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AFRICA REPORT

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



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Africa Report (ISSN 0001-9836), a non-profit magazine of African affairs, is published bimonthly and is scheduled to appear at the beginning of each date period at 833 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017. Editorial correspondence and advertising inquiries should be addressed to *Africa Report*, at the above address. Subscription inquiries should be addressed to: Subscription Services, P.O. Box 3000, Dept. AR, Denville N.J. 07834. Subscription rates: Individuals: USA \$30, Canada \$36, air rate overseas \$54. Institutions: USA \$37, Canada \$43, air rate overseas \$61. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: If this magazine is undeliverable, please send address changes to *Africa Report* at 833 UN Plaza, NY, NY 10017. Telephone: (212) 949-5666. Copyright © 1992 by The African-American Institute, Inc.

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UPDATE

IN THE NEWS

Eyadéma's Sword Is Mightier than the Conference

"According to my analysis, we have not achieved one of the sovereign national conference's major objectives, which is reconciliation among Togolese," the interim prime minister of Togo, Joseph Kokou Koffigoh, told journalists on December 9. The prime minister's "analysis" was no doubt influenced by the fact that he had been seized in an attack on his official residence the previous week by troops loyal to President Gnassingbé Eyadéma, Togo's authoritarian leader for the past 24 years, who was stripped of all but ceremonial powers during the country's national conference three months earlier. Under less delicate conditions, the prime minister might have acknowledged that one of the greatest impediments to national reconciliation is Eyadéma, and one of the major flaws in Togo's democratization exercise has been the inability of the transitional government to gain control over all elements of the military.

The string of events which led to Koffigoh's capture began when the interim parliament, the High Council of the Republic (HCR), banned Eyadéma's Togolese People's Assembly (RPT) party on November 26. The move set off fighting the following day between Eyadéma supporters and those loyal to the interim government, leaving six dead and 50 wounded. On November 28, troops loyal to Eyadéma surrounded Koffigoh's residence with tanks. The forces had earlier seized the national radio station, announcing, "The armed forces of Togo demand one more time of the head of state that he name an effective man to form a new government. If not, the entire town [Lomé] will be reduced to ashes." The message was that Eyadéma should be reinstated as president, and the HCR should be dissolved.

After Koffigoh held consultations with Eyadéma, and Eyadéma in turn conferred with the soldiers, the troops withdrew from their positions around

the residence on November 30. Eyadéma denied any involvement in the military exercise, but declared that further negotiations would be carried out between himself and Koffigoh. The withdrawing troops claimed to be only "partially satisfied."

The army's decision to pull out was helped by the threat of French military intervention in the crisis, as had been requested by the prime minister. Three

television that evening, a shaken Koffigoh announced, "To avoid a bloodbath...I decided to surrender."

The international community acted quickly in condemning the coup. Shortly after the putsch, the U.S. State Department spokeswoman, Margaret Tutwiler, said, "We call for the prime minister's immediate release and demand that President Eyadéma take firm action to undo this morning's action and put Togo's democratic process back on track."

Similar condemnation was expressed by France, but French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas made it clear a few days later that force would not be used to defend the democratic process France had demanded its former colonies embark on in 1990. The minister's remarks came in the wake of protests against France's failure to act by Togolese in Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, and France.

The success of the brutal attack on the residence was in sharp contrast to Eyadéma's attempt at the end of August to thwart the July-August national conference and regain his grip on power. On August 26, after tolerating weeks of incriminating testimony against him, he sent troops to surround the conference hall and cut off all communication with the outside world. Undeterred, the conference delegates continued the proceedings inside hotel rooms and elected Koffigoh head of the transitional government. In the end, with the help of international pressure, Eyadéma was forced to reopen the conference. With his strongman tactics apparently rendered ineffective, it seemed his political life had reached an end. But control of the army was never effectively turned over to the HCR.

Despite some ceremonial control Koffigoh might exercise over the military—the army commander, Brig.-Gen. Bassibe Bonfoh, reportedly pledged his support for the prime minister—Eyadéma has always had more influence on

Ernest Hartsh



Eyadéma is a force to be reckoned with in Togo

hundred French troops had been dispatched to neighboring Benin from their bases in Chad and the Central African Republic. Although the French Foreign Ministry spokesman said that the troop movements were designed to "ensure the safety of the 3,000 French in Togo," he also implied that France wished to defend the "democratic process." The former colonial power had sent troops to quash a rebellion in 1986—then on Eyadéma's behalf.

Despite the threat of French intervention, soldiers again surrounded Koffigoh's residence on December 2. The next day, they launched a brutal assault on the palace which left at least 17 dead and led to Koffigoh's capture. The prime minister was brought to Eyadéma for discussions and a radio report announced that the two had agreed to form a "national unity government." On

the military than Koffigoh. Better than 70 percent of the 12,000 soldiers are from Eyadéma's Kabyé ethnic group, which is from the underdeveloped north of the country. Many of the Kabyé mistrust Lomé's more privileged residents, who, like Koffigoh, are predominantly Ewe. Eyadéma brought the Kabyé into the political fold in force, under the banner of national unity, when he created the RPT in 1969. Many observers feel that the national conference was largely seen by the Kabyé as having stripped them of their voice in government. Eyadéma's supporters in the army include all of the heavily armed elite units such as the Rapid Intervention Force, which sources say spearheaded the putsch.

A destabilization campaign, apparently aimed at restoring Eyadéma to power, began almost immediately after the national conference was concluded. While the extent of Eyadéma's involvement in the campaign may be disputed, it is clear that he has benefitted by the army's violent actions, which include two botched coup attempts in October. Ethnic clashes also took place, including particularly fierce fighting in the north at the end of October which left 31 dead. According to *Africa Confidential*, it was Eyadéma's plan to use the army to destabilize Togo, and in so doing, split the HCR elements into two groups: one composed of the radicals who called for violence in the streets and a moderate group, of which Koffigoh is a part, who called for reconciliation. Eyadéma molded his image as a great unifier, a role he has always used to legitimize his rule, by repeatedly calling for an end to the violence. The HCR president, Philippe Fanoko Kpodzro, and Eyadéma issued joint appeals for peace on November 10.

The radical wing of the HCR was unconvinced by Eyadéma's reconciliation overtures, and continued to call for stern action against the old regime throughout November. When it was learned that the RPT intended to hold a party congress, the radicals in the HCR won out and the former ruling party was banned on November 26. Koffigoh was in France when the decision was made, but returned the next day to be greeted by the attack on his residence.

After being taken to Eyadéma, Koffigoh was given little choice but to agree to form the new transitional "national unity government." He

retained his post as prime minister and told journalists on December 4 that he was free to go where he pleased, despite being loosely guarded by the military. Both he and Eyadéma asked that the soldiers return to barracks and an uneasy calm was restored to Lomé in the days that followed the putsch. While denying complicity in the army action, Eyadéma insisted that he was in full control of the military and said he supported its demands that the HCR dissolve.

The HCR has kept a low profile since the coup, with many of its members having fled the country or gone into hiding. While several Eyadéma opponents have asserted that they would refuse to recognize any new government, a group of 18 parties reportedly backed the proposal to form a new cabinet. The recognition appears to be aimed at salvaging some of the gains of the national conference in July and August, including the legalized multi-party system.

While the actions of early December have thrown into disarray the plans for democratic elections, there has been speculation that Eyadéma seeks a future presidential bid. By maintaining a carefully controlled democratization process, the argument runs, Eyadéma will be able to regain legitimacy and international approval. The French inaction suggests that they may be

willing to accommodate such a scenario. Virtually every other Western government has condemned the coup, but have all ruled out military intervention in Togo.

Hopes for an "African solution" to Togo's crisis were given a lift when diplomatic sources relayed that an envoy of Benin's President Nicéphore Soglo would visit Togo to try to set up an African mediating group similar to the one which helped to forge a peace agreement in Liberia. Several West African states reportedly support such an initiative.

Eyadéma has been willing to continue negotiating a return to multi-party rule, albeit on terms more favorable to his RPT than the HCR would like. It remains to be seen whether the president's opponents are willing to coexist with pro-Eyadéma elements in a future government. For the time being, Koffigoh has little choice. Eyadéma's bargaining chip—apparent control of the army—is a strong one. The president was able to retain the army's allegiance even after acceding to virtually every opposition demand during the national conference which publicly humiliated him. In time, Togolese will decide whether it is again necessary to go into the streets and try to force the fall of Eyadéma, or if it is better to accept a future government which permits him a role. ■

Election Boycott in Burkina Faso

President Blaise Compaoré, who took power in a bloody coup d'état in October 1987, had hoped to legitimize his rule by holding Burkina Faso's first democratic elections in 13 years on December 1 and January 12. He was determined to do this without meeting the long-standing demand of the country's opposition that he hold a sovereign national conference prior to the elections. When Compaoré refused to meet a November 1 deadline to concede to the demand, the opposition staged a civil disobedience campaign which included a successful boycott of the December presidential election. Far from legitimizing Compaoré's regime, the unsuccessful election, and subsequent violent attacks against opposition leaders, have cast serious doubts on the government's credibility.

Compaoré, the sole candidate in the

election, won by receiving 86 percent of the votes cast. But the real victor was the opposition alliance, the Coordination of Democratic Forces (CFD), which succeeded in forcing a low turnout at the polls: Less than 25 percent of Burkina Faso's 3.5 million eligible voters participated in the election. While observers reported few incidents during the voting and the election results were declared satisfactory by a French monitoring team, opposition supporters destroyed 42 of the 79 polling stations in Bobo-Dioulasso and disturbances occurred in Ouahigouya. The Burkinabé Movement for Human Rights (MBDHP) condemned the action by the protesters and also accused the army of intimidation, including kidnappings and floggings. One hundred and thirty-two people were reportedly

Continued on page 9

ALGERIA

On December 26, Algeria held the initial round of its first-ever free parliamentary elections, following three decades of one-party rule by the National Liberation Front (FLN). With less than a month remaining in the run-up to the voting, it was not certain that the party most likely to gain the most votes, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), would even stand in the election. The FIS, which is a Muslim fundamentalist party, had boycotted the last attempt at multi-party elections in June to protest gerrymandering of constituency boundaries, leading to riots which forced the government to abort the elections. Several leaders of the Islamic Front have declared their dis-taste for Western-style democracy.

Nonetheless, the FIS agreed to stand in the elections. Observers believe members opposed to taking part in the voting became convinced that participation would lead the government to release top FIS leaders who were imprisoned for their role in the June riots. Forty-nine parties and 5,712 candidates took part in the first round of voting on December 26, but after the votes were counted, the FIS—known for its power in the streets—had proven its dominance at the polls.

The Islamic Front won 189 seats in the 430-member parliament, ahead of the secularist Front for Socialist Forces which claimed 20 seats, and the governing National Front which took only 16 seats. Seats for which no candidate won a majority were to be contested in the runoff elections on January 15. With up to 225 places up for grabs, a parliamentary majority for the FIS—which needed only 27 more seats—seemed a certainty.

Observers had projected—and the government had hoped—that the FIS would gain only a third of the parliamentary seats. This could have enabled the government to form a coalition with parties that were opposed to the FIS and its claim that it wants to turn Algeria into an Islamic state. *The New York Times* quoted a senior government official as saying, "Unbelievable, but true," after he had learned of the FIS victory. "It is a catastrophe. May God preserve the country."

One result of the elections will probably be the release of the FIS's top two leaders, Abassi Madani and Ali Bel-

POLITICAL POINTERS

hadj, who were imprisoned when the government was forced to cancel the June elections.

The FIS interim leader, Abdelkader Hashani, who is known as a moderate, announced that the Islamic Front would now focus on pushing for new presidential elections. President Chadli Benjedid, whose term ends in 1994, had hinted before the voting that he might allow an early election date.

The FIS has gained its support as the champion of the poor and claims that an "Islamic solution" is the answer to Algeria's economic woes, which include a 20 percent unemployment rate.

The Algerian vote has been closely watched for its implications for democratization in North Africa, where several governments have suppressed fundamentalists.

DJIBOUTI

At least 25 people were killed and scores were wounded in a shoot-out involving security forces in Arhiba, a slum district of Djibouti's capital, on December 17. The fighting, which broke out when police were checking security papers, is the latest incident in an escalating conflict between Afars and government forces, which threatens to plunge Djibouti into the turmoil of civil war that its neighbors in the Horn, Ethiopia and Somalia, have experienced.

The Afars, who make up roughly 40 percent of Djibouti's population of 500,000, are demanding that the government of President Hassan Gouled Aptidon, which is dominated by the Issa ethnic group, allow multi-party elections. Afars have been waging a guerrilla campaign in the north of the country which turned to open military confrontation in November and have formed the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy to push for their demands. Following the December clashes, Gouled announced that he would allow multi-partyism, but only after holding a referendum to decide the issue, according to a Radio France International report. Such a referendum could be as long as six months away.

Gouled claims that the Afar rebellion in the north was launched from Ethiopia, where Afars of Eritrea are demanding an autonomous state. The president uses the claim as a basis for intervention by France, which protects Djibouti from external threats in exchange for maintaining its largest overseas base in the country. In November, France, which granted Djibouti independence in 1977 and has backed Gouled ever since, offered to mediate in the conflict, but rejected Djibouti government requests for military action against the Afar rebels. French troops did disarm and deport 40,000 Ethiopian troops who had spilled into Djibouti after the fall of Mengistu Haile Mariam in May, but France remains reluctant to become involved in a conflict which it views as internal. The French, who grant Djibouti \$62 million a year in aid, have continued prodding Gouled toward democratization.

LIBERIA

Implementation of the Liberian peace accord, which stipulates that free and fair elections be carried out within six months of November 1, 1991, continued to be hampered in December by rebel leader Charles Taylor's resistance to cede territory to the West African peace-keeping force, Ecomog. Under the terms of the accord, signed at an October 29-30 meeting in Yamoussoukro, all Liberian fighters are to be disarmed and all of Liberia's 13 political sub-divisions are to be secured by Ecomog within a 60-day period which began November 15.

The 8,000-member peace-keeping force has reportedly not moved very far outside of Monrovia, where it is based. In response to Taylor's refusal to allow Ecomog to occupy the Liberian countryside, Liberia's interim president, Amos Sawyer, accused the rebel leader of "holding back the peace process" to prolong the conflict "for gainful ends." Taylor denied the charge and announced that "several vital issues" still had to be discussed before the voting. The rebel leader has continued to insist that border posts be patrolled jointly by Ecomog and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) forces, although this demand was soundly rejected at the October meeting.

Sawyer said that he is confident that Liberia will succeed in carrying out elections as planned.

AFRICAN OUTLOOK

Egypt's Boutros Boutros Ghali Heads United Nations

On January 1, Egypt's Boutros Boutros Ghali became the first African United Nations secretary-general in the organization's 45-year history. Ghali has inherited the UN's top post at a time when the job is probably the most powerful and challenging it has ever been, due to the unprecedented level of



UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali

international prestige and responsibility given to the organization by the end of the Cold War.

The selection of Ghali, who was Egypt's deputy prime minister for foreign affairs, to succeed Javier Perez de Cuellar as secretary-general was a victory for the Organization of African Unity (OAU). It began the push to have an African fill the post at its June conference in Abuja, Nigeria, where Perez de Cuellar also said it was time that an African get the job. The OAU submitted a list of six African candidates to the 15-member UN Security Council, which presents a single choice to the 166-seat General Assembly for a vote. The OAU candidates were Ghali; Zimbabwe's finance minister, Bernard Chidzero; Olusegun Obasanjo, former Nigerian head of state; Ghana's Kenneth Dadzie, head of the UN Conference on Trade and Development; Sierra Leone's James Jonah, assistant secretary-general at the UN; and Gabon's Minister of State for Culture Francois Owono-Nguema.

Despite Africa's position that it deserved to hold the post after 45 years, and support from the 101-nation non-

aligned movement, the six OAU candidates were joined by eight others, including five Western entrants, when the Security Council began a series of straw polls it uses to narrow down the field and arrive at a consensus candidate to recommend to the General Assembly.

Among the Western candidates was Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, who is the former UN high commissioner for refugees, current director of UN relief activities in the Gulf, and a personal friend of U.S. President George Bush; two prime ministers; and the first

woman candidate ever to be seriously considered for the post. Two Africans not on the OAU list were also included in the initial straw poll. The 14 candidates were touted as the strongest ever to be presented to the Security Council for the job.

Africa's candidates fared well in the straw polls, with Ghali and Chidzero running neck and neck in the lead throughout November. Ghali had the support of China and France among the five permanent members of the Security Council who can veto a candidate,

Continued on page 11

AIDS Conference Held in Senegal

"Africa, unfortunately, is really going to begin to face the enormous burden of this epidemic in this decade," Michael H. Merson, director of the World Health Organization's (WHO) Global Program on AIDS, said at the Sixth International Conference on AIDS in Africa, held in Dakar, Senegal, in December. The statistics offered at the conference which back up the claim are frightening: More than 6 million Africans will die because of AIDS in the next decade, eclipsing all other diseases as the primary killer on the continent. Four million Africans will be born HIV-positive in the next 10 years, and the World Bank projects that as a result of the disease, life expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa will drop to age 47 from 50 by the year 2010, rather than rise to 60.

While the scourge of AIDS is felt throughout the world, and especially in the Third World, it has hit Africa the hardest. The continent carries 60 percent of the world's AIDS burden, while accounting for only 8.7 percent of the global population. An estimated 80 percent of the HIV transmissions in Africa are the result of heterosexual intercourse, leading conference experts to call for programs to be targeted at the general population on a wide scale. To date, due to limited resources, initiatives taken by African governments to stop the spread of AIDS have been carried out on too small a scale, or aimed at particularly high risk groups, such as prostitutes.

"The most realistic approach for Africa at present is in preventing further spread of the disease," said Peter Lamptey, who is a Ghanaian doctor and director of AIDS Technical Support Project, which is funded by U.S. AID. "With no vaccine or cure in sight, we must focus on how to change human sexual behavior so people can protect themselves from getting the disease now."

Sentiment among the conference participants was that Africans today are much more likely to understand the disease than in past years when several governments concealed the facts on AIDS, but they are not necessarily willing to change their behavior as a result. In recognition of this problem, the conference emphasized the need for prevention research to determine which programs will actually lead people to change their practices. Past prevention research has included a study in Zimbabwe to determine youths' receptivity to condoms.

In a testament to the urgency of the AIDS epidemic, WHO has declared that it will bypass its standard animal trials and begin testing humans in Rwanda, Uganda, Brazil, and Thailand to see if a vaccine can prevent infection. Hopes for a vaccine are years away. In the meantime, behavior change is the only weapon Africa has against the spread of AIDS. ■

Burkina *Continued*

arrested as a result of the violence in Bobo-Dioulasso.

Nonetheless, Compaoré's campaign headquarters said that it viewed the victory as a credible one, noting that similar participation rates had been sufficient to bring several Western leaders to power. But arguments over the interpretation of the election returns were overshadowed by violent attacks on opposition figures on December 9. The most serious was the assassination of the head of the Burkina Labor Party (PTB), Clement Oumarou Ouédraogo, who had played a prominent role in the boycott. Ouédraogo died instantly and his wife was seriously injured when an unidentified assailant threw a hand grenade into his car at a traffic light. The opposition leader had been one of Compaoré's deputies before he formed the PTB when alternate parties became legal in April 1991.

An hour before the attack on Ouédraogo, the secretary-general of the Democratic Revolutionary Group, Tall Moctar, who also played an important role in the boycott, was seriously wounded when attackers sprayed him with machine-gun fire in a forested section of Ouagadougou.

The next day, angry mourners threw stones at Burkina Faso's defense minister, Lassana Ouangrawa, who had come to pay respects at Ouédraogo's funeral. The crowds were dispersed when defense forces fired shots into the air. The presence of Ouangrawa at the funeral was indicative of government attempts to distance itself from the killings. Compaoré's party, the governing Organization for Popular Democracy/Labor Movement (ODP/MT), declared that the attacks were "aimed at staining the image of our young democracy." On December 11, the government postponed the January 12 elections indefinitely, stating that it had done so to conform with its message of reconciliation.

At a December 12 news conference, the CFD charged that the government was aware of plans to carry out the attacks. The group also suggested that the attacks were intended to silence individuals who would challenge the government by speaking out at a national conference.

On December 14, the president issued a communiqué announcing that

"in the next couple of days, a national reconciliation forum will be held on the subject of democracy, human rights, and development," which "must lead to the adoption of resolutions that will bring solace to our nascent democracy." The communiqué added, "The president of Burkina Faso counts on the various social and political partners to attend."

Compaoré's call for a national reconciliation forum and the cancellation of the January legislative elections highlighted the government's desire to cool its highly confrontational relationship with the CFD, ever since it decided to carry out the elections in the face of an opposition boycott.

At the heart of the confrontation is the CFD's unyielding demand for the creation of a national conference or a similar sovereign structure, which has been a major issue from the time a referendum-approved new constitution set Burkina Faso on the road to multi-party elections in June 1991. Compaoré has repeatedly charged that the demand is unconstitutional, but his critics assert that the constitution's chief architect was the government and that the opposition only supported the constitution because of its broad implications for multi-partyism.


Between June and October, Compaoré made several efforts to pacify the opposition. These included inviting opposition leaders to join a transitional government and the holding of a consultative conference in June, which was boycotted by the opposition on the grounds that it had no sovereign status. The climate between the two adversaries grew worse through October, with opposition demonstrations taking place on a regular basis.

After the failure of an October tripartite commission, set up to bridge the gap between supporters and opponents of the national conference, the opposition set the November 1 deadline for the government to accede to its demands. Radio France International reported on October 27 that the CFD threatened to withdraw its offer of dialogue and reserved "the right to take any energetic action which would unblock the situation." The energetic action included demonstrations and the call for a boycott of the elections. The CFD had already decided not to enter

candidates for the presidential election. Among the six candidates who withdrew their electoral bids were Hermann Yaméogo of the Alliance for Democracy and Federation and Pierre Claver Damiba of the Convention of Progressive Patriots/Social Democratic Party.

After having already pushed the election dates back a month, Compaoré decided to defy the opposition's ultimatum and hold the elections. He campaigned as the sole candidate throughout November, while the opposition stepped up its pressure for a national conference. Demonstrations in November led to clashes.

By proceeding with the elections without first meeting the demand for a national conference, the government had in essence challenged the CFD. In the end, the opposition was emboldened by its successful election boycott and



The sole candidate, President Blaise Compaoré

Russell Geelke

public anger over the killings. The transition to multi-party rule that at one time seemed to be carefully staged by the president appears to have slipped from his control. However, this may be temporary. Compaoré may have already regained the initiative over the opposition by quickly calling for the national reconciliation forum to show that his regime is concerned with a peaceful transition to multi-party rule.

Compaoré will remain reluctant to give in to demands for a national conference—the likes of which have stripped power away from leaders in three of the six countries which border Burkina Faso. Time will tell whether the government and the opposition will negotiate an agreement on how to carry out the democratization process. ■

INTERVIEW: MOUSTAPHA THIOMBIANO, AFRICAN RADIO PIONEER

Russell Geekie

On December 31, 1990, Africa's first independent radio station, Horizon FM, went on the air in Ouagadougou. The transmission was the result of an eight-year struggle with the government of Burkina Faso by Horizon's founder, musician Moustapha Thiombiano. While the station maintains an African flavor and utilizes six local languages as well as French, a distinctly American influence and the use of English have also contributed to the popularity of Horizon. Having achieved his dream of setting up a private radio station in Africa, Thiombiano now talks of a station that will broadcast to the entire continent—a powerful concept when one considers that most Africans rely on radio for their information.

Africa Report: When did your struggle to set up Horizon FM begin?

Thiombiano: When I got back from the United States in 1983, I began to set up a radio station—and I fought with the government. In 1984, I applied for a license, and I went on the air in 1987. It was so powerful that they shut me off in four days. They were so scared about how popular Horizon FM became, so they told me I should wait a while. And it took five years of waiting! Now they have set up something in Burkina Faso called the "code of information" which allows private citizens to own a radio station. I've been on the air continuously since December 31, 1990.

Africa Report: What were your reasons for establishing a private radio station?

Thiombiano: I wanted a private radio station because I found that in Africa, government radio is used only for political reasons. Human beings are left behind. For instance, there is no communication to really help farmers, or musicians, or to help families take care of their babies. I set up this radio station to help the masses of Burkina Faso.

The government has no control whatsoever over my radio station. I give the news as I see fit. I play the kind of music that I want. I am free. I accept the many political parties that we have here. I receive several communiqués from the political parties which I read on the air.

Africa Report: Could you comment on the format of Horizon FM?

Thiombiano: The format is everything—we do everything. We do more than the national radio station. For instance, we have a program where kids can call in and sing a song for their mom and dad. My radio station is open to everybody. We do sports, world information, cultural programs, health programs, all kinds of programs that teach families to open up their minds. That's why it is called Horizon.

Africa Report: Horizon broadcasts in French and six Burkinafabe languages, and African music is an integral part of your programming, but the use of English and the American style is also a big part of your station. Do you attribute this American influence to the 15 years you spent in the U.S., or was it more a response to the demand for American music?

Thiombiano: It's the demand. American music is very popular throughout the world. When people call to ask for music, it will be a song by M.C. Hammer, Vanilla Ice, Michael Jackson, Madonna, or Bob Dylan, all kinds of American songs. What most of the music people ask for on our direct line is American music. I get all the new releases from the United States every two weeks—from the Washington, D.C. area, New York, and the Los Angeles area. My representatives



include KMI, Inc. in Washington, D.C., Stevie Wonder's station in L.A.—KGLH—and a station in Bordeaux, France, called the Black Box. So I receive the top music from around the world.

Africa Report: At what stage is independent radio in Africa?

Thiombiano: I have started the African fever of opening up private radio stations on the continent. I receive 50 letters a day from around Africa—South Africa, Zambia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Côte

d'Ivoire. People are calling and writing to find out if they can come here and see what I have done in order to see if they can do the same thing in their own countries. They want to know how I went about getting the station set up, and what kind of equipment I have and how much it costs. Everybody has their eyes on Burkina Faso because we have the private radio station. People have been inviting me to come to their countries to be interviewed in their newspapers and even to speak on their national radio stations—to excite. We are pioneers on the continent of Africa in private radio today and the government of Burkina Faso is reaping the reward. I suffered for it. I sent letters to ministers who said, 'No way, what do you want to do with a radio station?' African governments are afraid of giving someone a licence to exploit private radio. They are afraid of somebody taking the radio station in order to stage a coup d'état. I have started a war.

Africa Report: You have plans for a second station in Bobo-Dioulasso. What are your plans after that?

Thiombiano: My vision right now is to go as far as Bobo-Dioulasso and to the frontier between Burkina Faso and Mali, as well as Côte d'Ivoire. I am expanding my radio station. I also met some people from the United States who work for a satellite company. I would like to talk to them and see if they can hook me up on satellite. Why not cover the continent of Africa? We have millions of satellites hanging up in the sky. I want to do something better with this radio station than just serving Burkina Faso, because if I can spread this radio station all the way to South Africa, Senegal, the Gambia, Ghana, something will happen. Those presidents will know that there is a private radio station in Burkina Faso and I will force them to accept private radio stations. With private radio stations, African cultural development will flourish. Governmental radio stations are not telling people the truth.

Africa Report: How powerful is your transmitter now, and what is its range?

Thiombiano: It has 500 kilowatts. That is a range of 90 miles—Koudougou, Zorgo, Fada, Pô, etc. Now I will go as far as 250 or 500 miles—the borders of Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, and Bobo-Dioulasso, which is the second largest city in Burkina Faso.

Africa Report: You're established in Burkina Faso, it would be extremely difficult for the government to shut the station down. What about when you start broadcasting from Burkina Faso into its neighbors such as Mali? What problems do you foresee?

Thiombiano: I don't care. It's what I want to do. I like to face the problems. If they arise, I will know what to do. It is

like a dream to have this station today. After setting up this station, I've seen the worst of it.

I would also like to set up the very first pan-African private TV station—like Walter Cronkite from New York, you used to see him across the United States. Why not from Ouagadougou? Why not say, "This is Africa News from Ouagadougou?" I would love people to tune in in South Africa, Zambia, the Gambia, and all over Africa to hear the news. Why not? This is our continent. Why are people building barriers to communication? That is not right. With the African politicians today, things are changing drastically. People today have some freedom to speak out. What people are saying today you could not have said five or six months

ago, you would have got yourself beaten up or thrown in jail.

Africa Report: A parallel could be drawn between the newspapers and the radio in Burkina Faso. The private newspaper, *l'Observateur*, has in a sense liberalized the government paper, *Sidwaya*. Do you believe that as private radio competes with government stations, these stations will begin to liberalize?

Thiombiano: Yes. In fact, the government has already begun to change its programming. Musically, it is better than before. In the past, they woke you up in the morning at 5 am with drums, drums, drums and political slogans—all day. Today the national radio station is polishing itself up. ■

UN Continued

while Chidzero had the halfhearted backing of Britain. Finally, on November 21, after a reported flurry of lobbying by France, Ghali succeeded in winning the election with 11 votes and 4 abstentions, followed by Chidzero and Obasanjo with 7 "yes" votes each. Either 9 "yes" votes for another candidate or a "no" vote from one of the permanent members of the Council would have forced another vote.

African leaders quickly declared their support for Ghali in an effort to dispel speculation that some were disappointed that a black African had not been selected. *The New York Times* reported that after discussing the vote with several other African delegates, Nigeria's UN representative and OAU president, Ibrahim A. Gambari, said, "The mood in the African group is one of congratulations. We wanted someone nominated by the Organization of African Unity and we got that. Some of us wanted our own candidates, including Nigeria, but we all support Mr. Ghali."

Ghali's portfolio—especially as a peace-keeper—was never questioned by the Security Council. The author of hundreds of publications had played an important role in negotiating the 1979 Camp David peace accords and was considered instrumental in winning the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990. He is fluent in French, English, and Arabic, and is considered a good administrator.

Reservations expressed by Security Council members—particularly the United States, which is a permanent member—revolved around the 69-year-old's health. Two years ago, he had been incapacitated for several months due to an abscess of the liver. The argument against Ghali was that a younger

secretary-general who would serve two terms was needed to bring about the far-reaching changes that are needed at the United Nations. Ghali has stated that he seeks only one five-year term.

After convincing the Security Council of his vitality, Ghali, the sixth secretary-general, now faces the task of transforming an organization noted for its bloated, patronage-ridden bureaucracy and inability to collect dues from its members, into an effective force that has the vision and ability to tackle the world's crises.

Many observers believe that a new bureaucratic structure is the number one priority for Ghali: He must put the UN house back in order before hoping to tackle the enormous demands placed on the organization by the international community. Twenty-two countries have already developed a restructuring plan to present to the new secretary-general. A main recommendation of the plan is to replace the current system where 30 top officials of the various UN agencies, many of which have overlapping responsibilities, are directly accountable to the secretary-general. All of the "major activities" of the secretariat would be divided among four departments, headed by four deputy secretaries-general: peace-keeping and diplomacy; humanitarian relief; economic and environmental issues; and management of the UN itself.

Apart from increasing the UN's ability to work within the limits of its relatively tight budget of a projected \$3 billion for the next two years, including extra-budgetary operations, the organization must find a way to make its members pay their dues in a timely fashion. Several of the countries which now find the UN to be extremely beneficial to the world owe dues, such as the United States, which owed almost half

a billion dollars, including \$140 million for special peace-keeping operations in October of last year. Roughly two-thirds of the organization's members owe the UN just under \$1 billion.

While the major task for the new secretary-general may be to make the UN more efficient, he must also focus on the expanded role of the organization in a changed world. The discrepancies between the North and South, rather than East-West confrontation, will dominate the world agenda and the UN will be increasingly responsible for issues of regional peace-keeping, democratization, human rights, economic development, population, and the environment. The need for an effective UN to tackle these issues is perhaps greatest in Africa, which has been increasingly marginalized in the post-Cold War era.

Perez de Cuellar recognized Africa's worsening plight in August of last year in his review of the five-year United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, which was launched in 1986. Ghali's predecessor said that economic and social conditions worsened over the last five years and warned that the continent will face an "unrelenting crisis of tragic proportions" without substantial international assistance and debt cancellation. He characterized Africa as "the greatest development challenge of our time."

If the world's nations are serious in their new commitment to the UN, Boutros Boutros Ghali has an opportunity to start the UN on the path to being the organization that was envisioned when it was formed in San Francisco in 1945, whose aim is to maintain international peace and security, and to develop international cooperation in economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems. ■

THE GAMBIA

African Business reported that a delegation of U.S. businessmen expressed interest in a number of tourism-development ventures in The Gambia during a November visit to the country as part of an Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) trade mission. Tourism is the country's main earner of foreign exchange. The publication reported that a representative of the Sheraton Management Corporation accompanied the group, which consisted of over 40 companies.

The OPIC trade mission, which was also sponsored by U.S. AID, toured West Africa, making stops in The Gambia, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Senegal. OPIC promotes U.S. investment in foreign countries, while insuring investors against losses incurred because of political factors.

ALGERIA

On November 30, Algeria's parliament ended the monopoly held by the state-owned company Sonatrach on the production of oil, gas, and minerals. Under the new law, foreign companies can own up to 49 percent of production in existing fields and mines. Sonatrach will continue to own a controlling interest in all of the sites.

The decision to allow foreign companies to exploit the country's considerable resources is part of a plan set forth by the existing government to end the economic stagnation the country has been gripped by over the last few years. Diplomats suggested that the decision could lead to better oil production and much needed foreign exchange.

With the sweeping success in December's elections of the fundamentalist Islamic Salvation Front, which has not yet presented a clear economic policy, foreign companies will most likely wait to see what the climate of the new parliament will be before committing to any significant ventures. The fundamentalists and government both recognize oil as the mainstay of Algeria's economy. Energy Minister Nordine Ait Laoussine reportedly said that the government hoped that ending the monopoly would bring in \$14 billion over the next 10 years. Algeria's biggest oil-field, Hassi Messaoud, which pro-

BUSINESS BRIEFS

duces roughly half of Algeria's crude oil output, has been included among the fields open for foreign exploitation.

In a related development, *The Journal of Commerce* reported that energy ministers of Algeria, Morocco, Spain, and France, had planned to meet in Rabat, Morocco, at the end of December to discuss plans to build a natural gas pipeline from Algeria to Europe. The paper quoted the European energy minister, Antonio Cardoso E Cunha, as saying, "The Rabat meeting is supposed to give impetus to the project, but with elections in Algeria...no decisions can be taken now."

Algeria has been calling on the Organization of Petroleum Exporters (OPEC) to cut back oil production, claiming that the organization was overly optimistic about the price of oil in its November meeting in Vienna. OPEC's dominant member, Saudi Arabia, has denied an Algerian request for an emergency session to shore up oil prices. According to a report in *The Financial Times*, Laoussine said that Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Gabon, the main producers of light crude, would be ready to act on their own to cut back production of this type of oil. The five nations form a group known informally as the "light brigade."

DEBT

"Those who have come to the party have had a very good time," the World Bank's chief economist, Lawrence H. Summers said. "The problem is that so far it hasn't been a very large party." The party that the economist was speaking about was the Brady initiative to reduce the amount debtor nations owe, and among those that weren't included are virtually all of the sub-Saharan African countries. Summers was addressing his remarks to a press conference on the World Bank's annual report on Third World indebtedness, released in the middle of December.

In the report, the Bank urged greater debt forgiveness for the poorest African countries by official creditors. This stand was also taken by the Group of Seven leading industrial countries in a July meeting, but the widespread forgiveness has not been forthcoming. The Bank cautions that if action is not taken almost immediately, economic reforms begun in roughly 30 African countries will be jeopardized. The Bank calls for a two-thirds reduction in official debt for the world's poorest countries, which the Bank believes would give them a realistic chance of servicing their currently unsustainable debt burdens.

The Brady initiative, which has helped middle-income debtor countries in Latin America, has not been effective in Africa because it focuses on reducing debt owed to international creditor banks, and not to the rich countries' governments, where most of the poorer nations owe their money. Roughly two-thirds of sub-Saharan Africa's debt is owed to official creditors.

The report states that sub-Saharan Africa's debt more than tripled to \$174 billion over the last ten years, topping the region's gross national product. The entire export earnings of countries such as Mozambique and Somalia are not enough to meet their debt service payments.

The World Bank debt table figures estimated that \$7 billion of southern Africa's current debt had been forgiven by major donor nations over the last four years.

WEST AFRICA

The CFA franc, currently guaranteed by the French treasury at the rate of 50 CFA franc to 1 franc, would be "linked" to a future single European currency, France's economy and finance minister, Pierre Beregovoy, announced in Maastricht on December 10.

The finance minister was in Maastricht for the summit which paved the way for a single European market in 1992, and a single European currency by the end of the decade. Agence France-Presse reported that the finance minister said, "The CFA franc will be linked to the single currency just as it is currently linked to the franc."


A LESSON IN DEMOCRACY

The recent vote in Zambia provides a lesson for Africa's democrats in the conduct of free and fair elections and the peaceful transfer of power. The involvement of foreign and local election observers, as well as the dedication and commitment of the Zambian people, ensured that the process toward multi-partyism would not be derailed, and offers a new model in civic responsibility and participation.

By MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Margaret A. Novicki





t was a look of trepidation—not the thrill of victory—that flickered quickly across Frederick Chiluba's face as he turned for the first time to survey the tens of thousands of Zambians who had just voted him into office by an overwhelming landslide in one of

Africa's first free and fair multi-party elections. The crowd which gathered in the blistering late morning sun outside the Zambian High Court was giddy with anticipation, surging forward to catch a glimpse of the diminutive former trade unionist as he mounted the red-carpeted stairs toward the inaugural dais.

"We want to see our president," shouted a supporter in response to the police's heavy-handed attempts at crowd control. Though the throngs were pushed back by a cordon of unflinching security men, nothing

could subdue the elation which bubbled forth from the over 150,000 Zambians massing on the lawn in front of the building. Their unbridled joy and pride in the successful exercise of people's power could not be reined in.

No one had anticipated quite so large a victory, 81 percent for Frederick Chiluba and 90 percent for his Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) in the presidential and parliamentary contests respectively, against incumbent President Kenneth Kaunda and the United National Independence Party (UNIP), the single party which had governed unchallenged for 17 years. Nor could one have expected so rapid and untroubled a handover of power.

The Zambian people's verdict on over a quarter-century of the Kaunda presidency—one they held responsible for the descent of an erstwhile booming economy to the precipice of bankruptcy—could not have been clearer. Less apparent, but nonetheless real, were their expectations of a dramatic change for the better, having exercised their right to choose a new government.

Hence, as the mantle of office was bestowed on President Chiluba—and with it the awesome responsibility of rectifying decades of mismanagement—he could be forgiven for appearing more overwhelmed than overjoyed at the daunting road stretching ahead of him.

"The stream of democracy—dammed up for 27 years—is finally

free to run its

course as a mighty African river, not because of arms, not because of bullets, but because the patience of

Zambia with corruption, repression, and dictatorship had run out," said Chiluba in his inaugural address. But, he cautioned, "Let nobody labor under the illusion that the progress we seek will be easily and speedily attained. The hour has come, we have seized it, and now, to work!"

For Chiluba and the MMD, indeed, the hour had come, as their election slogan stated. Only 48 hours after a relatively incident-free election day, a smooth, non-rancorous transfer of power was effected. Minutes prior to the new president's inauguration, the nation tuned in to state-run television to witness Kenneth Kaunda, the father of Zambian independence, concede defeat.

In contrast to his usually ebullient style, Kaunda, clutching his trademark white handkerchief, appeared drawn. "I tried to do my very best," he said apologetically, then, appealing to his supporters, he said, "We must accept the verdict of the Zambian people. This is the nature of multi-party elections: You win some and you lose some."

It was by no means a given that the people's verdict would be accepted. The road to this successful exercise in democracy had been a precarious one, fraught with accusations of intimidation and irregularities and the uncertainty of whether the vanquished—be it the MMD or UNIP—would accept the outcome. MMD supporters threatened to "take to the streets" if their party lost, and former President Kaunda and UNIP were at best reluctant participants in the democratization process, not unlike their counterparts in Zaire, Cameroon, and Kenya, where incumbents fear that the ballot box holds their demise.

Indeed, from 1990 on, the Zambian government had attempted to orchestrate the inexorable tide toward pluralistic politics which culminated in the October 31 election, but found itself outwitted—and ultimately unseated—by a determined opposition. The reasons for this first successful trans-

Margaret A. Novicki was a member of the Carter Center-National Democratic Institute Z-Vote observation team.

Margaret A. Novicki

REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS: 1991

NOTICE TO VOTERS

Petauke Constituency
Polling Day: Thursday, 31st October, 1991
Hours of the Poll: 0600 hrs to 1800 hrs
YOUR BALLOT PAPER WILL LOOK LIKE THIS:

INSTRUCTIONS: Use for ONE candidate ONLY. Do not mark ONE, then X, then mark ONE, then mark X. Do NOT mark other marks on this paper by which you can be identified.	
Name of Candidate	Party
MULUMBA, Lame	UNIP
MWANZA, Clement	UPND

Mark a cross X next to the symbol of the candidate you support
Do not make any other mark on the ballot paper
Leave the polling booth paper, fold it once to hide how you have voted
on the Presiding Officer's table. Leave the Polling station quietly

YOUR VOTE IS SECRET

Printed by the Government Printer, P.O. Box 30126, Lusaka

Issued by the Director of Elections, P.O. Box 50724, Lusaka



Melinda Ham

fer of power via multi-party elections in anglophone Africa are unique to the Zambian experience, and offer a new chapter in the continent's ongoing drive to democratize.

What was key in Zambia was the involvement of a broad range of interest groups—the churches, students, professional bodies, civic associations, the judiciary, the media, and local and foreign election observers—all of whom, by their vigilance, ensured that the process would not be derailed. A workable recipe for popular participation in the process of political transformation has emerged from the Zambian example, offering an alternative to the “national conference” model prevalent in francophone Africa and hope to the continent’s aspiring democrats.

But the potential for pitfalls was ever-present, making the achievement all the more remarkable. The mood in Lusaka the week before the elections was tense. As the competitors’ sophisticated campaign commercials aired on national television and last-minute election rallies were held, accusations were hurled back and forth by both MMD and UNIP

Above, MMD supporters leaving the inauguration

Right, casting a ballot for the presidency

officials that their supporters were being intimidated.

There was substance to MMD charges that the ruling party, still holding the reins of power, including the state-owned media and national coffers, enjoyed undue advantages vis-à-vis its opponents, both monetarily and in access to the electorate. To even the balance, the government and its party, UNIP, were to be “delinked” in the pre-electoral period. However, this never really occurred, due to the tenacity of local party barons who refused to surrender even the slightest perquisite in their waning days in power.

The MMD was especially concerned about having equal coverage in the newspapers, radio, and television, a not-unfounded worry, as it was clear that Zambia’s predominantly



state-run media was favoring UNIP. Only the newly founded *Weekly Post*, the nation’s sole independent newspaper with the catchy slogan, “They Bury, We Dig,” offered readers an impartial line on the elections.

In a landmark challenge, however, the Press Association of Zambia won an injunction in the High Court—a testament to the independence of Zambia’s judiciary—temporarily suspending from their posts the government-appointed heads of the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation and the *Times of Zambia* for reporting biased in favor of UNIP. Pre-elec-

tion coverage then tilted back more favorably into balance.

Up until the day before the elections, MMD officials were adamant in their opposition to some of the voting day procedures instituted by the quasi-independent Electoral Commission. Its decision to count votes at central locations around the nation instead of at the actual polling sites was a particularly controversial issue, as the MMD feared that the ballot boxes could be tampered with in transit. This question was ultimately resolved by an agreement to allow agents of both parties to accompany the votes from the polling stations to the counting sites.

But what turned out to be a critical factor in the conduct of the elections was the involvement of local and foreign election observers. In the highly charged atmosphere of an incumbent head of state facing possible defeat and resistant to popular demands for a democratic system of government, it was essential that independent monitors be involved to verify the outcome and to give confidence to the electorate that they would not be intimidated into voting for one party or the other.

In the days leading up to the vote, Zambians were heard repeatedly expressing fears that the ruling party might tamper with the election results. Their concerns were not irrational. From 1990 on, President Kaunda had acceded to demands for democratization only haltingly. His first concession to the popular will was to offer a referendum on whether to continue with the one-party state. In the end, he abandoned this project when it became apparent that the nation's democrats were determined to forge ahead with demands for multi-party elections. A failed coup attempt in June 1990 emboldened the MMD, a pro-democracy front grouping labor, students, and professionals, to demand nothing less than free elections.

Opposition parties were legalized in December 1990, the MMD was registered as such, and in March 1991, elected Frederick Chiluba, leader of the Zambia Congress of

Trade Unions, as its president. A new constitution for the Third Republic was prepared and adopted in July 1991, paving the way for the first multi-party elections in 17 years to choose a new president and 150 members of the National Assembly. But equivocation on setting a date fueled the opposition's demands for impartial international observers to monitor the elections.

Initially rebuffed in its request, a group of Zambian professionals, led by lawyer Roger Chongwe (now minister of legal affairs), formed a local election monitoring group, the Zambia Independent Monitoring Team (ZIMT) in July, chaired by David Phiri, former governor of the Bank of Zambia. In September, ZIMT was joined by the formation of another local group, the Zambia Election Monitoring Coordinating Committee (ZEMCC). Composed of the Christian Church Monitoring Group, the Law Association of Zambia, the National Women's Lobbying Group, the Press Association of Zambia, the University of Zambia Students Union, and a group of NGOs, ZEMCC was conceived as an umbrella to coordinate all civic associations with a perceived interest in the outcome of the democratic process.

ZEMCC's chair, the Reverend Foston Sakala, explained: "We, the churches, came together and decided

that we couldn't afford to remain spectators in these elections because they are unique—all the others were under the one-party system." ZIMT's Phiri added, "In Africa, politics is a means of livelihood, it's not a devotion," hence the need to monitor the process as independently as possible. Both groups set about recruiting volunteers in the nation's nine provinces, and began programs targeted at civic education.

But the shot in the arm to the local monitors was President Kaunda's belated invitation to foreign observation teams to participate: "Let them come, we have nothing to hide," he said. In response, President Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center of Emory University, together with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), set up the Zambia Voting Observation Team (Z-Vote), a project which included three pre-election missions to advise local officials on the conduct of fair elections and a 40-member international observer delegation for the final vote on October 31. The Commonwealth and the Organization of African Unity also sent smaller observer missions.

The goal of the Z-Vote operation, according to Richard Joseph, head of the Carter Center's African Governance Program, was to "show international support for the election pro-



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cess, conduct an objective assessment of the elections, and provide an opportunity to learn from the Zambian experience." Z-Vote also bolstered the confidence of the local monitoring groups by providing training seminars and collaborating in the observation of the elections themselves, as well as the vote-counting.

However, despite an invitation from the Zambian president, the Z-Vote observation team was not greeted with open arms by all representatives of government. This ambivalent—and sometimes openly hostile—attitude was evidenced by an advertisement taken out by UNIP in the *Times of Zambia*, characterizing the observers as part of "a big imperialist plot" with an "assignment to facilitate the removal of the UNIP government and replace it with a puppet one." While President Kaunda disassociated himself from the ad, UNIP officials at party headquarters in Lusaka were less diplomatic with their views about the observer mission's presence. "We didn't want you," said one party leader.

This perception was not unique to the capital city. In Petauke district, part of Zambia's predominantly rural Eastern province and—as it turned out—one of the only UNIP strongholds in the nation, Z-Vote observers were met with a hostile diatribe by the district governor, himself a UNIP parliamentary candidate. The governor accused the observers of attempting to impose "American democracy" on the unwilling Zambian people and of being partisan to the MMD.

Problems of "delinking" the government and party were very apparent in Petauke—UNIP stickers and campaign posters adorned the district government offices, and the governor greeted the observer delegation sporting a UNIP tee-shirt. Stories of physical and verbal intimidation of MMD supporters and the largely illiterate and destitute electorate—including the strong-arm, bullying tactics of the district governor himself—were rife in Petauke on the day before the elections.

However, as election day dawned, an atmosphere of peace prevailed in Petauke, as was the case around the

Melinda Ham



President Jimmy Carter's Z-Vote observation team provided independent election monitoring

nation. In 110 degree heat under a searing sun, voters lined up patiently from 6 am throughout the day to cast their ballots, in some instances having trekked miles through the bush to a remote school or local shop that served as the polling place.

In virtually all polling sites visited, representatives of both parties were present with the local electoral officers throughout election day. Youthful representatives of ZEMCC and ZIMT observed the conduct of the vote patiently and with great dedication, although some were turned away for lack of proper identification, many others lacked transport to reach the remote bush stations, and most had no funds for food or drink.

As the polling places closed down at the end of a tedious and scorching day, the ritual sealing of the ballot boxes, again in the presence of both party representatives, and the sometimes hours-long wait for the trucks to transport the boxes and officials to Petauke town for counting, began. Due to the remoteness of some of the polling stations, some on no more than dirt paths miles into the bush, vote tabulation didn't begin until noon the following day. But the manual counting of thousands of votes was a sight to behold: Hundreds of volunteers sat in uncomfortable chairs in the stifling heat for hours at a time, painstakingly opening each box and counting the paper ballots one by one, as international and local observers looked on.

The international observer delegations returned to Lusaka from their assignments around the nation with few and only minor irregularities to report, but with considerable praise for the dedication and commitment of the Zambian people to the process of democracy. A parallel vote tabulation (PVT) conducted by Z-Vote from 350 randomly selected voting sites confirmed what voters and observers were gradually but with some astonishment coming to realize had occurred—a landslide victory for the MMD. The PVT confirmation of the results was instrumental in facilitating a rapid handover of power from the vanquished to the victors.

The Z-Vote delegation's final statement, commending the Zambian people for the first free and fair multi-party elections in anglophone Africa, summed up observer sentiments: "We leave Zambia profoundly moved, and even changed, by what we have seen and experienced. We thank the Zambian people for permitting us to share in this historic moment and to witness an extraordinary display of civic virtue.

"We will never forget that we were invited to Zambia by Dr. Kaunda and that he called on Zambians to assist us in our work, even in the face of opposition within his own party. In a democratic system, as he reminded all of us, there are no permanent winners or losers...It is the people who decide. Wherever we go, we will be ambassadors of the new Zambian democracy. Whenever we speak of democracy, we will recall the exemplary Zambian model of a peaceful transition."

Indeed, the elections were a triumph not only for Zambia, but for the African continent. As other of its leaders continue to resist popular demands for a stake in the system, they would do well to learn the lesson provided by the Zambian experience, even if they interpret it to mean that their days at the helm are drawing to a close. But what better legacy to leave behind than that which Kenneth Kaunda bequeathed to his people—the right to freely choose their government? ○




ZAMBIA

A NEW

The honeymoon for the Movement for Multi-party Democracy after its stunning ouster of President Kaunda, who ruled for 27 years, may last only six months, but it will be a tough half-year. The treasury is bankrupt, Zambia's debt is \$7 billion, and the bloated civil service and copper companies must be reduced by some 17,000 workers.

Melinda Ham



PAGE

By MELINDA HAM

White-wigged judges swathed in black and red robes led newly elected President Frederick Chiluba into Zambia's first pluralist parliament in nearly two decades. "This is the first truly free parliament in our history," said the president as he looked out on his Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) members sitting in 125 of the 150 seats.

Chiluba opened Parliament less than a month after his landslide victory in the October 31 elections because, he said, "Democracy, like justice, must be seen to be done." He is well aware that he is setting a precedent, heading the first peaceful, democratic change of government in anglophone Africa.

But, he added with a note of realism, "I cannot deny the cold shivers of apprehension either...realizing the extent of our country's devastation." After only a month in power, the new government has already taken steps to reverse the corruption and excesses of 27 years of ousted President Kenneth Kaunda's rule and to rebuild the "tattered and battered" economy. As Chiluba said, "Deeds and not words will solve our problems."

The new government's task is unenviable. The nation owes creditors about \$7.2 billion. It has inherited a totally bankrupt treasury. "We have at last managed to shine a torch in the cupboard of state. Regretfully...the cupboard is bare and even the crumbs which we thought were many are few," the new president said.

Melinda Ham is a Canadian freelance journalist based in Lusaka, Zambia.

Chiluba revealed that former President Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP) government spent about a third of the national budget, equivalent to \$250 million annually, on subsidizing maize, fertilizer, transport, and loss-making state companies.

He said that Zambians had the choice "to beg [from donors] or work." He said his vote was to work: to raise standards of living, create jobs, generate income, and earn foreign exchange, "or we risk forever being banished to the dark dungeons of international disrepute and perpetual internal decline."

The new president appealed to the Lusaka-based diplomats sitting in Parliament's balconies: "We need a mighty tide of sympathy, goodwill, and effective aid."

Earlier, Chiluba had met with World Bank Vice President Edward Jaycox, on a one-day visit to Zambia with a team of top-level Bank and IMF specialists who were to remain in the country for three weeks to renegotiate a new economic reform program.

In 1987 and again in September last year, the previous UNIP government derailed from its IMF and World Bank-approved program and failed to repay arrears. As a consequence, the Bank froze its aid and many other countries followed suit.

Jaycox emphasized that even though they were dealing with a new

Margaret A. Novicki




Margaret A. Novicki

Zambians after the MMD's victory:
President Chiluba called on the people to work, to raise standards of living, create jobs, and generate income, or face perpetual internal decline

MMD government, they were at the end of their tether: "The Bank has not emerged unscathed from these attempts. We cannot continually ask donors to support programs that fail. Our credibility has been damaged. Our word is not going to be worth very much if we fail again."

But the Bank vice president showed cautious optimism that Chiluba and his MMD government could make a break with Kaunda's pattern and stick with an agreed program. In line with World Bank thinking, Chiluba seems solidly committed to freeing the economy, promoting the private sector, encouraging local and foreign investment, removing foreign trade barriers, and promoting export-based agriculture and industry.

In his first weeks in office, he turned some of his promises into deeds. To make a clean break with the past, he removed the heads of most of the state companies, the gov-



ernment media, and the defense forces.

Paramilitary officers surrounded the headquarters of the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) in Lusaka, preventing workers from entering while the offices of the chief executive, Francis Kaunda (no relation to the former president), were searched.

Kaunda and other top ZCCM officials had been implicated in a \$20 million copper shipment scandal revealed in the independent *Weekly Post* newspaper a few months ago. Chief executives and managing directors of eight other state companies who had been hand-picked by former President Kaunda were also sacked and replaced with qualified people a few ranks below them on the corporate ladder.

Bwendo Mulengela, the managing editor of the government-run daily newspaper, the *Times of Zambia*, and Stephen Moyo, the director of the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation—the sole radio/television station—were also removed from their posts.

Just before the elections, the vocal Press Association of Zambia won a court injunction temporarily suspending Mulengela and Moyo—again both Kaunda appointees—from their posts for their coverage of the campaign, on the grounds that it was biased in favor of the ex-president and UNIP. Journalists across the country had deeply resented Moyo and Mulengela, both former university lecturers, as Kaunda puppets and because neither were trained professional journalists.

Only two days before the opening of Parliament, the heads of the army, air force, police, and the national service were also replaced. Former UNIP politicians were given until November 30 to vacate their government houses and vehicles for the MMD to take over.

UNIP as a party kept surprisingly quiet after its humiliating defeat. Its prophecy of civil war if the MMD won was quickly proved false. Kenneth Kaunda is determined to remain the leader of UNIP in opposi-

tion, despite calls for his resignation from younger party members such as wealthy businessman Enoch Kavindele, who tried to challenge him for the UNIP leadership at the August party congress.

But while the new MMD government rides on its current wave of popularity, it must also implement some tough measures. The price of the staple food, maize meal, frozen by the UNIP government for more than a year and a half, was raised in December. More than 10,000 people must be trimmed from the bloated civil service and about 7,000 from the copper mines—the country's two biggest employers.

Most political analysts are surprised at Chiluba's deliberate and measured approach. The new president and his government seem to have assessed that the electorate wants change now, but not radical change that will upset the rhythm of their daily lives.

But every untested government is bound to make mistakes and in a few minor instances, new ministers acting independently have made ill-considered decisions. Residents of Kanyama squatter township in southern Lusaka had their lives irreparably altered when bulldozers came in the early morning hours and razed over a hundred illegally built houses, and MMD Minister of Local Government Michael Sata did nothing to stop them.

Although the MMD won the national elections, local elections have not yet been held. UNIP still controls all local district councils. The bulldozers were acting on a resolution of the Lusaka Urban District Council to destroy all structures built on illegal land.

But Kanyama residents blamed the MMD directly and Sata specifically for their misery. "Sata did nothing to protect us. I would have never voted for the MMD if I knew this would happen," said Diane Jere as she and her five children huddled in the rubble of a house that had cost her over \$5,000 to build. Almost as an afterthought, Sata later arranged temporary accommodation for the

550 people affected in unused buildings in the Lusaka show-grounds.

In another instance, the Islamic community was shocked when Minister of Information Stan Kristor, a "born-again" Christian, banned Muslim programs on ZNBC, arguing that Zambia was a Christian nation. After being attacked by the press and criticized by Minister of Legal Affairs Roger Chongwe, who said the ban ran contrary to the freedom of worship enshrined in the constitution, the ban was rescinded.

Clearly, much of the strength and success of the new government will lie in the cohesiveness of the controversial cabinet, which some political analysts believe has the potential for divisiveness.

Emmanuel Kasonde, a successful businessman and former permanent secretary in the ministry of finance under Kaunda in the 1970s, holds the key position of finance minister. Observers say Kasonde heads the possible faction of the "veterans"—those who already know the ropes and want to exert their influence.

Newstead Zimba, former general secretary of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions at the time Chiluba was chairman, and now minister of home affairs, also has claims on the new president. As Chiluba has said himself, the trade unions provided the training ground for his political career. Ben Mwila, a wealthy businessman and now defense minister, was one of the prime financiers of the MMD campaign. He and a few others who feel they have paid for their stake in the party, could flex their financial muscle.

But for the time being, Chiluba should consider himself lucky. He has built a cabinet of mature men, although unfortunately at this stage, not a single woman. They have taken on an almost war cabinet mentality—forgetting their differences and enthusiastically jumping in together to resuscitate the economy by rebuilding the social, agricultural, industrial, and trade infrastructure. The next six months will provide the most critical test of the tolerance of the electorate and the donors alike.○



A BREAK WITH THE PAST?

BY MAKAU wa MUTUA



Camerapix

President Daniel arap Moi has finally caved in to the idea of multi-party democracy, but it took a full-court press from Kenya's Western aid donors to achieve it. But merely transforming a one-party state into an open society will not reverse the decade-long deterioration of Kenya's political, economic, and social institutions.

Students protesting the murder two years ago of Dr. Robert Ouko, the minister for foreign affairs

Betty Press



On December 3, in a bid to thwart intense domestic and international pressure, President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya announced his intention to allow a multi-party political system. In a meeting of party delegates held in Nairobi, the Kenya African National Union (Kanu), the ruling and sole legal political party, agreed to repeal section 2A of the Kenyan Constitution, a 1982 provision that made the East African nation a de jure one-party state. If fully implemented, the move would end more than two decades of authoritarian single-party rule.

This dramatic reversal came barely a week after Western aid donors, meeting in Paris, suspended all aid to Kenya for six months pending political and economic reforms. The donors have been pressing Kenya to open up the political arena to a competitive electoral process and to curb widespread official corruption and inefficiency. The decision marks the first time that aid donors have set an explicit schedule tying aid to political reforms. The action is bound to embolden advocates of reform in other African countries.

President Moi's announcement came after a confluence of domestic events that has shattered any pretense of the regime's credibility. Most prominent among them was the gruesome murder in February 1990 of Dr. Robert Ouko, the minister for foreign affairs and international cooperation. At first, the government resisted a public inquiry into the killing. It later agreed to an investigation by Scotland Yard detectives, but then immediately quashed their report implicating senior government officials. The government's unwillingness to release the report convinced most Kenyans that Ouko was killed with the president's consent or knowledge. Eventually, Moi was forced by unrelenting public pressure to appoint a judicial commission of inquiry.

In November, John Troon, the Scotland Yard detective who led the

initial investigation, told the commission that Nicholas Biwott, the minister of industry, and Hezekiah Oyugi, chief of internal security, were the prime suspects in the Ouko slaying. Over the years, Biwott had come to symbolize graft and disrespect for the rule of law. Detective Troon told the commission that Biwott and Oyugi masterminded Ouko's murder because he knew of and was opposed to their corrupt practices.

The naming of Biwott, until then Moi's closest aide and the second most powerful man in Kenya, profoundly shook the government. These disclosures could not have come at a worse time for the beleaguered regime. Aid donors unhappy with official corruption were due to meet in Paris on November 25. On November 19, Moi sacked Biwott and Oyugi, and several days later he ordered their arrest in connection with the killing. He also abruptly and arbitrarily disbanded the commission of inquiry, fearing that it would implicate him as well. As the government reeled from the crisis, pro-democracy activists stepped up their assault on the one-party state.

Amid this political crisis, the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), a loose coalition of advocates of political pluralism, called yet another public rally in Nairobi for November 16 to press for political reform. The government warned that it would not allow the "illegal" gathering. On November 16, armed riot policemen fired tear gas and used batons to violently disperse a crowd of several thousand "wananchi" who had gathered at the Kamukunji rally

grounds to hear the FORD leadership.

On that day, government agents arrested the entire FORD leadership, some as they prepared to address the crowd. Those arrested included Oginga Odinga, Kenya's first vice president, Paul Muite, chairman of the Kenya Law Society, Gitobu Imanyara, editor of the *Nairobi Law Monthly*, and former parliamentarians Martin Shikuku and Masinde Muliro.

The government, in a blatant exercise of ethnic divide and rule, flew the dissidents to their "ancestral" lands and held them incommunicado for several days. They were released in late November as international denunciations mounted. The detainees continued to call for multi-party politics upon being released.

Moi's decision to allow the registration of other political parties is a testimony to the tenacity of the democratic renaissance that has been sweeping Africa. Since 1989, millions of Africans across the continent have been demanding an end to authoritarian one-party rule and the introduction of an open political process. This struggle seeks to reverse decades of unspeakable human

Dr. Robert Ouko:
His mysterious mur-
der in February 1990
helped shatter the
pretense of credibility
in Moi's regime



If fully implemented, President Daniel arap Moi's decision under pressure would end more than two decades of authoritarian single-party rule.

rights abuses and to create accountable political institutions. The tidal wave of democratization has uprooted one dictator after another. In October, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia became the latest to fall after Frederick Chiluba's Movement for Multi-party Democracy resoundingly defeated him at the polls, a fate Moi hopes to avoid.

A few African dictatorships continue to resist the demands for political pluralism. In Cameroon, President Paul Biya barely clings to power despite overwhelming demands for a national conference to chart the country's future. In Sudan, the Muslim fundamentalist junta of Gen. Omar Hassan al-Bashir continues to execute and detain without charge proponents of a liberal political process. In Zaire, President Mobutu Sese Seko has refused to resign and hand over power to a neutral transitional government, although his brutal regime has been stripped of all domestic and international legitimacy. But now that Moi has cracked under pressure, reformers in these countries are likely to intensify their demands for reform.

The attempt to liberalize the Kenyan political process comes after more than a decade in which Moi has perfected the repressive state created by the country's first president, Jomo Kenyatta. Soon after becoming president in 1978, Moi continued the Kenyatta legacy of political detentions, unfair trials, extrajudicial killings, and severe restrictions of virtually all civil and political liberties to silence his opponents. In 1980, he suddenly banned the Academic Staff Union of the University of Nairobi.

In June 1982, a number of university lecturers were arrested and accused of teaching subversion. They included Willy Mutunga, a law lecturer, Al-Amin Mazrui, a linguistics

teacher, Edward Oyugi, an educational psychologist, George Mkanangi, a sociologist, Kamoji Wachira, a biologist, and Mukaru Nga'ng'a, an historian. Most of them were freed in 1984, although the government has continued to persecute some of them. Another lawyer, Dr. John Khaminwa, was detained for daring to represent political detainees. In mid-1982, Moi rammed through Parliament a bill making Kenya a de jure one-party state. From then on, the government became increasingly intolerant of dissent.

It was during this period of increased repression that the Kenya Air Force staged a failed coup attempt in August 1982. Numerous people were killed and injured. Hundreds were convicted of treason, sedition, and other offenses. In the aftermath, Kanu moved to suppress all dissent and strengthen the one-party state. Beginning in March 1986, a new wave of arrests and political persecutions started. Civil servants, journalists, businessmen, lecturers, teachers, and small farmers were arrested in connection with an alleged clandestine organization called Mwakenya. Scores were convicted for political offenses after giving forced confessions. Most were tortured while in custody. Hundreds of others were arrested for suspected political opposition and held, some for months, without charge.

The legal community, which has developed into the most vocal opponent of the government, also came under full-scale assault during this time. In 1986, the government detained without charge two lawyers, Wanyiri Kihoro and Mirugi Kariuki. In February 1987, Gibson Kamau Kuria, then a Nairobi lawyer, was detained under the Preservation of the Public Security Act after he and Kiraitu Murungi, his law partner, filed a habeas corpus application on

behalf of Kariuki. He was released nine months later after considerable pressure was mounted by human rights groups and donor countries.

To further tighten its control, the government abolished the secret ballot in 1988 and introduced queue-voting. As a result, people were afraid to line behind photographs of candidates known to be critical of government policies. In August of that year, the Kenyan Parliament approved without debate two key constitutional amendments.

The first extended from 24 hours to 14 days the period during which the police may hold those suspected of committing capital offenses incommunicado detention without recourse to judicial scrutiny. This change was horrifying given the frequent reports of abuses in Kenyan prisons. The second amendment removed the security of tenure from judges and members of the Public Service Commission, which is responsible for the discipline and appointment of civil servants. This change compromised the remaining safeguards on the independence of the judiciary.

Although the government introduced a bill to restore the security of tenure in 1991, the confidence of the judiciary was severely shaken. The judiciary remains subject to the executive in politically sensitive cases. Particularly vulnerable in this regard are foreign judges who serve on contract and depend on the government for job security.

Two other sectors that have come under sharp attack include the clergy and the press. Magazines and newspapers deemed critical of the government have been frequently banned. Repeated government attempts to ban the *Nairobi Law Monthly*, the outspoken legal journal, and to persecute Gitobu Imanyara, its editor, have come to symbolize the govern-

ment's disrespect for the rule of law.

The government has often warned the clergy not to "meddle" in politics, and has on several occasions threatened to abolish the constitutional right to worship. On at least one occasion, the government is believed to have ordered the murder of a clergyman. On August 14, 1990, Alexander Kipsang' Muge, the outspoken Bishop of the Eldoret Anglican Diocese, was killed in a suspicious vehicular collision. Bishop Muge had consistently criticized the government for human rights violations and its intolerance of dissent.

All these violations notwithstanding, the crisis which forced Moi to cave into opposition demands did not begin in earnest until the middle of 1990. Amid growing calls for a more open political process, the government formally detained several critics and lawyers on July 4, 1990. Those detained included three proponents of a multi-party political system: Kenneth Matiba, Charles Rubia, and Raila Odinga. Additionally, three human rights lawyers, John Khamina, Mohamed Ibrahim, and Gitobu Imanyara, were also arrested. All were freed later after an international outcry. Two other human rights lawyers, Kiraitu Murungi and Gibson Kamau Kuria, fled to the U.S. fearing arrest and detention.

Several days later, numerous government critics and supporters of multi-partyism were arrested following demonstrations in Nairobi and other outlying districts. Police and security forces attacked and killed at least 28 people during the demonstrations. In the meantime, outspoken lawyers, clergymen, and opposition politicians continued to call for reforms. As recently as last August, Moi reportedly said that multi-party democracy would not come to Kenya for at least 200 years. He then scaled down the period to "two or three years" and later to "soon," as domestic and international pressure increased. In the end, it was the relentless persistence of the opposition forces, the demands of the aid donors, and the revelations of the

Ouko inquiry that brought the government to its knees.

But it would be premature for the opposition forces to declare victory. Meaningful political and economic reforms in Kenya cannot be accomplished by the mere act of repealing the constitutional amendment prohibiting multi-partyism. The country needs to revamp and revitalize, or even in some cases overhaul, its political, economic, and social institutions. It needs to create an ethos of respect for human rights and to establish a culture of tolerance for opposing views. Painstaking efforts will have to be made to create an accountable executive, an independent judiciary, and an elected and productive legislature. Officials will have to learn to respect the law and to eliminate graft. A presidential diktat cannot accomplish these tasks.

The opposition has reacted cautiously to the president's announcement. Needless to say, it would be foolhardy to participate in a general election on Moi's terms. For this reason, many in the opposition want a sovereign national conference to be convened before elections are called. The conference would have the power to appoint an interim government, draw up a new constitution, repeal draconian laws, limit presidential terms, and oversee the country's first multi-party election in more than two decades. Absent a national conference to define these issues, Moi is likely to call an early election and use virtually all state apparatuses to ensure his re-election.

It would also be a mistake for the opposition to form political parties unless the government takes several other steps to underline its commitment to change. Principal among these is the unconditional and immediate release of all those convicted or jailed for political offenses.

In particular, the opposition must publicly press Moi to release immediately and unconditionally George Anyona, a former parliamentarian, Edward Oyugi and Ngotho Kariuki, both former university teachers, and Augustus Kathangu. The four were arrested in Nairobi in July 1990 and

charged with sedition. They were convicted and sentenced to seven years imprisonment last July. Anyona was also detained in 1982 when he announced the imminent formation of an opposition political party. He enjoys broad national support and his release would tremendously increase the effectiveness and appeal of the opposition.

The opposition should also demand the immediate release of Rumba Kinuthia and Mirugi Kariuki, both human rights lawyers, and Koigi wa Wamwere, a prominent opposition politician. All three were arrested in October 1990 and charged with treason. Other demands should include the granting of a clear and proper amnesty to all exiles, with a guarantee that they not be prosecuted upon return and the restoration of passports to individuals from whom they have been confiscated. These actions, together with the convening of a national conference, would underline the government's commitment to political reform.

The opposition cannot afford to splinter at this time. Moi intends to call an early election not only to take advantage of its poor organization, but also to divide it. Several reports indicate that some opposition leaders intend to form their own political parties and to participate in an election on Moi's terms and without a national conference. Such an approach would be a recipe for disaster. In the euphoria of the moment, it would be unwise to rush headlong into an election without careful deliberations about the direction the country needs to take after more than a quarter-century of dictatorship.

Similarly, it would be a mistake for donors to restore aid to Kenya in six months on the basis of the government's introduction of multi-party politics. Any future aid should be conditioned on demonstrable and meaningful political reforms and respect for human rights. In other words, the Kenyan government must make a break with its authoritarian style of governance. ○



ZAIRE

THE REVOLVING

DOOR

With his third appointed prime minister since October, Zaire's dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko, seems determined to stave off opposition demands for democracy by coopting their leaders. While the U.S. seems to agree with his power-sharing schemes, the influential European powers, France and Belgium, as well as African countries favor Mobutu's departure before he drags the country down with him.

By MARK HUBAND

ON EVERY LEVEL, ZAIRE

is in crisis. Of all the African countries experiencing an upsurge in popular demands for democratic politics, Zaire has long been regarded as the one which would see the most painful transition. Its experience is also one which reveals most about how the end of the Cold War north of the equator has jeopardized the survival of Africa's superpower satellites.

The signs of this crisis are obvious. Inflation is running at 10,000 percent. There is not even enough money to print new banknotes. Since the riots of September 23-24, thousands of people have found themselves unemployed, their factories destroyed or closed after their expatriate employers were evacuated during the exodus of up to 20,000 foreigners which followed the riots. The economy of the capital, Kinshasa, has effectively ceased to function. Meanwhile, work at the state-owned Gecamines mining operation in the southern province of Shaba, which provides the country with 60 percent of its foreign exchange, was suspended for about a month.

Even before the ascendancy of President Mobutu Sese Seko in 1965 and the consolidation of his 26-year-old dictatorship, the violence which characterized the years after independence of the former Belgian colony of Congo in 1960 revealed the pressures which any new ruler of the country would be forced to confront and, in Mobutu's case, attempt to suppress.

The current economic crisis is matched by a political crisis which every day reaches greater depths of gravity. On November 22, the opposition coalition—the Sacred Union—announced the expulsion of one of its leaders, Jean Nguza Karl-I-Bond, and his party, the Union of Federalists and Independent Republicans (UFERI), from the coalition. The expulsion, which had been expected for up to a month, came after Nguza said on November 15 that he was available to serve as interim prime minister. The crisis in the opposition

is a gift to Mobutu as he tries to tempt his rivals into making deals which will ensure his own survival as president.

Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, leader of the Democratic Union for Social Progress (UDPS), had long been in conflict with Nguza despite both being members of the Sacred Union, which groups 140 opposition political parties. Tshisekedi was appointed prime minister in October, but was sacked after a week when he refused to accept the authority of the presidency. To the Sacred Union's disgust, he was replaced on October 26 when another opposition leader, Bernardin Mungul Diaka, broke ranks with the coalition and agreed to form a new government. In response, Tshisekedi formed an alternative administration with himself as prime minister.

After the sacking of Tshisekedi from the prime ministership, Nguza issued a statement saying he no longer recognized Tshisekedi as the opposition's candidate for the post. Tshisekedi's allies in the Sacred Union interpreted this as a sign that Nguza, who has long had hopes of becoming president, would now put himself forward as a prime ministerial candidate.

Within a few hours, Nguza retracted the statement, saying he had been misquoted. However, few in the coalition believed him and at a subsequent meeting of the opposition he was prevented from speaking. Nguza, who is a celebrity abroad and enjoys wide support particularly in the southern province of Shaba, reacted to his expulsion from the coalition by accusing Tshisekedi of dictatorial tendencies, paving the way for his own prime ministership candidature. He was appointed prime minister in late November.

Aware of the perilous route Zaire



Camerapix

Members of the Zairian army, which now numbers around 100,000: Senior army officers are largely from Mobutu's Equateur region and have been trained by France, Belgium, China, and Egypt

has been taking, African countries have made desperate efforts to bring the sides together. The Organization of African Unity secretary-general, Salim Ahmed Salim, made the rare move of issuing a statement saying that Mobutu had to accept democratic change. In November, Nigerian Foreign Minister Ike Nwachukwu was sent as an envoy of President Ibrahim Babangida, who is current OAU chairman, to try and broker a peace.

But the most concerted effort has been carried out by Zaire's close allies in Senegal. The Senegalese minister of state and opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade succeeded in having Mobutu agree to the appointment of the new prime minister, Nguza, to replace Mungul, who is regarded as unrepresentative by both the opposition and the all-important foreign powers who are attempting to steer Zaire away from civil war.

Mobutu's grip on power for the past 26 years has depended on the success of his policy of divide and rule with regard to potential opponents. Between 1960-65, most of the members of the current opposition were involved in the various governments which rose and fell. The collusion of those who are now Mobutu's opponents in the events which led to his rise to power, as well as their acceptance of ministerial and other posts since he took power, seriously reduces their credibility, and those Western countries with influence in Zaire are also facing a crisis with regard to what their policy should be.

Tshisekedi is the opposition leader behind whom the public can unite, largely because he is the least tarnished by the Mobutu brush. However, when the country's first post-independence prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, was murdered in January 1961, Tshisekedi was minister of justice, a factor which supporters of Lumumba will not let him forget. When Mobutu seized power, Tshisekedi became interior minister. In 1967, he again became minister of justice, and was involved in drawing up the charter for Mobutu's new political party, the Popular Movement for the Revolution, which has been the tool with which Mobutu's dictatorship has forged the character of the regime.

Tshisekedi's move into the opposition in 1980, with the founding of the Democratic Union for Social Progress (UDPS), led to his harassment and imprisonment by the regime. However, skeptics believe that he remains physically alive due to his brother, Bonaventura Kalonga, who is married to a cousin of Mobutu's late first wife, Marie Antoinette.

An even more suspect past is that of Nguza Karl-I-Bond. As recently as March 1990, Nguza occupied the post of foreign minister in Mobutu's government. He has been prime minister as well as ambassador to the U.S., interrupted with spells of imprisonment, torture, and exile after falling out with Mobutu.

A third key opposition figure with a past which is expected to haunt

him is the leader of the Christian Democratic Party (PDSC), Joseph Ileo. Ileo accepted the post of prime minister after the illegal dismissal of Patrice Lumumba from the prime ministership in 1960, and has since been associated with the events which led up to Lumumba's death.

Apart from playing off his opponents, the other key to Mobutu's survival since the turbulent mid-1960s has been his relationship with the United States, and particularly the Central Intelligence Agency with which he has had close links since 1959 while living in Belgium.

On August 25, 1960, the CIA sent a message to its station chief in Zaire (then called Congo) giving urgent priority to the "removal" of Patrice Lumumba, a radical anti-colonialist who was unlikely to serve U.S. interests in the region. Stories abound of the CIA attempting to poison Lumumba's toothpaste, though he was eventually killed by Mobutu supporters before any CIA plan had been carried out. From then on, Mobutu was regarded as pro-U.S.

During visits to the U.S., he has been a guest at the private home in Kennebunkport, Maine, of President Bush, who was director of central intelligence in 1976-77. The former director, William Casey, shared intelligence information with Mobutu, with whom he had a close personal relationship, which grew closer in 1985 when the U.S. Congress lifted a ban on covert aid to Jonas Savimbi's Unita forces in the war against the MPLA government in Angola.

The Zairian air base at Kitona was used for the channelling of arms to Unita. Angola's response was to allow anti-Mobutu dissidents to base themselves on its territory, and in 1978, they invaded the southern province of Shaba (then called Katanga), being repelled by a multinational force only after thousands had died.

American efforts to ease its way out of these close ties with Mobutu have intensified, with senior administration officials publicly accusing him of corruption and Congress calling for the United States to speed the regime's demise.

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in November, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen said: "With every day that slips by, human suffering in Zaire increases and along with it the risk of ethnic conflict and civil war. The best hope for Zaire now is for genuine power-sharing between President Mobutu and the opposition."

Cohen went on to say that Washington was concerned "by the president's apparent unwillingness to distinguish between state finances and his own, a failing which lies at the heart of Zaire's dismal economic record." He said that the then newly appointed prime minister, Mungul Diaka, was not acceptable to the U.S. and urged the speedy reconvening of the suspended national conference to debate a multi-party constitution and prepare elections.

In a recent interview, Mobutu said he did not believe that the U.S. would attempt to impose a new leader on Zaire, and he appeared reluctant to betray any feeling that he has been let down by the West. This reluctance is thought to stem from the fact that his service to the West has largely been in his own interest rather than that of the country as a whole.

However, splits over strategy have opened between the three countries with influence in Zaire—the United States on one hand and France and Belgium on the other. The U.S. believes chaos will result if Mobutu is forced out of office, while France and Belgium have made it clear that he should accept that his credibility has disappeared and relinquish power.

Belgium's Christian Democrat government has been under severe domestic pressure from the opposition liberals who glean much of their support from the business community which still has interests in Zaire and generally takes a pro-Mobutu stance. Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens' policy has been to maintain cool relations (the status quo since Mobutu ordered troops to massacre student protesters on Lubumbashi University campus in May 1990), but not to take action to remove Mobutu.

France has been forced to change its policy over the past two months. President François Mitterrand's son, Jean-Christophe, who is responsible for French policy in Africa, had promoted cohabitation, with Mobutu remaining president and the opposition running the government. This policy fell apart when Mobutu demanded money from Tshisekedi's short-lived administration to pay soldiers who had been promised a pay rise. The money was refused by the newly appointed opposition finance minister, an event which contributed to the collapse of Tshisekedi's government.

This was followed by an article in the pro-government newspaper, *Salongo*, citing taped telephone conversations between the French ambassador to Kinshasa, Henri Rethore, and the French Foreign Office. The tapes, which are in Mobutu's possession, allegedly reveal French plans to actively undermine the 26-year-old dictatorship. The French embassy in Kinshasa has made no official response to the recordings, which were made in defiance of rules governing diplomatic relations guaranteeing the privacy of diplomatic communications.

In the past two years, France has steered political change in West and Central Africa as it pleased, largely unhindered by the objections of the dictators whose demise democracy has brought. Zaire is clearly the exception. Tension has risen between Elysée Palace, home of President Mitterrand, and the river boat Kamanyola, on which Mobutu has spent every night since he announced multi-party democracy on March 24, 1990.

Then, stung by the decision to move the November summit of the world's French-speaking countries from Kinshasa to Paris in protest at his human rights record, as well as the withdrawal of his own invitation to the summit, Mobutu went on the offensive against France and Belgium.

In an interview disrupted by his supporters at the summit, he said: "I only have problems with two coun-

tries of the European Community, France and Belgium, because of their interference in Zaire's affairs. If we allow in any country the kind of behavior which is taking place toward Zaire, one can already say for the whole of black Africa, 'Goodbye sovereignty, goodbye independence'."

The U.S. demand that Mobutu share power with the opposition has continued to fall short of the views of France and Belgium, though neither country has made a clear statement about where it stands, preferring to discredit Mobutu without laying down guidelines. Belgium has been the most outspoken, with Eyskens being quoted as the source for claims that up to 42 people were killed in bomb attacks carried out by the army against opposition activists in Kinshasa during November.

Meanwhile, U.S. policy-makers are faced with a dictator who has served their needs and an opposition which largely failed to impress the West with its vision of Zaire's future. When the U.S. ambassador in Kinshasa, Melissa Wells, visited Tshisekedi during his brief appointment to the prime ministership, he told her: "Now we have democracy, so we expect you to give us the money we need."

According to senior diplomatic sources, Wells was visibly shocked at Tshisekedi's directness, reminding him that a detailed economic reform program first had to be worked out.

Hardliners in the Mobutu regime, particularly Zaire's ambassador to Israel, Gen. Eloki, are thought by military and diplomatic sources to be close to preventing further change even if it means defying Mobutu. The army chief of staff, Gen. Mahele Liyeko, has issued statements announcing that soldiers will carry out immediate executions against looters, a strong sign that the army intends to take an active role. "If the situation deteriorates further, then military action is inevitable," Western military sources have said.

According to military sources in Kinshasa, the Zairian army currently numbers around 100,000 personnel.

The largest sector is the regular army known as the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ), which numbers 81,000, 60,000 of whom are under arms. Next in size is the 12,000-strong civil guard, headed by Gen. Kpama Baramoto, brother-in-law of Mobutu, who headed the commando operation on Lubumbashi University in May 1990. But it is the Special Presidential Division (DSP), numbering 6,500 under arms, which represents the strong arm of Mobutu's rule. Both the Civil Guard and the DSP are answerable to the president, while the FAZ is under the control of the ministry of defense.

Senior army officers are largely from Mobutu's Equateur region and have been trained by France, Belgium, China, and Egypt. South Africa now has a military training role, while Israel is responsible for training the DSP. The former West Germany was involved in the training of the Civil Guard until it was discovered that it was to be used as a highly political force aimed at defending the regime. At that point, the training was handed over to Egypt, and European governments have remained tight-lipped about the German role.

Gearing up for a future new world order which largely overlooks Africa, African countries have been quick to recognize that a diplomatic solution to the crisis in Zaire is vital. Meanwhile, for Belgium, Zaire represents its only sphere of influence outside its own border, though its own domestic political instability puts it in a weak position to find solutions in a country many times its own size.

For France, Zaire is the Goliath of "francophonie" for which it has to feel responsible in its role as godfather to the French-speaking world. Now, the limits of this role are going to be tested. France has ensured political change in the region by doing nothing to save the dictators it once supported. This passive role does not apply in Zaire, as the dictator is ready and able to hang on until he decides he has had enough. Meanwhile, he appears increasingly prepared to take the country down with him. O



Margaret A. Novicki

At a recent conference on democracy in Africa, sponsored by the African-American Institute in New York, the former head of the Economic Commission for Africa explained that it is not enough for governments to simply launch the democratic process—they must provide the conditions, the “five Cs” as Dr. Adedeji calls them, to make it sustainable. The following are excerpts of his remarks to the conference. We also provide a summary of this ground-breaking meeting of policy-makers and individuals involved in the continent’s drive toward democracy.

Sustaining Democracy

By **ADEBAYO ADEDEJI**

More than ever before, Africa needs fundamental change and transformation—political, economic, social, and cultural. Such a change cannot be brought about in societies where there is a pervasive lack of democracy, where existing patterns

of social differentiation and political organization have tended to encourage a rather narrow base for decision-making and where the lack of popular debate over basic national development policies and their implementation persists.

Therefore, for Africa to prepare itself for the 21st century, it must

undergo a second liberation which will result in the birth of a continent where democracy, political and economic empowerment, accountability, and economic justice prevail.

Difficult as it may be to launch the democratic process, its sustainability is even much more difficult, more complex, more delicate, more

Can Democracy Deliver?

Early in November, nearly 100 Africans and Americans listened in rapt attention as President Nicéphore Soglo recounted how the Beninese people managed to overthrow an 18-year dictatorship and successfully hold their first democratic multi-party elections since independence. Rather than delivering a self-congratulatory oration, President Soglo explained just how tough—and terrifying—the process was, how tenuous a hold the nation's democrats have on power, and how high the people's expectations remain, nearly a year later, of their first democratically elected government.

This was the sobering message that the Beninese president carried to delegates at the African-American Institute's (AAI) 22nd annual conference, entitled, "Can Democracy Deliver? Obstacles and Opportunities in the Post-Cold War Era," held at Unicef House in New York on November 8-9. "Democracy is a dynamic which must be preserved through permanent struggle," he reminded his African colleagues present, many of whom were in the midst of their own battles to achieve a pluralistic system of government, but have yet to experience the inevitable hangover after victory has been won.

Indeed, as J. Brian Atwood of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs noted, it is not elections alone which make a democracy. Its foundation must be a civic society which understands the nature of choice, and it must be sustainable—in Africa's case, "at a time when we are poorer and more divided than at independence," said Legwaila Joseph Legwaila,

permanent representative of Botswana to the UN.

Against these formidable odds, this civic society is nonetheless in its nascent phase in many countries across Africa. "The tide of change in the world in favor of democracy is sweeping all continents. It is no longer possible to insulate one region of the globe from events happening in another. The phenomenon of democratization is a manifestation of our innate quest for autonomy. Africa is determined not to be left behind," said Paul Ssemogerere, Uganda's second deputy prime minister.

This "African renaissance" or "second liberation," as participants coined it, was the subject of the AAI meeting, which brought together high-level policy-makers from the U.S. and Africa, members of the private sector and academia, journalists, and others with a consuming interest in the political and economic progress of the African continent. Their goal was to reflect for two days not only on the conference theme, "Can democracy deliver?", but, according to AAI President Vivian Lowery Derryck, on the following questions: Are there preconditions necessary to having democracy? What institutions are needed to support it? Once democracy is achieved, how can it be sustained? And, what should be the role of donors in the process?

The first question was answered with a resounding yes; democracy can deliver, as long as the conditions exist for it to grow and thrive. Adebayo Adedeji, former secretary-general of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, reminded participants that the notion of democ-

volatile, and dangerous. Therefore, for the democratic process to become sustained and sustainable, a number of conditions must prevail. The first of these is the most careful and continuous nurturing of the process. Democracy, unless properly handled, can be divisive and can lead to polarization. It can become dysfunctional and counterproductive, a winner-take-all endeavor. It is this kind of divisive "democratic" practice, with its built-in economy of affection, nepotism, and corruption, that has provoked military intervention and military regimes in too many African countries since independence.

Therefore, to avoid this kind of divisiveness and polarization, we

need to internalize what I have called the "five Cs" into our political system. These are the politics of consent, of consensus, of conviction, of commitment, and of compassion.

Consensus politics is involving people in the process by which policies are developed, listening to what they have to say and adapting the approach to leadership and government in the light of all these. Consensus politics also requires developing a national consensus on major issues and policies. By so doing, such policies, when translated into laws, programs, and projects, win the consent of the majority of the people, if not of all, and with that consent, their conviction in the rightness of the causes being pursued and commitment to see them through. The policies of consensus and consent, conviction, commitment, and compassion are the practical corollary of a concern

for a nation as a whole, not just for a particular group.

The second condition for sustainability is the widespread existence of independent people's organizations. It cannot be gainsaid that the existence of people's organizations is central to the realization of popular participation. It is essential that these people's organizations are genuinely grassroot, voluntary, democratically administered, and self-reliant, and that they are rooted in the tradition and culture of the society so as to ensure community empowerment and self-development. These organizations will also play a major role in shaking off lethargy and traditional beliefs that are impediments to development. Through networking, they can become effective instruments for nation-building and national unity as well as for subregional and regional cooperation and integration.

Adebayo Adedeji, former secretary-general of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, heads the African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies in Nigeria.

racy is not a new one to the continent. "Although we didn't have a party system [in Africa's past], we had participation and accountability. Colonial authorities were a poor guide—they suppressed our democratic practices and introduced authoritarianism," a legacy which haunts the continent up to today.

However, unlike other countries where economic development preceded the expansion of a pluralist society, the reverse has occurred in Africa—economic failure has led to demands for democracy, noted Professor Carol Lancaster. While the preconditions for democracy may differ from place to place, certain institutions are required to sustain it—an independent and responsible media, real political parties, strong civic associations, to mention a few. Outside support is also needed, because it is very difficult for African countries to undertake political and economic liberalization simultaneously.

From Richard Joseph, head of the Carter Center's African Governance Program, participants heard of Africa's different models of transition—national conferences, democratic multi-party elections, coopted transitions, guided democratization—and the need for "pacts"—political, social, external, and institutional—in order to consolidate democracy once it has been won. The contributions of the churches, universities, the media, human rights groups, women, and the private sector to the process of democratization were all examined, as was the all-important role of the donor community in supporting this historic trend.

Representatives of the U.S., Canada, France, and Britain noted that progress toward democratization would increasingly be used as a condition for aid by the

international community, although as AAI's Ms. Derryck put it, it should be "supportive conditionality," to encourage rather than threaten African countries to move toward more pluralistic societies. Regional groups such as the OAU should be more active, as should local and foreign NGOs.

The link between democracy and development was emphasized. Said Scott Spangler, assistant administrator for Africa of U.S. AID, "For sustainable development, good governance is required." "Good governance," added Dr. Adedeji, "is necessary for democracy to survive. Good governance entails responsibility for human rights, constitutional government, rule of law, transparency in the wielding of power, accountability by those in public office, freedom of information, and an equitable share of resources."

There were words of caution, nonetheless, that ethnicity and the militarization of the continent were potential spoilers in the drive to democratize, and that this "second liberation" of Africa might end as fragile as the first, if it is only emulating Western political models. "Changing the culture of politics" might be a better term than "democratization," suggested Professor Pearl Robinson.

As Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of Equator Advisory Services said, "Democracy is not a panacea, but because it fosters accountability and transparency, it has a better chance of success." Nor is it entrenched overnight. Despite its pitfalls, all agreed, democracy offers the best chance for Africa to advance, especially as it builds on an innate part of African tradition—the culture of tolerance. ■

—M.A.N.

Thirdly, the democratization process must be seen and nourished as both an end and a means. Human rights and human dignity, freedom of thought and association, and the pursuit of happiness are ends achievable only in a democratic environment. And they are worthy of pursuit by any civilized society.

But over and above these, democracy is also a means to an end. It provides an enabling environment for the achievement of a higher level of development. It is now crystal clear that Africa's persistent socio-economic crisis cannot be resolved and human and economic conditions improved without the full and effective contribution, creativity, and enthusiasm of the vast majority of the people.

Thus, at the heart of Africa's development objectives must lie the overriding goal of human-centered development that ensures the well-being

of the people through sustained improvement in their living standards. Unless this takes place, anti-democratic forces and sentiments may re-emerge and triumph.

Therefore, a holistic, human-centered development paradigm as advocated in the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes (AAF-SAP) is a sine qua non for sustainability. As emphasized in AAF-SAP, "the urgency of alleviating mass poverty and of increasing welfare of the African people is rooted not simply in the humanistic or altruistic aspects of development. It is predicated, above all, on the rational proposition that to achieve and sustain development, it is necessary to ensure the education and training, health, well-being, and vitality of the people so that they can participate fully and effectively in the development process."

Such a human-centered paradigm also leads to the inevitable conclusion that important as education, skills, technology, health, and the general well-being of people are, they are by themselves not enough to bring about a self-sustaining process of development. To them must be added the enabling political environment—freedom of speech, thought, and association; freedom from arbitrary arrest; the freedom to express and articulate new ideas and new thinking, however unconventional, without fear of arrest or molestation. It is only in such an economic and political environment that a high level of productivity can be generated and sustained, that the values of self-reliance can be developed, and that the people will develop self-confidence in themselves.

In addition to the democratization of the political and development pro-

cess, there must be material incentives for people to make the fullest possible use of their skills and talents. This calls for a new developmental ethic which is informed by social justice and whose watchword is equity, whereby people derive benefits commensurate to what they contribute and such benefits are sufficient to meet the basic needs of the individual, the family, and the community.

The principal actors in the political and economic systems must play their roles effectively and with commitment. The governments must yield space to the people, otherwise popular participation will be difficult to achieve. The people and their organizations must develop their capacities to participate effectively in socio-economic policy and developmental issues. Non-governmental organizations should be fully participatory, democratic, and accountable. The national and regional media should always strive to fight for and defend their freedom at all cost and make every effort to champion the cause of democracy.

At the level of women's organizations, measures to enhance the contribution of women in the political and developmental process must be enhanced. Women's burdens must be considerably relieved and the equal rights of women to land and credit must be secured. At the level of organized labor, trade union rights must be guaranteed and defended; all workers, including rural workers must be organized and mobilized; and above all, workers' organizations must be democratic, voluntary, autonomous, and accountable.

Finally, and given the centrality of youth and students in this process of sustained democracy, all the major impediments to the participation of youth in the democratic process—such as frequent bans on youth and student organizations, police brutality against unarmed protesting students, detention and harassment on campuses, dismissal from studies, and arbitrary closure of educational institutions—must be eliminated. On their part, the youth

and students must join forces with their governments and the international community to combat growing drug trafficking and drug abuse. All youth and student organizations must be democratic, voluntary, autonomous, and accountable and should coordinate their activities with workers', women's, and peasant organizations.

Our sixth condition for sustainability is that the democratic process must go beyond national borders in Africa and be developed into a pan-African movement. Given the very artificial nature of these borders and the imperative necessity of forming larger polities in future years and of fostering regional and sub-regional cooperation at the present time, the democratic culture must be sustained not only within national borders but also across and beyond such borders.

As we stated in AAF-SAP, the political Balkanization of Africa into arbitrary nation-states should elicit from the continent and its people the impulse to restructure the fragmented region into a more coherent and stronger economic and political entity. The African sense of oneness and solidarity should be the motor, and democracy and development should be the accelerator to achieving this objective, thus enabling Africa to finally break the umbilical cord from its unenviable colonial and precolonial past.

Seventh is the role of the international community, particularly the donors—bilateral and multilateral. They could assist the process and help in its sustenance, or they could abort it by trying to control and manipulate it through the imposition of conditionalities. If they choose to do the former, then they must address the problems of debt, commodities, and resource flows to Africa urgently. Democracy cannot thrive in empty stomachs. It cannot thrive in conditions of abject poverty and in societies where poverty has a brutalizing impact. It cannot thrive in conditions where life is generally short and brutal.

The donor countries and their mul-

tilateral monetary and developmental institutions must see democracy in Africa as an integral part—and not as the consequence—of the democratic reforms sweeping elsewhere throughout the world, and therefore lend it and the African governments and people the same enthusiastic support as they are giving to the countries of Eastern Europe. In fact, because of the fragility of the African economies, they deserve more and not less material support from the donors.

The democratizing process is only at its beginning. Not all African countries have taken even the first step. Only a minority—a significant minority though—has done so. But there has been a sturdy beginning which we must build upon. To launch the process is one thing, to ensure its sustainability is another. In the long run, the latter is more important as it is more difficult. It calls for sustained determination on the part of the people and their democratic governments. It also calls for generous support from the international community, and more importantly, for its understanding. There can be no instantaneity, no quick fix. Our friends from the West often forget that true democracy became a reality in most of their countries only recently. A holier-than-thou attitude with harsh conditionalities will only abort the process.

While democracy is worthy of pursuit by itself, it will not survive unless it is accompanied by development. Democracy and development must be seen as constituting the two blades of a pair of scissors. It calls for patience, tolerance, persistence, and transparency.

Democracy is also full of ups and downs—hopefully more ups than downs. Just as you need the pair of blades to cut a cloth, you need both, democracy and development, to bring about the socio-economic transformation advocated in AAF-SAP. Or to vary from the analogy, democracy and development together with accountability and empowerment, must be seen like a horse and a carriage. You cannot move your load unless you have both. ○



NIGERIA

Although President Ibrahim Babangida has tightly controlled the transition to civilian rule by the end of the year—even creating the two competing political parties—old campaign problems have

VOODOO *Democracy?*


resurfaced: bribery, forgery, election-rigging, and other habits of traditional Nigerian politicking. Other tough issues for the government have been outbreaks of religious and ethnic violence in the north, and conducting a census to determine the nation's population count.

By KARL MAIER

A man with a disabled leg struggles to walk down a road with a heavy load on his head, when a passerby stops to suggest that he shift the weight of the cargo before it falls to the ground. The man responds by saying that the problem is not what he is carrying, but what he is carrying it with, a disabled leg.

That proverb, says Nigeria's

Nobel Prize-winning author, Wole Soyinka, aptly describes the increasingly troubled transition to civilian rule program being carried out by President Ibrahim Babangida's military government. "All the problems surfacing now are the result of internal defects of



the program, its contradictions," says Soyinka, "and that is why I have called it voodoo democracy."

The transition program, which promises general elections before a handover to civilians by the end of 1992, was under growing strain in recent months as Nigeria's "new breed politicians" showed that contrary to government wishes, they could show the "old breed" a thing or two when it came to rigging elections.

In October, a series of gubernatorial primaries began to choose candidates for the only two legal parties—the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC)—which the government created in an effort to cleanse Nigerian politics of the ethnic, religious, and regional tensions that undermined previous attempts at democratic rule. The primaries showed, however, that old habits die hard. Widespread abuses included bribery of both voters and electoral officers, forgery of election results, fake voter rolls, and the use of underage voters.

The government's National Electoral Commission initially lauded the first primaries on October 19 as largely free and fair. But as the media reports began to surface about illegal practices and a number of key elections were subject to court actions, the NEC decided to step in. On November 25, NEC Chairman Humphrey Nwosu reversed the commission's previous position of not interfering in internal party elections and ordered the banning of 12 gubernatorial aspirants and the holding of fresh elections in nine states.

The government backed up the action with a new decree, legally invulnerable to challenge by the courts, giving the NEC wide powers to disqualify candidates from standing for elections or holding elective office "on any ground whatsoever." The decree, No. 48 of 1991, also gave the commission the authority "to accept, cancel, or annul [the result]

of any primary presented to it by the political parties."

Thirteen former politicians, already banned by the military, were arraigned on charges of illegally interfering in politics. The detainees, including such powerful personalities as the former chief of staff, retired Gen. Shehu Musa Yar' Adua, Arthur Nzeribe, former Lagos State Governor Alhaji Lateef Jakande, and Alhaji Muhammadu Abubakar Rimi, were to spend Christmas in custody while awaiting trial in January. They are to be tried by a special tribunal and if convicted could face five years in jail or a fine of \$25,000, or both.

The moves were typical of President Babangida's six-year-old government, which has attempted to tightly control the transition program and even issued a decree making it a crime to disagree with it. As part of the transition, the government banned former politicians, including the 13 arraigned in December, created two political parties, the SDP and the NRC, wrote their political programs, and decided that future elections would be held by "open ballot," with voters queueing for the candidate and party of their choice so, the reasoning went, everyone would be certain of the winner.

"Naira burgers," slices of bread with naira currency notes in between handed to voters, and other tactics dashed such hopes, however, although the government has vowed that future elections will be clean. The controversy surrounding the primaries prompted the country's increasingly vocal human rights community to call for the scrapping of the government's transition program and the opening of the system to free politics. Launching a "campaign for democracy" on November 11, former Nigerian Bar Association President Alao Aka-Bashorun said, "This dictatorship has led the country to a dead end and unless we return to genuine democratic government based on the sovereignty of the people, a national catastrophe is unavoidable."

Such public criticism of its plans clearly irked the military, which has

responded with harassment of several prominent lawyers, such as Aka-Bashorun, Chief Gani Fawehinmi, and Femi Falana. The Secret Security Service (SSS) has confiscated the passports of all three men, most recently depriving Falana of the possibility of travelling to the October summit of the Commonwealth in Harare, Zimbabwe, where he was to attend a human rights meeting. Those actions have drawn widespread criticism from the human rights community and prompted Soyinka to publicly announce his decision to forego travelling abroad to represent Nigeria.

Babangida has been particularly concerned at the specter of religious and ethnic violence, which flared in mid-October in the ancient northern city of Kano, cutting short his own attendance at the Commonwealth summit. Rioting erupted and quickly spread out of control following Muslim protests at a planned holding of an open-air revival by a German Christian fundamentalist preacher, the Reverend Reinhard Bonnke.

The trouble started on October 14, when 8,000 Muslim youths, many of them Koranic students, marched to the Emir's palace in central Kano to demand that the Christian meeting be cancelled. The Emir failed to address the protesters, but instead sent an emissary to assure the crowd that the Bonnke crusade had been cancelled.

As the youths left the palace grounds, they headed for a district in the center of town known as "Sabon Gari," or strangers' quarters, the home of the largely Christian Ibo immigrant community from southeastern Nigeria. The young Muslims, mainly members of the indigenous Hausa people, began looting and burning cars, shops, and homes, often with entire families inside. Chanting "Allah Akbar" (God is great), the Hausa Muslim youths took control of the area and began random killings.

Some of the victims were Hausas themselves, mistaken for Christians because they were wearing Western clothes that day. The Ibos are partic-

Karl Maier is the West Africa correspondent of The Independent of London and contributes to The Washington Post.

ularly resented among poor Hausas because of their superior education and trading skills. The rioting revealed the deep religious and ethnic tension that has plagued the region since Islam reached Kano nearly 500 years ago. It was the second major outbreak of such violence in 1991, following similar riots in neighboring Bauchi state in April, when up to 1,000 people lost their lives.

The authorities declared a dusk-to-dawn curfew after the first day of violence, but isolated incidents continued throughout the night. The attacks began anew the following day, but the cycle of killing worsened considerably. The Ibos organized on a large scale and began to counterattack.

Betty Press

Christians which continued until November 26, when the government restricted movement of everyone and started a four-day national census.

The census sought to answer a question as old as the country itself: How many Nigerians are there? The head count, which was estimated to cost nearly \$120 million, was a key part of the transition program, and it appeared to be largely a success. The results are not expected until March 1992, but if all goes well with the data analysis, it would mark the first accurate count since independence 31 years ago. Three previous attempts have failed. "If anyone can carry out an acceptable census and actually announce the results, it is this government," said Alphonse MacDon-

their tax burden. Post-independence censuses, in 1962, 1963, and 1973, were rejected because of schemes by regional leaders to inflate local numbers in order to obtain a bigger slice of the national budget and seats in the federal legislature.


The National Population Commission (NPC), headed by Alhaji Shehu Musa, went to great lengths to depoliticize the census, by dropping all references to religious and ethnic affiliation and by ensuring that census supervisors were not from the regions they worked in.

Population experts who closely monitored the census predicted that the results would show that the count was largely free of the irregularities that marred previous attempts. "It went better than expected and I am more confident than ever of an accurate count," said MacDonald. He and other UN and Nigerian officials also predicted that Nigeria's population, long held to be in excess of 110 million people, would be revealed to be less than 95 million.

The census seemed to be good news for the Babangida government at a time when the political transition and the economic austerity program, under severe pressure from soaring budget deficits, inflation, and debt-servicing obligations, were heading into choppy waters.

If the battle to carry out an accurate census has been won, however, the heroes were the foot-soldiers, the census-takers themselves. It was largely a youthful affair. Teachers, students, and civil servants mainly in their 20s went door to door carrying plastic green and white bags, Nigeria's colors, and the questionnaires, earning about \$30 for four days' work.

"This is something I felt was important to do," said Okereka Kingsley, a 26-year-old technical assistant to the Population Commission in the eastern city of Port Harcourt. "People were begging to be counted in the census because they know that when the planning of resources begins, they will be left out if their community is not registered."



Voter registration:
"All the problems surfacing now are the result of internal defects of the program, its contradictions"

Moving in packs and armed with sticks, metal bars, and a few homemade firearms, they took the battle into Hausa quarters. The resulting melee, which was halted only when the security forces were given orders to shoot on sight, left hundreds of people dead and wounded, although the government stuck to its official figure of just eight people dead. The violence sparked an exodus of Ibo

eld, the country director of the UN Fund for Population Activities.

The roots of the controversy over Nigeria's population date back to 1914, when Britain joined the largely Muslim and underdeveloped Northern Protectorate with the mainly Christian and richer Southern Protectorate. In the 1952 census carried out by the British, considered the last fairly accurate count, the north emerged with a larger population, although some residents from both regions boycotted the exercise, fearing it to be a colonial trick to increase

Steve Maines



Five years after the adoption of the UN's ambitious Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, the result is a worsening of economic and social conditions and a gloomy outlook for the future. While the continent made progress toward democratization, it did not do enough to liberalize its economies. The Africans, for their part, maintain that the donor community reneged on its commitment to increase aid, with net inflows actually declining 5 percent from 1986 to 1990.

By ANNE SHEPHERD

If the last decade proved rough on African countries, the present might be even worse. That, at any rate, is the gloomy message that permeated the recent review of the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UNPAAERD) in New York.

The program—unique in UN history for its focus on just one region of the world—was adopted at a special session of the General Assembly in 1986 to find ways of overcoming the severe crisis facing most African countries.

But, according to the UN secretary-general's final review and appraisal of the implementation of

UNPAAERD, "Despite Africa's broad range of initiatives and notable progress toward democratization, economic and social conditions actually worsened" during the five-year period. Overcoming the "persistent, decade-long crisis in Africa" presents "the greatest development challenge of our time," the report declared.

Yet, during a two-week debate by an ad hoc committee in the General Assembly on Africa's plight on September 3-13, donors rejected specific targets suggested by the secretary-general for increased aid, debt relief, and a fund to diversify Africa's commodity exports. Even the watered-down version of the somewhat inappropriately named "New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s" met resistance in the General Assembly, with the U.S. insist-

ing on a rewording of key sections.

"Western governments have hardened themselves vis-à-vis the specific problems of Africa," charged one African negotiator. "We are up against a brick wall."

"Africa has got to get used to two things," added a UN Africa specialist. "First, resources will be hard to come by in the next decade. Second, they will have to give a lot in return for whatever resources they get." At a time when the continent needs help more than ever before, he noted, "Africa will increasingly have to rely on itself."

According to the secretary-general's report, during the UNPAAERD period, GDP growth averaged a mere 2.3 percent, well below the rate of population growth. As a result, GDP per capita fell by an average of 0.7

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percent per year and was lower at the end of the program than at the beginning.

Gross domestic investment as a percentage of GDP, notes the report, remained at low levels and actually declined, from about 23.9 percent in 1980 and 19.2 percent in 1986 to 17.6 percent in 1989. Gross domestic savings stagnated at around 16 percent during 1986-89, compared with 24 percent in 1980.

On the plus side, the report maintains, the Programme of Action served to focus the attention of African and other governments on the basic economic, human, and governance problems of Africa, thus setting the continent on the right course. By the end of 1991, 35 African countries had adopted IMF- and World Bank-sponsored economic recovery programs.

With the publication in 1989 of the World Bank's introspective, groundbreaking report, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, African countries and international financial institutions have moved closer to an understanding of the continent's long-term problems.

More attention, for example, is being given to human resource development, as witnessed in the setting up by the World Bank, African Development Bank (ADB), and UN Development Programme of the \$100 million, Harare-based African Capacity Building Fund.

Fears of global isolation have prompted more meaningful efforts at

regional integration. During the Organization of African Unity summit in June, African countries signed a treaty to establish, in six stages, over a 34-year period, an African Common Market.

The last few years have also witnessed an upsurge of pro-democracy movements around the continent demanding more transparent forms of government. In this regard, "the adoption of the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, and the declaration of the African Heads of State and Government at their 1990 summit on the political and socio-economic situation in Africa and the fundamental changes taking place in the world, are significant landmarks," the report says.

Yet, it warns, "the continuation of these reforms, as well as the implementation of the African strategies cited above, is being jeopardized by the lack of even minimally adequate resources. Neither socially nor politically can this reform effort be sustained without improvements in social services and a gradual rise in real income becoming apparent to African consumers and voters."

While the secretary-general's report lays some blame on continued internal problems such as political instability, civil strife, and military conflicts, it states emphatically that "economic performance and efforts to improve it were particularly undermined by an unfavorable external environment."

In 1986 alone, Africa lost \$19 billion as a direct result of falling commodity prices, rising to \$50 billion for the entire UNPAAERD period. Adding to the problem, foreign debt rose to \$272 billion by 1990, double its 1980 level, and equivalent to 90 percent of the region's GDP. Debt service payments total \$20 billion a year, or 30 percent of export receipts.

While some donors substantially increased aid to Africa, the overall performance fell short of expectations: Indeed, according to the UN report, net resource flows to Africa declined, from \$24.6 billion in 1986 to \$23.3 billion in 1990.

"In their reviews and evaluations," noted Ghanaian representative K.D. Dankwa on behalf of the G7 group during the debate on Africa's economic recovery at the UN, "the secretary-general, the ECA conference of ministers, and the OAU ministers have all determined that UNPAAERD has been a failure. What is even more disconcerting is the finding that whereas Africa has largely discharged the immense and costly responsibilities it assumed under the compact, the international community has reneged on its undertakings."

Western governments—while acknowledging the inadequacy of resource flows—put most of the blame for the failure of UNPAAERD on internal shortcomings. The tough line taken by Western governments is illustrated by the intervention of Sweden (usually one of the most liberal) during the General Assembly

THE LOST DECADE

While the Nordic countries had achieved the 0.7 percent target for development cooperation, the Swedish delegate noted that external assistance was of limited value without correlated changes on the African domestic scene.

Despite economic reform measures being taken by African governments, he maintained, greater efforts needed to be made to liberalize economies, open up free trade, remove general subsidies that were not focused on the poorest parts of the population, and encourage the development of a thriving private sector. Trade with and investment in Africa, he charged, continue to be impeded by a "plethora of red tape and bureaucratic fences."

"It has not been a lost decade for others, so why should it be a lost decade for Africa?" asked a senior U.S. official who has been involved in the negotiations. "We are willing to accept our obligations, to accept the necessity for more assistance, in fact all they want, but within the context that African countries have the prime responsibility for their own development."

The same official conceded, however, that developments in Eastern Europe—or the "prodigal son phenomenon," as he put it—have had a profound effect on Western attitudes toward Africa, and explained in part the West's tough line. Asked recently by an African diplomat when Africa would become fashionable in the West, the U.S. official responded: "Africa had its chance in the 1960s but they threw it away."

That the West is hardly likely to come to Africa's rescue in its greatest hour of need is underscored by the out-turn of the UNPAARD review. In his report, the UN secretary-general put it to donors that to double the continent's annual per capita income to the modest sum of \$700, Africa would have to achieve a GDP growth rate of 6 percent per annum over the next 24 years.

This, the report said, would require a revitalization of the historic

countries, as well as the achievement of specific targets with regard to aid, debt, and commodity prices.

Rejecting the multilateral "compact" approach, the U.S. and more conservative donors, not wishing to cede the political leverage associated with aid, argued for a case-by-case approach. Agreement on the new agenda in the General Assembly was further held up by U.S. insistence that wording in the original ad hoc committee document—which refers to the continent's commitment to democratization—be made more specific by referring to the link between improved governance and accountability and successful long-term development.

In his report, the UN secretary-general estimated that to achieve a 6 percent growth rate, Africa would require \$30 billion in net official development assistance by 1992, to increase on a cumulative basis at 4 percent per annum to the year 2000.

In the new agenda, external partners committed themselves to "provide additional resource flows to Africa that will complement domestic efforts and financial resources," without putting a figure to this support.

Even more important than aid flows, the report went on to say, "is the need for a bold attempt to tackle Africa's debt problem." Citing the recent cancellation by the U.S. of \$7 billion of Egypt's debt and forgiveness of 70 percent of Poland's debt as examples of measures that can be taken, given the political will, the secretary-general proposed: a cancellation of all official bilateral debt and semi-official exports credits; substantial reduction through donor financing of debt owed to multilateral institutions (which accounts for 40 percent of the continent's debt-servicing obligations); and writing down of private commercial debt through donor-funded equity and environment swaps.

The draft new agenda presented by the ad hoc committee to the General Assembly, citing the Group of 7 London summit in July, made reference only to the need for "additional

beyond the relief granted under Toronto terms" (which involve a one-third cancellation of official debt).

Yet, late last year, the U.S. was arguing that this paragraph be further refined to read: "With regard to debt, the summit agreed on the need for additional debt relief measures on a case-by-case basis, for the poorest, most indebted countries, going well beyond the relief granted under the Toronto terms."

Whatever wording is finally agreed, the unlikelihood that the targets set by the secretary-general will become a reality is underscored by the difficulties being faced by British Prime Minister John Major in selling his "Trinidad terms" (which involve a once-off, two-thirds cancellation of official debt) to other industrialized countries. After failing to get a concrete response during the G7 summit in London in July, Major announced at the Commonwealth heads of government summit in Harare recently that if he can't carry others with him Britain will move alone.


The new agenda is similarly vague on the other debt proposals promising, for example, no more than "serious consideration" to reducing the burden of debt owed to multilateral financial institutions. It also goes no further than to authorize a feasibility study on an African Diversification Fund, postponing one of the report's most original and pressing suggestions.

For beleaguered African governments, the clear message is that—at Nigeria's ambassador the UN Ibrahim Gambari, put it in a speech on behalf of the Organization of African Unity—"our salvation is fully in our hands."

Yet even more so than the countries of Eastern Europe, argues the UN expert who has been closely associated with UNPAARD, Africa needs a jump start to get going. Right now, he says, "the outlook is grim. My worst fear is that a lot of the new democratic regimes will find themselves increasingly turning to authoritarian means."

Babacar Ndiaye: AFRICA'S PREMIER BANKER

The president of the African Development Bank sees limitless possibilities for Africa's economies in this era of democratization, with a whole new set of markets for Africa's exports in Eastern Europe and the private sector as the engine for growth. Although the continent suffered setbacks over the last decade, Babacar Ndiaye argues that to focus on its heavy debt burden is to overlook the central challenge for Africa's leaders—generating new inflows of resources.



Margaret A. Novicki

By MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: You said recently that Africa is "more impoverished" today than five years ago, when the UN Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UNPAAERD) was launched. Why? What has failed in Africa and on the part of the international community? What strategy is needed for Africa to move ahead instead of backwards?

Ndiaye: The impoverishment of Africa is measured by the growth of national product, and research indicates that we will need to have a constant growth rate of 4 percent in order for Africa to be at the level of the early 1980s. That suggests that the continent will require a lot of resources—national savings, foreign financial support—just to maintain a level of what it

was in 1980. So we need to do more. But do more in which direction?

First on the reform side: Policy reforms are important. It is impossible to do anything which is not in the framework of policy reform. But now I am more inclined to talk about the alternative solution proposed by the Economic Commission for Africa a couple of years ago. The attractiveness in this proposition is that the macroeconomic policy reforms have to be coupled with the transformation of the production structure, with the processing of our raw materials, with the diversification not only on the production line of cash crops, but of trading partners. This is absolutely important—we have to look at a comprehensive structural adjustment approach.

Of course, one of the difficulties with UNPAAERD was that Africa was expecting too much from its partners in the north. The total amount of resources expected was over \$40 billion, and twice that amount to be mobilized internally. From inside, it was difficult to mobilize \$82 billion over five years because Africa's global savings are not that high and even if savings exist, one has to look at a network of savings institutions to be placed in villages, in the rural areas, in the capital cities, in order to collect these savings. It was also necessary to undertake an informational campaign to familiarize the peasants and the rural people with the banking and savings system for them to feel confident that when they are depositing their funds, they can have them back, the value of the money is preserved, and they can even earn a profit out of it.

It is simple for industrialized countries, for people who are not living in an underdeveloped context, but these small things are important—familiarizing people with the modern financial system. So the basic work was not done and no wonder after five years that we could not mobilize the resources necessary to be injected in UNPAAERD.

Obviously, apart from the lack of administrative system—the banking and financial service network I have just mentioned—one should not ignore external factors. The drop in commodity prices has had a tremendous effect on savings and investment levels in Africa, as well as the weight of debt service—public authorities being confronted with the tradeoff of paying part of their debt in order to maintain credit standing with the donor community, versus the necessity of facing investment needs and even sometimes simply current expenditure: how to pay the civil servants, how to bring in essential commodities, these kinds of things. This tradeoff was very difficult for many African leaders and obviously had an impact on financing UNPAAERD.

Africa Report: So the economic reform programs need to be deepened and more adapted to local circumstances. That is your criticism?

Ndiaye: Yes, they are too much addressing short-term needs, macro-economic balances, and not the transformation of the economic structure.

Africa Report: How do you see donor countries' responses to Africa's debt burden, which currently stands at \$275 billion? Do the new proposals such as the Trinidad terms address the root problem?

Ndiaye: To look at it seriously, the debt problem is diverting our energy unnecessarily because instead of making the right diagnosis of the problem, we are still considering its symp-

toms—i.e. that you have to pay your bill and you don't have the resources to do so. You think of rescheduling or reducing it, a debt relief arrangement, but all these are like taking aspirin for a headache. Maybe you can sleep for the night, but tomorrow you still have your headache because the cause of it has not been cured.

Our main problem, if we are to address it properly, is to have resources to finance our development. And debt is part of those resources. Even if the stock of debt, the \$275 billion, were cancelled today, you will get rid of some of your headache. But don't forget that most of the bills due for debt service by the very least developed countries are not paid anyway, because they don't have the means to pay them. So to say after a period that you don't have means to pay, OK we forgive it, well I am morally better off, but that will not put my investment on, that will not make my countryside green or put the spare parts in the engine. What will do that is fresh additional resources in the continent. So if we only limit ourselves to debt relief or debt reduction, if we only limit ourselves to the Trinidad terms, which are better than the Toronto terms, and Toronto was better than Venice, it will not be enough if we don't talk about an additional flow of resources toward the development of our continent.

That would ideally be direct investment—a non-debt-creating resource flow—having business firms, industries investing directly in Africa. Of course, we have to create the conditions to attract those investors in such a way that when they come in, they also try to get indigenous partners, not necessarily governments to further multiply state enterprises. I'm not looking for those kinds of things. So we have to work in order to attract more direct investment, non-debt-creating resources in Africa.

Second is to see if we can mobilize more concessional resources and of course borrowing, increasing the debt flow. But when we have all these resources in place, they have to be used properly, not for luxurious buildings or investments, but productive investment. If that is done, we will be creating the conditions to be able to expand our gross national product, our trade possibilities, and of course to be able to properly service the debt.

Africa Report: Given that donors' attention is now also diverted to Eastern Europe for example, are you optimistic that this increased resource flow will happen, or is Africa being further marginalized?

Ndiaye: First of all, we should not overreact to the fact that European countries may tend to look to Eastern Europe to help consolidate the new democracies and to help developing market economies in these countries. I consider this kind of trend very natural, as it is very natural for the United States to think of Mexico because the border is very close. It is not only by mere commercial interest that the U.S. is thinking about strengthening the relationship with Mexico and also with Canada. Today, the economic situation is changing in Mexico, capital flight is reversing, the economy is starting to boom, and as a consequence, it will reduce immigration. So I consider this a natural trend and I wish a lot of good to European countries to have the same kind of positive effect as the U.S. and Mexico. I would have loved that Burkina Faso was like the U.S. in Africa. I am sure they would have helped Mali and Chad.

My main point here is that we should not overemphasize

what we would consider ourselves as a natural and moral obligation to our neighbors and more so if the neighbors are our brothers. Having said that, we should see this as a new opportunity for African markets. I am insisting on that. I just came back from Germany and when the wall collapsed and some Germans came to Berlin, they didn't buy Mercedes or sophisticated things—they went and ate some bananas! So we should not leave this potential for other Third World countries to go and exploit this market with their agricultural products. We have here expanded possibilities. That is how I would like us to see it—as a new challenge and a new opportunity.

Of course, we are in a world of high competitiveness. We are competing with Eastern Europe because we can see it immediately. But we should not forget that we are competing with other parts of the world. We are competing with Asian countries in general, the middle-income countries, the newly industrialized countries. We are competing because we have the same structure, the same climate, the same potential, so Africa should not drag its feet. We have to improve our conditions; we have to do serious reform and we have to be competitive in order to receive more resources.

Africa Report: What in your view is the link between democratization and development? What role should the private sector play in Africa's economic growth?

Ndiaye: There is no sustainable development without democracy. Democracy is a prerequisite. And the private sector is an important tool, an instrument for achieving democracy in Third World countries. The simple fact is that when we were in the situation of the one-party system, the people were all depending on the center—the center will give work, will decide your destiny, etc. The center was the power and the source of your happiness or your misfortune. When you have a widespread private sector, the situation is the reverse. Authorities depend on the private sector because even the income of the government has to be discussed with the population. So government will depend more upon the people in a society where the private sector is expanded than in a society where government is controlling everything.

Philosophically, we consider that the private sector has not only an economic role to play, to have better living conditions for our people, but more than that, a political role. A wide and well-established private sector is a mechanism for the consolidation of democracy. We have to work to develop an indigenous capacity for the private sector. So the democratization which is going on in Africa is a very good sign, a very healthy turn of events. We have to work to consolidate that. The aim of the African Development Bank is precisely to finance development, and we should therefore look at the best way to finance the private sector. ■

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"Never before has there been assembled under one roof as large and distinguished a group of Africa's most successful businessmen and women—from every corner of the continent. Nor has a conference on investment in Africa—and held in Africa—attracted so many top business officials from abroad...Our very presence is ample evidence of our collective rejection of Afro-pessimism."

With these positive words, African Development Bank (ADB) President Babacar Ndiaye declared open an unprecedented conference in Senegal on investment opportunities in West Africa, hosted by the African Business Roundtable (ABR) of which he is founding chairman. Co-sponsored by the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the U.S. Agency for International Development, the November gathering in Dakar's prestigious Meridien President Hotel was the climax to a four-country ABR whistle-stop tour that took American investors to Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, the Gambia, and Senegal.

Created as an informal advisory body to the ADB, the ABR now has the status of an independent, non-profit association that is Africa's first continent-wide business organization—a high-powered millionaires' club of entrepreneurs whose credo is that the future of Africa in terms of development and growth rests not with the overburdened and incapable public sector, but with the creative genius of the private sector.

Peter da Costa is a freelance journalist based in Banjul, The Gambia.

Ndiaye's speech, delivered in the direct language of business, was a definitive endorsement of the private enterprise culture sweeping the globe as a follow-up to the democratization trend: "It is a thriving private sector that will bring the innovation, the technology, and the resources that will help Africa tap its vast and rich natural and human resources." The private sector's ability to act as engine of development, argued Ndiaye, depended on three factors: the political changes sweeping the continent; the new approaches to public policy management; and the onward march toward greater African economic integration and cooperation.

Democratization in Zambia, Cape Verde, and São Tomé and Príncipe, along with developments in Algeria, Benin, Namibia, and Senegal, proved that "the traditions of conciliatory democracy, popular participation, and conflict resolution are not new or alien to Africa," said Ndiaye. This political enlightenment, he argued, was the flip-side of economic openness, mirroring the "deep conviction that economic freedom and the entrepreneurial ethic are the principles we must apply to the task of development."

On the policy level, Ndiaye added, investor-friendly legislation, including tax holidays, free-trade zones, and liberal investment codes, were the order of the day. Recognition that regional economic cooperation was the only answer to marginalization post-Europe 1992 was the catalyst behind the June 1991 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Abuja treaty

aimed at an African Common Market. The motivation behind this pan-Africanism—*intra-African trade and investment*—was, explained Ndiaye, a central objective of the Roundtable. Businessmen and women, he concluded, were the key to defying national boundaries, forging regional markets, and spreading information and technology continent-wide.

Ndiaye's boast about the impressive attendance was no hollow one. Center-stage were such African business giants as Nigerian magnate Chief Bashorun M.K. Abiola, Zambia-based banking mogul Andrew Sardanis, and Cameroonian whiz James Onobiono (whose Compagnie Financière et Industrielle turns over some \$270 million annually and employs 3,000 people), as well as a host of young tycoons with a list of academic qualifications to match their entrepreneurial achievements.

West Africa as a marketplace for indigenous and foreign investors was laid bare at a panel discussion on the investment climate. University of Michigan economic development guru Dr. Ernest Wilson adopted an optimistic approach toward structural adjustment, arguing that the SAPs had raised producer prices of agricultural output and thereby contributed toward the empowerment of the rural peasantry—though urban elites had suffered. Privatization was a necessity which had already shown good results in Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire, he added, concluding that democratization and greater freedom of association would lead to an equitable distribution of wealth. Few of the

The Capitalist CREDO

The African Business Roundtable is a club of African entrepreneurs whose credo is that the private sector should act as the continent's main engine of development. Meeting recently in Dakar, the businessmen stressed that conditions in the marketplace will determine the flow of investment, domestic and foreign, and African economies must free themselves of government obstruction and corruption.

subsequent speakers chose to stress the optimistic view without making it clear that the regional investment climate left a lot to be desired.

Alhaji Abdulaziz Ude, chairman of Tahigh Holdings Ltd., a Nigeria-based company with a \$20 million annual turnover, described in graphic detail why Africa is currently an investor's nightmare. "We are light years behind any other region in the world—and that is the reality." Ude's incisive exposé of the barriers a foreign investor typically faces, from his first inquiry at the local diplomatic mission right down to the airport red-tape he experiences on arrival, was a prelude to a vitriolic attack on governments whose political motivations were blamed for decisions that stifled the business environment. The glaring absence of government policy-makers to answer these charges drew rebukes from the floor, but proved the point many tried to make that government can no longer, and should no longer, involve itself in the business of business.

Insisting that it was incumbent not solely on the Western investor but also on the indigenous African businessman to develop his continent, Ude lambasted government interference in the private sector. "We know of people who built up their businesses brick by brick, only for the politicians to put them out of business with one stroke of the pen," he said. "Taking on the political establishment can be suicidal, but I think now is the time to do it."

African tycoons, he added, were perceived by governments as threats to power, unlike in the West where billionaires were respected and recognized as agents of nation-building. Singling out some ABR members as shining examples of Africa's talent,

Ude demanded: "Why have these people not been able to tower to the heights of their counterparts in other parts of the world? Because of petty envy and jealousy. As Kwame Nkrumah said: 'Seek ye first the political kingdom...'"

While welcoming foreign investors as business partners, Alhaji Ude stressed that without the Western superpower collaborators of Africa's dictators, the continent would be in much better shape. "There must be a universal declaration not just of human rights but of political rights," he said. "We have missed the agricultural, industrial, and computer revolution—why should we accept a permanent fate of regression when we have men and women who are endowed with the tremendous dynamism to uplift us and bring us to the 20th century on the eve of the 21st?"

Why indeed? Chief Adeyemi Lawson, a Nigerian business legend cited by Ude as a role model, attempted some answers. "We belong to the generation that bridged the gap between the colonial era and now. First, political maturity comes through a process of evolution, not overnight. Second, the sanctions of the marketplace do not respond to rhetoric or government views. Investment will flow into Africa when the conditions are right."

For Lawson, the great hope for Africa is South Africa, which he predicted would be the largest and possibly only source of investment capital to sub-Saharan Africa once it had completed its political evolution. "We suffer from indiscipline and immaturity. Interacting with South Africa will mean discipline rubbing off on us." Lawson also argued that South African businessmen might be suspi-

cious of their black countrymen and seek links with black Africans "who already speak the language of the marketplace."

Along with indiscipline and immaturity comes corruption, a subject many were at pains to avoid, but one confronted head-on by others. While some postulated that graft was something that only came into play when private business entered into bids for state contracts, others accepted it as a specter that investors either learned to participate in or were driven away by. In his keynote speech on banking and finance in West Africa, Chief M.K. Abiola rebuked his colleagues for being so self-effacing that ammunition was handed on a plate to foreign detractors. "Official corruption is an authentic Western export," he insisted. "Yet we give too much publicity to even flimsy allegations of corruption levelled against us, allegations which are subsequently magnified and embellished by the Western press and their so-called risk analysts."

Chief Abiola challenged the tendency toward generalized accusations and allegations, exhorting the organized private sector to expose those who approached its members for a bribe. "This, I am convinced, is the only way to tackle this problem and put an end to the mindless attempt to destroy our collective reputation. If there are racial or other reasons why the West does not want to invest in Africa, then so be it, but we cannot continue to undermine ourselves by providing those whose interest in our future is, at best, hesitant with ammunition to confirm their prejudice." As one American delegate told *Africa Report*: "Suspicion is a two-way street. Government thinks the private sector are crooks and

thieves and the private sector sees government as corrupt, lazy, and so on. It doesn't exactly create the conditions for dialogue, does it?"

West African businessmen, then, are on the offensive, whether it be against negative stereotyping or in favor of intra-regional trade. Chief Abiola's keynote speech, a definitive paper on the monetary and fiscal mechanisms necessary for regional economic integration, made a number of innovative recommendations designed to speed the goals of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas).

The backdrop to Abiola's thesis that only banking and financial institutions can fill the economic sub-regional vacuum is the statistic that most of West Africa's external trade—96 percent between 1980 and 1990—is with countries outside the 16-member community. Existing systems, by dint of their rudimentary nature and the disorganized nature of the private sector, have militated against the growth of capital stock markets, with the result that industry has not had sufficient financial investment. "International financial institutions have over-leveraged Ecowas economies with debt instruments, while the more prudent equity financing option has been practically non-existent," he added.

Problems affecting the expansion of intra-regional trade, said Abiola, included the inadequacy of the banking system, the multiplicity of national currencies (and their non-convertibility), the colonial hangover of anglophone, francophone, and American heritages, and the competing rather than complementary nature of Ecowas member nationals.

One particular problem Abiola identified was the dearth of dynamic correspondent relationships among banks divided by colonial traditions. The fact that British banks tended to set up in anglophone countries and French banks in francophone countries had "led to the improbable situation where an importer in Côte d'Ivoire who wished to buy from an exporter in Nigeria must open a letter of credit through a French bank in

Abidjan which sends it to its head office in Paris, which in turn sends it to its British correspondent bank in London which finally sends it to its banking affiliate in Nigeria... This otherwise simple exercise, which ought to take no longer than 48 hours, becomes a cumbersome intercontinental transaction involving four banks in four countries and sometimes takes as long as eight weeks."

Despite this gloomy catalogue, added Chief Abiola, the informal, non-documented trade sector continued to boom throughout West Africa. He quoted statistics showing that while official trade between Nigeria and its Ecowas partners (excluding petroleum transactions) stood at about \$20 million a year, unofficial trade accounts for about \$100 million annually. This fact, according to Abiola, proved that the efforts of the private sector were constantly dynamic, and that the fault lay with official policies and the lack of decisive political will which combined to "frustrate serious investors and drive meaningful trade underground."

To close his paper, Chief Abiola recommended first that Cameroon, which spurned Ecowas membership under Ahmadou Ahidjo because he feared the preeminence of Nigeria as a regional trading partner, be admitted into the Community. He also suggested the setting up of a totally private commercial bank to enhance the activities of Ecobank, an Ecowas entity which, though it operates in five member-states to facilitate financing of intra-Community trade, "is still more like a financial services bureau serving the club of Chambers of Commerce across the region than a commercial bank informed and guided by the peculiar activities and profit-centered interests of individual investors and businessmen."

Other recommendations included the setting up of export guarantee schemes sponsored by governments and a realistic exchange rate reform for the region. In arguing that a common Ecowas monetary unit, a single currency, should be adopted, Abiola showed patriotism in nominating the naira as the currency to be adopted.

Most significantly, in a blaze of applause, Abiola urged all governments to intensify their privatization programs and to turn over ownership and management of all public corporations and commercial businesses to the "indisputably more efficient" private sector. This act required a greater level of political will, the chief warned.

It was fitting that the most eloquent and powerful argument for privatization should come from a man regarded as Africa's richest tycoon, "Mr. Midas Touch" as one delegate whispered. Questions about the success or otherwise of the Roundtable gathering were easily answered by the number of business deals being made over the 72-hour period. The Nigerian oilman smelled a deal to ship petroleum to Senegal. The black American from Texas found a friend for life and a valuable business partner in the Ghanaian Mr. Big of chicken farming. The publishing mogul made contacts with U.S. investors brought to the meeting by OPIC. The Gambian hotelier made strides toward getting the vital partnership finance needed for his ambitious tourist complex.

Suggestions from ABR members pleased with the conference's success included giving the ABR observer status at the G7 summit, World Bank, IMF, and EEC. A lobbying group in the U.S. to promote black business through the ABR was postulated, as was a similar organization in Africa to pressure the OAU, Ecowas, and other political forums.

But the biggest benefit of ABR 1991 may lie in the extent to which it has elevated the image of the African businessman abroad. As Alexander Kerserling, a senior international finance corporation official responsible for helping medium-sized African entrepreneurs, put it: "People in the U.S. never...thought African businessmen of the sort we've seen here existed. They are taken aback. The ABR is a forum which promotes interaction between these dynamic Africans and their hitherto ill-informed sources of investment. That's why it works." ○



THE CYCLE OF DEPENDENCY

Betty Press



Images of starving children in Africa draw millions of dollars in donations. But do these images represent a true picture of the impact of food relief on the Third World? Not exactly. The underlying reasons, the mechanics, and the effects of food aid are more complicated than the televised pictures lead one to believe.

By HEATHER HILL

In the heart of Alto Hama, a half-destroyed hamlet in central Angola, some 5,000 ragged rural peasants are assembled in a small field beside a church.

Clutching empty sacks, pails, boxes, baskets, and bowls, they docilely form two long lines that terminate at makeshift checkpoints manned by young Europeans. Four large trucks,

meanwhile, are aligning themselves on the other side of the checkpoints so that local day recruits can unload their cargo. Then, as an anticipatory buzz rises from the crowd, the com-

plex and increasingly controversial exercise of food relief begins.

It goes like this: Each person surrenders a blue ticket to the Red Cross workers at the checkpoint and then goes to the trucks to collect a ration of cooking oil, beans, or maize meal. As the long, hot day creeps forward, the two lines advance almost imperceptibly: Beans spill from the improvised containers, old women have difficulty hoisting the 50-kg sack of maize meal onto their shoulders, and the tins of oil are awkward to carry away. But a note of picnic-like excitement dominates the proceedings, and by the end of the day, children are tossing discarded cardboard boxes back and forth like frisbees.

It's a picture that would warm the heart of anyone who is moved by the plight of the hungry in the Third World. But look again: Behind the fragile ribbon barriers are the ever-present dealers, tough young men in flashy clothes attempting to buy or steal the rations. In mid-afternoon, a mêlée breaks out when a thief grabs the food parcel of an Angolan who has fallen asleep after undergoing the queue. And on the fringes of Alto Hama, fat cattle are grazing and maize fields flourishing. Do these people really need free food from the European Community?

"The target of this operation is to get people off food relief," says Pierre Gauthier, a media spokesman for the International Committee of the Red Cross. "The effects of the war are ongoing. The emergency will be over only when the people become self-sufficient."

ICRC officials are anxious to impress upon a visitor that this food distribution—four months after Angola's 16-year civil war has ended—has the specific purpose of preventing rural Angolans from eating the seeds they will receive in several weeks when the agricultural season begins. The role of food aid is changing dramatically, and since so much of it depends on the generosity

and political will of a public thousands of miles to the north, aid organizations are having to tread the fine line between traditional idealism and the somewhat more complex reality.

"Food aid does more damage than good," asserts an Oxfam official in southern Africa. "It destroys the rural economy. If you put [free] maize on the market, it lowers the price for the farmers. It can get to the point where the farmer won't bother growing food."

"It's easy to distribute food for free," observes an official in Angola's ministry of social affairs. "But it's also surprising the effects it can have on people's psychology to think they can have their stomachs filled without having to do anything for it."

For many people, disillusionment with food aid came in the aftermath of Band Aid, when pop star Bob Geldof, organizer of the 1985 global charity concert, described the subsequent failures in delivering food to Ethiopian famine victims as "a perversion of the act of human generosity." But people working in the field have been aware for more than a decade of the countless disasters wrought by well-intentioned but unregulated Western-based charities for whom food aid is a big business. More and more publications are documenting the errors of old-fashioned give-aways.

And the victims are invariably the recipients: farmers sabotaged by a sudden oversupply of their crop, people who are either dead or out of danger by the time the food gets to them, people who are given food inappropriate to their usual diet or their medical condition, people who become trapped in the aid dependency cycle, unwilling or unable to go back to growing their own food.

Because the pitfalls and weaknesses of food relief have become so apparent, a new phase in its evolution has begun: free food for sale. Instead of the food simply being given away directly to (most often) refugees, it is sold at subsidized rates to middlemen—established small traders or government agencies—as a way of maintaining the existing

local economy. The sale of food aid is not well known, not just because it is new, but because it is a complex mechanism in the giant industry of food relief—and one not easily explained to a First World public which wants to save starving children.

"Some donor [agencies] don't accept it," said the Angolan government official who works in the social welfare department. "U.S. AID used to be appalled at the idea of selling food aid. But we [relief personnel] have to attack the idea that people are dying of hunger. It's a misconception that food is urgently required in an emergency situation."

At present, there are only a few cases of relief food being sold. One is Angola, where the World Food Programme has agreed to sales of its stocks to the Gabela railway line. The railway company needs the food for the workers who are building a rail link from Porto Aboim to Gabela. The money realized from the sales will then go into a fund run by the local peasants' association, which will use the money to rehabilitate day care centers.

"The fact that there aren't shops doesn't mean that food should be free," points out the Angolan government official. "We have to act as a substitute for the shops."

Another such scheme has been undertaken in Ethiopia's Ogaden desert, where the population has been swelled this year by the arrival of some 250,000 refugees from neighboring Somalia. The fragile livestock economy of the Ogaden has been devastated by the massive influx, and development officials were faced with the prospect of both Ethiopians and Somalis arriving en masse at refugee camps and food distribution centers. Save The Children and the World Food Programme decided to sell donated grain at low rates to desert traders in an effort to maintain the established market patterns of the rural areas.

"Nobody yet has managed to give out grain successfully," observes John Seaman, head of policy development at Save The Children in

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Ethiopia. "You give it out to some people, they end up selling it to others and it goes to market that way. The choice is really not whether you sell the grain, but who's going to sell it to whom."

Malawi provides perhaps the best illustration of the effects of free food on the local economy. In 1986, Mozambican refugees began pouring into this small agricultural enclave by the hundreds of thousands, fleeing a brutal, guerrilla-style civil war across the border. Today, the refugees number 1 million, packed into camps cheek by jowl with the national population of 7 million. Indeed, in the Nsanje region of southern Malawi, Mozambicans outnumber Malawians by three to one.

Since the Mozambicans are effectively forbidden to farm in Malawi, they receive food exclusively from the relief organizations. The country has become the World Food Programme's biggest recipient in Africa, which every month brings in 6,000 tons of maize, 300 tons of groundnuts, and more than 900 tons of beans. (The biweekly ration package distributed by the Red Cross also includes sugar, cooking oil, and salt.)

Aid officials working in Malawi agree that there is less "diversion"—theft—of food relief by government officials or subcontracted workers than in most other African countries. What that means is that there is far more food for the refugees to sell. Indeed, sales are so brisk along the roadsides that Malawi's business community, composed largely of East Indians, is complaining to the government that "they have a very strong and illegal competition," according to one relief worker.

Cooking oil is a particularly sore point. This is the most popular component of the ration package, and the Malawian cooking oil industry has seen its market shrink because the product is being sold widely and more cheaply by the refugees. In an attempt to curb the illegal sales, the WFP has decided to reduce the amount of oil given to the refugees.

But ultimately, the WFP, an agen-

"Food aid does more damage than good. It destroys the rural economy. If you put free maize on the market, it lowers the price for farmers."

cy of the United Nations, takes the view that its food is a present and the refugees are free to do with it what they wish. Furthermore, according to the WFP, once the food enters the country, it becomes the property of the Malawian government, upon whom the onus falls to police the illegal sales. Only a few sporadic arrests have been made, however, and the illegal sales continue.

But if the Malawian government receives no taxes or customs duties on the tons and tons of donated food entering the country, it is benefitting in other ways. The relief organizations have brought in vast amounts of hard currency. Médecins Sans Frontières, for example, runs its biggest operation in Malawi, with an annual budget of \$3 million. Every major relief organization in the world is working in some way with the Mozambican refugees, hiring local people, donating vehicles, and building schools and hospitals as they go.

The beneficence of the international community toward the Mozambican refugees in Malawi has taken some ironic turns. The hard currency spent by the donor organizations has created an economic boom for Malawi. The urban shops, once nearly bare, have blossomed with South African consumer products ranging from chocolate to electrical appliances.

Another unforeseen development has been the disproportionate prosperity of certain groups of refugees, such as those who live in camps along the Ntcheu-Dedza highway. The stretch of road between these two small towns constitutes the border between Malawi and Mozambique. Along it, there are thick clus-

ters of refugees' huts on the Malawian side; on the Mozambican side, there are miles and miles of farms which the refugees work during the day. "They sell their produce in Malawi, so they have a better life than the Malawians," a relief official explained.

Indeed, over the long-term, many of the refugees have better health and nutrition than the citizens of the host country. An MSF doctor has observed that the "hungry season"—the period between the two annual harvests—is becoming a greater hardship for Malawians. "More and more, we are getting Malawian children in the intensive feeding units."

One of the most noticeable health problems for Mozambicans can be traced straight back to the food rations they get when they come to Malawi. Even when they arrive, they tend to have "no grave problems," the MSF doctor said. But "two months after their arrival, we have noticed that there is severe malnutrition among the children," said the MSF doctor. "We suppose it's because the family sells the rations to pay for their passage [across the border].

"Refugee life is sometimes irrational," she said. "Sometimes these people have imperatives we don't understand. No matter how malnourished they are, they still use the food for other purposes." The MSF doctor cited refugees in Sudan who used their rations of grain and sugar to brew alcohol.

The subtleties and snafus of food relief, however, are not generally broadcast in the developed world, partly because of lack of interest, partly because the vast majority of people respond to the same old knee-jerk appeal. "We've all been guilty because we've all used images of starving kids to raise money," admits the Oxfam official.

"I think it's immoral. Black Africans don't like it because it's degrading. But it pulls at people's heartstrings. When we put a starving kid in the paper, we always get a good response." ○



SOUTH AFRICA

Alfredo Muecke/AM



Historic negotiations between the F.W. de Klerk government and black political organizations opened in December. Whatever the outcome—for example, an interim administration in which the National Party and the African National Congress would share power—de Klerk seems confident that he can obtain the approval of the white electorate in a promised referendum.

By PATRICK LAURENCE

A

s 1991 drew to a close, the prospects of a peaceful settlement to South Africa's protracted conflict, after alternately advancing and receding for nearly two years, once again looked hopeful.

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THE YEAR OF

The meeting on December 20 and 21 of some 240 representatives from a wide spectrum of political forces at the World Trade Fair on the outskirts of Johannesburg marked the start of substantive negotiations after months of pre-negotiation discussion.

The representatives had already chosen a name for their meeting at a preparatory conference on November 29: the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, or Codesa. The use of the word "convention" was redolent with history.

More than 90 years earlier, representatives from all over South Africa gathered at the National Convention of 1908-1909. Their aim was to unite the four British colonies—Cape, Natal, Orange Free State, and Transvaal—into the Union of South Africa; their task was compounded by the bitter memories of war.

Two of the four colonies—Free State and Transvaal—had been Boer Republics until their defeat in the Anglo-Boer war of 1889-1902. The National Convention succeeded, however, in forging the Union of South Africa in 1910.

Its success was a major achievement and a huge, if incomplete, step on the road to reconciliation between Boer and Briton. The Union, however, rested on the subordination of the

black majority, who, having been excluded from the deliberations of the convention, were denied equal citizenship in the infant state.

In a sense, the delegates who converged on the World Trade Fair for the first meeting of Codesa were completing the task started by their compatriots more than 90 years before: They were creating a new form of union in which blacks would be co-founders and equal citizens.

If the National Convention united South Africa after the Anglo-Boer war, Codesa was mandated to reunite South Africa by reincorporating the quartet of nominally independent states—Transkei, BophuthaTswana, Venda, and Ciskei—which had been excised from South Africa in accordance with the dictates of "grand apartheid."

One of the items on Codesa's agenda was the fate of the TBVC states, as the four putatively sovereign states were known. The overwhelming mood was that they should return to South Africa and help forge its future. By sending delegates to Codesa, the TBVC states had implicitly but unmistakably acknowledged that their future lay in the emerging new and reunited South Africa.

Codesa, like the National Conven-

tion, was marked by absences at the negotiating table. There was one critical difference, however. Black leaders were excluded from the National Convention against their will. Political movements, black and white, absent from the deliberations leading to Codesa, and from Codesa itself, excluded themselves.

Those who rejected invitations to attend the preparatory meeting for Codesa ranged from Eugene Terreblanche's Afrikaner Resistance Movement on the right to Pandelani

drawal was its conviction, expressed on the eve of the preparatory meeting and during the meeting itself, that the ANC and the "de Klerk regime" had concluded a secret deal to act in collusion to determine the shape and direction of Codesa and, more specifically, to set up an interim government in which they would share power.

The specter of rejectionist forces hung over the talks, raising the question of whether they could subvert the process toward a settlement and

In the September 1988 election, the National Party and the Democratic Party obtained nearly 70 percent of the vote, against about 30 percent for the Conservative Party. Since Zach de Beer's Democratic Party was a participant in Codesa, de Klerk's assumption that its supporters would vote in favor of a settlement in a referendum was not wishful thinking. He thus had a fair safety margin to cushion the National Party against Conservative Party gains.

From a different perspective, opinion polls offered the ANC a great deal of comfort. The combined support of the Azanian People's Organization and

the Pan Africanist Congress, as indicated by opinion polls, was minimal, running at well below 10 percent. Unless the ANC made fundamental mistakes during the negotiations, it seemed assured of, at the least, a clear plurality of black voters.

Put another way, pro-settlement forces included political parties which represented a clear majority of the whites and the two biggest and the two most powerful black-oriented forces, the ANC and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party.

These facts pointed to an inexorable conclusion: Political forces which excluded themselves from the negotiations were a bigger danger to themselves than to the settlement. They were—as de Klerk's Minister of Constitutional Development, Gerrit Viljoen, remarked, at the close of the preparatory conference for Codesa—in danger of irreversibly marginalizing themselves.

The corollary to that situation was that Codesa represented, in a phrase which entered South Africa's political vocabulary toward the end of 1991, "a sufficient consensus" to forge a settlement for the whole nation.

The notion of "sufficient consensus" was developed during the pre-negotiation talks between the ANC

NEGOTIATIONS

Nefolovodhwe's Azanian People's Organization on the left. Sharing their rejection of the negotiations was Andries Treurnicht's Conservative Party, the official opposition in the white chamber of South Africa's tri-racial parliament.

Although they viewed Codesa from different perspectives, these organizations reached the same conclusion: It was a forum for a sell-out. They differed, of course, about who was selling out whom.

Terreblanche and Treurnicht accused President F.W. de Klerk's ruling National Party of capitulating to Nelson Mandela's African National Congress and its ally, the South African Communist Party. Nefolovodhwe feared that the ANC had made fatal compromises and that it would be outwitted and forced to agree to a deal which would fall short of "true liberation."

The position of the Pan Africanist Congress was more complicated. It had participated in the preparatory meeting, at which procedural points about Codesa were resolved. But it had then suspended further participation pending consultations with its rank and file members, many of whom were vociferously critical of negotiations with "the enemy."

The reason for the PAC's with-

whether a settlement without their agreement would be viable.

The continued growth of the Conservative Party in the white community was a worrying factor to those who pinned their hopes on a settlement. On the eve of the preparatory meeting on November 29, it won a spectacular by-election victory in Virginia in the Free State, capturing the seat from the National Party in a swing of more than 15 percent in its favor.

The growth of the Conservative Party was made pertinent by de Klerk's promise to refer whatever agreement emerged from the negotiations to the white electorate for approval. The pledge gave the Conservative Party one last chance to topple de Klerk before the pending enfranchisement of blacks reduced it to a minority party, drawing its support from a dwindling white demographic support base.

De Klerk, however, remained confident that he would win a clear majority in a referendum in the white community. His confidence was based on the calculation that the loss of National Party supporters to the Conservative Party would be more than cancelled by the backing it would win from members of and sympathizers with the Democratic Party.

and the de Klerk administration; it was decided to strive for consensus in the negotiations proper, but where that proved impossible, to proceed on the basis of a "sufficient consensus." The concept was never precisely defined, but it clearly implied more than a mere majority vote.

The agreement could be interpreted as a pragmatic but democratically defensible arrangement between the two most important interlocutors or as a "conspiracy" by them to control proceedings to the disadvantage of the smaller parties. The PAC saw it as a conspiracy, although according to ANC Secretary-General Cyril Ramaphosa, the PAC itself had conducted "secret talks" with the de Klerk government.

Either way, the squabble between the ANC and the PAC meant that the Patriotic Front, an alliance of anti-apartheid forces established under the aegis of the ANC and the PAC on October 27, was effectively destroyed hardly more than a month after its creation.

The confident anticipation that a major bloc of anti-apartheid forces would confront the de Klerk government in concert at the negotiations had been shattered. Instead, cleavages had emerged in the Patriotic Front and provided the de Klerk government with an opportunity to deploy its old strategem of divide and rule.

Against that, however, the de Klerk administration and the ANC were moving for the moment in tandem, indicating that the situation was far more fluid than most observers had anticipated. One manifestation of the fluidity concerned the ANC's demand for an interim government.

Initially, de Klerk had opposed the call, arguing that South Africa was a sovereign country and not a colony, and that installation of an interim government in South Africa would be too reminiscent of the transitional governments which had taken over in Rhodesia and Namibia shortly before they attained independence.

De Klerk's line consisted essentially of two points: First, there could

be no substitution for the sovereignty of the present tri-racial parliament—which excluded blacks—until it voted itself out of existence by approving a new constitution; second, "transitional arrangements" to give extra-parliamentary parties a say in the administration of the country would be considered provided they did not compromise the sovereignty of parliament.

But toward the end of the year, official thinking shifted perceptibly: It began to warm to the notion of an interim government in which the ANC would be a major partner. The only proviso was that the envisaged transitional government could not exercise power in a constitutional vacuum and that the present constitution would have to be amended to provide a legal basis for it.

Amendment of the constitution implied one further step. De Klerk and his predecessor, PW. Botha, had promised the white electorate that they would not make any major constitutional initiatives without referring to them for approval. An amendment to admit blacks to government thus implied an election or a referendum.

Critical differences, however, remained in the approaches of the ANC and the de Klerk administration. The ANC wanted an interim government of short duration: Its primary function was to pave the way for the election, on the basis of one person, one vote, of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution for South Africa; that task, in the ANC's view, could be completed in a relatively short time of between 18 and 24 months.

The de Klerk administration wanted the interim government to last for a longer time, measured in years rather than months. Press reports talked of an interim government lasting between five and 10 years. Government spokesmen stressed that there was a quid pro quo for its willingness to share power: The ANC would have to share responsibility.

The broad strokes of the government's strategy were visible between the lines: By prolonging the period of

interim government and making the ANC co-responsible for running the country, it was hoping to further reduce the ANC's mystique as a resistance force. Less cynically, the longer the life of the interim government, the more South Africans would become accustomed to the notion of blacks playing a key role in the governance of the country.

One of the first items on the agenda of Codesa was the establishment of interim arrangements for the governance of South Africa until the adoption of a new constitution. It promised to be a tough, bruising debate.

Two equally important items were listed high on Codesa's agenda: "General constitutional principles" and "constitutional-making body/process." The exegesis of those somewhat obscure phases was relatively simple. Codesa would discuss broad constitutional principles and thus provide a framework within which a constituent assembly could draft a constitution.

It foreshadowed a possible compromise between the government's proposition that Codesa itself draft a constitution and the ANC's position, which was endorsed by the PAC, that constitution-making should be left to an elected constituent assembly.

There were several points of convergence in constitutional thinking between the major interlocutors, including universal adult suffrage, a bicameral legislature, proportional representation, an independent judiciary, and a justiciable bill of rights.

But, contrapuntally, there were critical areas of difference: One concerned the nature and composition of the presidency (with the ANC favoring a strong executive-type presidency and the government, a collective presidency drawn from the three or five major parties); another related to the balance of power between the central and regional governments and the upper and lower houses.




An exciting year lies ahead; after months of maneuvering, 1992 promises to be the "Year of Negotiations."



COMMONWEALTH

BANQUETS AND BANTER

Margaret A. Novicki



Andrew Meldrum

Clockwise,
from top left:
former Presi-
dent Kenneth
Kaunda of
Zambia,
President
Kamuzu Banda
of Malawi,
President
Robert
Mugabe of
Zimbabwe,
and Sir Dawda
Jawara,
president of
The Gambia

Sarah-Jane Poole

The 28th Commonwealth summit in Zimbabwe produced no surprises, but instead a vague promise to work on behalf of democracy, human rights, free market economics, and a liberated South Africa over the next decade. The rift over sanctions against Pretoria, the sticking point of the 1989 summit, was smoothly patched over so that all members, including Britain, could endorse the proposal.

It was an impressive sight, the gathering of 43 heads of government of some of the world's most and least powerful countries, the richest and the poorest, the largest and the smallest, at the opening of the 28th Commonwealth Heads of Government summit in Harare.

Garbed in grey business suits, colorful West African robes, and flowing Asian saris, the leaders met to shape a new role for the Commonwealth in the 1990s and into the 21st century.

Aged Malawian Life President Hastings Kamuzu Banda lost his balance as he climbed the stairs to the dais—Kenyan strongman Daniel arap Moi helped him to his seat. Those two African leaders remained out of step with the summit, which was a forum for the trends of multi-party democracy and promotion of human rights which have swept throughout Africa and most of the world.

The Commonwealth, of course, is the curious organization that brings together Britain and all but one of its former colonies to work together as equal partners for their common interests. The British empire which spanned the globe has now become a voluntary and mutually beneficial association. Every two years, the leaders meet for a week of discussions, banquets, and banter.

"What other international organization can bring together such a diverse group of leaders from every corner of the globe and hold wide-ranging discussions with no need for an interpreter?" asked British Prime Minister John Major, praising the Commonwealth's shared use of English. The proceedings were liberally sprinkled with references to Shakespeare, Dickens, and cricket as illustrations of the common cultural heritage.

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Far from detesting their former colonial oppressor, Commonwealth leaders positively gloried in meeting with Queen Elizabeth II and in discussing international politics and playing cricket with Prime Minister Major.

The Harare summit was especially significant, as the Commonwealth's previous summit in southern Africa, in Lusaka in 1979, was the decisive factor in bringing about the Lancaster House negotiations which resulted in Zimbabwe's independence in 1980.

Hopes were high that the Harare summit would produce an equally historic breakthrough for South Africa, thereby providing its relevance in the new era. As it turned out, no such headline-seizing agreement was achieved and instead the Commonwealth had to fall back on a wordy declaration with somewhat vague endorsements of democracy, human rights, and the free market economic system to show what the organization intends to achieve in the coming century.

The Commonwealth's most outstanding non-member—South Africa—once again was a major issue at the summit. But even as the summit opened, hopes fizzled that it would produce a significant breakthrough in South Africa's stalled constitutional negotiations.

Zambia's former president, Kenneth Kaunda, attempted to get the Commonwealth leaders to invite President F.W. de Klerk and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi to join them on their weekend retreat to Victoria Falls. African National Congress President Nelson Mandela and Pan Africanist Congress President Clarence Makwetu were already present in Harare as observers. Such a meeting of South Africa's "major players" under the Commonwealth umbrella would have emulated the historic 1979 Lusaka summit where Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo joined the leaders and agreed to negotiations which swiftly led to a new constitution and Zimbabwe's independence.

But Kaunda found little enthusi-

asm for his initiative from summit host Mugabe and others. The final blow came with Mandela's firm rejection of Kaunda's plan. Mandela told John Major in no uncertain terms that he was opposed to the invitation of any officials from Pretoria, according to British government sources.

Kaunda's plans collapsed like a flat soufflé and the Zambian leader left Harare in what looked like a huff shortly after the first day's opening ceremony, missing even the elaborate state banquets and dancing hosted by Queen Elizabeth, which the outgoing Kaunda had enjoyed so much at previous Commonwealth summits.

Kaunda was uncharacteristically grave and tight-lipped in Harare. Certainly, it was a very difficult time for him. He was visibly shaken by the news that his son, Kambaranje, was sentenced to death for killing a woman. Also, it must have been hard for Kaunda to listen to all the praise for multi-party democracies as his single-party rule was about to come to an end. He was waging a bitter and, as it turned out, futile campaign to beat the newly legalized opposition parties. Within two weeks, Kaunda was resoundingly defeated in Zambia's first multi-party elections in 17 years. The election loss that saw him unseated from power in Zambia also removed him from the arena of international politics where he dearly loved playing the statesman.

So the South African initiative flopped before it even started. But that did not prevent Major and Mandela from reaching a new agreement on cricket. The two leaders announced they would work together to get South Africa to qualify for this year's World Cup.

Sanctions—whether to keep them or scrap them—were discussed, but they did not excite the same passions that divided the 1989 summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Britain still wanted to see all sanctions lifted, but affable John Major withdrew the antagonistic sting that his predecessor, Margaret Thatcher, had given the sanctions argument.

Whitewashing Harare

When young Princess Elizabeth visited colonial Salisbury in 1947 with her parents, the King and Queen of England, she drove through the city's main African township in an open car. Smiling black schoolchildren lined the township streets waving little Union Jacks.

Returning to the city, now named Harare, Queen Elizabeth expressed the desire to once again visit the township and as a result, the Mugabe government frenetically cleaned up often neglected parts of the capital city.

Anxious to make a good impression, the Zimbabwe government left no pothole unpaved, no major building unpainted, no street unswept, and no squatter's fragile shack un-bulldozed.

Because the Queen visited Mbare township, the Harare city government decided it must rid the township of some 400 squatters' shacks. In a court application, the city government stated it would be "an embarrassment" if the Queen should view the squatters' village. The High Court rejected the application, but the city went ahead and removed the squatters to a farm some 35 miles away. Despite protests of human rights activists and non-governmental organizations, officials would not let anything get in the way of making Harare pretty for the exalted visitors.

Harare's streets were never safer. Day and night, patrols of four and five policemen strolled along every block, both in the city center and the adjacent Avenues district of apartment blocks and hotels. Their mission:

to clear the streets of the prostitutes and *tsotsis* (thieves) who have come to claim the area as their own. An unwary Namibian delegate to a Harare conference was stabbed to death in the Avenues earlier in the year and officials were determined that would not happen during the Commonwealth summit.

Such patently cosmetic (and temporary) changes can be expected from any government prettifying its capital for an international summit. However, these actions can also be perceived as Mugabe government arrogance toward the Zimbabwean people. In the months leading up to the summit, Harare's government-owned *Herald* newspaper published cynical, even angry, letters to the editor about the government's blinkered concentration on the foreign visitors at the expense of Zimbabweans.

It's not the first time Zimbabwe's leaders went a little summit-mad: The same frantic clean-up took place in September 1986, when the 101 leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement came to Harare for a self-congratulatory pow-wow.

"It's time our leadership turns to the problems faced by ordinary Zimbabweans: unemployment, inflation, rising crime," said a Harare office-worker. "We are happy to host conferences, but we want to see our government addressing our problems, not just attending to luxuries needed by visiting leaders."

—A.M.



Margaret A. Novicki

Squatter camp outside Harare

The pro-sanctions side softened, too. Robert Mugabe, the staunchest sanctions supporter, made it very clear that he did not want to see the Harare summit split over the sanctions issue.

Major's mollifying ways did not make headlines, but he favorably impressed virtually everyone at the summit. "It's quite remarkable. Major used the same language as Thatcher, almost word for word, to appeal for an end to sanctions. Yet this time, others nodded in agree-

ment," commented an observer who had attended three previous Commonwealth summit. "The reservation to the sanctions stand that Major inserted into the final communiqué was widely seen as a reasonable dissenting view, not a combative broadside designed to sink the whole plan."

Major won an important change in the way in which the Commonwealth's financial sanctions can be lifted in phases. He won approval for a clause which states that an interim

government can decide if the time is right to lift financial sanctions. In contrast, the draft version, written by the group of 10 foreign ministers who met in New Delhi, proposed that financial sanctions should only be lifted once a new constitution had been completely written.

"The financial sanctions are the most effective ones," said the analyst. "Once they are lifted, South Africa will be able to get large loans from the IMF and World Bank, and that will make a big difference to the

economy. An interim government can be in place long before a new constitution is written, so it is a victory for Major to win that alteration."

At the Harare summit, South Africa was constantly spoken about as if it were a foregone conclusion that a new constitution and majority rule would be accomplished very soon. If the unending rounds of township violence were referred to, they were described as temporary problems that would be solved on the road to a new constitution.

Not even the presence of Nelson Mandela and his angry accusation that President F.W. de Klerk bore responsibility for unleashing a police "killing machine" on the townships made much impact. "What can the Commonwealth do to stop South Africa's violence? We are outsiders and we can only encourage. I don't think we can find a solution," said a Commonwealth official privately.

"De Klerk's inability to stop the violence has seriously eroded the goodwill that he had won in the Commonwealth. The general view is that he is just not able to rein in the police and army. Others are becoming more suspicious. But most Commonwealth leaders still see de Klerk as the one they must look to, along with Mandela, to bring a positive change to South Africa."

British government officials expressed a similar opinion. "The violence is reprehensible, but there is very little we can do from the outside," said a Foreign Office official. "We have offered assistance to improve police training, so police performance can be more responsible in the townships, but we don't see much else we can do at this point."

That left human rights and "good governance" as the focus for the Zimbabwe summit. "The cry for freedom as well as the cry for justice stops at no border," declared Mugabe at the opening. "The Commonwealth of the 1990s should be a torch-bearer of democratic principles which so many expect us to uphold."

All other speakers echoed Mugabe's views, including John Major, who said, "The Commonwealth is well-placed to catch the tidal wave of human rights and democracy which is sweeping across much of the world. We can ride that wave, or be carried along by it. We cannot ignore it."

Commonwealth insiders said the organization was looking for a new cause to pursue with the same fervor as it had the anti-apartheid drive since 1961. The strongest proponent of human rights among the leaders attending the Harare summit was Gambian President Sir Dawda Jawara, who has appealed since the early 1970s for the Commonwealth to establish a human rights commission. But the reluctance of most leaders to become tied down to any specifics in the area of human rights proved much stronger than the enthusiasm of a few.

One of the brightest jewels in the crown of the British Empire, Victoria Falls, provided the spectacular setting for a weekend retreat for the Commonwealth leaders where they could hammer out the wording of the declaration to spell out the direction their club should take into the next century.

The resulting torrent of words added up to a few phrases stating support for human rights, democracy, and sound economic policies among a flood of platitudes, panaceas, and placebos. The thundering falls sounded far more momentous than the tinkling declaration.

Indeed, the glittering summit produced little in the way of specific programs to promote human rights and good government among the Commonwealth's 50 members. The fact that the meeting closed a day early indicated that the leaders had run out of steam.

A far more decisive outcome had been expected at the summit's opening. The announcement that the Commonwealth's new secretary-general, Nigerian Chief Emeka Anyaoku, would visit South Africa to investigate ways to help the negotia-

tion process seemed much less than the dramatic breakthrough that Mugabe and others had offered as a glimmering hope.

A gloomy disappointment settled over observers, including human rights activists and anti-apartheid crusaders, when it became clear that the gala meeting would wind up with a conspicuous lack of concrete plans and concise, impassioned statements.


But sober reflection on the summit's discussions and a realistic assessment of the nature of the Commonwealth itself persuaded some that a few significant accomplishments were achieved at the summit. The fact that human rights and democracy were endorsed by all 50 members as goals to strive for is a positive step, especially as those principles are currently practiced by only about half the Commonwealth states. The summit also largely healed the rift in the Commonwealth over sanctions, as Britain agreed to stand close to the position of the rest of the association, rather than diametrically opposed to it, as at previous summits.

It is easy to conclude that Zimbabwe's Commonwealth summit amounted to much less than the roar of Victoria Falls, but the jury is still out. With determined, practical implementation by both the Commonwealth secretariat and its member-states, the new declarations could result in effective promotion of democracy and human rights, as well as action to encourage the achievement of majority rule in South Africa.

"We hope South Africa will continue to move, and we will look for every opportunity to help the process of establishing democracy there," said a Commonwealth Secretariat official. "Assisting South Africa is a more specific goal than the more general aims from the Harare meeting of promoting democracy and human rights throughout the Commonwealth. We don't expect to get that done in two years. After all, it means getting right what the British Empire got wrong." O



THE PATH TO PRIVATIZATION



Unicef/Jorgen Schytte

A danger in private medicine is that it might starve the public sector of resources

Mozambique is undergoing a painful transition from a socialist nation at war with itself to a society opening up to the private sector. But how much opening up is to be allowed? Market forces are now permitted to operate in some areas, but as the case of Dr. Fernandes illustrates, there is confusion over whether free enterprise is really free.

By **RUTH ANSAH AYISI**

Silence fell over the packed courtroom in Maputo as judgment was passed on medical doctor Aires Fernandes and nurse Alcinda dos Santos. Judge Rafael Sebastião found the two guilty. Their crime had been to practice private medicine.

Last September, Fernandes, 43,

and dos Santos, 39, were both fined 100,000 meticais (about \$62) and a further 40,000 meticais for court taxes and lawyers' fees. After the verdict was announced, defense lawyer Dr. João Albano submitted an appeal which was accepted by the judge.

Fernandes, a doctor in a clinic at

Maputo's central hospital and a medical lecturer at the capital's Eduardo Mondlane University, had operated a private medical service in his house between May and August, where he and nurse dos Santos had attended to 120 patients after working hours. His practice was closed by the police

following a complaint by the ministry of health.

The case hit the headlines for days in Maputo. Supporters of the defendants had earlier signed a petition that the case should never have gone to court in the first place. "This case is ridiculous," said one elderly man as he wrote his name. "We have said goodbye to communism."

In the past two years, President Joaquim Chissano's government has swept in radical political and economic reforms. While still officially committed to democratic socialism, Frelimo recognizes the role of market forces in the economy. An Economic Recovery Program (PRE), sponsored by the International Mon-

UN/Van Lierop



etary Fund and the World Bank, has been in force since 1987 and Marxism/Leninism has been officially dropped.

In November 1990, the government ushered in a liberal constitution that honors individual human rights and guarantees universal adult suffrage by secret ballot. Social services are being privatized. Private schools, funeral parlors, and law practices are no longer illegal. Pri-

vate medical practice was an exception until December, when it was legalized. Fernandes' case will possibly be the last of its kind.

In many ways, the case symbolizes the challenges that Mozambique faces as it makes a dramatic transition from a centrally planned economy to a more liberalized one, from a country at war to one hopefully to experience peace, and from a one-party system to a multi-party one.

Since independence from Portugal in 1975, the Mozambican government has attempted to provide health services that are affordable to every Mozambican. But that goal has been thwarted by war and poverty.

Mozambique, one of the poorest

countries in the world, with a predominantly rural population, has had much of its health service network destroyed by the 16-year-old war between the government and rebels of the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo). Today, the hope is for lasting peace. But even then, the political and economic reforms will bring a mixed bag of blessings for Mozambique's 15.7 million people.

The defense's main arguments in the Fernandes case pointed out

some of the contradictions inevitable in a country undergoing dramatic changes. It argued that the government had not restricted the practice of traditional medicine. It is estimated that over 70 percent of the population prefer to see a *curandeiro*, a traditional healer.

But traditional medicine is private and therefore illegal according to the law, said Fernandes. Commenting on the news that the state was considering forming an association of the country's traditional healers, he said: "Yet this is encouraging the creation

of an association that according to current legislation is illegal." The judge said, however, that "from time immemorial it [traditional medicine] has operated in the country without obeying any regulations."

The defense also accused the state of breaking the law by introducing special consultation services in 1976 for top officials, the wealthy, and foreigners. Depending on the client, the cost is either 20,000 meticas or \$20. The defense added that 50 percent of the foreign exchange

countries in the world, with a predominantly rural population, has had much of its health service network destroyed by the 16-year-old war between the government and rebels of the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo). Today, the hope is for lasting peace. But even then, the political and economic reforms will bring a mixed bag of blessings for Mozambique's 15.7 million people.

Today, Mozambicans are witnessing changes in all the social services that once were considered an individ-

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income from patients of the special clinic went to the doctors, showing cooperation between the state and doctors in the encouragement of private medicine in hospitals.

On the same lines, speaking for the defense, Dr. Ivo Garrido, former director of Maputo Central Hospital, said that in one month, by working two hours a week in the special clinic, he received double the amount that he earns in the national health service. He also pointed to the higher general medical charges made without any alterations to existing laws. "The law is trampled on every day, and very often practice precedes the law."

But the minister of health, Dr. Leonardo Simao, who testified for the prosecution behind closed doors, had also given his opinion earlier at Frelimo's sixth party congress last August. He said that at the time, the law forbidding private practice was still on the statute books. "An individual citizen cannot break the law just because he thinks it's out of date," said Simao. He added then, however, that the debate was not over, and the health ministry was investigating in what circumstances doctors might be allowed to run private clinics.

The danger in private medicine, he said, is that it might starve the public sector of resources, and that it could lead to a concentration of staff in the cities. Over 80 percent of the population lives in the countryside where rebels have torn apart much of the national health service. Today, Mozambique's infant mortality rate of between 175 and 200 out of every 1,000 live births is one of the highest in the world.

Another government priority at independence, education, is going through a similar crisis. This year has witnessed a wave of strikes by teachers nationwide. Recent strikes by teachers have affected both primary and secondary school pupils. The teachers have been dissatisfied with the education ministry's failure to implement a new career structure and wage scale that should have taken effect from April last year. Many secondary schools have had

Serious planning for Mozambique's social, political, and economic development is overshadowed by the ongoing destruction.

their final exams disrupted by the strike.

But having exams or even lessons disrupted is nothing new for hundreds of thousands of children living in the countryside, where the war has prevented them from studying. The war has also forced many people to migrate to the relative safety of the towns. Schools cannot keep pace with the numbers in the swelling urban centers.

Today in Maputo, an estimated 50 percent of the schools run more than one shift a day. Some children only manage to get a place to study at night. Others less fortunate do not find a place at all. Teachers, too, unable to make ends meet with their salaries, often give private classes after school for which they charge the parents.

The real test for Mozambique's social services will come, however, when the war ends. For example, the demands on the weak health and education network will be even greater with peace. Hundreds of thousands of people displaced within the country and over a million refugees in neighboring countries will return home to their dispersed homesteads where schools and health posts have been burned down or are often ill-equipped.

Optimism about the ending of the war is higher than it has been since direct negotiations began between the government and Renamo in Rome a year and a half ago. The two warring sides have begun to make some headway. A major breakthrough came with the signing on

November 13 of a protocol on the formation and registration of political parties after a ceasefire.


The new protocol contradicts the law on political parties passed last year. Under the law, political parties need to have at least 100 supporters from each of the country's 11 provinces to avoid regionalism. But because Renamo is likely to have few supporters in southern Mozambique, it was not happy with this condition. The new protocol does not stipulate that the supporters should come from different provinces. The ninth round of talks, scheduled to begin last December, was to deal with the electoral law.

One of the reasons why the talks have produced more than previous rounds—when all that was usually achieved was a promise to meet again—is that Renamo has recently been boosted by some confidence-building measures. In the past, Renamo—which had gained a reputation as one of the most brutal rebel movements in the world—had little recognition from the international community. Today that has changed, in what is apparently a deliberate move to try to stop Renamo's foot-dragging in the peace process, and to give it confidence to change from a military organization to a political one.

On November 1 and 2 in Geneva, Renamo's leader, Afonso Dhlakama, met with the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Jeffrey Davidow, and the U.S. ambassador to Maputo, Townsend Friedman. But the highlight for Dhlakama must have been his trip to Portugal where he met President Mario Soares, Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco da Silva, the secretary of foreign affairs and cooperation, Manuel Durao Barroso, and Cardinal Antonio Ribeiro.

Yet, whether this new drive will bring about the much-needed ceasefire is still open to question. And while the war continues to rage on in much of the vast countryside, serious planning for the country's social, political, and economic development is overshadowed by the ongoing destruction. ○

Republic of Somaliland has handled the aftermath of the ouster of long-time dictator Mohamed Siad Barre differently. The former British colony has re-established law and order, withdrawn its guerrilla forces to barracks, and is now trying to reconstruct the war-devastated region.



Darkness had already fallen when President Abdirahman Ahmed Ali emerged from his Hargeisa residence. The leader of the self-proclaimed independent Republic of Somaliland climbed behind the wheel of a battered Toyota Landcruiser. The guard at the gate gave a cursory wave as the president pulled out into the main street, driving alone.

A few days earlier in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, I had watched the then-interim president of anarchy-ridden Somalia, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, being driven at high speed in

a heavily armed convoy of five vehicles, running the gauntlet to cross his divided city.

After a devastating civil war, the peace and stability which has been restored in Somaliland, formerly northern Somalia, is a stark contrast to the continuing chaos in Mogadishu and symbolic of the determination of people in the north to rebuild their lives.

"I don't want to seem arrogant, but we've handled things differently here in the north," President Abdirahman said. "We set our priorities. We re-established law and order, disarmed all civilians, and withdrew our forces [those of the Somali National Movement—SNM] to barracks. The

next step is the reconstruction of the country."

When the breakaway Somaliland Republic established an independent state in May this year, President Abdirahman, 60, took up residence in the mansion previously occupied by former President Siad Barre's son-in-law, Gen. Said Hersi Morgan, the army commander who led the government campaign against the Isaaq-dominated SNM rebels when the war escalated in 1988. The SNM's red, white, and green flag now flutters from the roof of the house where the ruthless and eccentric Morgan once kept two caged cheetahs.

The civil war left Hargeisa in ruins. Eighty percent of the build-

SOMALIA

GOING IT



ings in the town were completely destroyed, many of them by aerial bombardment carried out by Siad Barre's mercenary Zimbabwean pilots.

The view of Hargeisa from the air is of a town without roofs. The exposed pale green and blue plaster walls inside the buildings now reflect the sunlight. Only the ubiquitous purple bougainvillea appears to be untouched by the devastation. Many of the houses are boarded up because of the tiny, but lethal anti-personnel mines which were scattered by Siad Barre's forces when tens of thousands of Isaaqs fled Hargeisa. What was not destroyed was looted. Many of the corrugated iron roofs, for example, found their way to Borama, a town close to the Ethiopian border.

But the people of northern Somalia are slowly returning, mindful of the danger, picking their way through the rubble with care. In the shell of one bombed Hargeisa build-

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ing which had still been under construction when the war started, 800 schoolchildren squat on upturned paint cans and perch on the demolished brick walls, receiving their first formal lessons for three years.

"We need books, pencils, paper, blackboards, and chalk...We have nothing," said the English teacher, Mohamed Jama Ibrahim. "Even most of the teachers have left the country, and those who are here now aren't getting paid. But at the same time, the children are really happy to start school again," he added.

In the nearby Sheik Bashir primary school, established in 1943, many classes are now held in the shade of the acacia trees which surround the damaged school buildings. "The motivation of the teachers and the children is quite remarkable," commented John Butterly, the new field director of the British aid agency, Save The Children, which is helping to rehabilitate the schools in Hargeisa. "The people of Somaliland have shown that they're ready to work for themselves, and they've

done a tremendous job so far with next to nothing." Butterly, who has worked in the Somali refugee camps such as Hartisheik across the border in eastern Ethiopia for the past 18 months, says that the children's attitude has changed completely since returning home from the refugee camps. "The psychological effects of the war on the children are enormous, but these children are handling the situation very well," he added.

Only occasionally, the tranquility of Hargeisa is shattered by the sound of an explosion, as mine clearance teams, consisting of nearly 200 Somali volunteers dressed like riot police with protective headgear, continue their painstaking work to remove and blow up the tens of thousands of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.

On the perimeter of the old military headquarters in Hargeisa, they work on their hands and knees, inching their way forward in a line, probing the sandy soil. A young boy who lost a leg in a mine explosion stands

ALONE

By PETER BILES



nearby watching the team. Other children play across the street, oblivious to the danger. Although the demining operation is funded by the European Community, it will be many years before Hargeisa is safe again.

Apart from the mines and the unexploded shells which litter the town, an immense stockpile of military hardware is another of Siad Barre's legacies to Somaliland. In a

deserted military camp at Gabley, 30 miles from Hargeisa, abandoned tanks, armored personnel carriers, Stalin rockets, and anti-aircraft guns are dotted about the bleak landscape. Tons of ammunition lie scattered carelessly across the floors of decaying buildings. "None of this is stored properly," said Paul Cairns of the British company, Rimfire, which is supervising the mine clearance work,

"and outside, there are thousands of disused mines lying in a heap in the sun. It's very dangerous indeed."

A host of non-governmental organizations have returned to assist with the reconstruction of Somaliland. Health services are being resurrected. Work is under way to repair the main water supply, which was deliberately wrecked during the war. Stormwater drains are being cleared

Madness in Mogadishu

About 2,000 people, mostly civilians, are believed to have been killed in the latest upsurge of fighting between rival factions in the Somali capital, Mogadishu. Relief officials say that at least 6,000 people have been wounded.

Forces loyal to the interim president, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, and supporters of his political rival, Gen. Mohamed Farah Aidid, have been battling for control of Mogadishu since November 17. Heavy gunfire and shelling have been reported on a daily basis, with the conflict taking on the characteristics of urban guerrilla warfare. Aid workers have been unable to reach many of the casualties, and the International Committee of the Red Cross described the situation as "a humanitarian disaster of the worst magnitude."

Early in December, the U.S. State Department called on the warring parties to stop the killing. "Those fighting are not attempting to depose a dictator or repel a foreign invader. Rather the appalling and intolerable slaughter results from selfish attempts by clan-based factions to gain or maintain advantage over one another," said a State Department official, Margaret Tutwiler. "The United States deplores the suffering imposed on the people of Mogadishu by the leaders of the warring parties, and calls on these leaders to stop the senseless carnage and wanton destruction of their own country," she added.

The power struggle between Ali Mahdi and Aidid can be traced back to January when the former's rebel group, the United Somali Congress, ousted President Siad Barre, forcing him to flee the capital and seek refuge in his home area, the Gedo region of southwestern Somalia.

Gen. Aidid, who claims much of the credit for the final USC offensive on Mogadishu, says he was not consulted when the USC hastily set up an interim administration, headed by Ali Mahdi, three days after Siad Barre's flight.

Aidid did not recognize the peace conference con-

vened in Djibouti in July when six armed Somali factions agreed to form an interim government for two years, and reappointed Ali Mahdi as president.

In September, Aidid, who by this time was chairman of the USC, claimed that Ali Mahdi had not been elected democratically, and began calling for his resignation. Hundreds of people were killed in four days of fighting between Ali Mahdi's clan, the Abgal, and Aidid's clan, the Habar Gidir, both sub-clans of the predominant Hawiye clan in Mogadishu.

When the conflict erupted again in mid-November, Aidid, in a broadcast on Radio Mogadishu, claimed to have overthrown Ali Mahdi. But as the fighting continued, it became clear that neither side had overall control, although Aidid's forces succeeded in holding a number of strategic installations, including the port and airport, sometimes with the assistance of previously neutral sub-clans, such as the Hawadle.

As the fighting raged, Mogadishu's hospitals once again took the strain. With wards overflowing, hundreds of casualties, many of them women and children, had to be cared for outside in the hospital grounds, or seek treatment in makeshift clinics. The three biggest hospitals—the Digfer, Benadir, and Medina—were all in the southern part of the city, held by Aidid. The Abgal in Ali Mahdi's stronghold, the northern Kaaraan district, were trapped, unable to reach the hospital or in many cases receive any medical care.

Appeals by the Red Cross and other international aid agencies in Mogadishu for the two opposing forces to observe a truce in order to allow food and medical supplies to be transported to all areas of the city fell on deaf ears. However, relief officials succeeded in moving some medical convoys across the front line from the south to the north of Mogadishu.

Meanwhile, clan elders appeared powerless to intervene and end the conflict as Mogadishu sank deeper and deeper into anarchy and despair. ■

—P.B.




of refuse. Roofs are being replaced.

Somaliland's bankrupt economy is also being revived, although massive international assistance will clearly be needed. The goat and camel herders are resuming their normal lives, and President Abdirahman says livestock, on which the economy has traditionally depended, is now being exported through the port of Berbera to Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Gulf states.

The working day is nevertheless a short one. Government ministries operate from 9 am to 12 pm, and in keeping with tradition, Somalis retire during the afternoon heat to chew khat, a mild narcotic.

Abdirahman admits that Somaliland is starting from scratch, but feels the British colonial influence over his territory has been an important factor in the collective progress made so far. "The British way of doing things which we've practiced here is far superior to the Italian way in Mogadishu," said the president. At Hargeisa airport, a plaque commemorating the opening of the terminal building by Britain's Duke of Gloucester in 1958 has been preserved. However, the graffiti scribbled on the wall alongside is more revealing: "Forget Mogadishu—welcome Somaliland."

The old colonial boundaries which divided British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland before independence in 1960 have been reintroduced by the SNM in the creation of their new republic, and Abdirahman says that despite the lack of any international recognition for Somaliland so far, there will be no reunion with the rest of Somalia. "All the countries in the Horn of Africa [Somaliland, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Djibouti] could establish economic cooperation and work together in many fields. But we want two separate sovereign Somali states. Somaliland is here to stay, and as far as we're concerned, there's no going back on that." O



Scenes from Hargeisa, including, above left, ammunition scattered in a ruined building; above, the plaque commemorating the opening of the airport terminal building by Britain's Duke of Gloucester; and, left, a squad of mine clearers



THE WAR WITHIN

War continues in northern Rwanda despite a massive government crackdown against the Tutsi, dissidents, human rights activists, and others suspected of sympathizing with the rebel forces. Local officials frequently incite the Hutu majority to attack or kill their Tutsi neighbors, and although opposition parties have been legalized, the situation in Rwanda remains grim.

By NICOLA JEFFERSON

According to the Rwandan government, it is the rebels alone who are responsible for the continuing havoc in the nation. But a recent visit to nine of Rwanda's 11 provinces showed that the gap between rhetoric and reality is increasingly apparent. War continues in the north, but local authorities incite and participate in violent

attacks mainly against the Tutsi. Tutsi refugees have repeatedly tried to invade Rwanda in an attempt to return to their country.

It was not until October 1990, when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) attacked from Uganda, that Tutsi refugees appeared to pose a serious threat to the government. Many members of the RPF are Rwandans of Tutsi origin who

deserted from the Ugandan army, prompting charges that the Ugandan government is supporting the rebels. Following the attack, Belgium, France, and Zaire sent troops; only French troops remain.

Despite several ceasefires, fighting continues in the north, the RPF having launched a serious attack against the commune of Muvumba last November and against a health

Nicola Jefferson

center in Nyarurema in December.

Immediately after the October 1990 RPF attack, the government retaliated with mass arrests. Over 8,000 people suspected of anti-government sentiments were detained, the majority of them Tutsi. Fewer than two dozen were eventually brought to trial. Some were released after several weeks, but nearly 2,000 remained in detention for as long as six months, in prisons and/or military camps.

Detention conditions were deplorable: overcrowded and unhygienic, with little or no medical attention. Initially, some detainees received no food for periods of up to eight days. In one prison in the east, 1,500 prisoners had to share one toilet and had to pay to use it. Some prisoners were confined for weeks or months in dark cells. Many were beaten and tortured, particularly at the military camps. At least several dozen died. One prisoner, desperate and disoriented, cracked under the pressure and asked the guards to shoot him. He was shot on the spot. In some cases, next of kin received no official notification when prisoners died and so have been unable to dispose of their property.

Authorities have not returned the passports of many former detainees and many others have been unable to return to their jobs, although they have never been charged with a crime, much less convicted. Many ex-detainees who held government jobs and received salaries while in detention are now being required to repay the amount received during their imprisonment.

While arrests were taking place in urban areas, local authorities were inciting Hutu in the rural region of Kibirira to attack their Tutsi neighbors. More than 300 Tutsi were killed, many others were wounded, and several thousand had to flee their homes. Many homes were looted and burned, crops destroyed, and livestock stolen. After victims accused local officials of having



Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana

planned the attack, the government removed the *sous-prefet* and mayor from office. They were jailed briefly along with several others accused of responsibility in the attacks, but were subsequently released. The government claims that the cases are being investigated, but no trials have taken place.

At the end of January last year, the RPF captured the important northern town of Ruhengeri. They held it for only a day, but that was long enough for them to open the prison and release hundreds of detainees, many of them confined since the beginning of the war. When the RPF withdrew, some of those freed followed them, but others returned to their homes only to be re-arrested or killed by the authorities. One eyewitness saw the authorities kill nine unarmed people.

Just as the first RPF attack was followed by the Kibirira killings, the brief RPF success at Ruhengeri became the pretext for a new wave of attacks against the Bagogwe, a subgroup of the Tutsi who live in northwestern Rwanda. Police (from local and national forces), military, civilian officials, and others launched a series of assaults that left more than 300 Bagogwe dead and many others injured and deprived of property.

In August, still another of the Bagogwe was killed by a mob which included two national police officers. No one has been tried for the earlier

killings and only three men were detained in connection with the August murder. Bagogwe in the region are frequently harassed and threatened and some have been intimidated into moving to other parts of the country. Local authorities in the region have failed to protect them. The widow of the man killed, explaining why she relocated her family, said, "For five months, we couldn't sleep at night. People threw stones on the roof and insulted us."

On the night of November 7-8, about 500 civilians, primarily Tutsi, were forced to flee Murambi in the east following a series of savage attacks in which, once again, local authorities were implicated. Unlike the violence at Kibirira and against the Bagogwe, this attack is not linked to any dramatic developments in the war. The authorities have blamed the attacks on efforts by the newly recognized opposition political parties to win followers in the region. But according to the victims, the communal councillor provoked the incident.

They added that as the attackers fought with machetes and sticks, they insulted the victims for being Tutsi. One young woman who was repeatedly raped heard an attacker shout, "You Tutsi girls think you are too good for us. We'll take care of you. We'll give you AIDS." In echoes of earlier violence when Hutu attacked Tutsi, intending, they said, to cut the tall aristocrats down to size, one attacker took an axe to the legs of a young Tutsi.

We visited Murambi immediately after the November 7 attack and saw one injured victim abandoned on the road by government officials who had been asked to transport him to a hospital. We saw another man who sought in vain to register a complaint about yet another attack which occurred the night of November 11, forcing his family to flee. His cattle were also pillaged.

The mayor of Murambi, his superior, the *sous-prefet*, and military officers are also implicated in the disappearance of 16 people who were arrested by his communal police in

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October. In a similar incident in the commune of Kanzenze, at least eight and as many as 11 men accused of helping the RPF disappeared after they were arrested by the communal police and transferred to a military camp. Others arrested at the same time returned home after a brief detention during which they were severely beaten. No one was ever charged with a crime.

Small settlements dot the desolate region along the eastern frontier of Rwanda. They shelter many Tutsi who sought refuge there after returning from Uganda in 1982, many of whom fled attacks by Obote youthwingers. In one small community, two men were recently killed by the authorities, one shot in broad daylight by a soldier. The residents recount numerous cases of rape and extortion by soldiers stationed in the area and at least 11 people have disappeared, presumed killed by either military or civilian authorities.

Several people reported that those living in border communities were forced by soldiers to bury unidentified bodies in mass graves; they pointed out the grave sites. Others said that they had seen bodies dumped, as many as several dozen at a time, in the bush. We visited three sites where remains were strewn about the area.

Nor is there security in the capital, Kigali. People complain repeatedly of arbitrary and random killings by soldiers who are never punished. Opposition politicians, outspoken journalists, activist clergy, and attorneys who have defended politically unpopular clients have been threatened with death. At least two activists have escaped serious injury in suspicious "automobile accidents." Another received an anonymous death threat on official stationery from the ministry of national defense for the Rwandan army.

Although most of the abuses are at the hands of the government, the RPF is also responsible for killing, injuring, and kidnapping civilians, as well as destroying their property. These abuses, which occur after rebel attacks, have taken place in the

Political power has remained firmly in the hands of the Hutu. Under President Habyarimana, the Tutsi have been systematically denied access to employment and education.

regions bordering Uganda. About 160,000 people have been displaced from their homes and are now in refugee camps in the north or have settled with relatives elsewhere in the country.

The current war has its roots in Rwanda's history. The Hutu constitute about 85 percent of Rwanda's population; the other 15 percent are Tutsi, who ruled Rwanda as a monarchy for several centuries. The two groups share a common language, history, and culture, but have long fought each other for power. Their conflict sharpened during the colonial era when Europeans favored the Tutsi with education and jobs while systematically excluding the Hutu from such privileges.

Shortly before Rwanda became independent in 1962, the Hutu rebelled against the Tutsi king and aristocracy, killing about 20,000 and driving 150,000 more into exile. There are between 400,000 and 700,000 Tutsi refugees living outside the country, many of whom are in Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and Zaire. Attacks against the Tutsi between 1959 and 1964, and in 1973, which left tens of thousands dead, created new waves of refugees.

Some refugees have been permanently resettled in the host countries, but many others live in uncertainty along the frontiers. Some want to return to Rwanda, but others, who have no documents, merely want

their status regularized so that they can cross the frontier to visit.

Throughout this century, tension between Hutu and Tutsi has been a dominant feature of Rwandan politics. Following the sudden death in 1959 of the Tutsi ruler, who had been in power for nearly three decades and who represented stability and moderation, a coup d'état by conservative Tutsi put his young half-brother in power. This encouraged the more extreme political parties, those identified with exclusively Tutsi or Hutu demands, to grow while moderate parties that brought together people of both groups lost ground. The killings began between 1960 and 1961 after the Hutu, provoked by increasingly radical Tutsi propaganda, attacked leading Tutsi. The result was the death of tens of thousands and the mass exodus of over 130,000 more.

The clashes set the stage for the discrimination that has marked the life of the Tutsi since independence. Political power has remained firmly in the hands of the Hutu. Under President Kayibanda, and then under current President Habyarimana, the Tutsi have been systematically denied access to employment and educational opportunities. Since Habyarimana seized power, those from the president's home region in the north have been rewarded to the detriment of Hutu and Tutsi in the south.

In this unremittingly grim picture, there are some encouraging signs: Rwandans have responded to the crisis by organizing six new associations in defense of human rights. A number of journalists have publicized the abuses, although more than six were arrested in 1991 and charged with defamation, subversion, or "threatening state security." As of this writing, several journalists are in hiding. Reports indicate that at least three others have been arrested, at least one of whom was badly beaten. The newly formed opposition political parties are cooperating with human rights groups and the press in gathering information on abuses and in trying to offer protection to civilians. ○



BANKING ON BOOKS

By ANDREW MELDRUM

Zimbabwe's annual book fair attracts writers, editors, booksellers, and publishers from all over Africa and the rest of the world. At the same time, ironically, books are fast becoming an endangered species on the continent where shortages of paper, distribution problems, and government bureaucracies make publishing and selling books very difficult. One bright spot, at least for southern Africa, is the prospect of regional cooperation with South Africa's flourishing publishing industry.

Middle-aged office workers sported bright buttons with the simple message, "Don't Tax Books," while young people wore colorful tee-shirts featuring a bookworm.

Thousands of Zimbabweans, of all ages and from all walks of life, attended the sixth Zimbabwe International Book Fair to see the wide range of displays, to purchase books, and to participate in workshops. Attracting writers, publishers, editors, and booksellers from all over Africa, Europe, and North America, Zimbabwe's book fair has become Africa's premier publishing event.

The prestigious Noma award for African literature, the continent's

top literary prize, was presented to Nigerian author Niyi Osundare at the book fair.

A measure of the book fair's success is that Zimbabwe's publishers have formed a Book Fair Trust which will organize the event annually. Unfortunately, however, the Zimbabwe Book Fair is just about the only bright spot on the country's otherwise dismal book publishing scene.

"We have a number of problems," said Tainie Mundondo, marketing and sales director of Zimbabwe Publishing House. "We have to deal with a lot of unresponsive bureaucracy, and there is a shortage of essential publishing materials, especially paper.

"Then we have distribution problems and many publishers are not getting paid for books sold to schools, which is our main market. Sometimes it seems like there are just too many

problems," sighed Mundondo. "And we don't see the government bureaucracy giving us the green light to solve these problems."

Mundondo said the problems facing Zimbabwe's publishers are the same ones that have strangled local publishing throughout Africa. "We look at Tanzania, there is no book industry in Tanzania. We look at Zambia, there is no money for books in Zambia. We look at Malawi and they have problems. The book problem is an African problem," she concluded.

Paul Brickhill, chairman of the Zimbabwe Book Publishers' Association, agrees with Mundondo that the country's publishing industry is seriously hampered by a number of constraints.

"Zimbabwe's book publishing industry has faced 11 years of neglect. That has brought us a combination of problems that add

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up to a crisis for us," said Brickhill. "With continued neglect we could become a bookless country, like so many others in Africa."

Brickhill said the problems include: erratic access to paper supplies, mismanagement and non-payment of huge textbook orders for government schools, reduced allocations of foreign exchange to import books, a punitive double taxation of imported books, and an impenetrable maze of government bureaucracy that avoids making firm decisions.

Faced with such a daunting set of problems, Zimbabwe's book publishers, particularly the independent, indigenous publishers, have grouped together to form the Zimbabwe Book Development Council.

"We aim to put books on the political agenda as health has become a political issue here," said Brickhill. "We need to create a national book policy which will be a unified approach to our problems. We will lobby the government to improve the conditions for publishing. That would not only benefit the publishers, it would benefit the nation as a whole."

"We don't have financial muscle," said Brickhill. "The only way we can influence government is to get books into cabinet meetings, politburo meetings, and parliamentary debates. There should be questions like, 'Why are there schools without books?', 'Why are there tens of thousands of school kids with no textbooks at all?' That's a national scandal and we see it as the responsibility of government to change that situation."

Brickhill agreed that the problems which dog the Zimbabwean book publishing industry have stifled book publishing in many other independent African countries.

"In independent, sub-Saharan Africa there are only four countries which have viable book publishing industries: Zimbabwe, Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria," said Brickhill.

"The rest are completely dependent upon outside agencies and imports. As a result, these countries have very few books. Without committed, concerted action, we are looking at the prospect of a bookless continent."

In dramatic contrast, South Africa has a flourishing book publishing industry which, according to Brickhill, is 50 times the size of Zimbabwe's. "We hope that as the southern African region opens up, we can cooperate to everyone's benefit," said Brickhill. "Unless we learn the ropes of regional cooperation, we won't survive."

The vibrant atmosphere at the 1991 Book Fair testified to the energetic dedication of Zimbabwe's book publishers, who are the organizers of the Book Fair Trust and Book Development Council.

"The problems we face have made us a robust, determined book publishing industry," said Brickhill. "We are determined to reach our potential to publish books for Zimbabwe's needs and to sell to the region and beyond."

Some international agencies are also attempting to help Africa's book publishers. The Canadian Organization for Development through Education (CODE) works in 13 African countries.

"We bring in books donated by Canadian and American publishers and distribute them in schools that don't have books," said John Laidlaw, CODE's southern Africa field officer. "At the same time, we try to do the other side of the coin, which is to support the publishing, printing, and marketing of locally produced textbooks for schools, reading books, and children's books."

Laidlaw concurred that Africa's book publishers are plagued by many difficulties. "What problems don't they face?" quipped Laidlaw of Africa's publishers. "The continent has a wealth of writers and designers. The problems come in actually publishing the books."

Most countries have severe shortages of paper on which to print the books. Marketing is also a problem, getting books distributed in the rural areas is a very big problem. Government constraints with taxes, with bureaucracy. All this points to difficult times for publishers in the region."

Laidlaw said his organization is trying to help African publishers, "in any way we can. We are assisting training programs, helping publishers to get access to paper. We help organize workshops. We also help in marketing schemes.

"We want to promote positive attitudes about books and about reading," said Laidlaw. "We want people to get away from the attitude that a book is only something to get you through exams and instead to get the idea that a book is something to enjoy like an ice cream or a Coke."

The tactics of Paul Brickhill and other publishers in Zimbabwe Book Development Council won some success at the book fair. No less a figure than Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe commented, while attending the fair, that he would like to see books more readily available throughout the country.

"We have to make available as many books as possible and as cheaply as possible so that people can afford to buy them," Mugabe said. "What I'm saying is that we have negated our education programs and our efforts to develop our society by putting stupid taxes on books. My ministers can tell you that on many occasions I have criticized the customs duties on books. But we have bureaucrats, bureaucrats, bureaucrats."

With such outspoken support from Robert Mugabe, who is well known as an avid reader, Zimbabwe's book publishers may well be able to turn around the situation so the country can boast of a flourishing book publishing industry as well as a successful book fair. ○

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