AFRICA REPORT
AMERICA'S LEADING MAGAZINE ON AFRICA

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JULY–AUGUST 1984

Africa's Future: Hostage to the Drought



ALSO IN THIS ISSUE:

President Masire on Botswana and Southern Africa

Interview with Upper Volta's Capt. Sankara

The Politics of American Foreign Aid

Africa in the House of Representatives

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IN THIS ISSUE

This issue of *AFRICA REPORT* focuses on the drought that continues to afflict two-thirds of the African continent, wreaking havoc on already strained economies and necessitating a reexamination of development options and food production policies. Reporting from southern Africa and the Sahel, respectively, Denis R. Norman, Zimbabwe's minister of agriculture, and Howard Schissel, a freelance journalist, assess the extent of the drought in the two regions, and examine options facing governments and donors. Following the recent UNEP conference in Nairobi, Alastair Matheson evaluates international efforts to combat the growing threat of desertification in Africa.

We also provide interviews with two African heads of state whose countries are seriously affected by drought — President Quett Masire of Botswana and Captain Thomas Sankara of Upper Volta. In addition to commenting on the drought, the two leaders discuss other domestic and international issues affecting their countries.

The role of food aid is examined from the private voluntary organization perspective and from that of the U.S. government in two articles by Kenneth Hackett of Catholic Relief Services and Julia Chang Bloch of U.S. AID. Senator John C. Danforth explains why Americans should be concerned about the economic and environmental crises in Africa, and donor efforts to combat the Sahel drought are discussed in an interview with Anne de Lattre, director of Club du Sahel.

Cheryl Christensen, Arthur Dommen, and Peter Riley of the U.S. Department of Agriculture evaluate African government food policies in light of the drought. The politics of American development aid to Africa is analyzed by Carol Lancaster, while Congressman Howard Wolpe, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, explains new Africa policy initiatives in the House of Representatives.

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The cover photograph of a woman collecting firewood was taken in M'bout, Mauritania by Karen Durlach.

Captain Thomas Sankara,

President of the National Council of the Revolution, Upper Volta

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

AFRICA REPORT: Upper Volta is among the least-developed countries in the world, with few natural resources and afflicted by endemic drought. What are the development options for your country? Describe the priority sectors of your economic program.

SANKARA: The somber picture you have just painted of the situation in Upper Volta is a reality, but a reality that no longer frightens or worries us since the August 4 revolution, because we believe we have found the real key to our development on both the political and economic fronts. On the political front, starting with a clear ideology and a clear form of organization that makes the people responsible for their own acts and for the future they want to build, we intend to face all our problems and to define the way of life that is best suited to the concrete situation in our country. We no longer view with a sense of fatalism and doom the physical situation in which we find ourselves. To the contrary, with much stoicism and good humor, we believe that solutions exist to all these problems.

First, we must identify our enemies, the causes of our problems, and then the solutions. I am going to give you some reference points; the drought is the consequence of the climatic situation and the physical degradation of the soil, but it has also been caused by human activity, by the growth in population—the number of mouths to feed. People participate in bringing about desertification, and we think that by conscientizing our people we should be able to slow the advance of the desert. Second, it is people who speculate and earn profit from the drought. The worse the drought in a country, the more international traders speculate with grains, and the greater their superprofits. Therefore, there are factual links between the domination of international capital and the poverty of the people. These factors made us realize that our economic development process had to be rethought.

Today, therefore, our economic philosophy requires first of all that we rely on our people as we move toward really giving them economic power. Upper Volta is 90% rural, agricultural, backward. That is why in our economic development we must give priority to agriculture. That means for us, first, better water management through small water reserves. You may have seen press reports of the inauguration of small dams that peasants have constructed. We also believe that the subsoil holds quantities of water that must be exploited. In making use of these two sources of water, we will be able to free ourselves from dependence upon our very hypothetical rainy seasons and from the generally insufficient rainfall—particularly insufficient these last 10 years.

Second, we must provide the most appropriate factors of production—agricultural inputs and fertilizers—to our peasants and farmers, even if we have to subsidize them. Third, peasants must have an assured market for their production. That is why we have decided to favor small-scale agro-food industries. In that way, there will be an incentive for production—assuring that production will be totally absorbed. We will no longer be haunted by overproduction and by the difficulty of finding national or international markets for our production. This approach will certainly entail changes in Voltaics' eating habits and will also lead us to search for other foreign markets for our goods, but we have no other choice.

Therefore, our new economic philosophy is to strengthen the economy. Food security is a must. We must insure that Voltaics will no longer wake up in the morning and ask themselves what they are going to find to eat that day. We must banish once and for all those pathetic visions of peasants scratching the bare earth, wondering how they will be able to feed their children.

Starting from there, we think that the other sectors of the economy—notably industry—can be developed; but as for industry, too, we are not blindly optimistic right now. We are not dreaming of large-scale industries here in Upper Volta. To the contrary, we are proposing to build small-scale industries because the capital to establish them is easy

Editor's note: This interview was conducted in Ouagadougou in mid-May.

to mobilize, because the effects are immediate, and also because the smaller and less sophisticated the industry, the more the Voltaics will be able to manage the technology. And we intend to develop these industries throughout the nation. We aim at a nationally independent economy, one that is free from the domination of international capital. That is, it is the Voltaics themselves who will decide the future of their economy.

AFRICA REPORT: But Upper Volta's economy is very dependent on foreign aid. What hopes do you have of breaking your dependence on foreign assistance?

SANKARA: First of all, it is necessary to say that we are not opposed to international aid in principle—the proof is that we ourselves have already given food aid to other African countries since August 4. We have also received food aid since August 4, and we hope that this assistance will be increased. Our only condition is that aid must not be alienating, it must not pose a threat to our sovereignty, dignity, and honor. A man is capable of dying from hunger, of refusing a meal, if that meal is offered to him under humiliating conditions, under conditions that put him in a position of slavery. For a people, it is the same. Therefore, we are not against aid; we think that people can and must help each other in the interest of everyone's long-term security and well-being.

We say therefore that if international donors want to come to Upper Volta, they will be welcome, provided that they respect the preconditions that I indicated to you earlier. And we are fully prepared do without foreign aid if it is not given on our terms. That is why, ever since we came to power on August 4, we have chosen to accustom our people to sacrifice so that they will be ready to make sacrifices and count on their own abilities. If aid comes, so much the better. But if it doesn't, we are prepared. We cannot grovel for aid.

And you may have noted that we have formed a revolutionary emergency fund, which is open to contributions from all Voltaics and non-Voltaics. It is thanks to this fund that we are buying grain for disaster victims. It is also thanks to this fund and to other resources that we are struggling to assist small-scale farmers in the rural areas so that we can move from food security to food self-sufficiency and even to food exportation.

And we aim to launch large agricultural projects like the development of the Sourou Valley, which can become an important breadbasket for Upper Volta. Studies indicate that the soil there is rich and that irrigation would enable us to make use of more than 24,000 hectares [59,000 acres] for the production of maize, rice, wheat, soya, and sugarcane. We are also intent upon testing a new crop—jojoba. Upper Volta is convinced that it is a useful plant that will help us be in a stronger position on international markets.

For us, the revolution is not simply words. The revolution is also the radical transformation of statistics, and the Voltaic statistics of today are quite lamentable. But we are engaged in a revolution, and we are determined to enable our country to produce much more than it currently does. We will make our soils give us all we need. *That* is the revolution.

AFRICA REPORT: From your point of view, why is it that the quantity of international aid that has been disbursed in Upper Volta over the years has failed to generate any substantial improvement in the level of Upper Volta's economic development?

SANKARA: If we take the year 1983, in that year there were about 400 visits by experts to Upper Volta—that is more than one visit a day. Since independence, international aid has totaled more than $500 million. But the consequence, the impact, has been minimal, if not negative in certain domains. This is the fault both of those who provided the aid and of the manner in which it was distributed—and also of the Voltaics themselves. Donors have not always had the sincere aim of helping Upper Volta. They used aid as a means of gaining control over our country—cultural control, economic control, political control; by making their presence felt, they turned the Voltaics into perpetual beggars, and foisted on them a beggar mentality.

Our policy is that the point of aid is to eliminate aid. When aid only goes to produce a greater need for aid, the cure is worse than the illness. This country is overrun by bad aid. Now there are certainly some who have come to Upper Volta with noble and generous intentions but have not been able to put their aid to good use because they do not have sufficient understanding of the country; they haven't wanted to respond to the people's own needs. Instead they came here with preconceived ideas from other countries. Or perhaps they never dared to say to the Voltaics:

Landis McIntire

Capt. Thomas Sankara: "We are determined to enable our country to produce much more than it currently does. We will make our soils give us all we need. *That* is the revolution."

"You are making a mistake in this or that area." They provided assistance, then it became clear that Voltaics were pursuing inappropriate goals, but the donors, out of modesty, protocol, or formality, did not dare to change direction. These two kinds of assistance have meant that although we have received much aid in Upper Volta, we have few results to show for it.

There are also problems with the Voltaic recipients of the assistance. There are donors who come to help the government and those who come to help the people. Those who have come to help the government arrive in Ouagadougou and go to see such or such a political figure, who says: "Put such a development project in such a region," even if it is not the most needy area. So when you look at a map of Upper Volta and the distribution of aid, you see that the most aid has gone to those regions that had the good fortune to have a local son in the government.

Then, a lot of donated goods find their way onto the market—American products like cooking oil, grain, and flour, which have written on the bag, "Not to be sold or exchanged," but you will find them in all the markets. Everyone buys this oil, flour, maize—everyone speculates with it. Teachers receive food aid for their students and sell it; the next day it is on the market, and everyone buys it. The whole country is addicted to aid. And you cannot tell me that those who have donated this cooking oil, this flour, this maize, don't see what is happening, are not aware of its misappropriation. They are well aware of it. Sometimes they are actually delighted to have a group of corrupt officials, conditioned to corrupt others. It is not easy to say "Stop!" to that aid because if you do, you will automatically have every local administrator against you. We are aware of this. Sometimes this happens deliberately, sometimes by mistake, but you can't tell me that the Americans don't have ways to go over the books and tell when these products are diverted.

Also, when we Voltaics receive aid, we just waste it. As soon as someone receives an aid grant, he sets out by buying a grandiose desk, then a car, then a wall-to-wall carpet for his office, air conditioning, air tickets to attend a seminar in New York, another one in Calcutta, finally a conference in Honolulu—this is how we use our aid. Another part of this money goes to recruiting useless officials: you hire 25 deputies—cousins, aunts, uncles—then a security guard, a deputy security guard, a vice-deputy security guard, and so on. Finally, you get stationery printed up with nice gold letterhead saying, "Office of the Director of Project Such and Such." Voilà! The project is beautifully presented, once in a while you go out and make a speech, and that's all.

So the blame is divided; it is partly our own and partly that of those who have come to assist us. We have decided to change all that now. To change it, we have set up people's revolutionary tribunals, where everyone is judged—from security guards to ministers and presidents—in public. All the petty graft you've engaged in—everything is judged. And since then, we've noticed that Voltaics themselves have become more careful. You can see that here no one throws away paper clips—we economize. We write on both sides of the paper. This is how we make our people responsible for themselves. Then again, we have the political courage to say to those who aid us: "Here's what we want, here's what we don't want." We have created a special executive department to keep track of all nongovernmental organizations. So we think that those who sincerely want to help us will now find clear and precise directives and they must be precise and clear themselves. This is how and under what conditions we intend to receive aid. As we receive it, we will constantly keep watch over ourselves, for we ourselves have many faults, but we will also bravely critique all those who come to help us, however powerful they may be.

AFRICA REPORT: Could you characterize the extent of the drought that is afflicting Upper Volta at present? Is it worse than that of the early 1970s?

SANKARA: This year's drought is very serious, a 120,000-ton cereal deficit. In addition to the 1983-84 drought, we also have to deal with the cereal deficits that have accumulated since 1973 and that make this year's drought particularly hard to bear. The wells give less water every year. One has to dig deeper and deeper to reach the water table. In 1973, you could perhaps find water at 30 meters; in 1975, perhaps at 50 meters; and now you have to go to 80-100 meters. This is a whole new technical difficulty. The peasants cannot dig deeper than 25 meters. Along with this, since the soil has been poorly tended for so many years, it is harder to renew. We need more and more fertilizer every year to regenerate it. The effects of the shortages since 1973 are now visible in the physical state of our children. So this drought is much more serious. This is why we must address ourselves to this drought quickly so as to put a halt to the consequences of the last few years and so that we can look ahead to the future.

AFRICA REPORT: Is food self-sufficiency a realistic aim for Upper Volta?

SANKARA: Yes, perfectly. It is realistic first because not all the fertile soils have been exploited. Much of the fertile land was infested by onchocerciasis, which has been conquered now, thanks to the World Health Organization. It is

Margaret A. Novicki

Voltaic soldiers: "The military man is no longer a man apart. Politically, he must live with his people and that is the difference between this and all previous coups d'état"

realistic also because we have not made rational usage of our soil. For rational usage, we must put the accent on yield per acre and not solely on total levels of production. It is realistic because modern methods allow us to enrich the soil and to make profits. It is realistic because there are new seed varieties that can expand production. Thus we do not despair about this matter. Formerly, Upper Volta was self-sufficient, but it became increasingly less so. Therefore, we are going to extend our range of food crops and animal varieties.

AFRICA REPORT: Can you explain the aims of the Voltaic revolution? Is it not rather difficult to effect a revolution in a country where 90% of the population is "rural, agricultural, backward," as you said earlier?

SANKARA: Our revolution aims at liberating the Voltaic people from all forms of domination—internal and external. Our revolution aims at giving the Voltaic people the power to build their future. These goals make our revolution very difficult, and we are aware of that. Why? Because the level of education of our population is very low, if you take into account the obscurantist politics of past governments and also the feudal organization of society and the weight of tradition. That means that not everyone in our country understands the importance of the struggle for liberation. And our revolution is even more difficult because we are dominated by imperialism, which controls our country on the cultural, economic, and political fronts, as well as on the military front. That means that for us to transform Voltaic society, we have to fight against imperialism—and imperialism is very powerful. It has very strongly conditioned our people. They themselves do not dare challenge it, nor do they think it possible to do so.

For example, if we ban nail polish, we would have grave problems in Upper Volta because our women are conditioned to think that it is a product that is not only useful, but indispensable. If we ban champagne or cheese, we are liable to have strikes or serious social tensions. That is to say that imperialism controls us on the cultural front, and it also has its local valets—Voltaics, like us—who plunder our people to the profit of imperialism. They organize this plunder and certainly gain benefits for themselves. Therefore our struggle is very complicated, and not all parts of society understand its meaning. Little by little, when we achieve victories, they applaud; but if they see sacrifices on the horizon, they are not willing to bear them.

AFRICA REPORT: Could you explain the role and tasks of the committees for the defense of the revolution (CDRs)? Has the concept taken hold in the rural areas, or it is still largely an urban phenomenon?

SANKARA: The CDRs' first mission is political—organization, mobilization, and conscientization. I told you earlier that our work is very difficult because the political consciousness in this country is not very developed. Therefore, the CDRs' task is to raise the level of consciousness, to explain every day to the people the meaning of their struggle and sacrifices, to tell them who their friends and enemies are within the country and outside. In addition, the people have to be shown that there is both positive and negative in our culture. As in every culture of the world, some aspects of our African culture are condemnable and some praiseworthy.

The CDRs secondly have an economic mission. They are on the job. You may have seen on television the delivery to the CDRs of an important shipment of materials—wheelbarrows, axes, shovels, and hammers. We no longer want aid that comes as a bank check. If any people want to help us, we ask them to send us wheelbarrows, cement, tools, or to purchase tools for us in our stores here in Upper Volta. We want to work. It is the CDRs who construct the dams, schools, clinics, roads—and all this at a lower cost. A structure that a company under the old system would build for $100, today can be built with $25 because the remaining $75 represents the activity of the CDRs.

As far as governmental services are concerned, they have the job of overseeing energy conservation measures; they put out the lights; they supervise the use of paper, pencils, and office supplies. They encourage the worker to increase production and to find more efficient production methods. But also on the military level, they have to take part in defending our country, the defense of the people. For us, it is not possible to entrust the defense of our country to one group of men, not even to a group of specialists. The defense of a country is the responsibility of the people.

You also asked me if the CDRs are only important in the city or in the rural areas. I will tell you that the CDRs are everywhere now. If you had some time, you could go in the countryside, and you would find CDRs. Not on the same level, I agree with you. In the countryside, the CDRs get together and try to decide how they are going to rebuild a road or how to buy grain—the problems are different from in the city. In the cities, the level is more politicized, since there are also more intellectuals there. But the CDRs are everywhere, and everywhere everyone knows that they are the means by which we can defend our ideas and our interests.

AFRICA REPORT: The unions represent a powerful force in Voltaic politics. Your government recently had a confrontation with the teachers' union. What is the current climate between the government and the unions, and specifically the teachers' union? Are the unions counterrevolutionary?

SANKARA: Unions as such are not counterrevolutionary. But sometimes their leadership is reactionary, counterrevolutionary, and manipulated from abroad. We have a very good relationship with the unions—a critical relationship; the unions don't go easy on us, and that's a good thing. They complain that we don't go very fast or else they complain that we make decisions without consulting them. And they are right to do so. It is a good thing that unions exist, because they are a spur that forces us to go further ahead. If ever the unions said, "Bravo! Well done! The government is perfect!" that would be bad for our country. The unions must criticize us. They are our uneasy conscience. They represent all the workers, the ones who truly feel the weight of the economic system in which we live and who demand that the system be transformed.

Our relationship with the teachers' union is still good, even after we dismissed 1,500 teachers. You see, we didn't

slam the door in their faces. We said, "Look out. We've dismissed you because you are taking part in a subversive activity"—not because they went on strike. Some of them didn't even know they had been involved in subversive activities. We opened the door and said, "If, after a while, we see that you have changed your behavior, that will be fine." We might put them back into certain positions, as we have already said, but we are in no hurry. We are not going to hire them back haphazardly, no, because after all they are teachers and they must be responsible. A lot of those teachers have written us to say, "Please excuse me. I made a mistake, I was taken in, I didn't know. Forgive me." Our answer is, "No. You are responsible for educating future leaders of Upper Volta. If you can be manipulated by people who come in the middle of the night to tell you to go on strike, that's not good." They must be aware of their responsibilities. We leave the door open.

AFRICA REPORT: Are the CDRs a means of diminishing the power of the unions?

SANKARA: No, the CDRs and the unions are not in opposition to one another. But it is also true that the CDRs defend the material and political interests of the workers. They also defend the interests of the people as a whole, just as those unions with an anti-imperialist orientation do. Of course, there will always be people who will take offense, who will be irritated when the CDRs take away a little of their prestige, but that is no more than an individual position.

AFRICA REPORT: You have exhorted Voltaic women to free themselves by the revolution. But the cultural constraints on improving the condition of African women—including men's attitudes and the weight of tradition—are great. How can they liberate themselves under these circumstances, and how do you view the role of women in Africa's economic development?

SANKARA: First of all, there are more women than men in Upper Volta, and it is impossible to wage our revolution without them. We exhorted them to liberate themselves because we saw that women made up a mass of potential revolutionaries that no one had yet put to good use. Women are subject to two kinds of domination at once—by men and by imperialism. They fight alongside us against the same enemies, but they also have to fight against us, the men.

Look at the Voltaic woman in the countryside: she wakes up at 4:30 AM to walk 5, 10, 15 kilometers to fetch some water. She must come back and cook, she must wash the children, she must heat water for her husband who is asleep, and then she must go to the fields with her husband to plow the earth. When she is finished, she has got to go plow her own field. When her husband's day is finished, he rests. She then has to go look for wood to bring back to the house. She must do the cooking. After dinner, she has other chores to do. She wakes up at 4:30, but she never goes to bed before midnight. At age 35, she becomes a rag. This is not right. This is why in our country men used to have several wives—because they are the workers. Further, women represent a source of free pleasure for men.

Women are exploited in relations of production and also in sentimental relations, in affection. But women are further exploited because of imperialism, which also dominates the Voltaic man. So we decided to liberate them. We encourage them to organize themselves. But if women are to be liberated, they must realize that they alone can liberate themselves. Today Voltaic women have been dominated for so long that even when they want liberation they don't know what to do. If you entrust a woman with some responsibility, she goes off immediately to ask a man what she should do. This is the mentality. It is not like in your country, where women are far more independent from men. To be free, we think, women must also have their means of action. When a woman has been fed and kept by a man, she becomes his slave. This is why we have organizations whose purpose is to raise their level of consciousness and show women that they are the equals of men. Even physically, women can do the same things as men.

But in our educational system, we are told from childhood on that women are inferior to men. A woman grows up with this mentality. Women even undergo bodily transformations so that they will know continually how inferior they are to men. You know the problem of excision. Excision is a practice aimed at making women seem inferior to men. An excised woman has less sexual pleasure, people say, and so she is more likely to remain faithful to her husband. But looked at more closely, it is a means of guaranteeing that a woman is the property of the man, just as you brand cattle with a hot iron. We want to fight against all this. It is not

Janet Milhomme

Pro-Sankara demonstration in Ouagadougou: "We took power by a popular insurrection on August 4"

easy because even women think there is no use trying. But women must be liberated. For this reason, we are appointing more and more women to responsible positions. One of the cabinet ministers in our government is a woman. Soon there will be a woman appointed as high commissioner of a whole province and still more women will take up positions of responsibility. Two weeks ago, we named women to city hall in the capital. So little by little, women are taking on responsibilities, and we are talking about this because sincerely we have all been marked by the way our sisters and mothers have suffered.

AFRICA REPORT: What are the objectives and orientation of your foreign policy? Relations between your government and France were tense for some time. How would you characterize your relations at this time?

SANKARA: Our foreign policy—we think that the Voltaic revolution cannot live without relations with the outside world. The Voltaic people cannot live without the outside world. This is why we must have as much contact as possible with the outside. That is what we are striving for, and we are in contact with all, regardless of their ideological or political orientation. We say that because we love our own people we must love others as well.

For example, the American people are geographically very far from the Voltaic people. But we say that we Voltaics have many lessons to learn from the American people. It was the Americans who said, "America for Americans"; and we say today, "L'Afrique aux Africains." This is a legitimate wish for independence. Some Americans fought against slavery, and we stand with them. The United States is a melting pot, and we think that this melting pot must go still further, because it is the best of all racial contacts. And let's not forget that it was in Chicago that May Day began with workers' demonstrations in 1886. But every year, when May Day is celebrated all over the world, people forget that it is a victory and a lesson that the American people gave the whole world.

So you see, wherever people are fighting for justice, the Voltaic people are in solidarity with those struggles. The Voltaic people stand solidly with the Americans for every time that the American people have fought for liberty, democracy, and justice. So we are not the victims of preconceived ideas. This means that conversely, whatever goes against liberty, justice, and the right to self-determination—we will resist it firmly. And we are happy to know that even in the United States there are many people who oppose certain American policies.

We are genuinely nonaligned. You must have read speeches where we attacked Eastern countries, Western countries—we speak out against everybody because the facts are on our side. And if a situation improves, we applaud. When the United States invaded Grenada, we protested. When Reagan announced that he was going to withdraw his troops, we called the ambassador to congratulate him. That means we are not proceeding with blinders on. We are able to see in all directions, to congratulate when we ought to and to condemn when we believe that we ought to in the name of the people.

Our relations with France are improving because we are


Bara

"The Voltaic people stand solidly with the Americans for every time that the American people have fought for liberty, democracy, and justice"

working at it. At the beginning, it wasn't easy; France had colonized Upper Volta and many neighboring countries. For a long time, France was accustomed to the false language of certain men who are no longer the true representatives of Africa. Africa has changed. Mentalities have changed. But there are still policymakers in France who think that the African point of view is represented by two or three people; and when they have asked those persons' opinions, they think they have gotten the African point of view. They are making a very grave mistake when they let two or three people determine their policy, while forgetting the interests of millions and millions of Africans.

When in the beginning we spoke frankly and directly to the French, they were shocked. We know that. But our intention was not to shock them or to make them angry. Rather, it was to tell them frankly, "Here is what we want in Upper Volta. Even if you feel that things are fine as they are, we are going to tell you the truth." The truth hurts, but it is useful. In our country we say, "If you want to tend a wound, don't look at the wounded man's face." If you do, you will see the expression of pain on his face and you won't treat the root cause of the wound. When we tell the truth, it is in the interest of our friendship with France. It is also for the sake of friendship with all other peoples that we tell the truth, that we say sincerely whatever we think, good or bad. We think that the situation today is evolving in a positive direction even if there are still problem areas.

AFRICA REPORT: Is Upper Volta currently threatened by opposition forces in the neighboring countries, such as Ivory Coast, for example?

SANKARA: Upper Volta is threatened. We regularly receive information telling us of the hostility of certain countries in relation to our country. Not everyone likes revolution. Not everyone is for revolution. Some people are afraid of it. If revolution means giving the people a voice, giving them arms, giving the economy and its wealth over to be administered by the people so that a few people who have bank accounts in Switzerland, the United States, or elsewhere can no longer exploit it—obviously certain people are going to be afraid of that kind of revolution. They are afraid of being judged by the people, and so they cannot

give the people a voice; the people will criticize them very strongly. They cannot hand over the economy to the people, because the people will demand a fair distribution of wealth. They do not want to give arms to the people, because with those arms the people will overthrow them.

But that is exactly what we are doing. We are offering the people a voice. When you go into the tribunals, you will see that whoever comes to speak says just what he thinks. We are also giving the people the economic management of the country. Today all salaries are controlled, even that of the president. The president's perquisites have been done away with, too. Everyone knows this, and everyone observes it. If the president buys a car, everyone will know it and will want to know where the money came from. And we have put arms in every region of Upper Volta, and the people are ready to defend themselves.

AFRICA REPORT: There seems to be a trend in West Africa toward military governments. Why do you think this is so?

SANKARA: I would like to ask you to change your perception of the situation in Africa about this one thing. It is certainly true that military regimes have come to power, but military regimes are not all alike. I do not want to judge any of them, I am simply going to speak of the situation in Upper Volta. Before our government, three military regimes had preceded us. Generally, the military men who took power before us were putschists. A junta came and seized power without any political program, forgetting that in order to change society you have to take on real problems. Thus, in various countries I will not name here, there have been military governments that were earnest when they took power and that violently overthrew the former governments, but that shortly thereafter divided up the spoils in such a way that every person who had thought the hour of justice had arrived realized that he had just changed masters. There is a new master in place, and he can be bargained with. The people continue to suffer.

Alain Nogues/Sygma

Capt. Sankara greeting French President Mitterrand: "There are still French policymakers who think that the African point of view is represented by two or three people, while forgetting the interests of millions of Africans"

But we are different. We are military men, it is true, but we are not a military government. This time, we've seen military men coming out of the barracks forging ideological links with civilians and taking power together with them. We took power by a popular insurrection on August 4. There were military men, but there were also many civilians who worked underground, by making contacts and so on. And that is why you will see that in our government there aren't many military—only five. The civilians are more numerous. All our structures include both military and civilians, and we do not want to make a distinction between the two. The military man is no longer a man apart. Politically, he must live with his people, and that is the great difference between this and all the coups d'état up until now. This is why politically our government cannot be called a military government.

Everywhere in the world where coups d'état have taken place, the military have contributed. Look at China, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, the countries of Latin America; look at the United States even—in every case, the military contributed, whether as maquisards, as guerrillas, or in the form of private armies in the service of one or another political leader. But there is such a thing as the military dictator. In Africa and outside of Africa, there are many of them—but there are also regimes where all the citizens and the revolutionary patriots combine forces. That's what has happened here.

AFRICA REPORT: What are the biggest challenges that face Upper Volta in the coming year?

SANKARA: In the coming year, the greatest challenges on the economic front will be to provide water, plenty of dams, plenty of schools, plenty of clinics, and to see to the creation of small, light industry—canning tomatoes and tomato paste, preserving onions, potatoes, lettuce, cabbage, and peppers, making mango marmalades and compotes and so forth—small-scale agro-food industries. Another challenge will be control over trade. To this end, we have established 90 new stores, although from 1970 to 1983 there were no more than 35 stores in all the provinces. In just a few months, we built 90, almost three times as many. That's what we call revolution—transforming the statistics. To go from *A* to 25 times *A*—that's what we have in mind. A normal revolution is *A* plus one, *A* plus two, *A* plus three. We want an exponential revolution.

And that brings us back to the political front, where the challenge of the coming year will be to establish the best organization of our political structures. On the international level, we will have to promote a better understanding of the Voltaic revolution so that other countries will know that the Voltaic revolution is not directed against them. On the contrary, our revolution wants nothing but friendship and solidarity from all peoples who are willing to understand it and to know that we are not puppets of any other power. Not at all. Here we criticize all other powers, whoever they may be; but that is the only way that we will be respected. □

The Sahel's Uncertain Future

BY HOWARD SCHISSEL

"When I was a student at Boutilimit in 1953," remarked Mogdad Ould Dahane, director of transport at the Mauritanian Commission for Food Security, "we welcomed General de Gaulle at this fort, which was then surrounded by a flourishing forest and agricultural plots." Just 30 years later, the ecological situation has radically changed for the worse. In early 1984, Boutilimit, the capital of the Trarza region — some 130 miles southeast of the capital, Nouakchott — was a picture of desolation: the old French fort was in ruins, the surrounding area was practically denuded, agricultural activities were restricted to the cultivation of a few watermelons, and wind-blown sand dunes were threatening to engulf the once active trading and religious center.

The extent of environmental degradation, caused in part by the persistent dearth of rainfall in the Sahel region of West Africa, is perhaps nowhere better observed than in the Mauritanian hinterland. In a traditional grazing area like the Trarza region, trees were literally being suffocated by advancing sand dunes and pastureland was virtually dried out. Over the past decade, in fact, almost two-thirds of the rugged acacia trees within 60 miles of the Mauritanian bank of the Senegal River have disappeared; palm groves in oases such as Chinguetti and Ouadane have been abandoned.

The impact of the drought on the population has been severe. With traditional agro-pastoral activities in decline since 1970, there has been a massive influx of destitute herders and uprooted farmers into the towns. Mauritania's demographic makeup has been inverted. Only 25% of the population lived in urban areas in 1970; by this year, the figure had risen to close to 75%.

Because of its geographical position, Mauritania is an extreme case. Yet the negative trends so evident in this country have also made themselves felt, with varying impact, in the other Sahelian states. A decade after the great drought (1968-1973) that ravaged the area and resulted in unprecedented foreign assistance, the Sahel still has not gotten back on its feet. None of the adverse trends identified has been stopped, let alone reversed. It is certainly not an exaggeration to say that time is growing short for the Sahel.

The word *Sahel* is derived from



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Arabic, meaning shore or border; and in West Africa, it applies to the border of the Sahara desert and constitutes the transitional zone to the better-watered areas to the south. Geographically, the Sahel is a 200- to 350-mile-wide belt stretching across West Africa where both nomadic cattle raising and sedentary agriculture are practiced. Although suffering from the vagaries of climate, the Sahel was once the seat of the great medieval empires of Ghana, Mali, and Songhai. Even today, it possesses the resources to offer a decent standard of living for its population.

Eight countries, members of the Ouagadougou-based Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), are generally considered to constitute the Sahel: Cape Verde, Gambia, Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Niger, and Chad. Guinea-Bissau has recently applied for CILSS membership, and the northern parts of Cameroon, Nigeria, Togo, Ghana, Benin, and the Ivory Coast also have a Sahelian climate.

The heart of the Sahel's dilemma lies in the fact that the factors of production in the rural areas have not been improved. In sum, the last two decades have been marked by the trend of extending production of cereals like millet and sorghum, instead of intensifying output. Thus, neither farmers' productivity nor the yield per acre has risen in recent years: average millet and sorghum production remains extremely low. Rainfall or subsistence crops account for some 95% of cereals production in the Sahel. The seed varieties utilized have not been renewed, and only a small percentage of total cereals output is farmed with animal traction and fertilizers. Five percent of cereals are produced with irrigation, but yields are much lower than in other parts of the Third World, and conversely, production costs are higher. Paradoxically, it is less expensive for Senegal or Mali to import rice from Thailand than to produce this crop themselves.

Climatic hazards make the Sahelian production system terribly vulnerable. Where land has become scarce, farmers have reacted by reducing the length of the fallow period, which reconstitutes soil fertility. The need of expanding towns for cooking wood and charcoal has accelerated deforestation in the Sahel. An increase in the herd size and a thoughtless policy of drilling large numbers of boreholes for cattle have also contributed to the degradation of the Sahelian environment. These elements are part and parcel of a cycle that is building up steam and progressively sterilizing a growing portion of the Sahel land mass.

More ominous in the long term is the fact that a fourfold increase in the Sahel's urban population over the last 20 years has coincided with a similar growth in rice and wheat imports. With the projected doubling of urban population by the end of the century, the Sahel is likely to become progressively more dependent on imported cereals, a good share of which will come from food aid. Thus, the rural agricultural zones are not only less and less capable of supplying the towns, but they are even losing their ability to assure mere sustenance for the farmers and their families.

"Foreign aid has often been misdirected, either through lack of sufficient study and preparation of projects, or through simple self-serving initiatives by the donors."

The negative factors affecting livestock raising are similar to those operating in the case of cereal crops. Although herds have been largely reconstituted since the mid-1970s, they have failed to match population growth. Thus, livestock no longer plays the same role in Sahelians' food supply and exports as in the recent past. First, the average person's meat intake has fallen from 37 pounds in 1968 to an estimated 29 in 1977. Second, herd structure has changed. There are fewer cattle and more goats, sheep, and camels. Export markets for this type of livestock in the richer coastal states are limited. Sahelian exports of cattle must now also face stiff competition from frozen meat imported from South America. Urban dwellers require produce that cannot be provided by traditional methods, increasing dependence on imports.

The Sahel, especially Gambia, Senegal, and Mali, was once a major exporter of groundnuts. But the Sahel's output is on the slide. From 1.5 million tons a year in the early 1960s, the region barely produces a million tons a year today. Not only is the volume of groundnut exports declining, but its position on the world market, compared with other sources of edible oil such as maize and soya, has been constantly deteriorating. Some years ago, it could be justified economically for countries like Senegal and Gambia to grow groundnuts and import rice; now, however, the deterioration in the terms of trade makes it of dubious value to specialize in this one crop. Yet only limited efforts have been made to diversify agricultural production.

In contrast to cereals and groundnut farming, the development of cotton cultivation has resulted from a full-scale conversion of farming methods, including the introduction of seed varieties suitable for the Sahel, fertilizers and pesticides, and use of animal-drawn plows. The results have been spectacular — there has been a fivefold growth in yields per acre over the last two decades. This gain demonstrates that Sahelian agriculture can be radically altered for the better. Cotton is a valuable cash crop that has received top priority from governments and development agencies. However, there does not seem to be the same incentive to invest in upgrading cereal farming or traditional livestock raising. Moreover, cotton has tended to grab much of the best land, to the detriment of food crops.

Criticism has increasingly been focused on the agricultural policies of Sahelian, and indeed most African, governments, which since independence have chosen to keep grain prices as low as possible to satisfy non-producing, but potentially troublesome, urban populations. All studies underline the insufficiency of profit margins for rural producers, who are therefore not interested in boosting output. The need for more effective food strategies to raise incentives for pro-

ducers and reduce state control over the cereal market has been recognized.

The revision of Mali's food strategy has been the most comprehensive in the Sahel. When Mali turned to the World Bank in 1980, the solution advanced by its agricultural experts was simple — the grain trade must be liberalized by ending the official monopoly granted to the parastatal authority, OPAM, and by augmenting producer prices to encourage farmers to grow more.

Results were quickly seen. OPAM's market share for grains plummeted from 30% to a mere 5%. It was thought that village cooperatives would take over part of OPAM's role by buying grains from farmers at official prices at harvest time and then reselling the cereals to rural people in the months preceding the new crop season at a price lower than the one prevailing on the free market. Unfortunately, things did not work out as planned. Cooperatives often lack funds to buy up surplus grain, and private traders have reasserted their hegemony over the grain market. For the most part, these traders seek to pay farmers as little as they can for the grain and to resell it in the months preceding the new harvest, when demand is at its peak, at the highest possible price. Thus, the majority of Mali's farmers have not been paid more in real terms since the new government policy was announced; and, of course, they do not have the financial incentive to work harder. The result of this policy, tailored according to suggestions in the World Bank's Berg Report, has been to take the surplus that can be extracted from the rural economy and transfer it from the state bureaucracy to the private sector, without any noticeable benefit to the rural population. Solutions are obviously not as easy as meets the eye, even those of the reputed development experts.

Foreign aid has often been misdirected, either through lack of sufficient study and preparation of projects, or through simple self-serving initiatives by the donors. A good example of the former is the case of the reafforestation efforts to stop the southward march of the desert. On paper the so-called green belts of eucalyptus trees looked attractive, but in the field the experience has turned out to be yet another costly failure. As one forestry expert in the Sahel explains: "[The eucalyptus tree] needs cultivating. It needs water. It needs all the management skills that these people do not have."

Karen Durlach

Nomads in Senegal: The principal resource of the Sahel region is its farmers and herders and their remarkable adaptability to a harsh environment

Examples of development projects serving the interest of the sponsoring country are legion. One of the prime examples is the Diré solar energy scheme in Mali, financed by France. In 1980, the French Ministry of Cooperation sang the praises of this project, which was designed to pump water from the Niger River to irrigate agricultural land near the town. The solar energy installation cost over $1 million and never succeeded during its functioning life of just one month in pumping more water than two diesel pumps costing $6,000. Today the ruins of this complex are a stark reminder of where misguided development plans lead.

Food aid is certainly necessary to avoid having malnutrition among the Sahelian populations turn into widespread famine, as in 1973-74. If emergency food aid is essential, the same cannot be said of institutionalized aid packages meant more to dispose of agricultural surpluses in the industrialized countries than to encourage an amelioration of the rural economy in the Sahel. Cheap imported cereals depress market prices in the Sahel and consequently eliminate the economic incentives for farmers to produce larger food crops. Paradoxically, it can be said that food aid as it is currently disbursed by most Western donors is counterproductive, discouraging efforts toward food self-sufficiency in the Sahel, as well as in other parts of Africa and the Third World.

The fragility of the Sahelian administrations and economies is such that many are not capable of absorbing new projects, let alone maintaining the old ones. It is estimated that for each new acre of land brought under cultivation in Mali, another one goes out of production for lack of upkeep. In spite of the efforts of the Club du Sahel to coordinate donor efforts, many still tend to pursue their own goals. Sahelian governments, desperately short of skilled personnel, can hardly hope to coordinate the influx of aid schemes and assess their viability. According to a source in Ouagadougou, there were some 340 different aid missions to Upper Volta in 1981. Moreover, new projects generate very heavy recurrent budgetary costs, which the Sahelian countries are largely unable to support, and so projects quickly deteriorate.

Bureaucratic and business interests

also condition development planning. After years of delays, the Senegal River Valley Authority (OMVS) has finally begun building the two dams that are intended to harness the river and allow an extension of irrigated farming. Many experts believe that this $1 billion-plus scheme will become the Sahel's "white elephant." For one, it was probably not necessary to build two dams; studies showed that only one upstream in Mali would have been sufficient. But Senegal wanted "its" dam too, and if the two-dam solution had not been adopted, then the OMVS program would not have gotten off the ground. In addition, the OMVS project is capital-intensive, and past experience vividly demonstrates that state agricultural agencies like SAED in Senegal and SONADER in Mauritania are inefficient vehicles for mobilizing rural populations for higher productivity. But a more grass-roots approach had the "disadvantage" of providing fewer blandishments for foreign companies and state functionaries.

The Sahel, like other Third World regions reliant on the production of primary products, has been severely affected by recent trends in the world economy. The region has mineral resources, but falling demand in the industrialized countries and soft prices have played havoc with Sahelian finances. Mauritania's iron ore exports are down to their lowest level in a decade; Niger's uranium mines are in the doldrums; and Senegal's phosphates are having a hard time attracting customers. Upper Volta has been incapable of raising financial support for its proposed manganese mines. The deterioration in the terms of trade for these minerals has been dramatic. If a country needed 100 units of phosphates or iron ore to purchase 100 units of manufactured goods in 1975, 205 units of phosphates and 116 units of iron ore were necessary in 1982.

Since the Sahel consumes more than it produces and the rate of economic growth is too low to finance new investment, its trade balance and balance of payments have gone permanently into the red. These deficits have been financed by disbursements of foreign aid, capital transfers, and recourse to foreign borrowing. The result has been a steep increase in foreign debt. In absolute terms, the Sahelian countries' foreign debt is certainly not a threat to the international financial system, but in relation to their present economic potential, most Sahelian states are more heavily indebted than Mexico or Brazil. Debt service for most Sahelian countries is comparable to the most heavily indebted countries of the Third World.

Karen Durlach

Erosion along the Senegal river in Mauritania: "Two-thirds of the rugged *acacia trees within 60 miles of the river* have disappeared"

All these factors combine to make Sahelian political systems terribly brittle. Chad is in a permanent state of instability. Only the Senegalese military intervention saved President Jawara's government in Gambia. Radical young officers took power last year in Upper Volta. President Seyni Kountché had a close call when dissidents attempted to seize power at the end of 1983. President Moussa Traore's regime in Mali, in office since 1968, is threadbare. Mauritania's national sovereignty is increasingly threatened by the conflict in the Western Sahara. Democratic Senegal under President Abdou Diouf is an exception, but the economic situation is precarious and unrest in the Casamance region could raise the political temperature.

"The start of a solution to the Sahel's multiple problems," stresses Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh, sociologist at the Mauritanian Institute of Scientific Research, "can come only from the Sahelians themselves." The principal resource of the Sahel region is its farmers and herders and their remarkable adaptability to a harsh environment. But little attention has been paid to the wishes and needs of rural communities by distant bureaucracies in Sahelian capitals or abroad. Moreover, when rural populations have attempted to set up and manage their own institutions on the local level and turn them into authentic vehicles for development, their efforts have often been undermined by state administrations jealous of their authority. Unless Sahel farmers and herders can organize for greater political and social strength, the possibilities of altering the present pattern of underdevelopment will be increasingly remote.

The Sahel may never offer the economic potential of the more fortunate coastal states, but it can provide an acceptable way of life for its inhabitants, reduce its dependence on foreign assistance, and augment its export capacity. Sahelian development must be viewed with a long-term perspective, with grass-roots schemes like basic health care and education, as well as village-oriented projects, playing a greater role than grandiose prestige projects. With more efficient utilization of limited local resources, these will be the essential factors necessary for the Sahel to escape its present development impasse. Alternatives are limited. As Ould Cheikh notes: "Unless we mend our ways, the Sahel at the end of the century will, at best, be very similar to what it is today, or in a more pessimistic scenario, the region will become the backwater of Africa." □

Food Security for Southern Africa

BY DENIS R. NORMAN

The southern African region has been haunted by a succession of drought seasons for the past three years, which has seriously affected agricultural production and has been one of the most severe constraints to the region's economic development. Drought is not uncommon in southern Africa, but this particular drought has been the worst in the history of the region, with about two-thirds of the area, particularly in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe, receiving less than 60% of the normal rainfall.

This article will briefly examine some of the devastating effects of the drought on agricultural production and on food supply in southern Africa and will focus on the potential role of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) food security plan, and donor assistance, in increasing and sustaining food production in the region.

THE DROUGHT AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

The existence of food shortages in southern Africa, and the region's dependence on food imports, had been recognized even before the current drought caused a further reduction in food production in the area. This drought has created a severe financial burden for SADCC member states and has jeopardized the region's financial capacity to revitalize its economies and increase food production. Projects for boosting agricultural production and development that had been started in 1980 have not had an opportunity to produce results, because financial, physical, and human resources have had to be directed away from these projects toward drought relief and rehabilitation programs.

Lack of adequate rainfall during the past three years has drastically reduced subsistence production and yields from marketable cash crops and in some areas has resulted in complete crop failures and livestock deaths. The drought has also led to a reduction in the area under irrigation, devastated available pasture land for livestock, and seriously affected the availability of water for domestic uses.

Because of the importance of agriculture in the economies of most SADCC countries — where approximately 75% of the region's population of about 67 million is directly dependent on agricultural production for income and employment — the ramifications of the drought on the overall performance of the region's economies cannot be fully assessed. Another problem is that some of the effects of the drought are of an indirect nature, and thus difficult to quantify. These include the long-term effects of reductions in food production, farm incomes,



Senator Denis R. Norman is Zimbabwe's minister of agriculture.

African Forum News Services

Cattle in southern Zimbabwe moving from one dried-up watering hole to the next

and employment on the nutritional status of the population and on savings for future investment; lowering of the ground water level; deterioration of vegetative cover; and soil erosion.

Attempts have, however, been made in each country to estimate some of the financial implications of the drought and to give a rough indication of the extent to which the drought has affected the region's economies in the short term. There are two forms of financial losses that are associated with any drought. First, there are direct drought-induced financial losses, which result from decreases in crop yields and in the value of crop production per given area, and losses from livestock deaths.

Second, there are related costs incurred through expenditures on drought relief programs such as feeding programs, food imports, cattle rescue operations, distribution of free farm inputs, water supply schemes, and related administrative costs. This form of expenditure has obviously necessitated the diversion of funds from normal investment programs.

The value of losses resulting from reduced crop yields is calculated by subtracting actual recorded production from what is assumed to be the average yield for each crop in a given area in a year of normal rainfall, then multiplying the difference by the average price for that crop. This method, however, assumes that the reduction in yields and in crop areas is attributed to drought alone, and not to other agronomic factors such as pests and diseases or to economic factors such as low prices.

The value of losses attributed to reduction in crop areas is estimated by multiplying the total reduction in area planted by the average yield per crop, and multiplying by the average price. In this regard, it has been observed that when farmers are expecting drought conditions to prevail, they tend to plant less acreage of food crops such as maize and other cereals, which are prone to drought, and to switch to more drought-resistant nonfood crops such as cotton and tobacco — a practice that results in reduced food availability.

The situation in the peasant farming sector is aggravated by the lack of draft power — much of the cattle having died or weakened from lack of grazing — and, in the absence of adequate credit facilities, lack of necessary farm inputs to start planting in the new season.

Production of wheat, which is more satisfactorily grown in winter under irrigation in most of the region, is directly related to the availability of water for irrigation, which determines the total area that can be planted. Because of the inadequacy of water storage facilities in the region, wheat production declined by about two-thirds between 1981 and 1983, and wheat imports have simultaneously increased.

Livestock deaths represent direct losses in income and wealth, and it is estimated that more than one million head of cattle have died in the region during the drought. Cattle represent a significant proportion of agricultural activities since they provide food, draft power, and manure and are an important source of cash income.

The extent of drought-induced losses and related costs, calculated on the basis of direct agricultural losses and drought relief costs incurred, is indicated in the accompanying table for six of the most affected countries in the re-

Financial Cost and Losses of the 1982-83 Drought (in millions of U.S. dollars)

Country	Direct Agricultural Losses	Costs Incurred	Total
Botswana	68.9	51.9	120.8
Lesotho	45.0	78.7	123.7
Malawi	—	13.4	13.4
Mozambique	75.1	79.0	154.1
Swaziland	26.4	2.9	29.3
Zimbabwe	360.0	119.6	479.6
Total	575.4	345.5	920.9

Source: SADCC Drought Report, January 1984.

gion for the 1982-83 period. Similar figures apply to the 1983-84 period. The estimated total value of direct losses in agricultural production for the six countries is $575.4 million for 1982-83.

EMERGENCY DROUGHT RELIEF EXPENDITURE

To alleviate famine and other disasters that could have arisen from the drought, governments have had to incur heavy expenditures on emergency drought relief programs. For the six countries shown in the table, it is estimated that up to $345.5 million was spent in 1982-83 on food aid, emergency seed supply, cattle rescue operations, water supply schemes, and transport and related drought administration costs.

Relief packages of seed, fertilizer, and insecticides have been distributed freely to the most seriously affected and economically destitute peasant farmers in some parts of the region. The measure is deemed necessary because crop failure leads to a lack of seed and the loss of income needed to purchase inputs needed for growing food in the next season. This vicious cycle has had a particularly harsh effect on peasant farmers who rely mainly on homegrown seed.

SOME LESSONS FROM THE DROUGHT

There has been considerable rethinking by agricultural planners in the region about the most efficient ways and means of ameliorating the effects of this drought and future droughts. The drought has exposed certain structural weaknesses in the agricultural sectors of the economies concerned, and there is therefore an urgent need to implement projects and agricultural policies that will lead to correct land use and greater production and service specialization and help to rectify these structural programs.

Some of these projects include the provision of adequate food storage facilities, farm credit schemes, irrigation systems, projects to deal with water supply problems during drought, improved livestock management and soil conservation, and the implementation of suitable agricultural and pricing policies.



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Minister of Agriculture Denis Norman with Prime Minister Mugabe: "Given sufficient incentives, the SADCC region can produce enough to feed its people"

Farm credit schemes are necessary to enable farmers to meet seasonal expenditures and to develop their farms, and these schemes should be coupled with programs to ensure adequate and regular supplies of essential farm inputs.

Irrigation development is a necessity in the region because food production in southern Africa is characterized by considerable variations due to changes in climatic conditions. Rainfall represents the most critical uncertainty to the farmer in this region. Although the feasibility of irrigated agriculture may be limited by cost of water, high capital development costs, and expenditure on the training necessary to ensure effective irrigation management, its return in terms of increased production, reduced risks of crop failure, and contribution to greater food security is high. A comparison of average maize yields in areas of marginal rainfall in Zimbabwe, taking a three-year average, shows that dryland maize averages 0.8 tons an acre, whereas yields as high as 3.6 tons an acre can be achieved with irrigation. The difference is a gain in yields of about 400%.

Another project that has attracted significant international interest is the rural public works program, aimed at enlarging the productive base of rural areas and reducing the rate of immigration by rural people to urban areas. The program is designed to offer rural people income to purchase food and other essential commodities, while providing additional work in various projects such as the construction of village-to-market roads, small irrigation schemes, soil and water conservation measures, and afforestation.

This program is being implemented in recognition of the fact that drought, more than causing food shortages alone, represents a significant loss of income and employment. And although food relief is necessary to meet sudden emergencies, it is certainly not an appropriate response to the long-term problems caused by drought. Public works projects enable food aid and relief expenditures to be converted into investment funds, and they also generate employment.

Apart from implementing the projects mentioned above, individual SADCC governments have recognized the need to adopt correct and positive pricing policies for agricultural products — policies that will restore viability in agriculture and encourage farmers to grow the right mix of crops in the most ecologically suitable areas.

In Zimbabwe, for instance, steps

have recently been taken to encourage the production of more drought-resistant grains such as pearl millet, finger millet, edible beans, and sorghum in the appropriate areas of the country, a measure that will help to render the farmer less vulnerable to drought. This objective has been accomplished by incorporating these products into the official controlled marketing system and offering incentive prices, with the prime objective of providing the farmer with a guaranteed market and price structure for his surplus production of these products.

African Forum News Services

Zimbabwean farmer surveys his withered crop: Irrigation development is a necessity in the region

ZIMBABWE AND THE SADCC FOOD SECURITY PLAN

The heads of state and governments of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe signed a declaration in April 1980 that defined agriculture as one of the principle areas for regional cooperation and as an important vehicle for reducing economic dependence and fostering economic development.

Priority was attached to agriculture chiefly because the majority of the people in the region depend on agriculture and livestock for subsistence, and also in view of the fact that food production in most of these countries is currently insufficient. In this regard, Zimbabwe is charged by SADCC with the responsibility of coordinating and working out a regional food security plan.

The main objective of the SADCC food security plan is to work toward satisfying the basic food needs of the population of the region, achieving national self-sufficiency in the supply of essential foods, and reducing heavy drains on foreign exchange imposed by food imports.

Obviously the extent to which food production can be increased depends on the measures each member state undertakes according to its own capacity and priorities, although there is a wide range of activities that can be jointly implemented to strengthen the efforts being carried out at the national level. Within this framework, various projects and programs have been initiated, aimed at reinforcing the national and regional food research capability; increasing production capacity; improving systems of delivery, conservation, processing and storage of food; and establishing more efficient systems for the prevention of food crises such as those caused by the current drought. A series of regional studies aimed at providing the data and analysis necessary to construct a program tailored to the specific needs of the region has been carried out since 1980 with the assistance of various donor agencies.

It is recognized that the elimination of periodic food crises such as those recently experienced and the implementation of longer-term projects require that domestic efforts be supplemented by international assistance. Since 1980, the SADCC region has received $4.4 million for regional food security projects, and in addition $12.6 million has been secured for food security and drought-related projects, excluding food aid. In February, SADCC states met in Lusaka and called for a total of $185 million for food and agriculture-related programs.

It is estimated that during the 1984-85 period, because of the impending food shortages, the region will require aid or funds to import grain, particularly wheat and maize, valued at more than $1 billion. During the same period, the region's population of 67 million will be increasing by another two million.

As a final point, it is important to note that given sufficient incentives, the SADCC region, its farmers, and the land can produce positive and tangible results. The region can produce enough to feed its people, despite recurrent droughts. Basic incentives that could be given to farmers in the region to boost agricultural production include the provision of adequate input supplies, efficient marketing facilities, appropriate research and extension policies, and realistic producer prices for their produce. □

AFRICA'S DROUGHT

Will the Tragedy Be Repeated?

BY KENNETH HACKETT

The horror of the Sahel may be repeated more than once before the governments choose to recognize the problem and act.

—*Disaster in the Desert: Failures of International Relief in the West Africa Drought*, by Hal Sheets and Roger Morris (1974)

The above statement appeared a decade ago in response to an inadequate international relief effort for the Sahelian drought in the early 1970s. Sadly, the quote might prove all too prophetic. The "horror of the Sahel" may indeed be repeated, but on a much larger scale.

Today, an even worse drought is ravaging 31 sub-Saharan countries. The specter of famine hangs over one out of every three Africans in the sub-Saharan region. Bickering in the United States over required levels of food aid will do little to prevent the human tragedy that is unfolding in Africa. Immediate and generous assistance is needed to relieve the suffering of millions of people. Sheer numbers fail to convey the human dimensions of this unchecked famine.

Famine entails much more than the agonizing pain of physical hunger. Crop failures and the resulting loss of income can force fathers to abandon their families and seek (often nonexistent) work in urban areas. Women and children, who are most vulnerable to the debilitating effects of malnutrition, are left with nothing, save the seeds for next year's crops. But these seeds are often eaten when food aid is unavailable. In other cases, single mothers who have already lost some of their children must seek food in strange towns. They travel for days with little idea of where they will get their next meal.

Against this backdrop the social fabric of entire communities can unravel as proud people resort to begging. A foreign aid observer in Mozambique recently reported from Tete province that starving, emaciated people were hunting for scraps in the rubbish dumps. Others are reduced to eating leaves from the trees.

In Mali, the United Nations Children's Fund estimates that 100,000 children will starve to death this year, and more than 200,000 will suffer irredeemable damage to their health from chronic malnutrition. Once again, numbers fail to reveal the emotional strain on a family or describe the pain in parents' eyes as they watch their children suffer.

The growing demand for more humanitarian assistance stems in part from the grueling tenacity of the current drought, which encompasses not only the Sahel but also countries in the Horn of Africa and southern Africa. And the duration of this drought — now in its third year — makes it one of the most severe in modern history.

Unfortunately, the drought came when many African economies were particularly vulnerable. A drought-induced famine becomes a disaster when a government cannot provide sufficient food or is unable to further burden a fragile economy with local or foreign purchases of food supplies. Many African countries now find themselves in this position.

Lingering effects of the world recession and limited access to foreign markets diminished the ability of African countries to cover food deficits with commercial imports. In addition, Africa is the only continent that has experienced a decline in the per capita production of food. Former food exporters are now food importers. High interest rates and balance of payments deficits also prevent many countries from increasing investments in rural areas to maintain adequate levels of production. These factors, combined with drought, political instability and war, make it virtually impossible for many African nations to fend off widespread famine.

All this suggests a crisis of grave proportions. Yet international relief efforts are not mobilizing on a scale to match this disaster. The reasons are varied and complex. Sometimes overlooked, though, is the donors' disenchantment with previous relief efforts to Africa, which might go a long way toward explaining the paucity of assistance to date.

After the disillusionment with the Vietnam War, the Sahel crisis of the early 1970s provided international donors with an outlet for altruism that was uncomplicated by military involvement. Emergency aid for Africa

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today is not as fast in coming, though the situation is much worse. The general populace is still sympathetic, but governments, including that of the United States, seem less concerned with African problems.

The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America recently recommended a whopping $5 billion assistance package for that region over the next five years. In contrast, proposed development assistance for all of Africa during the same period is but a fraction of that. Africa is not targeted for fast and extensive food aid or for agricultural assistance, even though the continent is made up of the largest number of countries on the brink of starvation.

Many donors are frustrated with the apparent lack of progress in Africa despite billions of dollars in past aid. Agricultural failures are often cited — Africa's food imports have tripled during the last decade. African governments often erred in the immediate post-independence period by placing industrial development above agriculture and imposing artificially low farm prices on crops to benefit urban shoppers, thus reducing production incentives. Western governments must also shoulder blame, though, for giving a green light to expensive and sometimes inappropriate projects.

Donors in Africa should re-think the depth of their commitments. Change will not come overnight, nor in a decade. Not when Africa has 20 of the 31 least-developed countries in the world. Unfortunately, governments, like individuals, expect quick fixes. We must ask today whether the international community has really made the large, sustained investment necessary to move Africa out of crisis and into self-reliance.

Two- or three-year aid packages will do little to solve sub-Saharan Africa's complex problems. It would be a tragic mistake to assume that the threat of famine will disappear once this drought is over. Drought is only one factor behind the genesis of famine. Famine will always be but a hair-trigger away in Africa as long as 90% of its population must live in absolute poverty.

Famine in Africa is a direct result of a failure on the part of African governments and the international donor community to focus attention on improving the situation for the poorest majority. This majority derives most of its income from subsistence agriculture. In Zimbabwe, for example, 4.3 million of 7.3 million people subsist from their own production of crops and livestock.

This fragile existence collapses when a drought causes crop, hence income, failure. Even if food is available for purchase outside the affected area, income failure prevents the affected population from acquiring it. Thus, famine thrives as much on the victims' poverty as it does on circumstances created by a drought or other factors.

Failure to counteract the drought and stave off the growing famine will not only exact a grim toll on human life, but affect countries for generations to come. A few of the enormous long-range implications are discussed here.

The drought affected countries that were already burdened with massive debt. Declining economies before the drought had led to the curtailment of public services and development programs and the neglect of essential infrastructure like roads and ports. Aid receipts prior to the drought could do little to compensate when export prices collapsed. The terms of trade for Africa's developing countries declined more than 50% between 1977 and 1981.

Even under the most optimistic economic assumptions, as the International Monetary Fund warned in May, debt payments will take nearly a quarter of the export earnings of Third World countries in 1987, up from a fifth of earnings in 1983. But the severe impact of the drought, with no end in sight, suggests future difficulties for many African economies.

On the ecological front, the drought causes brushfires and desertification. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) workers in Mauritania saw gardens covered by sand, trees dying, and huge sand dunes shifting over a brief two-year period. Environmental damage translates to human anguish when a reduction in good grazing land destroys the lifestyle of thousands of nomadic people. This has occurred in Mauritania,



U.S. AID

A Senegalese farmer practicing plowing while waiting for rain: "Famine will always be a hair-trigger away as long as 90 percent of Africa's population lives in absolute poverty"

forcing many people to abandon entire social customs as they relocate to urban slums or become refugees.

This human dimension is the ultimate concern. The effects of a famine today will surely shape the Africa of tomorrow. Africa's future is being decided now. Hunger is ravaging the young. Adults, many down to one meal every two days, fall victim to malaria, hepatitis, and other tropical maladies. An estimated 100,000 people died in Mozambique in the last few months of 1983 alone.

In addition, tyranny, internal disorder, and arbitrary borders have saddled Africa with nearly half the world's refugee population. An estimated three million Africans are refugees, and an equal number of people have been displaced within their own countries. These people often suffer in squalid conditions, especially when the host countries are already overtaxed with unbearable internal problems.

Life for these people and the survivors of a famine is often bleak. The psychological trauma and hopelessness can leave permanent scars and inflict as much damage as the physical pain and suffering. Lethargy often replaces the will to live, and fatalism can engulf entire communities when they are powerless to influence their destiny.

Such anguish is incomprehensible for many Americans, who are overwhelmed by the magnitude of the disaster. But the United States also possesses an unmatched ability to avert further damage through the humane force of emergency food assistance. When epidemic malnutrition strikes, as it has in Africa, the immediate emphasis must be on supplying the missing food to give people a minimum reprieve.

How are international donors meeting this need? Too little assistance is arriving too late. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations estimates that as of April 1984, the 24 most severely affected countries in Africa have a total cereal import requirement of 5.4 million tons through the 1984 growing season. Of this amount, the FAO estimates that 3.3 million tons will have to come in the form of aid. Pledged aid meets 69% of this requirement, but actual deliveries amounted to only 1.1 million tons by mid-March, or less than half the amount pledged. It also appeared that deliveries of food to combat the summer "hungry season" would fall short of the need indicated by the FAO.

The international community should be doing more for Africa, and the U.S. can set an example by making a much greater commitment than it has made to date.

Updates on the African situation from the U.S. Agency for International Development reveal that emergency food aid more than doubled (in metric tons) in fiscal year 1984 over FY 1983, implying that the U.S. is doing its share in the war against famine in Africa. But the U.S. has historically supplied at least half of the emergency food needs in past crises, and it is falling short of that mark in Africa today. While dollar amounts of food aid might remain steady, the tonnage purchased by these dollars totals much less than it did a decade ago.

"The U.S. response to the drought of the 1980s is particularly troublesome in that many parallels can be drawn with the flawed response to the Sahelian drought a decade ago."

The Brandt Commission's Common Crisis (1983) also noted that aid has fallen as a proportion of the donors' gross national product, with the U.S. nearing the bottom of the list of "developed" countries. Finally, the overall donor response to food requirements last year was inadequate even as needs increased substantially as the drought's effect gained momentum.

The U.S. response to the drought of the 1980s is particularly troublesome in that many parallels can be drawn with the flawed response to the Sahelian drought a decade ago. Donors and African states failed in the Sahel crisis to heed early warnings of impending food shortages. In *Disaster in the Desert*, Hal Sheets quoted a U.S. official as saying that the drought "sneaked up on them over a five-year period."

The lack of urgency of the U.S. response through 1983 and 1984 suggests that the agencies involved again did not pick up and act on the early warnings of disaster, even though the Global Information and Early Warning System warned of a worsening food situation in many African countries in early 1983. Catastrophic droughts do not happen suddenly. Regular reports from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) meticulously laid out the scenario for a gripping drought.

Under similar circumstances, hesitation and delay in responding to the Sahelian crisis of the 1970s compounded the tragedy. This scenario is unfolding again. The lag time in delivering emergency food (once authorized) can be up to four months. But essential appropriations for aid often become enmeshed in politics. It happened a decade ago, and it was repeated last spring.

In March, for example, the House of Representatives passed a measure providing $150 million in emergency aid for the sub-Saharan countries. Only $90 million of food aid made it to the pipeline, however, after the Senate tied approval of the other $60 million to passage of a Central American military aid package. It took more than two months to pry the $60 million loose from an array of unrelated attachments, and approval did not come until May.

At numerous points in the debate over increased emergency food assistance, the issue was raised over the absorptive capacity of the countries to move more aid. Catholic Relief Services recognizes the difficult distribution problems since we have handled a vast majority of the food channeled through private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in sub-Saharan Africa in recent years. Existence of distribution snags should not paralyze the U.S. commitment to respond. In Ghana, CRS tackled a transport infrastructure that had decayed seriously in the last four years. The transportation bottleneck was broken by supplying tires and spare parts for commercial truckers.

Such debate over the absorptive capacity of the neediest countries threatens to become a self-fulfilling prophecy unless such measures, which are within our grasp, are adopted. Ad-



Catholic Relief Services

CRS water project in Mali: PVOs can handle more responsibility if they are given more money and less restrictions

ditional food aid will be of little use when dropped on the dock. Accompanying funds are also required for inland transport. In our view, the best solutions would be to earmark a given amount of dollars per metric ton, varying from country to country according to need, with food donated under the P.L. 480 Title II program, to provide for in-country distribution.

Questions also arise over the ability of private voluntary organizations themselves to shoulder more responsibility for allocating emergency aid. PVOs can handle more, given more money, less cumbersome restrictions, and more flexibility in the allocation of food. PVOs also have the most experience helping those who are most desperate — the subsistence farmer and the poverty-stricken urban dweller.

CRS is providing more food aid to sub-Saharan countries than at any other time in its history. Other PVOs are also rising to the task. CARE is operating a logistics unit in Mozambique that ensures the transport of food from the port to the country's interior, a task demanding enormous resources. World Vision International is combating the transport bottleneck with an airlift.

But the number of American private voluntary agencies involved in the emergency programs can be counted on two hands. Many PVOs — whose programs traditionally forswear involvement in food relief efforts — cannot remain idle in the face of such devastation. As indicated previously, progress in development programs will be set back, if not nullified, if people do not have enough food for one meal a day.

The indigenous churches have recognized the magnitude of the problem, and are implementing programs that involve the victims of famine in order for them to gain control of their reality. Such efforts need greater support, especially when food is a valuable resource for achieving development objectives.

Where should the U.S. go from here? The immediate response must address the human anguish and save lives. African governments desperately need a reprieve that can be provided only through a massive mobilization of external aid. The aid must arrive swiftly and in a much larger volume than presently planned.

The drought is not a brief phenomenon. Climatic updates by the NOAA already predict another bleak year for southern Africa: "The potential exists for extreme food shortages across the southern parts of the continent before the 1985 harvest in light of the current food shortages and high probability of poor yields in upcoming harvests." Let this serve as adequate warning to the U.S. that the drought endangers not only lives in the short term but also

threatens the long-term survival of millions of people.

Even as pleas arise for more humanitarian assistance, the scales for FY 1985 are tipping toward a larger share of military assistance. The administration is asking for $190.5 million in military aid for Africa in FY 1985, up from a request of $119.5 million in FY 1984, and more than double the amount in FY 1983.

Meanwhile, U.S. food aid programs and development assistance show meager changes in appropriations from year to year, despite a growing need. Worse yet, actual deliveries can fall short of pledges.

It would be naive to believe that "security assistance" is unnecessary in Africa. But most of the development problems in Africa are of an internal nature. Thus, the current trend toward analyzing African problems with increasing emphasis on security concerns obfuscates the critical issue of internal development.

Military aid also does nothing to help a majority of the populace escape the grip of poverty and thus opens the door for chronic famine in the future. A better balance of humanitarian and developmental aid is needed to reestablish the U.S. as a realistic, credible, and compassionate partner in development for the poor nations of the world.

Equally disturbing is the rather uneven allocation of U.S. foreign aid on the continent. In FY 1985, five countries — Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, Liberia, and Zaire — will receive over 50% of U.S. assistance. The argument of focusing on strategically important and "friendly countries" fails to take into account the interrelatedness of economic development of the continent. Furthermore, such a selective approach impairs the leverage and influence that could be exploited by the U.S. toward more positive developmental ends in a larger number of countries.

In addition to the depoliticization of the aid process, medium- and long-range development assistance will be necessary long after the drought ends. The U.S. must devote more energy and investment to the support of agricultural surplus. Many African governments have acknowledged their own mistakes in de-emphasizing agricultural production in the years after independence. Donor disenchantment with the failures of the past should not interfere with renewed efforts aimed at agricultural self-sufficiency.

U.S. assistance can also help to develop roads, ports, educational systems, agricultural research institutions, and other critical infrastructure for a developing nation. Such assistance must be monitored to guarantee the creation of infrastructure rather than the growth of bloated bureaucracies. Finally, terms of trade must be improved so developing countries receive respite from the vicious cycle that causes their economies to stagnate. A major step in the right direction would allow for forgiveness of debt, especially in cases where the terms of debt were never commensurate with the country's ability to pay. Otherwise, the onerous burden of debt will stifle growth for years. It is estimated that a recent rise of one percentage point in America's interest rates added nearly $4 billion to the annual bill of Third World borrowers.

Most important, however, is the need to involve Africans in solving their own problems, including poverty. External food aid and assistance meets the short-term threat of hunger due to drought and famine. But the long-term problems are for the Africans to solve.

The longer the world waits to make a *substantial* commitment to the current crisis, the longer it will take Africa to get on the road to self-reliance. At one time it was hoped that Africa would feed itself by the year 2000. But an indicative joint study by the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Senegalese government concluded that Senegal will not be self-sufficient in all areas of food production until 2010, and then only after massive doses of financial aid. So each delay today means a greater burden in the future.

And the future is formed today. Remember the human cost. Acute deprivation will cause five million children to die each year, while malnutrition cripples five million more. The future of Africa hinges on the well-being of its populace, but the survivors of a famine are permanently affected, both mentally and physically. Famine can damage the health of a whole generation.

It is not too late to help. But aid is needed more swiftly and in larger amounts. Famine is the short-term enemy. Poverty must become the long-term agenda for both Africa and other governments, as well as for those who look for a better future in Africa. Otherwise "the horror of the Sahel" will be repeated — not only now, but in the years and decades to come. □

Catholic Relief Services

Famine victims awaiting rations in Tigre, Ethiopia: "International relief efforts are not mobilizing on a scale to match this disaster"

The Role of American Food Aid

BY JULIA CHANG BLOCH

The prolonged drought plaguing much of Africa is attracting attention in the United States and around the globe. Even casual observers of the African scene are aware of reports, such as those issued by the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), that food shortages in some two dozen sub-Saharan nations have reached emergency proportions. I recently visited several of these countries, where I saw firsthand the human suffering and other problems created by the paucity of rainfall and of food. I know you would have shared the compassion I felt for these stricken people and nations.

The U.S. has responded compassionately to the current food crisis in sub-Saharan Africa. As soon as the present fiscal year began, the U.S. Food for Peace program (also known as the PL-480 program, after the public law that authorized it) began allocating extraordinary amounts of emergency food aid to the afflicted countries. By late January, emergency shipments of over 200,000 tons of food donations for 18 African countries had been approved. It had also become clear that the reserves set aside for emergency relief were rapidly running out, and the administration asked Congress for a $90 million supplemental appropriation to fund additional emergency food aid for the drought-stricken countries. Congress passed the supplemental appropriation bill quickly, and we have already spent the bulk of the additional funds to finance increased emergency food assistance for sub-Saharan Africa. Congress is also in the final stages of approving another $60 million supplemental appropriation for relief of the African food crisis. Some of this additional $60 million can be used in the current fiscal year.

The Food for Peace program will provide unprecedented quantities of emergency food aid for sub-Saharan Africa this year. We will ship more than 450,000 metric tons of emergency food assistance to needy countries of the region in fiscal year (FY) 1984. The value of the shipments, including freight costs, will exceed $150 million. This volume of emergency food aid will be nearly triple last year's level and 3.5 times more than the FY 1982 amount. Our total PL-480 program for sub-Saharan Africa will be greater even than the amounts provided during the Sahel drought in the mid-1970s.

This is a famine relief effort that every American can take pride in. The amount of hard work and dedication devoted to finding the necessary funds, procuring the commodities, and arranging their export are truly impressive. The bigger challenge, however, is ensuring that the food aid provides real relief. Doing so entails much more than simply sending food in response to an international appeal and hoping for the best. That kind of food aid program, experience has shown, typically provides little relief to the truly needy and frequently creates additional problems. It is a cruel waste of resources.

Even in a food emergency situation, the Food for Peace program has an obligation to mount relief efforts that are efficient *and* effective. To be effective, emergency food aid must, at the very least, reduce starvation and hunger. To be efficient, wastage and other losses should be minimal. The relief effort has to be carefully designed to fit the specific needs of the emergency. While compassion might compel us to sacrifice some efficiency in emergency programs, we must be sure that the trade-off is warranted.

All the talk about the African drought and food crisis may sound as if there is a single, uniform emergency situation throughout the sub-Saharan region. In fact, famine-threatening problems and their causes vary greatly both among and within the countries of the area. Although drought and economic recession have been pervasive, they have had varying effects on individual nations and on localities within them. In some countries, other adverse weather conditions, such as floods, cyclones, and heat waves, have exacerbated the drought's effects. Some nations are torn by civil strife and warfare, or inundated by refugees. Certain countries are better able to cope with food emergencies, such as those where, for example, good marketing or distribution systems

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exist. In deciding on how to respond to an emergency appeal for food aid, the prospective donor government should look at these specific considerations as closely as possible.

The first step in this process of response is to try to define precisely the magnitude and the nature of the emergency problems. In Mozambique, for example, torrential rains and flash floods in certain localities have ruined whatever crops were able to grow in the parched fields that had become crusty spillways from prolonged drought. In certain areas, insurgency has disrupted normal food distribution channels. In Ghana, brush fires have done further damage to crops stunted by thirst. In famine-prone Ethiopian provinces such as Eritrea and Tigre, both farming and marketing have been severely hampered by warfare. In other drought-plagued nations, particularly in southern Africa, food shortages have reportedly been more evenly spread throughout the country. Even in those countries, however, the consequences are likely to vary by locality and socioeconomic class.

Another important variable is the extent to which existing food distribution systems, either commercial markets or free feeding programs, can handle increased food aid. The presence of an international relief organization already operating feeding programs, such as Catholic Relief Services, CARE, or the World Food Program, is a major advantage. In many places, including Lesotho, Mauritania, and Rwanda, emergency food aid is distributed through existing maternal-child health centers and school feeding programs. There are limits to the amount of additional food donations these programs can handle, however, and to expand them at all usually requires extraordinary inputs, such as extra transportation and management facilities.

Some countries have few or no ongoing feeding programs. In places such as Zimbabwe, the market system reaches all the way out to the hinterlands. In such cases, widespread food shortages can be dealt with to a great extent by simply putting food aid into the regular markets, although some modifications might be necessary to ensure that all those who have money can have access to affordable food supplies. To the extent that the emergency has made people destitute, however, some nonmarket means of meeting their food needs must be found. One possibility for doing so is a food-for-work program, which gives laborers food or income or both in exchange for work on public works projects. However, creating such feeding programs is a difficult task, particularly where no relief agencies are present, or where none have ever operated before.

By now it should be clear that determining the exact nature of the extraordinary food problems is a demanding but crucial task. If, for example, a localized emergency situation is mista-



"Food distribution systems must be taken into account in determining what kinds and amounts of emergency food aid are warranted"

ken for a generalized one, the infusion of food aid into the market system may not help the needy communities, and may in fact benefit those who are relatively better off already and cause dislocations to the local market. We have an obligation to see that such problems do not occur.

Analyses that merely attempt to assess a country's food deficit on a nationwide basis, without taking into account distribution considerations, are of limited utility as a guide to determining what kinds and amounts of emergency food aid programs are warranted. Such global assessments of the problem may give a rough indication of the order of magnitude of the overall food shortage, but they do not serve as a useful measure of how much and what kind of extraordinary food aid effort would be justifiable in a particular country's case. Various organizations, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture and FAO, have estimated the food aid needs of the 24 priority countries at more than 3 million tons this year. Although these estimates are not based on anything near the precise country-by-country data necessary for calculating real emergency food aid needs, they do offer some insight into the degree to which food shortages have intensified this year. According to the FAO, the same 24 countries needed between 2.6 and 2.8 million tons of food aid in 1983. No blanket food emergency was declared that year. The increased needs this year are on the order of 500,000 tons. So, even though such assessments have only an indirect and rather distant connection with predictors of hunger and starvation, the amount of increase in the food deficit can serve as an indication of the extent to which there is a threat of famine.

Ideally, the assessment of food aid needs in a specific emergency situation should try to determine which communities and population groups are threatened by famine and how much food it would take to avert starvation and serious hunger. The United States attempts to make such assessments, to the maximum extent feasible, in deciding on how to respond to food emergencies.

The field missions of the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) monitor production and rainfall throughout their respective countries' growing seasons. Through formal and informal contacts with the host governments and other donors, the missions prepare themselves for analyzing and responding to any possible emergency food requests that might arise. When a host government submits an emergency food request to the international community, the donors usually meet under the direction of the UN representative to analyze the request. Often, an emergency food assessment team is brought in to help formulate a specific proposal for emergency food aid. Private voluntary agencies, international organizations, or U.S. embassies also help analyze emergency needs or government requests in conjunction with other donors, and the results are transmitted to AID headquarters in Washington. These specific, detailed proposals serve as the basis for the U.S. government's emergency relief programs.

Despite the fact that the U.S. follows such a careful process, the PL-480 program can respond quickly to a request for emergency food aid. Requests for emergency programs that an established voluntary agency or multilateral organization is to administer, and which require no U.S. funding for inland transportation, receive approval quickly (in one to three weeks). Recently, for example, it took less than a week to approve a World Food Program request for 3,000 metric tons of food for distribution to Somali refugees.

In many cases, emergency proposals have complications related to management and logistics, and the time required to assure the soundness of the program varies with the nature of these problems. Before we could approve a recent 4,500 metric ton emergency request from voluntary agencies working in Ghana, for example, we had to send a team there to help ensure that the food would be distributed efficiently, effectively, and equitably.

In responding to food emergencies, we must also remain mindful of the possible conflict between short- and long-term objectives. The policy of the current U.S. administration is to provide emergency relief for acute, short-term food shortages while simultaneously addressing longer term problems — underdevelopment and malnutrition. We try to alleviate immediate human suffering with emergency food aid. At the same time, we attack root causes of hunger and malnutrition through development as-

UNHCR

Growing maize in Zambia: "Our PL-480 program has contributed significantly to improving incentives to small farmers to increase food production"

sistance programs, including non-emergency food aid.

Emergencies are, of course, far more likely to occur when countries are unable to maintain sufficient stocks of food or to finance imports of food to meet the needs created by adverse weather conditions. A number of countries are continually at risk of famine by virtue of an inability to deal effectively with unanticipated declines in domestic food production. As a consequence, each year countless Africans are threatened by severe hunger and starvation. They and their governments become increasingly dependent on food aid — a dependency that hinders finding longer term solutions.

Experience shows that increased food availability is not sufficient to deal with longer term hunger and malnutrition. Hunger is more directly related to poverty and purchasing power than to overall food deficits. As a result, while responding to food emergencies, the U.S. also seeks to address the causes of food shortages in needy countries. In addition, we encourage countries to take greater responsibility for meeting their own food needs.

Particularly in the case of the "emergency syndrome" countries of Africa, we must make every effort to ensure that our food aid contributes as much as possible to alleviating the underlying causes of the food problems. Fifteen sub-Saharan countries have received emergency food aid in three out of the past five years.

Although we will not hesitate to continue providing emergency food aid to prevent famine, by sustaining the "emergency syndrome" we run the risk of creating disincentives and dependency. We need to gear all our food aid efforts (including, whenever possible, emergency programs) to promoting food security for African countries — and we are trying to do just that.

There are several ways we can use our food aid programs, including our emergency assistance, to promote food security in Africa. For example, in Cape Verde, Upper Volta, and Mauritania, we have undertaken special Food for Development programs, which are working to eliminate inappropriate price policies and other root causes of chronic food emergencies; similar programs are in various stages of development for other famine-prone African countries (Mali, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, and Niger). In Zambia, our PL-480 program has contributed significantly to improving incentives to small farmers to increase their food production, particularly corn.



U.S. AID

High-protein porridge for drought victims in Niger: "The Food for Peace program is a famine relief effort that every American can take pride in"

The local currency proceeds from the in-country sale of PL-480 commodities can fund agricultural development projects and emergency preparedness planning, as is the case, for example, in Mauritania. Similarly, PL-480 might be used for establishing buffer stocks in emergency-prone countries — if there are sound plans for their management and replenishment.

We can, and often do, provide dollar and technical assistance to complement emergency food aid efforts, such as expanded and improved food distribution mechanisms.

While we cannot stand by and ignore human suffering, we must guard against governments using our support to put off the day when they will confront their structural problems squarely. The challenge to us is to strike the right balance in a given country context — and sometimes it is a difficult task indeed.

We all realize that food aid alone cannot solve the problems of hunger in Africa. Still, it can be of vital importance in alleviating human suffering, in encouraging and facilitating solutions to longer term fundamental development problems, and in meeting the longer term balance of payments needs of many very poor countries. □

Anne de Lattre,
Director of Club du Sahel

INTERVIEWED BY HOWARD SCHISSEL

AFRICA REPORT: Drought has again hit the Sahel, with the 1983-84 cereals crop the lowest in a decade. With drought also affecting southern Africa and the Horn of Africa, is there not a danger of the Sahel's losing its status as a priority region for foreign assistance?

DE LATTRE: While the original impetus for donors to assist the Sahelian countries came from the drought, it is clear that they have not continued to provide such support solely because of an event that occurred 10 years ago. The Sahelians and the donors have built up a system and process for joint study, dialogue, and coordination within the Club du Sahel/CILSS [Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel] framework. This has developed confidence among the partners over the years and now provides a much more solid foundation for long-term cooperation than did the emergency of the drought.

Furthermore, we do not think of the Sahel as being in a race for external aid or in competition with other areas. Rather, we think the Sahel should proceed on the basis of a clear analysis of its own problems and attempt to find the resources tailored to its needs. To the extent that there is a finite pool of donor assistance available and that other areas will be putting claims on those funds for emergency purposes, it is reasonable to expect that the Sahelian countries may find it more difficult to secure the funds they need. This argues for preparation of programs and more efficiency in the use of funds, something we are trying to do within the Club du Sahel.

AFRICA REPORT: You have recently visited the Sahel. Are the conditions as bad today as they were in 1973?

DE LATTRE: Yes. In general, the 1983 crop season was quite bad. Rainfall was insufficient, and there was a very significant shortfall in production. There will be a number of problems of an emergency nature confronting the Sahel countries over the next few months, ranging from getting food to needy people to saving livestock, and even to assuring that certain urban areas have enough water to drink. Some countries such as Niger have fewer problems than others, like Mauritania. However, pockets of distress will probably arise all over.

AFRICA REPORT: Are Western donor governments and international organizations capable of meeting a new food emergency in the Sahel?

DE LATTRE: Capable, yes, but this does not mean that there will not be problems. Many observers have already compared the present sitution to that which existed in 1973. Some say it is even worse, although I doubt it. In any case, clearly the present systems that the Sahelian countries themselves and donors have put into place are functioning better than was the case in 1968-73, because we have not seen the calamities that one would expect from such a drought as now exists. All actors—Sahelians and donors—seem to be coping better with the situation than was the case 10 years ago. I am sure that there will be oversights and dramatic problems, but we hope they can be kept to a minimum.

AFRICA REPORT: How do you explain that none of the unfavorable trends identified in the Sahel after the 1968-73 drought have been stemmed, let alone reversed?

DE LATTRE: Those unfavorable trends, such as a decline in per capita food production, dependence on imported food, insufficient farm productivity and livestock production, soil infertility, and environmental degradation, are not simple matters to reverse. They represent very profound problems that have built up over decades. Perhaps some people were overly optimistic in thinking that they would begin to be reversed in the short term. Moreover, the weather has not been cooperative in the past few years. An analysis of rainfall data has shown that you have to go back to the 1950s to find a series of good years of rain. One mediocre year does not do much to build back water tables, soil humidity, or production.

Also, we have decried the fact that the funds spent in the Sahel were not massively redirected towards those crucial problems, as we had hoped. There has been some timid redirection, but the key sectors are astonishingly underfinanced. No more than 4% of official development assistance [ODA] goes for rainfed agriculture; and even a sector such as ecology/forestry, where great strides have been made in providing assistance since the Club was started in 1976, only receives about 1.5% of all ODA. Of course, the worldwide economic situation and the oil shocks have curbed the Sahelian countries in their own economic efforts, and so they too have fewer funds to devote to their own development.

AFRICA REPORT: Has there been a change in attitude of Sahelian governments concerning the region's economic dilemma?

DE LATTRE: The Sahelian leaders are very concerned about the trends. All of the governments are under great stress, and their margin for maneuver is limited. If it is pos-

sible, Sahelian leaders are more worried than they have ever been about the future of their region. They are more and more convinced that the CILSS/Club du Sahel strategy, adopted in 1977, is the correct approach—that assuring food security must be the first priority. When the Club strategy was prepared in 1976-77, that was not nearly as popular an idea as it appears now. So I think both on the intellectual or conceptual level and on the practical policy level there is a convergence of views that the problem of food security must be at the top of the agenda. Several years ago, this idea was not quite so clear in the minds of Sahelians and donors as it is now.

AFRICA REPORT: Why haven't the Sahelians managed to work out and effectively introduce a system allowing more intensive utilization of land and labor?

DE LATTRE: A system for better and more intensive utilization of land and labor is not something that is produced full bloom, all at once. It is something that evolves from a series of steps, developed from research or new technology. Insufficient research has been directed towards the problem of developing farming systems adapted to the various local conditions in the Sahel, particularly in view of the increasing costs of fertilizers and other inputs. There is experimentation and research proceeding in many different quarters in the Sahel and certainly examples exist that show that more intensive production can be obtained, namely in cotton and groundnuts. But intensifying production economically and maintaining soil fertility is a difficult combination, particularly in a drought-prone region. There is also the question of policies. Sahelian farmers could certainly produce more if the incentives existed for them to do so. Within the CILSS/Club framework, we have had a constructive ongoing dialogue on how cereals policies can be adjusted to favor domestic production, and almost all the CILSS member countries have taken steps in that direction. Since such policies are part of an intricate system, it is not easy to find the best approach; but in a number of states, this kind of problem is receiving the attention it did not have several years ago.

AFRICA REPORT: Is food self-sufficiency still a realistic goal for the Sahel?

DE LATTRE: Food self-sufficiency is a catchword, meaning that the Sahel should grow as much food domestically and regionally as it can. It was never meant to imply autarky. Nor did it mean that the Sahel should pursue uneconomic goals of growing all of its own food at all costs. Interregional and intraregional trade and regional cooperation are implicit in the strategy. Within that context, namely, one that envisions that the Sahel could assure itself a reasonable degree of food security, growing largely its own food and assuring its food supply through trade, we believe that the Sahel's strategy is realistic. This belief is based on the very extensive studies that have been conducted in the Sahel, particularly since 1973, which show that technically and physically the Sahel has the ingredients in land, manpower, and water to reach a high degree of food security. The further question is the time for reaching that goal. One has to think in terms of several decades, 30 to 40 years. In addition to resources, greater food security involves sociocultural change, organization, and management—domains where progress is slow.

AFRICA REPORT: Sahelian development planners say it is impossible to count on rainfed agriculture to assure the region's food needs, stressing that it is only irrigated farming that can "drought-proof" the region. Yet the track record for irrigated agriculture in the Sahel is far from impressive.



International Labor Office

Agricultural training center in Senegal: "Insufficient research has been directed at the problem of developing farming systems adapted to Sahelian conditions"

DE LATTRE: One should not be simplistic in opposing rainfed and irrigated agriculture. At present, rainfed agriculture supplies about 95% of the domestically produced cereals consumed in the Sahel. A small increase in the percentage of rainfed production can have a tremendous effect in increasing food supply, and so a great deal of effort should be put into rainfed agriculture. Irrigation is not a panacea. If it does not rain, irrigated agriculture is affected too. It is true that high yields with some security can be derived from irrigation, but is is certainly no easy matter. The CILSS/Club strategy counts on irrigated agriculture to move forward and particularly to help fill the rice gap. A lot of lessons have been learned in the Sahel about the organization of irrigated perimeters, water management, maintenance, and other factors that have tended to reduce the effectiveness of irrigated projects. A Club study pointed out that little headway was being made in the Sahel in irrigation because almost as much land was being lost to deterioration as was being developed in new perimeters. Both Sahelians and donors are beginning to absorb the lessons of the past, which show that gains must be consolidated, maintenance must be assured, organization must be improved, and more

care must be taken in designing new irrigation projects to assure that they will succeed.

AFRICA REPORT: Do you think that the Sahel is becoming dangerously dependent on foreign food aid and financial assistance?

DE LATTRE: Yes. Over the past few years, there was a tendency to call for food aid too easily. It was often a substitute for budget support. But unlike cash, the physical product of imported cereals competed in the marketplace

Karen Durlach

Failed millet crop in Mauritania: "One has to think in terms of decades to reach the goal of food security in the Sahel"

and in the only market where any financial resources exist to buy domestic production, namely, in the cities. Thus local farmers saw their potential markets in the cities being taken over by imported food, much of it food aid. Imported food aid also tends to change local consumption habits, making it even harder to satisfy national needs from domestic production.

With respect to financial assistance, it is indeed dangerous for developing countries to be so dependent on outside donors, because one never knows from one year to the next what assistance will be forthcoming. Planning becomes problematic. But this does not necessarily argue against providing more assistance for a period of time if donors and recipients join forces to use it for real development objectives. Another aspect of aid is that outside financing, even grant financing, is not free. It implies costs to the host government, which must budget to cover its part of project costs and eventually to assume the recurrent costs of the project when the donor phases out. We have devoted a lot of effort to going into this problem of recurrent costs with Sahelians and donors. In fact, the Club produced the first major study ever done on this question, long before anyone else worried about it. There is a realization beginning about the dangers involved; and through joint discussions with donors and particularly at the national level, we are beginning to see better habits in the conception of projects, to reduce their costs, and in the budgeting for recurrent costs.

AFRICA REPORT: Foreign aid donors are increasingly complaining that they have few positive results to show for the money spent and manpower committed to the Sahel over the past decade. Do you expect a slowdown in the level of foreign assistance to the Sahel?

DE LATTRE: Some donors are concerned about the lack of tangible results, but overall, I think, they take a balanced view of what was possible and what has been accomplished. One should not ignore the fact that there have been accomplishments. Some small irrigated perimeters are doing quite well, new technologies are being introduced. We have learned from the false starts, and on the whole the effort has been constructive. Many Sahelians have been trained. Foreign assistance funds may be more scarce in the coming years, and so it is all the more necessary to assure that the programs presented to donors are sound and backed up with a policy environment favorable to their success. That has been one of our main themes over the years, starting with the landmark study on cereals policy, which we conducted with the help of Dr. Elliot Berg in 1978, and the numerous sector analyses we have carried out with Sahelian and donor analysts.

AFRICA REPORT: One of the key themes stressed by the Club de Sahel has been the necessity to control recurrent costs in development projects. But a third of all development spending is simply earmarked to keep Sahelian administrative machinery running.

DE LATTRE: We have several currents running in different directions that account for the amount of assistance provided for nonproject purposes. The worldwide recession hurt the poor countries and cut into their ability to finance current expenditures, imports, new investment, and their own administration. The oil price shocks also contributed to this. Whereas we have been pressing for better, lower-cost project designs that are more adapted to local circumstances, donors have also been aware that it is important not to allow the entire administrative machinery to grind to a halt. If the export picture brightens, as it appears to be doing, and if the Sahel countries can continue to make progress in controlling their administrative expenditures (and they have made some limited progress), I think we could see more resources devoted to investment instead of administration.

AFRICA REPORT: Courageous political decisions are needed to boost cereals output. Do you see such moves forthcoming?

DE LATTRE: It is often very difficult to know exactly what policy decisions need to be made to improve the cereals production system, because it is a delicate, complex system. If you act on only one part of the system—for example, pricing—without taking into account other factors such as storage, marketing, soil fertility, cost, and delivery of inputs, you can do more harm than good. There was an example of a Sahelian country that abruptly raised the price

of millet one year and in doing so bankrupted the cereals board without helping long-term cereals production a bit. Within the CILSS/Club framework, we have been not only studying this problem, but carrying on a continuous dialogue between Sahelians and donors. One must also realize that if Sahelian countries take difficult decisions, they must do so on the basis of assurances that they will be supported in their efforts. An example of this is taking place in Mali, where donors have grouped together to provide long-term assistance in cereals as the government makes adjustments. Since we are already beginning to see some rather courageous decisions being made on the part of Sahelian authorities, I think we can be hopeful that they will continue to move in that direction provided they get the support they need.

AFRICA REPORT: What positive changes have taken place in the Sahel over the past decade?

DE LATTRE: The Sahel has made some immense strides over the past 10 years, but they often do not show up in the statistics. Agricultural production has increased even though it did not keep up with population increase. A lot of necessary experimentation and research has been done, setting the stage for future progress. Policies have been changed. The level of dialogue between donors and Sahelians is much more honest and relevant than it was before. If you add up all the hopeful signs, they provide a basis for believing in a better future and certainly balance out the negative publicity one sees.

AFRICA REPORT: The Club du Sahel held its fifth conference late last year, and CILSS met at the heads-of-state level at the beginning of 1984. What new proposals came out of these meetings?

DE LATTRE: The fifth conference of the Club du Sahel, held in Brussels in October 1983 at the invitation of the European Community, was a very useful meeting. Donors and Sahelians agreed that much valuable work has been accomplished within the Club in cereals policy, recurrent costs, and sector analyses, and in mobilizing financing. Several ideas were put forth, including the suggestion that the Club should continue to be provocative and nonconventional by looking into future problems, changes, and ways to help the changes. Donor coordination was given a boost when the Club decided that national-level progress review meetings should be held in each CILSS member country where the host government and donors could jointly take stock of their efforts, particularly in the agricultural sector. The Club was encouraged to continue its work in recurrent costs and cereals policy—a development showing that the partners had confidence that these subjects were worth pursuing. There was a lot of discussion about the need to put development projects in their proper context, namely, at the grass-roots level, with governments endeavoring to create the conditions for farmers to take their own initiatives and pursue their own development. This discussion will take time to translate into concrete action, but it represents a change in the thinking of the development partners. Development can no longer be from the top down.

AFRICA REPORT: In your view, what should be the priorities for the Sahel during the rest of the 1980s?

DE LATTRE: I would like to make it clear that the Sahel is not a basket case. It has physical and human resources, and it will keep on receiving external assistance. One of the future priorities will be to organize a better convergence of national, regional, and international development efforts. To achieve this priority, changes are necessary on the part of Sahelian governments as well as external donors. The key to development is agriculture: rainfed and irrigated production, livestock, fisheries, reforestation, and improvement of soil fertility, taking the inescapable drought factor into account. Much more assistance is needed for agriculture as well as for the social and educational sectors and for supporting the changes that will be forced upon the Sahelian governments by the pressure of circumstances. Demography and urbanization must be controlled. The Club du Sahel is a think tank and a forum for permanent consultation. It will be provocative. It will anticipate tomorrow's problems and propose new directions. The Sahel is a challenge requiring inventiveness and innovation in addition to resources. It also requires staying power and continuity, and all the donors must refrain from their natural tendency to want quick results. □

Karen Durlach

U.S. emergency food arriving in Dakar: "All actors—Sahelians and donors—seem to be coping better with this situation than 10 years ago"

Quett Masire,
President of Botswana

AFRICA REPORT: What was the purpose of your visit to Washington and your meeting with President Reagan? What is your government's view of U.S. policy in southern Africa? Is constructive engagement working?

MASIRE: I went to Washington at the invitation of the United States government, and I do not think it would be useful for me to speculate on the reasons for the invitation. I am aware, however, that it is normal for the heads of government of friendly countries to visit each other. I am not the first nor the last head of government to visit Washington. From Africa alone, I am aware that the heads of government of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Liberia, and Zaire have been to Washington in the past.

I consider that the U.S. government has an important role to play in southern Africa, given the political and economic options it can use to influence events in the region. A case in point is the role played by the U.S. government to facilitate the withdrawal of South African troops from southern Angola. This has been a positive use of influence by the United States, and I believe that it could contribute even more positively if it could help expedite the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 in Namibia.

It is not quite clear to me what constructive engagement involves and what it is intended to achieve. But if constructive engagement means U.S. involvement with South Africa and persuading the latter to effect positive social change, I would say that that policy has still to yield concrete results. I would submit that change should not be expected overnight, but that at least there should be some recognizable movement in the right direction. As events unfold in South Africa today, no positive signs are visible, given that the majority black people of that country have been excluded from the current constitutional dispensation.

AFRICA REPORT: One of your key economic aims has been to promote a program of rural development, because the vast majority of Botswana's population depends on the land. Yet the results have been discouraging, partly because of the effects of drought. Can you explain the program and its achievements and setbacks?

MASIRE: Since the late 1970s, attention has been focused increasingly on the promotion of productive activities in rural areas of Botswana as a complement to the rapid growth of social service infrastructure. We can point to considerable achievements in rural development since this period: increased coverage of villages by the water supply program and upgrading of rural roads by both capital- and labor-intensive methods; increased decentralization of planning and decision making to strengthen local authorities; expansion of education and health facilities in the rural areas; formulation of land-use plans for many parts of the country; launching of intensive area-specific integrated development schemes in selected parts of the country; establishment of extension officer cadres to promote small, village-based industries and the provision of financial assistance to producers; and continued expansion of production in the livestock sector.

Basically the approach has been to reinforce local skills, planning and administration capacity, and to make the optimum usage of available local resources, with the twin aims of creating employment and increasing rural incomes.

The setbacks we have experienced include: a continued shortage of skilled and trained personnel to plan and implement such programs; the realization that rural employment creation, in terms of permanent jobs, has not been expanding fast enough to absorb increases in the school-leaving population; and the decline in arable farming production and productivity, despite the introduction of extensive assistance programs, on which many households depend. This decline is largely due directly to erratic and insufficient rainfall and also to its effect on the willingness of farmers to make further investments in a risky enterprise like dryland farming.

AFRICA REPORT: Could you characterize the extent of the drought in Botswana and your aid needs?

MASIRE: An extensive relief program is being run for the third consecutive year, to deal with the problems facing the population as a result of the continuing drought. Basically, all sectors of the rural economy have been badly affected,

whether crop producers, livestock producers, hunters, or those casually employed. Rural incomes have fallen as a result, and malnutrition rates have risen.

The government's strategy is to provide supplementary food to those most vulnerable as a result of drought, to offer short-term job opportunities on community-based projects to the able-bodied to accelerate provision of human water supplies, and to undertake various measures to help crop and livestock farmers to preserve and build up their productive assets in anticipation of improved climatic conditions.

To implement these programs, we will require on the order of $35 million in this financial year and 43,000 tons of various foodstuffs, mainly cereals, in this calendar year. We have recently made detailed and specific requests to the international community for such assistance and have received very encouraging initial indications, particularly on our food and aid requests, which are the most difficult part of the program for government to make up itself.

We have all the institutional machinery in place to coordinate, implement, and monitor our relief programs, although areas such as public works and construction of water systems are short of some technical personnel.

AFRICA REPORT: Another major problem is providing jobs, and Botswana's policy is to attract foreign investment. What incentives does Botswana offer to get foreign investors to bypass its competitors for capital, particularly South Africa?

MASIRE: Indeed, one of Botswana's most pressing problems is to generate productive employment opportunities for the majority of people entering the labor force every year. We are working on measures to expand and diversify our industrial base to alleviate this problem. Our approach to industrial development emphasizes free, privately owned enterprise and relies on the market mechanism for influencing investment decisions. Within this framework, we have taken initiatives to create a healthy investment climate. In this regard, we have succeeded in establishing probably one of the most liberal and efficiently administered foreign exchange control regimes, thereby creating private sector confidence. On company tax, our maximum rate is 35% of all taxable income, which is obviously one of the most generous.

In addition, we provide direct financial incentives to investors submitting industrial project proposals that contribute to an increase in productive employment. By means of these factors, we are able to offer an attractive alternative investment location to foreign investors wishing to come to southern Africa. I must conclude by saying that our stable political climate also generates a positive effect, in addition to the fact that investors in Botswana have automatic access to the markets in Swaziland, Lesotho, and South Africa because of the common customs union arrangements we have entered into with those countries.

AFRICA REPORT: To what extent is Botswana dependent on South African technology and trade? And to what extent does Pretoria's trade compete with yours?

MASIRE: Only about two decades ago, Botswana was considered to be one of the poorest countries in the world, and I have no doubt that you will agree with me that it takes longer than that to develop an industrial technological base to sustain modern development for the foreseeable future.

Our policy is to diversify our relations with other countries, and to this extent we have been successful in establishing strong and mutually beneficial development cooperation arrangements with several countries. Although we have no such official development cooperation with South Africa, we do have free-trade arrangements as members of a common customs union that includes Lesotho and Swaziland. We are a landlocked country. In addition, we are neighbors of South Africa, which happens to have a well-developed industrial and communications infrastructure. Our geographical situation, therefore, gives South Africa considerable comparative advantage concerning the extent to which its economy is able to influence technological development and trade patterns in Botswana.



Nobu Arakawa

President Quett Masire: "The U.S. government has an important role to play in southern Africa given the political and economic options it can use to influence events"

AFRICA REPORT: In light of South Africa's pressure on its neighbors to rein in the African National Congress—what you have publicly called "bullying"—what is your attitude toward South African refugees affiliated with the ANC? Has your government's policy changed since South Africa's crackdown on the ANC?

MASIRE: Botswana's policy toward refugees derives from our international obligations as specified in those sections of the Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees; from our constitution, which has entrenched the concept of human rights; from our legal system, which upholds the rule of law; and from our political philosophy, whose principles are human equality and human dignity.

All those who come to Botswana and qualify as refugees are specifically prohibited from using Botswana as a base to attack their countries of origin. This policy has been implemented successfully in the past 18 years and applies to all refugees, irrespective of their political affiliation. There is no reason for us to change our policy, which has stood the test of time and has not been faulted by anyone.

UNHCR

Refugees in Botswana: "All refugees who come to Botswana are specifically prohibited from using the country as a base to attack their countries of origin"

AFRICA REPORT: Pretoria does not seem to be pressuring Botswana, as it is Lesotho, into signing a "nonaggression pact," apparently because your government and South Africa have an informal security agreement. Would you comment? Would you explain some of the details of this cooperation?

MASIRE: Your question is grossly uninformed in that since March 1984, Botswana has been under tremendous and constant pressure from South Africa to sign a nonaggression pact. It is our view that there is no cause for South Africa to apply these bullying tactics on us, given that our policy on refugees has been implemented over the past 18 years with equanimity. Botswana has no informal security agreement with South Africa, as you aver.

AFRICA REPORT: During April's Frontline states' meeting, what conclusions were reached on how to deal with Pretoria's pressure on its neighbors?

MASIRE: The Frontline states reiterated that the root cause of the problems in southern Africa is apartheid itself. Apartheid has been condemned in categorical terms by all, including the leaders of the Western world. The Frontline states observed that apartheid cannot be made acceptable by the use of military or economic power. With regard to the Nkomati Accord, they expressed the hope that South Africa would live up to the commitment to cease its acts aimed at the destabilization of Mozambique through the use of armed bandits.

AFRICA REPORT: What do you believe is the most effective way for the Frontline states to help bring about change in South Africa?

MASIRE: In order for the Frontline states to be in a position to help bring about change, they must be economically and politically stable so that they can continue to pursue an independent foreign policy—free of economic and political destabilization. In that position, the Frontline states can retain the capacity to influence events and even set examples of human equality and dignity in the region.

AFRICA REPORT: Since independence, Botswana has been one of the few democratically run countries in the region, despite having been an economic hostage to South Africa. How do you account for Botswana's stability?

MASIRE: Botswana's stability derives from our national character of mutual understanding and forbearance. It has always been our practice, even at the traditional meeting places called *kgotla*, to accord freedom of speech to every man and woman without hindrance. In our dealing with neighbors like South Africa, we have always pursued a foreign policy based on principles rather than expedience.

AFRICA REPORT: One of the main goals of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) is the upgrading of transport and port facilities in Mozambique to lessen dependence on Pretoria's infrastructure. Has that effort—and even the role of SADCC—been jeopardized by the new economic cooperation plans between South Africa and Mozambique?

MASIRE: As far as I am aware, there is no connection between the Mozambican transport and ports facilities and the recently signed security agreement with South Africa. I don't see how the agreement would affect the improvements of these facilities, aimed at enabling them to serve the region in line with the objectives of SADCC.

The role of SADCC is clear, i.e., to reduce economic dependence on other countries, especially the dependence on South Africa. No sensible country would tolerate the kind of overwhelming economic dependence that obtains between most of the SADCC member states and South Africa, not even South Africa itself. I do not think that the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique should cause Mozambique to abandon the SADCC objectives. □

UPDATE

Botha's tour of Western Europe ends South Africa's diplomatic isolation

In late May and early June, South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha made a 16-day tour of Western Europe. Botha visited Portugal, Switzerland, Britain, West Germany, Belgium, France, Austria, Italy, and the Vatican. The trip was an extraordinary breakthrough in South Africa's isolation. Since the 1960s, most European governments have—at least in their public statements—ostracized South Africa, which has replied by disregarding foreign criticism of its policies.

But South Africa's recent "detente" with its neighbors has provided European leaders with a convenient pretext to meet with the leader of the white minority government. After invading Angola at least six times since 1975, South Africa began earlier this year to pull its troops back into Namibian territory, which it occupies in violation of international law; then, after repeatedly raiding and bombing Mozambique and supporting rebels who crippled the Mozambican economy, South Africa signed a non-aggression pact with the Maputo government. While Western opinion called it "regional detente," one African leader described Pretoria's policy as "bashing its neighbors to the floor, then picking them up and making them sign accords."

There was enough recognition of that viewpoint to make Botha's visit somewhat embarrassing to his European hosts. Only the governments of Portugal and Britain would admit that they had extended a formal invitation to Botha, although the heads of state of Switzerland, West Germany, Belgium, and Italy—as well as the Pope—all had discussions with him.

On his three-day visit to Portugal, Botha met with Prime Minister Mario Soares and President António Ramalho Eanes. Botha and Soares discussed the status of the 700,000 Portuguese emigrants working in South Africa, as well as the disposition of electricity and revenue from Mozambique's Cabora Bassa hydroelectric dam, which Portugal partly owns and which supplies South Africa with much of its energy. Cabora Bassa has repeatedly been endangered by attacks of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), a rebel group backed by South Africa until the signing of the Nkomati accords.

Botha declared that his government was willing to sign a non-aggression pact with Angola similar to the Nkomati agreement with Mozambique: he rejected any plan for Namibian independence that was not predicated on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Botha also claimed that South Africa's "reforms would continue in order to ensure that all citizens would have the chance to decide their own future." Soares said that Botha's visit was an "honor" and "should be viewed as normal," and he accepted Botha's invitation to visit South Africa in the near future.

In Switzerland, Botha met with President Leon Schlumpf and with Swiss banking officials to discuss increased Swiss credits to South Africa. Swiss banks were instrumental in raising a massive Eurobond loan to the South African government in March; and the Transkei homeland, when it sought a multi-million dollar loan earlier this year, could obtain it only from a Swiss bank. Switzerland, in turn, purchases more than half of South Africa's gold exports every year. In a speech at Berne, Botha declared that South Africa's blacks were "persuaded" rather than "forced" to move to the homelands created by the government.

Botha's visit to Britain was the first by a South African prime minister since 1961. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's official invitation to Botha provoked ferocious criticism by opposition party leaders and the press. The tabloid *Daily Mirror* proclaimed that "Mr. Botha is a disgusting man because

Continued on next page

SOUTH AFRICA continued

he is the keeper of a disgusting policy."

In his five-hour talks with Thatcher, Botha tried to get the British Prime Minister to close down the offices of the African National Congress in London and to approve the sale of reconnaissance aircraft to South Africa; Thatcher turned down both requests and told him that apartheid "was not acceptable." Meanwhile, almost 40,000 people marched through the streets of London to protest Botha's visit.

In West Germany, which is now South Africa's leading trade partner and a leading source of loans to Pretoria, Botha's visit with Chancellor Helmut Kohl was marred by Kohl's refusal to shake Botha's hand in front of photographers and by the explosion of a bomb outside a Frankfurt bank.

The French and Italian governments refused to meet with Botha, although cabinet members in Belgium and Austria held discussions with Botha when he visited their countries. In France, Botha laid the foundation stone of a memorial to South African soldiers who died fighting the Germans in World Wars I and II.

While Botha was in Italy, Pope John Paul II finally agreed to grant him an audience. A lapse of communication led to an embarrassment for Botha: the day before the Prime Minister met with the Pope, security police in Namibia arrested 37 prominent SWAPO officials who were attending a barbecue held on Roman Catholic property. The men were quickly released. ■

U.S. launches coordinated private sector initiative in Africa

The U.S. is embarking on a campaign to promote American investment in Africa and to encourage African entrepreneurs to take over the responsibilities currently handled by governments in those countries. The responsibility for coordinating the effort has been given to the recently-formed Interagency Group on the Private Sector in Africa, an informal coalition of government agencies including U.S. AID, the departments of State, Treasury, Agriculture and Commerce, the Export-Import Bank, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), among others. The existence of the group is an indication of widespread agreement among the agencies and the Congress that development programs, in order to be effective, must concentrate on the private sector and on the restructuring of Africa's economies.

The effort results from disillusionment with past development aid which, it is generally agreed, has been a total failure. American officials have blamed African domestic economic policies for Africa's economic crisis. If Africa persists with these "misguided policies," U.S. officials assert, no amount of foreign assistance will help.

The dismantling of Africa's state-owned marketing agencies and government corporations, therefore, is one of the prime goals of the U.S. program. U.S. AID's Private Enterprise Bureau, formed three years ago, has focused its efforts on promoting the indigenous private sector to replace the government bureaucracies. The bureau has acted in an advisory capacity to African and other Third World governments which request assistance in making these changes, and it has provided commercial credits to African entrepreneurs, particularly those who wish to invest in industries related to agriculture. American policymakers also expect that stronger private sectors in these countries will pave the way for future U.S. private investment.

A model project is in Kenya, where U.S. AID has matched the funds put up by three commercial banks to make loans to small and mid-size businesses. Plans are now underway to replicate this project in other African countries.

The Group is also encouraging American businesses to consider Africa when they think about investing overseas. OPIC has set up an "opportunity bank" which provides American corporations with information on investment opportunities, while other agencies are arranging U.S. trade missions to Africa while, at the same time, advising African governments on how to make a favorable impression on the Americans. Representatives of the interagency group have held investment conferences across the United States in an effort to raise interest in Africa.

At one of these meetings held in Los Angeles in April, Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker commented that American business has "not taken the initiative in developing opportunities but has waited for Africans and third parties to come to them." Crocker also said that American business could help Africans to restructure their economies better than the U.S. government could because "American business can speak more candidly and sensitively to African leaders about African policies than we can through official channels."

Crocker reported that Somalia, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, the Gambia, Cameroon, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Zaire, Guinea, Gabon, Liberia, and Mauritius had come to the U.S. seeking advice on how to attract foreign investment. For countries willing to make structural adjustments, Congress has approved the $500 million Economic Policy Initiative (EPI) which was requested by the administration. For FY 85, $75 million of that fund is available for selected sectors within African countries which undergo "reforms" aimed at moving toward a free market system. At first, Congress balked at approving the funds out of fear that they would be used as a "political slush fund" for the administration to pay off its friends in Africa. The funding was approved only after Congress was given a say about the disbursement.

The effort has already resulted in a trade agreement with Senegal, and other agreements are in the works

with Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Burundi, and Zaire. Other African countries have reportedly requested trade agreements, including Somalia which, according to one source, "has offered the U.S. carte blanche." The trade agreements generally provide that U.S. firms will be given the same treatment as indigenous firms; allow for the repatriation of an agreed-upon portion of profits; give U.S. firms the prerogative of seeking mediation by the World Court; and contain guarantees against the expropriation of property.

Despite the agreements and attempts to make Africa more hospitable for U.S. investment, Americans have not been knocking down doors to invest in Africa. Americans still prefer Asia or Latin America, territory with which they are more familiar.

According to Leonard Robinson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, who heads the interagency group, "We are just building a foundation now. It will take a good five years or so before we really see the effects of this initiative." Robinson feels that the immediate goal is to "institutionalize the free market system" before this effort, like so many other aid projects, disappears without a trace. ■

WESTERN AFRICA

Legal wrangle in Nigeria over military trials of civilian officials

The trials of civilian politicians detained after the December 31 coup have begun in secret in five major Nigerian cities. Although a civilian judge sits on each of the five military tribunals, the final legal authority rests with the tribunal chairmen, who are all military officers. The holding of the trials in secret, the merely advisory role of the civilian judges, and the abolition of the right of appeal prompted the Nigerian Bar Association to direct its members to boycott the trials.

Attorney General Chike Ofodile said that the lawyers' boycott would not prevent the trials from continuing. "The accused persons," said Ofodile, "have been given opportunities to defend themselves, and all they should do is to avail themselves of these opportunities."

Although everything about the trials is secret, including the names of the accused, the identity of the first three defendants became known when they submitted writs challenging the competency of the military courts. Bisi Onabanjo, Bola Ige, and Michael Ajasin, the former governors of Ogun, Oyo, and Ondo states, were accused of extorting more than $2 million from a French construction company to help fund the election campaign of their Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN). A Lagos high court judge, Roseline Omotoso, accepted the governors' contention that the tribunal had no jurisdiction over legal offenses allegedly committed before the military government came to power. But the government immediately invalidated her decision by issuing a new decree that gives the judgments of the military tribunals legal precedence over the rulings of all other courts.

The Lagos tribunal then went on to sentence Onabanjo to 22 years in prison, but Ige and Ajasin were acquitted for lack of evidence. In announcing the verdict, the chairman of the tribunal, Brig. Paul Omo, was careful to recite detailed evidence of Onabanjo's guilt. Omo stated that the trial was fair despite being held in secret, for the testimony of sworn witnesses, he said, confirmed that Onabanjo had orchestrated the payment of the $2 million bribe to the UPN.

Days later, Melford Okilo, the former governor of Rivers state, was sentenced to 21 years in prison for maintaining illegal bank accounts overseas. Sam Mbakwe, ex-governor of Imo state, was jailed for 10 years and fined more than $30,000 for illegally exchanging naira into dollars.

The tribunals are the most-publicized part of the military government's "war against indiscipline." A publicity campaign on billboards and government-owned television and radio stations is calling on the public to fight corruption, nepotism, sloppy workmanship, disorderly conduct, and the hoarding of scarce commodities. So far the campaign seems to have been treated seriously; for example, the recent change of currency, which required Nigerians to turn in their old naira notes for different-colored new ones, went smoothly. But previous governments' attempts to control "indiscipline" have all failed.

The Nigerian public is particularly cynical about the tribunals. Instead of being the epitome of the anti-corruption campaign, the secret trials are inspiring contempt among most Nigerians. Many citizens suspect that the military government has ordered the trials to be held in secret lest the defendants testify publicly about corruption under previous military regimes as well as under the last civilian government. Another popular theory is that the secret testimony of the defendants will reveal where their caches of money are hidden, enabling those now in power to confiscate the previously-stolen funds.

One jailed official is said to have been outraged when the military claimed to have found $4 million stashed under the floorboards of his house. "It's a lie," he protested. "There was $6 million—somebody stole the rest!" ■

THE GAMBIA
Death sentences

Three years after the failed attempt to overthrow President Dawda K. Jawara, the fallout from the coup continues to monopolize attention. The final trial in connection with the plot took place in late April, and 24 men were condemned to death. The death sentences may be commuted after review by the president or by the court of appeals, as were those of 63 other people who were found guilty.

The attempted coup was partly


Camerapix

President Dawda K. Jawara

inspired by charges of official corruption, and Jawara has since dismissed several government ministers and instituted the "Evaluation of Assets and Properties and Prevention of Corrupt Practices Act." The act established a committee with investigative powers, although Jawara must approve its findings before they are made public.

However, opposition groups—among them, the banned Movement for Justice in Africa-Gambia (MOJA-G)—claim that corruption is still widespread. Corruption, they charge, is proportionately more serious in the Gambia because the population is so small and the economy so weak.

In May, four members of MOJA-G were arrested and will be tried, according to a diplomatic source.

Jawara has continually affirmed the importance of national security and stability. But the recent devaluation of the dalasi by 25 percent, and the 13.5 percent increase in the price of rice, a staple food, will no doubt give radical opposition groups more ammunition. Nevertheless, in the 25th year of both the Gambia's independence and Jawara's rule, there have been 539 defections from the official opposition National Convention Party to Jawara's own People's Progressive Party. ■

GHANA
Borders open

In mid-June, the Ghanaian government announced the opening of its borders with Ivory Coast and Togo, as well as the lifting of the midnight-to-4:30 a.m. curfew which had been in force since Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings came to power on December 31, 1981. Ghana's borders with its neighbors were closed in September 1982 in a campaign to end cocoa smuggling; however, internal security was a further factor, as the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) has long maintained that dissidents seeking to destabilize the government operate from bases in Ivory Coast and Togo.

In late March, dissidents simultaneously infiltrated Ghana from across the Ivory Coast and Togo borders, an event which provoked a strongly worded protest to the Abidjan and Lomé governments. Both of Ghana's eastern and western neighbors have maintained that while they do not condone dissident activities, they cannot refuse exiles seeking political asylum.

The opening of the borders was seen as a conciliatory gesture by the Ghanaian authorities, given that both Ivory Coast and Togo stand to gain economically from free transit, as well as an indication of the PNDC's confidence in its ability to maintain internal security. Togo's economy suffered because the closure sharply curtailed Togolese merchants' normally brisk trade with Ghanaians who entered the country to purchase goods not available at home. And at one time, Ivory Coast was reportedly gaining some 50,000 tons of Ghanaian cocoa per year from cross-border smuggling.

Meanwhile, Ghanaian officials are cautiously optimistic that the drought and the resulting food deficit will not be as severe this year as in 1983. Rainfall patterns appeared to be closer to normal at the onset of the rainy season in April and May; farmers were better prepared to cope with the possibility of crop failures from drought; and approximately 140,000 metric tons of food aid had begun to be disbursed. Midway through the lean season which lasts until the main harvest begins in September, international relief agencies in Accra reported that the food supply situation, although still below normal, has improved. Prices for basic foodstuffs are substantially lower than last year's.

And in other economic news, the government held a seminar on investment promotion in Accra in early June in which its proposed revision of the 1981 investment code was debated by representatives of the domestic and foreign private sector. According to Dr. Kwesi Botchwey, the PNDC Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning, "We welcome and indeed actively encourage foreign investment in areas we define as priority," including petroleum exploration, mining and mineral processing, timber, logging and wood processing, quarrying, deep sea fishing, food processing, and domestically based manufacturing industries. In an effort to attract foreign investment to Ghana, the new code introduces an external accounts status which guarantees repatriation of profit for new and old investments provided that they are self-financing in foreign exchange.

Seminars organized by the Ministry of Fuel and Power were held in London; Houston, Texas; and Calgary, Canada, in late June and early July to declare open some 7,300 kms. of offshore blocs for petroleum exploration. Following a seismic survey carried out by Geophysical Services Inc., a subsidiary of Texas Instruments, the government was inviting all interested investors to participate in developing Ghana's petroleum resources, which are "indispensable for the country's sustained economic growth."

During the meetings, which were well attended by representatives of the American, European, and Canadian oil industries, Ghanaian officials explained the new laws governing the petroleum sector, including the Petroleum Exploration and Production Law, promulgated in August 1983, as well as the role of the newly established National Petroleum Corporation. According to industry spokesmen, Ghana possesses enough as yet unexploited petroleum reserves to at least ensure oil self-sufficiency. ■

GUINEA-BISSAU
New constitution

In May, the National Assembly approved a new constitution and elected a 15-member Council of State to replace the Revolutionary Council that has governed Guinea-Bissau since the coup of November, 1980. As expected, João Bernardo Vieira was unanimously elected to a five-year term as chairman of the council.

Two deputy chairmen, Col. Paulo Correia and Col. Iafai Camara, were also appointed by the Assembly. Camara, a former minister of the armed forces, has become increasingly influential since 1980.

The new system of government further consolidates Vieira's power as head of state. Earlier, he had dismissed his prime minister, Victor Saúde Maria, to thwart an attempted swing to the right within his government.

Parliamentary elections, which had been suspended after the coup, were revived and periodic elections for the National Assembly were made mandatory.

Carmen Pereira, Guinea-Bissau's foremost woman leader, became the new president of the National Assembly. ■

MALI
Back in UMOA at last

Mali was readmitted into the Monetary Union of West Africa (UMOA) on June 1, more than two decades after withdrawing from the organization. UMOA (Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and Upper Volta) is part of the CFA franc zone, a group of countries whose common currency is valued at a fixed rate to the French franc.

Mali, which has had its own currency, will now adopt the CFA franc, and the Central Bank of Mali will be absorbed by the Central Bank of West African States. Mali's entry into UMOA should curtail the black market and cross-border smuggling that previously had undermined the country's economy. But French and West African experts are still determining how UMOA can manage the debt of $140 million owed by the Central Bank of Mali to the French treasury.

The Malian economy suffers in part from the phenomenally high burden of government salaries. Since independence, more than 90 percent of all Malian graduates have been hired for government jobs, and public salaries now consume 80 percent of the national budget. ■

NIGER
Political prisoners freed

To coincide with the tenth anniversary of his assumption of power, President Seyni Kountché freed two of Niger's most prominent opposition figures. Former President Hamani Diori and nationalist leader Djibo Bakary, who were both instrumental in Niger's drive for independence from France, had been in prison or under house arrest for nearly a decade. Approximately three dozen other people were also released from detention. Bakary and Diori both still command substantial loyalty among Nigeriens, so Kountché's clemency seems to be a sign of confidence in his personal hold on power as well as a gesture of reconciliation. ■

SIERRA LEONE
Stevens shakes it up

In May, citing his deteriorating health, Christian A. Kamara-Taylor resigned from the ceremonial post of second vice president. Kamara-Taylor had previously been the powerful secretary-general of President Siaka Stevens' All People's Congress (APC).

Stevens used Kamara-Taylor's resignation as an opportunity to shake up his cabinet. In a surprise move, he appointed Francis Minah to take over the post of second vice president. Two years ago, Stevens had demoted Minah from minister of finance to minister of justice.

Stevens also dismissed the minister of information, Moiwo Korji, who had been in ill health, and Mohammed Dabo, the minister of social welfare and rural development, who is believed to have been connected with a recent corruption scandal. Stevens replaced Dabo with Sani Sesay, an official from the finance ministry. Edward Kargbo took Korji's position, and S.B. Kawusu-Konteh became the new minister of trade and industry. In a nation that is well-known for its turbu-

Cotton replaces food as Sahel crop

Profits from cotton production are increasing in many West African countries. Cotton thrives in dry soil, so it can be planted in areas where drought has made the soil unsuitable for growing food crops. Furthermore, cotton has risen steadily in price since 1981, enabling governments to increase the price paid to farmers for producing it.

In Mali, this year's projected harvest of 152,000 tons will be the largest ever. Production in Ivory Coast and Senegal has increased almost fifty-fold since the 1960s. In 1983, Cameroon constructed two new ginning mills, Togo one, and Benin upgraded two; feasibility studies are underway in almost every country in West Africa.

In Chad, the cotton crop has also climbed to record levels, more than doubling in the last two years despite the disruptions of the civil war. Almost half of Chad's population is now involved in cotton production, and nearly 90 percent of Chad's foreign exchange earnings come from cotton. Most of Chad's cotton is grown in the south, where rebel activity has been steadily dwindling. As state purchasing cooperatives raised the producer price of cotton, this season's crop surpassed the forecasts of 120,000 tons by 25 percent, and the district of Mayo-Kebbi doubled its production from the previous year. However, at an agricultural conference at Pala earlier this year, Chad's minister of agriculture and rural development, Djidingar Dono Ngardoum, said that "there is now a food shortage even in areas where the harvest was normal." ■

lent election campaigns, Kargbo and Kawusu-Konteh are notorious for the violence that occurred in their districts during the last two elections, but Stevens reportedly considers them among his closest advisers. ■

TOGO
Former VP dies

On March 26, former Vice President Idrissou Antoine Méatchi died of a heart attack after being taken to an infirmary from Mango prison, where he had been detained without charge or trial since December 1982.

A former leader of the Union Democratique des Populations Togolaises, a northern-based political party, Méatchi served as minister of agriculture in Togo's first government under President Sylvanus Olympio. After Olympio's assassination in 1963, Méatchi became vice president under Nicolas Grunitzky. When current President Gnassingbé Eyadema seized power in 1967, Méatchi became director general of agriculture at the ministry of rural economy and held that position until his official retirement in 1978.

Since a failed coup attempt in 1977, Eyadema has cracked down on opposition to his government. Although Méatchi's arrest in December 1982 stemmed from accusations that he had allegedly accepted bribes to construct unsuitable grain silos ten years earlier, it is widely believed that Méatchi was arrested for attempting to organize political opposition to the Eyadema government. ■

UPPER VOLTA
Sankara sacks former ally

President Thomas Sankara's National Council of the Revolution (CNR) showed its first signs of schism when Ibrahima Koné, one of Sankara's closest associates, was dismissed from his post as minister of youth and sports on May 23. Along with Maj. Jean-Baptiste Lingani, Capt. Blaise Compaoré, and Capt. Henri Zongo, Koné had been a member of Sankara's inner circle. When the previous government of Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo arrested Sankara in May 1983, Koné rallied nearly 1,000 youths and students to march through the streets of Ouagadougou calling for Sankara's release; Koné was arrested by the Ouédraogo government soon after. That event was the first in a series of protests which led to Sankara's assumption of the presidency in August 1983.

Sankara had been planning to visit Ivory Coast at the end of May, but his trip was postponed, leading to speculation that Koné's dismissal may have been connected with a military plot to overthrow Sankara. Two officers were dismissed on May 19, and eight days later another dozen officers were arrested. Seven of the men were executed on June 12 after a military tribunal found them guilty of complicity in the coup attempt. ■

EASTERN AFRICA

Final agreement reached on EAC breakup

An agreement signed by the presidents of Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda in Arusha, Tanzania in mid-May signaled both the end of the East African Community (EAC) and the possibility that the three states could reach future cooperative agreements which would accomplish some of the goals of the EAC. The Arusha accord finally settled the long-disputed disbursement of the assets and liabilities of the EAC, a disagreement that had kept Tanzania and Kenya at odds since the EAC began to crumble in the mid-70s.

Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere commented at the ceremonies: "We know from bitter experience that our countries need each other. Today we are meeting to sign an agreement which formally brings the community to an end. . . therefore I cannot pretend that this is a very proud day for East Africa."

Ugandan President Milton Obote blamed many of the EAC's problems on the man who deposed him in 1971, Idi Amin: "When tragedy befell Uganda in 1971, the conduct of the military regime became a great embarrassment to both Kenya and Tanzania." Kenya's President Daniel arap Moi spoke of "renewed forms of cooperation that will no doubt be based on a firm foundation, having its roots in the experience of our past."

An important step toward cooperation occurred before the signing when it was announced that Kenya and Tanzania would reopen passenger and freight rail links between the two countries. Earlier, air transport links had been renewed as both Kenya Airways and Air Tanzania opened routes across the border. However, Tanzania's and Kenya's independent railways and airlines are money-losers. A real step forward would be the kind of cooperation that might result in the rebirth of East African Airways and East African Railways.

Readjustments

There are, however, still significant barriers to the open trade relationship which has been envisioned. Because of exchange rate discrepancies and the thriving black market for the Tanzanian shilling, businessmen in East Africa prefer dealing in foreign exchange to trading at official rates. Kenyan businessmen are also reportedly wary of dealing with Tanzania's government-owned enterprises and would prefer to do business with their Tanzanian counterparts.

Tanzania and Uganda have recently instituted some reforms aimed at rectifying this situation while partially placating the IMF. Tanzania, which has been wrangling with the Fund for the past two years, finally agreed to devalue its shilling by 25% and to reduce government subsidies on maize meal, a staple food. The IMF, however, had requested a devaluation of 35% earlier this year, and Fund officials have not yet announced whether negotiations with Tanzania will resume.

At the same time, to partially offset these measures, Tanzania has increased the minimum wage by

ering a series of vitriolic anti-American speeches over the last few months.

While the military losses in the north are causing many Ethiopians to question their government's policies, the most controversial move was the decision to boycott the Los Angeles Olympics. Many Ethiopians, even those in favor of establishing a communist party, feel that it is a unnecessary capitulation to Soviet demands. An important debate in Ethiopia has been over whether or not the adoption of a communist party will turn Ethiopia into a Soviet pawn. ■

KENYA
An invitation to dissidents

President Daniel arap Moi has delared a general amnesty for Kenyan exiles abroad, and the Kenyan government is now actively trying to entice some of the dissidents who fled the country during the last two years to return home. The government has recently shown its intentions by refraining from prosecuting two recently-returned dissidents, James Orengo, and Chelegat Mutai, former Members of Parliament.

Both Mutai and Orengo had fallen victim to a purge of vocal and dissident legislators which took place during 1981 and 1982. Mutai was arrested in late 1981 and charged with filing false mileage claims on her government car, and Orengo was arrested in July 1982 and charged with three counts of forgery and theft of a client's money. Rather than stand trial during a time when dissidents were regularly being jailed for minor violations, both chose to jump bail and flee to Tanzania.

Orengo was sent back from Tanzania at the end of last year along with the participants in Kenya's abortive 1982 coup following the normalization of relations between the two countries. After five months under maximum security, he was released and the charges were dropped.

Mutai returned voluntarily to have a last visit with her terminally ill mother, and she then decided to remain. No charges have been brought against her yet.

Though the Moi government's public posture has been to extend an invitation to all dissidents to return home to help in "nation building," there are certainly some exiles who are not welcome. Opposition groups feel that the offer is really an attempt to divide Kenya's exile community, which has recently developed some cohesion and is beginning to have an impact in Kenya and abroad.

One exile who was apparently not welcome was Anyang Nyong'o, a former political science professor at the University of Nairobi who went back for an international social science conference. Upon reaching his rural home in western Kenya, he was attacked and severely beaten. Though it was officially declared an attempted robbery, most observers feel that the beating was politically motivated.

Kenya and Tanzania invest in pyrethrum

The little-known pyrethrum chrysanthemum has become an important export crop for Kenya and Tanzania. The attractive white flower of this low-growing plant has been recognized for its outstanding insecticidal properties. When processed, this natural insecticide has applications in many products from agricultural sprays to flea collars. Kenya and Tanzania are the world's largest suppliers of pyrethrum.

Five years ago, the pyrethrum industry in East Africa was in danger of losing its market to Western insecticide manufacturers. The worldwide recession, reduced production, and competition from synthetic pyrethroids drastically reduced exports. With less income, the African pyrethrum industry could not afford to pay farmers an adequate price for their labors, thereby inducing farmers to move to more profitable cash crops. As it was reaching a crisis point, the industry rebounded. New facilities were built, research accelerated, and management became alert to customers' and growers' needs. Kenya, the number one producer with cash earnings of $30 million, harvested its largest crop in 1982.

Production now surpasses demand, although there is good reason to believe that some Eastern countries, particularly China, may be buying large quantities. The U.S. demand is stagnant, according to William Gullickson, general manager of McLaughlin Gormley King, the only company that refines crude pyrethrum in the U.S. Gullickson thinks that it may take a long time for pyrethrum to regain its former markets. "There is a lot of concern from our customers that Africans can't do it," he says. "And there is experience to warrant it."

Kenya's government has made a full commitment to dispelling that notion. Pyrethrum is its third-largest cash crop behind coffee and tea, and it is vital to the economy. Kenya is now conducting research, opening processing plants, and providing farmers with expertise and assistance.

Tanzania has built a new processing plant and continues to investigate ways to increase its production from last year's 1700 metric tons. The new processing plant has a capacity of 4,500 tons, though Tanzania exports only crude extract, not refined pyrethrum as Kenya does.

In 1983, the U.S. imported 243,800 pounds of pyrethrum crude, worth approximately $1.2 million and 282,800 pounds of refined pyrethrum worth over $10 million. U.S. producers of pet products such as flea and tick sprays, have completely returned to the natural product because of its effectiveness, while companies making consumer insecticides have stayed with synthetic pyrethroids because they are slightly cheaper.

Recent studies have shown that some insects are beginning to develop resistance to the synthetic product. For this reason, for the valuable foreign exchange earned, and because pyrethrum may be environmentally safer, the Pyrethrum Boards of Kenya and Tanzania plan to stand behind their product and continue to look for new markets.

—*John A. Kerr* ■

The list of those who fled Kenya in the early '80s is a long one. After Kenyatta's death in 1978, there was a brief period of tolerance during which Kenyan politicians, university lecturers, journalists, and intellectuals began speaking their minds. In 1981, however, the government began a crackdown on "Marxist-oriented elements," and anyone who criticized the Moi government was soon dismissed from his post or charged with some kind of criminal violation.

Moi's offer of amnesty came amid signs that Kenya's exiles are preparing to turn up the heat on the Nairobi government. Renowned Kenyan novelist Ngugi wa Thiongo, unquestionably the spiritual leader of Kenya's dissidents, recently published an article in *South* magazine which chastised Kenya's intellectuals for remaining silent in the face of repression in Kenya, and he called upon them to resist the regime. It was the first time that a Kenyan intellectual had made such a plea.

Thus far, the government's offer of amnesty has been ignored by the exiles.

More on Njonjo

As "revelations" continue to come from the Njonjo inquiry, the most important developments in the proceedings may be taking place outside of the courtroom. Njonjo, who may have been the most hated man in Kenya at one time, is slowly coming to be seen as a victimized hero by his own Kikuyu ethnic group who have lost both political and economic power since the death of Jomo Kenyatta. The newspapers have recorded several arrogant outbursts in court from both Njonjo and his lawyer, W.S. Deverell, and the public seems to like it. Observers have concluded that Njonjo now feels that he is in no danger of being punished for his actions. ■

SEYCHELLES
René re-elected

President Albert René was re-elected on June 15 with just over 92 percent of the vote. Opposition leaders, including exiled former President James Mancham, called on voters to boycott the election, but voter turnout was reasonably high. René's administration has instituted Africa's most comprehensive social security system, including free education and medical care. Only minor changes in the cabinet are expected to be made after the election, for René himself holds more than half of the cabinet portfolios. ■

Joe Margolis

Prime Minister Salim Salim

TANZANIA
Salim Salim named PM

Salim Ahmed Salim, Tanzania's foreign minister, was appointed prime minister of Tanzania in late April after the sudden death of Edward Sokoine in a car crash. Sokoine, who was killed shortly after President Julius Nyerere announced that he would be resigning the presidency next year, was the leading candidate for the presidency.

The appointment of Salim, which came as a surprise to no one, makes him Nyerere's heir apparent. Salim, 42, is a career government official who built his reputation in Tanzania's diplomatic corps. In the 1970s, he was Tanzania's chief representative to the UN and was supported by the OAU and many Third World states to succeed Kurt Waldheim as secretary-general of the UN in 1981.

Nyerere took the occasion of Salim's appointment to restructure his cabinet, reducing the number of ministries from 21 to 14. ■

UGANDA
Border raids

Cattle raiding and smuggling along the Kenya-Uganda border has been a continuing problem, but the raids have been picking up in recent months. Armed with automatic weapons, the Karamojong, who live in northeastern Uganda, have reportedly killed hundreds of people on both sides of the border since January. The Pokot of Kenya have also stepped up their attacks since they killed 12 Kenyan soldiers since last January.

In Uganda, about 35,000 villagers and farmers have fled both the raids and the government's retaliation since April. According to some reports, the Ugandan government's indiscriminate measures against the raiders have been more damaging to the local populations than the raids. Air attacks have destroyed entire villages on both sides of the border, and troops have regularly harassed local people when searching for the bandits.

A recent Ugandan report described finding large caches of guns and ammunition as well as stolen cattle. The report indicated that the raiding was still a threat and stressed the necessity of joint action by Kenya and Uganda to control the border.

The raiding in the northeast only adds to the problems of a country already wracked by violence. President Milton Obote, in an April speech, linked all opposition to his government to National Resistance Army guerrillas who have been fighting against his regime for the past three years. In order to flush out the guerrillas, the government cut off all relief supplies to Luwero district, a center of guerrilla activity.

In May, the army massacred dozens of civilians at Namugongo, a Christian shrine. In an uncharacteristic move, the government acknowledged the killings instead of attributing them to guerrillas masquerading as soldiers as it usually does. ■

CENTRAL AFRICA

'National reconciliation conference' in Congo will try to arrange peace for Chad

A new peace conference, at which all the parties to the Chadian conflict could negotiate in a neutral venue, will convene in Brazzaville before the November OAU summit. Both former President Goukouni Oueddei, now leader of the rebel Government of National Unity (GUNT), and current President Hissène Habré have agreed to attend. Representatives of at least nine other Chadian political factions are expected to be present.

For at least the third time in two years, Goukouni has offered to resign as leader of GUNT. On May 30, Habré responded by offering, in turn, to step down as president of Chad. Habré declared his support for "any perspective, any opportunity, and any way to restore peace," and stated his own willingness "to retire from the political scene." Habré's offer came one month after Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafy finally acknowledged, after more than a year of constant denials, that Libyan troops are present in Chad.

Goukouni and Habré's offers to resign inspired new speculation about a possible "third man" whom Habré and Goukouni, as well as France and Libya, can all find acceptable as president of Chad. However, Habré's offer to resign as president is contingent upon Goukouni's resignation from the GUNT leadership. And Goukouni's offer likewise depends upon Habré resigning first.

Meanwhile, Qaddafy's long-awaited acknowledgment that Libya actually had invaded Chad is not likely to have any effect on the situation. He expressed Libya's willingness to withdraw its troops "if France first withdrew its 3,000 men." France has repeatedly offered to withdraw, but only if Libya did so first. Neither side trusts the other: Qaddafy would not be willing to withdraw so far north that he would have to relinquish control over the Aouzou strip, a mineral-rich zone along Chad's border with Libya; France is concerned that, if its forces withdraw before Qaddafy's, the Libyans could rearm Goukouni's troops or redraw the border to Qaddafy's liking.

Camerapix

Goukouni: Yet another offer to resign

On June 7, Habré celebrated the second anniversary of his seizure of power. There are some signs of economic and political progress. The textile, sugar, tobacco, and brewery enterprises have recovered, approaching the 1980 level of production; Ndjamena's second commercial bank opened earlier this year; civil servants' salaries are now being paid on time, if not in full; and unrest in the south has diminished.

However, food production is still suffering from drought and war. The gross national product is now lower than it was in 1978, and the 1983 estimated per capita GNP—$120—is one of the lowest in the world. Normal exports have almost ceased, while black-market trade is booming. Much of the urban economy now caters to the needs of the French soldiers, while prices of staple foods have increased.

No new solution to the civil war is in sight. Since 1978, 11 peace conferences on Chad, sponsored by the OAU or by neighboring countries, have all failed; five cease-fires have been arranged and then broken; pan-African peacekeeping forces have been brought in twice; Libya has intervened militarily twice and France three times. ■

BURUNDI
Help from France

In May, the bi-annual joint committee on Franco-Burundian cooperation convened in Paris, chaired by French Minister of Cooperation and Development Christian Nucci and by Burundi's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Laurent Nzeyimana. French aid, which has been increasing steadily since 1980, is expected to reach $25 million this year. There are 160 French technical advisers (*coopérants*) in Burundi, along with some French military advisers who serve as engineering consultants.

Burundi has largely escaped the drought afflicting so much of Africa, but its efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in food production have been hindered by the rapid growth of its population.

Burundi is almost completely dependent upon coffee for its export earnings and therefore is at the mercy of overseas commodity traders. Although its foreign debt was minimal only three years ago, Burundi was forced to devalue its currency by 30 percent last year and is now engaged in negotiations with the International Monetary Fund.

France provides 20 percent of all foreign assistance to Burundi, and the increase in French aid this year is timely, for Burundi will host the next annual Franco-African summit in November. ■

CAMEROON
Executions after coup

The death toll from the coup attempt of early April continues to rise. According to official figures, 70 people were killed and 52 wounded during the three-day firefight in the streets of Yaoundé between rebels and government loyal-

ists. But the actual casualty figures are probably in the hundreds and are still increasing as the government sentences and executes the rebel leaders. Under the state of emergency declared on April 18, more than 1000 people were initially arrested, of whom 436 were expected to be brought to trial. By early June, 46 men involved in the coup had been tried, convicted, and executed by firing squad.

On April 30, a military tribunal—empowered during a state of emergency to try defendants under military codes of conduct, without the right of appeal—found 35 men guilty of having participated in the coup plot. They were all executed the following day. At least two civilians were believed to be among the dead: Ahmadou Bello, director-general of Cameroon Airlines, and Nana Moussa, a diplomat.

The second round of trials, in May, resulted in more than 60 acquittals, but at least eight more death sentences were handed down. ■

CONGO
Economy still growing

The Central Committee of the Congolese Labor Party (PCT) recently issued statistics showing a 13 percent increase in the 1983 gross domestic product after a 12 percent rise in 1982. The PCT called for a reduction in the budget while expressing its determination to renew state enterprises.

The development of the "central villages" that had been promised in the latest five-year plan was also stressed. In an effort to spur economic growth and to halt the rural exodus, infrastructure and social services will be improved in selected villages in the north.

As a result of decreased petroleum revenues, the 157 proposed central villages have been delayed. The first 50 are currently in the final planning stages. ■

RWANDA
Government cleanup

President Juvénal Habyarimana has christened 1984 the "Year of Increased Food Production." Habyarimana, who rarely appears in public, recently made a surprise visit to Kigali's market to ensure that merchants were not overcharging their customers. But his other concern has been to purge his government of inefficient and disloyal bureaucrats. A cabinet reshuffle in January has been followed by a ministerial commission empowered to investigate the performance of government officials.

Camerapix

President Juvénal Habyarimana

The commission found that "in the heart of the administration there are a number of elements whose indiscipline, irregularity, and inadequate performance have long been known. . . but supervisors have not been picking them out and sanctioning them for their behavior." The commission will now move on to investigate the performance of public corporations and provincial officials. ■

ZAIRE
Mobutu takes no chances

President Mobutu Sese Seko rescheduled Zaire's presidential election, moving the date up from November 10-11 to July 28-29. Mobutu, who seized power in 1965, will be the only candidate. He is expected to win the election.

Mobutu is taking no chances, however. Besides moving the election date forward to prevent any expression of discontent, he has also called upon the military to be "vigilant" during the elections. Mobutu is developing "ways and means of making it possible for soldiers to take an effective part in the election campaign."

Mobutu has also made voting a compulsory duty of citizenship. Under a new decree, all Zairians over the age of 18 will be required to vote in the upcoming election.

In the December 1977 presidential election, Mobutu also ran unopposed and was elected to a second seven-year term by 98.16 percent of the vote. ■

A tour of Rwanda's industries

Athanase Shirampaka, who owns a pasta factory in Kigali, Rwanda, now produces 20 tons of macaroni per year. He is one of the first Rwandans to start his own business, but his company's survival is threatened by the importation of foreign food products. His complaints were characteristic of those heard by Rwanda's Minister of Industry, Mines, and Labor, Mathieu Ngirira, on his tour of companies near Kigali in May.

Ngirira began his week-long tour at a sugar-processing plant. Rwanda's annual sugar needs have risen to 9,000 tons, but the plant at Kabuye can supply only 2,000; a shortage of funds has delayed the planting of sugar cane on an additional 1,000 acres. Rwanda must import the rest of its sugar needs, further depleting its treasury.

Sodeparal, a leather-goods factory, has been hurt by a four-fold increase in the price of rawhide and by continued imports of shoes and other leather products. The factory manager asked why the government could not get its citizens to follow its own urging to buy locally-made goods.

The managers of Rwantexco, a clothing factory, asked the government to stop "certain persons" from importing textiles "that are no better than ours, and more expensive." Rwantexco, the managers said, can match the foreign goods in quality and price but not in "prestige," and the company "is in danger of strangling" without government protection. ■

Nationfoto

Nyerere, Jomo Kenyatta, and Obote at EAC founding, 1967

35% and decreased by 20% the wages of the country's highest paid workers.

In Uganda, measures have been introduced to close the gap between the black market and official rates of exchange for the Ugandan shilling. The two-tier exchange rate which was introduced in 1982 was abandoned in favor of a single floating rate, and price controls have been lifted to conform with IMF and World Bank recommendations. Civil service salaries have been increased by 500%, and sales taxes have been reduced. In addition, producer prices for coffee, which earns Uganda 90% of its foreign exchange, have been increased in order to encourage production.

There is a glint of hope that these reforms will stabilize the economies of the three countries and lead to a degree of real economic cooperation. However, the situation which led to the breakup of the EAC is still present: an economically dominant Kenya is in ideological opposition to Tanzania, and Uganda is caught in the middle. ■

COMOROS
Mayotte referendum

The deadline is nearing for a decision on whether the island of Mayotte will retain its status as a French "territorial collectivity" or whether it will unite with the three islands of the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros. By December 22, 1984, the French government must sponsor a referendum allowing the Mahorais—the 55,000 inhabitants of Mayotte—to vote on whether they wish Mayotte to be attached to France or to the Comoros.

Mayotte now elects a deputy to both the French National Assembly and the French Senate. Mayotte also uses the French franc as its currency and is heavily dependent upon French development aid. In previous referenda, one in 1974 and one in 1976, the Mahorais voted overwhelmingly to retain their association with France.

But the Comoran government of Ahmed Abdallah, like the previous administration of Ali Soilih, insists that Mayotte is historically and ethnically part of the Comoros. France is under great pressure from the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations to relinquish its claims of sovereignty over Mayotte and "return" the island to the Comoros. It is believed that France may agree to do so, in exchange for the right to build a naval base at Mayotte and an airport elsewhere in the Comoros. ■

ETHIOPIA
Move for Eritrean unity

In an effort to unite the feuding and disparate factions which are fighting for independence in Eritrea, the Eritrean Liberation Front-Popular Liberation Forces (ELF-PLF) convened their first congress in seven years in southeastern Sudan. About 300 delegates turned up at the behest of their Arab supporters to discuss Saudi Arabia's offer of "unlimited support" on the condition that they are able to unite.

Osman Saleh Sabbe, who heads the ELF-PLF, has the support of the Saudis who are suspicious of the ELF-PLF's main rival, the Marxist-oriented Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). The EPLF is virtually the only group still fighting in Eritrea, while the ELF-PLF has only been able to occasionally infiltrate along the border from Sudan.

Sabbe told reporters that the Saudis were pressing the divided guerrilla factions to unite to force Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam to accept a negotiated settlement and to abandon his alliance with the Soviet Union.

The congress followed a series of successful attacks carried out by the EPLF in Eritrea. In late May, EPLF guerrillas destroyed 30 aircraft in an attack on an Ethiopian base in Asmara. Reports of other battles indicate that the fighting has taken a heavy toll on the Ethiopian army, and there have been claims of increased desertion by Ethiopian army troops in the province.

Other reports have indicated that Soviet advisers have been playing a larger role in the Ethiopian army's battles, creating tension between the Soviets and the Ethiopians as they have suffered a series of military setbacks. The Soviets act as political, infantry, and artillery advisors and "involve themselves in the smallest tactical details," according to sources. The EPLF has captured several Soviet advisers.

Olympic controversy

The Soviet role in Eritrea is one of the factors which are causing many Ethiopians to have second thoughts about Ethiopia's plans to institutionalize a communist party in September. Mengistu is facing much resistance within the ruling Dergue, and has countered by deliv-

Qaddafy facing greater economic and political challenges in Libya

On May 8, fighting broke out for several hours between Libyan security forces and 20 to 30 dissidents in Tripoli. A coalition of the Muslim Brotherhood and other dissident groups, including the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, mounted the attack on the Bab al-Azizya barracks, the headquarters of the "revolutionary committees" which is often used by Qaddafy as his personal residence. The attempted coup—the first armed resistance against Qaddafy—was put down by government troops, and all but three of the rebels were killed. A large-scale sweep followed, and perhaps as many as 5000 people were arrested including university staff, students, Muslim fundamentalists, and members of the PLO. It was also reported that seven people were hanged in early June as a result of the botched coup attempt.

The incident in Tripoli was the culmination of a mounting resistance to Qaddafy's regime within Libya. Earlier, in May, bombs exploded at al-Abyar and at the military camps of Fwaihat and Rajma near Benghazi. The public hangings of two student fundamentalists in Tripoli for treason, and three more in Benghazi in mid-April, fueled open dissent among many students, leading to a boycott of classes. Two of the people who participated in the executions were later found dead.

Qaddafy blamed "American-backed Muslim Brotherhood hit squads" operating from Sudan for the Tripoli attack, and he threatened to "export terrorism to the heart of America" if the U.S. did not stop "exporting terrorism" to Libya. He also pledged to overthrow "the dirty American agent, President Nimeiry of Sudan."

According to a report in Britain's *Observer*, the people killed in the Tripoli clash were Muslim Brothers recruited by the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), which is led by Mohamed Maghariaf, a former close associate of Qaddafy. According to opposition sources, the U.S. encouraged Maghariaf to set up the Front with $30 million supplied by Saudi Arabia.

Many Libyan exiles feel, however, that Maghariaf and the Muslim Brotherhood are as unacceptable as Qaddafy's regime. The British-based Libyan Constitutional Union (LCU) called the Tripoli attack an ill-conceived suicide mission and charged that the action set their cause back by providing Qaddafy with an excuse to clamp down on all opposition. The NFSL countered, saying that the attack had lifted a "a huge psychological barrier and the people have been encouraged. For the first time, too, the regime has been forced to admit to the existence of the Front, referring to its leaders by name—a further sign to the people of a tangible movement of genuine resistance."

Economic problems

At least a part of the dissatisfaction with Qaddafy stems from Libya's declining economy. Qaddafy's survival throughout his rule has depended upon his ability to broaden his internal base of support. He successfully mobilized the poorest section of society against the old elites, pursuing a policy of economic nationalism which limited private wealth and organized a redistribution of resources. Welfare rights were extended, and socialist policies were introduced, resulting in substantial popular support for the regime.

Margaret A. Nowicki

Qaddafy: Facing genuine resistance

However, these policies have been severely undermined by the recent fall in oil revenues, which has resulted in a balance of payments deficit of over $1 billion per year for the last three years. Libyan oil output has already fallen by more than 60 percent from 2 million barrels per day to 600,000 due to declining world demand for oil—and Libyan oil in particular. Foreign exchange from oil exports has fallen from $22 billion in 1980 to an estimated $10 billion for this year. Per capita income in Libya has fallen from $11,000 to $8,000 since 1981.

The combination of a poor oil market and international isolation have led to a decline in goods and services over the last three years. Qaddafy has been forced to order cutbacks of food imports, and he has imposed salary cuts.

Another rift between Libyans and their leader has developed over the introduction of compulsory military service for both boys and girls. Students, members of the officer corps, and elements of Libya's middle class have been especially enraged. ■

EGYPT
Opposition gains influence

The results of the parliamentary elections of May 27 were close to what most observers had predicted: President Hosni Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP) won 73 percent of the vote, giving it 391 of 448 seats in the Assembly. The remaining 57 seats, 15 percent of the vote, were won by the Wafd party whose leader, Fuad Serageddin, protested, saying that the elections had been rigged. Three other parties combined to capture the remaining 12 percent of the vote, but none received the minimum of 8 percent

needed to take a seat.

The Wafd's gains are partially a result of its alliance with Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood or *Ikhwan Al-Muslimini*. Though the *Ikhwan* is a banned organization, and therefore ineligible to participate in elections, its members will now occupy several of the seats won by the Wafd.

The Wafd and the other opposition parties campaigned against Mubarak's "pro-Western" politics, and though the opposition is no threat to the NDP's plurality, Mubarak is responding to the growing anti-American sentiment in the country. He has said that he would like to exchange ambassadors with the Soviet Union and has thus far refused to return an ambassador to Israel. ■

SUDAN
Nimeiry hangs on

President Gaafar al-Nimeiry has called a state of emergency aimed at controlling the growing unrest among Sudan's northern, predominantly Arab population. The emergency, which was declared in early May, bars public meetings, regulates movement, and imposes censorship and curfews.

The declaration was made in part to control the wave of strikes which have been called by professional groups. A strike among college professors closed Khartoum University, while a physicians' walkout shattered the nation's already inadequate health care network. The state of emergency was finally imposed as the strikes spread to the accountants' and clerks' unions. A strike by accountants and clerks would have prevented the state from paying laborers, which would have created a more serious threat to Nimeiry's already tottering government.

The strikes, motivated by basic wage demands, reflect the collapsed state of the nation's economy caused in part by the cost of suppressing the rebel movement in the southern part of Sudan.

Sudan's economic problems have been compounded by the adoption of Islamic investment codes which have disrupted credit markets. Domestic and foreign investors are cautiously approaching the new rules, which make interest payments illegal. More importantly, the concept of limited liability has been abandoned, making investors personally responsible for the activities of companies they have invested in.

The mood in Khartoum

In commemoration of the 15th anniversary of the May Revolution which brought President Gaafar al-Nimeiry to power, banners were draped along Khartoum's major boulevards celebrating another revolution—the rule of Islamic Law, the *Sharia*: "*Sharia*—people's law," and "No rights without *Sharia*." However, in Khartoum today, a person's rights are determined not just by the *Sharia*, but by his position relative to the barrel of a gun.

According to orthodox Islamic practice, the *Sharia* in Sudan should apply only to Muslims, but since May it has been married to an arbitrary martial law, and no one stands outside its sway. Traditionally recognized as a country where hospitality to foreigners reigned supreme, Sudan is fast becoming a place where foreigners feel threatened by the capricious application of the *Sharia*.

Hence, one late May morning a senior officer of UNICEF in Sudan, suspected of brewing beer, was held with a gun to his head while military police ransacked his house, discovering nothing. Perhaps to assure that the search was not in vain, however, the soldiers took $80 before departing. Similarly, a priest of the Italian Comboni Brothers—one of the oldest missionary orders in Sudan—who was suspected of making wine now that none can be imported, was detained while police inspected his Khartoum mission.

The Sudanese are faring no better. In early May, after the police rounded up thousands of Khartoum residents for minor offenses, cautious citizens disposed of whatever potentially suspect commodities they possessed. Aside from liquor, these included containers of petrol, which is rationed in Sudan, and even sugar, which is scarce. Hoarding is considered to be a serious violation, and hoarders are severely punished. In late May, a raid on a discotheque located in a restaurant complex on the Blue Nile resulted in the arrest of everyone present, including the dance hall's manager. All are liable to public flogging even though—in keeping with the *Sharia*'s current arbitrary application—no one had been forewarned that dancing was outlawed.

The floggings, held daily at two o'clock when the sun is at its searing zenith, have replaced soccer as the country's top spectator pastime. Hundreds of people daily scale the walls and fill the courtyards of the nine emergency courts throughout Khartoum to witness the proceedings.

One guest at these ceremonies was Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, whom Nimeiry released from prison last year after a seven-year sentence and who was then assigned the task of "consolidating the Islamic method" in Sudan. In mid-May, on Nimeiry's orders, he attended an amputation at Kober prison in Khartoum North. Turabi, the brilliant, bespectacled Muslim Brotherhood theoretician, and one of the principal propagators of Islamic law, straightaway fainted as the criminal's hand was sliced off.

As will any people living under such conditions, the Sudanese are developing a sense of gallows humor. Thus, a popular joke in Khartoum these days concerns a new sports complex that South Korea has donated to Sudan: Athletes from a dozen countries are assembled for the opening ceremonies of what will become an annual event, but Nimeiry is late in arriving to officially open the competition. Hours pass while the athletes, still in formation, wilt beneath the punishing sun. When Nimeiry finally shows up, the Sudanese contingent, which is the only one still conscious, breaks into caustic, mockingly exuberant applause. Realizing their indiscretion and Nimeiry's likely response, one athlete turns to another and says, "It looks like next year we'll have to team up for any clapping."

—*R.W. Schusler Jr.* ■

A few days after the declaration of the emergency, Nimeiry reshuffled his cabinet, replacing some of the ministers with individuals who are more personally beholden to him. The newly-appointed minister of internal affairs was dismissed within a week after taking his post, however, reportedly for hoarding coffee.

U.S. officials seem to be tiring of what they perceive as Nimeiry's sensationalism. While the Reagan administration has strongly supported the Sudanese government—twice supplying AWACs planes after Nimeiry claimed that he was being threatened—the current state of emergency has produced only alarm in Washington. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker flew to Khartoum a week after Nimeiry declared the emergency. Upon his return, top U.S. officials began privately questioning Nimeiry's emotional stability and his ability to maintain control of the country that he has held on to for the last 15 years. ■

TUNISIA
Placing the blame

The former minister of the interior, Driss Guiga, has been sentenced to ten years in prison for his role in the bread riots that took place earlier this year. Now residing in London and working as a consultant for a Saudi Arabian businessman, Guiga was tried in absentia by the Tunisian Supreme Court, and charged with misleading President Habib Bourguiba about the seriousness of the riots and exploiting the violence to further his own political career.

In his defense letter to President Habib Bourguiba, dated May 16 and printed in *Le Monde*, Guiga reminded the president that the government as a whole was responsible for the riots and not Guiga alone.

Guiga reaffirmed his loyalty to Tunisia and to the Bourguiba government, but he strongly stated that he would not play the part of a scapegoat for Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali, who authored the plan to raise bread prices which subsequently led to the riots. Also on trial in connection with the riots are Abdelhamid Sekhiri, former director-general of the police, and Ezzeddine Driss, former Tunis police chief. ■

WESTERN SAHARA
Morocco digs in

Morocco and the Polisario Front continue to issue conflicting reports about the course of battles in the Sahara. It is clear, however, that Morocco has extended its defense wall, nearly doubling the size of the territory under its control. According to Polisario, the extension of the wall to the town of Zag in southern Morocco cost the Moroccans nearly 600 lives. The Moroccans, who usually refuse to release casualty figures, said that 38 men were killed and 100 wounded during the extention of the wall.

Observers feel that Morocco's strengthened position may preclude a compromise and thus endanger the next OAU summit.

Morocco has said that it will continue to move the wall eastward and southward until either the entire territory is under its control or until a deal is struck with Algeria preventing Polisario forces from entering across the Algerian border. Morocco has steadfastly refused to negotiate with Polisario representatives.

Though the Moroccans have claimed the extention of the wall as a great victory, the doubling of the territory will severely tax the military's ability to continue supplying the troops positioned along the perimeter of the wall. Though no one is sure exactly what the war is costing Morocco, most observers have estimated the figure at $1 million per day. That cost is certain to rise as more troops and equipment are needed to control the territory. ■

Delegation of Israelis attends conference held in Morocco

In mid-May, the World Congress of Moroccan Jews held its bi-annual meeting in Rabat. For the first time, an Israeli delegation was present at the proceedings. Among the Israelis were nine Knesset members, two mayors, the editors of three major newspapers, and several intellectuals and community leaders. Prominent Zionists from Western Europe and the U.S. also attended.

At the conference, Morocco's minister of state, Ahmed Alaoui, called for the creation of an "association of the sons of Abraham" in order to encourage dialogue between Arabs and Jews. Alaoui also said that Morocco's King Hassan II is "one of the few heads of state who can call upon Jews and Palestinians to recognize each other and to allow for a mutual understanding to live together in Palestine in the future."

The invitation to the Israelis was seen as an attempt by Hassan to take the place of Anwar Sadat as a moderate force in Middle East politics. Hassan's move was also made with one eye on the U.S., where Congress has been wary of his repeated requests for arms to carry on the war in Western Sahara. "Our presence," said a member of the Israeli delegation, "will reinforce the prestige of King Hassan in the United States and in all Jewish communities throughout the world."

Though Hassan did not personally meet with the delegation, Crown Prince Mohammed hosted a banquet that also was attended by Prime Minister Mohammed Karim Lamrani and other Moroccan cabinet ministers.

Syria immediately recalled its ambassador from Rabat and accused Hassan of betraying the Arab cause. Moroccan officials responded by saying that Hassan had consulted several Arab leaders—including Yassir Arafat, Hosni Mubarak, King Fahd, and King Hussein—and none of them had objected to inviting the Israelis. However, with the exception of the Egyptians, all of the Arab governments denied having given their approval. ■

Political violence spreads in Zimbabwe

In the worst civilian violence since independence, hundreds of people were injured in the Midlands region in mid-June when thousands of supporters of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's ZANU party attacked the homes and offices of followers of Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU opposition party.

Mugabe's government has accused ZAPU members of harboring armed dissidents who have killed at least eight ZANU officials this year.

After the rash of rioting, the government banned all ZAPU political meetings in Midlands "until dissident activity is wiped out." The ban, which was also intended to reduce inter-party violence, immediately had the opposite effect. Violent anti-ZAPU demonstrations took place in five more Midlands cities, including Gweru, where 22 people were injured when 20,000 ZANU loyalists stormed the party offices of ZAPU and of Bishop Abel Muzorewa's UANC. At Kadoma, an even larger crowd raided opposition party offices while two ZANU cabinet ministers looked on.

Simbi Mubako, the minister of home affairs, commented: "Any party that supports banditry should not be expected to be treated with kid gloves by the government. If support for the bandits continues, sterner measures can be expected." Mugabe had delivered a similar warning to ZAPU in May at the funeral of Peter Simunyu, a ZANU official who was murdered by dissidents. Mugabe said that supporters of the dissidents should be "eradicated" and proposed "a manhunt, not only in houses but in the bush, in the anthills, and in the trees."

The civilian attacks on ZAPU in central Zimbabwe have broadened the conflict, which until recently was fought primarily in Matabeleland between government troops and armed dissidents.

Potential investors have been disturbed by the recent violence in Zimbabwe, and Mugabe's government has worked hard to improve its overseas image. However, accounts of army atrocities filtered out of Matabeleland and were picked up by the Western press, precipitating threats by Nathan Shamuyarira, the information minister, to prosecute those foreign correspondents who write "negative and unsubstantiated" articles about Zimbabwe.

To stop the firestorm of rumors that atrocities were taking place in Matabeleland, the government organized a tour of the region by 52 foreign journalists. But the tour backfired when local residents and international relief workers repeatedly spoke of beatings, rapes, and arbitrary killings by government troops. ZANU officials accompanying the tour dismissed the charges as lies. John Tsimba, director of information, informed the foreign reporters that "you have not found evidence of genocide in this whole region, no mass killings, no mass graves."

The government still seems unable to gain the support of the majority of Matabeleland residents. Many Ndebele-speaking people feel that the government's promises—equitable redistribution of land, and a restructuring of society—have not been adequately fulfilled in Matabeleland. The Ndebele believe that the lack of fundamental change is a conscious policy of discrimination by the Shona-dominated Mugabe government. ■

ANGOLA
Czech hostages released

In late June, Unita rebels freed 20 Czech hostages whom they had been holding for more than a year. In releasing the hostages, Unita gained a significant diplomatic victory. The Czech deputy minister of foreign affairs, Stanislav Svoboda, was dispatched to Unita's headquarters to witness the release. He greeted Unita leader Jonas Savimbi as "Mr. President," although by arriving late Svoboda avoided having to watch Unita's military parade.

The 20 hostages were the last of the original 64 Czechs who were captured at the Alto Catumbela wood pulp mill; women, children, and the ailing had been released earlier. Unita is still holding three Bulgarians and four Portuguese, as well as five Americans and some Colombians captured in early June. ■

BOTSWANA
Masire visits U.S.

On his May visit to the U.S., President Quett Masire asked for American help against South Africa's "unreasonable and illogical pressure."

South Africa is using its diplomatic and economic resources to force Botswana into signing a mutual non-aggression treaty similar to those signed by Mozambique and Swaziland.

Masire said that South Africa had no justification for seeking a non-aggression pact, since Botswana has never been aggressive toward any of its neighbors. Nor had Botswana ever allowed ANC guerrilla activity against South Africa, Masire affirmed. Botswana is heavily dependent on the passage of exports and imports through South Africa and the Southern African Customs Union; without international support, particularly from the U.S., Botswana would have to yield to South African demands, said Masire. (See interview with President Masire, page 32.) ■

MALAWI
Development waits for cash

Months after the February donors' conference, at which Malawi sought funding for its development projects, the plans remain only plans. At the conference, which was attended by 15 nations and 24 international organizations, President-for-Life Hastings K. Banda requested $113 million in support for the development program. Finance Minister Chakakala Chaziya said that $406.1 million will be needed to complete the projects slated for 1984-87.

Since 85 percent of Malawi's labor force works in agriculture and 89 percent of export revenue is earned from sugar, maize, groundnuts, cotton, and tea, the conference centered on agricultural projects, including extension services, farm mechanization, and irrigation. Educational improvements and secure transportation routes were also among the projects for which funding was sought.

The donors' conference was unique for the absence of South Africa and Israel, two of Malawi's traditional allies. It is believed that Malawi was interested in new sources of aid and wanted to avoid past criticism for its close contact with South Africa and Israel. Libya, Saudi Arabia, and several other countries did not attend the 1984 conference because of the previous participation of South Africa and Israel.

The only country that committed funds was Algeria, which promised $150,000. Further pledges are, however, expected to trickle in. ■

MOZAMBIQUE
MNR still active

The Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) has grown stronger, not weaker, since the signing of the Nkomati accord in March. Under the terms of the mutual non-aggression pact signed at Nkomati, South Africa was to cease all support for the MNR, a rebel group seeking to overthrow the government of President Samora Machel. While South Africa has won international acclaim for signing the agreement, Mozambique has probably lost at least as much as it gained from the treaty.

Government officials claim that MNR guerrillas have expanded their field of operations into nine out of Mozambique's ten provinces. Only Cabo Delgado province, in the extreme north, is safe from MNR attacks. Throughout May and June, civilians and even foreign aid workers were attacked and killed by the rebels; the MNR inflicted at least 100 casualties.

Informed sources claim that just before the signing of the Nkomati accord, South Africa expelled approximately 1000 MNR guerrillas into Mozambique from a training camp near Phalaborwa in the eastern Transvaal. Those guerrillas, newly trained and freshly armed, were able to fan out through Mozambique and resume their attacks just as South Africa was pledging to stop supporting them.

The same sources believe that, although the South African government has adhered to the conditions of the Nkomati accord, "certain elements" within the South African military have continued to arrange the delivery of supplies and munitions to the MNR. In a secret meeting in May with South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha, Mozambican officials insisted that South Africa provide them with intelligence data on MNR activities, and reiterated Machel's pledge to give amnesty to any rebels who turned themselves in.

The Nkomati accord is also causing dissension within the Mozambican government. In mid-June, Machel dismissed three important officials, two of whom were members of the Frelimo political bureau, and replaced them with men believed to be less ideologically opposed to the rapprochement with South Africa.

The new minister of security, Col. Sergio Vieira, who replaces Gen. Mariano Matsinhe, led the negotiations with South Africa on monitoring compliance with the terms of the Nkomati accord. Col. José Oscar Monteiro replaces Gen. Armand Guebuza as minister of internal affairs; Monteiro was also prominent in the Nkomati negotiations, having attended the final round of talks in Cape Town in March. José Carlos Lobo, minister of mineral resources, was replaced by Abdul Magid Osman, formerly the secretary of state for coal.

Also in response to the Nkomati accord, in early June the U.S. government lifted its seven-year-old ban on direct economic aid to Mozambique, releasing an initial disbursement of $500,000 for famine relief and financial assistance. ■

SWAZILAND
Fraud case and 'coup attempt'

On June 8, four of the most powerful men in Swaziland were dismissed by the Liqoqo, or supreme council of state, "in the interests of national peace." The men were Richard V. Dlamini, the minister of foreign affairs; Sishayi Nxumalo, the finance minister; Titus Msibi, the police commissioner; and the army chief of staff, Col. Mangomeni Ndzimandze.

The dismissals were apparently connected with Nxumalo's investigation of a case of fraud allegedly implicating members of the Liqoqo. The fraud scheme is said to involve the smuggling of goods into South Africa without customs dues being paid to the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Nxumalo had already ordered $60,000 worth of clothing to be confiscated until it could be proven that the goods had been imported legally, and his investigation was likely to have implicated several members of the Liqoqo in the fraud scheme, observers said. Nxumalo also intended to investigate a possible multi-million dollar fraud in the chemical industry.

After the men were dismissed, the Liqoqo began referring to them as "the gang of four" and charged that they had attempted to overthrow the Swazi government. The coup attempt allegedly failed when the plotters were unable to obtain the keys to unlock the royal armory where weapons are kept.

South Africa confidentially requested that Swaziland investigate the fraud case, and the Swazi government replied by approving the establishment of an independent commission to make "an urgent investigation." South Africa, as the largest member of SACU, stands to lose the most in any case of fraud.

But South Africa is also concerned about the dismissal of Dlamini and Nxumalo, who had been instrumental in the negotiation of Swaziland's non-aggression pact with Pretoria and in the discussions of a "land deal" in which South Africa would cede parts of two of its homelands to Swaziland. ■

Why We Must Help

BY JOHN C. DANFORTH

The following article was written by Senator John C. Danforth in January following his two-week fact-finding tour of Africa. Senator Danforth's efforts to focus American government and public attention on the drought and food situation in Africa were instrumental in gaining passage of a $150 million supplemental allocation for food aid to the continent.

Politicians argue about the extent of hunger in the United States, but for Africa there can be no debate. No food has reached the drought-stricken, guerrilla-plagued settlement of Changanini in Mozambique since November. The people are eating leaves from the trees, roots, and cashew nuts, and the results of such a diet are predictable. One need not be a physician to diagnose starvation: emaciated bodies, distended bellies, discolored hair, and haunting eyes are symptoms anyone can recognize. As of early 1984, such infrequent aid as has arrived from international donors was sporadic and unsupervised. Unlike the Thailand-Cambodia border of 1979, volunteers from organizations such as CARE, Catholic Relief Services, or World Vision had not yet arrived.

Elsewhere in Africa, the combined efforts of donor countries and private voluntary organizations have averted widespread starvation in a desolate landscape. A three-year drought in the Sahel has created what might be the setting for an Ingmar Bergman movie. One drives for miles through a land with no ground cover and scattered scrub trees to the dust-shrouded village of Mafré. No rain has fallen for more than a year. Of 40 families that lived in Mafré several years ago, only five remain. They are hanging on with cash and in-kind gifts sent by relatives who have gone to the hard-pressed city of Dakar in search of jobs. One of the most generous statements I ever heard was made to me by Mafré's village elder: "We don't have much to offer, but you are welcome to stay the night."

Michael Maren

Famine victims: "A long-term commitment by donor countries is needed"

In the immediate future, conditions in Africa can only get worse. Even in the unlikely event that drought in the Sahel were broken immediately, it would be months before a new crop could be harvested. In the meantime, the United States, always generous with food aid, will be called upon to do more. Mozambique must be addressed as an immediate crisis, requiring on-sight personnel and a systematic effort to get food to the hungry on a predictable schedule. The administration's expected request for a supplemental appropriation to increase food aid to Africa should be acted on by Congress on a priority basis. While any call for more spending will be subject to careful scrutiny in light of our budgetary difficulties, a relatively modest increase in our commitment to Africa can help that continent survive the present crisis.

But what of the long run? Food aid can meet a crisis. It can keep people alive who otherwise would perish. It can sustain refugees in Sudan or help Senegal survive a drought. But food aid, by itself, does not help countries become self-sufficient. It does not help them solve the long-term problem of feeding growing populations on land that, by any standard, is unproductive. When traveling in Africa, one looks for some light at the end of what appears to be an endless tunnel of food dependency. There is an occasional glimmer.

In Somalia, a team from the University of Wyoming is working on new methods of growing sorghum in an arid climate. The team believes that production can be doubled by relatively modest changes in the timing and den-

John C. Danforth is a Republican senator from Missouri who has recently returned from a fact-finding tour of several African countries.

sity of planting. In Senegal, a major international effort has begun to irrigate the Senegal River basin. Many expressed to me the need for more research into improved seeds suitable for dryland agriculture and for better extension services to educate African farmers in new techniques. While flying at a low altitude over Somalia, it appeared to these untrained eyes that much could be done to bring under production fertile but undeveloped river valleys.

To develop Africa's resources and move it toward self-sufficiency would require long-term commitments by donor countries, and would be far more expensive than shipping in food aid. Irrigation is especially costly; however, in places such as Senegal it offers the best hope of increased production. But the only alternative to development assistance is a continent that will forever live from hand to mouth and forever be dependent on the generosity of others.

America's own budget difficulties have forced us to question all forms of government spending, including development assistance. Unfortunately, this budgetary restraint has resulted in a deep cut in our commitment to the one program that has been the most help in developing countries and through which we can best leverage contributions from other donor nations: the World Bank's International Development Association.

My own view is that development assistance for Africa should be increased, but that it should not be squandered. Whatever investment we intend to make in Africa could easily be wasted by spreading our resources too thin on a host of minor projects in a host of unpromising countries. It would be better to target our efforts — to do a few things well.

A key to effective targeting is to concentrate our development assistance on a limited number of countries that would make the best use of our investment.

After gaining independence in the past quarter of a century or so, some African countries looked to the East, adopting the Soviet model of state farms and collective farms with no meaningful role for the individual farmer. As Somalia and Mozambique are beginning to realize, such a model has not worked in the Soviet Union and it cannot work elsewhere. While I do not believe that food aid should be conditioned on the political or economic philosophy of the recipient, development assistance is a different matter.

To offer food to hungry people is a matter of principle. To offer development assistance to a country whose own policies discourage production is to pour water into the sand. For the sake of food production, and not to make a philosophical point, America should direct development assistance to those countries whose governments do not control farming.

Finally, a practical, budget-conscious American might ask, "Why bother about Africa?" Why spend a dime on a continent so far away when we have our own problems right here at home? The answer, I think, has to do with who we are and how we perceive ourselves as a country. America is more than a place to hang your hat. It represents a value system most of us believe in very strongly. That value system has to do with the worth of human beings, whoever they are, wherever they are. We believe that lives are worth saving, that our fellow humans must be fed. But it is not enough to profess this belief. We must act on it. □



Karen Durlach

U.S. Peace Corps volunteer in Senegal: "We must act on our belief that lives are worth saving and that our fellow humans must be fed"

Stopping the Desert's Advance

BY ALASTAIR MATHESON

Although it is widely accepted that desertification — one of the world's most serious environmental hazards, threatening the livelihood of 850 million people — can be halted by existing technology, a vigorous United Nations attempt in Nairobi last May to revive international interest in a seven-year-old action plan to halt advancing deserts failed to elicit any significant financial support.

The plan, drawn up initially by the UN Environment Program (UNEP) in 1977, is now in danger of becoming a dead letter, with man-made deserts steadily spreading and robbing a hungry world, and Africa in particular, of precious arable land.

Instead of coming up with fresh initiatives and ideas for raising the massive total of $90 billion required, as UNEP had hoped they would, the traditional Western donor nations turned the tables on UNEP, accusing it of failing to set proper priorities that affected countries could follow, at the same time alleging that some recipients had misappropriated project funds. They echoed one another by stating that existing funds should be spent more effectively to combat desertification at the grass-roots level.

Alastair Matheson is a Kenyan journalist who has traveled extensively throughout Africa over the past 40 years. After retiring from the United Nations, where he worked for UNICEF and the UN Environment Program, he became East Africa correspondent for the London *Observer*. He is also a stringer for *Time* magazine.

There was a consensus among delegates from both developed and developing countries that it was impossible to achieve the original target date to stop "desert creep" by the year 2000, and a new minimum date was set for 2010.

Most Western nations insisted that they should undertake their own bilateral projects rather than have UNEP act as the funding body for antidesertification projects in Africa and elsewhere. The chief U.S. delegate, Bill Long, was particularly critical of institutions set up by UNEP to plan and coordinate regional projects to stop advancing deserts and called for more time to discuss future proposals. Said Long, who is director of the Environmental Affairs Division of the State Department: "Hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent in the Sahelian region, but we are hard pressed to find success stories."

The Scandinavians and several other delegations supported Long in calling for greater "people participation," and he was also backed by Professor Hassan Abdel Rahman, head of Sudan's desert control program, while the French spokesman declared: "Any policies that do not include the local populations are doomed to failure." Because it has received the widest publicity since the 1970s, the drought — and resultant desertification — in the Sahel states was frequently referred to, and many delegations had high praise for the work of the UN's Sahelian office, holding it up as a good example of regional cooperation absent elsewhere.

But there were also those who found fault with the priorities adopted by some Sahelian states, and the message was loud and clear: if donors in the West provide further funds for antidesertification, they want a say in who will benefit and how.

Inevitably, some of the potential recipients saw the danger of "strings" and political motives in such bilateral aid, and they no doubt primed Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi, who declared in his speech opening the huge new UN complex where the meeting took place: "I believe that the day the developed countries cease to politicize contributions, the United Nations will be able to succeed in fulfilling its objectives for the benefit of mankind."

UNEP's executive director, Dr. Mostafa Tolba of Egypt, who is dedicated to the action plan and its aims, was irked by the trend of the debate, but he reluctantly conceded that despite novel proposals to raise funds — such as a tax on arms and on gold sales to the IMF, and even "parking fees" to be levied by countries on stationary satellites in their air space — not much cash can be expected beyond the $600 million now available annually from all sources, aimed at stopping deserts.

Heeding the general call for more appropriate priorities for those countries affected by desertification, Tolba warned: "By not giving priority to desertification control, you are destroying the future of your countries." Still unconvinced by donor nations' excuses about lack of finance, the UNEP chief had the last word when he challenged them: "If you want to tell me that you cannot produce $70 billion between now and the end of this century to stop desertification but can produce $15 trillion to produce arms, then you had better convince me that I am mistaken."

The drought that hit more than half the countries of Africa was not unexpected, as warnings had been coming from various sources long before the affected populations began to suffer real hardships. In the Sahel states, the latest drought was a continuation of the harsh conditions that began back in 1968.

Early in 1983, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) started appealing for assistance to combat the effects of the current drought, which it foresaw as imminent, and soon it was expressing fears that the international community might ignore the persistent appeals to save some 150 million Africans in danger of starving. Some politely called it "aid fatigue."

Seven years ago, the mounting menace of advancing deserts, or desertification, was first drawn to the public's attention in Africa and the rest of the world by a special UN Conference on Desertification (UNCOD) in Nairobi, at which an ambitious plan of action was drawn up and a worldwide appeal launched for funds.

The alarming rate at which the arable areas of the globe are disappearing in as many as 100 countries was already known to be about 15 million acres every year, while another 40 million are annually being reduced to "zero economic productivity" according to UNEP, the United Nations Environment Program. UN experts have since warned that more than a third of the earth's land surface — over 18 million square miles — is directly threatened by desertification. In Africa, the Sahara Desert relentlessly rolls southward at four miles a year, having claimed more than 400,000 square miles in the last 50 years.

This menace now directly threatens the livelihood of 850 million people. But the world's financial response has been almost negligible: Because of lack of funds, the ambitious plan of action that aims at halting the desert's advance by the year 2000 cannot be implemented, and the case for the urgent creation of regional institutions and projects designed on a regional basis has been largely ignored. Whereas droughts create an aura of urgency about them once famine follows and thousands of people begin to die, desertification is less visible, yet more insidious, robbing people of scarce arable land.

Only in the Sahel were any attempts made in Africa immediately after 1977 to set up an effective regional mechanism, and by the following year UNEP and UNDP (United Nations Development Program) expanded the mandate of the UN Sahelian Office (UNSO), first set up in Ouagadougou in 1973, to give it a more active role in what is probably the hardest-hit part of the whole world. (Its area was extended later to include the Sudan and neighboring states, and UNSO became the UN Sudano-Sahelian Office.) Later still, a "green belt" project was launched in the countries north of the Sahara Desert, but a corresponding vegetation barrier in the south has never materialized.

The two-day meeting on desertification, held in conjunction with the May 1984 session of the UNEP Governing Council in Nairobi, was a coordinated attempt to revive interest in the worldwide problem of desertification. For the discussions, in which about 100 nations took part, a series of detailed studies were provided as background material. These represented the findings of a team of eminent international scientists and experts on the world's drylands. One of the most important surveys was an up-to-date assessment of the extent of desertification in the world carried out by Professor Jack Mabbutt, a British authority on the problem of aridity who now lives in Australia.

Professor Mabbutt pointed out that since the 1977 Desertification Conference the dryland population has risen from 650 million to 860 million, of whom 500 million live in moderately desertified areas and 120 million in areas undergoing severe to very severe desertification.

Projections made by Mabbutt and other scientists in their global surveys for UNEP indicate that the rate of "desert creep" in the world's rainfed croplands will speed up in the next 15 years, but they forecast that "the most dynamic" form of destruction will be seen in the forested zones of the world.

In his detailed survey of desertification in Africa's Sudano-Sahelian region, which contains the countries most affected by drought and which dramatically drew the world's attention to the problem, Mabbutt agrees with those other scientists who hold that the Sahel drought that started in 1968 has never ended.

Analyzing the current situation in the Sahel, Professor Mabbutt found the most serious problem to be the encroachment of sand dunes both in coastal areas and in the rangelands of the interior. He said that attempts to arrest "dune migration" have met with



William Campbell/Unicef

An example of "dune migration": Attempts to stop it have met with only limited success

only limited success. Some of the rangeland pastures have been regenerated where livestock pressure is light. In areas of heavy pressure, forest and bush cover are being steadily destroyed by both grazing and fuel gathering.

Summing up the trends for the whole Sudano-Sahelian zone from Mauritania to Somalia, Professor Mabbutt found the extent of desert advance "particularly disturbing" in view of the large investment in lands and grants from donor countries anxious to help the affected African states recover from the drought and to launch antidesertification projects.

"There is no country where the trend has slowed, while two groups show a markedly accelerating trend (Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger; and Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalia). Sudan might also be included in this class," he stated, and stressed that great pressure was being exerted on the land because of the sedentarization policies of governments, who were restricting nomads' movements, encouraging the spread of cultivation, and providing permanent water supplies.

The drought has also accelerated the advance of desertlike conditions in southern Africa, and Professor Mabbutt reported that while there has been some success with a number of improvement schemes aimed at combating desertification, the southern African drought since 1979 has had a "devastating impact" on both livestock and crop-based populations.

In some cases the situation has been aggravated by political strife that diverted the resources that might otherwise have been spent on holding back the desert. Mabbutt made a particularly gloomy forecast for Lesotho, predicting that by the year 2050 its rangelands, 85% of the landmass, will have been engulfed by the eastward spread of low-value woody shrubs. The projected result is a 3% annual loss of forest cover in drylands sectors and a loss of 300 tons of topsoil each year from certain areas of the rainfed croplands.

Reports from North Africa showed that while there have also been severe droughts there, the Maghreb states have not suffered as much as those south of the Sahara. However, Mabbutt found cultivation of food crops extending into marginal areas, with much damage being done to the light-textured soils by overmechanization.

Overirrigation has become a problem in Algeria, lowering the watertable and reducing crop yields. Although deforestation is also a general problem, it is more serious in Tunisia than in Algeria and Morocco, where losses of forest cover have been offset by recent plantings. Progress has also been made with the North African "green belt," begun after the 1977 conference to check the desert's northern advance.

The twin perils of drought and desertification are by no means the only causes of widespread famine currently plaguing so much of Africa. Recent studies have identified a range of subsidiary causes, from the rapid growth in population to poor government planning, insufficient emphasis on food production, and lack of incentives to producers. In a number of countries, surveys have revealed an overemphasis on creating "prestige projects" and sophisticated infrastructures, while little or nothing has been spent on preventing further desert encroachment. Many concerned observers also deplore the large sums being spent on sophisticated arms and military hardware by some states.

"The Sahara rolls southward at four miles a year, claiming 400,000 sq. miles of desert in the last 50 years."

A growing body of world opinion believes that imported food will not provide the long-term answer to Africa's agricultural problems, and some aid agencies are trying to help countries feed themselves, even under unfavorable climatic conditions. The British-based OXFAM agency, long an advocate of strengthening nations' food production, discourages overdependence on food and other aid, except in dire emergencies; and there are signs that the United Nations and several traditional donor countries are also coming around to this point of view.

It was an American delegate, Julia Chang Bloch, who told a donors' conference at FAO headquarters last year: "I'm concerned not by the hungry child in 1983, but by the hungry child in 1985." Her statement was meant to drive home the point that African states should be helped to draw up their own food strategies in partnership with potential donors, tackling the longer-term aspects of hunger rather than adopting ad hoc measures to meet immediate emergencies.

Several EEC delegates supported this view, stressing the need for greater self-reliance instead of overdependence on permanent food aid from abroad. Support also came from the director-general of the FAO, Edouard Saouma, who said: "The provision of food aid to food deficit countries will minimize human suffering; but it will not insulate these countries against recurrent food shortages unless agricultural production is stepped up."

Earlier last year, the FAO revealed that out of 41 African states south of the Sahara, only five had kept their food production consistently ahead of population growth in recent years. These were Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, Rwanda, and Sudan.

Belatedly, the message of self-sufficiency is getting through to African governments, despite recent accusations that some of them have been exaggerating the magnitude of the famines in order to obtain free food from the rest of the world. In May, Tanzania's minister for agriculture and livestock development, Professor John Machunda, told experts who gathered in Dar es Salaam to discuss food self-sufficiency in sub-Saharan Africa that African governments had themselves to blame for not developing their agricultural sectors.

He said that although colonial policies had caused agricultural stagnation, the situation is worsening because governments only pay lip service to the improvement of agriculture. According to Machunda, African food production began to decline in the early 1960s, long before these disastrous droughts began.

Tanzania is one of the countries leading the way in persuading its peasant farmers to grow more drought-re-

sistant crops and concentrate on traditional foods such as cassava, beans, millet, sorghum, and potatoes, rather than on wheat, maize, and rice, which need more water and fertilizers.

Although Kenya has also been hit by successive droughts, it has managed to feed itself in the past year, largely because of the phenomenal success of a hybrid type of maize called "Kathumani," named after the research station near Machakos where it was developed. It can be harvested in about half the time some other varieties take to mature, yet uses less water and is less dependent on costly imported fertilizer.

In a paper prepared for the UNEP meeting giving population projections based on statistics gathered by the UN, Professor John C. Caldwell, an Australian demographer, warned that the most rapid rise in population by the end of the century will be in areas such as the Sahel, which are least able to support more mouths to feed.

Caldwell pointed out that Chad's population will probably rise from four and a half million to 12 million in 40 years' time, and Niger's will increase from its present five million to more than 20 million. This change will be due, he said, to a relaxation in traditional constraints on fertility among nomads and to the relatively low levels of urbanization there.

Caldwell thinks that the "migration solution" resorted to in past Sahelian famines will no longer be possible as a means of survival, but he foresees international relief aid on a far more massive scale than at present. He pointed out that modern communications bring harrowing scenes of famine and sickness from Africa to affluent audiences in the north, resulting in speedy famine relief operations. Caldwell commented: "There has been evidence that contemporary famines are no longer major killers, if only because the modern state and the international community are loath to accept mass deaths — especially when publicized."

Professor Mabbutt maintains that the world community should help to combat the effects of desertification. His view is controversial and likely to be challenged by many in the West, for he argues that although the countries of the developed world have been least affected physically by desertification, they must accept a special responsibility for the problem and contribute to the common effort to stop it.

"It is not just common humanity that requires this," Mabbutt says, "but a recognition of common culpability. . . . To the extent that desertification in its worst manifestation results from unequal opportunities and inequitable access to resources, its causes lie beyond the regions most directly affected; they are a consequence of political and financial agreements, and the terms of trade at international levels are ultimately most responsible."

Although that may be an ingenious argument for raising the necessary funds to combat desertification — now $4.5 billion a year for a 20-year program to halt the world's deserts — what might have greater impact on the hardheaded bankers and development agencies in the West is more likely to be the fact that the annual damage done to crop production from the "creeping deserts" has been estimated at $26 billion, or over five times the cost of the proposed remedy.

Before the donor countries will open their coffers wide enough to disgorge that kind of cash, they will have to be convinced that in the threatened areas of Africa and the rest of the Third World there is at least a strong political will and determination to face the challenge of fighting the deserts and taking the major political and economic risks entailed.

Another of UNEP's expert team, Professor Harold E. Dregne of Texas Tech University, has come up with some very disturbing facts about the misuse of much of the money already allocated for stopping the deserts. In his evaluation presented at the May Nairobi meeting, he revealed that out of almost $5 billion spent between 1978 and 1980 on what were rather broadly defined as desertification projects, less than a quarter went toward projects specifically aimed at halting the deserts. According to Dregne: "Most of the desertification project money went to constructing roads, buildings, and water supplies and was also spent on research, training courses, and meetings."

Charging that governments and political leaders appear to have little appreciation of the relation between food self-sufficiency and desertification, the scientist from Texas lamented: "As long as governments put showplace projects and appeasing urban populations at the top of their development lists, desertification will not be controlled."

Most urban centers may have escaped the full effects of "desert creep" up to now, but with statistics like those for the Sahel and some other African states, it may not be long before some capitals are engulfed either in sand or by streams of migrants fleeing from the sterile sand. □

B. Wahiha/UNEP

Cutting trees for firewood in Kenya: Forest and bush cover are being steadily destroyed by grazing and fuel gathering

Assessing Africa's Food Policies

BY CHERYL CHRISTENSEN, ARTHUR DOMMEN, AND PETER RILEY

The recent drought dramatically highlights the serious food problems facing many African countries. The immediate response to a crisis of such magnitude has been — and must be — to help hungry and starving people. Yet unless such responses are coupled with actions capable of changing the underlying conditions that make Africa's food situation so precarious, there will be more life-threatening food crises in Africa's future.

This drought was not an isolated event. It is the third major drought in Africa since the late 1960s (Sahel, 1968-73; East and southern Africa, 1980; Sahel, West, East, and southern Africa, 1983-84), and comes in the context of a steady decline in per capita food production. Declining per capita food production has meant rising dependence on grain imports (both commercial imports and food aid) and generally stagnant or declining levels of consumption, in a region where nutritional levels are now generally too low.

Dr. Cheryl Christensen is chief of the Africa and Middle East Branch, International Economics Division, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. Dr. Arthur Dommen and Peter Riley are research section leader and agricultural economist, respectively, of the Africa and Middle East Branch, International Economics Division, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.

Most African food production systems now have little margin for human error or natural disaster, in a world where both occur regularly.

African countries have also faced seriously deteriorating economic conditions. As a result of severe inflation-fueled crises and the world reces-

Relative Variability of Rainfall in Sub-Saharan Africa



From *The Climates of West Africa*, by O. Ojo (Heinemann Educational Books, Ltd., 1977). Reprinted with permission.

sion of 1979-82, many African countries have experienced declining real income (after taking inflation into account) in recent years. Sub-Saharan Africa's gross national product has stagnated since 1981, translating into significant declines in per capita GNP. Many African countries have had difficulty generating the necessary income and domestic savings to cover their balance-of-payments deficits, and have therefore resorted to increased borrowing from both public and private sources abroad. These loans, secured at high interest rates during the 1979-82 period, have resulted in heavy debt service burdens; arrears and reschedulings have become commonplace, while foreign exchange reserves have dwindled.

The recent strength of the dollar on foreign exchange markets has not made the task of readjustment easier. It has greatly increased the cost of debt service for most countries, since much of their debt is denominated in dollars. Also, imports of goods valued in dollars have become much more expensive — the most important item in this category being petroleum.

The combination of severe food crises and financial distress has resulted in a commitment to policy change in many African countries. There is a growing recognition that much of the poor performance of the agricultural sector can be traced to policies that provided inadequate incentives to food producers and discouraged effective domestic marketing, while inappropriate exchange rate and trade regimes have hindered agricultural exports. Policy change is the approach that can be most readily used to bring immediate gains. Yet for most countries, policy changes are a necessary — but not sufficient — condition for improving their food situation and cannot simply provide a "quick fix" for Africa's serious food problems.

Margaret A. Novicki

Irrigation project in northern Ghana: Sub-Saharan Africa has the world's lowest percentage of irrigated land

THE SETTING FOR POLICY CHANGE

Most sub-Saharan countries have started to adjust policies, and in some cases there are signs that this will lead to sweeping changes. However, given the structure of agriculture and the general state of African economies, there are limits to how much improvement this will bring in the short-run. In a setting where there has been limited investment in agriculture, the development of effective research services and other institutions, improved infrastructure, and other basic requirements will be slower. There are no new technologies currently available to increase productivity dramatically, as the Green Revolution did in Asia.

Most African food production occurs under rainfed conditions, and yield variability is high throughout much of the continent. The countries affected by the recent drought all lie in regions where 20-30% variability in yield can be expected. While traditional food crops such as millet and sorghum afford a measure of drought resistance, these are characterized by low yields and have not benefited from significant technological improvements. Furthermore, these crops have often lost ground to corn in much of the region, particularly in East and southern Africa. In some countries, recent developments such as reductions in fallow periods for cultivated lands, overgrazing, and deforestation have increased susceptibility to drought effects.

Currently sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest share of irrigated land of any region. Although there is physical potential for more irrigation in Africa, large-scale expansion is generally constrained by high capital costs, management problems, questionable ecological effects, and, often, displacement of existing farmers. Small- and medium-scale irrigation schemes are more feasible, but offer most modest gains in output. Even in cases where a significant level of irrigation exists, such as in Zimbabwe, drought has meant a lack of replenishment for dams along with high evaporation rates. Zimbabwe has had to reduce irrigated area by about half in the last two years.

Storage facilities are lacking or deficient in most countries, despite widespread interest in strategic reserves, exacerbating the problems of variability. Both initial and recurrent costs of centralized storage are high as well, representing costly burdens for these poor nations. In this environment, policymakers are thus confronted with cyclical shortages and periodic surpluses, creating difficult management problems. Finally, the effects of national policy reforms (e.g., exchange rate changes) have been severely limited by international economic conditions, leading the World Bank — a strong advocate of policy reform — to conclude that the process will be a long one, depending heavily on external as-

sistance at least in the medium term.

The food policy environment is a complicated one. Many policy instruments — not just food or agricultural prices — affect the food situation. These policies can be divided into two categories: agricultural sector policies (including producer and retail pricing policies; crop and input marketing) and more general macroeconomic policies (including trade regimes and exchange rates). These policies generally affect each other (although they may be made in isolation) and inconsistencies among policies may have as significant an impact as any single "right" or "wrong" policy.

CURRENT POLICY CHANGES

In many countries, inappropriate agricultural pricing and marketing policies have led to the decline of the agricultural sector as a whole, including both food crop and export crop production. Farmers have often reacted by cutting output to cover only their subsistence needs or by withdrawing from official markets. Striking examples of these tendencies have been evident in Ghana, Mozambique, and Tanzania, countries plagued by both shortages of food and declines in agricultural exports. Most African governments intervene heavily in the agricultural sector, particularly by setting prices, marketing agricultural commodities, and distributing (sometimes subsidized) agricultural inputs. Price distortions and marketing failures have been pervasive, with prices for staple crops often set below world market prices in an attempt to provide low food prices to politically critical urban populations (including government employees and industrial labor). In some countries, critical urban areas have come to rely heavily on imported food.

The general reason for attempting to hold down producer prices is to provide cheap food to politically key urban areas. Yet many governments face situations in which efforts to do this via official prices set at a low level have been counterproductive. These policies have led to both expensive subsidies — often in the form of reimbursement of marketing losses to state marketing agencies, often called parastatals — and the emergence of much higher priced "parallel markets," which mean that consumers also pay higher prices. In several cases, government agencies have been less able to procure food, which increasingly flows into unofficial channels. Hence, Tanzania's parastatal marketing agency saw corn procurement fall from 220,000 tons in 1978-79 to 85,000 tons in 1982-83. In Ghana, food produced and marketed through parallel markets brought extremely high prices. The producers also receive higher prices for food sold to private traders for cash than they receive for cash crops, where the government has a monopoly on purchases. According to one report, farmers currently receive five times as much for corn as they do for cocoa. This means that corn sells for 100,000 cedis, or more than $3,000 per ton at the official exchange rate.

Export crop pricing has frequently been used as a vehicle for raising government revenue, and low prices, combined with overvalued exchange rates, have weakened the entire agricultural sector. Ghana, now facing a serious drought-triggered food emergency, provides a dramatic example of the way in which inappropriate policies can lay the groundwork for disaster. Even though the nominal producer price for cocoa in Ghana increased 28 times between 1973 and 1982, the real price (after taking inflation into account) dropped by more than 50%. During that time cocoa exports fell by 35% to 237,000 tons, causing a sharp decline in export earnings. Foreign exchange shortages forced Ghana to curtail imports, including food, at a time when food production was decreasing. Ghana was, therefore, already facing a critical food situation at the time of the 1983 drought.

Many countries are already beginning to raise producer prices for staple commodities. East African countries, primarily after their experience with drought in 1980, significantly increased producer prices for their staple food commodity — corn. Prices are now well above market prices (computed at official exchange rates). These price increases have also translated into smaller, but positive, increases in real producer prices. Producer prices for rice, a West African staple, have also exceeded world market prices in several countries, although the record is more mixed.

While correcting producer price policy distortions is important, there are real constraints on what such adjustments taken in isolation can be expected to accomplish. In the short term, responses to price increases will depend very heavily on weather. Zambia, for example, has steadily and significantly increased its producer corn prices in recent years, and achieved a large increase in the area planted with corn. But poor weather in the last three years held

Cereal Import Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1977-83



down yields, and production stagnated. The Zambian case also illustrates another point concerning the immediate impact of price incentives. Zambia has a small core of commercial farmers well able to react to price incentives. However, to reach the subsistence sector comprised of smallholders and thereby tap more of the country's large agricultural potential, more is needed: suitable technology, extension services, and reliable marketing.

Ironically, when weather is good, price increases may trigger large crops, straining a government's financial and physical resources for purchasing grain. The Liberian government, responding to a bumper rice crop triggered by higher producer prices and good weather, recently stopped purchasing rice from producers when its storage facilities were full. In other countries, financial constraints led to delayed payments, which can create an additional disincentive to production. Delayed official payments, coupled with a lack of adequate and timely inputs, has constrained corn output in both Kenya and Tanzania this year, despite higher prices.

In other cases, lack of consumer goods in rural areas limits the incentive effects of government-set prices, or, worse yet, actually creates a preference for another currency that can be used to purchase consumer goods across the border. Many African countries have trade regimes that work to restrict the supply of consumer goods, particularly in rural markets. The value of a country's currency compared with that of its neighbors determines the degree to which producers are willing to hold that currency or, conversely, are eager to avoid holding it; in the latter case the frequent result is a flourishing smuggling trade.

Karen Durlach

Newly constructed grain storage facility in Mauritania: "Storage facilities are lacking or deficient in most countries despite widespread interest in strategic reserves"

The lack of basic consumer goods in rural Mozambique and various marketing weaknesses have been severe and among the leading causes of its agricultural decline. The government began major policy reforms in 1983 and 1984 that focus on providing farmers with more incentives. Along with downplaying state farms, government policy gives more support to the critical role of small private retailers in marketing. Though these developments are encouraging and are likely to improve efficiency over state bodies, extreme transportation problems will persist for some time because of shortages of vehicles, spare parts, and fuel. African governments have also made policy changes affecting retail food prices, although they are more complicated to characterize. In some cases, official prices, while lower than "free market" prices, do not provide an overt consumer subsidy. This is the case in Nigeria, for example, where the official price of rice (government controlled) is well above the price of imported rice, but far below parallel markets. The delivered price of Thai rice is about $15 per 50 kilo bag, while the official price is $50 per bag. Unofficially, rice sells for up to five times as much. The new government faces a political imperative to reduce prices, but doing so entails a potentially high cost to its long-term objective of increasing domestic rice production.

In three other West African nations, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, coastal countries where imported rice accounts for a significant share of urban rice consumption, retail rice prices deflated by the food price index have moved downward since 1970, while in Senegal they have not shown any observable upward trend. Where there are heavy transport costs, however, as in interior countries, retail food prices have on occasion risen more sharply than the general price index; this was the case, for instance, with cereal prices in Mali for two years out of four during 1979-82.

In other cases, where the government is involved in processing and marketing domestic produce, the situation is quite different. Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have all subsidized consumer corn prices, generally by underwriting the losses of their parastatal marketing institutions. As producer prices were increased, consumer prices also rose, though often not as fast as producer prices, and losses incurred by parastatals rose. Between 1979 and 1983, Kenya's producer corn price rose 144% (well above the consumer price index increase of 71%), while the official retail corn price rose only 68%. The real marketing margin thus declined substantially, putting pressure on the parastatal marketing agency and contributing to a substantial increase in its budget deficit. A similar, but less extreme, situation prevailed in Zambia between 1979 and May 1983. Producer corn prices rose 103% (again above the consumer price index increase of 72%), while official retail prices rose only 79%. In May, however, the official re-

tail price was raised 30%. In such situations, consumer subsidy issues are intimately tied to the operating costs of parastatal marketing agencies.

Parastatal marketing agencies have been a drain on the budgets of many African governments, where high operating costs characterized many boards operating in both staple food and export crop markets. Eliminating this drain on their budgets, though not easy (since more often than not it meant reducing the number of employees), was something governments could do. As a consequence, many African countries, including Madagascar, Mali, and even socialist Mozambique, have been reducing the number and the role of their parastatals and opening up greater areas in their national economies to private enterprise. At the same time, they have been attempting to make those parastatals that remain in existence more efficient.

An important aspect of the economies of many African countries in the 1960s and 1970s was that the exchange rates of their currencies became distorted. The general overvaluation of their currencies, made possible because of their protective trade policies, supplemented by exchange controls and restrictions on foreign investment, had the consequence that imports, including food imports, were made cheaper, while their exports were made more expensive. Overvalued currencies were a major reason the rural-urban terms of trade were so unfavorable for agricultural producers in African countries. For example, East African corn prices are much closer to world market prices if unofficial exhange rates are used as a basis for the comparison.

Yet, as Ghana's case illustrates, exchange rate adjustment can be very costly, dramatically increasing food prices during an existing food emergency. During the last year, the Ghanaian government has devalued the cedi from 2.75 to 35 to the dollar, putting tremendous upward pressure on food prices. In December 1983 the retail prices for corn ranged from 22 cedis to 40 cedis per kilo, compared with the controlled price of 6 cedis. Rice prices were 6-8 times the official price of 13 cedis. The minimum daily wage is 40 cedis, which buys 1 kilo of corn, or 500 grams of rice.

Severe foreign exchange constraints have affected both economic performance and the ability of governments affected by food crises to cope with them. Zimbabwe, facing serious balance of payments difficulties, imposed severe import restrictions in the last two years, with allocations to importers decreasing by as much as 60% in real terms. Because of drought, Zimbabwe — normally a corn exporter — is now being forced to make large and unprecedented corn imports, further handicapping the operation of its industry and other sectors dependent on imported inputs.

CONCLUSION

Some of the most basic policy distortions affecting African food production are now being addressed in a variety of countries. However, the recent drought suggests a disturbing interaction between the standard prescriptions for adjustment and the practical requirements of managing food emergencies. Although devaluations may be necessary in the long run, in the short run they make needed food imports more costly. The result is a further weakening of the foreign exchange position of the government, an increase in food aid appeals (thinly disguised as balance of payments support), or severely curtailed consumption, leading to malnutrition or death for people directly affected by production or economic disasters. In addition, price and marketing policy changes entail risks that must be recognized and handled. These are important short- and medium-term policy adjustment issues. Ultimately the success of such policy measures in improving Africa's food situation will also depend on other, longer term policies, including investment in infrastructure, training, research, and extension. □



Margaret A. Novicki

Market in Tamale, Ghana: Prices for staple crops are often set below world market prices to provide low food prices for politically critical urban populations

U.S. Aid, Diplomacy, and African Development

BY CAROL LANCASTER

When Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, the United States moved quickly to establish a bilateral aid program there. In 1981 and 1982, U.S. aid to Zimbabwe reached $75 million per year. This aid was aimed at helping the new government recover from the years of war and begin a process of development. The U.S. aid program was also intended to facilitate warm U.S. relations with a nonracial government that, although ideologically Marxist, was not pro-Soviet, was strategically located in southern Africa, was politically influential in the region, and — it was hoped — would become an example of different races living together in peace. As with most other bilateral U.S. aid programs, the one in Zimbabwe served a mix of political and economic objectives.

Recently, the Reagan administration decided to reduce U.S. aid to Zimbabwe from $64 million in 1983 to $40 million in 1984 and to $30 million in 1985. The official reason for this decrease was federal budget constraints. However, it is rare for U.S. bilateral aid to be cut by as much as the Zimbabwe programs were without the purpose of signaling dissatisfaction or punishing the recipient government for policies the U.S. does not like. In Zimbabwe's case, the U.S. disapproved both of that government's abstention on the UN Security Council resolution condemning the Soviet Union for shooting down Korean Airlines Flight 007 and of the active support Zimbabwe lent to the Security Council resolution criticizing the U.S. invasion of Grenada.

The reduction in U.S. aid to Zimbabwe is part of a growing pattern of cases where U.S. aid to Africa is raised, lowered, changed, frozen, or eliminated based upon the behavior of African governments on issues of importance to the United States. Ghana provides another example. U.S. official development assistance — including disbursements of already obligated funds — was frozen in April 1983 when a Ghanaian official accused the U.S. Embassy of supporting coup plotters. The U.S. demanded a public apology, with which the Ghanaian government did not comply, although Ghanaian officials are said to have privately admitted that the accusation was false. Since that time, Ghana has undertaken a stringent and courageous set of economic policy reforms along the lines that the U.S. has long advocated, but the U.S. has unfrozen only $3 million of the total $13 million package, and has not considered providing any new government-to-government aid to support the recovery program. Humanitarian assistance, in the form of food aid, has however been provided to combat the effects of the drought.

Linking U.S. aid to political concerns did not begin with the Reagan administration. It has been an element in aid policy since the U.S. began providing concessional aid shortly after World War II. What is disturbing about current policies is the increasing importance of such concerns in aid decisions and the danger that increasing aid to "proven friends" and lowering or eliminating aid to countries whose policies displease the U.S. will vitiate the contribution of that aid to development and result in the waste of aid funds when they are provided to "friendly" regimes that are inept or corrupt. An increasingly politicized aid program may also lose support from Americans truly concerned with development and, ultimately, may inspire Third World governments to demonstrate their resistance to this overt pressure from the United States.

Foreign assistance has played an important role in U.S. relations with sub-Saharan African countries since their independence. The establishment of U.S. diplomatic relations with newly independent governments was normally accompanied by the initiation of a bilateral aid program. These programs served a variety of objectives. They facilitated access and influence where the U.S. had few economic, political, or strategic interests or historical ties. Aid was intended to ensure the stability of the new governments, strengthen their Western political orientation, and encourage their support for U.S. policies on the continent and elsewhere. Aid was given to promote long-term economic development and to facilitate access to African markets and resources for U.S. business. And, in cases of emergencies, aid was provided for humanitarian relief.

U.S. bilateral aid to Africa grew rapidly in the early 1960s with the Kennedy administration's interest in the newly independent states of Africa.

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That administration was optimistic about the prospects for economic and political development on the continent, and it believed that U.S. aid had an important role to play. The political instability that followed the 1963 Congo crisis dampened U.S. optimism about the prospects for African development and democracy. At the same time, the Vietnam War absorbed more U.S. government attention and resources. As Washington's interest in Africa waned, the size of its foreign aid programs declined sharply.

In the early 1970s, U.S. bilateral aid rose modestly as Americans took a lead in establishing the multidonor Sahel Development Program to help countries in West Africa recover from the prolonged drought. But it was not until 1978 that U.S. economic assistance to Africa again reached the level of 1963. The Soviet and Cuban involvement in conflicts in the Horn and southern Africa in the mid-1970s, combined with the Carter administration's concern for development problems worldwide and the special interest in Africa on the part of a number of senior foreign policy officials, led to the sharp increases in U.S. aid to Africa during the late 1970s.

Since the Reagan administration came to office in 1981, two new trends have become apparent in U.S. aid to Africa:

- A shift of emphasis from development to the use of aid to promote U.S. security and political interests on the continent.
- Within development policies, a shift of focus from "equity" toward a greater emphasis on growth to be promoted by private sector participation and economic policy reforms.

These changes reflect the ideological predilections of the Reagan administration — an emphasis on the East-West conflict and U.S. strategic and political interests worldwide vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, a skepticism regarding the effectiveness of aid as a tool of development, and a belief in the efficacy of free markets and the private sector in stimulating economic expansion.

Several changes in foreign assistance programs in the 1985 budget demonstrate the shift away from development objectives and the increased importance of security and political objectives in U.S. aid to Africa. First — and for those concerned with development, most unfortunate — is the reduction in the U.S. contributions to the International Development Association (IDA), the soft loan window of the World Bank. IDA is widely regarded by developed and developing countries alike as the most efficient and effective source of external support for development. Its loans, largely for development projects, go to the world's poorest countries on highly concessional terms. Typically, IDA loans carry no interest (but a service charge of less than 1%) and have a repayment period of 50 years, with 10 years' grace. Countries receiving such aid must have an annual per capita income of no more than $795 in 1981 dollars. The major recipients of IDA funding include India, China, and African countries. For many of the latter, IDA is the largest source of their development aid.

Because IDA makes loans on such concessional terms, it must be replenished periodically to continue its operations. Developed countries are the principal source of contributions to IDA, with the U.S. providing 25% — the largest single share. The last replenishment of IDA (the sixth) was at a level of $12 billion over three years. (It was in fact stretched out to four years when the U.S. Congress failed to appropriate the full U.S. contributions on time.) For the seventh replenishment, the World Bank had proposed a total level of $16 billion over three years, representing a small real increase once inflation is taken into account. The increase would help raise the volume of loans to Africa and permit significant amounts of aid to India and to China, the newest member of the institution. Other donors were prepared to contribute their traditional shares to this total, provided the U.S. did the same.

The Reagan administration refused to support an increase to the $16 billion level. In the face of considerable international criticism and pressure, it held to a position favoring a drop in IDA funding to a level of $9 billion, or a U.S. contribution of $750 million per year over the three years of the replenishment period. The principal reasons given for this position were gen-

President Kennedy with Mobutu Sese Seko: U.S. bilateral aid to Africa grew rapidly during the Kennedy administration, but political instability following the 1963 Congo crisis dampened American optimism

eral budgetary constraints and the belief that Congress would not appropriate a higher annual level.

In fact, these reasons do not go very far in explaining the administration's position. Presidents are almost always concerned about budget constraints, although none has had to face budget deficits of the current magnitude. Congress has long been reluctant to appropriate funds for IDA, reflecting the small public constituency supporting aid through multilateral financial institutions and the lack of strong leadership both within Congress and in the White House in promoting such funding. But despite Congress' demonstrated reluctance to appropriate funds for IDA, it has appropriated more in recent years than the $750 million now planned.

The administration's major objection to IDA is its inability to control aid provided through that institution. By their nature, multilateral institutions do not allow any one donor to determine policies or programs. Less influenced by political goals of donors, these institutions are freer to provide aid on largely developmental grounds, and thus can be more effective in promoting development in recipient countries. However, even these institutions are not impervious to the influence of major donors and have often adopted policies strongly supportive of U.S. goals abroad. Nevertheless, the lack of direct control by donors over loans from multilateral institutions does make that aid less useful than bilateral aid in advancing national political and security objectives abroad. Indeed, the lack of U.S. control over IDA loans means that such loans could be made for purposes contrary to U.S. policies, for example, promoting development in countries hostile to the United States.

The Reagan administration's dislike of multilateral development banks was evident almost as soon as it took office. In the process of reviewing the 1982 budget proposed by the Carter administration, Office of Management and Budget Director David Stockman proposed to the president that all U.S. contributions to such institutions be halted. The memo containing this proposal was quickly leaked and the ensuing pressure from developed and developing countries alike forced the proposal to be set aside. But distaste for the multilateral development banks remained.

What will be the impact on African countries of the decrease in IDA funds? A significant decrease in IDA loans is probably unavoidable. The World Bank has a mandate to seek additional funding for IDA from other sources, but it seems uncertain that significant amounts of such funding will be forthcoming. Approximately 40% of IDA lending now goes to Africa. If one assumes a $9 billion final replenishment level rather than the $12 billion level of recent years, flows to Africa could drop from a possible $1.6 billion a year to $1.2 billion a year.

In adjusting to the lower level of IDA funds, World Bank officials may try to soften the impact on Africa by putting the main burden of reduced funding on loan levels to India, forcing that country to seek more funding from the World Bank itself, at near commercial rates. (This was also apparently one of the goals of the Reagan administration's position on a low IDA replenishment.) But however the lower IDA level is handled, flows to Africa are likely to fall at a time when many African countries are facing the most severe economic crisis in their brief histories.

Oil importing and exporting countries alike have been caught in a balance of payments squeeze that has forced down imports of consumer goods, investment goods, and even spare parts and raw materials necessary to keep existing production going and to maintain basic infrastructure and services. As a result, growth has slowed or halted in many countries. Aid from IDA and elsewhere has helped ease the impact of foreign exchange shortages and has encouraged difficult and often politically risky policy reforms. The reduction in resource flows may not make the difference between economic recovery or continued deterioration in Africa, but it could make recovery more difficult or deterioration more rapid.

In addition to the immediate impact of a reduction in IDA lending to African countries, there is a potentially more troubling consequence from the U.S. position. During most of the postwar period, the U.S. has defined its world leadership role not just in terms of military strength to resist Soviet expansion but also in terms of helping to solve major world problems, including the long-term challenge of development in the world's poorest countries. The U.S. was instrumental in the establishment of the World Bank, IDA, and the regional development banks, in providing bilateral aid and encouraging other countries to do so, and in seeking more

U.S. Department of Defense

U.S. military maneuvers in Egypt: From 1981 to 1985, military assistance to Africa will have risen by nearly 150 percent, and bilateral economic aid by only 40 percent

effective approaches to development worldwide. Other developed countries have frequently waited to see what the U.S. would do on aid issues before making their own policy decisions. The U.S. position on IDA, together with other U.S. foreign assistance policies, will likely be seen by developed and developing countries alike not only as a move away from IDA and multilateralism but also as a retreat from development in general.

The U.S. aid programs that have shown the greatest increases in recent years are the bilateral military assistance programs, further underlining current emphasis on promoting U.S. security interests abroad. From 1981 to 1985, U.S. military assistance to African countries will have risen by nearly 150%, whereas bilateral economic assistance will have increased by only 40%, less than the rate of inflation during this period. During the same period, the proportion of military assistance in total U.S. bilateral assistance to Africa will have doubled, from 10% to nearly 20%.

In the past, U.S. military assistance has played a relatively minor role in Africa as the U.S. has avoided competing with Africa's major arms suppliers — the U.S.S.R. and France. Rather, the U.S. has relied primarily on assisting African governments to meet that long-term goal that they all share — national development — and that the U.S. is far more able and experienced at addressing than the Soviets.

Not only has a shift in emphasis taken place in the objectives U.S. aid serves, but a change has also occurred in the concept of what constitutes development and the role of foreign assistance in promoting it. In the 1960s, U.S. development policies emphasized growth, usually measured in the rate of expansion in gross national product. Development assistance programs funded infrastructural projects — roads, ports, communications facilities — which were necessary for such growth to take place. In the 1970s, the emphasis in development policy shifted towards a concern with "equity," ensuring that the poorer sectors of the population, particularly in the rural areas, enjoyed the benefits of growth. Development assistance projects were oriented toward providing for the "basic human needs" of these groups — for example, health or primary education — as well as at assisting the expansion of smallholder agricultural production.

The current orientation in development policy has moved away from "basic human needs" toward an emphasis on the role of the private sector in development and on economic policy reforms that would encourage private investment. Reflecting these emphases worldwide, the Agency for International Development (AID) has established a new Bureau of Private Enterprise to develop projects encouraging private sector activities. However, there have been relatively few such projects in Africa because of the low level of development and the serious economic problems facing much of the continent. Investing in Africa at this time is unattractive to foreign investors and difficult even for African entrepreneurs.

"The U.S. may be seen as leading a retreat from development at a time when development problems are most severe in Africa."

The emphasis in development policies for Africa has been much more on economic policy reforms. A new bilateral aid program for Africa, called the Economic Policy Initiative (EPI), has been proposed in the 1985 budget to provide aid to those countries willing to undertake comprehensive reforms. The EPI would have $75 million in funds for the first year and $425 million for the following four years. One wag in the White House has dubbed the EPI the "tough love" aid program.

Conditioning aid on governmental economic policies is, like many other policies described here, not new with the Reagan administration. It has been proposed a number of times in the past and has usually proven extremely difficult to implement. Political considerations in aid programs have made it hard to condition aid on economic policy performance; countries regarded as important politically but with poor economic policies will rarely have their aid cut. Indeed, proposals to cut aid levels substantially to almost any country, whatever their economic policies, will generally spur U.S. ambassadors in those countries to lobby vigorously (and often effectively) against such cuts on the grounds that they will send an unfriendly political signal and threaten good relations with that country's government. And with this administration, where the link between aid levels and U.S. political interests is especially strong and explicit, it is hard to see how aid to politically important countries such as Sudan, Zaire, or Liberia can also be conditioned on economic performance.

Several other aspects of the EPI raise doubts about its potential effectiveness. First, it is relatively small in dollar terms. Programs of $75 million or even $100 million a year in aid divided among several countries will represent a relatively small addition to their total aid flows. Economic policy reforms are often politically risky for any government and especially for many African governments whose political support is frequently weak. It may take more than the aid EPI can provide to offer governments sufficient incentives to undertake comprehensive economic reforms or ease the impact of such reforms on domestic groups.

Second, the EPI could itself become a contingency fund to advance political or strategic goals in Africa. Aid resources are seldom adequate to meet political needs. EPI funds are highly flexible in their proposed uses and as yet unallocated to specific countries. Unless their use is strictly controlled, they will likely become a contingency fund for U.S. ambassadors or Washington policy officials seeking resources to deal with political problems and unanticipated crises on the continent.

With the changes in development policies has come a shift in bilateral foreign assistance programs proposed for Africa. In 1985, the Economic Support Fund (ESF) is proposed as the largest of the three major U.S. bilateral aid programs in Africa, at $391 million. ESF monies are flexible and can be dis-

persed quickly. In financing imports and supporting government budgets, they are the kind of assistance many African governments most urgently need and want. Their flexibility also makes them the most useful form of bilateral economic assistance for promoting U.S. political objectives abroad; they can be increased or decreased without disrupting ongoing development projects. Nearly 60% of ESF funds are concentrated in countries of the Horn — Sudan, Kenya, and Somalia — where the U.S. has important strategic interests, including access to naval and air facilities in Somalia and Kenya for U.S. Indian Ocean fleets.

The Development Assistance (DA) program proposed for 1985 shows virtually no growth over the level estimated for 1984. DA funds are far less flexible, funding development projects that usually take from four to eight years to be completed. Development assistance is also concentrated, albeit far less than that of ESF, in the Horn, with 20% allocated to Kenya, Sudan, and Somalia. DA programs are widely dispersed throughout the continent, with modest programs, averaging $10 million a year, in 30 sub-Saharan African countries.

The third major type of bilateral aid, the Food for Peace program, actually appears to drop in the 1985 budget compared with estimated 1984 levels. However, this program is the major vehicle for providing emergency relief to countries facing food shortages. The 1984 program includes a recently approved $90 million supplemental appropriation to meet emergency food needs. It now appears likely that another $60 million will be appropriated because of effective pressure from key members of Congress. If emergency food and refugee relief programs are not included in food aid program levels for Africa, the dollar value of those progams will have varied little between 1980 and 1985. The largest amount of food aid goes to Sudan ($50 million per year) with programs of between $16 million and $20 million in Somalia, Liberia, and Zaire. Most other African countries have a small food aid program for maternal-child feeding or school lunch programs amounting to $3 million or less a year.

Reagan administration policies putting primary emphasis on advancing U.S. security and political objectives abroad bring with them several dangers. First, the U.S. may be seen by other donors as leading a retreat from development at a time when development problems are most severe in the poorest countries, and particularly in Africa. It is the wrong kind of leadership in an economically troubled world.

Closer to home, the foreign assistance policies pursued by the Reagan administration could eventually lead to further reductions in U.S. economic assistance levels. An important aspect of U.S. aid programs is their usefulness in serving multiple objectives. It is unlikely that the fragile political support for them among the American public and in Congress would continue if the balance among these objectives were upset, with aid used to pursue one objective at the expense of others. If security and political objectives were pursued too singlemindedly, support for aid in the U.S. by liberals, church groups, and others concerned about development could erode.

Over the past several years, the administration has managed to get adequate support in Congress for its growing military assistance program by including high levels of funding for IDA and other development activities favored by liberals. With the reduction in IDA funding, it is not yet clear what the administration will be able to trade with liberals for their continuing support of rising levels of military assistance and large programs of aid to Central America. Discontent with U.S. foreign aid among supporters of development in Congress and the public could lead to lower levels of aid for all purposes.

Finally, current U.S. aid policies could lead to a lessening in the contribution of U.S. aid to development in Africa. The emphasis on political uses of aid will destroy its usefulness as a development tool if it is provided to "proven friends" regardless of their abilities to use it effectively and is increased or decreased for political purposes regardless of a country's development policies or the role U.S. aid is playing in that development. The key to the effectiveness of foreign assistance as a tool of American diplomacy is the maintenance of a delicate balance in its objectives. If that balance is upset, both the U.S. and Africa could be the losers. □


Camerapix

Statue of Lenin in Addis Ababa: U.S. aid to Africa is raised, lowered, changed, frozen, or eliminated because of behavior of African governments on issues of importance to the U.S.

Africa and the U.S. House of Representatives

BY HOWARD WOLPE

For the past two decades, African nations and U.S.-Africa relations have for the most part been the victims of benign neglect on the part of the Congress. However, congressional interest in African issues has recently increased. This trend reflects growing concern about superpower confrontation on the continent, the increasing political importance of the 50 African nations that together constitute almost a third of the United Nations, and a growing recognition that an economically expanding African continent holds enormous opportunities for increased American trade and investment. Yet another factor contributing to increasing congressional interest in African issues is the growing political assertiveness of America's black electorate and the new salience of southern Africa's liberation struggles for black Americans.

Finally, and most recently, the devastating drought that is affecting over half the African continent has drawn the attention of the entire House of Representatives membership, which has actively expressed its alarm over the dilatory nature of the administration's response to this humanitarian crisis and worked to expedite the passage of $150 million in emergency food aid. The recent creation of a Select Committee on Hunger, which will provide a new focus on food productivity problems in Africa and elsewhere, will also broaden the number of members of Congress involved in U.S.-African issues.

Afripix

Residents of Mogopa, South Africa who were forcibly removed from their homes by the government: "American diplomacy is becoming increasingly irrelevant to the future of South Africa"

In the House of Representatives, the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs is the only body that addresses itself exclusively to U.S. relations with the nations of Africa. Egypt, it should be noted, is the sole African country to fall under the jurisdiction of the House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. The major legislative responsibility of the subcommittee is to handle the African portion of the foreign assistance authorization bill. It is this bill that establishes the specific levels of assistance that Congress is willing to support; however, the actual dollars must be provided by the Committee on Appropriations and the passage of a separate foreign assistance appropriations bill.

It is in the consideration of the foreign assistance authorization bill that the Africa Subcommittee is afforded an opportunity to engage in public debate not only on the levels and type of assistance the United States is providing African nations, but also on the assumptions underlying the administration's policy toward these countries. The subcommittee makes use of expert private and administration witnesses in public hearings to help inform its decisions both on aid levels in the economic and military assistance programs, and on specific policy conditions that may be attached. The recommendations of the subcommittee are then forwarded to the full committee, which in turn votes on the recommendations from all the subcommittees and forwards the foreign assistance authorization bill to the full membership of the House.

Both the full Committee on Foreign Affairs and the entire House may choose to modify the subcommittee's recommendations. A similar process occurs in the Senate, and, ultimately, the differences between the two versions of the bill must be resolved by a conference committee of a select group of House and Senate members. The resulting compromise is then returned to the two chambers for final passage, and is then sent to the White House for the president's signature, or veto.

For most members of Congress, the debate on the foreign assistance legis-

Congressman Howard Wolpe (D-Mich.) has served as chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa since January 1981.

S. Romilly

Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Mugabe with Rep. Howard Wolpe: "The entire Congress must begin to hear from Africans and Americans who are seeking a new course for U.S. relations with the continent"

lation may be the only time they will have an opportunity to address African issues during the entire year. And as the total amount of aid going to Africa (averaging about $1 billion in total military and economic aid for the past several years) does not represent one of the larger regional programs, it has not often been a major issue of debate on the floor of the House or Senate. Additionally, in 1981, Congress passed a two-year bill and, in 1983, a "continuing resolution" was approved, which only provides for the previous year's funding levels and programs. So members of Congress who do not serve on the Foreign Affairs or Appropriations Committees have not had much opportunity for several years to become directly involved in African issues.

In addition to handling the foreign aid authorization legislation, the House Subcommittee on Africa has continuing oversight responsibilities for the conduct of American foreign policy towards Africa. In this connection, during the tenure of the Reagan administration, the Africa Subcommittee has maintained a very active schedule. The subcommittee has held hearings on such diverse subjects as African refugees; the situation in the Horn of Africa; U.S. policy toward the Western Sahara; southern Africa policy; Namibia; conditions inside South Africa; strategic minerals in southern Africa; export controls and arms embargo issues; American business practices in South Africa; regional destabilization in southern Africa; corruption and human rights violations in Zaire; U.S. policy toward Libya, Sudan, and Chad; the internal situation in Sudan; the African food crisis; International Monetary Fund and World Bank policies; and U.S. commercial relations with Africa. The purpose of these hearings is to broaden public and congressional awareness and understanding of these issues, to evaluate current U.S. policies, and to consider related legislation or policy recommendations.

The series of hearings on building trade with Africa is an ongoing project of the subcommittee, undertaken in cooperation with the Subcommittee on International Trade and Economic Policy. It is aimed at providing a comprehensive overview of current African trade-related policies and the bureaucratic structure that implements these policies. The subcommittee is also examining what state and local governments are doing in order to foster commercial export ties with the African continent and how such efforts are coordinated with the federal government. In addition, it is seeking to determine how the American business community sees these government efforts and how it views the prospects for enhancing export relations with African economies. The end-product of this joint subcommittee effort will be a package of recommendations for legislation to make the United States more competitive in the growing African market.

The subcommittee has also sponsored three congressional delegations to 15 countries in Africa over the past three years and has hosted meetings in Washington for a steady flow of visiting African dignitaries, including several heads of state. Members of the subcommittee and of the subcommittee staff also receive periodic briefings by a number of government agencies to keep abreast of events throughout the continent, and meet regularly with members of the African diplomatic corps, plus an array of lobbyists, relief organization representatives, academics, business representatives, and human rights activists as well.

By gathering an enormous amount of information on the problems and prospects for U.S. relations with African countries and presenting its findings for public debate, the subcommittee has attempted to play a constructive role in the development and management of U.S. policies toward Africa. But the House Subcommittee on Africa consists of only nine members of Congress (six Democrats and three Republicans) who must seek the support of a majority of their 435 colleagues in the House if their efforts are to have their fullest impact.

As a result of its work over the past three and a half years, the subcommittee majority has developed an important critique of the Reagan policies toward Africa that it believes could help move the U.S. toward a more enlightened approach to the increasingly important nations of Africa. In its essence, this critique argues the following

three points: (1) the administration's preoccupation with the superpower rivalry has caused it to view the continent through an East-West prism, thereby neglecting the central concerns of African states to promote and protect their national sovereignty and economic development; (2) the tripling of military assistance to Africa reflects the administration's inability to recognize the reality that most of the political instability in African states results from internal economic, social, and political difficulties rather than external military threats; (3) the administration's policy of "constructive engagement" in southern Africa has had some very destructive consequences both for regional stability and for American interests there.

The view of the Reagan administration that Africa's importance derives almost entirely from its role in the competition between East and West is not original. However, no previous administration has made this ideological orientation so dominant in its approach to the African continent. Tragically, this approach not only has the effect of denying the authenticity and independence of African aspirations, but it also has the effect of distancing important African states from America and making the U.S. vulnerable to manipulation by unstable and repressive regimes whose leaders loudly profess their supposed "anticommunism." This view of Africa as nothing more than a battleground for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is not dissimilar to the "carving up" of the continent by the former colonial powers. Both approaches rest on the racist assumption that Africans are not capable of determining their own futures or choosing their own relationships with other countries.

The subcommittee has made a concerted effort through hearings, amendments to the foreign aid legislation, and consultations with administration officials to demonstrate the dangers of the above approach. In the case of Zaire, for example, the subcommittee has amassed considerable evidence pointing to the manner in which the Mobutu regime uses its professed "anticommunism" to mask its massive corruption and repression. The subcommittee has succeeded in decreasing military assistance to Zaire and imposing conditions on Economic Support Funds as well. More importantly perhaps, it has tried to encourage the administration to distance itself from President Mobutu and become active in supporting the human rights of opposition figures in Zaire as a way of responsibly investing in a more constructive future relationship with Zaire.

The subcommittee has similarly questioned the administration's "anticommunist" preoccupation reflected in its approach to the Western Sahara conflict. Here the efforts of the United States have been to demonstrate, through increased arms sales to Morocco, its commitment to proven "anticommunist" friends such as the

king of Morocco. By embracing King Hassan's war in the Sahara, the United States risks increasing tensions between Morocco and Algeria and compromising American long-term interests in the stability of North Africa. The subcommittee has written language into the foreign aid authorization legislation calling for direct diplomatic contact with all parties to the Western Sahara conflict and a negotiated political settlement.

With respect to the Horn of Africa, the subcommittee has issued repeated warnings that current American policies risk transforming the regional conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia into a major superpower confrontation. The subcommittee has urged that the administration undertake an aggressive diplomatic initiative designed to improve the bilateral relationship between Ethiopia and the United States, and to reduce regional tensions. In addition, the subcommittee has insisted that arms aid to Somalia be tied to assurances that Somalia is not directly engaged in activities in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.

The Africa Subcommittee has also expressed concern over the increasing militarization of U.S. foreign policy towards Africa, which is seen in the tripling of military aid levels to Africa since the Reagan administration took office. On a continent with 22 of the 30 poorest countries in the world, the subcommittee is certain that military hardware is not the answer to development needs and questions whether such assistance is the solution to political instability when economic deterioration is most often at the root of discontent. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the case of the Sudan. While President Nimeiry does face a genuine external threat from Libya's Qaddafy, the reality is that Nimeiry's greatest threat arises from an internal economic and political crisis. Further burdening countries with repayments on foreign military sales credits only diverts very scarce foreign exchange resources away from more economically productive investment.

The subcommittee believes that every nation has legitimate security considerations. The key is how to best address these concerns while refraining from exacerbating existing disputes or encouraging military solutions. The administration has signed facilities access agreements with Somalia, Kenya, and Morocco and is exploring others with Egypt and Sudan. The access agreements have led to stepped up arms aid to these countries, and the Rapid Deployment Force has conducted several military exercises with some of the countries in the region.

The danger is that the U.S., in trying to enhance its ability to quickly project massive force into strategic areas like the Persian Gulf, has begun to emphasize the military utility of some strategically located African states to the neglect of their economic potential and development requirements. The

subcommittee has sought to limit the increases in military assistance and is currently trying to transfer $16 million from arms aid for Africa to drought-related disaster assistance. The subcommittee would like the United States to avoid becoming engaged in an escalation of the arms race in Africa.

It is in the region of southern Africa that the subcommittee believes the misperceptions of U.S. policymakers are potentially most damaging. The Subcommittee on Africa has found that the policy of "constructive engagement" with South Africa is based on a false assumption that the United States has "shared strategic interests" (East-West interests) with Pretoria that override the American interest in seeing the abolition of apartheid and in bringing an end to South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia. For the past three years, there has been a sharp intensification of repression within South Africa and South Africa has engaged in broad-ranging aggression against all of its regional neighbors. The principal effect of "constructive engagement" has been to implicate the United States in both of these developments. Consequently American diplomacy is becoming increasingly irrelevant to the future of South Africa despite the administration's portrayal of recent events as victories for U.S. diplomacy.

It is this issue that has received by far the most congressional attention. Both public and congressional dissatisfaction with the Reagan approach to South Africa has led to the House adoption, as part of the reauthorization of the Export Administration Act, of several economic sanctions against South Africa. The principal restrictions include: (1) a mandatory fair employment code for U.S. subsidiaries in South Africa, (2) a ban of U.S. bank loans to agencies of the South African government, (3) an end to the importation of South African gold coins, and (4) a ban on all new U.S. investments and extensions of credit in South Africa. Other provisions in the House version of this legislation include a reimposition of export controls prohibiting the sale of items to the South Africa military and police, and restrictions on the export of nuclear materials and technology to South Africa and other states refusing to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Congress has already passed legislation that directs the U.S. executive director to the International Monetary Fund to vote against all loans to countries that practice apartheid unless the secretary of the treasury verifies to the Congress that certain conditions have been met.

While the failed Reagan policy of "constructive engagement" is a major reason that Congress is now attempting to take stronger measures against South Africa, it has been the sustained lobbying activities of a coalition of anti-apartheid organizations, unions, churches, civil rights organizations, and black elected officials over the past several years that have helped create a new atmosphere on Capitol Hill conducive to the success of this effort. In addition, the African diplomatic corps in Washington has recently provided a unified voice in support of these initiatives.

Finally, the subcommittee has tried to demonstrate that the United States will be unable to expand its political influence or to advance its economic interests in Africa if it persists in its ideological approach to the continent. Indeed, the administration's East-West fixation is likely to produce the very consequences it seeks to avoid — the increase of Soviet and Cuban influence in Africa. In southern Africa, the Western Sahara, the Horn, and Central Africa, the United States' preoccupation with its rivalry with the Soviet Union is dangerously escalating regional conflicts, threatening the loss of potentially beneficial relationships with a variety of African countries, undermining prospects for economic growth and political stability, and drawing America into an unholy and counterproductive alliance with the white-minority government of South Africa.

For several years, the subcommittee has been seeking to broaden congressional support for closer economic and political ties with African states and for a more aggressive pursuit of self-determination in South Africa and Namibia. The success of this effort will continue to depend upon the active involvement of the Congressional Black Caucus, the Ad-Hoc Monitoring Group on Southern Africa, the African diplomatic corps, the coalitions concerned with southern Africa or hunger in Africa, development specialists, academics, churches, civil rights organizations, and other concerned individuals and groups. Many of the above have maintained a useful dialogue with the subcommittee members and staff, but have not shared their concerns with the larger number of members of Congress who do not often deal with African issues. For the problems and prospects of Africa to receive the attention they deserve, the entire Congress must begin to hear from Africans and Americans alike who are seeking a new course for U.S. relations with the African continent. □

Department of Defense

U.S. military maneuvers in Sudan: "The tripling of military aid to Africa reflects the administration's inability to recognize that most of the political instability in Africa results from internal difficulties"

Letters to the Editor

To the Editor:

I carefully read the March-April issue of *AFRICA REPORT*. Not only was the article on the Upper Volta revolution interesting, but also the interview you had with Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, the Nigerian coup, etc. Let me congratulate you for the presentation of this magazine. I was eager to receive the next issue.

If the Upper Volta revolution is so accepted inside and so assailed outside of our borders, it is because it holds up the new challenges in Africa: the fight against poverty and malnutrition, dignity, and the renunciation of the feudal behavior of Africa's leaders. On August 4, 1984, it will be interesting to assess what has happened thus far in Upper Volta.

KI Doulaye Corentin
Ambassador of Upper Volta
Washington, D.C.

To the Editor:

It has been a year since I called Colin Legum's article ("After the Amin Nightmare," January-February 1983) "a piece of nonsense . . . an abuse to *AFRICA REPORT* . . . plain garbage."

Today, I would like to congratulate Rick Wells on the "Uganda's Security Nightmare" article (March-April 1984). Wells' report is fair, unbiased, and puts forth the facts without editorializing or, as Legum did, licking Obote's feet. Nor has the article glorified the guerrillas in Uganda.

Shame to Colin Legum for deliberately, unconcernedly, greedily, and recklessly feeding *AFRICA REPORT* readers massive lies. For all the innocent blood that was spilling in Uganda as Legum covered up for Mr. Milton Obote, and for the murders and sufferings that have continually been institutionalized because of Legum's disregard for the truth, may Mr. Colin Legum take responsibility and live with a baptism of blood.

For a report that lays down the bare facts and leaves judgment to the readers, may Mr. Rick Wells be congratulated for his professionalism.

Charles K. Lwanga
Ellensburg, Washington

To the Editor:

The article by Louis E. Martin ("What Role for the Black Press?") in the May-June issue was a useful historical review of Africa coverage in the black press. However, the article had several omissions and failed to note some significant developments of recent years.

One such omission was the role of *Muhammed Speakes* and the contributions of journalists Joseph Walker and Charles P. Howard. More recent developments would include: the southern Africa reporting of Les Payne in *Black Enterprise* and *Essence*; the work of Charlie Cobb for *Africa News*; the international coverage provided by Henry Jackson at *Encore*, and, more importantly, the utilization of the Africa News Service by the *National Leader* of Philadelphia. This relationship between Africa News Service and the black press will continue in the forthcoming *City Sun*, a black weekly based in Brooklyn. The *City Sun* will also publish stories from InterLink, which distributes Inter Press Service material in the U.S.

Consequently, I feel there is greater cause for optimism in improved Africa coverage in the black press than Mr. Martin.

Michael C. Beaubien
The Bronx, New York

Books

THE ROAD TO ECONOMIC STAGNATION

Patrick Manning, *Slavery, Colonialism and Economic Growth in Dahomey, 1640-1960*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, 446 pp., $40.95.

In *Slavery, Colonialism and Economic Growth in Dahomey*, Patrick Manning seeks to explain how colonial Dahomey, which even at the beginning of the twentieth century was the second wealthiest territory in all of French West Africa, is now listed among the world's poorest nations. Based on a statistical analysis of foreign trade and colonial finance in the southern portion of what is today the People's Republic of Benin, this study provides valuable evidence on the impact of colonialism as well as data for the debate on "dependency" theory. Manning's findings demand a more nuanced view from the "development of underdevelopment" theorists like André Gundar Frank, as well as from neoclassical Marxists like Bill Warren and Albert Szymanski who see the long-range impact of colonialism on capitalist development as essentially positive. Manning rejects those historians who have pictured a long-term decline in the region's wealth. Rather, Manning argues that the quantitative evidence shows that the economy has grown at a modest rate with periodic interruptions over the course of its modern history. He reconciles the contradiction between the thesis of growth and that of decline by arguing that the issue is not the comparison with economies outside Africa or with other African regions, but with absolute growth over the long run.

Of the thousands of calculations in this volume, two stand out: from 1640 to 1865, the export of two million slaves depopulated the region for part of that time; from 1905 to 1960, the French government annually collected and sent to France over 20 percent of the value of the region's annual exports. The economy nevertheless grew over this three-century period. Despite negative external influences, population growth and producer investment resulted in positive domestic growth. Manning shows how the development of indigenous "mechanisms of accumulation" made this possible.

Over three centuries, he discovers an "unmistakable but inadequate growth rate on the order of 1% per year." Except for the period from the 1840s to the 1930s, Dahomey failed to match the rate of growth of other leading African countries in the twentieth century and did not approach the growth of the world's economic leaders during the era of the slave trade.

In contrast to those who argue the economic benefits of European contacts, including slavery, Manning clearly shows how Dahomeans would have been better off if the region had never participated in the export of slaves. Although the slave trade did not cause the destruction of society, a slowdown of economic growth of as little as 0.1 percent per year after 2,000 years resulted in a domestic product that was 20 percent lower than would have otherwise been the case. This wealth would have enabled Dahomey to better withstand the onslaughts of capitalist expansion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Because of the expansion of agricultural exports, stimulated by increased demand from the private sector, colonial Dahomey of the twentieth century was wealthier than in the nineteenth century. The colonial state did not, however, stimulate economic development. Neither the colonial state nor the capitalist sector created new wealth. The growth of the state and of the twentieth-century capitalist sector stemmed from the transfer of resources from other sectors.

Manning argues an "early growth" thesis, namely that Dahomey developed its economic and social system unaffected by, and essentially independent of, European contact even earlier than the fifteenth century, so that Dahomean society of the nineteenth or even twentieth centuries continued to resemble that of the seventeenth century in many details. The kings of Dahomey accumulated great wealth through their control of land and labor, and later through commercial profit and tax revenue.

Manning's study conveys a sense of the strong continuity of the dominant classes. The leading merchant and planter families of twentieth-century Dahomey were in large measure those of the nineteenth century, who had dominated Dahomey even before the French conquest. Despite their original dependence on slave labor, they very early turned "their commitment to a capitalist future."

The Dahomean bourgeoisie was

therefore "not inherently democratic," since it arose out of a slave-owning class, "which put its needs for land and labor before any rule of law." However, to defend its own economic interests against the French state and the French bourgeoisie, this domestic indigenous bourgeoisie became the leader of the Dahomean national movement after World War II.

From the 1930s to 1960, policies of the colonial government clearly had brought Dahomey into a condition of dependency and stagnation. Opposition by the Dahomean bourgeoisie to the economic policies of the French colonial state produced the major conflicts that resulted in independence.

In whose interest did the French state rule? Manning offers a pluralist model of state responsibility: never soliciting the opinions of its subjects, the state did respond to pressures from key Dahomean economic interests and families and to pressure from foreign and French merchants as well as to the personal interests of state officials. The colonial state served the cause of capitalism, first through the expansion of state-owned capitalist enterprise, and second through the creation of a docile wage-labor force, which in turn ensured the supply of cheap raw materials.

However, the French colonial state siphoned off a growing portion of the economic surplus. Customs duties burdened all who participated in commerce. A large percentage of the salaries of French civil servants were sent back to France. The French owners of nationalized railroads also reexported their resources from Dahomey. After 1905, large revenues were exported from Dahomey to Dakar. The net effect was to "set Dahomey on the road to economic stagnation." By the mid-twentieth century, per capita income in Dahomey was less than one-tenth that of Britain, whereas in the late seventeenth century, per capita output ranged somewhere between one-quarter and one-half that of England.

My biggest difficulty with the book is that Manning tells us that his analysis "emphasizes the conflict among classes." However, there is very little detail to make the dimensions of those conflicts understandable. Thus, he tells us that "the royalty and nobility of the Fon Kingdom owned great estates," that Porto Novo had its wealthy merchant and land-owning families as did other regions of the country; and that "some men owned more land than they and their families could work and paid for cooperative work groups or hired labor individually whereas others hired themselves out." But all of this is very vague. He tells us that during the 1930s, expatriate firms increased their level of investment and "the same was true for the Dahomean bourgeoisie." However, he does not detail their efforts. He tells us that large landowners who also acted as merchants stand out in the "recorded conflicts" and that conflicts involving slaves and wage laborers came into the open, but neither the text nor the footnotes are precise. Finally, he indicates that the French succeeded in dividing the leading Dahomean families through the selection as chiefs of French-educated youth among the aspiring African bourgeoisie, but, except for naming two of those families, Manning leaves us uninformed. All of this, however, may be asking for information that is currently unavailable. We are in Patrick Manning's debt for a most remarkable collection of data and a thoughtful historical analysis of key problems of economic and political development.

Irving Leonard Markovitz
Queens College of the
City University of New York

Books Received

(Inclusion in this list does not preclude the review of a book at a later date)

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Chaliand, Gerard. *The Struggle for Africa: Conflict of Great Powers*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982, 121pp., $16.95.

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Spencer, John. *Ethiopia at Bay*. Algonac, Mich.: Reference Publications, Inc., 1984, 370pp., $24.95.

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African jumping beans?

A surprising fact: One third of all the oil imported into the United States comes from West Africa.



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Tourism is also a big business in West Africa. Recently the World Bank loaned Senegal $13.6 million for the development of its Petite Cote region, south of Dakar. Resort and hotel complexes with 30,000 beds will be built here during the next ten years. And that's a lot of beds!

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