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IN THIS ISSUE

The focus of many of our articles is upon the challenges facing African agriculture. All the writers also consider the implications of the topic for the United States. David Norman has some criticism of policies followed in many countries and provides some suggestions for reform while Lane E. Holdcroft adds some further suggestions, with special reference to the role of the Agency for International Development.

The particular circumstances of farming in Zimbabwe, the Sudan, and Nigeria are examined in three further articles.

The new chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Africa is Nancy Landon Kassebaum. We publish her replies to Africa Report's questions on a wide range of African issues.

The role of Nigeria in African-American relations is underlined in an article by African-American Institute president and former U.S. ambassador in Lagos, Donald B. Easum.

We also carry an interview with the Zimbabwean information minister on the takeover of newspapers in his country and other press matters. The 'In Washington' column examines the Reagan administration's developing Africa policy, with special emphasis on the role of the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Chester Crocker.

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Photo Credit:
The cover photo of rice harvesting in Senegal was taken by Ray Wilin for World Bank.
AGRICULTURE

Progress or Castastrophe in Africa?

BY DAVID NORMAN

Africa is a continent of harsh contrasts. Great diversity exists not only among its people but also in its climate and soils. Neither of the latter is particularly favorable to agriculture. Climatically, over half of tropical Africa has too little rainfall while at the other extreme some areas are dense rain forests. Apart from a few regions such as the Kenya Highlands, soils are of poor quality, and in much of Africa rate among the world’s poorest.

The potential productivity of much of the land — given the present state of knowledge — is limited. Agricultural productivity is further determined by the actions of man. Traditionally African farming systems were well adapted to the low population densities that formerly prevailed. Self-sufficiency characterized two vital aspects of traditional farming systems: first, providing for family food needs and, second, perpetuation of the farming system year after year without dependency on commercial inputs of any type. Common traditional practices included shifting cultivation involving farming land for short periods with regeneration of natural soil fertility through long-term fallowing, and mixed cropping, which involved planting various crops simultaneously on fields to counter agricultural constraints such as limited growing seasons and poor soil qualities. Also, in West Africa tradition itself shows us that “the farmers and the ranchers should be friends.” For generations the Fulani cattle herders and crop cultivators have benefited from a complementary relationship with the animals producing manure for the harvested fields in exchange for crop residues that provided sustenance for the cattle.

Certain changes, however, have upset the traditional symbiotic relationships between farmers and the natural environment — especially land — creating an agricultural crisis.

CHANGES IN AFRICAN AGRICULTURE

Improvements in communications and infrastructure such as roads, railways, health, and educational facilities are crucially linked to economic development. Such changes together with rapidly increasing population growth rates, averaging about 1.6 percent per annum between 1970 and 1979, are however having profound and disturbing effects on the farming systems practiced by farmers in Africa.

During colonial days the production of export cash crops such as coffee, rubber, cocoa, groundnuts, and cotton was stimulated through newly constructed railways and roads. Post-independence needs for foreign exchange encouraged continuation of export cash...
crop production. In fact, in 1974 agriculture contributed an average of 57 percent of the total value of exports from 32 African countries. Such an emphasis, together with other ramifications of improved communications, has had profound effects on food production at the local level and on relationships within villages and families. The traditional concept of shared poverty at the village level, a community-based type of social security, is increasingly breaking down and being replaced by individualized poverty. Also, the extended family system has in the past been a cushion against individualized poverty, with married sons continuing to live in the household of the parents, and with many relatives claiming a share in any family’s wealth. Increasingly, married sons are establishing independent households, and relatives’ claims for shared wealth are more frequently being rejected. Factors encouraging these trends, and decreasing Africa’s food self-sufficiency, are many but certainly include the introduction of cash crops, increases in off-farm employment opportunities, migration of family members to work in mines, urban areas, etc., and improvements in educational facilities. Although there are other factors that may slow down the disintegration of close-knit agricultural communities and families, the trend is already such that the need for government intervention during periods of acute food shortage is becoming increasingly crucial.

Rapidly growing population densities are also having a profound effect on farming systems. Initially farmers responded to governmental incentives to increase export cash crop production through expanding the area cultivated. However, in many areas rising population densities eventually placed a limit on this strategy. Consequently research institutions throughout Africa concentrated on developing land-intensive improved technologies for export cash crops. Thus, a trend was started, which to some extent continues until today, in which improved technologies and support systems — that is, input distribution systems, extension and institutional credit services, and product-marketing programs — favored export cash crop production at the expense of domestic food crop production.

Increasing population densities have another important influence, in that they place progressively greater pressure on farming systems that traditionally were designed for abundant land. Perhaps more important than population density per se is the population density in relation to the carrying capacity of the land. Because of the poor quality of much of the land on the continent, a crisis is being reached in that the land-extensive traditional farming practices are not being adapted sufficiently quickly to methods that are more land-intensive in nature. Fallow periods in shifting cultivation are now often not long enough to permit regeneration of soil productivity, while management applications, where livestock and crops interact, are not sufficient to offset the decreases in the area that is fallowed. As a result, in many areas such as the Sahel, it is apparent that soil productivity is being undermined at the present time to provide survival for current farming families. In the long run such strategies could well result in an irreversible decline of the ecological base, which will eliminate the opportunity for future generations to derive their living from agriculture.

Improved communications and a high population density are important in influencing the distribution of income and welfare at the village level. Studies have shown, for example in Sierra Leone, that in low-density, land surplus areas income differences between families are relatively small, and the number of workers in the family is the major factor accounting for these differences. However, with higher population densities, the amount of land and its productivity are important in accounting for the differences in family incomes. The resulting trend towards increasingly unequal income distributions at the level of the village obviously needs to be viewed with concern, especially since breaking up of community and family solidarity means that the traditional social security system is no longer so effective. The relationship between production and the distribution of that production is important in assessing the linked problems of poverty and hunger. However, although this trend should be viewed with concern it is obvious that, at this stage in many parts of Africa, attention needs to be devoted to arresting the tendency for overall incomes to decline in densely populated areas, rather than to simply attacking the issue of income inequality. In poor countries little can be done about decreasing the income inequalities without concurrently improving the overall per capita income level.

**FOOD SHORTAGES**

Apart from the oil-rich Near East, the steepest decline in food self-sufficiency during the last 20 years has occurred in Africa. The Food and Agriculture Organization has estimated that for the continent as a whole the food self-sufficiency index dropped from 104 in 1963 to about 95 in 1975. Estimates from a recent study by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Agency for International Development show that there will be by 1990 in sub-Saharan Africa, an import gap of 11.5 million metric tons (cereal equivalent) if 1975 real per capita incomes and producer price patterns continue. Bringing diets up to minimum caloric consumption levels of about 2,300 calories per person per day
would require about 12.4 million tons. If real per capita incomes increase, then the import gap will be larger. Unfortunately, however, real per capita incomes decreased between 1975 and 1979. Thus, continuation of the 1979 income and price pattern levels would reduce the import gap, but increase the unmet food needs. Because of considerable regional disparities in incomes, results from the study indicate that unmet food needs are likely to be most severe in the Sahel, central Africa, and East Africa.

Why then are the food shortages so severe, especially when in 1977 more than 67 percent of the economically active population still derived a livelihood from agriculture? Problems are related to both demand and supply.

Urban dwellers, and the growing numbers of migrants from rural areas, often create problems on the demand side through preferring particular foods, such as wheat and rice. Ecological constraints confine the production of these crops to fairly limited areas, and therefore the demand for them can often only be satisfied through importation. Consequently, reduction of the import gap may mean shifting dietary preferences to domestically produced products. For example, in Senegal attempts are being made to make the traditional millet and sorghum food crops more attractive to the urban consumer by processing them into couscous and bread.

However, the supply side also contributes greatly to the lack of food self-sufficiency. As indicated earlier, governmental policies, research, and support programs have historically emphasized export cash crop production, usually at the expense of food crop production. Indeed, in spite of ample evidence, showing that small as well as large farmers are responsive to price changes, governments in some countries have tried to reduce producer prices for food in order to keep prices down for the potentially politically troublesome consumer. Thus, it is not surprising that such producer disincentives, combined with a lack of other support systems and relevant improved technologies, have perpetuated low productivity of food crops. Increases in production particularly by small farmers still continue to be primarily achieved through increases in acreage.

Governments have become concerned about the food shortages and escalating food import bills. Although food aid has on occasion helped stave off disaster in the short run it has usually done little to solve the long-term problem of chronic shortages. Consequently, several countries have tried to increase food production dramatically through specific programs such as irrigation projects in the Sahel, state farms in Mozambique and Guinea, and large commercial farms, such as in Zambia where less than one percent of the farmers account for a very high percentage of the production that is marketed. However, large-scale, highly capitalized mechanized systems of farming, although sometimes better geared to using technologies transferred from other regions, have often not been very successful. In any case, such production, which is predicated on cheap and readily available fossil energy, has usually come at a high cost in terms of imported equipment, and in benefiting a few people at the expense of the vast majority of farmers who have small farms. This is particularly regrettable since history has shown that these same small farmers often did respond well to incentives for producing export cash crops, as in the case of groundnuts in Nigeria.

Given the right conditions, the same response should be possible with food crops. Large farms will not by themselves be able to solve the problems of continuing food shortages. The answer in the long run lies with the small farmer. Hunger is determined by poverty because people who do not produce do not consume. Studies in East Africa have shown that if the welfare of people in rural areas—in this case small farmers—is not improved, there will be an acceleration of rural-urban migration creating further problems in the cities, more unemployment, and even greater hunger. In addition it is doubtful that large-scale farming would provide employment opportunities in sufficient numbers and attractiveness to significantly alleviate this problem.

**WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE?**

Alleviation of agricultural problems in Africa will require that critical decisions be made regarding the allocation of funds to agriculture compared with other sectors, to export cash crops and livestock compared with food crops, and regarding their actual utilization within the selected commodity groups. Awareness is growing that greater emphasis has to be placed on rural development. Countries as diverse as Cameroon, Guinea, Congo, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Malawi are allocating larger amounts of their development expenditures to agriculture. Historically, allocations within agriculture have heavily favored export cash crop production. A number of World Bank studies on West African countries have indicated that export cash crops appear to have been more efficient in converting domestic resources into foreign exchange than food crops—such as millet, sorghum, rice, and maize—in saving foreign exchange. This implies that it could be rational for countries to export cash crops and use the foreign exchange to import food. However, this comparative advantage that many countries appear to possess in producing export cash crops has probably been artificially induced. For example, the poor competitive position of food crops is due in part to a lack of relevant improved technology and support systems. Readjustment of the balance between export cash agriculture and production for local consumption is overdue, especially in an era when global food shortages are likely to increase.

The timing and coordination of production, marketing, and trade policies, with the emphasis on serving small farmers, will be critically important in any program to transform domestic food production.

Since small farmers in Africa have usually proved to be responsive to prices, increases in food production in the short term should be possible through combining a more attractive pricing policy with appropriate marketing—including, where necessary, improvement in transportation systems—and storage programs. However,
there are two problems with this approach in the long run. First, attractive support prices for food crops together with the necessary governmental storage facilities will involve substantial commitments of scarce governmental resources that have many alternative uses, thereby detracting from development of the economy as a whole and the nonagricultural sector in particular. Second, there is a definite limit to the degree to which food production can be increased without improved technologies. A point will soon be reached where, because of competition for land and labor, greater production of one commodity, for example a food crop, can come only at the expense of decreased production elsewhere, for example, an export cash crop. Because of the continuing need in many countries for foreign exchange earnings contributed by export cash crops, long-term increases in food production will have to come from structural changes in the productivity of food crops, requiring a number of interlocking programs.

Two of the most important preconditions for improving food crop productivity are the distribution of land and the development of relevant improved technology. Fortunately, apart from a few countries, such as Ethiopia and parts of Kenya and Zimbabwe, land tenure has not been a major issue in Africa especially where population densities are still relatively low. Much more critical at this stage is the lack of improved food crop technology. Technologies transferred from elsewhere have generally been suitable only for large farms or for situations where climate, land, water supplies, and support systems are all favorable. Such conditions are rarely met in Africa. Green Revolution-type technologies, relying on these favorable conditions, do exist for wheat, rice, and maize but not for the main staple food crops of many African countries, namely millet, sorghum, pulses, and root crops. Therefore, research urgently needs to be directed towards emphasizing improved technologies for food crops and especially for tailoring them to the realities faced by the mass of small farmers, such as fluctuating levels of water availability, seasonal labor bottlenecks, and, sometimes, inadequate support systems. To try to ensure a closer congruence between the needs of farmers and experiment-station based research, an approach called farming systems research is being implemented in many African countries. This research approach, which consists of four stages — namely, descriptive/diagnostic, design, testing, and extension — explicitly includes the farming family in the research process. The emphasis is on developing improvements in the currently practiced farming systems, im-
Road building in Tanzania: Infrastructure is vital to economic development
The Nyafaru Farm Community lies at the end of a muddy, rutted road, perched on a hillside and overlooking a deep valley and the distant blue mountains in Mozambique. It is a cluster of unprepossessing buildings, including the old school assembly hall with a gaping hole in its roof. With modern, American-style farms on the outskirts of Salisbury, what is the attraction of this remote farm?

Nyafaru was one of a handful of communal farming experiments suppressed by the government of Ian Smith, now reborn under the African government of Robert Mugabe. One previous chairman of Nyafaru’s board of directors was Didymus Mutasa, now speaker of the Zimbabwe Parliament. He was followed by Moven Mahache, the present deputy minister for lands, resettlement, and rural development. Robert Mugabe hid at Nyafaru the night before fleeing ahead of the Rhodesian security forces into the sanctuary of Mozambique. Both Mutasa and Mahache were imprisoned by the previous Rhodesian government. Nyafaru was closed when the border area was declared a “no go” zone during the mid-1970s. But the idea endured, and so did Nyafaru. The idea and this example have a powerful grip on the minds of Zimbabwe’s leaders.

The outcome of Zimbabwe’s experiment in land resettlement and rural development is important for the United States. The arguments for Zimbabwe’s significance have been well rehearsed. Zimbabwe lies at the heart of southern Africa. Crucial transportation and communication lines from mineral-rich Zambia and Zaire pass through Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe itself is a rich and diverse source of minerals, including gold, coal, chrome, asbestos, nickel, iron, and copper.

Zimbabwe’s central location and dynamic economy make it a natural growth pole in southern Africa, especially important as the countries in the region attempt to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa. With the formation of the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference, the nine black-ruled countries of southern Africa have the opportunity to vitalize the region by rationalizing economic development and improving regional transportation and communication systems.

The Lancaster House negotiations that ended the war in Zimbabwe set an example for southern Africa with far-reaching implications. It was an accomplishment few thought possible. It created the conditions for peace and stability under a moderate, popularly elected government in Zimbabwe, one with credibility in Africa and the West. It provides an example for a future settlement in Namibia. Over time, Zimbabwe, if it remains peaceful and prosperous, is proof to South Africans that accommodation with black nationalism is possible.

Zimbabwe’s diversified economy, strategic location, multiracial character, and influential leadership provide important reasons for U.S. interest. But it also is the case that the whole is more than the sum of the parts. Zimbabwe is not just another poor African country, lost in the American press and struggling to maintain a precarious hold on economic and political survival. It is a test case, in a science without laboratories, in transforming “radical” socialist rhetoric into meaningful economic progress and social stability using Western democratic institutions and African social norms.

Zimbabwe’s leaders constantly...
stress that land was the key issue in the independence struggle, and remains the central economic issue for the new government. Upon independence a year ago, Zimbabwe inherited a system of land division that granted ownership rights over half of the land to about 6,000 white commercial farmers and the remainder to the roughly four million rural Africans living in Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) and African Purchase Areas. (The term “Tribal Trust Lands” is “repugnant to the present government,” but is used in this paper to describe historical conditions and continuing realities.)

This gross inequity in land division, legislated by the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and the Land Tenure Act of 1969, is the de facto reality of present-day Zimbabwe, although these laws were repealed just before independence. Out of this system of land apportionment grew the pervasive black-white income differentials that enabled the 4% of the population who were white to receive 65% of the income.

White-owned land is the better land in climate and soils, while 75% of the black land is in the two worst agroecological zones. White farms are closer to road and rail links, and thus to collection depots. It is not unusual for transport to cost black farmers 45% of the price received for grain.

The previous white governments of Rhodesia reinforced the racial distinctions through an array of laws and regulations. The Maize Control Act of 1934, various marketing regulations, and a 10% levy on African farmers discriminated against African producers. The Master and Servants Act limited the rights of domestic and agricultural workers. Extension and research services catered to the white farmers; one estimate is that the average recent government expenditure on extension services for a commercial farmer is $350, while the average for a TTL farmer is about $12. The same inequities existed in the provision of credit. In 1978 the government provided $216 million to commercial farmers, but only $2.4 million to black farmers.

The TTLs are overpopulated and overgrazed. TTLs are three times more densely populated than the white farming areas, despite the 1.5 million African laborers and their families living there. In 1978 the government estimated that the TTLs were supporting 2.5 times as many people as safe environmental limits permitted.

Shifting cultivation, the African response to soil exhaustion, is no longer possible in the majority of TTLs. The number of landless young men is increasing. TTLs became overcrowded labor reservoirs, incapable of supporting their populations without exporting adult male laborers.

It is hardly surprising that the effects are measurable in yields per acre or income differences. Estimates of TTL corn yields are from 600 to 700 kilos per acre, one-tenth of commercial farm yields, and one-third of yields produced on African purchase farms. Furthermore, TTL food production per capita declined dramatically during the years following the 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). Roger Riddell, a Zimbabwe economist, estimates that TTLs produced an average of 352 pounds of corn per person in 1962, but only 231 pounds by 1977.

The intensification of the war in the late 1970s made conditions in the TTLs even worse. The TTLs were recruiting grounds and places of refuge for Patriotic Front guerrillas, and were the targets for attack by the Rhodesian security forces. Rural infrastructure was destroyed; the administrative and social structure broke down as well. Villagers were herded into protected villages reminiscent of Vietnam. Veterinary and extension services were suspended; thousands of dipping tanks were destroyed; and an estimated one million cattle were lost during the war.

The 5,200 white commercial farmers, down from the peak of 6,000, produce 90% of marketed agricultural production. Zimbabwe achieved general self-sufficiency in food production during UDI, as farmers switched from export crops, such as tobacco, to food crops and cotton. Zimbabwe is nearly self-sufficient in wheat, and expects a bumper corn harvest of over 2 million tons, with about 1.2 million tons available for reserves and exports.

The Zimbabwe government clearly recognizes the importance of the commercial farming sector and is well aware of Africa’s dismal record in per capita food production. Prime Minister Mugabe has emphasized his government’s determination to maintain and improve on food self-sufficiency “so that our political independence does not become impaired by the scourge of starvation and food shortages.” The
document prepared for the Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD), held at the end of March 1981, states flatly: "Land in commercial areas that is being farmed productively will not be diverted from its present use and ownership."

Under these conditions of economic disparity, between white prosperity and black political power, no one in Zimbabwe would dispute the ZIMCORD document's assertion: "A satisfactory solution to the problem of fair distribution of land and rural development is the key to Zimbabwe's political and social stability and to the future economic growth and development of the country and even of the southern Africa subregion as a whole. It is central to the country's policy of national reconciliation."

Land resettlement and rural development are crucial to the solutions of a number of interrelated economic problems.

1. Improved nutrition and health are linked closely to increased African production and rising rural incomes.
2. Land resettlement on abandoned or unutilized white farms is essential to relieve the overcrowding and serious environmental deterioration of the TTLs.
3. Manufacturing and mining, though highly developed and diversified by African standards, cannot together absorb the African labor force, which is increasing by 80,000 workers per year.
4. Zimbabwe has thus far avoided the rush to urbanization that has characterized many African countries. Many of those who sought refuge from the war in urban areas have returned home. Rural development is essential to slow migration to the cities.
5. Zimbabwe is anxious to end the African migratory labor system that benefited white settlers, but separated families for long periods and maintained TTL farming practices at low levels of technology. Em-
trolling disease, and reducing white political vulnerability.

Although there is unanimity in recognizing the central importance of land resettlement, there is caution in proceeding with implementation. A central concern, according to the ZIMCORD document, is "to ensure that the resettlement program will not be a transfer or extension of the subsistence farming practices to new areas."

elaborately documented, it largely succeeded in securing its target of $1.9 billion in donor pledges for a three-year period. The bulk of the funds, $1.2 billion, is for land settlement and a rural development project, detailed in Part II of the document.

With the shrinking of the white community during the war, there is no lack of land available for resettlement, although a substantial portion of it may be in the less desirable agro-ecological zones. The government plans to acquire some two million hectares (about five million acres) of abandoned or unutilized commercial farming land over the next three years. A crash program of distributing crop packs of seed, fertilizer, pesticide, and simple tools enabled refugees to return to their home areas last year, but the much harder task of land resettlement has barely begun. Probably no more than 2,000 families had been settled as of March.

There are three basic models for resettlement: (1) individual arable allocations with communal grazing areas, (2) communal living and cooperative farming, and (3) individual arable allocations with communal grazing in conjunction with a core estate operated on a communal basis. The third model, built around a core estate, is intended for use in large irrigation schemes and has not been tried. The choice is between the first two models: the balance and relationship between the two is not yet clear.

The communal model has strong emotional appeal to some members of the government. Guy Clutton-Brock, an English social worker, and Didymus Mutasa fathered the communal farming movement in the late 1950s. It was Christian in ideology, multiracial in character, nonviolent in approach, and dedicated to improving farming practices among Africans.

At about the time of UDI in 1965, Mutasa and Clutton-Brock collaborated to establish the Cold Comfort Farm Society, a multiracial communal farm near Salisbury. It was a radical step in a conservative society, described by an African newspaper as a "Mecca for Africans who consider themselves the victims of injustice."

In 1967, the Cold Comfort group of 12 Africans and two whites moved to a farm purchased from Lord Acton, where they stayed until 1970 when the Smith government banned the farm, arrested Mutasa, and deported Clutton-Brock.

Some of the remaining members went to Nyafaru, with which Mutasa had also been involved, until it too was closed in 1976. Those who had not been detained then retreated from the war zone to Boulders Farm near Salisbury, owned by John Deary, the chairman of the Catholic Commission on Peace and Justice, one of the Smith government's strongest critics.

Widespread detention of politically aware Zimbabweans merely insured the spread of the communal idea. Prison proved the perfect classroom. Cold Comfort and Nyafaru came alive after independence, with newer efforts based on these examples. On a recent Sunday morning Didymus Mutasa could be found at Cold Comfort, pruning the fruit trees.

Simba Youth Farm is another example of a communal farm. It is run by 55 young former political detainees, men and women ranging in age from 15 to 35. They have spent the last few months planting crops and restoring an aban-
doned farm provided by the government. Their inexperience is evident, but their enthusiasm is engagingly captured by their charter: "We have had the motivation to do our bit by establishing a place or places for carrying out commercial farming and technical training in dressmaking, carpentry, and building for the reconstruction of our country of Zimbabwe both socially and economically."

Their wrecked farmhouse shows the ravages of war. The roof is a patchwork of scavenged metal sheets; the windows are covered with plastic scraps; the plumbing and wiring were looted. Their kitchen is an open shed with a central log fire. Their corn crop is evidence that they can grow corn, but it will be difficult to sustain their initial enthusiasm.

Down the road some two miles is Camp Haven, a project run by Danish volunteers to provide a home and livelihood for 2,500 refugee children, many of them orphans, who had sought refuge in Mozambique during the war. On a recent Saturday, the minister of education and culture, Mr. Dzingai Nutunduka, joined a thousand volunteers to build four new classrooms for the Camp Haven School. "Education with production" is the minister's description of such efforts to recast education in a self-reliant mold. In camps dotted throughout Zimbabwe there are ex-guerrillas and refugees waiting for resettlement. Says one observer: "They think of ZANU-PF as their parents."

Nyafaru, Cold Comfort, Simba, and Camp Haven are all variants on a common theme — blending nationalism and a communal spirit in a new system of effective agricultural production. But the conditions of adversity and political stress that welded these efforts together are unlikely to be replicated in the future. The communal model seems to require some ideological "glue." How much of that was supplied by the politicization of the rural areas during the war is a major question.

In a recent interview, Mwen Mahache stressed that the government wants to encourage communal efforts, but "we don't want to force people into a communal arrangement against their will." Communal farms are thought of as demonstration projects, particularly suited to "young unmarried people and displaced persons."

The evidence to date is that potential settlers want individual plot allocations, but accept communal grazing because there are no realistic alternatives. Under this system, farmers share difficult tasks at peak times, but the inputs belong to the individual farmer and the return is his. The government accepted the near unanimous request by settlers for individual plot allocations in a resettlement scheme at Soti Source, but the existing infrastructure on the larger farms may actually favor cooperative farming.

Of the several possible constraints to land resettlement, money to pay for the land is among the least important. Of the $1.2 billion capital costs of the three-year rural development program laid out in the ZIMCORD document, only about $160 million was earmarked for land purchase. Most of that is in hand. The remainder was for various types of infrastructure, services, and rural facilities. Nor are foreign donors, other than the British, being asked to pay for actual land purchase.

The second constraint is more serious: lack of expertise and trained manpower. At the same time as a great expansion of extension and other services will be necessary to make these schemes successful, there is a substantial loss of skilled white manpower. The gap cannot be filled in the near term and will act as a constant drag on ambitious development plans. A related immediate bottleneck is the need for technical expertise in drawing up resettlement plans. The ZIMCORD document admits that the task is beyond the capacity of the government agencies concerned, and will require the employment of outside consultants.

The third constraint is the lack of rural infrastructure and facilities. To make the resettlement schemes viable a range of infrastructure and service are essential: roads, collection depots, storage facilities, training centers, irrigation, and such ancillary items as rural growth points, clinics, schools, maintenance facilities, and credit mechanisms. Roughly $1 billion of the ZIMCORD budget will go for these items, which will also generate large recurrent costs.

Although most public attention has focused on land settlement, it is only one — although the key — element in the broader scheme of reducing population pressures in the TTLs and increasing their productivity. Other elements include employment creation in small rural industry, ending TTL land ties for city dwellers, and modern sector employment creation. The government intends to implement an integrated rural development strategy, combining infrastructure and services, in the TTLs where the pressure on resources is greatest. A less intensive development program is planned for the remaining TTLs.

In effect, a rural revolution is projected, clothed in banker's language. It is an exceptionally ambitious program, requiring large inputs of capital, manpower training, effective government administration, and widespread political mobilization.

At the ZIMCORD Conference in March, the United States, in the person of Agency for International Development administrator Peter McPherson, pledged $75 million in economic assistance for fiscal year 1982. U.S. economic assistance to Zimbabwe since independence has been $51 million, over two U.S. fiscal years. Because aid funds are only appropriated one year at a time, the future year AID projections of $75 million each for fiscal years 1983 and 1984 are indicative, not firm figures.

Money for Zimbabwe comes from the Economic Support Fund (ESF), not the development aid account. There are at least two advantages to this arrangement: the Economic Support Fund, the overtly political account that goes primarily to Israel and Egypt, is budgeted for a $500 million increase compared to a minimal increase in development aid; and ESF money can be disbursed rapidly without the time-consuming requirements of development assistance.

It has disadvantages, however. One is that ESF is on the verge of becoming the Reagan administration's answer to Third World problems: throw them some political money without much
concern for its development impact. The ESF budget for Africa is increasing from $144 million to $231 million in one year, a 59% increase. It is only a matter of time before this generates a political reaction in Congress. Further, funds are authorized and appropriated by region or even country, which tends to increase the political visibility of this type of aid. For all the congressional interest Zimbabwe generated before independence, its relatively smooth course since independence has dampened congressional passion. McPherson’s commitment from Salisbury has thus far stirred no political embers.

But U.S. aid to Zimbabwe must face certain issues if it hopes to be effective economically and achieve a positive impact on the Zimbabwe government. Among them:

First, the issue of land reform ought to be the centerpiece of the U.S. program, as it is for Zimbabwe. The United States should not shy away from this normally sensitive topic, since in Zimbabwe the conditions for land reform are both feasible and suit all sides politically. If the white Commercial Farmers Union is enthusiastic, who can be opposed? No one now, but the potential for discontent is great. Land reform is urgent; change must be visible.

Second, there is likely to be a constant race between infrastructure in all its forms and resettlement. If settlers are merely dumped in areas without adequate preparation, the whole chain of expectations is in danger. Both the political and economic consequences would be extremely serious.

Third, Zimbabwe’s infrastructure and services, highly developed for Africa, are deceiving. Designed to serve large white farms, the system must be fundamentally restructured to deal with small-scale African farmers. As one example, even the crop research emphasis needs to be changed.

Fourth, the great shortage is likely to be trained manpower, especially mid- and upper-level technicians. While there will be a substantial need for expatriate technicians to fill positions in the short run, Zimbabwe wants to maintain careful control over their use. One U.S. advisor will cost at least $120,000 per year, including salary, housing, expenses, and related costs. A number of Zimbabweans can be trained for that amount. The Peace Corps could be very useful, especially in conjunction with a Zimbabwe development corps, but it may be too sensitive politically.

Fifth, the regional context is important in every way: transport through Mozambique, regional cooperation and planning under SADCC, regional food imbalances, and political and security concerns over Namibia and South Africa. Aid to Zimbabwe is no substitute for sensible policies toward Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique. No amount of aid can correct for a major tilt by the United States towards South Africa.

Sixth, Zimbabwe’s agricultural and manufacturing output can supply her neighbors, if they can find the necessary foreign exchange. U.S. law permits AID recipients to purchase goods and services in other developing countries. Zimbabwe’s farmers and businessmen are anxious to tap the surrounding markets. A recent exchange of Zimbabwean corn to Zambia for U.S. wheat to Zimbabwe under PL480 Title II demonstrates the possibilities.

Seventh, made in America ideological views will not be accepted in Zimbabwe. Extensive government involvement through agricultural marketing is a British legacy that benefited white farmers greatly. The same system is about to be attempted in mineral marketing. The United States ought to look with favor on a variety of economic models, including communal farming experiments, so long as there is an honest evaluation of the results.

The Zimbabwe experience should force the State Department and AID to examine the inadequacies of both the Economic Support Fund and development aid in dealing with countries of similar characteristics: intermediate-level per capita income, substantial development in certain sectors and groups, and large numbers in continuing poverty. Some middle ground is clearly needed, without the complicated, pervasive U.S. involvement of development assistance, or the political commitment of ESF.

The Zimbabwe model is being used to describe possible negotiated settlements of intractable conflicts as diverse as Namibia and El Salvador. The model has particular appeal in the United States because revolutionary violence was arrested and supplanted by evolutionary change funded by foreign donors. The United States has, in effect, bought itself a share in an ongoing revolution, one which we must hope succeeds.
AGRICULTURE

The Role of External Aid

BY LANE E. HOLDCROFT

Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region in the world where per capita food production declined over the past two decades. This decline exacts a high price in both human and economic terms. The human price is inadequate nutrition. In most sub-Saharan countries, per capita calorie intake falls below minimal nutritional standards. The economic price of inadequate food production is an increasing demand for food imports at a time when grain prices are rising and many African governments face acute balance-of-payments and foreign exchange problems.

Our recent USDA-AID study finds that the implications of this pattern are severe. Using a series of equations that capture the dynamics underlying production and consumption between 1965 and 1979, we estimated import demand and unmet food needs in 1990 if historical trends continue. The picture is a stark one. If 1975 real per capita income levels and producer price patterns prevailed in 1990, sub-Saharan Africa would have an import gap of 11.5 million metric tons (cereal equivalent).

High as this is, there would still be large unmet food needs. Bringing diets up to minimal calorie consumption levels (about 2,300 calories per person per day) would require an additional 12.4 million tons.

Ordinarily, the assumption that per capita income remained at 1975 levels would be considered a pessimistic one, designed to show primarily the growth in import demand associated with population growth. Our study suggests, however, that for many countries this may be an optimistic assumption. Real per capita income declined in all regions of Africa between 1975 and 1979. If real 1979 per capita income levels and producer price patterns prevailed in 1990, the import gap would fall to 9.5 million tons, while unmet food needs would rise. An additional 13 million tons would be required to attain minimal calorie consumption levels.

Even if we assume that there is growth in real per capita income and that growth follows 1965-79 patterns (essentially smoothing out the effects of recent economic problems), the picture is disturbing. The import gap rises to 18.5 million tons — some 11.9 million tons being accounted for by West Africa alone. Because income growth is so skewed across regions, diets reach adequate levels in West Africa, while major unmet food needs persist in the Sahel and in central and East Africa. Meeting these needs would require an additional 9.1 million metric tons of cereals. If growth followed more recent 1974-79 trends, the regional skewing would become even more extreme.

Under these conditions, the 1990 import gap would be 21.1 million tons — with 18.2 accounted for by West Africa. Unmet food needs would persist, and 10.1 million tons would be required to eliminate them. The conclusion seems clear. If growth in incomes follows historical patterns, there will be dramatic increases in the paying demand for imports by 1990, yet very little increase in the domestic production of food available to respond to unmet food needs.

Why is sub-Saharan Africa's food balance so precarious? Much of the problem lies on the supply side. Productivity has been low, and growth in production has depended primarily on increases in acreage. To some extent, this reflects the structure of food production. Although land tenure patterns vary from region to region, most food production occurs in the subsistence sector. There is little use of commercial inputs that might improve yields, and most of the labor for cultivation is provided by people working with relatively simple hand tools. Labor requirements, and labor bottlenecks equally, put constraints on the additional acreage that can be cultivated.

In addition, however, the natural environment plays an important role. Wide variations in yield occur, reflecting adverse weather, pest infestation, and crop diseases. Many tropical soils are fragile, losing organic matter and nutrients quickly if they are exposed or cultivated intensively. Cropping patterns and fallowing systems have been the major vehicles for managing soil fertility. Yet, if African food production is to increase, ways must be found to make a transition both to a more commercial system of production.
and marketing and to viable methods for more intensive cultivation with higher yields.

Knowledge of African food production systems is spotty and has not led to the development of viable packages of inputs based on improved technology, as has occurred in Asia and elsewhere. The environmental obstacles of such new technology are enormous. In addition, the conditions of labor scarcity and labor bottlenecks in which food production takes place in Africa make the search for viable technology difficult. On the whole, better use of pulses, roots, and tubers. In some areas, attempting to reduce the import gap may mean shifting dietary preferences. In others — especially West and East Africa — it may depend more on developing ways of processing local foods to make them more convenient to urban consumers who still have taste preferences for them.

Historical orientations and policies have also contributed to creating existing conditions. Agriculture and its support system have been, and to a great extent remain, geared toward production of export crops. Cash crops are generally produced primarily for external markets. Internal urban markets are often supplied through imports, sometimes because it is less expensive for countries to import food than to encourage domestic production and bear high internal distribution costs. Changing this emphasis will require substantial investment in infrastructure and institution building.

The success of any move to transform domestic food production will be extremely dependent on the timing and coordination of marketing, production, and trade policies. Our analysis of the 1965-79 period suggests that production is responsive to price in all regions except central Africa. Pricing policy can, therefore, be an instrument for increasing food production. Changing pricing policy will not, in and of itself, solve the problem, however. Pricing policies are ineffective unless the transportation system is adequate. In addition, storage facilities may be necessary to support an announced pricing policy.

In the short term, the right mix of trade, marketing, price, and storage policies, put into effect by governments who have become conscious of the consequences of the food problem, may create an incentive for farmers to produce more food.

Unless there are structural changes in food production, however, there will be a point at which greater production of one commodity can come only at the expense of decreased production elsewhere. Under these conditions, the tradeoff between food crops and traditional export crops rapidly assumes the character of direct competition for land and labor resources. Governments are able to influence the outcome of this competition through their pricing policies (inputs and outputs), but they are constantly pressured to influence it in favor of cash crops where the latter account for a heavy share of foreign exchange earnings.

In the longer perspective, therefore, the timing of implementation of agricultural and other related policies becomes critical. In the absence of incentives for farmers to adopt new farming practices and technology, government investments in agricultural research, extension services, and input delivery systems will have only a small payoff, quite inadequate to deal with the scope of the food problem. On the other hand, the application in an ad hoc manner of policies creating incentives to farmers produces unexpected and costly results if the physical foundation for higher productivity has not been laid.

It is probably unrealistic to expect that the countries of sub-Saharan Africa can find the resources and new technology to eliminate the huge import gaps that characterize the economies of many of them today. They can narrow
these import gaps. Doing so requires a combination of workable policies and investments in productive infrastructure and an upgrading of human capital leading to a transformation of their subsistence sectors from present low levels of productivity and quality of life to higher levels of productivity and quality of life.

THE EXTERNAL DONOR RESPONSE TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA'S DETERIORATING FOOD SITUATION

On the basis of the analyses contained in the USDA/AID Food Problems and Prospects study and the AID Africa Bureau's analysis of AID investments in Africa, 1976-82, a central theme for a "Food Sector Assistance Strategy for the 1980s for Africa" has emerged over the past several months. This theme, which is being well received by host country governments and other major donors, calls for focusing external donor assistance on (1) the creation of a national policy and program environment that provides farmers with adequate incentives, including access to production inputs, to increase their output (primarily of food); and (2) concurrently, the development of self-sustaining institutions that adequately service national food production and distribution systems.

The "Food Sector Assistance Strategy" paper, now being formulated in detail for use by AID's Africa Bureau and for discussion with other major external donors, is intended to provide a clear statement of the framework within which AID and possibly other donors can prepare their country-specific assistance strategies and select appropriate projects in collaboration with host country governments.

This evolving "Food Sector Assistance Strategy" will focus on:

- Encouraging high priority (in funding and manpower) on food production and distribution vis-à-vis other development needs.
- Assisting in creating national policies and programs that give farmers incentives to expand output, especially of food.
- Concurrently assisting over the long term in building self-sustaining institutions that provide inputs and services required for effective production and distribution systems.
- Recognizing the need for concurrent, linked actions among policies and programs; for example, incentives for farmers may be meaningless without providing supporting technology, inputs, marketing systems, and transport.
- Providing for continuing participation by Africans at all levels, including farmers, in the development processes so as to build popular support and to increase chances for self-sustaining growth.

This "strategy" will require that external donors increase and focus their assistance in the following areas:

Nigerian corn crop: National policies should give farmers incentives to expand food output

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Planning and Policy Analysis

- Assist the most food-deficient countries in undertaking comprehensive food sector strategy studies.
- Provide short-term assistance to host countries in the analysis of food/agriculture/rural sector policies (for example, pricing policies, policies on access to resources).
- Initiate long-term projects to institutionalize planning and policy analysis capabilities, as well as to foster a sector or program approach, in contrast to a project approach, to development.

Development and Diffusion of Improved Production Technology

- Agricultural research.
- Extension and training.

Access to Production Inputs

- Production and distribution of physical inputs (fertilizer, improved seed, etc.) and appropriate equipment, including hand tools.

Commodity Marketing Systems (to link farmer producers to rural and urban consumers)

- Storage, transport, rural roads, processing.
- Market structure (private/state organizations).
- Food security.
- Consumer demand analysis (traditional foods).
- Postharvest losses.

Long-term institution-building projects that adequately support food production efforts and food distribution systems are critical to the above outlined "strategy" for ameliorating the African food problem, particularly institutions for research, extension, and manpower training. Attention must be given developing institutions, public and private, that over time will contribute to the following:

- Expanded production and distribution of physical inputs (hand tools, equipment for animal traction use, fertilizer, etc.).
- Expanded attention to crop storage and crop protection.

- Increased efficiencies in marketing systems.
- Identification and use of extension systems suitable to Africa.
- Development of technologies/inputs that are applicable to the African agricultural, social, and political systems, which include the conduct of innovative research that will utilize, whenever possible, available indigenous resources.
- Expanded analysis of consumer preferences, integration of such information with research on new varieties, and work to develop processing technologies to expand utilization of traditional staples.
- Improvements in basic transport networks in support of increased agricultural production.

This "strategy" suggests a significant shift towards assisting in the development of those basic institutions needed to sustain improvements in the national food production and distribution systems and away from the multisector "area development" projects with a variety of disparate interventions directed at improving the "quality of life" of the targeted beneficiaries. There is ample evidence that these area rural development schemes have had relatively limited success in reaching their objectives and have had virtually no impact on the production of food.

Emphasis on building up those basic research, extension, and training institutions should not be interpreted as a lessening of the concern with regard to the equity issue, because the focus of these institutions must be on supporting small-scale producers who with their families comprise the vast majority of the population of African nations. And with regard to national planning and policy analysis efforts, the focus must be on formulating and implementing plans and policies that will provide adequate incentives for small-scale producers to increase their production of food commodities.

While the commitment of African national leaders to improving food production and marketing systems varies considerably, there is increasingly among them the recognition that food crops for domestic consumption require more attention and that policies and programs of the past decade have, for the most part, been unsuccessful in reaching stated objectives. Thus their receptivity to new approaches and external donor assistance in relaxing the major constraints to increased food production has increased. One indication of this receptivity is the large number of African nations (19) that have requested assistance in undertaking national food sector strategy studies under the aegis of the World Food Council.

Also, external donors have increased their efforts to coordinate their assistance to African nations over the past several years, particularly at the country level. New groupings of donors and host countries have emerged to undertake joint planning and program implementation at the regional level. For example, a number of the food sector strategy studies noted above are being undertaken jointly by external donors. And major regional and country-specific programs in agricultural research are being planned by the Concerted Action for the Development of Africa (CADA) group of bilateral donors in Africa.

Critical to this "strategy" is giving greatly increased attention to the training of African agriculturalists, economists, and administrators, particularly at the college undergraduate and graduate levels. The paucity of technically competent Africans to undertake national planning and policy analysis efforts, and, in general, manage and staff the institutions, both public and private, that service the agricultural sector of African nations is perhaps the major constraint to overcoming the deteriorating food situation.

The role of external donors in assisting African nations to revise the current trends in food production and consumption is becoming increasingly clear, and the "strategy" discussed above is intended to be responsive to the challenge. Yet it must be recognized that this effort will require sustained and increased levels of external donor assistance over the next decade and probably beyond. Nothing less than a long-term commitment to overcoming Africa's food problem will suffice.
The Green Revolution policy of the federal government is a matter to which we attach the highest priority.

The Green Revolution is not a new concept. It was enunciated in the 1950s by a group of scientists working at the International Institute for the improvement of maize and wheat in Mexico. The workers, through scientific research, succeeded in breeding improved seeds which revolutionized the production of maize and wheat in Latin America and Asia. The seeds were then called "miracle" seeds because of the tremendous yield increases achieved. A similar technology has also been applied to dramatically increase the production of rice in the Philippines.

However, although the original concept of the Green Revolution was based on the use of improved seeds, it was soon recognized that any realistic strategy aimed at increasing agricultural productivity must include other development packages such as the use of fertilizer, pesticides, extension aids, provision of credit, marketing, storage, etc. This administration is concerned with this broader concept of the Green Revolution which will bring about an improvement in the whole farming system, and lead the country to self-sufficiency in agricultural production, better nutrition for all, improvement in rural incomes, and adequate raw materials for industrial development. Put differently and more succinctly, the objectives of the Green Revolution policy of the present administration are as follows:

1. To provide adequate, reliable, safe, and stable food supplies for the country's rapidly rising population at prices average people can afford.
2. To become self-reliant in basic food requirements and thereby minimize the potential threats to national sovereignty from excessive dependence on others for basic food needs as soon as possible.
3. To raise and stabilize the nutritional standards of all Nigerians with particular stress on increasing the share of animal protein in total protein.
4. To ensure stability in food commodity and input markets and thereby avoid economic, social, and, possibly, political disasters.
5. To ensure fair and reasonable levels and distribution of incomes among food producers.

1. Population drift from rural to urban areas, leaving an aging farm labor force.
2. Disruption caused by the civil war and drought.
3. Inadequate and ineffective extension services, inadequate supply and erratic availability of inputs and other farm support services.
4. Inadequate infrastructure.
5. Inadequate public expenditure on agriculture.

In order to attack the food problem in a systematic manner, my Ministry commissioned a combined team of Nigerian and World Bank experts in January 1980, to examine in depth the food situation in Nigeria and to identify broad programs and strategies that will lead to an early achievement of self-sufficiency. The team in its report put the food production deficit for 1979-80 at 2.6 million tons of grain equivalents, and estimated that at the present rate of increase in food production, the deficit will increase to 5.3 million tons of grain equivalents by 1985. In order to completely eliminate the food deficit by 1985, domestic production of crops will need to increase by about 6.6% annually between 1980 and 1985. For fisheries and livestock, an annual increase of about 11.3% will have to be achieved over the same period. To achieve all this, required public expenditures alone were estimated at $2.64 billion over a five-year period.
However, indications are that agricultural growth rates in excess of 4% per annum are extremely difficult to achieve and sustain over a 5-year period. Given the huge agricultural potential which exists in Nigeria, it is nevertheless clear that while Nigeria may have to continue for sometime yet to import wheat and milk products if we do not change or modify our food habits, it is possible for us to achieve self-sufficiency in the production of the main food staples such as rice, maize, sorghum, millet, and groundnuts.

The team of experts drew up a Food Production Plan for Nigeria to cover the period 1981-85. The plan contained far-reaching recommendations on all aspects of food production, including crops, livestock, and fisheries. It also recommended a number of institutional and policy reforms to improve the extension services, input delivery, input subsidies, marketing, storage, and credit. In the rest of this paper I will try to show how the federal government, working in very close collaboration with state governments, plans to translate these and other recommendations into additional agricultural production both in terms of more food for all Nigerians and abundant raw materials for the expanding agro-based industries. I will examine these issues under five main headings: rural integrated projects, crops, livestock, fisheries, and forestry.

The federal government is impressed by the success of the integrated Agricultural Development Projects (ADP) which were started on a pilot phase in Funtua, Gombo, and Gusau during the third Development Plan period. The federal government therefore plans to establish similar projects in all states of the Federation by 1983. The ADP projects will not only contain components that will lead to an increase in the productivity and incomes of the farmers, but will also lead to development of rural infrastructures such as feeder roads, bore-holes, wells, and dams for rural water supply, staff housing, and limited health facilities.

In this connection, it is pertinent to point out that while the federal government's financial allocation for the integrated agricultural development programs during the third National Development Plan (1975-1980) was only $29.4 million, during the 1980 financial year alone, the present administration allocated $21.84 million to the programs. Total allocation for the fourth plan is projected to be about $348.0 million which is additional to the $480.0 million which will be loaned to the rural development program over the same period by the World Bank.

It is now well known that the production of food and cash crops suffered considerable decline in the recent past. In one or two cases the decline compounded by excessive demand has reached crisis proportion. Rice and maize are typical examples. The production of cocoa also fell from 214,000 tons in 1974-75 to 145,000 tons in 1978-79, while purchases by the Groundnut Board dropped from over 1 million tons in 1966-67 to 82,000 tons in 1975-76.

A number of bold programs have thus been articulated to exploit the huge potential which exists in order to rapidly increase grain and tuber production during the National Development Plan period. Summarized, the main elements of this program are as follows:

**Seed Production.** As mentioned earlier, improved seed was the most important ingredient of the Green Revolution in Asia and Latin America. We plan to expand therefore the natural seed program to enable it to achieve the production of at least 75% of the total seed required in Nigeria during the plan period instead of the present 18%.

**Fertilizer.** Next to seeds, the use of fertilizer is the most important in ensuring high productivity. This is why we are increasing fertilizer supplies to about 1 million for the 1981 cropping season. A land resources department with a special unit for soil testing and provision of advisory services on types and levels of fertilizer to be used on various soils has been established in order to improve fertilizer use.

**Agricultural Mechanization.** Human labor as a source of energy on the farm has become not only scarce and expensive, but unattractive. Human labor must therefore be replaced systematically through the introduction of farm machinery. In the last four years the federal government has spent $10.26 million as direct assistance to state governments for land clearing. By the end of this year 350 Cooperative Societies and farmer associations would have received a farm tractor at 50% subsidy as part of our tractorization program.

Finally, other programs aimed at increasing crop production include the establishment of three oil palm companies for the development of oil palm estates; the establishment of large-scale farms by the National Grains Production Company in all states of the Federation; World Bank assisted projects in rice, oil palm, cocoa, and rubber; projects aimed at the rehabilitation of groundnut and cotton; and the National Accelerated Food Production Project which is aimed at teaching farmers the latest agricultural technology, soil erosion control, etc.

Efforts to raise crop production will be matched with efforts to raise the production of meat, milk, and eggs. The aim is to raise the per capita consumption of protein which is about 50% of dietary requirement. Meat supply is contributed by 50% from cattle, 35% from sheep and goats, 7% from poultry, and the rest from other domestic animals.
The main elements in the livestock development program are as follows:

**Cattle.** Expansion of the World Bank assisted project involves the provision of credit, and technical assistance to private ranchers and small holder fattens, and development of grazing reserves for tsetse eradication. The favorable climate of the plateau areas of Mambilla and Jos will be exploited for dairy and beef production.

**Sheep and Goats.** Improved sheep and goat production units will be established to provide breeding stock to farmers.

**Piggery.** Pig development centers will be established to provide services and inputs to pig producers. Cooperative processing and marketing units will also be encouraged.

**Poultry.** The major objective will be to provide steady and adequate source of parent stock and commercial day-old chicks as well as low-cost good quality feed.

**Animal Health.** All livestock programs will be supported by a vigorous animal health program, which will involve a massive vaccination program and the provision of vaccines and drugs.

**Ranches.** The establishment of ranches and commercial poultry and dairy will be undertaken by the Nigerian Livestock Poultry Company and its subsidiaries.

**Fisheries Development.** Since fish is one of the best and cheapest protein-rich foods, it has a crucial role to play in the Green Revolution program. The fisheries subsector also has the additional advantage of quick returns to investment.

The major constraints facing the rapid development of fisheries in Nigeria are well known and may be summarized as follows:

1. Inadequacy of capital for fisheries development—the local fishermen do not have the necessary financial resources to transform their largely subsistent fishing into profitable industrial fisheries.
2. Lack of infrastructure, especially fishing terminals.
3. Shortage of trained manpower—this problem has been made more acute because none of the Nigerian institutions of higher learning offers full courses in fisheries science at present.
4. Inadequacy of modern fishing inputs; e.g., boats, engines, nets, and accessories.
5. Poor communication network in the fish production centers.
6. Lack of effective fishermen cooperatives.

During the third National Development Plan, policy measures were introduced to alleviate some of the critical constraints. Because the majority of our indigenous fishermen use old-style techniques, particular emphasis was
Mechanized land preparation is more efficient
U.S. uses 'constructive engagement' policy with South Africa

The Reagan administration has announced that its policy toward South Africa will be "constructive engagement" in expectation of "reciprocity" from Pretoria. Cooperation from Pretoria, a State Department official said, "could lay the basis for a more constructive bilateral relationship."

The announcement came after talks between Roelof Botha, the South African Foreign Minister, and Secretary of State Alexander Haig and other officials, after which Botha said there was "a very real possibility" that Pretoria would resume negotiations on independence for Namibia. Botha said he endorsed the U.S. proposal for white minority guarantees in advance of elections.

The U.S. framework is also said to include other measures which an official characterized as "strengthening" UN Security Council resolution 435: no deadline for the Namibia negotiations (which Pretoria reportedly indicated could take up to two years), and a U.S. pledge not to pressure South Africa to accept solutions it believes are counter to its interests.

Having won these concessions, Botha then complicated the negotiations by reportedly informing Haig that the UN military transition force agreed upon by all sides in 1978 was now unacceptable to his government. Botha was reportedly told that the UN force was a "central element" of 435 and that eliminating it "would be difficult."

A further wrinkle in the plan is the concern by both the U.S. and South Africa over the 20,000 Cuban troops in Angola. A U.S. official said the administration wants a formula to link the phase-out of South African troops in Namibia with a reduction of Cuban troops in neighboring Angola. (Washington Post, May 1, 17 and 18, 1981; Washington Star, May 14, 15 and 17, 1981.)

After year's independence, Zimbabweans urged to work hard

With the first year of Zimbabwe's independence over, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe urged a nationwide radio audience to work hard in order to make the country more productive. He said there must be "continual planning for expansion." (Salisbury Radio, April 17, 1981.)

Economic problems have surfaced just as the political and military tensions were easing. Recently, ministers from both Mugabe's Zanu-PF and Joshua Nkomo's Zapu party have shared some political platforms, demonstrating greater unity. Nkomo worked hard to persuade his guerrillas to give up their weapons and by May 20 all the guerrillas had been disarmed. However, integration of the guerrillas into the national army will probably take until the end of the year. The cost of maintaining the guerrillas and the army consumes about 20 percent of Zimbabwe's budget. (Economist, May 16, 1981.)

Last year, the country's growth rate was about 9 percent, buoyed by the lifting of sanctions and good weather. This year it is expected to be 8 percent. Major problems are the lack of skilled labor—artisans, mechanics, engineers, computer technicians—low transport capacity and land resettlement. This last is one of Mugabe's priorities but it is proceeding very slowly. About 1,400 families have been settled and this year's target is 6,000, but the government maintains that up to a million people may eventually have to be resettled. (Africa, May 1981.)

Mugabe's overall aim, according to one of his aides, "is to create wealth through existing capitalistic structures on the grounds that the larger the cake, the larger the slices that can be cut from it. He may change those structures in time, but for the moment he needs them." (Wall Street Journal, April 16, 1981.)

Mugabe visited China in May, full of praise for the role China played in supplying weapons during the independence war. "The Chinese made our struggle their own struggle, our sufferings were their sufferings," he said. "Our victory was your victory as well. We congratulate you on a job well done."

But Mugabe left China disappointed, having received promises of less aid than he had hoped for. However, Zimbabweans will be sent to China to learn collective farming as a prelude to the introduction of cooperative farms in Zimbabwe. (London Guardian, May 14 and 18, 1981.)
Tutu: church must speak for oppressed

Bishop Desmond Tutu told the national conference of the South African Council of Churches in May that the church must fight oppression and be prepared “to suffer and perhaps die” if it was going to identify with the poor.

Tutu, the SACC general secretary, condemned the government’s continuing policy of forced removals—the uprooting of blacks from “white” areas and transporting them to the impoverished homelands. He said the church must speak up for “the hungry, the homeless, the unemployed, the voiceless, the uprooted and dumped ones, the disqualified ones and those who are endorsed out of cities.”

Seized arms in Texas were ‘meant for Unita’

The 1,476 military weapons and ammo, worth $1.2 million, seized at Houston Intercontinental Airport earlier this month were paid for by Armscor, the South African weapons-buying agency, and destined for Unita, the anti-government guerrillas in Angola, according to a London Observer report.

The Observer report says the two British arms dealers arrested in the Houston raid by U.S. Customs agents had a genuine $1.5 million letter of credit from Armscor drawn on a Dallas bank. A Customs agent in Houston said that though the arms were to be flown to Johannesburg, they could have gone anywhere after that. “The Unita forces in Angola are the obvious place for the final destination,” he said.

Unita, led by Dr. Jonas Savimbi, is backed by Pretoria and was assisted by the CIA in Angola’s 1975 civil war. Following that covert aid, Congress cut off any future assistance through the Clark amendment, which the Reagan administration has said it wants repealed and which is currently under congressional consideration.

The captured arms were: 796 M-16 assault rifles, 350 short-barreled M-16 carbines, 100 grenade launchers, 230 assorted handguns and a million rounds of ammunition. Since the South African army uses standard rifles of a different caliber, the NATO-pattern FN assault rifle, the M-16s would be of little use to them.

Unfortunately for the men arrested in the raid—who are charged with violating the Neutrality Act and conspiracy—they tipped off authorities to the plan by applying for an export license using a fraudulent “end-user” certificate showing the arms were destined for Sudan. A legitimate firearms dealer contacted by the Britons also notified the authorities and from that point on, their every movement was shadowed by law enforcement officers. Customs agents set up a fictitious arms dealing company and received the South African money in payment for the weapons. (London Observer, May 17, 1981.)

Meanwhile in what was seen as a move to identify with blacks, the Roman Catholic church chose a black priest for its top national executive post. Not only is Father Smangaliso Mkhathswa the first black to hold the post, he is also a former detainee now restricted under a government banning order.

Bishop Tutu, whose passport was withdrawn by the government in April for the second time in a year, said the church was still prepared to talk with Prime Minister Pieter Botha “on the dismantling of apartheid,” but would not participate in an exercise “designed to perpetuate white supremacy however it may be described.” (Sowetan, May 6, 8 and 13, 1981.)

Sahara, Chad head OAU agenda continued

The 36th council of ministers meeting, held in Addis Ababa in February, was occupied primarily with the situations in the Western Sahara, Chad and Namibia, topics likely to dominate the June sessions. On the conflict in the Western Sahara, no decision was reached on whether the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), represented by Polisario, will be admitted to the OAU as the 51st member state. Instead, the question was postponed until the Nairobi summit.

At the 1980 OAU summit in Freetown, Sierra Leone, the Western Sahara issue dominated the deliberations of the heads of state, as 26 member states, the simple majority required for admission to the organization, recognized the SADR. Several countries threatened to walk out of the OAU if the SADR gained admission. Therefore, a compromise was worked out, under which Morocco agreed to meet for discussions with all parties to the dispute—Algeria, Mauritania, and Polisario, under the auspices of the OAU ad hoc committee on the Western Sahara.

The meeting did take place in September 1980, but Morocco refused to accept the proposed peace plan, which included a ceasefire and referendum. The Western Sahara issue, therefore, is expected to be an explosive one at the Nairobi summit, for it will be difficult to postpone the SADR’s admission again, if it still has the requisite support.

Morocco opened formal diplomatic relations with Kenya in May by sending an ambassador, Saad Eddine Taieb, and setting up an embassy. Observers indicated the move was calculated to gain influence with the Kenyan government, since Moi is to be the OAU chairman for one year, in order to have an effect on the debate at the summit.

Libya’s involvement in the Chad civil war is expected to be another divisive topic, as there was no unanimity of opinion expressed on it at the Addis Ababa meetings. A meeting called by the OAU committee on Chad, scheduled for April in Lagos was canceled when Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi refused to attend. The talks were to have dealt with the OAU peacekeeping force to be sent to replace the Libyan troops in Chad. The matter will be discussed at the summit.

The Namibian problem was the only topic in Addis Ababa on which there appeared to be majority agreement. South African intransigence in the Geneva negotiations was condemned as the cause of the talks’ collapse. The new plan proposed by the U.S. government for Namibia’s independence is likely to come up on the Nairobi agenda.
WESTERN AFRICA

Benin

- President Mathieu Kérékou paid a state visit to Nigeria in April, during which talks were held with President Shehu Shagari on a number of issues, including an alleged border incident in March.

As a result of the meeting, the Nigeria-Benin joint boundary commission is to be reactivated. Reports in March indicated that troops from Benin had occupied some Nigerian villages in Sokoto state and taxes were being collected by the soldiers.

Benin's ambassador to Nigeria, Eustache Prudencio, denied that the army had been involved and that the "invasion" was carried out by cattlemen and peasants who had ignored border regulations.

The Nigerian Defense Minister, Alhaji Akanbi Onyanga, said in April that his government was investigating the alleged incursion into Sokoto. (West Africa, March 30 and April 20, 1981; Lagos Radio, April 13 and 16, 1981.)

Chad

- According to reports in May, Libya took sides against President Goukouni Woddeye in fighting between his troops and those of Chad's Foreign Minister Ahmadou Ahydjo's assistance in expediting the OAU-sponsored plan for elections and withdrawal of Libyan troops.

A meeting of the OAU committee on Chad scheduled for early April in Lagos, Nigeria was canceled when Qaddafi refused to attend. The meeting was to have discussed new arrangements for the peacekeeping force to be sent to Chad. At the OAU council of ministers meeting in Addis Ababa in March, it was agreed that troops from Nigeria, Algeria, Cameroon and Libya would compose the force, in contrast to the 1980 Lagos Accord, never implemented, which called for a force of soldiers from Congo, Benin, Togo and Guinea.

Qaddafi was said to have preferred the old arrangement, which, although it did not permit some Libyan troops to remain in Chad, provided for a peacekeeping force of troops from smaller countries not bordering on Chad. No new meetings on the conflict were immediately scheduled. Nigeria's Foreign Affairs Minister, Ishaya Audu, said, "We would like to watch the developments there for a while."

However, in mid-May, Qaddafi told visiting Sierra Leone President Siaka Stevens, chairman of the OAU, that he had begun withdrawing his troops from Chad. The Libyan leader said, "The Libyan forces that have maintained peace and stability in Chad have begun to withdraw and are ready to be replaced gradually by Chadian military units." No date was announced for the completion of the withdrawal. (Washington Post, May 18, 1981; Financial Times, May 12, 1981; West Africa, April 13 and 27 and May 11, 1981; Washington Star, May 10, 1981; Jeune Afrique, April 22, 1981; Kenya Weekly Review, April 17, 1981.)

Ghana

- President Hilla Limann paid an official visit to London in May to discuss Ghana's plans for economic development with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and leading businessmen. The Ghanaian government is seeking increased foreign investment as one means of alleviating its severe economic difficulties. A liberal investment code, which would allow foreign investors a majority stake and guarantee them management control, has been presented to the Ghanaian parliament for approval, where it was being debated in May.

Limann told businessmen at the London Chamber of Commerce that the priority sectors of the economy are agriculture and infrastructure—roads, ports and railways. One measure which should facilitate Britain-Ghana trade was the expected approval by the British government's Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) of an increase on ceilings for short- and medium-term credits on exports to the country. The ECGD had been providing only limited cover for exports to Ghana since the coup by Flight Lieut. Jerry Rawlings in 1979. British exports to Ghana have remained stable at about $194 million in 1979 and 1980.

The Ghanaian government is also seeking foreign investment to exploit its substantial reserves of gold, diamonds, bauxite and timber. One provision of the new code is the establishment of an Investments Center, to be headed by the Vice President and including most ministries involved in deciding on new investment.

While the investment code has its critics in Ghana, such as Takkyiwa Manu, a lecturer at the University of Ghana, who called it a "scandalous document" by which the government is "bending over backwards to satisfy the multinational corporations which are out to plunder our resources," some observers believe that increased investment is the only way for Ghana to remedy its shortage of foreign exchange.

The foreign exchange crisis is but one symptom of Ghana's ailing economy. The high cost of living prompted the Ghana Trades Union Council to threaten a nationwide strike in April. The strike was called off after a meeting between the TUC, government and manufacturers' representatives. As a result...
of the meeting, the Prices and In-
comes Board will be dissolved, and
the distribution of 15 essential com-
modities, including milk, sugar,
rice, maize and flour will be made
directly to workers’ cooperatives
and other organizations. (Financial
Times, May 18, 1981; London
Guardian, May 16, 1981; West Af-
rica, April 13, 20 and May 4, 1981.)

Guinea
• Guinea’s recent discovery of
eight uranium deposits was the sub-
ject of a March meeting in Conakry
of international mining interests.
Representatives from Nigeria and
of companies from eight other coun-
tries including the U.S., France and
West Germany, attended the meet-
ing to discuss the mineral’s poten-
tial exploitation.

• The director and deputy director
of Guinea’s state-run People’s Stores
were arrested in
Guinea-Bissau
• The director and deputy director
of Guinea-Bissau’s state-run Peo-
dered.

Guinea-Bissau
• The director and deputy director
of Guinea-Bissau’s state-run People’s Stores were arrested in
March, along with Armando Ra-
mos, former Minister for Com-
merce and Industry, as part of a
government crackdown on corrup-
tion.

Francisco Coutinho, the stores’
director, is the brother-in-law of
overthrown President Luis Cabral,
and was accused of mismanage-
ment and embezzlement. Ramos,
who was the government minister
responsible for the stores, was
charged with negligence and in-
proper use of funds.

The People’s Stores, established
during the war against Portuguese
colonial rule, sold consumer goods
and bought peasant harvests for dis-
tribution and export through a na-
tionale network.

Guinea-Bissau has been suffering
from severe food shortages during
the past year, and observers believe
the state of the economy was behind
the coup which overthrew Cabral.

According to Agence France-
Presse reports, Guinea-Bissau is
expected to lose between 70 and 80
percent of its 1981 harvest, resulting
in a 70,000 ton food deficit, because
of drought and a shorter rainy sea-
son. The World Food Program is
sending 5,000 tons of maize as
emergency food aid to be distrib-
uted in the hardest hit areas, in
south and central Guinea-Bissau.

(West Africa, March 30, April 6 and
13, 1981.)

Ivory Coast
• Tensions between the Ivory
Coast and Ghana over an incident in
March in which 46 Ghanaians died
of asphyxiation in an overcrowded
Abidjan police cell reportedly were
eased after a meeting between the
two countries’ presidents in Lome,
Togo, in early April.

Three weeks after the deaths, and
following the Ghanaian Interior
Minister’s report that he was
snubbed by Ivorian President Felix
Houphouet-Boigny when he went
to Abidjan to investigate the inci-
dent, Ghanaian students in Accra
attacked the Ivory Coast embassy.
The Ivory Coast evacuated its dip-
losc participation in a planned bauxite project in
Guinea. Bauxite has been exploited
for several years and accounts for
over 90 percent of Guinea’s ex-
ports. (West Africa, April 6 and
May 11, 1981.)

Guinea-Bissau
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The People’s Stores, established
during the war against Portuguese

the meeting’s end expressed the
Ivory Coast’s regrets over the
deaths, which included four chil-
dren between the ages of ten and 16,
and Ghana’s condemnation of the
students’ attack on the Ivorian em-
bassy.

Following the reconciliation, the
staff of the Ivory Coast embassy
was planning to return to Accra.
(Africa, May 1981; West Africa,
April 6, 13 and 20, 1981; Economist,
April 11, 1981.)

Liberia
• On the first anniversary of the
military government’s takeover in
April, the Liberian head of state,
Master Sgt. Samuel Doe, an-
nounced that a commission was be-
ing formed to draft a constitution
to return the country to civilian rule.

Doe did not specify when military
rule would end and said that strict
security measures would remain in
effect until that time. When asked
by reporters about his role in a civil-
gian government, Doe said, “I am
not interested in anything but to go
back on a farm and work, or do any-
thing anybody can do to live.”

The old constitution was sus-
pended after the coup against the
late President, William Tolbert. The
25-member commission to draft a
new one is headed by Dr. Amos
Sawyer, dean of the political sci-
ence department at the University of
Liberia. Doe said members of the
commission were chosen on the
basis of “regional balance, techni-
cal competence and commitment to
the course of change in the interest
of the Liberian masses.”

Another measure announced in
Doe’s coup anniversary speech to
the nation was the release from jail
of 19 political prisoners, including
two former defense ministers, Allen
William and James Gbarbea.
Twenty-four others, including
Adolphus Tolbert, son of the late
President, remain in jail.

Doe also used the anniversary oc-
casion to pay tribute to the U.S. gov-
ernment. Liberia’s largest aid do-
nor. The U.S. provided $23.85 mil-
ion in 1980 and approved $33 mil-
ion thus far in 1981 in assistance to
Doe’s government. The strength of
U.S.-Liberia ties was evidenced by
the presence of 100 U.S. Green Be-
rets in Monrovia, who arrived in
destabilization and plans of hegemonist forces. The tension has been increasing in the northern region because of the evolution of conflicts in the Western Sahara, from which Mauritania has withdrawn." (West Africa, May 4, 1981; Kenya Weekly Review, May 1, 1981.)

**Nigeria**

- According to an April report in the Washington Star, President Shehu Shagari recently disclosed that Nigeria has sold about 450 metric tons of unenriched uranium to Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi and may sell him more in the future.

Western sources indicated that Niger's uranium could be processed to make nuclear weapons, but it would be difficult. They also said that while they were not certain what Libya was doing with the uranium, they believed the Tripoli government was probably supplying it to Arab nations and Pakistan.

Niger is the world's fourth largest uranium producer. It banned shipments to Tripoli in January when Niamey suspended diplomatic relations because of Libya's involvement in neighboring Chad. Kountche said, however, that he did not rule out resuming the sales.

*World uranium prices have fallen recently and since Niger is in desperate need of funds, Kountche said, "If the devil asks to sell him uranium today, I'll sell it to him."*

However, in a speech on the seventh anniversary of military rule in Niger in April, Kountche urged further vigilance against Libya, noting that while the Tripoli government may not overtly intervene in its neighboring countries, "other forms of direct or indirect subversive action may appear through the infiltration of agents, corruption, inciting tribal antagonism or subversive propaganda on radios."

He added "Unknown to you or not, the enemy is trying to turn you into agents working for his cause, which is the disruption of Niger." (West Africa, April 27, 1981; Washington Star, April 14, 1981.)

**Nigeria**

- Atlantic Richfield (Arco), the seventh largest U.S. oil company, notified the Nigerian government in April that it is ending two oil supply contracts involving 60,000 barrels of crude a day. Arco said it based its decision on the current world oil glut. "We just couldn't justify the price," a company official said. "We've got a lot of oil piling up. With our reduced refinery runs, we just don't need all that high-grade crude," he added. Nigeria charges between $40.40 and $41 per barrel for its high-grade oil, making it one of the most expensive in the world. Unless Nigeria finds another buyer for the oil, Arco's cancellation of the contracts was expected to cost the country approximately $900 million a year, or about 3 percent of Nigeria's estimated annual oil revenue. A spokesman for the state-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corp. said, however, that Nigeria was not worried by Arco's decision and would not cut its prices from the current level. He added that he did not foresee any shortage of buyers for the oil.

In May, Gulf Oil Corp. said it was opening discussions with Nigeria on reducing the price of its oil. Nigeria is Gulf's single largest foreign oil supplier and Gulf produced about 112,000 barrels per day in the country in 1980. Gulf also bought an additional 117,500 barrels under long-term arrangements.

The company's president, James Lee, said if a price cut were not obtained, Gulf would be forced to consider reducing the volume of oil it gets from Nigeria. (Wall Street Journal, April 14 and May 13, 1981; New York Times, April 24, 1981; Financial Times, April 15, 1981.)

- Nigeria's National Labor Congress (NLC) called a nationwide general strike in mid-May to press its demands for a tripling of the minimum wage to $550 per month. Although the response to the strike call was said to be spotty, Lagos was disrupted for the two-day duration of the protest when civil service, railways, retail trade and some bank workers walked off their jobs.

In addition, the NLC was calling for larger housing and travel allowances, improved pensions, and the abrogation of restrictive legislation limiting the rights of some workers to go on strike. President Shehu Shagari had urged the congress to cancel plans for the strike, and said the minimum wage demand was unrealistic and would have serious consequences on the public and private sectors if implemented.
Labor leaders agreed to call off the strike after two days in return for pledges of a higher minimum wage and improved fringe benefits. Agreement was reached between the NLC, a federation grouping 42 unions, and a team of government officials and legislators led by the Vice President, Alex Ekhuemel. The national assembly was to be directed to pass a law setting a new minimum wage within 30 days. (London Times, May 13, 1981; Financial Times, May 13, 1981; West Africa, May 11, 1981.)

Senegal

- Senegal's new President, Abdou Diouf, has embarked on a series of liberalizations since taking office in January, which observers believe are designed to strengthen his political base and undercut the opposition.

A constitutional amendment was adopted by the national assembly in April lifting the restrictions limiting the number of political parties in Senegal to four. The only requirement for new parties is that they not identify themselves with any race, ethnic group, sex, religion, sect or language.

In April, the legislature also approved an amnesty for political and press offenses committed between 1976 and 1980 and for which the sentences were less than one year or two years suspended. Exit visas for Senegalese citizens have also been abolished, with the purpose of facilitating those who wish to leave the country to seek employment elsewhere.

In a speech to the nation on Senegal's 21st anniversary of independence from France in April, Diouf also announced plans for a reform in the educational system. A mass literacy campaign will be launched, and attempts will be made to make education more universal. National languages are to be used in schools, as opposed to French, which was utilized under President Leopold Senghor.

In May, the government withdrew dismissal and suspension notices sent to 59 members of the Sole and Democratic Union of Senegalese Teachers, after a 24-hour strike in May 1980. A government-sponsored national educational conference in January had recommended the withdrawal of the notices.

And on the economic front, Diouf announced that the government had canceled farmers' debts to the state totaling $88,000 for seeds and fertilizer, and said that prices paid for their crops would soon be raised. (West Africa, April 20, May 4 and 11, 1981; Jeune Afrique, May 6, 1981.)

Sierra Leone

- General elections are to be held in Sierra Leone some time in 1981, although as of May, the date had not been announced. The elections will be the first held since the country became a one-party state in 1977.

Vice President S.I. Koroma announced that the previous system of "unopposed candidates" will be eliminated—meaning voters will be allowed to choose among candidates running for particular offices. All candidates for office must, however, be members of the All Peoples Congress, the ruling party.

Observers indicated that the government's probable reason for calling elections at this time is to divert attention away from the "Vouchergate" scandal and to restore trust in the government. Three cabinet ministers were arrested in the wake of the scandal, in which thousands of dollars from the Bank of Sierra Leone were being paid out on false vouchers to fictitious companies. (West Africa, April 13 and May 11, 1981; Africa, May 1981.)

EASTERN AFRICA

Djibouti

- President Hassan Gouled paid official visits to Sudan and Southern Yemen in April, following visits to Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia.

The Djibouti leader said the March-April tour of Horn of Africa states was intended to find "common ground" among the countries' leaders, not to mediate, in disputes between Somalia and Ethiopia, Ethiopia and Eritrea province, and Somalia and Kenya.

Gouled praised efforts by Sudan's President Gaafar al-Nimeiry "for the creation of circumstances conducive to the establishment of security and stability and the achievement of understanding between the various peoples of the region." (Sudanese News Agency, April 20 and 21, 1981; Aden Radio, April 8, 1981.)

Ethiopia

- In April, Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo of Italy became the first Western foreign minister to visit Ethiopia since the 1974 revolution.

Colombo met the Ethiopian leader, Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, and agreed to provide the same level of aid that Italy gave to Somalia in 1980. Since Ethiopia's revolution, Italy, which has historical links with Ethiopia, has given Somalia much aid and training.

Colombo's three-day visit was at Ethiopia's invitation. There have been indications that some of the Deg, the ruling military council, are unhappy at the increasing military and economic dependence on the Soviet Union. For its part, the USSR is unhappy with Ethiopia's slow progress toward establishing a Communist Party.

Another visitor in April was Gen. Yepishev, chief of the political directorate of the Soviet army and navy, member of the central committee and presidium. (Financial Times, April 22 and May 7, 1981; Addis Ababa Radio, April 7, 1981.)

Kenya

- The Kenyan government detained three editors and two reporters from the Daily Nation on May 22, for "misleading the public" over the doctors' strike, which began two weeks before.

Afterwards, President Daniel arap Moi threatened to ban the newspaper, its weekly sister, Sunday Nation, and the Swahili-language Taifa Leo. The editor-in-chief of all three papers, Joseph Rodrigues, was among the five detained.

The Daily Nation had also appealed to Moi to let Oginga Odinga (see following story) run for parliament, incurring the government's wrath.

The strike by doctors working for the government also prompted a demonstration and protest march by hundreds of Nairobi University students. Riot police broke up the demonstrations by firing into the
Oginya Odinga, the Luo politician who was Kenya’s first Vice President, seemed poised to make a big political comeback in March but was back in political limbo after some ill-chosen remarks.

Odinga, all set to be elected to a seat to parliament especially vacated so he could make the comeback, made a speech in which he disclosed he once clashed with the legendary Jomo Kenyatta. Kenyatta “wanted to grab some land,” Odinga said, “and he asked me to do the same and I refused.” After that gaffe, President Daniel arap Moi attacked Odinga for disturbing “peace and unity.”

Then, Kanu, the only party, refused to clear Odinga for the parliamentary by-election. Odinga had also been barred from all elections since he was detained (under Kenyatta) for nearly two years in 1969.

Instead, Odinga’s political foe, Odongo Omamo, was cleared to run for the seat unopposed after the nomination papers of Jalango Anynago, an Odinga ally who would have won in a walk, were rejected by the high court. (Kenya Weekly Review, April 17, 24, and May 24, 1981; Sunday Nation, April 19, 1981; Nairobi Radio, April 11, 1981.)

**Madagascar**

- A dissident left-wing opposition group has rejoined Madagascar’s National Front, the country’s only political party.

The reconciliation of Madagascar’s National Independence Movement occurred after its 80-year-old leader, Monja Jaona, who had been under house arrest for three months, talked with President Didier Ratsiraka in March. Jaona was arrested last November in the capital, Antananarivo, after organizing demonstrations in Toliary on the southwest coast. His arrival in the capital coincided with an outbreak of strikes by students and university teachers. (Africa Research Bulletin, April 15, 1981.)

**Seychelles**

- The government of Seychelles hopes to increase its exports of fish, raising the present yearly catch from 4,400 tons to at least 10,000 tons using traditional methods.

The UN Food and Agricultural Organization, which is advising the government, said the Seychelles had a potential of 45,000 tons of tuna alone from its 200-mile zone over offshore waters. In 1979, the government began licensing foreign boats for fishing. Fees amounted to $1 million that year and are expected to exceed $1.5 million in 1981.

France has provided the islands with four 105-foot tuna vessels and is training the crews. Britain has built a 350-foot concrete pier and cold storage facilities for 1,000 tons of fish. (Africa, April 1981.)

**Somalia**

- In late April, President Mohamed Siad Barre dismissed ten members of the Supreme Revolutionary Council from their cabinet jobs, including the Defense Minister, the national security chief and the chairman of parliament.

The ruling military body had been revived last October, replacing a civilian government, in order “to correct errors that had crept into state machinery.” A state of emergency was also declared.

According to a late April London Guardian report, Siad Barre’s popularity is at an all-time low because of the country’s economic collapse and the continuing Somalia-supported guerrilla war with Ethiopia which has created an enormous refugee problem.

On May 15, Siad Barre reportedly made an unexpected trip to the U.S. for what was called “strengthening Somali-American ties” and “medical reasons.” (New York Times, May 18, 1981; Mogadishu Radio, April 29 and May 6, 1981; London Guardian, April 24, 1981.)

**Tanzania**

- Tanzania’s economic problems are so severe it has canceled plans for the December celebrations of the 20th anniversary of independence from Britain.

Another indication of the serious-
Vice President, Paulo Muwanga, who is also Defense Minister and who has been steadily strengthening his influence in the army and expanding the secret police force. Observers said that even some members of Obote's party, the Uganda People's Congress, consider Obote to be Muwanga's puppet. Muwanga, or other factions in the ruling party, could, it was believed, strike a deal with the guerrillas. (Economist, May 9, 1981; London Observer, May 3, 1981; Kenya Weekly Review, May 1, 1981; London Times, May 1, 1981.)

CENTRAL AFRICA

Central African Republic

- David Dacko was sworn in as president for a six-year term in early April, although four opposition candidates continued to contest the controversial March election. They are seeking its annulment from the Supreme Court.

  In his inaugural address, Dacko said the opposition leaders should "forgive and forget" and called for an end to all "hostile, partisan and sterile actions." Dacko also ended the state of siege which he had imposed after rioting in Bangui when his 50.2 percent victory in the polls was announced. Bangui University was also re-opened.

  The legislative elections scheduled for June 15 were expected to be hotly contested by the opposition. The four candidates who ran against Dacko united to form a provisional political council.

  Ange Patasse, who came in second in the presidential race and chairs the Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People (MPLC), accused Dacko in April of launching a program to eliminate political leaders, with French collusion. Patasse alleged that Dacko had recruited mercenaries to subdue the northern and eastern provinces and said the MPLC would not participate in the government unless an inquiry determined that there were no irregularities in the presidential election.

  In the meantime, Dacko formed a 17-member cabinet and appointed four secretaries of state. The new Prime Minister is Simon Narcisse Bozanga, a former cabinet member in the government of Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa. Dacko retained the defense portfolio himself. (Afrique-Asie, April 27, 1981; West Africa, April 13 and 20, 1981.)

- In late March, the Minister of Health ordered the dissolution of the national council of the Central African Red Cross, alleging that its statutes had not been submitted to the authorities for approval. Ruth Rolland, former president of the Red Cross in the Central African Republic, said her dismissal was a "coup de force" by President David Dacko, who was not even empowered to dissolve the Red Cross executive.

  Rolland had publicly stated that she had not received "any donation from the President of France," contrary to what Valery Giscard d'Estaing had claimed on French television during his losing bid for re-election in March.

  Giscard had finally admitted receiving large gifts of diamonds from former Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa, but said they were sold and the proceeds given to Central African charities, including the Red Cross. Dacko confirmed that he had received the check from Giscard and it would be "handed over to the new Red Cross council as soon as it is elected."

  Rolland said it was highly unusual procedure for money to be donated to the President and not directly to her. Observers believed that Rolland's support for one of the opposition candidates in the Central African presidential election may have been the reason for her removal from the Red Cross executive. (West Africa, April 13, 1981.)

Congo

- President Denis Sassou-Nguesso signed a treaty of cooperation and friendship with Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev in mid-May, while on an official visit to Moscow.

  The trip by the Congolese head of state had been planned for more than two years, but had been postponed because of differences between the two countries. The Soviet Union has requested a naval base at Pointe-Noire, but Brazzaville has been reluctant to agree to the proposal.

However, observers indicated that the Kremlin regards the treaty as a diplomatic success, despite the fact that no military clauses are included in it. (Le Monde, May 14 and 18, 1981.)

Equatorial Guinea

- In early April, an attempted coup against President Teodoro Obiang Mbasogo was foiled by the security forces in Molabo, the capital. Seventeen people were reported killed in the fighting, including two members of the presidential guard, composed of Moroccan troops, and several Equatorial Guinean soldiers.

  More than ten people were arrested, including several former ministers in the previous regime led by Macias Nguema, who was overthrown by Mbasogo in 1979. The prisoners include: Pedro Ekong, former Minister of Health; Angel Masie, former Interior Minister; Esteban Ngoma, former ambassador to Spain; Carmelo Modu, a businessman; and Ricardo Nyumba, a prominent executive.

  Madrid newspapers reported that a wealthy businessman who returned to Equatorial Guinea from exile in late 1979 was the suspected backer of the abortive coup. However, one of the man's partners claimed in Madrid that the conspiracy was fabricated by Equatorial Guinea authorities. He alleged the coup attempt was prepared by them to undermine the prestige of Mbasogo's political opponents. (West Africa, May 4, 1981; London Times, April 29, 1981.)

Rwanda

- President Juvenal Habyarimana reshuffled his cabinet in March, retaining the posts of Prime Minister and Defense Minister, and sacking three other ministers.

  The Ministers of Finance, Education, and Social Affairs and Cooperatives were replaced in the shake-up. The Education Ministry was divided into two: the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education, and the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research.

  Two of the 18 posts that had been vacant were filled: Minister of Public Works and Equipment, and Minister of Civil Service and Em-
Zaire

In April, Zaire Prime Minister Nguza Karl-I-Bond submitted his resignation in a letter to President Mobutu Sese Seko from Brussels, Belgium, where he was on a private visit. He cited "personal reasons" for his departure from the government.

Nguza was previously Zaire's Foreign Minister at the time of the first Shaba invasion in 1977 and was dismissed, arrested for "high treason" and condemned to death. The sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, and he was released from jail in 1978 after serving ten months. In March 1979, Nguza was re-appointed Foreign Minister and then in 1980, named Prime Minister.

The official Zaire news agency, AZAP, characterized Nguza's resignation as "an act of gross cowardice," and implied that Nguza had chosen Brussels as a haven in order to join Mobutu's opponents, many of whom are based there.

According to a report in Jeune Afrique, however, Nguza's departure was due to Mobutu's appointment, in a February cabinet reshuffle, of Bomboko Lokumba as Foreign Minister and vice prime minister. Mobutu reportedly introduced the new vice prime minister position while Nguza was out of the country, and appointed Lokumba, like Nguza, a popular figure in international circles, to neutralize Nguza's influence. Nguza reportedly feared a repeat of Mobutu's 1977 machinations against him.

He was replaced in late April by Nsinda Udujou, a businesswoman and former Interior Minister and minister to the presidency. Jeune Afrique, May 6, 1981; West Africa, April 27 and May 4, 1981; Kenya Weekly Review, April 24, 1981.

According to a report in mid-May in Le Monde, Nguza has declared himself a candidate to the presidency when Mobutu's current term expires in 1984, or before, if the circumstances permit. He said, "I resigned to be in peace with my conscience and to remain true to my principles."

Nguza also said that although he did not wish to ask for political asylum in Belgium, nor was he interested in joining any opposition groups there, he could not have resigned in Kinshasa because to do so would have been the "equivalent of asking for the key to my old cell."

He expressed hope that Mobutu would hold to an earlier promise for "the democratization of institutions and free elections in a peaceful, legal and democratic framework." (Le Monde, May 18, 1981.)

Zambia

After the leaders of the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) boycotted a meeting scheduled for April with the Minister of Labor and Social Services, Basil Kabwe, a move expected to worsen the already tense relations between the ZCTU and the government, all 17 labor leaders expelled from the ruling party in January were re-admitted to the organization in late April.

The 17 men had been expelled from the United National Independence Party (UNIP) because the ZCTU had opposed legislation decentralizing government authority and extending party control to the local governments. The expulsions sparked a spate of strikes in Zambia's copper and cobalt mining centers in January.

UNIP's secretary-general, Humphrey Mulemba, said that a ban placed on the union leaders' travel abroad and the restriction of foreign labor leaders from visiting Zambia was still in force. (Lusaka Radio, April 24 and 25, 1981.)

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In mid-May, the International Monetary Fund agreed to provide Zambia with a $1 billion loan over the next three years, the largest IMF loan ever granted to a sub-Saharan African country. Negotiations had been going on for several months, and Zambia is expected to draw its first installment—$144 million—almost immediately to stave off the worst foreign exchange crisis of its 17-year independence.

The loan is expected to provide a desperately needed boost to Zambia's ailing economy, hit by low copper and cobalt prices, rising fuel costs, and the toll of having maintained economic sanctions against Zimbabwe prior to its independence in 1980.

In a related event, Zambia's Central Bank suspended commercial banks' authority to approve applications for payments of imported goods, in an effort to conserve foreign exchange. All applications for letters of credit or other import payment instruments must go through the Central Bank. (Economist, May 16, 1981; Financial Times, April 23 and May 7, 1981.)

NORTHERN AFRICA

Algeria

Three American gas-pipeline companies—Consolidated Natural Gas Co., Columbia Gas System Inc., and Southern Natural Resources Inc.—announced plans to reopen negotiations with Algeria in late May on the resumption of shipments of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to the U.S. Algeria had been selling the LNG to El Paso Natural Gas Co., the largest U.S. importer of the gas, which in turn distributed it to the three companies. Talks between Algerian and U.S. Energy Department officials over a new export price for the LNG ended in a stalemate in February, causing El Paso to write off $365 million against its 1980 profits "in view of the remote prospects" of resumed gas shipments, which were halted in April 1980.

The three distributors have expressed hope that a new agreement with Algeria can be reached, and they engaged Warren Christopher, U.S. chief negotiator for the release of the American hostages from Iran, to represent them in the talks.

The Algerian government had sought to achieve a parity price level for exports of both oil and LNG of about $6 per 1,000 cubic feet. The U.S. government resisted the increase, arguing instead for a ceiling of about $4.50 per 1,000 cubic feet. However, a 20-year contract signed by Algeria in April with Distigaz of Belgium under which LNG will be provided at $5.00 per 1,000 cubic feet, the highest price obtained from any customer, may hinder agreement with the U.S. companies.

It is believed that the Reagan administration will veto any agreement to buy LNG at the Belgian price. Any LNG deal must be ap-

Egypt

- In early May, President Anwar Sadat introduced a new budget totaling $14 billion, which provides for large wage increases to offset the impact of inflation and places high priority on continuing subsidies on basic foods and necessities. The package, which comes into effect on July 1, will cost the government about $724 million per year.

Subsidies on tea, rice, sugar, cooking oil and bread will be increased from $2.1 billion to $2.8 billion, to maintain a lid on retail prices. While Sadat has been criticized by Western governments and the IMF for maintaining the subsidies, he has refused to eliminate them, mindful of an attempt to do so in 1977 which sparked riots in which several people were killed. More than 60 percent of the real income of the poor and about 40 percent of the middle class' income comes from the subsidies.

The lowest-paid workers will receive the largest benefit from the wage increases. Those earning the minimum of $28.90 a month will receive a 50 percent boost in salaries. The 3.5 million public sector workers and government employees, who earn $144.90 a month, will receive a $30.40 monthly raise.

Egypt's balance of payments position has improved in recent years—with a $700 million surplus in 1979, and a near $1 billion surplus for 1980—due mainly to Egypt's expanding oil production. In late April, Mobil Corp. announced the discovery of natural gas and oil in an offshore test well 28 miles from the Nile delta. The results of the drilling at el-Temshah no. 2 well, undertaken in a production-sharing contract with Egypt's state-owned oil company, were said to be encouraging.


Libya

- The U.S. government ordered Libya to close its diplomatic mission in Washington and remove its staff from the country in early May, citing "a wide range of Libyan provocations and misconduct, including support for international terrorism." The move was one step short of a severance of diplomatic relations.

A State Department statement said the U.S. government was concerned by "a general pattern of unacceptable conduct" by Tripoli's embassy in Washington, which Libya calls a "people's bureau." There have been reports within the past year of involvement by Libya's foreign missions in a campaign of harassment, including murders, of opponents to Col. Muammar Qaddafi's regime. The Reagan administration has also expressed displeasure over Libya's activities in Chad, Sudan and Egypt.

The U.S. withdrew most of its diplomats from Libya in December 1979 after rioting crowds burned and looted the embassy in Tripoli. The embassy was officially closed in May 1980, and since then U.S. interests there have been represented by Belgium.

There are still about 2,000 Americans in Libya, mostly employees of the seven major U.S. oil companies. The U.S. receives approximately 640,000 barrels of Libyan oil a day, about ten percent of total oil imports. While Dr. Ali Houderi, the head of Libya's mission in Washington, reassured the U.S. that its citizens would be safe in his country, the State Department advised the American oil companies to begin an "orderly drawdown of their personnel."

Prior to his return to Libya, Houderi suggested that Libya might cut off oil exports to the U.S. in retaliation for the closure of the mission, but that action was only one of a range of measures the Tripoli government could take. In mid-May, however, Qaddafi said his government would not use an oil embargo as a weapon against the U.S. and said Americans living in Libya would be safe "unless the situation deteriorates" because of further U.S. actions against his country.

In an official statement, the Libyan government denied that it supports international terrorists, saying it distinguishes between terrorism, which it opposes, and liberation movements, which it supports. Qaddafi also said, "I am sorry to see this childish behavior by the American government, which is not suitable for a big power."

He added that Libyan relations with the Soviet Union were good because Soviet arms sold to his country helped it maintain its defenses against "enemies." Qaddafi paid an official visit to Moscow in late April, his first since 1976, where he attended meetings with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. A joint communiqué issued at the trip's end stated the two governments' common positions on international issues—including attacks on the role of the U.S. in the Middle East and Third World, and a rejection of "attempts by imperialist circles to equate international terrorism with the liberation struggles of people." (New York Times, April 30, May 7, 8, and 15, 1981; Wall Street Journal, May 7 and 14, 1981; Washington Post, May 7 and 8, 1981.)

Morocco

- President Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone, chairman of the OAU, and Edem Kodjo, the organization's secretary-general, arrived in Morocco in mid-April for discussions with King Hassan on the Western Sahara war.

The two men were scheduled to present Hassan with the official text of recommendations made in September 1980 by the OAU special committee on the Western Sahara. Among the points of the OAU plan were a ceasefire by December 1980, which did not take place, and a referendum supervised by the OAU and UN allowing the people of the Sahara to decide their future.

The Moroccan government has repeatedly rejected the OAU recommendations for a settlement of the dispute. Moroccan Foreign Minister Mohamed Boucetta has said in the past that Rabat would never accept a ceasefire because "it was never the first to open fire."

A major showdown on the Sahara war is expected at the 18th OAU summit to be held in Nairobi in late June. Morocco was able to forestall the admission of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, represented by Polisario, to the OAU at the 1980
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The Algiers government has gained the support of the requisite international opinion. However, the SADR had hoped of gaining more favorable international opinion.

Meanwhile, on the ground, tensions between Morocco and Algeria have increased after an incursion into Algerian territory by Moroccan troops pursuing Polisario fighters. The Algiers government has put army units on alert in the western border region. (West Africa, May 4 and 18, 1981; London Times, April 14, 1981.)

Tunisia

• At a special congress of the ruling Socialist Destour Party (PSD) in April, President Habib Bourguiba announced his readiness to permit a multiparty system of government in Tunisia. The PSD has been the country's only party since Bourguiba founded it 25 years ago.

• New parties will be required to demonstrate that they are representative, comply with the constitution, preserve the nation's gains, and reject fanaticism, violence and ideological or material dependence on foreign powers. It is believed that Bourguiba's liberalization will not be extended to include Moslem fundamentalists or the Communist Party, which is banned.

• In view of the new provision for several parties, the national assembly will be dissolved and elections are slated for October. The current legislature was elected in 1979 for five years and at the end of the current session, in July, the deputies will be asked to submit their resignations.

• The opposition Movement of Democratic Socialists (MDS) seized the opportunity to announce that it is forming a political party and congratulated the government for "the series of sincere measures" it has undertaken toward the institution of democratic process in Tunisia.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Angola

• In May, the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee voted to maintain the congressional ban on military aid to the Unita rebels in Angola, while the corresponding committee in the Senate voted to repeal the ban, known as the Clark amendment.

• The Reagan administration had asked Congress in mid-March to remove the restrictions on covert or overt U.S. aid to Unita, led by Dr. Jonas Savimbi, which were adopted in 1976, characterizing the ban as "an unusually all-encompassing restriction on U.S. policy options."

• If the differing votes of the two congressional committees are upheld by the full House and Senate, the question will have to be resolved in conference. In 1980, the same situation occurred, and the House prevailed, retaining the ban.

Malawi

• The South African government has formally apologized to the ambassador from Malawi, one of the few African nations with which Pretoria has diplomatic relations, for an incident of racial discrimination involving the ambassador's 16-year-old son.

• Malawian ambassador McLean Machinjili's son was to have played on his school's rugby team against an Afrikaans school team. The Afrikaans school refused to play, saying
it would not take part in a mixed rugby match. Ambassador Machinjili said the incident was proof that some South African parents were teaching their children racial discrimination. (London Guardian, May 5 and 7, 1981.)

South Africa

- Three men alleged to have taken part in the sabotage of a Durban power station in April have been arrested by Lesotho police and were to be turned over to the South African security police.

  South African Police Minister Louis le Grange announced that the three were found in possession of rifles, automatic pistols and grenades and were believed to be members of the banned African National Congress.

  Le Grange said the men fled to Lesotho by car after sabotaging the power station and crossed the border on foot. Two of the alleged saboteurs were also said to have been involved in the June 1980 sabotage of the Sasol oil-from-coal plant.

  Security police have said recently, following the discovery of several caches of weapons in the Johannesburg region, that the ANC is “planning a more advanced and bigger internal onslaught.” (Sowetan, May 8, 1981; Johannesburg Radio, April 21, 1981.)

- Two alleged black guerrillas charged with “furthering the aims of the African National Congress,” a banned organization, were acquitted in April after the court found “contradictions in the state’s evidence.”

  Raphael Khumalo, 24, of Soweto, had also been charged with possession of four AK-47 rifles, two automatic pistols, hand grenades and dynamite. His co-defendant, Raymond Dladlu, had also been charged with transporting Khumalo, despite the fact that he was a “trained terrorist,” from Swaziland to South Africa. All the charges were dropped.

  And an ex-student from Soweto who had been convicted of receiving military training from the ANC had his five-year sentence overturned in April. An appeals court said there was no adequate evidence that 19-year-old Adam Masake had received the training. Masake had claimed that security police tortured him into confessing to crimes he had not committed. (Sowetan, April 27 and May 7, 1981.)

  An attempt was made in May on the life of David Thebehali, chairman of the Soweto Council, when a hand grenade was thrown under his official car. Thebehali was unhurt but his car was extensively damaged.

  Thebehali is a controversial figure in Soweto because he heads the government-set up council which was elected with only 6 percent of the township’s voters participating in a boycotted election. He has been the target of frequent verbal attacks by other black politicians.

  Thebehali blamed “hostile press reports” for the assassination attempt. He said the press was “responsible for the atmosphere of hatred” against him and the council. One critic said Thebehali “must not expect sympathy from blacks because he is responsible for high rents and electricity bills.” (Sowetan, May 8, 1981.)

- Bishop Desmond Tutu has lashed out at a “smear campaign” conducted against him when he was overseas in April and continuing in May.

  Thousands of pamphlets have been distributed in Soweto and other black townships attacking Tutu, who is general secretary of the South African Council of Churches. The various pamphlets, which Tutu labeled “scurrilous,” have been signed by a fictitious body, the United Trade Unions’ Council, and by the Young Christian Workers and the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People of South Africa, both of which have denied having anything to do with the pamphlets.

  Bishop Joe Joshua of the latter organization said he has hired private investigators to find out who is behind the campaign. “If we find the people responsible,” he said, “we are going to sue them heavily.”

  The pamphlets try to discredit Tutu by praising him and then going on to claim that he lives in luxury and educates his children overseas while telling the world “we would gladly suffer for our principles.”

  Tutu charges that the government is behind the “well-orchestrated campaign to vilify and denigrate both SACC and myself.” He added, “But having had the Info scandal, you can’t be surprised that a system as evil as apartheid will use methods such as represented by these pamphlets.” (Sowetan, April 22, May 5 and 7, 1981; Rand Daily Mail, April 8, 1981.)

- Sigma Motor Corp.—a subsidiary of the Anglo American Corp. conglomerate and 25 percent-owned by Chrysler Corp.—has recognized the independent black and Coloured (mixed-race) National Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber Workers following April’s strike by virtually the entire black and Coloured workforce of 4,000.

  Negotiations were being held in May over higher wages and the issue of 18 workers who had acted as intermediaries during the strike and were subsequently fired. The union, which won its battle to become the workers’ sole bargaining agency, replacing a management-set up liaison committee, said reinstatement of the 18 workers was fundamental.

  The Geneva-based International Metalworkers Federation, to which the South African union had appealed, said the Sigma dispute was a challenge to Anglo American chairman Harry Oppenheimer to prove the liberalism he has been preaching. (Sowetan, May 7 and 13, 1981; Johannesburg Star, April 25 and May 2, 1981.)

- Ninety-six white South African draftees went absent without leave from a military base near Pretoria in April. All but 17 returned soon after and those draftees were accused of “mutiny” by the army, which said they would be arrested.

  This is the second reported incident of draftees going AWOL in 18 months. In October 1979, 300 draftees just returned from combat in Namibia walked off another army base.

  The 96 national servicemen at Elandsfontein base all belonged to the catering school of the ordinance survey corps and walked out reportedly after complaining about food and conditions. (Johannesburg Radio, April 27, 1981.)
States. As a member of the Budget Committee I have been unpopular and least understood programs in the United
Foreign aid is one of the most politically
KASSEBAUM: Africa? What criteria should govern our aid programs there?
couraging other nations to provide aid at a level more in line
priorities, one of which was to vote to reduce foreign aid.
AFRICA REPORT: Will you work for increased aid for
AFRICA REPORT: Senator, do you think the U.S. should do more to help African refugees? Would you consider calling hearings on this?
KASSEBAUM: I believe the United States should engage with its allies in a more intensive search for the political solutions that will make it possible for the African refugees to return home and reconstruct their lives. We plan to hold hearings this summer on the general subject of African refugees to determine what the United States should be doing in addition to the already considerable aid we are providing. If I am not mistaken, the United States is already providing 40 percent of all African refugee aid. Perhaps we should be encouraging other nations to provide aid at a level more in line with their own economic status.
AFRICA REPORT: What criteria should govern our aid programs there?
KASSEBAUM: Foreign aid is one of the most politically unpopular and least understood programs in the United States. As a member of the Budget Committee I have been forced to make difficult decisions about budgetary priorities, one of which was to vote to reduce foreign aid. The present economic climate is one in which our finite resources are outstripped by our humanitarian impulses. Foreign aid had to be reduced along with domestic programs. At the same time, I believe it is important to complement our diplomatic and military strengths with a positive foreign policy that necessarily includes foreign assistance.
AFRICA REPORT: Should the United States help African states to counter Libya's active role? How?
KASSEBAUM: Although I have not yet come to a firm conclusion on particular approaches to take in meeting the challenge of Col. Qaddafi's expansionist notions, it would seem to me that we should seek ways to cooperate with the Organization of African Unity's efforts to maintain the sovereignty of African nations.
AFRICA REPORT: Is it the business of the United States to promote change in South Africa—or to stand in the way of change? What principles and what interests should guide American policy toward that country?
KASSEBAUM: The United States has a substantial interest in the business of fostering progressive change in South Africa—although we too often overestimate our ability to do more than influence events there. There is considerable truth in Dick Moose's statement last year that no amount of political action from overseas can overshadow the solution to be worked out by South Africa's own people. It seems to me that in encouraging a more just society in South Africa we are protecting our national interests as well as being true to our national ideals. Given the economic, political, and strategic importance of southern Africa, it would seem to me that a South Africa with whom we could have close relations—which means a South Africa that is a democratic and just society for all its people—would be a high priority for any administration.
AFRICA REPORT: Would you back a democratic settlement in Namibia, even if that leads to a SWAPO victory?
KASSEBAUM: A truly democratic and independent Namibia is certainly an essential objective of our African policy, and a democratic Namibia is by definition a country in which its people have freely chosen their government. The choice of that government is for the Namibian people to make.
AFRICA REPORT: What should be our attitude toward the Savimbi insurgency and the MPLA government in Angola?
KASSEBAUM: Ideally, there will be a democratic election in Angola so that we can determine who are the legitimate leaders of the Angolan people. Since there has been no election, the debate in the United States about whether the MPLA or UNITA movements represent the Angolan people is only a matter of opinion among the international supporters of the movements. I would certainly expect that should the MPLA win in a free and fair election, the United States would recognize the choice of the Angolan people.
AFRICA REPORT: Would you support a policy of confrontation in the Horn; for example, by arming Somalia with offensive weapons, or by backing insurgents opposed to the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia?
KASSEBAUM: It would seem to me that the United States should encourage reconciliation between the various competing factions in the Horn of Africa, and as part of encouraging reconciliation we should work to give all parties in the disputes the confidence to work towards peace. The massive aid the Soviet Union is providing Ethiopia certainly undermines such an effort. The very important role the Sudan is willing to play in encouraging the Ethiopians to seek an end to their civil war should be encouraged. The Sudanese experience gives them a voice of some authority on the issues of effective political participation as a solution to internal warfare.

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New Hope for the Sudan

BY ANDREW LYCETT

In March of this year Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeiri finally inaugurated the vast Kenana sugar factory, situated between the White and Blue Niles near Rabak, about 150 miles south of Khartoum. When full production is reached in 1982-83, Kenana, reputedly the largest sugar factory in the world, should be producing 333,000 tons of sugar for an economy that last year imported 301,234 tons of the commodity at an unbearably high free market price of $235 million. Although some of Kenana's output will be for export, theoretically self-sufficiency in sugar should be achieved within a couple of years.

But the price has been great. The original $125 million project envisaged in 1973 rocketed in price to $613 million and was finally inaugurated three years behind schedule. At that Kenana is one of only two of the really huge agricultural development projects envisaged for the Sudan in the mid-1970s that have actually been started. At that time the fond hope was that cooperation between Arab money (newly increased by the fourfold rise in oil prices in 1973), Western technology, and local resources would turn the Sudan into the breadbasket of the Arab world by the mid-1980s.

A $6 billion Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (AAAID) was specially formed to help implement these plans. But perennial logistical and infrastructural problems in the Sudan, political uncertainty at home and in the wider region, and the unwillingness of Arab governments and individuals to commit funds to projects where returns were so long-term and indeed unsure delayed the start of AAAID's operations.

By the time the authority was on its feet in 1978-79, the groundwork had changed. Kenana was already under construction, but all its attendant problems were being experienced. AAAID began to veer away from its original vast projects, such as ranching, towards smaller, perhaps more manageable, initiatives like poultry farming. At the certed effort, spearheaded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, to realize Sudan's agricultural potential through revitalization of existing schemes rather than the committal of scarce funds to huge new developments.

Of that potential there is no doubt. The Sudan is the largest country in Africa — roughly the size of Western Europe, in fact — and only a very small proportion of its 200-million-plus acres of cultivable land is currently under the plow. But the Sudan's hugeness has always contributed to problems of communication, with the result that its agricultural potential has never fully been realized. On the contrary, recently farm projects begun in the middle years of this century have suffered severe decreases in output, mainly because they have not been able to replace outdated machinery and change outdated management practices.

Particularly severely hit has been the huge Gezira scheme, situated, like Kenana, just south of Khartoum in the fertile area between the two main branches of the Nile. Started by the British after the building of the Senar Dam in 1925, the scheme has now grown to encompass over 2 million
INTERVIEW

Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum,
Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Africa

"Foreign aid is one of the most politically unpopular and least understood programs in the United States."

AFRICA REPORT: Senator, what led you to accept this subcommittee assignment? What do you hope to achieve in this subcommittee chair? How does it affect your domestic political functioning?

KASSEBAUM: I've always had an interest in foreign relations; in fact my masters degree from the University of Michigan is in diplomatic history. Senator Charles Percy [R-Ill.], when he became chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, asked that I join the committee, and after some deliberation I agreed. One of the things I would like to do on this committee is to enhance popular understanding regarding the domestic importance of a sound foreign policy.

AFRICA REPORT: Senator, before asking you the more detailed questions, I would like to know what your position is on the difference within the foreign affairs community between those who tend to interpret international developments in terms of U.S.-Soviet rivalry and those who see that as one among many factors.

KASSEBAUM: While there are those policymakers with a cast of mind that emphasizes U.S.-Soviet rivalries, I do not believe that they are unmindful of more comprehensive considerations. Obviously, the importance of U.S.-Soviet rivalries in a given situation would depend primarily on the particulars of that situation. A concern for Soviet and Soviet surrogate actions in Africa is a valid field of interest for American policymakers. It would be foolhardy to minimize our concerns about Soviet expansionism and intervention in Africa.

AFRICA REPORT: How do you see that issue affecting United States policy toward Africa?

KASSEBAUM: The Soviet Union and the other Eastern bloc nations have a right to engage in normal diplomatic and commercial relations with Africans states, and the United States should not seek to prevent such relations, nor should we view them with particular concern. However, the destabilizing presence of Soviet surrogates in a military role in

These written replies were provided by Senator Kassebaum in response to questions submitted by Africa Report editor Anthony J. Hughes.
acres and, again like Kenana, is said to be the largest unit of its kind — a farm under single management — in the world. As such, it produces 75 percent of the Sudan's cotton, which alone accounts for about 60 percent of the country's foreign exchange earnings, as well as substantial amounts of the Sudan's outputs of wheat and groundnuts.

However, during the 1970s, the Gezira began showing its age. Instead of remaining an ambitious cooperative venture between tenant farmers, the government and the Gezira Board, the scheme degenerated badly as a result of outmoded practices and equipment. Tenants who were quite rich by Sudanese standards had become absentee landlords. There was little incentive for them to produce more than the barest minimum.

Whereas a good yield of cotton was considered to be eight qintars a feddan, Gezira tenants were averaging only four, and two seasons ago that figure was down to three. With wheat, introduced in the scheme in the mid-1970s, annual yields had dropped from 1.39 tons a hectare over the period 1973-77 to 1 ton in 1978 and 0.68 tons in 1979.

Three years ago, at a particularly bad moment in Sudan's balance-of-payments history, the IMF came up with a novel suggestion to attempt to rectify this situation. It would continue to provide balance-of-payments support, but only if the Sudan took corrective measures to raise local productivity and increase exports of cash crops — specifically through concentration on output of cotton for foreign markets rather than of wheat and fruit for domestic consumers. In the opinion of the IMF, Sudan's climate was too hot for profitable growing of wheat.

However, this formula led to considerable opposition both in Gezira, where tenants were unhappy to change well-established practices, and at the national level, where apparent acquiescence by the government in foreign-sponsored economic packages was easily exploitable politically. But the IMF together with the Sudanese authorities stood its ground. Part of the IMF's strategy was introduced in September 1979, when newly appointed Finance Minister Badreddin Suleiman devalued the Sudanese pound, thus reducing the price of Sudanese exports, and did away with onerous dues such as the 10 percent export levy and the development tax. The average Gezira tenant's income was increased by around 35 percent at a stroke. He was also offered incentives to encourage better yields, particularly of cotton, where financial rewards were promised for output above the average yield of four qintars a feddan.

But there was a quid pro quo. The IMF considered one of the biggest drawbacks of the Gezira scheme what it called "the nature of productive relationships." Because of the history of the scheme, tenants were contracted to the Sudan Gezira Board only for their cotton crops and were free to dispose of other commodities as they wished. With cotton, however, they had to buy seed, water, and services from the board at specific prices, deliver their produce back to it, and wait up to six months for what remained of the proceeds once the government and board had taken its share.

The tenants were not particularly happy with this arrangement, but they worked it to their best advantage. Inevitably they used inputs bought for their cotton crop to nurture private wheat, groundnut, and vegetable patches, which, although not particularly valuable in terms of foreign exchange for the country as a whole, at least brought the best and most immediate returns on the open market for the individual.

But the outcome was that cotton, which in 1978-79 made up only 31 percent of the Gezira acreage, had to bear all the expenses. The IMF suggested changing this situation and charging for essential inputs such as water for other crops as well as cotton. When this plan became known to Gezira tenants in summer 1979, they staged a long and sometimes violent strike, which almost brought the Nimeiri government to its knees. But after the Badreddin Suleiman package of September, they became more adapted to the twin strategy of financial incentives for productivity and charges for seed, water, and services.

Last year, the more theoretical considerations having been covered, the second, more practical stage of the Gezira revitalization package was introduced. This time the World Bank was involved in what has become a 10-year program to modernize the vast project. Immediate emergency aid worth $32 million was provided to allow the Gezira Board and tenants to purchase equipment and spare that, because of foreign currency constraints, have been beyond their resources. High on the shopping list over the past year have been heavy machinery to clear irrigation canals and ditches.
that have become so clogged with weeds and silt that some parts of the scheme were not receiving water at all, deep plows and heavy-duty tractors, and spare parts for the scheme’s 1,100 vehicles and plant (such as the vital Gezira Light Railway, which carries cotton to ginning factories).

Now the World Bank, with assistance for the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, is financing a feasibility study to identify areas to be tackled in the first five-year phase of the new official 10-year Gezira rehabilitation program. Authorities in Khartoum talk insistently of their desire for mechanization, which is already proving successful in nearby Rahad, the other vast agricultural scheme started in the mid-1970s. Possible strategy includes widespread leveling of the land, which in turn allows greater mechanization.

All these plans should provide a considerable boost to Western and particularly American agribusiness, not least because reduced wheat production in the Sudan will throw the country onto the world market for its supplies. Currently wheat demand in the Sudan is increasing at 15 percent a year, and last year the wheat deficit was 476,000 metric tons. Already the United States, the world’s principal supplier of wheat, has begun to help cover that deficit, providing $20 million worth of PL 480 grains under an agreement signed at the end of 1979. The Sudan was the first country in Africa to receive this grant under Title 3 of the PL 480 agreement, which allows the recipient country to keep local currency generated by sales for development purposes.

In addition the Sudan has been using funds from large commodity import programs signed with the United States in 1979 and 1980 to import more grain. Now that the habit has been established, and American bakeries are being built, U.S. imports of wheat to the Sudan are likely to grow substantially over the next few years.

American companies are also likely to gain from the provision by the World Bank and associate agencies of funds for rehabilitation of the Gezira and other run-down agricultural schemes. Already in the last three years following the establishment of the U.S.-Sudanese Business Council, a number of American companies have established agencies in Khartoum. Last year, for example, the Sudanese-Egyptian Agricultural Integration Company took delivery of two $58,000 mechanized cotton-picking machines supplied by International Harvester, and the Chicago-based company followed this success by announcing the investment of over $500,000 in the construction of three maintenance workshops in Khartoum, Port Sudan, and Sennar.

With the arrival of additional funds, mainly from the World Bank, the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum sees “some real opportunities for U.S. exporters and even investors.” particularly in agricultural machinery, storage facilities, and chemicals. It reported last year that 1,200 tractors were being imported into the Sudan and that “if financing were available” the market could easily absorb 2,500 units each year, with comparable advances in sales of other machinery. Since the Export-Import Bank has not yet accepted the Sudan as a worthy credit risk, finance from World Bank and other sources is a boon to American and other Western exporters of agricultural machinery. Apart from Gezira, the World Bank’s IDA affiliate has also recently committed $67 million to the rehabilitation of agriculture, mainly irrigation, in White and Blue Nile agricultural schemes.

Indeed, one does not have to look far for evidence of increasing American penetration of the Sudanese market. In Gezira the unhurried ways of the British, who started the scheme before the Second World War, are on the way out, and Texas-style talk of leveling the land and full mechanization are in. And at Kenana the American concern Arkell has taken over management of the sugar factory from Kenana, which conceived and started the project.

Some Sudanese, of course, see this as all part of a great plot hatched with the connivance of the IMF and the World Bank. But others allow that Sudanese agriculture was not fulfilling its potential and that only vertical rather than horizontal development, as proposed by these two agencies, will halt their country’s growing food deficit and allow it to think once more in terms of becoming “the breadbasket of the Middle East.”
Recovery or Relapse?

BY F.S.B. KAZADI

"The Founding-President is not a magician. By himself he can do nothing. With the help of his people he can do anything."

—President Mobutu Sese Seko

Zaire’s President Mobutu speaks the above words daily on Zairian radio. He speaks them at all hours of the day, between music programs and before the news.

To those familiar with Zaire and its longest surviving leader, the words contain a remarkable admission: an admission that all is not well in the country, an acknowledgement that even a chief whose very name signifies "the all conquering warrior" may need help.

In addition, when President Mobutu’s second-in-command, First Commissioner Nguza Karl-I-Bond, suddenly announced his resignation in Brussels last April, the Zairian News Agency reported the anger and dismay of government leaders and, using terms which could only have come from the highest sources, characterized the resignation as "a cowardly desertion."

These are but two examples of what amounts to a significant change in the relationship between Zaire’s president and his people. In earlier years, President Mobutu had assumed a position of towering, almost deific omnipotence, appearing nightly, for example, from the heavens on television.

The change in tone shows not only a public recognition of Zaire’s recent ill fortunes, but also the growing pragmatism and frankness on the part of Zaire’s leaders as they seek to spark economic recovery without disrupting the political and social maturation of central Africa’s largest nation.

The Republic of Zaire, which borders nine other African nations and spans two-thirds of the continent at the equator, has problems that demand unique solutions. Unfortunately, the search for those solutions has been hampered by a legacy of plunder carried out virtually without interruption from the eighteenth century until today.

The legacy means that today, Zaire, one of the six most richly endowed states in Africa, has one of the lowest per capita income figures on the continent.

The Zairian economy continues to suffer from inflation, loss of productivity, and monetary weaknesses. The problems began in the early 1970s, when the price of copper—which supplies two-thirds of Zaire’s foreign exchange and half of the government’s total revenues—rose to record levels on the world market. The Zairian government undertook a series of ambitious development projects and financed them through loans based on current market values of its mineral wealth.

When the price for copper fell in 1975 from $1.50 per pound to less than $.50, the government fell behind in its loan repayments. The nation’s foreign debt rose from $3 billion in the mid-1970s to almost $5 billion in 1980. Creditors rescheduled the loans a number of times, but the government experienced difficulty in paying even the interest on the massive debt.

As a result, the consortium of banks and foreign governments with loans to Zaire—the Paris Club—balked at financing any new loans until Kinshasa implemented an economic stabilization agreement with the International Monetary Fund. The stabilization plan, like most IMF plans, called for cuts in government spending, stricter controls on foreign exchange, and a number of monetary devaluations.

The Zairian government signed standby agreements with the IMF in
Economists say that the successful implementation of the third IMF agreement and Kinshasa's relatively prompt payment in 1980 of the interest due on its national debt are indications that the government has "bottomed out." They characterize the Zairian government's effort to honor its obligations as "heroic." Inflation, they say, has been reduced from 100 percent per year in the late 1970s to 50 percent in 1980. And they conclude that the government's foreign debt burden will begin to ease if productivity can be increased.

Unfortunately, economic productivity in Zaire is about one-third of capacity according to IMF figures; and the prospects for its recovery in the immediate future are not good.

Copper production has remained constant in recent years at about one-half of the record level of 400,000 metric tons set in 1970s; and production of cobalt, amounting to two-thirds of the Free World's supply, has remained at 15,000 tons per year. The price for copper has risen in recent years to about $.90 per pound, but the price for cobalt has dropped to less than $20.00 per pound. These price levels have made expansion of Zaire's mining industry — a major project of the government in the early 1970s — economically unappealing.

Diamonds and gold are produced in sizable quantities in Zaire, but the government receives only a fraction of the revenue from their sale because of the high incidence of smuggling.

Nevertheless, Zaire is an extremely wealthy country. The mining centers of Lubumbashi, Kolwezi and Mbuji-Mayi enjoy robust economies. And Kinshasa shows all the signs of a boom town. In these cities, the markets and stores are filled with manufactured goods imported from Europe and Japan and with food flown in from southern Africa.

However, these cities are exceptions. For Zaire's interior is suffering from a combination of high prices, inadequate money supply, and loss of most industrial productivity. As Zairians put it, there is "no economy" in Kisangani, Mbandaka, Kananga, and Bukavu. Gasoline is unavailable in these cities except on the black market, where it costs 10 zaires per liter (approximately $12 per gallon when computed at the official exchange rate). Electricity and running water are turned on for a few hours a day, if at all. Roads have fallen into disrepair, and many buildings have been abandoned. In these cities, for example, a bottle of beer costs more at a local pub than at Kinshasa's posh Intercontinental Hotel.

Despite Zaire's economic problems, a small group of businessmen has grown extremely wealthy by importing products with foreign exchange purchased from the government at the official rate (approximately 3 zaires to the dollar) and selling them locally at the black market rate (approximately 9 zaires to the dollar). As a result, this group enjoys expensive cars, videotape machines, and digital watches, while the average Zairian worker struggles to feed his family.

For example, a laborer in Kinshasa earns an average of 300 zaires per month. From those wages, he must pay his rent (about 100 zaires) and buy food (120 zaires for a two-week supply of manioc). Professionals may earn 500-1,000 zaires per month, and entrepreneurs such as taxi drivers and market vendors may earn considerably more, but the ever rising cost of living has removed any pretensions they may have had of belonging to a "middle class."

Wages have been frozen for two years; strikes are forbidden by law; and the pool of unskilled workers remains large. Yet, Zaire has been unable to return to pre-1975 levels of productivity.

In order to spur production, economic advisers have been encouraging the Zairian government to limit government expenditures, control the flow of hard currency, and seek increased foreign investment.

Zaire is in extreme need of foreign capital. And although the government has considerably liberalized foreign investment codes since the heyday of nationalization in the mid-1970s, profits and investments still may not be repatriated. And this factor, along with a continued lack of confidence in the nation's political structures, have made it difficult to attract any significant investment.

Although the pragmatic philosophy of the Zairian government has failed to draw new private capital from abroad, the country continues to attract development projects sponsored by multilateral lending institutions and foreign governments. Many of the larger projects suffer from problems in funding and manpower, but they continue to attract support from governments around the world that wish to maintain a "presence" in the equatorial giant.

One such project is the bridge over the Congo River. With financing from the governments of Zaire and Japan, construction crews are building a suspension bridge over Africa's mightiest river at Matadi. The two-level bridge, designed to carry rail and automobile traffic, will link Kinshasa and central Zaire with the ports and farms of the Bas-Zaïre region, which to date has been the breadbasket of western Zaire.

Sixty kilometers upriver from
Matadi, a consortium of French, West German, and U.S. companies are working on a giant hydroelectric plant. The Congo River drops 100 meters in a few kilometers at Inga and generates 40,000 kilowatts of hydroelectric potential, more potential energy than at all of Africa's existing dams combined. The first phase of the project is currently in operation and provides power to the Bas-Zaire and Kinshasa. The second phase — Inga Two — is nearing completion. It will enable the government to electrify the railway linking Matadi to Kinshasa, to power a 100 percent increase in refining and copper production in Shaba, and to export electricity to Zambia's mines as well as to neighbors on the Atlantic coast.

Another project underway with French cooperation will link Zaire's nine regional broadcasting stations to the 20-story Voix du Zaire facilities in Kinshasa. Satellite stations are being built around the country; radio and television facilities are being refurbished; and extensive training programs have been started. The aim is to provide Zairians throughout the country with color television, FM radio, and possibly telephone connections.

In the agricultural sector, the U.S. government is providing technical and financial assistance to increase agricultural productivity in northern Shaba. The project seeks to increase productivity not only through extension services and seed projects, but also by developing what specialists call "intermediate technologies" in order to provide the region with hoes, picks, and shovels, farm-to-market roads, and cooperative organizations for harvesting, storage, and marketing.

Other less ambitious projects include low-income housing construction, fish-farming projects, and rice-growing schemes. The Zairian government has been criticized for emphasizing large-scale projects and high-technology imports. The government, however, does appear to be focusing on smaller, rural projects designed to benefit the poorest of the poor.

Zaire's citizens, however, are still waiting for the "revolution" promised to them shortly after an army colonel named Joseph-Desire Mobutu took power on November 24, 1965, in a bloodless coup.

At that time, Zaire (then called Congo Kinshasa) had undergone five years of regional secessions, parliamentary crises, and intertribal clashes. The methods used to bring a measure of stability were brutal, though certainly no more brutal than those of Belgium's colonial administration in the twentieth century and King Leopold II's personal trading consortium in the nineteenth.

President Mobutu founded the Popular Revolutionary Movement (MPR) and outlawed all other political parties. He put down the regional rebellions and set about rebuilding the national army. By the early 1970s, he had made considerable progress toward the goal of uniting the country politically and economically.

However, reports of President Mobutu's growing wealth and increasing incidents of officially sanctioned smuggling and bribe taking began to overshadow his government's achievements. Today, the incidence of corruption has become so well entrenched in Zaire that, according to one 25-year resident, "corruption has become correct."

Consequently, 15 years after its proclamation by President Mobutu, Zaire has yet to experience a political or economic revolution. However, popular apathy and the fear of a return to the chaos of the early years apparently have smothered any large-scale uprising against the government or torching of
the country's political structures. Nevertheless, there have been some brush fires.

The most recent was Nguza's resignation. The wily businessman-politician left the Zairian government in April following a period of waning influence. Although the average Zairian tended to treat Nguza with the same disgust with which he views most feeders at the public trough, foreign governments were impressed with Nguza's eloquence and diplomacy. His leadership was a great help in Zaire's numerous consultations with donor governments and international lending institutions. However, Nguza's influence, which was highly touted in the European media, tended to rankle the president-for-life of the MPR and the scores of aspirants who courted his favor.

Nguza, who is from a powerful family in Shaba, had already experienced a fall from grace. In 1977, President Mobutu accused the then foreign minister of having prior knowledge of the invasion of Shaba by Katangese exiles based in Angola. He was sentenced to death for treason but was eventually pardoned and reinstated. Zairian observers who noted Nguza's waning influence viewed his departure as an act of personal survival, rather than one of political opposition to the Mobutu government.

Political opposition, however, continues to seethe beneath the surface in Zaire. The most recent incident occurred in late 1980. On December 30, Zairian officials arrested a group of parliamentarians at a house in Kinshasa. The parliamentarians had signed a 50-page document that opened with the headline "Mobutu Must Resign." The document went on to delineate in respectful but blunt tones the total failure of the current government on the political, security, economic, cultural, and even social levels.

The chief of state was reportedly furious over the document. He ordered a round of hearings on the matter, charging members of the group with subversion and insulting the president. In earlier times, such dissidence would have been punished by public hangings, or at least by long prison sentences. However, President Mobutu decided to drop the matter, but he banned the politicians from political life for five years. He explained his actions to the media, saying a wise father knows when to punish his wayward children and when to forgive them. Diplomats based in Zaire said the amnesty was an example of "reforms" being carried out in the Zairian political and judicial systems. Others said President Mobutu rather was following his own political instincts by acquiescing to international and domestic pressure for leniency.

Other Zairian dissidents have fared less well. In July 1979, some 200 citizens — primarily students — were allegedly shot by Zairian soldiers in East Kasai. According to parliamentary representatives from the region, the students were digging illegally for diamonds on the Lubilanji River near Mbuji-Mayi and were attacked for failing to pay the local military authorities for permission to prospect in the area.

In 1980, students at the Kinshasa campus of Zaire's national university rioted for higher scholarships, better food, and additional school supplies. The government responded by closing the university for half a year. Other uprisings, less well documented, in the Kwilu and Kisangani areas in the late 1970s, were also reported to have been harshly put down by government forces.

Popular uprisings in Zaire, whether for political or economic reasons, are severely punished. And all blame is assigned to military and political leaders in the area of unrest. As a result, the political system has tended to treat the symptoms of political opposition, rather than the causes.

Despite these longstanding problems, however, Zaire continues to lead most of the continent in promoting the expression of Africa's rich cultural heritage. Groups of writers meet regularly in Kinshasa and in the provincial cities. Theater and ballet groups perform regularly, despite the economic crunch, to packed houses. Artists, both within and without the established workshops, produce some of the most innovative art in the region. And Zaire's orchestra music continues to animate nightclubs and dance halls throughout Africa as well as in Europe and the Caribbean.

African leaders have acknowledged President Mobutu as one of the pioneers of the African "authenticity movement." In the mid-1960s he called for a return to African traditions and launched the movement by dropping the colonial names of Zaire's cities, such as Léopoldville and Elizabethville, and reinstating their precolonial names, Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. A few years later, the Democratic Republic of the Congo became the Republic of Zaire, and Zairian citizens officially dropped their Christian names for African ones. The results of this campaign can be seen in fashion, religion, and the arts. And Zaire's influence can be seen not only in Africa, but in Europe and in the Americas as well.

In conclusion, Zaire will continue to exert considerable influence in African affairs, for its problems are far less than its geopolitical importance or its potential in natural and human resources. Moreover, the economic and political hardships have hardened Zairians' will to survive. And the growing pragmatism and accompanying cynicism in the country mean that Zairians in the future will be less likely than in the past to follow a guide who appears to them from the heavens.
Building an Africa Policy

BY RICHARD DEUTSCH

"This administration will give high priority to resolving conflicts in southern Africa, a region of strategic, political, and economic importance to the United States and the Western world," Dr. Chester Crocker told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Crocker, then assistant secretary of state-designate for African affairs, outlined the Reagan administration's emerging policies toward Africa in the first of two confirmation hearings held this April.

The Senate committee scheduled the hearings within days of a White House announcement that Crocker would soon set off on a fact-finding mission to Africa, primarily southern Africa. U.S. officials said the Reagan administration had completed the first phase of its Africa policy review; Crocker's mission signified the second phase: the former Georgetown University professor and Africa scholar would consult with leaders in a dozen African capitals and explain the direction of developing U.S. policies on southern African questions.

A few hours before climbing aboard a U.S. jet that would take him to London and then on to Africa, Crocker briefed the Senate committee on the initial conclusions of the administration's Africa policy review.

"I consider it critical that this administration begin with a clear delineation of what our interests in Africa are, namely: supporting regional security, without which social and economic progress cannot take place; ensuring for the United States and our allies fair commercial access to essential petroleum and non-fuel minerals; promoting U.S. trade and investment in Africa...; fostering basic human liberties...; and cooperating with our Western allies and friends in Africa to deter aggression and subversion by our adversaries," Crocker told the committee.

Crocker pointed out, however, that "our interests in Africa are increasingly threatened by political instability, external intervention, [and] economic malaise." He added that the administration sees the causes of Africa's problems as "both regional and external in their origins," and believes that "the policies that we pursue must seek to address both sources."

"Our political relations with Africa," Crocker said, "must be guided by our interests, both global and regional. Day-to-day working relations require both patient diplomacy and a deep comprehension of local power realities."

One major thrust of Reagan diplomacy would be to support American friends on the continent: "This administration believes it is important to stand together with proven friends in Africa...to work with our African friends to address the sources of Africa's instability," said Crocker.

U.S. aid to the continent would be boosted, and assistance policies reordered, beginning with more aid for America's friends. There would also be an effort to create more African "winners."

"It is not Utopian to believe that more African nations can, like Nigeria, become a practicing democracy that no longer needs U.S. assistance. We are not ashamed to back winners. On the contrary, we are proud to do so," stressed Crocker.

On the other hand, Crocker testified that the Reagan administration "is committed to a leading role in meeting Africa's humanitarian crises." This pledge would be backed up a few days later in Geneva, when international donors gathered to commit funds for African refugee relief. An American contribution of close to $300 million would represent one-half of the world's response.

In his Senate testimony, Crocker said American interests require a U.S. military presence in the Horn of Africa. He said the United States intends to stand by the military facilities agreements negotiated by the Carter administration with Kenya and Somalia: "Africa is an integral part of the global political arena, and this administration has no intention of adopting a unilateral, self-denying ordinance when Western strategic interests are at stake. Nor do we believe these interests to be incompatible with African regional security...There is no reason to apologize for or downplay the agreements we have signed."

However, it was Crocker's outline of Reagan administration policies on southern Africa that drew most attention. He made clear the United States intends to "remain engaged" in the region: "The challenge this administration accepts is to develop policies throughout southern Africa that enhance our interests and impede opportunities for our adversaries."

Turning first to Namibia, Crocker said, "We support the objective of an early transition to an internationally recognized independence for Namibia."

What Crocker did not mention in his first Senate hearing is that the Reagan administration already had serious
committee the Reagan administration’s approach to relations with Angola: “It is the best way to get there.”

Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kans.), the head of the Africa Subcommittee, asked if the Reagan administration’s proposal for a substantial contribution to Zimbabwe’s reconstruction effort was meant as a signal to South Africa. Crocker replied, “So long as Zimbabwe demonstrates the potential to be a winner in both political and economic terms, I think we will stand by this policy.... It is a signal of our interest in multiracial accommodation inside Zimbabwe that could be of significant potential to the region. In that sense it is a signal to all the parties of southern Africa.”

Senator S.I. Hayakawa (R-Calif.) asked a key question: “The fact that there has been a change of policy towards South Africa with the coming in of the Reagan administration gives me a combination of hope and additional nervousness. In what way does the present administration hope to influence South Africa?”

“We believe that there are many elements that must be brought to bear, of which pressure is one and support is another.... The key point I would like to leave you with is the notion that we must not only believe in punitive measures, but also in supporting what we believe in, not simply in distancing ourselves, but in being helpful. This is the new tone and also the new substance of our new approach to our relations with South Africa,” explained Crocker.

Senator Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) probed deeper: “I would be interested in your description of how we are going to follow a balanced policy, seeking to improve relations with South Africa... but recognizing the danger of taking steps that would alienate us from black Africa. How are we going to walk that tightrope?”

“Senator, I believe that it is abso-
minister, Joachim Chissano, emerged from a meeting with Crocker to publicly condemn the Reagan administration’s new approach to South Africa, saying, “We feel the changes in South Africa are not significant at all. They are aimed at protecting apartheid.”

While Crocker was in southern Africa, foreign ministers from more than 30 nonaligned nations met in Algiers to discuss an imminent Security Council meeting on Namibia. The foreign ministers called on the United Nations to impose mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa because of Pretoria’s refusal to implement the UN plan for Namibia’s independence. They also called for increased military assistance to SWAPO.

And in Luanda, the presidents of the six Frontline states gathered to criticize the Reagan administration’s policies. They said they thought the administration’s request for a repeal of the Clark Amendment was the prelude to an attempt to “destabilize” the government in Luanda. The African leaders condemned warming relations between Washington and Pretoria. And they reaffirmed their support for the UN plan for Namibian independence, stressing “the urgent need to implement this plan without delay, evasion, qualifications, or modifications.”

The Frontline communiqué, and news leaks of Crocker’s conversations with Frontline leaders, prompted the American envoy to speak out publicly on Namibia during his last stop on the continent. He told a press conference in the Nigerian capital that he was skeptical the UN plan would by itself bring independence to Namibia.

From Lagos, Crocker flew back to London for a two-day meeting with Foreign Office officials of the Western contact group on Namibia: the United States, Canada, Britain, France, and West Germany. The meeting ended with a joint communique in which the Western contact group obliquely called for a modification of the UN plan.

The five had “considered possibilities for strengthening the existing UN plan” to give “greater confidence to all the parties in the future of an independent Namibia.”

Later, in Washington, U.S. officials explained that the Reagan administration considered the UN plan “dead in the water.” They said Crocker had conveyed this to the African leaders he had visited and had expressed the American desire to modify the plan to give South Africa more confidence in the process. But they also said the United States would not let Pretoria determine the shape of a Namibian settlement.

The officials told reporters that the United States had been advancing one specific idea for “improving” the UN plan, and revealed that Crocker had spoken with African leaders about the possibility of holding a constitutional convention before elections in Namibia, similar to the settlement reached on Zimbabwe last year at Lancaster House.

The officials said the African leaders had “raised no objection in the abstract sense” to this new approach. And they announced that South African Foreign Minister Roelf Botha would visit Washington in mid-May for consultations on Namibia.

Returning to Washington, Crocker almost immediately faced a second hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The hearing had been called at the insistence of Senator Helms, who said he considered Crocker’s trip “dismal” and wanted to question Crocker again. Helms, however, failed to show up for the hearing. Most of the senators present expressed their support for Crocker, and made little attempt to hide their exasperation over Helms’ “dilatory tactics.” The Foreign Relations Committee voted overwhelmingly to recommend full Senate confirmation of Crocker’s nomination.

In his second hearing, Crocker told the Senate committee that he had not gone to Africa with “an American plan” for Namibia, but with “preliminary ideas.”

“Among the questions at which we are looking, of course, is the issue of a constitution,” Crocker told the Senate panel. “It is our view that the formulation of a fairly complete and comprehensive constitution prior to elections in Zimbabwe made a substantial difference in enabling the parties to look to the future with greater confidence than otherwise would have been possible.”

He said his visit to Africa had produced “a sense, if you will, of the parameters within which a settlement of the Namibian problem can take place.”

And he said the Western contact group foreign ministers would meet in late May to formulate more specific proposals for “improving” the UN plan.

Crocker’s second confirmation hearing also focused on the Reagan administration’s plans for relations with Angola. Senator Paul Tsongas recalled a recent Washington Post interview with Angolan Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge. The Angolan official had stressed that his government would send home the Cuban troops as soon as the UN plan for Namibia was implemented and South Africa ended attacks against SWAPO bases in Angola. Jorge called for implementation of the UN plan without modification, and he ruled out any possibility of reconciliation between the MPLA government in Luanda and Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA movement. “We do not accept reconciliation with traitors and terrorists. Savimbi represents nothing in my country,” said Jorge.

Senator Tsongas asked what Crocker thought of Jorge’s statement. “We are not convinced that it is quite as simple as the way the foreign minister put it…. Progress in the Angolan context towards national reconciliation and Cuban withdrawal would facilitate progress towards a Namibian settlement, while, at the same time, the reverse applies,” said Crocker.

Later, in an interview with this correspondent, Crocker explained that the Reagan administration sees the Angolan situation as “a very interesting proposition. It confirms our view that there is a close relationship between the conflicts in Angola and Namibia… but something more precise needs to be said about that relationship. We’re looking for some more specific indication of how the resolution of these two conflicts might work. We don’t say that
as a threat or precondition that we are creating, it's simply reality on the ground.'"

On Namibia, Crocker explained that the Reagan administration believes the UN plan by itself 'is not going to lead to the essential decision that must be made, and that is a decision by South Africa to implement the transition to independence. Some new ideas must be given a chance. We need a realistic basis to proceed. It's a question of finding common ground to move forward. If we can, we have every intention of leading the way.'"

But there was little common ground to be seen at the United Nations that week. As Crocker was completing his mission to Africa, the Security Council agreed to the request of the African group, and began a 10-day debate on Namibia.

The council's deliberations opened with an appeal, supported by Britain, France, and the United States that the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance of Namibia be allowed to present its views. The DTA asked to be heard on an equal basis with SWAPO, on the grounds that it is an interested party to the Namibian issue. With the three Western members dissenting, the Security Council refused to hear the DTA. This action was angrily denounced by South Africa, which pointed to the vote as evidence that even the Security Council was biased on the Namibian issue. U.S. Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick agreed, saying the refusal to hear the DTA damages the capacity of the Security Council to act as a peace-maker.

Formal council debate began with a demand from the African members for mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa. Speaking for the Organization of African Unity, Sierra Leone’s foreign minister, Abdulai Conteh, said that all peaceful efforts to resolve the Namibian dispute had been exhausted, and that 'now is the time for the UN to act.' Conteh admitted that some African economies would also suffer because of the trade bans, but he said the sanctions should be imposed as a matter of principle.

Several dozen foreign ministers and high-ranking officials from African and other nonaligned nations flew into New York to address the council. They called for passage of five draft resolutions on sanctions that provided for the severance of all diplomatic and trade relations with South Africa and an embargo on oil deliveries.

South Africa's director general of foreign affairs, Brand Fourie, warned the council not to impose sanctions: 'Threats will accomplish nothing other than to strengthen our determination not to permit an unfair solution to be foisted on the territory .... South Africa will not take sanctions lying down.'

Fourie's words went not only unheeded, but unheard. Delegates from African, nonaligned, and Eastern-bloc nations walked out during his speech.

U.S. Ambassador Kirkpatrick asked the council to consider 'practical alternatives' to sanctions: 'If we are realistic — and if we are not we waste our time and that of everyone else — then we will understand that resolutions do not solve problems. Declarations do not secure independence.'

Ugandan Ambassador Olara Utunnu, leader of the African group in the Security Council, countered: 'What would we say to the founding fathers who issued that famous declaration of July 4, 1776? What shall we say to peoples all over the world who draw inspiration from that monument of colonial resistance,' he said, expressing the dismay and anger felt by many African delegations in reaction to Kirkpatrick's position.

Day after day, as the public debate continued, African and Western delegates met privately as well. The Africans pressed the West to spell out explicitly how it planned to bring Namibia to independence. Western contact group members asked for more time, saying they would draw up specific proposals to break the impasse on implementing the UN plan when their foreign ministers met in May. But the Africans feared that another delay would simply strengthen South Africa's position in Namibia, perhaps allowing time for an internal settlement to take place in the territory.

Compromise plans were floated and abandoned. A vote was called. The United States, Britain, and France vetoed the sanctions resolutions.

Ironically, much of the script for the Security Council action on Namibia seemed to have been written and rehearsed in advance. Even before the opening speeches, the Africans had made clear a sanctions vote was unavoidable, while Washington and London had quickly stressed that vetoes would be cast in response. Neither side gave ground, and the entire debate was streaked with bitterness.

"Was it all just a diplomatic charade?" Crocker was asked in an interview.

"No," said Crocker, "what we have at the UN is a situation in which the Frontline states and other important African nations have made clear their concern. It is their belief that South Africa is the reason we haven't had a settlement. They wanted to make their sense of urgency... But they're going to wait and see what we come up with, and once we have specific proposals on the table, they'll consider them. Once the dust settles, then we can move forward."
Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira, Zimbabwe Minister of Information and Tourism

INTERVIEWED BY MICHAEL C. BEAUBIEN

On January 3 of this year, Minister of Information and Tourism Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira announced that the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust had acquired a 42% share that the South African Argus Group had held in Zimbabwe’s five major newspapers: the Herald and the Sunday Mail (Salisbury), the Chronicle and the Sunday News (Bulawayo), and the Umtali Post Weekly. This $2.72 million purchase was facilitated by an $S million grant from Nigeria. Several months earlier the new Zimbabwe government had purchased the Inter-African News Agency from the South African Press Association. These measures effectively ended South Africa’s control over the dissemination of news within Zimbabwe. Yet, these initiatives produced almost universal criticism from the West and charges of a government takeover of the press.

Additional information not yet announced at the time of the following interview with Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira involved the composition of the Mass Media Trust and the new African editors of the major newspapers. The first trustees of the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust include Dr. Davidson Sadza, a private medical practitioner in Salisbury; John Hills, managing director of David Whitehead and Company; M. Ndabwa, deputy town clerk of Bulawayo; Ebinath Mapondera, a well-known social worker and member of the Commission of Inquiry on Income, Prices, and Working Conditions; Hamish Mkushi, a lawyer with the firm of Mkushi and Sawyer; Grace Todd, a retired schoolteacher and wife of a member of the Senate; and Dr. Walter Kambe, deputy principal of the University of Zimbabwe.

The new editors for three of the five major newspapers include:

- Herald: Fari Munyuki, who is a graduate in journalism from Macalester College in Minnesota and has been a writer with the Zambia Daily Mail and the Times of Zambia as well as editor in chief of a Lusaka magazine, the Weekender.
- Sunday Mail: Willie Musarurwa, who is currently vice-chairman of the board of governors of Zimbabwe Broadcasting Company and was previously an editor with several Zimbabwe newspapers before assuming the post of publicity secretary for Joshua Nkomo’s Patriotic Front (ZAPU).
- Chronicle: Thomas Sithole, who has worked as a freelance journalist and a sports editor and chief reporter of the Tanzanian Daily News.

AFRICA REPORT: How would you evaluate the coverage provided Zimbabwe by the Western media since independence?

SHAMUYARIRA: We have had a very bad press overseas since independence. They have continued to predict that there is going to be a civil war in the country and that the coalition government is going to break up. None of this, of course, reflects the truth.

During the war, there were 50 people killed each day. Since we came into power, the number has been reduced to zero. There are still isolated incidents of shooting here and there and incidents of guerrilla units opening fire on each other, but they are isolated incidents. This does not mean that civil war is imminent or that the government is about to collapse.

The government will never collapse. It is very strong. Our party, Comrade Mugabe’s party, can form the government by itself without any other party. We have 57 seats in a parliament of 100. So there is no way the government can fall. The bad press we have had, the exaggerations implying that there is going to be a breakdown in law and order and a breakdown in the system, are totally untrue.

AFRICA REPORT: What factors do you think have prevented foreign correspondents, particularly British and American reporters, from providing balanced and objective reporting on Zimbabwe?

SHAMUYARIRA: There are two reasons, we think. One is that most of the foreign correspondents from America and Britain who come here are based in South Africa. They come here once a month to report on what they have seen. But they live in South Africa, where they are conditioned by the South African press to a position where they don’t like
us and certainly distrust us. So they come here having read the South African papers for the whole month, and they come with the prejudices of the South African press. One can see that from the questions they ask. They tend to be very hostile. That is one reason.

Another reason is that the British and American press, the Western press generally, have been predicting all along that there would be a civil war. They predicted this during the Smith period. This was one of the reasons given by Smith for not granting independence. He said that if we grant independence, the Shona and Ndebele would be at each other's throats and we would have civil war. During the Lancaster House conference, they continued to predict this. Frankly, I think they don't like the fact that we have proved them wrong on this. There will be no civil war, and we will continue to work together with Nkomo's party. There are problems, and there have been problems in the past, but these problems can and will be overcome.

AFRICA REPORT: You seem to be suggesting that if Western news agencies based their reporters in Salisbury (Harare) there would be a marked improvement in the coverage.

SHAMUYARIRA: Yes, there would be a marked improvement.

AFRICA REPORT: What about the possibility of the news agencies employing African nationals as stringers in the countries where they don't have correspondents based?

SHAMUYARIRA: Yes, they should. There are some African stringers who are here now, but not many. Certainly we would want that, and that would also represent a marked improvement.

AFRICA REPORT: As you noted earlier, the recent events in Bulawayo did provide the Western press with more ammunition, but could you explain the circumstances surrounding the seizure of film at Salisbury airport from correspondents returning from Bulawayo?

SHAMUYARIRA: I cannot explain in any detail because it was done by the Criminal Investigation Department, which is a section of the police. I did not understand the reasons why they took such action. If they did not want reporters to photograph certain situations, they could have kept them out of the area instead of allowing them in and then seizing the film. But as soon as I heard about it, I called the minister responsible and told him to release the film, and they did so. I really don't know the reasons for the initial action.

AFRICA REPORT: Many foreign correspondents, notably David Ottaway of the Washington Post, have celebrated the kind of relationship the foreign press has enjoyed in Mozambique. Have you made any effort to note the specific kind of government measures that Mozambique has employed in relating to foreign journalists? Will your government facilitate more such tours as this Oxfam-America press tour for foreign journalists?

SHAMUYARIRA: Yes, we will do that. We will continue to facilitate tours of this kind. We will continue to have a very open relationship with the foreign press. We want to emulate what the Mozambicans have done. We will cooperate with foreign journalists and have a completely open press here. The one measure we have reintroduced from the previous regime is what we call the TEP, the temporary employment permit. Journalists are required to register at Liquenda House, where they are issued a card that certifies them as accredited journalists. We needed to know who was in the country and what news organizations they represented. There is no other restriction.

AFRICA REPORT: Would there be any internal monitoring of correspondents in the country? Are there any areas of the country or any of the camps that you have placed off-limits at this point?

SHAMUYARIRA: No, they can go anywhere. The only thing is that if they wish to go to a military camp they must get permission from the military authorities.

AFRICA REPORT: Could you explain why your government has decided to buy the shares of the South African Argus Group and establish the Mass Media Trust?

SHAMUYARIRA: First, it must be remembered that the newspapers of Rhodesia were an important instrument for the colonizers of this country from South Africa, notably Cecil John Rhodes. They were brought in by the colonizers and used for the purpose of advancing their interests in mining, agriculture, and, later, industry. The papers never changed much from their South African origin. Up to now all the editors were recruited from South Africa. Second, their primary concern was the politics of the new white settlers. However, while they claimed to speak for the white settlers, in fact they spoke for big business, especially the Chamber of Mines in Johannesburg. When the interests of...
white settlers clashed with those of big business, the papers backed the latter. Thirdly, the politics, culture, and history of the majority African population were never central to the operations of the newspapers. Consequently, the unity of the nationalist movement and the goals of national independence that it sought for Zimbabweans were never a central concern for the papers. Instead, they accentuated division and distorted the national goals by simply equating them to communism. At no time in the history of the struggle or at successive constitutional conferences did the papers support the African position. Papers with this kind of orientation could not be accommodated in a free, democratic, and independent Zimbabwe.

Soon after coming to power we informed the Argus Company that the continued ownership of Zimbabwe Newspapers by a foreign company—and one based in South Africa at that—was unacceptable to the Zimbabwe Government. We cited a number of countries like Canada and Australia that have legislation that prevents any foreign companies from buying or operating newspapers. As soon as it was known that the Argus Company was willing to sell their shares in Zimbabwe newspapers, an interest was expressed by one South African company and two British companies. We rejected them on the ground that we did not want control to shift from Johannesburg to London, but to Salisbury, and to a broadly-based group of Zimbabwe nationals. A well-known multinational company acting on behalf of a Zimbabwean politician made a strong bid to buy Zimbabwe Newspapers outright. We felt this deal would return control to big business again. We wanted to move away from intrigue and emphasis on profit. We wanted to establish a chain of newspapers that are the mouthpiece of the Zimbabwean people as a whole, and not the Chamber of Mines in Johannesburg or anywhere else.

The imaginative solution was the creation of the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust. This is an autonomous and independent body of distinguished Zimbabweans. It will consist of a board of seven trustees; and a secretariat of five professionals. An agreed number of professionals will serve on the board of directors of Zimbabwe Newspapers and also on that of the Zimbabwe News Agency (ZIANA). The directors appointed by the trustees will serve alongside representatives of commercial companies, and the company will continue to make its profits. But those profits accruing to the trust will be plowed back into the business because the trust has no shareholders to pay. It is that aspect we have described as non-profit making.

AFRICA REPORT: I understand that there are similar mechanisms in Ghana and Nigeria. Has there been any effort to learn from their experiences?

SHAMUYARIRA: Yes, I have been to Ghana and Nigeria. We have also looked at many other similar situations. We looked at India, Yugoslavia, and Romania. The Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust we have established seems to be along the lines that best suit our own situation.

AFRICA REPORT: Is this similar to the India Press Trust?

SHAMUYARIRA: No, the India Press Trust is different in significant respects. The India Press Trust is owned by a consortium of newspapers, whereas our trust is not a consortium of newspapers. Our trust will be an autonomous body.

AFRICA REPORT: Although the Mass Media Trust board is supposed to be an independent agency, who will provide the guidelines for the operation of the board? Will the members travel to other countries to study the operation of various media trust boards, or will experts from other countries, particularly socialist countries, come to provide guidance?

SHAMUYARIRA: No, not really. I think the Mass Media Trust board will have to learn from its own experiences, because we are not copying any particular model, either from the socialist countries or from India, although we were heavily influenced by the India Press Trust. We studied their constitution very carefully before we set up the trust. But we are not copying any particular model.

We have started something new and unique. I think the trust will grow as a Zimbabwean institution, with its roots in this country and controlled by Zimbabweans. It should grow to the extent that it becomes the main vehicle for the people to express their wishes and desires and to express their criticism of the government where criticism is justified. The trust will be the framework where the debate about the goals of our society and our system of government can take place. It must be an open debate where the government will be criticized. We accept that.

AFRICA REPORT: Could you amplify for me the relationship between the board of trustees and the board of directors?

SHAMUYARIRA: The board of trustees are the trustees of the trust. The board of directors are directors of Zimbabwe Newspapers. Some of them are appointed by the trustees, and some are appointed by other financial interests. The trust holds only 45% of the shares. The other 55% are held by seven different companies, with small amounts each. One has 13%, and another has 5%. Seven different companies hold the other 55%, and they appoint their own directors to the board as well. So when the board meets, there will be representatives of the trustees and representatives of these other companies, which will constitute the board of directors. The executive director of this board will be appointed by the trust.

AFRICA REPORT: What are the other companies?

SHAMUYARIRA: They are local companies. There is an insurance company, Old Mutual, which is the largest single holding with 11%, and an electric company, Electra, which owns about 10%. There is a building society that has about 8% and other small interests. These companies have no interest in newspaper work as such. For them it is just a form of investment. They have invested in Zimbabwe newspapers for profit.

AFRICA REPORT: The latest reports concerning the Mass Media Trust provide for the appointment of new African editors for the papers concerned. Is there going to be any effort to hire more African or Third World journalists?

SHAMUYARIRA: No, not at the moment, because we
just haven’t got the reporters. We have started an Institute of Mass Communications, which is opening on the first of April. However, we have been using the facilities of Rauneh House College for some emergency training. We have 40 Americans who are being trained there now in a six-month course, which will end in March. We will employ some of them in the newspapers. But we are beginning a major training program on the first of April that will last for one year. When we have enough trained people, they will be absorbed into the newspapers. At the moment we just don’t have the African manpower to fill all the vacancies. So what we are concentrating on is changing the editors so we can change the policies.

AFRICA REPORT: Would you be receptive to Third World journalists from other countries coming to Zimbabwe to work?
SHAMUYARIRA: Yes, we would be very much open to this. We would like them to come and help us.

AFRICA REPORT: Is your objective a majority African, or at least Third World, staff on your newspapers?
SHAMUYARIRA: Yes.

AFRICA REPORT: Will the students in the planned Institute of Mass Communications be trained in the conventional Western philosophy of journalism, or will they be trained in the socialist model?
SHAMUYARIRA: They are going to be trained within the socialist framework. The three areas we are going to train journalists in are print journalism, broadcast journalism, and production techniques. We are going to give them such training as will fit them to serve a socialist Zimbabwe. Within that perspective, we are going to teach them to be productive and constructive—in other words, not criticizing for the sake of criticizing. We want productive and constructive people.

AFRICA REPORT: Do you foresee any criticism from the Western press for your decision to train future journalists under the socialist model?
SHAMUYARIRA: Yes, we have been criticized already, and we will be criticized a great deal in the future. But I think we can live with such criticism.

AFRICA REPORT: Do you intend to cooperate with some of the new agencies of the New World Information Order, such as the Pan-African News Agency?
SHAMUYARIRA: Yes. As a matter of fact, I recently received a letter from the regional office of the Pan-African News Agency in Lusaka. I replied that the new Zimbabwe News Agency will link up with the Nonaligned Press Pool in Belgrade. I have already attended their conferences and formed links with Prensa Latina of Cuba. We already have a close relationship with AIM of Mozambique and will jointly establish links with Latin America and Asia.

However, what is more important for us here in this initial period is links with the black states to the north. Throughout the period of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), the links were with South Africa. South Africa was the country that was considered an example of good government, prosperity, and so forth. Everything to the north was considered chaos.

When I was appointed minister of information, I addressed the journalists’ union and told them that we must look to the north and not to the south. This will be our major effort. There are no correspondents from this country in Lusaka, Dar es Salaam, or Lagos. Even on the radio and the television, we receive no news, commentaries, or documentaries on developments in black Africa. We must first show that we belong to black Africa. Our independence represents a shift from belonging to the white south to the black north. This is what we will concentrate on in the mass media. When we have succeeded in this, we will expand to the Third World generally.

AFRICA REPORT: Are there any plans for the launching of a bilingual newspaper utilizing the native languages?
SHAMUYARIRA: Yes. However, there is already a paper called The People, which was utilized by the previous regime for propaganda. It was distributed free in the rural areas and published biweekly. Our people never read it, because it was full of propaganda; but it was useful for other things. Now we are producing a proper paper, which will be sold. It will be printed in Shona, Ndebele, and English.

AFRICA REPORT: Well, that concludes my questions. Is there anything else that you feel should be reflected in any reports on the media developments in Zimbabwe?
SHAMUYARIRA: People should realize that the changes we have made in the press are historic. These papers had been run as a colonial enterprise since 1891. They had been part of the European establishment for 90 years. Therefore, the changes we have made are very dramatic. We have made the changes much earlier than may have been expected; but we have done so because we felt that it was important to represent Zimbabwe properly and not to endure continued South African control over the dissemination of news in our country.
in any examination of the opportunities for strengthening U.S.-Nigerian business relations, one must first ask two key questions. The first of these questions is: How does Nigeria view the Reagan administration's attitudes toward Africa and what would be Nigeria's advice? The second question is: Why should we care what Nigeria thinks about these things? Are U.S. interests likely to be in any serious way affected by Nigerian views of U.S. policy toward Africa?

With regard to the first question, I have used the term attitudes rather than policies because there is an understandable disinclination among Africans to make a distinction between the two. Africans are ready to give the U.S. administration time to formulate its African policies, but they already see signs of attitudes that they believe presage policies with which they differ.

On what do Nigerians base their judgments to date concerning the attitudes of the Republican administration toward Africa?

They base their views upon what our president says. Early in March in an interview with Walter Cronkite, President Reagan said he though the United States should be trying to be helpful to South Africa as long as a serious and honest effort was being made by South Africans to remove apartheid. He asked whether the United States could abandon a country that had stood beside us in every war we had ever fought and a country whose minerals were strategically essential to the free world.

Nigerians—and Africans generally—have interpreted this statement as support for South Africa's continued refusal to face what Nigerians consider the basic issue in South Africa—an issue that goes beyond apartheid to power-sharing and full equality of all races.

A second factor influencing Nigerian views of evolving U.S. policy has been the administration's break with the past in receiving high-level South African military officials for conversations in Washington and at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. Although somewhat mollified by Washington's subsequent reaffirmation of the no-visits policy, Nigerians have found unsatisfactory our explanation of the visas—and the conversations—which we said were honest efforts.

A third factor has been the administration's attitude toward Angola and particularly the announced decision to seek repeal of the Clark Amendment. This decision has provoked widespread African criticism since it is seen as indicating intent to give military assistance to Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA forces in southern Angola. The administration's disclaimers of any such necessary intent have met with sharp skepticism from African leaders—skepticism not diminished by praise of Savimbi's charm by administration spokespersons.

These three factors have contributed to the following fourth major Nigerian concern regarding U.S. attitudes: namely, that the United States is no longer serious about pushing South Africa to give up Namibia. Nigerians see current U.S. reexamination of UN Resolution 435 as threatening the validity of the painstaking efforts of the past four years. These efforts created a framework for an internationally acceptable solution to South Africa's illegal control of that territory.

Nigerians are especially worried by the possibility that the U.S. might make the departure of Cuban troops from Angola a precondition to continued efforts to produce a Namibian settlement. Nigerians are not happy about the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. But they share the view of Angolan Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge, expressed on several occasions during his visit to the United States last week, that a Namibian settlement will produce an Angolan instruction to the Cubans to return home.

Nigerians maintain that the Cubans' principal role is to protect Angola, not against Savimbi, but against South African military forces operating from across the border in Namibia. Savimbi's forces nonetheless benefit from a variety of linkages with those South African forces. Any U.S. assistance to him would be viewed in most of Africa as tantamount to an American alliance with South Africa. It would be certain to provoke immediate and sharp reactions from most Africans and certainly from Nigerians.

Nigerians argue that U.S. aid to Savimbi will in any case do the reverse of what they assume would be the U.S. intention behind such aid—that is, it would bring an escalation, rather than a reduction, of Cuban and Soviet presence. And it would destroy any chance of a Namibian settlement. In response to suggestions that the United States wishes to preclude the Cubans from operating in "risk-free" environments, Nigerians would reply that the greatest risk Castro faces in Angola is to be not needed.

Nigerians are asking whether U.S. concern for continued access to South African mineral resources and for continued "Western" control of the Cape sea route will have the effect of dissuading us from any actions that the South African government might regard as hostile. They believe that we equate stability with absence of Marxist activity. They fear that we will accordingly support leaders or regimes that profess anti-Marxist conviction whatever their approach to human rights or to the question of equality of political and social opportunity may be. They suggest that our attachment to short-term stability has the effect of encouraging
South African government intransigence on power-sharing. They believe there will be an eventual breakdown of public order and that this will jeopardize longer-term assurance of the strategic resources and assets that the U.S. administration believes are critically important to the U.S. national interest.

Nigerians are worried about knee-jerk reactions by the U.S. to Soviet presence and activities in Africa. They would like to be reassured that we are prepared to take into account the historic roots of Soviet influence. Frelimo, the MPLA, ZANU, ZAPU, the ANC, the PAC—where else, other than communist China, could these groups have gone to obtain military assistance in their nationalist struggles against Portuguese rule, against an illegal Rhodesian minority government, and against a South African regime that might be termed totalitarian by some, authoritarian by others, oligarchic by still others, but is certainly considered by Nigerians as above all racist and therefore unacceptable?

Let us look now at the second question: Why should Nigerian views on these issues matter to the United States? Why should Nigerian attitudes concern us? So what, if President Shagan threatened to use oil as a weapon against the U.S. in the event our policies were seen to buttress apartheid in South Africa or to discourage a democratic solution in Namibia? Are not Nigerians well known for their pragmatic approach, for their attachment to their own self-interest? How could they be so shortsighted as to think with the sale of a commodity that represents 90 percent of their foreign exchange income—a commodity which fully 50 percent is sold to U.S. buyers?

First of all, we must understand that Nigerians feel more deeply about these issues than about any other international question. For Nigerians, it is not El Salvador that matters, not Southeast Asia, not Afghanistan, not the Horn of Africa, not the Western Sahara, not Lebanon, not Israel, and not Iran—it is southern Africa that counts.

The U.S. Embassy in Lagos was bombarded with rocks in early January 1976. My house was mobbed by demonstrators. A letter from President Ford to the Nigerian head of state was termed "insulting" and "fatuous." The CIA was accused of complicity in the assassination of that same head of state a few weeks later, in February. And three times over the following seven months our secretary of state was turned down when he asked to visit Lagos. Why?

Because of U.S. policies in Angola in 1975, when the U.S. aligned itself on the same side as South Africa in the internal struggle for power between the MPLA on the one hand and, on the other, UNITA of Savimbi and the FNLA of Holden Roberto. I would submit that this is a pretty clear demonstration of how deeply Nigerians feel about southern Africa issues.

Let me remind you of another such indication of Nigerian views on this issue. This example is much more recent. In the summer of 1979, fearful that the new Conservative government of Mrs. Thatcher was going to recognize the so-called internal settlement regime of Ian Smith and Bishop Muzorewa in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Nigeria nationalized the British Petroleum share of Shell-BP and then quietly began disqualifying British companies seeking new contracts, licenses, and so forth in the lucrative Nigerian market. Shortly thereafter, at the Commonwealth conference in Lusaka, Mrs. Thatcher announced, to the great satisfaction of Nigerians and most other Africans, that the internal settlement did not represent a valid test of Zimbabwean opinion. Nigerians take some of the credit for that Tony judgment and for the felicitous series of events that have followed in Zimbabwe.

So back to the question. Do Nigerians care enough about U.S. comportment in Angola, in Namibia, or in South Africa to cut off our oil, which represents nearly 20 percent of U.S. imports, second only to purchases from Saudi Arabia? The quick answer is yes, they do. Under certain market circumstances, they might well take such action—even if it hurt. Under some other market circumstances, they might not.

But there are other unpleasant possible consequences for U.S. interests as a result of Nigerian displeasure with U.S. policies elsewhere in Africa. It is essential that we move from oil to these other questions as we assess this issue.

The now promising U.S.-Nigerian collaboration in agricultural development could be aborted. U.S. firms seeking contracts or joint ventures in construction, manufacturing, engineering, planning, and communications would be dropped in favor of competitors from Europe, Japan, or Brazil. The flow to the United States of Nigerian federal and state legislators and their staffs would dry up, depriving both sides of the benefits of further exchange of views on two executive-presidency constitutional systems with remarkable similarities.

Even more serious might be our inability to enlist the kind of collaboration that made Nigerian understanding so useful an asset to the U.S. government during the past four years. This kind of understanding produced Foreign Minister Joseph Garba's valiant and energetic attempt to mediate the Shaba problem between Zaire and Angola in the summer of 1977. That attempt was rendered possible only because Secretary Vance was able to assure Foreign Minister Garba that the United States would not overreact to the reported role of Cubans and East Germans in that affair.

In somewhat analogous fashion Nigerian support of the Anglo-American plan for Zimbabwe grew out of Nigerian conviction that the Carter administration was sincere in its attachment to full democracy in Zimbabwe and equal rights in South Africa. The repeal of the Byrd Amendment, the diplomacy of the then U.S. ambassador to the UN, Andrew Young, and the personal commitment of President Carter were seen by Nigerians as convincing demonstrations of a concern for the way in which Africans themselves defined their problems. It was a combination of these factors that encouraged Nigerian support of the UN plan for Namibia, of which the United States was the prominent architect. Without Nigerian influence with SWAPO, SWAPO might never have accepted the plan's formula.

In conclusion, I have tried to suggest that, however positive may be the presentations of my colleagues regarding the possibilities for useful and profitable endeavor in the Nigerian market—and I feel these possibilities are enormous—they can be seriously jeopardized by U.S. actions elsewhere on the African continent. We need Nigerian understanding. When we have had it, as evidenced in the several examples I have cited, Nigerian support for U.S. diplomatic initiatives has been an important contributor to the progress of those initiatives. Conversely, Nigerian opposition as illustrated in the Angolan case has been costly to U.S. interests. It is therefore of great importance that the Reagan administration make all possible effort to seek out and listen to the views of Nigeria as "policies" begin to emerge from "attitudes."
Books

U.S. COMPANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA


*Decoding Corporate Camouflage* is an important contribution to the intensifying debate over the U.S. role in South Africa. With the independence of Zimbabwe and the escalating war in Namibia, the white laager looms ever more isolated, except for its corporate partners.

One hundred thirty-five U.S. corporations have agreed to the Sullivan Principles as a guide for a change of the unequal work conditions of the African work force in their South African subsidiaries. The corporations have pledged to implement both nonsegregation in the workplace and fair employment practices, such as equal pay and opportunities for black workers. Elizabeth Schmidt outlines the principles and then penetrates their camouflage.

First, the principles themselves do not challenge apartheid. The South African government actually reviewed them and changed wording to make them acceptable. Even in fulfilling the principles, the U.S. corporations remain in compliance with the unequal and repressive laws of apartheid.

Second, even though the principles represent moderate reform, not the transformation of labor relations, they have not been implemented by the signatories. They remain principles, not work codes, as the Reverend Sullivan himself admits. Using data reported by the corporations themselves, Schmidt shows their nonimplementation of basic civil rights. One example from many cited in the book is that General Motors (on whose board of directors Sullivan sits) “desegregated” its washroom facilities by changing the “Europeans Only” signs to color codes: blue doors for white-only lavatories, orange for blacks and coloreds.

Third, the history of U.S. corporate investment in South Africa is one of aiding apartheid, not transforming it. U.S. corporations produce in key strategic sectors in South Africa. Schmidt, with careful documentation, shows how the motor vehicle, energy, and computer corporations contribute directly to the South African police and military apparatus. From providing computers that make “influx control” more efficient, to supplying crucial oil and weaponry to the war machine, U.S. corporations sustain the status quo in South Africa.

In assessing U.S. corporate involvement in South Africa, the author does not ignore the South African people. She documents their demand for the removal of U.S. capital. The few who do support foreign corporate investment are mainly dependent on the South African regime for their status positions. The book concludes that the code of conduct is only the corporations’ plan to protect their public image while retaining their high profits — profits based on cheap African labor.

*Decoding Corporate Camouflage* is a necessity for any student of southern Africa or of transnational corporate conduct. The book contains important and useful documentation for policy advisors. It is especially relevant as the new Republican administration is reassessing American policy toward South Africa.

Carol B. Thompson
University of Southern California
To see the "Venice of Africa" travel to Benin (Dahomey) and the village of Ganvie. Here over 10,000 people live in stilt houses, high and dry over a lagoon. Needless to say, they’re fabulous fishermen.

In the 5th century A.D. while the Roman Empire was falling in Europe, the Kingdom of Ghana was a full-fledged political state in West Africa.

The ancient Kingdom of Dahomey exchanged ambassadors with the court of Louis XIV.

Part of the fun of West Africa is bargaining. So here are three hints for successful bargaining:

Handshaking is an important social grace in West Africa, so remember to shake hands with everyone in the room when you’re being introduced. Also, always shake hands (pass food or gifts, etc.) with your right hand. That’s important!

NOTE: Elephants have the right of way.

The air is so clear in Mauritania that scientists gathered there to witness the solar eclipse in 1973.

Abidjan, Ivory Coast is often referred to as the "Manhattan of Africa". It has a "Central Park", skyscrapers, and the Hotel Ivoire is often compared to a glass-enclosed Rockefeller Center.

While you’re on a photo-safari in Gabon, perhaps you’ll get a picture of the extremely rare situtongas. And perhaps you won’t.

Dakar, Senegal is often referred to as the "Paris of Africa".

NOTE: When driving through the national parks remember that elephants have the right of way. They’re bigger than you are.

Africa’s "Macy’s" and "Gimbels" are the open markets in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. They’re not to be missed.

Air Afrique offers regularly scheduled, luxurious, non-stop jets from JFK to Dakar, Senegal, and then on to the rest of Africa. It’s the only way to fly!

Now what are you waiting for? Isn’t it time you discovered West Africa? Just call your Travel Agent or your nearest Air Afrique/Air France office today. Hurry!