research that they are unable and/or unwilling to examine their own attitudes and the language which reflects those attitudes. Thus a small cadre of intellectuals sets the tone for a large army of teachers. Millions of students reap the harvest.

The prospects for change are not very great. Appended is a bibliography which provides a first step toward recognizing our biases and dealing with them.

Yet, change too, is a process which does not come overnight. The role of change is central in the process of education. F. Champion Ward* summed it up nicely when he pointed out that international education is crucial in the decade of the 1970's, that an awareness of the galaxy of cultures which constitute the universe is a major agenda for educators and that moving inside and learning about a culture different from ours is an imperative.

For me—and for many of you—Africa's cultures present that challenge. Acknowledging their existence is a given. Shaping the future to affirm their equality is the task. The rest is in God's hands.

*F. Champion Ward, "Dangerously Provincial". Remarks prepared for a meeting of the Institute of Chief State School Officers, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, July, 1974.


1. Clarke, Jackson, Kaiser, O'Dell. *Black Titan: W.E.B. DuBois (An anthology by the editors of Freedomways)*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1970.
2. Keith E. Baird. "Semantics and Afro-American Liberation" *Social Casework*. Family Service Association of America. New York. May 1970.
3. John Henrik Clarke, ed. *Marcus Garvey and the Vision of Africa*. N.Y.: Random House, 1974.
4. Earl Conrad. *The Invention of the Negro*. N.Y.: Paul S. Eriksson, 1966.
5. A. Babs Fafunwa. *Recommendations Concerning Terminology in Education on Race Questions*. Paris: UNESCO House, 1968.
6. John G. Jackson. *Introduction to African Civilization*. N.Y.: Greenwood Press, 1970.
7. M.F. Ashley Montagu. *Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race*. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1964.
8. Richard B. Moore. *The Name Negro: Its Origin and Evil Use*. N.Y.: Afroamerican Publishers, 1960.
9. Raphael Philerman Powell. *Human Side of a People and Their Right Name*. N.Y.: Philerman Press, 1937.



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# Books

## Anthropological Perspectives

*Africa From the Sahara to the Zambezi.* Edited by Tom Stacey and E. E. Evans-Pritchard. (Danbury Press, Danbury, Conn., 1973. 144 pages, illus, maps, $3.98 with series subscription)

This is the second volume in the Peoples of the Earth Series edited by Tom Stacey and the late anthropologist, E. E. Evans-Pritchard. The series aims to provide an introduction to the cultures of the world for the general reader and prepublication advertisements indicate that it contains up-to-date information. Evans-Pritchard is the editor of the African volume, which contains essays by Africans and Africanists on the Amhara, Danakil, Somali, Nuba, Shilluk, Fulani, Ashanti, Americo-Liberians, Anlo-Ewe, Yoruba, Dogon, Mbuti, Massai, Kikuyu and Karamojong. It reflects the usual bias toward English-speaking Africa, since only the Dogon and Mbuti live in French-speaking Africa. The book is also biased toward the northern part of Subsaharan Africa, since all of Africa south of Zaire and Tanzania is unrepresented.

As is common in collections of essays by different authors, this collection is uneven. Several authors try to avoid using anthropological concepts, sometimes to the point of saying little of substance due to over-generalizing or making imprecise analogies. For example, Anlo-Ewe women are said to "almost worship men" and Yoruba religious cults are said to be like U.S. college fraternities. Other authors use anthropological concepts without any attempt to define them. Since there is no glossary, bibliography or footnotes, these essays will not be too useful to general readers. One essay, in contrast to all the others, contains first person references that describe the author's experiences as a member of the society.

The volume begins with an essay on human conservation by Francis Huxley which stresses the demise of tribal societies and their right to maintain their way of life. Most of the examples in this essay are from South America and a list of 47 societies threatened with imminent extinction includes only two from Africa, the Ituri Pygmies and the Bushmen. One wonders what is the relationship between the introduction and the essays, all of which describe viable societies, including the one on the Mbuti (who are Ituri Pygmies) in which they are said to "flourish" in their environment.

The societies are grouped into geographic regions. A brief essay on the history and culture of each region precedes the descriptions. Most of the societal descriptions are written in the ethnographic present and ignore history and contemporary life (except where anthropological studies have been made relatively recently). The use of the ethnographic present is highly misleading, since many of the activities, especially warfare and some religious rituals, ceased to exist around the turn of the century. On the other hand, many essays do not mention missions, schools and national governments. None of the societies described in this volume have completely shut out influences from these sources and several of them actively participate in national institutions.

The essays on the 15 societies are supplemented by a glossary consisting of one paragraph descriptions of 160 societies, which give approximate population figures, languages, subsistence and precolonial political organization for each. The book does not, however, include a map of Africa, so these societies cannot be located. Maps show the areas where the 15 featured societies live, but these cover only one nation or a region of a nation. For the 15 featured societies there are many colored and black and white illustrations each of which has a one sentence label. As a whole the illustrations focus on what is unique and exotic about Africa: dancing, musical instruments, masks, wooden pillows and unusual landscapes, for example. Relatively few illustrations depict the commonplace aspects of life upon which anthropologists usually focus their studies—subsistence production, trade and child care.

As a whole the book fails to give an accurate picture of contemporary life in African societies. Had the authors included a discussion of the sources of their data and the book's use of the ethnographic present, general readers would be forewarned about the relationship between the data in the book and contemporary African life. But they did not do this, so general readers are likely to gain misconceptions about contemporary African life from this book. Only persons already familiar with ethnographic literature on African societies can assess the data in this volume, which is far too general to be useful to them. □

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*An Introduction to the Study of African Culture* by Eric O. Ayisi. (Heineman, London, 1972, 110 pp., photographs, glossary, index).

*Lega Culture. Art, initiation and moral philosophy among a Central African people* by Daniel Biebuyck (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1973, 268 pp., profusely illustrated, bibliography, index, $20.00).

*Africa Counts* by Claudia Zaslavsky (Prindle, Weber and Schmidt, Boston, 1973, 328 pp., profusely illustrated, bibliography, index).

Although there are as many definitions of culture as there are anthropologists, the best-known definition lumps together all the ideas, rules and techniques that people acquire as members of a society. The trouble with such a definition is that it doesn't much help in knowing where to begin exploring the enormous variety of known cultures and in discovering how and why they differ. One approach to this problem, roughly identifiable as "social anthropology," emphasizes the term "society" in the above definition. Social anthropologists are likely to be interested in the collective rights assigned to different groups in a society, in family organization, land tenure, law and politics. Culture, which

comes later (if at all), is held to be in qualitative aspect of social relations, not so much what you do as how you do it.

One of the best known spokesmen for this point of view is Meyer Fortes, recently retired from the Chair of Anthropology at Cambridge University. Fortes writes the foreword to *An Introduction to the Study of African Culture*, by a former student of his, Eric O. Ayisi, who is engaged in political research at the University of Ghana. The book is designed principally, the author says, to meet the needs of university freshmen taking courses in African Studies. It is essentially an introduction to the jargon of social anthropology as spoken at Cambridge, Oxford, and at African universities belonging to the same tradition.

The first chapter, for example, on "Sex and Marriage," surveys some African rules about whom one can marry or sleep with, and introduces terms such as "levirate" (inheritance of one's brother's widow) and "polygamy" (marriage to more than one wife), but says nothing about behavior. But then, African students who read the book will already know much about the culture of at least their own part of Africa; what may be new to them, as most of us, is the idea of studying it systematically, and the concepts that have proved useful for this purpose in Africa and elsewhere. Most of the examples Ayisi uses ("the ethnography," as we say in the trade) come from Ghana. He covers an enormous amount of theory in a short space, his examples are well controlled, and his writing, terse and lucid.

Another use of the word "culture," not shared by anthropologists, makes an invidious distinction between ourselves, who have it, and others whom we see as lacking it. People who adopt this point of view assume that if others do not use our etiquette they have *no* etiquette; if they do not value as subtle and wise what we value, they have no values, subtlety or wisdom. Africans, for example, tend to regard Americans as immoral because they expose parts of the body that any decent person would keep covered; Americans tend to think the same about Africans (some Africans), though with respect to different parts of the body. When we find such attitudes among African peoples we deprecate them as "tribalism;" our own tribalism we call "national pride." Anthropologists recognize such attitudes as part of their respective *cultures*, and are not likely to be indignant about them.

The victims of tribalism, on the other hand, have every reason to be indignant. In the context of American tribalism, Africa has long played a special role. Africa, or rather an imaginary "Africa" peopled by barbarians, has been used to glorify by contrast all that white Americans are proud of in their European heritage. (The bits it is hard to be proud of are forgotten.) John Henrik Clarke, one of the leaders in recent efforts to revise the popular view of Africa, writes the introduction to Claudia Zaslavsky's *Africa Counts*. As a survey of "Number and pattern in African culture," this book is admirably detailed and comprehensive. The test is supported by a wealth of tables, diagrams and photographs. The most interesting chapters deal with mathematical games and with pattern in art and architecture; this will be a treasure trove for school teachers.

The book would have been much better without its second theme, that of making Africa "count" in the eyes of unenlightened Americans. The author's technique here is that of the straw man. "It is only in the past few years," she writes, "that European investigators have admitted the possibility of African contributions to world culture." The views of L. L. Conant, who referred to Africans as savages, are cited in support of this proposition, although Conant wrote in 1896.

Zaslavsky herself, however, adopts the characteristically American tribal view that other cultures are to be evaluated in terms of their "contributions." When she approaches the conceptual origin of African numerologies and topologies in philosophy, a point at which African culture presents the European mind with profound and exciting challenges, she relapses into the crudest ethnocentrism, heading her inconclusive jottings "Number symbolism and superstition."

Daniel Biebuyck, in *Lega Culture*, wants neither to help people pass examinations nor look for contributions. The Lega are a Bantu-speaking people of eastern Zaire. In this study the emphasis is on the qualitative aspect of culture rather than on social relations. At the center of the study, as of Lega life, is the Bwami cult, its initiation procedures, and the moral philosophy embodied in the proverbs and artworks it employs. The Lega are well known to art historians and collectors for their extraordinary cool wood and ivory masks, whose nature and function, as Biebuyck shows, have usually been misunderstood.

In the course of several years' intensive fieldwork, Biebuyck himself went through the entire cycle of Bwami initiations, discussing them in detail with Lega experts. His book is an exposition of an "anthropocentric, pragmatic, rationalist" philosophy of "unfathomable depth," in which, as the Lega say, "the words of the land are things that lie together, things that transform, things that are high." This is no easy book, then, no place to find quick answers to ethnocentric questions, but an intense and demanding representation of an African culture interpreted from within. If you *really* want to know about African culture, this is the kind of book to read, but it won't be easy. □

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## BOOKS RECEIVED

### (Inclusion in this list does not preclude the review of a book at a later date)

Abun-Nasr, Jamil, *A History of the Maghrib*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1973, Paper $5.95

Adedeji, Adebayo and L. Rowland, (editors) *Management Problems of Rapid Urbanisation in Nigeria*, The Challenge to Government and Local Authorities, Ile-Ife, University of Ife Press, 1974, Price overseas: $12.00

Ajala, Adekunle, *Pan Africanism: Evolution, Progress and Prospects*, London, Andre Deutsch, 1973

Akinyemi, A. B., *Foreign Policy and Federalism, The Nigerian Experience*, Ibadan, Ibadan University Press, 1974

Alagoa, E. J. and A. Fombo, *A Chronicle of Grand Bonny*, Ibadan, Ibadan University Press, 1972, Price $3.50

Amir, Shimeon, *Israel's Development Cooperation with Africa, Asia, and Latin America*, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1974, Price ca. $12.50

Aptheker, Herbert, (editor) *The Correspondence of W.E.B. DuBois*, Volume I, Selections, 1877-1934, Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1973, Price $20.00

Bardeleben, Manfred, *The Cooperative System in the Sudan*, New York, Humanities Press, 1973, Price $15.50

Bebler, Anton, *Military Rule in Africa: Dahomey, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Mali*, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1973

Bell, Trevor, *Industrial Decentralisation in South Africa*, London, Oxford University Press, 1973, Price $16.00

Beyda, Vivian (editor) *Vitamin A Deficiency and Blindness Prevention*, New York, American Foundation for the Blind/American Foundation for Overseas Blind, 1974, Price $2.00

*(Continued on page 52)*

## BOOKS (Continued)

Brett, E. A., *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change 1919-1939*, New York, Nok Publishers, 1973, Cloth $16.00, Paper $4.95

Chambers, Robert and Jon Moris, (editors), *Mwea: An Irrigated Rice Settlement in Kenya*, New York, Humanities Press, 1973, Price $50.50

Clammer, David, *The Zulu War*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1973, Price $9.95

Clarke, John H., *Marcus Garvey and the Vision of Africa*, New York, Random House, 1974, Price, paper $2.95, also in cloth $12.95

Clarke, W. H., *Travels and Explorations in Yorubaland 1854-1858*, edited by J. A. Atanda, Ibadan, Ibadan University Press, 1972, U.S. Distributor: Africana Publishing Corp., New York, Price $14.50

Cohen, Daniel, *Shaka: King of the Zulus*, New York, Doubleday & Company, 1973, Price $4.50

Cohen, Michael, *Urban Policy and Political Conflict in Africa: A Study of the Ivory Coast*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1974, Price $14.75

Collison, Robert, *The Scolma Directory of Libraries and Special Collections on Africa*, Hamden, Connecticut, Archon Books, 1973, Price $7.50

Coombs, Philip, with Manzoor Ahmed, *Attacking Rural Poverty: How Nonformal Education Can Help*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1974, Price $15.00 (cloth) $3.95 (paper)

Crapanzano, Vincent, *The Hamadsha: A Study in Moroccan Ethnopsychiatry*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973, Price $12.00

Crowder, Michael, *Revolt in Bussa; A Study of British "Native Administration" in Nigerian Borgu*, 1902-1934, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1973

Curley, Richard T., *Elders, Shades and Women: Ceremonial Change in Lango, Uganda*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973, Price $8.00

Davidson, Basil, *Can Africa Survive?* Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1974, Price, (Cloth) $6.95, (Paper) $3.45

Diop, David, *Hammer Blows and Other Writings*, Translated and edited by Simon Mpondo and Frank Jones, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1973, Price $5.00

Doe, Sleweon, *Africa Demands Transcendence Home and Abroad*, Berlin, Sleweon Doe, 1974

DuBois, Shirley Graham, *Zulu Heart*, New York, The Third Press, 1974, Price $7.95

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# In Washington

## New Agenda for Africa Policy

By BRUCE OUDES

Just about the time that the rains began in the Sahel this summer, Washington also received its long overdue washing. As recently as the end of June a U.S. veto at the United Nations loomed over Guinea-Bissau, the outlook for the repeal of the Byrd Amendment was uncertain, Stonewall Nixon was in the White House, and Air Rhodesia's Renton Cowley was still in the U.S.

Then 11 days after Mr. Nixon took his masonry to San Clemente, President Ford switched his long-standing view on the Byrd Amendment and came out for repeal. Meanwhile, Portuguese-African negotiations moved to the point that it was clear that the U.S. would soon have embassies in both Bissau and Lourenco Marques and that ultimately the U.S. Navy likely would have new company during its regular visits to LM—Soviet trawlers. And, after Renton Cowley's return to Salisbury, Air Rhodesia found itself relying on the mails in order to drum up business in the U.S.

There should be no tears over the fact that Mr. Nixon will no longer have Africa to kick around, and there is a ray of hope in the fact that—at least as far as the Byrd Amendment is concerned—President Ford appears eager to have a bit of detente with the Black Caucus. In late July Vice President Ford had rejected a pitch from Vernon Jordan of the Urban League about repealing the Byrd Amendment, but he changed his mind three weeks later after moving into the White House. As a result, Rep. Donald Fraser, floor manager of the House repeal effort, agreed to a White House request that the key vote be delayed until after the Labor Day recess in order that administration lobbyists might have time to round up enough votes to insure the demise of the three-year old Byrd Amendment under which the U.S. now has imported $50 million worth of Rhodesian commodities.

Given the strong possibility of serious difficulties in implementing a cut-off date for commodities allowed in the U.S. under the Byrd Amendment, perhaps the central significance of President Ford's reversal was his cooperation with the Black Caucus. A Republican President finally seemed to have discovered the political principle first used by the Democrats more than a decade ago: namely that in terms of unit political cost it is easier to give in to pressure from Black America on a question involving far-off Africa than it is to move on a domestic issue.

However politically expedient and casual the President's switch was, it was a hint of bi-partisan political cooperation on Southern Africa at the highest level. And signs of cooperation rather than the confrontation of the past four years are, of course, more than welcome. To be sure, J. F. ter-Horst, the White House spokesman who disclosed the President's change of heart on the Byrd Amendment, himself resigned three weeks later, but at the same time the President did have the common sense to reject the proposal that Pat Buchanan, one of Mr. Nixon's more contentious ideologues, be named U.S. ambassador to South Africa. The selection of Ms. Shirley Temple Black this summer to be U.S. envoy in Accra adds a bit of pizazz to the American diplomatic corps in Africa, but given Mr. Buchanan's track record on the Byrd Amendment while in the White House, it would seem reasonable to expect that after a few weeks in Pretoria Buchanan would have been proposing a military assistance program and mutual defense pact to Prime Minister Vorster.

Assuming that repeal of the Byrd Amendment is now a foregone conclusion—a fading symbol of a past administration's Africa policy—then this should be the time to seize the opportunity to build a consensus on Africa policy and the responsibility for this belongs with Rep. Charles Diggs as much as with President Ford.

Diggs' House Africa subcommittee has been less active much of this year since the resignation in February of Ms. Goler Butcher, the subcommittee's highly productive counsel, who in slightly more than three years helped to give Diggs the issue identification with Africa that he was looking for. Diggs, increasingly absorbed with the District of Columbia committee, has had correspondingly less time to spend on African questions.

For Diggs, the situation would seem to present a new variation on what, for him, is an old problem. On the one hand there is that part of his constituency which wants only confrontation with the leadership of white America on Africa, but on the other is Diggs' personal ambition to be chairman of the full House Foreign Affairs committee someday. That, of course, is the type of leadership job which requires compromise. Diggs has a strong hold on the Democrats' Africa platform, and he can veto or modify any African policy initiative he doesn't like in a Democratic administration, but he can not dictate what the African policy *initiatives* will be in any given future Democratic administration much less a Republican one.

However, he does have at his disposal within the African subcommittee a situation in which he might further develop his influence on overall U.S.

Africa policy. This namely is the fact that in the past few years most of the G.O.P. mossbacks on the Africa committee have been replaced by moderate and fair-minded Republicans such as Edward Biester, Guy Vander Jagt, and Charles Whalen. As part of the policy of partisan confrontation during the Nixon years Republican leaders had virtually no influence on the direction of the Africa subcommittee. This was certainly comprehensible during the incorrigible Nixon administration, but is less so now in an era of comparative detente between the White House and Capitol Hill. In short, any substantive recommendations on which Diggs, Biester, Vander Jagt, and Whalen can agree would stand an excellent chance of being approved by any reasonable administration. This, it would seem, is a prize which would make the effort at improving the degree of consensus within the Africa subcommittee highly worthwhile.

The Senate's Africa subcommittee as such remains stiffled by the present pattern of Foreign Relations committee organization which makes it virtually impossible for subcommittee chairman Hubert Humphrey to organize hearings on Africa. This political reality underscores even more Diggs' central role in Africa questions on the Hill. However, while Diggs has been less active personally on Africa questions in 1974, Sen. Humphrey has been toiling steadily on a number of African questions. Humphrey, Gale McGee, and Jacob Javits seem to informed Senate observers to be the most active in the Senate on Africa questions on a day-to-day basis.

Humphrey's and McGee's staffs conspired on the coolest legislative move on Africa this year. When the House voted to cut the administration's $150 million emergency relief legislation to $115 million because of a flap over $35 million earmarked for Pakistan, the Humphrey-McGee forces managed to get the bill back up to $150 million with the $35 million going to Africa instead of Pakistan. This meant that Africa is to receive a total of $85 million in *grant* aid from a $150 million bill. This is the biggest chunk of U.S. grant assistance for Africa since the early 1960s, one that substantially reduced the sting of the administration's back door cuts last January in the FY 1974 aid program.

However, the outlook for the current fiscal year—FY 1975—isn't exactly rosy as Rep. Otto Passman made clear during appropriations hearings this summer on the new aid bill. Passman went off the record several times to tell administration witnesses that he didn't think Congress would approve a bill this year. A Passman performance has to be seen to be believed. At one point Passman, an old-line Louisiana Democrat, erroneously identified the only Black woman spectator as being the wife of Dr. Samuel Adams, AID's Africa director. Dr. Adams is black.

While Passman's views on aid are nothing new, the supporters of foreign aid on the Hill received a jolt this summer when Sen. Alan Cranston came out with a categoric proposal that no military government be eligible for foreign aid. This, of course, would virtually wipe out U.S. aid to Africa.

The outlook is equally uncertain on the Hill for U.S. participation in the African Development Fund, the African Development Bank's soft-loan window. The U.S. has until the end of December to keep its public promise to become a charter member of the fund; but unless there is firm White House intervention on behalf of the $15 million bill, it looks like Congress won't clear the necessary legislation in time.

* * *

While the new agenda on Africa policy is more positive, the one investigative effort that must be carried forward is the Rhodesia story. While Mr. Nixon's failure to execute U.S. law implementing Rhodesia sanctions wasn't on the Judiciary Committee's list of impeachable acts, it should have been.

The important thing about the case of Renton Cowley is not that he finally left the U.S. in early July, four months before the expiration of the latest extension of his visa. Rather it is that he was neither indicted, nor arrested for having committed a felony not a part of Rhodesia sanctions regulations. That felony was perjury which he clearly committed in his application to the Immigration and Naturalization Service for permanent residence in the U.S. This was thoroughly spelled out by the documents which Gerd Stamnes, his former employee, turned over to U.S. officials in March—four months before Cowley voluntarily left the U.S. Unwillingness of the U.S. to prosecute a publicized case such as Cowley's constitutes an important lesson for all Rhodesian residents dealing with U.S. officials: Feel free to lie as much as necessary and in writing if necessary because the U.S. simply will not prosecute. The worst that will happen to them if unmasked is that they will be quietly told to leave the U.S., an inconvenience which falls far short of criminal prosecution.

Certainly Rhodesia's determination to persuade Americans to break sanctions has been in no way impaired by the recent revelations. Only July 5, less than a week after he returned to Salisbury, Cowley sent a "Dear Agent" letter to his contacts in the American travel industry. The letter read in part, "By now you may well have heard, through one source or another, of our New York office having recently closed entirely, and of my relocating to Rhodesia after a stay of some 6½ years in the United States. This is, in fact, quite correct. It is now my responsibility to maintain contact with you on a regular direct mail basis, so as to keep you updated with regard to Air Rhodesia's services, as well as any improvements in tourism facilities within the country. We are all most appreciative for the custom we have enjoyed in the past from you, and greatly look forward to being able to welcome your future clientele to our fair land."

A few weeks later Derek Ebben, of the United Touring Company in Salisbury, was once again able to evade the alleged U.S. sanctions "net" by entering the U.S. in order to follow up on Cowley's letter.

One case study illustrates how the INS manages to drag its feet on the illegal entry of a Rhodesian resident even when presented with firm evidence well in advance of the arrival date. The case involved an Air Rhodesia pilot, Capt. B. R. van Huyssteen,

who, according to a February 15 memo to Cowley from Salisbury, was *due to depart on March 31 for a trip* to Denver and Seattle. Salisbury requested van Huyssteen's transportation in the U.S. be arranged on a gratis basis with United Airlines. In 1973 United trained Air Rhodesia pilots on Boeings in Denver, and Seattle, of course, is the home of Boeing.

On the basis of this memorandum the State Department in March asked INS to prevent van Huyssteen's entry. After repeated prodding by State, INS replied in early April that van Huyssteen had slipped into the country because of an error by "summer help." Prodded further by State, INS reported that the Princeton, New Jersey, address van Huyssteen had given on his entry form was phoney. End of investigation.

One facet of the Cowley case raises implications for U.S. relations with South Africa. Hermanus C. du Preez, consul in the South African consulate general in New York, in January provided Cowley, an old friend, with a letter implying that Cowley was a South African resident. "Our records show" Cowley's "permanent address" to be *Cape Town, du Preez wrote in full* knowledge that this was a ruse masking the fact that Cowley's home is on Greendale Drive in Salisbury. South Africa, of course, is free to extend its passports to whoever it pleases on whatever grounds it pleases. Cowley had a South African passport. But it is on entirely different ground when it helps a Rhodesian resident hide from U.S. officials the fact of that Rhodesian residency. Apparently this happens from time to time, but there is no indication that the State Department has ever complained to Pretoria about the practice.

The Federal Aviation Agency, informed sources say, in early September turned over to the Justice Department the results of its investigation of the illegal interline agreements maintained by a score of U.S. carriers with Air Rhodesia. Attorney General William Saxbe, it will be recalled, has a track record of supporting Rhodesia. However, if Justice plays it straight, there presumably will be two indictments against most of the airlines involved. One will be for failure to file an interline agreement with the Civil Aeronautics Board as required by law and the other for maintaining an agreement with Air Rhodesia.

If the airlines choose to use in their defense the fact that FAA officials apparently from time to time told the U.S. airlines to wink at the Rhodesia sanctions regulations, then it might be possible to get at some of the questions involving malfeasance by U.S. officials that appear to be at the root of this case. According to Gerd Stamnes, Pan American's lawyers—after checking with the FAA—told Cowley in 1973 that there was no need for concern on the question of the interline agreements. Meanwhile, an FAA spokesman blamed "manpower shortages" for the FAA's failure over the past six years to make the two five-minute phone calls to CAB clerks that are all that is necessary to determine, first, which U.S. airlines have filed interline agreements with Air Rhodesia with the CAB and second, which U.S. airlines, according to the IATA manual, maintain interline agreements with Air Rhodesia.

During the summer Common *Cause's success in obtaining the* court-ordered release of the 1972 "hit list" maintained by Maurice Stans for the Committee to Re-Elect the President has a tidbit that may have some bearing on the 1972 export license issued by the Commerce Department to Flying Tiger for the sale of a used DC-8 to Jack Malloch, the veteran sanctions buster. (See In Washington, Jan.-Feb., 1974) According to the "hit list", Ms. Anna Chennault, Flying Tiger's Washington-based vice president for international affairs, contributed $2,500 on March 17, 1972, and another $2,500 a week later. Stans, who Rhodesia regards as a good friend, was still Commerce Secretary at that time. The DC-8 left the U.S. at some point in the first half of October, 1972. On October 30, 1972, the CREEP list shows, Ms. Chennault pledged another $10,000, but there is a further notation dated December 6, 1972 saying "$7,500 received. No more?" Asked about the 1972 sale to Malloch, Ms. Chennault said she has "no involvement with those areas." □

# cultural resistance

## Art from Guinea-Bissau Mozambique and Angola

**October 29, 1974— February 1, 1975**

**African-American Institute, 833 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017**

Africa Report
MAGAZINE FOR THE NEW AFRICA
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NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1974



# THE NEW BALANCE:
## U.S. Aid and African Commodities

Zambian Copper Exports

# POPULATION

**Population by sex, rate of population increase, area and density for Africa:** (continued from September-October issue) **latest census, and mid-year estimates for 1963 and 1972.**

[Unless otherwise specified, population figures are present-in-area estimates for the present territory; area estimates include inland waters.]

| Country | Population: Latest census (in units) | | | | Population: Mid-year estimates (in thousands) | | Annual rate of increase 1963—72 (%) | Area (km²) | Density 1972 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Date | Both sexes | Male | Female | 1963 | 1972 | | | |
| AFRICA (cont.) | | | | | | | | | |
| Morocco | 20-VII-71 | *15 379 259 | | | *12 665* | **15 825* | | 446 550 | 35 |
| Mozambique | 15-XII-70 | *8 233 834 | | | *6 842* | **8 508* | | 783 030 | 11 |
| Namibia | 6-IX-60 | 526 004 | 265 312 | 260 692 | *554* | **659* | *2.0* | 824 292 | 1 |
| Niger | X-59—III-60 | 2 501 800 | 1 214 380 | 1 287 420 | *3 332* | *4 213* | *2.6* | 1 267 000 | 3 |
| Nigeria | 5—8-XI-63 | 55 670 055 | 28 111 852 | 27 558 203 | **46 324* | **58 020* | *2.5* | 923 768 | 63 |
| Réunion | 16-X-67 | 416 525 | 203 497 | 213 028 | *371* | *466* | *2.6* | 2 510 | 186 |
| Rwanda | V-XI-70 | 3 735 585 | 1 792 511 | 1 943 074 | *2 924* | *3 896* | *3.2* | 26 338 | 148 |
| St. Helena | 24-VII-66 | 4 649 | 2 233 | 2 416 | *5* | **5* | | 122 | 41 |
| Ascension | 24-VII-66 | 476 | 428 | 48 | *0* | **1* | *17.8* | 88 | 14 |
| Tristan da Cunha | III-38 | 186 | 428 | | *0* | **0* | ... | 104 | 3 |
| São Tomé and Principe | 30-IX-70 | *73 811 | *37 478 | *36 333 | *58* | **75* | *2.9* | 964 | 78 |
| Senegal | IV-60—VIII-61 | 3 109 840 | 1 531 760 | 1 578 080 | *3 326* | **4 122* | *2.4* | 196 192 | 21 |
| Seychelles | 5-V-71 | 52 650 | 26 244 | 26 406 | *45* | *55* | *2.3* | 376 | 146 |
| Sierra Leone | 1-IV-63 | 2 180 355 | 1 081 123 | 1 099 232 | *2 298* | *2 627* | *1.5* | 71 740 | 37 |
| Somalia | | | | | **2 390* | **2 941* | *2.3* | 637 657 | 5 |
| South Africa | 6-V-70 | *21 448 169 | *10 561 145 | *10 887 024 | *18 077* | *22 987* | *2.7* | 1 221 037 | 19 |
| Southern Rhodesia | 21-IV—11-V-69 | 4 846 930 | 2 440 180 | 2 406 750 | *4 230* | *5 690* | *3.3* | 390 580 | 15 |
| Spanish Sahara | 31-XII-70 | *76 425 | *43 981 | *32 444 | *32* | *91* | *12.4* | 266 000 | 0 |
| Sudan | 17-I-56 | 10 262 536 | 5 186 126 | 5 076 410 | *12 944* | *16 489* | *2.7* | 2 505 813 | 7 |
| Swaziland | 24-V-66 | 374 697 | 178 903 | 195 794 | *344* | *434* | ... | 17 363 | 25 |
| Togo | 1-III—30-IV-70 | 1 953 778 | 940 512 | 1 013 266 | **1 655* | **2 093* | *2.6* | 56 000 | 37 |
| Tunisia | 3-V-66 | 4 533 351 | 2 314 419 | 2 218 932 | | *5 377* | | 163 610 | 33 |
| Uganda | 18-VIII-69 | 9 548 847 | 4 818 449 | 4 730 398 | **8 174* | *10 462* | *2.8* | 236 036 | 44 |
| United Republic of Tanzania | 26-VIII-67 | 12 313 469 | 6 005 894 | 6 307 575 | *11 115* | *13 996* | *2.6* | 945 087 | 15 |
| Tanganyika | 26-VIII-67 | 11 958 654 | 5 826 413 | 6 132 241 | *10 786* | *13 602* | *2.6* | 942 626 | 14 |
| Zanzibar | 26-VIII-67 | 354 815 | 179 481 | 175 334 | *329* | *394* | *2.0* | 2 461 | 160 |
| Upper Volta | 30-IX-60—22-IV-61 | 4 300 000 | 2 158 600 | 2 141 400 | *4 669* | **5 611* | *2.1* | 274 200 | 20 |
| Zaire | 23-V-55—II-58 | 12 768 706 | 6 182 306 | 6 551 284 | *16 159* | *22 860* | *3.9* | 2 345 409 | 10 |
| Zambia | 22—30-VIII-69 | *4 056 995 | *1 987 011 | *2 069 984 | *3 500* | *4 420* | *2.6* | 742 614 | 6 |

*Italics* indicate estimates of questionable reliability.
* Provisional. * United Nations estimate.

# Africa Report

MAGAZINE FOR THE NEW AFRICA

A Publication of the African-American Institute


**How Africa is Short-Changed.** The cover story takes a hard look at United States' interests in Africa. Citing the continent's importance as a source of raw materials and pointing to the positive effects of aid on the US balance of payments, the author comes to the conclusion that Africa deserves a bigger share of a bigger aid budget.

He examines recent analyses of US aid flows and concludes that, in many cases, not only were statistical and compilation methods inaccurate but also that the conclusions and inferences drawn were faulty.


**Two Men in the News.** Leaders from two parts of Africa are the subjects of News Analysis and the Interview respectively. From Botswana we have a report on the significance of President Seretse Khama's election victory. The OAU's recently elected Administrative Secretary General, William Eteki Mboumoua discusses some current African issues and outlines his hopes for his own stewardship of office.

For the immediate future he reveals that Africa's joint military planning is more advanced than many observers had believed, in the face to threats to peace and orderly progress to majority rule in southern Africa. Regarding African unity, he intends to work for the speedier implementation of practical schemes. In his view such programmes will make the concept more meaningful for the ordinary people of Africa.

**More than a Head Count.** The first Census to be carried out in most of French-speaking Africa presents problems of a kind not experienced in more tabulated or more regimented societies. The author, just back from an extensive tour of the region, describes the imaginative methods devised by the authorities concerned to cope with expected difficulties.

While giving credit for the hard work and ingenious planning being devoted to the Census in each country, she is critical of the apparent lack of cooperation between the different states involved. Exchanges of information could lighten the load for all, allowing solutions devised to solve a problem in one to be implemented by others.






**NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1974 VOLUME 19 NUMBER 6**

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# How Africa Is Short-Changed

**As Africa's importance to the United States increases and as Africa's development needs grow, so U.S. assistance decreases. We are now more dependent upon Africa than vice-versa.**

BY WILLIAM R. COTTER

The U.S. Foreign Assistance Bill receives increasing opposition in Congress nearly every year *despite* the fact that we are growing more dependent on developing countries for oil and other essential raw materials. The annual Aid Bill is subjected to delay, whimsical defeat and unrelated riders. It is frequently held hostage by the Congress in order to put pressure on the Administration for unrelated foreign policy objectives. A recent example was a rider which demanded the end of U.S. military assistance to Turkey because of its invasion of Cyprus. That Executive-Congressional dispute was resolved only at the 11th hour in October 1974, thanks in part to Congress' need to go home to campaign.

It has become almost routine for the Congress to act with near total irresponsibility in considering the Foreign Assistance Act. In 1971, the Senate first defeated the Foreign Aid Bill—only to reconsider later on. In early 1974, the replenishment for the U.S. contribution to the International Development Association (IDA)—the "soft loan" section of the World Bank—was overwhelmingly defeated in the House of Representatives in reaction to the Arab oil embargo. That action was also reversed later in 1974 (by the same House of Representatives). At this writing (November the Congress has still not passed a Foreign Assistance Bill for fiscal year 1975 even though two-fifths of the fiscal year has already passed. The aid effort limps along on the basis of a continuing resolution only.

The performance of Congress in recent years with respect to the foreign assistance legislation is usually attributed to the fact that "there is no constituency for aid" in the United States. I disagree. There *is* a constituency for aid but it requires national leadership to educate it and mobilize it. Neither the White House nor Congressional leaders have taken any steps in recent years in that direction. The assumption that the constituency can, somehow, spring up on its own is simply naive.

Many liberals and others who are personally predisposed to aid wonder, however, whether development assistance programs can be "sold" to the American public even if they were willing to make an effort. I believe very strongly that they can be for two reasons: (1) it is in our own self-interest to continue and expand our foreign assistance efforts; and (2) there is a natural American predisposition, according to recent surveys and other indicators, to support assistance which is directed toward clearly understood humanitarian needs and is *not* encumbered with extraneous military aid efforts, unrelated riders, Vietnam supporting assistance, etc.

This article focuses on the relationship of Africa to the United States but much of the analysis could be applied to other parts of the developing world (although Africa has historically received a far too small percentage of U.S. assistance programs and that imbalance should be corrected in the future).

### Africa's Growing Importance To The United States

Let's first look at oil. Long gas lines in the United States reminded us of our dependence on others for an important and growing part of our energy needs. It is often believed by the consuming public that the U.S. receives the lion share of its imported crude from the Arab states. This is untrue. In fact, Nigeria has, in 1974, become the second largest supplier of foreign oil to the United States just behind Canada. Venezuela, which held the second spot both in 1972 and '73 has now dropped to fourth in importance as it cut back its production. Nigeria, on the other hand, supplied the United States with petroleum all through the Arab boycott and has, since the ending of the boycott, continuously increased exports to the U.S.[1]

However, African oil is just the first example of our international dependency for scarce raw materials—much of which we will have to obtain from Africa in the future. Take copper as another case in point. In 1970, the U.S. imported no copper. In 1985, it is estimated that we will import 34% of our copper needs, and in the year 2000, 56%. Copper, of course, is essential for us if we are going to supplant oil with coal or other sources (such as solar power) which will be converted into electricity. Electricity cannot be utilized if we do not have

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copper wires to transmit and conduct it. Four countries of the world supply most of the world's exportable copper: Chile, Peru, Zambia and Zaire.[3] Of those four copper exporters, the two African countries (Zambia and Zaire) produced 1,319,000 short tons of copper in 1973 compared to 1,053,000 short tons for their Latin American counterparts.[3] As the U.S. increases its imports of copper (and it already imported more than 670,000 short tons in 1973) it is likely that it will have to look to African sources for roughly 56% of its mushrooming need for foreign copper.

Nor is it only copper and oil which make us increasingly dependent on Africa. We now import 98% of all our manganese, 54% from Africa; 24% of our chrome comes from Africa; Zaire and Zambia provide 47% of our cobalt and Malagasy 22% of our graphite. All of the world's 53 most important minerals are found in Africa, and its iron reserves are twice those of the United States. Africa also has 42% of the world's cobalt, 34% of its bauxite and 23% of its uranium. It has the greatest hydroelectric power potential of any continent.[4]

In sum, if, as seems certain, we will become increasingly dependent upon imported energy and mineral resources, the United States *must, in its own selfish interest,* assure good relationships with African countries. Otherwise we run the risk that a "metals weapon" (like the "oil weapon" which was wielded so effectively by the Arab states in 1973) could be used against us. We must recognize our interdependence with Africa if we are to avoid a possible "metals crisis" which, the *Wall Street Journal* warned its readers, could follow the energy crisis.[5]

### U.S.-African Trade and Investment

In addition to our future need for Africa's resources, we currently make a handsome profit from our commercial relations with that continent. American trade with and investment in Africa is growing very rapidly. In the first six months of 1974, American exports to Africa increased 55% over the first half of 1973 (to $1,697,000,000) while our imports (mainly petroleum from Nigeria) more than doubled (to $2,737,600,000.)[6] American capital investment in Africa also continues to grow and could increase quite dramatically if American companies provide a major part of the capital for the *liquefied natural gas plants which are to* be constructed in Nigeria. Our investment in Black Africa (i.e., excluding South Africa and the North African countries) has reached approximately $2 billion.[7] It is commonly believed that the bulk of American investment in Africa is concentrated in South Africa. In fact, South Africa now accounts for less than a third of American capital investment in sub-Saharan Africa[8] and an even smaller portion of total U.S. African investment.



Working on a Mobil oil platform off the coast of Nigeria

Before passing to an analysis of what the U.S. "gives" to Africa in the form of foreign assistance, it might be useful to estimate what American exporters and investors "receive" in the way of profits from their African commercial relations. If we assume that American exports to Africa will total $3,400,000,000 in 1974 (roughly double the total for the first half of 1974) and we assume (conservatively) a 20% profit margin on exports, this would result in profits to U.S. exporters of some $680,000,000 on their 1974 exports to Africa. If we also assume a 20% annual return on U.S. investment in Africa (of some $3,500,000,000) this would yield an additional $700,000,000 profit. (Incidentally, a 20% rate of return is probably conservative for U.S. investments in Africa since the return averaged 26% in 1970[9] and is probably higher now *since so much investment in Africa is* in oil production. The dramatic increases in price for petroleum products have undoubtedly further augmented the earnings of U.S. oil companies operating in Africa.)

*In summary, U.S. companies during 1974 will likely earn in the area of $1,380,000,000 from African investments and trade.* I do not mean to imply by the foregoing that these economic relationships with Africa solely benefit U.S. companies. Obviously, trade and investment are eagerly sought after by most African nations. There is clearly a considerable developmental impact from well-planned and managed foreign investments which meet national development criteria. While the oil companies, for example, are making considerable profits from their African investments, they have, at the same time, helped produce enormous new sources of development funds for the host governments. Nevertheless, while recognizing that American trade and investment are usually desired for their own sake by Africans, we should also remember that these commercial dealings are very profitable for the U.S. companies concerned.

The Foreign Assistance Authoriza-

## U.S. OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
(Millions of Dollars)

| | Fiscal Years | Total ODA | Africa | Africa % of Total | Latin America | Latin America % of Total | South Vietnam | South Vietnam % of Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1962 | 4,413 | 430 | 9.7 | 956 | 21.7 | 156 | 3.5 |
| Kennedy | :1963 | 4,331 | 477 | 11.0 | 927 | 21.4 | 196 | 4.5 |
| | (1964 | 4,007 | 354 | 8.8 | 1,039 | 25.9 | 222 | 5.5 |
| | (1965 | 4,090 | 300 | 7.3 | 1,070 | 26.2 | 277 | 6.8 |
| | (1966 | 4,768 | 335 | 7.0 | 1,138 | 23.9 | 737 | 15.5 |
| Johnson | :1967 | 3,934 | 357 | 9.1 | 922 | 23.4 | 568 | 14.4 |
| | (1968 | 4,089 | 318 | 7.8 | 1,062 | 26.0 | 537 | 13.1 |
| | (1969 | 3,515 | 333 | 9.5 | 740 | 21.1 | 414 | 11.8 |
| | (1970 | 3,668 | 275 | 7.5 | 907 | 24.7 | 477 | 13.0 |
| | (1971 | 3,429 | 324 | 9.4 | 464 | 13.5 | 576 | 16.8 |
| Nixon | :1972 | 3,589 | 299 | 8.3 | 581 | 16.2 | 455 | 12.7 |
| | (1973 | 4,113 | 257 | 6.2 | 842 | 20.5 | 502 | 12.2 |
| 62-73 Totals & Average % | | 47,946 | 4,059 | 8.5 | 10,648 | 22.2 | 5,117 | 10.7 |

*Sources: "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, July 1, 1945-June 30, 1971" Office of Statistics and Reports, AID (May, 1972), pages 9, 32, 64, 82.*
*"U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, July 1, 1945-June 30, 1973" Office of Statistics and Reports, AID (May, 1974), pages 9, 33, 81, 84.*

tion Law approved by Congress in December 1973 put particular emphasis on aid programs that would most directly benefit the lowest income groups in the developing countries assisted by the United States. By that criterion, Africa should receive a much larger percentage of U.S. development assistance than is the case. (See Table) African countries are, within the entire developing world, generally much younger (most gained independence in the early 1960's), much poorer, and have less developed systems of education, transportation, power, and industrial infrastructure than is true in most other areas of the Third World.

Africa holds 16 of the 25 poorest nations in the world so identified at the April 1972 UNCTAD meeting in Chile. Only one country (Haiti) is in Latin America. In addition, African countries make up 20 of the 32 nations in the world judged by United Nations' experts to be so poor and so short of food that crop failures and the high prices of grain, fertilizer and petroleum threaten them with bankruptcy and their people with starvation.[10]

The problems of these desperately poor African countries have been greatly exacerbated by the dramatic increase in oil prices. As Robert McNamara, President of the World Bank, said in the 1974 Annual Report, "Perhaps the most important conclusion that emerges from an analysis of the year's events is that it is the poorest countries that will be hit hardest".[11] The plight of the poor nations resulting from the quadrupling of oil prices is so staggering that $5 billion would need to be provided by the end of 1975 just to keep those countries at the same level they had in 1973.[12] A study done by a German-American team on behalf of the Club of Rome (an international group of industrialists, scientists, economists and sociologists that sponsored an earlier study entitled "The Limits of Growth") projects that developed countries will have to make annual investments of $250 billion in the developing countries in order to avoid "apocalyptic upheavals."[13]

In short, the scale of need in the developing countries is enormous and the world situation is becoming dangerously explosive as the gap between rich nations and poor nations increases. Within that group of poor, developing nations, Africa has the greatest number of deprived countries.

And yet, despite the emphasis in the 1973 aid legislation on the poorest groups in the developing world, the U.S. aid program continues to neglect Africa, relatively, while at the same time our overall aid effort declines drastically.

### Africa—Low Man On The Aid Totem Pole

Given Africa's relatively greater need, a responsive U.S. development assistance program should give greater emphasis to that continent. Unfortunately, the opposite is the case and has been, historically, since the first days of African independence. As the Table shows, Africa's share of U.S. official development assistance to less developed countries averaged only 8.5% from 1962 through 1973. It reached a high of 11% under President Kennedy but has generally declined since that time, reaching a low of 6.2% in the last recorded year under President Nixon. By contrast, Latin America, which has approximately the same population as those African countries which have received U.S. Development assistance, has consistently received from two to three times the amount of aid which went to Africa (except for the single year, 1971). Why does Latin

America get such special emphasis in our aid program? African countries are much poorer (average per capita income $223 compared with Latin American per capita income of $604[14]) and, as noted earlier, Africa has 16 of the poorest 25 nations in the world while Latin America has only one. Similarly, of the 32 nations described as "close to starvation" by the United Nations, 20 are African and only four are in Latin America. Latin America has not only had the special "Alliance for Progress" Program but Congress, in 1970, established the Inter-American Foundation, whose objective is to increase individual participation in the Latn American development process. No similar foundation has been established for either Africa or Asia.[15]

It has sometimes been argued that the relative overemphasis on Latin America by the U.S. is made necessary because of our historical ties with that area while the British and French have taken relatively greater responsibility for assistance to Africa where they previously had colonies. That argument may have had some validity in the early 1960's but as British and French development assistance plummets (see Graph) no one is taking up the slack in their African programs.

The per capita income of Latin America, we have seen, is higher than Africa to begin with. Nevertheless, the total receipts from all major donors to Latin America is considerably higher than for Africa. In 1972 per capita receipts of resource flows in Africa was $9.80. The comparable figure in Latin America was $13.40. Similarly, the average for 1969-1972 for Africa was $9.60 while the four-year average for Latin America was $13.75.[16] Thus *our* deemphasis on Africa has *not* been counterbalanced by large efforts of others.

Finally, we have a "special relationship" with Africa that is probably more important than our unique historical ties with Latin America; namely it is the continent of origin for 20,000,000 U.S. Blacks. That special U.S. relationship with Africa is being increasingly recognized and articulated by Black Americans. In summary, by every criteria, U.S. assistance to Africa should be considerably larger than U.S. assistance to Latin America. Those factors include: the greater poverty of African countries; the special relationship of a large portion of the American community to Africa; and, the disproportionate flow of resources now going to Latin America from other sources. If Congress is really serious about aiding the poorest in the Third World, why the continuing neglect of Africa?

The pattern of eroding U.S. aid to Africa continued through fiscal year 1974. Last year U.S. AID loans and grants to Africa totaled $135 million (*including* the special allocation of $25 million for drought relief in the Sahel[17]) with the result that *1974 marks the lowest level of AID loans and grants to Africa since the inception of the African aid program in the early 1960's.*[18]

Iron-mining in Liberia; Africa's iron reserves are twice those of the U.S.

Cassiterite mining for tin in Zaire

There is one bright spot in recent U.S. aid to Africa, however, which should be noted. This is the extremely ambitious drought relief program mounted by AID for the Sahelian countries. "Because of what the United States has done, many families have survived who would otherwise have perished."[19] U.S. drought aid will total some $140 million for the six afflicted countries. This means that more than 42% of all aid to Sahel will come from the United States.[20] This special response to the drought problem in Africa is an interesting example which will be discussed further in the concluding section dealing with the problem of building a constituency for aid in the United States.

The Graph, which shows changes in aid flows from the early '60's to the early '70's as a percentage of GNP, dramatizes just how great a diminution in our aid effort has occurred since 1962. Only France has experienced a greater reduction in the percentage of Gross National Product devoted to aid. Of the 16 DAC countries (members of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD) 11 have *increased* the percentage of GNP devoted to foreign aid since 1962 while five countries (Italy, United Kingdom, Germany, U.S. and France) have *decreased* their aid efforts in that period. For 1972, the U.S. at .29%, ranked close to the bottom of the 16 countries in terms of the percentage of GNP going to foreign assistance. Only Switzerland (.22%), Japan (.21%), Austria (.09%) and Italy (.08%) ranked lower. And of those four countries, three (Switzerland, Japan, and Austria) *increased* their aid efforts from 1962 to '72 while the U.S. was, during the same period, dramatically decreasing its effort. Of the four countries ranking lower than the U.S. in percentage of GNP devoted to aid, only Italy—a country tottering on the verge of national bankruptcy—shared with the United States the dubious distinction of a decrease in aid effort during the past decade.

The decline of U.S. aid as a percent of GNP has been a steady process ever since World War II. In 1949 the U.S. gave 2.78% of its GNP in economic assistance to other nations.[21] The 1949 level was roughly 10 times the aid effort of the 1972 level.

Further, the present value of U.S. foreign assistance should be deflated to account for inflation. From 1962 to '72, the purchasing power of the Dollar declined more than 30%. The decline has been even more rapid since. This means that simply to maintain the 1962 level of development assistance ($4,413,000,000) would have required $5,737,000,000 in 1972. Similarly, to maintain the $430,000,000 level devoted to Africa in 1962 would have required $559,000,000 in 1972. In fact, our African aid expenditures for Africa in '72 and '73 averaged only about half that amount. Given the further aid decline in '74 (combined with accelerating inflation) it is obvious that *we are now giving Africa less than half the development assistance (in real terms) which we gave in 1962.*

### Aid And The Balance Of Payments

There is one other myth about American aid which ought to be set right, and that is that our aid program is "wrecking the U.S. balance of payments" as the *Reader's Digest* recently said.[22] This is completely untrue. In the first place, 85 to 90% of all aid dollars go to purchase U.S. goods and services.[23] As a result, for the overwhelming portion of U.S. aid, there is no adverse effect on the balance of payments. In addition, given the repayment (with interest) on past loans each year, the total economic development aid program actually has a *positive* effect on our balance of payments. Those loan repayments have averaged approximately $800 million in the last two years or roughly 20% of the annual development assistance total.[24] If, therefore, 85 to 90% of the foreign aid program is comprised of purchases of U.S. goods and services and if an-

Africa needs trained manpower; a Peace Corps teacher in Ethiopia




NOTE: Figures at the "1962" line show percentage of GNP devoted in that year to official development assistance for the 16 months of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The 1972 level is given at the end of the bar graph for each country.
SOURCE: 1973 Review of Development Cooperation, OECD (Nov. 1973) page 189

*The Portuguese "aid effort" should not be included in DAC statistics since Portugal's assistance program went almost exclusively to support the development of its then "overseas provinces"—Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. Since Portugal maintained (until the April coup) that these provinces were integral parts of Portugal itself, resource flows going to them should no more be counted as development aid than federal revenue sharing in the United States. Both are obviously, internal transfers.*

other 20% of its value is made up of repayments of earlier year loans, then the current operation of the program actually has a 5 to 10% *positive* annual impact on our balance of payments.

### Can The Decline In U.S. Foreign Aid Be Reversed?

I believe it can—and indeed, must be reversed. It has become increasingly fashionable for liberals and conservatives alike to attack the U.S. foreign aid program. On the conservative side, George Wallace claimed at the 1972 Democratic Convention that the U.S. had squandered $212 billion in foreign give-aways. In fact, only $66 billion of that sum had gone to aid developing nations while the rest was either Marshall Plan aid to Europe or military assistance.[25] Similarly, Senator Church, in his famous "Farewell to Foreign Aid: A Liberal Takes Leave", used a good number of misleading numbers concerning what the U.S. foreign aid program really "costs" the United States each year.[26] More recently, Democratic Senator Russell Long said "The foreign aid program was supposed to have been over with 20 years ago, and they are spending more than $8 billion a year on it".[27] I'm not sure who ever said aid should have stopped 20 years ago (which would mean *before* most African countries became independent!). Long seems to imply that the foreign aid program should have ended once Europe recovered and that aid to developing nations is not really in the U.S. interest. Also, his figure of $8

billion a year is more than double actual official development assistance (which is the only fair way of judging the U.S. aid program). A recent article in the *Reader's Digest* by Robert Strother claims that the total foreign aid bill "comes to nearly $11 billion".[28] However, both Strother and Senator Long apparently include U.S. military assistance in their numbers. This would encompass, for example, the extraordinary $2.2 billion grant to Israel to enable it to rebuild its armaments after the 1973 Mideast War. A House study done in 1974 sets the total foreign aid figure at $20 billion but that included $7 billion for lending activities of the Export-Import Bank, which do nothing except finance the sale of U.S. commodities and provide substantial revenues to the U.S. Treasury.[29] In the numbers game, one has to be very careful. Actual official development aid to poor countries is $4 billion, not 8, 11 or $20 billion as critics have variously claimed.

Other critics have included Senate Majority Leader Mansfield, who has begun to vote against aid appropriations consistently even though he is in favor of "People to People" aid where there are real needs. Mansfield recently said that the American people would support such a direct aid program but not to "military dictators".[30]

Senator Alan Cranston, a liberal Democrat from California, has also come out against aid to "repressive dictatorships".[31] While the Mansfield and Cranston lines might be useful if we could all agree on what constitutes a "repressive dictatorship" or a "military dictator", it completely ignores the fact that even in so called "dictatorships" there are pressing human needs. Dictatorships do not last forever and is it right to punish the people in a "dictatorship" because we disapprove of their government leaders for which, by definition, they are not responsible?

Senator Cranston apparently favors terminating all drought relief activities in Africa since he includes in his list of "repressive dictatorships" all of the six Sahelian states (Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta) as well as drought-stricken Ethiopia. Thus, by the Cranston test, the U.S. should not have launched a major drought relief effort despite the fact that there has been clear public support in the United States for a humanitarian response to that disaster. Cranston goes on to list a large number of other African countries for whom he would stop aid, including Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Liberia, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zaire. Some of these countries do have military-led governments at present, many of which have accomplished more for the welfare of their people than was true under earlier Westminster Parliamentarian models. Curiously, many of the countries on the Cranston list do *not* have military leadership and are, in fact, quite open societies with contested, free elections (even though under a "one party" umbrella). The source of Cranston's list of "repressive dictatorships" may be the Freedom House "Comparative Survey of Freedom"[32] which is, at best, a crude shorthand method for classifying countries according to American preconceptions; at worst, plain wrong in the categorization of many countries in the world, and particularly weak in its analysis of the current situation in African countries. I hope that Cranston's attack on aid to such African countries was more the result of the hurried preparation of position papers during a reelection campaign than a final judgment on such a complicated problem.



Copper-processing in Zambia

### Can An American Aid Program Be Justified To The Public So That An Informed Constituency Will Emerge For Aid?

I believe it can. Any discussion should probably start with the humanitarian needs of developing countries. Americans are still in favor of aiding poor countries primarily for moral and humanitarian reasons.[33] Senator Mansfield, himself, has indicated that the American public will support "People to People" aid efforts and the public sympathy for assisting others at the time of national disasters such as the drought in Africa, floods in Bangla-

(Continued on page 54)

INTERVIEW

This interview with the Administrative Secretary General of the Organization of Africa Unity was carried out by the editor of **Africa Report,** Anthony J. Hughes.

# William Eteki Mboumoua

AFRICA REPORT: Mr. Secretary-General, May I ask you first about your own role. Some critics allege that the secretary general is nothing more than a messenger boy for the African Heads of State. At the other extreme former holders have been criticized for taking too much initiative. How do you view your role?

ETEKI: Your question is rather aggressive and provocative but I shall answer it. There is nothing in the relevant provisions of our Organization to restrict the role of the Secretary-General to that of office boy or messenger for the Heads of State. I think that if there has been some complaint it is because this is all a matter of style, the Organization itself being a tissue of contradictions. It would be difficult for the Secretary General to satisfy each and every one of the tendencies and contradictions which go to make up the Organization.

As far as I personally am concerned, I am not well qualified to be a messenger boy. In playing such a role, in trying to play such a role, I would risk becoming the bearer of contradictory messages, which would be rather difficult.

Speaking objectively, I believe that the role of the Secretary General is to be a kind of vector, giving dynamic direction to the conflicting positions. The Secretary General has a triple or quadruple role. He must implement as faithfully as possible what has been resolved by the supreme councils of the Organization. His job is to animate and to give dynamic direction to the machinery of the Secretariat. His role is to prepare the most effective and appropriate strategies and actions for the realization of the aims and objectives of the Organization. As you see, that is not a passive role. On the contrary, it envisages a dynamic conception. Furthermore, I would add another role to the Secretary General; it is up to him to contribute to the projection of a clear image of the Organization. After all, he is permanent so it's up to him whenever possible to present to the public the position of the member states regarding the principal problems faced by those states.

I said on another occasion and put this in a fairly concise form when I said that the Secretary General is both the promoter and the entrepreneur—so he can't be the office boy!

AFRICA REPORT: Do you think that Africa's Third World colleagues have a special duty to aid their brothers in their economic difficulties? Do you think that those Afro-Arab colleagues who have oil revenues have an even more specific obligation to help, above all in cases where the African countries have a particular problem with meeting the increased cost of oil?

ETEKI: Looking at it objectively, I think the Third World, as a group, has a certain number of characteristics, which in themselves create solidarity. They belong to a world which is exploited, both economically and politically. They belong to a world which has been excluded from international decision-making for a long time. They belong to an emerging world, anxious to affirm its right to dignity. Finally, they belong to a world which has a common political orientation regarding the rights of the individual. All that provides an objective base for unity but the solidarity must not only be political. This unity would be more effective if it were also economic, as far as relations with the powers which dominate and control world business are concerned. Furthermore, it should be an economic unity to the extent that we can organize a sort of autonomous economic entity in which we would be among equals; if you like, in such a way that I really believe that those countries which have greater means might help the others. This would be aid not in the charitable sense but rather in the sense of co-assistance, mutual aid, according to which each one can develop and each can draw profit. This applies to our friends in the Arab countries who, by good fortune, are in possession of capital funds. Instead of those funds being invested in industrialized countries, which already have their own capital, they could be invested in African countries, who have the greatest need of them. As I said, not in the sense of charity but in the sense of enlightened self-interest.

I think an effort has been made in this direction which needs encouraging. We have to nurture this effort and create a favorable climate for such cooperation. That's the way I see it and I think the Arab countries themselves would get something out of it. I believe that natural resources can become exhausted. If one day the oil dried up in those countries and if the revenues derived from the exploitation of the oil were not invested in places where it would produce a permanent return, I think that would be a bad thing. Now, the African countries present exactly that enormous potential for building up the present capital funds. I believe that to be most certainly in the interests of both Arabs and Africans.

AFRICA REPORT: If the political will is there for trans-

fers, investment, from Arab countries to Africa, are the existing institutions able to cope or are new organizations necessary for channeling those funds?

ETEKI: I believe that there are numerous institutions already existing which could undertake this function. Some of the Arab countries have such institutions. In Africa itself we have the African Development Bank. It is therefore fair to question whether we really need yet another body. Such a new institution would have to be shown to be absolutely necessary; that is to say, it would have to be of maximum utility and efficiency. I am not convinced that would be the case at the moment. One can perfectly well make use of the existing institutions.

AFRICA REPORT: Turning to Southern Africa, Sir, so long as Angola does not have an independent majority-rule government there is a danger of a White, UDI, supported by outside elements. Why did the OAU not carry out contingency planning of a military kind to meet such a threat?

ETEKI: You should know that if the OAU did not immediately take concrete measures to meet the possible threat of the creation of a Rhodesia-type situation, it was not because we hadn't thought about it but because we already have the structural provisions. The Committee of the Commission of Defense of the OAU is already in existence and can be convened at any time. I must admit that the event in Mozambique, in Lorenco Marques, for example, came as a surprise to us, to everyone. Perhaps that will lead to initiatives providing for structures and preparations aimed at responding with maximum speed and effect to situations which could disrupt the steady progress of majorities towards independence. In some way, one can say that what happened in Mozambique was a salutary lesson since it taught us to be prepared. I think the African states have given thought to that and I should inform you that one of them—Congo—asked for a meeting, an extraordinary session, of the OAU Council of Ministers to consider this question. If this session does not take place, through lack of a two-thirds support, the problem will nevertheless be debated very soon in another session of the Organization.

AFRICA REPORT: Mr. Secretary-General, Africa has protested at violations of Rhodesian sanctions by foreign powers. There are well-documented instances of continuing blatant violations by a West African country. What has the OAU done about that situation? I can name the country in question: Gabon.

ETEKI: Listen, I don't have the facts on this problem but right away I should say that as far as sanctions against Rhodesia are concerned, the trade of Western countries with Rhodesia is more significant than that of any African countries with Rhodesia. If we concentrate our criticism upon the European countries it's because at the present time we are of the opinion that it is thanks to their support for Rhodesia, thanks to their failure effectively to implement sanctions, against Rhodesia, that that country remains strong. Any trade which Rhodesia might have with one African country or another is infinitely negligible and does not really contribute to reinforcing their attitude of quasi-apartheid, of racial discrimination.

AFRICA REPORT: Although it might not be important economically, perhaps it is of psychological importance for Rhodesia, in whatever way it can, to continue contacts with African states. Don't you agree?

ETEKI: That may be so. But that does not prevent an African country—and I do not know that there is such a country—that does not prevent that country from remaining loyal to the struggle which the OAU is waging against Rhodesia or from participating in all the action which the Organization is taking in this matter. Anything else can be regarded as marginal. It may be surprising but it is of no great importance.

AFRICA REPORT: There has been talk of the creation of an Africa High Command. Is there progress towards such a concept in the way of multilateral military cooperation of a practical nature? Are there contingency plans, for example, for help for Zambia in the event of a Rhodesian seizure of Kariba Dam? Of help for Mozambique in the event of a South African strike to protect its transportation outlets? Of help for Angola in the event of a foreign-supported attempt at secession by, say, Cabinda or other regions?

ETEKI: I think I have already more or less answered that question. The African approach is a pragmatic one. I believe that what is most important is to be prepared to meet any serious situation which might arise with maximum speed. We are prepared for that. The structure exists.

AFRICA REPORT: Mr. Secretary-General, what practical, concrete moves towards African unity would you like to see achieved during your term of office?

ETEKI: If the process of decolonization continues in the way it is now developing and goes still further I shall be very happy.

*Regarding the aim of building African unity I hope* to be able to concentrate more on action producing concrete measures, based upon the notions of unity and integration, I want Africa to be integrated. That is say, I look forward to the achievement of concrete technical and economic objectives, in the field of the complementality of our economies, in the field of organizing communications, in the field of developing the exchange of information, in the field of creating channels which will bring Africans closer to one another, in the field of making Africa aware of its unity—a true unity, culturally, geographically, politically and also strategically.

I think we have to bring the concepts of unity and of the organization of unity down from the peaks of leadership to the level of the ordinary people, to the level of the African masses. In that way they will perceive the need for unity, they will perceive their common Africanness and they will create the conditions for genuine solidarity.

If efforts can be made, if a beginning can be made towards achieving such results during my term of office, I shall be very happy. □

NEWS ANALYSIS

# The Success of Seretse

At a time when the political future of the Southern African sub-continent is the focus of such international interest, it might be expected that a general election in the strategically important republic of Botswana would receive wide publicity. Moreover a democratically-run general election in Africa, on a multi-party basis, eight years after independence, is by now a rare event and this alone might have been expected to lead the world press to give it wide coverage. Yet symbolically, although it was the British government that gave Botswana its independence in 1966, the *British Broadcasting Corporation* did not see the results as important enough to warrant any mention in its domestic broadcasts. American media also virtually ignored the election. Discouraging as the fact may be for democrats in Botswana and elsewhere, it can perhaps be construed as a compliment that Botswana's free multi-racial (or more correctly non-racial) democracy in the heart of south-central Africa should be taken for granted.

The electoral system and the mechanics of voting follow a pattern familiar in Commonwealth Africa at independence. The election of a President is directly tied to the election of members of Parliament through a system of endorsement; moreover since a recent constitutional amendment the President (i.e. the leader of the successful party or coalition) is an *ex officio* member of the National Assembly. New constituency boundaries drawn up by an independent Delimitation Commission came into effect at this election, and resulted in the number of seats being increased to thirty two, the changes following population movements revealed in the recent census; this makes precise comparisons on a constituency basis difficult. The Government ran a campaign to persuade citizens to vote, and the government-owned *Botswana Daily News* gave reasonable coverage to all four parties, who were also each permitted to broadcast their message over *Radio Botswana*. The tolerant ethos prevalent, characterized by a good-natured cynicism and a willingness to let everyone have their say, is typical of the political style of the country. It is President Khama's major ambition to demonstrate to a sceptical Southern Africa that a free, multi-racial and stable democracy is a real option, not only for Botswana but for all her neighbors. He sees it as Botswana's mission to show an example which could lead to a peaceful solution of the problems of the sub-continent. Thus Sir Seretse has repeatedly rejected the idea of imposing a "one-party" state, which is seen to be as incompatible with democracy as is racial exclusiveness. Four parties contested this election—the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP or "Domkrag"), the Botsawana People's Party (BPP), the Botswana National Front (BNF) and the Botswana Independence Party (BIP).

Nevertheless it has been a fact of political life since independence that the Democratic Party is the only national party in terms of organization and support. The party has contested every parliamentary and local government seat and without exception saved its deposit in every constituency. The BDP moreover is the only one to employ full-time organizers and maintain party offices in the capital, Gaborone, and three outlying centres. Yet even the BDP had stopped publishing its party newspaper (*"Therisanye/Consultation"*) soon after the 1969 general election; an "election special" was produced in time for this year's poll. The People's Party newspaper *"Masa"* (*"The Dawn"*) has not appeared for many years, while the National Front publication *"Puo Phaa"* (*"Straight Talk"*) never resumed regular publication after being involved in a sedition case, even though the charges were eventually dropped. Political communication thus is very much personalized, in the opposition case relying heavily on the Members of Parliament and a handful of key district councillors. A ruling party has the obvious advantage that its policies become government policies and can then be legitimately propagated to the masses, as was done by a well organized radio listening groups campaign on the current National Development Plan.

It is rather difficult to characterize the nature and support for the Democratic Party. Founded as a conservative counter to the older People's Party, and with the tremendous advantage of the leadership of Seretse Khama, born chief of the largest clan, the Bangwato, the party was originally supported by most chiefs. Seretse's persecution in the late 1940's at the hands, ironically, of a British Labor government under

*Mr. Macartney was until recently Lecturer in Government at the School of Social and Economic Studies of the University of Botswana, Lesetho and Swaziland at Gaborone.*

pressure from South Africa, made him a hero far beyond the bounds of Bechuanaland, while, paradoxically, his enforced abdication of the hereditary title made it possible for his formidable talents to be deployed in the political sphere. Other key figures however included Quett Masire, a progressive Bangwaketse farmer and teacher with no pretentions to royal blood. Dr. Masire as General Secretary is the central party figure, Vice-President of the Republic, leader of the National Assembly, and Minister of Finance and Development Planning. Another important party man is K. P. Morake, now Minister of Education (formerly Minister of Local Government and Lands). He, Masire and the Executive Secretary, Patrick Balopi, have provided the professional organization which has consolidated the BDP's support all over the country. In addition the BDP has been able to draw on financial support from much of the business community; recently they invested money in building Tsholetsa House, in central Gaborone, the rents from which will assure the party of sufficient income in the years ahead. Thus the BDP has become increasingly the natural ruling party, producing a long and serious manifesto which reads somewhat like a five-yearly Presidential address to the nation. The Democratic Party benefit greatly, it is true, from the able leadership of Sir Seretse, but has consolidated itself into a position to continue as an institution for the foreseeable future. Opposing the Domkrag giant is thus a daunting task. The main interest in Botswana politics has accordingly centered on how opposition could be organized.

To understand what makes two of the Opposition parties tick, one has to go back in history to the foundation in 1960 of the BPP as the Bechuanaland People's Party, the first nationalist party. The BPP leader, Philip Matante, to this day makes sturdy anti-colonialist noises, between cryptic utterances about being the best Leader of the Opposition that Sir Seretse could hope for. The BPP still have a scattering of support in various parts of the country but their main strength lies in the small, land-hungry North-East District and Francistown, both still dominated to some extent by the detested land-owning Tati Company. Splits within the BPP led before independence to the formation by Motsamai Mpho of the Botswana Independence Party. Defeated in the 1965 election, Mpho made a surprise come-back in 1969 and is the most consistent radical and modern voice in the National Assembly. The main opposition in terms of votes comes from the National Front, founded in 1966 by a number of the critics of Domkrag and inspired by the intellectual Dr. Kenneth Koma.

Originally conceived and referred to as a United Front to unite all opposition, it failed in its main objective but moved to fill the role of a radical urban opposition, strongest in Gaborone and Lobatse. The far-reaching decision to ally with the disaffected veteran Chief Bathoen II (pronounced Bat-weighing) of the Bangwaketse clan, and to nominate him as a "figurehead" Presidential candidate, boomeranged: while it succeeded in gaining for the BNF three Bangwaketse seats in 1969 the conservative Chief alienated many radical voters and proceeded to outmaneuver the radical wing to gain control of the party outside as well as within Parliament. The contradications within the BNF, as well as the lack of a readily-understood policy, have led once again to the creation of a vacuum on the Left of politics. The disarray of the three opposition parties—they disagreed amongst themselves more often than they opposed the Government in unison—was manifest in the National Assembly, whose debates provide the clearest guide to party positions.

To understand the significance of the 1974 elections it should be recalled that in the contest preceding independence in 1966 the ruling BDP won all but three of the seats. In 1969 the BDP total was reduced by four seats, one in the North-West being lost to the BIP and three in the South going to the BNF. Moreover in that same 1969 election the BDP only retained its hold by greatly reduced majorities on a further three seats (one in the North-West and two urban constituencies) and was fortuitously unopposed in one other. Elsewhere in 1969 its position had been fairly secure and, indeed, it did make inroads in the BPP margin in the three seats held by that party.

Hence the real arena of 1974 was in the seven opposition-held seats (three BPP, three BNF and one BIP) and in the BDP marginals mentioned above.

Nomination day provided in some ways the biggest surprises. Four BDP candidates were returned unopposed; significantly one of these was in the constituency of Mmadinare, which contains Selebi-Phikwe, largest and newest town in the Republic and centre of the booming copper-nickel industry and a "natural" centre for radical opposition. No single party other than Domkrag contested more than half the

Table I

| Party | 1974 Seats won | 1974 Share of total votes cast | 1974 No. of candidates | 1969 Seats won | 1969 Share of total votes cast | 1969 No. of candidates | 1965 Seats won | 1965 Share of total votes cast | 1965 No. of candidates |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BDP | 27 | 76.7% | 32 | 24 | 68.6% | 31 | 28 | 80.4% | 31 |
| BIP | 1 | 4.8% | 6 | 1 | 6.0% | 9 | 0 | 4.6% | 24 |
| BNF | 2 | 11.5% | 14 | 3 | 13.5% | 21 | — | — | — |
| BPP | 2 | 6.5% | 8 | 3 | 11.9% | 15 | 3 | 14.2% | 26 |
| Ind. &) others) | 0 | 0.5% | 3 | — | — | — | 0 | 0.8% | 2 |
| Total | 32 | 100.0% | 63 | 31 | 100.0% | 76 | 31 | 100.0% | 83 |

**THE NEW CABINET OF BOTSWANA**

President: Sir Seretse Khama
Vice President and Minister of Finance & Development Planning: Dr. Q. K. J. Masire
Minister of Mineral Resources & Water Affairs: M. K. Segokgo
Minister of Agriculture: E. S. Masisi
Minister of Works and Communications: J. G. Haskins
Minister of Education: K. P. Morake
Minister of Home Affairs: B. K. Kgari
Minister of Health: M. P. K. Nwako
Minister of Local Government and Lands: L. Makgekgenene
Minister of State, Office of the President (Foreign Affairs): A. M. Mogwe*
Minister of State, Office of the President (Public Service Information and Broadcasting): D. K. Kwelagobe
Assistant Minister of Finance and Development Planning: P. Mmusi*
Assistant Minister of Local Government and Lands: L. M. Seretse*
Minister of Commerce and Industry: to be appointed

*new member

seats, and instead of the expected four, only two Presidential candidates were nominated: Sir Seretse Khama and ex-Chief Bathoeñ Gaseitsiwe, leader of the National Front. From then on the overall result was a foregone conclusion. The interest therefore focused not on who would win but on how the three rival opposition parties would fare. Another point of interest was the Democratic Party's list of candidates, widely expected to reveal sweeping changes. In the event however only one sitting MP was not readopted (and one other dropped out). One white candidate was adopted for a safe BDP seat, underlining the multi-racial nature of Domkrag; his opponent, as it turned out, lost his deposit.

On polling day the BDP gained, on paper, two seats, one from the BPP and one from the BNF. The BDP triumph however was greater than that: if it had polled the same votes as in 1969 it would automatically have lost Maun & Chobe to the BIP (in a straight fight) and Gaborone to the BNF (owing to re-delimitation). By holding these seats the BDP showed a positive swing to Domkrag and in the Gaborone result dealt a severe blow to the prestige of the BNF Vice-President Dr Kenneth Koma. His intellectual counterpart in the BDP Dr. Quett Masire, who had suffered the humiliation of defeat by the BNF Leader in Kanye South in 1969, and remained in the National Assembly only by co-option, took a big gamble by contesting BNF-held Ngwaketse-Kgalagadi rather than a safe seat elsewhere.

Masire's sweeping success brought rejoicing crowds to State House and has secured his position as deputy leader of the party and Government. Moreover by smashing the myth of the "tribalization" of Botswana politics this constituency result was by far the most significant of the election. By contrast the BDP gain of Mochudi, a heavily altered constituency, in a three-cornered fight, was almost predictable, especially since the previous BPP incumbent had died shortly before the dissolution. Elsewhere three of the five remaining opposition seats have been reduced to marginals, the exceptions being the BNF strongholds of Kanye North and Kanye South. The BDP campaigned on the platform that "the Batswana have never been better off".

Table II

| Party | Symbol:Color | Leader |
|---|---|---|
| Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) | jack:red | Sir Seretse Khama |
| *Botswana Independence Party (BIP)* | cow:green | *Motsamai Mpho* |
| Botswana National Front (BNF) | key:black | Bathoeñ Gaseitsiwe |
| Botswana Peoples Party (BPP) | star:yellow | Philip Matante |

It is increasing mineral wealth that provides the Government with the resources for its strategy of achieving balance growth, involving heavy subsidies for rural infrastructure. To this end a start was made with an ambitious and highly visible Accelerated Rural Development Programme, the first phase of which ended just before the election. The hope is that a boom in agriculture, commerce and light industry will follow, to cushion the rural population against the nightmare of recurrent droughts. Of more immediate significance for the election was a substantial rise in civil service salaries—reversing previous incomes policy but particularly benefitting the lowest paid government employees. More recently a measure to control profiteering was announced and was undoubtedly very welcome. The decision to launch an independent currency, to replace the South African rand within two years, was likewise popular and has important long-term consequences. Just as welcome was the President's announcement that Botswana would take over the railway line run by Rhodesian Railways, thus ending the constant irritation of racial discrimination, practiced illegally by the Rhodesian management. The main theme of the BNF party political broadcast made by Dr. Koma was free primary education and improved urban housing, echoing points stressed in the party manifesto. In the BPP broadcast Matante promised a new constitution "not drawn up by foreigners" and a fair share for Batswana in the selling of diamonds from Orapa. Local grievances (land and chieftainship) and allegations of broken government promises, were more prominent in the opposition's rural campaigns.

None of the opposition parties can find much consolation in the results and will have to go away and do some hard thinking about their strategy in future. As the BDP celebrate their impressive victory and the opposition lick their wounds, however, the ruling party must worry about one thing: the extremely low turnout of 31.2% of registered voters (in the contested constituencies). *Apathy may reinforce* BDP rule in the short run, but in the long run it is a rather shaky foundation for democracy. □

TRAVEL

# Africa on the Cheap

"The barriers of misunderstanding will disappear only when there are sufficient numbers of non-racist, non-air-conditioned tourists traveling regularly through the continent."

**By RICHARD SYNGE**

There are many well-known reasons for vacationing in Africa—the game parks of East Africa, the historic sites of North Africa and Ethiopia, the vibrant culture of West Africa and the whole continent's marvelous beaches—but discovering such attractions is only scratching the surface. There is enough of lasting interest in Africa to occupy the adventurous traveler for a lifetime.

As education about Africa improves and more is written about travel across the continent new horizons will inevitably open up for the tourist who is bored with just sun and sea. Already growing numbers of young Europeans and North Americans are discovering the excitement of Africa in a way that no package tour could handle.

The tourists who benefit most from visiting Africa are those who take the time to understand its people and their way of life. Conversely Africa benefits from having such visitors who can honestly retell their experiences with enthusiasm. Too few tour companies allow room in their itineraries for the opportunity to learn about the Africa of now. They like to stage a fantasy world based on romanticism about the past.

The cushioned air-conditioned group tour approach to Africa has its place for the uninitiated tourist in a hurry or incapable of handling the unexpected, but it is ultimately self-defeating. The experience is always somehow second-hand. Really the only way to enjoy the vast spaces and the homely villages is to cut loose and travel alone, or with one companion.

It is neither difficult nor costly to enjoy Africa at first hand. The only precious Western commodity it requires is time. The more you get into Africa the less money you need to spend. I am not suggesting that tourists should become parasites on the community, but that the whole process of understanding Africa should not be evaluated in monetary terms.

Discovery of Africa demands a resistance to discomfort, which makes exploration primarily an activity of young people (but not exclusively). One has to be unencumbered by baggage, willing to take whatever form of transport is going and to sleep rough when necessary, untroubled by pressing family or financial responsibilities, and ready to be inspired to further adventures

*Richard Synge is an experienced traveler and writer on African affairs. He has been a contributor to Africa Research Bulletin, Africa magazine and African Development. He is editor of the recently-published Travelers' Guide to Africa and Assistant Editor of the annual Africa Contemporary Record.*

Baya basket-workers on the Trans-African route, East Cameroon



at a moment's notice.

These qualifications whittle down considerably the numbers of potential Africa ramblers which is no bad thing—but the most important qualification of all is yet to come. One has to like Africans. A scandalously high proportion of foreign tourists in Africa are either overt or covert racists.

In fact one or two African Governments regard tourism as a fundamentally racist activity. In view of the caliber of tourist one meets in their countries, this opinion may not be far removed from the truth. The barriers of misunderstanding will disappear only when there are sufficient numbers of non-racist, non-air-conditioned tourists traveling regularly through the continent.

The capital cities of Africa nearly all provide a good introduction to the countries they serve, even if many of them stand in stark contrast with the surrounding countryside. They all have the international facilities one might expect—at least one or two luxury hotels, travel agents, car hire services and organised tours, which can be used for a brief introduction.

Finding the cheaper hotels and restaurants takes a little time, but they are always there. There are also camping grounds and youth or mission hostels with cheap full board rates and the opportunity to meet other travellers if not local inhabitants.

Getting about within a city involves trial and error but there are always bus services with absurdly cheap fares. Taxi fares vary from city to city—expensive in Lagos and Nairobi but cheaper in most other cities especially if one is willing to travel with other passengers.

A convenient, cheap and intimate introduction to most cities is made by hiring a bicycle—easily done in West and Central Africa.

Capital cities are always worth visiting, for meeting people, making friends and learning what makes an African nation tick, as well as for cultural interest, entertainment and night life. But like cities everywhere they tend to be expensive. The main areas of Africa for easy travel by cheap public transport, and for good inexpensive accommodation, are the North, West and East. Getting **between** those regions presents special problems.

The Sahara Desert is one of the world's greatest barriers to communications but it is now regularly crossed by travellers in their own vehicles (preferably driving in convoy), or taking local buses and trucks. The precautions about desert travel should however always be taken seriously.

Only tackle the Sahara between October and May, when the cool or chilly nights demand warm clothing. The summer months are overpoweringly hot, both night and day. Stock up with food and a two-gallon water container per person to fill at wells along the way and you will both survive and enjoy it. The oases are wonderful islands of life in a sea of perpetual danger.

Once across the desert and into Nigeria life changes drastically. Cheap hotels and hostels with basic facilities for sleeping and washing are easily found in the cities of the north while every manner of vehicle carries passengers at rock-bottom prices. Fruit, vegetables, bread and other food are sold in the markets.

The other great barrier is the equatorial region between Cameroon and East Africa. In Cameroon itself however real live tourists are a common sight. The game parks

Cheap ferry transport from Bangui (CAR) to Zongo (Zaire) contrasts with the speedboats of French residents.

and mountain ranges of the north could take months to explore fully but to help you there are regular mini-buses passing the most remote villages where you can witness the wonderful dancing of the Kirdi people amid the eerie volcanic peaks of *the Kapsiki hills.*

Once out of Cameroon and into the Central African Republic things become more difficult for any traveller, whether on a restricted budget or an expense account. Americans however have one advantage over all other nationalities in that they do not require visas (ever since the astronauts called in to see Life-President Bokassa and gave him some moonrock). The principal problem in the CAR is an almost total absence of motor fuel.

The situation is even more complicated in the dense forests of north-eastern Zaire, where the roads are almost non-existent and there is no regular public transport at all. One must just hope to find the occasional passing vehicle. Accommodation is scarce too but the mission stations usually welcome visitors.

It is worth battling with the forests to emerge on the beautiful highlands of Eastern Zaire—a peaceful but intensely cultivated part of the world, revelling in a temperate climate. On the Zaire/Uganda border a five-day climb into the Ruwenzori (the Mountains of the Moon) is rewarded with an experience of weird vegetation, different climatic conditions every few hundred feet and rugged snow-covered peaks.

Once into Rwanda at the beautiful lakeside resort of Gisenyi one is firmly in East Africa and travel becomes a simple matter once again. Taking a ride with a passing lorry the journey may be slow, due to the steep gradients and rough road surface, but the marvellous scenery of Rwanda makes you want to take your time.

Rwanda's hard-working people have cultivated to the very tops of their huge mountains and if they are not rich in money terms they are wealthy in contentment and generosity.

Elsewhere in East Africa travel is exceptionally easy. Long-distance taxi, bus and train services are cheap and efficient. For the game parks however one must expect to have to pay for a tour vehicle—and to share with others in order to reduce costs.



Typical bar serving maize beer in the Zaire forests—*photographs in this section by the author.*

The coast is a world unto itself—relaxed and vibrant with colour and enjoyment of life. Remote spots like Lamu provide the cheapest accommodation and restaurants imaginable in a fascinating urban environment that has changed little in 100 years. Transport is by dhow.

Wherever the traveler goes in Africa he is confronted by the language problem. English and French get you around with consummate ease in the cities and towns, but in the villages and 'the bush' it is advisable to have at least a few key phrases of the main local language. A working knowledge of Arabic, Hausa and Swahili would be almost ideal.

As a general rule it is important to carry enough money to get out of anywhere in an emergency and enough to get through day-to-day living at whatever rate you can afford. As for clothes one change is all you need, since you are going to pick up a bundle of local garments as you go along: they are beautiful and suit the climate perfectly. In this way you can support local industries.

The more you see of Africa the more you want to see. And if you are not wealthy it is nice to know each time you go back that traveling cheaply is not only still possible but also the most rewarding and enjoyable way of seeing the continent. □

# More Than a Head Count

**"Before sending out census-takers it is going to be necessary to reassure a lot of people, who might identify the census with taxation, or military enlistment or even government harrassment."**

By URSULA WOLFF

How can you take a census of a village—when you don't know that the village exists? How accurate can your census figures be when the villagers tell you Ibrahim is alive and well and tilling the fields—and he died six months ago?

These are just a few of the scores of problems facing the census experts in some fifteen Francophone African countries scheduled to have their first general population census in 1975.

The key influence behind this sweeping census survey is the 41-member U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, at whose instigation an African Census Program has been established to help these first-timers, who include Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Niger, Chad, Mauretania, Upper Volta, Congo, Madagascar, Burundi, Sénégal, Central African Republic, Rwanda, Cameroon, and Guinea. Under this Program, almost all of these countries are or will be receiving technical and financial assistance from the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) or its offshoot, the U.N. Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA)—aid which has largely made these surveys possible. Of this group, only Guinea has not received U.N. assistance; its first census has been completed. For the costs involved in setting up such country-wide census programs are astronomical. In the Ivory Coast alone, a total of $3.5 million (826 million CFA) has been allocated for this purpose, of which the Ivoirian government is contributing over $2.6 million, with the rest funded by the UNDP.

But according to these governments, it is all worth the cost. Says Koko Kouakou Tano, the Ivory Coast's Director of Statistics, "It will, at last, give the Ivoirian government a photograph of the people; an essential point of departure on which we can base all further studies and development projects."

In Dakar, Abdou Karim Diop, Sénégal's Statistics Director confirms this view, "For overall economic and social development planning we have to know the structural base of our population, who they are, their age, where they live, their ethnic origins. At the same time, we hope these results will give us not only a population index, but a much-needed electoral list."

Most of these census surveys were originally slated for completion in 1974, in conjunction with World Population Year, but they have encountered so many obstacles that even the now revised 1975 goal seems optimistic.

One of the most frequently cited reasons for this census postponement has been the Sahelian drought and the consequent mass migrations. But other problems, too, have beset the census-takers and, to date, few of these have been resolved.

The biggest headache of all has probably been the lack of cartographic resources. Few up-to-date maps exist and those that do are often incomplete and inaccurate. In none of the countries visited are there any maps or lists that include villages, *campements*, or compounds: neither their place names, nor precise locations, nor any but the roughest idea of how many people are involved. Below the *arrondissement* level, the maps are blank and have to be filled in before any general census can take place. Thus, in Sénégal, where there are 90 mapped *arrondissements*, there remain an estimated 13,000 to 15,000 unmapped villages under this administrative unit!

How do you get this information in the fastest, most economical and efficient way? Where do you find the trained personnel to do the cartographic work? While Niger was deciding whether or not to use aerial photographs to speed up the process, at an estimated cost of $340,000 (80 million CFA) for Southern Niger alone, the Sénégalese group were wondering where to get the additional transportation necessary to finish their field work, which was only 20% completed by September—with the remaining 80% to be mapped and verified before next April's scheduled census. This cartographic work, which is the backbone of any census operation, requires not only a considerable outlay of money, personnel, and transportation, but it is a painstaking, time-consuming job as the Ivoirian plan confirms. For even after the old maps have been revised with the help of aerial photographs, these new additions still need field verification. For this purpose alone, the government anticipates sending out some 100 *agents de reconnaissance* who will personally have to check each place name and location on their regional lists and then confirm their findings with local officials.

If a dearth of cartographic resources was the number one problem for these countries, lack of transportation came a close second. (And even those governments that did not cite transportation as a problem now, will probably see it as a problem once their census gets under way!)

Distributing questionnaires to thousands of widely dispersed census-tak-

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ers—getting the census-takers around their locales to ask the questions—and then retrieving these questionnaires, all within a short period of time, is perhaps of little concern in a country like the U.S., but it's a logistics nightmare in Niger, Cameroon, or Sénégal. For many villages are far from the major roads and can only be reached by land-rover (when you have one to spare), horse, camel or, as is the case with some Sénégalese villages, on foot—with a 25-mile walk each way! To compound the problem, timing is a crucial factor, for if the actual survey takes too long, population shifts would make the figures invalid. Thus, in Niger, as a single example, they have to count an estimated 4,500,000 people within no more than 15 days. No easy task, given not only limited transportation, but also a lack of trained personnel, which was in short supply on all levels in all countries and constituted yet another major problem.

Training programs for both supervisory personnel and census takers are thus being planned in these countries, and will employ a pyramidal format which keeps head office training at a minimum. In Sénégal, the Dakar team will be responsible for training only 30 supervisors. These 30 are expected to train some 450 "controlers," and each of these will be responsible for the local training of 6-10 surveyors. On paper this looks good, but you still have to find enough literate and available surveyors: 4,500 in Niger, 6,000 in the Ivory Coast and, according to the census team in Ouagadougou, some 10,000 surveyors are needed in Upper Volta. Where are they going to find so many readily available people who can take off two weeks to do these surveys? Most countries plan to use teachers and students; the Voltaic government anticipates enlisting "everybody, including government workers and hospital aides."

Once having found and trained the census-takers to count the people, you then have to decide who to count when. And in most Francophone West African countries that, too, presents a problem, for even in non-drought times, there is a steady flow of migrant labor out of one country and into another. In which country do you count the people? Will they accidentally get counted twice? Or, perhaps, not at all, for many migrant workers are not eager to be counted. The numbers involved are considerable. Foreign workers in the Ivory Coast, for instance, constitute 20% of the total population, and comprise 44% of Abidjan's 800,000 inhabitants. In Niger, an estimated 10% of the population heads south every fall to Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, and Ghana while thousands of Voltaics seek work in the Ivory Coast. Thus, many census surveys will be held between February and April, which is the end of the dry season and just before the annual migrations begin.

Malagasy street scene

It is a particularly thorny issue as many migrants fear expulsion once the government becomes more "officially" aware of them, while the governments, in turn, are worried about potentially losing a valuable work force.

Before sending out census-takers, therefore, it is going to be necessary to reassure a lot of people. Not just migrants, but others, too, who might identify the census, from previous experience, with taxation, or military enlistment, or even government harassment. There are some villages, according to one census expert, where the moment any official-looking outsider appears, the villagers disappear. "The charcoal is still burning when we get there," he says, "but there's nobody in sight."

Cognizant of this problem, the Ivory Coast has planned a full scale communications program with which President Houphouet-Boigny will be personally involved. Headed up by Mr. Herault-Delaunoë, Director of the *Institut Ivoirien d'Opinion Publique*, the program will utilize radio, television, newspapers, and magazines, with messages in some 40 dialects. Ciné-buses will show specially prepared short films on the subject, a census magazine will help local administrators answer questions, and there will even be a census song. All with one objective: reassure the people that the census is for the good of everybody.

Given the improbable situation

where there are unlimited funds, complete maps, trained personnel, ample transportation, and a smoothly functioning communications program that makes everyone eager to answer your questions, your problems would be over, right?

Wrong. In fact, they've just begun!

For now comes that most sensitive of all problems: how to prepare a questionnaire that will be understood by everyone and will elicit an accurate response.

Just ask an elderly West African villager how old he is, or how many children there are in his family. The answers may be manna for the sociologist, but in their lack of accuracy, they mean only more misery for the census expert!

The simplest questions relating to fertility and mortality, originally planned for inclusion in the 1975 population census, have in fact proven so thorny that many countries are dropping them from the roster.

In a recent Abidjan pilot survey, for example, when the women were asked how many children they had, much to the census-takers' dismay, many gave only the number of children living with them at home and completely omitted the children that were living elsewhere. The Dakar group, as a result of similar experiences, has thus decided to ask only, "How many children do you have living in the compound?" foregoing the prospect of getting fertility rates in favor of getting an accurate population count.

The decision to use the word "compound," by the way, was also the result of much trial and error, having been preceded in past Sénégalese surveys by the word "household," which proved a total disaster, and then by "extended family," which didn't fare much better. The choice of language is a vital factor in preparing these questionnaires and, as the census experts have come to realize, even the most basic Occidental census vocabulary may have totally different connotations when applied in an African village.

Though sometimes it doesn't matter what terms you use, the response still won't be accurate. Such has been the Ivoirian experience regarding questions on mortality. Many villagers do not wish to discuss the subject, and when the census-takers in last spring's pilot project would ask about some Mamadou or Ibrahim who was still on their records, the villagers would reply that Mamadou was just find and was out there tilling the field—which is what he had been doing up until six months ago when he died!

Where infant mortality was concerned, mothers of the deceased would often have such an emotional response that they could not or would not answer the surveyors' questions regarding these children. And if the surveyor pressed too hard, he ran the risk of not getting any further responses at all.

A major factor here, as Abidjan's Statistics Director Koko points out, is that little progress has been made in these countries with respect to the *état civil*. It is thus difficult to question people on what they still consider strictly personal family matters as births, marriages, or deaths. Because of minimal civil record-keeping in these areas, statistics are scarce, a hindrance, obviously, to any governmental social planning. If in the West, we feel we've lost our identity to a computerized number, the West African villagers are on exactly the opposite end of the pendulum.

Faced with these problems, the census takers are going to need an extraordinary amount of diplomacy and skilled questioning techniques for which their couple of days training scarcely prepares them.

Thus, the Dakar team, directed by Abdou Diop and UNFPA advisor, Jacques Gagnon, have decided to keep their questionnaires to a minimum. "We're going to count the living," says Gagnon, "and just concentrate on age." That alone should keep their hands full! For given the traditional lack of civil certification, many older West Africans don't know precisely how old they are. Since this is, however, the Sénégalese government's prime concern, an elaborate plan has been developed to determine age. Those who cannot produce an actual birth certificate will be requested to show the less accurate but still acceptable *jugement supplétif*, by which the person involved has formally presented himself before a civil authority together with two witnesses who swear they knew the year that he was born. For people who have neither form of certification, special "historical calendars" have been devised. Compiled in the style of the old chronicles that recite the year El Hadj Mohamed passed away, or the month the locusts ate up the harvest, these calendars are based on historic events that have taken place on the local/*arrondissement* level. The age of the person will be determined according to what he remembers of these events.

There is no doubt that a good deal of careful planning and creative thinking are going into these population surveys, and one can only be impressed by the determined efforts of this small group of people who are engaged in a project with such massive problems.

However, in one vital area the findings were uniformly disappointing. Here are some fifteen Francophone countries engaged in the identical task of setting up their first population census, many confronted with the same problems. Yet there seems to be a notable lack of cooperation and communication between these countries. There has been so little dialog, in fact, that this correspondent was asked by census experts on several occasions, "What are the census teams doing in the other countries you visited?", for they didn't know.

To be sure, there have been the annual meetings in Addis Ababa in 1973 and 1974 but beyond this, there has been little exchange of ideas or information. To the extent that the findings of last spring's Abidjan pilot survey were not communicated to other census teams, though they might have profited by what the questionnaires brought to light. And where such informational exchanges have taken place between professionals in adjacent countries, at least one expert was reminded rather sharply by his host government that "You're working for us, not them."

Yet such cooperation could mean considerable cost savings for these governments, both in terms of time and labor, by reducing needless trial-and-error duplication as well as in materiel, where there might be a sharing in the bulk purchase of paper or in the printing of the questionnaires.

Instead, the tremendous advantages that could be gained in having such a simultaneous survey have scarcely been utilized—to the disadvantage of all concerned. □

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## Observers Eye South African Responses As Pressures Intensify In United Nations

The change of government—from white to Black—in Mozambique, the expulsion of Pretoria's representatives from the U.N. General Assembly and predictions of rapid violent change in South Africa's urban areas have combined to elicit an unusual response from white South Africa. Instead of withdrawing further into the *laager*—the South African version of a protective circle of covered wagons—South Africa's leaders have been making conciliatory noises to its supporters in the western world, to Black Africa and, in one sense, to the Blacks within its borders.

While no one is prepared to predict exactly what recent statements will mean in fact, there has been considerable comment that they were made at all.

Having reacted with cautious optimism—at least in public—to the advent of Black government on its eastern border, South African Prime Minister John Vorster acknowledged in late October that "southern Africa has come to the crossroads, I think," he continued, "that southern Africa has to make a choice. I think that choice lies between peace on the one hand or an escalation of strife on the other." (*Financial Times*, October 30, 1974.)

The first, seemingly spontaneous, reaction to Vorster's statement came from Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, a man who has confronted South Africa over a racial and political divide for more than a decade. Calling Vorster's statement "tremendously encouraging," Kaunda suggested that this was "the voice of reason for which Africa and the rest of the world have been waiting." (Zambia *Daily Mail*, October 30, 1974.)

Although the words came from Kaunda, veteran journalist and Africa-watcher Colin Legum asserts that the sentiment came from many parts of Black Africa. In a report in the London *Observer*, Legum states that Kaunda consulted with Presidents Nyerere of Tanzania, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaïre and Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana, as well as with Samora Machel, the leader of Frelimo, which will soon form the government of independent Mozambique. (November 3, 1974.)

And while Vorster, in his October speech, had urged

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## Nigeria's Military Rule To Continue; Gowon Cites 'Sectional Politicking'

The military government created loud rumbles throughout this increasingly powerful West African nation when it announced that it would not go through with a promised return to civilian rule in 1976.

Head of State General Yakubu Gowon said, in a speech delivered on the 14th anniversary of the country's independence, that such a move would throw the nation back into confusion. (*Financial Times*, October 2, 1974.)

Although the announcement by Gowon was greeted with what one correspondent described as "stunned shock," the move did not come as a complete surprise. (*Financial Times*, October 2, 1974.)

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Before Gowon's address a combination of unsettling factors, including rumors of army unrest, increasingly severe problems of government corruption, conflict over recent census figures and the slow pace of Nigerian development, had prompted heavy speculation that the return to civilian rule would not come on schedule.

Rumors of an attempted coup helped create an atmosphere of heightening tension as General Gowon returned from a state visit to China in late September. At that time, Gowon told the press that plotters were out to destroy him and his government. (*Economist*, September 28, 1974.) Other reports noted that there were rumors that certain sections of the country were getting ready for an armed conflict, apparently in the North. (*Africa Confidential*, October 18, 1974.)

Problems of corruption among senior officials were brought to light when Joseph Tarka, former minister of communications, resigned his post amid press reports of corrupt dealings. Indeed, prior to Gowon's independence-day speech the controversy over government corruption was reaching Watergate-like proportions as an angry press found itself increasingly at odds with the government.

Gowon's post-China press conference was, at least in part, inspired by the fact that he was beginning to feel the heat himself. He said he believed that certain Nigerians "were aiming at the man at the very top," and that their method was to discredit his lieutenants.

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Prime Minister Ian Smith of Rhodesia to come to terms with that country's Black majority, there was considerable speculation that Vorster had already come to terms with Smith, had read him the riot act and was prepared to sacrifice the albatross to South Africa's north on the altar of a continued white presence in South Africa.

The reshuffling of southern African realities was momentarily interrupted a few days later when, having rejected the South African delegation's credentials a month earlier, the Arab-Asian bloc at the U.N. attempted to expel the nation from the world body because of its apartheid system and its refusal to cede control of Namibia according to World Court ruling. Exercising their Security Council veto in unison for the first time in U.N. history, three permanent members of the Council—France, Britain and the U.S.—defeated the move. (New York *Times*, October 31, 1974.)

Although reaction in South Africa was immediate and angry Vorster had recovered enough by November 5 to issue a public thank-you to the three western powers. In a much-reported speech to his home constituency, he asked the world for a grace period of six months to a year. "I do not ask for more than that. If South Africa is given that chance [political commentators] will be surprised at where the country will stand." (Washington *Post*, November 7, 1974.)

In a hasty move to reassure alarmed whites, South African Interior Minister Connie Mulder soon announced that statement had been widely misinterpreted as meaning the country was planning changes in its apartheid policy. Vorster, Mulder said, was referring only to foreign relations with Black Africa. (*Times of Zambia*, November 15, 1974.)

Changes within South Africa would, it seemed, be limited to accelerated independence to the African homelands. But this promise had evidently not been cleared with the leaders of the Bantustans, eight out of nine of whom issued a joint statement rejecting independence at this time.

While some political commentators in South Africa claimed that the combination of the homeland leaders' statement and the clarification of the Vorster speech dampened any hopes for a quick improvement in South African tensions, saying the actions put the "South African political situation right back where it was," others disagreed.

Long-distance observers saw not the almost traditionally cited "winds of change" but the beginnings of a whirlwind that might soon be reaped by the white community. Sources inside South Africa have reported the elation expressed by Black South Africans at the sudden transformation of the "terrorists" and "Communists" in neighboring Mozambique into a legitimate government treated with respect by white South African leaders.

Already there have been rumblings; rallies billed as supporting Frelimo have been held and have resulted in arrests, bannings and self-exiles. Pundits are proffering a new timetable for South Africa: urban guerrilla warfare inside South Africa within two years; the fall of Rhodesia and the ceding of Namibia in the same period; the fall of white South Africa within eight to 10 years.

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Controversy over the census figures, released last May, has been steadily growing, related as it is to tensions between the North and the South and to what has been described as a "long-standing incompatibility" between the two regions. (*Africa Confidential*, October 18, 1974.)

At the heart of the conflict is a dispute over the figures themselves, which show that since 1963 population of the six northern states has risen from 30 million to 51 million while that of the six southern states has risen only from 25 million to 28 million.

Despite the continuing oil boom, Nigeria's economic development has not proceeded at anticipated levels, falling far short of targets set in the 1970-74 plan. Only three of some 55 proposed manufacturing projects have been finished.

Without setting a new target date, Gowon assured Nigerians that the idea of civilian rule would not be abandoned. He announced that a panel would be established to draft a new constitution.

Still, Nigeria's ban on political activities, due to be lifted this month, is to remain in force, and Gowon has also said all civilian commissioners and state governors will be replaced by the military in the next few months.

Although interest in General Gowon's independence address centered around his announcement that civilian rule would not be restored in 1976, most of the Head of State's speech reviewed results of the country's second National Development plan and unveiled the general thrust of a new five-year economic effort. (*West Africa*, October 14, 1974.)

The new plan, which will run from 1975 to 1980, calls for an overall expenditure of about $32 billion with new priority given to agriculture. The plan allots more than $3 billion to farming, nearly six times the sum allocated under the plan just concluded.

Some $9 billion has been allotted to industry, an increase of about 30 times what was allocated in the previous plan. Industrial objectives include making Nigeria self-sufficient in such items as petroleum products, petrochemicals, pulp, paper and sugar. Although Nigeria is already one of the world's top oil producers, the country has yet to develop a substantial refining capacity.

**Gowon's Speech**

"Four years ago when I gave 1976 as the target date for returning the country to normal constitutional government, both myself, and the military hierarchy honestly believed that by that date, especially after a bloody civil war for which there had been a great deal of human and material sacrifice and from which we had expected that every Nigerian would have learnt a lesson, there would have developed an atmosphere of sufficient stability. We had thought that genuine demonstration of moderation and self-control in pursuing sectional ends in the overall interest of the country would have become the second nature of all Nigerians.

"Regrettably, from all the information at our disposal, from the general attitude, utterances and maneuvers of some individuals and groups and from some publications during the past few months, it is clear that those who aspire to lead the nation on the return to civilian rule have not learnt any lesson from our past experiences. In spite of the existence of a state of emergency which has so far precluded political activity, there have already emerged such a high degree of sectional politicking, intemperate utterances and writings which were deliberately designed to whip up ill-feelings within the country to the benefit of the political aspirations of the few."

General Yakubu Gowon
From His Independence-Day Speech
October 1, 1974

## Oil-Rich Cabinda Gains in Importance As Angola Moves Toward Independence

The closer Angola gets to independence, the more attention will be focused on Cabinda, the territory's oil-rich exclave to the north.

Already there have been rumors of secret deals to cede Cabinda to Zaïre, as well as the emergence of a new movement, calling itself the Front for the Liberation of Cabinda (FLEC), which says it wants the province to become an independent state on the model of Switzerland.

Rumors of a possible deal with Zaïre began with reports by a BBC correspondent in Tanzania that President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaïre recently negotiated a secret pact to obtain Cabinda by agreeing to back Holden Roberto, leader of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA). Presumably, the deal would be concluded when FNLA came to power in an independent Angola. (Africa News, November 14, 1974.)

Other reports have indicated that Mobutu would prefer to see a team from Angola's three liberation movements negotiating with Lisbon, despite the fact that he personally prefers Roberto. (*Christian Science Monitor*, November 11, 1974).

Mobutu has also met with Daniel Chipenda, leader of the Maoist wing of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and seems to have accepted Chipenda as a legitimate voice on Angola matters. Chipenda recently moved his base from Lusaka, Zambia to Kinshasa, the capital of Zaïre.

A FLEC uprising in mid-November was squelched by Portuguese troop detachments, but not before the group had seized 21 Portuguese soldiers as hostages and captured the regional airport and several other key installations.

The FLEC fighting met with resistance from at least one faction of another Angolan independence movement, the MPLA, which vehemently opposes the secession of wealthy Cabinda. MPLA troops exchanged fire with FLEC forces and took up positions outside the provincial capital in Cabinda.

In a statement to the press, the president of MPLA, Agostinho Neto, reiterated MPLA's position on Cabinda. Neto said MPLA had no intention of negotiating with FLEC, which he termed an unjustified separatist movement created by "powers trying to take advantage of Cabinda's riches, notably oil." (Zambia *Daily Mail*, November 8, 1974.)

Neto was most likely referring to rumors that the FLEC revolt was inspired by the Republic of the Congo. Congo has already denied the rumors, assailing FLEC's tactics and calling the secessionist group "discredited." (Africa News, November 21, 1974.)

Meanwhile, it was reported that the families of American employees at **Gulf Oil's** Cabinda operations were evacuated to South Africa, although Gulf had earlier denied reports that production had been halted or that any workers had been evacuated. (Africa News, November 7, November 21, 1974.)

Although Portuguese forces had reestablished control and imposed a curfew in Cabinda, the situation remained tense as **African Update** went to press.

As uncertainties over Cabinda mount, it is clear that the province will continue under the intensive scrutiny of both the Republic of the Congo and Zaïre.

While Zaïre is probably important to watch with regard to the outcome of events in Cabinda, Mobutu's country is unquestionably not interested in jeopardizing its relationships with Angola. In addition to Cabindan oil, Zaïre must also ensure continued access to the Benguela railway for shipment of copper from its Shaba copperbelt to the Atlantic coast ports of Lobito and Benguela. Most of the railway runs through Angola.

Mobutu has consistently denied that Zaïre would attempt any takeover in Cabinda, and some observers (*Christian Science Monitor*, November 11, 1974) believe that both Zaïre and the Congo Republic will ultimately throw their weight behind an independent Cabinda.

# Western Africa

## The Gambia

● **A World Bank loan and an African Development Bank loan** recently awarded to the Gambia are expected to help the country overcome the effects of drought on its agricultural development.

The World Bank will lend the Gambia $1.5 million to create an irrigation system for rice cultivation along the north and south banks of the River Gambia. The World Bank project will be integrated with a scheme set up in 1968 by an agricultural mission from Taiwan.

Though the Taiwanese project is considered successful, the Gambia still imports 12,000 tons of rice from Burma each year. The amount of this imported rice available to Gambians greatly decreased when refugees of the Sahelian drought began migrating to the Gambia.

The African Development Bank will loan the Gambia $2 million for a four-year cotton development plan in the eastern part of the country. A cotton gin will be established, and land cultivated for cotton exports will be increased from 1,000 to 10,000 acres. (*African Development*, October, 1974.)

## Ghana

● **Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.** plans to increase the annual capacity of its Valco smelter in Ghana by 50,000 tons to 220,000 tons, in an effort to meet the world shortage of aluminum.

Kaiser President Cornel C. Maier forecasts a critical shortage of the metal in the U.S. by 1976. He believes expansion of the Valco smelter in Ghana will help meet U.S. demand for aluminum, thus curbing depletion of U.S. stockpiles.

The company is negotiating with the Ghanaian Government for increased electric power to operate the expanded facility. Kaiser is also completing arrangements for financing the $60-million project that is scheduled to be completed by early 1976.

Investment in new facilities has been deferred by Kaiser until now because of low prices for aluminum ingots that prevailed in 1972 and 1973. Although Maier estimates that an ingot price of 45 cents per pound would best support new investment, he expects the company's recent move to raise the U.S. price of primary aluminum ingots from 36 cents to 39 cents will be sufficient for expansion of the Valco plant. (*Financial Times*, October 2, 1974.)

● The Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board appealed to the World Bank for $40 million worth of aid to spur further development of its cocoa industry. **Cocoa prices have started to decline** after a season of record highs, and production fell to 400,000 tons in 1973-74 after a peak season of 557,000 tons in 1964-65. (*Financial Times*, September 19, 1974.)

Ghana's overall trade figures show losses this year. The government blames the deficit on the oil crisis and world inflation. March statistics show exports at $73.4 million and imports at $83.2 million, representing a deficit of $9.7 million.

This compares with a surplus of $35 million for the same period last year. (*Middle East and African Economist*, September 1974.)

● Ghanaian markets are filled with secondhand clothes, factories are supplied with cast-off machines, and roadways are clogged with lumbering vehicles that only start with a push downhill. Recently, the Ghana Standards Board decided to enforce **inspection of imported goods** to ensure that the country does not become a dumping ground for low-quality products from other nations.

Col. Nkegbe, Commissioner for Industries, told Ghanaians that his ministry would require manufacturers to certify that machinery was modern before an import license would be issued. Col. Nkegbe said Ghana was wasting foreign exchange by importing poor-quality goods. (*West Africa*, October 21, 1974.)

## Guinea-Bissau

● The African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) claims Portugal is trying to thwart PAIGC efforts to form a federation between **Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde islands.**

Although Portugal recognized Guinea-Bissau's independence in September, it called for a referendum in the Cape Verde islands in which residents would decide their political future.

PAIGC Secretary-General Aristides Pereira charged that Portugal recently sent reinforcements to the islands and that Portuguese soldiers opened fire on a demonstration supporting the PAIGC.

After investigating sporadic incidents involving Portuguese soldiers and Cape Verdians, Portugal claimed that the incidents were not politically motivated. Portugal also claimed that new troops sent to the islands were relief forces, not reinforcements. (*West Africa*, October 21, 1974.)

Meanwhile, Portugal wants to set up a provisional government with PAIGC members and representatives of political groups opposed to the PAIGC. The PAIGC is against representation by other groups, but it is expected that an agreement will soon be reached. (*Christian Science Monitor*, November 18, 1974.)

## Guinea-Conakry

● On October 1, Guinea signed an agreement with a Canadian company, Société des Grands Aménagements du Canada (Sogramcan), to construct **a $555-million railway** across the country.

The 600-mile line will extend from the Guinean coast inland to bauxite deposits in the northwest and iron ore mines along the Liberian border.

Docks for 250,000 ton ships and storage facilities for three million tons of iron ore and 1.5 million tons of bauxite will be built to handle the expected increase of minerals transported by rail to Conakry.

Construction on the railway will begin next year and should be completed by 1980 or 1981. (*West Africa*, October 21, 1974.)

## Ivory Coast

● Political observers took special note of **recent cabinet reshuffles** in the Ivory Coast because President Houphouet-Boigny rarely makes changes in his ministries.

Trusted figures remained in important ministries: Konan Bedie retains his position as Minister of Finance, and Arsene Usher Assouan continues as Minister of Foreign Affairs. But other changes may indicate presidential response to criticism that some cabinet members were incompetent and that the cabinet as a whole did not represent all the regions of the country.

Houphouet-Boigny appointed journalist Laurent Dona-Fologo as the new Information Minister and diplomat Clement Meledje as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Observers were surprised by the appointment of two military officers as Secretaries of State for the Interior and for the Navy. Col. Ouassenan Kone and Mohammed Fadika became the first military personnel to be offered cabinet posts in the Ivory Coast Government. (*Africa*, October 1974.)

● The World Bank seems to be on its way toward becoming **the Ivory Coast's biggest financial backer,** investing about $60 million per year in the West African nation.

If the World Bank maintains its present lending rate, it will contribute about $300 million to the country's 1976-80 Development Plan as compared to some $367 million from all other foreign sources. (*West Africa*, October 14, 1974.)

The World Bank is now said to be associated with important Ivory Coast projects in agriculture, transportation, communications and education. And recently an Ivory Coast delegation visited Washington to negotiate additional World Bank funds, about $11 million, for aid to small businesses.

The Ivory Coast also plans to extend explorations for oil, and is now talking with international oil companies about exploration contracts for an offshore area of 105,000 square miles. The reports (*West Africa*, October 14, 1974) did not name the companies that are now talking with the Ivory Coast.

Despite the Ivory Coast's increasing support from the World Bank, West Africa continues to rank last in terms of aid from the giant agency.

Although West Africa's share of World Bank funds rose from $176,600,000 for 20 projects in 1973 to $281,700,000 for 24 operations in 1974, West Africa continues to receive less World Bank funding than any other region of the world.

The Bank's annual report noted that East Africa received $408,400,000 for 30 operations; Europe, the Middle East and North Africa received $1,338,500,000 for 43 projects; the Asian region received $1,351,800,000 for 45 operations; and the Latin American and Caribbean received $923,200,000 for 32 projects.

The proportion of lending for West African agriculture rose 29%, compared with a 22% gain the year earlier. The report further noted that in West Africa as a whole, economic growth has barely kept pace with population growth and that income disparities within and between individual countries have generally widened.

## Liberia

● Exploitation of Liberia's iron ore deposits in the Wologizi mountain range moved closer to reality with the recent signing of a formal agreement in New York by the Liberian Iron & Steel Corporation (LISCO), a group of Japanese companies and **American Metal Climax** (AMAX).

The agreement allows AMAX and the Japanese firms to acquire an initial block of LISCO stock with an option to purchase up to 51% interest in LISCO.

The companies plan to begin operations by 1980. The mines are expected to employ several thousand Liberians and to produce an expected capacity of 10 million tons of iron ore pellets per year. (Liberian *Age*, October 18, 1974.)

● The U.S. Government will contribute $1.5 million toward a $2.5-million project to **reorganize Liberia's Civil Service.**

Dr. John Payne Mitchell, Director-General of Liberia's Civil Service Agency, says the program will focus on training staff members and on studying proposals for better working conditions.

A team of experts from the California State Civil Service is in Liberia to help with selection and placement of qualified civil service personnel. Five Liberian officials recently left for the U.S. to study public administration at the University of Southern California at Sacramento. (Liberian *Star*, September 25, 1974.)

## Niger

● Niger recently announced its **1975 budget totaling about $60 million,** a 7.5% increase over the 1974 budget. Information Minister Capt. Gabriel Cyrille said the government would not raise taxes to meet spending estimates but expected increased revenues from already existing taxes to pay 1975's bill. (*West Africa*, October 21, 1974.)

Niger is counting on continued foreign aid, however, to help it overcome the effects of the Sahelian drought that killed most of its livestock and caused thousands of nomads to migrate to cities for relief. (Africa News, September 30, 1974.)

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) granted Niger $1.2 million to dig wells along a 10-mile stretch of road also being constructed with CIDA funds. The wells are expected to benefit 40,000 people and 100,000 head of livestock in 108 villages in the country's Diffa region.

Heavy rains during the past few months have encouraged large numbers of refugees to return to their homes with packages of seeds and a three-month supply of food provided by the government. (*Jeune Afrique*, October 19, 1974.)

Nigerien President Seyni Kountche would like to see the country's nomads become at least partially sedentary. According to development experts, uncontrolled grazing of nomadic herds contributed to the Sahelian drought by destroying sparse natural vegetation along the desert's edge.

Niger plans to reconstitute its national herds by establishing special centers for breeding stock that survived the drought with stronger animals from other countries. Kountche wants the nomads to graze the new herds in designated areas of Niger and to raise crops as well. (Africa News, October 24, 1974.)

Meanwhile, Mali accused Niger of preventing the return of Malian nomads to their own country. Malian Defense Minister Kissima Doukara said the nomads fled to Nigerien relief camps during the drought. Doukara speculated that Niger was detaining the Malian refugees in order to gain increased foreign assistance for victims of the drought.

Nigerien officials said they were unaware of any effort to detain Malian nomads but suggested that some of the nomads may not want to return to Mali. It was noted that nomads in the Sahel often carry several passports to allow them to move freely from one country to the next. (New York *Times*, October 21, 1974.)

## Nigeria

● U.S. investors are involved in a **500-bedroom hotel** that is to be constructed on Victoria Island, Lagos.

The First Chicago Limited, the London merchant bank subsidiary of the **First National Bank of Chicago,** is leading a banking syndicate that has raised $32 million for EKO hotels, which is 51% owned by the Lagos State government and 49% by Oxy Holiday of Africa, a unit of the **Occidental Petroleum Corporation.**

The hotel will be managed by Holiday Inns.

## Senegal

● **A new political party,** the Senegalese Republican Party (PRS), is being formed in Senegal. Although the country's constitution allows any number of parties, Senegal has had only one, the Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS).

A lawyer and lecturer in economic science, Abdoulai Wade, will lead the new party which draws its members primarily from Senegal's young. The PRS says it does not want to challenge the power of the established UPS and that it hopes to contribute a new dimension to Senegalese political life.

Leaders of the PRS have been careful not to risk censure by the ruling UPS before they have had a chance to make positive proposals. So far there has been no official UPS reaction to formation of the new party.

But Senegalese Prime Minister and UPS Deputy Secretary General, Abdou Diouf, said that his government would respect the constitution's provisions for a multi-party system (*Africa, October 1974.*)

● A Senegalese has been nominated to become the next director general of the United Nations Educational and Cultural Organization, thus becoming **the first African to hold the top UNESCO post** since the organization was formed in 1946.

If confirmed, Amadou M'Bow, presently UNESCO's assistant director general in charge of education, will succeed Frenchman Rene Maheu, who is retiring after 12 years in office.

As head of UNESCO's main offices in Paris, M'Bow would serve a six-year term. A final decision on the appointment was expected as **African Update** went to press, but M'Bow's succession to the post seemed assured.

● Despite severe drought conditions that affected Senegal's food supplies in recent years, the country's **cotton production has steadily risen** from 100 bales in 1964-1965 to 57,000 bales in 1973-74.

The country presently cultivates 72,000 acres of cotton and is hoping to raise production to 125,000 bales by 1980.

Nearly half of total domestic cotton production is used by local textile plants. The rest is exported to France, Italy, Spain, Japan, Morocco and West Germany.

This year the Society for the Development of Textile Fibers (SODEFITEX) will take control of the country's cotton development schemes. The government will own 80% of SODEFITEX, while the remaining shares will belong to the French Company for Development of Textile Fibers (CFDT), which has been responsible for the growth of Senegalese cotton production since 1967.

SODEFITEX is currently worth about $3 million but the government plans to encourage more foreign investment to develop its textile industry. (*Foreign Agriculture*, September 30, 1974.)

## Togo

● Togo's one political party, Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT), recommended that the government **end diplomatic relations with South Korea.** The move is the result of improved relations with North Korea and the People's Republic of China, following Togolese President Eyadema's visit to the Far East in September.

During Eyadema's visit, North Korea agreed to build a training school for RPT members in the northern city of Lama-Kara. North Korea also plans to finance construction of an agricultural machine repair factory.

Results of Eyadema's Chinese visit included successful ne-

gotiations to build a sugar refinery. China also sent a team of 30 doctors along with medical supplies to Togo in October. (*West Africa*, September 30, 1974; *Jeune Afrique*, October 12, 1974.)

## Eastern Africa

### Comoro Islands

● Three of the Comoro Islands — Grande Comore, Moheli and Anjouan—are expected to overwhelmingly support a referendum, scheduled to take place December 22, declaring the islands independent from France.

The fourth Comoro Island, Mayotte, has already declared its desire to remain part of France, but its 24,000 inhabitants are expected to be outvoted by the rest of the Comoros' 300,000 residents.

Some observers believe the separatist movement of Mayotte will remain a problem after the Comoros win independence, but the islands' Arab prime minister Ahmed Abdallah says Mayotte would probably vote for its own independence in a few years anyway. He claims the separatist movement is sparked by sentiment against his government and not by pro-French feelings.

Most of the people on Mayotte are Catholic. The rest of the Comoros' population is Moslem. The islands' economy is based on exports of vanilla, copra, and oils for perfumes. Reports predict the Comoros will have to maintain strong ties with France after independence to avoid economic collapse.

The Comoros strategic location could attract offers of aid from major powers looking for bases in the Indian Ocean. The anticipated reopening of the Suez Canal and changes in southern Africa could make any land mass off the coast of East Africa a magnet for the attentions of the U.S., Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, and Japan. (*Jeune Afrique*, September 21, November 2, 1974; *Christian Science Monitor*, November 7, 1974.)

### Ethiopia

As **African Update** went to press, the military government in Ethiopia announced that 60 former officials and military officers had been executed. (New York *Times*, November 25, 1974.)

Included in those who were machine-gunned were two former premiers, the head of the ruling military council and a grandson of former Emperor Haile Selassie. Radio Ethiopia called the executions an "act of justice."

Lieut. Gen. Aman Michael Andom, chairman of the 120-man military council, was considered a moderate and had been disposed several days earlier.

According to the Washington *Post*, newspapers across Africa generally condemned the executions. "To kill people is not the way to solve the problems facing African countries," was the reaction of *Uhuru*, the newspaper of the ruling party in Tanzania.

Reports from Addis Ababa indicated the capital was tense. Former Emperor Haile Selassie has not been heard from since September. Further details and analysis will follow in the next issue of **African Update.**

● Ethiopia's new military government is already facing a **variety of opposition**, as various groups within the conflict-ridden country protest what they see as a refusal to share any power with civilian groups.

On October 26, military police opened fire on a crowd of 1,500 unemployed workers demonstrating outside the headquarters of the Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions, killing one person and wounding two others.

According to press reports, the police had informed the throng that demonstrations had been banned by the military government. When the workers refused to disperse, the police evidently began firing. (London *Times*, October 28, 1974.)

The Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions early condemned prolonged military rule, joining many students and professionals in opposing the new government. Thus far, the ruling Provisional Military Council's only response has been to establish a 50-member civilian advisory board, including four teachers, three trade union representatives, two clergymen and two university lecturers. (London *Times*, September 24, 1974.)

Students see the board as a ruse, claiming it will have no effective power. They are also critical of the Council's proposal to conduct a $27-million literacy campaign, which the military claims is a necessary prerequisite to relinquishing power to civilians.

The students, who are expected to teach in the literacy program, say the campaign is a ploy to get them out of Addis Ababa so that the military can consolidate its power. The government has ordered some 60,000 students and teachers to leave their university posts for a year's service in the literacy program. (Africa News, November 11, 1974.)

The military council seems to have set itself at odds with organized labor early on, ordering the arrest in late September of three trade union leaders for attempting to arouse labor opposition to the armed forces takeover.

The Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions responded by issuing a call for a general strike to protest detainment of the organization's president, its vice president, and its general-secretary. Most workers ignored the strike call, prompting the union group to charge the government with instigating a media campaign to discredit the detained men and create factions in the labor camp. (Africa News, September 30, 1974.)

A four-man delegation of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions is now in Ethiopia to negotiate release of the union leaders. So far the delegation has not been allowed to meet with any representative of the military government. (London *Times*, October 25, 1974.)

Some critics have observed that the mounting number of arrests could pose its own problems. The military rulers are left with a diminishing number of trained personnel to administer the country's affairs. (Africa News, October 7, 1974.)

● A report from the *Economist* notes that the soldiers who are now in charge of the Ethiopian Government are a **"shadowy" group**, with only the chairman of the Provisional Military Council, Major Mengistu Hailemariam, being a well known name in Ethiopia.

According to the British magazine (September 21, 1974) the other 80 members of the armed forces committee remain anonymous. General Aman Andom, the country's recently executed head, was not a member of the cohesive military group. On tours of Eritrea, it is reported, Andom was carefully watched to make sure he did not waver from the party line.

● Early pronouncements from the military government on Ethiopia's **literacy program** seem aimed at attuning the country to government by a reformist military group.

According to radio reports monitored out of Addis Ababa, literacy workers will be stationed in 550 centers throughout the country to carry out the task, which is aimed at raising the "level of awareness of the peasant masses."

Chief commanders of the armed forces, the police and the territorial army have been discussing how to ensure the safety of those working in the literacy campaign. The current proposal calls for work garments and shoes as well as uniforms and caps to be provided to the 60,000 campaign workers.

In another radio report, the Provisional Military Council called on both government and private institutions to cooperate with journalists by providing them accurate information about events in Ethiopia. The statement called on officials of ministries, executives of government agencies and private institutions to open their doors to the mass media "instead of avoiding journalists on one pretext or another."

The military evidently feels repression of information is synonymous with the former government in which it says people were never told whether the country was progressing or not.

● The overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie appears to have had little or no impact on chances for an early solution in **Eritrea**, Ethiopia's Red Sea province where new outbreaks of fighting were reported in late October.

Shortly after coming to power, the new military rulers threatened to step up the Eritrean campaign, at least that is the contention of Osman Salah Sabbe, leader of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), the group that has spearheaded independence efforts since 1961, when Ethiopia annexed the territory.

Toward the end of October, it was reported that heavy fighting had broken out in Ethiopia's northern-most province. Diplomatic sources in the Eritrean capital of Asmara reported hearing jets and cannon fire in the city. They further noted that three battalions of troops moved into the province bolstering the Ethiopian army division already stationed there.

Government sources in Addis Ababa said the fighting is between rival factions of the secessionists. Other reports, however, say clashes took place between the government and the guerrillas.

The new military government evidently favors some sort of federation arrangement with Eritrea, and has rejected the ELF call for negotiations leading to complete independence. The smaller Popular Liberation Front (PLF) is said to have already agreed to federation, thus exacerbating conflict between the two groups.

## Kenya

● If **the October parliamentary elections** are any indication, Kenya will proceed into 1975 with few major alterations in its overall policy of free enterprise and pro-Westernism.

Observers saw the record voting as a general confirmation of President Jomo Kenyatta's leadership (he was unopposed for his third five-year term) despite the fact that some of the president's personal choices, including Foreign Minister Njoroge Mungai, were defeated at the polls.

Under the Kenya constitution, the president must also be a member of parliament, and Kenyatta was reelected to his seat unopposed, as was Vice President Daniel arap Moi. (New York *Times*, October 16, 1974.)

Despite the fact that Kenya's top leadership remains intact, a number of former cabinet members and their deputies lost their seats in the nationwide contest. In addition to Mungai, defeated incumbents included Natural Resources Minister William Odongo Omana, Labor Minister E. Ngala Mwendwa and Tourism Minister Juxon L. M. Shako, all of whom lost their seats in parliament, thus disqualifying them from service in the cabinet.

Mungai, who was appointed minister of foreign affairs in 1969, was defeated by political science professor Jonston Muthiora, who studied at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. during the 1960s. Mungai, prior to his appointment as foreign minister, held various other posts in the cabinet.

All candidates in the election were members of the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU). Kenya is effectively a one party state, and all KANU candidates were pledged in advance to general support of the party's program.

Despite the existence of only one party, the election offered considerable diversity of personalities and approaches, although the government's well-known critic, Oginga Odinga, was not allowed to stand for a seat. (London *Times*, October 16, 1974.) In all, a total of 89 incumbents were defeated, following the general pattern of Kenya's last election in 1969 when about two-thirds of the parliament was unseated.

The voting marked the end of a turbulent and sometimes violent campaign in which a total of more than 700 candidates vied for some 158 seats.

Brawls erupted throughout the campaign, forcing the government to ban electioneering in some areas. In the week prior to the vote, a man was stabbed to death for refusing to cheer a candidate he did not support, and the police tear-gassed scufflers at a rally for one incumbent. (Africa News, October 21, 1974.)

To ensure calm during the polling, election day was declared a public holiday. All bars were closed, and all demonstrations were banned. Generally, though, the balloting went smoothly. (*Financial Times*, October 15, 1974.)

The main problem with the election, some observers later noted, was that it did nothing to clarify the important issue of Kenya's future. Kenyatta is thought to be more than 80 years old, and nothing in the voting revealed who is likely to succeed him.

Other observers noted that the high turnover in parliament may have represented discontents among the populace over corruption and wheeling and dealing in high places. The London *Times* in its post-election editorial noted, "Candidates known to be favored by the establishment were in fact widely trounced. There is a feeling that ministers, and the Kenyan establishment generally, never had it so good." (October 16, 1974.)

Other observers point out that the vote was also a manifestation of widespread anti-Kikuyu sentiment. The Kikuyu are not only Kenya's largest single ethnic group, but also dominate the country's public and commercial life.

● The Kenya Government, referring to articles alleging that important Kenyan officials have **mistreated American businessmen**, has charged the Washington *Post* and Britain's *Sunday Times* with "malicious and sensational" reporting.

Several recent stories in the Washington *Post* reported the expulsion of an American geologist who opened a ruby mine in Kenya, and the harassment of his American business partner. According to the *Post*, the two were squeezed out of the mining operation by Kenya's vice president and former interior minister, who sought increasingly large shares of the mine for Kenya. (Africa News, October 10, 1974.) According to the Washington *Post*, the Americans at one point offered as much as 72% interest in the mine to the Kenyans, but the offer was not accepted. (Washington *Post*, September 28, 1974.)

The *Post* also reported expulsion from Kenya of an Esso Oil executive, who was allegedly ousted for trying to collect an overdue $70,000 oil bill from Kenya's president.

*The ruby mine, said to be the world's largest, sparked a* controversy that has led to increased speculation that relations between American businessmen and the Kenya Government

have been slowly deteriorating.

The Kenya Government has yet to set out its own version of the ruby-mine affair, although it has said that it expelled the American geologist for frustrating Africanization efforts within the company.

A spokesman for the Kenyan embassy in Washington told the American newsservice, Africa News, that the Esso manager was expelled for unfairly demoting African employees, and for refusing credit to Kenyan farmers. These practices, the Kenyans said, also frustrate Africanization.

The stakes in the squabble are high. Kenya generally welcomes foreign investment, and U.S. companies alone have invested nearly $200 million in Kenya.

It is not clear whether the ruby-mine affair contributed to the defeat of former Foreign Minister Njoroge Mungai in the recent elections. Evidently Mungai met with one of the Americans and proposed forming a new ruby-mining company with himself as a major partner. The Washington *Post* reported that Mungai at one point offered to use his influence at the State House to have the expulsion order rescinded.

Meanwhile, the Kenya Government has set the end of 1974 as the deadline for complete Africanization of the country's trade. (London *Times*, October 10, 1974.) The government anticipates that by the end of the year, non-Kenyans, mostly British Asians, will have transferred their businesses to Kenyans.

## Malagasy Republic

• General Gabriel Ramanantsoa, Madagascar's head of state, recently announced the discovery of large iron ore deposits about 75 miles southwest of Majunga. Mining experts estimate the deposits contain 400 million tons of iron ore. (*Le Moniteur Africain*, October 17, 1974.)

## Somalia

• The Soviet newspaper *Pravda* recently published details of a **friendship and cooperation treaty** signed by the USSR and Somalia last July.

*Pravda* reported that the treaty contains provisions for training Somali military personnel and for supplying Soviet arms to Somali defense forces. The treaty also pledges each nation to non-participation in any hostile activity directed against the other. (Africa News, November 7, 1974.)

It is believed that details of the treaty were published to demonstrate the general nature of Soviet-Somali relations. The U.S. still maintains that the Soviet Union has a military base in Somalia. At a September news conference, President Ford claimed that the USSR had a base located in the Aden Gulf port of Berbera. (East African *Standard*, September 6, 1974.)

*It was also reported last July that 150 Soviet technicians* were assembling a squadron of Soviet-built MiG 21 jet-fighters in Somalia. (*To the Point*, July 27, 1974.)

Mohammed Siad Barre, president of Somalia and current chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), assured President Ford in October that there were no Soviet bases in Somalia. He invited representatives of the U.S. Congress to tour his country and certify that no Soviet bases existed there. (Africa News, October 17, 1974.)

Meanwhile, Somalia expressed concern about France's intention to reinforce its military base in Djibouti just north of Somalia. Somalia favors independence for the Territory of the Afars and Issas, where Djibouti is located.

French plans to strengthen the Djibouti base underline its unwillingness to lose this strategic chunk of land. Observers note that because the U.S. was forced to evacuate its base in Asmara, Ethiopia, earlier this year, western powers are likely to support a strong French base to offset what they believe is increasing Soviet influence in the area. (*Jeune Afrique*, October 5, 1974.)

• *Somalia will receive an $8 million loan from the International* Development Association (IDA) to expand educational facilities and to establish **training centers for nomads.**

Specific plans for the IDA project include construction of an Academy of Somali Studies, equipped with a language laboratory, library and audio-visual workroom; construction of an elementary teacher training college; provision of equipment and additional buildings for 10 secondary schools; construction of 10 nomad training centers; and rebuilding and staffing of the country's Fishery and Marine Institute.

## Tanzania

• In the midst of a continuing economic crisis, Tanzania has evidently come into **sharp disagreement with a major international agency**, the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Although it is not clear whether the conflict has been settled, tensions reported during the controversy could prefigure problems that may continue for this East African nation.

The dispute evidently arose in early November when the IMF said it was willing to assist Tanzania in its moment of grave economic need, but only if the country abandoned its major development emphases. President Julius Nyerere, who has been personally identified with the country's social and political goals, apparently rejected any such offer. (Africa News, November 4, 1974.)

Without IMF aid (in the form of balance-of-payments assistance) Tanzania could face bankruptcy and possible famine. This year, the East African nation imported much of its food, but next year money for imports is expected to be in short supply.

An IMF spokesman in Washington told **African Update** that the fund would not comment on the specific Africa News story, but reported that on October 31, Tanzania had drawn some $12.6 million in Special Drawing Rights from the IMF. The purchase by Tanzania of foreign exchange may indicate that its dispute with the IMF was successfully resolved, at least for the shortrun.

Apparently the problem arose when an IMF team was called in to advise Tanzania on its economic problems. Its report called the country's financial prospects gloomy.

Experts say there are three major factors in the country's current money crunch. One is the high price of manufactured goods that must be imported from industrialized nations. Tanzania has no choice but to purchase imports at constantly inflating prices.

In addition, along with much of Africa, Tanzania has suffered from bad weather and lack of fertilizer. The resulting poor harvest and need to import food has wiped out remaining foreign currency reserves.

According to the Africa News report, the IMF believes Tanzania should convert its development aid to cash, and should seek low-interest loans. Even at that, the fund says, a quarter of its deficit will remain.

Sources close to the situation say conditions attached to the Fund's assistance offer would require Tanzania to abandon plans for moving its capital, and to postpone implementation of *ujamaa*, or cooperative villages. Both are viewed by the government as long-range plans to spur development.

The Fund team argues that the expenditure needed to move the capital from Dar es Salaam on the coast to Dodoma in

the interior is unjustifiable. It also says *ujamaa* villages will disrupt economic and social patterns of the rural areas.

Nyerere has rejected the Fund recommendations calling them a kind of "balance sheet" planning. Social and political goals of primary importance are often ignored in such calculations, he says.

The government hopes that moving the capital inland will combat lopsided development along the coast. And its plans for *ujamaa* villages to boost farm production and encourage cooperative efforts are at the heart of the national economic policy.

Meanwhile, Tanzania's economic crisis remains. In early November, the government announced sharply increased retail food prices to prod agricultural production and to pay for grain imports. (Africa News, November 4, 1974.)

● Tanzania over the past few months has received nearly $30 million in financing for a variety of development projects.

In late summer, the International Development Association (IDA), an affiliate of the World Bank, approved a $10.2-million credit to Tanzania to help finance a **highway maintenance project.** At the same time, IDA announced a second credit, this one for $10 million, to help improve living conditions among families in the Kigoma region of western Tanzania. A third IDA credit of $9 million was slated for helping the East African nation develop its **sugar industry** and will be augmented by a $9 million World Bank loan.

The highway project, according to the IDA, represents the first stage of the government's program to improve maintenance of primary roads throughout the country. Tanzania is divided into 20 regions, and 10 of these are covered under the program. In the 10 regions there are about 3,300 kilometers of roads that are scheduled for rehabilitation.

The Kigoma project is designed to provide villages with economic and social infrastructure, together with credit and technical support services for agricultural development. About 135 recently settled *ujamaa* villages—with some 250,000 people—will be affected by the project, according to IDA. Villages will be helped in clearing tsetse-infested bush and provided with primary schools, improved roads, health clinics and water-supply systems.

Tanzania has centered its program of rural development around the *ujamaa* village settlement, emphasizing community self-help and cooperation. The United Nations Capital Development Fund is participating in the project, scheduled for completion in 1980, and is slated to provide $1.5 million on a grant basis to the government.

The IDA sugar project is designed to help the development of a new sugar estate and to provide for construction of a new factory and related facilities. It is anticipated that the project will boost production of refined sugar by some 45,000 metric tons.

● During September, President Julius Nyerere became the third African head of state to visit Cuba since the 1959 revolution. (*East African Standard*, September 20, 1974.)

Thousands of Cubans cheered Nyerere's arrival at Havana Airport aboard an Air Jamaica jetliner. Nyerere was greeted by Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro at the airport, which was decorated with huge portraits of the Tanzanian president, as well as slogans in Spanish and Kiswahili.

Nyerere's Cuban visit was the last leg of a 12-day Caribbean tour that also included Tobago, Guyana, and Jamaica. (London *Times*, September 7, 1974.)

Previous African visitors to Cuba were former Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella and the present Algerian head of state, Houari Boumediene, who made his trip last April.

### Uganda

● An attempt to overthrow Ugandan President Idi Amin was crushed by loyal troops in early November, according to East African diplomatic sources.

It was reported that at least 15 soldiers of a special commando division established by Amin were killed and several others wounded in a brief rebellion at Kampala's Mbuya barracks.

Room-to-room fighting is believed to have started when the commandos complained they had not been paid for three months and had not received full food rations. (New York *Times*, November 11, 1974.)

● President Amin is hiring 250 Pakistanis to fill some of the posts vacated when he expelled 80,000 Asians from Uganda in 1972. The Pakistanis, along with their families, will bring about 2,000 Asians back to Uganda.

The Pakistanis are leaving their own country, where there is a reservoir of well-educated, unemployed professionals, to work in Uganda under three-year contracts. They will not be allowed to set up private businesses.

Amin recently asked India to provide Uganda with technicians, but the Indian Government said it would not discuss assistance until the Asians expelled in 1972 received compensation for the property they lost. (Los Angeles *Times*, September 27, 1974.)

● President Amin recently ordered Great Britain to reduce from 50 to five the number of staff members assigned to the British High Commission at Kampala. Amin's latest moves against Britain apparently resulted from continuing bad publicity for Uganda in the British press. (*Financial Times*, November 7, 1974.)

Earlier this year Amin threatened to expel all 1,500 British citizens from Uganda in retaliation for BBC coverage of an International Commission of Jurists' report on political repression in Uganda. (See **African Update,** May-June 1974.)

The British High Commission's defense advisor, Lt. Col. Charles Potts, was expelled from Uganda at the beginning of November and 14 other members of the staff were scheduled to depart a week later. Amin announced that all remaining staff members would have to obtain official permission to visit places outside Kampala. (East African *Standard*, November 8, 1974.)

## Central Africa

### Cameroun

● Drought, fuel shortages and booming prices combined in 1974 to create **a bleak economic outlook for Cameroun,** which until this year had been recording some modest gains.

Dramatic losses in basic commodity production have called attention to the deteriorating picture. It is expected, for example, that groundnut production for 1974 will be off by some 32,000 tons; cotton by 18,000 tons; coffee by 7,700 tons and cocoa by 6,000 tons.

The Camerounian Government has been pledged to increasing productivity, particularly in agriculture, as part of its overall development plan. Undoubtedly 1974 will prove something of a setback, especially when contrasted with 1973, a year in which gains in agriculture gave the country a trade surplus of $14 million.

Some observers believe the Camerounian Government can no longer rely exclusively on policies of increasing agricultural

output and processing imported raw materials for export as a means of preventing trade deficits.

As an antidote to inflationary pressures, it has been suggested that the country consider withdrawal from the franc zone, but critics of the move argue it would complicate exchanges with neighboring Gabon, the Central African Republic and Congo-Brazzaville. (*Africa Confidential*, October 4, 1974.)

Meanwhile, Cameroun continues to be frustrated in its attempts to discover an economy-bolstering oil deposit, despite intensive searches by American, French and Dutch firms.

In September, Camerounian President Ahmadou Ahidjo met with Nigeria's Yakubu Gowon to try to settle a border dispute between the two countries. Political observers felt Ahidjo is anxious to secure the area in case oil should be found there.

The two leaders agreed to set up a two-kilometer no-man's land along their shared border. Many observers feel the temporary solution will not satisfy the Nigerians along the border, who want to reclaim some of Cameroun's land. (*Jeune Afrique*, September 21, 1974.)

## Congo-Brazzaville

● Statistics resulting from a **population census** carried out in the Congo last June increased government concern about the concentration of population in the country's two major cities. Figures show that 32.75% of the Congo's 1,300,120 inhabitants live in urban areas, mainly in Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire.

The Congo's average population density is only four inhabitants per square mile, but Congolese officials note that nearly 75% of the country's population lives in the south.

Congolese Prime Minister Henri Lopes says census figures demonstrate the validity of the government's efforts to limit exploitation of the south's resources and to encourage movement of the people back to the countryside. (*Africa*, October 1974.)

## Central African Republic

● Jean-Bedel Bokassa, the Central African Republic's President for Life, Keeper of the Seals, Minister of Social Security, Civil Service and Mining, recently announced he would further **broaden his powers** by assuming control of the Ministry of Defense, Civil Aviation and Aeronautics.

Bokassa also named Henri Paul Boundio as a special representative to the Presidency in charge of the organization and security of land and river transportation. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, September 30, 1974.)

Boundio faces difficult problems. The Ubangui River is the landlocked country's only route to the sea. About 90% of the CAR's exports are carried 700 miles by boat from Bangui down the river to Brazzaville in the Congo. Goods are then transported by train the remaining 300 miles to the sea.

For several months this year Bangui was completely cut off from its trade routes because drought lowered water levels to unnavigable depths. The rest of the year, lack of river barges and railway wagons delayed the flow of goods into and out of the country. Major commodities, such as sugar, flour, cement and fuel, remain in short supply.

The fuel shortage also means an almost total collapse of internal transportation, as well as suspension of flights by the local airline, Air Centrafrique.

Despite clogged transport lines, diamond smugglers are reported to be getting their goods out of the country. The government, which depends on diamonds for 50% of its exports, empowered police and customs personnel to conduct searches at any time on any individual, including ambassadors and visiting government delegations. The minimal penalty for possession of undeclared diamonds is an $800 fine or two year's imprisonment.

## Zaïre

● Engineers, envisioning **substantially boosted power for Zaïre**, are currently at work on a project to harness the mighty rapids and fierce currents of the Zaïre River, a move they expect will bolster the country's electrical capacity beyond that of the entire American system.

The project calls for transfer of power from the recently constructed Inga Dam to the country's copper mining industry in Shaba Province 1,000 miles away at a cost of $260 million.

America's **Westinghouse Electric**, Belgium's ACEC and Austria's Voest are members of an international consortium supplying turbines, alternators, transformers, hydraulic machinery and other equipment necessary for the plan.

An Italian firm, Astaldi, and a Belgium firm, Safricas, have been awarded engineering and construction contracts for the Inga II project, which is expected to be completed between 1976 and 1980.

Three American firms—**Morison Knudsen International, International Engineering Company**, and **Fischbach and Moore International**—have begun work on converter stations and cable lines in an 80-meter corridor cleared through the overgrown terrain of southern Zaïre.

Zaïre's transportation system is unable to handle the heavy equipment necessary for the project. So contractors have ordered 12 heavy-equipment rail cars, three self-propelled river barges, a special barge for cranes, 300 trucks, 26 truck cranes and 55 tractors. **U.S. Steel International** will provide two-thirds of the steel needed for the project's 9,400 pylons. (*African Development*, October 1974.)

The mining society of Tenke-Fungurume in Shaba Province was recently awarded $112.5 million worth of credit to buy equipment and services necessary to exploit copper and cobalt deposits in the region.

Half of the credit will come from the U.S. Export-Import Bank and the other half from a consortium of private banks. An American firm, Fluor Utah, Inc., a subsidiary of **Fluor Corporation** has been selected to design a copper processing plant at the site of the Tenke-Fungurume deposits. **Amoco Minerals** and Leon Tempelsman & Son are participating in the international consortium carrying out technical and feasibility studies for the project.

When constructed, the plant is expected to produce 130,000 tons of copper and 6,500 tons of cobalt each year. (*Le Moniteur Africain*, October 10, 1974; African-American Chamber of Commerce *News*, October 1974.)

● When Muhammad Ali knocked out George Foreman in the eighth round of their Kinshasa heavyweight championship bout, **U.S. enthusiasm for Zaïre** probably reached new heights.

Although it was not immediately clear whether the fight lived up to the expectations of its investors (pre-fight rumor had it that it would not) the excitement of fight night helped whip up enthusiasm for this increasingly powerful Central African nation.

Looming large over the proceedings was a giant portrait of President Mobutu Sese Seko and as the closed circuit camera zoomed back from the picture to show a panorama of the stadium lit against the dark backdrop of African sky, the man in the leopard-skin cap seemed to be watching, smiling benevolently over the pugilistic drama.

Meanwhile, the fight may represent only the tip of the iceberg so far as U.S. enthusiasm for Zaïre is concerned. A recent *Business Week report (September 21, 1974) notes that* Zaïre's political stability and mineral wealth have helped triple U.S. investment in the country since 1970. According to *Business Week*, the volume of U.S. investment in Zaïre now stands at $110 million, with another $125 million firmly in the planning stages. The magazine further notes that about 80% of all foreign capital coming into Zaïre is American.

Among U.S. firms with a strong presence in Zaïre are **Goodyear Tire & Rubber, General Motors,** and **Gulf Oil. Pan American World Airways** has a technical assistance agreement to help Air Zaïre, the national airline, attain profitability, and Pan Am's Inter-Continental Hotels Corporation shares ownership with the government in a $12.5-million hotel in Kinshasa.

Other American firms operating in Zaïre include **International Telephone & Telegraph, IBM, Singer, Mobil, Texaco, First National City, Morgan Guaranty** and **Chase Manhattan Bank.**

### Zambia

● Zambia's copper industry is losing its luster with prices for the metal tumbling from April's $2,730 per ton to mid-September's low of $1,159.

Copper importers have reduced their demands for the metal, causing the market to be glutted with copper from Zambia, Zaïre, Chile and Peru.

The annual report for Zambia's copper group Nchanga Consolidated, recently presented by Minister of Mines Andrew Kashita, did not reflect the dismal downturn of sales. Kashita reported that peak prices in early 1974 combined with low *costs for transporting copper on the Benguela Railway to* Lobito, Angola, to offer a bright picture.

The report, however, contained results of the boom that began in 1973. It is expected that current market losses will take six months to take their toll on the company's earnings. (*To the Point*, October 19, 1974; *African Development*, October 1974.)

## Northern Africa

### Algeria

● The U.S. and Algeria have announced resumption of **diplomatic relations** which were broken by Algeria in 1967 to protest U.S. support of Israel during the Middle East War. (*Christian Science Monitor*, November *13, 1973.*)

Observers are speculating that improvement in U.S.-Algerian relations may precipitate Algerian President Houari Boumediene's withdrawal of support for higher oil prices.

Boumediene led moves by oil-producing nations to raise prices in the past. But it is reported that during U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's visit to Algeria in October, Boumediene assured him that Algeria was not anxious to confront the U.S. on the oil issue. (New York *Times*, October 16, 1974.)

In an apparent attempt to make the country's climate more hospitable, the Algerian Government has begun to allow resident foreigners to repatriate their earnings. France particularly welcomed the decision to allow its citizens to transfer money from Algerian banks to French accounts. (*Le Monde*, September 28, 1974.)

French actions concerning migrant workers, however, seemed an ambivalent response to Algerian efforts to improve relations between the two countries. The French Government decided to continue a three-month ban on African migrant labor. The ban was imposed in July and was sched*uled to be lifted in October.*

France did, however, announce measures to improve welfare conditions for African workers already in the country. The new measures cover pensions, health, welfare, family allowances and labor rights. France plans to build 70,000 homes for workers now living in urban slums.

Tense relations between French workers and the country's four million migrant laborers, most from North Africa, sparked a wave of anti-Arab violence in southern France last year. When 12 Algerian workers were killed during these incidents, the Algerian Government banned further emigration of Algerians to France.

Algeria later rescinded the ban, but no one was arrested for the Algerians' deaths until this year. In October, a 53-year-old policeman from Marseilles was accused of killing 16-year-old Ladj Lounes on August 28, 1973. (Africa News, October *17, 1974*; London *Times*, October *29, 1974.*)

● Encroachment of the massive Sahara desert into fertile lands beyond its borders requires a massive response. During the next 20 years, Algeria will plant six billion pine and eucalyptus trees in a 932-mile belt across the country in an effort to slow down the **advance of the Sahara's shifting sands.**

According to historians, Algeria was once a vast forest. Now a stretch of rolling green hills along the country's coast contrasts with the stark gray mountain-high piles of rocks that cover much of Algeria's interior.

But the country will mobilize 100,000 workers to carry out the reforestation project that will cover 7.4 million acres of land with new trees. (Los Angeles *Times*, October 18, 1974.)

● **General Telephone and Electronic** has signed a $232-million contract with Algeria to build a factory at Sidi-Bel-Abbes in the northwest part of the country. The factory will employ 5,800 people to produce 190,000 black-and-white televisions, 50,000 color televisions, 450,000 radios and 70,000 record players and tape recorders. (*Jeune Afrique*, October 12, 1974.)

● Sonatrach, the Algerian state oil company, has awarded a $60-million contract to Willbros (Overseas), the British subsidiary of the **Williams Group** of Tulsa, Oklahoma, to construct compressor stations for a 40-inch pipeline from Hassi R'Mel in north-central Algeria to Skikda on the Mediterranean coast. (*Financial Times*, September 19, 1974.)

Sonatrach has also signed an exploration contract with **Amoco International Oil Company.** It was the 10th such Algerian accord with a western oil firm. Sonatrach's participation will be 51%. (*Moniteur Africain*, October 10, 1974.)

### Egypt

● Having agreed to terminate the "special relationship" between his country and neighboring Libya, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat announced in early autumn the beginnings of **agreements with the U.S., France and the Soviet Union.**

A bare two days after the French Government announced it had lifted its seven-year embargo on arms sales to Middle East countries, it was reported in Paris that the government of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing had promised Egypt 50 Mirage F-1 fighter planes. Sadat's eagerness to obtain the

Mirages was said to stem from the fact that Egyptian pilots have trained on the craft (lent by Libya) and from his alleged reluctance to depend too heavily on supplies from either the USSR or the U.S. (*Financial Times*, August 31, 1974.)

While the dramatic improvement in U.S.-Egyptian relations was being headlined around the world, Egypt and the Soviet Union were quietly mending fences. A five-year economic pact will be signed by the two countries, as will a trade protocol agreement. The economic agreement will begin in 1976; the trade protocol will be signed in January during a summit talk in Egypt between Sadat and Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev. (*Financial Times*, October 23, 1973.)

In addition, the Soviet Union has agreed in principle to provide Egypt with a nuclear reactor that will produce 460 megawatts of electricity and will be constructed under the 1976-1980 five-year plan. (*Financial Times*, October 29, 1974.)

The announcements followed earlier news that the Soviet Union had airlifted new weapons to Egypt, including 50 MiG-23 fighter aircraft. The arrival of these new planes, and of the French Mirages, indicates that Egypt will not miss the planes lent by Libya and recently returned. (*Financial Times*, September 12, 1974; *Africa Confidential*, September 20, 1974.)

While Egypt and the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation are cautiously hammering out the guidelines by which American private investment will be welcomed once again, the Egyptians are establishing priorities for development. No. 1 on the list are two major petrochemical complexes at Alexandria and Cairo, projects the government is already planning with western oil firms.

The economic climate in Egypt, according to U.S. Ambassador Hermann Elits, is buoyed by Egypt's dedication to the negotiating process in seeking a Middle East settlement. Since the war of a year ago, the country has had assistance offers of about $2 billion from various international donors, and investment projects totaling more than $3 billion are currently being discussed.

A new U.S.-Egypt agreement signed August 19, meanwhile calls for the U.S. to provide the Middle Eastern nation with $16.5 million in wheat on a low-interest, long-term basis. (*Middle East and African Economist*, September, October 1974.)

## Libya

● **Exxon Corporation** resumed partial production of oil and natural gas in Libya after reaching a limited settlement of a price dispute with Italian and Spanish customers.

Gas Natural of Spain signed an interim contract with Exxon to absorb the cost of increased export taxes levied on foreign oil companies by the Libyan Government. Negotiations are still pending between Exxon and Snam Progetti S.P.A., a unit of Italy's state-owned Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi.

At first, both companies refused to absorb the higher costs and Exxon decided to close down temporarily its liquid gas operations. Exxon asked the Libyan Government for permission to burn off, or flare, the excess gas produced when crude oil is pumped from the ground.

Libya refused to cooperate with Exxon, however, and ordered the corporation to shut down all its operations in the country until resolution of the price dispute. (*Financial Times*, October 11, 1974; Wall Street *Journal*, November 1, 1974.)

## Morocco

● In October, the Moroccan Government awarded offshore oil-exploration concessions to three American companies. **Sun Oil Company, Chevron Company,** a subsidiary of Standard Oil Company of California, and **Kilroy and Western Company** signed agreements to search for oil off Morocco's western coast. (*Moniteur Africain*, October 17, 1974; Wall Street *Journal*, October 23, 1974.)

Morocco does not share the booming oil profits of its Arab neighbors. But like the wealthy oil-producing nations, Morocco is the target of world criticism for amassing a fortune from the sale of a commodity everyone needs and few have.

Morocco's precious commodity is phosphate, the fossilized remains of fish and other marine animals used to make fertilizer. The country produced 20 million tons of the mineral last year and has a supply expected to last another 2,000 years.

Morocco is the world's leading exporter of phosphate and is third in production after the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Morocco has led moves during the past year to increase the price of phosphates from $15 to $63 a ton. The price jump has raised the country's expected phosphate revenues from $160 million to $1 billion. Phosphate earnings will finance expansion of mining operations, construction of two ports at El Jadida and Essaouira and construction of a plant to convert phosphate into fertilizer.

Morocco's phosphate bonanza has prompted criticism primarily from developing nations that cannot afford the price increase. Developed nations have urged Morocco to make price concessions to famine-stricken countries in the Sahel and Asia. Nations meeting at the World Food Conference in Rome during November are expected to bombard Morocco with pleas to ease the world shortage of fertilizer.

Morocco claims phosphate prices remained too low for too long and that the increased revenues are necessary for its own economic welfare. Nevertheless, the Moroccan Government plans to offer nonproducing countries new credit terms for purchasing phosphate.

The new conditions include possible long-term payments at reduced interest rates for developing countries. For richer countries, Morocco is proposing an exchange of phosphate for investment in developing its phosphate-processing industry. (Washington *Post*, October 1, 1974; *Financial Times*, October 8, 1974.)

## Sudan

● The glowing reports that have been coming out of Sudan for the past two years dimmed somewhat as early October brought **floods,** an alleged **coup plot** and **rioting** in the south.

Since the country's 16-year-long civil war was ended in the spring of 1972, the Muslim north and the Christian and animist south have reportedly made remarkable strides in healing the rift, to the extent that the south enjoys autonomy within a federal system.

Rioting in early October was touched off by rumors that a joint Sudan-Egypt river-improvement project would be accompanied by settlement in Sudan's south of 2.5 million Egyptian settlers and 6,000 Egyptian troops. According to reports out of London, Southern Sudanese have a dread of Egyptians.

The rumor-mongering evidently was aimed not at undermining the government of President Gaafar Nimeiry but at more local political targets. Although a state of emergency was declared, the situation in the south was not viewed as

critical, and by early November Nimeiry was able to take Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere to Juba, the southern capital, on a state visit. (London *Times*, November 3, 1974; Africa News, October 24, 1974.)

While the southern riots were the first violence experienced by the nation since 1972, a coup plot was announced by the president in early October. In his monthly television broadcast, Nimeiry announced a number of army officers had been plotting against his government for more than a year and would be brought to trial. (*Financial Times*, October 9, 1974.)

Natural disaster hit in late September. Sandwiched between drought-stricken Chad and Ethiopia, Sudan's lowlands began flooding over in late September, leaving more than a quarter of a million people homeless and 15 dead. Their crops, which were near harvest, destroyed and their grain stores wiped out, the inhabitants of the wet lowlands—like their parched neighbors—will now have to depend upon international relief efforts until their next harvest. (Africa News, October 7, 1974.)

## Southern Africa

### Angola

● At least 48 people were killed and more than 100 were injured in a November weekend of shooting, grenade-throwing, robberies and attacks on vehicles in the vast African suburb of Rangel, outside Angola's capital city, Luanda. (*Times of Zambia*, November 12, 1974.)

According to the *Times of Zambia*, eye witnesses in the capital spoke of heavy automatic weapons fire in the suburb near the headquarters of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

Circumstances surrounding the fighting were unclear, but it was initially feared that clashes between various factions of Angola's three liberation movements might have prompted the outbursts. (New York *Times*, November 11, 1974.)

The *Christian Science Monitor* (November 12, 1974) was more definitive in its report, attributing the fighting to clashes between "rival Black liberation movements."

Portuguese troops and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) joined forces to restore order.

The *Monitor* pointed out that "militants" supporting the MPLA were generally regarded as the source of the violence, which broke out after the arrival of a delegation of Angola's third liberation movement, the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA).

MPLA opened its Luanda office in late October after becoming the last Angolan liberation movement to sign a cease-fire agreement with the Portuguese. The truce was signed by MPLA President Neto and representatives of the ruling military junta in Portugal.

There was widespread dissension within MPLA over the cease-fire pact. The movement's Vice-President Daniel Chipenda said the faction of the party that he leads rejected the cease-fire.

● In the wake of bloody rioting in Luanda, Portugal appeared to be attempting to speed up the decolonization process in Angola.

During the latter part of November, a Portuguese senior minister was conducting talks in Algeria with Angola's largest liberation group, MPLA. In addition, Portuguese Foreign Minister Mario Soares was scheduled to visit Zaïre for talks with FNLA leaders, who head the territory's other major independence movement. (Africa News, November 25, 1974.)

Portuguese authorities recently said they no longer plan to adhere to the two-year decolonization plan proposed by ex-President Antonio de Spínola, who resigned in October. Angola will receive independence as quickly as possible, they say. Private talks have been conducted with some leaders of Angola's liberation movements, but no settlement has yet been reached.

### Botswana

● **Elections in Botswana** at the end of October secured a third term of office for Sir Seretse Khama as president of the country and gave his ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) an overwhelming majority of 27 out of 31 parliamentary seats.

But the victory was not entirely sweet for Khama. Only one-third of Botswana's eligible voters went to the polls, indicating that most people believed a BDP victory was a foregone conclusion. A viable alternative to the ruling BDP seems unlikely to emerge. The three main opposition parties —Botswana National Front, Botswana People's Party, Botswana Independence Party—share only four parliamentary seats.

President Khama is strongly opposed to a one-party political system and is proud of his country's multiparty, democratic tradition. But some observers believe the lack of organized opposition to the BDP, and voter apathy, may lead Botswana toward becoming a one-party state. (*Rand Daily Mail*, October 29, 1974; Africa News, October 31, 1974.)

● Independence in the former Portuguese territories and the current squeeze on Rhodesia's white regime are encouraging Botswana to **reexamine its economic priorities.**

Until the Portuguese coup altered the political scene in southern Africa this year, Botswana was surrounded by white-ruled nations. Though vigorously opposed to racist policies in Rhodesia, South Africa and the Portuguese territories, Botswana's economic stability has depended in large measure upon maintaining good trade relations with its neighbors.

During his campaign for reelection, Sir Seretse Khama called for Botswana to pull out of the rand monetary zone and establish its own currency. President Khama also indicated that his administration would take control of a section of railroad running from Rhodesia through Botswana to South Africa.

Great Britain controlled the line when Rhodesia and Botswana were the former British territories of Southern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland. Rhodesia has controlled this vital link to South Africa since it declared UDI in 1965. (*Africa Confidential*, September 20, 1974; *Africa*, November 1974.)

### Lesotho

● **Westrans Petroleum Incorporated** of New York has set up an oil drilling rig at Mahobong in the Leribe district of Lesotho. The company was granted an oil concession in November, 1972, and began prospecting early in 1973. (Johannesburg *Star*, September 7, 1974.)

### Mozambique

● Mozambique moved toward the new year hopeful that outbursts of **racial violence** would not continue into 1975.

By early November, more than 1,600 persons had been detained for questioning as combined operations of Portuguese forces and Frelimo militia formed a special police force to detain anyone in the capital city of Lourenço

Marques who could not present suitable identification. (Africa News, November 4, 1974.)

The rigid security was justified by Frelimo leader Joaquim Chissano, prime minister in the territory's provisional government, who said police operations were necessary to discover "rumormongers" who were trying to disrupt national development.

Mozambique has experienced several violent outbreaks since Portugal announced plans to give the territory independence. According to those plans, the provisional government, composed of both Portuguese appointees and Frelimo representatives, is slated to give way to a Frelimo government when independence is granted in June.

The latest major outbreak came in late October when racial disturbances tore the Mozambique capital. (Zambia *Daily Mail*, October 28, 1974.)

Some 49 people were reported killed during that outbreak which was triggered by an incident in which a Portuguese soldier pushed a Black youth who was wearing a shirt decorated with the Frelimo flag. (New York *Times*, October 23, 1974.)

Portuguese commandos and Frelimo troops then exchanged fire and crowds of angry Blacks reportedly emerged from shantytowns on the city outskirts in search of whites.

According to the London *Times* (October 28, 1974) Frelimo party members were holding meetings all over the city to explain the official policies of the organization, emphasizing its nonracial character.

Frelimo has attempted to stem the mass exodus of whites that has tended to follow each outbreak of violence.

● Observers are predicting that Mozambique's unstable economy means it will have to walk softly in renegotiating links to its white-ruled neighbors, South Africa and Rhodesia.

About 40% of Mozambique's annual budget has come from rail and port dues on South African and Rhodesian goods shipped through the country. But Frelimo has already committed itself to supporting U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia. Observers noted that the U.S. can anticipate a boost to its tobacco exports if Rhodesian tobacco has to be shipped out via South Africa at higher prices. (*Foreign Agriculture*, October 2, 1974.)

The loss of Rhodesian revenues may be balanced by a renewed flow of goods from Zambia. Now that Mozambique is free from Portuguese domination, Zambia can end its boycott of Beira and Lourenço Marques and route copper exports through these ports.

The new government has not decided what to do about links to South African trade. Ten million tons of goods pass through Mozambique ports from the Transvaal. Some say Mozambique cannot afford to ignore the possibilities for increasing government revenues from this traffic. (London *Times*, October 2, 1974.)

Mozambique may also decide to assure itself future profits from South Africa by keeping the Cabora Bassa dam project on schedule. But South Africa is more concerned about its completion. The dam would provide South Africa with a vast new power source. Mozambique, on the other hand, would not lose any current income by stopping the project now. (*Financial Mail*, August 30, 1974.)

Sending Mozambiquans to South African gold mines is also a tough issue for the new government. Observers do not expect Frelimo in June to forbid miners to work in South Africa. Aware that South Africa would suffer without the 100,000 Mozambiquans now working in South African mines, Mozambique's provisional head also knows he cannot afford 100,000 more unemployed people should he try to stop them from going to the mines. (*Africa Confidential*, October 4, 1974.)

Mozambique does plan to keep the gold South Africa pays the miners for their labor. Before this year, Portuguese officials responsible for labor contracts with South Africa paid the miners in escudos, Mozambique's local currency, and credited revenues to Mozambique's government account. South Africa's gold payments, however, went to Portugal where the gold was resold when the world market price increased. (*Rand Daily Mail*, September 29, 1974.)

Another problem for Chissano is whether to encourage South African tourism in Mozambique. The loss of tourist income would mean a 10% chunk out of the country's meager budget.

The new government is expected to focus its attention on agricultural development. Mozambique's economy is based on the export of cotton, tea, sugar and cashewnuts. But until this year's April coup in Portugal, most of the profits from these exports went to the Portuguese.

Mozambique is the world's largest producer of cashewnuts and did a healthy export business until Portuguese traders arbitrarily raised the price of cashews earlier this year. Now demand for the expensive nuts has dropped. (Johannesburg *Star*, October 5, 1974.)

Portuguese also raked in sugar profits before Chissano's government was installed. Sugar was exported to Portugal for half the price that Portuguese merchants later sold it for on the world market.

Only a small percentage of Mozambique's revenues come from its industries—brewing, canning, textiles, an assembly plant for Fiats, fertilizer and explosives.

## Namibia

● **Continental Oil Company** (Conoco) is pulling out of an oil venture with **Phillips Petroleum Company** and **Getty Oil Company** off the coast of Namibia.

A Conoco spokesman said geological and technical factors prompted the company's decision.

But the United Church of Christ, which owns 141,561 shares of Conoco, is crediting stockholders with pressuring the company to cease operations in Namibia. According to a church statement, "This is the first time that a multinational corporation, faced with mounting shareholder concern about its investment in a white minority-ruled part of Africa, has chosen to withdraw from the area."

Beyond what it considers its success with Conoco, the church group says it will continue to place a high priority on oil companies operating in Namibia. A church spokesman told **African Update** that Phillips Petroleum, Getty Oil, **Texaco** and **Standard Oil of California** were likely targets of church-sponsored resolutions in 1975.

Conoco was granted permission by the South African Government to join the oil venture off the Namibian coast in July 1972. Church groups, opposed to South Africa's administration of Namibia, presented resolutions at the company's last two annual meetings, calling for Conoco to end all business activities in Namibia and adjacent waters until a government approved by the U.N. was established. The resolution was defeated both times. (*Wall Street Journal*, November 1, 1974; Africa News, November 11, 1974.)

Conoco's decision to withdraw from Namibian operations came soon after the U.N. Council for Namibia decreed in September that any natural resources exported from Namibia without the council's approval would be subject to seizure and held in trust for the people of the territory.

The council stated that any permission, concession or license granted by the South African Government or the administration of South West Africa for exploitation of natural

resources was void. (Windhoek *Advertiser*, September 30, 1974.)

● Sean MacBride, Commissioner of the U.N. Council for Namibia, was recently announced as winner of this year's Nobel Peace Prize.

MacBride, former chairman of Amnesty International and a past secretary-general of the International Commission of Jurists, said he was surprised by the award, but also indicated that he felt public recognition of his work would focus more attention on the aims of the Council for Namibia.

At a news conference following announcement of the award, MacBride told reporters of his proposal to establish an Institute for Research and Training in Zambia. He said such an institute would help prepare exiled SWAPO members in Zambia to govern their own country when it was liberated from South African control.

According to press reports, the U.N. Trust Fund for Namibia, set up in 1970 to train and educate Namibian exiles, now has a total of $2,734,545. U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim recommended part of the fund be used toward establishing the Zambian institute. (Africa News, October 7, 1974; *West Africa*, November 4, 1974.)

● In September South Africa announced plans for a multiracial constitutional conference to discuss the future of Namibia.

Prime Minister Vorster claims the conference could lead to a referendum with options of federation or total autonomy for Namibia's 800,000 inhabitants. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, September 30, 1974.)

The U.S. applauded the move calling it a demonstration of South Africa's willingness to ease its apartheid policies. But many distrustful Namibians regarded South Africa's move as a ploy to avoid expulsion from the U.N.

According to Peter Katjavivi, a London representative of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), South Africa's conference proposal is "basically an old idea in a new dress."

Katjavivi pointed out that South Africa still wants to divide the African population of Namibia so that whites can continue to control most of the territory's resources. He noted that only representatives of specific ethnic groups would be invited to the conference. Political organizations with interests crossing racial lines would not be allowed to attend, he said. (*Africa*, November 1974.)

Prime Minister Vorster's offer to consider all options for Namibia, including independence, drew fire from whites, as well as Blacks. Extreme right-wingers in the National Party accused Vorster of "betraying the white man," but Vorster assured them South Africa would not leave Namibia's 73,000 whites out on a limb.

## Rhodesia

### Rhodesia Nationalists Negotiate

A Reuter dispatch of December 3 has revealed that two detained leaders of Rhodesian nationalist movements were released by the Smith regime for secret talks with Black African leaders in Zambia. Joshua Nkomo, president of the banned Zimbabwe African People's Union, accompanied by Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa, head of the legal African National Council, and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, president of the Zimbabwe African National Union, also banned, participated in talks that apparently led to developments detailed in **African Update**, page 21. The nationalists' temporary release backs up the contention that South Africa has been pressuring Rhodesia to come to terms with its Black majority.

● Rhodesia celebrated the **ninth anniversary** of its unilateral declaration of independence from Britain by putting forward its most optimistic public face, despite increasing signs that the future of the breakaway colony is anything but secure.

Speaking at an independence anniversary ball, Rhodesian Minister of Commerce and Industry Elly Broomberg predicted that Rhodesia was on the "threshold of an era of unprecedented prosperity." (*Times of Zambia*, November 11, 1974.)

Prime Minister Ian Smith echoed Broomberg's optimism declaring, "Over the last decade we have had to face a number of serious difficulties. We have overcome them all. In the same way, we will deal with any problems of the future." (BBC Monitoring Service, November 13, 1974.)

Smith encouraged Rhodesians to "dedicate themselves to promoting better understanding and greater racial harmony" in his independence day speech to the nation. The conciliatory tone of the speech, however, did not seem to be in keeping with government actions during weeks preceding UDI celebrations.

At the end of September, the Rhodesian government banned publication of one of the country's leading newspapers for three months, a Roman Catholic publication called *Moto*, with a largely African circulation of about 30,000. (London *Times*, September 27, 1974.)

In mid-October, police arrested 20 members of the African National Council without stating reasons for their detention. According to the police, the men were not arrested because they were ANC members. (London *Times*, October 17, 1974.)

ANC officials view the arrests as an attempt to dismantle the power base of Africans in Rhodesia. Apparently, Smith is no longer anxious to include ANC representatives in settlement talks. He recently said he has been "overpatient and overtolerant" with the ANC and believes any further talks might be seen as a sign of weakness on his part. (Africa News, October 3, 1974.)

Despite his avowed optimism about Rhodesia's future, Smith is reported to be worried about losing his South African friends. South Africa appears to be willing to buy time for its own survival by loosening its ties to Rhodesia and by considering a retreat from Namibia.

It is reported that South Africa is considering terms for removing the 2,000 South African police that guard Rhodesia's northern border and the Kariba province in the northeast. (Washington *Post*, October 13, 1974.)

South Africa has stated it will withdraw its police from Rhodesia if Zambia would agree to freeze the activities of Zimbabwe liberation movements operating out of its territory. The South African statements followed reports that Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda felt the time was ripe for genuine negotiations between Black Africa and South Africa. (*Rand Daily Mail*, November 7, 1974; London *Times*, October 30, 1974.)

Smith may not believe South Africa will ditch Rhodesia, but it was stated in a Zambian newspaper that a pragmatic Vorster told Smith during a private conversation in Pretoria, "I can see a country called Zimbabwe on the world map before 1980. This is a reality the peoples of Rhodesia and South Africa must accept now and begin to plan accordingly." (Zambia *Daily Mail*, November 1, 1974.)

Smith told reporters, however, that he "does not see the Rhodesian nation flinching if there are matters of principle at stake, even if rail links close down and farmers and businessmen begin to feel the pinch. I believe we will go on." (BBC Monitoring Service, November 12, 1974.)

● Among other financial disclosures about vice-presidential-designate Nelson A. Rockefeller came news that Rocky owns 25% of Rhodesia's largest chicken farm. (Johannesburg *Star*, September 14, 1974.)

According to the Johannesburg *Star*, Rockefeller reportedly acquired his interest after Rhodesia's UDI in 1965.

The farm is owned by Basic Economic Corporation, a company in which Rockefeller has a 25% interest.

## South Africa

● South Africa recently intensified efforts to mechanize its gold mines, particularly as it faces a decreasing flow of Black workers from neighboring countries. (Wall Street *Journal*, November 4, 1974.)

Adriaan Louw, chairman of one of South Africa's largest mining groups, Gold Fields of South Africa, Ltd., recently projected that the Black labor force at many mines would fall to about 65% of former requirements by the end of the year.

The gold mining industry in South Africa has for several years been attempting to develop a rock-cutting machine that would allow for more underground automation.

South Africa's gold mines employ some 375,000 Black workers, most of them in menial jobs. About three-quarters of the workers come from outside South Africa, mostly from Mozambique, but also from Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and, until last April, from Malawi.

Last spring President Hastings Banda of Malawi banned recruitment of Malawians to the mines following the deaths of 77 Malawian miners in a Wenela aircrash in Botswana.

If independent Mozambique follows Malawi's lead the South African gold industry could be in even deeper trouble. Nearly 100,000 Black workers in South Africa's mines are from Mozambique. (*Times of Zambia*, September 25, 1974.)

To date, the provisional government in Mozambique has given no indication of what its policy on South African labor will be.

Most recently the South African Chamber of Mines, which includes the majority of the country's gold producers, announced its members would invest some $220 million in a crash research program to push ahead with mechanization. (*African Development*, October 1974.)

In addition, in early November (*Rand Daily Mail*, November 7, 1974) South Africa made the first approach on recruiting Black labor in Rhodesia.

● The Australian Government, in late September, ended all official promotion of trade and investment in South Africa and announced that the country would sponsor **no more trade missions to Pretoria.**

The Australian announcement, reported in the Johannesburg *Star* (September 28, 1974) noted that future South African activities of the Australian trade commission would be limited to providing "usual" marketing information and assistance to Australian firms.

At the same time, Australia also disclosed that it would support international economic sanctions against South Africa, if other trading partners of Pretoria would follow suit.

In disclosing the end of formal trade promotions, Australia also announced a list of 19 suggested guidelines on employment conditions for firms already in South Africa. The list included establishment of minimum wages at least 50% above the poverty datum line.

● The 20-nation **Arab League was flooded with protests** from African governments over reports that Jordan had sold British-built Centurion tanks and a land-to-air missile system to South Africa.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) sent a formal protest to the Arab League and protests were also lodged by the Cairo-based ambassadors of African countries.

The strongly worded OAU note said Jordan's alleged arms sale came as a bitter disappointment following broad African support for the Arab cause in the Middle East.

Jordan, which persistently denied any arms sale to South Africa, was later reported to have admitted the sale, promising to refrain from such transactions in the future. (Washington *Post*, September 21, 1974.)

● West Germany could surpass Britain as South Africa's **No. 1 trading partner** within the next year, according to reports in the *Times of Zambia*. (October 30, 1974.)

The *Times of Zambia*, which noted that West German investment in South Africa now exceeds $1.5 billion up from only $105 million in 1965, suggested that Bonn's attitude is like that of nearly all countries that trade with South Africa, which is that as long as all western countries continue to trade with Pretoria, there is not reason for any single country not to participate.

● Two American firms recently announced expansions of their South African operations.

In late October, **Eli Lilly & Co.** announced plans to expand its plant near Johannesburg to allow for manufacturing of injectable products and expansion of dry products manufacturing. Construction of a $2.2-million two-story addition is scheduled to be completed by 1976.

Earlier in October, the Johannesburg *Star* (October 5, 1974) announced that work had begun on a $4.9-million expansion of the industrial rubber products manufacturing section of a **Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company** facility in South Africa.

The new facility will provide increased production of conveyor belting.

● Massive ore bodies discovered by **Phelps Dodge Corporation** in South Africa could produce metals valued at more than $1 billion per year, it was recently announced by South Africa's minister of mines, Dr. Piet Koornhof.

As a result of an exploratory program, the American metals firm had already announced the presence of mineral deposits containing copper, lead, zinc and silver. The South African official's announcement, however, was one of the first indications of the commercial value of the enterprise. (Johannesburg *Star*, September 9, 1974.)

It is expected that the discovery will help put the little-known town of Aggeneys, in the North-western Cape Province, on the map.

● A new South African law may prohibit American companies from giving out **information** on their investments in South Africa.

According to the second section of the Second General Law Amendment Bill, the furnishing of information in compliance with any order, direction or letters of request issued or emanating from outside the Republic is prohibited.

South African officials claim the law has no effect on the dissemination of business information by companies and individuals in general but does bring under government control information requested by foreign governments. (*Financial Times*, October 17, 1974.)

Presumably, any government wishing to compile information on South African wages and working conditions would have to obtain permission from the minister of economic affairs.

# Japan's Alliance with Apartheid

Many governments condemn apartheid while continuing to maintain close relations with the South African regime. Japan is one such country, which until recently succeeded in avoiding publicity for its co-operation. This document is the result of the most exhaustive research so far carried out into the commercial ties between the two countries.

BY YOKO KITAZAWA

Japan's business relationship with South Africa began in the early 1960s in the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre. Throughout the '60s, economic relations were mostly in the realm of trade, with Japan importing raw materials and exporting finished industrial goods to South Africa. During this period (1960-1970), trade between Japan and South Africa increased 500%.

From 1970 on, Japanese economic advance into South Africa increased on a much greater scale. This was in accord with the South African government's plan to industrialize and modernize the economy.

Faced with dual threats from the advance of the national liberation movements in Mozambique, Angola, Namibia and Southern Rhodesia, and a growing militancy of the Black population within the country, the South African government chose a path of rapid industrial development to strengthen its political position, to maintain its apartheid system, and to maintain a strong and powerful military capacity.

Since 1972, Japan has been the fourth largest trade partner of South Africa. In 1973 the total amount of trade between these two countries exceeded one billion dollars for the first time. In 1973 Japan's exports to South Africa jumped 64% over the previous year, while Japan's imports from South Africa leapt 31%. The rapid rate of Japan-South Africa trade represents an alarming trend which is not found among the other major trade partners of South Africa such as the U.K. and the U.S.



In early 1970, the White minority regime in South Africa started several large-scale industrial development projects. Among these, the most important schemes include:

1) **Sishen-Saldanha Bay Development Project.**

This project includes the construction of an 860 km railway from an iron ore deposit at Sishen to Saldanha Bay on the West coast, worth R 1,000 million. Some of the ore will be exported in ore form and the rest will be manufactured into pig iron at a large steel mill to be built at Saldanha.

Work on construction commenced in 1973. It is expected that the first ore from the new mine at Sishen will be transported over the railway and shipped from Saldanha Bay in 1976.

After an intensive exchange of missions between South Africa's state-owned ISCOR and Japan's major iron and steel industry, three long term sales contracts were signed.

First, Japan would purchase large volumes of semi-finished steel products from ISCOR's Saldanha steel mill starting in 1976. (see table A-1)

Secondly, Japan signed two contracts for the Sishen iron ore. a) From ISCOR, Japan will import seven million tons of ore annually. b) Another five million tons of ore would be purchased from two private companies.

Japan's import contract of Sishen ore was projected to total $1500 million, spread over 12-15 years, starting in 1976.

2) **St. Croix Terminal Harbour Construction Plan**

Along lines similar to the ISCOR deals for Sishen ore, Japan's iron and steel industry began to negotiate with Consolidated African Mines (CAM), a private company in South Africa, for the purchase of iron ore.

South Africa's Minister of Transport, Ben Schoeman, reported to Par-

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one rand = $1.45

liament in March 1972 that CAM had arranged with Japan a 16-year contract to provide 70 million tons of iron ore to Japan, on the condition that ore terminal facilities at St. Croix island in Algoa Bay were completed. (see table A-2)

Meanwhile, CAM announced that it had signed another R 100 million contract to supply the Japanese steel industry with 8.6 million tons of manganiferous ore over 11 years beginning in 1977. Deliveries for this contract could go up to 11 million tons per year. In the interim Japan agreed to take more than 400,000 tons of manganiferous ore from CAM between 1974-1977.

3) **Richards Bay Expansion including a New Railway link from Witbank Coalfield.**

Under this project, a large amount of coking coal will be exported to Japan's iron and steel industry. In July 1970, the Mitsui Mining Co. agreed to provide long term technological assistance to South Africa's Transvaal Coal Owners' Association (TCOA). In March 1971, seven Japanese steel mills and cokeworks signed with TCOA a contract for importing 27 million tons of coal worth $350 million. TCOA was to export 450,000 tons in the first year from Lourenco Marques, and then exports would be increased to 3 million tons per year over 11 years from 1976, with a railway link from Witbank and a fast-loading plant installed at the new Richards Bay harbour. The construction of these facilities would cost R 100 million.

Because of purchase contracts with those projects, Japan's trade with South Africa will skyrocket after 1975 despite the Japanese government's repeated pledges that trade with South Africa would not be increased.

All of the three projects in South Africa are related to the development of underground mineral resources as well as an expansion of infra-structure which guarantees the export of these mineral resources. Japan's massive long term purchase contracts for these products are the means of assuring the commencement of the projects. Even more than direct investment, such Japanese purchases are helping these industrial projects. The effect is to help solidify the White government's political and economical power as well as indirectly to bolster it militarily.

In return for these advance purchase contracts, Japanese steel and heavy machinery industries also agreed to supply plants and machinery to the following South Africa's industrial projects, thus contributing directly to their success. Let us not forget that all these economic links are directly with the South African government.

4) **ISCOR's Expansion Plan worth R 2500 million**

In November 1973, ISCOR announced a ten-year expansion plan. According to this plan, ISCOR was to invest R 2,500 million in three different works so as to increase production by 1983 to 10.5 million tons of iron and steel production a year.

Japan's steel and heavy machinery industries, began in 1971 to negotiate with ISCOR to sell steel mill equipment. The official Bulletin of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry of Japan said on October 20, 1971, that Japan's participation in ISCOR's large scale project had been progressing steadily. In early 1971, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries obtained an order from ISCOR for steel rolling mills and Hitachi also got an order for billet steel mills.

Some of the sales contracts signed by the Japanese companies for ISCOR are in the table B.

The Japan-ISCOR deals for the sale of large steel plants were carried out

Table A

**JAPAN'S LONG TERM PURCHASE CONTRACTS WITH SOUTH AFRICA**

1) Sishen-Saldanha Bay Project (worth R 1000 million for project)

a) *Sishen Iron Ore* 12-15 year period starting in 1976

| | South African companies | annual export to Japan |
|---|---|---|
| From: | Iron & Steel Corporation (ISCOR) | 7 million tons |
| | Consolidated African Mine (CAM) | 3 million tons |
| | Associated Manganese (AM) | 2 million tons |

b) *Saldanha semi-finished steel*

| years | annual export to Japan |
|---|---|
| 1976 | 3 million tons |
| 1977 | 7 million tons |
| 1978 | 9 million tons |
| after 1979 | 11 million tons |

2) St. Croix Terminal Harbour Construction Plan

a) *a 16 year contract with CAM* to provide 70 million tons of iron ore to Japan, effective when the St. Croix port is expanded.

| years | annual export to Japan |
|---|---|
| first 3 years | 2.5 million tons |
| next 2 years | 3.5 million tons |
| then 10 years | 4 million tons |
| final year | 15 million tons |

b) *Manganiferous ore contract with CAM*
an 11 year period starting in 1977
total R 100 million
8.6 million tons of Manganiferous ore to be shipped to Japan

3) Richards Bay Expansion including a new Railway link from Witbank

a) Transvaal Coal Owners' Asso. (TCOA) Witbank coal
total 27 million tons of coal to Japan

| years | annual export to Japan |
|---|---|
| 1973-1976 | 450,000 tons from Lourenco Marques |
| 1976-1986 | 3 million tons from new Richards Bay harbour |

while the yen was floating. Therefore, an assurance from ISCOR to absorb any exchange losses and easy-term loan financing guaranteed by the Japan Export Import Bank to participating Japanese firms was an obvious prerequisite.

For example, Mitsubishi, which supplied ISCOR with a hot rolling mill, disclosed that the contract was signed on a Rand basis using Japan Exim Bank deferred payment financing. *For Mitsubishi, this was the largest single export in recent years totalling 15% of its yearly export overseas.*

The Mitsui group obtained a R 50 million contract for building an oxygen furnace at ISCOR plant in New Castle. *This was said to be the largest "prize" in the machinery field that South Africa had ever signed.* It was explained that this was because Mitsui was the agent in the Japan-South Africa coal deal.

Friendship with South Africa had paid off once more.

5) **Orange River development project**

In the early '70s, South African Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM), a South African government agency, launched its R 1000 million Orange River project, the largest ever undertaken in the country. In August 1973, Japan's two major electric machinery companies were to supply power generators for ESCOM's construction of power plant, the key sector of the project.

6) **South Africa's Maritime project**

The preceding economic development plans in South Africa were assured by the expansion of mineral exports to Japan, which in turn created a need for a considerable expansion of South Africa's shipping services.

Since 1972 Japan's shipbuilding industry has sold three super tankers and one sugar bulk carrier to South Africa. (see table B-6)

It is important to note that these massive commitments by Japan's heavy industries in ISCOR and the Orange River projects have been categorized as plant exports in Japanese government statistics. This is a characteristic pattern for Japan's heavy industry, which refrains from setting up subsidiaries overseas through direct investment, in contrast to U.S. and European multinational corporations.

Table B

**JAPAN'S SUPPLY OF PLANT AND MACHINERIES TO SOUTH AFRICA**

4) ISCOR's Ten Year Expansion Plan (worth of R 2500 million)

| Companies | items | value |
|---|---|---|
| Kawasaki Heavy Industries | 6 furnaces | $ 70 million |
| Hitachi-German's Demag | a billet rolling mill | $ 12 million |
| Mitsubishi Heavy Industries | a hot rolling mill | $ 33 million |
| *Mitsui Shipbuilding* | *an oxygen furnace* | *R 50 million* |
| Chugai Ro Kogyo | a billet heating furnace | |
| Nippon Steel | a hot coile lines | $ 10 million |

5) Orange River Development Project (worth of R 1000 million)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Hitachi-Tokyo Shibaura | 2 hydro-electric power generators | $ 10 million |

6) South African Maritime Project

| Japan's companies | items | tonnage | delivery |
|---|---|---|---|
| IHI dockyard | super tanker "Kulu" | 217,400 tons | 1971 |
| " " | " " "Gondwa na" | | 1972 |
| " " | " " "Sinde" | 266,000 tons | 1972 |
| Mitsui dockyard | a sugar carrier | 26,000 tons | 1976 |

Instead of directly investing overseas, Japanese firms with long-term export loans supplied from Japan's Exim Bank usually obtain orders to export plants and equipment.

When the rapid growth of Japan's export volume to South Africa drew international criticism, the Japanese government announced in May 1974 a ban in the use of Japan's Exim Bank loans to South Africa. However, an official of Exim Bank quite frankly admitted that, despite the government decision on the ban it would not cause any substantial policy change since it had already financed most of Japan's export of plants to ISCOR.

Today, Japanese business is closely linked to South Africa's massive development plans. The major aspects of Japan's involvements in the plans are 1) long-term stable guarantees in importing mineral resources, and 2) Japanese supply of equipment for construction and expansion of South African heavy industry. Despite the stated policy of the Japanese government against racial discrimination, Japanese business works closely with and strengthens the White minority regime and its official policy of apartheid.

Japan's commitments to economic projects are not confined in these heavy industries in South Africa. South Africa and Namibia have the world's second largest estimated uranium ore deposit, amounting to 26% of the world's known total. In 1972, South Africa produced 4000 s. tons of uranium ore, which was 16% of total world production.

Japan's electric power companies had earlier concluded a ten year advance purchase contract with South Africa and Nambian mines. The seriousness of these uranium deals and the particular political implications of purchasing uranium from a state controlled mine in Nambia need to be underlined.

In 1973 the South African government announced that the progress at the Valindaba uranium enrichment pilot plant was encouraging enough to warrant preparations for a full scale plant. In June 1973 the South African government through a visiting Japanese Atomic Energy Commission mission requested Japan's financial participation in its projected uranium enrichment plant. South Africa made it clear that if Japan's participation in the project materialized, Japan would have an inside track on the purchase of enriched uranium. Secret negotiations on the project have continued for several years. In April 1973 Soichiro Matsune, Chairman of the AEC of Japan Economic Federation and also

Table C

**JAPAN'S LONG TERM PURCHASE CONTRACT OF URANIUM ORE FROM OVERSEAS**

(1975-1985)

| | |
|---|---|
| *from: Denison Co. of Canada* | *28,000 s. tons* |
| Rio Algom (RTZ) of Canada | 5,600 |
| NUFCOR of South Africa | 12,500 |
| Rio Tinto Zinc of South Africa | 17,500 |
| Rossing Uranium Mine (RTZ) of Namibia | 8,200 |
| CEA-URANEX of France | 8,800 |
| Queensland Mines of Australia | 3,200 |
| Total | 83,800 s. tons (80% of total needs) |

vice chairman of Japan Atomic Energy Industrial Forum visited South Africa. He talked with Dr. A. J. A. Roux, chairman of the Atomic Energy Board about the Japan-South African joint project to construct a R 550 million Valindaba uranium enrichment *plant near Pretoria.*

In June 1973, the South African AEB mission reciprocated by visiting Japan. It was reported that discussions focussed on Japanese possibilities of "investment" and "participation" in *the construction of this uranium* enrichment plant which would be completed by 1980.

Beside the uranium enrichment plant project, South Africa has plans to construct a nuclear power station near Cape Town. A 1970 cable dispatched from Tokyo by South Africa's ESCOM representative revealed that the Mitsubishi group offered South Africa, the cheapest bid for an atomic reactor. This reactor had been patented by Westinghouse, U.S.A.

In January 1973, the Mitsubishi group announced that it would participate in the international tender for equipment for the construction of South Africa's nuclear reactor. Since Mitsubishi's offered price was the cheapest, South Africa kept its option open to Mitsubishi group until August 1974.

It is reported that the cost of plant construction was R 340 million and the plant's estimated power capacity is projected to be one million kwh. Thus Mitsubishi is directly assisting South Africa build an atomic reactor and help South Africa become an atomic power.

Japan's deals to purchase uranium ore from South Africa and Namibia and to sell equipment and to finance uranium enrichment plant and nuclear power plant definitely strengthen the South African economy. The construction of a uranium enrichment plant helps South Africa join the World *Nuclear Club. South Africa will* potentially be able to produce atomic bombs when the plant is in operation. Any cooperation with South Africa in such a strategically sensitive area should be immediately condemned.

*Secondly, Japan's purchase of ura*nium ore from the Rössing Mine in Namibia, which is illegally occupied by South Africa in defiance of UN decisions, presents a clear example of encouraging South Africa to stay in Namibia.

Thirdly, large purchase of uranium ore from South Africa enable Japan to launch a considerable number of nuclear reactors in Japan. Today's existing four reactors will be increased to 35 by 1985. Of course this is a definite challenge to many Japanese people who are understandably sensitive over any nuclear issue, because the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

In 1968, the Japanese government prohibited Japanese companies from directly investing in South Africa. However, what I have discovered in South Africa is a growing network of Japanese industrial involvement.

Today there are more than 70 Japanese firms with representatives and offices in South Africa. Industries such as auto, electrical appliance, electronics and rubber, have established (fran*chise-holding) subsidiaries for manu*facturing and assembling.

While this involvement is not in the form of direct investment of Japanese capital with wholly owned subsidiaries, like GM South Africa or British Leyland (South Africa), the tangible reality of Japan's corporations is still keenly felt. Instead Japanese corporations join in joint ventures (the term used by the press in South Africa and Japan) with South African capital and Japanese blueprints, technical expertise and above all *equipment, making the ven*ture possible.

In addition, many of these Japanese subsidiaries in South Africa are in "border industrial areas" of "Bantustans", thus assisting the South Afri*can government in moving Africans* out of the cities on to miserable reservations.

Let us not be deceived by the standard Japanese excuse that these manufacturing operations are not Japan's responsibility since they are not run by Japanese management and are not strictly defined joint ventures.

If you provide a thief with a weapon to use to rob or kill, you are an accessory. You are supporting a theft or a murder, whether you are formally called a "partner" or a "member of a joint venture". Similarly Toyota and other Japanese companies cannot conveniently claim they have no responsibilities in South Africa. It is clear that no Toyota would be able to roll off the assembly line in South Africa without Toyota Japan's help. Japanese parent companies have obligations they cannot ignore.

The Industrial Council in Port Elizabeth which deals with worker's wages but without the consultation of Black workers, set a new wage agreement for Black workers in January 1974.

According to the agreement, Black workers would obtain 56 *cents per* hour as a *minimum starting wage.* However, Black workers in Japanese plants are excluded from even the limited benefits of the Council because Japanese motor assembly plants are *mostly located in the border industrial* areas, where even more backward labour conditions are possible. (table D on the 1974 January minimum wage list of Black workers in the auto industry in South Africa)

*Toyota pays only 65%* of the starting wage paid by GM or Ford, and

Table D

**1974 JANUARY MINIMUM WAGE LIST OF BLACK WORKERS IN THE AUTO INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA**

| Name of Company | Site of Plant | Minimum hourly wage | Monthly wage | P.D.L.* | M.E.L.* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ford, GM | Port Elizabeth | 56 c | 110.80 | 78.58 | 117.87 |
| Citroen, V. W. | P. E | 47 | | | |
| Toyota | Durban | 38 | 76.95 | 78.13 | 117.19 |
| Chrysler | Pretoria | 35 | | | |
| Peugot | | 32 | | | |
| Datsun-Nissan | Pretoria | 25 | 49.45 | 75.44 | 113.16 |

* Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce figures for 1973 for Black family of 6.

Nissan pays less than half of what the U.S. corporations pay. Both Toyota and Nissan pay far below the Poverty Datum Line, for the Black workers. In short, both companies are involved in gross exploitation of labour and starvation wages.

Toyota is the largest automobile manufacturer in Japan. Its largest motor assembly factory outside Japan is in South Africa. The assembly plant in South Africa was set up in 1962 in Durban.

In response to the Vorster Government's "decentralization" policy, Toyota South Africa moved in 1971 from Durban to a newly designated border industrial area. During this 10 year period, Toyota South Africa's capital rose ten fold, from R 1.5 million in 1962 to R 15 million in 1971.

Toyota is one of the most successful companies operating in South Africa. Toyota South Africa's net taxed profits in 1973 rose by 42% compared to those of the previous year. And in August 1974, Toyota launched a new R 1.8 million truck plant at its assembly complex. Today Toyota's trucks are sold to White farm owners who strongly support the Nationalist Party and apartheid.

Toyota South Africa has remained essentially a franchise-holder for a wholly South African owned concern. However, even with no direct investment from Japan's parent company, there had been close cooperation between Toyota in Japan and its South African company. Thus in addition to the profit on sales of unassembled vehicles, franchise rights and the sales of technological skills, Japan's Toyota has received a whole new chunk of revenue.

Massive loans have been arranged by EABC to South Africa.

Japan International Bank participated in these loans providing $24.5 million. When the Japanese government exerted pressure, the loan was stopped in the middle, with $10 million paid.

However, we have information about a new bank loan. On July 2, 1973 the *Johannesburg Star* reported that Slater Walker Securities South Africa (subsidiary of a U.K. company) requested a $20 million loan from Japan for South Africa's industrial projects. Japanese banks provided this loan by making a private bond placement through a group of nine Japanese banks led by the Industrial Bank of Japan. The loan was then set up for 15 years with 8.25% interest.

In the light of this new evidence I make the following suggestions. Steps should be taken by the UN to study and evaluate this research and prepare a list of requests to the Japanese government and Japanese companies.

Examples of Japanese complicity in strengthening White minority rule should be brought to the immediate attention of the OAU for their consideration and action. The Japanese government takes the OAU, its positions and actions very seriously. The UN Special Committee on Apartheid should publicize the economic relationship between Japan and South Africa and should publish materials outlining these facts.

I believe that all available pressures should be brought to bear to secure the cancellation of all advance purchase contracts with South Africa, most of which will start after 1975. I would like to see the end of Japanese technical assistance and the supply of equipment for South African industrial projects. In particular steps need to be taken to end all cooperation in the nuclear area with South Africa including the end of uranium purchases and the cessation of sales of atomic plant equipment to South Africa.

Another measure which should be implemented is the withdrawal of all Japanese private business operations in South Africa. In the interim, all Japanese companies operating jointly with South African firms should be given a "Code of Business Conduct", by the Japanese government. This code should demand the immediate end of starvation wages and discriminatory benefits. Finally I believe we should press for an end to all bank loans to South Africa both directly and indirectly. □

**FOOTNOTES**

1. South African Monthly Abstract of Trade Statistics *Rand Daily Mail*, South Africa, March 11, 1974
2. *Rand Daily Mail*, S.A., ibid.
3. *South African Financial Gazette*, May 21, 1971
4. *Star*, S.A., June 20, 1973
5. *Financial Mail*, S.A., July 6, 1973
6. *Financial Mail*, S.A., January 18, 1974
7. *Financial Times*, London, February 14, 1974
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10. *Star*, S.A., January 26, 1974
11. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, Tokyo, July 3, 1970
12. *Rand Daily Mail*, S.A., March 13, 1971
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16. *Nihon Kogyo Shimbun*, Tokyo, August 23, 1973
17. *Financial Mail*, S.A., May 20, 1974
18. *Asahi Shimbun*, Tokyo, June 21, 1973
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20. *Financial Mail*, S.A., June 28, 1974
21. *Asahi Shimbun*, Tokyo, June 21, 1973
22. *Star*, S.A., July 10, 1973
23. *Star*, S.A., June 22, 1973
24. Press release made by ESCOM November 18, 1970
25. *Star*, S.A., April 9, 1974
26. 1974 Report of G.M. South Africa
27. *Financial Mail*, S.A., August 27, 1971
28. *Rand Daily Mail*, S.A., February 28, 1974
29. *Rand Daily Mail*, S.A., August 30, 1974
30. *Financial Mail*, S.A., February 15, 1974
31. *Asahi Shimbun*, Tokyo, July 19, 1974
32. *Star*, S.A., September 11, 1974

# Ujamaa: A Personal Assessment

**Tanzania is suffering from the effects of the world economic situation and from food shortages. Nevertheless President Nyerere's policy of Ujamaa, involving villagization and a degree of communalization, is to be implemented with even greater energy. In this report a correspondent gives his own assessment of the impact of the ideology in one part of the country.**

By RAY ELLIS

After driving seventy miles over a tortuous dirt road deep into the Handeni District of Tanzania, the sight of the *ujamaa* village of Nkamaa was a welcome relief. The miles of forest and scrubby thorn trees had only occasionally been broken by cleared patches of small farms and clusters of mud houses. The hours of driving had dulled my senses and cramped my legs, but they were quickly revived at the striking sight of the village. It was built on a large clearing at the foot of a towering mountain and the grass roofed houses were lined up in two neat rows. Immediately you felt there was something special about this village in Tanzania's remoteness.

Our Community Development Land Rover bounced to a stop in the center of the village near a water pipe rising from a concrete slab. Seeing our vehicle, children ran from their homes. Women paused in crushing the corn they were preparing for the evening meal and a young woman at the water tap stared at us as the water overflowed her unattended bucket and washed the dust from her bare feet.

The Community Development man for the district stepped from the Land Rover and rocked up on his toes as he swung his arms. He was delighted with the sight of the flowing water and seemed to be transfixed by the sight of the small waterfall splashing over the edge of the bucket. Smiling he said, "Good, good," to no one in particular, "this is a good village. They've done everything themselves."

Seven years ago villages like Nkamaa were just an idea in the mind of President Julius Nyerere. He called them *ujamaa* villages, from the Swahili word suggesting brotherhood or familyhood in the African sense of the extended family. In his now famous manifesto of Tanzanian African Socialism, the 1967 Arusha Declaration, he made his clearest pronouncement of the concept of *ujamaa* and the course of development he was setting for the country. "Our emphasis," he said, "must be on what we ourselves can do. We must produce more cotton, more coffee, more tobacco; and if, without too much government assistance people build a dam or a school or a road, they must do it. This is what we can rely on, not outside assistance."

Tremendous popular enthusiasm was created for the principles of the Arusha Declaration. Nyerere personally walked over a hundred miles in the country near Mwanza and traversed the nation to rally the people behind him. Enthusiastic Tanzanians marched throughout the country to demonstrate their support of the President and *ujamaa* villages began to to spring up. In many ways the Arusha Declaration was a realistic plan for development to deal with the country's weaknesses. One major effect was to make a clear psychological break from the colonial past which created the impression that development was something that came in the form of outside aid.

Tanganyika, as it was called before the union with Zanzibar in 1964, had existed as a Trust Territory of Britain rather than a true colony like her more developed neighbor to the north, Kenya. So many of the benefits of colonization which tended, at least, to develop the economic infrastructure of the subject state were lacking. In fact, it is the Germans, who ruled Tanganyika before the First World War, who must be credited with much of the basic development rather than the British in their forty-four year of benign rule. The Tanganyikan economy was based on the production of raw materials for export. Sisal was the major export and the major source of foreign exchange. But in 1965-66 the bottom fell out of the market for the rope making fibers and the fledgling economy received its first cold bath and an object lesson of its vulnerability. Synthetic fibers could do the job more cheaply.

*Mwalimu*, Swahili for teacher, as Nyerere is often called, knows his country's economic weaknesses and the shortcomings of the people and like an indefatigable teacher he travels continually lecturing to the people. He rarely tells people exactly what they want to hear. Typical of his blunt and frank style is a speech he made to a group of Chagga farmers on the lush slopes of Mt. Kilimanjaro. With his voice rising in a clipt staccato manner

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The improved maize crop



he declared, "The Americans are going to the moon! The Russians are going to the moon! We can't go to the moon! . . . while the Americans are going to the moon, we Africans are dancing . . . our friends are using their brains while ours sleep and grow fungus!"

Tanzania is a nation of about 13 million people, more than 90% of whom are subsistence farmers. They are the greatest untapped resource the country has and it is the group to which Nyerere has so passionately channeled his energies. Their traditional methods of agriculture contribute little to the economy, the strength of the nation or to their own welfare. "Our tools are as old as Muhammad," Nyerere once said and, "We live in houses from the time of Moses." It is change in this large portion of society that has become his primary concern. A great revolution would take place, he believes. "If two million farmers in Tanzania could jump from the hoe to the oxen plow, it would be a revolution. It would double our standard of living, triple our product." He wants desperately for these farmers to become part of the solution rather than the problem.

*Ujamaa* villages are one part of the solution. It is a kind of bootstrap approach which reflects Nyerere's sense of African socialism. *"Ujamaa,"* says the president, "describes our socialism. African socialism unlike the European prototype is neither born of the agrarian and industrial revolutions, nor is it based on class conflict. Tanzanian socialism finds its roots bound with the traditional African social system of the extended family expanded to the wider society of the nation." *Ujamaa* villages reflect this philosophy and are Tanzania's answer to the Israeli kibbutz and the Chinese commune. It is an attempt to harness the energies of traditional communal enterprise, to raise the standard of rural living. Land is shared. Farming is done communally. Marketing is a co-operative effort and major expenditures are made by the village rather than the individual whether for a plough, a radio, a dispensary or a tractor. The village is run as a small scale democracy with its own elected officials. And each village becomes more effectively a political unit under the control of TANU (Tangan-

yika African National Union), the single political party.

The peasants, as the farmers are usually called these days, are the focus of development such as in the village of Nkamaa where the elected leader of the village welcomed his unexpected guests. He stood as straight as the smoothly polished ebony staff which he held. He wore a white *kanzu*, the ankle length shirt worn by Moslem men and had the smile of a proud benevolent grandfather. Standing in the middle of the villagers he gently chastised the community development officer for not warning him of his visit so the village could prepare a proper welcome.

Nkamaa ujamaa village

Turning to me, the foreigner, with a friendly smile he said, "Look at me. My kanzu was dirty, but now you see it is clean and white," he said fingering the edge of his garment. "See the women over there fetch water just here in the middle of the village," pointing with his chin in the direction of the women who were filling their buckets and pots. "Before they walked a long distance. In the dry season they had to dig holes in the ground for a taste of muddy water. Before our children couldn't go to school, but now we have a teacher to help us. Before we suffered from sores and sickness, but now we have an *mganga* (a general word in Swahili for someone with medical skills) sent by the government to bandage our sores and to treat our fever. Before we had many small farms scattered in many places and a small harvest. Now we have a big farm and a big harvest!"

For the old man of Nkamaa he was seeing dreams he never dared to dream come true but for others the organizing efforts of the government have been meddlesome or dreams denied. Some people, notably among the Chagga, who live on the slopes of Mt. Kilimanjaro, have resisted *ujamaa* schemes. They are the most prosperous and well educated group in Tanzania. Their coffee groves give them a cash crop and the means to develop their entrepreneurial skills. Some have threatened to burn down the mountain rather than be wrested from their traditional homes and farms and placed into communal villages by outsiders. Nearby in the Pare Mountains to the south, the Pare people have resisted in the same way and no viable *ujamaa* villages have resulted in either area.

In the early days after the Arusha Declaration enthusiasm often went beyond good sense and many villages were created that were doomed to failure. However, the professional community development workers seemed to have a practical and tolerant approach to the problems of development. In this way they have avoided the ideological rigidity of certain TANU Party leaders, some of whom are suspicious and narrow-minded.

On the far western side of Kilimanjaro I visited a project completed by the communal efforts of the local people. They had laid a pipe from a large water tank which collected the clean water from the melted snows of the peak high above and from the frequent rains that shroud the mountain. For the hundreds of people living below the tank, originally built by a mission nearby, it was an arduous walk up the mountain to fetch water. Or it was a matter of collecting the water from the numerous drainage ditches that laced the area around the beehive-shaped Chagga houses. The abundant water from the ditches was easily contaminated and usually not safe to drink. The work was completed in record time by the people who would benefit from the pipe. Groups competed with each other to finish their section first and everyone from children to grandparents contributed something.

As we rode alongside the length of pipe on a narrow trail we paused from time to time at the water stations where people gathered to greet the visiting community development man who coordinated the funds for the materials and saw that they were delivered. Enthusiastically clapping and singing "*TANU Yajenge Nchi*" ("Let TANU Build the Nation") the party song, they waved flowers and branches as a sign of welcome and joy. Falling behind the Land Rover the group grew larger and larger as we crept through the lush groves of coffee trees and bananas. At the final water station in an open flat area a large group of people were already assembled. They were singing around a water tap that had been decorated with garlands of yellow flowers and a cross twisted from long slender leaves. In a brief talk the community development officer praised their initiative and self-reliance reminding them that all this was made possible through the leadership of TANU. With shouts of, "*Uhuru na kazi! Uhuru na umoja! Uhuru na TANU!*" (Freedom and work! Freedom and unity! Freedom and TANU!) The speech ended and the people started singing again, "*TANU Yajenge Nchi.*" We walked back through the crowds to our Land Rover which had been completely covered with flowers and branches in our absence.

On the way down the mountain I fingered a strip of leaf that had been tied around my wrist by the TANU leader with the explanation that others would see now that I had been welcomed by the Chagga and that I must visit them again. I was still a bit awed

by the celebration and the warmth of their reception. It was only a simple project costing about $1,444 for the materials and it was something they would have completed whether *ujamaa* villages existed or not. I asked the development officer if he thought they should have *ujamaa* villages there.

"These people don't need *ujamaa* villages," he answered. "They are vigorous and enterprising people. They want to advance, and they have a long tradition of devoting one day a week to communal projects. In fact, they start more work than we are able to assist them with. But out there," pointing to the hot flat grasslands below, "where conditions are hard, they really need *ujamaa* villages to advance a little. If we can get them into a village," he continued, "then we can help them. We can dig a well, send a teacher, build a dispensary and teach them how to farm better. The way they live now it's too difficult for us to reach them."

Not all the people who could benefit from these developments want to be reached or to change their traditional ways of living. The same development officer who bounced so contentedly on his toes at the success of the Nkamaa water project spoke with bitterness about his frustrations, failures and lack of money. "There isn't even enough money to fuel or repair the Land Rovers and the trucks we need to complete projects. They're grounded. We can't deliver the final supplies to Nkamaa so they can cover the water tank. And the people," he said pausing in reflection, "can be very difficult to deal with. Sometimes these people are so 'Swahili,'" he said referring to a lethargy or lack of ambition that many have come to associate with the people who live near the coast. "They'll talk all day with the most beautiful words, sitting in the shade of their front porch sipping Arab coffee," he said pretending to hold a small cup of the strong brew delicately between his fingers. "But they do nothing. We work first and then talk," he declared with his eyes flashing. "They're jealous of their neighbors or afraid of being cursed by them. If someone gets sick or has an accident they come crying in fear, '*Nimelogwa! Nimelogwa!*' (I'm cursed! I'm cursed!)," raising his voice like a man whining in terror. "They're afraid to leave their family or clan and live close to strangers in an *ujamaa* village, even though it would be better for them."

The doctrines of Nyerere's African Socialism are resented by more than some stubborn farmers. In the urban centers, especially Dar es Salaam, the capital, the effects of Tanzania's socialism are felt most acutely. For example, the State Trading Corporation, created after 1967, was designed to supersede much private business and to more effectively control and shape the market economy. The STC controls all external and wholesale trade, nationalized rented property, has opened retail stores and taken over hotels. But poor management, planning and coordination caused temporary food shortages and created scarcities and limited choices of consumer goods by mistake and design. Not being able to buy cooking oil, sugar or rice, or paying more for cloth in an STC store than in a small private shop is irksome, indeed, to the urban dwellers. It tends to dim their hopes and rising expectations. As one wag put it, "Nyerere is trying to make us all equal, all equally poor."

Celebrating the water project's completion—*photographs in this section by the author.*

The burgeoning urban populations in every developing country like Tanzania, are an inherent problem. The cities are an irresistable lure for the rural people. They still come to the towns with the hope of becoming wage earners and acquiring property. But Nyerere has refused to pitch his development appeal on the old colonial idea of grow some more crops, sell them and buy yourself a radio, which leads people to conclude that life must be better in the towns where they make radios and where you can buy a car, a stove and a refrigerator as well. Instead, he has pointedly tried to stop the pressures of urban consumerism. It is difficult to adjust these desires and not everyone believes they should be adjusted.

For an educated worker or a laborer on the docks it is often a frustrating life in the cities. "The things the President is doing in the country-side are very popular with the peasants," one government clerk commented, "but in the cities we aren't so happy. Sometimes I think it was better under the British when you could get what you wanted. Life in town is tough."

So far Tanzania has had one of the most stable governments in Africa, which is a tribute to Nyerere's widespread popularity. In 1962 a soldier who participated in the brief army mutiny commented, "How could we overthrow the government when the leader is so popular with the people?" The comment still seems to apply. The government has survived serious economic difficulties through loss of trade and foreign aid. It has survived the implementation of Nyerere's brand of African socialism. It has survived the so-called Treason Trial of 1970 which convicted some of Nyerere's old associates who resented the extent of his socialism when it cut into their land holdings and pocketbooks. Periodic rumors of coups and revolution float around the capital, but nothing seems likely to happen with the intimidating presence of armed loyal troops around the capital.

The question is, will Nyerere be able to succeed with moral persuasion and his great personal energy as he has done so far? He is a leader of principle and conscience who believes in his mission. He believes that his country's strength and hope lie in the countryside with the peasants. An anti-materialist streak in him gives him little patience with the educated elite, who he feels are a potential class of exploiters. "Everybody in this country," he once said to a group of disgruntled university students, "is paid too much—except the peasant." □

# In Washington

BY BRUCE OUDES

## Southern Africa Policy Watershed

It just may be that the triple veto orchestrated by the United States of the move in the Security Council to expel South Africa from the United Nations will turn out to have been the high water mark in the erosion of African-American relations of the past five years.

Had there been an adequate degree of confidence in relations between Washington and Black Africa, the U.N. events might have been orchestrated jointly as a *pas de deux* rather than as the sparring match which in fact it was. Certainly the exercise was enormously useful from the point of view of promoting peaceful change in Southern Africa. Africa demonstrated its leverage in the U.N. and the Security Council vote called widespread public attention to the important leverage which the U.S. exercises *vis-a-vis* South Africa.

The African Studies Association voted 38 to 30 at its annual meeting to condemn the United States for its action, but the virtually—if not entirely—unanimous opinion of the daily metropolitan newspapers in the country supported the administration's decision to veto. Of the two views, the editorial writers were much nearer the mark than the Africanists.

While vetoing Guinea-Bissau's U.N. membership application—which probably would have happened this Autumn had there not been a coup in Portugal—would have been a U.S. diplomatic error of the first order, it would have been wholly hypocritical, cynical, and opportunistic for the U.S. to have allowed South Africa to be ousted from the U.N. hard upon the controversial U.S. Southern Africa policy of the past five years. In the years immediately ahead if there is a rationale for at least suspending South Africa's membership in the U.N., it is founded upon the unique nature in international law of the Namibia case whose origins date from the very founding of the League of Nations.

If that problem can be solved, then the only grounds for temporarily abridging the universality rule in U.N. membership should flow from an International Court of Justice opinion that the apartheid doctrine is so inherently fallacious that the prerogatives of sovereignty can in the case of South Africa be abridged. This would be to international law what *Brown vs. Board of Education* is to U.S. law. In any event, this day—should it come to that—is years off; South Africa should be given due process internationally even if it seems to most observers abroad that South Africa domestically gives little if any attention to due process to the majority of its citizens.

It was no great surprise that the U.S. effort to moderate this year's world diplomatic offensive on South Africa was a case of too little too late, but what was encouraging was that the steps were at least in the right direction. After his usual group meeting with the African delegations to the General Assembly, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger asked for and was granted an audience by Nigerian Foreign Minister Okoi Arikpo. Little of substance came from the meeting, but Secretary Kissinger persisted by making a point of attending the Nigerian national day reception in New York. On October 11 President Ford received Somali President Siad Barre who visited Washington on behalf of the OAU. President Nixon snubbed President Kaunda in 1970 and General Gowon in 1973, when each was respectively OAU Chairman.

Aside from the problems created by the tension between two U.S. military aid recipients—Morocco and Spain—over Spanish Sahara and the question of when to send a U.S. ambassador back to Khartoum to resume normal relations following Sudan's decision to release the Palestinian assassins of two U.S. diplomats, the central political (as compared to economic) problems on Secretary Kissinger's African agenda increasingly revolve around Southern Africa. This is a very important moment to be watching closely for signs of a new era in Southern Africa policy.

Given the veto of South Africa and the recent leaking of the full text of a draft of the 1969 study in response to National Security Study Memorandum 39, the pressure is growing for a major U.S. policy speech on Southern Africa. Will Kissinger or Ford make the address? Or will it be delegated to assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Donald Easum who will have an important role in any case in formulating its substance following his five-week trip to nine southern African capitals? Will there be a note of humility in the administration's attitude—admission of the errors and miscalculations that have been made since Dr. Kissinger came to Washington? Or will the stonewalling continue? Will the U.S. delegation to Mozambique's independence June 25 include those Americans who have literally spent their lives working in support of African liberation? Or will it contain only those business persons who were only too eager to jump into Mozambique and Angola in the long years before the Portuguese coup? Might Dr. Kissinger himself attend the ceremonies—or at least visit sub-Saharan Africa at some point before he steps down from office? It seems only a matter of time before the administration makes some further gesture of support for the U.N. role in Namibia, but will the U.S. also release the guidelines of the "arms" embargo of South Africa—the embargo which was undermined in such petty fashion in the 1970-73 period?

In some off-the-cuff remarks at a gathering marking United Nations day

Secretary Kissinger made a start by publicly taking a small bite of crow. He confessed that when he came to Washington in 1969 he was "not a complete admirer" of the U.N. but that he has since changed his mind and is "now convinced of the absolute necessity of a global approach to preserving peace." He did not mention Rhodesia and Namibia by name, but it was possible to conjecture those might have been two of the situations he had in mind.

That question of just what—if anything—is in Secretary Kissinger's mind on sub-Saharan Africa is, of course, a central one. While Mr. Nixon's attitude toward Africa became increasingly clear during his final three years in office, Dr. Kissinger's personal view always has been something of a puzzle. On the one hand there were the facts that Dr. Kissinger's only personal experience in sub-Saharan Africa was a trip to South Africa in the mid-1960s and that he always had to take into consideration what he knew of Mr Nixon's attitude toward Africa; but on the other, stands his reputation for fairness and his intellectual respect for fresh thinking. Certainly, now that Mr. Nixon has departed and Dr. Kissinger has been Secretary of State for more than a year, he can much less easily dodge personal responsibility for Africa policy, particularly as President Ford seems to be giving him such a free hand on African questions.

But in order to know precisely the right questions for Dr. Kissinger to answer, one has to first return to 1960s to set a few things straight.

The failure of the Zimbabwe guerrillas at Wankie in August, 1967, was a singularly important sign that any lingering thoughts of imminent change in Southern Africa were not well founded. At the same time South Africa's rapidly expanding defense budget was but one important sign that America's "hear no evil, see no evil" posture toward South Africa certainly was not a policy designed to work *effectively* toward "peaceful change." In 1968 the existence of this new situation was at least tacitly acknowledged in the visit of Assistant Secretary Joseph Palmer to South Africa. Palmer was the first ranking American diplomat to visit South Africa since the Eisenhower administration.

In the fall of 1968 the State Department produced a still unpublished study of policy toward southern Africa. However, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, not wanting to tie the hands of an incoming administration, declined to implement the study's recommendations.

In 1969, through the National Security Council system, Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger ordered in NSSM 39 (one of 85 such foreign policy studies that year) a fresh look at southern Africa. However, that spring Mr. Nixon tacitly fore-ordained the outcome of the entire exercise by having an exceptionally warm conversation with Portuguese Prime Minister Caetano who visited Washington for Eisenhower's funeral. Sources who have seen the memoranda of conversation of that series of meetings say that while the lower level contacts had an air of professional restraint, the meeting between Nixon and Caetano was a "love feast." State Department officials concerned with southern Africa after those meetings sought to convince themselves that Caetano would be significantly more progressive than Salazar, but as 1969 moved on it became clear that it was Mr. Nixon who intended to move the U.S. toward Portugal.

Dr. Kissinger signed off on NSSM 39 on April 10, 1969, thus setting in motion a small working group of representatives of Defense, CIA, State, and the White House which was represented by two NSC staff members, Col. Richard Kennedy and Roger Morris. Col. Kennedy remains on the White House staff, but Morris, a young State Department officer on loan to the White House, resigned from the Executive branch following the Cambodian invasion in May, 1970. The exercise in its first stages was to produce an options paper. The August 15 version was the one leaked to the press this summer. In addition a document of completely different structure known as an issues paper was also produced. The National Security Council, chaired by the President, dealt with the entire ball of wax at a meeting in December, 1969. However, Mr. Nixon had already informed South Africa of the general thrust of his thinking during the course of a September, 1969, meeting with Sir Francis de Guingaud who flew from South Africa especially for the appointment.

On January 2, 1970, Dr. Kissinger sent to Mr. Nixon a memorandum, publicly reported here for the first time, which contained his recommendations as a result of this deliberative process. The memo contained several pages of recommendations organized in tabular fashion.

Under **Tab A** Dr. Kissinger recommended that the U.S. "straddle" the black-white division in Africa. Thus after many hundreds of hours of bureaucratic effort specifically designed by the President to end "straddles," the U.S. in general terms was back to what it had always been and what probably will always be on southern Africa: namely an essentially centrist position. However, Dr. Kissinger then went on to say *"I recommend a general posture of partial relaxation along the lines of Option Two presented at the National Security Council meeting."* The unexpurgated text of **Option Two** of the August 15 version of the southern Africa study is printed below.

Under **Tab B** which dealt with South African issues, Dr. Kissinger's only hard recommendation was a relaxation of the arms embargo. Under **Tab C,** Dr. K. urged that South West Africa *"should not be made an issue in bilateral relations"* with South Africa.

Rhodesia was discussed in **Tab D.** On the question of the U.S. consulate in Salisbury the recommendation was that *"the President should stand by his original decision to keep it."* This wording strongly supports the contention that Mr. Nixon's decision to differ with British Prime Minister Wilson on Rhodesia dated from June, 1969, when Britain closed its high commission in Salisbury but the U.S. lingered on. On a separate question of *"should we allow the importation of chrome and other minerals?"* Dr. Kissinger recommended *"further study"* of the Union Carbide case and that State, Treasury, and Commerce should *"begin to fomulate"* plans under which the U.S. would quietly back away from sanctions if other nations were to continue to violate them.

**Tab E,** Portuguese Africa, recommended that the U.S. should *"relax the embargo"* in terms of permitting the

sales of *"non-lethal equipment which has dual civilian and military use."*

**Tab F,** *"Black states,"* recommended a *"special aid effort"* to the black states of southern Africa, increasing current aid levels by about $5 million.

**Tab G,** export promotion, recommended *"full Ex-Im facility for South Africa and the Portuguese territories avoiding conspicuous trade promotion."*

Mr. Nixon approved those recommendations and also in February, 1970, a National Security *Decision* Memoranda promulgating them. That same month, someone in the White House, apparently Roger Morris, disclosed the revised thrust of U.S. policy in Southern Africa to Ken Owen, the *Johannesburg Star's* able Washington correspondent, over lunch at the Occidental restaurant. Owen laid much of the story out for his readers almost immediately thereafter. However, the White House was highly concerned about U.S. reaction. A covering note on the NSDM instructed the bureaucracy to be particularly closed mouth about the new slant. This caveat was added after a small group of U.S. scholars with "secret" clearance in Washington on a State Department program asked White House personnel about this "NSSM 39" about which they had heard bits and pieces.

As a result of **Tab B** the so-called 'grey areas committee' approved in February, 1970 the sale of the first of what to date have been ten C130s to a South African charter firm, Safair. According to State Department reports in 1973 the company has used the planes to transport military equipment under contract to the South African military. A review of this decision in the summer of 1974 resulted in only minor modifications of the terms of sale. Safair now has agreed that it will not use South African military pilots and military personnel in the planes and that they will not be stored in military hangars.

In agreeing to sell the planes the United States government was responsive to pressure both from Lockheed and from the Georgia Congressional delegation. Lockheed's main plant is in Georgia.

As a result of **Tab D,** the ad hoc inter-Agency Committee on Union Carbide was created including among its members the then Deputy Attorney General, Richard Kleindienst who, according to other participants, made it quite clear that the implementation of the President's wishes, rather than the law, was the subject under discussion.

He was referring to a memorandum, drafted by the State Department's legal office which, as summarized on page A-9 of the August 15 study, said *"in strictly legal terms"* Carbide's application to import Rhodesian chrome based on its December 21, 1966, payment falls under the prohibition of the Executive Order implementing sanctions and *"clearly violate(s) the intent"* of the Security Council's sanctions. The memorandum of law produced by the Kleindienst committee resulted later in 1970 in an additional NSDM granting Carbide's request without modifying the Johnson administration's Executive Orders on Rhodesia. Mr. Kleindienst, among other things, is now ironically enough a Washington lobbyist for Algeria. Essentially this 1970 Africa policy remained in effect until blown out of the water by the Portuguese coup. Yet, even in this context there were steps which contradicted the central philosophy of these policy guidelines.

Probably the best example of this was that a matter of weeks after the President ordered that South West Africa "not be made an issue" in relations with South Africa, Ambassador Charles Yost managed to gain access to Mr. Nixon and convince him of the need to take modest steps to discourage new U.S. investment in South West Africa. Thus Dr. Kissinger apparently was not involved in a decision which clearly went the other way—in the direction of making Namibia (South West Africa) an "issue" in U.S.-South African relations.

How then is one to assess Dr. Kissinger's role in all this? No assessment should fail to note that while Dr. Kissinger was fuzzy minded on southern Africa in 1970, he also apparently was not well served by his principal aides on African questions. Few, including the then new Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, had any on the ground experience in southern Africa.

*At the same time one must also suspect* that the reason for the leaking of the full text of the August 15, 1969, study plus the summary of the January 2, 1970, memorandum in the summer of 1974 had more to do with the "get Kissinger" atmosphere prevalent in Washington now than it has to do with sincere motives to clear the air on southern Africa in the national interest. While elements of the decision-making surrounding what might be called the NSSM 39 Era became public prior to the Portuguese coup and have been published in this column in the past, directly quotable material did not become available until after the April 25 events which rendered the tenets of **Option Two** distinctly invalid.

The issues posed by all this can be *divided into four clusters. The overall* question for Secretary Kissinger should focus on the factors which led him to conclude in 1969 and 1970 that the drift of post-World War II history would be permanently halted in the colonial areas of southern Africa and that Black Africans would have to rely wholly on the indulgence of the White leadership for further political gains.

The second, dealing specifically with South Africa, poses the issue of whether through the partial relaxation of the arms embargo that South Africa would believe the U.S. was engaged in capitulation more than communication.

In other words, did not things like the shaving of the embargo and the proposed increase in Ex-Im exposure steps really undercut rather than support the gravity of the valid posture of communication?

Thirdly, even assuming the Black guerrillas were not going to make substantial gains in Rhodesia, what was the point of undercutting Britain on sanctions adherence?

Finally, given the history of our gradual involvement in Vietnam how could a reasonably prudent person argue that Export-Import Bank support for the sale of dual purpose equipment to one side in foreign wars (the Portuguese colonies) was not a highly controversial issue which balance of payments gains could hardly offset?

But regardless of how fully these questions are answered, the policy pendulum continues to swing back toward the respectable center. State Department officials are trying to figure out what if anything can be done about the fact that the deep level mining engines which the U.S. allowed to be sold to South Africa during the Nixon era arms embargo relaxation can be adapted to the Centurion tanks which South Africa recently acquired from Jordan.

Certainly in the coming months, many signs of U.S. responsiveness to

Africa aspirations in the dwindling number of colonial territories in southern Africa can be expected. However, one of the earliest came just 48 hours after the U.S. cast its Security Council veto in support of South Africa.

After Edison Zvogbo of ZANU delivered a particularly thundering oration in Chicago to members of the African Studies Association, John Linehan, the astute Director of Public Affairs in State's Africa bureau, conspicuously offered Zvogbo a cigarette, lit it, and poured him a glass of water.

Linehan, who until the Portuguese coup and Mr. Nixon's resignation would have had to think twice about appearing on the same platform with an African "terrorist," then got up and publicly suggested that Ian Smith is "still on cloud nine." American diplomats, of course, generally are not in the habit of publicly accusing the head of a friendly foreign "state" of living in a fantasy world.

The gestures generally were lost on a crowd intent on casting aspersions on the credibility of any U.S. State Department representative. However, the nuance was not lost on Mr. Zvogbo who graciously congratulated Mr. Linehan. "Nice speech, Jack," he said.

While a cigarette and a glass of water do not constitute diplomatic recognition, this perhaps was one occasion in which one could both clear the air and tell which way the wind was blowing simply by puffing away on the evil weed. □

## TEXT OF OPTION 2 OF NSSM 39

Secret

**OPTION 2**

**Premise:**

The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists. We can, by selective relaxation of our stance toward the white regimes, encourage some modification of their current racial and colonial policies and through more substanial economic assistance to the black states (a total of about $5 million annually in technical assistance to the black states) help to draw the two groups together and exert some influence on both for peaceful change. Our tangible interests form a basis for our contacts in the region, and these can be maintained at an acceptable political cost.

**General Posture**

We would maintain public opposition to racial repression but relax political isolation and economic restrictions on the white states. We would begin by modest indications of this relaxation, broadening the scope of our relations and contacts gradually and to some degree in response to tangible—albeit small and gradual—moderation of white policies. Without openly taking a position undermining the UK and the UN on Rhodesia, we would be more flexible in our attitude toward the Smith regime. We would take present Portuguese policies as suggesting further changes in the Portuguese territories. At the same time we would take diplomatic steps to convince the black states of the area that their current liberation and majority rule aspirations in the south are not attainable by violence and that their only hope for a peaceful and prosperous future lies in closer relations with white-dominated states. We would emphasize our belief that closer relations will help to bring change in the white states. We would give increased and more flexible economic aid to black states of the area to focus their attention on their internal development and to give them a motive to cooperate in reducing tensions. We would encourage economic assistance from South Africa to the developing black nations.

This option accepts, at least over a 3 to 5 year period, the prospect of unrequited U.S. initiatives toward the whites and some opposition from the blacks in order to develop an atmosphere conducive to change in white attitudes through persuasion and erosion. To encourage this change in white attitudes, we would indicate our willingness to accept political arrangements short of guaranteed progress toward majority rule, provided that they assure broadened political participation in some form by the whole population.

The various elements of the option would stand as a whole and approval of the option would not constitute approval of individual elements out of this context.

**Operational Examples:**

—Enforce arms embargo against South Africa but with liberal treatment of equipment which could serve either military or civilian purposes.

—Permit U.S. naval calls in South Africa with arrangements for non-discrimination toward U.S. personnel in organized activity ashore; authorize routine use of airfields.

—Retain tracking stations in South Africa as long as required.

—Remove constraints on EXIM Bank facilities for South Africa; actively encourage U.S. exports and facilitate U.S. investment consistent with the Foreign Direct Investment Program.

—Conduct selected exchange programs with South Africa in all categories, including military.

—Without changing the U.S. legal position that South African occupancy of South West Africa is illegal, we would play down the issue and encourage accommodation between South Africa and the UN.

—On Rhodesia, retain consulate; gradually relax sanctions (e.g. hardship exceptions for chrome) and consider eventual recognition.

—Continue arms embargo on Portuguese territories, but give more liberal treatment to exports of dual purpose equipment.

—Encourage trade and investment in Portuguese territories; full EXIM Bank facilities.

—Establish flexible aid programs in the black states of the region; respond to reasonable requests for purchase of non-sophisticated arms but seek no change in Conte amendment.

—Towards African insurgent movements take public position that U.S. opposes use of force in racial confrontation. Continue humanitarian assistance to refugees.

—Increase information and exchange activities in both white and black states.

*PROS*

1. Encourages existing tendencies to broaden relations between black states and white and thus reduce tensions—South Africa's new outward policy, Zambia's trade and *sub rosa* political contacts with South Africa and Portugal.

2. Preserves U.S. economic, scientific and strategic interests in the white states and would expand opportunities for profitable trade and investment.

3. Relaxation of the U.S. attitude toward the whites could help lift their present siege mentality; and it would encourage elements among the whites seeking to extend South African relationships with black Africa.

4. U.S. diplomatic support and economic aid offer the black states an alternative to the recognized risks of mounting communist influence.

5. Increased aid would also give us greater influence to caution the black states against violence confrontation and give them a tangible stake in accepting the prospects of gradual change.

6. Would reduce a major irritant in our relations with Portugal, and afford the Caetano government opportunity for liberalization.

*CONS*

1. Relaxation of the U.S. stance towards white states could be taken by the whites as a vindication of their policies. Many black states, led by Zambia and Tanzania, probably would charge us with subordinating our professed ideals to material interests and tolerating white-regime policies.

2. There is a serious question whether pro-Western leaders of the black states could continue to justify their stance to their populations if the U.S. officially declared its opposition to current liberation efforts. Radical and communist states would be the beneficiaries.

3. Unilateral U.S. relaxation of sanctions against Rhodesia would be a highly visible violation of our international obligations and would be damaging both to the U.S. and to the U.N.

4. The current thrust of South African domestic policy does not involve any basic change in the racial segregation system, which is anathema to the black states. There is virtually no evidence that change might be forthcoming in these South African policies as a result of any approach on our part.

5. Requires extensive diplomatic and economic involvement in a situation in which the solution is extremely long-range and tthe outcome doubtful at best.

6. It is doubtful that the additional aid contemplated would be sufficiently great to influence the black states in the direction indicated. □

# Letters

### Mind your Language

I am impressed by the fundamental irrelevance of Evelyn Jones Rich's argument ("Mind Your Language," **Africa Report,** September-October 1974). We can grant her all her basic points, that "language is a living thing," that "it provides insights into a culture which both shape and reflect basic attitudes," that the use of certain words shows a lack of touch with "the reality of our times and the expressions of that reality," that their continued use shows a non-openness to change, that, finally, words themselves and how they are used devalue, degrade, imply inferiority, are, in short, a "put down". All this is correct.

What is not valid, what in fact is totally misconceived is her solution that we expurgate from the language we use the words which offend. There are three objections one can raise, two minor, yet which both lead to the final and important point. First, since language is a living thing, it will always change. What is acceptable now, to her, to all of us, was inflammatory yesterday and will be startingly bad taste tomorrow. The shift from 'colored' to 'negro' to 'Afro-American' to 'black' is the obvious example. What term will tomorrow bring, or is 'black' the final word?

Second, her objection is, in many cases, not to the words themselves but to the manner in which they are used. It is not the word but the person who must be judged—how she uses the word and what she means to imply. This is difficult at best. E.g., her use of "traditional religion" for "animism" is not much of a substitute since 'traditional' is as much a tainted word to many as "animism' is to her. Her distinction cannot really be applied, and her solution is to, in effect, ignore how a word is used and throw all potentially offensive words out of our vocabulary. This is not merely inconsistent; it is *such a passive stance.*

This is the final point. The solution to controversial terms is not their expunction but their self-conscious use. Her rejection of words is still based on accepting the definitions and uses of others. The man in the man in the street who calls his soul brother a 'bad nigger' has a much better understanding of the functions of language precisely because he refuses to accept the definitions and the intentions of others. He changes not the language of the dominant but its meaning; he makes the words his own; he defines himself in his own terms.

Rich seems to think that the use of words will somehow change reality. It will merely make her feel more comfortable. The use of 'nigger' by the common people, the people who experience the reality of the black situation much more directly than does the middle-class black, is a truer use of language, and a more powerful one. Rich wants nice words, neutral words. The need is for powerful words—words which belong to the people, are defined and used by them, from their own perspective and for their own needs. Rich's argument is fundamentally irrelevant because it accepts a never-ending process. As long as she does the dominant will always be able to degrade the dominated by how they use their words. Only when the dominated self-consciously and proudly use controversial words, and especially when these are the words meant to degrade, does the process stop, is the oppressive use of language put to a stop, is the oppressor robbed of his weapons. Then attention can focus on the real issue, the objective condition. A struggle is to be waged, yet Rich advocates a game by the rules others have set, on a field not of her choosing.

Otwin Marenin
Ahmadu Bello University
Zaria, Nigeria

### Language and Numbers

Cheers for Evelyn Jones Rich for her article "Mind Your Language" in the September-October 1974 issue of AFRICA REPORT. Copies should be sent to all travel agencies, educators, and many other people who are not likely to read AFRICA REPORT.

Some months ago I wrote to the Travel Division of the NEA to object to their characterizations "dark continent" (of Africa), Alexander the "Great" and his "Paths of Glory." The replies I received indicate how difficult it is to influence people to change.

Among the references used by Ms. Rich was an article by Professor A. Babs Fafunwa, Dean of the Faculty of Education, University of Ife. I have found his material particularly helpful in my own writing and speaking. A few weeks ago I had the good fortune to be able to discuss with Professor Fafunwa the recent initial efforts of his faculty to incorporate Yoruba culture into the curriculum materials they are preparing for primary grades in both the Yoruba and English languages.

I am less happy about the review of my book **Africa Counts: Number and Pattern in African Culture,** particularly with regard to my treatment of number symbolism. In this "preliminary survey of a vast field awaiting investigation" (Preface page viii) I attempted to deal only with the outward manifestations of beliefs about numbers. I did not feel that I was capable or that it was within the province of this book to delve into the conceptual origins of the many complex African philosophies. The section headed "Number Symbolism and Superstitions" begins with the *sentence, "No phenomenon associat*ed with African numbers has been so misinterpreted by European investigators as the subject of number symbolism and taboos." This brief section deals with beliefs about numbers found not only in Africa, but in ancient Greece, in ancient Mesopotamia, among the ancient Hebrews, relating to the German philosopher Hegel, and in the United States today. The book, after all, was written chiefly to enlighten ethno-

centric Americans—no easy task, as I am discovering.

Of course, I welcome any specific corrections or additions that fit within the framework of this book, and *should be glad to incorporate them* if and when the book is revised.

Claudia Zaslavsky
New York, N.Y.

**Botswana and South Africa**

The observations contained in the article on "Malawi", in the "African Update" Section (page 35) of "AFRICA REPORT"—September/October 1974, are noted. However I feel obliged to draw your attention to what I consider a misinterpretation of the attitude and policies of Botswana in this article.

First of all, you and your readers will perhaps be interested to learn that the investigation commissioned by the Botswana Government into the tragic air crash has long been completed. Without going into the technicalities of the nature and properties of aviation fuel, I can simply state that the crash resulted from a faulty mixing of aviation fuel by employees of the petroleum company responsible. Further appropriate action for compensation is being taken against the company. I give this information to illustrate that the investigation by the Botswana Government was not motivated by political reasons, whatever the other parties concerned may later make of the crash.

Secondly, while the above is merely a small correction, I cannot help but point out the misleading insinuation contained in the article—fourth line from the top on the righthand side—where it is stated briefly:

> "Except for the satellites surrounded and dominated by South Africa, Malawi is the only Black African nation to cooperate with South Africa's self-defined civilization-preserving mission."

By implication the meaning, as every reader will have noted, is that the **satellites** referred to in this article "cooperate with South Africa's self-defined cilvilization-preserving mission".

I assume—as I am sure every reader has—that Botswana, because of her geographical position in this white minority regime dominated region, where she shares long borders with Rhodesia, South Africa and *Namibia which is still under the il*legal occupation by South Africa, and a small border with Zambia, is one of the "satellites" referred to in this article.

Needless to say, the strong and harsh economic realities which faced Botswana when she attained independence forced upon her a defined functional relationship with South Africa which was naturally unavoidable. But I defy you to produce any single evidence on any aspects of Botswana's policies which can be said to be cooperating with South Africa's "self-defined civilization-preserving mission". I ask you to state any specific aspects of Botswana's policies geared or calculated to assist deliberately, South Africa's realisation of its "mission." Assuming that your readers know the political connotation of the phrase "satellite state", I ask you to explain to them those aspects of Botswana's attitude and policies which, in the opinion of "Africa Report" show Botswana cooperating with South Africa in the preservation of her racial policies and segregated socio-political society. Or else reference to Botswana in the manner that it appears in this article remains a gross exaggeration and misinterpretation of policy attitudes.

Despite the functional relationship with South Africa, which has been imposed by harsh socio-economic realities, Botswana has never given comfort to the policies of its neighbouring white minority ruled states. She has never acted at the behest of these minority governments. Quite to the contrary, Botswana has, as everybody who follows events in Southern Africa is aware, spoken very strongly against racism and apartheid in this area. Botswana has denounced racial domination and the denial for self-determination and equality. Right from the beginning Botswana stood firm in opposing arms sales to South Africa by the United Kingdom. Botswana rejected the notion of an empty dialogue with Pretoria, and denounced the Bantustan system. Despite the bomb-explosions which have downed aircraft and spilled innocent blood, despite *barbarous acts of terror and abduc*tion, Botswana has continued to give due assistance to persons fleeing from the tyranny of the minority regimes. Botswana has not only sacrificed by complying with Sanctions against Rhodesia, but it is further studying the take-over of the Rhodesia Railways operations in Botswana, as well as that of breaking with the Rand Currency and introducing her own independent currency within a few months to come. Botswana has rejected any notion of diplomatic relations with Pretoria and does not accept financial aid from South Africa.

*Of course I could go on and on to* give a record of Botswana's attitude and policies. But I believe I should allow for independent evaluation. Others, watching events closely in this region, have already referred to Botswana as "walking a tight rope". To Botswana it may be something else. But it is most emphatically not "satellitism". I hope your readers can agree with me that information should be sought and printed, and that where an interpretation of state-behaviour is given, the basis for such interpretation should be made known. I hope the brief contribution I give here will be useful to "Africa *Report" and its readers, and that* you will have no objection to printing it in your appropriate columns.

Thebe D. Mogami
(Botswana's Permanent Representative to the United Nations)

***Too may Children for Whom?***

Asking whether birth control policies in Africa are conspiracy or myth is raising a false question in the wrong context. Overpopulation remains a conundrum. Does it exist, and if so, how is it measured? Assessment of population adequacy or overpopulation on less than world scale is impossible. We are impressed by the neo-Malthusian specter of the globe,—spaceship earth,—as

finite. Unchecked population growth must lead to standing room only. However, carrying capacity estimates of the absolute limits imposed by potential food supply or the second law of thermodynamics (heat load) arrive at hundeds of billions of people. Such numbers are beyond practical planning horizons. Lesser limits of growth estimates are based on specific industrial models or include value priorities about the quality of life. These raise fundamental disagreements among nations. The rich countries appear prepared to spend part of their high incomes on improvements to the environment. The poorer countries would settle for higher incomes with more pollution.

Carrying capacity of a less than global area must be measured in relation to mobilized or potentially available resources. These are not drawn merely from the area examined. Economically successful regions draw on a wide variety of resources from outside their territory. The most productive and richest geographic units are major urban places drawing on virtually world wide resources. They are overpopulated beyond any dreamed of local carrying capacity, but rely on human skills and transportation for income. Identifying the resource base area for an overpopulation assessment has thus not been successful. The jig-saw pieces of so many fatherlands provide a seductive red herring for analysis, but they are irrelevant to resource economics.

Any region of poverty (= underdevelopment) can be described in two ways. Either the income is too low for the number of people; or there are too many people for the income. This is a truism, but it must be realized that overpopulation as commonly used in the absence of measurement standards is simply another way of saying underdevelopment. Looking at two sides of the same coin makes for endless inconclusive discussion.

The issue is further complicated in that people are a resource as well, against which overpopulation must be assessed. The more people, the greater the potential production of income. The greater also the need for income. People are thus both the problem and part of the solution. There is no easy way out of this conundrum, but it has allowed scholars like Pradervand and Colin Clark to label overpopulation a myth.

Concentration of population allows for spatial and scale economies, flexibility and change in production, and specialization of skills and labor. Except for primary production in agriculture, mining, forestry and fishing, modern industry is urban based. Areas of sparse population lack scale advantages and may be limited to primary production based on earth resources. Crude population densities are thus no guide to population problems.

Scholars might point to the crowded lands of south Asia as prize examples of overpopulation. But large populations provide opportunities for the establishment of many kinds of industry. Although severely limited, these countries have some alternatives during times of low food production. The truly overpopulated lands must be sought in regions of low resource potential. Such may be the disaster countries on the fringe of the Sahara. Their populations are too small and sparse for any but the simplest production, and too distant from major trade centers to gain high incomes from these. The economy is thus confined to subsistence agriculture and other primary production activities. With their only resource, the climate, failing they have only prayer and starvation to fall back on.

Here I was carried away myself, speculating about the resource potential of the Sahel. The concept of overpopulation seems so attractively clear. Until we have measurements of resource potential relevant to populations, the existence of overpopulation remains a nebulous and unconvincing assertion.

Wolf Roder
Professor
Dept. of Geography
University of Cincinnati

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION (Act of October 23, 1962; Section 4369, Title 39, United States Code)

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I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete.
Robert Denerstein, Business Manager

## How Africa Is Short Changed

(Continued from page 8)

desh, etc. is well known. Americans *do* care about the plight of others and that basic instinct can be used as the primary building-block for future aid support. Indeed, the Overseas Development Council concluded that "public support for the idea of giving U.S. assistance to underdeveloped countries is at an historic high of 68%".[134] In that connection, both Bishop Moore of the New York Episcopal Diocese and Cardinal Cooke, Roman Catholic Archbishop of New York have called on their parishioners to observe "meatless Wednesdays" for the duration of the world hunger crisis.[135] The enormous amount of American private assistance channeled to the needy abroad through churches, CARE, UNICEF, Save The Children Federation, ORT, etc. also testifies to the continuing American concern for humanitarian needs abroad.

The problem with our aid program is that it has been submerged in a welter of other foreign policy concerns such as fighting Communism (no longer quite so fashionable), bolstering military capability of allies, Vietnam reconstruction, etc.

It is time for the White House and/or Congressional leaders to take the foreign aid bill out from under this umbrella of distasteful and unpopular fellow travellers. Allow the Agency for International Development to demonstrate the "People to People" (as Senator Mansfield said) impact of our aid programs and then sell it to constituents as a needed American response to the poverty existing in our increasingly interdependent world.

At the same time, as indicated at the outset of this article, our own self-interest can easily be shown: we need the oil and minerals from the developing world; we make large profits from our sales to them and our capital investment in their industries; we need their cooperation if the gap between the rich and the poor in the world is not to send us all over the explosive brink to the apocalyptic bottom. In Africa, our companies will earn $1,380,000,000 this year from African trade and investment. This is more than *five times* the level of our development assistance to Africa. Moreover, the amount of aid we do give goes almost entirely to purchase U.S. goods and services, creates employment here and bolsters our own economic well-being.

To summarize, we "give" Africa very little—and less all the time; we receive from her an enormous amount and we are more dependent on Africa (in terms of petroleum and raw materials) than she is on us. Such a message, used to underpin the more basic appeal to American moral and humanitarian concerns, ought to be sufficient to reverse the declining fortune of the aid program. But this will only happen when Executive and/or Congressional leadership speaks up and educates the public concerning the real facts of our humanitarian aid program. Senators Mansfield, Church and Cranston should join with traditional allies of aid such as Senator Humphrey (who is also Chairman of the Senate Sub-committee on Africa), Senator Javits, Senator McGee and Senator Moss to fashion a new aid program which is clearly directed toward the development problems of the poor countries and the poorest segments of their populations. These and a large number of other Senators share a common concern for the desperate plight of the poor abroad. They seem most disturbed (and properly so) by the military and "power politics" measures which clutter up the current aid program. I believe they would support an effort directed at the clearly identified needs of the poor abroad. Perhaps they could fashion a new program and lead a campaign to reverse our pathetic recent record on foreign aid appropriations.

Foreign aid should be taken seriously, it should not be subject to endless continuing resolutions, it should be free of the baggage of military assistance and unrelated foreign policy riders and it should be much larger than in the past. The American aid effort is an international disgrace and the curve should be reversed. Finally, I hope if Congress *does* take a closer look at our foreign aid program that the Africa portion will be considerably increased since it has been so neglected in the past. □

[134] Washington **Post**, October 24, 1974.

[135] **Tuesday** Magazine, April, 1974, page 7.

[136] Washington **Star News**, June 30, 1974.

[137] Address by The Hon. Donald B. Easum, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, before the African-American Chamber of Commerce, May 17, 1974.

[138] **Wall Street Journal**, December 26, 1973, page 1.

[139] Department of Commerce, F.T. 990, September 13, 1974.

[140] See Note 4.

[141] "How Much Does the U.S. Really Give Africa?", **Africa Report**, September/October 1972, page 20. Also see Note 4.

[142] See Note 8, page 20.

[143] New York **Times**, Section 4E, October 20, 1974.

[144] World Bank Annual Report 1974, page 14.

[145] Baltimore **Sun**, October 13, 1974.

[146] New York **Times**, October 10, 1974.

[147] **World Bank Atlas**, 1973, pages 6, 12 and 13.

[148] "Flow of Resources to Developing Countries", OECD 1973, page 329.

[149] 1973 Review of Development Co-operation, OECD, 1973, pages 210-211.

Note: figures given refer to total assistance flows, including private investment, and not simply to flows of Official Development Assistance.

[150] Agency for International Development, Fiscal Year 1975 Submission to the Congress, Africa Program, page 1.

[151] See Note 8, page 19.

[152] **Africa Report**, September/October 1974, page 15.

[153] Presentation by Dr. Samuel C. Adams, Jr., Assistant Administrator for Africa, AID, at the Fourth African-American Dialogue held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, December 1973. Report in preparation.

[154] See Note 8, pages 19-20.

[155] "Foreign Aid: What Does It Really Cost?", the **Readers' Digest**, September 1974, page 153.

[156] See Note 8, page 20.

[157] "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, July 1, 1974-June 30, 1971", Office of Statistics and Reports, AID (May 7, 1972), page 9; "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, July 1, 1945-June 30, 1973", Office of Statistics and Reports, AID (May, 1974) page 9. Compare with Table in text.

[158] See Note 8, page 18.

[159] See Note 8, page 17.

[160] **Wall Street Journal**, October 15, 1974.

[161] See Note 22, page 152.

[162] See Note 22, page 152.

[163] "Face The Nation", CBS Television, October 27, 1974.

[164] Johannesburg **Star**, September 21, 1974.

[165] **Freedom at Issue**, January-February, 1973, page 4.

[166] Paul A. Laudicina, "World Poverty and Development: A Survey of American Opinion", Overseas Development Council, October 1973, page 5.

[167] See Note 33, page 4.

[168] New York **Times**, November 3, 1974.

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