


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AFRICA REPORT

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1993


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

The U.S. In Somalia:

**SETTING A NEW POLICY
AGENDA FOR AFRICA?**





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
Africa Report (ISSN 0001-9836), a non-profit magazine of African affairs, is published bimonthly and is scheduled to appear at the beginning of each date period at 833 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017. Editorial correspondence and advertising inquiries should be addressed to *Africa Report*, at the above address. Subscription inquiries should be addressed to: Subscription Services, P.O. Box 3000, Dept. AR, Denville N.J. 07834. Subscription rates: *Individuals*: USA \$30, Canada \$36, air rate overseas \$54. *Institutions*: USA \$37, Canada \$43, air rate overseas \$61. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices. **POSTMASTER**: If this magazine is undeliverable, please send address changes to *Africa Report* at 833 UN Plaza, NY, NY 10017. Telephone: (212) 350-2959. Copyright © 1993 by The African-American Institute, Inc.

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The cover photograph of the U.S. Marines in Mogadishu, Somalia, during "Operation Restore Hope" was taken by Les Stone/Sygma.



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UPDATE

IN THE NEWS

U.S. Commits Force to Somalia, But For How Long?

President George Bush ordered U.S. troops into Somalia on December 4 in what he described as a humanitarian mission to "save thousands of innocents from death." The action came less than 24 hours after the 15-member UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 794, authorizing the deployment of a U.S.-led military force to clear the way for food deliveries in the famine-stricken nation.


Somalis, who have been denied relief aid because of looting by warlords and gangs of bandits, anxiously awaited the arrival of 28,000 American troops in December, some 1,800 of whom arrived on December 9. But the scope and duration of the U.S. mission, dubbed Operation Restore Hope, was left ambiguous by the UN resolution and a number of questions still need to be addressed to ensure the long-term security of Somalia.

The U.S. decision to intervene came against the backdrop of a failing international relief effort to feed an estimated 1.5 million Somalis at risk of starvation. UN provisions to send 3,500 guards to protect relief aid were never fully implemented, as an initial contingent of 500 Pakistani soldiers in UN blue helmets proved ineffective against heavily armed looters.

The worsening security situation was highlighted on November 24 when a World Food Program ship carrying 10,000 tons of wheat was shelled as it tried to dock in the port capital, Mogadishu. The next day, the president first offered the services of American troops to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, but stipulated that they remain under U.S. command.

After intense negotiations, command was de facto given to the U.S. in Resolution 791 which authorized the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible, a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia." This was achieved by leaving the decision of command up to the participating states and the secretary-

general, who had conceded as a practical matter that the U.S. would have to retain control of its troops in a letter he wrote to the Security Council on November 29. At the same time, concerns of developing nations that the U.S. force not be given carte-blanche in Somalia were partially addressed by provisions in the resolution which gave



President Bush ordered troops into Somalia on December 4

the UN secretary-general and Security Council oversight functions in the operation. Diplomats said the resolution, which marks the first time the Council has authorized the use of force in a nation's internal affairs, would give the UN considerably more power than had been the case in the Gulf War.

With the UN behind him, and after reportedly gaining the support of international leaders, top members of Congress, and President-elect Bill Clinton, President Bush went on television on December 5 to justify the U.S. intervention. "In taking this action, I want to emphasize that I understand that the United States alone cannot right the world's wrongs, but we also know that some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement, that American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement of the community of nations. Only the United States has the global reach to

place such a large security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly and efficiently and, thus, save thousands of innocents from death. We will not, however, be acting alone. I expect forces from about a dozen countries to join us in this mission."

President-elect Clinton, who was reportedly briefed the day of Bush's announcement by the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, later released a statement placing him firmly behind his predecessor. "Impediments to delivery of relief supplies and particularly looting of lifesaving food supplies simply must not be allowed to continue," Clinton said. "The mandate our armed forces and our partners in the coalition will fulfill is to create a secure environment to save lives, and I commend President Bush for his leadership on this important humanitarian effort."

The president-elect's support for intervention in Somalia is crucial because he will inherit responsibility for the mission when he takes office on January 20. But the crisis has the potential to prove problematic for the new president, who promised throughout his presidential campaign to "focus on the domestic economy like a laser beam." Instead, his unproven ability in foreign affairs may be quickly put to the test. Supporters of President Bush may laud him for making the "tough" decision to get involved in Somalia, but it will be Clinton who will have to decide when to pull U.S. troops out, a proposition that is fraught with potential pitfalls.

The outgoing president explained that the mission was to "open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and prepare the way for a UN peace-keeping force to keep it moving" and that the U.S. "will not stay in one day longer than is absolutely necessary." But the administration has not given a definitive answer on when the operation will be completed, saying only that it will probably last no more than two to three

UNM Tschabas

months. The possibility of a quagmire remains on the minds of American policy-makers.

The outspoken U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hempstone, argued vehemently against the intervention in a December 2 cable he sent to Undersecretary for International Affairs Frank G. Wisner on the eve of the operation. Hempstone reportedly said, "Somalis, as the Italians and British discovered to

for this scenario is made greater by a lack of consensus on a plan for disarming the warring factions and turning future U.S. positions over to UN forces.

The secretary-general says the U.S. must do the disarming, but the Americans have made no such commitment. Informally, however, U.S. officials have told Security Council members that they plan to round up heavy weapons, including machine guns, mortars, and artillery pieces, according to *The New York Times*. But Americans are reluctant to commit to the almost impossible task of collecting the thousands of small arms that the country is awash in and there were reports that Somali warriors were caching weapons prior to the arrival of the Americans.

A number of commentators have suggested a money-for-weapons solution to the question of disarmament. But relief workers have pointed out that the overall success of such a scheme is contingent on giving Somali fighters—the vast majority of whom have no other means of making a living than looting—an alternative livelihood. This will require a long-term commitment to economic reconstruction and political reconciliation.

Despite the high expectations of Somalis in Mogadishu that the U.S. will become involved in such a long-term effort, the U.S. and its allies in the operation do not yet have a coherent post-intervention strategy. A number of aid workers and Somalis—who do not oppose the use of force per se—contend that this leaves the campaign fundamentally flawed and may even lead to a worsening of the situation.

There were also fears that the intervention might make foreign aid workers—who were instructed to stay indoors for the first 48 hours—potential hostages to Somali gunmen.

Debate among Somalis and Africa experts over the consequences of the intervention has grown heated in the wake of the unprecedented media attention being given the East African nation. Rakiya Omaar, a Somali activist who helped establish the human rights organization Africa Watch, was fired from her consultancy position with the organization when she failed to temper her strong opposition to the U.S. intervention. "I think the sudden arrival of 20 or 30,000 U.S.


troops with or without prior consultation with Somalia's underground and with the relief organizations...will escalate [the violence]...and force any responsible relief organization to withdraw its people," she said on the CNN program "Crossfire" on November 27.

Omaar and her colleague, Alex de Waal, who resigned his post as associate director at Africa Watch, argue that the formula for the successful reconstruction of Somalia involves utilizing the existing social, economic, and political structures which continue to function, despite the lack of a government in the country. They say the Western media has ignored the recent progress veteran relief organizations were making in negotiating with Somalis, including clan elders.

Omaar and de Waal said Boutros-Ghali's former special representative in Somalia, Mohamed Sahnoun, had made great strides in negotiating with Somalis prior to his dismissal in October. According to *Africa Confidential*, the release of the representative, who "had succeeded in winning the respect of most Somalis," was due in part to his insistence that intervention not be attempted without proper consultations with Somali factional leaders. The newsletter described Sahnoun's successor, Ismat Kittani, as a catalyst for the intervention.

Amid criticism that the U.S. was not doing enough to contact the established parties in Somalia, President Bush's special envoy, Robert B. Oakley, was meeting with relief agency representatives and Somali factions on the eve of the U.S. military deployment. Prior to meeting with Oakley, the two main warlords in southern Somalia, Ali Mahdi Mohamed and Gen. Mohamed Farah

Continued on page 11




Bandits have deprived Somalis of relief aid

their discomfiture, are natural-born guerrillas...They will mine the roads. They will lay ambushes. They will launch hit and run attacks. They will not be able to stop the convoys from getting through. But they will inflict—and take—casualties."

This was the scenario Gen. Colin L. Powell said the U.S. planned to avoid by sending such an overwhelmingly large force, and experts have agreed that, at least for the short term, the chances of heavy U.S. casualties are low.

But even if the mission to get the food moving again is a complete success by Bush's current standards, a number of officials fear that once the U.S. turns the operation over to UN peace-keepers and pulls out, the fighting will begin anew. This could also leave the U.S.—which plans to keep a sizable number of troops off shore as a deterrent to future aggression—open to becoming involved again. The potential



Cameraspix

C.A.R.

The Central African Republic's military ruler, President André Kolingba, announced on November 28 that general and presidential elections will be held respectively on February 14 and 28. The announcement by the leader of the ruling Democratic Assembly of Central Africa follows a failed October elections attempt which was seen as a blow to CAR's tenuous democratization process.

Kolingba called the October 25 elections on September 7, ostensibly to implement recommendations of the "Great National Debate"—the then recently completed forum to decide the country's future. But the opposition had boycotted the debate to press for the convening of a sovereign national conference, and viewed the hurried electoral process with suspicion. Nonetheless, by the middle of September, all parties had agreed to participate in the legislative and presidential elections.

The result was a tense and disorganized run-up to the vote, which ended up being marred by glaring irregularities and incidents of violence. With the polls still open on October 25, CAR's Minister of Public Security and Territorial Administration Ismaila Nimaga issued a statement saying, "Following disturbances resulting from premeditated acts of sabotage, electoral materials could not be distributed satisfactorily at Bangui's polling stations...Consequently...all voting operations in Bangui [the capital] have been suspended and postponed to a later date." The minister also announced that polling was suspended in Paris, "where serious incidents disrupted the smooth running of the voting exercise." Reports of other irregularities and disturbances included a death in Berbérati.

On October 28, the Supreme Court supported Kalingba's request to cancel the elections, citing irregularities which included threats and violence, illegal voter registers, and missing electoral equipment in certain polling stations.

Some international observers criticized the decision to nullify the entire election and not just the results in areas where fraud and disturbances took place.

The government—which was accused of orchestrating a substantial proportion of the fraud—stands to gain from the delay. Partial results of the cancelled polls show that Kolingba came in only fourth in the field of five presiden-

POLITICAL POINTERS

tial candidates and, according to *Africa Confidential*, he has been pursuing alliances with other parties to defeat Abel Goumba, who apparently polled first in the nullified presidential election.

Goumba, who heads the Concert of Democratic Forces alliance, joined the other presidential candidates in agreeing to the new elections, but has expressed serious reservations over the arrangements for the run-up to the February vote. The arrangements include a National Provisional Political Council of the Republic, comprised solely of presidential candidates, to advise the president. Kolingba's mandate to rule was also extended.

Among the other presidential candidates are Ange-Félix Patassé, leader of the Movement for the Liberation of Central Africans, who is considered a powerful contender; and ex-president David Dacko, who ran as an independent candidate and is considered a potential ally of Kolingba.

TOGO

A general strike in protest over army support for President Gnassingbé Eyadema began November 16, leaving Lomé and southern Togo paralyzed. Trade unions and opposition groups are demanding that a new security force free of ties to Eyadema be established to ensure free and fair elections, the formation of a new government, and the prosecution of soldiers who held parliamentarians hostage in late October.

The assault on Parliament is one of the military acts that brought Togolese to the brink of a confrontation with the army after a year of watching the security forces bully the transitional government of Prime Minister Joseph Kokou Koffigoh into submission. The soldiers stormed into Parliament on October 22 and took more than 40 parliamentarians hostage, demanding the return of millions of dollars in funds they had been required to contribute over several years to the former sole legal party, the Togolese People's Assembly (RPT). The speaker of Parliament pushed through a bill to repay the money from RPT funds the national conference had frozen last year.

But Togolese are also increasingly frustrated with Koffigoh's government, which has continually been forced to compromise with Eyadema and the army. The transition period itself was scheduled to end last August, but Koffigoh was forced to extend it to December. Eyadema has also all but ignored an election timetable agreed to in a September referendum which stipulated that legislative elections be held before presidential ones, instead pressing ahead with presidential elections by the end of the year. In the latest power wrangle between the president and prime minister, Eyadema asserted that Koffigoh's efforts to dismiss two ministers were illegal.

In protest over the developments, the United States suspended \$19 million of aid to Togo. A State Department spokesman reportedly said that the aid would remain suspended until "free and fair elections are held."

While Koffigoh and Eyadema held a dialogue over the crisis, activists worried that Eyadema was planning to provoke violence to strengthen his position. An increasingly frustrated opposition might play well into such a plan. Thousands of Togolese, fearing a new round of civil unrest and confrontation at the onset of the strike, did not wait around to find out, fleeing instead to neighboring Ghana in mid-November. Among those reportedly leaving Lomé was Koffigoh's wife, Rosaline.

MADAGASCAR

Malagasy opposition leader Professor Albert Zafy took a commanding lead over his eight rivals in presidential elections held in the Indian Ocean island on November 25. But the leader of the Committee of Active Forces (CFV)—who was projected to win almost 46 percent of the vote in early returns—failed to receive the majority needed to avoid a runoff with the incumbent of 17 years, President Didier Ratsiraka, who took 29 percent of the vote.

Prime Minister Guy Razamanasy told Radio Madagascar that the second round of elections would probably be scheduled for mid-January.

Although the November voting was carried out peacefully, there were worries that the run-up to another presidential election might signal a renewal of the violence and confusion that has plagued Madagascar's democratization process.

AFRICAN OUTLOOK

Kenya's Opposition Challenges Moi's 'Secret Weapon'

UNIMA Tzoveras



President Daniel arap Moi warned in 1991 that multi-party politics would lead to civil unrest

Since Kenya's President Daniel arap Moi announced the legalization of multi-party politics in December 1991, a wary opposition has charged that the ruling Kenya African National Union (Kanu) would stage-manage the electoral process to retain its grip on power. The president referred to the setting of the election date itself as his "secret weapon," implying that he would call a snap election on the ill-prepared and increasingly splintered opposition. But when the government finally announced an electoral timetable in the beginning of November, the opposition successfully appealed to Kenya's High Court to grant it more time to nominate candidates, and the National Electoral Commission (NEC) was forced to postpone the country's first open polls in 26 years from December 7 until December 29.

The opposition, which had reportedly been contemplating a boycott of the polls, hailed the court decision as an important victory in its attempts to ensure that the government did not manipulate the electoral process.

The appeal over the nomination period was filed under a certificate of urgency by the leading opposition group, the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya (FORD), three days after the government released its electoral timetable on November 3. The party argued that the government had

illegally shortened the period for nomination of candidates from 21 to 10 days and that Attorney-General Amos Wako had inappropriately amended the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act to facilitate the change. Wako had substituted the word "more" for the word "less" in chapter 7 of the country's election laws so that it

read, "The day or days upon which each political party shall nominate candidates to contest parliamentary elections in accordance with its constitution or rules shall not be more than 21 days after the date of publication of such notice."

In an affidavit, the chairman of FORD-Kenya, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, said the shortened nomination period adversely affected his party because it would not be able to put forth its best candidates. The other opposition groups, including FORD-Asili and the Democratic Party, supported the request to postpone the process, as attempts to meet the 10-day nomination deadline were disorganized and marred by violence. International observers also expressed concern with the way the electoral process was shaping up. U.S. ambassador to Kenya Smith Hempstone reportedly said, "Many donors will not accept the legitimacy of an election which is seen to be flawed."

In upholding the appeal on November 12, Justice Thomas Mbaluto criticized the attorney-general for amending Kenya's election laws without parliamentary approval and suspended the electoral process. Wako maintained that he did not agree with the ruling, but said the government would abide by it.

Oginga Odinga said that Mbaluto's ruling had destroyed Moi's "secret weapon" and was reason enough for those responsible for the "illegal

amendment" to resign, according to the Kenya News Agency (KNA).

The electoral process was re-started on November 16 when the NEC issued a new timetable with December 29 as the new election date. But the opposition still expressed several concerns in the run-up to the elections, including the government's continued manipulation of the electoral commission, the restriction of opposition activity, and an upsurge in violence since the original election timetable was announced.

The International Human Rights Law Group, which sent a fact-finding mission to Kenya in November, said the electoral commission had shown a lack of objectivity and seemed ill-prepared for the elections, while the government of President Daniel arap Moi had shown an overt willingness to use its powers to influence the outcome. The leader of the mission, Patrick Macrory, said, "Until now the opposition parties have shown a surprising degree of tolerance to the deficiencies in the electoral process, but there are signs that their patience may be wearing thin."

One opposition demand which has fallen on deaf ears has been for the removal of officials responsible for the electoral process who are allegedly partial to the government. A day after faulting the electoral commission's timetable, the High Court supported NEC Chairman Justice Zakayo Chesoni against an opposition request that he be declared unfit and unqualified to head the commission. The dismissal of the request, which had been filed by four opposition parties in July, was a shot in the arm for the government because it was handed down in the wake of renewed calls for the chairman to resign.

Another target of the opposition was Attorney-General Wako. Kenya's *Sunday Nation* reported that a group of 32 lawyers, including FORD-Kenya Secretary-General Gitobu Imanyara, called for Wako's resignation on November 27 on the grounds that he unlawfully amended the law, prosecuted the opposition, was apathetic to Kanu stalwarts calling for violence, and generally favored the ruling party.

At a press conference, the attorney-general did not respond to the accusa-

Nigeria's Transition Delayed Again

tions—saying instead that he would answer to some of them at an appropriate time—and lectured the press that “as the election day draws near, there [are going to be a lot of] accusations and counter-accusations, demands of resignation, and all forms of false accusations directed at public officers.” He appealed to Kenyans not to be distracted by the accusations and “to know that the pressing issue now is what we can do to make the elections free and fair and conducted in a peaceful atmosphere.”

That elections would be carried out in a peaceful atmosphere had been questioned since 1991, when Moi was warning that opening up Kenya's political system would lead to widespread civil unrest. Government critics contend that the ethnic violence which followed the legalization of multi-party politics was fomented by Moi, first to postpone the multi-party process and later to divide the opposition.



FORD-Kenya Secretary-General Gitobu Imanyara

Violence around political gatherings escalated in November after the original electoral timetable was released. Five people were shot dead at an anti-Kanu rally in Meru District on November 10 and shots were fired at the opposition Democratic Party Secretary-General John Keen the following day while he was touring Kajiado North, where he plans to run against Kenya's vice president and minister of finance, George Saitoti.

The issue of security and violence proved to be a major concern in the run-up to elections, featuring prominently in a 13-point list of demands opposition parties submitted to the government and the NEC on November 18 that they said must be met to ensure that the scheduled voting was free and fair. Other points dealt with government interference in the monitoring of the elections, NEC independence, the

Nigerians anxiously awaiting their country's return to civilian rule scheduled for January 2 learned that they would have an additional eight months to contemplate the transition when President Ibrahim Babangida announced in a nationally televised speech on November 17 that elections to select his successor had been delayed from December 5, 1992 to June 12.

Babangida's decision came in the wake of September presidential primaries which were fraught with fraud, including widespread vote-buying. On October 16, after reviewing a National Electoral Commission report on the farcical primaries, the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) nullified the results and dissolved the executive committees of the only two legal parties, the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP).

In his November 17 speech, Babangida said that a delay in the electoral process was necessary to ensure that it would be free of the corruption

that plagued the primaries. He said, “We want to install a government that will get to office through free and fair elections, and not through fraud and deceit...Nigeria cannot be bought at the expense of Nigeria and Nigerians.”

Babangida spoke of a need for Nigerians to find common ground in picking his successor, noting, “All presidential aspirants were extremely distrustful of one another, to the extent that they were unable to engage in politics of moderation, accommodation, and consensus-building.”

The head of state also outlined the government's plan for the new presidential selection process which calls on the SDP and NRC to nominate a candidate from each of Nigeria's 30 states and the federal capital territory, Abuja. This, says Babangida, “will give each component part of the federation a sense of belonging and thereby facilitate national unity.”

The 23 presidential aspirants, all of whom were banned from contesting the

Continued on page 11

voter register, safeguards on the handling of ballot boxes, the need for all parties to agree on the timetable, and equal media access and treatment.

Kenya Television Network reported that in response to the demands, the electoral commission would meet with all of the political parties on a regular basis, but it remained to be seen how meaningful the dialogue would be.

In one sign that the government was better addressing opposition demands, Minister of Information and Broadcasting Burudi Nabwera said on November 24 that the policy of equal coverage for all political parties had been accepted and implemented by the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation and the KNA. But the minister said speeches by political leaders could be carried only as long as they do not threaten national security, and all political parties would be required to pay for a 90-second advertisement slot.

The need for equal media coverage—including free air time on government-owned radio and television—had been called for by a number of international observers, including the Commonwealth, which was prepared to send a team to monitor the elections.

In an earlier concession to the oppo-

sition, the attorney-general reportedly said political parties would not need licenses to stage campaign rallies when the electioneering starts. An inability to obtain licenses had been a major impediment to the opposition over the last year.

As Kenya approached the December 29 election date, the opposition and a number of independent monitors, including the International Human Rights Law Group, asserted that the electoral process remained flawed by technical shortcomings and government interference. Nonetheless, the opposition seemed willing to participate in the elections as the government moved slowly toward realizing some of its demands.

That may suit Kanu. Observers say that the ruling party—which appeared likely to face the fate of Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party at the beginning of the year, only to rebound after its opponents all but self-destructed—could ill afford another postponement in the electoral process, which would give the opposition time to organize itself. The leading opposition group, FORD-Kenya, was already touted to have a fair shot of outdoing Kanu in the December 29 vote. ■

Tourists Are the Latest Victims of Egypt's Civil Strife

In the latest round of an escalating war between Islamic fundamentalists and the government of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, 14,000 police and security forces staged an operation in the Imbaba slum district in Cairo to search for suspected militants on December 8. The massive sweep, which ended after more than 600 suspects had been rounded up, comes after emboldened militant groups opened a new front of the war by staging attacks against foreign tourists in October and November. The attacks, which are seen to be part of a larger campaign to replace the government with a Muslim theocracy, are particularly troubling to the government because they aim to take away its main source of foreign income, tourism.

The most militant of the Islamic fundamentalist groups, el-Ganaa el-Islamiya (the Islamic Group), first revealed its plan to target tourists in August when it warned Western embassies not to "send their people to Luxor or Qena." But the most serious incidents did not begin until October 2 when a Nile cruiser carrying 140 Germans was ambushed, leaving three Egyptian crew members wounded. The ninth such attack on October 21 left a 28-year-old British nurse dead, and five German tourists were seriously injured in a November 12 incident.

By the end of October, U.S., British, and Australian embassies issued warnings advising their nationals to avoid travelling to southern Egypt. The U.S. State Department listed Minya and Asyut provinces—the sites of frequent battles between security forces and militants—as the most dangerous touring areas.

The travel advisories dismayed Egyptian tourism officials who oversee an industry that employs at least 1 million workers. The country has an estimated 500 hotels, 3,000 tour guides, 7,000 buses, 10,000 tourist restaurants, and 200 Nile cruise boats, all dependent on foreign visitors. In all, foreign tourists pump over \$3 billion a year into Egypt's economy and tourism officials had hoped that the number would climb to \$4 billion this season, which ends in June. The attacks have already led a number of foreigners to cancel their vacations to Egypt.

The government—which is particularly vulnerable to a decrease in tourism

revenue because of a faltering economy and attempts to implement austerity measures demanded by the International Monetary Fund—responded to the attacks by stepping up security measures. The governor of the embattled Asyut province, Hasan al-Alfi, said that Egypt would do what is necessary to counter militants' attacks on tourists.



President Hosni Mubarak cracked down on fundamentalists

"Violence must be repressed by violence," he said. Egyptian police have carried out several operations in attempts to quell the violence against foreigners, including the November arrests of more than 150 militants in Asyut province, 200 miles south of Cairo.

But the Islamic Group says it is undeterred by the government's counter-offensive and that it would continue the attacks until Mubarak's regime ends its clampdown on fundamentalists. In a November 24 interview with Agence France-Presse, a spokesman for the group said, "Tourists bring alien customs and morals which offend Islam, especially the attire of some women...Tourism must be hit because it is corrupt."

The call for attacks on tourists is only the latest strategy in a violent campaign by radical religious groups, which observers say is the most serious political test facing Mubarak since he assumed power 11 years ago. The violent acts began in May with the slaying of 14 Christians in Manshiet Nasser and include the assassination of the outspoken anti-fundamentalist columnist, Faraq Fouda, on June 9. The violence claimed at least 70 lives in 1992.

Mubarak's main response to each violent episode has been to clamp down harder on the fundamentalists, earning Egypt an increasingly poor human rights record. Several militants have

been killed by the police and hundreds of suspects have been tossed into prison where they are frequently tortured, according to human rights groups. The Egyptian security officials also have been accused of detaining family members of alleged militants in order to coerce the suspects into surrendering to the authorities.

In addition to a greater number of security force operations, the government has instituted several repressive laws to combat the fundamentalist threat. In July, the death penalty was instituted for anyone belonging to a "terrorist" organization. The government also broadened the powers given to security forces under a 1981 emergency decree, including the right to detain people without trial. In a further move, the government announced that all mosques—which form the fundamentalists' principal power base—and their prayer leaders will be put under state control.

But far from putting a stop to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, Mubarak's six-month-old campaign appears to have led to increased support for the movement and an escalation of the almost daily violence. The fundamentalists also gained popularity by being the first to act—far ahead of the lethargic government—in the aftermath of the earthquake that shook Egypt in October.

It is against this background that an increasing number of Egyptians have been arguing for the government to liberalize the political system, to make it more responsive to people's economic and social problems. Some influential Egyptians even advocate allowing the more moderate of Egypt's banned Islamic fundamentalist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, to operate legally. "The state unfortunately puts the Muslim Brotherhood on the same list with people who are mentally sick or with people who are fanatic, extremist," Egyptian attorney Moukhtar Nour, whose clients include Islamic militants, told *The Washington Post*. "That's a blatant fault committed by the state, because in this way, it loses the forces [of the Brotherhood] in combatting terrorism."

While the government may well stop short of unbanning the Brotherhood, it may need new allies in 1993 as Islamic fundamentalists continue to gain support in Egypt. ■

Nigeria Continued

rescheduled election, responded to the president's speech in an uproar. One of the SDP candidates, Patrick Dele Cole, told the Nigerian news magazine, *Newswatch*, that the suspension of the electoral process was a "massacre of the political elite."

In recognition of the malpractices during the presidential primaries, many Nigerians had little sympathy for the plight of the politicians. But the population—which has seen the AFRC postpone its decision to return the country to civilian rule three times since 1990—remains skeptical of the motives behind the delay and also questions why the transfer of power cannot take place before August 27, which marks the eighth anniversary of the coup that brought Babangida to power.

One influential Nigerian who is strongly opposed to the extension of Babangida's rule is the former head of

state, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo. In anticipation of the president's announcement, Obasanjo released a statement to the press which said, "The primary elections for the presidency, it now seems in retrospect, were designed to fail...The handing over of power to an elected civilian government on January 2, 1993, must proceed apace...[because]...prolongation of military rule cannot be the answer under the present circumstances."

Joining the attack on the electoral delay have been human rights groups, both in Nigeria and abroad. According to a November 12 Agence France-Presse report, Nigeria's Campaign for Democracy, which is an umbrella group for several human rights organizations, lawyers groups, and opposition movements, called for a civil disobedience campaign to "make the country ungovernable" if Babangida reneged on his promise to return the country to civilians on January 2.

The president of the Nigerian Civil Liberties Organization, Olisa Agbakoba, said that the delay "confirms a hidden agenda to perpetuate military rule," according to the November 11 *Christian Science Monitor*. But Babangida has repeatedly denied charges of any agenda to prolong his grip on power.

In an effort to show that he is serious about the transfer of power, Babangida pointed out that the 684-member National Assembly, elected in July, was to be sworn in on December 5 and would assume a degree of legislative power on the originally planned date for the transfer to civilian rule, January 2. Whether the body would have any real power was seriously questioned by Babangida's qualification that it would



President Ibrahim Babangida

legislate unless "otherwise directed by decree." Another change planned for January 2, which was viewed with skepticism, was the AFRC being replaced by a National Defense and Security Council and the Council of Ministers being supplanted by a civilian Transitional Council.

While Nigerians have found the pace of the transition back to civilian rule painstakingly slow, a representative from the U.S. State Department summed up the view of some international observers when he told *Africa Report*, "Our concern is sustainability of democracy...If they need a few more months to make sure that it [the democratic process] will work, we will not say anything."

The threat of another military coup is never far from Nigerians' consciousness. But the biggest threat to Nigeria's democratic process may well be the nation's faltering economy. Babangida has been unable to renew an agreement with the IMF and the country remains indebted to the tune of \$30 billion. Tackling this will remain a paramount concern for whoever is in power come August 27, 1993.

Somalia Continued

Aidid, both came out in favor of the U.S. presence in the country. But the men, whose fighters come from rival sub-clans of the Hawiye, have not shown a willingness to disarm and do not have full control of their forces.

In another troubling sign to U.S. policy-makers, Aidid's warriors were converging on Bardera in December in an effort to re-take the famine-ravaged town from the forces of Gen. Mohamed Siad Hersi Morgan, son-in-law of former President Mohamed Siad Barre. The operation was an apparent attempt to gain as much of a military advantage as possible before the deployment of U.S. troops, a strategy a number of the warring clan leaders apparently shared.

Back in the United States—where Americans saw the first wave of soldiers hit the beaches up close via the media circus of hundreds that had gathered to cover the event—public support for the operation was reportedly high in mid-December. That situation may change as Clinton's January 20 inauguration draws near, however, and he may be faced with having to use his political clout to rally Congress behind the intervention.

The expected chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative Lee H. Hamilton, has

already promised that a congressional resolution on the operation "will be the first order of business" when the House convenes later in January. The representative says that there is a need to "define the mission precisely" to allow the U.S. to get out when that is accomplished.

The stakes in Somalia are high—not only for the hundreds of thousands who face starvation there, but also for people trapped in humanitarian crises throughout Africa and the world (on December 7, Boutros-Ghali asked the already overstretched UN to become involved in another major peace-keeping operation in Mozambique). A failure in Somalia could seriously dampen world leaders' support for international operations elsewhere.

French Prime Minister Pierre Bérégovoy, whose government contributed over 2,000 troops to the intervention, highlighted another issue brought up by the international action in Somalia when he said the mission would set a new precedent for the UN by establishing "a duty of intervention when lives are threatened." But how that "precedent" will apply in other crises, such as those in Liberia and Sudan, remains hazy. The consequences of deploying troops in Somalia may profoundly shape the first post-Cold War president's decisions on when to act in the future. ■

LIBYA

"Call it primitivism if you like, but I want to embark on direct distribution of wealth," Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi said in a November 18 speech to Libya's equivalent of parliament, the General People's Congress. The statement was in reference to a dramatic plan to distribute half of Libya's oil revenue, estimated at \$10 billion, directly to the people.

"Every Libyan family will have a right to its share," Qaddafi said. He estimated the government would distribute \$7,000 to \$10,000 a year to each family.

But he added that priority would be given to families that emigrated to Egypt, Sudan, and Chad, which he referred to as "greater Libya." He said the government wants 100,000 families of five to 10 members to settle in each of these countries which are "rich with water that Libya does not possess," and blessed with land and opportunities. An examination of overpopulated Egypt, war-torn and famine-stricken Sudan, and mostly desert-covered Chad might suggest otherwise.

Qaddafi seemed to acknowledge past government mismanagement in his speech, saying, "We do not have a government or a quarter to whom we could give the money and ask for it to be spent on us. No, give us the dollars in hard currency and we will deal with it ourselves." The Libyan leader further admitted that the government "went too far" in spending over \$23 billion on arms over the last 20 years.

North African diplomats reportedly interpret the plan as the latest in a series of sensational and erratic statements that suggest the colonel is cracking under the weight of an acute economic crisis and widespread discontent, exacerbated by the international sanctions the United Nations Security Council imposed in a March 27 resolution.

The air and arms embargo backs Western demands that Tripoli hand over for trial two Libyan intelligence officers, Abdel Basset Ali Megrahi and Lamem Khalifa Fhimah, accused of the 1988 Pan Am bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland. Libya has also been asked to hand over four men implicated in the 1989 bombing of a French UTA jetliner over Niger.

The Security Council was scheduled to review the sanctions on December 15 and possibly decide on tougher measures.

BUSINESS BRIEFS

The sanctions have already led the government to withhold salaries of hundreds of its employees. In addition, the oil industry, which is said to pump 1.5 million barrels of oil per day, is suffering from a lack of high-tech spare parts.

OIL

While Qaddafi was announcing his tenuous plans to distribute Libya's oil wealth, the price of the commodity was heading for an eight-month low in December.

January crude oil had fallen to \$19.08 a barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange on December 4, after losing over a dollar from the previous week. The price continued falling despite a late November agreement by the Organization of Petroleum Exporters (Opec) to stabilize its production at 24.58 million barrels a day.

But analysts say this basically formalized the existing level of output. Nonetheless, Opec members' output had risen to 25.18 million barrels a day in October—a 12-year output high—as members stepped up production to beat the anticipated November production agreement. Output for November was 25 million barrels per day.

Opec's attempts to support a higher oil price have been hurt recently by Ecuador's decision to leave the organization and the possibility that U.S. President-elect Bill Clinton could ease the embargo on Iraqi oil sales.

SUDAN

A new war is set to begin in Sudan. But this one will pit the forces of Coca-Cola against Pepsi-Cola in a battle for supremacy of the cola market.

African Business reported that the Atlanta-based Coca-Cola Company reentered the Sudanese market with trial runs in late October, following the lifting of a ban on the production of Coca-Cola in Sudan. The company had previously secured a license to operate a plant in Khartoum in 1984, but saw its agreement questioned after President Gaafar al-Nimeiry was overthrown the following year. The license was

revoked in 1986 because the company operated plants in Israel, according to the article.

A new Coca-Cola plant in Khartoum is owned by the New Industries Company. According to the report, the company's general manager, Nicolas Limmios, said the plant would soon begin production at the full production level of 35,000 crates per day. Limmios expects that within a year, Coca-Cola will capture 40 percent of the market, which had been almost monopolized by Pepsi-Cola.

But Coca-Cola's renewed effort to sell products in Sudan is not the only activity the company has been undertaking to increase its market share on the continent of late.

The company announced on November 18 that it is establishing sub-Saharan Africa as a separate operating group. The new president of the group will be Carl Ware, who has served as deputy group president of the former Northeast/Africa Group, and as chairman of the Coca-Cola Foundation.

The company's senior vice president, John Hunter, who is also president of Coca-Cola's International Business Sector, said, "The Coca-Cola Company has long recognized the importance of Africa, where we have made significant market investments for many years. With the establishment of this group, we add even greater focus on the potential that sub-Saharan Africa holds with its close to 500 million people."

Coca-Cola sells products in 46 countries in sub-Saharan African.

GHANA

Ashanti Goldfields Corporation is set to become the world's leading user of bacteria to produce gold according to a November 24 article in the *Financial Times*.


The process, which uses naturally occurring thiobacillus ferro-oxidans to eat away at difficult ore, is expected to produce 300,000 troy ounces of gold a year, according to the article.

The project was made possible by a \$140 million International Finance Corporation-structured loan, and is part of Ashanti's three-year, \$305 million expansion program.

Ashanti reported earlier that it produced 645,000 ounces of gold in fiscal year 1991-1992. The expansion program is expected to increase the company's output to over 1 million ounces per year.

U.S. POLICY


BY FRANCIS A. KORNEGAY, JR.



AFRICA IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

Les Skono/Syigma

After Somalia, the author writes, President Bill Clinton should focus on fashioning a post-Cold War security strategy that can deal with conflicts arising from the legacy of superpower-sponsored regional military build-ups. Such a policy would necessitate not only structuring a revitalized UN-based global peace-keeping system, but also relying heavily on strengthening regional institutions, such as the Organization of African Unity. Future humanitarian/peace-keeping operations on the continent would thus require utmost cooperation between the UN, the U.S., and Africa.



With the end of the Cold War, it was widely expected that Africa would quickly fade into oblivion in U.S. global calculations at a time when foreign affairs were increasingly expected to take a back seat to domestic priorities.

However, the precedent-setting humanitarian intervention in Somalia that President George Bush has bequeathed to President-elect Bill Clinton suggests that developments on the ground in Africa hold a high potential to force their way onto the global agenda in ways that Washington will find hard to ignore. Further, the increasing demands that these crises are placing on the United Nations' thinly stretched resources are coming at a time when the UN Africa bloc's candidate, former Egyptian Foreign Minister Boutros Boutros-Ghali, is the UN secretary-general.

From an African perspective, the Boutros-Ghali factor is of no small importance. At stake is the fate of African issues on the international agenda at a watershed juncture when the world's major powers are looking to the UN and other instruments of multilateral diplomacy to manage global relations in the new multipolar environment.

The Somali crisis is a case in point. It was Boutros-Ghali who, with the help of pressure from Congress, rescued Somalia's humanitarian crisis from the oblivion it was being consigned to by the major powers' preoccupation with Serbian aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now, ironically, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia is generating pressure on the U.S. and the UN for a more forceful intervention in Bosnia—all of which indicates how difficult it is going to be for President Clinton to remain focused like a "laser beam" on domestic economic recovery.

To develop the maneuvering room needed to fulfill his domestic agenda, Clinton may have no choice but to early on give equal billing to fashioning the outlines of a post-Cold War security strategy that addresses the many urgent questions arising out of the commitment of U.S. troops to Somalia. This should, among other things, accelerate a much-needed rethinking of Africa policy and, more broadly, the role of the UN and other international organizations in managing and/or resolving regional conflicts. A reformulated Africa policy cannot be separated

from a broader coming to terms by the U.S. with a new global environment—one rife with instability stemming from superpower-sponsored regional military build-ups and arms races that are bitter legacies of the Cold War.

To the extent that an enhanced UN role is envisioned in addressing the African manifestations of this "new world disorder," the fashioning of an effective U.S. policy toward the continent will depend on Clinton moving beyond the promising pronouncements he made during the campaign to actually implementing a meaningful role for the UN in achieving his administration's global objectives.

In making this suggestion, there is no illusion as to the magnitude of the task involved, given the UN's institutional deficiencies and sometimes debilitating constraints placed on it by member governments. But assuming the Clinton administration does turn to the UN in a major way, this could provide a compelling justification for strengthening African continental and sub-regional institutions—essential to fashioning multilateral UN-centered approaches to African problem-solving, especially in the crucial area of conflict resolution. The urgency of moving in this direction is underlined by President Bush's response to the Somali crisis.

The strengthening of continental and subregional institutions, whether in Africa, Europe, Asia, or America, ought to be an essential corollary to revitalizing the UN system as the centerpiece of a global collective security framework tailored to the post-Cold War 1990s. In effect, the strengthening of these institutions in Africa would strengthen the African pillar of a new UN-centered collective security system. But this all hinges on the UN being upgraded as a key factor in shaping post-Cold War U.S. security strategy, starting with clearing up the U.S.'s remaining debt to the UN, coupled with pressure on the world body to institute urgently needed reforms in its operations. Clinton may be better able to embark on fresh initiatives in foreign affairs that will complement the domestic initiatives his administration is expected to give top priority. An emphasis on strengthening peace-keeping capabilities within the context of multilateralizing important elements of foreign policy would point in this direction.

A UN-centered collective security system incorporating rapid deployment capability, bolstered by regional pillars, and including equitable burden-sharing among the major G-7 powers, would be beneficial in two ways. It would minimize the possibility of the U.S.'s becoming

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over-extended in commitments beyond the most compelling spheres of national security interest; it would provide the U.S. with maneuvering room in responding to crises on a case-by-case basis and would promote a more secure international environment for global economic growth and cooperation. Here, it is important to point out that those regions of the world that may appear peripheral from a short-term geopolitical/strategic perspective, in 21st century geo-economic terms, may turn out to be anything but, given the growing preoccupation with expanding opportunities for U.S. trade and investment in an economically competitive global market.

From this standpoint alone, putting Africa on the backburner could prove to be regrettably short-sighted. In any case, according to candidate Bill Clinton's statement in the September-October issue of *Africa Report*, strengthening UN peace-keeping capabilities and exploring "new ideas for United Nations preventive diplomacy" should open up



Camerapix

new policy vistas for addressing Africa's urgent needs based upon his stated interest in fashioning an Africa policy factoring in an upgraded U.S. commitment to the UN.

But factoring the UN into a revised Africa policy framework is useful only insofar as there is a companion commitment to strengthening collaboration with and support for inter-African institutions. This is not only important from a conflict resolution perspective. Over the longer term, it is crucial to accelerating the pace of regional cooperation and eventual integration, thereby facilitating the fulfillment of Africa's potential for attracting trade and foreign capital. But regional cooperation and integration can only be advanced within a climate of regional stability. The Liberian civil war remains a threat to West Africa's economic integration prospects. By the same token, the unsettled transitions in Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa threaten to undermine the potential for regional cooperation and integration in southern Africa to which the entire continent is hitching its economic recovery prospects. And East Africa's contribution to Africa's recovery will never be fulfilled as long as the Horn of Africa remains in turmoil.

The importance of conflict resolution as a precondition to recovery is increasingly appreciated by Africa's elites, as conflicts on the ground force them to confront long-held assumptions about "sovereignty" and "non-interference" which constipate the process of arriving at genuine-

ly African solutions. In this regard, the humanitarian/peace-making intervention of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecomog) in the Liberian civil war is precedent-setting with possible far-reaching implications in African interstate relations.

The initiative has the potential to strengthen the hands of Africa's more visionary leaders like OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim, who is waging an uphill battle to overcome self-serving notions of "territorial integrity," and "non-interference" in the hope of institutionalizing African collective self-reliance in conflict resolution and management.

With an eye toward structuring a UN-based global peace-keeping system (making provision for preventive diplomacy and peace *enforcement* as well as peace-making) with complementary continental components, the Clinton administration has an opportunity to take the lead in moving in this direction by actively supporting Salim's "Proposals for an OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Resolution."

The proposals call for: a new organ to be set up within the OAU Summit's Bureau comprising a chairman

Left, relief workers

Right, the intervention of Ecomog in Liberia's civil war is precedent-setting

and eight other members representing Africa's five regions; em-

powering the Bureau to act on behalf of heads of state in sanctioning any deployment of military observer or peace-keeping forces; a beefed-up secretary-general's office augmenting the Bureau with an "early warning system" to monitor and analyze trends, with recourse to "eminent African personalities" to engage in preventive diplomacy as well as the expert counsel of African military personnel; revival of the virtually moribund OAU Defense Commission with an enhanced advisory capacity specifically for peace-keeping operations; and a provision for mediating territorial disputes by erecting an interim "arbitral tribunal" staffed by "eminent African jurists" pending the launching of the African Court of Justice provided for in the treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC).

At a news conference in Dakar, Salim also suggested that there should be "an African peace-keeping unit specially trained inside the armed forces of every African country." Finally, the Salim proposals call for a special fund to be established, beginning with \$1 million from the OAU's regular budget, to provide material support for the mechanism's operations with provision for voluntary contributions from "states, individuals, and institutions within and outside Africa."



Patrick Robert/Sygnma

What is compelling about the OAU proposals is their compatibility with the UN's peace-keeping mission. UN Under-Secretary General for Special Policy Affairs in Africa and the Middle East James Jonah has noted that the UN is well placed to assist in building up the OAU peace-keeping capacity. But there is the bottom-line consideration of financing. Here, Jonah points out that under Chapter 8 of the Charter the Security Council can "authorize the OAU to carry out a peace-keeping operation, and maybe financing could come through this channel." But here again, this consideration begs the question of the U.S. contribution to the UN and the need for Washington—at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue—to seriously consider a series of proposals that would strengthen America's UN commitment, including the financing of peace-keeping operations.

Among other things, there is the suggestion that U.S. funding for UN peace-keeping be transferred, in the congressional appropriations process, from the State Department to the Department of Defense budget. Perhaps such a readjustment could allow for contingencies that could support similar activities by continental and hemispheric bodies like the OAU and NATO as well as the OAU, and for subregional structures that become involved in peace-keeping like Ecomog/ECOWAS in Liberia.

Clinton is on record arguing for the U.S. to "pay our fair share of the costs of UN peace-keeping operations" while advocating that "we... explore new ideas for UN preventive diplomacy, including the idea for creating a UN Rapid Deployment Force that could be used for purposes beyond traditional peace-keeping for humanitarian purposes." The revived U.S. commitment to the UN called for by Clinton could easily intersect with African peace-keeping initiatives to provide substance to a new collective security system where UN and regional initiatives would be mutually augmenting and complementary.

But to make this reality, the U.S. will have to demonstrate a stronger commitment to strengthening continental and subregional pan-African institutions. One option in this regard would be for the U.S. to consult with African leaders on the appropriateness of the U.S. being accorded observer or associate membership status to the OAU accompanied by the appointment of a U.S. ambassador to that body, whose brief would extend to interacting with other continental and subregional bodies.

Closer diplomatic involvement by the U.S. in the OAU system would demonstrate America's commitment to supporting pan-African institution-building within the framework of a new UN-centered world order. An OAU ambassadorial post would help to consolidate and give coherence to U.S. African diplomacy in much the same manner as the posting of a U.S. ambassador to the OAS facilitates hemispheric diplomacy. Further, it would firm up the U.S.-African relationship grounded in this country's African heritage, and place the U.S. in a better position to coordinate its response to African crises in consultation with Africans. This, in turn, would strengthen African confidence in the level of importance that Washington attaches to African concerns.

In terms of current and potential crises, the U.S., in the short-term, should encourage a consolidating of the UN's response to problems in East and southern Africa. Both regions require the sustained attention that can only come from the appointment of long-term UN special envoys with regional mandates, backed up by cooperative UN/OAU monitoring arrangements. The situation in the Horn of Africa is especially complicated by the absence of a regional counterpart to West Africa's ECOWAS or the frontline states/Southern African Development Community (formerly SADCC) groupings in the South.

A UN special envoy in the Horn could play a crucial role in working with the OAU to coordinate the urgent famine relief and peace-keeping operation in Somalia, while engaging in the diplomatic trouble-shooting needed to help resolve the political conflict that is the source of the crisis. Given the dramatic nature of the Somali crisis, its resolution may actually require consideration of re-instituting the UN trusteeship principle, updated to incorporate a leading oversight role for the OAU, which should work with local Somali elites in re-fashioning governance of the Somali regions on a more viable basis. Similar diplomatic, famine relief coordination, and conflict-management efforts are needed in Sudan and Ethiopia.

A UN special envoy, with a regional mandate, is equally compelling for southern Africa where fragile, but for the rest of Africa, crucially important transitions are under way in Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa. Successful transitions in these countries, South Africa in particular, are of make-or-break urgency in determining the future economic prospects of much of the continent. Yet, as events in the fall of 1992 have demonstrated, satisfactory outcomes to these transitions are far from assured.

How President Clinton follows through in disengaging from Somalia and in relating to the peace-enforcement crisis in Liberia will constitute early defining moments in U.S.-African relations under his administration. In spite of the emerging conventional wisdom that such African crises are outside the scope of post-Cold War U.S. national interests, America nevertheless retains major responsibility for the breakdown of governance in Somalia and Liberia. These predicaments, among others of lesser urgency on the continent, are at least in part attributable to past U.S. policies dictated by overriding Cold War considerations. At the same time, it is also obvious that it is beyond the capacity of the U.S. to single-handedly respond in full to each and every African crisis it may have contributed to. Hence, the importance of developing a policy approach that relies heavily on the UN, the OAU, and African subregional organizations.

Operation Restore Hope underlines the urgent need for U.S. collaboration with other Western democracies and developing countries in moving in this direction so as to greatly heighten the threshold at which the U.S. is compelled to spearhead a humanitarian intervention on the scale of Somalia. This no doubt entails an uphill struggle given the bureaucratic bottlenecks and regional political complexities that often immobilize the UN and the

OAU. The U.S. should place a high priority on enabling the UN to be more responsive in emergency rescue situations like Somalia. Here, the UN's lack of a mandated rapid deployment capability to undertake forceful peace-making as opposed to purely passive peace-keeping forced the U.S. to take the lead in Somalia.

But beyond intervening to secure food deliveries, the question that goes begging is what comes next? How is longer-term security to be guaranteed in a country where the state has totally disintegrated and sovereignty, in effect, breaks down? What is the responsibility of the international community in restoring sovereignty? What should be expected of the OAU as well as the UN? Whereas there are expectations that the UN will assume responsibility for bringing about national reconciliation and a semblance of governance, there has been no mention of a role for the OAU. Yet there is widespread concern among Africans that humanitarian intervention in Somalia may set a precedent leading to the "recolonization" of Africa. Meanwhile, the OAU has been silent. What does this low profile imply for the future of Secretary-General Salim's conflict management/resolution proposals which, in any case, may not go nearly far enough to address contingencies like Somalia?

The calling out of retirement of the former U.S. ambassador to Somalia, Robert Oakley, to serve as political adviser to the military command of Operation Restore Hope is acknowledgement by Washington that the U.S. cannot stand aloof from restoring governance in Somalia, though it is not likely to play a central role in this process. This was a point, however, that became an almost instant preoccupation with the news media. A *Newsweek* article observed that "unless a contingent of peace-makers stays long enough—which could be years—to fashion some kind of effective national authority, the causes of Somalia's chaos will only re-emerge." Further, it noted that "many experts doubt that military steps to guard food convoys can, or should, be separated from rebuilding the nation."

These considerations have fueled the notion of re-establishing governance in Somalia through the vehicle of trusteeship. However, if a straight-out UN trusteeship is unacceptable, perhaps the preferred option is an inter-African solution involving the OAU in partnership with the UN in underpinning an internal Somali settlement. A joint OAU/UN partnership would not impose a solution on Somalia as much as facilitate a Somali solution and consolidate it through peace enforcement and assistance in restoring the basic tools of governance.

Within this context, the UN charter could be amended to allow for the installation of what former Ugandan Foreign Minister Olara Otunnu calls a "transitional arrangement" to underscore the temporary nature of external involvement. The UN trust role could be subordinated to the oversight of the OAU in consultation with a transitional Somali authority or, in cases like Liberia, to a subregional organization like Ecomog. The UN mandatory arms embargo aimed at the Taylor forces in Liberia introduces the potential for UN/Ecomog cooperation in eventu-

ally stabilizing that situation where, incidentally, in the wake of Operation Restore Hope, there is a demand for similar U.S. involvement.

Because of the fundamental nature of the questions raised by the humanitarian intervention/peace-keeping dilemmas in Somalia and Liberia, the Clinton administration may want, early on, to encourage the convening of a UN special session on peace-keeping and humanitarian intervention. This would provide an opportunity to explore options under the UN Charter and develop appropriate guidelines for addressing such situations. In the process, the U.S. would have a suitable frame of reference for establishing its own criteria for undertaking future international rescue missions on a case-by-case basis, factoring in strategic security interests as well as strictly humanitarian concerns. However, for such deliberation to be truly productive, a UN special session on peace-keeping and humanitarian intervention should stimulate regional collective security dialogues in Europe, the Americas, and Asia as well as in Africa. The end result could be the fashioning of a UN-centered collective security system that decentralizes peace-enforcement and peace-keeping responsibilities. Continental and/or subregional organizations would, in effect, constitute the front-line of engagement in Somalia-like emergencies and, hopefully, prevent them from escalating to that crisis level.

As outlined here, the fashioning of a UN-centered Africa policy is suggestive of how America's post-Cold War commitments could be mediated through a multilateral framework which spreads the security burden while enabling the U.S. to concentrate on its domestic priorities without becoming "isolationist." Africa, in turn, could benefit from a policy that encouraged the strengthening of UN/African peace-keeping capabilities within a framework of international cooperation that minimized tendencies toward the marginalization of the continent and its concerns.

For Africa, the stakes are high. The continent has a window of opportunity within the next four years to advance its security and economic interests while its candidate, Boutros-Ghali, is the UN secretary-general and while a Democratic administration with strong pro-Africa constituencies is in the ascendancy in Washington.

For the Clinton administration, the stakes are also high. Forging an Africa policy that is anchored in a revitalized UN system, strengthened African continental and subregional institutions, and a collaborative approach to addressing the continent's problems, constitutes a major challenge—not just in terms of how America is to relate to Africa, but more broadly and fundamentally in terms of how the post-Cold War environment is to be managed so as to contain threats to international security while promoting sustainable development and economic growth without succumbing to "imperial overstretch." Clinton's approach to Africa could provide clues as to how these concerns will be managed through the remainder of the 1990s. ○



TALKING TOU

J. Ozanne/Sygma

The West African military force, Ecomog, which is trying to subdue the expansionist ambitions of Charles Taylor and bring peace to Liberia, is getting backing from the UN for its arms embargo. In another symbolic move, the UN has also named a special representative for the war-beleaguered nation. Ecomog is hoping that its sanctions—which include an economic blockade of Taylor-held Liberia—will bite enough to avert the need for a possible all-out offensive against Taylor's National Patriotic Front army.

W

est Africans engaged in mediation to end the civil war in Liberia will consider a UN resolution supporting an arms embargo a major boost to their intensifying campaign to bring to heel public servant-turned-revolutionary

Charles Taylor. The flamboyant, media-savvy factional leader has so far resisted all moves to bring the region's oldest republic to the multi-party ballot box.


The resolution, passed unanimously in late November after foreign ministers of the 16-member Economic Community of West African States (Ecomog) lobbied the world body's current session, confers badly needed legitimacy on sanctions against Liberia's combatants, which came into force on November 5. UN approval means Ecomog—the seven-nation task force based in Liberia's capi-

tal, Monrovia, since September 1990—can press ahead with a military blockade of all air, land, and sea ports with unprecedented confidence.

What is more, the UN has appointed a special representative for Liberia—in line with Ecomog requests and Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's declared support for regional and sub-regional initiatives in conflict management. But the UN stopped short of giving its unequivocal support for comprehensive economic sanctions declared by Ecomog leaders at an October meeting in Cotonou, Benin—a reflection of the growing perception among UN members that the Nigeria-led Ecomog has compromised its status as Liberia's neutral policeman.

The sanctions are aimed principally at forcing Taylor into compliance with accords signed at Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire, a little over a year ago. Yamoussoukro IV enshrines the Ecomog peace plan, which holds all factions to disarmament and encampment supervised by Ecomog as a prerequisite for repatriation and resettle-

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GH TO TAYLOR

ment of refugees, voter registration, and ultimately what would be, if organized as envisaged, Liberia's only free and fair poll since its founding by freed American slaves in 1847.

His signing of Yamoussoukro IV and a later clarification in Geneva notwithstanding, Taylor has consistently refused to demobilize the estimated 12,000 men, women, and children who make up his National Patriotic Front (NPFL), which exercises military control over most of Liberian territory outside Monrovia. His contention that Ecomog is an agent of Nigerian expansionism in Liberia has been stepped up in recent months, as has his call for the West Africans to be replaced by a UN force.

That the UN has stopped short of sending its own peace-keepers into Liberia is as much a reflection of current preoccupations with other conflicts such as that in the former Yugoslavia as it is a sign of Ecomog's determination to stay at the helm of the tortuous mediation process it feels it has managed, at great sacrifice, with virtually no outside material support. Diplomats say that while UN moral support is welcomed, real commitment to peace in one of the world's ignored trouble spots could be more tangibly demonstrated by logistical support for Ecomog and cash backing for the expensive shuttle diplomacy.

"We've been doing the job of the Security Council for the last two years," a West African diplomat told *Africa Report*. "So to ask the UN to help in Liberia is no more than requesting them to do their job." Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, who is helping to prepare Liberia for

elections, suggested after a recent meeting with Taylor that a 20-man team of UN observers might be useful in monitoring the peace monitors themselves, a suggestion Ecomog rejected as impractical. How the new UN representative in Liberia and his civilian team will fare in assessing the impartiality or otherwise of Ecomog remains to be seen.

Given the current state of affairs in Liberia, a UN presence is an important symbol. Since October 15, when Taylor declared war on Ecomog and launched artillery and infantry attacks on Monrovia, the picture has become increasingly confused and the future for the city's inhabitants, inflated to 1.5 million by the war, more uncertain by the day. The collapse of a ceasefire that had held, by and large, for nearly two years has been accompanied by some of the fiercest fighting seen since December 1989 when the NPFL took on the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) in its bid to oust the reviled former dictator, Samuel Doe.

Then, Ecomog intervened to stop the carnage as Monrovia became the staging ground for bloody ethno-religious factional fighting between the NPFL, AFL, and INPFL, a Taylor splinter. Now, as then, Ecomog, has come under fire. It has finally shown its potential for aggression after months of restraint in the face of extreme provocation. Peace-keepers who deployed in NPFL-held areas earlier this year under delusions that their role in Liberia was finally being accepted suffered emasculating humiliation as they were kidnapped, tortured, even murdered by the NPFL.

Ecomog's retiring field commander, Maj.-Gen. Ishaya Bakut, told journalists shortly before the October 15 onslaught: "All Taylor has succeeded in doing is discrediting us." Bakut, the third of four successive Nigerians given the task of implementing Yamoussoukro IV, had *strong grounds for his pessimism. In the year he served with Ecomog, he watched Taylor renege on accord after accord, amid the apparent inability of his political masters at Ecomog to reach a consensus on a decisive mandate for the force.*

Ecomog's new commander, Maj.-Gen. Adetunji Olurin, now has the onerous task of directing the bolstered coalition's imposition of Ecomog's sanctions decision, as well as keeping NPFL units at bay in the absence of a new ceasefire. Officially put at 10,000, the Ecomog force is said by insiders to be much larger, while diplomatic sources confirm reports of a significant reinforcement in heavy weapons and other arms. Nigeria continues to dominate and largely finance the operation. It has at the very least doubled its original two battalions, with major participation coming from Senegal (2,500 men) and Ghana (one battalion). Guinea, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia complete the composition, together with a token contingent from Mali.

Nigerian frigates have shelled the marshes around *Monrovia to dislodge NPFL commando units, while the key NPFL port of Buchanan, 40 miles southeast of Monrovia, is subject to a naval blockade. Buchanan and other strategic NPFL sites, including Gbarnga, Taylor's seat 125 miles to the north, have been bombed and strafed by Nigerian jets, which are enforcing Ecomog's imposition of a no-fly zone over Liberian airspace. Signs are that the sanctions are beginning to bite. Reports speak of severe fuel shortages in NPFL-held areas, a logical sequel to the Ecomog edict that any ship headed for Taylor-held ports of Buchanan, Harper, or Greenville must first stop for inspection at Monrovia's freeport.*

In itself, the arms embargo is too late, since the NPFL took advantage of the stalemate afforded by the November 1990 ceasefire to stockpile a formidable array of weapons, many unconventional, with which it is now prosecuting its do-or-die campaign. Ulimo, a coalition of anti-Doe Krahn and Mandingo elements that has brought its war against Taylor from bases in neighboring Sierra Leone to the very outskirts of Monrovia, is also armed *and in the absence of a buffer zone at the porous north-eastern frontier will continue to sneak in guns. Monrovia itself is awash with stray weapons, often wielded by armed bandits seeking to profiteer from the breakdown of law and order.*

Ecomog's dusk-to-dawn curfew—with the accompanying warning that any armed person on the streets at night risks being shot on sight—is in part a response to increasing lawlessness. It is also a response to allegations that Ecomog is in collusion with Ulimo, the AFL, and the "black berets"—400 Liberians who are the first graduates of a scheme run by the Ecomog-installed Monrovia interim government to rebuild a more ethnically

diverse national army. Sources say in excess of 1,000 are presently in training in neighboring Guinea. Ecomog's inadvertent—some say calculated—*involvement with these groups in the defense of Monrovia has further damaged the peace-keepers' image of impartiality, drawing assurances from senior commanders that once the "common enemy" is dealt with, then the other factions will be restrained.*


The success of Ecomog's unilateral economic blockade will depend to a large extent on Côte d'Ivoire. The francophone country has directed a two-track foreign policy, on the one hand signing Ecomog initiatives (it spearheaded the Yamoussoukro accords) and on the other, giving de facto recognition to Taylor's National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government (NPRAG). But, Ecomog intelligence sources say, Ivorian troops have also sealed off their border with Taylor's Liberia, thereby depriving the NPFL of its sole land point of entry for supplies.

Burkina Faso, the origin of most Taylor-bound convoys of weapons and mercenaries, has been diplomatically pressured to the point that it now says it will send 1,000 troops to join Ecomog. If the offer is genuine, it may do more than any Ecomog confidence-building exercise thus far to persuade Taylor that the West Africans have honorable intentions. The Burkinabe offer followed a crisis meeting on November 7 convened by the Nigerian head of state, Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, in his capital, Abuja. Attended by eight leaders, the meeting formally invited Ecomog refuseniks to bolster the peace-keepers' capabilities. Abuja also condemned the October 15 attack and the death of four American nuns it said were killed by the NPFL.

That Burkinabe leader Blaise Compaoré attended the summit, to be promptly berated by his fellow heads of state, is a testament to the resilience of a community beset by internal divisions, and exacerbated by outsiders. Certainly Compaoré's new line over Liberia must be attributed to strong U.S. condemnation of Burkina Faso's role in prolonging the civil war. In what many viewed as the first tangible expression of U.S. decisiveness over the Liberia imbroglio, it has withdrawn its ambassador from Ouagadougou and prevented a new Burkinabe envoy to Washington from taking his seat.

What began with an apparent gaffe by Africa policy chief Herman Cohen—who was reported by the BBC as saying Ecomog must be replaced by a UN team because it could no longer be considered neutral—ended with the clearest American

*Charles Taylor:
Flamboyant,
media-savvy,
and intransigent*



position yet: A State Department spokesman said the U.S. still supported Ecomog's mediation in Liberia and considered Ecomog a neutral peace-keeping unit.

On an official visit to the Gambia, Cohen told *Africa Report* that the remarks attributed to him had been engineered.

The BBC sound-bite had been "fabricated, a fake interview." Rather more authentic, however, were a sheaf of State Department documents leaked to several news media in early November detailing communications between U.S. diplomatic missions on the Liberia situation. The State Department has maintained an enigmatic silence on the documents, marked "secret" and "confidential," what one Western diplomat described as an "inspired leak."

If authentic, the communications, acquired by *Africa Report*, provide an intriguing insight into the American analysis of Liberia and show the extent to which Ecomog is divided over how best to end the stalemate. Benin's President Nicéphore Soglo, the current Ecomog chairman, is seen as increasingly exasperated over what he perceives as Nigeria's hijacking of the mediation process. In a memo to Washington dated October 27, the American ambassador reports: "In my latest conversations with President Soglo...I am finding that he has thrown up his hands over Liberia, deciding that Nigeria has taken over Ecomog and that Ecomog is too divided to have a common policy for a peaceful resolution of the problem. Let them fight, he mutters often, until they are exhausted...."

Senegal, whose two battalions joined Ecomog earlier this year only after a \$10 million cash injection from the U.S., is revealed to be in despair over Taylor's refusal to implement Yamoussoukro IV and exasperated by the murder of its men, whom the NPFL initially welcomed as impartial peace-keepers. Assistant Secretary of State for Defense Lilley reports in a telex that the Senegalese chief of staff, Maj.-Gen. Mamadou Mansour Seck, told him on a visit to Washington in October that "the best solution to the Liberia problem would be to 'eliminate' Taylor, and made his meaning very clear." Lilley instructs diplomats in Dakar to tell Seck and senior Senegalese officials it is not U.S. government policy to back assassinations.

Another communication from Dakar to Washington reads: "Seck opened with his now-familiar diatribe against Taylor, noting he is the sole obstacle to peace in Liberia...Seck [noted] that he thought the existence of Ulimo, and its recent advances in Liberia, was a good thing. 'Taylor only understands force,' said the General. 'He has already violated the terms of the Cotonou communiqué. Our [Senegal's] interest in Liberia is humanitarian. We were sent as peace-keepers, but now a state of

THE ARMS EMBARGO IS TOO LATE, SINCE THE NPFL HAS STOCK- PILED A FOR- MIDABLE ARRAY OF WEAPONS.

war exists and we need to be prepared for it.' " Another message reveals Senegal's plans to make a "technical retreat" from Liberia, aided by a \$500,000 U.S. contingency fund (reliable sources say West Africans have been successful in exerting diplomatic pressure on Senegal to stay in the coalition).

The extent of the U.S. role in nurturing the Yamoussoukro IV accord is also laid bare. An October 23 memo from its Abidjan embassy to State reveals American recognition that the process leading up to the accord—a result of a meeting between Vice President Dan Quayle and Ivorian leader Félix Houphouët-Boigny—was intended to make Taylor president. "Last year, the GOCI [Ivorian government] committed its resources and prestige to finding a political solution...that would likely have led to Charles Taylor's legitimate access to the presidency and, the Ivorians hoped, a peaceful and stable neighbor on their western border."

The same memo expresses U.S. paranoia over being blamed, by association with Côte d'Ivoire, for being a party to the conflict rather than a disinterested peace-broker. This fear may explain why a request for \$2.5 million in military assistance from the U.S.—a result of Ivorian fears the conflict would spill over its borders—has not yet been met. An October 25 memo describing a conversation between Ambassador Horan and Ivorian Foreign Minister Amara Essy reports: "Essy said the GOCI was a little disappointed the U.S. had urged [Côte d'Ivoire] to play a greater role in Liberia, but was not forthcoming as [Côte d'Ivoire] had hoped it would be, when its actions had military consequences or required more direct U.S. diplomatic involvement."

The forecast for Liberia remains depressing. The NPFL, already under the sanctions squeeze, will continue to throw itself at an Ecomog force increasingly prepared for war, despite Taylor's statement that he will comply with the UN call for a multilateral ceasefire (at time of going to press, fighting was still going on in and around Monrovia). Ecomog contributors, emboldened by the UN resolution and convinced of the probity of the force's actions, will step up the blockade and prepare for a possible all-out offensive against NPFL positions. They will have learned from the drive of October 1990, when then commander Maj.-Gen. Joshua Dogonyaro enforced a cease-fire and set up a protective buffer zone around Monrovia after a three-week blitzkrieg. Babangida told fellow leaders at Abuja that the Community had no choice but to stick it out in Liberia, so a pullout is unlikely.

But with the dense hinterland an inhibiting factor to Ecomog's securing the whole country, an NPFL guerrilla war could last for months, even years. Should the West Africans decide to march on Gbarnga, the civilian death toll—estimated at anything between 20,000 and 100,000 since December 1989—could rise even higher. Having surmounted formidable hurdles to keep the peace process on track, Ecomog now faces possibly the most difficult task—completing the precedent-setting Liberia assignment with its beleaguered image and honor intact. ○





Sarah-Jane Poole



Sergio Santimeno/AIM



Gil Lauriciano/AIM

Mozambican soldiers:
A ceasefire was signed on
October 4

Below: President Joaquim
Chissano

LESSONS FROM ANGOLA



Joel Chiziane/AIM

As Angola teetered between a fragile ceasefire and a return to civil war, its Portuguese-speaking cousin, Mozambique, appeared to be travelling down the same road toward contested, inconclusive elections and continued civil strife—until the United Nations Security

Council agreed in mid-December to dispatch 7,500 peace-keepers to the war-torn nation.

The specter of Angola's continued unrest had hung heavily over Mozambique, whose new peace plan leading to elections had immediately fallen behind schedule. Mozambique's President Joaquim Chissano and Renamo rebel leader Afonso Dhlakama signed an accord in Rome on October 4, calling for a ceasefire and detailing a peace process to bring about nationwide elections in one year. But within a month, the Mozambican plan was already behind its timetable.

In Angola, although Jonas Savimbi's Unita movement finally agreed in early December to participate in a coalition government with President José Eduardo dos Santos's MPLA party, the threat of renewed hostilities


remained ever-present. Potential scenarios included Unita dividing Angola in half so that it would rule the southern and central territories where it has retained military control, or an attempt to squeeze Luanda—under the MPLA's control—by seizing the rest of the country.

In deciding in mid-December to send peace-keepers to Mozambique, however, the United Nations has drawn lessons from the Angolan crisis which can help Mozambique avert a similar continuation of its violence. The experience in Angola is applicable to Mozambique because the two countries share similar histories and their current political and economic situations are parallel.

Angola and Mozambique, the two Portuguese-speaking countries of southern Africa, have been fated to mirror each other both in colonial history and after independence in Marxist rule and vicious, foreign-backed civil wars. The end of the Cold War brought the possibility of peace to both countries. Because the collapse of the Soviet Union left the two Marxist governments without powerful allies, both ruling parties moved away from one-party states and centrally controlled socialist economies and sought new friends in the West.

Angola got the first breakthrough, chiefly because of American interest in the country's rich oil deposits. Pres-

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In early December, Mozambique appeared poised to follow the same tenuous route as Angola—failed demobilization, disputed elections, breakdown of the ceasefire, and possibly a return to civil war. But in a sign that the UN Security Council learned from the experience in Angola, it announced on December 16 that it would send 7,500 peace-keepers to Mozambique to disarm and demobilize the combatants, and organize elections by October 1993.

sure from the United States brought the MPLA and Unita to sign the Bicesse peace accord in 1991. The agreement called for a ceasefire, demobilization of the rival armed forces, and national elections in September 1992.

Mozambique's peace negotiations in Rome dragged on for nearly two years and were marked by delays by Renamo leader Dhlakama. By the time the Mozambican accord—spelling out a ceasefire, demobilization, and elections—was signed on October 4, 1992, the Angolan agreement was already unravelling.

Before Angola's September 29-30 elections, Jonas Savimbi unequivocally told international journalists that if he and Unita lost the elections, they would claim the polls were rigged and return to war. And that is what happened. Although Unita did relatively well in the elections, winning more than a third of the parliamentary seats and even more of the presidential votes for Savimbi, it accused the MPLA of cheating and rejected the results.

After weeks of tense uncertainty, fighting broke out in the first week of November in Luanda. More than 2,000 people were killed. Unita controlled strategic portions of the city, but after a week it was surrounded by MPLA forces and fled Luanda. In the process, several of Savimbi's top generals were killed or taken captive. Unita did much better throughout the rest of the country, however. Savimbi's men took over Huambo, Angola's second city and a Unita political stronghold. Unita also took over Caxito and N'Dalatando, secured control of Lobito port, and encircled the neighboring city of Benguela. In addition, Unita encircled key provincial cities like Malange, Kuito, Luena, and Saurino. Virtually all the roads throughout the countryside fell under Unita's control.

Although Unita is widely blamed for the post-election violence, it is clear the MPLA also has significant blood on its hands. Numerous Unita officials and supporters

were summarily executed in Luanda. After the fighting, MPLA supporters searched out and killed people suspected of supporting Unita.

The United Nations brokered a ceasefire to the post-election fighting, but it did not appear to solve the country's divisions. Savimbi refused to come to Luanda to meet with dos Santos, claiming, with some justification, that Luanda was not safe for Unita. On November 20, when the MPLA and other parties met to form a new government based on the election results, Unita refused to take part.

By the end of November, it looked as though Unita intended to continue with its plan to cut Luanda off from the rest of the country. In early December, however, Unita pledged to join a government of national unity and respect a ceasefire, just three days before the expiration of a government ultimatum for the group to halt hostilities and join a coalition government or face a declaration of war. But the situation remained tenuous, with no assurances that the Unita statement would be adhered to.

As Angola hung in this precarious balance between war and peace, between unity and division, confusion reigned in Mozambique where the peace process was falling behind schedule. Zimbabwe had indefinitely delayed the withdrawal of its 7,000 troops stationed in Mozambique, which were to have been pulled out by November 15, according to the Rome agreement. The Zimbabwean troops safeguarded the 180-mile road and rail corridor linking their land-locked country to Mozambique's Beira port. The corridor is particularly strategic now, as a substantial amount of drought-stricken Zimbabwe's emergency food imports come through Beira.

Zimbabwean Defense Minister Moven Mahachi first claimed that the United Nations had asked Zimbabwe to keep its troops in Mozambique until the UN could ensure the safety and stability of the Beira Corridor. But this was denied by the UN's chief military observer in

Mozambique, Lt.-Col. Girish Sinha, who stated his mission did not have the authority to make such a request. Then Mahachi said the withdrawal was being delayed for "logistic and technical reasons."

Reading between the lines, it appeared that UN envoy to Mozambique Aldo Ajello, in a special visit to Harare, warned President Robert Mugabe that a complete removal of Zimbabwean troops would result in chaos along the Beira route. It is estimated that there are 1 million Mozambicans seeking refuge along the Beira Corridor—most are hungry and many have weapons. Safe deliveries of food to not only Zimbabwe, but also Zambia and Malawi would be jeopardized by the absence of the Zimbabwean troops, according to military experts.

The trouble over the Zimbabwean troops was matched by other hitches in the peace process. Neither Renamo nor the Mozambican army had gathered in the 49 assembly points to begin disarming and demobilization, as stipulated in the Rome peace accord. Nor did the UN, with just 20 officials in Mozambique, have adequate personnel to monitor the peace process. Talks in Maputo between Dhlakama and Chissano failed to materialize amid Renamo complaints that it had not been allocated appropriately luxurious housing.

In other words, Mozambique's peace process was in shambles, until the glimmer of hope provided by the UN's December 16 announcement. The unanimous Security Council decision provides for 5,500 troops and 2,000 civilians to be deployed in phases, in what will be the third largest UN operation after Yugoslavia and Cambodia at an estimated cost of \$330 million a year.

Starting with two battalions of Italian peace-keepers, the mandate of the "blue helmets" in Mozambique will include monitoring the cease-fire agreement, disarming the rival armies and integrating portions of the two forces into a new national army, organizing elections by October 1993, and taking over the protection of transport corridors from Malawian and Zimbabwean troops. Reflecting the lessons learned from the failed Angolan effort, the UN is insisting on full disarmament of the more than 110,000 rival troops before elections can take place.

As the Angolan experience demonstrated, no longer can it be assumed that a ceasefire and internationally monitored elections are sufficient to establish a lasting peace in a country torn by years of bitter civil strife. There must be strict demobilization and disarmament of both armed forces before elections take place. The UN monitoring team in Angola, UNAVEM, openly admitted

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that only 50 percent of the armed forces had been demobilized just one week before the elections. This figure hid the fact that most of the demobilization had been of government troops, leaving Unita's smaller, but highly disciplined force largely in place.

A larger UN team and peace-keeping force could have insisted on complete demobilization and disarmament of both forces. The election campaign should not have begun until the international team could confirm that both sides were disarmed and dispersed and a new joint force was in place.

It does not appear to have been wise to trust a notoriously corrupt government like the MPLA to administer the election process. Although some of Unita's specific charges of vote-rigging are valid, they would not have changed the overall outcome of the election. But it should have been expected that such charges would have been made.

Rather than playing a monitoring role, it appears the United Nations should have run the elections itself, as it did in Namibia, to ensure a fair outcome. In Namibia in 1989, the UN had close to 9,000 officials overseeing elections for a country of 318,250 square miles and just under 2 million people. In Angola in 1992, the UN had 500 officials to monitor elections in a country of 481,354 square miles and 12 million people. A larger UN team with more responsibility might have prevented any charges of foul play, thus obviating an excuse for rejecting the outcome.

While Angolan leaders paid lip service to the election process, a lack of faith in the polling process was plainly evident on both sides. The MPLA government created a new anti-riot police. The new police force was highly visible with smart uniforms, weapons, and Nissan Patrol vehicles. For its part, Unita created a similar force, ostensibly to guard Unita offices and residences. They too were well-armed and drove about in new GM vans from the U.S.

These rival forces were created using loopholes in the peace accord. They imparted a sinister message that neither side trusted that the elections would settle matters. Both forces were at the forefront of the violent outbreaks before the elections and in the large-scale clashes afterwards.


It is uncanny to see the same tactics being used in Mozambique. Renamo leader Dhlakama accused the Chissano government of moving its crack army members into a special police force that would fall outside the demobilization process. Dhlakama charges such a build-up of the police force is the same tactic used in Angola and brought on that country's current troubles.

Angola's train of events will hopefully not be allowed to repeat itself in Mozambique, which will see the demobilization and disarmament of its rival armies before the election campaign begins. Neither side should be permitted to create new praetorian guards. The elections should be neutrally administered. If nothing else, Angola's elections have provided the international community with useful lessons to prevent a similar fiasco in Mozambique. ○

SAVIMBI's SOUR GRAPES

Angola threatened to plunge once again into civil war after Jonas Savimbi refused to accept the outcome of the September 29-30 elections in which he lost the race for the presidency and his Unita movement polled only a third of the parliamentary vote. The fragile

ceasefire was forgotten as heavily armed Unita and government forces clashed in the capital and elsewhere. But efforts are ongoing to bring about a negotiated end to the latest violence and restore peace to the troubled nation.



J.-P. Laffont/Sygma

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or years during Angola's civil war, a raised Russian tank stood as a city landmark in downtown Luanda. As multi-party elections approached in the southwest African nation, an oversized symbolic dove was hoisted above the military vehicle in a hopeful sign that peace would replace the brutal hostilities. But the tank remained

in place and the peace the dove portended was never given a full chance to become reality.

Parliamentary and presidential elections on September 29-30 had been viewed as a panacea, with the closing of the polls successfully unlocking the doors to the devastated country's social, political, and economic reconstruction. The United Nations special representative to Angola, Margaret Anstee, echoed the thoughts of many outsiders when she called the balloting "generally free and fair" and said the real winners were the Angolan people.

Moreover, the end of the Cold War renewed hopes

that the superpower rivalry fought on Angolan soil had lost its supporters, that the country would benefit from a lasting peace, and that the 4.8 million registered voters would have had their hand in shaping the future government of their country. But no one seemed to have more leverage on the decision to return the country to war than the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Unita) leader, Jonas Savimbi, for years aided by the U.S. and South Africa in his bid to topple the then Soviet- and Cuban-backed Marxist government.

International mediating efforts by South Africa's foreign minister, Pik Botha, as well as U.S., Portuguese, and Soviet diplomats failed to bring Savimbi and President José Eduardo dos Santos together in a meeting to pave the way for a peaceful settlement to what had become an increasingly volatile armed conflict. "We and the Americans created Savimbi, but no one controls him," a senior South African diplomat who had for years commanded Unita troops said in Luanda.

The United Nations-observed voting was the final stage in a peace agreement signed by President dos Santos and Savimbi. The accord was heralded as the final seal to the country's 16-year civil war, which followed a brutal 14-year armed liberation struggle against Portuguese colonialists. But the post-election days were fraught with tension, measured by vehement allegations of fraud and strategic movements of armed forces around the country. Political shifts were reflected in a wildly fluctuating exchange rate offered for U.S. dollars by the unofficial and pervasive street changers.

Attesting to increased confidence, the parallel market exchange rate plummeted in the first few days after voting when calm reigned over the country. But the weekend after the elections, Angolans were forced to question what appeared to be premature faith that whatever the outcome, the winners and losers would have to abide by the "people's choice." That weekend, Savimbi repeatedly alleged massive government fraud and threatened not to accept defeat. His militant words followed provisional and incomplete results in which he and Unita trailed dos Santos and the ruling People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

Savimbi pulled his Unita generals out of their new posts in the unified army and the parallel exchange rate shot up from just over 2,000 to 3,500 new kwanza to the U.S. dollar. Tensions rose as rumors circulated around Unita's preparation of an offensive move while Savimbi mustered his forces.

A Unita declaration to the nation demanded that the National Electoral Council annul the vote-counting process, stop the release of any more results, and acknowledge that the government riot police (created only months before the elections) had intimidated voters at the polls. Thus, with about 10 percent of the vote count outstanding, and dos Santos still retaining the majority necessary to win on the first ballot, the final vote tally

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Sarah-Jane Poole



President José Eduardo dos Santos

Left, voters in Boa Esperançu

Vicki R. Finkel

Living in a War Zone

I had planned to meet a friend at 11 am on October 31. At 10:50 am, the heavy gunfire outside was about four hours old, ruling out hopes that I would make my appointment. In fact, it would be three war-filled days before I could semi-safely leave my house in the Maianga section of Luanda.

That sunny, beach-beckoning Saturday was the start of the anticipated government cleansing operation against *Unita in Luanda*. From my second floor window, I could view armed civilians strapped with ammunition firing into a nearby apartment building known to house *Unita* supporters.

Around-the-clock exchanges conspired to rob me of sleep and the country of peace. Rocket shards ripped holes in the plaster roof above my head, and I would later learn that many of the rapidly fired bullets had in fact made it into the house. Unfortunately, the house sat atop a hill in the crossfire between a government security building and *Unita* positions.

Like being at the top of a roller coaster and screaming for the terror to end, I was powerless to stop the continual rounds of shelling from deciding my fate. I phoned friends for information on the fighting in other areas of the city and of their situations. Some were verging on tears, fearful not only for their personal safety, but for the country whose promise of a lasting peace was shattering with our windows. "After six years of working here, I don't want to be forced to leave with my tail between my legs," a friend—a development worker—said.

At 6 am on Monday, the BBC announced that "the United Nations had arranged a ceasefire at midnight and according to our correspondent in Luanda, it appears to be holding." I do not know where that correspondent report-

ed from, but from my position of cover, in a triangular niche under the stairs leading to the second floor, mortar fire continued to sail ceaselessly overhead into the late afternoon.

By Monday evening, the shots had died down to a relatively safe level for me to drive in a white-flagged vehicle and assess the situation. Through the windshield, an unfamiliar Luanda unfolded, dramatically different from what I had come to know over nearly a year and a half working in the country. Men positioned with AK-47 rifles straddled open windows of vehicles. Dead, mutilated bodies, many naked or with *Unita* flags draped over their bloodied skin, littered the pavement. Vehicles in front of *Unita* buildings were shot and destroyed and the offices looted bare.

The state radio's continuous airing of the popular peace song, "Being brothers is being different yet equal at the same time," rang hollow in the city where children gazed down at burning *Unita* bodies. The melody was interspersed with pleas for available doctors and nurses to check in at the hospitals—clearly, the massive shelling had supplied a heavy load of patients.

While expecting the government offensive, *Unita* could not have calculated the armed response on the part of civilians. Living under the heavy doses of propaganda fed by the one-party state radio, television, and newspaper for 16 years, exacerbated by *Unita*'s antagonistic words even after the elections, Luandans lashed out with years of pent-up rage in grisly acts of revenge against their hated enemies.

"We could not take it any more, we had to kill them," a neighbor said as he strived to convince me of the righteousness of his actions. ■

—V.R.F.

was held hostage by *Unita*'s threat to return to war.

But just as the flamboyant trees dotting the capital refused to conceal their brilliant blossoms, Angolans did not hide their determination to live as normally as possible despite the signs of imminent warfare. Post-election shoppers were hit hard as prices skyrocketed on basic commodities. Soap powder, for example, virtually doubled to nearly twice the monthly minimum wage of 12,000 new kwanza. The estimated billions of dollars spent on the government's election campaign had sapped the coffers of the country whose war-shattered economy remains heavily dependent upon imports.

As daily government news reports told of *Unita* occupying more government municipalities and killing local administrators, the Swedish, French, and other foreign embassies evacuated their nationals. They feared that the instability, which the foreign affairs ministry declared a war-time situation, would escalate into an uncontrollable military confrontation.

Tensions peaked on the second weekend after the elections when a bomb exploded in downtown Luanda, less than 50 yards from the Hotel Turismo, the headquarters of the *Unita* leadership since their arrival in the capital in June 1991.

Later that week, another thunderous explosion pierced the Luanda night as an ammunition depot of the new unified air force burned about four miles from Luanda airport. The blast, which reportedly killed 13 arsenal guards, set off a wave of violence in the capital, and forced people to flee their homes, panicking that war had erupted.

In many ways, war-time conditions had in fact descended upon the country of 12 million. "We are back to a peacetime situation, with people running into the bush for safety," said Paulette Nichols, emergency project officer for Unicef. The government dropped its peacetime reconciliation rhetoric and returned to its propaganda campaign, belligerently condemning *Unita* and its military

advances. Unita's post-election threats to "turn Luanda into ash and rubble" only bred growing hatred in the heavily divided country.

While Unita's top brass had shed their military fatigues and picked up coveted colonial homes in Luanda, where they had sat on joint commissions with the government since the ceasefire signed on May 31, 1991, numerous armed and uniformed Unita guards patrolled what had become Unita areas of the city, centering around the movement's delegations. They blocked traffic at a whim, wearing necklaces of grenades and sporting dark sunglasses while toting rocket-propelled grenades and other weapons.

After blocking the release of election results, the mercurial Savimbi himself released the final tally in Huambo two days before the National Electoral Council officially divulged the outcome. A second round of presidential voting was declared necessary as no candidate received an outright majority. Dos Santos won 49.57 percent, Savimbi 40.07 percent, with the remaining votes split by nine candidates. In the parliamentary race, the MPLA received a clear majority of 53.85 percent to form the new government, gaining 129 of the 220 parliamentary seats; Unita trailed with 33.85 percent or 70 seats while the remaining 21 seats were divided among 10 third parties.

But the concluding second round of elections remains a distant goal. The government has ruled out elections until Unita disarms its troops and allows the government to extend its administration throughout the entire country. Accusing South Africa of ongoing support to Unita, the government declared Pik Botha persona non grata. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen's assertion that "Savimbi will face international condemnation and isolation if he returns to the civil war" seemed to have little effect on the U.S.'s former "democratic freedom fighter."

If Savimbi's erstwhile allies questioned their hold on the military commander, sporadic bombings and murders patently showed that the government no longer retained full control in the capital, traditionally an MPLA stronghold throughout the civil strife. But when Savimbi flew to his residence in Huambo shortly after the elections to devise his strategy from Unita's southern heartland, the party's headquarters in Luanda seemed an amputated limb, severed from control in the south.

Assessing their strategic disadvantage in the MPLA capital, about 40 Unita armed guards launched an attack with rockets and heavy gunfire outside the light aircraft zone of the capital's airport, early on the morning of October 30. Eight people, including three Portuguese, were killed in the hour-long conflict. The offensive was

UNITA'S POST-ELECTION THREATS ONLY BRED GROWING HATRED IN A DIVIDED ANGOLA.

likely cover for an attempt to fly out vulnerable Unita supporters from Luanda in the midst of escalating tension fueled by Unita's growing occupation of southern Angola. Unita had reportedly taken over more land since the elections than it had occupied before the ceasefire and even Luanda had turned into a militarized zone.

With the election results published, the MPLA attained a mandate to govern and recognition from the international community. After vain attempts to reach a peaceful settlement, international mediators appeared to throw up their negotiating hands over fruitless bids to settle the crisis. Moreover, the MPLA had long since secured the backing of the Luanda populace to wage what became a bitter offensive in the capital. The government armed the population in preparation for a three-day blitz against Unita members. Heavy artillery rained down upon the besieged capital in an attack in which over 1,000 people were reported killed in Luanda, and an equal number in the rest of the country.

Top Unita leaders, including Savimbi's nephew and chief spokesman in Luanda, Elias Salupeto Pena, and Unita Vice President Jeremias Chitunda were gunned down as they attempted to drive out of the city. A dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed in Luanda in a bid to sweep up dead bodies and curtail rampant looting among the armed population.

The government stated that the offensive was in response to an alleged Unita coup plan. The massive battle effectively purged Unita from the capital, and extinguished the flickering hope for peace in the country. Foreign embassies and the United Nations evacuated remaining staff, producing a virtual vacuum in aid work. The U.S. imposed a 60-day moratorium on all U.S.-funded projects in the country.

The UN under-secretary-general for peacekeeping operations, Marrack Goulding, talked to both dos Santos and Savimbi in mid-November in an ongoing effort to mediate the conflict. With the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) mandate expiring on November 30, Goulding expressed reluctance to commit to an extension of UNAVEM's stay in Angola until he was assured that both sides would abide by the peace accords.

In a letter written to Margaret Anstee, Savimbi, after meeting Goulding, said that "even though the elections were rigged," he would respect the results, but added that if provoked, he "will fight for 10 more years." In early December, three days before the expiration of a government ultimatum for Unita to halt hostilities and join a coalition government or face a declaration of war, the rebels agreed to be a party to a government of national unity and to respect a ceasefire. But as long as Unita remains heavily armed, its promises bear little weight.

And while the dove in Kinexixe Square, now surrounded by burned-out cars and mutilated campaign posters, still flies above the city, its efforts to land continue to be blocked by military obstacles. ○

LOOSENING THE REINS?

Although Malawian activist Chakufwa Chihana (right) was convicted of sedition—i.e., advocating multi-party democracy and an end to the 30-year reign of Life President Kamuzu Banda—and received a sentence of three years at hard labor, the autocratic regime has begun to mellow slightly, thanks no doubt to Western donors' freezing \$74 million in aid. Two political opposition movements have been formed and Banda unexpectedly announced a forthcoming referendum on whether Malawi should remain a one-party state.



Sheikh Chihana

"orton Chirwa died fighting for freedom...his death will spark afresh the fire of democracy and we must keep that fire burning," activist Chakufwa Chihana told thousands of mourners in November at the funeral of Malawi's most famous political prisoner, who was detained for more than a decade on charges of treason.

Previously such speeches at a funeral—which in effect was a forum—or a political rally would have been unheard of under the three-decade rule of Life President Kamuzu Banda, who has imprisoned or driven into exile many political opponents. But since September, the whole framework of Malawian politics has been dramatically liberalized. Two political opposition movements have formed, while on October 18, Banda announced that a national referendum would be held as soon as possible on whether the country should become a multi-party democracy or remain a one-party state.

Almost everyone was caught off-guard by the referendum announcement. It seemed a complete about-face for the Life President and his Malawi Congress Party (MCP) after they had decided at September's party congress that the MCP would remain as the sole political party. Political analysts attribute the turn-around to the \$74 million aid freeze by Western donors which has been in effect since May. The Malawi government is beginning to crack under the pressure, the analysts claim.

Internal pressure is also escalating. In September, the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) was launched. Trade union leader Chihana is its leader and other prominent

members include lawyer Harry Chiume and the outspoken Presbyterian minister, Rev. Aaron Longwe, who was detained with a dozen other churchmen in August for organizing a human rights rally. Chihana had tried to establish AFORD in Malawi in April after attending a conference of exiles in the Zambian capital, Lusaka, but he was arrested at Kamuzu International Airport by security men and charged with sedition. But ironically, five months later, the Malawi government did nothing to prevent AFORD's launch.

In mid-October, a second group, the United Democratic Front (UDF), which had been working underground for several months, also went public. The UDF is led by Bakili Muluzi, a former MCP secretary-general and a prominent leader in the Muslim community. Other UDF members are Edward Bwanali, health minister until he was fired in 1991, former political prisoner Aleki Banda, and other ex-cabinet ministers and civil servants.

As one Western diplomat said: "While AFORD is a group of outspoken younger radicals with little political experience, the UDF is composed of more conservative, seasoned politicians who have worked within the system." UDF leader Muluzi added: "If we believe in democracy, we should encourage a proliferation of political movements. We are fighting for similar goals as AFORD and we are talking with them."

Members of these two movements, as well as representatives of associations of lawyers, businessmen, and churchmen have formed a broad-based alliance called the Public Affairs Committee (PAC). At the request of the government, the PAC recently began meeting with the MCP to work out a framework for the run-up to the referendum. Simultaneously, the new spirit of liberalism has spilled

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A Conversation with Enoch Chihana

Chakufwa Chibana, head of the Southern Africa Trade Union Coordination Council and crusader for human rights and democracy in Malawi, was recently honored by the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial as the recipient of the ninth annual Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Award. On trial for treason at the time, however, Chibana's passport was taken away and he was unable to leave Malawi to attend the award ceremony. His son, Enoch Chibana, a senior at Wichita State University, accepted the award on his father's behalf, and spoke to Africa Report editor Margaret A. Novicki, about the state of human rights and democratic freedoms in Malawi today.

On the struggle Chakufwa Chihana has waged for human rights and democracy:

For decades, people in Malawi have been oppressed, and most of the opponents of the government were killed. My father was put in detention for a long time, and I don't know how he survived. Being a survivor of this repressive regime, he thought now it is time for a change and time to give freedom to the people of Malawi. So through his organization, the Southern Africa Trade Union Coordination Council, he decided that he could do something, because at least he was known. He felt if he just let things go on, he would be to blame. So he decided to risk his own life. He went back to Malawi from Botswana where he was residing. From 1985 to April 1992, he had been doing his work underground, contacting other people. Finally in 1992, he decided it was time to open up. So he went to Zambia and organized a conference for all exiled Malawians to come together and decide the nation's future. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the changes in South Africa, and democracy spreading to all of Africa, there was no need for Malawi to remain a very closed society. After that meeting, secret agents from Malawi followed my father wherever he went, and he was told that when he returned to Malawi, he would be arrested.

Our president is 96 years old and he has no successor. Once a dictator dies or is overthrown, there is a vacuum and

everybody is hungry for power if there is no democracy. Everybody will start picking up guns. So to avert this situation, my father organized all the people who were in exile to talk about it. Before he went into exile, he had also organized the people inside Malawi—the churches, lawyers, and businesspeople and they gave him a mandate.

Before he returned from Zambia to Malawi, he called me and said, "My son, this is the last time that I will be speaking to you. I am going to Malawi and I will be killed. But if I am killed, people in the international community will know there is

Margaret A. Novicki



something wrong with this government and someone will come up to liberate the people."

As his son, I didn't want to see my father die for other people, but as a citizen of Malawi, I liked his idea. When he boarded the plane in South Africa, the Malawi government sent the ambassador of Malawi to South Africa, plus secret agents on the same plane. Immediately when he landed, my father delivered a speech advocating multi-party democracy and respect for human rights, but he didn't finish it. He was arrested immediately. Fortunately, there were Western diplomats there to welcome him. My father was taken and the diplomats followed and they were returned at gun point. He was put into detention.

For the first time, the ambassador of the United States condemned Malawi, and the British, French, and others followed.

over into the media. The MCP, UDF, AFORD, and PAC all have unprecedented publicity secretaries and enthusiastically give statements to local and foreign journalists. The press law was amended, so that any journalist who falls afoul of the Malawi government now receives only five years instead of life imprisonment. Banda has also said that anyone who has the capital is free to set up a newspaper.

As a result, two privately run newspapers, the monthly *Michiru Sun* and the fortnightly *Financial Post*, have sprung up in the last year. "These two newspapers are gradually setting the trend for a free press and free expression," said Edward Chitaula, joint owner of *Michiru Sun*, at a recent media seminar in Lusaka.

But he added quickly that this new freedom still has well-defined limits. "For the time being, freedom of expression means to air your views with or within the ruling system for the continued general good of the nation.

Where expression goes against the set mechanism, eyebrows may be raised."

But the new openness has not been without problems, as all the cogs in the Malawi government system are not as well-tuned to the new thinking as they should be. The MCP's militarist wing, the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP), has been overzealous in trying to control the AFORD supporters who gather daily outside the high court in Blantyre for Chihana's sedition trial and sing songs of praise about him.

On several occasions, the MYP has used batons to drive supporters away. Scores of people have been injured and at least two people have been beaten to death. On another occasion, unidentified hooligans stoned the car carrying Chihana and his lawyer, Bazuka Mhango, from the high court. All the car windows were broken and Mhango was hit in the head with a stone. AFORD spokesman Harry Chiume claims it was "an assassination

Then later on, Malawi was exposed in *The New York Times* and many other papers. As a result of that, my father had access to a lawyer. Aid to Malawi was cut by 33 percent, which made the government open up a little bit. Still, there are so many problems in Malawi. Internally, the people are ready for change and for democracy, but they need international support because there is still that atmosphere of fear. After 30 years of being oppressed under a police state, people are afraid to talk and directly criticize the government. In April, 38 people died who demonstrated for change. So now it is up to the international community to help, because if it doesn't, democracy is going to fail. The president can die any day, and there will be a war in Malawi, which the international community can avert by acting now.

On the role of the U.S.:

From the U.S., we need more economic and diplomatic sanctions. The ambassador should say, "We don't like what you are doing to the people. If you continue, we will not give you this." The aid cutoff did have an impact. Kamuzu Banda said openly to the people, "I think we have done what the international community has asked us to do"—repealing the Preventive Security Act which empowered the president to detain anyone without trial. But in practice they are still detaining people. The party and the president are above the law. So my father cannot say he had a fair trial because even the judge, before he is going to render the verdict, has to think twice about himself and his family.

On Banda's announcement of a referendum on multi-party democracy:

It is a positive sign, but that was not his intention. His intention in announcing a referendum was just to tell the international community that he is not afraid of democracy. But he is always misinformed and out of touch, so he thinks people support him because the people around him, the cabinet, always tell him lies and being a dictator he likes to hear good things. For a referendum to happen, you have to create a climate where there is no fear and people can vote freely without thinking twice. So the opposition has to have access to the media. People age 18 and up need to exercise their right to vote and all the exiled Malawians need a general amnesty to return to Malawi and participate in the referendum. None of these conditions are in place, and Banda didn't even set a date for the referendum.

On the differences between the two opposition move-

attempt" and that the hooligans were MYP youths acting on Banda's command.

Another point of contention is that neither the UDF nor AFORD have been allowed to hold rallies—except for Chirwa's funeral where members of both groups spoke—to encourage people to vote in favor of a multi-party system in the referendum. Over 50 AFORD members have been arrested across the country for possessing or selling AFORD membership cards. Although the UDF and AFORD have registered as associations, neither of their applications has been approved.

MCP spokesman Hetherwick Ntaba says: "AFORD is illegal in every aspect especially because they are behaving like a political party. The police are not harassing AFORD members; they are simply enforcing the law."

But when a United Nations team visited Malawi in November to assist the government in drawing up guidelines to conduct a "free and fair" plebiscite, the

ments, the Alliance for Democracy [AFORD] and the United Democratic Front [UDF]:

The differences are that in my father's group [AFORD], most of the people suffered under Banda's oppression since independence. They are the ones who opposed Banda from the beginning. They are the ones who fought for freedom for Malawians from the beginning. The second pressure group created the situation in Malawi right now. They are the ones who formed these laws in Malawi, they were in Kamuzu Banda's cabinet, they were his right-hand men. Because they had a problem with the government, Banda fired them and now it is the politics of revenge. They couldn't form a pressure group at the beginning because they were afraid for their lives. But when Banda announced a referendum, they immediately formed one. For most of them, it is just political ambition, to gain the positions they lost.

They didn't want to join my father because they thought someone might point a finger at them, so they formed their own group. But my father's group welcomed that, because in a pluralistic society you need to have so many groups with different political opinions, as long as they are committed to democracy and the fight for human rights.

On the steps the Clinton administration should take:

Africa has been ignored in American foreign policy and most of the past administrations, except maybe Carter's, have embraced these dictators, giving them money, weapons, regardless of their human rights record. They didn't care as long as they were not communists. I would like the Clinton administration to take a very, very strong stand on these dictators, for Clinton himself or the secretary of state to go to Africa, expose them to the international media, and talk straight about freedom and democracy. Most of the problems in Africa would be solved, because these dictators don't want a confrontation with the U.S.

I would like to see the Clinton administration take a very strong stand on Africa, because otherwise they will be going to Africa to feed people. They should rather invest now in African people than later on, which will be very expensive. It will be exactly like the situation in Somalia, where they nurtured Siad Barre, and when he was overthrown, there was a vacuum and everyone is now taking guns and fighting. It is the same everywhere in Africa where there is dictatorship. The U.S. has a lot of respect among so many Africans, but if they continue ignoring Africans, it will be a big problem. ■

PAC insisted that if the referendum was to go ahead at all, the constitution had to be amended. Article Four states explicitly: "There shall be only one party in the republic and that party shall be the Malawi Congress Party."

The funeral of Orton Chirwa, who had spent 28 years fighting to change the Banda government, was a uniting force for the UDF, AFORD, and other opposition groups. Chirwa, who was 73 when he died, had been a founding member of the MCP and the country's first attorney-general. But he had rebelled against Banda in the 1964 cabinet crisis just months after independence from Britain. Chirwa, a British-trained lawyer, and his wife Vera fled to Tanzania where they established the Malawi Freedom Movement in exile to fight for an end to Banda's dictatorship. The newly formed opposition's challenge now is to pick up the gauntlet thrown down by Chirwa and continue his fight. ○

DROUGHT, DEATH

Victoria Kaufman



A

s southern Africa's severe drought burned throughout 1992, the rural people of Zimbabwe's badly parched Matabeleland region had to resort to lengthy searches for sources of water. Families marched for miles to a dry river bed where they would dig in the sand until they reached the water table. Then they would haul the cloudy water up in the buckets and carry their precious, but heavy, load home.

Another way to find subterranean water was to go down old, disused mine shafts, deep into the earth. But when some people in the Kezi area of Matabeleland South went down into the old Antelope Mine, they found bones, human bones. They found skeletons of scores of people, some still with clothes and shoes.

There was little doubt that these were the remains of some of the people who had disappeared during 1983-85,

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when the Mugabe government carried out an extremely brutal crackdown in rural Matabeleland to try to stamp out anti-government rebels.

The bones found in the mine shaft were reported to the police, who told the people to avoid the area. Then, according to the local folk, a member of the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) also warned them to stay away from the mine shaft. Finally, the people took the matter into their own hands and carried out a proper burial for the remains.

This was not an isolated incident. Throughout Matabeleland, which stretches across southern Zimbabwe, people hunting for water sources have discovered skeletons and mass graves. Confronted by the evidence of the harsh treatment they received at the hands of security forces, the Ndebele-speaking peasants have called for new measures from the government, such as investigations into who was killed by government troops, identi-

AND

Although Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe's government is a relatively free and stable society, it has posted a less than ideal human rights record in the 13 years of Zanu-PF rule. Recent evidence of massacres in Matabeleland and disappearances or deaths of dissidents have spotlighted the role of the clandestine security force, which wields unchecked power in its efforts to stifle challenges to the ruling party.

cation of the remains, apologies, and compensation paid to the families of those killed.

As yet, none of those actions has been taken. But the discovery of these remains in Matabeleland has coincided with the launch of a new human rights group to focus Zimbabwean attention on the country's human rights record. Independent newspapers and magazines have taken up the touchy issues that were previously swept under the rug by Zimbabwe's government-owned press.

Zimbabweans are demanding new action to right old wrongs, such as the Matabeleland massacres. They are calling on the government to establish new policies to prevent other human rights abuses. The human rights activists, along with Zimbabwe's independent press, have drawn attention to a worrying series of killings suspected to have been carried out by the country's security forces, including the much-feared CIO. Most worrying of all, say the activists, is that Zimbabwe's normally independent judiciary has apparently been compromised so that these cases were not brought to court.

"We have come to a watershed for the protection of human rights in our country," said Dr. Reginald Matchaba-Hove, interim chairman of Zimrights. "We Zimbabweans are demanding the basic rights that are enshrined in our constitution, but are not always upheld by the government."

President Robert Mugabe's government has reacted

DISSIDENTS

to the new interest in human rights with defensive alarm, angrily rejecting the criticisms and crudely charging that the crusaders are a threat to Zimbabwe's security. Security Minister Sydney Sekeramayi, who is responsible for the CIO, lashed out at the country's human rights activists and independent press when addressing a graduating class of new police constables on October 29.

"Whereas in the past, the greatest threat to our security was external, the current threat emanates from some commissioned individuals masquerading as human rights activists, ivory tower intellectuals, and some foreign mass media correspondents dedicated to sowing seeds of national despondency, racial ethnic hate and conflict," charged Sekeramayi. "The security and defense forces

should be fully aware of these hostile machinations. Appropriate administrative, political, and security measures will be taken to nip these destabilization maneuvers in the bud."

Such accusations have been dismissed as political rhetoric by the activists, who assert they are acting in the national interest. "Zimrights and other civic groups have an important role to play in nation-building. We want to see our society become more open, for our government to be more accountable and for the individual's civil rights and freedom of expression to be respected," says Matchaba-Hove. "If we criticize government, that does not make us traitors or unpatriotic. Nor are the new newspapers which are critical of government or the new political parties. We are part of the positive movement in Zimbabwe to become a truly pluralistic, democratic society."

It is a bit surprising that human rights has become such a burning issue in Zimbabwe. Since its independence in 1980, the country has been relatively peaceful and prosperous. After nearly a decade of working to make the country a socialist, one-party state, President Robert Mugabe's ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) put aside those plans. In general, the courts have been independent and the rights of the individual have been upheld. Zimbabwe appears a model of stability and freedom, especially in contrast to overt oppression found in neighboring countries like South Africa and Malawi and the rampant violence in Mozambique and Angola.

"Certainly there is no doubt that our human rights record is better than many in Africa. And our own record is improving, particularly as a result of the lifting of the state of emergency in July 1991," says Matchaba-Hove, referring to the draconian emergency laws which granted sweeping powers to security forces including the right to detain an individual indefinitely without trial.

"But human rights are not relative. We don't believe that just because Zimbabwe is an African country we must settle for a sub-standard level of rights. We believe Zimbabwe deserves and can attain a very high level of human rights."

Zimrights, founded in May 1992, is the country's second human rights organization. The first is the 20-year-old Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, which crusaded for the rights of Zimbabwe's black majority during

the repression of the white-minority Rhodesian regime. During the war to win majority rule, gross abuses of human rights were carried out by the Rhodesian security forces.

Since Zimbabwe became independent, the most serious blot on the country's human rights record is the army's incursion into Matabeleland in 1983-85. Attempting to crush anti-government violence in the southern region, the army's specially trained Fifth Brigade stormed through rural Matabeleland, beating, raping, and killing civilians. Outcries from the Catholic Commission and reports in the international press eventually brought a stop to the army's actions. The exact number of peasants killed by the army is unknown, but the Catholic Commission suggests any number ranging from 2,000 to 20,000 people were killed. Many health officials in Matabeleland estimate the 20,000 figure is closer to being accurate.

The anti-government violence in Matabeleland was finally brought to an end, not by the army's repression, but by a political accommodation, the Unity Accord of 1987, which merged Joshua Nkomo's Zapu party into Robert Mugabe's Zanu-PF.

But the wounds caused by the army's Matabeleland violence remain. In addition to the sorrow, there is the purely practical matter of death certificates. Because many people, mostly men, disappeared in the custody of security forces and their bodies were not recovered, no death certificates were issued. That means the widows and children cannot inherit the property and savings of the murdered men.

Also, according to Zimbabwean law, a child's birth certificate will only be issued if the father signs it or if a death certificate of the father is presented. Without such death certificates, hundreds of children were born in Matabeleland without birth certificates and are now barred from attending government schools because they cannot produce the necessary papers. These administrative problems, and the government's intransigence, have increased a deep-seated resentment in Matabeleland.

"The government needs to find a permanent and long-lasting solution to the Matabeleland disturbances," said Matchaba-Hove. "First the government should apologize for the atrocities committed by the Fifth Brigade, for a mistake in which excesses occurred. Second there is a need to compensate the victims and their families. The constitution provides for such compensation. And the government should help the families of those killed to get death certificates. It is the only way to start healing the wounds, otherwise they will continue to fester."

Robert Mugabe recently rejected the suggestion that his government should apologize or make any compensation. He said what had happened was during a war and no compensation was paid in such situation.

Further controversy over the Matabeleland troubles blew up when the former commander of the notorious Fifth Brigade, Perence Shiri, was promoted to vice-marshal of Zimbabwe's Air Force. That appointment was widely criticized throughout Zimbabwe. "For those who

have suffered, it is like rubbing salt into the wound," commented Matchaba-Hove.

In addition to the old sore of the Matabeleland troubles, Zimbabwe's human rights activists are concentrating on a troubling series of mysterious deaths in which members of the security forces are the suspects. Police investigations into the deaths have been very late and shallow. When public opinion forced police to arrest the suspects or to re-open investigations, Zimbabwe's Attorney-General Patrick Chinamasa closed the cases so that no public prosecution would take place.

Army Captain Edwin Nleya had gathered evidence about army involvement in illegal poaching of elephant and rhino and smuggling in Mozambique. He told his family that he was being followed by "men wearing suits and sunglasses" and that he had heard army officials plotting his death. He said he feared for his life. Nleya also wrote Joshua Nkomo to say he was afraid. He disappeared on January 2, 1989, and his body was found two months later on a hillside next to a tree with a rope hanging from it. An inquest ruled he died by hanging, but his family refused to let the case be closed and, in December 1989, a magistrate ruled that he had been murdered. Nleya's widow, Mercy, has campaigned in the independent monthly magazines, *Parade* and *Horizon*, for a full investigation into who killed her husband. She herself received death threats, but no new action was taken to reopen her husband's case. In 1992, the attorney-general ruled the Nleya case closed, saying there was no evidence to indicate he had been murdered, in direct contradiction to the earlier magistrate's ruling.

Another Zimbabwe National Army officer, Lt. Shepherd Chisango, died in custody in Harare in June 1991. The reason for his arrest is unclear, but he apparently witnessed the army's involvement in smuggling when he was stationed at the Forbes border post in Mutare along the Mozambican border. His wife visited him in military custody in June 9, 1992, and saw that his arm was in a sling and he had bruises. He died later that day. A first postmortem stated that he died from an overdose of the anti-malarial drug, chloroquine. A second examination found that he had numerous bruises and injuries and he might have died as a result of a fractured skull. The independent press refused to let the case fade away and two members of the military police were arrested in connection with Lt. Chisango's death. Again, Attorney-General Chinamasa ruled there was no cause to prosecute and closed the case.

Rashiwe Guzha was a computer typist who had an affair with the deputy director of the CIO, Edison Shirihuru. After she broke it off and had a number of arguments, she disappeared from her workplace in May 1990. A woman fitting her description was seen in the custody of two CIO officers at a police interrogation center. There was no police investigation into her disappearance until her family demonstrated in downtown Harare. It was not until 16 months after Guzha first disappeared that police began investigating. When asked in court why the police

took so long to look into the matter, a top police officer said the police were afraid of the CIO. Finally three CIO officials, including Shirihuru, were arrested for Ms. Guzha's disappearance, but they were released on relatively low bail. Once again, the attorney-general ruled there was no sufficient evidence to prosecute.

Outrage and cynicism was widely expressed when the news of the attorney-general's actions were announced. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace announced it would continue the investigation of Capt. Nleya's case. Zimbabwe's independent weekly newspaper, *The Financial Gazette*, called for Chinamasa to resign. Criticizing the attorney-general's action on the three cases, the *Gazette* said they brought about "a particularly dark moment for Zimbabwean justice."

"We cannot claim in the circumstances to be a society founded on the rule of law," stated the *Gazette* on November 19, "or indeed on the principle of equality before the law, a prerequisite for all healthy democracies. What we witnessed was a travesty of the law. Powerful men with political clout are apparently beyond the law and they are undoubtedly aided and abetted by a bullying executive and a spineless attorney-general...It is patently clear that Mr. Chinamasa cannot deliver even the elementary justice which his post requires. It is therefore time for him to go."

In addition to these three well-documented cases, there are a number of other mysterious deaths. Seven people investigating ivory poaching and smuggling died in car accidents between 1987 and 1990. Four members of the Open Forum, a Bulawayo-based discussion group that is critical of the government, have died in suspicious circumstances. Two were run down by a car when leaving an Open Forum meeting. Two more, including a well-known University of Zimbabwe professor, died in a car accident.

Christopher Giwa was an anti-government leader of the University of Zimbabwe student council. After graduation, he signed up as leader of the youth wing of the new political pressure group, the Forum for Democratic Reform (FDR). He died when his car crashed into a stationary army truck. The FDR has called for an inquest into his death. Many critics say these deaths, and others, amount to a pattern of suspicious deaths of people who challenge the power of the party in power, Zanu-PF.

"What needs to be done is for the state to have an independent investigating commission for suspicious car accidents of politically active people," said Paul Temba Nyathi, director of Zimbabwe Project and vice-chairman of Zimrights. "It would create a more open environment, where people aren't so suspicious."

Nyathi also criticized the attorney-general for dismissing the three cases, saying Chinamasa is "clearly subject to political pressure." Nyathi was most critical of the CIO, saying the intelligence organization is a "danger to our democracy and a danger to our freedom. The CIO is so powerful as to render the work of the attorney-general powerless."

Zimbabwe's CIO, according to Nyathi, is patterned on the security apparatus of the old communist regimes of Eastern Europe. "In Eastern Europe, the security fed the population doctored information and stopped people from expressing their views," said Nyathi. "The result was when one bit of freedom came in, the whole thing collapsed. In the end, the over-emphasis on security was a liability to the socialist aims."

"The CIO was created by the Rhodesian regime to keep blacks from challenging their power," said Nyathi. "Then the Zanu-PF government inherited it, and got new training from Eastern European allies. Now the CIO prevents anybody from challenging the ruling party. The CIO clings to the mistaken belief that any challenge to Zanu-PF equals a challenge to state security. They take action against anybody whom they perceive as a challenge to the party."

The CIO is a highly secret group which operates out of President Mugabe's office with a hidden budget. It is not known how many people are employed by the CIO, but it is well-known that there are agents in the cities and throughout the rural areas.

"The CIO should be much more accountable to the public instead of operating as a clandestine organization based on fear and coercion," said Nyathi. "There are lots of patriotic Zimbabweans who do not back Zanu-PF. The rights of those people should be protected."

Many Zimbabwean human rights activists believe a new government will be able to make the changes to improve the country's observance of human rights. The Mugabe government has become very unpopular in the urban areas, but it has been able to retain support in the less sophisticated rural areas, where 70 percent of the country's people live. The ruling party reaches into every village and the CIO also has agents in the rural areas. With such a heavy presence in the rural areas, it will be difficult for new parties to influence the massive rural vote needed to win the national elections.

One foreign journalist who visited Zimbabwe was favorably impressed by the open attitude in the cities, but was struck by the frightened, oppressed atmosphere in the rural areas. "The people were afraid to talk to us. We were quickly referred to the local party chairman," he said. "It seemed more like what I would expect in Malawi or South Africa."

It is clear that there are several areas in which Zimbabwe's human rights record can be improved. The existence of two Zimbabwean human rights groups, a growing and increasingly outspoken independent press, and the growth of new political parties augur well for the future.

"We human rights groups have a lot of work to do," said Paul Temba Nyathi. "The simple part is to criticize the government's human rights record. That offers us an easy target. The most difficult thing is to change people's attitudes. We want the entire population to be knowledgeable about their rights, so they will be able to stand up for themselves. We have a lot of work ahead of us." ○

INTERVIEW

By Margaret A. Novicki

Frederick Chiluba Champion of Zambia's Democracy



Russell Geeke

Frederick Chiluba was elected president of Zambia in one of Africa's first democratic elections. A year later, he talked to Africa Report about the challenges of his first year in office—the difficulties of institutionalizing democracy and introducing a new work ethic in a former one-party state. He also explained his government's plans to privatize and expand the once-bankrupt Zambian economy.

Africa Report: What have been the biggest challenges of your year in office, as head of one of Africa's first democratically elected governments?

Chiluba: It has been a very hectic year. When we started, we had the support of our people, which remains the case today, but we also had a lot of ill will especially from those from whom we took over, who didn't expect us to last any longer than three months. But we persisted and held on because our people supported us. The mandate we got of more than 80 percent of the vote meant a lot to us. It meant introducing a totally new culture and approach to life, introducing a new work ethic to realize that life is not as easy as we saw it in the first and second republics, where food was dished out free of charge and made people think that government would provide for them perpetually. We thought that we could let the people know that they could best run their lives if they provided for themselves and their families. Of course, the government has a duty to ensure that the environment makes it possible and facilitates jobs which people will perform and will be paid for.

We therefore had to start with the hardest things—the liberalization of the economy, the withdrawal of subsidies on consumption—so that we could create some breathing space for the economy to begin to rise once again. Politically, the floodgates had opened. Freedom had come and was being felt by many people. Today, we have no less than 30 political parties in our country. It is an expression that you cannot altogether leave the fate of a country in the hands of one political party, that there must be free expression of opinion and belief. So politically, we are alright. Democracy has come, there is tremendous political dissent. Apart from the other parties which have blossomed, there has been a tremendous growth in interest groups. We are delighted that democracy is taking root.

But when the economy was liberalized and prices were freed, there were pressures on our people. The social aspect of life has been adversely affected and people have certainly complained that prices are up. But this restructuring is not only restructuring, it is a kind of transformation which has to last forever. What we are starting to do is a kind of base upon which we can build. We want to remove

distortions which made people believe that all was well when in fact the very opposite was the truth. We do realize that we must take cognizance of what the people require. So we have been spending time on improving the other, social side of life—medical care, education—so what they are losing in the food prices, they gain on the other side. It is not a direct trade-off, but it does help.

So it has not been an easy year, it has been turbulent. As if the problems we took over were not enough, we were hit by a drought that had a devastating effect. It not only diverted our efforts, but it called upon resources which we didn't have, so we had to turn to the international community for assistance. This we got and I must continue to thank the American people and the administration under President Bush. They came to our aid when it was really needed. We got balance of payments support of close to \$47 million, the U.S. government wrote off our external debt to the tune of \$170 million, and another \$85 million is to be written off next year. Then we got direct food help worth \$51.5 million—close to 256,000 tons of cereal, corn—so we have survived. Many countries in Europe—Sweden, Germany, Denmark, Norway, in and outside the EEC—have also been extremely forthcoming and helpful. But this has only helped us to stabilize so that we can begin to go on.

I can't claim that our programs have really started in earnest, because we were merely trying to rehabilitate the broken-down infrastructure and put systems in place. I can safely say that in this second year of our government, we will really start to implement more programs to address specifically the issues that we promised in our manifesto.

Africa Report: You were left with a collapsed economy and a \$7 billion debt. What are the main pillars of your economic program? What will you do differently from the previous government to set the Zambian economy on a new course?

Chiluba: First of all, this whole picture has to change. We are moving away from a command economy run by the government to one which is best run by the people themselves, in other words, to a market economy. That is fundamental and significant. Eighty percent of the economy was in public hands, under

public ownership. We have liberalized that—moving from public to private ownership—and this is a major cornerstone of our economic policy. Therefore we started a whole program of privatization. Alongside it, we liberalized prices. Even when the parastatals yet to be sold are in public ownership, we want to make them work as commercially as possible.

The economy has not performed extremely well since independence. At independence in fact, when the population was close to 3.5 million or so, we had about 300,000 people in formal sector employment and 27 years later, with population growth, we are close to 7.5 million, but the formal sector is still sluggish, it has not been creating any new jobs, still close to 300,000 or 400,000. Even in the event of privatization succeeding, I do not see the creation of such numbers of jobs as to absorb the growing population. I think the informal sector can come to the center stage of economic development. But the informal sector has to be assisted. Government must create such facilities as accessibility to the banking facilities—to credit, in short. The Zambian people are mostly interested in doing their own thing, they are natural businessmen and women. They love to be on the street, maybe with a bicycle or on foot, selling one type of merchandise or another. This is one area where if we do not create opportunities for jobs, we will be creating a huge problem because the civil service has already been trimmed. We have already gotten rid of close to some 12,000 people. Unless we are prepared for them, we will have an explosion on our hands. And I see them not getting again into the formal sector, but rather absorbed by the informal sector.

Africa Report: Do you include agriculture in the informal sector, as Zambia has great agricultural potential?

Chiluba: The peasant farmer is one such employer of own account as they are called, or self-employed. They are in agriculture, they are in light industry, in commerce, they can be found anywhere. The informal sector deserves due attention because, believe you me, whether we want it or not, when privatization starts, there will be structural unemployment. Most of our parastatals just employed and employed and they never bothered whether they made a profit or not. Now when a real businessman comes, and he knows he wants to make a profit, he will not entertain that kind of employment without due consideration of what profit to garner out of it. So when that happens, I fear the number of unemployed will grow.

The informal sector can do miracles. It has helped a lot of countries in Latin Ameri-

ca. In fact, some of the so-called briefcase businessmen earn more profits than those in the formal sector, yet they don't pay tax! If my government organized them properly, it would make a lot of money from them. But you don't only organize them to get tax out of them. You organize them first to facilitate the operations of their businesses. They start as individuals, but maybe in a year they will employ three or four other people and those people will not be counted as loafers. They are working and they will relieve government of the pressures which could mount without that kind of job creation. Especially in Third World economies, the informal sector is the real answer. But that answer can only come if governments try to facilitate its work. The informal sector is bustling with men and women whose ingenuity and acumen can create anything.

Africa Report: What has been the response on the part of foreign and local businesspeople to your privatization campaign?

Chiluba: We have gotten tremendous interest. Obviously, we are a new government and we have tried to sell our government as positively as possible, but money isn't that easily coming. But of the companies we have advertised domestically and abroad, the response has been tremendous. We have received between 200 and 300 responses and I am sure it is going to work very successfully.

Africa Report: Will the copper mines be privatized as well?

Chiluba: In the long run, yes. This whole program is so well laid out that we have a certain group of companies to go now as the first group and after that we will get into the others, 11 or more groups which comprise those companies to be sold. It is a matter of time.

Africa Report: Western governments and multilateral institutions have been very happy with what you've done so far on the economic front, but the people haven't been and there have been a number of strikes. Coming from a trade union background yourself, what is your answer to them?

Chiluba: I know that genuine trade unionists don't look at strikes with some kind of romance. It is something that they want to use as the very last resort. However, I must say that the strikes we have had, industrial strikes, have been sometimes a little baffling because they have been used as a way to blackmail government because before you even argue or reach a kind of stalemate, the strike starts. But I still think it's all because it's new and everybody is enthusiastic and motivated and we have this new climate of democracy, that perhaps there has been this feeling that they must exercise it.

But again I must admit that there has been a genuine feeling of disappointment, because generally when we started, an atmosphere was generated that created a crisis of expectations. Some people, in spite of what we told them, still felt that relief would come overnight, and when we said we have to show more responsibility, they thought we were running away from the promised way of life. But that was just a misconception, and people know that they have to work, to sacrifice in order to gain those conditions that they talk about. People felt that inflation must not settle against the workers, they must fight to ensure that they also receive the benefits of their sweat. One has to just maintain the balance, otherwise the fight still goes on.

Africa Report: What would you like to change about U.S. policy toward Zambia, or toward Africa in general, and what would you like to tell the new U.S. president, Bill Clinton?

Chiluba: President-elect Clinton, the bias toward Eastern Europe must be checked. Democracy in Eastern Europe is as good as democracy in Africa. He must look at what is happening in Africa. We are not a dark continent, we are a continent of promise. We need the support of President Clinton and of other presidents in Europe. For instance, the question of trade must be looked at. I think we have been exploited for too long to wait any longer. We need a fair return on our products. For instance, if you look at the way prices are fixed for our raw material, copper, on which we are totally dependent, and many agricultural products from Africa, and then the kind of machinery we import in order to carry on with business, it is exorbitant! They are unaffordable. We don't want to continue to be beggars, we want to be trading partners, but the conditions must be such that trading is on an even ground.

Africa Report: There are so many countries in Africa where the people are striving for democracy as the Zambian people did and are finding themselves frustrated by recalcitrant rulers. What would you say to them and to those leaders who are resistant to change?

Chiluba: First, I am not a champion of democracy in Africa, nor is my country a model, but human rights are universal. Wherever people are not free, they will seek to be free someday. The problem is that anyone resisting this change is only creating violence because change cannot be stopped or reversed. My appeal is for fellow presidents to embrace change and facilitate it so that change will embrace them in turn and create conditions for development in their countries. ■

ONE

More than a year after democracy came to Zambia, living standards have fallen, health and education programs have deteriorated—but economic reform is on track and Zambians have easily embraced a new democratic culture. While the govern-

YEAR

ment of Frederick Chiluba (below) pledges to try to mitigate the effects of structural adjustment, even critics admit that the building of a democratic society takes time.

ON



Sarah Jane Poole

Just over one year has elapsed since trade union leader Frederick Chiluba stood on the steps of the Lusaka supreme court, beside white-wigged judges swathed in black and red robes, and was sworn in as Zambia's second president since independence from Britain in 1964.

In that one year, Chiluba's Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) government has made major economic strides in the midst of the worst regional drought this century and initiated a new democratic culture promoting freedom of speech and expression for every citizen.

But few of Zambia's 8 million people have benefited materially from the new government. Most people's living standards have rapidly deteriorated and literally millions have been impoverished. Few improvements have been made in health and education, which remain in a state of decay.

As Finance Minister Emmanuel Kasonde admits, "Our government has not been sufficiently sensitive to the social effects of the structural adjustment program. We have been trying to lay the foundation for economic

Melinda Ham is a Canadian freelance journalist based in Lusaka, Zambia.

growth, but our success has been at the cost of human suffering."

Kasonde also points out that his government started from a severe disadvantage: "The MMD inherited a dismal economic scenario. Zambia had a bad name, few international friends, and an uncertain future."

Just weeks before the October 31, 1991 election, the World Bank had frozen aid to former President Kenneth Kaunda's government and other donors followed suit, while the country's international debt stood at \$7.5 billion. The treasury was empty, social services were collapsing, and giant state companies controlled 80 percent of the economy.

But Chiluba's government wasted no time and within a month in office, it had begun restoring relations with donors, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. At the March Consultative Group meeting in Paris, Zambia received pledges worth a staggering \$1.2 billion and is currently the largest recipient of British and Japanese aid on the continent. Then at the Paris Club meeting in July, bilateral donors cancelled \$950 million of Zambia's international debt.

"Zambia held democratic elections just at the time when most donors were rating 'good governance' high as a condition for aid. It was Zambia's lucky coincidence," says one European diplomat.

The government has bravely implemented its structural adjustment program agreed upon with the World Bank and IMF. All subsidies, even on the staple food, maize meal, have been cut—a move which caused riots under Kaunda—as the government turns the economy over to free market forces.

Industries and factories now can easily obtain foreign exchange to import spare parts, machinery, and raw materials, and shops are filled with imported goods, from cassette players to Italian olives.

The government has also taken initial steps toward privatizing the 152 state companies by passing a Privatization Act and opening bids for the first 17 companies, which include a jeweler and an agricultural equipment dealer. The response—more than 320 pre-tender applications—was unexpected. All state companies eventually will go, including Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines, which earns 95 percent of the country's foreign exchange annually. Foreign investors have flocked into the country, bringing with them more than \$200 million of new investment.


"Our single biggest achievement is to have continued to implement our structural adjustment program at the same time as administering drought relief, without one program tampering with the other," claims Vernon Mwaanga, minister of foreign affairs.

Tony Mornement, the Lusaka-based representative of



Melinda Ham

Melinda Ham



the World Food Program, says that Zambia has "the most successful drought relief program in southern Africa." Chiluba declared a national emergency weeks before any other affected country and Agriculture Minister Guy Scott began ordering the 1 million tons of maize needed to feed the people.

Much of the imported maize is being sold commercially. The 1.7 million people who had total crop failure are not receiving free hand-outs as they would have under Kaunda's government. Instead, 26 committees of the program to prevent malnutrition (PPM) have been set up by church groups and non-governmental organizations in the worst affected areas to administer the aid through "food-for-work."

These programs are organized from the grassroots upwards. Village headmen discuss with their villagers which projects are the priority in their area, such as repairing roads, digging boreholes, building clinics and schools, or fixing dams. Then the villagers work five days a week and get paid with a ration of food to feed five people.

Although at first glance these programs may seem like chain-gang labor, the people who participate are very enthusiastic and they have contributed to the MMD's popularity in the rural areas.

"Our community will have something lasting to show for our effort as well as us all receiving food equally. Under Kaunda, you only got food if the village headman liked you," says Nelson Mulongo, a farmer whose total peanut, sunflower, and maize crops failed and 16 of his 20 cattle died in the drought.

Scott attributes much of the program's success to the democratic environment. "If people in some areas are not receiving enough food or if there is corruption, they go to the media and shout about it. So far, not a single person has died of starvation. But on the flip side, some issues have also been blown out of proportion."

But the response to the MMD in the urban areas, where more than half the population lives, is not as favorable. The government has failed to control inflation which has spiralled to over 120 percent—double the target—and the kwacha has been devalued to one-fifth of its previous

worth in the last year. Wages have not kept pace, so most people struggle to buy even the most basic goods.

Margaret Nkunka is a cleaner in a downtown Lusaka office and a widowed mother of three. She earns about \$44 a month and spends about two-thirds on food—mealie meal, vegetables, and the occasional piece of meat—and the remaining third on rent. "I have nothing left to save and if I have to buy a school uniform or something else I'm in trouble," she says.

In line with the structural adjustment program, the government is rationalizing the over-bloated civil service and the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines, which will involve the retrenchment of more than 25,000 workers. This, combined with the inevitable redundancies when state companies are sold—which could run as high as 45,000 workers—will cause untold suffering for thousands of Zambian families.

Health services and education have not received the attention that the MMD promised in the election campaign. Some hospitals have more drugs and schools more desks, but despite these negligible physical improvements, the crumbling infrastructure remains unchanged and more emphasis needs to be placed on training teachers and on increasing the motivation of medical personnel and improving conditions of service.

In November, the country was hit by a national disaster when over 500 people died of cholera in the copperbelt town of Kitwe over two weeks that could have far-reaching political implications. It was Zambia's worst cholera outbreak in one area in such a short period of time.

The health minister, Dr. Boniface Kawimbe, blamed the epidemic on broken-down equipment at the sewage and water treatment plants and a lack of chlorine. But fingers also were pointed at Minister of Local Government Michael Sata for failing to nip the epidemic in the bud by repairing the water system before the onslaught of the rainy season exacerbated the crisis.

ZCCM took over the water works to do emergency repairs and chlorinate the water, while army trucks carried the dead from the congested mortuaries to burial in mass graves in Kitwe cemetery.

In an open letter to President Chiluba in the state-run *Zambia Daily Mail*, Lusaka resident Rosemary Nsofwa said: "If health is not a priority in Zambia today and if you, Mr. President, cannot mourn for all the human suffering we are facing, you are not fit to be our leader. Resign."

Finance Minister Kasonde promises that the 1993 budget will give "a larger slice of the national cake" to both education and health, and that Zambians will be given a "peace dividend" as defense spending—for a country which has never fought a war—will be drastically cut.

The official opposition, Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP), which has 25 of the 150 parliamentary seats, claims that politically the MMD has made little progress toward democracy. UNIP spokesman Rabison Chongo says, "Zambia can be credited as a model of democratic and peaceful transition in Africa, but we are not a model of democracy in action."

And to some extent, some Western donors agree. "The MMD has achieved economic wonders in very adverse circumstances in the last 12 months, but all the ingredients of a democracy are not in place," says one.

Fred M'membe, the managing editor of the only privately owned newspaper, *The Weekly Post*, argues: "The MMD has achieved a lot. It has created a new democratic culture where any Zambian is free to say what he wants, but the government is also free to challenge him back." The cost of this freedom is the dozens of libel writs which have piled up against *The Weekly Post*, but M'membe says smiling: "We haven't lost a libel case yet."

One problem is that there is little credible opposition to the government in any form. The only two daily papers and the sole television and radio station remain in government hands, although there are plans to privatize them soon. The church-owned *National Mirror* and *The Weekly Post* represent the only independent press and their circulation, like those of all newspapers, is decreasing because of the decline in readers' purchasing power.

Although there are more than 30 small opposition parties, none of them have a substantial following or offer alternative policies to the government. UNIP is the only one with any national structure and it was so heavily discredited and defeated in last year's general election, it is unlikely to make a comeback for some years. Lobby groups are few and ineffectual on major policy issues. Trade unions—formerly the only opposition in Kaunda's one-party state—have lost a lot of steam now that their charismatic leader, Chiluba, is the national president.

The police are another area of concern, as they still retain wide-reaching powers under the Preservation of Public Security Act to ban demonstrations, which the MMD promised to repeal. At least 30 criminal suspects have also been shot dead since January, which demonstrates blatant disregard for basic rights.

One diplomat said: "We are concerned about Zambia's slip-ups on human rights. But in comparison to some other African countries, Zambia's abuses are nothing to lose sleep over."

So the MMD has survived united through this first year of the political teething pains of democracy, even though many critics thought the disparate movement of church leaders, trade unionists, and businessmen would fall apart after it ousted Kaunda.

Only two out of 27 cabinet ministers have resigned and both on unsubstantiated claims of corruption. The former minister of works and supply, Ephraim Chibwe, also was sacked for accepting kickbacks on contracts, while the former minister of information, Stan Kristofar, was fired for making racist remarks.

As M'membe says: "Because of donor pressure, the MMD had few options to choose from, but the route they have taken seems to be the best. The government must battle to look after those impoverished by economic reforms, and respond to public opinion. There is no other way in a democracy." ○

Repression of a kind more characteristic of Africa's pre-multi-party politics era is now gripping Cameroon, two months after President Paul Biya claimed victory in the country's first multi-party presidential elections.

A state of emergency was declared in the largely English-speaking opposition stronghold of Western Cameroon on October 27, after demonstrations broke out following the ruling Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) victory on October 11. In November, the London-based human rights group Amnesty International says, there were mass arrests of opposition supporters.

CAMEROON BY MARK HUBAND

On November 23, Amnesty reported the death in police custody from torture of a 30-year-old accountant, Gandhi Che Ngwa, who was

arrested in the opposition stronghold of Bamenda. John Fru Ndi, the leader of the main opposition party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF), was at the time, and has remained, under house arrest at his home in Bamenda along with 135 of his supporters who are living on his compound. On November 27, all 135 were arrested when security forces arrived claiming they were searching for guns.

Twenty-seven police and paramilitary officers had come to arrest two SDF supporters. Fru Ndi told the police they would have to arrest everybody on the com-

A FLAWED VICTORY

After eking out a slim victory in Cameroon's first-ever multi-party elections, President Paul Biya (right) then launched a violent clampdown on the main opposition party, the Social Democratic Front, placing its leader, John Fru Ndi (left), under house arrest. The October 11 election itself, which Biya won by 4 percentage points, was so filled with irregularities, according to outside observers, as to be completely discredited.

pound or leave the two suspects. All 135 detainees were later released. However, at least 200 others have remained in detention, being held 40 to a cell, according to Cameroon's government-appointed National Commission for Human Rights and Freedom.

The commission visited Bamenda between November 14-16, following the riots which erupted after the announcement of the election results. After visiting prisons, the families of victims, and opposition detainees, the commission chairman, Solomon Nfor Gwei, concluded:

"The state of emergency and its consequences, including massive arrests, many road barriers, and the massive presence of the armed forces makes Bamenda look like a war zone. The brutality of the forces of law and order, particularly during arrests, is very alarming. Many detainees are continuously being subjected to psychological and physical torture, some of whom we saw in great pain, with swollen limbs and genitals, blisters and deep wounds, and cracks on skulls...Bitterness seems to be deeply entrenched in many people, particularly the victims, some of them ready or preparing for any acts of vengeance. Despair rather than hope for a better future is quite evident in many."

President Biya was declared the winner of the election on October 23, with 39.9 percent of the vote. Fru Ndi was given 35.9 percent, while the third main candidate, Bello Bouba Maigari, won 19.2 percent, according to the Supreme Court, which put turnout at 71.87 percent.

The contest is being seen as a landmark and litmus test of the current state of Africa's democratic process. Cameroon's ruling elite, like that in Kenya or Côte d'Ivoire, had initially taken the line that multi-partyism would promote tribalism and lead to the disintegration of the country along ethnic lines.

From the ethnic viewpoint, Cameroon is more of a test than either Kenya or Côte d'Ivoire. It has over 260 distinct ethnic groups. Its colonial past has left it divided linguistically into English- and French-speaking areas, the latter comprising 80 percent of the population. It is strongly Muslim in the north and strongly Christian in the south, a highly emotive factor owing to the past political dominance of northern Muslims during the presidency of Ahmadou Ahidjo immediately after independence in 1961 until his death in 1982 when Biya took power.

Biya, like Ivorian President Félix Houphouët-Boigny and the Kenyan leader, Daniel arap Moi, is not a convert to multi-party politics, and Cameroon's election revealed how far he was prepared to go to ensure that real multi-party debate is prevented from taking off. Fru Ndi's arrest mirrors that of Ivorian opposition leader Laurent Gbagbo earlier this year. Gbagbo was accused of being involved in organizing a riot, which was in fact stirred up by agents-provocateurs, but was sentenced though later released after four months in prison. Fru Ndi's arrest, on the security forces' pretext of looking for guns, reveals

how the leaders of the formerly one-party states are becoming rejuvenated with their claimed electoral successes. With enormous confidence, the dictators are bouncing back.

Dispute over the outcome of Cameroon's election was enraging opponents of the vicious Biya regime before the polling stations even opened. A week after the election, on October 19, the provincial governor of East Province, George Achu Mofor, resigned in disgust at the way the government had forced him to use all means to ensure that the ruling party won in his province. In his letter of resignation to President Biya, a copy of which has been obtained by *Africa Report*, Achu, who is the brother of the prime minister, Simon Achu, said:

"Let me draw your attention to the fact that I did not find it in accordance with my conscience to implement the instructions of the minister of territorial administration given during the last extraordinary Governors' Conference of 28 September 1992. By these, we were instructed to do everything fair and foul to ensure at least a 60 percent victory of the CPDM party candidate in our provinces. This subjected us, as he insisted, to an 'obligation de resultat.' Furthermore, we were to be appraised thereafter on this basis. To assist us in this task, a six-page document issued by the UDC party on techniques of electoral fraud was distributed to us."

The letter goes on to say that once the results had been declared, as a governor he would be expected to impose tough security measures "and to severely repress any acts of violence resulting from discontent following their declaration. I do not think I would be in a position to enforce such orders that could lead to bloody confrontations between the forces at my disposal and citizens who are convinced that they have been deprived of their rights."

The most detailed analysis of the conduct of the election was provided by the United States' National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), which had arrived in Cameroon to train election officials, but also took on an observer role.

For the first time in its history, NDI issued a statement condemning an election outcome, saying: "Widespread irregularities during the pre-election period, on election day, and in the tabulation of results seriously calls into question, for any fair observer, the validity of the outcome. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that this election system was designed to fail. While several parties were responsible for election irregularities, the overwhelming weight of responsibility for this failed process lies with the government and President Biya."

Shortcomings identified by the NDI observers, whose delegation was led by the former attorney-general of Maine, Jim Tierney, included:

- "the extremely partisan use of the government-controlled television and radio in favor of the incumbent president;
- "excessive powers being accorded to local government officials, particularly on matters of voter registration;

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- "the unrepresentative character of the National Vote Counting Commission, which had little or no ethnic or regional balance;

- "little control of the distribution of voter registration cards allowing multiple and underage voting;

- "throughout the country, the names of eligible voters were improperly crossed off the register;

- "polling sites were arbitrarily moved in some areas prior to election day in an apparent effort to sow confusion and reduce voter turnout in specific areas;

- "political party pollwatchers were prevented from entering polling sites and, in one case, were barred from entering the entire territory of Rey-Bouba in the district of Mayo Rey, which was controlled by a traditional leader who supported President Biya."

The NDI report concludes: "Undue delays in the release of the official results provided the opportunity for wholesale manipulation, while the failure to publish polling-site-by-polling-site results precludes the possibility of a credible, independent review of the overall election results."

Alleged cheating and malpractices of the kind identified by NDI, as well as the biased use of the media, are nothing new. In the Ivorian election in 1990, much the same was true. Perhaps the only real difference between the two elections was that in Côte d'Ivoire, supporters of the ruling Democratic Party stuffed thousands of their own party's folded ballot papers into the ballot boxes before they were sent to the polling stations, and secured a much larger margin of victory than Biya.

But another more important difference between the two countries, and one which makes Cameroon a much more significant test of the current state of the continent's democratic transition, is the fact that abuse of the democratic process has created a crisis in Cameroon of the very kind which only a successful move toward multi-party democracy can avoid. The country is now a time-bomb as a result of an unpopular president—who could only muster 39.9 percent even with the alleged abuses—claiming victory for a regime which human rights groups say has killed up to 400 people over the past two years of pro-democracy demonstrations.

Realization of this crisis has been swift. On November 27, the U.S. suspended \$14 million in aid to Cameroon in response to growing human rights abuses and detentions without trial following the election. American aid had already been cut by nearly 17 percent in 1991, partly in protest at human rights abuses under Biya. Aid for 1992-93 has been set at \$24 million.

Since the recent clampdown, the U.S. has led the way

ABUSE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS HAS CREATED A CRISIS OF THE VERY KIND THAT ONLY SUCCESS IN MOVING TO MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY CAN AVOID.

in condemning the state of emergency and was unequivocal in its criticism of the electoral process. In a State Department statement on November 14, spokesman Richard Boucher said that "following the seriously flawed October 11 presidential election, the government of Cameroon has resorted to intimidation to consolidate its position...Cameroon should immediately lift the state of emergency...as a signal that reconciliation, not punishment, now tops its agenda."


Again reflecting the true state of the democratization process, however, the single most influential country on the continent and its biggest aid donor—France—sent a letter to Biya congratulating him on his victory. According to French sources, the letter was sent at the insistence of President François Mitterrand's son, Jean-Christophe, the president's adviser on African affairs until July 1992. Jean-Christophe Mitterrand's replacement in the post, France's former ambassador to Togo, Bruno Delaye, was apparently reluctant to recognize the result and had suggested a "cool" response to Biya's fraudulent victory.

France's links with Cameroon are based on substantial business interests, and the French oil company Elf-Aquitaine has a virtual monopoly on oil exploration off the Cameroonian coast. When John Fru Ndi visited Paris during a foreign tour in 1992, he left France with a clear message from the French government that it did not want to see an English-speaking president elected in Cameroon, he said in a recent interview. Now France is finding itself in an increasingly difficult position, as the low esteem with which it is regarded among anglophone Cameroonians means that it cannot play the negotiating role which is so vital if the current crisis is to be resolved.

Attempts by the Anglican archbishop of Cape Town, Desmond Tutu, to try and bring the government and opposition together failed on November 19. Tutu encouraged Biya to form a government of national unity with the SDF, but his appeals were rejected by both sides due to the enormous political gulf between them. Biya has proposed holding a "great national debate" to change the constitution, but has said he will stay in power throughout the discussions. Meanwhile, the SDF and its allied parties have insisted on the convening of a national conference, which would take over the running of the country for a transition period.

Biya has meanwhile attracted some opposition politicians into a new cabinet created during the last week of November. The SDF is now increasingly isolated, with other opposition leaders having accepted the election result. However, the SDF leader has remained determined not to accept the result despite the increasingly violent measures the government has taken. "Biya is wasting his time thinking he can frustrate me. The government is still trying intimidation. They have reached their own end. They don't know how to break the impasse," Fru Ndi said in a recent telephone interview from his Bamenda home, which remains surrounded by security forces. ○

A WINNING FORMULA



**Much to the surprise of the opposition
and outside observers, Jerry Rawlings**

|| GHANA || BY RICHARD JOSEPH



On November 3, 1992, almost half of the 8.2 million registered voters in Ghana went to the polls in the first and decisive round of the presidential elections. Since the voters' register was, by all accounts, not accurate, the turn-out could have been as much as two-thirds of those eligible. Long before the final results were in, however, it was clear that the incumbent head of state, Jerry J. Rawlings, had outstripped his opponents by a significant margin, ending with 58.3 percent of the vote to 30.4 percent for the runner-up, Professor Albert Adu-Boahen of the New Patriotic Party (NPP).

The official results also showed that Rawlings had obtained over 50 percent of the vote in all of Ghana's 10 regions except Ashanti, the stronghold of the Danquah-Busia tradition now represented by the NPP. In his home Volta region, Rawlings polled a plebiscitary 93.3 percent. The remaining 11.3 percent of the total vote was divided among three pretenders to the Nkrumahist legacy. Leading the way with 6.7 percent was Dr. Hilla Limann, the former elected head of state who was deposed by Rawlings' second military coup in December 1981 and was now the candidate of the People's National Convention (PNC). Then came Kwabena Darko, an affluent entrepreneur and candidate of the New Independence Party (NIP) with 2.8 percent, followed by Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Emmanuel Erskine of the People's Heritage Party (PHP) with 1.7 percent.

Rawlings' resounding victory was not accepted graciously by the defeated candidates and many of their supporters. In parts of Ashanti, outbreaks of violence led to the imposition of a curfew for a few days following the elections. Despite sporadic acts of violence elsewhere, Ghana was spared the level of post-electoral violence that had recently brought renewed turmoil to other African countries like Cameroon and Angola. The opposition took little time compiling the evidence that it initially threatened to take before the Supreme Court in a bid to have the presidential elections voided. It also collectively agreed to boycott the legislative rounds of the elections, which had been scheduled to begin on December 8, unless a series of demands, notably the preparation of a new voters' register and changes in the composition of

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the Interim National Elections Commission (INEC), were met.

While the observer mission of the Commonwealth quickly declared the election to be "free and fair," a judgment seconded by a small team from the Organization of African Unity, the 25-member Carter Center team, buttressed by over 400 Ghanaian monitors deployed to all the regions, took a more nuanced position. In the absence of any compelling evidence of deliberate rigging and fraud, it accepted the official results despite the number and variety of irregularities which it attributed to logistical difficulties and the uneven training of election officials, polling agents, and security personnel. In its preliminary report, the Carter Center group also presented a summary of the irregularities and inconsistencies observed in various parts of the country while noting the large number of instances in which the elections proceeded smoothly and efficiently.

There was no clear pattern to these problems, which varied from constituency to constituency, and even among polling stations in particular constituencies. In general, the more urban the constituency, and the greater the density of the population served, the more likely it was that serious organizational problems were encountered. In some cases, near anarchy prevailed as running verbal battles ensued between party agents, presiding officers, and crowds of onlookers. The most serious problem observed related to the number of prospective voters in many constituencies who were turned away because their names could not be found on the register. Since Ghana lacks a consistent voter identification system, there was considerable variation in the procedures followed by election officials to verify the identity of voters.

At the root of Ghana's post-election dispute was the deep disquiet over what the opposition parties believed to be excessive control exercised by the ruling Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) over the electoral process. High among their list of grievances was the voters' register, which had first been compiled in 1987 at the time of elections to the district assemblies. These assemblies, two-thirds of whose members were elected and the rest appointed by the central government, predated by five years the return to democratic multi-party politics.

A partial opening of the register in 1991, and valiant efforts to eliminate the many duplications and inaccuracies during the months preceding the 1992 vote, did not

won a clear majority in the first round of

Ghana's presidential elections, which international observers certified as fair, despite objections by Rawlings' electoral opponents. Rawlings' overwhelming popularity in the rural areas, whose inhabitants have benefitted from a decade of economic reform, sealed his electoral victory, a new phenomenon in African politics.

dispel the opposition's lingering doubts that the PNDC had confronted it with "a stacked deck." Hence, the promptness with which it attributed its defeat to a deliberate operation engineered by the PNDC and its agents. Caught between the virulent charges on both sides was the Interim National Election Commission (INEC), led by Justice J. Ofori-Boateng, which had labored mightily, and openly, to steer an independent path between the PNDC that appointed it and the opposition that did not fully trust it.

While the supporters of Jerry Rawlings—distributed among the National Democratic Congress (NDC), the National Convention Party (NCP), an Nkrumahist rump, and the Egle Party—rejected the opposition's complaints as a case of "sour grapes," the latter presented Rawlings' unexpected first round victory as *prima facie* evidence that it had been "right all along." Having put aside their grave reservations about the electoral process out of a fear that the military regime would proceed with elections in their absence, as occurred in Burkina Faso in 1991, they resolved after the presidential vote to take a firmer step and insist on an acceptable register and other changes. By contrast, Rawlings and the victorious NDC found their resounding victory marred by the specter of winning unexpected complete control of all the institutions of the Fourth Republic.

On November 20, INEC announced the legislative elections were postponed until December 22 and the following week talks began between representatives of the government, INEC, and the opposition to explore solutions to the impasse. It seemed unlikely that Ghana's political leaders would reach an agreement to permit the legislative elections to be conducted on a competitive basis, and in sufficient time, for the Fourth Republic to be inaugurated as scheduled on January 7, 1993. A dialogue conducted in good faith by the two sides could still resolve the electoral disputes, many of which are technical in nature, and allow Ghana to continue along the path leading to a full constitutional democracy.

Few observers could have predicted that Ghana would experience such a complete return to multi-party politics after years of bitter struggle between the PNDC and its opponents. By election day, the number of independent newspapers in circulation that freely criticized Rawlings and his government exceeded significantly those which largely reflected official viewpoints. Of the two state-owned newspapers, the *Daily Graphic* had taken pains to ensure that all political opinions were adequately represented. While the television broadcasts gave extensive coverage to the rush of public works inaugurated by the PNDC chairman, Rawlings, in the last weeks of the presidential campaign, the opposition was also afforded the opportunity to present its positions, including the screening of its own political commercials.

It remains to be seen how much the other key institutions of a pluralist democracy, especially the judiciary, will regain their full autonomy and vigor after 11 years of PNDC rule. The religious and civic organizations, which

played such an important role in pressuring the regime to restore constitutional government, seemed oddly docile in the run-up to the elections. It will obviously take at least a full term of the Fourth Republic for Ghanaians to regain the confidence that has been sapped by the decade-long "culture of silence."

In the absence of any meaningful consultation and dialogue, the government and its opponents are quick to threaten force in trying to make their views prevail. Today, the peace, stability, and continued economic progress of Ghana depend critically on the adoption by the leading political actors of new patterns of discourse in seeking resolution of their disagreements despite the heightened electoral competition and discord.

What Ghana most needs in the struggle to overcome its electoral crisis will require equal measures of idealism and realism. On the side of the opposition, there must be an acceptance of the fact that the "provisional" in the name of the PNDC no longer corresponds to the reality of its popular base. Unlike many military rulers in Africa, who can only hope to govern through the barrel of a gun, Jerry Rawlings has acquired a broad support base among diverse sections of the population.


In the absence of accurate polling data, the actual level of this support cannot be estimated with any certainty. On the side of incumbents, it must be recognized that the strongest basis for their continued exercise of political power is not force of arms, but the legitimacy to be conferred by consensual politics. It is manifestly in their interest to treat the opposition forces, which are bruised by the years of exclusion and summary dismissal, with a modicum of respect.

Ghana has the opportunity to become a leader among African nations again. Under the PNDC, the country has led the way in a courageous attempt to stabilize an economy that had nose-dived during the 1970s. The PNDC has also taken bold steps to restore equity in the allocation of resources between the rural and urban areas. For the 1990s, a new challenge has appeared in the overwhelming demand of Ghanaians for a full constitutional and multi-party democracy. Both the PNDC and its opposition must still demonstrate that they have accepted this challenge and the frustrations and uncertainties it entails.

As several African nations appear to be faltering in their transition from authoritarian systems to pluralist and competitive democracies, Ghana is fortunate in having no really insuperable impediments to overcome. A "lack of political will" is an explanation that has often been advanced to explain why many Third World nations have failed to implement necessary but painful economic reforms. No one would dispute that Ghana's incumbent political leaders, as well as their determined opponents, have demonstrated considerable political will. One day, however, they may have to answer to posterity about the uses to which that political will was put when the country's hope for a self-sustaining constitutional democracy was suddenly at risk. ○

CHILDREN
BY PETER DA COSTA

**S E C U R I N G
T H E F U T U R E**



Margaret A. Novicki

Debt, drought, socio-economic problems, and wars—Africa's four plagues—have taken a heavy toll on the continent's people, especially its most vulnerable, the children. Meeting in Dakar recently, Organization of African Unity members forged an agreement with donor nations and multilateral institutions to spend more money on children's health, food security, and related issues in an effort to save a million young lives annually.

Members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) have entered into an ambitious contract with international financial institutions and donors aimed at improving the depressing lot of Africa's children, in line with the development goals set by the 1990 New York World Summit for Children.

At a conference held in Senegal's capital Dakar—hailed as the largest and most important gathering on the plight of children since New York—ministerial delegations from 44 OAU member states agreed with repre-

sentatives of 18 donor countries and officials of international financial institutions on specific targets to be met by the year 2000 which could help save a million young lives annually.

The 10-page "Consensus of Dakar" sets a two-fold challenge. Africans are to implement major policy reform—including restructuring of government budgets and mass social mobilization so as to directly target child-beneficial programs. This internal action is to be matched by donors, who are expected to more than double current levels of official development assistance (ODA) earmarked for children.

UNICEF—which assisted the OAU in organizing the

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conference—estimates Africa will need an estimated \$12.7 billion annually in the 1990s, in addition to current spending, to achieve World Summit targets. Of this figure, \$8.8 billion a year is needed for disasters like war and drought.

OAU secretary-general Salim Ahmed Salim described the commitment as “a compact for a human development strategy on the part of African governments and their development partners with the emphasis on first call for children” and made much of the fact that Africa is the first continent to respond to the New York summit call. *Behind the concern and urgency demonstrated by the impressive array of delegations is the fact that Africa’s children are at greater risk and distress than any other.*

The statistics make for bleak reading and put into perspective the mammoth challenge facing the continent. Although they constitute little more than one-tenth of the world’s child population, Africa’s young make up one-third of the almost 13 million who die worldwide every

year. This disproportion, say experts, is on the rise despite continuing strides in reducing child mortality in recent years.

Africa brings up the rear in key development indicators. It has the worst under-five mortality rate, lowest life expectancy and worst rate of primary school enrollment, and is second only to south Asia in under-five malnutrition. Life expectancy of babies born in Africa between 1990 and 1995 is still 20 years behind the West with malnutrition currently affecting a quarter of under-fives and 39 million stunted by lack of proper nutrition. With the average African poorer now than a decade ago when there was more food per person than today, urban unemployment as high as 60 percent and a sole doctor for every 24,000 people, it is small wonder children are so vulnerable.

Salim identifies the culprits behind the figures as debt, drought, socio-economic problems, and wars. Conflict, particularly internal, Salim told participants, was the

Orphans of the Koran

Amadou is an unusually small eight-year-old boy. Day after day, he shuffles around the dusty streets of Banjul, capital of the Gambia, clad in the same grimy second-hand corduroy trousers and knee-length traditional cotton top whose intricate stitching has long worn away.

Braving parched conditions characteristic of the bone-dry harmattan season in the Sahel region of West Africa, Amadou and his friends, Saihou, 10, and Yorro, seven, wave their tins at passers-by hoping for donations of food or money—preferably both.

The three waifs are *almudos*, children who must beg as payment for their instruction in the Koran, Islam’s holy book, or face the wrath of their teacher (*marabout*). They haunt strategic sites—banks, cinemas, restaurants, gas stations, taxi ranks, and supermarkets—working systematically toward their target.

Since leaving his home village of Medina Gounasse in eastern Senegal four years ago, Amadou has neither seen nor heard from the parents who put him under the care of Cherno Seragu, the peripatetic teacher whose current *daara* (Koranic school) in a Banjul slum doubles as a dormitory for the 20 or so boys under his instruction.

Amadou and his friends are on the streets from 8 am to 2 pm, and must each hand Seragu five *dalasi* (55 cents) a day. Amadou almost always meets his target—“or else,” he explains, “I get a beating.” Some of his fellow boarders, he says, are not so smart and suffer repeated, often severe, chastisement.

Street boys are an ubiquitous sub-regional phenomenon, especially common in Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, and Guinea. In theory, their parents, too poor to pay fees for regularized Koranic schools, hand their

male offspring over to live with *marabouts*, who teach them discipline and the basics of Islam in return for whatever menial domestic tasks they can perform. In practice, the story is all too often different.

Apart from memorizing the Koran, very few *almudos* (or *talibés*, as they are known in Senegal) benefit from their tutelage. According to researchers, the majority emerge from their apprenticeship functionally illiterate—admittedly with a firm grounding in the ways of street survival.


“In the urban context, where traditional social relations are eroded and new values emerge,” reads a Unicef analysis of women and children in Senegal, “a good number of the *marabouts* end up by teaching Koranic education not out of a sacred duty, but as a means of survival of which the *talibés* are the instruments.

“As such, the original social contract...veers more and more towards the satisfaction of the *marabout’s* needs to the detriment of the child’s education.”


Senegalese statistics reveal that less than 30 percent of the child’s time is spent studying, while 63 percent of Koranic schools in the Dakar region don’t even have fixed locations. Two-thirds of *marabouts* surveyed sent their own sons to regular Koranic or Western-style schools.

Authorities estimate that of the 500,000 Senegalese children aged seven to 12 who don’t attend primary school (42 percent of the country’s children), between 50,000 and 100,000 are *talibés*. Of these, 90 percent are below the age of 16.

Experts identify two categories of *talibés*: a larger group that descends on the towns during the dry season to return to their villages and farming communities for the planting season; and a second group, whose



Margaret A. Novick



Margaret A. Novick

members spend years away from their birthplace and may not necessarily return home at the end of their studies.

It is to this second group that Amadou belongs, a group that is constantly at risk from the dangers associated with urban vagrancy. According to social workers, many fall victim to traffic accidents or become unwitting tools of vice. Others resort to drug abuse.

Dr. Ayo Paimer, a pediatrician at Banjul's Royal Victoria Hospital, lists malaria, infected scabies, tropical ulcers, impetigo, ringworm, diarrhea, and tuberculosis as ailments common to street boys. "What is more," she adds, "there's no guarantee they get the requisite levels of nutrition, so many are underweight." Sanitary conditions are more often than not "abysmal" while access to medical care is limited.

Faced with such odds against making it to their mid-teens—after which the boys either seek manual employment or train to become *marabouts* themselves—many wonder why parents choose to expose their children to such a life.

Momodou Lamin Saho, coordinator of an Islamic non-governmental organization and a former Gambian attorney-general, says the phenomenon is less attributable to Islam than to economic necessity. "You don't find these boys in Arab states, where Islam originated. It's a purely sub-regional phenomenon perpetuated by poverty," he explains.

"This is not sanctioned by the Koran. However Fulanis, especially in Senegal, were at the forefront of the spread of Islam and most of the saintly families are Fulani. So parents value an Islamic education and if they can't afford to pay fees, they enter their offspring into this social contract with the *marabout*."

Saho, a firm believer in Arabic and Islamic scholarship, nevertheless concedes the *marabout-almudo* relationship is far from the ideal medium for Koranic education. "But it's up to the Islamic authorities to take the lead in raising money to prevent kids having to work for their instruction—not Western-influenced legislators whose ideas are just not practicable to our cultural setting."

Lawally Cole, program officer at Unicef Banjul, insists religion is being used as a tool for "exploitation of the young and poor to make people very rich." He says while the government—which has ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child—is against the practice, it is hampered by severe constraints. "Some years ago, the police rounded up all the *marabouts* and expelled them," he recalls. "But within a matter of months, they were back."

Senegal, which has similar commitments to the protection of the child, is likewise hamstrung by budgetary constraints. However, the germ of a policy is emerging. In the short term, parents will be sensitized about the conditions under which children live. In the long term, the idea is to reform the Koranic educational system to obviate the need for boys as young as three to be taken from the family setting and put on the streets of strange cities until they are well into their teens.

Amadou has spent half his short life away, but can still remember his father (a bicycle repairer), mother, and younger sister. He hopes to leave Banjul for Medina Gounasse in the coming months. If he does make it home to stay, Amadou will indeed be lucky. But many boys like him may never get back to the family life they can only dimly recall.

—P.d.C.

most tragic conspirator against the child. "One common characteristic of all conflicts—from Liberia to Somalia, from Angola to Sudan, and from Rwanda to Mozambique and South Africa—is that it is the most vulnerable groups which are most affected, and the most vulnerable of them are the innocent children who get caught in the cross-fire."

These conflicts have ensured one out of every five world migrants and one of every two refugees is African. Africa now has six million refugee and 12 million displaced persons, the majority women and children. Participants responded by backing OAU efforts to institutionalize conflict management. They reiterated that principles of the Convention of the Rights of the Child—among them the prevention of conscription of under-15s—be observed. Dakar also called on African countries to step up commitment to safeguarding civilians and humanitarian assistance during war through special mechanisms such as "corridors of peace" and "days of tranquility."

There are also medium-term targets, to be achieved by 1995: A rise in Africa's immunization coverage level from 75 to 80 percent against diphtheria, whooping cough, tetanus, polio, and tuberculosis; 90 percent coverage against measles and, for women, 90 percent against tetanus toxoid; 80 percent usage of oral rehydration therapy (ORT) to prevent dehydration caused by diarrhea; virtual elimination of iodine deficiency and its consequences; and exclusive breast-feeding for four to six months and sustained breast-feeding for at least two years.

The Consensus says these are low-cost goals mostly achievable with modest levels of additional external support if there is strong political commitment and widespread social mobilization. James Grant, Unicef's executive director, told *Africa Report* measures like immunization, which were "80-90 percent political mobilization", and ORT promotion (the salt/sugar solution saves 500,000 lives a year) would be in line with the New York emphasis on "what it is that countries themselves can do."

Evidence of self-reliance in Africa would, said Grant, mobilize public opinion support in the industrialized world. "When you tell the audience in the U.S. today that immunization levels in sub-Saharan Africa are equal to and better than in most American states, they can't believe it. But it demonstrates what could be done." It is this support (the Consensus sets a target for donors of 20 percent of ODA for child-specific programs) that will help achieve costlier longer-term goals.

These targets for the year 2000 include: slashing severe protein-energy malnutrition by half and achieving household food security, universal access to clean water and safe waste disposal; reducing infant mortality by one-third and maternal mortality by half; and lowering the number of children in especially difficult circumstances.

While a continental follow-up mechanism to the Dakar Consensus is envisaged, to be supported by UN agencies and NGOs—allowed for the first time to join bilateral dis-

cussions between donors and governments—implementation at country level will be through national programs of action (NPAs). Organizers say nearly 40 completed NPAs were presented in Dakar with several more in the pipeline. Many will be re-drafted as a result of the conference and will eventually be incorporated into bilateral and multilateral consultative processes and development programs.

Participants say the conference's success will be evident in the extent to which countries will prioritize the concerns of their children in the coming months. As Kenyan educationalist Eddah Gachukia told *Africa Report*: "You only have to look at the increase in NGOs flocking to help Nairobi's street children after the World Summit on Children in 1990 to realize the tremendous interest this conference will generate." Be that as it may, skepticism will dog the implementation process, with donor commitments a subject of much speculation.

Immediate effects of the Dakar conference have however raised hopes that commitments will be met on both sides. Norwegian Development Cooperation Minister Karl Norheim Larsen announced her country would be giving an additional \$1.4 million to Unicef over the next year for the implementation of NPAs in Africa. With 1.09 percent of its GNP devoted to ODA Norway is the world's leading development donor. DANIDA chief Birte Poulsen also announced Denmark would pump an extra \$2.5 million to Unicef for sub-Saharan children in especially difficult circumstances. Others are expected to follow the lead of the Scandinavians.


In mid-conference the African Development Bank (ADB) signed a landmark agreement with Unicef to make available funds for NPAs. Between now and 1996, the ADB says it will spend \$2.5 billion on the social sector, an amount predicted to increase to \$7 billion by the year 2001. Some 100 NGOs—a significant constituency since 30 percent of development aid to Africa is either channeled through or generated by them—participated in Dakar, in addition to 40 mayors from Canada, Nigeria, Italy, and Senegal who pledged the commitment of municipalities in implementing child-friendly programs.

Zimbabwean leader Robert Mugabe—apart from host president Abdou Diouf the only head of state in evidence—gave participants food for thought when he listed as part of a five-point proposal the freeing of aid for children from political conditionality. Mugabe, whose country is among Africa's most progressive in child survival, protection, and development, said the majority of Africa's \$280 billion foreign debt should be cancelled and urged that cost recovery requirements should be removed or softened where primary health care and education were concerned. He also categorized as special categories child refugees and AIDS orphans.

The Dakar Consensus reflected some of Mugabe's concerns, especially giving the nod to "debt-for-children" swaps—the conversion into local currency by creditors of monies owed by an individual country which would be used to support NPAs and other child-related actions. ○

E X P O S I N G T H E P A S T

Both the African National Congress and the government have finally, grudgingly, conceded that each of their security forces were guilty of gross human rights abuses—beatings, torture, even murder. But in airing past atrocities, there was also suspicion that both sides wanted to bury that history. As *Africa Report* went to press, President F.W. de Klerk conceded there had been “dirty tricks,” but claimed that politicians were not fully informed.



Kevin Carter/The Weekly Mail

Ghosts from the past are haunting the two main interlocutors in South Africa's negotiating process, complicating the already protracted and tricky task of reaching a settlement.

In an ironic twist of history, Nelson Mandela's African National Congress (ANC) and F.W. de Klerk's National Party (NP) face similar—though not identical—moral and political dilemmas. Founded within two years of one another—the ANC in 1912 and the NP in 1914—the two movements are confronted with the task of deciding how to deal with the abrogation of human rights by their security departments.

The challenge before these two long-time adversaries is two-fold: to acknowledge the excesses of their security personnel and to identify and deal with those responsible.

In the ANC's case, it relates to the brutal excesses of

its security department or Mbokodo, “The stone that crushes”; in the NP's case, it focuses on the covert activities of the security police and their brethren in military intelligence and the shadowy Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB).

Cyril Ramaphosa, secretary-general of the ANC, has declared that the ANC has displayed greater courage and superior morality than de Klerk's NP in confronting the ignoble aspects of its past.

Ramaphosa's boast is partially justifiable: The ANC did appoint a commission of inquiry to investigate allegations of maltreatment of detainees in its prison camps in neighboring states during the “armed struggle” against apartheid, and even more important, it did fulfill its promise to publish the commission's report.

The report is a damning indictment of Mbokodo. Its hapless victims were found by the commissioners to have been “denigrated, humiliated, and abused, often with staggering brutality” by Mbokodo officials. The abuse of power was not a temporary aberration. It did not last for a

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month or two, and was not confined to one or two detention centers. It took place for nearly a decade in camps in four African countries.

The ANC president, Nelson Mandela, exhibited the political courage referred to by Ramaphosa when the report was released: He frankly described Mbokodo's behavior as a violation of the ANC's own clear code of conduct and acknowledged "ultimate responsibility" on behalf of the ANC leadership.

ANC spokesmen and indeed the ANC-appointed commission itself have argued that the abuse of power by Mbokodo should be seen in context. It was a defensive reaction against the infiltration of spies and agent provocateurs by the "apartheid regime" into ANC ranks.

Chris Hani, chief of staff at the time of the ANC's underground army, Umkhonto we Sizwe or MK, has described the atmosphere in the camps as one of "paranoia and hysteria."

As Hani has said: "The regime was destabilizing the ANC, killing its leaders, assassinating commanders of MK [and creating] a situation of overall suspicion...People began to lose a balanced approach in terms of combating the infiltration of the ANC...The innocent and the guilty were sometimes lumped together."

Another point made by ANC spokesmen, some of whom have come close to offering apologies for the atrocities, is that the ANC lacked the resources of the apartheid state and that the excesses of Mbokodo are therefore less heinous than those of their counterparts working in service of apartheid.

The ANC's approach contrasts with the tack taken by President de Klerk; he has given the impression of a man on the defensive, seeking to bury the past rather than expose it.

By a strange convergence of events, the release of the ANC commission's 74-page report coincided with two interrelated and relevant developments: the introduction of a bill in Parliament to indemnify people who have committed politically motivated crimes and the opening of the inquest into the death of the anti-apartheid activist, David Webster.

De Klerk's Further Indemnity Bill, described by its most vehement opponents as a "murderers' charter," empowers him to indemnify individuals without their having to disclose what crimes they committed. In terms of the original bill, publication of the name of the person indemnified will be the only information available to the public.

De Klerk has been sharply criticized by his political foes, ranging from the ANC to the liberal Democratic



Guy Adams/The Weekly Mail

Party, of seeking primarily to indemnify suspected assassins and torturers in his security forces without full disclosure. His aim, in the view of his indignant opponents, is minimum disclosure—a mere name printed in a gazette—not detailed confession.

The Further Indemnity Bill is thought to have been de Klerk's attempt to assuage the anxiety of those members of the security forces who waged a secret—and often merciless—war against anti-apartheid activists before the unbanning of the ANC. Their aim is thought to have been—more than indemnity—to protect them from prosecution by a future government; they are suspected of having tried to get indemnity without disclosure, forgiveness without contrition.

Fearing that they may be indicted by a new post-apartheid government, these security force apparatchiki are suspected of wanting to re-write South Africa's history, to expunge details of their offenses from the record. Their anxiety has been sharpened by the emergence of new details in the inquest into the death of Webster.

Webster was gunned down by unknown assassins on May 1, 1989. His death raised a cry of outrage from opposition forces comparable to that precipitated by the death in detention 12 years earlier of the black consciousness leader, Steve Biko.

The prime suspect, in a corporate sense, was the CCB, whose Orwellian-sounding title accurately conveys its sinister image. Since the start of the Webster inquest, suspicions against the CCB have hardened.

The inquest court heard testimony—strongly challenged, it is fair to record, by Defense Force lawyers—that the assassination was carried out on the orders of a senior military officer by three men with CCB ties. The court heard, too, that a fourth CCB man, Staal "Steel" Burger, was involved.

Two witnesses in the inquest identified "Chappie" Maree, a former policeman who was recruited to serve as a CCB operative under Burger, as the man who shot Webster.

One, Johan Gagiano, a freelance journalist, told the court that Burger had admitted that the killing of Webster was a CCB project, carried out by the CCB cell commanded by Burger and on orders from high-ranking South African Defense Force officers.

**THE ANC'S
APPROACH CONTRASTS WITH THE
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DEFENSIVE.**

Gagiano testified that three CCB men from Burger's cell were in the car from which the fatal shot was fired: Ferdi Barnard and Calla Botha, like Maree former policemen, and Maree, who allegedly fired the shot from the back seat of the car.

In another dramatic development, a man who witnessed the gunning down of Webster in May 1989 told the inquest court that he had seen the person who pulled the trigger in the courtroom itself. The witness, Corrie du Plessis, remembered the gunman's face because he had red-blond hair and pockmarks. His later formal identification of the suspect was made in camera on the judge's order. By a process of deduction, the man he is thought to have pointed out as the gunman who allegedly fired the shot was Maree.

A third witness, Willie Smit, who had once employed Barnard, testified that he had been approached for an alibi by Barnard and Botha to protect them from suspected involvement in the attempted murder of another anti-apartheid activist.

Their fear, according to Smit, was that police investigators might connect them to the Webster killing, to which—Smit testified—Barnard confessed. Later, after being confronted by a huge man in the corridors of the court building, Smit withdrew his testimony. Botha, however, confirmed that he and Barnard had approached Smit for an alibi.

Further dramatic evidence before the inquest court came from the chairman of the CCB, the bearded Gen. Eddie Webb, a former officer of the Defense Force's Special Services.

Webb made three crucial admissions during his testimony: that it was his task as CCB chairman to approve the "elimination of enemies of the state"; that the CCB managing director, Joe Verster, had approved two "eliminations" without consulting him; and that he had misled an earlier judicial inquiry into political assassination, the Harms Commission, by denying knowledge of two assassination attempts.

The disclosures during the Webster inquest must be seen against the background of the suspected involvement of the CCB in the assassination of a white Swapo official, Anton Lubowski, in Namibia in September 1989.

Significantly, the Namibian authorities asked their South African counterparts to extradite four CCB men, Burger, Maree, Barnard, and Botha. They wanted to charge Burger and Maree with the Lubowski murder and to subpoena Barnard and Botha as state witnesses.

The South African authorities refused to comply with the request. Burger and Maree proclaimed their innocence but refused to stand trial. Instead, their initial reaction was to go into hiding.

The Webster inquest, like the publication of a military signal message apparently implicating the head of military intelligence, Gen. Christofel van der Westhuizen, in the 1985 assassination of anti-apartheid activist Matthew Goniwe, heightened suspicions in opposition circles that de Klerk is involved in a cover-up.

Where the ANC admitted that torture and brutality occurred in its camps, de Klerk insisted that he was not aware of the name of a single person in government ranks who wanted to—or, by extension, needed to—apply for indemnity under the Further Indemnity Bill.

Suspensions against de Klerk congealed further when he used the President's Council—a government-controlled institution—to force the Further Indemnity Bill through Parliament after it had been rejected by one of the three houses.


De Klerk denied that his motive was to ensure indemnity for his security forces or that he was under pressure from them to push the bill through Parliament before the end of the year. He declared that he needed to place the bill on the statute book to give effect to an agreement with the ANC to free prisoners incarcerated for politically motivated offenses not covered under existing legislation or regulations.

Standing back and assessing the situation, the ANC appears to be ahead on points in the moral contest against its old adversary. But to secure an incontestable victory the ANC must go further: It must identify the people responsible for what its own commission described as an extraordinary and prolonged abuse of power and ensure that they never again hold important positions in the organization.

If the ANC delays and obfuscates, if it fails to take decisive steps against those officials who behaved in an "unconscionable and pernicious" way, it will squander the moral advantage it enjoys.

Without appropriate follow-up action, there is a risk that the ANC's commission will be seen in the same light as the Harms Commission. Appointed by de Klerk in February 1990 to investigate politically motivated murders amid mounting suspicion of state complicity in the killings of anti-apartheid activists, the Harms Commission report was seen as insubstantial at best and a subterfuge at worst.

The Harms Commission—as Judge Louis Harms admitted in his September 1990 report—failed to restore public confidence in the security forces. The ANC will similarly fail to substantiate its claim to moral superiority if its leaders are not seen to take tough action against the officials in ANC ranks with a penchant for torture and sadism. ○



John Battersby

Chris Hani, former chief of staff of the ANC's underground army, described the atmosphere in the camps as one of "paranoia and hysteria"

SINISTER

Greg Mannovich/Sygma



D

awn broke to the sound of a thunderous explosion outside the tiny village of Dimbaza, in the nominally independent South African "homeland" of Ciskei, on a recent morning.

Four hand grenades, thrown by a group of men hiding in the savannah scrubland, exploded on the dusty roadside. A fifth whirled into a Ciskei Defense Force (CDF) bus that was collecting employees from the village to go to work. One died; seven others were injured.

Anne Shepherd is a London-based journalist who has travelled widely in Africa and written extensively on African economic and political issues.

The CDF and South African Defense Force (SADF), which has been called in by military leader Brig. Oupa Gqozo to "stabilize" the area after the unrest that followed the massacre of 28 African National Congress (ANC) supporters there in September, immediately blamed the ANC for the incident. As a result, Gqozo called off talks, scheduled for October 26, between the Ciskei administration and the ANC to try and resolve their differences.

ANC officials in East London, provincial capital of South Africa's Eastern Cape province, shied away from commenting on the incident until further investigations had taken place. But they posed several questions.

CISKEI

The September massacre of 28 African National Congress demonstrators by the Ciskei Defense Force was the most outrageous act of what observers see as a longtime, systematic campaign by the Ciskeian authorities, in collusion with the South African Defense Force, to kill ANC activists in the Eastern Cape, the movement's strongest base. With a pliable homeland leader, Brig. Oupa Gqozo, the South Africans—according to critics—are carrying out their divide and rule policy while using the homeland as a training ground for anti-ANC operatives.

Why, for example, had the men, who apparently ran for about a mile before boarding a vehicle which ferried them away, *not been apprehended, despite the presence of SADF troops in the area?* Why too had the incident taken place just before the meeting with Ciskei officials, which the ANC, South Africa's main liberation movement, had been pushing for? Could it be that—as evidence in the past has so often pointed to—a sinister “third force,” working to discredit the ANC, had been involved?

The incident is just one of a series that has rocked this territory—one of four which only South Africa recognizes as independent—since the headline-grabbing massacre in Bisho, the Ciskei capital.

As the ANC admits, much of the violence, particularly the burning and looting of houses belonging to CDF employees, has resulted from a backlash among its supporters. *According to SADF figures, of the 54 incidents that occurred in the area in September-October, 51 were directed against members of the Ciskei army and police forces, and only the remainder against the ANC.*

But the ANC and independent monitors have chronicled a long list of abuses by the CDF and SADF, which they say have escaped world attention, now that the initial outcry over the Bisho massacre has died down.


According to statistics compiled by the Independent Monitoring Network, which comprises groups like the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa

(IDASA), Lawyers for Human Rights, and the Independent Board of Inquiry, a total of 59 deaths have been reported in the area over the September-October period. The network maintains that 42 of these were ANC members, and only 17 supporters of the Gqozo regime.

“The SADF is out to destroy the ANC,” says a church leader in the area. “Terrible things are happening. The area is like a war zone.”

Independent monitors warn that if urgent action is not taken, the area will rapidly deteriorate into a low-level civil war, similar to that in Natal where the ANC is locked in a battle with the conservative, Zulu-based Inkatha movement, which—at least in the past—has been aided and abetted by the government.

The South African establishment, despite protestations to the contrary, has every reason to want the trouble in Ciskei to continue. Traditionally, the Eastern Cape province, which comprises Ciskei, the Transkei (another nominally independent homeland), and the area between (known as “border”) is regarded as the ANC's strongest base. It is the home of the Xhosa people, the second largest ethnic group in South Africa. ANC leader Nelson Mandela hails from the Transkei. Many ANC intellectuals—and indeed other nationalist leaders from surround-



Greg Marinovich/Sygnia

*Opposite page:
The Ciskei Defense Force*

*Above: Brig. Oupa Gqozo,
military leader of the
Ciskei homeland*

ing southern African countries—studied at Fort Hare, in the Ciskeian town of Alice.

According to a recent report on the Ciskei by the Independent Board of Inquiry: "Ever since the South African government identified the political threat of a united East Cape region, their aim has been to work against unity. This meant that Ciskei and Transkei were never permitted to become a single homeland region, and that any conflict within the region was encouraged and sometimes actively initiated." This has been particularly true since the advent of the military administration of Gen. Bantu Holomisa in the Transkei, which is sympathetic to the ANC.

According to the report, researched by Louise Flanagan over an extended period in the area, the Eastern Cape has also been used by the military "as a testing ground for officers on their way to the top." The report traces several instances of SADF personnel, including the current chief of military intelligence, Gen. Christoffel van der Westhuizen, who cut their teeth in the Eastern Cape, convenient as a training ground "because it is so often ignored by the media."

The Independent Board of Inquiry and the Johannesburg-based *Weekly Mail* have uncovered a series of covert operations in the area over the past few years. These include Operation Hammer, a citizen force grouping set up by van der Westhuizen which ran a dirty tricks unit that has been allegedly linked to the murder of ANC activist Matthew Goniwe.

Another operation, exposed as a military intelligence front last December, was the Adult Education Consultants, whose local arm, Dynamic Teaching, propagated a strong anti-communist line, and International Researchers (IR), later renamed Ciskei Intelligence Services.

Both Dynamic Teaching and IR were involved in the launching last July of the African Democratic Movement (ADM), the political party that Gqozo is using to legitimize his rule following his overthrow of the equally notorious Lennox Sebe in 1990. Former acting secretary-general of the ADM, Basie Oosthuysen, was an employee of Dynamic Teaching. His successor, Thamsanqa Linda, worked for Eduguide, another wing of Adult Education Consultants.

Ominously, the head of the IR, Anton Nieuwoudt, played a prominent role in training an elite group of Inkatha paramilitary fighters at a base in the Caprivi

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Strip. The ADM, which operates through ethnic structures, is viewed by many residents of the area as Ciskei's equivalent of Inkatha.

The equation is further complicated by the involvement of SADF personnel in the running of the Ciskei army and police forces. Almost all the top posts in these are staffed by officers either seconded from the SADF or SAP, or who have retired from these services and are now directly contracted by Ciskei.

Under a security agreement between South Africa and the four territories it regards as independent, any one of these can call on the SADF for reinforcements during a crisis. The SADF has distanced itself from the Bisho massacre which has been condemned worldwide for the way in which Ciskeian forces opened fire on ANC demonstrators who overstepped the agreed bounds of their march to enter the Bisho stadium.

However, in the wake of unrest following the Bisho massacre, 467 South African troops have been stationed in the territory, and two base camps established, one in Alice, and the other in King Williamstown. According to a spokesperson for the SADF, the main purpose of this presence is to protect property and infrastructure. The SADF portrays itself as a neutral force, trying to keep the peace between the CDF and ANC supporters.

The ANC concedes that its supporters have rampaged the homes of CDF functionaries and ADM supporters, but stresses that this is a response to the political repression in the territory, which forbids free political activity. "Our people are boiling with anger," says a local ANC representative. "What we see happening here is a response to years of brutal repression, first under Sebe, and now under Gqozo."

The ANC also challenges the claim that the SADF is a peace-keeping force. Hundreds of affidavits collected by the organization support the view that what the SADF claims to be routine searches for weapons have turned into a purge of ANC in Ciskei, with several membership cards reportedly confiscated.

Disagreement also persists over the series of sophisticated murders that have plagued the area since the massacre. Although only four arrests have been made, and no proof of any sort has yet emerged in court, the SADF blames these attacks on Umkhonto we Sizwe, the ANC's military wing. The ANC does not deny the existence of MK functionaries in the area, or their access to weapons which—by agreement with the government—would only be handed over to an interim government. But it points to the many killings of its members as evidence that some other sophisticated force is also operating in the area.

Ultimately, church leaders say, the only lasting solution to violence in the area is for legislation banning free political activity to be lifted, and for Gqozo to stand the test of an election, as a prelude to a full reintegration of the homelands into a new South Africa. The de Klerk government, by simply turning off economic and military support, can force Gqozo to take such measures. The question is whether it really wants that to happen. ○

TOURISM

BY HOWARD W. FRENCH

Howard W. French

Howard W. French

BENIN'S



CULTURAL

Benin has begun seriously trying to attract tourists, putting particular emphasis on the architectural and historic legacies of the slave trade. To kick off the tourist revival,



Howard W. French

BOUNTY

Benin has joined forces with other African nations to organize a nine-day festival, Ouidah '93, intended as a coming-out party for West Africa's tourism.

Just off the main roads in Benin, a land jammed with history, even an uninitiated visitor can hardly help stumbling upon the kind of vivid displays of culture that many other regions of the world can only match with elaborately staged revivals of dimly remembered folklore.

Where tourism is concerned, Africa has long been seen as little more than a virtually undifferentiated game

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park. But a stroll even slightly off the beaten path in this country shows off the continent as a place of living religions, vibrant dance, elaborate traditions, and also dramatic change.

While large parts of Africa, from Somalia to Liberia, writhe in a biblical misery, recently Benin, like other countries that have partaken in the continent's sweeping democratic revival, has begun working seriously for the first time at attracting Western tourists.

For Benin, like many of its neighbors, the centerpieces

of its tourism ambitions are the architectural and historic legacies of the slave trade. Recent efforts have been concentrated on cleaning up and restoring or reconstructing slaving forts and chattel markets that dotted a coastline that saw the departure into bondage in the early 18th century of as many as 20,000 slaves a year from some of the trade's biggest West African centers.

With its rich history of empire—the Fon, not the Benin Kingdom whose name the country expropriated from neighboring Nigeria—Benin's new democratic government is also working at both studying and restoring often well-preserved imperial palaces and other important archaeological sites centered around the interior city of Abomey.

In the most ambitious event of its kind since Nigeria hosted a festival of African arts, Festac, in 1977, Benin has enlisted the support of several other governments in the region, as well as Unesco, France, and the United States, for the organization of a grand festival, billed as a reunion of Africa and the Americas that, although repeatedly delayed, is now scheduled to take place in early February.

The nine-day festival, billed as Ouidah '93, is intended as something of a grand coming-out party for West Africa. Its organizers hope the event, which will include performances from neighboring countries, as well as musical groups and artists from the United States, Haiti, Cuba, and Brazil, will reawaken the outside world's interest in the region, especially capitalizing on several years of mounting interest among blacks of the diaspora in their mother continent.

In an attempt to make the festival as substantive and stimulating as it is memorably diverting, the organizers have planned theme days of theater and cinema, a book fair, and lectures about the slave trade and its impact both on Africa and the New World.

Receiving special attention will be Benin's contributions to the spread of African religious practices throughout the New World, and experts on Haitian Voodoo and lectures on African-inspired religions in Brazil, Cuba, and the United States will be featured.

Visitors will also be taken along still extant ancestral footpaths, known as La Route de l'Esclave, which were used by slavers to conduct captives from the interior to forts like the austere, white-walled structure built by the Portuguese at Ouidah in 1721, which will be the headquarters of the festivities.

During a trip to Benin in August, a journalist followed the contours of the Slave Route, driving along dusty back roads, stopping every few miles to chat with villagers often surprised at the unannounced arrival of an outsider.

OUIDAH '93, A NINE-DAY FESTIVAL SCHEDULED IN EARLY FEBRU- ARY, IS BILLED AS A REUNION OF AFRICA AND THE AMERICAS.

In a daylong trip, the visitor came upon authentic masques being danced before an assemblage of youth and elders in one village, the weekly market for the area in another village, and a marriage ceremony accompanied by a live band in yet another. At each stop, the villagers promptly invited the visitor's participation.

Most captivating of all, however, was the kind of historical discovery that Benin—like its other neighbors who are counting on a greater awareness of the continent's past—hopes to use to help market itself. Midway to Abomey from Ouidah, a few insistently curious questions at the sleepy town of Allada showed the way down yet another small byway to the village of Togoudo, where Haiti's founding revolutionary hero, Toussaint L'Ouverture, was born in 1743.

Since 1983, the poor residents of Togoudo, a moldering village whose royalty helped found the Fon kingdom, have themselves been without a king. After a tour of the birthplace of Toussaint L'Ouverture, of which little remains but the crumbling red clay walls of homes that have long ago collapsed and all but disappeared, villagers, themselves keenly aware of their historical importance, expressed hope that the spread of tourism would not leave them out.

"Our village is a cortege of ruins," said Albert Goudo Tessi, the wizened secretary of Togoudo's dilapidated, thatched-roof royal palace. "We no longer have the means to support a king. We can't even rebuild his house the way it should be. Maybe if more outsiders came here, things would change."

But if Benin boasts the right combination of assets, from newly democratic government to a wealth of history and culture that is for the most part readily accessible, the country also bears its share of the handicaps that, beyond the age-old issue of the West's negative stereotyping of the continent, has helped deprive it of its share of what is often called the world's largest industry—tourism.

While African heads of state meet with ritualized frequency to discuss regional integration, merely traveling by road from one small state in the region to another is a frustrating lesson in how distant their goal remains. Border crossings into Benin from neighboring states are a slow and difficult experience. And grudging, corrupt officials appear little concerned with conveying a sense of welcome.

Were it not for the compensating friendliness of ordinary people, traveling within the country could not be described as any better. In Benin, which is unexceptional in this regard, a dozen roadblock shakedowns by steely-eyed police whose vigilance is clearly more intended at filling their pockets than stopping crime is about par for the 50-mile ride to the border with Togo.

At best, organizing festivals showing off the region's history, art, and culture is only half of the task needed to put Africa back on the world's travel maps. If it can clear up these kinds of blights, Benin will have taken another great step toward making the continent a place that visitors love to come back to. ○

ECONOMIES

BY ANNE SHEPHERD

Integrating African regions economically may be the only way that small and weak countries can compete in a world market increasingly made up of powerful economic blocs, such as those in Europe and the Pacific Rim. But there is doubt on how to do it in southern Africa—whether to support the newly created Southern Africa Development Community with the imminent membership of the region's economic giant, South Africa, or achieve growth through the Preferential Trade Area or Customs Union agreement, or perhaps a combination of all options.

BUILDING A BLOC



No one said so in so many words, but when 10 southern African countries signed a treaty in August to work toward a common market, they also dashed hopes of a more rational approach to integration efforts on the sub-continent.

At their heads of state summit in Windhoek, Namibia, members of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), citing the likelihood of South Africa becoming a member, committed themselves to becoming the "Southern Africa Development Community" (SADC).


Until recently largely a coordinator of \$3.4 billion worth of projects funded by donors anxious to help the region strengthen its economies vis-à-vis that of South Africa, SADC says it will now promote the free movement of goods, capital, and people across its borders. No timetable is given for this, but a background paper cites SADC as one of the building blocks in the Organization of African Unity Abuja



Margaret A. Novicki

Above, the Limpopo railway line in Mozambique

Left, Chevron oil rig in Cabinda, Angola



Margaret A. Novicki

Treaty for an African common market by 2025.

Ironically, the 18-member East and Southern Africa Preferential Trade Area (PTA), to which eight SADC members (excluding Botswana and Namibia) belong, has cast itself in the same role.

At its summit in Lusaka, Zambia, in January, heads of state of this larger organization resolved that "the PTA and SADCC be merged into a single common market for Eastern and southern Africa, within the context of the Abuja Treaty for the African Economic Community."

Meeting in Dakar, Senegal, in June, heads of state of the Organization of African Unity welcomed the PTA resolution to form a Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). They urged other regions which

had not yet "adopted similar decisions" to do so in order "to avoid wasteful duplication of efforts in the economic integration process."

Despite the fact that eight SADC heads of state signed the PTA communiqué, when they got to Windhoek, they had apparently changed their minds. The SADC communiqué, while acknowledging the PTA "proposal," reaffirms the "consensus of member-states that SADCC and the PTA had distinct objectives and mandates and must therefore continue to exist as autonomous, but complementary entities."

SADC officials claim that those of their members who belong to the PTA misunderstood the PTA resolution they signed and later distanced themselves from it. However, Zambia, which hosts the PTA, openly campaigned for the merger, and is understood to have signed the Windhoek treaty only under considerable peer pressure. In contrast, Botswana, which has gained international notoriety by hosting SADCC, canvassed against the PTA move, supported—naturally enough—by the SADCC secretariat.

Publicly, SADC says it will continue to coordinate with the PTA to avoid duplication. The Windhoek communiqué directs that a study be undertaken on "how best to harmonize relations between SADC and the PTA in the context of the process toward the establishment of the African Economic Community."

But, as the SADC theme document for this year, "Towards Economic Integration," concedes: "At the highest point of integration...it will not be practicable for countries to belong to more than one regional community." This also implies a choice for four SADC members presently also belonging to the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) revolving around South Africa.

SADC officials admit that by pursuing the Windhoek Treaty rather than the alternative course of a merger with the PTA, the swords are now drawn. They justify the duel as healthy competition. Economists, on the other hand, fear that instead of having one winner, the whole region might end up the loser.

On the face of it, there are strong forces gravitating in favor of stronger integration in southern Africa, and the continent more generally. Domestic economic reforms, coupled with the prospective emergence of powerful regional blocs in Europe, North America, and the Pacific Rim are sending home the message that small and economically weak countries cannot afford to go it alone.

The promise—albeit tentative—of a democratic South Africa emerging has sharpened the focus on regional integration for a variety of reasons. As this year's SADC theme document concedes, in the past, "a significant component of the international political and material support for SADCC and its member-states was predicated on the anti-apartheid struggle; and was justified in terms of supporting the countries of the region in the face of South Africa's destabilization and military aggression."

Three Into One Won't Go

Southern Africa's problem as it seeks more meaningful regional integration may well be that it is spoiled by choices. In all, there are three different regional organizations, each with its own distinct approach:

- Formed in 1980, Southern African Development Coordination Conference's (SADCC) approach to integration has evolved from project cooperation. An essentially political grouping which tapped the conscience of donors reticent over imposing sanctions against South Africa, SADCC initially focused primarily on coordinating donor-sponsored projects to rehabilitate transport routes destroyed in wars fueled by Pretoria. Cognizant of the problems that have faced overly ambitious and centralized regional organization in Africa, SADCC opted for a decentralized system in which each member took charge of a sector (such as transport, agriculture, industry, etc.).

With political changes in South Africa since 1990, and the growing attention in the West to Eastern Europe, donors have made it increasingly clear that they won't go on picking up the tab indefinitely. In addition, with a GDP three times that of the rest of the region, South Africa poses a potential threat to the smaller economies, unless ground rules for an equitable approach to regional integration are put in place. These factors have prompted SADCC, over the last three years, to pay more attention to production, investment, and intra-regional trade (which stands at a mere 5 percent of the goal).

The new SADC, which the group refers to as the "development integration approach," aims to deepen cooperation in these areas, through integrating systems of investment, production, and trade, "including promoting the freer movement of capital, goods, and labor." This calls for ceding national sovereignty to the broader regional good—a will so far not tested in the loose coordination of projects mostly paid for by outsiders. There are also practical problems: The wide divergence in inflation rates in the countries of the region at the moment, for example, rules out monetary cooperation.

- The Preferential Trade Area was initiated in 1981 by the UN Economic Commission for Africa as one of

three regional organizations (the others being the Economic Community of West African States, and the Economic Community of Central African States) which would link up to form an African Economic Community, now scheduled (optimistically) for 2025. As its name suggest, the PTA's focus is on gradually reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. A common list of 200 items on which barriers were to be removed has been increased to 319 commodities, and the deadline extended from 1992 to 2000. A Harare-based clearing house, which aims to overcome the foreign currency barrier to trade by enabling countries to settle only their trade balances in hard currency, now handles 70 percent of intra-regional trade, and is envisaged as a precursor to monetary union. However, trade between the 18 countries, which stands at 6 percent of the total, has been hampered by the unwieldy size of the group, poor communications, complementarity of production, and fears of the bigger economies (Zimbabwe and Kenya) benefitting disproportionately from the arrangement. The latter has led to a new focus on production: The PTA has 51 industrial projects, and recently established an investment bank.

- The Southern African Customs Union (SACU), including South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Namibia, is the oldest, and technically most advanced of the regional groupings. A customs union takes the free trade zone idea one step further by adding a common external tariff against outside countries, although it does not provide for the free mobility of capital and labor, as is the case in a common market. The arrangement has given South Africa guaranteed export markets in the smaller countries, although the protective barrier against external competition has reduced the efficiency of South African industry. Smaller countries profit from customs revenues, which are divided according to a formula that gives them a favorable share. However, the arrangement has tied them to South African imports, at prices that are not necessarily competitive. All the SACU members, excluding Botswana, belong to the rand Common Monetary Area. ■

—A.S.

With the "passing of apartheid," the document continues, "some cooperating partners will, in apparently good conscience, look elsewhere to give their assistance, where they believe they can derive greater political dividends."

Political change in South Africa, the document points out, is also likely to lead to new investment being attracted back to the region's economic giant. Unless structures are in place for a broader regional market, the argument runs, inequitable development will simply be perpetuated.

In effect, the region has now experimented with two broad approaches to regional integration. The first is the classic market-driven approach, beginning with the liberalization of trade, then factors of production, between a group of countries, such that they progressively transcend being a preferential trade area, to a common market.

Thus in the case of the PTA, members charge each other lower tariffs than those applicable to non-members, but customs duties are still levied on imports from other countries. In the next stage—a free trade area—which

the PTA is aspiring to—no duties are applied on goods from other members, though each still determines its own tariff policy in relation to goods imported from outside the area.

The phase after this—represented in southern Africa by the Southern African Customs Union that revolves around Pretoria—is a customs union, in which trade with non-members is governed by a common external tariff. With the free movement of labor, in addition to capital (which flows freely between the five), SACU would become a common market.

Indeed, four countries—South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, and Swaziland—share the same currency, which virtually makes them an economic union. The “highest,” and most difficult, stage of integration in this model is a political union, in which—in addition to economic integration—the political institutions of member countries are also federated.

SADC began with a similar ultimate objective, but approached it through what it calls “development integration.” This school of thought argues that it is pointless to liberalize trade if countries are producing the same sorts of goods and services, and don’t have the infrastructure to facilitate trade (a problem particularly acute in southern Africa, because of South African destabilization of transport routes in Mozambique and Angola).

The SADC approach has thus been to first emphasize infrastructural projects, then investment and production, with an increasing emphasis on the role of the private sector. Moves toward the free movement of goods (trade) and factors of production (capital and labor) have come as a later, rather than initial, stage in the search for a common market, and ultimately political union.

Up until recently, the thinking seemed to be that all three regional organizations could co-exist, and indeed complement each other. In the initial stages, that was probably true. Infrastructural projects being carried out by SADC, for example, could help the PTA overcome the non-tariff barriers to trade that it confronted.

But as the two organizations focus more keenly on deeper integration, the potential for overlap has increased proportionately.

Should SADC, for example, transform itself into a free trade area, there would be a duplication in tariff policy. With regard to monetary harmonization, the PTA has already gone some way in this area with its clearing house and common unit of currency. The question that would arise is: Would SADC build on this in its own efforts (and if so what would happen to SADC members that do not belong to the PTA) or would it try a different tack?

It seems inevitable that there will be overlap and wastage. Now that the two organizations have declared themselves in competition, the other question that arises is which will outpace the other.

SADC’s two main attributes as a model for integration have been its regional and political coherence, as well as its ability to involve all its members through allocating

each sector to coordinate, while avoiding a massive centralized bureaucracy.

Many question, however, to what extent SADC will continue to hold together as a unit without the anti-apartheid glue. Similarly, as SADC moves away from project coordination toward economic integration, its structure—though as yet undecided—will of necessity alter.

Achieving the goals that SADC has set itself will be no mean task. Although most countries in the region are undertaking structural adjustment programs, macro-economic conditions vary widely from debt-ridden Mozambique to Botswana, with its surplus foreign reserves.

With its past emphasis on reducing dependence on South Africa, SADC appears well placed to provide the framework for South Africa, which has a GDP three times that of the region, to rejoin the region on the basis of mutually beneficial development, but huge problems lie ahead.

As South African economist Rob Davies points out in a recent paper, *South Africa in the Region*, “SADCC does not possess an integrated direct production sector to balance the input from South Africa’s much broader manufacturing base, nor does it have sufficient sectoral economic policy or macro-economic and overall planning coordination.”

Despite the stated commitment of the African National Congress to balanced regional growth, economists point out that the initial focus of a democratic government will be on internal, rather than regional inequities. While donors funded projects, it was relatively easy to forge a consensus within the old SADCC. The “acid test,” as one SADC official concedes, “is yet to come when countries are faced with the choice between short-term national, and long-term regional interests.”

Because of its more practical, trade-oriented approach, the PTA has been attracting considerable interest of late among businessmen and donors.

Last year, the European Community, a major SADC donor, sent shockwaves through the organization when it stipulated for the first time that funds normally allocated to SADC only would have to be split with the PTA, which has been drawing increasing attention from the business community, including in South Africa.

Yet, as most donors and businessmen readily acknowledge, the PTA is far from perfect. Apart from the persistent lack of political will to implement its decisions, the 18-member group is hampered by its unwieldiness. As a Harare trade analyst puts it: “The PTA collects members as though they were smarties, with no regard for regional coherence.”

Recent moves to resuscitate the East African Community, which includes three PTA members (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania), have been cited as evidence that successful regional integration must begin in small units.

Like SADC, the PTA also suffers from huge economic disparities between the economies of its countries. The PTA would become lopsided if South Africa joined, just as SADC will. Indeed, Davies argues that by joining the

PTA, South Africa could slow down the organization's progress toward reducing trade barriers, since countries with some sort of manufacturing base like Zimbabwe would resist measures permitting South African goods to flood their markets.

There is also, at this point, a direct conflict between the PTA, which demands a most favored nation treatment among its countries, and SACU which does not allow its members to enter into concessionary agreements with other countries unless their partners agree. Lesotho and Swaziland, which belong to both, have been given two successive five-year exemption clauses, but will soon have to decide which regional organization to stick with.

Few doubt that when it comes down to it, they will choose SACU, which, whatever its political connotations, is the most coherent and advanced of the integration efforts in the region.

This has led some economists to argue that the best way forward is to scrap both SADC and the PTA, and gradually expand SACU outward. Mozambique, Malawi, and Angola have privately indicated an interest in SACU membership.

Although this is politically attractive to Pretoria, the idea is likely to be opposed by South Africa's purse-keepers, on the grounds that as larger economies join, the revenue-sharing formula would prove unaffordable. Indeed, some economists question if it is in South Africa's interests to belong to any of the regional organizations in the sub-continent, since the African countries it would most seek to trade with—like Nigeria—are not in the sub-region.

The most likely scenario that economists see emerging out of the present milieu is a multiplicity of bilateral trade agreements overlaying a weak regional organization.

Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (which has taken the hardest political line against South Africa) have recently signed preferential trade agreements with Pretoria. Such agreements are of mutual benefit. But, economists say, they lack an overall framework to deliver the region its dream of a place where people sharing the same currency, voting for a regional parliament, can trade and move across boundaries without even noticing that they have done so. ○

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Traditionally in Africa, the elderly are an important part of the extended family, held in high regard and cared for.

Not any longer. Young people's salaries are eroding and they are under severe financial constraints. In addition, traditional and cultural values are changing. In many instances, the elderly are considered a burden, and particularly vulnerable are women.

FAMILY

On a desperate attempt to save an elderly patient from dying, the doctor tried to trace a family member of the sick man. To the doctor's relief, he managed to track down a son who was working nearby. The doctor explained that his patient needed a blood transfusion and financial assistance. But the son's response came as a shock. "Who is my father? He never cared for me and Mama. I don't know him. Let him die."

Most Ghanaians would be outraged by the son's response, just as they are generally horrified that in Europe, many elderly people are institutionalized rather than taken care of by a relative, however distant. Traditionally in Ghana, as in most African countries, the old are regarded as senior family members who impart wisdom and should at least be held in respect and cared for.

In West African languages, expressions for the elderly mean things like, "he or she who knows," or "he or she who has vision." The Akan of Ghana have a proverb which says: "When children learn to wash their hands, they may eat with the elders."

But the sick man was a Ghanaian and so is his son, and these days although such a case is rare, it is becoming less so. "Twenty years ago, the general view would be that you must look after your father because he fathered you, irrespective," said Nana Apt, a 49-year-old sociologist at the University of Ghana, Legon, and president of the African Gerontological Society. "Now it is the modern economics. The salaries people are getting do not keep them going, neither themselves nor their immediate family, so that now it becomes easier for children to say, 'Look, I can't,' because they themselves cannot even cope."

Ghana, like other African countries, has been swallowing the bitter pill of a structural adjustment program sponsored by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Nine years after President Jerry Rawlings' government initiated the program, Ghana can boast of having

the highest growth rate in black Africa, but prices have soared and the cedi, the national currency, has been drastically devalued. The cash economy gives little room for generosity among the extended family.

While tax exemptions are available for children's education, they are not allowed for supporting the elderly. Moreover, most pension schemes are aimed at those who have worked in the formal sector, which is only a small proportion of the elderly.

Besides financial problems, traditional values are being eroded and the cultural gap between the old and young is widening. Educational opportunities have also split families, which had a history of living together in the countryside in a large family home. Young people have flocked to the towns or emigrated overseas. Research has shown that rural youth are twice as likely to live with their grandparents as urban youth. And fewer young married couples these days are willing to live in the same house as their parents.

The cash economy also puts pressure on young people to earn money fast. Today, everything is money. Young people these days tend to feel less obliged, for example, to look after an elderly aunt or uncle.

Therefore, a particularly vulnerable group are elderly women who have living children, like a pair of unidentical twins, Akwele and Akuokor Dokwi. They live by themselves in a tumble-down shack on the outskirts of the capital, Accra. The shack is bare inside except for a few tins that are used as plates and cups, and some scrawny chickens kept in a coop. The sisters depend on the charity of the church and people in the community. "We don't even have enough money to buy food," says Akuokor.

The twins came from a farming family in the Upper West region. They are unable to read or write and worked on a farm until they moved to Accra. "Our mother said our father was too old, so she married another man," said Akuokor, angry tears pouring down her wrinkled cheeks. She brought out a ragged handkerchief and sobbed some more.


A few minutes later, Akuokor

*Akwele Dokwi, left,
and Akuokor Dokwi*

Ruth Ansa Ayisi

Ruth Ansa Ayisi is a freelance journalist based in Maputo, Mozambique.

VALUES



reveled in the opportunity to continue chatting. Her days are spent simply. "When I get up the morning, I sweep the house, clean the coop and everything. I want everything to be clean. But because of my legs, I can't go far away. I just stay in the house."

Akwele looks frail, but she too seemed overwhelmed with excitement that they had visitors who were prepared to hear their stories. "We had wanted to go to school, but our father said we must work in the fields," said Akwele.

"A teacher even came to our house to try to take us to school." Akwele had two children, both of whom died at a young age. Akuokor never married, but looked after her father until he died.

Yet Akwele and Akuokor are luckier than others in that they benefit from Help Age, a non-governmental organization set up three years ago. Help Age fitted a new piece of iron sheeting for a roof so the twins no longer get drenched when it rains. They also have visits and receive some food.

The problems that the elderly face are varied, and sometimes even when they have a relative looking after them, they can still be in need, said Veronica Ayisi, one of the volunteers of Help Age.

Ayisi regularly visits Emmanuel Anum Tetteh, an elderly man who lives with his brother and niece. His leg had been grotesquely swollen from foot to thigh for two years, but the niece had not taken him to the hospital. Indications are that Tetteh is suffering from an advanced form of elephantiasis.

"The niece does not have enough money," said Ayisi. "She has no permanent job. She has children and she has to look after her father, too. There is not enough money to feed them and take him to the hospital."

The even more pitiful cases, however, are those begging in the bustling streets of Accra. "God bless you," they say, when coins are thrown at them by a driver stuck in a traffic jam.

"You never saw this 10 years ago in Accra," said Dr. Apt.

Other African countries, such as those with wars like Mozambique, Somalia, and Sudan, or those with a high number of AIDS cases among the young population, have an even more critical problem of caring for the elderly.

In Mozambique, for example, over a decade of war between the government and the Renamo rebels has ripped apart families. Thousands of elderly while away their time in refugee camps in neighboring countries, others in government-controlled accommodation centers or alone in their villages without the comfort of family or enough food to eat.

Chilente Simango is a typical tragedy. Silver-haired Chilente appeared to be waiting to die. The worst drought in living memory this year in Mozambique had meant that he had not eaten for two weeks. His interest in life had been sapped out of his body. A grandfather of seven, Simango now lives without any family member in an accommodation center in Chibabava, the heart of the central province of Sofala. "The war has separated me from my family," said Simango. "I don't know where any of

them are or who is alive or dead. The rebels did not take me because I'm too old."

In Mozambique's cities, prices are so high that even a middle-income wage earner cannot make ends meet. Mozambique is by some estimates one of the poorest countries in the world, with over 70 percent of its 15.7 million people living in absolute poverty. Like Ghana, a structural adjustment program has also meant more goods in the shops, but attached are prices that only the rich can think about.

It is a common sight to see elderly women and men roaming around the cities in rags begging outside banks or in the markets. Some employ children to beg for them.

Throughout Africa, it is only gradually being acknowledged that it is not only the West that is failing their elderly population.

And the real crisis facing the elderly in Africa has not yet emerged. Ghana, like other African countries, still has a relatively small elderly population because life expectancies are so low, averaging around 49 years. But as medical care is improving, people are beginning to live longer. For example, in 1960 the proportion of people over 60 years of age was 4.2 percent, but by 2025 the proportion should rise to 6.4 percent. Females consistently outnumber men among the elderly.

But the solution in Africa is not so easy. Poverty, war, and the breakdown of norms are bewildering for Africa's elderly. They took it for granted that their old age would not be their responsibility but their children's. "During our childhood in Ghana, we stayed in a family house, so we helped the aged," said Ayisi. "We used to do everything for them."

Help Age, now in its third year in Ghana, has begun to play a limited but important role, and is aiming to expand its activities.

But obviously, Help Age cannot solve the problem alone. The real solution is for governments and the people to change their attitudes, says Dr. Apt. This includes the old and young, men and women.

"In Ghana, those who retire from formal employment are talking about their retirement children. And it is really silly because they are dependent and then there will be dependents of the dependents."

Studies carried out by Apt show that most young people would like to look after elderly family members, but find that there are serious financial constraints.

The ideal situation would be for there to be some assistance for people to continue to care for their elderly family members, said Apt. "People feel guilty that they are not able to look after their elderly."

But few people live in an ideal situation.

"People in countries like ours, and I always address this to young people, need to begin to look straight into the eye of aging in the sense of planning," said Apt, "because life has changed, and there is no point in saying I am going to have 10 children and they are going to look after me. Most likely, the children will migrate and go elsewhere." ○

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NEWS COMMENTARY AND OPINION

By VIVIAN LOWERY DERRYCK

Among the foreign policy challenges facing the new president, none is more complex, yet straightforward than Africa. Africans and Africanists who closely follow U.S. politics, however, look at the domestic preoccupation of the incoming administration and Congress and fear that the continent will be abandoned. Marginalization is the common term heard in any serious discussion of U.S.-African relations.

The new administration has an opportunity to change that perception and address humanitarian needs at the same time. Two immediate conflicts need to be addressed right away: Liberia and Somalia. After tackling those two literally anarchical situations, the U.S. can move on to actively supporting Africa's 22 democratizing countries.

Liberia is a catastrophe made in America. Founded by repatriated slaves, the country is an African microcosm of the U.S. The legal system was codified by Cornell University; the flag boasts one star on a field of blue with 13 red and white stripes; the U.S. dollar is the currency of the realm. A West African peace-keeping force is struggling to keep rebel leader Charles Taylor from capturing Monrovia and with it the entire country.

It is not in the U.S. interest for that to happen. A Taylor victory signals to disgruntled warlords across the continent that if you don't like the government, mount an invasion force and "come on in." When Taylor invaded Liberia from neighboring Côte d'Ivoire in December 1989, he had no ideological difference with Samuel Doe. He never crusaded to make Liberia a better managed, more secure, or more socially just and equitable nation-state. On the contrary, he has merely aspired to avenge a personal vendetta. After Doe's death, with an acquired taste for power, Taylor has proceeded to rape, pillage, and plunder his own country.

When the fighting became too much, when some 750,000 of Liberia's 1.5 million people were refugees or internally displaced, when more than 25,000 had been killed, a West African peace-keeping force of seven nations stepped in. With amazing forbearance, the Economic Community Military Operations Group (Ecomog) has tried to stem the violence. Meanwhile, Taylor has violated four different accords signed in Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire. He has lied to every single eminent personage involved, from the 90-year-old president of Côte d'Ivoire Félix Houphouët-Boigny, to former President Jimmy Carter.

Ecomog is incredibly expensive to maintain. The Nigerians have shouldered the major burden, spending more than \$350 million during Ecomog's two-year lifespan, but other contributions have come from Sierra Leone, Guinea, the Gambia, Ghana, and Senegal. Nevertheless, one cannot but ask if Sierra Leone, with the highest infant mortality rate in the world and a per capita income of less than \$200 per year, should be forced to contribute to Ecomog when the U.S. has men and materiel redundancies from the end of the Cold War. The U.S. should contribute materiel and technical assistance, and reconfirm to Taylor that we support Ecomog.

Here is one case where a new president can make a difference. In one fell swoop, President-elect Clinton can demonstrate his commitment to the UN and multilateral responses to trouble spots, as well as signal his concern about Africa in a four-part plan. First, support the Ecomog ministers' request to the UN for additional peace-keeping forces and a special envoy. Second, visibly demonstrate U.S. support for Ecomog by increasing financial support. Third, send in the Marines. Military analysts agree that the presence of U.S. Marines off the coast with the possibility of landing and definitely participating to shore up the embargo will temper Taylor's resistance. Fourth, lend U.S. support, through the presence of the Marines, to strengthen the embargo on Taylorland, as the large portion of Liberian territory that Charles Taylor holds is commonly called.

Vivian Lowery Derryck is president of the African-American Institute.

The U.S. needs to show resolve and backbone. We have given lukewarm support to Ecomog over the past two years, but now is the time to demonstrate that humanitarian concerns in a small country with extremely close ties to the U.S. still matter.

Somalia is a man-made tragedy for which the international and African communities can both be blamed. The tragedy is a clear case of the lives of women and children being suborned to the vicious power plays of a handful of willful, stubborn male warlords.

The Bush initiative to offer up to 30,000 U.S. troops to address the Somalia situation is a landmark step. It is acknowledgement of some measure of U.S. responsibility for the situation, given our support for arming Somalia during the Cold War. It is also a courageous decision to confront the fact that there are situations in which human suffering takes precedence over the sanctity of sovereignty. The decision signals continued U.S. commitment to the basic tenet of responsiveness to humanitarian crises.

In Somalia, approximately 20 men and their teenaged troops are holding 5 million starving people hostage. Three options present themselves: one, the West African Ecomog solution; two, an intra-African force; or three, more assertive UN action, including peace-making, peace-keeping, interim administration, and oversight of free and fair elections to establish a new government. African nations do not have the financial resources to pursue options one or two, nor is there a Horn of Africa regional organization with the cohesiveness of Ecomog. Therefore, the UN option remains the only viable alternative.

But without U.S. leadership in the Security Council, the UN is tentative, hostage to all the old shibboleths of sovereignty. For instance, the UN is still compelled to try to obtain agreement from the fractious warlords, Ali Mahdi and Aidid. Only bold action can cut through those futile negotiations and challenge these warlords with force for force. And seemingly, only the U.S. can lead that challenge within the multilateral system.

Clearly, without U.S. leadership, the UN is not able to act. The OAU, the cognizant regional organization within the UN system, must observe its allegiance to the tenet of sovereignty, but the UN Security Council is able to overcome that proviso by clearly demonstrating that sovereignty is not relevant to a country that has no government.

The U.S. decision to urge multilateral action on the model of the Persian Gulf coalition is the right choice. The outgoing administration has committed to an important policy shift in a clearcut commitment to human survival over sovereignty. President-elect Clinton has already signalled his commitment to a more activist foreign policy in defense of human rights and humanitarian assistance. Somalia is an acid test, providing an opportunity for a concerted action that demonstrates bipartisan commitment to an important principle.

Both Somalia and Liberia offer the new administration opportunities to spell out its criteria for multilateral action, outline its ground rules for military engagement, and reaffirm its commitment to and respect for human rights, coupled with humanitarian relief. Moreover, these are criteria and strategies applicable to Bosnia and brewing trouble spots elsewhere.

A more pro-active stance in both countries would be hopeful to all those involved in Africa, for if the new administration takes advantage of these opportunities in Liberia and Somalia to signal that Africa remains a part of the foreign policy equation despite the end of the Cold War, Africans and Africanists can begin to explore the more enduring issues of supporting economic reform, strengthening the private sector, encouraging the consolidation of democratic gains through fostering robust civil societies, and investing in education for long-term growth.

The new administration offers hope for a new era in U.S.-Africa relations, the beginning of a new world order for the continent. ■

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