In this issue
This issue focuses on the arts—black music in the edited transcript of a colloquium sponsored by Africa Report at Brooklyn College, New York, and music, dance and drama in a report on the All-Nigeria Arts Festival just held at Kaduna. Both pieces contribute to the living dialogue on the problems of cultures in a shrinking world. Do such cultures die or—changing perhaps—survive? Do we fold our hands and wait for the death, if death there is to be, or do we fight for preservation? And if the latter, will preservation mean rejuvenation, or rather the freshly painted irrelevance of a well-embalmed corpse?

Big questions, for which we have, not so much no answers, as too many answers—all different. Questions that concerned our distinguished panelists. Questions to which Bob Wren's report on the All-Nigeria Arts Festival gives a very cheerful answer. The festival showed that rejuvenation there can be. But—in the case of Kaduna at least—it was the people who did it, not the experts. Certainly, the experts provided some of the fuel, but the people provided the flame.

Other important articles in this issue include an interview with Roy Innis of CORE that continues the debate raised in last issue's piece, Rethinking Black History. Innis differs radically from Professor Orlando Patterson in his views of African-black American relations. Also featured is an article on a group of people all too well known to the Africa "professionals" of the international community and hardly at all to most others: the continent's refugees, now a full one million weak.

Picture credits: Cover—Dale Moyer; pg. 13, Drum magazine; pgs. 13-18, John Storm Roberts; pg. 21, Chris Strachwitz; pg. 22, John Storm Roberts; pgs. 31 and 32, United Nations.

On the cover (clockwise from top left): Otis Redding, Billie Holiday, King Curtis, Art Blakey, African musician, Mahalia Jackson, Center, Louis Armstrong.

Coming next issue
Part of Africa Report's focus in the next issue is expected to be on Upper Volta, with interviews with important political figures as well as an article on the country itself. Among other items will be a major examination of books for children on African themes.


AFRICA REPORT, JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1973
Chad/Libya

France is one of the main beneficiaries, and probably the initiator, of a surprise rapprochement between Libya and its southern neighbour Chad. The problems between the two countries, including a breach of diplomatic relations, stemmed from Libya's support of the Chadian rebel movement, FROLINAT (Chad National Liberation Front), which had been carrying on guerrilla warfare since 1962. (Chad, a country of around three million inhabitants, is divided roughly half and half, between southerners whose culture is African and who dominate the government, and Muslim, Arabic-speaking northerners from whom came the support for the rebels.

Now, under a classic form of modern Libyan democracy, Chad's President Francois Tombalbaye announced he was breaking off diplomatic relations with Israel last November. The move was followed by an official visit to Tripoli by Tombalbaye just before Christmas during which he was offered an immediate loan of $92 million—more than twice the landlocked state's annual budget. Under his policy of extending his influence in black Africa at the expense of Israel, Colonel Muammar al-Qadafi was this time apparently willing to sacrifice FROLINAT, whose main foreign base in recent years was Tripoli. FROLINAT leader Dr. Abba Sidick was at one time given radio time on Tripoli radio for propaganda broadcasts beamed to Chad, as well as cash, arms and training facilities for his guerrillas.

It was in August, 1971, that President Tombalbaye broke off diplomatic relations with Libya after alleging Tripoli was behind a coup plot. France, carrying on what African and French critics saw as a colonial-type military intervention against FROLINAT from 1969 onwards while developing close relations with Libya's soldier rulers, was severely embarrassed by the dispute.

Chad's diplomatic turn-about is believed to have been arranged in September in Paris during a mysterious visit by Libyan Prime Minister Abdel Salam Jalloud. For France the advantages of the deal are the resolution of the contradiction of friendships with both Libya and Chad and the near-certainly that the costly military intervention, which formally ended last August with the recall of the commander of the Franco-Chadian forces, General Edouard Cortadellas, will not have been wasted.

For Chad, the shift in its foreign policy stance on Israel, bringing it nearer to the FROLINAT point of view, meant that Mr. Tombalbaye's regime suddenly became acceptable to his Arab neighbours. According to reports from Fort Lamy not confirmed by the Libyans, Tripoli even agreed to hand over FROLINAT members based in Libya.

In addition, old development projects dear to Chadian hearts were revived by the rapprochement with Libya. In Tripoli Mr. Tombalbaye discussed joint oil-prospecting in the extreme north of Chad, the construction of a metalled road to link their two capitals and the setting-up of a free port on Libyan shores for Chadian imports and exports, which at present are transported by rail, river and road from Brazzaville. But much of the Libyan cash will necessarily be needed to meet Chad's immediate current needs—financing urgent imports, payment of government salaries, habitually paid late, and providing the cash needed just to keep the administration of this vast country moving.

What France has promised Libya as its part of the deal is less clear. No communique was published after Major Jalloud's visit, but French and Libyan sources indicated that the talks ranged over many subjects. Some of these were known to be:

First, new arms purchases, possibly tanks and shore artillery, and the French Middle East arms embargo which will presumably affect the sales of the 110 Mirage fighter-bombers to Tripoli when the Libyan-Egyptian union comes into operation next year;

Secondly, possible French purchases of oil produced by the nationalized concessions of British Petroleum;

Thirdly, private French participation in ambitious agricultural and irrigation projects using desalinated sea-water, and a number of industrial projects.

Zambia

Zambia officially became a one party country on December 13. At a ceremony witnessed for the first time by the news media of the country, President Kaunda ushered the nation into what has

Digest of Information on African Colleges and Universities

The digest covers 32 colleges and universities in 26 African countries. It provides information on admission and degree requirements, academic courses, housing facilities, tuition and maintenance costs, special institutes, departments, calendars, etc.

Price $3.75

Make remittance with order to:
African Universities Digest
The African-American Institute
866 United Nations Plaza
New York, New York 10017

AFRICA REPORT, JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1973
been termed the Second Republic by
the country's constitution—was passed
by parliament only five days previously.

To most Zambians, the passing of
these bills was something of a non-event.
Although it was the culmination of a
full year's exercise, no one was in any
doubt as to whether the Zambian parli-
ament would ratify the move.

The African National Congress, which
was banned as a political body during
December, made the expected final ob-
jections in Parliament, but the decision
was a foregone conclusion.

Parliament passed the three constitu-
tional amendment bills the day after
the ANC's lawyer from UK, Tom Kel-
lock, QC, had launched an appeal
against an earlier decision by Zambia's
Chief Justice, Brian Doyle.

Kellock—who had earlier been de-
scribed as "a half-baked lawyer" by
President Kaunda—contended in court
that the head of state had no powers
under the constitution to set up a Com-
mision of Inquiry into the setting up of
the one-party democracy. This, accord-
ing to Kellock, was not in the public
interest.

His other argument boiled down to
the fact that Harry Nkumbula, the ANC
leader, and his supporters would lose
individual rights under the new constitu-
tion.

In another piece of irony, when the
President of the Appeal Court, Mr.
Justice Leo Baron, reserved judgement,
the ANC was prevented from holding a
court to discuss the one party state
because the speaker of the National
Assembly, Mr. Robinson Nabulyato,
said this would be sub judice.

Although members of the now-de-
funct ANC will be allowed to sit as
independents in parliament, the new
legislation has effectively banned all
other political movements apart from
UNIP. ANC will sit in parliament until
the end of its present life or until it is
dissolved and general elections called.
The longest ANC's present members in
parliament have been given is up to De-
cember 31, 1973. But a hint has already
been given that parliament may be dis-
solved much earlier than that.

The white paper on the form of a
one-party system which the government
published after accepting most of the
recommendations made by the 13-mem-
ber commission chaired by Attorney
General Fitzpatrick Chuula, propounds
government's future thinking.

Among the significant changes in the
government structure will be the setting
up of the office of the Prime Minister
and the Secretary General of the party.
These will be held by two people ascer-
able to the president, who will have an
executive role and will be elected.

This change is meant to have the ef-
fect of strengthening party organization
and making government a more effective
vehicle for implementing national policy
while leaving the president in full control
of both the party and government.

Up until the constitutional crisis which
led to the appointment of the first com-
mission, again led by Chuula, a post in
the central committee automatically
meant a cabinet post. It also meant that
the president of the party was auto-
matically the head of state. This will no
longer be the case in the one party
state.

President Kaunda once said the party,
civil service, armed forces and all work-
ers must first be disciplined before one
party came.

His tough disciplinary code, an-
nounced in November, is meant to
achieve this. It demands of political
leaders an austere type of life; they can
no longer participate in business ven-
tures or own property. Kaunda has given
them five years to get rid of property
such as houses, farms, etc.

Possible results of the one-party
amendment are still unclear. According
to Foreign Minister Elijah Mudenda, a
member of the UNIP central commit-
tee, there has been a 22 per-cent swing
of ANC members to UNIP since 1968.
This has not only depleted the ANC
strength in parliament but also sapped
the morale of its supporters in many
areas. Recently, ANC supporters on the
Copperbelt called on Nkumbula to dis-
band his group, according to the gov-
ernment-owned newspaper, the Zambia
Daily Mail.

In the Southern Province and the
conservative Western (formerly Barotse)
Province, in-roads have been made by
UNIP. But observers report that tradi-
tional feelings still linger, and in South-
ern Province it has been said a good
number of villagers even believe that
NKumbula is the head of state. UNIP
will have to convince the population
there that Mr. Nkumbula's career as a
politician has come to an end, a hard
ut to swallow for villagers who have
hitherto regarded Nkumbula (who was
born in the area) as father of politics.

Western Province, which traditionally
was led by a Litunga (King), made a
dramatic swing to ANC following the
banning of the United Party, which was
led by Nalumbo Mundia, a former cab-
inet minister expelled by Dr. Kaunda. A
gradual change is apparently taking
place there. But it is thought doubtful
whether the government could expect
immediate mass support.

As for the banned United Progressive
Party (UPP) and its leader, Simon Kap-
wepwe, released from detention with 24
others on January 2, in a recent speech
Dr. Kaunda said he would welcome Mr.
Kapwepwe and Mr. Nkumbula into the
new government structure. But most
observers in Lusaka regard reconcilia-
tion as unlikely. Even if Kapwepwe ac-
cepted to re-join UNIP, which he left to
lead the ill-fated UPP, UNIP supporters
consider him a renegade together with
the others now in detention.

Will Nkumbula enjoy the same respect

Articles in Africa Report are inde-
pendently selected and edited by the
magazine's staff in an attempt to give a
balanced presentation of important is-
Sues affecting contemporary Africa.
The articles do not necessarily reflect
the views of the publisher, the African-
American Institute, which recognizes
the right of reply, especially to un-
signed articles.
from his traditional supporters of Southern Province if he announces a switch of allegiance?

Morocco

If many observers both inside and outside Morocco are convinced a third coup d'état attempt will succeed, King Hassan II seems to believe he can continue in power by using the same methods and the same men he has employed for the past ten years.

After two abortive military coups, in July 1971 and August 1972, the king formed a new government late in November composed entirely of political independents of the kind that had been in office for a decade. Led by his brother-in-law Ahmed Osman as Premier, the king's new formation has been entrusted with organizing fall elections.

All the major parties refused to join the new government despite the monarch's personal efforts to elicit their support. Party leaders say their refusal was because the king refused to hand over substantial powers to them so they could push through "radical reforms." The king, however, contests their claim to majority support in the country, and argues that only freely-elected representatives of the people have a right to make any sweeping changes. The king says therefore he is "betting heavily on democracy," and is determined to hold the parliamentary elections provided for by the country's third constitution adopted by referendum last March. The parties have not yet announced whether they will participate in the elections or not, but in present circumstances it appears highly unlikely that they will, since they claim all previous polls were "shamelessly rigged."

In an effort to re-establish confidence in the régime, the new government is making a big play for "honesty, integrity and probity." Numerous personalities, including six former Cabinet Ministers, have been brought to trial for corruption. There has been a major purge of the provincial administration with the appointment of a dozen new Governors, most of them younger men. Press freedom has become a reality. None of the Opposition papers have been seized since M. Osman took office, and even the leader of the outlawed Moroccan Communist Party has been allowed to bring out a new "revolutionary" weekly. Public debate is encouraged, although agitation is severely repressed, particularly among students who were clobbered by baton-charging troops in Rabat on several occasions in December.

Meanwhile, the 50,000-strong Armed Forces have been disarmed. Commanders have been changed or switched around while dozens of others have been placed on the "retired list." Evidently there is a persistent fear that the military will try a third coup if given half a chance, and there can be no doubt that many officers must be chafing at the numerous restrictions now imposed on them. The military are also waiting for the King's decision as to the fate of the 11 air force officers sentenced in November to die by firing squad for their part in the attempt to shoot the monarch down in his airliner last August 16. Their execution is expected to be stayed.

The economy, basically sound, is suffering from the atmosphere of uncertainty although all other conditions are good: a strong foreign reserves position, good trading prospects, and a bright outlook for the coming agricultural season. The trouble is that, as party leaders say, the abortive coups and a series of leftist plots seem to be symptoms of widespread disillusionment with Hassan's "personal rule" caused by a feeling of frustration over the last decade. As a consequence official promises of a better future, more "participation" of the people in government, and more social justice, arouse little enthusiasm among...
Kiswahili
Kwa Kitendo
AN INTRODUCTORY COURSE

By
SHARIFA M. ZAWAWI

Class-tested and in accordance with current linguistic theories, this is the first Swahili text-tape program by a native speaker. It is organized into 40 units followed by 12 supplementary readings written by the author and containing passages from such important writers as Julius Nyerere and Shaaban Robert. Each unit uses an East African situation to illustrate essential linguistic patterns and consists of a dialogue, oral and written drills, vocabulary, and an explanation of points of grammar and culture. Instructor's Manual, 1971, Paper, 290 pp.; $7.95. 40 TAPES: $275.

HARPER & ROW
10 East 53d Street
New York 10022

OUT OF AFRICA:

the mass of the 15-million population since the new government is very much the mixture as before.

Since the August 16 attempt on his life, moreover, the king has tightened his personal security considerably, while the wildest rumors that there have been further attempts to kill him gain rapid acceptance, even when demonstrated to be untrue. The king's personal fears, and the readiness with which people are inclined to believe he has been attacked again, are significant indications of the régime's vulnerability.

It is unfortunate also that the king's desire to maintain a liberal atmosphere, with Press freedom and multi-party system, also allows scope for agitation and subversion (48 leftists are in jail in Casablanca for fomenting student strife) which have to be put down ruthlessly to prevent the situation getting out of hand. Here again the confidence needed for "free and honest elections" tends to be eroded.

In fact the parties, labor and student unions have made the liberation of political detainees a battle cry and they promise to keep unrest simmering by demanding their release at every opportunity. Unfortunately the King knows if he releases them all at once his political opponents will continue to demand more concessions, so his problem is to decide where to draw the line between liberalism and authoritarianism.

Liberia

Black Americans might be able to acquire dual citizenship if a November 18 agreement between President William R. Tolbert of Liberia and a black American delegation headed by the Rev. Jesse Jackson of Operation PUSH (People United to Save Humanity) survives the various legal pitfalls. If so, they will become citizens of a country that is changing in many ways since the death of former President Tubman.

More than a year has passed by now since Tubman died, and policies of the new administration of President William Tolbert have begun to take shape. On the whole the national mood is one of optimism and relief.

Nobody could have expected the President to remake the society overnight. Any "new enlightenment" in Liberia has just begun to expose the depth of its problems: over-dependence on foreign capital and foreign aid, corruption, weakness of agriculture, and the role of its "settler" elite. But some observers, both Liberian and foreign, are beginning to say that there has been little real change.

"Everyone at the university is talking about revolution now," a student said recently, "and they really mean it. The division between the tribal and settler kids is deeper than you can imagine, and getting deeper. Some tribal kids think the whole system should be overthrown."

Most observers believe there is no revolution brewing at the University of Liberia. The only student protest in history, last year, was an in-house issue, concerning the personality and policies of the university president (an in-law of Liberian President Tolbert). Yet even the talk of revolution is significant, since previously it could not take place.

"Before, there were security agents everywhere, and many people were hauled into jail," according to another student. "Now you can say anything you want." Many Liberians feel this is true, and they are much bolder than before in expressing criticism.

Freedom of speech is not much exercised in national media, which only voice criticism sanctioned by the government. This may be a question more of tradition and private interest than censorship, but still it is effective. A Liberian reporter privately commented that the Liberian Age was a party newspaper, and the Star, though independent, was partly owned by the president's brother.

"Furthermore, this is a small country," he added. "If what you say hurts somebody, it will also hurt somebody else, and finally come back to you."

In foreign policy Liberia has shifted...
its course slightly. For the first time am-
bassadors have been exchanged with the
Soviet Union. There is new friendship
with neighboring Guinea, and Rumania
has been approached for aid in develop-
ing steel mills and perhaps a new iron
mine. But relations with Greece were
dramatically strengthened by Tolbert's
state visit in September, and Liberia's
closest ties are still with the United
States.

In fact, it has been suggested that
the motives for new ties with the east
may only be to strengthen the country's
bargaining position for still more Amer-
ican aid. Liberia received $13 million in
non-military aid from the United States
in 1971-72, and almost $300 million
since 1946, and the Peace Corps and
US Military Mission also operate large
programs. In the United Nations and
other world bodies, Liberia still custom-
arily follows the lead of the United
States.

Liberia's relations with foreign inves-
tors are a major talking-point. German
and Swedish concerns own four
large iron ore mines, and the largest of
the rubber plantations.

"All production is in the hands of ex-
patriates . . . [who] are bent on im-
peding this nation's development," the
President said in an unusually strong
statement in October. At the heart of
Tolbert's policy towards foreign con-
cerns is "Liberianization" of staff-level
jobs, and the campaign has caused a
stir, particularly in the personnel depart-
ments of companies that find the gov-
ernment no longer freely grants work
permits to expatriates. As might be ex-
pected, expatriate executives have re-
acted unenthusiastically. "Business con-
fidence in Liberia has dropped way
down since Tolbert," one commented,
"and Liberianization has been at the
heart of it."

Many Liberians do not agree. One
university professor called the program
"a political sop to angry young intellec-
tuals wanting jobs, [which] does not deal
with the more basic economic problems,
such as money transfers out of the coun-
try and weakness of agriculture." But it
Corruption permeates every aspect of the society," in the words of an administrator in a foreign aid program. "Nearly everyone is on the take—every chief, every principal, every official. Corruption is part of the system, and it is the only way many people survive."

In the past, the example may have been set at the top.

"Here there is no clearcut line dividing the personal from the state budget," according to an academic. "Therefore the president tends to act rather like a king, saying, 'I am the state, therefore everything that belongs to the state belongs to me.' In this way President Tubman died a very rich man, his savings secure in Swiss banks, while his country remains little developed."

In somewhat the same fashion, the new president personally accepts money gifts from organizations, with which he can do as he wishes: $20,000 from LAMCO, the Swedish iron ore mine, at his inauguration; and later, $5,000 from the German mine, and $2,000 from the Lebanese community. However, President Tolbert has assigned the money to various development projects, and no one accuses the new President of "eating money" (a local expression for embezzling). Yet the personalization of state finances causes trouble on lower levels. For example, many people hesitate contributing their $10 to a National Fund Raising Rally, as asked by the President, because they suspect the money will be "eaten" somewhere along the line.

There also remain cases of conflict of interest. Many government ministers still own rubber plantations. In fact, nearly all privately-owned plantations belong to officials in government. Liberian union officials and many workers claim this is the reason unions are not allowed to organize in agriculture, and why pay for workers is so low.

Liberia has been criticized for the power of its elite, the Americo-Liberians, or settler families—descendants of free blacks from America. Since arriving on the coast of Liberia in 1822, these settlers have been in control of government and have enjoyed easy access to the state's resources. President Tubman worked to bring other Liberians into government, and President Tolbert, who is Americo-Liberian, aims to ease the imbalance further. He makes an effort to speak in inland languages on occasion, and has stressed the importance of developing "up-country" regions. Yet in his administration Americo-Liberians still predominate, holding top positions both in government and in business.

There is a growing political consciousness among "country" (non-settler) youth. Education leads them to question the role of the elite, and to take more pride in their traditional background. It is unsure whether in the long run Tolbert's gradual reforms will satisfy them, or if there will need to be more drastic changes later.
IN WASHINGTON

Clark McGregor’s vacation: ‘different’ might be an understatement

By Bruce Oudes

First the good news: For the first time in 13 years Africa in 1972 registered a favorable balance of trade with the United States.

Now the bad: In 1972 the US registered its first unfavorable balance of trade with Africa since 1959.

Being as this is a town that sees Africa only as one big cliche, one might say the U.S. views this development with alarm, its African trade bag being half empty rather than half full. Thin humor, however, cannot conceal the fact that by coming in a year when the U.S. was registering probably the worst balance of trade deficit in its history and during a strongly business oriented Administration, the small African contribution to U.S. trade woes is merely setting up the Mother Continent for U.S. retaliation on a wide variety of policy issues.

On the basis of nine-month figures which State Department officials feel certain will be borne out by the final tallies, U.S. imports of African petroleum quadrupled in 1972, bypassing green coffee as Africa’s most important export to the U.S. American exports to Africa were off by something in the neighborhood of $250 million. Given the rising U.S. need for foreign oil, the Algerian gas and South African platinum/palladium deals, and the resumption of imports from Rhodesia, the unfavorable U.S. balance of trade with Africa is not likely to be a one time thing, but the pattern of the future.

The investment picture, meanwhile, according to figures released late in 1972 shows that during 1971 U.S. direct private investment in Africa exclusive of South Africa increased 10 per cent to $2,869 million. Investment in South Africa climbed better than 11 per cent to $964 million. These figures suggest that in 1972 U.S. investment in South Africa passed the $1 billion mark, and investment in the rest of Africa passed $3 billion. Investment in Libya in 1971 increased less than 3 per cent to $1,044 million suggesting that in late 1972 or early 1973 South Africa regained the top spot in U.S. private investment in Africa. By the time President Nixon leaves office U.S. investment in South Africa should be in excess of $1,500 million.

This economic news appropriately describes the atmosphere surrounding Clark MacGregor’s visit to Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique, and Angola during the holiday season. MacGregor, who had just become a vice president of United Aircraft after managing the President’s re-election campaign, was beyond doubt the most politically significant American visitor to Salisbury since UDI. The net effect of his visit was to substantially increase the pressure on Britain and Rhodesia to have another go at a settlement waltz.

MacGregor told a Beira news conference December I after his tour that he was enjoying “an agreeable and different” holiday and that he was happy to confirm all the fine things he had understood constituted Portuguese policy in Africa. He tried to pull the “private citizen” bit in an interview with a Washington columnist after his return, but the Rhodesian Financial Gazette of December I quoted him as saying, “For anyone in public life as I am, being on holiday can’t mean that I switch off. I’m not a private citizen . . . .”

After conveying his impressions of the trip to the President, MacGregor said he thought U.S. policy toward Rhodesia would change “probably within the next two years” most likely starting with a gradual easing of travel and trade restrictions. “I’m not saying the President will recognize Rhodesia, but it wouldn’t surprise me at all if he did so . . . .” MacGregor cited all the Cold War reasons for justifying this change of U.S. policy including Communist penetration of Africa and the Indian Ocean. Another, unsaid, undoubtedly was that the resumption of U.S. exports to Rhodesia—including United Aircraft products—would help redress the trade imbalance caused by the Byrd Amendment.

Although careful to say he was not
repeating the President's words, MacGregor left the impression that the President feels that black American support of McGovern, the events in Uganda, and Africa's opposition to the U.S. anti-terrorism resolution at the U.N. leave him free to follow what he regards as pragmatic policies in southern Africa. This in turn forces the question of how actively the President plans to raise the Rhodesia question with Britain in 1973. Heath shed a crocodile tear—that is, lightened sanctions a bit—in November. However, he and his ally, Nixon, did not go through with the full dropping of trade barriers as they might have. (See "In Washington," May, 1972.)

Peering between the lines of what MacGregor said, this surely is what the White House is contemplating in 1973 if Heath and Smith can't arrange a settlement sans embarrassing details like Pearce Commission.

Nixon made a start on whipping the State Department into line on Rhodesia by naming Kenneth Rush Undersecretary of State. Rush left the presidency of Union Carbide in 1969 in order to join the Nixon team. According to a very well-placed State Department official, Rush personally raised with the President the matter of Union Carbide's request to import chrome from its Rhodesian subsidiary after he was sworn in as ambassador to Bonn. The President said he didn't see why not, the source added, and White House aide Peter Flanigan called Nathaniel Samuels, the Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs to get State working on a process that took a year to complete before Union Carbide got its way.

Nixon & Co. are still getting help on their Rhodesia project from an unusual quarter—their arch enemy, the Washington Post. Sharp-eyed White House aids can't help but have noticed that the Post's November 29 editorial asking "What in blazes is Clark MacGregor... doing in Rhodesia?" nevertheless reiterated that paper's fundamental policy which is that the Rhodesia question is ended once Britain and Rhodesia reach a settlement. The Post refuses to treat the central problem of the Rhodesian mess which is that Moscow and Peking won't support any settlement short of majority African rule. Thus, the White House can reason, if their arch enemy agrees that Rhodesia is strictly a British problem, all the U.S. has to do is to be seen following Britain's lead regardless of where it might be taking the U.S.

MacGregor's decision to air his Rhodesia views also cleared up the question of why the White House didn't try to defeat the Byrd Amendment during 1971 and 1972. MacGregor was the President's chief aide for Congressional relations before the campaign assignment and as such was the person whose refusal to call key Republican Senators meant victory for Byrd. MacGregor, of course, received Bishop Abel Muzorewa last May. It is understood that MacGregor didn't return the courtesy during his Rhodesian safari.

The State Department says it has no plans to inform the American people how much the U.S. is importing from Rhodesia as a result of the Byrd Amendment. However, according to a leaked State compilation, the U.S. during the third quarter of 1972 imported 40,000 tons of Rhodesian minerals on 12 vessels. Most was chrome, but also included were nickel cathode, asbestos, and beryllium. The nations who violated sanctions by carrying the booty to the U.S. on ships in their registry were Liberia, Britain, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, and South Africa.

The new Australian government's decision to close the Rhodesia Information Office means that the two-man Rhodesian operation in Washington is Salisbury's only diplomatic establishment outside of South Africa and Portugal. While the U.S. was trumpeting to Africa in 1970 the significance of closing its consulate in Salisbury, the RIO here was in the midst of an expansion program during which its budget has quadrupled in the Nixon years to $175,000 annually, all of which flows directly from the Rhodesian foreign ministry in Salisbury according to data the RIO files with the Justice Department.

The RIO doesn't list its contacts with the Administration and Congress in these reports, but they do disclose that Washington is also a base for its operations in Canada (making the Canadians sanctions violators), that the RIO is now showing its films through a commercial distributor, and that during the Nixon years it has been able to routinely show its films at U.S. government installations. In 1971 it had a pre-Christmas showing for the Army at Fort Myer. During the first half of 1972 the RIO peddled its message at 11 U.S. government installations. Besides NASA, the U.S. Forest Service, and the VA, the RIO scored at U.S. Navy installations at Portsmouth, N.H., and Vallejo, Calif., as well as at the Marines' Camp Lejeune. ("From the halls of Shabani to the shores of Kariba")

While the stuff of the Nixon-Smith courtship is titillating, the President's white-thinking desire to punish Africa because of Uganda and the heresy of not supporting the U.S. on its anti-terrorism plan at the U.N. requires closer examination. First, the terrorism resolution was the only substantive matter at the U.N. in which the President was interested last fall.

He undoubtedly did not understand just how much he was tightening the link between southern Africa and the Middle East in doing it. South Africa and Portugal used a golden opportunity to demonstrate to Nixon their indispensability to the U.S. in helping in the defense of Israel. The plus Lesotho were the only African support Nixon got in the key tally December 11. Ivory Coast, Malawi, Mauritius, and Swaziland abstained and the rest of Africa—including Botswana—voted unanimously against the U.S.

The fact that such staunch U.S. friends as Liberia, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Tunisia felt they could not support Nixon apparently meant nothing.

Africans, the Washington Post suggested in an emotional editorial December 13, were for terror. "Does this mean more violence is to be expected? In the short run at least, probably yes... African 'liberation' movements will do what they can in white-run Africa, aided, by the way, by funds from the World Council of Churches. It is a grim and frightening prospect...." Once again the thrust of the President's southern Africa policy got vital support from an unexpected quarter, boosting the odds further in favor of a U.S. veto of Guinea-Bissau's U.N. membership application next fall.
The net result of this process, of course, claimed by its most fanatic exponents, and a President willing to do business for self-serving reasons persist in granting a dream among some whites, whites for claim of African Unity. While many say they are simply recognizing the black minority may be preserved. The Administration made fundamentally correct decisions on the Uganda Affair—pulling out the Peace Corps, halting new assistance, and accepting 1,000 stateless (not British) Asians—but communicated them in a most unprofessional fashion. State publicly announced it would not make any new aid to Uganda before it had informed the Uganda government in private. Charles Bray, State's spokesman, and Assistant Secretary David Newsom collaborated on that one.

At the same time the necessarily delicate relationship between a career assistant secretary and a politically appointed ambassador, Thomas Melady, contributed to some obvious foul-ups by the American Embassy in Kampala. Newsmen, fortunately, managed to convince Manhattan Rep. Edward Koch not to legislate the cut-off. State said December 18 that harassment of Americans in Uganda has "ended," and that new loans will not be signed without "appropriate consultation" with Congress and "a full evaluation" of U.S.-Uganda relations.

Given the apparent linkage in Nixon's negative thinking between the Uganda Affair, the U.N. terrorism vote, and black American votes and Africa policy, perhaps only Israel has both sufficient clout in Washington and interest in Africa to be able to convince the President and Dr. Kissinger not to follow the MacGregor-Rush line on Rhodesia and the Lisbon line on Guinea-Bissau. Israel must be among the first to recognize Cabral's government if it is to have any hope of retaining influence in black Africa. At the same time an Anglo-American decision to flout the U.N. on Rhodesia would only make it more difficult for the U.S. and Israel to keep U.N. voting from becoming even more pro-Arab. The rapidly evolving black-Jewish relationship in the U.S. and Africa got two other particularly interesting twists in 1972. It turns out that the Democratic Party plank that would deny U.S. tax credit to American firms in white-ruled Africa (see "In Washington," July-August, 1972) was the result of black-Jewish logrolling. Ed Epps, 26 and black, a member of the Democratic Platform Committee's foreign policy subcommittee, says he pushed it through. Epps, who personally is no particular friend of Israel, said "two Jewish delegates with McGovern buttons" convinced him not to vote against a stronger pro-Israeli plank by promising not to oppose his southern Africa amendment. While Clark MacGregor went to white Africa after the election, the Rev. Jesse Jackson went to Liberia and apparently worked out a plan with President Tolbert whereby black Americans could obtain dual U.S./Liberian citizenship in the same way that Jewish Americans can obtain dual U.S./Israeli citizenship.

One decision the President made nearly two years ago on southern Africa policy is only now beginning to be fully discernible. The ostensibly ad hoc decisions allowing South Africa and Portugal to purchase more types of U.S. aircraft and herbicides are not ad hoc at all, according to a well informed source. They are pursuant to a 1970 National Security Decision Memorandum ordering the bureaucracy to rule in favor of U.S. business whenever a "gray areas" case comes up involving the two countries.

An arms sales ban remains, but it is not the broad military embargo of the Kennedy-Johnson years. Portugal recently purchased U.S. aerial mapping planes. Lockheed, which sold C-130s to the South African military a decade ago, now reportedly wants to sell them C-5s. The South Africans presumably are interested in acquiring naval reconnaissance aircraft they were denied by a 1965 U.S. ruling.

Unpublished Export Control Office figures show the U.S. sold South Africa a total of 1,967 light aircraft, transport aircraft, and helicopters worth $192.5 million between 1963 and Sept. 30, 1971. The Pentagon says the U.S. trained 83 Portuguese air force officers between mid-1970 and mid-1972. The U.S. had trained an average of less than four per year during the previous seven years. U.S. trained pilots usually prefer to fly U.S. made planes. All this of course does not indicate a Nixon preference for white Africa, oh no, just exports, old chap, exports."

AFRICA REPORT, JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1973
On November 27, 1972, a discussion of black music took place at Brooklyn College, New York, in which both black American musicians and academics, and African musicians and academics working in the New York area participated. The intention was to explore the state of black music at the present time, allowing the discussion to go where the participants wanted, rather than structuring it in advance. Since the discussion was before a student audience and in a university setting, problems of teaching and studying black music bulked large. What follows is an edited version of the discussion, which was sponsored by “Africa Report” and for which Brooklyn College generously provided facilities.

Moore: First, I'd like to throw out the general question, what are the problems of hanging on to what we've got, in terms of the music that comes out of Africa, while at the same time we live within the casing of other cultures that are aimed in another direction?

Goines: Because we're sitting here in an academic institution, I think immediately of the black composers working more or less in the European tradition. I've noticed in the past, in playing the works of many of the younger black composers, that there are not many African retentions and reinterpretations in their work, and this I had attributed to the academic process itself.

Moore: tools and the procedures of European musical education, would come up with the same type of end result that the teacher was using: specifically, if a person is trained in the twelve-tone technique, then nine times out of ten he will utilize this particular technique.

Another thing has been happening in the last couple of years has been the desire for a number of these young composers to negate this tendency, and to make a conscious effort to make some kind of a tie between what they are doing and what they feel they should be doing if this African heritage is to be incorporated into their work and to be furthered in this sense.

Barretto: In another area, not the classical area but so-called popular music, I think that there's been a retention. But there hasn't been the realization. Whether the people realize it or not, you certainly find in the things that are happening in the Latin area, by the very nature of its direct influence from Africa to the islands, that the African influence was and is still strong there, and in American pop music. . . . When we played in the Ivory Coast we heard some groups there and we saw dances that were . . . you could see where the boogaloo comes from, only you might ask the kids here what they were doing and how they related that to Africa and they might not be able to answer it. Yet it was there, obviously, at least the rhythmic thing had been
handed down, and the roots were still there, you couldn't deny it.

**Moore:** Mixtures in general is what I was getting at with my question. In this particular age that we live in it's almost more natural to mix. We are barraged with everybody's ideas and everybody's cultures. If you watch television news you get a commercial about Alka Seltzer, you have a picture of somebody skiing down a mountain in order to sell something, you have people being killed in Vietnam, and then you have something funny... they're whisking you all over the world. And musically we have the same kind of thing—it's just like a grab-bag.

Does that pose a threat to African music, and to African-rooted music? Is it something we as performers should worry about? Leonard Goines hinted that the pure European classical tradition was being maintained on purpose by certain young black composers who studied it. What about black music?

**Olatunji:** We have to realize that for the survival of the remnants of African culture in the New World, in North and South America, we must have institutions that will help to perpetuate them. But we don't have these institutions—and that is the only important thing, as far as I'm concerned, that we lack. Even though we have people who have been trained in the western way of composing and writing (I can't read music, I do my composition by do-re-mi-fa-sol-la-ti-do, but that can take me anywhere to teach, because I've developed my own technique, based on what I have inherited), there is not a single institution in this part of the world to help to encourage, to produce and to develop talent.

It's quite easy, as Brother Ray Barrett said, in Latin America. But we have to remember that what they took over there they retain in the form of religion, in the form of social institutions, which was not possible in North America, except when you go to the Gullah districts in South Carolina and Georgia, where people still bear African names like Olalee Harris or Bobo Talya, which means "the truth" which comes from the Vai language. What institutions do you have to encourage people who are going through the discipline—because that's what I consider a university, is for, just giving you the discipline to be able to budget your time, to accomplish a particular task?

The absence of social institutions...
creates a lot of problems, and I think the little that we have left in this part of the world of that African influence that has benefited so many people in the world, will soon disappear. Because our emphasis today is not really on the surviving elements of what we have left, but on taking what we know about it and trying to make it what it is not. So I think we should talk about how we are going to develop some of these institutions, or an institution within us and those scholars (I am not talking about those of us who are per - institution, like another institution within Brooklyn College; not just for blacks, but for all those who would be interested. I think it is high time that forms) dig down and do this research so that we can be given the kind of credit that we really deserve.

Gwangwa: I'd like to reinforce Mr. Olatunji's point. I agree. And also I find that in studying music, most of the experts—people that we study—are Europeans: Bach, Mozart. Not that they are not good musicians, they are fine, but to really get down to our thing, to retain the African heritage, we have to start to study some of the black composers, the African composers, see how they go about their music. Because in this country we don't have an immediate environment.

For instance, Mr. Olatunji's been here for 22 years, and I've been here quite a long time myself. I find that all the music I am playing or writing, I do mostly from memory. Because I'm not in the immediate environment, I'm trying to retain as much as possible, but as much as I am assimilating too, I find that I am assimilating when I'm trying to reject, because we don't have these institutions, or any place of reference where you can retain the home thing, you see.

Goines: I was in Surinam this summer, and I spent some time with the Dju ka [descendants of escaped slaves who maintain an African-style communal life], and I found African retentions there in many instances that were almost 100 per cent. There are areas, all along the coast from Uruguay going all the way back to Ecuador, where you'll find isolated pockets, black communities, where black music is retained. Throughout the Caribbean Islands, especially in places like Haiti and Cuba. And in Brazil—I spent some time also in Brazil this summer, and in Bahia, the black area in the north, you have a number of retentions.

Again it points to the same fact that Michael was making before. Where the institutions have been preserved, the music is preserved, and that's because of this functional nature that he was speaking of. When we are speaking of black music, and when we are speaking of retentions and reinterpretations, and asking will it survive, are we asking, "will it survive as it does in Surinam, where they still have an African tribal type of life?" That's the only place in this continent where we still have African tribal life, and to my knowledge that's the only place that we have that degree of retentions and reinterpretations. In places like Cuba and Haiti, where we do have a large number of retentions and reinterpretations, there's been much more of a mixture, it's been syncretized a great deal more.

Michael spoke about the Georgia and Carolina Sea Islands, where we have our greatest number of retentions and reinterpretations, but in North America, by and large, there are very few over . . . because we don't have any kind of cult retentions, we don't have these direct religious . . .

I'm sure you're saying, Yes, we do, because you think of the Pentecostal Church, you think of the Baptist Church, and we do have all of these. But we do not have candomblé, as they do in Brazil, we don't have vaudou as they do in Haiti, we don't have shango as they do in Cuba and Bahia and in Trinidad, we don't have lucumí, we don't have okonto as they do in Guinea. As far as retentions and reinterpretations in North America, that's finished—I don't think that we can go back that far.

But what we are saying, I guess, is that there is a need to retain the North American black music as it was, not to try to incorporate a complete African lifestyle in North America. Is that what you were saying?

Olatunji: Not necessarily so. If you all remember, Brother [John] Coltrane, may he rest in peace, got to the point whereby he couldn't go any farther, and he was doing some soul-searching—and you all remember how his music was first regarded.

Now, what he was trying to do is to find new areas of identity and interpretation, and he started coming to our school, studying the language, because he discovered that he could find probably new inspiration in what the language had to offer him. So even though we are not saying that what we know as North American black music should take an about-turn, it has a reservoir that needs to be exploited, I think.

Barretto: I think we should deal basically with the fact that we're talking about beauty. And beauty is a thing to be retained, to be passed on. I don't care so much about its original function—as a drummer I don't have to play my drums to pass a message, I can make a phone call—so I have to deal with that and live with that. But the beauty of drumming I can hang on to.

The way you listen to Brahms or Mozart—this is the way to listen to African music. This is the way I listen to classical music, this is the way I
"Much of the black man's sustaining capacity comes from his song."

listen to jazz, to Bird, to Diz—I soak in their beauty, I don't ask why or where. I think this is the basic function that we have to deal with today.

Moore: Is it a richer experience when you're drumming poetry, when you know that your drums are talking in a particular language and you're participating in an ensemble than when you're drumming in the other way, which is like a self-expressive kind of abstract poetry? You know what I'm saying.

Olatunji: I cannot disagree with my Brother Barretto, because he is in a unique position, coming from an environment which knows what it's all about, so he doesn't have to care about what it means. But we're talking about people who don't know what it means. He has a unique background, a unique community experience, from whence he came—he still retains that.

Barretto: I was referring though, Mike, to the way I define it from a personal point of view. I don't have to get involved in . . .

Olatunji: You're blessed already!

Barretto: We all are! But I would say we're going to get institutionalized, or attempt to. Then certainly emphasis must be placed on the history and the meaning as well as the actual music itself.

Ekwueme: There have been several points tossed about, and I really do not know exactly where to begin. I must explain where I come from myself, because I perhaps see music, and in particular African or Afro-American music, from an entirely different perspective from my colleagues here, in that I look at it particularly from an analytical point of view. We talked about research and scholarship, and those of us who are involved in teaching on the university level have to be involved in research and analysis and description . . . cutting up and finding out whys and wherefores.

I'd like to touch on briefly some of the points that have been raised here. The first, that we all know, is the question of retention. Retention is a very broad subject. We can look at the functional aspect of music, and we find that there is definitely retention in the extraordinarily functional aspect of music amongst black peoples throughout the world, as originated in the home-continent of Africa.

As my colleague here, Olatunji, has traced briefly, music comes in at every facet of human endeavor. I don't want to touch on love and marriage and death, as he mentioned, but I want to touch on one aspect which affects us all, and this is the question of using music for work.

Perhaps the area of work-songs is where the black man's universal identity throughout the world manifests itself most vividly. He has had to work very hard all his life, trying to eke out a living, toiling laboriously with primitive tools on overworked pieces of land, or sweating his life away in the mines, railways, cotton fields or sugar-cane plantations to the enrichment of the white man, both in Africa—notably in South Africa and the Portuguese colonies—and in the New World. The situation is not much different even today. The wonder that the black man has survived this ordeal becomes less bewildering when it is realized that a lot of this sustaining capacity comes from the power of his song.

Personally, I am particularly interested in those aspects where the retention is more theoretically musical, in those fundamental parts of music like melody, harmony, rhythm, form, instrumentation, and musical aesthetics.

Melodically speaking, maybe a lot has been changed in the music of black America, but we still notice those fundamental principles of scale and melodic organization which originate from Africa. To wit, the pentatonic scale is an African form of scale, although other parts of the world had it. But music is pentatonically organized in many areas of Africa. Yoruba music for example is almost exclusively pentatonic. And if we only look at a few black American songs we find the pentatonic scale coming out. Take spirituals, because we probably know them most, perhaps more than current pop songs. There are so many belonging to the pentatonic scale, and you even find that flavor of the pentatonic scale in present-day pop songs such as "Papa was a Rolling Stone," by the Temptations. Now one important thing again about African and Afro-American, melodic lines is the blue note. The blue note really arises from the fact that we in Africa have what we call "neutral thirds"—that is, thirds that are neither major nor minor but in between, which the slaves brought over here, and since there are no neutral thirds in American European music had to opt for the minor third in some of those aspects.

In harmony again, we find that parallel harmony, which is imitation of the melodic line at a different pitch, is the normal way of harmonizing songs in Africa. The same thing occurs in the Caribbean and in black American churches. You will find people will parallel the melody, at a fifth or a fourth above, or a sixth, it doesn't matter, but it's still the same principle.

I think that's enough for harmony, we're not really going to go into technical detail. I am going to touch very briefly on rhythm. I just want to mention that there are two rhythm patterns that belong to Africa and belong also to the Caribbean, and to every black man anywhere, and also have
now been inherited by those non-black peoples on whose music the rhythms and drums of Africa have had an important and dominant influence, notably the Spanish people. Somebody once said that Cuba may be called Nigeria in slow motion—musically speaking, not politically speaking!—because there is a fundamental rhythm pattern in Nigeria that is found in Cuba but much slower, and in fact this rhythm pattern has become a rock rhythm pattern throughout the world.

Two rhythm patterns form the basis of many musical accompaniments in the black world. The first may be subdivided into 3+3+2, and the second into (2+2+3) + (2+3). Apart from these two patterns, there are other aspects of rhythm such as the simultaneous combination of several diverse rhythm patterns on various instruments (known as polyrhythm), and the displacement of accents from so-called strong beats (referred to as syncopation), which are commonly employed by black people in all parts of the world.

There are many other aspects of rhythm of course which we can't go into here, but these retentions, which are fundamental to rhythmic accompaniment to any piece of music, show that there have been a lot of retentions.

Instrumentation I want to touch on just a little bit. A fundamental principle of African instrumentation is the act of beating. We like to hit things. If it's a bell or a drum—we like to beat it, and it is this that has given rise to many percussion instruments developed throughout the world. It is this that has given birth to the steel bands of Trinidad and the West Indies, to the vibraphone of Lionel Hampton, to other things that Quincy Jones uses today. Even when we use woodwind instruments or brass instruments we use them percussively, because we just like to beat things. And that percussive aspect of our music is retained throughout the black man's musical output.

Finally, a touch on esthetics. There's always a two-dimensional aspect in African artistic endeavor: there's the outward visible sign, and there's the acoustic audible sound. If a man dances he's primarily letting you see the movement of the feet and the arms and the body, but the African invariably wears bells, jingles, anklets, anything to amplify that movement in sound so you can also hear him dance. If you watch the Ballets Africains you're going to see them and hear them. James Brown sings for you to hear—but do you go to hear James Brown? You go to see him. So for any art that is primarily for the visual, there is always the audible. For any art that's primarily aural, there is always the visual.

But beyond these two dimensions there's a third one, one that is intangible, one that can only be defined as the inner spiritual force—the soul. It manifests itself in diverse ways, but the soul of music—which is what Olutunji and Ray Barretto are talking about in different terms—you cannot touch it, you can't define it, but it is there, it is the burning energy, the force, the ntu, the superhuman, supernatural sensation that permeates all our endeavors in musical output.

Moore: The glory of African music itself may be its ability to adapt, its ability not only to—in the African traditional sense—create itself a work-song that will get the hoeing done or something, but adapt itself to slavery, to political oppression, to big cities, to a family's being torn systematically apart, to the breakdown of that original religion and the substitution of a new religion. All of these things, the existence of the blues, ragtime, jazz, etc., etc., are testimony to the fact that this music has that ... maybe it's that life-force that's more important than the various particulars.

Barretto: The proof of the pudding is in its own perpetuation. It's here, it will be here, and it will continue to influence. As the media grow, as communications grow, I think this influence will become even stronger. I think its shown by the awareness now of Latin-American music, in its purest sense—I'm not talking about Cugat and those people, that was "whity"—but in the things that are happening today and the fact that you can make a motion picture, that you can make records that are being distributed all over the world.

When we were in Africa it seemed like the circle had come full turn. It's as if the two continents had met—it was the most thrilling experience of my life. And now, you can't pick up a commercial without hearing a conga drum in the background, you know—it's there, it'll grow, it has to grow, it's too strong a force, you can't hold it back.

Moore: Not only that, but in Africa itself, there have been times when so-called Latin music has been the rage. Right now James Brown is the rage there. I was in Ghana last year and apparently James Brown had just swept through the continent and could get himself elected king any time he wanted to, and it set me to wondering, possibly to worrying . . .

There was a conference there at the Institute of African Studies, and Professor Ndubia and a lot of other people, Akin Euba from Nigeria and some other people were concerned about the youth of Africa finding out about traditional African music. They were worried that there was this wave from outside. Of course it's like wave two of African music coming back after it's been digested somewhere else, but still they did consider that a real problem, which is to some extent why I bring the problem back and toss it our way, because we're even more sur-
Goines: I'm glad this is coming up, because we have been speaking primarily about African traditional music, and we hadn't spoken very much about the popular music. And as you stated, since the 1960s at least, there's been a big western type of influence, and even before that with highlife and this type of thing.

I remember when I first hit East Africa about six or seven years ago, in listening to the music on the jukebox I was trying to figure where this Latin sound was coming from, and it took me quite a while to get a satisfactory answer, and the answer was very easy once it came: the most popular recording at that time was done in Kinshasa, in the Congo, and the Congo had this big influence from Latin and Caribbean music, and specifically from Cuba and places like that. And it doesn't take us very long to know why the music from Cuba would attract them, because it's very close, and as Ray stated, this is a cyclic thing.

And at that same time, when I went over to West Africa, James Brown was still soul brother number one, and they were doing the Afro beat and other types, which was not so much like the calypso at all—well, maybe a little—but with a sort of Motown type of shuffle. Where do you think that this is heading from the popular music standpoint, Ray, do you have any ideas?

Barrettto: I don't know—we're going to meet at the pass somewhere.

Gwangwa: I think it's also because the people out here, all the black people, are taken from different parts of Africa, and that's why you find what is being done here is the same as there. Of course you find people taken from the Congo, the West Coast, and the music is from different tribes, and when they got out here they got together. It's like a melting-pot. In the blues you find resolutions that we never have for instance in South Africa, like maybe F-sharp resolving to a G. A lot of use of the Dorian mode, for instance, in South Africa, which you don't find very much in other sections of Africa. Like you would find there's more drumming in the West Coast than you would find in South Africa. There's a lot of different kinds of melody and different harmonization. But all these people that have come here from different sections of Africa, as big as it is, have a music that has become like black music that is indigenous to the United States, and all you've got to do is just look back and try to trace it where it came from. It's all there, all of it.

Barrettto: That's the problem, you see. The Latin community has this mixture of Africa and Spain, and those that are a little lighter tend to go more towards the Spanish thing. There is this refusal to accept the strong African heritage that is still there whether they want to realize it or not. And the younger black American generation—is now saying, "But dad, you never told me that we are Africans," when they go to, say, Michael's school.

It's not just learning the music itself but learning that this is all part of our heritage. Once we begin to understand that, I think that the perpetuation of the music will intensify, because we can now deal with our own root-beginnings and say, "Hey, that's beautiful, I knew there was a reason why I liked it, an innate reason, and now I know that it's part of... it's in my bloodstream too, I can accept it, I'm glad of it, bring it all on and let's have some more." And that's how it'll grow.

Goines: That brings up something very interesting that happened with me this summer also. In the past, in speaking of music of the Latin and Caribbean countries, we have made an artificial separation between the English-speaking, the French-speaking, the Spanish-speaking, so forth and so on. On my way back from Surinam I was very fortunate in that I hit Guyana just about the time that their three-week festival of Caribbean arts began. They had a program designed to draw together under one roof members of 22 countries, performing groups, speakers, etc., and to try to define some kind of common heritage, and to move on from that. You had groups there from Cuba, from Haiti, the entire Latin and Caribbean area.

At the same time that I learned a great deal from the performances and being able to see a lot of the musical elements and characteristics exhibited, I had a chance to speak with the directors and performers from all of these different groups. And it was enlightening to me when I spoke, for example, with the director of the group from Brazil and she said to me that she was surprised to find, when she saw a lucumi group from Cuba, how close they were to their group. For the first time she had seen how similar all of them... It was very easy for me to explain to her, because the Yoruba base was the same.

I think that Guyana is to be commended for having this type of undertaking. It was very fruitful, if for nothing else than that it began people thinking in terms of a Caribbean type of national music, rather than thinking in terms of Spanish and French. Because the African-characteristic elements transcend all of this.

Moore: Getting back to the other end of the spectrum, most of us here are composers and arrangers on certain levels. Is it your experience that you mix consciously European elements into the music, wherever you think that your ground-level, roots musical style is coming from? Do you reach for, say, a strange chord out of the avant-garde classical tradition?
'I think . . . there's nothing major to worry about, there's just work to be done.'

Gwangwa: South Africa is a large country, and if you try and take music from the different tribes and try to put it together, it's very diverse. And I don't think that you would be trying to reach out for a chord that is foreign, because it would sound foreign—it wouldn't fit, it just jars the ear. So I never really try to find any kind of foreign thing.

Barretto: That's musical boundaries being torn down and the old traditional dos and don'ts of composition and arranging being eliminated. I wouldn't be surprised if the European-oriented composers become more and more aware of African music. I think you will find symphonies being written with that influence. I expect that to be the next big movement.

Gwangwa: Well, I figure that within Africa itself, we have a range of so many kinds of music that you could write without doing anything that is European, and it would appear that it's European, but it really isn't.

Barretto: But we're beginning to . . . once we can get past political boundaries and get past the old suspicions about one another, maybe we can start dealing in terms of "I dig where you're at, I'd like to use it for some of my things and see what happens."

Moore: Mr. Gwangwa, you play trombone, which is a western instrument, that's a foreign element already.

Gwangwa: Actually, I never even think of it as a western instrument, you know, because it's just the sound that I'm dealing with, but to me it has always had an African sound, that I am trying to utilize in a certain manner, but I never really think what any music is, what's the instrument.

I still want to hear something that is purely western, that I can say has nothing to do with Africa. I don't believe in the Gregorian chant having had any effect on South Africa, for instance. (I always keep on saying South Africa, but it is the only place that I have really known very much.) And I have heard various kinds of music coming out of Africa, from the back country, from people who never have been exposed to any kind of western music at all, who sing in certain harmonies . . . you know, I took a Congolese record to my counterpoint teacher and said, "You analyze that and I'll write the exam," and he broke, the computer broke!

Ekwueme: This is very interesting, because anybody who may have said that Gregorian chant, medieval music, or any period of European music influenced African music is basing his judgment on this fallacious theory that nothing, period, much less anything good, could come out of Africa. It is the same assumption that, to try to justify the existence of metal artifacts in Africa, people have to hypothesize that the European must have taught them how to work metal, which is a ridiculous theory to propound. It's just the difficulty the white man has in accepting that there are certain fundamental, sophisticated cultural developments in Africa that have come about without the help of the white man.

Talking about influences and compositional techniques—we find that fundamentals of African harmony include what I call a "pedal" tone, a drone, which again manifests itself in western black American music . . . One of the most intricate pieces I have heard, harmonically and rhythmically, is a piece sung by ten Ekonda Congo women in Zaïre. For one, it is in 13/8 metric system, and the harmony is in five parts, starting with a drone. Anyway, that's one of the most difficult pieces I've had to work with, and it is indigenous African, from the deepest "jungle" there could be in Africa, without any external influence.

However, it is up to us to capture these powerful ingredients of African music and use them in our compositions. And I am not afraid of the changes that take place, because no man is an island entire of himself. The African, in fact, has to take from other cultures to the enrichment of his own.

Olatunji: That's what I'm saying. We have been robbed of our culture, of our cultural practices. Take a simple example, Tom Jones is a product of Motown, really. And grew big on it.

(Continued on page 20)
Black music on record

By John Storm Roberts

It is, obviously, impossible to list even the most important recordings of black music of the United States; and there is now a good deal of material from other parts of the black pluriverse, even if it is patchy both in quality and in geographical coverage. This listing, therefore, concentrates on new African records, with a few others that are relatively unknown, or that cover a little-known area. It does not preclude, in the case of new records, a longer review.

An album of great importance, although it is not without faults, is Roots of Black Music in America, compiled and annotated by Samuel Charters (Folkways FA2694), an attempt to suggest connections or parallels between the New World and the relevant musical styles in Africa. The recording quality—reflecting the quality of earlier albums from which this one was drawn—is poor, some of the examples are decidedly odd, and the notes, too technical for the layman, are probably not technical enough for the expert. But a beginning to this kind of comparative exploration is overdue.

Apart from this album, Folkways Records, of 701 Seventh Avenue, has perhaps the largest collection of African material. The Bärenreiter series issued for Unesco is admirably documented and illustrated, as are the superb French Ocora selections from francophone West and Central Africa. Both these series are available in big record stores.

Highly welcome are the first releases from a new organization, the Traditional Music Documentation Project. On its label, Kaleidophone, the TMDP has just released ten albums of recordings from Hugh Tracey issues that originally appeared on the South African Gallotine label. These records (Kaleidophone KMA 1-10) include seven arranged by instrument-type, and three country collections—Rhodesia, Tanzania and Uganda. All the examples were recorded in the early 1950s, and therefore are beginning to take on a certain historical perspective. Listeners should remember that these records all stem from south-eastern, eastern and central Africa (from parts of what is now Zaire). The most interesting records in the collection are perhaps the two devoted to examples of guitar music. These include some highly important and rare examples of very early Congolese guitar playing—important because of the later pan-African influence of Congolese urban music.

In the modern urban field there have been a number of new releases. In one of these I am myself involved. Africa Dances (Authentic 601) is an attempt to present to a U.S. audience a wide range of modern urban African styles, with notes explaining their complex relations with each other and with Afro-American styles. This record, for which I wrote the notes as well as making the selections, gives examples from 11 countries (including some rare East African tracks) and a range of around 20 years.

A substantial batch of new West African and Zairian recordings documents continuing developments in the modern urban field, and particularly a growing tendency for styles to take elements from each other without losing their identity. This is particularly noticeable in a collection of newish recordings from western Nigeria. Ashiko Music Vol. 2, by I. K. Dairo and his Blue Spots, on Decca WAPS 34, taken together with two recordings by his rival Ebenezer Obey, recorded with some two years or so between them, show this very clearly. The Obey recordings are Decca WAPS 38 and WAPS 58. Particularly marked is the progressive influence of Congolese guitar styles. The syncretization is even clearer on another Yoruba recording, General Prince Adekunle in the United Kingdom (Iboke Orisun Iye MOLPS 6), where for perhaps the first time, a juju guitarist uses black U.S. elements fairly convincingly.

Two releases of Ghanaian highlife illustrate strikingly the major changes that have taken place in 20 years. Hi-Lifes You Have Loved (Decca WAPS 45) is an anthology record reissuing some of the major successes of the 1950s, by groups such as the Black Beats and E.T. Mensah and his Tempos Band. This was the period in which, perhaps, most western influences came into highlife. Contrast this record with Uhuru Special Hi-Life Numbers, a relatively recent album by the Professional Uhuru Dance Band (WAPS 31). Here the wheel is turning full circle, with urban popular musicians in search of their own traditional roots, and of new ways to relate to them, including references to traditional, semi-traditional and older urban Ghanaian styles.

The flood of releases from Zaire continues unabated, and the favorites remain the same—Rocheuran, Franco, Dr Nico. Most show signs of a sort of creative fatigue. The musicians involved can produce a highly professional sound in their sleep, and too often sound as if they were doing so. For the record, Rocheuran’s most recent album is on African 360.040. The most interesting releases are not from Rocheuran or Franco, however, but from other musicians somewhat overshadowed by the big names. One of these is the late Bayon Marie Marie, whose very personal style is recalled in a memorial album, L’Intrepide Bayon Marie Marie, on African 360.023B. Two other albums featuring somewhat (though only somewhat) less well-known musicians are “Dynamite” Verekes et l’Orchestre Veve, (African 360.016) and Sam Mangwana (African 360.031B).

A logical development in the two-way relationship between African and U.S. music is the growth of syncretic popular styles that are somewhat similar whether they come from American or expatriate African musicians. Notable recent examples include a rarity—an LP by a Kenyan band. This is Matata, on a small British label, President PTLS 1052. Frankly it is something of a mish-mash—but interesting nevertheless. Another group new

(Continued on page 51)
(Continued from page 18)

So why can't we take from all those cultures, for goodness sake, and not be ashamed of it, so we can also enrich our own cultural practices by acquiring from others?

We Africans and African descended people have to live in two worlds. We have inherited the practices of our forefathers and we live with the acquired experiences of living in the 20th century world. And that's where we excel, that's where we are better than others. So we have an advantage, and we should use it, and not be ashamed of it.

I think this brings us back to how we are going to create institutions that will keep what we have. I think to bring it off, especially in this century and this part of the world, is going to take the joining of all of the blacks, Afros. And unless those of us who are in a position of power find ways in which this information can be shared, I believe that 20 to 25 years from now, it will still be something that we are talking about—wondering what has happened to it, why it has disappeared altogether.

Barretto: With one danger, Michael.

We've just got to be careful that we don't get ripped off in the process. Just the way James Brown, with all his success, is still not on the same financial or social level as a Tom Jones. There are too many kids who can say "Hey, man, did you see that cat do that thing," and "Hey, let me do that" and they start a group, and those cats are blond and blue eyed. And they go on to Vegas and you'll still be playing over here on 125th St., you know? And that's where the danger is, that we'll get ripped off.

Olatunji: Well, I wouldn't be afraid of sharing my knowledge in that area with anybody because I know what I have, I know who I am. Economic consideration is going to come when we have more than one James Brown. Why shouldn't there be more than one James Brown? There are so many talents on our streets, more than any theater in the world. There are so many talents in Harlem. I wouldn't be afraid of that, because many of our people have become aware of what their heritage means. What the dances mean. What the music means.

Coming back to black studies, we're now in the period of trial and error. And when a course is offered, how many of our people register for it? And if they do register...

Just because I'm a black professor, if you don't do your assignment you don't automatically get an "A". We're pointing one finger at the other person, and I fear that we have four fingers left pointing to ourselves. Now we need to examine what these four fingers are doing, right or wrong. We have to go to work. We have our studies to do now.

Ekwueme: I think it's important, too, for us to take a reckoning of ourselves and what our objectives are. If you want to have an institution, what do you want to be the function of the institution? Do you want a place where we can meet and rap and play some music when we like, go, come when we like? Even if you play with a group, you know that you've got to be there at rehearsals regularly and practice very hard for some time. There's got to be some discipline. Without discipline, you cannot do anything. If you come when you like, you read the assignments if you like, you do your work if you like, and don't do it if you don't like, because it's patterned after a white man's institution, you are not helping anybody.

So we must first of all define what the objective is. Are we going to achieve anything? If so, what? How are we going to achieve it?

Barretto: Before we get into goals and ideals, the basic reality is: you get an institution—who's going to pay for it? You have to either go back to Uncle Sam and say: "You've got to provide funds for us," in which case you're at his mercy again, or somebody's going to say: "I'm going to work for nothing." And then his landlord is going to kick him out. So we're into a whole vicious circle.

Olatunji: I would say yes and no. Yes in the sense that, as I said, we have so many strikes against us. But I don't know of any place else in the whole wide world, and I've traveled far and wide, where if you really want something, if you really want it that bad, you can struggle for it. You can get it, as bad as things are for black people.

I hate to bring my school in, but it's an example. I saw the need for it, I established it, and the only way the school has been maintained for the past seven years is through concerts given by my group.

Moore: Mmm. That sounds like part of a solution.

Olatunji: What I'm saying is that if we stop and take a look at what our four fingers pointing to ourselves are doing, especially in New York City, and in the United States of America, we can start our own institutions.

And I can tell you one thing. When they see that you are really doing it yourself, I believe that even funds are provided if you start your own institutions. Now we have been able to get people who are qualified to come. There are people with master's degrees in my group. I call on people, and they come. Clark Terry has been on many of my albums. Yusuf Lateef used to play in my band. It's calling all of the talents and putting it together and make it work. And that's how we are going to retain and perpetuate this vital force.

Barretto: Motivation. I don't think anybody on this panel was born rich. You get kicked in the teeth by being born black and you turn that into pride. You get kicked in the teeth by being born Puerto Rican and you turn that into pride. And once you turn that into pride, you turn that into motivation. . . .

I learned drums, and I didn't have no money. I went out and I watched and I listened and whoever could teach me something I stole—I did what I had to do. I know Michael did the same thing. I know we've all learned from the past and . . .
Sonny Boy Williamson (center) with Houston Stackhouse and Peck Curtis—major blues artists in a style on which white rock stars grew rich 20 years later.
Motivate yourself. There's too much strength, too much beauty, there are too many giants sitting out there. Give yourself a chance to grow. Don't put the fact that you're living in America, that there are so-called white institutions, white policemen . . . the hell with all that. Go and do your thing. 'Cause it's gonna happen, we're gonna grow and I think that history will record us as the race that gave the world beauty. I mean, that's the biggest contribution we can give.

Goines: One of the biggest problems in Afro-American music or black music or however you want to define it, is the ethnocentric point of view that's been there in all of the literature, and we know very well why this is so. All of the literature until very recently was done by white scholars, or whoever you want to call them, many of them with dubious credentials. In the area of jazz, all that you needed to do was to stake out a claim and say, "I'm a specialist in this, and not in that."

I was on a research trip with one person last summer, and I don't want to mention his name, but we were questioning someone and after we had interviewed him he said, "Well, I have to place it in correct perspective." And by this he meant that he was going to discount everything that the guy had said and put it the way that he wanted it. Now this is research done by someone with a big name, and of course his books will be regarded from that standpoint.

But one of the biggest problems that we have again stems from this one, and that is the problem of one course in an institution. Now I have fought with this in many places. I teach a survey course at NYU, and I have hassled with them over and over because you can't teach Afro-American music in one semester. It was okay three, four years ago when everyone became interested in Afro-American music, because no one knew anything. So survey courses popped up all over, but even the student body is much too sophisticated now for a one-semester course to handle everything. We need courses in music of Latin and Caribbean areas, not because it's different, but because it needs to be handled by itself.

Where can you go to get a course, say, in the country blues or the folk blues that will go into the kind of depth that's necessary? I remember in my training spending semesters on particular European composers, I studied Purcell for a year. You know? The nature and the scope of black music is such that courses have to be expanded so that we can handle all of those things. I myself had no formal training in black music until I had four degrees, including a doctorate. Of course I had been playing and studying and singing and everything else since I was in the junior choir, and playing in the street and playing in the pit band at the Apollo Theater and all this kind of thing, so you're familiar with everything that's going on out in the street. But when myself and Donald Byrd were coming up from the Manhattan School of Music we had no jazz ensemble or any kind of band that would prepare us for recording sessions, or to play in the studio pits, or to do a Broadway show. We had to do that out in the street. That's changing slowly, and the program that we have at Howard is such that, if you caught Donald Byrd's last couple of concerts here in New York you'll see a couple of our students are playing with him, and this is the kind of training and experience that was completely out, when we were coming along. But the scope of the whole problem is so immense that we have to tackle it from every side possible.

Ekwene: Part of our problems as black people—I suppose other people have the same problems—is that when we disagree on methods we tend to take it on a personal level, and we'd rather

Caribbean "mummies" group is typical of the islands' mixed heritage, using fragments of a medieval English Christmas play and fife-and-drum music with analogies in both Africa and Europe. The "mummies" drum in a style, like early jazz drumming, that shows strong European military band elements but is totally transmuted by African-descended attitudes to rhythm and musical practices.
see the opponent die than have anything to do with him, and this has been the bane of our destruction. We cannot disagree on principles and methods of arriving at the same goals without fearing that we have different goals. I personally have resented the attitude of “blacker than thou” which seems to come up in many black people, and I always say, “I come from an aristocratic family in Africa, so nobody can tell me he is blacker than I.”

Also, talking about institutions, as Carman Moore pointed out, unfortunately we are living in a 20th-century world, a world dominated by western technology and economic power, and we have to survive in this world. The whole idea of our sitting here today in an institution of higher learning is patterned on the western system. Africans have their own institutions. We had our own universities long before Oxford and Cambridge were established, but they were not on this pattern. So if we have to live in a pattern of western institutionalization with courses and programs and things, we have to adapt ourselves to the circumstances and make the best we can of the situation.

I’ll tell you a little of my own experience. I motored from the university where I was teaching to the State University of New York at Stony Brook, to teach one course each semester on African music. In the first semester I had about 20 black students. By the time the semester ended there were only ten, and many of them unfortunately did not do as well as I had expected. Because for some of these things you need just a little effort, of coming to class, going to the library, reading something that is put on reserve for you—and they wouldn’t do that. How much more can I ask as a black professor?

If you want to learn about African music, and only one course is offered, attend regularly, read the things assigned to you to read, do your homework, take the examinations, get your credit in that one course, then you know one thing in African music. You can go from there to something else.

Suppose we instituted courses in African music here. Who will teach them? It is up to us now, when we have gone through this mill, to get together and put out the authoritative, factual, documented information for our children to learn. But until that is done we’ll still be suffering—watching Tarzan movies and listening to James Brown.

One of the causes of the failure of Black Studies programs in this country is politics and warfare between blacks and blacks. There are many white people who don’t have baccalaureate degrees who teach at universities, especially in music, because you do not need a baccalaureate degree to teach someone how to play the piano, you don’t need a Ph.D. to teach somebody how to play in a jazz ensemble, the experience is what matters there. But when internal politics comes in, there’s nothing one can do.

Barretto: Well, I think we’d be some kind of outer space if we didn’t argue, man, I mean we have to argue, you know.

Moore: That’s the creative process.

Barretto: But we can’t divide in the process. The unity, the common goal is always in sight. Has to be.

Moore: Right!

Well, today we’ve been talking about some of the challenges of the 20th century to black music, to this music that comes out of Africa. I would like to have a statement from each of you as to your sense of this problem at this point.

Gwangwa: For my part I would appreciate it if more black people went to more actual performances. The performances are important because then the people would learn that the visual thing is important in a lot of African music, other than just listening to the radio, because what you hear in the media this day is a hit record, and the hit record is approved by them, and that’s the record that sells and that’s the person that you’re going to see and that’s it.

If people went out more than just sitting in class and waiting for the one course or semester, or ten semesters, and started to go and find the cultural school that Michael has. . . . If there is only one course in your college, go out and do a little more research, there’s a lot more to be done in that line. And that way you can get something that you couldn’t get in the school, because like we say, we couldn’t really teach it even in five semesters, there’s so much to be taught. We only have been exposed to certain kinds of music, and only from a certain geographical area in Africa, and Africa is so big, you know, there’s so much to learn. I myself still find that I have to go back home and I’m going to learn—people always go to Africa and teach. But we really have to learn quite a lot from Africa, still quite a bit.

Barretto: Well, I am a Puerto Rican. My parents are Puerto Rican. Up until very recently that’s what I knew about myself. But my whole life has been involved in drumming. When I became intellectually conscious as well as emotionally conscious of what I was doing, I knew that there was something to drumming that had to do with other than Puerto Rican, so when I became conscious of Africanness and blackness . . . I can understand that other people who had been denied knowledge, the way I had, could also not deal with black music and its root. And if as a performer it took me time to get into it, the non-performer would have an even harder time.

What I’m getting at is relating. When every nonwhite, no matter where he’s from, can relate to Africa as the root and relate to it with pride, then I think Michael’s school will fill up, I think the demand for studies in the white institutions will increase, and the pressure will be great.

Motivation has to be spread. The cat that goes home from school and wants to play records, to fool around, he’s not taking care of his business, and he’s not asking himself, “They’ve got their culture, where am I from?” Got to ask yourself that first. Then the things that you’ve been listening to—Drums of Passion, the mambo and the chachas and things—you’ll start saying, “Hey, that comes from something else, and that rhythm in James Brown’s record—that comes from something else.” Then you start checking that, and the further back you go the further you go into yourself. And the taller and more beautiful person you become to yourself. And that happened to me. I think if that kind of motivation can grow and grow, we’ll really see an awareness of where we are and where we came from.
Olatunji: I believe, as I have always believed, that the time would come, and something is really going to happen to us so that we can wake up one day. Because there are stages to the fight for freedom: freedom of expression, freedom from the shackles of oppression. When you finally wake up one day and find that you've been in chains for so long and you ask for that freedom, then you realize that from time immemorial in history people who ask for it don't usually get it, which brings us to you're going to fight for it. I think we're at the fighting stage now for the revitalization of what has been the maintaining force that has kept us going so far.

So I hope that we will do three things: that we will be able to continue this discussion much farther, so that we can achieve unity of purpose; that in the process of getting that unity of purpose we will be able to develop a positive program of action; and when we do develop a positive program of action then we're going to really ask for total commitment from everybody.

The more of this type of discussion that we can have, bringing in all of these very talented brothers and sisters, the more we will be able to develop a unity of purpose, and a positive program of action. And then we'll be able to demand and get total commitment.

Goines: One thing that always happens when a group of people get together and deal with the subject of black music is that they deal a great deal with the problems, and their solutions are the immediate solutions they see. And I've come to believe that this happens because most of the differences that we find relate to the same thing, which is the former exclusion of black music from the curriculum or from the history books or from any other place.

If black music had been handled in music history along with white music then there wouldn't be a need for a course in black music or for us to sit here and discuss it now. If I had studied jazz and all of the other forms of black music when I had a course in 20th century music, then I would not have needed some other kind of course. The problems are on many different levels. There are problems that relate to the students, there are problems that relate to the administration, and there are problems that relate to the faculty. And it all comes from this former exclusion.

What I would like to see happen, if not now then after a few more of these type of meetings, is that we can just start at the problem level, and not deal with the problem over and over. We've got to move on from there.

Ekwune: I'd like to remind all of us that the problem is not limited to music. There are many other branches of African and Afro-American cultural expression in which the same problems arise, particularly art and its whole history and development. Dance—drama—folklore, which is still a continuing tradition even in black America today. And of course contemporary literature, both African and Afro-American literature, which is extremely powerful. These are all branches of the black man's cultural heritage, which today needs to be examined and re-evaluated in the context of the present-day world.

Personally I have no fear for African music as such. If after years of separation from the mother-country, centuries of oppression and human degradation, and other forms of obstruction, it has continued to persist in hardly changed forms in some cases, then there's nothing to fear because it will weather whatever storms are coming. And we can be sure that there will always be African music as long as there are Africans and African-descended people. There will always be Afro-American music as long as there are Afro-Americans.

What is important to look at in my judgment is the motivation, the goal ahead, the objective. Where do we go from here, what is our attitude toward the whole situation, and how do we battle these problems?

Let me just quote: "No man is an island entire of itself." The black man cannot and should not live in isolation. He cannot but be subject to the tremendous influence exerted by the economic and political forces of Western civilization. He must draw from cultures other than his own, to the enrichment of his own. He must continue to adapt to changing conditions in order to survive in an ever-changing world. But his strength lies in the power of his unique identity—the cultural affinity that has overcome the gigantic span of separation by colossal waters. The legacy that has withstood the bondage of slavery and the yoke of imperialist impoverishment.

He must continue to preserve the heritage and perpetuate those lasting bonds that take him back to the original home continent. Wherever his present abode may be—in Latin America, the Caribbean area or the United States—the black man must seek out and capture that power that lies in the knowledge of his art and culture, his religion, in whatever guise, his history, and above all, the three-dimensional soul of his music, so that the extraordinary strength of his cultural genius will, in spite of the pressures of external forces, triumphantly continue to endure.

Moore: Well, that's an incredible testimony to the strength not only of these fine brothers and black musicians, but also of the African roots in the music. The sense of the panel, it seems to me, is that we do wish to pay some attention to the survival of these African roots and of the secondary roots, not only to the Africa that gave the first seed to the blues for example, in the U.S., but to the blues itself. But that attention must be paid in the face of modern technology, the fact that the media are in the hands of others. And I think we feel that from these African-rooted cultures must come the kinds of introspection—looking back into our own culture and understanding of that culture—that can only come from a certain kind of careful analysis and study.

I think it's also the sense of the panel that these roots are just in full flower at this time, and that the future holds no danger of the non-survival of African-rooted music. We've seen it last through such incredible trial and we see it spreading forth across the world, carried by not only people with black faces, but by whites and Orientals and everybody else.

Finally, I think we're talking about a music that has its own survival built into its own esthetic, and there's nothing major to worry about, there's just work to be done.
November 5: The foreign policy of the Malagasy Republic continued to undergo the reorientation designed by its new head of state, General Gabriel Ramanantsoa. Following an official visit to Peking by Foreign Minister Didier Ratsiraka, diplomatic relations were established with China, and the Malagasy ambassador in Taipei was recalled. The Johannes- burg Star [November 11] expressed discomfort at the encroachment of Chinese influence in Africa and saw the ties with Madagascar as a considerable strengthening of Peking's position in the Indian Ocean.

November 6: Amilcar Cabral, Secretary-General of the PAIGC, announced at a news conference in Algiers that a Council of State is soon to be formed in Guinea-Bissau. The "Popular National Assembly of Guinea" will consist of 80 delegates chosen from the 15 regional councils already elected by popular vote and 40 delegates from the PAIGC membership.

November 7: A military tribunal imposed the death sentence on 11 leaders of the assassination attempt on King Hassan of Morocco last August 16. The three-week trial of 220 air force officers and men resulted in prison terms for 32 and acquittal for 177. Among those sentenced to death by firing squad were Lieutenant-Colonel Muhammad Amokrane, former deputy chief of the air force, and Major Kouera el Wafi, commander of the Kenitra air base.

November 10: Britain extended for one year the Rhodesia Sanctions Order; the vote in Parliament was 266 to 29 in favor of extension (the House of Lords later approved the order, 159 to 43). Many Conservative M.P.s were won over at the last moment by the Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, who promised concessions where British exchange controls caused personal hardship in matters such as travel, marriage and adoptions, or as they affect the sick and the elderly. A Rhodesian government spokesman called the concessions "valueless"; the moderate, multi-racial Centre Party welcomed them, and an official of the African National Council angrily rejected any move to reduce the effectiveness of the sanctions.

November 14: It was announced in Brazzaville that the month-old territorial dispute between Gabon and Equatorial Guinea has been settled through the joint intervention of the Congo and Zaïre. The two countries agreed on an offshore border line in Corisco Bay; the uninhabited islands in the bay which were the cause of the dispute will be "neutralized."

November 15: Dr. Marcello Caeziano, Prime Minister of Portugal, made a

Uganda diary

General Idi Amin personally inspected a head count of the Asians permitted to remain in Uganda; the total was thought to be about 2,000, with an equal number possibly living outside the capital. The president told a mass rally on November 12 that the remaining Asians would be physically transported to the countryside and given land to cultivate.

A Somali delegation inspected the Uganda-Tanzania border on November 10, as provided for in the peace agreement. Amin declared the inspection "satisfactory" and reopened the border, which had been closed for about a week.

The national economy showed the effects of the expulsion order; most small shops were closed following the departure of their Asian proprietors. Sugar production dropped drastically following the expulsion of Asian millionaires Mahendra Mehta and Manubhai Madhvani, owners of the two largest sugar plantations as well as major tea estates and industrial and transportation firms. Large quantities of sugar were being imported from Kenya by the end of the month. A major bus company in Jinja closed down because of financial difficulties one week after the departure of Mr. Mehta, its former owner.

President Amin promised to get the economy back on its feet in one week. On November 23 he created a government board to run 15 major companies, including the Mehta and Madhvani sugar estates, and personally directed Army Lieutenant Colonel Suleiman to open the bus company in Jinja.

The president ceremonially opened the new Libyan Arab-Uganda Bank for Foreign Trade and Development on November 20, owned 51 per cent by Libya, and was predictably critical of Britain for cancelling a proposed $23 million loan to Uganda November 30.

The government's conflict with the Roman Catholic Church came clearly in the open on November 30 with the expulsion of 58 European missionaries. Amin had ordered a headcount of all non-Ugandan missionaries a week before in preparation for "Africanization" of the churches. On December 3, he publicly accused the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kampala, the Most Reverend Emmanuel Nsubuga, of conspiring against him. When a papal nuncio arrived bearing a note from Pope Paul assuring him of the Church's good will toward Uganda, Amin was said to have changed from his uniform into traditional Muslim dress in what was later described as "a characteristic snub."

Finally, a twice-postponed announcement on the future of Britons in Uganda was made in a midnight broadcast December 18. In it, the president proclaimed the nationalization of eight British firms and told all Britons who did not plan to stay in Uganda indefinitely to get out by the end of the year. By December 31, 120 Britons, mostly teachers and their families, had left. The number of British expatriates in Uganda dropped from 7,000 to 3,000 since August.
**Africa Day by Day**

statement on nation-wide television that was interpreted as a serious rebuke to Rhodesia. The Portuguese leader criticized "some of our neighbors" for spreading alarm about the military situation in Mozambique. Rhodesia has made no secret of its concern over that situation which it seems to feel is fast deteriorating. Sources in Lisbon say that considerable bad feeling resulted from Ian Smith's "holiday" trip to Lisbon last month, which was a poorly disguised showdown on the Mozambique situation. According to a report in London's Financial Times, Lisbon officials were so embarrassed by the Rhodesian Prime Minister's references to discussion of Mozambique upon his return to Salisbury that all reports of it were censored in Portugal. The trip was to be strictly non-official, they said, yet Smith's aides slanted leaks in a way to imply a kind of recognition of the Smith government, an implication which Lisbon has no desire to make. This, together with recent Rhodesian criticism of the Portuguese High Command in Mozambique, puts a heavy strain on the relations between the two countries which, some say, might be exploited by Britain to bring Rhodesia to a settlement in the year to come.

November 19: Ahmed Osman, Moroccan premier-designate, presented his new government to King Hassan, having failed to persuade the nation's political parties to join a coalition. (See "Out of Africa," page 5.)

November 24: President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire inaugurated the first dam and hydro-electric station ever built on the Congo River on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of his rise to power. The Inga dam is situated between Kinshasa and the principal port, Matadi. It was built by Italian companies (Sicai and Astaldi) and contains Italian-made generating equipment. The Inga project will generate 1,000 megawatts annually by the end of the decade, and will provide electricity via a transmission cable over 1,000 miles long to the copper industry in Shaba. From there, a link-up with the Kariba Dam network is envisioned, providing the first international electric power network in central Africa.

**November 25:** A spokesman for the government of Egypt denied rumors of a major reshuffling of the military command. Reports originating in Beirut claimed that 110 high-ranking officers were arrested following the discovery of a military plot against President Sadat on November 11. The same sources, according to Paris' Le Monde, named Mustapha Mehrez, chief information officer, General Ali Abdel Khabir, former commander of the first military region, and General Abdel Kader Hassan, former deputy minister of war, as the principals affected by the shuffle.

Brazil's foreign minister, Mario Gibson Barboza, spent the better part of November touring Africa accompanied by representatives of all of Brazil's major newspapers. The Brazilian minister visited eight independent African states, explaining a proposal for tri-partite talks to resolve the conflict between Lisbon and guerrilla movements in Portuguese African territories. There were reports that the guerrillas would welcome the talks, and government officials in Yaoundé said that Cameroon President Ahmadou Ahidjo was considering placing the proposal before the OAU. Most West African diplomats indicated that Portugal would have to show a willingness to grant independence to her African territories before the talks could begin.

**November 28:** The U.N. Security Council prepared for a debate on the Escher report on Namibia. The report had been widely and hotly discussed around the U.N. since its publication on November 16. The initial reaction of most African delegates was negative: Salim A. Salim of Tanzania, chairman of the Committee on Decolonization, said, "The South Africans have not yet seen fit to make any concessions." But other delegates claimed that a careful study of the report would show significant concessions had been made. On the question of the unity of Namibia, for example, South Africa backed away from its insistence on separate development for the different ethnic groups in order to accommodate the U.N. position, and agreed to the formation of an advisory council drawn from representatives of the various groups. Vorster himself would assume responsibility for the territory as a whole, relieving the different ministries presently responsible for its several sectors. The agreement also included a promise to examine the possibility of removing restrictions on the freedom of movement and assembly. But where critics could not be silenced was in the report's failure to specify details of a plan for the independence of the territory, and the refusal of South Africa to agree to a U.N. presence in Namibia.

As the debate in the Security Council got under way, the main question to be considered was whether or not to renew Kurt Waldheim's mandate to pursue dialogue with South Africa on the question of Namibia. Reports from Windhoek indicated that African political leaders in the territory generally favored the continuation of dialogue, yet firmly rejected the idea of an advisory council as proposed by the South African prime minister, SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization), on the other hand, said through its secretary for foreign relations in New York that it would categorically reject further contact with South Africa because the talks thus far had not focused on the central concern: independence.

On December 6, a resolution tabled by Argentina was passed renewing the Secretary General's mandate, yet regretting South Africa's failure to give "unequivocal clarification" of its policy concerning independence for Namibia. Alfred Escher was not made a public scapegoat during the debates as some feared, yet the deep dissatisfaction with the results of his mission felt by most of the African delegates could only mean that his contract would not be renewed. He quietly went back into retirement on December 11.
French President Georges Pompidou's third African tour was expected to provide an indication of the future of France's relations with her former colonies in Africa. Already five of the 13 nations bound to France by cooperation agreements dating from about 1960 (Mauritania, Congo, Niger, Cameroon and the Malagasy Republic) had requested a renegotiation of those agreements, and this trip to two of the least prosperous countries within the franc zone was said to be part of France's effort to maintain the initiative in a rapidly developing diplomatic situation.

The French president arrived in Ouagadougou on November 20. His host, General Sangoule Lamizana, indicated that Upper Volta would like to see its ten-year-old agreements with France brought up to date, but not fundamentally changed. Pompidou took the opportunity to announce France's decision to cancel certain debts incurred by her former colonies just after independence; the total debt, shared by 14 nations, is about $200 million.

At a reception in Lome, Togo, where he arrived November 22 on the second and last leg of his trip, Pompidou encountered his first difficulty. President Etienne Eyadema, in a welcoming speech, called for a change in parity of the CFA franc against the French franc. The French were reportedly surprised by this public statement on what they considered a delicate matter.

Pompidou departed from a prepared text to say firmly that parity was a question for French monetary authorities alone to consider. The two heads of state seemed to come to an agreement during a long talk the following morning, and Pompidou returned to Paris November 24 after promising increased aid to Togo.

While President Pompidou had been talking of the possibility of more flexible arrangements within the franc zone, his Finance Minister, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, was working them out with members of the Central Bank of the States of Equatorial Africa and Cameroon. An agreement was signed on November 23 in Brazzaville giving increased African control of the bank.

Members of the second major franc zone monetary organization, the Central Bank of West African States, met in Niamey, Niger, on December 1, and concluded by giving firm support to the basics of the existing monetary agreements with France. There followed a number of individual statements in support of the franc zone, and by month's end only Mauritania, Dahomey and the Malagasy Republic had become marginal to it. But within the context of the new, and so far successful, French policy defined by President Pompidou, even these three nations could retain an affiliation with the loyal members of the zone.
tween the two countries have been strained in recent months; the Portuguese ambassador left Blantyre on three months' leave November 15, and it is widely believed that he was requested to leave for failing to give "adequate explanation for the incursion of Portuguese troops" from Mozambique into Malawi.

As Frelimo has stepped up its guerrilla activities in Mozambique, both Rhodesia and Malawi have become fearful for their important rail links to the sea which pass through Mozambique. Rhodesia's open criticism of the Portuguese inability to contain the guerrillas led to public rebuke of Rhodesia by Prime Minister Marcello Caetano in mid-November. It was about that same time that reports reached Salisbury that several attacks against the Beira-Tete railway line had been carried out along a 100-mile stretch where the line skirts the Malawi border; it was thought that Frelimo guerrillas based in Malawi were responsible. One reason for the growing tension between Portugal and Malawi is thought to be Lisbon's increasing suspicion that Banda might strike a bargain with the guerrillas: freedom to operate within his borders in exchange for an agreement not to attack strategic rail communications through Mozambique.

December 12: On the occasion of the ninth anniversary of Kenyan independence, President Jomo Kenyatta told a rally in Nairobi that foreign investors would be protected, but that Kenyanization of the economy would continue. The government officially denied in mid-November that any mass expulsion of Asians was being planned. The Kenyanization laws date from 1967, and greatly accelerated the progressive transferal of businesses from foreign to Kenyan hands. This is done primarily through the Trade Licensing Act which provides for a withdrawal by stages of trade licenses from non-citizens. The Asian community is hardest hit by the measure. Approximately 50,000 Asians in Kenya hold British passports, and no other, and an estimated 80 per cent of the retail trade in the country is controlled by Asians.

The new Egyptian Minister of War, General Ahmed Ismail, was in Tripoli, presumably trying to patch up a little-publicized rift between Egypt and Libya. It was President al-Qadafi who was credited with being behind President Sadat's decision to expel the Russians from Egypt, and he is reportedly not pleased by Cairo's overtures to Moscow in October. The Libyan leader also was an admirer of General Ahmed Sadek, the former War Minister ousted by Sadat. Though the rift is considered minor, it was noted that the latest installment of Libya's $82 million subsidy to Egypt is six weeks overdue, and President Sadat is thought to have cancelled a planned trip to Tripoli.

December 13: The foreign ministers of Zambia, Zaïre, the Congo and Tanzania met in Kinshasa in a round of talks designed to bring together Angola's two main liberation movements. The two, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), have been at loggerheads for years. The division has made it easier for Angolan authorities to contain the guerrillas in this, the most economically important overseas province of Portugal. The talks succeeded and an accord between the two organizations was signed.

December 15: General Ramanantsoa declared on December 10 that "there is now a breath of freedom in Madagascar." Three days later he was forced to declare a state of siege in the important port town of Tamatave where schoolboy demonstrations turned into wholesale race rioting. The roots of the racial problem go back to the end of the last century when a two-tier social structure implanted itself with the aid of the French colonialization effort. A Malayo-Polynesian minority, the Merinas, inhabited the high inland plateaus while the African majority lived largely on the coast. The French established the seat of power at Tananarive among the Merinas who came to dominate the poorer coastal peoples. On December 12, fights between Merina and coastal students broke out in a dispute over General Ramanantsoa's Malagachization policy which changed the language of instruction from French to one which was understood perfectly only by Merinas. The fighting took to the streets and soon turned into a purge of the Merina population, as well as general rioting and looting. The government used a minimum of force to restore order in the hope of preventing civil war.

December 18: The United Nations Council on Namibia was expanded from 11 to 18 members, to include, among others, the Soviet Union and China.

December 23: President François Tombalbaye of Chad concluded a three-day visit to Libya which seems to have resulted in a new friendship. In discussing the visit three days later, President al-Qadafi said that he had promised to turn over to Chad any FROLNAT guerrillas found in Libya. Up until the time of President Tombalbaye's visit, the guerrilla movement dedicated to the overthrow of his government had maintained a powerful radio transmitter in Tripoli. (See "Out of Africa," page 3).

December 26: As a result of constitutional reforms, elections for the legislative assemblies of Portugal's overseas provinces will be held by the end of March, 1973. The Assemblies will be elected in part by universal suffrage and in part by the provincial administration. Mozambique and Angola will hitherto be called "states." All the territories will be governed autonomously, the highest official being the governor, described as the agent and representative of government of the Republic.

December 31: Zambia's president Kenneth Kaunda released former vice-president Simon Kapwepwe after 11 months' detention for "un-Zambian activities." Kapwepwe had left Kaunda's UNIP party and founded an opposition movement. Zambia is now officially a one-party state. (See "Out of Africa," page 3).
Recently Africa reached another milestone in its history, one very few are aware of, and which many may be shocked to learn. By the end of 1972, there were at least one million refugees brought to the attention of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Ever since the earliest days of the era of decolonization the number of refugees has been rising. Over 250,000 Algerians fled to Tunisia and Morocco, but they were fortunate enough to return to an independent Algeria. There are still over 400,000 Angolans, 60,000 Mozambiquans and 80,000 from Guinea-Bissau who were not as lucky. And a large number of South Africans, Namibians and Zimbabweans live in exile. Unfortunately, the other half-million refugees have fled not colonial rulers but their fellow countrymen in Rwanda, Burundi, Zaïre or Sudan. These one million refugees have been forced to take up a new life in the dozen African countries that have received them.

Last year, as repeatedly over the last decade or so, Africa’s refugees have been in the news. Over recent months the movement of refugees out of camps and settlements and back to their former homes in the southern Sudan has been favorably received. What made even bigger headlines, however, was the tragic crisis in Burundi which led to considerable bloodshed and an outflow of refugees. Each time the refugees were in the news there was a spurt of interest in their fate, a mixture of curiosity and pity, which might be accompanied by the feeling that had circumstances been different one might also end up a refugee. Then the interest fades, attention is directed to other events, and the refugees are forgotten.

Yet a person is not only a refugee while his story appears in the newspapers, he is a refugee most often for years and sometimes until he dies. What is sadder, and this is now happening in Africa, his children may be born refugees, and if nothing is done, their children’s children may also be refugees. The refugee problem is a long and hard one, requiring many forms of aid and a generous dose of human kindness. Even then, as we shall see, the result can be an encouraging success, an unhappy compromise, or tragic failure.

I met one of Africa’s one million refugees in a little market town where he had come to purchase a few things not available in the nearby settlement. He and his family were decently dressed and seemed happy.

“Go back home? I don’t see why.”

“Don’t you miss the country you left,” I asked, “the village you lived in, your friends or family?”

“Yes, sometimes I miss them, the ones that did not leave as I did. But we had no choice but to leave. And now I have as much here as I left behind, or more, money, there’s a school for my children, there’s a dispensary. We had none of this back home. Why should I return?”

When I visited the settlement where he lived, it was obvious that he had all these things and more. Indeed, the economic level there was considerably higher than in his old village or in the other villages around the settlement. He had not really forgotten his old home despite the way in which he was driven out, but there were now many reasons to stifle nostalgia.

Perhaps nine-tenths of Africa’s refugees have been settled on the land, as is both normal and logical, since the vast majority are of rural background. When there are difficulties in their home country they gather their scant possessions and move to a place of safety, often across an international boundary. There they are met by representatives of the host government and of various refugee agencies and given food rations or clothing if they are in serious need. They, and perhaps also their cattle, are vaccinated and then they are settled in.
Often enough they arrive in villages of the same ethnic group but across a national border, and traditional hospitality comes into play. New homes are built, land is cleared for farming, their children go to the same schools and use the same services, and soon the refugees can hardly be distinguished from the nationals. To avoid a general lowering of living standards when a larger population draws on the existing facilities, the UNHCR and various voluntary agencies have helped to build new schools or hospitals, provided tools and seeds, and sometimes foodstuffs until the first harvests come. With such aid, this “spontaneous” settlement has been a success in Senegal and for Angolans in Zaïre. The refugees are living much as they did before on the other side of the border, but now in safety.

Over the ages it has been observed that refugees, having lost everything in their land of origin, have been willing to make extraordinary efforts to succeed in their new country. Often they have come with new skills, but above all they have been shaken loose from their old environment and are willing to innovate and sacrifice in order to make good. This has been true of the African refugees, as was noted by a man who has helped settle many thousands of them, who comments:

“Admittedly mass movements of African peasants rarely bring with them special skills unknown to the country in which they take refuge, but their presence in the new host country, provided that there is agricultural land to spare, and their need for succour, provide a challenge which can lead to positive gains for the country concerned.

“Properly treated from the start, they bring with them one of the most important prerequisites to any agricultural scheme in Africa—land hunger. Their removal from their own familiar environment can render them more absorptive of new agricultural methods, and the fact that they have to be provided for with reasonable humanity and with proper attention to the social aspects of their settlement provides an opportunity for the local people around them to be drawn into and stimulated by their activity.”

In order to use these human resources fully—and secondarily in order to supervise the refugees—several countries have decided to create “organized” settlements. Projects have been launched in the Central African Republic, Sudan, Burundi and Ethiopia. In Tanzania and Zambia, the national policy was to bring all rural refugees into such settlements. So far the broadest and most successful program has been in Tanzania. This was not an easy task, and in the early days there was near-disaster when several thousand refugees threatened to leave their camps. But they were persuaded to stay and, in cooperation with the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service, careful and comprehensive plans were worked out for settling over 50,000 refugees on several settlements.

Each new influx of refugees in Tanzania was noted by the government, and its agents along the border would direct the refugees to reception areas and ultimately settlements. There they were looked after by a staff of expatriates, Tanzanians, and very soon also refugees, with agricultural experts, teachers, doctors and general services. Upon arrival, the refugees received medical and other care. There was clothing for those who needed it, and emergency food supplies. Then they were assigned a site for their houses and farms. Each family received enough land to reach more than mere subsistence level. Even while they were building their own homes, the necessary infrastructure was being set up: administrative and communal centers, roads and water supply, dispensaries and workshops. A key element was the school, built to government specifications and following the same curricula as all others in the nation.

The refugees were given seeds and soon planted maize, beans, cassava and groundnuts. They were also introduced to paddy-rice. They had to live off their harvests, and put away enough seeds for the next planting season. There were also efforts to introduce cash crops like cashew nuts or oranges, and fish ponds for an added source of protein. Other sources of income were wages from employment on the project or sales of goods made in the workshops. The refugees were not left unguided, for each settlement had a test farm where agriculturalists and refugees worked together to select the best seeds and crops. One of their number was usually trained as an extension worker for the village.

Most refugees were accustomed to farming their own plots, but they also had to learn the Tanzanian way, with its stress on cooperation and self-help. Thus, gradually communal plots were opened for certain crops and the workshops were run on a cooperative basis. By 1971, the first of these settlements had reached a level of economic progress such that it could continue on its own. The ICRS withdrew its staff and the refugees were henceforth treated like their neighbors. They kept on receiving government services and making a contribution to the country—an amazing one for men and women who had arrived with only the clothes on their back a decade before. Not all settlement projects have been successful, and the reasons are often hard to find. In some cases there was insufficient land for newcomers, as in Burundi, or the land available was not particularly good, as in Uganda. There might be flaws in organization or insufficient government support, as in the Central African Republic. But even where one could not speak of success, the refugees were at least settled on the land and could look after their own needs. Greater problems arose when refugees decided to leave a settlement and shift for themselves. In such cases these so-called “free lives” were often forced to accept very marginal land, with no technical assistance or social facilities. Their standard of living could fall to the point where they were lucky to earn a bed and food by working for bigger farmers. In other cases, they drifted into the towns and cities, where their lack of capital and skills condemned them to an equally precarious life.

The urban refugees present quite different problems, and encounter quite different problems themselves. I met one such urban refugee in a cheap bar, in preference to the rather squalid quarters he was sharing with several others, where he did not wish to invite me. He was rather shy, but the message was similar to that of more vocal refugee spokesmen.

“Sometimes I wish I had never left home. I didn’t know it would be so hard here!”

“But what about the colonial domination? What about the war?”

“I know, I know I won’t go back. But what future do I have here? What will happen to me next? Where can I go?”

Only about one-tenth of the refugees are of urban background, or too educated to live anywhere else than in town (or, in practice, in the capital city of any
country that gives them asylum). But even 100,000 refugees is a sizeable problem; indeed, they are a far greater problem than the many more rural refugees.

Throughout the colonial or settler-dominated territories there are young people who feel that educational opportunities are insufficient, that they will never rise to a decent level economically or socially. Some have decided that the only path to fulfillment is through solidarity with the nationalist struggle, others assume a much more personal attitude. Members of both groups often flee to independent Africa and, although refugees usually have to be accredited with some liberation movement, many of them do not end up in the ranks of the freedom fighters. Sometimes, after trouble within the nationalist movements, students and dissidents seek refuge again and again, going from one country to the next. The student I met had already been to three, and might try several more before he found a new home, if ever he did.

When these young refugees first came from southern Africa, they usually came seeking an education. Assuming that the struggle might soon be over and the new independent states would need trained cadres, they were rapidly provided with scholarships, sometimes in Africa but more often abroad. Indeed, there was almost an auction of potential leaders as east and west offered education in their schools. The United States accepted about 300 under a Southern African Student Program, Scandinavia offered hundreds more scholarships, and the United Nations set up special programs for these students. The socialist countries, the Soviet Union and China sometimes flew plane-loads of Africans to training institutes and seminars. To fill the gaps in the education of the young refugees, the African-American Institute opened two training schools in Tanzania and Zambia, which prepared the students for higher education. But, as the cold war thawed and it was clear that these refugee students would not be leaders in the near future, the scholarships started drying up.

Perhaps this rivalry would have been helpful if only the education had been appropriate. Unfortunately, the refugees had a preference for non-technical subjects including, as often as not, political science or law. Since they did not have an adequate background in science or mathematics, the only universities they could enter offered liberal arts. With no professional skills these students tended to stay on and seek even higher education. Education, as one refugee counsellor has commented, was no longer a solution, it was a way of avoiding a solution by becoming a perennial student. Moreover, once the refugee had spent several years in Europe or America he began losing contact with Africa. His tastes and training increasingly isolated him from his home continent. Thus, recently, the trend with the High Commissioner for Refugees and other refugee bodies offering
scholarships, like the International University Exchange Fund, has been to stress skills and technical training, while offering this education as much as possible in Africa.

But this is not the end of the problem. For there is limited room in Africa's secondary and higher institutions and, as is quite natural, each country provides priority for its nationals. Thus the refugee agencies have had to step in to obtain and often finance the schooling of refugees, paying not only tuition but also some sort of living allowance. These allowances, modest as they are, have since become a bone of contention with the locals, whose children sometimes receive less. But the refugees, with no relatives to look after them and often unaccustomed to the local food and housing, find them all too skimpy. Nevertheless, despite these trials and tribulations, the young refugee may get an education. At higher levels, the southern African students are being joined by children of rural refugees who have left the settlements for further training. And they all join the mass of school-leavers and graduates.

What happens then? Obviously, the refugees must look for work. But the job market in Africa is extremely tight. The educational systems of the young states are turning out graduates much faster than their economies can create jobs. And, once again, the preference goes to nationals. There is considerable opposition to giving a refugee a post, and often even an expatriate, technical assistant or volunteer is preferred. These foreigners are often paid by external sources, and in addition, they have limited contracts and can be replaced by nationals later. It would not be so easy—or purposeful—to hire a refugee for a few years until he can be replaced by a local. Thus even refugees with suitable training and a desire to work in and for Africa are rejected. More often than not, the HCR resettles refugees outside of the continent, and of the SASP's 500 highly trained students only some 100 have returned to Africa.

To overcome these problems, the Organization of African Unity in cooperation with the High Commissioner's Office and several voluntary agencies, has set up the Bureau for Placement and Education of African Refugees. BPEAR's Director, Lamine Ba, and high level OAU officials have travelled around the continent asking the member states to offer scholarships or at least receive African refugees if others pay the way. They have urged that refugees then be recruited to the civil service, the private sector or even as teachers and doctors in countries where there is a scarcity of trained personnel. The results, so far, have been sadly limited. HCR and World Council of Churches attempts at helping refugees with skills as carpenters or tailors to set themselves up in business have been only marginally more successful. The mass of trained and unemployed refugees is still growing.

This means that only ten years after the problem arose, Africa is getting its own "hard core" refugees. People who came to brother countries with high hopes are beginning to lose them. The saddest cases are the southern Africans who heard and believed the appeals and promises of independent Africa. One can scarcely find people more skeptical at best, bitter at worst, than many highly educated South Africans. They are now being joined by Rhodesians, and refugees from a dozen countries.

All these urban refugees are faced with the same dangers, as was pointed out by a knowledgeable social worker, Mrs. Acolia Simon-Thomas, in research done for the IUUEF/WCC. These problems "centre around insecurity due to lack of efficient government machinery to determine quickly eligibility, unemployment, lack of relevant education and training, which results in inability to find jobs. In the
absence of employment and educational possibilities, the urban refugee is compelled to live for a long period at subsistence level and is forced into overcrowded, usually unsafe and unsanitary living conditions. His social maladjustment and unproductive life brings about a feeling of frustration, despair, lassitude and instability."

Thus Africa has gained little from this category of refugees, whose potential for good was enormous. What about the potential for evil? There is already a rise in educational unemployment throughout the continent, and it would not seem that a few more such people would make a difference. However, since the refugees stand even less chance of getting a job than a national, they may be more active in seeking alternatives. Already petty thievery and prostitution supplements the allowance of a small minority.

It would be unwise to forget what has happened to the world's largest mass of permanent refugees—the Palestinians—and this parallel is not academic: similar events have already occurred in Africa. The Rwandese refugees have been permitted to form groups of inyenzi who received military training and then launched raids against their former homeland. The real victims of this were not themselves, but other Tutsi driven out and swelling the ranks of refugees. More recently, some inyenzi joined with simba refugees from Zaire in supporting an attempted coup in the host country of Burundi, and bore at least some responsibility for the initial massacre and subsequent outflow of yet more refugees last year.

This past year started off rather well for the refugees. The war in Sudan was finally settled and already about 30,000 refugees had returned home (see Africa Report, November-December 1972). This was a particularly welcome result for the representatives of the refugee agencies who had helped keep these tens of thousands of refugees alive and well, and brought some to an economic level such that there was no haste in returning to the devastated southern Sudan.

For the first time, thousands of refugee students who had been trained and educated were able to return to their native land, assume posts of responsibility, and cooperate in the establishment of a united nation. However, the Burundi situation meant that by the end of the year at least 40,000 refugees had escaped into neighboring territories and the overall number of African refugees reached one million.

There was, of course, no celebration to mark the arrival of the millionth refugee in a camp somewhere in Africa. There was no reason for the continent to be overly proud of this situation, neither as concerned the refugees who should have been avoided, those fleeing difficulties in independent Africa, nor the many southern Africans and those from Portuguese territories, whose return would be further delayed. Despite repeated efforts by the Organization of African Unity and others, few solutions had been found to permit refugees to alter their status by a return home. Thus the masses of refugees had to live off the land, sometimes reaching a rather satisfactory level or at least eking out the same subsistence they had before, although the situation of the "free-livers" was le... viable.

The urban refugees were also beginning to cause serious difficulties, and the frustration among them was growing, especially those whose escape from colonialism was not the end to their troubles. Moreover, how could the continent even acknowledge an event about which its peoples still knew so little? For it seems obvious that if more attention were paid to the problem, if more Africans knew of the hardships and desperation of some of their brethren, greater efforts would have been made to help.

What could be done to help? Many things. But first it must be recalled that almost all of the refugees, owing to the hazards of fate, have been received by a dozen African states. These states have usually done their best, and yet they were carrying a burden that was sometimes too heavy for them and, at any rate, should have been shared by the whole continent. The other countries with few or no refugees could, and should provide material assistance to the host states, the agencies running the settlements, or the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees which helped to finance them. In addition, since the most acute problems arose with the urban refugees, the OAU's other member states could grant scholarships or work to qualified refugees. BPEAR, which looks after the aspects of education and placement, might be given greater support than it has so far enjoyed, and the Refugee Commission could be reactivated. Along with material aid, the refugees need legal protection such as provided by the 1951 International Convention and the 1967 Protocol. To date, unfortunately, only 24 African states have adhered to the former and far fewer to the latter. It is particularly regrettable that the special "African" Convention of 1969, carefully and painstakingly drawn up by the Organization of African Unity, has only been ratified by five states and thus not even come into force. Fewer states have adopted national legislation guaranteeing a positive and regulated status to the refugees, and the hope of ultimately becoming citizens of their new home countries.

Africa has reacted extremely well in crises. Its countries have generously granted asylum to the refugees and permitted operations to help them settle. But this can only be a beginning, and the African states and peoples must continue contributing in the longer haul as well. More has to be done to share the burden of material support, to receive and promote the well-being of refugees settled on the continent, to offer the able among their children an education and opportunity to work, and finally to facilitate the assimilation of those who would stay. One million refugees are too important to neglect. Their potential for evil, if they are not cared for, is not negligible. But their potential for good is far more significant. Given help and sympathy, they can make an immeasurable contribution to their lands of asylum and Africa as a whole. This potential should be tapped, now, before there are more refugees, and before growing frustration and the phenomena of urbanization complicate the task.

“Africa Report, January-February 1973

33

"One million refugees are too important to neglect. Their potential for evil . . . is not negligible. But their potential for good is far more significant."
INTERVIEW

‘Pan-Africanism and black nationalism are one’

Roy Innis talks to Afroman U. O. Canada

Canada: Last issue, we published a view of the relationship between Africans and black Americans by Harvard professor Orland Patterson. Now Roy Innis, leader of the Congress of Racial Equality gives a very different perspective on the same issue.

Canada: Mr. Innis, what are your feelings about the relationship between black Americans and black Africans?

Innis: In practical terms, there is no difference. Nationalism is the local component of pan-Africanism.

Canada: Are there any differences between nationalism and pan-Africanism in the conception of black people?

Innis: If Nixon wanted to sell jets to the Arabs, the Jews here would have stopped him. The Jews, as you know, are separatists. We can do like the Jews, also.

Canada: Do you believe in integration?

Innis: No. I do not believe in integration. There are still some areas where blacks are not treated fairly. We must look to Africa to work out solutions to these problems.

Canada: Surely, Mr. Innis, all leaders of both groups are struggling or have struggled for the same goal, that is, freedom and equality for all blacks. Isn’t that right?

Innis: Yes, that’s not completely right. Partially, it may be the same goal but they have different strategies.

Canada: Are you an integrationist or a separatist?

Innis: I am a separatist. I believe in pragmatic separatism. We can cooperate with whites, but not in the same way. We want to maintain our own culture and traditions.

Canada: Which of the existing civil-rights groups would you say belong to the nationalist/separatist and which belong to the integrationist/assimilationist?

Innis: The National Urban League, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, People United to Save Humanity, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and others may be classified as integrationists. The Nationalist/separatists are people like Marcus Garvey in the western hemisphere and his predecessors like Edward Blyden and Martin Delaney. These people wanted to relate to and reconnect with Africa by returning there to build up Africa and then chase out Europeans. Blacks of today in this group want to go back to Africa and help in building Africa. In other words, those of us who go to remain there [Africa] or are struggling abroad simply have a goal to be able to relate to and call Africa ours, just as the Europeans in America relate to Europe—they never want to dissolve into white America.

Integrationist/assimilationists are people like W. B. DuBois and his predecessors like Booker T. Washington and Douglass. They want to be more European than Europeans themselves. They want to intermarry, mingle with whites, get all the good things of white America. Integrationists/assimilationists are people like Martin Luther King and his predecessors like W. B. DuBois and his predecessors like Booker T. Washington and Douglass. They want to be more European than Europeans themselves. They want to intermarry, mingle with whites, get all the good things of white America.

Canada: Could you give a classification of every group, nationalist/separatists and integrationists as you see them?

Innis: Yes. Distinctively, there are two classes of blacks—be they in America or in our motherland, Africa. The first class is the nationalist/separatists and the other is the integrationist/assimilationists.

Canada: Would you define each group and the differences between them?

Innis: Yes. The nationalist/separatists are people like Marcus Garvey in the western hemisphere and his predecessors like Edward Blyden and Martin Delaney. These people wanted to relate to and reconnect with Africa by returning there to build up Africa and then chase out Europeans. Blacks of today in this group want to go back to Africa and help in building Africa. In other words, those of us who go to remain there [Africa] or are struggling abroad simply have a goal to be able to relate to and call Africa ours, just as the Europeans in America relate to Europe—they never want to dissolve into white America.

Integrationist/assimilationists are people like W. B. DuBois and his predecessors like Booker T. Washington and Douglass. They want to be more European than Europeans themselves. They want to intermarry, mingle with whites, get all the good things of white America.

Canada: Surely, Mr. Innis, all leaders of both groups are struggling or have struggled for the same goal, that is, freedom and equality for all blacks. Isn’t that right?

Innis: No, that’s not completely right. Partially, it may be the same goal but they have different strategies.

Canada: Are you an integrationist or a separatist?

Innis: I am a separatist. I believe in pragmatic separatism. We can cooperate with whites, but not in the same way. We want to maintain our own culture and traditions.

Canada: Which of the existing civil-rights groups would you say belong to the nationalist/separatist and which belong to the integrationist/assimilationist?

Innis: The National Urban League, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, People United to Save Humanity, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and others may be classified as integrationists. The Nationalist/separatists are people like Marcus Garvey in the western hemisphere and his predecessors like Edward Blyden and Martin Delaney. These people wanted to relate to and reconnect with Africa by returning there to build up Africa and then chase out Europeans. Blacks of today in this group want to go back to Africa and help in building Africa. In other words, those of us who go to remain there [Africa] or are struggling abroad simply have a goal to be able to relate to and call Africa ours, just as the Europeans in America relate to Europe—they never want to dissolve into white America.

Integrationist/assimilationists are people like W. B. DuBois and his predecessors like Booker T. Washington and Douglass. They want to be more European than Europeans themselves. They want to intermarry, mingle with whites, get all the good things of white America. Integrationists/assimilationists are people like Martin Luther King and his predecessors like W. B. DuBois and his predecessors like Booker T. Washington and Douglass. They want to be more European than Europeans themselves. They want to intermarry, mingle with whites, get all the good things of white America.

Canada: Could you give a classification of every group, nationalist/separatists and integrationists as you see them?

Innis: Yes. Distinctively, there are two classes of blacks—be they in America or in our motherland, Africa. The first class is the nationalist/separatists and the other is the integrationist/assimilationists.

Canada: Would you define each group and the differences between them?

Innis: Yes. The nationalist/separatists are people like Marcus Garvey in the western hemisphere and his predecessors like Edward Blyden and Martin Delaney. These people wanted to relate to and reconnect with Africa by returning there to build up Africa and then chase out Europeans. Blacks of today in this group want to go back to Africa and help in building Africa. In other words, those of us who go to remain there [Africa] or are struggling abroad simply have a goal to be able to relate to and call Africa ours, just as the Europeans in America relate to Europe—they never want to dissolve into white America.

Integrationist/assimilationists are people like W. B. DuBois and his predecessors like Booker T. Washington and Douglass. They want to be more European than Europeans themselves. They want to intermarry, mingle with whites, get all the good things of white America. Integrationists/assimilationists are people like Martin Luther King and his predecessors like W. B. DuBois and his predecessors like Booker T. Washington and Douglass. They want to be more European than Europeans themselves. They want to intermarry, mingle with whites, get all the good things of white America.

Canada: Surely, Mr. Innis, all leaders of both groups are struggling or have struggled for the same goal, that is, freedom and equality for all blacks. Isn’t that right?

Innis: No, that’s not completely right. Partially, it may be the same goal but they have different strategies.

Canada: Are you an integrationist or a separatist?

Innis: I am a separatist. I believe in pragmatic separatism. We can cooperate with whites, but not in the same way. We want to maintain our own culture and traditions.

Canada: Which of the existing civil-rights groups would you say belong to the nationalist/separatist and which belong to the integrationist/assimilationist?

Innis: The National Urban League, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, People United to Save Humanity, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and others may be classified as integrationists. The Nationalist/separatists are people like Marcus Garvey in the western hemisphere and his predecessors like Edward Blyden and Martin Delaney. These people wanted to relate to and reconnect with Africa by returning there to build up Africa and then chase out Europeans. Blacks of today in this group want to go back to Africa and help in building Africa. In other words, those of us who go to remain there [Africa] or are struggling abroad simply have a goal to be able to relate to and call Africa ours, just as the Europeans in America relate to Europe—they never want to dissolve into white America.

Integrationist/assimilationists are people like W. B. DuBois and his predecessors like Booker T. Washington and Douglass. They want to be more European than Europeans themselves. They want to intermarry, mingle with whites, get all the good things of white America.
Canada: In the last two or more years, black elected officials [the Black Caucus] in Washington have been struggling with the U.S. government for more aid to and recognition of African states. Do you admire their efforts?

Innis: Their efforts are not—and may never be—very effective because most of them are integrationists. They don't really love the motherland as the Jews love their Israel. The little they are doing now is simply because we are forcing them to do so.

Look at it this way. They have much more bargaining power than they used to have. We have more people—25 million, official counting, but we know we are over 30 million blacks in the U.S. and there are only five million Jews throughout the United States—but the Jews have more voting power. We have only one Senator, that is, Senator Edward Brooke of Massachusetts—but he is more white than black.

Canada: Why do you use the Jews as a yardstick for blacks to emulate in order to relate properly to Africa?

Innis: First, the Jews are a small enough model to study very easily. Secondly, they are a model of people who faced oppression in the lands of oppressors. They are like those of us who were deported [from Africa] by colonialists to the land of oppression. Actually, they are an example of nationalists who understand the need for a homeland.

Canada: Talking about relations between Africans and black Americans, do you accept the allegation that some black Americans discriminate against black Africans in the United States?

Innis: It's true that some blacks here discriminate against Africans. These blacks are the misinformed ones. They are the integrationists. They love only the blood of their erstwhile European grandfathers, rapists and oppressors.

Canada: Do you think that this sort of discrimination explains why so many marriages or friendships between Africans and black Americans break up?

Innis: I know a lot of girls who couldn't make it with their African husbands, as well as those who are still together today. The reason is that black Americans too often try to change Africans into Europeans living as they [black Americans] live here, and hence they don't get along. An African does not want to be changed culturally and socially and basically, therefore, he offers resistance from his unpoluted black African way of life to black American integrationists who want to make a white man out of him.

Canada: What about Africans who discriminate against black Americans?

Innis: I have not heard or seen that practiced by any Africans from the motherland. I was in Africa so many times—and I was always received with open arms. Believe me, I went to Africa like a prodigal son going home.

Canada: As most black Americans were—to use your own word—deported initially from West Africa. Why do you think many black Americans today copy the cultural life of North and East Africans?

Innis: Only a few relate to East African cultures, and these few are nationalists. Many others, you'll notice, do not really relate to East Africans, rather they emulate the Arabs, which is worse. That's why they learn Swahili. They actually do not identify with East and West Africa, south of the Sahara but rather with North Africa. History, we know, tells us that the first black men were enslaved through the Arab nations to Europe but most black people in the Western world today were actually "deported" from West and Central African slave markets by oppressive colonialists.

However, we must forgive these integrationists/assimilationists who want to adopt the cultures of North Africa rather than the cultures of East and West Africa. With increasing contacts, these wrong relations will be changed. CORE every year sends pilgrimages to both East and West Africa to give the black Americans more exposure to their [African] people.

Canada: What can African governments do to promote this relationship between Africans and black Americans?

Innis: The big key to an improved relationship is for individual African governments to do more to relate and ally themselves—sometimes more openly without fear or shame—with progressive black Americans in the United States. And not be fooled by special color-cat aristocrats whom the American government presents to them as Negro leaders through posting them in American embassies in African states. You'll notice that U.S. governments often send light skinned Negroes to these embassies, and they are not real black Americans who can relate with Africans.

African governments must open up citizenship to black Americans, just as the Jews could become Israelis and Americans at the same time. CORE has been negotiating this citizenship issue with many African governments. In return we will be able to have the support we need to represent them [Africans] in the United States, as the Jews represent Israel here.

Whenever in the United States, African leaders should look us up. They should meet and discuss our common problems with progressive and nationalist leaders here.

African leaders should recognize the plight of black men in the United States and make the white man's racism an international problem and not an internal problem of the United States.

Canada: What do you think of the action of Uganda's General Amin in expelling over 50,000 Asians from Uganda and his alleged endorsement of Hitler's persecution of the Jews?

Innis: General Amin took a bold step in a very explosive way. But foreigners need not capitalize on that action. As black people, we have no records to prove if Hitler was a friend or an enemy of black people.

A country's economy is too important to be left in the hands of foreigners. It is proper to expel non-East Africans from Uganda. I hope West African states will do the same—perhaps more diplomatically but it must be done. Black people must refuse to allow other people to dominate their economy.

Canada: What form of government would you recommend most suitable for African states?

Innis: As a pragmatist, I will recommend total pragmatism. Africans should not adopt a preconceived system. We need any system that can work for us. Or we can update our previous system. I should like to practise communalism, which pre-dated Marxism, Lenin or democracy and the so-called European socialism. For one thing, I don't think that African states should be bogged down with any European systems.
Youthful traditions score at Kaduna

What happens to a traditional culture when the young people who must carry it on appear to be bombarded by elements of everywhere from the international entertainment and news media? A serious question raised by the participants in the Black Music Colloquium on page 12 of this issue. Answers we haven't got—but this report suggests that the arts and crafts that underpin the northern Nigerian masked dancer, right, are far from becoming "irrelevant"—never mind at death's door.

By Robert M. Wren

Behind the outstanding success of the All-Nigeria Festival of the Arts lay a question of great importance to all of Africa: the problem of the preservation of traditional art seen to be under attack by imported influences. This problem understandably preoccupied a two-day symposium on "the place of Nigerian Antiquities in the World of Arts," and less specifically, the rest of the festival, which was held in Kaduna, North Central State, from December 9-16, 1972.

Understandably, because in Nigeria a whole society is undergoing change at a phenomenal rate (a 12 percent annual economic growth-rate in so large and densely populated a nation is surely unique even in this century). Nigerian arts are no more likely to remain static than Nigerian transportation or housing, so the question must arise whether the change can be controlled and if so should it be?

The festival itself implied a partial answer. The competitions at Kaduna followed 12 state festivals at which (if the Lagos festival was typical) the competition was already keen. Many thousands of people from certainly all walks of life and all levels of society were engaged actively in the creation or encouragement of Nigerian arts. At Lagos, for example, during many hours performing groups of all kinds from tens of villages had danced, played, paraded in magnificent and brilliant masks and costumes, all or almost all arising from the people themselves, not from a museum or an expatriate curator.

The South-Eastern State group at Kaduna was composed of recent secondary school graduates for choral music, varying-aged schoolgirls for dance, and rural villagers—farmers, palm-wine tappers, and the like—playing their accustomed horns, calabashes, drums and gongs. It would appear that for the time being little encouragement is needed to activate the arts, and that the Festival concept can help to keep dynamic a deep and indigenous artistic tradition.

The Kaduna Festival shows that Nigeria need not sacrifice culture to economic expediency, that there need be no true conflict between modernization—symbolized by the handsome stadium, the electronic communication, the accurate timing—and art, which rather than being reduced by the festival's modern setting was enhanced by it.

Kaduna—high, spacious, cool, and...
serene—is in December often cloaked with the mist-like dust of harmattan, and indeed on Monday, the third day of the Festival, visibility on a cloudless day was so poor that the plane carrying the guest of honor for the evening was unable to land and diverted to Lagos, 400 miles away. Clearing had begun late Monday however and as the week progressed the days, already satisfactory, became good, then excellent, so that the Grand Finale at Ahmadu Bello Stadium was the success it deserved to be on an ideal day.

Impressive as the weather and the performances—of which more shortly—was the clockwork precision of the schedule and execution throughout the Festival and, as well, the apparent scrupulous and intricate fairness of the judging. Promptly at 6:15 on the last day, after two hours and 25 minutes of the first and only public performances of the festival for a packed crowd of 30,000, Mrs. Victoria Gowon, wife of the Head of State, began the presentation of awards including, finally, a huge Golden Gong to the South-Eastern State delegation for best overall presentation. That delegation, overwhelmingly composed of teenagers, accepted with tumultuous ecstacy while their youngest member, the "Queen" dancer—eight-year-old Beatrice Omari Ogar—mounted the Stadium steps to greet and be greeted by General Yakubu Gowon.

Though General Gowon's speech which followed was inevitably anticlimactic—the stadium was three-fourths empty by the time he finished—the four-hour ceremony had been spectacular and exciting, rarely dull and never tedious, in short a remarkably sophisticated example of the new Nigeria looking upon its art and its traditions and being pleased to find them so good and so durable.

The Kaduna Festival was in no real sense a revival of the past. Its most remarkable characteristic, among quite a few, may have been its youthfulness. And where the performers were less young—as the choral singers and the traditional instrumentalists from northern states tended to be—their work was severe and craftsmanlike, indicating that their music was still contemporary. Further, of the seven competitive categories (dance, instrumental and choral music, drama in English, crafts, painting, and sculpture) only the first three were judged for "authenticity," and in those cases for only 15 out of 100 points.

Nevertheless authenticity was part of the general excellence which won first place for the South-Eastern State. Their girls, for example, were undeniably excellent—and some, like the one wearing a vast headdress as the "bride," almost magically beautiful—but they were certainly not even the second-best dancers. The best by popular acclaim (and category prize) were the East-Central State's squad of frenetically-paced small boys, brilliantly costumed, who danced with such speed, accuracy and (apparent) wildness that the audiences were in almost constant applause.

Almost as popular were the acrobats from the Mid-Western State whose handle-less cartwheels during the Grand Finale provided the most exciting five minutes of the afternoon, though they did not place in the judging. To my own mind, the best dancers, however, were the Western State troupe, two groups of six, one with swords, the others with curved Yoruba drum sticks, whose interaction with each other and whose rhythmic syncopations (using huge male and female drums) had a subtlety all other performances lacked. But Western State took only third; the more authentic South-Eastern State girls' dance celebrating virginity and marriage took second, and sheer popularity took first.

The awards to the East-Central State, incidentally, as well as their performances, reflect just how full the reintegration of the Ibo into national life has been since the Civil War. They alone introduced their instrumental music with the national anthem. Also in their choral music, they alone introduced songs from other regions of Nigeria in languages not spoken in their state; they alone expressed thus the unity of Nigerian culture. That they received first place gongs in choral music and dance, in turn, shows to what degree the past has lost relevance. Americans who are aware that the wounds of their Civil War are not yet completely healed may marvel at Nigeria, where the Biafran secession was not long ago thought to have been a permanent, unredeemable disaster.

The weakest part of the festival was in drama. South-Eastern State won with an unimpressive production of Iru Ikiddah's The Blind Cyclope by the Cross River Theatre group. (Curiously, they did far better after this festival with a private showing of Wole Soyinka's Brother Jero at the Kaduna Club.) Many thought the East Central State production of Hen-shaw's Jewels of the Shrine was better (it did not place), but it profited by following a miserable production of the same play by a state that shall be nameless.

The Western State took second with a visually exciting presentation of Wole Ogumyemi's Erna (a Yoruba Everyman). Perhaps all were hindered by the very poor facilities available for staging (my own production of J. P. Clark's The Masquerade had its worst performance, technically, on "All University Day" on the same stage; fortunately, it was not in competition). The most spectacular show—over-produced and under-acted—was the University of Ibadan's presentation of Hassan (adapted from James Elroy Flecker's play); with 50 gorgeously costumed actors, it was too big for the Government College theater the other productions had been forced to use, so it was played in the open on multiple settings. It was the only precision play production at the Festival.

But the best production—the most enjoyable even to me, a non-Hausa-speaker—was Kowa Yayi a Yi Mish (roughly, "if you do evil you will have evil done to you") performed in Hausa (not in competition) and lasting two and a half hours. The play is a satire on manners, police, and justice, in which an adulterously pregnant woman in danger of execution is counseled to reply to any questioner as to who the father is, "You are." It is an old comedy plot idea, handled with a full appreciation of its possibilities and amply fleshed out with sub-plots only thematically related, including hilarious satire on the police. If this play is a fair example, a dramatic tradition in Hausa is developing that could lead to very fine drama indeed. It is just the sort of tradition which Shakespeare had—complex, ample, varied, and (above all) in the vernacular.

The happy effects of the festival were suddenly reduced at 2.30 p.m. the day after the finale, when 17 Western State participants were killed. Their bus struck a stationary trailer which had stopped at a very sharp bend of the highway near Kaduna. No one who watched the Western State performances—consistently good to excellent, winning four prizes—can help but feel a special sense of loss at this tragic end to the week.
African art perhaps more than any other aspect of the African continent enjoys universal recognition, and yet few academic art programs devote much time to it. This is particularly true in the schools.

The reason for this neglect, of course, is that art teachers on all levels are products of a parochial educational system that failed to expose them to art outside the western tradition. Others who might be expected to teach about African art—social studies teachers, for example—are doubly handicapped: they are unfamiliar with African art and generally afraid of all art, which they see as an alien, intimidating, highly technical discipline unconnected to the "real" world of economics and geography.

This condition can and should be changed argues Ms. Carolyn J. Maitland, an art teacher from Theodore Roosevelt High School, New York City, in her paper "Teaching African Art in the Secondary School," delivered at the annual meeting of the African Studies Association in Philadelphia in November. Her main thesis is that "The integration of African art in the secondary curriculum should be regarded as an essential part of the educational process."

Ms. Maitland might have extended her argument to include all programs in African studies (instead of just art), for the objectives she sets for her art program are equally applicable to other disciplines. Studying African art, she points out, should help "dispel the myth that Africa did not have a significant cultural heritage prior to European colonization." It should also "promote pride among black students" and help all ethnic groups appreciate the value of African art.

Among her student objectives she lists: "To discuss the influence of African art on modern art today;" "To consider the functional qualities of African art and its relationship to the everyday lives of the people;" and "To discuss the typical African social structure and culture."

The resemblance between art and social studies objectives stems from the nature of African art itself. Unlike art in the west, which is created by specialists and hidden away in museums, African art is very much a part of everyday life, created by "average" people for useful purposes: its social function in other words, is inextricably entwined with its aesthetic qualities. As a result, it is not really possible to study African art without learning about African societies and religions.

What applies to art classes, then, can be applied to social studies classes with only a slight change of emphasis here and there. Moreover, art is an excellent introduction to a foreign culture. It is concrete, visual and very often provocative. It raises questions such as: What is it? Why was it made? What is its function? What sort of culture would create art like this?

Answers to these questions, of course, require an investigation of the historical, social and religious aspects of a culture. That in itself is a social-studies program.

Further, art has the advantage of raising a question that is seldom heard in social studies classes: What is the function of art and self-expression in society? Is that question any less relevant to social analysis than questions of geography, resources, internal politics or foreign relations? There is a very good chance that students will find issues of self-expression much closer to their hearts than issues of capital investment.

Lastly, there is a plethora of good materials on African art, ranging from films, filmstrips and slides, to books usable with opaque projectors.

Ms. Maitland begins her African art program, very sensibly, with an examination of "The Influence of Africa in Our Everyday Lives." She shows her students several panels of illustrations, beginning with pictures of modern western art that has been influenced by African art, specifically works by Picasso, Lipchitz and Brancusi. She then shows a panel of African art to illustrate the source of influence and to allow students to become acquainted with a different art tradition. She purposely concentrates on "realistic" art and avoids "unfamiliar forms" at this point.

Finally, she shows a series of panels depicting the use of "African design motifs and techniques in fashion design, interior decorating and personal adornment" in this country.

From a social studies point of view, such an exercise would illustrate the concept of "cultural diffusion" and ultimately the notion of cultural interdependence. It could be tied in nicely with Ralph Linton's popular article "One Hundred Percent American," which humorously reassures the purist American that despite his use of Turkish towels, China cups and Indian pajamas, etc., he is still untouched by "foreign" influences.

Ms. Maitland remarks that European (including white American) fashions are traditionally "dull in color and repetitive in design" but have recently taken on a new "excitement in color and creativity," mostly as a result of African influence. "Today a dress which is com-
A panel devised by Ms. Carolyn J. Maitland, a New York art teacher, to show the use of African motifs in U.S. fashion.

posed of three patterns within the design is indebted to African design for inspiration.

To reinforce this point, Ms. Maitland next has her students examine African artifacts such as batik and tie-dye materials, kente cloth from Ghana, basketry and sculpture. "Black Americans," she says, "can be proud of an artistic heritage which is appreciated and utilized by other ethnic groups."

Such an approach is undoubtedly useful as a motivating technique (and as a source of black pride) and should be encouraged, but from a social studies point of view a further question should be asked: To what extent is the value of African art and culture (or any art or culture) dependent upon its acceptance by "outsiders"? Or to put it another way: To what extent do we perpetuate our own ethnocentrism by valuing another art or culture because of what we can take from it?

In fact, African art is valuable whether or not Americans appreciate it. The arts and beliefs of a culture should be deemed valuable within the context of their own culture, not outside it. Is Ravi Shankar a great sitarist because he influenced the Beatles or because he meets the criteria of Indian critics? In short, our educational goal is not to learn to like all cultures but to respect their uniqueness.

Another question, equally valuable from a social studies point of view, is why so many Africans have adopted the "drab" dark-suit, dark-tie, white-shirt dress of conservative Europeans, so common in African cities. Clearly, the influence has been in one direction (from Europe) until recently; why has this trend begun to change?

Or, more subtly, why is it that diplomats from Senegal, Sierra Leone and Kenya appear at the United Nations in western dress, while their counterparts from Nigeria and Tanzania often appear in African dress? The answers lie in the histories, ethnic compositions and current politics of these countries. The point, however, is that something as seemingly innocuous as foreign influences in fashions can serve as a springboard to larger issues.

Ms. Maitland and her students, in fact, quickly go beyond this initial stage of cultural borrowing and pursue the cultural and historical background of African art. They question "the meaning of terms such as primitive, industrialized, savage, culture, crafts, and fine art," and conclude that "art produced by primitive people can be exceptionally sophisticated."

Ms. Maitland points out that "African art including design has been considered 'primitive', a term associated with crudity and lack of sophistication. Gradually the realization is spreading that the art and design of primitive people (referring to people who live a simple way of life removed from technology and industrialization) are neither technically crude nor aesthetically inferior."

This is an important point and cannot be made often enough, but does it go far enough? If "art produced by primitive people can be exceptionally sophisticated," then why persist in calling these people primitive? If a student says, "Gee, for simple people those Africans sure make great art," a teacher's reaction should not be one of satisfaction. It
should be another question: "If their art is so sophisticated, then why do you call them simple?" The answer of course is that their "primiveness" comes from elsewhere; it comes from our use of western technology as the yardstick of cultural sophistication.

But why use technology rather than art or anything else as the basis for judging cultures, if one insists in making such judgments? Why not use the warmth of human relations, or social stability, or the continuity of a fulfilling philosophy? Are these achievements any less significant than material progress?

As Ms. Maitland points out, in quoting Leopold Senghor, African art has been called primitive only in the sense that it was first and because it has remained close to the cosmic and vital sources of human emotions."

In effect Senghor reverses the meaning of "primitive," turning it into something sophisticated. Teachers should do the same. If African art is sophisticated, which surely it is, then the conclusion should be that African cultures are sophisticated, not that "primitive" people can make "sophisticated" art.

To study the cultural context of African art, Ms. Maitland uses a series of films, including The Family of Ghana (Contemporary Films), a highly personal account of village life on the coast of Ghana, showing the conflicts between a traditional father and his modernized son, and Bozo Daily Life (International Film Foundation), a non-narrated glimpse of daily activities along the Niger River in Mali. Both films are excellent and can be used in any type course on Africa.


Numerous filmstrips are also available. Ms. Maitland specifically mentions Masks, "which is part of an African art teaching kit," produced by the University of California. Also, the Museum of Primitive Art has produced a set of art slides for teaching purposes.

Any one of these films or filmstrips—preferably the latter because they can be held on the screen—could be used to launch an inquiry episode in social studies. Show students a series of masks and ask: What do you think these would be used for? Allow students to speculate freely; there are no right or wrong answers at this point.

As a spur to discussion, you might ask: Why do we wear masks? When? (What is the origin of Halloween? Why are masks worn?).

In general masks are worn to disguise the wearer; they also invest the wearer with new powers. A Halloween Superman not only hides his real identity but assumes the qualities, at least imaginatively, of the "genuine" article. The same is true with African masks. The wearer of the mask drops his daily identity and becomes the spirit he is depicting; at the very least he conjures up that spirit in himself and others.

Show pictures of other carvings such as statues and fetish figures, and ask similar questions: Where would these be used? When? Why? What comparable figures do we use in our everyday lives? (Christian medals, statues, crosses; Jewish mezuzahs, etc.). An African fertility doll will seem far less superstitious to students who recognize similar objects in their own culture.

Other kinds of art, such as Ife heads, Benin plaques, or Ashanti gold weights, will suggest more temporal aspects of African cultures. Students should be able to infer the types of societies that would create such art, and they should be able to relate it to the court tradition in European art. (Don't forget to show the stelae of Axum and the churches of Lalibella).

And of course the crafts of Africa, seen in the design of cooking utensils, the carving of calabashes or the weaving of materials, will suggest yet another function of art.

The point of such exercises is not to give answers—teachers in fact do not have to know very much about African art—but to raise questions, to stimulate curiosity and create a demand for information. Students can find their own answers or read material handed to them. Once provoked, however, students should want answers, if for no other reason than to test their own hypotheses.

Much of what the students find will be identical to the usual content of social studies programs: many masks are used in initiation rites, so important in belonging societies (and comparable to confirmation and bar mitzvah in the west); intricate carvings of the sixth century reveal the existence of highly sophisticated African societies at a time when Northern Europe was a collection of warring clans; Benin plaques record the history of early kingdoms in Africa; and fetish figures and other art objects grow out of a deep spiritual dimension in African cultures.

Just as important, students should develop an appreciation for the function of art in society, which might lead to some interesting questions about contemporary America. What does our art say about us? What would an archaeologist, a thousand years from now, infer about American society? What does an abstract painting suggest? Or a precise geometrical form? Does our art suggest an arid, scientific culture, caught up with technique and not feeling? Are we more interested in things than people? That is one hypothesis. Is it true?

Show examples of contemporary American art to the students and let them decide. Or examine everyday objects and ask: To what extent does art effect our necessary creations?

Ms. Maitland makes this observation: "We are aware that the aesthetic values and concepts of the African are utilized in every aspect of his life. In comparison, art in our own Western culture threatens to become an increasingly inconsequential luxury. We need to copy from the African the idea of integrating art into our every day life. It is a dichotomy that Western man has created between fine and applied arts. There is a need to propagate the use of good design which combines aesthetic and functional superiority in the creation of objects which serve our every day needs."

There is a saying that "Life is short, art long." Perhaps only through the study of art can we learn to appreciate the truth of that statement, and as a result come to understand the importance of culture and history.
Second thoughts on travel package finances

By Nancy McKeon

Kenya's great success in stimulating tourism to East Africa by encouraging group travel and package tours in the major coastal resort hotels and game parks has made tourist officers throughout Africa look to low-budget, pre-arranged travel as the secret to an increase in foreign exchange.

But while these officials are seeking to emulate Kenya, observers are already taking a hard look at where East African travel money really goes. Critics have long realized that most package tours are paid for in the country of tourists' origin, and except for the portion of prepayment that must be remitted to Kenya, much of the profit remains in Europe or the United States. But observers now contend that some packages, specifically ones that originate in Switzerland and Germany and include all food and lodging, do not generate minimal spending for incidentals in Kenya.

Resort owners along Kenya's coast—from Shimoni to Malindi—react with dismay at the German tourists' frugal ways. The manager of Mombasa's famed Nyali Beach Hotel moaned, "These Germans come here and just lie in the sun. Most of them do not do any sightseeing that costs extra, they do not shop in the town. They usually do not even buy an extra beer at the bar. Whatever is included in the price they paid in Germany is all they want." This may sound like a petty complaint, but in a country where so much of the economy is based on tourist spending, it has pretty serious implications.

Still, countries like Tanzania, which has gotten short shrift in the general crush of East African tourism, actively seek large groups like the German, Italian and Swiss package groups. December 1971 saw the beginning of regular charter flights from Germany to Dar es Salaam, and Germans now head the list of nationalities visiting the once-German colony, outnumbering the Americans. The groups that come into Tanzania include those that just stay at the various luxury beach hotels outside Dar and others that get on Tanzania's tourist circuit of game parks and towns of interest. The latter put more money into the coffers of the country because the game parks, as in Kenya, fall under the jurisdiction of the government department of tourism and wildlife, rather than the private sector.

The disadvantages that apply to package tourism do not apply to charter flights that do not include land arrangements, but for both the African nations and individual passengers there are perils here also. While it remains true that the cheap airfares offered by charter-flight dealers enable people to travel to Africa who might not otherwise be able to, it is also true that there are many disreputable charter "consolidators" who go out of business before the return flight, thus stranding passengers all around the world.

As more and more of these cases came before the public attention this past summer people's awareness of the risks heightened, but the lure of low airfares is still a strong inducement to take a chance. This last summer's crises all seemed to take place in Europe, and organization and resources were such that the travelers—largely young Americans—got home without too much fuss. But travelers stranded in Africa could have a harder, and more expensive, time getting home.

For that reason several African countries have been seriously discussing refusing landing rights to illegal charters; i.e., charter groups that do not meet with the specifications set by the International Air Transport Association, the governing body of most of the world's airlines. One West African country thinking about taking this step got stuck with a group of stranded charter-flight passengers once several years ago and vowed never again. Whereas British businessmen in London helped to bail out the young American tourists who were stuck without transportation home this past summer, neither private African business nor the public sector has the resources to make such a gesture.

The chairman of the African Travel Commission, Ignatius Ameduwa Atingbi, who is also secretary general of the Nigerian Tourist Association, has urged African governments to encourage charter flights as a way to lower airfares and spur tourism. And he is right. The major
In trying to get a bigger share of the tourism dollar, or shilling, or cedi, for the government, departments of tourism often introduce measures that, unfortunately, have the opposite effect. In many tours, for instance, Tanzanian tourist features have been substituted for Uganda's, now that the latter's borders have been effectively closed to visitors. But a recent increase in government surcharge on all hotel accommodations has caused many tour dealers to think twice about exploiting Tanzania's tourist potential. The net result? Probably, in the long run, a gain for Tanzania in foreign exchange. Right now, a stalemate.

A royal hotel in Addis

By John Ravenson

In 1944, after Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia had finally retrieved his domain from Italian occupation, he had a small palace built at the foot of Addis Ababa. This was Filwoha Palace—named after its mineral hot springs—and it was a place of relaxation while the more imposing Jubilee Palace was completed. Relocated later to a mere annex, the older palace was almost forgotten until 1963. Then one of the most significant events in recent African history occurred. Largely at the insistence of the Emperor, representatives of the emerging African states were called together to overcome their differences and form a common front toward the outside world. This conference also created an Organization of African Unity with its headquarters in Ethiopia's capital.

It was not easy to hold a summit conference in the Addis Ababa of that time. There were pitifully few hotels or accommodations of any sort. Yet one of the greatest assemblies of crowned heads, presidents and prime ministers was expected. So the Filwoha Palace was quickly refurbished as a suite for Haile Selassie, who wished to live near the other leaders. A new wing of the palace was made into a hotel, and a luxurious "imperial" wing was built to receive 33 African leaders. The new hotel was called Ghion, a Biblical term for a constant flowing source of lasting abundance. The lesser dignitaries and members of delegations—thousands of them, if one counts the bodyguards, secretaries and private cooks—were not as fortunate. The new hotel, several schools and even unfinished houses provided lodgings for many, while the remnant pitched tents on the hotel grounds or wherever room could be found.

After the conference, the hotel was opened for tourists, who have not stopped coming since 1963. They found the rooms pleasant, the garden refreshing, the hot springs soothing and the atmosphere always imperial. In 1970, the hotel was graced with a new restaurant in the shape of a toucouleur, the traditional peasant's hut so typical of the Ethiopian countryside. But the moments of splendor had not come to an end, for Addis Ababa was again and again the site of major African conferences, and Ghion was the hotel of predilection for heads of state and secretaries-general of international organizations.

At Ghion the atmosphere is imperial in more ways than one, for the Emperor himself lives just around the corner in the Jubilee Palace. You may well get a glance at him as he drives by in his limousine or stops to receive petitions from humble subjects. His private grounds almost surround the hotel, and the riding stable of beautiful Arabian ponies is just across the parking lot. You may be awakened in the morning by "reveille" calling the imperial bodyguard to duty and fall asleep to the sound of "taps." Nor is the Emperor an unfriendly neighbor. Tours of the palace can be arranged and the visitor may pass through the garden, where tame lions and cheetahs stroll like so many curious cats, and on into the building from whence the Lion of Judah rules his vast empire. Back at the hotel, you can go to the old palace, since become a casino, or retire to bungalow No. 73 where Nasser once slept, or room No. 225 where Nkrumah dreamed his dream of African unity, or that of many a great leader.
Darkness at noon in the heart of Africa

It has always been a source of energy, but a historic eclipse will make the sun a source of unprecedented tourist revenue in 1973 for Niger and Kenya, and a few countries in between.

The total eclipse of the sun, which will occur on June 30 at around noon, will be of exceptional duration. As it cuts a swath across the central section of Africa, the sun will be eclipsed a full seven minutes—close to the theoretical maximum.

As the eclipse travels from its point of origin in Brazil and across to Mauritania, it will reach its maximum duration over Mali and Niger, then cross over Chad, the southern portion of Sudan and northern Kenya, where it will be reduced to four and a half minutes.

As long as two years ago, scientists and tourists were making plans to view the unprecedented eclipse. More than 1,000 members of the scientific community have arranged to bring equipment to Mali and Niger, the prime site being 135 kilometers north of Agadès in Niger, to observe the phenomenon, and some 200 students and teachers, settling for four and a half minutes of eclipse, have already rented all available space at the Lake Rudolf Angling Club in northern Kenya. Because the club can only accommodate, in cabins, one-tenth of the 200 expected, most will camp out on the beach, leading Mrs. Pat Robertson, the manager, to hope that the lake's two resident 20-foot crocodiles will go away by June. The two have harassed, and in one case attacked, visitors to the lodge in the past.

But it is not too late for the general public to get in on the act. Both the Cunard Line of New York and Arnold Tours of Boston are offering trips to West Africa that will put visitors within pretty good view of the eclipse, though not for the optimum seven minutes. Both feature ships cruising off the West African coast at around noon on June 30.

Cunard (555 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10017, 212 867-0157) offers a cruise from June 22 to July 8 priced from $450 to $1,575, including scientific orientation. Arnold (79 Newbury Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02116, 617 536-0980) is featuring a flight from New York to Casablanca that connects with a French cruise ship. The flights leave June 23 and 24, the ship on June 26. The flights return to New York July 2. Costs, including the flight and cruise, range from $575 to $1,100. There will be special rates for groups of 15 or more.
Two views of Hoagland on South Africa

**South Africa: Civilizations in Conflict,** by Jim Hoagland (Houghton Mifflin, 1972. $10).

The sovereign Republic of South Africa would like to be regarded by the United States as the U.S. regards Israel. Yet, despite this, it treats America visa applications with the greatest suspicion. An American who does not seem disposed to be ideologically compatible with the self-view and world view of South Africa's ruling elite may be granted one if—and here one is trying to read the collective mind of South African officials—i.f it is believed that the individual is so fair minded that he is susceptible of being awed by the complexity of the South African social structure to the point of "understanding" South Africa, that is in essence putting it out of mind, once he gets back home.

Any American journalist from a major publication enters this thicket with at least one strike against him. By and large major American publications no longer employ supporters of racial segregation, and they try not to hire white supremacists as their foreign correspondents. This means that the American journalist going into South Africa is automatically one of those "on trial." He is under strong pressure to write stories that say implicitly or explicitly that the U.S. should be nice to South Africa. Yet the very terms of the visa application, which allows a representative to South Africa every few years, but rarely allow the same person in twice. The assumption is that the neophyte, if he's adventurous, will dare to say at most "apartheid is a no-no" and think he's getting away with something. However, this quite correctly no longer bothers the more sophisticated South African officials, who know that to say that is no longer news in the U.S. They simply refuse to renew the correspondent's visa, which allows the correspondent and his editors the delusion of thinking that he wrote something significant; and the correspondent's reputation among his peers goes up a notch thanks to the banning. Indeed, the syndrome has become so entrenched that any American correspondent who has his South African visa regularly renewed is suspected by his colleagues of being an apartheid sympathizer.

Jim Hoagland had to play this game like everyone else. Ultimately he was told not to darken South Africa's stoops again, but in the process he managed to beat the system. He obviously worked hard at beating it—that is at saying something despite South Africa's news management techniques—but he couldn't have done it without the help of the Pulitzer Prize jury. Hoagland, until recently the Washington Post's Africa correspondent, won the 1971 Pulitzer for international reporting for a series of articles based on a six-week visit to South Africa in 1970. The award appeared to surprise Hoagland's editors, who registered amazement that an off-front-page story like South Africa could have been plumbed for a Pulitzer.

Their assessment was essentially correct. Hoagland had masterfully organized and trenchantly, even lyrically, written his series, but he hadn't said anything that could convince one that South Africa was a major foreign policy problem for the U.S.—a day-in-and-day-out front-page story. Hoagland culled quotes like the masterpiece from a guide who, asked to explain the difference in wages between a black and white gold miner, replied, "Because Willie's skin is white. It is the most valuable commodity you can have in South Africa. It is more valuable than this yellow stuff we blast out of the earth." But in the final analysis Hoagland didn't say anything more than "apartheid is a no-no."

However, the Pulitzer apparently gave Hoagland the boost he needed. It is an instant American tradition that a Pulitzer winner should translate his prose into book form. Hoagland conformed, and the vastly expanded result is a penetrating piece of reportage that leaves an increased appreciation for the depth and seriousness of the policy problem confronting the United States in southern Africa. I undertook the job of writing a review with the idea of saying something about a book that hopefully, because of the author's exceptional skill,
was the last in the long line of "My Trip to South Africa" writing we've had in the past decade from Kennan, Drury, Michener, Kahn, etc. Instead, I found something substantially more, a first hand, tough-minded look at southern Africa all across the board, a mountain of raw material for policy pundits to ponder, a book that may well in time come to be seen as the first in a new U.S. generation on southern Africa.

Most outstanding is Hoagland's chapter, "A Peculiar Economy," effectively refuting the thesis that expanded foreign trade and investment is the best way to induce change in South Africa. Should the right people read Hoagland, the message might get through that for the sake of truth and good taste the drive to accelerate even further U.S. exports to South Africa (thereby spurring investment as well regardless of official rhetoric) during Mr. Nixon's second term should not be accompanied by pious prattle that this is being done for the good of black South Africa. Perhaps this particular political context is of itself a major reason for sensing a heightened significance in Hoagland's book read in the wake of the 1972 election, as compared with the original newspaper series in the summer of 1970—so long ago it even preceded the announcement of Mr. Nixon's first boom to Union Carbide on Rhodesian chrome. In mid-1970, the U.S. tilt to the white in southern Africa was still not publicly apparent. One's assumption was that Mr. Nixon would be sufficiently astute in handling the question to keep it in genuinely low profile.

Now, however, one knows better, and this in turn places new constraints on the political journalist. In other words he must deal with South Africa seriously as an American ally, South Africa, to many around the President, is not the anachronistic and extreme perversion of the attitudes prevalent in the America of a quarter century ago, but rather is well along the road to "solving" its racial problem and may in fact have developed some techniques in for instance handling questions such as public housing and dissent that could be applicable to the U.S. future. South Africa then can be seen from Washington as a class question rather than a race question, the class outlook of both governments being that of the top looking down rather than the Marxist bottom up.

Looking at these new constraints in a more historical context, in the early 1960s American journalists accepted the concept that a reporter could be professional and fair on racial questions as an integrationist, thus replacing the earlier concept that segregation was as respectable as integration. Nixon's political successes have partially modified this to the point that the objective reporter must give equal time to anti-busing views. Translating this into foreign correspondence, American journalists of the 1960s were able to tread lightly the line between covering South Africa as a racial matter and as a foreign policy matter. This was so because the conventional wisdom said white Africa was fast crumbling of its own folly without substantial foreign policy input from the U.S. Southern Africa news brought stirring hope to the hearts of liberals, and deep fear to the conservatives. Now it does just the reverse. This means that the professional journalist—who of course should have done so before—must rein himself in, treating Southern Africa as a strictly foreign policy question with the views of the segregationists there being just as respectable as the integrationists, a situation analogous to domestic racial reporting of the 1950s.

Hoagland, obviously aware of such forces, makes a start in cranking "South Africa - may - be - the - wave - of - the - future" type thinking into his analysis. Noting the analogy is not exact, Hoagland says the National Party in South Africa "had reacted to a series of crises somewhat in the same way the Nixon administration might have if it had had a free hand to follow Middle American public opinion, inflamed by Watts, Newark, the hippies of San Francisco in 1967, and finally Chicago in 1968."

Although Hoagland doesn't get very deep in futurology in a book that he acknowledges is essentially descriptive rather than prescriptive, he does get his feet wet on the question of U.S. policy in southern Africa in his concluding chapter, "The Dollar's Shadow." Not surv...
BOOK REVIEWS

prisingly, given the fact that he was writing from Africa, not Washington, and under deadline without very much genuinely relevant material in the field to refer to, this is the weakest chapter. Although it might have been stronger without it, the book would not have been as revealing of the author.

Jim Hoagland is fair, but he is by no means objective. If he were, the policy prescriptions he toys with would have been much farther to the right, closer to those of George Kennan. Hoagland cares, and cares passionately, about the future of the U.S. and that of southern Africa. "Perhaps in watching the South Africans shoulder their heavy burden of racial conflict we will all learn something," he wrote closing the book, "If not, that burden will surely crush first them, and then us."

That is apocalyptic stuff. Journalists like foreign policy elite are not supposed to "care." Caring leads to commitment on one side of a question or another and with it involvements, biased reporting, partisanship, and finally war. Yet Hoagland cares for both sides in southern Africa. That surely is an adequate standard for reporrtorial credibility. Ezekiel Mphahlele writes that Hoagland has probed intensely, "Almost as if, one gets only a slight hint about this, he were engaged in an odyssey into himself, seeking to understand himself and eventually his own fellow whites through the South African experience." Mphahlele is only partly right. Any American writing about southern Africa, well or poorly, right or left, is only kidding himself if he is not conducting "an odyssey into himself" in so doing. That is part of the ever closer, ever greater mutual fascination that South Africa and the United States have for one another. Hoagland seeks to understand not simply "his own fellow whites," but in a much more existentialist fashion "his" society, meaning black, white and all the other nuances of America.

Throughout his chapter on U.S. policy, Hoagland uses the reporrtorial device to keep at arm's length, and thus avoid defending too deeply, any of the policy options he suggests. He uses the word "Africanist"—as in "liberal Africanist"—at least five times, all in somewhat pejorative fashion. He was wise to do so, but he might have explained that the term has come to have distinctly negative connotations in the U.S. partly because of Vietnam backlash and partly because of the perceived chronic widespread turmoil in Africa.

An Africanist, by definition a non-African, is either a conservative who argues in self-interest which popularly means economic and political domination of Africa or a liberal Africanist who argues in the African national interest. Although it might have been stronger and under deadline without very much writing from Africa, not Washington, the book would not have been much farther to the right, closer to those of George Kennan. Hoagland cares, and cares passionately, about the future of the U.S. and that of southern Africa. "Perhaps in watching the South Africans shoulder their heavy burden of racial conflict we will all learn something," he wrote closing the book, "If not, that burden will surely crush first them, and then us."

That is apocalyptic stuff. Journalists like foreign policy elite are not supposed to "care." Caring leads to commitment on one side of a question or another and with it involvements, biased reporting, partisanship, and finally war. Yet Hoagland cares for both sides in southern Africa. That surely is an adequate standard for reporrtorial credibility. Ezekiel Mphahlele writes that Hoagland has probed intensely, "Almost as if, one gets only a slight hint about this, he were engaged in an odyssey into himself, seeking to understand himself and eventually his own fellow whites through the South African experience." Mphahlele is only partly right. Any American writing about southern Africa, well or poorly, right or left, is only kidding himself if he is not conducting "an odyssey into himself" in so doing. That is part of the ever closer, ever greater mutual fascination that South Africa and the United States have for one another. Hoagland seeks to understand not simply "his own fellow whites," but in a much more existentialist fashion "his" society, meaning black, white and all the other nuances of America.

Throughout his chapter on U.S. policy, Hoagland uses the reporrtorial device to keep at arm's length, and thus avoid defending too deeply, any of the policy options he suggests. He uses the word "Africanist"—as in "liberal Africanist"—at least five times, all in somewhat pejorative fashion. He was wise to do so, but he might have explained that the term has come to have distinctly negative connotations in the U.S. partly because of Vietnam backlash and partly because of the perceived chronic widespread turmoil in Africa.

An Africanist, by definition a non-African, is either a conservative who argues in self-interest which popularly means economic and political domination of Africa or a liberal Africanist who argues in the African national interest. Although it might have been stronger and under deadline without very much writing from Africa, not Washington, the book would not have been much farther to the right, closer to those of George Kennan. Hoagland cares, and cares passionately, about the future of the U.S. and that of southern Africa. "Perhaps in watching the South Africans shoulder their heavy burden of racial conflict we will all learn something," he wrote closing the book, "If not, that burden will surely crush first them, and then us."

That is apocalyptic stuff. Journalists like foreign policy elite are not supposed to "care." Caring leads to commitment on one side of a question or another and with it involvements, biased reporting, partisanship, and finally war. Yet Hoagland cares for both sides in southern Africa. That surely is an adequate standard for reporrtorial credibility. Ezekiel Mphahlele writes that Hoagland has probed intensely, "Almost as if, one gets only a slight hint about this, he were engaged in an odyssey into himself, seeking to understand himself and eventually his own fellow whites through the South African experience." Mphahlele is only partly right. Any American writing about southern Africa, well or poorly, right or left, is only kidding himself if he is not conducting "an odyssey into himself" in so doing. That is part of the ever closer, ever greater mutual fascination that South Africa and the United States have for one another. Hoagland seeks to understand not simply "his own fellow whites," but in a much more existentialist fashion "his" society, meaning black, white and all the other nuances of America.
more and that a coherent American policy might begin by saying so. Hoagland then toys with the concept of direct U.S. aid to the Bantustans.

Hoagland laid himself open to misunderstanding from all sides by setting up entirely artificial options in the attempt to keep himself at arm's length from his own policy recommendations. This is not the place to discuss the subject in detail, but a consistent, sensitive, and even-handed U.S. policy can be forged taking into consideration all of what Hoagland considers irreconcilable factors. However, the most serious flaw in his venture into policy questions is the insufficient attention to placing southern Africa into a world context—relating it to the major powers and to the Middle East. Hoagland wants maximum cooperation with the Soviets and Chinese in handling the situation, and he makes the very valid point that only the big powers can guarantee any partial or total settlement in the region, but the failure to discuss this fully serves to undercut his contention he is a generalist rather than regionalist.

Hoagland, however, in his concluding paragraph comes up with what should be the opening paragraph of any worthwhile prescriptive book done on U.S. policy toward South Africa. Syer cites it: one feels it impossible to do otherwise: "For all of its mighty flaws, however, South Africa retains mighty potential for proving prophets of doom wrong. It is a magnificent land that is worth the struggle to master it. There is a vibrancy of life, and therefore a demand for hope, for a coming to terms with the absurdity of existence. The result is a strange, attractive mixture of exuberance and melancholy in the people who live in this Elysian setting where beauty and betrayal set off each other in dazzling contrast. South Africa is Eden after the fall but before the expulsion..."

Jim Hoagland neither sought nor found cheap and easy profundities about South Africa. Surely in an era in which South Africa seems to be inexorably becoming more important to the United States regardless of which party is in power in Washington the question of free access to South Africa for American citizens becomes vital if U.S. policy is ever to be effective.
toward the region is to be sound and even-handed. South Africa exercises controls on the free flow of ideas within its boundaries; that is its own affair. Yet when it seeks as it regularly does to manage the flow of ideas about South Africa into the U.S. in order to influence U.S. foreign policy, isn’t that a form of interference in U.S. domestic affairs? Isn’t such a capricious visa policy an open invitation to the U.S. someday to retaliate by going down the quarantine path, the road to escalating hostility? More appropriate to the moment, how does a country with such a visa policy expect the U.S. to be its ally? Jim Hoagland is persona non grata in South Africa today although he neither preaches violent overthrow of the government nor is he otherwise a threat to state security. He does not even “hate” South Africa in the vindictive, self-righteous sense. Jim Hoagland is not welcome in South Africa in part because he understands it too well, but principally because he refuses to censor himself in what he writes about that country for American readers. That last single fact says all that needs to be said about the validity of South Africa’s claim that it is vital to the future of the so-called West, vital to the future of freedom and democracy and free speech.

—Bruce Oudes

There is no running way from the fact that to date the “African revolution” in southern Africa has been more successful in providing the hollow sound of drums than the ominous sound of guns. The white minorities in the southern redoubt—Rhodesia, Mozambique, South Africa—seem more secure, more confident and more defiant in their racism than ever before.

The bright hopes of the early 1960s, nourished on Harold Macmillan’s “winds of change” speech in Cape Town in 1960, were shattered and brought to an anticlimactic and as the late 1960s revealed the disarray not only in the ranks of the liberation movement but in Africa as a whole. The 1970s have only underscored the fact that blacks cannot escape the consequences of their own powerlessness by mere rhetoric and that in the final analysis, their salvation lies in themselves.

Many reasons have been advanced for the failures and continued ineffectiveness of the liberation movement. The formidable problems, both physical and psychological, facing the resistance leadership are constantly being pointed out and debated. Hoagland’s book contains several anecdotes which throw light on the inner workings of the white establishment. Basic white attitudes are brought out unintentionally in a revealing light. Thus, the eminently liberal Professor Julius Lewin falls—unconsciously perhaps—in to a common South African practice: “It is illegal for whites to teach Africans without a permit, as Lewin discovered when he was visited by police after volunteering to teach some black youths to read in a makeshift school in his garage.”

The garage has replaced the kitchen as the place where white South Africa “meets” black South Africa. Church services are held for black servants in the garage on Sunday afternoons. One Afrikaner domine, a staunch supporter of apartheid, used his garage as a place to meet his black mistress on Sunday afternoons. He was caught with her in flagrante delicto. To eradicate this “unspeakable sin,” the enraged members of his congregation burned the garage and the paraphernalia to a cinder.

Hoagland manages to capture the essential puritanical Calvinism and preoccupation with sex of the Afrikaners, as well as their slightly weird choice of phraseology. Dr. Verwoerd coined the phrase “black spots” to describe servants’ quarters in the white areas. Hoagland quotes J. J. Kruger, the South African chief censor: “This sex wave that is engulfing the rest of Western civilization is not for us. We are religious and conservative people. The people don’t want the sweet moan of pornography.” As part of a continuing effort to dehumanize him, a black is designated as a “labor unit,” and his family in the urban areas is regarded as “superfluous.” Hoagland’s description of the Afrikaner is cruel but accurate: “The Afrikaner is not white, as he proclaims, or even pink as most Americans are. He is gray.”

Some of Hoagland’s statements are confusing and appear contradictory. He writes: “The Dutch settlers who arrived in the middle of the seventeenth century were the first permanent settlers in Africa. They began to arrive when African settlement of the region was still in a state of flux and indigenous patterns of
social organization were just coming into being." Yet on the following page he states: "In a predominantly rural country, where African tribes occupied clearly defined territory and managed their own tribal affairs..." Earlier also, he had seemed to accept the evidence of earlier African settlement in southern Africa. He writes: "A recent authoritative work, the Oxford History of South Africa, Volume I, edited by Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson, presents a convincing case that Bantu-speaking tribesmen were probably in the region at least as early as the eleventh century.

Without ever defining his terms and explaining when, in his definition, a tribe becomes a nation, he leaves the reader to puzzle out statements like: "Urban Africans were becoming a New Tribe with the potential to evolve into a New Nation that would outnumber the whites." His use of the word "tribe" tends to be arbitrary. After ploughing through terms like "Afrikaner tribe," "African tribes," "Bantu tribes," "Zulu tribe," "colored nation" and monstrosities like "Bantu-speaking tribesmen," one is thankful when he finally abandons his foray into anthropology and returns to his very readable style of writing.

Hoagland advances the proposal that one way of solving the South African problem would be by the creation of "four or five governmental bodies formed on the basis of ethnic identification." The reader is not told how South Africa will be persuaded to accept this plan, nor by whom, let alone how, South Africa will be gotten to the bargaining table on the basis of equality. We are told, however, that the bargaining power that the black South African federation units "can have is their labor, which they must be able to withhold and yet survive."

Similar proposals have been peddled by South African liberals since apartheid was introduced in 1948. These arguments ignore the fact that white South Africa has no intention of giving up any of the power and privilege it enjoys now. It sees no reason to give up any more than 13 percent of South Africa's land area to the blacks. It does not feel threatened; consequently the temptation is to go on trampling on the blacks. Change will come the day the blacks reach the breaking point and refuse to take the muck white South Africa has been pouring down their throats any longer—when failure to resist would be a surrender of their humanity. The message then will be: "So far, but no further; if oppression goes past that limit, I could no longer believe myself a man."

External deliverance appears a pipe-dream, given the alignment of forces in the world today. The likelihood of the U.S. and the Soviet Union acting in concert to guarantee a settlement in South Africa is so remote that it can be dismissed outright. As John Marcum puts it: "... Western powers have built and nourished a relationship with Southern Africa that is fundamentally anti-revolutionary." That relationship is still growing today with western powers pouring investments into South Africa, supplying arms and the technical know-how and generally ensuring that white rule remains entrenched in the subcontinent. Meantime "Third World" revolutionaries are viewed with "apprehension by most Western powers, especially the United States."

Hoagland is very pessimistic about the possibility of a revolution in South Africa: "All available evidence indicates that the threat of revolution is not a realistic prospect, for lack of method, not for lack of cause." Apparently white domination will still be the basic feature of South Africa for the next 50 years. We reject this gloomy assessment. It is always a risky thing, this prediction business. The Third Reich was going to last for a thousand years. When Lord Hasley wrote his revised African Survey in 1956, it was predicated on an indefinite imperial domination in Africa. In two short years, it was already obsolete.

Granted, on past performance the black revolution has not been very impressive, and odds are still very heavy against us. But there are new breakthroughs and the revolution is acquiring a new sophistication and know-how every day. Black South Africa and white South Africa are set on a collision course, and when we will reach the point of collision is anybody's guess. My opinion is that white South Africa is living on borrowed time—time loaned to it by the blacks. Nana Mahoma, producer of Phela Ndeba ("End of the Dialogue") and South African activist.

Towards Social Change, ed. by Peter Randell (Christian Institute of South Africa, Johannesburg, 1971, n.p.).

In mid-1969 six commissions—Study Projects on Christianity in Apartheid Society (SPRO-CAS)—were established under the sponsorship of the Southern Council of Churches and the Christian Institute of Southern Africa. The sixth SPRO-CAS Report—Towards Social Change—is devoted to the urgency of the need for "radical reform and change" in South Africa. Its major basic assumption is that "the requirements of justice are that African, Indian, and Coloured people in South Africa (should) have influence and power which is effective in regard to all matters of policy affecting their interests."

Of course, the assumption, stated in this manner, begs the question, "what type of influence and what kind of power?" In attempting to provide an answer, the authors of the report ("a very broad group drawn from as wide a range of societal activity as possible") analyze apartheid society, expose its inconsistencies, and suggest strategies for change. The first chapter presents the commission's major presuppositions and offers the context within which strategies for change are advanced. The next five are written by individual members of the commission and deal with many of the specific themes in Chapter I: myths and justifications of apartheid ideology, organizations and institutions available for change, practical proposals for reducing inter-group tension, and broader perspectives on strategies for change within apartheid society.

The most egregious features of injustice and discrimination in South Africa are summed up in succinct but compelling terms. Having stated its position, the commission wastes little time or space in repeating manifestations of
discrimination in South Africa which have been documented time and again. Though readers may disagree with many of its specific recommendations, the report appears to focus on the major issue—how to devise, promote, and accelerate social change in South Africa. And, as noted in the introduction, it is not definitive but "a contribution at a point in time to an on-going process of change. It is itself part of that process."

There are, however, two major problems. First, the report's authors blur distinctions between caste and class. They argue that injustice in South Africa cannot be understood merely in terms of prejudice and racism, and regard the South African situation as one of "class-stratification where the lines of economic conflict are overlaid by racial divisions."

Acknowledging that race and ethnic differences are more important than class distinctions in the motivations and perceptions of the South African people, the commission maintains that racism, properly viewed, is a "powerful factor which tends to reinforce class distinctions in South Africa."

Yet there appears to be a lingering measure of uncertainty in the commission's position. Despite the thesis that racism is subordinate to class in their analysis of South Africa, mention is made of the fact that class cleavages in South Africa have a "caste-like character." Discrimination, inequality, and status are "utterly pervasive," and "... ethnic group membership is reified as the only important basis for group formation...."

Hardly a matter of mere semantics, the notion of racial caste extends to the heart of apartheid society. Both caste and class refer to patterns of social stratification, that is to divisions of social distinction which rank group membership and accord privilege and deprivation. Whereas a class system is relatively open and allows mobility between strata, a caste system is closed and groups are corporate to the extent that mobility tends to be impermissible. In a racial caste system, these social distinctions are assigned according to perceived physical differences in skin pigmentation.

Clearly social classes do exist in South Africa; however, class distinctions operate politically within the context of racial caste. Some black South Africans may conceivably be wealthier and even better educated than some white South Africans, but all black Africans are assigned lower social status by those in power. They enjoy no effective political power or representation, suffer flagrant statutory discrimination, and are subject to stark degradation. Irrespective of the achievements of the black South African as an individual, he or she cannot enjoy the rights and privileges of the upper stratum. Racial caste is the pervasive factor.

If apartheid is the "operative ideology" as the commission argues, it would be contradictory to subordinate racism to class, especially since many specific measures of apartheid are economically irrational. In view of South Africa's acute manpower needs, is racism merely a factor "reinforcing" legislation for job reservation? In terms of the pressing manpower requirements in urban areas, is racism merely a factor "reinforcing" governmental decrees that Africans will be returned to their "homelands"?

The report's second major problem is that there is too little analysis of external relationships. To what extent do foreign investment policies and dealings with multi-national corporations influence the perceptions of South Africans? To what degree does (and will) social change within Portugal or Rhodesia have a domestic impact on the third partner to the Lisbon-Salisbury-Pretoria axis? Even if liberation forces are militarily little more than an irritant on the periphery of white-dominant southern Africa, are they likely to have a psychological impact of whites and blacks in South Africa? Similarly, even if one acknowledges that international organizations are impotent in bringing radical change to apartheid society, does frequent condemnation by international organs have any effect whatsoever within South Africa, whether of soul-searching or reinforcement?

The SPRO-CAS commission has made a valuable contribution to the literature on social change in South Africa, and its recommendations deserve serious consideration. But though many would agree with the basis for its recommendations—"pressures from blacks themselves offer the only hope for incisive change in the foreseeable future," the gradualism implicit in many of the prescriptions is unlikely to satisfy advocates of radical change.

Clearly the commission does not try to absolve the South African government or people of responsibility for the ills of their society; however, the authors' attempt to account for the cause of injustice and discrimination as "human alienation... as found everywhere, in West and East, in the first, second and third worlds" does not tell the whole story. While it is true that "South Africa's problems are not unique," the basic fact remains: It is only in southern Africa that one finds racism consecrated as the official ideology. Human alienation is one thing; racial oligarchy providing for statutory, legalized discrimination as a way of life is another.

James H. Mittleman, Assistant Professor, Columbia University, New York.

Other books received

Subtitled: "Psychological Problems of Modernization in Ethiopia."


An examination of linguistic, social, political and technological aspects of nation-building in a culturally diverse society.
 LETTERS TO  THE EDITOR:

Awoonor's Nkrumah: too sympathetic?

Because of my job, which involves a considerable amount of travelling, your June 1972 issue has just reached me. Although Kofi Awoonor tries to paint a sympathetic picture of the late Kwame Nkrumah ("Kwame Nkrumah: symbol of emergent Africa") it is interesting to note that all the identifiable persons who appear in one of the pictures accompanying the article in which he is being sworn in as President suffered in his hands. An analysis of their dismissals and imprisonment will itself be a useful commentary on the late Osagyefo's method of government and point to some of the reasons that led to the 1966 Kotoka coup.

Those I refer to are, reading from the left, Sir Arku Korsah, Chief Justice; Mr. E. R. T. Majity, Commissioner of Police; Mr. E. C. Quaye, Chairman of Accra City Council and Major-General M. A. Otu, Chief of Staff.

E. Ofori Akomea, Geneva, Switzerland

Correction

A number of the photographs accompanying Professor Roy Sieber's article, "The 'Forgotten' Arts of Adornment," were wrongly credited. The correct credits are as follows. Pg. 29: Collection of Mr. and Mrs. Jo Dendel, photo by Frank J. Thomas, Los Angeles; pg. 30: Courtesy Lilly Rare Books Library, Indiana University; pg. 32: Collection of Mr. Jo T. Lest, photo by Frank J. Thomas, Los Angeles; pg. 33: Tweezers, collection of the University Museum, Philadelphia, photo by the owner; comb, collection of the American Museum of Natural History, New York, photo by the owner; gold bead, collection of Dr. and Mrs. Hilbert H. DeLawter, photo by the owner; copper anklet, collection of Dr. and Mrs. Roy Sieber, photo by Hedyie Coyne, Bloomington, Indiana.

Black music on record

(Continued from page 19)

to me, London based, consists largely of southern African musicians. This is Assagai, whose album Zimbabwe is on Philips 6308 079. This is highly international music of the type which U.S. and U.S. based African musicians tend to call simply "black music" and which Carman Moore dubbed "fusion music." The well-known Ghanaian Ramblers International group shows the same tendency on Decca WAPS 55, a more localized version of the complicated mix of showbiz trendiness and genuine experimentation typical of this sort of session. And the Parisian expatriate, Mann Dihango, has one of his most successful as well as most eclectic recordings in O Boso (Fiesta 360.039.)

Another form of eclecticism is found in African church music. Everybody, surely, knows the Missa Luba by now—it has always overshadowed better music of a similar type, not to mention the highly significant music of indigenous black churches of Africa. In case you have missed them, three highly interesting masses are: the Misa Donala from Cameroon, on Pathé-Marconi C 054-11144, and Missa Koonga and Missa N'kaandu, on Philips 6320 004.

Two major collections, very variable in quality but important if only for their width of coverage, are those on Folkways, and the much less well-known Cook label (101 Second Street, Stamford, Conn.). Cook has some particularly interesting traditional Trinidad drumming. Folkways has material from Haiti and Jamaica, as well as the only commercial recording, to my knowledge, of Cuban cult music (Folkways FE 4410).

The Nonesuch Explorer series, which maintains a good standard of stereo recording (allowing for the problems of field work), has two recordings with rare examples of black music. One is David Lewiston's In Praise of Oxala and Other Gods (Nonesuch H-72036), which contains fine examples of black Colombian music. The other was recorded by myself in Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, and is Caribbean Island Music (Nonesuch H-72047).

Lastly, a fine range of Spanish-Caribbean urban popular music is available on a number of U.S. labels that are regrettably unknown outside the Spanish-speaking community. Fania Records is perhaps the leader in the modern, U.S.-Latin music of bands like Ray Barretto, Johnny Pacheco and others. Though the smaller Alegre label has much fine music. A splendid historical perspective is supplied by the release on a number of tiny labels of songs by the Septeto Nacional de Ignacio Pinero, the Cuarteto Machin and the Septeto Habanero. This is delightful music, and most important historically as well. The labels to look for are Patty, Esquivel and Secco.
DON'T MISS
AFRICA IN '73!
JOIN THE EDUCATORS TO AFRICA ASSOCIATION (ETAA)
An African-American Institute Program

ETAA, the most reliable and most experienced organization in the Africa travel field, offers:

- Ten low-cost East and West Africa flights scheduled for 1973
- African travel materials and information, including a subscription to Africa Report magazine
- Teacher members receive Africa curricula materials
- Accredited study programs also available. 40 days in West Africa (Ghana, Togo Dahomey, Nigeria), $1,450; 40 days in East Africa (Ethiopia, Tanzania, Kenya, Zaire, Uganda), $1,750

EDUCATORS TO AFRICA ASSOCIATION
African-American Institute
866 United Nations Plaza
New York, New York 10017

Membership desired:
Educator $15 (& immed. family)
General $20
Student $10

Name
Address
State
School/College

Telephone
City
Zip

Make check payable to: African-American Institute