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
AFRICA REPORT

JULY-AUGUST 1988

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AFRICA REPORT

AMERICA'S
LEADING MAGAZINE
ON AFRICA

A Publication of the
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The cover photograph of peasants on the road to a food distribution center in Korem was taken in Wollo province, Ethiopia, by Todd J. Shields.



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Letters to the Editor

To the editor:

I would like to congratulate you and your staff on the March-April issue, "South Africa: The Road Ahead." It was a long overdue comprehensive look at the entire situation. I was pleased to see that your magazine was the one to take up the issue and present such thorough coverage.

As an organization actively involved in higher education in that country, we are often contacted by interested individuals newly involved in the issue. I am always searching for publications which will help them to look fairly at the situation in that troubled country. I have already recommended your recent report to several such individuals and I am sure that it will continue to be an important resource in the months ahead.

Congratulations on such a fine magazine and on making such an important contribution to the debate on South Africa.

Anne D. Moran
Executive Director
The University of Cape Town Fund Inc.
South Africa

To the editor:

In the update section of the March-April edition of *Africa Report*, you ran a story about the upcoming motion picture, "Red Scorpion," in which there was a plethora of inaccuracies with regard to the International Freedom Foundation (IFF). This letter serves to correct those errors.

"Red Scorpion" is a purely personal venture of Jack Abramoff. While Abramoff does serve as international chairman of the IFF as well, there is no connection between the Foundation and the film, either financial or otherwise. The movie, to my knowledge, has its own offices, staff, and budget. To say otherwise is patently false.

In describing the Foundation, you use the term "pro-apartheid." Enclosed you will find a copy of the Foundation's statement on apartheid; a cursory glance at the document should convince even the most skeptical reader that this organization is most adamantly against the South African government's coercive system of racial segregation and discrimination.

To quote the document: "The IFF therefore condemns the system of apartheid for subordinating individual liberty, economic opportunity, and political freedom to the selfish whims of a repressive elite." To describe the IFF as pro-apartheid is to ignore the facts altogether.

You further state that the foundation

has "consistently opposed anti-apartheid groups in South Africa," and cite our opposition to "Oliver Tambo's visit to the U.S.," as an example. To start, we are an anti-apartheid group in South Africa—we have a Johannesburg branch office. Secondly, we did not oppose Tambo's visit to the U.S. We opposed his meeting with Secretary of State Shultz.

We do not believe that the leaders of organizations which promote violence and terrorism against innocent bystanders should be treated by the U.S. government as heads of state. To construe anything more than that from our position would be tantamount to our arguing that your tacit support of Swapo means you are "pro-terrorist." It is very high on propaganda value, but is devoid of intellectual justification.

It is disappointing to us that your research department was unable to phone our offices to check the accuracy of your article. We respectfully request that your journal print a correction in the next edition, pointing out each of the inaccuracies listed above. The charges you make are serious and we do not take them lightly. We hope that you will treat the facts as seriously.

Colleen T. Morrow
Executive Director
International Freedom Foundation
Washington Office

Africa Report welcomes comments from its readers on issues raised in the magazine and on matters relating to African political and economic development. For reasons of space, a contribution sent in the form of a letter to the editor stands a much greater chance of publication than one submitted as an article. Letters should be as brief as possible, normally between 100 and 400 words.

The editor maintains the right to abridge or otherwise alter letters for reasons of space or other editorial requirements. It is editorial policy to maintain a balance of views on controversial issues.

All letters to the editor should bear the name and address of the sender. Requests for anonymity and non-divulgance will be respected, but such a requirement may render the letter less likely to be published.

UPDATE

IN THE NEWS

Zen and the Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare

State Security Council officials have been distributing a new manual entitled *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare* to leading South African politicians and civil servants, according to the Johannesburg-based *Weekly Mail*, which marks a significant break from the earlier military strategies authored primarily by former police chief Gen. **Johan Coetzee** and his super-spy sidekick **Craig Williamson**. The booklet, claiming to be a manual for all those who want "to defeat the revolutionaries" in order "to regain the initiative," spells out in great detail a strategy for "winning the hearts and minds" of black South Africans—or WHAM, as some security officials like to call it.

In the past, Coetzee and many other security branch strategists argued that political groups like the United Democratic Front, various township organizations, and trade union bodies should be allowed to exist, while keeping them under firm control through the use of systematic infiltration, detentions, and selective bannings. President P.W. Botha's government also made attempts to legitimize the apartheid state in the eyes of the black majority as part of a concerted effort to undermine mass resistance. Pretoria unveiled its scheme of grand reforms to democratize apartheid through the tri-cameral parliament, to stabilize the urban system with the help of the Riekert Commission, and to legalize the unions following the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission.

The failure of this strategy to undercut black dissent, however, has forced the Botha regime to reassess its focus on grand reforms from above, and instead to place emphasis on re-shaping the black communities from below. *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare* ar-

gues that the first step is to "annihilate" the enemy—"seeking out the enemy and destroying him." The next step is to restore "effective administration." As the manual puts it, "An effective and well-motivated administration will deny revolutionaries the initiative."

Once these two objectives have been met, a well-coordinated WHAM campaign can be implemented, involving such measures as "civil education," "counter-organization of the masses," "self-defense," and an effective "intelligence system." Through civil edu-



United Nations

South Africa: Putting WHAM into effect

cation, a "good working relationship between the administration and the masses" can be established, assisted by trained and loyal leaders who are well-paid for their efforts.

Counter-organization, says the booklet, is "the main weapon against revolutionaries. The government must take the lead under all groups, classes, clubs, and societies with the organization of social, career, sport, education, medical, religious, and military activities... The population must become involved and identify with the group's activities."

Self-defense is "the most important part of counter-organization of the masses," and should be carried out with the support of local leaders. These militias should be armed, forming the "bridge between the administration and the masses, and should therefore be politically oriented."

Lastly, establishing an efficient intelligence system is equally important if WHAM is to be successful. "It is essential for the government to have a covert intelligence system with roots among the masses and all organizations." To carry out such intelligence gathering, "joint committees" of "security force and administrative and political institutions" need to be created.

The government's decision to turn to WHAM may produce some initial gains, but as *The Weekly Mail* points out, the strategy's chances of success in the long-run are severely limited because it ignores the key issue of black political rights. As long as the Botha regime continues to regard the demand for political rights as the ideology of agitators, its attempt to legitimize state structures in the eyes of black South Africans is doomed to failure. ■

A Split in Unita?

Political differences and allegations of human rights abuses in Jonas Savimbi's South African-backed Unita rebel movement have reportedly caused a split in the organization which may seriously tarnish its image in the West.

News of disunity within Unita could not have come at a more inopportune time for Savimbi, with the much-publicized four-nation peace talks just getting underway in London in early May, and the rebel group standing by as a mere spectator on the diplomatic sidelines. Behind-the-scenes negotiations apparently served to sharpen divisions

among Unita members over whether to press for integration with the ruling MPLA in a government of national reconciliation, amid speculation that Savimbi might be dropped by either his U.S. or South African supporters in favor of a Unita leader more acceptable to the Angolan government.

On the eve of the London talks, six Portuguese-based Unita activists in Lisbon left the movement after accusing Savimbi of ordering the execution of dissidents. Former Unita youth wing leader André Serafim Yamba Yamba and other well-known rebel members told the Portuguese weekly *Expresso* that Savimbi had been responsible for the deaths of three senior officials who had challenged his leadership. Yamba Yamba also alleged that he had personally attended a mass rally at Unita's headquarters in Jamba where he had witnessed the public burning to death of an entire family, including children, after Savimbi had denounced them as spies.

In addition, the Unita dissidents claimed that Wilson dos Santos, the former Lisbon chief who had been instrumental in organizing Savim-

bi's visit to Washington in 1986, was now under arrest in a Unita-controlled area of southern Angola following disagreements over the group's dependence on South Africa. In the past year, Pretoria's failure to disguise its attacks on Angola has been a source of growing embarrassment to Unita—especially when rebel leaders have claimed victories in Cuando Cubango and Cunene provinces as their own, only to have South Africa later admit that a large number of its troops had been involved in the offensive.

However, Unita predictably denied Yamba Yamba's allegations. Foreign affairs spokesman Tito Chingungi rejected allegations of a split in the movement, and said there were "no problems at all" with dos Santos, who was busy fulfilling his obligations in the "liberated areas." A strongly worded statement by Unita's Directive Committee of Students added that the reason certain leaders had vanished from Jamba was that the rebel base was "the bastion of resistance and not a place for exhibiting cadres or leaders who are carrying out their duties wherever the struggle demands."

OBITUARY

The End of an Era: A Survivor Passes Away

Former President Siaka Stevens, who led Sierra Leone for 17 years, died after a brief illness in late May at his home in Freetown at the age of 82. He had been recovering from a stroke suffered in December of last year which paralyzed the right side of his body, before lapsing into a coma a few days prior to his death.

Stevens, one of the few African heads of state to voluntarily step down from office, had handed over power to his handpicked successor, Maj.-Gen Joseph Saidu Momoh, after persuading delegates to support Sierra Leone's army chief at the 1985 conference of the ruling All People's Congress (APC). Although the transfer of power in November 1985 went smoothly, relations with Stevens' protégé soon deteriorated following an unsuccessful coup attempt apparently involving Vice

President Francis Minah in March 1987. Stevens was placed under house arrest for allegedly participating in the conspiracy, and several of his close associates were subsequently sentenced to death, but charges were never brought against the late president.

Stevens, who had developed a following as a prominent trade unionist when Britain still ruled the country, formed the APC in 1960 and emerged on the national political scene as the leading opposition figure following independence in 1961. Within three years, he became mayor of Freetown, and by 1967 was sworn in as prime minister after the APC won a majority in the country's general election.

Almost immediately, however, Stevens and other APC officials were arrested by the then army chief, Brig. David Lansana, who declared martial law, and it was not until a counter-coup by junior officers that he was brought back to

power as prime minister in April 1968. Stevens subsequently survived two coup attempts in 1971 by calling on his friend and ally, President Ahmed Sékou Touré, to provide troops from neighboring Guinea to restore order because he could no longer trust members of his own armed forces.

In an effort to bolster his constitutional standing, Stevens pushed through a series of legal amendments in 1971 to become the country's first executive president. In 1978, Stevens strengthened his constitutional position still further when Parliament passed a bill al-



Stevens: Handpicked his successor

lowing one-party rule, enabling him to be sworn in for seven years under the new system.

But from 1980 onwards, Stevens faced mounting popular discontent and was repeatedly accused both of corruption and improper relations with the powerful Lebanese community. Severe financial difficulties eventually led Stevens to adopt International Monetary Fund-inspired austerity measures—which he dubbed "political suicide"—before resigning from office in 1985. Momoh was formally installed as president in November of that year, but as chairman of the ruling APC, Stevens continued to exert considerable political influence until the very end.

SOMALIA

Somali National Movement (SNM) rebels launched a major offensive against President Mohamed Siad Barre's government in late May which left 1,500 dead in fierce battles to control the northern capital of Hargeisa. Although authorities in Mogadishu initially denied reports of unrest as "baseless" and "cheap propaganda," the government was later forced to acknowledge heavy fighting in the north after 160 foreign aid workers were evacuated in a UN-sponsored airlift.

The SNM's military campaign—posing one of the most serious challenges to Barre's rule since he seized power 19 years ago—follows the signing of an Ethiopia-Somalia accord to resume diplomatic relations and to withdraw support for rebel movements in each other's territories. The pact put the Ethiopian-based group at a severe disadvantage and prompted rebel units to cross into Somalia.

UGANDA

President Yoweri Museveni signed a peace accord in early June with Lt.-Col. John Angelo Okello, leader of the rebel Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA), in what could be a decisive step toward ending a two-year civil war that has claimed the lives of at least 10,000 people. The pact with the UPDA—one of two main rebel groups fighting to oust the government—is expected to bring in 4,000 to 6,000 soldiers from the bush in northern Uganda.

Museveni, who announced a presidential pardon for all armed rebels, said they would be integrated into the ruling National Resistance Army. However, Eric Otema Alimadi, the UPDA's exiled political leader who was prime minister under former President Milton Obote, rejected the truce out of hand. Peace talks are also underway with Peter Otai's Uganda People's Army, the other main rebel group fighting in the east, but the movement is divided over whether to make peace with the government.

CHAD

Describing his offer as "a gift to Africa" to mark the Organization of African Unity's 25th anniversary in late May, Col. Muammar Qaddafi announced that he had decided to recognize President Hissène Habré's government and to release all Chadian prisoners of war. As part of his new reconciliation initiative, Qaddafi proposed a "Marshall plan" to help reconstruct northern Chad, and invited Habré to meet with opposition leader Goukouni Oueddei in Tripoli to put an end to the country's 20-year civil war.

Although Habré welcomed Qaddafi's proposals as a positive development, he showed little enthusiasm for talking to Goukouni—rejecting the idea as interference in Chadian affairs. Habré also expressed concern over Libya's failure to mention the "essential element" of the dispute, the "affair of the Aouzou region."

POLITICAL POINTERS

ETHIOPIA

In an apparent effort to defuse growing Western criticism of its policies, Lt.-Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam's government unexpectedly released seven members of Ethiopia's deposed royal family in late May after nearly 14 years in prison without trial. Following the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974, the seven women—including the monarch's 79-year-old daughter, Princess Tenagne-Work—had been held in Addis Ababa's central prison. All are said to be in good health and are thought to be seeking asylum in Britain.

Occurring at a time when Ethiopia has come under fire for expelling relief workers from Eritrea and Tigré provinces, the release of Selassie's relatives should help ease tensions with donor countries. But British college friends of Selassie's granddaughters, who have been lobbying the Ethiopian government since 1974, have vowed to continue their efforts until the emperor's three grandsons still in detention have also been set free.

LESOTHO

Ntsu Mokhehle, exiled leader of the Basotholand Congress Party (BCP), returned to Maseru in late May for the first time in 14 years to take part in peace talks with Col. Sekhobe Letsie, the ruling Military Council member responsible for defense and national security. In line with Col. Justin Lekhanya's reconciliation efforts, Letsie assured Mokhehle that the personal safety of all BCP exiles would be guaranteed if they came back to Lesotho "in a true spirit of peace."

Mokhehle, who fled the country in 1974 and later formed the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) after a long-running battle with the late Chief Leabua Jonathan, is now widely expected to accept the government's peace initiative. The overture toward the BCP, which is thought to have been encouraged by the South African authorities, provides further evidence of the close ties established between the two countries since Lekhanya unseated Jonathan in a 1986 coup that was allegedly engineered by Pretoria.

TANZANIA

Security forces shot dead two people and injured dozens of other demonstrators on May 13 when they opened fire on some 4,000 Muslims marching on the residence of Zanzibari President Idris Abdul Wakil. Muslim protesters had taken to the streets after evening prayers to stage one of the largest demonstrations on the island in recent years after Sofia Kawawa, chairperson of the Union of Tanzanian Women, publicly suggested that Islamic laws on polygamy and inheritance be amended to provide women with equal rights.

Political and religious tensions on the island came to a head the following day when the National Executive Committee of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi expelled seven prominent Zanzibaris, including former Chief Minister Seif Shariff Hamad. They were accused of anti-party activities and of disrupting the union between Tanzania and the twin islands of Zanzibar and Pemba.

AFRICAN OUTLOOK

Africa pays the price for toxic waste syndrome

A growing number of African governments, faced with massive economic difficulties and an overwhelming debt burden, are demonstrating an alarming willingness to allow their territories to become the secret dumping ground for millions of tons of nuclear or toxic industrial waste. In exchange for large financial rewards, a host of countries in West and Central Africa have agreed to lucrative deals with American and European corporations, turning a blind eye to the long-term dangers such waste can pose to the continent's future.

In the case of Benin, the dumping of toxic waste has been going on for some time. A closely guarded agreement with the French government was allegedly concluded earlier this year, allowing nuclear waste to be buried near Abomey—one of the main centers of opposition to President Mathieu Kérékou—in return for \$20 million and a guarantee of 30 years' special economic assistance. Benin is also said to have signed a contract with SESCO Ltd. of Gibraltar to take 1-5 million tons of toxic waste, and to grant the company a 10-year monopoly on hazardous industrial shipments.

Following mounting protests by Nigeria and other neighboring states, Kérékou issued a "strict order" to suspend all activities in connection with the "importation or transformation" of industrial waste, but the London-based newsletter *Africa Analysis* contends this directive was made for public consumption, and that at least part of the deal is still expected to go through.

Col. Leopold Ahouyea, a high-ranking Beninois military officer, pointed out that in any case, the burial of radioactive substances was "old news." He disclosed that between 1984 and 1986, the Soviet Union had delivered tons of nuclear waste to two disposal sites in central Benin and that in exchange, the Kérékou government had received

a number of Antonov-26 airplanes.

Unfortunately, Benin is not an isolated example. In recent years, as many as a dozen African countries are known to have been the target of American and European companies seeking cheap ways of dumping their toxic materials. While the going rate for waste disposal is \$1,000 per ton in Europe, many deals in Africa have been negotiated at rates as low as \$40-50 per ton.

Take the case of Gabon. Under conditions of utmost secrecy, President Omar Bongo allegedly negotiated a nuclear waste dumping agreement with a Canadian firm, Denison Mining Corporation, during his visit to the U.S. in 1987. The poisonous wastes are reportedly destined for burial by the middle of this year.

In late May, the Dutch firm, Van Santen of Rotterdam, announced that Congo had agreed to store 1 million tons of chemical waste from four unidentified European countries as part of an \$84 million deal. The company indicated that a similar agreement had been reached with Niger. Both governments categorically denied the allegations and launched an investigation into the report. Within days, Congolese authorities arrested five people, including three senior officials, and charged them with attempting to secretly arrange a \$12.6 million waste dumping deal over a three-year period.

According to *Africa Analysis*, President Teodoro Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea has personally approved a 10-year pact allowing an English company to dump a mini-

Nigeria foils South African bid to gain a foothold in Equatorial Guinea

The reaction in Pretoria was of bitterness and disappointment: One of South Africa's latest bids to establish a firm bridgehead in the heart of the continent had been stymied.

In a May 12 statement, South Africa's foreign affairs department described as "regrettable" the expulsion of seven South Africans from Malabo barely 24 hours earlier. It condemned Nigeria for "pressurizing" the government of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema to sever links with Pretoria.

Nigeria's role had been key, both in drawing attention to South Africa's dealings in the tiny Central African country and in mounting a counter-thrust to halt them.

Besides a range of economic ventures (a dairy farm, restaurant, and clandestine purchases of Nigerian crude oil), some of South Africa's other activities in Equatorial Guinea were particularly worri-

some to Nigeria, given their military potential. These included expansion of Malabo international airport and the construction of a satellite tracking station, both on the island of Bioko.

Nigerian military officers pointed out that Bioko is within 20 minutes striking distance by air from the port of Calabar and its adjacent oil-fields. One senior officer expressed the fear that Pretoria might train rebels on Bioko to attack Nigerian targets, as the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) rebels are doing against Mozambique. And with reason: Like the states of southern Africa that have come under South African attack, Nigeria has likewise given significant aid to the ANC and SWAPO.

To undercut this potential South African threat, President Ibrahim Babangida's government embarked on a multi-faceted campaign. In *Continued on page 11*

mum of 5 million tons of highly toxic industrial waste on the island of Annobon. The scheme is apparently worth \$1.6 million, but as scientists have warned, the result could be an "environmental nightmare" should anything go wrong.

Guinea-Bissau has also allowed harsh economic realities to override political and moral considerations by signing two contracts to accept large amounts of industrial waste from Europe. The first, concluded last October with a Swiss company, Inter-Contrat, provided for at least half-a-million tons over 10 years.



Camerasix

Kérékou: Dealing in toxic waste

The second, covering as much as 15 million tons of toxic waste over a five-year period, involved two British firms, Hobday Ltd and Empresa Bis Import-Export. In exchange, the government was to receive up to \$600 million—dwarfing the country's GNP which stands at \$150 million.

But once reports of the deals were made public, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in late May openly criticized Guinea-Bissau for agreeing to store toxic waste from abroad. Shortly thereafter, Natural Resources Minister Filinto Barros announced that the government had "suspended all work on studies for a possible industrial toxic waste dump" on its territory.

New coalition a challenge for SPLA

In a last-ditch attempt to break the political impasse which has plagued the country for nearly a year, Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi announced the formation of a new broad-based coalition government in mid-May—bringing in for the first time the fundamentalist National Islamic Front (NIF), led by Hassan al-Tourabi. But while the presence of the influential NIF in the coalition may have boosted Mahdi's hopes of effectively reconciling the northern Muslim majority at a time of mounting social unrest and an economy on the verge of collapse, it is certain to further polarize divisions with the Christian and animist south, and to hamper efforts aimed at negotiating a quick end to Sudan's civil war.

Following the political realignment, the NIF was allocated five cabinet posts, against 10 for Mahdi's Umma Party, and six for its old coalition partner, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). One of Tourabi's preconditions for joining the coalition as the newly appointed justice minister was a guarantee that former President Gaafar al-Nimeiry's 1983 sharia laws be replaced by a "more genuinely Islamic code" within two months.

Although Mahdi may have no intention of turning the clock back to the brutal interpretation of sharia during the last days of Nimeiry when limb amputation was punishment for theft for Muslims and Christians alike, Tourabi's presence in the coalition is likely to provoke bitter resentment from non-Muslims in the country. Tourabi has indicated that penal elements of sharia would not be imposed "summarily" as they were in the past, and Mahdi now suggests that a system exempting Christians and animists should be devised, yet this is a far cry from the prime minister's past promises to repeal the Islamic code altogether.

Bona Malwal, editor of *The Sudan Times*, the influential daily, thus accused Mahdi of having "decided to come out of the closet wearing his true Islamic fundamentalist colors." "The much-hated, quasi-Islamic legacy of September 1983 is about to be dusted down, touched up, and implemented at breakneck speed," predicted Malwal. "With it will come further divisions on a religious basis throughout the country."

Mahdi's failure to repeal sharia law, which has been a central demand of John Garang's Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) rebels waging a five-year battle against northern domination, will inevitably make the country's increasingly fierce civil war that much more difficult to solve. It will reinforce the SPLA's determination to fight for a secular state, and likely fuel dissent among the growing number of urban poor in the north—a high proportion of whom are non-Muslim southerners uprooted by the war.

The Khartoum coalition has already lost control of much of the south to the SPLA, and the main towns of Juba and Malakal remain under permanent siege. As a result, the government has increasingly pursued a scorched earth policy, while the army has reportedly been involved in widespread killings and torture against southern civilians.

But despite heavy losses on both sides, prospects of a quick settlement to end the war seem to be fading. Before a constitutional conference can be held, Garang first wants the government to implement the 1986 Koka Dam agreement between the SPLA and Khartoum, calling for a lifting of Nimeiry's state of emergency, a total repeal of the sharia, and an abrogation of foreign military pacts with Egypt and Libya. Mahdi, on the other hand, has argued that the fighting must cease before these steps can be taken—a position which is even less likely to be negotiable now that the NIF has joined the ruling coalition.

Guinea is another country which has become the dumping ground of industrial waste from the West. Some 15,000 tons of hazardous materials were recently discovered on Kassa, an offshore island near Con-

akry, when trees and vegetation began to wither throughout the once-beautiful tourist spot. The illegal importation of incinerator ash—brought in under the cover of "raw materials" for a brick manufactur-

ing project—was arranged by the Société Internationale Aluko Guinea, a Norwegian-Guinean joint venture iron products company.

Bulk Handling Inc., a Norwegian shipping firm, had delivered the first cargo of chemical waste originating from Philadelphia in March, as part of a total planned shipment of 85,000 tons. But once reports of the deal were made public, President Lansana Conté set up a commission of inquiry to investigate the scandal. Within weeks, the government called on Bulk Handling to remove the waste, and detained Sigmund Stroemme, the Norwegian Consul-General who is the shipping company's agent in Conakry. Several Guinean employees from the Ministry of Commerce were also arrested for granting licences to import the chemical waste.

Even Nigeria, which has led African efforts to stop the dumping of waste by industrialized nations, has not been immune from such practices. More than 3,000 tons of highly toxic waste from Italy were discovered recently near the coastal town of Koko in Bendel state.

Investigations revealed that the deal had been arranged by Iruekpen, a Nigerian construction company serving as a front for waste exporters. Iruekpen had applied for permission to import non-hazardous industrial chemicals for construction work, while actually dumping several consignments of highly dangerous substances in Koko as part of a lucrative international toxic waste trade. Gianfranco Raffaelli, an Italian businessman living in Nigeria, had reportedly forged documents to import the waste between August 1987 and May of this year, substituting the toxic materials on the documents with approved ones.

The Nigerian government called on Italy to remove the waste without delay, and ordered the evacuation of all Koko inhabitants living within a six to eight-mile radius of the stockpile. By mid-June, Information Minister Prince Tony Momoh announced the arrest of 15 people and said that a special tribunal would be set up to try those criminally involved. The government

also warned that anyone convicted of dumping toxic waste could face the firing squad.

The discovery of radioactive waste in Nigeria is sure to have embarrassed authorities in Lagos after President Ibrahim Babangida's government spearheaded the campaign against dumping toxic substances on African soil at the recently concluded OAU summit in Addis Ababa. Member-states called developed countries' plans to dump their wastes "a crime against Africa and Africans" and recommended that companies which have already deposited waste on the continent

should be made to clean it up.

But as Babangida pointed out, it is also up to African governments themselves to do their part if they are to put an end to such practices. "That any African state could collude and worse still acquiesce with industrialized countries, multinational corporations or anyone to dump nuclear wastes on its territory is not only shocking but incomprehensible," said Babangida. "No government, no matter the financial inducement, has the right to mortgage the destiny of future generations of African children to nuclear radiation." ■

ANC looks back to the future

For the first time since endorsing the Freedom Charter as the "guiding light for national liberation" in 1955, the African National Congress (ANC) is set to publish a new document providing the most comprehensive and detailed guidelines ever of its vision for a post-apartheid society in South Africa.

Although the ANC has not yet decided when to unveil the document, top-ranking members of the organization have revealed that the guidelines will reinforce, and not contradict, the charter's ideals. Once completed, the draft will be distributed for consideration to anti-apartheid groups both inside and outside South Africa, setting in motion what could be a process of debate similar to that which led to the drafting of the Freedom Charter 33 years ago.

The new document—the product of two years of intensive research by the ANC's legal and constitutional department—will not have the status of the Freedom Charter, but could represent the organization's most important policy outline in decades. It is widely expected to confirm the ANC's long-held commitment to a mixed economy, and to propose a non-racial, unitary state with a multi-party parliamentary democracy. The guidelines will also incorporate some key principles not included in the charter, such as a constitutionally entrenched right to strike, which has been a source of criticism for many years.


In addition, the document will seek to create a legal and constitutional framework through which the charter's aims and concepts can be put into practice. As one ANC official put it, "An obvious example is the charter's third clause—'the people shall share in the country's wealth.' The charter doesn't say how this will happen. Part of the reason for examining constitutional options is to make it possible—to take the ideas past the slogans and toward realization."

But the ANC is quick to point out that the document will be no more than a guideline for a post-apartheid constitution, and not a finished blueprint. Said MaAfrika Nodume Hlezi, a member of the legal affairs department, "It should be made abundantly clear that we have no right, nor any intention, to make a constitution for the people of South Africa. It is the prerogative of the oppressed majority of South Africa to decide on what type of constitution they want."

Zola Skweyiya, vice-chair of the specially formed Constitutional Committee, further emphasized that the changing nature of the struggle against apartheid will necessarily affect the framework of a new constitution. "An armed seizure of power will bring with it different demands and requirements from those of a negotiated hand-over, assuming that is possible. From all these perspectives, compiling a final constitution would be

"inappropriate," concluded Skweyiya. As a result, the ANC intends to formulate the guidelines broadly enough to accommodate various scenarios, while providing the basis for a wide-ranging consensus on a constitutional framework.

Although such a process has been in the works for some time, the ANC has long been reluctant to actually draft a constitution which could be interpreted by other anti-apartheid groups as a blueprint to be imposed on the country after liberation—and by implication the declaration of an ANC government-in-exile. The ANC has upheld the position enshrined in the Freedom Charter that only the people of South Africa as a whole, through a formal democratic process, can elect a legitimate post-apartheid government.



Tambo: Vision of a post-apartheid society

But the political upheaval of recent years within South Africa, combined with effective ANC diplomacy abroad, has helped the organization become a major factor in any post-apartheid equation. This Western recognition has brought with it increased pressure on the ANC to outline its policies and perspectives for the future in greater detail.

Since President Oliver Tambo's tour of the U.S. and Western Europe in 1986, the ANC has succeeded in using the Freedom Char-

NIGERIA . . . continued

part, it sought to offer an alternative to Pretoria's financial inducements, reaffirming commitments to provide Malabo with much-needed economic assistance and technical advisers.

Despite clamors from some quarters in Nigeria to take pre-emptive military action, Lagos made no such threats—at least in public. But it did remind its neighbor of Nigeria's military strength. During a state visit to Nigeria last year, Obiang Nguema was pointedly taken on a tour of military installations. And after a visit to Malabo in May of this year, Gen. Ike Nwachukwu, Nigeria's external affairs minister, stated, "We told Equatorial Guinea that South Africa's presence is unacceptable to Nigeria since it is a threat to our security."

A diplomatic offensive was also launched among other African governments. Nwachukwu repeatedly warned about the South African

ter and other policy statements to reject long-standing accusations that the organization is trying to force socialism on an unwilling majority. As Skweyiya said, "Western leaders found that the charter contained nothing they themselves—whatever their political perspectives—would be unhappy with in any constitution."

But having muted criticisms of its national objectives, the ANC has still had to explain how it would implement many of the Freedom Charter's vague principles. This has added impetus to the process of clarifying the ideals of the Freedom Charter by producing the draft guidelines which will extend the political debate on post-apartheid society. "We will not get our freedom tomorrow, but our people need to start knowing what is involved," argues Skweyiya. "These are political issues, and should not be allowed to be the exclusive preserve of the intellectuals, of governments, and of party politicians. This is something which should involve every member of the mass democratic movement, of the ANC, and of Umkhonto we Sizwe." ■

presence in Malabo during a tour of frontline states in May. At Nigeria's urging, a meeting of the OAU Liberation Committee, held in Harare that same month, adopted a strongly worded resolution condemning contacts with South Africa by states that are not historically or geographically obliged to have such ties (the Comoros and Seychelles were also singled out for censure). Officials in Cameroon, which has significant links in Equatorial Guinea, pledged to back Nigeria in its efforts.

The convening of the OAU's Council of Ministers meeting in Addis Ababa in mid-May, at which this question was slated for discussion, may have provided the final push toward Malabo's decision to expel the South Africans, so as to avoid further condemnation. Equatorial Guinea circulated a declaration to the delegates denying any links with Pretoria and affirming its support for the South African liberation struggle.

Yet some doubts remain about the actual extent of the break between Malabo and Pretoria. While several South African personnel have been booted out, the current status of the various South African projects, including the satellite tracking station, have not been specifically clarified. And the same South African statement regretting the expulsions included a vow to continue to "assist" the government in Malabo.

Babangida made it clear, however, that further collaboration with the apartheid regime by Equatorial Guinea—or other African countries—would not be ignored. On the day before the opening of the annual OAU summit of heads of state in late May, Babangida said it was embarrassing and disheartening for Africans to appeal to the international community to stop aiding South Africa while "some fellow African states are being lured into contrived friendship or subtle collaboration with the Pretoria regime."

"We must not," he affirmed, "allow ourselves to be used against the vital interests of Africa." ■

—Ernest Harsch

ECOWAS

The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), the 16-nation body launched in 1975, has taken a decisive step toward the economic integration of the sub-region with the long-awaited opening of Ecobank Transnational Incorporated, the organization's privately sponsored banking arm. Ecobank, originally conceived five years ago, officially opened its Lomé headquarters in May with an authorized capital of \$100 million—half of which has been issued and fully subscribed to. It is expected to play a key role in strengthening existing West African banking facilities and promoting the development of Ecowas member-states.

Plans to introduce a common currency for all Ecowas members by 1992, however, will likely be more difficult to implement. The proposed "Ecodollar" would facilitate trade across the sub-region and strengthen efforts toward political unity, but opposition remains from so-called strong-currency countries and nations using the freely transferable CFA franc.

LIBYA

Despite diplomatic protests by the U.S., Britain, and France, the Brazilian government has reportedly given the São Paulo-based company, Engesa, the green light to conclude a massive arms deal with Libya worth an estimated \$2 billion.

The arms-for-oil transaction, which includes the purchase of Osario tanks, Piranha air-to-air missiles, and Leo anti-tank missiles, will enable Col. Muammar Qaddafi's Jamahiriya to upgrade its ageing inventory of Soviet-made equipment and to replenish its arsenal of military hardware after last year's devastating losses in the Chadian conflict. Much to the dismay of the Reagan administration, Brazilian authorities failed to veto the deal, arguing that the arms sale to Tripoli involved only "defensive weapons," and that in any event the country's dire financial situation precluded any type of military embargo against the Libyan government.

NIGERIA

Nigeria Airways, the state-owned national carrier which has been in debt since its inception in 1959, currently owes its creditors more than \$200 million—fueling speculation that the government may finally be forced to dismantle the company. Run for years as an inefficient but basic service for the Nigerian establishment, the airline is now facing nearly insurmountable financial woes following the government's recent decision to raise the price of aviation fuel by 375 percent.

To offset mounting debts, Nigeria Airways doubled its fares late last year, but the strategy backfired as the airline succeeded only in losing customers and much-needed revenue. Since then, foreign maintenance contractors in France and Denmark have impounded two airbuses and a 747 over the company's failure to pay its debts.

BUSINESS BRIEFS**MOZAMBIQUE**

An unprecedented United Nations-sponsored conference on emergency aid to Mozambique was held in Maputo recently, producing pledges of \$270 million in food and financial assistance, and marking the first time such a donors meeting was held in the country requesting the funds.

The conference was equally significant in that a growing number of donors expressed a willingness to include non-lethal military assistance to protect their food donations and long-term development projects, having concluded that the military campaign by South African-backed Renamo rebels is the main cause of the country's emergency situation—not natural disaster or economic mismanagement. While these pledges are conditional on President Joaquim Chissano's ability to implement the IMF-backed Economic Recovery Program, the enthusiastic response of donor nations is regarded as an endorsement for the government's far-reaching structural reforms.

GHANA

During a recent visit to the mining town of Obuasi, Flt.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings appealed to workers of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation—which produces 85 percent of the nation's ore—to work hard to increase their output in an effort to make up for the loss of revenue from dwindling cocoa prices. Rawlings also took the opportunity to spell out the government's renewed commitment to organize and regulate small-scale gold mining, much of the output from which is currently sold unofficially or smuggled out of the country.

Eight district centers are to be set up for registering, licensing, training, and monitoring private mining concerns, and they will be designed to provide miners with sufficient support and incentive to encourage the sale of gold through official channels. According to government estimates, gold sales from private miners, who operate in areas not suitable for large-scale operation, could add nearly \$100 million to the country's GNP.

KENYA

Vast oil deposits have been discovered in Kenya for the first time, according to Energy Minister Nicholas Biwott, raising hopes that a major find of commercially exploitable crude oil or natural gas will prove to be a long-term economic boon to a country which presently must import all of its energy requirements from abroad. The oil reserves, located in the Turkana district in north-west Kenya, are being explored by Amoco and Petrofina, while a consortium of three companies is prospecting other deposits in the country's Eastern province near the Somali border.

Biwott, who said the next step would be to map out extraction points, disclosed "We have already done the testing and are now looking for suitable sites for wells." But given the lack of existing infrastructure and various technical and logistic problems, it is likely to be 10-15 years before Kenya can realistically expect to benefit from these sizeable oil finds.



ELECTION '88

The U.S. and Africa: THE REPUBLICAN PLATFORM

BY GEORGE BUSH

In response to a series of questions posed by AFRICA REPORT, the Republican presidential candidate, Vice President George Bush, outlines his projected policies toward Africa, addressing the continent's economic crises, as well as the southern African region's conflicts, in this Election '88 exclusive.

Africa is important in its own right and important to the United States. I have travelled to Africa many times during my public career and as Vice President. Through these visits, I have come to know and respect many of Africa's leaders. I find in Africa a rich sweep of history outside that recorded by foreign conquests. My visits gave me the chance to learn about the "inner" Africa as I travelled from Cape Verde to Khartoum and from Algiers to Harare. United States-African relations will have a high priority in my administration, and I will remain personally involved in them.

We have economic, strategic, and human interests in Africa. The continent is

a major and growing market for U.S. commodities, technology, and equipment. It is a source of minerals vital to our development and defense. Its shores control important trade routes. Domination of Africa by a power hostile to the West would represent a serious danger to our collective security.

Perhaps most of all, Africa is important to us in human terms. Africa is now suffering from a severe economic crisis. It is the moral duty of the world's wealthier nations to help Africa overcome this crisis. Our concern is all the more compelling because a significant percentage of Americans trace their cultural heritage to Africa.

U.S. goals in Africa are simple. We

seek increased economic growth and a deeper respect for human rights throughout the region. Africa can achieve these goals within a free and open society. The spent rhetoric of statism and collectivism has brought little besides privation and grief. The callous manipulation of human suffering by the Marxist regime of Ethiopia is an example of the bankruptcy of the Soviet model in Africa. We must replace this model with one based on mutual respect and a shared commitment to free enterprise and human dignity.

On the economic front, we must continue to encourage a shift from state-controlled economies toward free market systems. Such a system alone will



**Soviet-supplied
military equipment,
Ethiopia:** "While the
Soviets pour arms
into aggressive
countries menaced
by no one, we tai-
lored our military
aid to reduce ten-
sions"

**"Given the size of
Africa's current crisis, I
favor increased efforts
at debt rescheduling
accompanied by greater
coordination and
mobilization of Western
financial support."**

**Anti-apartheid
demonstration:**
"While well-inten-
tioned and morally
self-satisfying,
sanctions have
proved counter-
productive in prac-
tice"



Margaret A. Novicki



Gusau, Nigeria: "We must pursue with renewed vigor efforts
to develop new agricultural technologies adapted to Africa"

unleash the private sector as a dynamic engine of growth. Recently there has been a growing realization of this necessity throughout the continent in both socialist as well as capitalist nations. This is the most encouraging development in Africa in years.

All over Africa, there is a silent revolution, a turning away from the statist economic model, and a reaching out to free enterprise and open markets. What was the centerpiece of African socialism—state control of production and marketing—proved to be dysfunctional. It caused losses in production and a deterioration in transportation and com-

munications. In nation after nation, these policies are being reversed.

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are playing key roles in reorienting African economic policies. U.S. government and American business can also help. In today's world, our major contribution to economic development lies in the export of American know-how, skills, and planning ability. In addition to American management skills and technical achievements, we also offer access to world financial and commercial markets. For example, Citibank has a program underway to establish a \$30 million fund for investment in African companies. We must pursue with renewed vigor efforts to develop new agricultural technologies adapted to Africa.

Clearly, Africa will also require continued concessional development assistance. The objective of such assistance must be to promote self-sustaining African growth which will eventually end the need for outside aid. Our developmental assistance should focus on countries whose economic policies foster rather than stifle growth. Given the size of Africa's current crisis, I favor increased efforts at debt rescheduling accompanied by greater coordination and mobilization of Western financial support.

On the political front, we must oppose all insults to human dignity. Apartheid, repressive military dictatorships, and the disregard for the victims of famine and disease by their own governments have no place in international society. True to our heritage, we must remain vigilant in the defense of those individuals whose human rights are violated.

With regard to South Africa, all Americans agree on the need for an end to the racist doctrine of apartheid. Our policy is aimed at bringing about the peaceful end to this repugnant system. While we can offer assistance in achieving this goal, ultimately, the resolution of this problem rests with the South Africans. I believe the release of Nelson Mandela from prison would be an important first step. In addition, and in keeping with our belief that negotiation is the answer, I would meet with the leaders of both the black and white

communities in order to get the talks moving.


To hasten the change process, Congress voted a series of sanctions to compel the South African government to end apartheid. While well-intentioned and morally self-satisfying, sanctions have proved counter-productive in prac-

"I do not support further sanctions in South Africa. To imagine that we can impose a solution by taking further drastic unilateral measures shows a lack of understanding of South African realities."

tice. The record shows that all the steps taken in recent years by South Africa in the direction of dismantling apartheid were taken before sanctions. These insufficient actions included the elimination of the passbook requirements, the lifting of the prohibition on mixed marriages, the legalization of black trade unions, and the partial integration of hotel and restaurant facilities. Following the passage of sanctions, the South African government hardened its position and stopped making any new move toward reconciliation.

Some of the sanctions implemented have clearly hurt blacks more than whites in South Africa. Others have resulted in U.S. business assets being sold to white South Africans at bargain prices. This is not what we want to accomplish in South Africa.

I do not support further sanctions in South Africa. To imagine that we can impose a solution by taking further drastic unilateral measures shows a lack of understanding of South African realities. I think we need a more effective diplomatic strategy, which involves active coordination with Europe and Japan.



Unilateral American action can accomplish little, but coordinated multilateral action may be able to accomplish a good deal.

"Our own goals should remain a negotiated settlement, the withdrawal of all foreign troops, and the independence of Namibia. Continued strong support of Unita can contribute to these ends."

In my administration, the first thing I will do is meet with the heads of state of other Western countries to work out a united Western position on South Africa. Part of that position will be that fundamental political change is required if South Africa is to resolve its problems. Another part of the position will be that racial conflict in South Africa would be a catastrophe for all concerned. Therefore, we must all urgently work to prepare the way for negotiations about true sharing of political power.

We should also give economic support to black South Africans. There are many things that we are doing and can do to help the black community, so long as we do not cut ourselves off from the country by ill-advised actions. We should continue to expand the many government and private initiatives underway to help black South Africans in areas such as housing, education, and training.

Elsewhere, U.S.-sponsored negotiations are continuing between the parties concerned in Angola and Namibia, and it is pointless to second-guess them at this stage. The Angolan government has ac-

cepted the principle of the phased departure of Cuban troops. Our own goals should remain a negotiated settlement, the withdrawal of all foreign troops, and the independence of Namibia. Continued strong support of Unita can contribute to these ends just as our support of the Afghan freedom fighters played a key role in Afghanistan.

The guerrilla war in Mozambique is a tragedy. Serious charges of systematic brutality have been levelled against the forces of Renamo, the rebel movement. The government of President Chissano maintains close ties to Moscow, but is moving toward the West. It has recently made market-oriented changes in the economy, returned church property, and increased freedom of expression. I urge President Chissano to pursue this course with vigor. Ultimately, there is no alternative to a political settlement in Mozambique, and I urge both sides to accept that reality.

I favor economic assistance to the member nations of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) that supports the private sector and stimulates growth. This would strengthen and stabilize the economies of the frontline states. We should cut free the black states bordering South Africa from their total economic dependence on that nation.

The emphasis of U.S. programs for Africa must clearly be on economic, not military, aid. Soviet aid to Africa is almost entirely military, while this administration provides over six times as much economic as military aid to black Africa. While the Soviets pour arms into aggressive countries menaced by no one, we carefully tailored our military aid to reduce tensions by moderate assistance to countries facing a clear external threat.

The Maghreb provides a good example of a sound military assistance program. Two countries in the region, Morocco and Tunisia, have been victims of internal and external subversion. The modest military assistance which we provide to Morocco and Tunisia serves as a deterrent and contributes to the stability of the region. While helping our friends in Morocco and Tunisia, we must also work toward broadening our relations with Algeria. I actively partici-

pated in these efforts. The recent restoration of diplomatic relations between Algeria and Morocco is a positive and encouraging development.

In Chad, we recently witnessed another clear-cut case of Libyan aggression. Qaddafi's troops had occupied the northern half of that central African country for years. In a stunning feat, the Chadian army defeated the Libyan aggressors last year and drove them from most of the country. Had Libya's occupation of northern Chad continued unchallenged, it would have destabilized all the countries in the region. Chad received considerable French assistance, as well as military equipment from the U.S. during its struggle against Libya. I was pleased to work closely with our French allies in supporting Chad's national liberation struggle.

A successful American policy for Africa must begin with a deep commitment to help the continent move toward greater economic development within secure societies respectful of human rights. We can build a successful U.S.-African partnership on the three principles of economic growth, respect for civil liberties, and the security of both African nations and the Western world. Recent years have shown movement toward these ends, but many problems remain. The natural disasters of drought, famine, and Aids, civil turmoil, deteriorating infrastructures, and failed policies referred to earlier are well-known. However, determined action by African governments working in partnership with the Western world offers hope for a better future.

History shows that we can achieve the goals we seek under conditions of economic and political freedom. In our own two-century "experiment in democracy," we created a society which produced great strides in economic growth and personal freedom. This achievement came through our twin dedication to the free enterprise system and the principle of government based on the consent of the governed with protection for the rights of all. In our partnership with Africa, we can bring to bear not only our material assistance, but the guiding principles of our own growth for a brighter future for Africa in the years to come. □



ETHIOPIA

The War on Relief

BY TODD J. SHIELDS



Todd J. Shields

The recent escalation in the conflict between government forces and rebels in Eritrea and Tigre has put Western-led relief efforts on hold, potentially endangering millions of lives. In this special report, our correspondent analyzes how the war in the north has affected the supply of drought relief and talks with Berhanu Jembere, head of the Ethiopian government's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. He also looks at an unique international effort in emergency assistance and examines the region's latest refugee flow—from war-ravaged southern Sudan.

Pea-sants huddle behind a few strands of barbed wire as a chill wind sweeps the highlands of Hararge province. A child, barefoot and dressed in rags, stands shivering. Three women slip in the mud as they struggle under the weight of a grain bag.

These destitute farmers, gathered for a food handout at Grawa, in eastern Ethiopia, are among the lucky ones. Although their crops have failed and they are reduced to charity cases, the lifeline of relief grain still reaches them.

That is no longer true for an estimated 2 million peasants in the country's north—suddenly isolated from a massive international relief effort, cut



Todd J. Shields

"Emergency feeding programs aimed at some 4 million drought victims in the rest of the country continue"

President Mengistu: "The priority now for the government is the unity and sovereignty of the country, not feeding the people"



Betty Press

off by a sharp escalation in the long-running civil conflicts in Eritrea and Tigre provinces. Diplomats and aid workers, who until recently were optimistic that they could prevent hunger, now expect mass starvation and migrations leading to disease-ridden hunger camps like those seen during the great famine of 1984-85.

The last time around, the world ignored Ethiopia's growing famine for too long and help arrived only after many of the 600,000 to 1 million victims had died. This time around, the world took notice early and the food was there on time. Distribution began soon after the main rains failed last July and August and grain trucks were reaching scores of remote hamlets before malnourishment reached desperate levels.

Enough food was pledged to fulfill the estimated need, put at 1.23 million metric tons by the United Nations World Food Programme. When battles closed roads or rebel attacks and land mines

destroyed trucks—more than 100 were put out of action from October through April—giant C-130 Hercules cargo planes were brought in to shuttle grain. All in all, says U.S. chargé d'affaires James Cheek, the relief effort "was working," although "running into real trouble and sputtering along because of this paralysis on the roads."

But twin offensives by secessionist rebels in Eritrea and by guerrillas seeking greater autonomy for Tigre, along with the government's countermeasures, undid much of the progress

achieved by the Western-led relief effort.

First the Tigre People's Liberation Front (TPLF) spread through much of the province. When it relaxed its pressure, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) broke out of its traditional stronghold around Nakfa and rolled back government troops. The Eritreans

"Diplomats and aid workers, who were optimistic that they could prevent hunger, now expect mass starvation and migrations leading to disease-ridden hunger camps like those seen during 1984-85."

scored a stunning victory at the major garrison town of Afabet, where they destroyed three Ethiopian divisions in a battle ending March 19. The Tigreans then resumed their advances.

A TIME LY

Alem Ketema, Ethiopia: A snub-nosed biplane lifts off, lumbers past the fig tree near the end of the unpaved airstrip, and promptly disappears below the mesa's edge. The man sitting under the floral-patterned beach umbrella is not alarmed. He leans forward and speaks a bit of Polish into a battery-powered radio.

Within seconds, the grain-laden plane reappears, a white dot droning across brown and gray canyons to another mesa-top where villagers need food. Meanwhile, the man under the umbrella guides another biplane in, while yet another takes on gasoline from a tan fuel bladder.

Soon a fourth biplane comes back in. Workers in tattered rags heft 110-pound grain bags onto their backs and dump them into the plane. In two minutes, it has taken on 1.5 tons. It swings around to leave, its propwash blowing stinging clouds of pebbles and dust toward the thorn-topped fence that keeps donkeys and sheep off the runway.

So goes the typical morning at this highlands outpost, where Western grain, Polish pilots, and planes designed before World War II combine in a relief effort that would seem whimsical but for the number of people it supplies.

The operation here, like scores of feeding programs in drought-stricken Ethiopia, has been relatively unaffected by the turmoil in the country's north. There, civil war has left an estimated 2 million people beyond the reach of the relief network. But elsewhere in the country, aid workers continue with programs aimed at some 4 million people threatened with starvation since last year's rains failed.

Here in northern Shoa province, feeding programs have been underway since late 1985. In 1986, the British and West German air forces dropped food on the isolated mountaintops. Now five Antonov-2s from Poland's state-owned Pezetel aviation company shuttle food across canyons up to 4,500 feet deep.


The planes take minutes to reach hand-hewn runways at four villages that are hours away by road. Last year, they supplied food for 135,000 people each month. This year, the need is greater and they are expected to bring food for 200,000 people each month. "In 1985 when we came here, it was almost devastated. The people were in very, very bad shape," drawls Bob Walls, a Texan on-site for the U.S. Baptist Foreign Mission Board, which oversees the operation. Now, he says, the people are in better than average shape, notwithstanding a string of bad crops.

Minutes after Walls speaks, pilot Jean Rublevski, sporting blue plastic sunglasses and a blue-and-white beanie, takes off for Shilafel. The Antonov shakes and kernels of grain dance on its cargo bay floor during the 16-minute flight. At Shilafel, 1,150 people are receiving food today. They wait quietly under the midday sun; a handful queue before a sign saying "Destitute Registration."

A few yards away, a peasant guides two oxen through a field. The short rains so far have failed. The peasant is scratching a furrow in hopes of catching the last drops of a disappointing season, or the first drops of the main rains that have cruelly failed in recent years.

—T.S.

OPERATION



Todd J. Shields

Food distribution at Grawa: "Although their crops have failed and they are reduced to charity cases, the lifeline of relief grain still reaches them"

The Ethiopian government, faced with a possibility of losing control of the north to its opponents, responded by withdrawing from most of Tigre and much of Eritrea in order to concentrate troops against the older and stronger EPLF.

As the government withdrew, it took with it its own relief commission—previously a major provider of food in the embattled provinces, but now isolated in the few towns Addis Ababa controls. The withdrawal also crippled efforts by non-governmental Ethiopian relief groups. These organizations, mainly church-run and better able than the government's commission to operate in contested areas, were forbidden to carry food beyond government lines to the vast areas recently evacuated.

These moves alone severely restricted relief groups feeding more than 1.4 million a month. The effect was compounded when the government expelled foreign relief workers from the two provinces. The ejections, ostensibly carried out for the expatriates' safety, halted operations by several small groups, but most importantly sidelined the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). That organization, mandated by the Geneva conventions to help those in need on both sides of conflicts, had carried much of its grain into the "gray areas" not firmly under either side's control.

With the ejection order, the ICRC's 30 or so expatriate field workers returned to Addis. It parked and locked its fleet of nearly 30 trucks for fear they would be commandeered for the war effort, and its feeding program, which had been reaching 400,000 to 500,000 people each month, ground to a halt.

The relief effort is now isolated in the relatively small area the government controls. In Tigre, that consists solely of the provincial capital, Mekelle, which can be supplied only by air. About 5,000 metric tons of food are arriving each month. Given a standard ration of 16 kilograms per person per month, that would be enough to feed about 625,000 people. But Western officials believe that the four distribution centers at Mekelle could handle a maximum of about 300,000 people each month—this in a province where 1.5 million people are

thought to be threatened with starvation.

In Eritrea, where 1.7 million people are believed to be at risk, the government controls more territory, including a string of towns from the provincial capital, Asmara, to Keren, about 60 miles away. In those areas, the Joint Relief Partnership, a consortium gathering in Christian relief groups, is feeding 400,000 to 500,000 people. The government's own relief agency continues

operations, likely on a much-reduced scale from the 260,000 people it had been feeding each month in the province.

The upshot is that at most, a little over 1 million people are known to be receiving food aid in provinces where 3.2 million people need help. Those outside the constricted relief network "have nothing and they are either going to have to be allowed to move into areas where we have food or they are going to

The Walking Skeletons

In November, 7,000 skeletal refugees suddenly appeared in remote western Ethiopia, huddling without shelter among the scrub and acacia. They had nothing to eat but tree leaves and they died by the score, perishing at the end of a weeks-long journey through the parched landscape of southern Sudan.

Worse was to come, for the 7,000 signalled the beginning of a startling refugee flow—a torrent that each month brings thousands of starving Sudanese across the border. Thousands more drop by the wayside and hundreds arrive too thin to recover. They die in the rudimentary clinics and elephant grass-huts of four huge camps that for the strong, become miserable havens from the chaos and butchery of their country's obscure civil war.

The refugees' plight, although veiled by remoteness and overshadowed by the famine-threatened millions in northern Ethiopia, offers a clear picture of modern Africa at its worst—a picture of drought, poverty, and ethnic tensions simmering within the artificial boundaries Europe left behind as it shed its colonial empires.

The 270,000 or more refugees encamped in western Ethiopia are predominantly Dinka or Nuer peoples caught in a war that has continued off and on, sometimes raging and sometimes sputtering, since shortly after Britain's 1956 withdrawal from Sudan. The conflict pits the African, Christian, and animist southerners against the Arab northerners who dominate the Khartoum government.

Dinka are the backbone of the southern-based rebel Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), and so are targets for pro-northern forces. The Nuer, like the Dinka, are increasingly becoming sympathetic to the SPLA.

The refugees' accounts, as relayed by officials who have visited the camps, are this: Armed men, often militia from rival tribes who are backed by the Khartoum government, enter a village. They kill the men and rape and abduct the women and girls. Those who escape or flee before the armed men arrive are overwhelmingly the adolescent males who for the combatants represent recruiting prizes or potential enemy gun-bearers.

The youths begin the trek into Ethiopia, which can last up to four months. About one-fifth die on the way. The survivors live off the meager leaves, seeds, and beans found in the dried-up countryside and enter the camps "staggering. . . the walking skeletons seen in Kampuchea in 1979-80," says one UN official.

The flow, estimated by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) at 8,000 to 10,000 each month since November, swells a displaced population that has grown steadily since 1983, when Khartoum

starve," said one relief official. The situation is expected to become more acute as the crop year wears on and the isolated peasants draw further on their limited grain stores. As those run out, demand for relief grain should soar—a development expected to occur soon. That is expected to induce food migrations out of the conflict areas.

An alternative to mass migrations would be for the government to relent on its decisions—for instance, by allow-

ing food trucks past its lines or letting the neutral ICRC go back north. But few expect such a reversal from a government engaged in a major mobilization, entailing a special war tax and renewed conscription, and in an accompanying propaganda campaign that frankly labels the northern insurgencies Ethiopia's top priority.

"Unity, Integrity of the Motherland Above Everything Else" is a constant slogan in the state-run media, where

declared Islamic law and a peace agreement with the south collapsed.

More than 180,000 of the refugees are in a long-standing camp at Itang, about 50 miles from the Sudanese border. Assosa to the north and Fugnido and Dimma camps to the south hold 24,000 to 35,000 refugees each. Western officials who are veterans of Third World disasters return from the camps shaken.

At Fugnido's medical unit, four long straw huts housed 280 patients who "compared poorly with pictures of Nazi concentration camp victims and were as bad or worse as anything seen in Ethiopia during the 1984-86 famine," reports one Western relief worker. Tubercular coughs were the only sound in the dim ward; of the patients, "only one was observed moving—slowly crawling in his naked state towards a water jug," he said.

The Fugnido camp sprang up suddenly in November, when officials found the group of 7,000 on its unprepared site. "The first group was absolutely pathetic," says an aid agency official. "Everyone was skeletal. The only things they had to eat were tree leaves, acacia tree leaves."

Nearly 600 people died in the camp through the end of March, the official said. And the deaths were not limited to Fugnido. According to Kingsley Amaning, UNHCR's on-site representative, the death rate in the four camps as a whole reached four per 10,000 inhabitants per day in December—a figure that gives rise to a calculation of 80 or more deaths per day.

The death rate is down to a fourth of December's, says Amaning. But at Itang, 10 to 12 people still die each day in the camp hospital and feeding centers alone—"what happens outside the camp we don't know," he says. Others, including Wairimu Karago, UNHCR's Addis-based liaison officer, say the refugees' poor shape upon arrival largely accounts for the high death rates. "It's not so much the volume which has been a surprise, it's the condition—barely surviving," says Karago.

The camps' remote location is another problem. A truck coming from the port of Assab, where grain is delivered to Ethiopia, faces a two-week round trip to deliver grain to Itang, the most accessible of the camps. Few trucks are available for the trip because Ethiopia's own food emergency and its war against secessionist rebels in the north claim most of the trucks in the country.

Officials say they nonetheless have mustered enough trucks that food distribution in the camps may now be approaching adequate levels. But they point to an urgent need for high-protein, non-grain foods, and say feeding requirements will only increase—UNHCR is planning for 330,000 refugees by the end of the year.

—T.S.

groups ranging from garage owners to the military's political workers are reported ready "to pay the necessary sacrifices to crush the anti-unity and anti-peace elements." The publicity campaign is remarkable for more than its relentless repetition of stale slogans, for until recently, Ethiopia did not even admit it had a full-scale civil war in its northern provinces. The rebels, who have been fighting for 27 years in Eritrea and 14 years in Tigre, were simply called "bandits"—if their activities were acknowledged at all.

That changed drastically following the rebel offensives when President Mengistu Haile Mariam addressed the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Ethiopia. In a lengthy speech, Mengistu referred repeatedly to the northern rebels, calling them "terrorists motivated by arrogance and fanaticism" who are "hastening to throw the country into an abyss of destruction." In the 26 long paragraphs of his speech that were reproduced in the state-run English-language newspaper, Mengistu expended just two short sentences on the plight of the north's famine-threatened peasants.

The paltry nature of Mengistu's references to the hungry is seen by Western observers as indicative of the leadership's priorities since the rebel advances. "The problem now for the government is the unity and sovereignty of the country. That is the priority, not feeding the people," said one aid official.

The government has come close to explicitly admitting that prosecution of the war effort takes precedence over famine relief. According to Berhanu Jembere, the government's top relief official, food distribution will resume in contested areas only once "the area is cleared from bandit activities."

Relief officials and diplomats judge the expulsion of foreign aid workers against this background. At best, they say, the government wishes to avoid the embarrassment of foreign casualties or the inconvenience of dealing with relief convoys while trying to eradicate the rebels. A middling explanation is that the government wants to keep foreign eyes far from a grim war zone. The worst case offered is that the govern-



On their way to food distribution center at Korem, later taken by the TPLF

ment wants to conceal a scorched-earth policy, or even hide a policy of genocide by starvation. "This is a war campaign," said one Western official. "They don't want any access, they don't want anyone to see what is going on."

Despite the lack of access, information is leaking out of the provinces. Sources confirmed a government air strike on a feeding center at Wukro shortly after the town fell to the TPLF. And the EPLF is known to have decisively defeated a May offensive by the crack 102nd airborne division, which was seeking to recapture Afabet. The 102nd's drive, announced by the government as a "total offensive," likely represented the counter-stroke expected since the sudden rebel gains. Its failure leaves the lines in Eritrea about where they have stood since late March, with the government holding Keren, the most important town between Afabet and Asmara, and the guerrillas entrenched in the surrounding hills.

The lack of access also leaves relief officials with no way to monitor the grain still flowing into the provinces—an important point for Western donors who fear their donations won't reach the drought victims and know they must account to legislators and the public for how their aid is used. "We are particularly concerned it could be diverted to the military," says Canadian ambassador David MacDonald.

Those concerns were exacerbated by the inclusion of UN personnel in the April 6 order expelling foreign aid workers. "You just don't order the UN out. That is what it is for. It's neutral," says Cheek, the U.S. chargé d'affaires. Another official said ambassadors from major donor countries, in an emergency meeting, were "particularly upset" by the UN's withdrawal. The international body had three workers based in Asmara who supervised its 55-truck northern fleet and helped coordinate other groups' grain shipments. Those workers left the north and the UN trucks remained idle for most of April until Under-Secretary-General Martti Ahtisaari negotiated the workers' return.

But the problem of restricted access remained an issue—the European Economic Community (EEC), the third-largest donor behind the U.S. and the Soviet Union, threatened in May to cancel aid unless allowed to monitor its distribution. Late in the month, the government said EEC workers could go north. Whether they would be allowed out of the major towns to view the rural centers where the food is distributed was not immediately clear.

Despite the problems in the north, emergency feeding programs aimed at some 4 million drought victims in the rest of the country continue. But even these are plagued by the war. Offtake at



Women selling food in Makalle market



Ethiopia's two Red Sea ports has dropped as private trucks that had shipped grain inland are claimed by the war effort.

The transport shortage, along with normal port congestion, has resulted in a growing grain stockpile that exceeds 150,000 metric tons. David Morton, in-country head of the UN's World Food Programme, estimates that both ports will be filled to capacity for the major donors to continue shipments. "All of us have to look at scheduling and rescheduling," said one European ambassador.

"In Eritrea, where 1.7 million are believed to be at risk, the government controls more territory, including a string of towns from the provincial capital, Asmara, to Keren."

Another issue for the Western donors is whether they should try to supply Eritrea and Tigre through the rebels, who could carry grain in from Sudan. Such an effort would endanger tenuous relations with Ethiopia, which says any cross-border feeding would be considered a "serious breach" of its sovereignty. And according to one well-informed diplomat, cross-border operations could feed a maximum of 600,000 people. The rebel groups together claim to be feeding 1.2 million people—a figure that suggests a massive effort, and one viewed with great skepticism by many Addis-based officials.

Even the magnitude of cross-border feeding claimed by the rebels, added to the maximum known current feeding from the government side, gives a total of perhaps 2.3 million people receiving food. That would leave about 1 million famine-threatened peasants beyond the reach of food aid, isolated by war from an international outpouring that sought to prevent a recurrence of the haunting images of 1984-85. □



**Unloading relief supplies,
Makalle: "When there is a
humanitarian gesture, we
have accepted it willingly"**

BERHANU JEMBERE

INTERVIEWED BY TODD J. SHIELDS

Africa Report: To how many people in Eritrea and Tigre is the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) distributing food, since the recent expulsions of non-governmental organizations from the provinces?

Jembere: Now, actually, it is not only the RRC operating in those areas, but also the Ethiopian Red Cross and church organizations—the Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat, Orthodox Church, and Mekonnen Jesus. So we will share [distribution to] the rest of the populations which have been serviced by the other non-governmental organizations in this area.

Africa Report: The RRC will not be able to operate outside the government-held territory, which has shrunk in the past month and a half, and is now mostly around Mekelle and Asmara.

Jembere: We will be holding military convoys to reach the hungry population that is in need of supply.

Africa Report: How will the military convoys be able to go outside the government-controlled areas without being attacked? How will they reach rebel-held territory?

Jembere: That is why our food convoys require military escort.

Africa Report: The UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] would argue just the opposite—that it is safer without military escort.

Jembere: That is not properly assessing the situation. When the UN trucks were attacked in October, they were not escorted. [Editor's note: Rebels in Eritrea destroyed 23 UN trucks carrying 450 tons of grain.] I don't know why they come with this kind of statement. They don't have any means to justify it. What is more, it is not only direct shooting which is expected. There can also be mines laid in the streets where trucks or individuals can be blown up.

Africa Report: Have these military convoys of relief food begun yet?

Jembere: Yes, we have never stopped.

Africa Report: Have you always distributed your food with these military convoys?

Jembere: Yes.

Africa Report: But I gather you have not managed to penetrate very far into the countryside from places like Mekelle and Asmara.

Jembere: In those areas where there are needy populations, they have been serviced.

"We are not toys. We don't want to be pushed around by anybody. This is Ethiopia, no other country. We have survived several difficulties. And we will survive."

Africa Report: Has the RRC been able to move any food into either Axum or Senkata recently? What shipments have gone in there?

Jembere: I don't have this information now. But you know that the bandits have overrun several distribution points. They have had temporary seizures of those distribution points. But they are not remaining on those sites. As soon as the area is cleansed from bandit activities, we will resume our distribution activities.

Africa Report: When do you think that might be?

Jembere: It's going on daily. It's going on.

Africa Report: And when do you think it will be cleansed?

Jembere: I don't know. I have to refer to the military personnel who are in charge of the situation. If I say something, it would be just pure speculation.

Africa Report: The priority of any government is to protect its territory from insurgencies and consequently the conflict in the north has taken priority over other things. Therefore, will there be as much equipment and military convoys available to take the food convoys out into the population?

Jembere: You know a military operation is going on to clean the area of bandits. At the same time, food is being transported because we have also an obligation to feed the people. You have correctly said that it is the obligation of any government to protect its territory, to preserve its unity and integrity. But this is what others try to deny us, by disseminating hostile propaganda.

Africa Report: Since this relief operation geared into motion in October and November or even earlier with your early warning system, it has been hampered by the conflict and by rebel attacks and subsequent road closures. However, with the conflict intensifying in the north, won't it be more difficult to reach the people needed?

Jembere: Yes, of course. You know there have been difficulties which have been imposed by the acts of the bandits. From time to time, I think we in the relief operation were hoping the bandits and their supporters would perhaps be sensible enough and stop these destructive activities. But our patience perhaps has been interpreted as weakness. And so they aggregated their activities and more damage has been caused. Now we have to do something, pay the necessary sacrifices. We have to clean the area and make sure people are fed.

Africa Report: You are also talking about increasing the number of people you are reaching. How will you do that?

Jembere: Through this cleansing operation by the military.

Africa Report: While the cleansing operation is going on, how will you reach the people?

Jembere: As soon as the area is cleared of bandit activities.

Africa Report: But what about while the area is being cleared from bandit activities?

Jembere: Naturally, there can be no temporary stoppage. You cannot go under crossfire to feed the people. And the people will be warned to take preparation, to take cover, or to move to areas where military operations are not taking place. In fact, they are also expected to join hands with the military so that the enemies can be wiped out. There is a fact which no one can deny—that while bandits are in the middle of the

EPLF soldiers: "There is one fact which no one can deny: While bandits are in the middle of the people, it is very difficult to continue humanitarian activities"



Camerapix

people, it is very difficult to continue humanitarian activities. The people themselves should decide—just to clear themselves of the bandits.

Africa Report: You also have said that once the area is cleansed, the NGO expatriate workers will be allowed back north.

Jembere: Definitely. And this decision we have already taken because of our utmost concern for the life of the expatriate staff. As soon as the area is cleared, then they can resume their activities.

Africa Report: Many of the NGOs said they appreciate the government's concern for their safety, but they also wonder why—if the government feels it can handle the relief operation by itself—the NGOs were ever asked to help. Why are they actually there?

Jembere: I think to ease the pressure on the RRC. We can be overstretched, you know, because it is not only the two administrative regions in the north we have to look after, but millions of people in other administrative regions. Originally, we just appealed for food. It's only the donor agencies who said that they could give food only to the NGOs.

Our activities are always doubted. But we have never said that it would be beyond our capacity to administer the relief operation. There is still doubt and perhaps some suspicion. Certain donor organizations here appreciate the decisions that have been made—that we must be concerned about expatriate life—but at the same time there are some who still insist that this call should be reversed. I think some of them have the intention that we should give up everything and let bandits continue, let them go on with their destructive activities.

But also perhaps it is in someone's interest to see this country disintegrate. It is not only the problem of the famine. The critical question is the integrity of the country. And peace, of course.

Africa Report: A lot of the people out there needing food cannot wait more than a few days, much less weeks.

Jembere: Unfortunately, it is better to walk than to die.

Africa Report: Better for them to walk?

Jembere: To walk and try to get something rather than just wait where they are.

Africa Report: Some people with the Joint Relief Partnership [a consortium of mostly Christian relief organizations] have been saying that they would like to drive out past government lines as they stand now into areas not yet cleansed. Will they be permitted to do that?

Jembere: No, this will not be permitted. This is a sovereign state. And it is we who tell someone where to go, where to help, and whom to help.

Africa Report: Some people are afraid that their equipment, food, and medical supplies will be diverted to the war effort.

Jembere: This is just pure speculation.

Africa Report: Some donors say that since fewer people are going to be reached, less food will be needed. There is some thought of cutting back on the amount of food they will give.

Jembere: This is unexpected and it would be a very grave error.

Africa Report: They don't think that very many people will be fed under the current situation.

Jembere: We are Ethiopians. And it is we, the Ethiopians, who said that there are 5.2 million people in need of food in the country. No one told us. No one has appealed on our behalf. It's our country, our people, so why do people bring this kind of doubt? Why, when it is the government, everybody comes with doubts, speculations? When it is the bandits, nothing is said.

If I come to your country, and present myself to be more concerned than you, the citizen in your country, tell me what you think. We are not toys. We don't want to be pushed around by anybody. This is Ethiopia, no other country. We have survived several difficulties. And we will survive. The Ethiopians will not live by the wheat which comes from abroad. When there is a humanitarian gesture, yes, we have accepted willingly because we trusted everybody. But those who are not trusting us cannot continue with the present kind of arrogance. We do not expect any decision-maker from outside to tell us how to do things in our country and what to do for our people.

Africa Report: Some say that because of past tensions between the RRC and the ICRC, the expulsion of expatriates was basically aimed at removing them from the north, as the ICRC is the only one with a mandate to work on both sides of the conflict.

Jembere: What kind of mandate? This is a mandate which I don't recognize. I know the ICRC as a humanitarian organization, as a relief organization. It is because of this that we have accepted them. They are not considered other than any non-governmental relief organization.

Africa Report: We have also heard reports that after the rebels take towns like Wukro, Afabet, the government has come in and levelled them.

"Our activities are always doubted. But we have never said that it would be beyond our capacity to administer the relief operation."

Jembere: I have not been there and I don't have any information, but what if things of that nature have taken place? As I said, there is a cleansing operation going on. Shall we just say, "Okay, welcome bandits" and continue?

Africa Report: Could you comment on a claim from the TPLF that the government dropped bombs and napalm on Wukro? [Editor's note: The attack on Wukro was subsequently confirmed by three Western sources. Allegations of napalm use remain unsubstantiated. The death toll was thought to stand at several dozen.]

Jembere: When they overran Wukro, destroyed a lot of relief supplies, killed very many people, burned equipment, what had the world to say? And you as a journalist, do you just stand and give applause to such activities? A tooth for a tooth, an eye for an eye, if not more. □



THE POPULA

The executive director of the United Nations Population Fund warns that if development efforts will be overwhelmed, threatening the very basis—the

BY NAFIS SADIK

Nairobi, Kenya's capital, is a throbbing, thriving town at the heart of Africa. A center of government, finance, development, and international affairs, it draws statesmen, businessmen, diplomats, and tourists from all over the world.

A hundred years ago, Nairobi did not exist. At the turn of the century, it was an army camp, a railroad station, and a bazaar, linked by a muddy road. The army camp and its redcoats are long gone; the station is still there, but most travellers hardly notice it on their way to the airport. The bazaar, on the other hand, is thriving, and grows bigger almost while you look at it.

Nairobi, in fact, grew by six times between 1950 and 1979. "I am tired of being pointed out at international conferences as the leader of the nation with the world's highest population growth," said Kenya's President Daniel arap Moi

Dr. Nafis Sadik is executive director of the United Nations Population Fund.

not so long ago. No wonder: On current estimates, Kenya's total population will double in less than 20 years. By then, Nairobi could well be three times its present size. No country has ever grown at this pace—even Kenya, where the growth rate has been rising steadily for decades. It has now probably reached a peak, but growth will go on. From 20 million, Kenya could well have 70 million people by 2025.

Kenya is one of 42 African countries where population can be expected to double in 35 years or less. Looked at one way, these figures are welcome evidence of success in cutting down infant mortality and increasing life expectancy. But they mean problems for other areas of development. African leaders know better than to equate sheer numbers with national strength. The problem, as they point out, from Senegal to Swaziland, is that they must find the means of coping with all these new faces at the national table and find them quickly be-

fore social, political, and economic systems collapse under the strain.

Zimbabwe, one of Africa's recent success stories, could support four times its present population from its own resources, apparently putting the population crunch far into the distance. But on current estimates, Zimbabwe could reach that limit in 40 years. The government's response is firm. "While we do not propose in some crude arbitrary manner to limit population growth, we must seek to achieve a definable relationship between population growth and the capacity of our country to provide material requirements," said Prime Minister Robert Mugabe in 1985.

Zimbabwe's national conservation strategy accordingly calls for "replacement-level" fertility by 2015, in order to achieve a stable population of 23 million by 2075. In a country where women traditionally have four or more children, arguments in favor of "stopping at two" will have to be very persuasive. And the



Jorgen Schytte/Unicef

ITION CRUNCH

current trends in Africa's population growth continue, the continent's environment—upon which economic growth depends.

persuasion must be done quickly: The generation which will be having babies 40 years from now is already on the way. For Mugabe and other African leaders, the population problem is here and now.

Nevertheless, as Mugabe clearly recognizes, there is no point in rushing at it. Hard-sell tactics do not go down well in Africa. African society traditionally favors families of four or more, a mindset reinforced by the "wabenzi," the new rich who flaunt their wealth, their wives, and their many children. In the end, people will have small families not because governments say so, but because they can see the point.

Nigeria's Minister of Health, Dr. Olikye Ransome-Kuti, says, "There is a very high unmet need for family planning. The economic situation in Nigeria has brought it home to our people that if they want to have their children educated and well-fed, then they have to begin to do something about the chil-

dren they are going to have."

The optimists still argue that Africa is rich. If Africa's resources were developed for the benefit of all its people, they say, there would be no population problem. But as Nigeria and Zambia, among others, have discovered, the mere influx of oil or copper dollars guarantees nothing. Cautiously planned economies, as in Tanzania, have found the national capital tied up in trying to provide the basics of life for a burgeoning population. Meanwhile, industrial development and the infrastructure it requires are severely undercapitalized.

Development is not an overnight thing. It takes time to put in place all the many elements which go to make up the mix. And with the best will in the world, Africa does not have the time. Rapid population growth overwhelms development efforts, however carefully planned.

There is another twist to the story. The combination of rapid population

growth and the grinding poverty of much of the continent combine to threaten the environment—the very land, air, and water on which all else depends. The threat is accentuated by the drive to mobilize Africa's natural capital—its timber, mineral, and agricultural potential.

All over the continent, forests are disappearing under the axe and the bulldozer, cleared for subsistence farming, commercial logging, and export crops. Crucial watersheds are crumbling, as in the Ethiopian highlands. The great rivers they serve, like the Nile and the Niger, are shrinking, even as the numbers of people who depend upon them are growing.

Industrial development will not provide an answer to this constant degradation. Indeed, industrial development contributes its own burden to the environment. There are now grave doubts about the wisdom of huge projects like the Aswan or the Volta dams, or of

large-scale export agribusiness, as in the Niger's or the Nile's headwaters. Nigeria's belt of mangrove forest, which protected its coastline for centuries, has disappeared under urban sprawl and coastal development.

Industrial development draws people to the cities, which, like Nairobi, are groaning under the strain. In slums like Mathare Valley on the outskirts of Nairobi, population is growing at over 10 percent a year. These are often young people, drawn to the city by the hope of a better life. But they are also refugees, people driven off the land by poverty and overcrowding.

Slums and shanty towns like Mathare are found in every African city—perched on hillsides or river banks, in swamps or gullies, using land no one else wants. They are a visible and growing threat to the environment, social as well as physical. Without running water or proper drainage, the Mathares of Africa condemn millions to live among their own waste, shortening their lives and the lives of their children.

The children are already at a severe disadvantage. They are four times more likely to die in infancy than their counterparts elsewhere. If they survive, they have little chance of escaping their parents' poverty.

About one-third of Mathare Valley's adults are single mothers, a poignant example of how the population poverty trap selects its victims. Women carry more than their share of the environmental burden. As fetchers of wood and carriers of water, farmers, cooks, waste disposal experts, designers, and builders, they are in a very real sense the managers of the micro-environment in which they live.

But they—especially the poor among them—are also the most vulnerable of groups. Their work is barely recognized in national statistics and is heavily undervalued in economic terms. The result is that there is little protection for them because there is little perceived need for protection. What development assistance there is tends to go to men, which may be marginally useful, but may also have the effect of undermining already existing systems, created and operated by women.

Governments of all political shades



"The economic situation in Nigeria has brought it home that if people want to have their children educated and well-fed, then they have to do something about the children they are going to have"

now accept, like Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda, that whatever the path to national development, it must include some attention to population growth and some limit on the explosive growth of major cities. They are also coming to believe that to solve population problems, direct attention must be paid to the economic and social needs of the majority of the population, the vast numbers who throng the slums and shanties or try to find a living on the land.

Nigeria's Ransome-Kuti is a pediatrician by training. He has a natural sympathy for the vast masses who were left out when Nigeria's oil wealth was being divided under successive civilian and military governments. He is quite clear, even passionate, in his belief that the health needs of the poor must be addressed, and believes that this is an essential step on the road to smaller families.

With the help of U.S. AID, UNFPA, and Unicef, he has begun an ambitious plan to establish or refurbish health centers in the slums and suburbs of Nigeria's teeming cities, and to reach out into the remote rural areas with health care for mothers and children. He includes family planning as an essential element and he realizes the need for encouragement, especially among the men. Loudspeaker vans tour the suburbs playing songs and broadcasting speeches in favor of the smaller family, and the overworked nurses and doctors who staff the clinics have been told to add family planning to their list of services.

Nigeria, like ten other African countries in the last year, has recently announced a population policy. It includes a strong component for information, ed-

ucation, and communication. All successful population policies have the whole-hearted support of all sectors of the community, from national leaders to ordinary men and women in the villages and towns. It is the ordinary people who make the final decisions about family size. It is to the ordinary people that leaders must turn to gain acceptance for the idea of smaller, healthier families through birth-spacing.

Above all, the people must be convinced that birth-spacing is not a foreign idea coming from outside—it is an African practice dating from the time before African societies were invaded and colonized. Encouraging modern forms of birth-spacing, as a means to a strong and healthy family, will find an immediate response from the mothers and fathers of the new African peoples.

Among those who must be convinced of the importance of social development programs are the donors, governments, and public and private lending institutions. All acknowledge the need for slower population growth, but few take real account of the realities of successful programs.

They are beginning to accept however, that education, health, family planning, and women's programs are not optional extras or luxuries, but essential components in the development mix. This will be an important breakthrough, because of their influence on national and local leaders in African countries.

The social development agencies, such as WHO, Unicef, and UNFPA, and their counterparts in the developing countries—teachers, priests, non-governmental organizations, and social activists of all kinds—have been arguing for years that their programs are essential. Now there is a chance that they might be heard.

"Structural adjustment" programs to anchor the development plans of the poorest countries firmly in economic reality will include a social element—or at least will not exclude it. Plans for repayment of Africa's massive debt will still allow social programs to function. Social development programs are at last being recognized as crucial for Africa's future. For the millions of ordinary people and their families in African countries, it is not a moment too soon. □

Christine Namaddu was 14 years old when soldier Ojok, out on operations in the Luwero Triangle, found her hiding in the bushes, trying to conceal her small frame.

Ignoring the pleas of Christine's mother, who followed them until forced back, he kidnapped the schoolgirl and took her to his barracks. "He made me into his wife, although I had never slept with a man before," Christine recounted to Uganda's Human Rights Commission.

For the next three years, Christine was simply one of the spoils of war, like a looted radio or rustled animal. First, she lived with other stolen girls in Bombo barracks, which was also a torture den, then later in Ojok's village, where his family mistreated her. Now

Catharine Watson writes for The Independent, The Observer, and the Toronto Globe and Mail from Kampala. She also works for the BBC.

back home, the baby son she bore Ojok is a constant reminder of her ordeal. She calls him "Problem," and says he is unloveable. "I just hope he does not turn out to be a thief like his father," she sighs.

Hundreds of thousands of Ugandan women have stories like Christine. Many have ones far worse. Two decades of corrupt and violent rule and three wars since 1979 have brought untold suffering to this East African nation. "It has been terrible, particularly for rural women," says Joan Kakwenziire, the one woman on the six-member commission which is documenting abuses between Uganda's independence in 1962 and January 26, 1986, when Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army (NRA) took power.

"They have lost their husbands, their sons," says Kakwenziire, who also lectures in history at Uganda's Makerere

University. "The soldiers would come kill the husband. The woman would have to gather 10 or 11 children and run through the bush with them, living there—no bedding, no clothes, no food, seeing the children die one by one. My impression is that they are hardened. When they testify, I cry and they do not. They have seen so much and look worn out."


Uganda has had two main waves of repression and violence: from 1971 to 1979 under the rule of Amin, and from 1980 to 1986 under the rule of Presidents Milton Obote and Tito Okello. President Museveni estimates that 300,000 died under the first, and 500,000 under the second. For people in northern and eastern Uganda, the last two years have also been painful. Former Obote and Okello soldiers brought war into their midsts when they rebelled against the NRA.

Uganda's Women: A Ray of Hope



Two decades of violence and repression have inflicted a particularly heavy toll on Ugandan women. In recognition of their contributions—and their sacrifices—the Museveni government is encouraging efforts to increase the role and voice of women in the national political arena.

BY CATHARINE WATSON



Joan Kakwenzire argues that Uganda's turmoil, while tragic and costly for all Ugandans, has taken a particularly harsh toll on women. Data is almost completely lacking, but the educational performance of girls appears to have fallen faster than that of boys. As poverty deepened, parents opted to send sons, not daughters, to school, more sure of an eventual economic return from sons.

Sexual favors also became a commodity, as women—widowed or with husbands in exile or prison—struggled to support the family. "In their search for help, men would compromise them," says Kakwenzire.


But Kakwenzire also argues that there have been positive changes, particularly for educated women. "They have learned the fundamental lesson to respect their own capacity—to make friends of their own, to work. This is a capacity they always had but just did not know about."

The chaotic politics made men unsure of their futures, she says. "They knew

"Women grow 90 percent of food and contribute 60 percent of the labor for cash crops, but are poorer than they were in the 1960s."

they might be shot coming home at night, so they began taking their wives into their confidence, making them signatories on assets, teaching them to drive. A woman who could not get about was a liability. They began to look at their wives as colleagues, not subservient dependants. Those little things that give men dominance—like a woman not being able to find her way to the bank—began to disappear."

This, says Kakwenzire, has led to the "growth of a class of women who can fend for themselves." Caroline Lamwaka, 25, is one such woman. Most



"Since the NRM came to power, awareness of women has doubled"

of the men in her family were killed in Amin's purges, but backed by her mother and aunts, she reached university and is now a top researcher on Uganda's main paper, *New Vision*.

For the last year, she has covered the war in northern Uganda. "People tried to discourage me. They said, 'You will come back pregnant from those soldiers,' and 'Nice ladies do not stand around dead bodies.' But I feel it is so

natural to report on the war. And I have realized the value of my work."

Businesswomen have also emerged, a new trend in East Africa, unlike West Africa. They used connections, often sexual, to gain hold of shops and businesses Amin allocated out when he expelled the Asians in 1972. Now they are often called "Dubai women" because they import from the Gulf states, allegedly getting dollars by prostitution with

Arab men. Some are wealthy indeed.

For the majority of women, however, life has deteriorated precipitously. They grow 90 percent of food and contribute 60 percent of the labor for cash crops, but are poorer than they were in the 1960s. With the collapse of roads and transport, they are also more cut off from facilities like clinics and banks than ever before.

Sources at Unicef in Kampala say women contribute more than men to family welfare. For example, children in Luwero who lost their mothers in the war are far worse off than those who lost their fathers. Nevertheless, husbands still control women's earnings, and women rarely inherit land. When not surrounded by war, they still face domestic brutality. Sharply increased drunkenness in the villages causes much of the violence, says Augustine Ruzindana, the inspector-general of government and the man in charge of investigating human rights abuses since 1986.

Ruzindana recently tried to intervene on behalf of a woman whose eldest son had taken her land, but he failed. The local courts sided with the son. Ruzindana's analysis is that women will be oppressed until they become more economically independent. "Our low divorce rate is not to do with the success of our marriages. It is lack of options. There is an acute shortage of accommodation. A woman cannot just march out of a place. Even if she is brutalized, where does she go?"

But a ray of hope for women has come to Uganda with the politicians like Ruzindana who lead the National Resistance Movement (NRM). They are quietly creating a space in which women's groups can flourish and push for more.

Under previous regimes, Ugandan women had only conservative church-linked groups, like the YWCA. Now, there is a directorate for women in the NRM and since last March, a ministry for women and development. The government bank has launched a rural credit scheme for women. And probably most importantly, there is a secretary for women on every resistance committee (RC).

RCs are the grassroots political units of the NRM, nine-member committees at five levels from village to district. "Since the NRM came to power, awareness of women has doubled," says lawyer Maria Matembe, secretary for mobilization on Kampala district's RC. Kakwenzire says Museveni saw the power of women during their five-year bush war. Hundreds of women joined the NRA as fighters. They also ran safe houses, nursed, cooked, and provided intelligence.

"Museveni has sometimes sounded patronizing in his statements on women, chastising them for not trying for top jobs without recognizing the barriers before them."

Museveni has sometimes sounded patronizing in his statements on women, for example, chastising them for not trying for top jobs without recognizing the barriers before them. But last June, he denounced the bride-price—the widespread custom of selling daughters—as "outstanding bondage."

The NRM's political commissar, Kiiza Beisigye, says: "We started a deliberate struggle in the bush for women. Many of them were against it, preferring the status quo because they had been oppressed so long. But this is a negative aspect of culture. That is why we insisted there be at least one woman on each RC."

Joyce Mpanga is the minister for women. She says her priority is to raise women's incomes and their access to credit and inputs. "We want to investigate reducing the burden of women's work, so they can make more money and enjoy the fruits of their labor," says the former headmistress and civil servant with a masters in education from the U.S. Cabinet colleagues so far have been "supportive," she says.

There are now two full women ministers and three deputy ministers—more than under any previous regimes. There is also a new non-governmental women's organization called Action for Development, made up mainly of women civil servants, academics, and lawyers. They are researching the situation of women in war-devastated Luwero, pushing for the reform of key laws, and planning to acquire a sanitary towel-making machine. All sanitary towels in Uganda are imported and cost 500 shillings a pack. Uganda's minimum wage is 460 shillings a month: Nurses earn only 700. Rural women use rags.

But there is some concern among women activists that the new structures and the women ministers are only cosmetic gains or "lip-service." Museveni and Ruzindana often appear more progressive on women than the rank and file of their movement. At the national political school at Kyankwanzi, civilians debate the causes of Uganda's troubles, while living in the bush like guerrillas and learning to use the gun. They study the NRM's Ten Point Program, but learn little about women.

Course director for the school, NRA commander John Bashaija, says women should not be discussed separately from men: They both suffer from underdevelopment. When asked if they have discussed the problems of women, the



"Joan Kakwenzire argues that Uganda's turmoil has taken a particularly harsh toll on women"

Catherine Watson

students repeat Bashaija's view like parrots.

There is a depressing tendency for NRM cadres to argue that the backwardness of Africa must be eliminated before African women can be emancipated. "The average African man simply does not perceive as discrimination not having access to bank loans, not having economic security in the marital home," says Kakwenzire. She calls for a "conscious ideological struggle geared toward attitudinal change" in both men and women.

Women like Kakwenzire, Minister Mpanga, and Janet Mukwaya, the latter a former NRA guerrilla who now heads the NRM's Directorate for Women, are patiently and calmly promoting the idea that backwardness will *only* go when women are free. Patience and calm are essential, points out Kakwenzire, because women who "talk too much of women's liberation are regarded as really full of Western ideas. You get so much ridicule and eventually even become a social misfit. People start feeling sorry for your husband."

One of Janet Mukwaya's jobs is to support the women on the RCs. She is trying to import women's bikes so they can move about, and says their output so far has been prodigious, largely because women are used to working for free. But she says the biggest block to their participation are the men. "It is not uncommon for a man to beat his wife for going to an RC meeting. We advise the women to make sure her husband's dinner is cooked before she goes out so he has nothing to complain about."

Other examples of just how much attitudes need to change can be seen in a dilapidated building in downtown Kampala, home to a legal aid clinic for women. Run by the Uganda Association of Women's Lawyers, it has seen 100 clients since it opened in March. Yeri Wakabi, duty legal officer, says the bulk of the work is child maintenance, followed by inheritance cases. Divorce cases are rare.

The files contain heart-rending tales: "My husband got another woman and chased me out of the house. He sent me away when I went to his office. He bought a wheelbarrow and put the children's things in it. I never got my prop-

erty." Most of the clients are government secretaries or clerks, scraping by on salaries of 700 shillings a month, \$12 at the official exchange rate, \$1.60 at the unofficial.

Susan Mitala (not her real name) sits waiting for attention. She tells her story with pain, still hurt though it is eight years since her husband, a labor inspector, moved out. "He deceived me that he was single when we married. Then I heard that he had another woman and a baby. But I did not worry because I thought since he married me, that was the end of that. For three years I prayed that he would settle, but in vain."

Now Mitala is supporting three children. She does not want a divorce—she is a Catholic—just help with the children's school fees, an impossible 33,000 shillings a year. He gives her nothing. "Besides his job, he has a garage and three acres of land. If I could use the land, I could cultivate and raise money." Lawyer Wakabi will write threatening letters to bring him to court. But she hopes to settle out of court: Uganda's laws are archaic, and the maximum child maintenance awarded in court is only 200 shillings or 50 American cents a month.

Ugandan women lawyers are pushing for reform in this area and in the divorce and inheritance laws. For example, a husband need only prove adultery to divorce a woman. A woman, on the other hand, must prove adultery plus other grounds like cruelty. Also by law in Uganda, it is not adultery if a married man has an affair with a single woman, only a married one. Most of these outdated laws were inherited from the British. Customary laws, which in most of Uganda's ethnic groups preclude female ownership of property, need to be challenged as well.

The legal aid project is one of the most practical and successful for women in Uganda. But the government credit scheme is enormously sought after and needed too. Run by the Ugandan Commercial Bank (UCB), it gives unsecured loans to peasants on the basis of good character. Bank staff say they intend to give 80 percent of the loans to women, commensurate with their share of production.

Thirty miles west of Kampala, in the

fertile district of Mpigi, Medina, a 27-year-old-woman, is growing sweet potatoes with assistance from UCB. She lost her husband in the bush war which brought Museveni to power and is now on her own with four children. "Before, I was just growing some small food for us to eat. Now I am doing some commercial farming."

Florence Ssebowa, UCB's agricultural officer, says women are more reliable clients. "You give them a loan and they use it exactly, better than men." But the UCB scheme can only reach a few thousand women farmers. And in general, women have probably fared poorly in Uganda's post-war rehabilitation. "Aid is got by people who push," says Joan Kakwenzire. "Those, like women, who are used to having nothing, sit back and receive nothing."

The NRM is quietly opposed to polygamy, another practice most Ugandan women regard with sadness and distaste. But it does not intend to legislate against it. "That would be operationally difficult," says political commissar Beisigye. "Also, we do not take on too many things at one time." He and Ruzindana believe, however, that as Uganda's economy becomes more organized, it will become unviable. There is also hope that the recovery of Uganda's economy and the emphasis on real production and the decrease in loose money will wipe out the "sugar daddy phenomenon"—older men escorting younger women in an exchange of sex for material benefits.

"This increased immorality came with the quick rise of Amin's soldiers and supporters," says Kakwenzire. "They were illiterate men from the rural areas, and the first thing they thought when they got some money was to get a beautiful girl." And as life became harder and harder, women were tempted into these ties.

But with the threat of AIDS, a new and even more sinister relationship is beginning to rear its head. Many men are looking for younger and younger girls—13, 14, 15 years old—who they know will be AIDS-free. "As long as women are financially weak, all sorts of people will prey on them," says inspector-general Augustine Ruzindana. "The hill is still steep," says Kampala district RC official Maria Matembe. □

Women and Children On the Frontline

Former first ladies Graca Machel and Maria Eugenia Neto, two of the most eloquent spokespersons for the innocent victims of southern Africa's conflicts, explain the effects of war on the women and children of Mozambique and Angola and outline immediate needs to prevent the destruction of an entire generation of youth.

GRACA MACHEL

INTERVIEWED BY COLLEEN LOWE MORNA

Graca Machel (née Simbine) first joined Frelimo as a student of romance languages at the University of Lisbon in the early 1970s. In 1973, she left her studies to join the war for Mozambique's independence, which was being waged from bases in Tanzania. Shortly afterward, she became part of the transitional government in the run-up to independence from Portuguese colonial rule in 1975.

Machel became the country's first minister of education—a post she still holds today—and in September 1975, married Mozambique's first president, Samora Machel, whose first wife, Josina, had died in combat. On October 19, 1986, Samora Machel and several of his senior aides were killed in a plane crash on South African soil, widely believed to have been engineered by the Pretoria regime. Amid her grief, Graca Machel wrote a letter to jailed African National Congress (ANC) leader Nelson Mandela and his wife Winnie. It read in part:

"To you, in particular, Winnie, I express my sincere admiration. My husband was murdered in just one day, in just one fateful moment. Your husband is being murdered every day, every hour.

"Dear Winnie, Dear Nelson, Samora, your brother, fell on the battlefield. The world will never see Mandela and Samora in triumphant embrace on that glorious day when the flag for freedom is hoisted in South Africa. He did not complete his mission. But we will.

"Dear Winnie, my husband's death has left me with a great emptiness. The solitude I feel is immense. Only by continuing the struggle, contributing to the completion of his work, will my life have meaning."

Still dressed in black, and reluctant to discuss that bleak day in 1986 when southern Africa lost one of its most talented leaders, Graca Machel is nonetheless one of the most powerful spokespersons for the millions of Mozambicans who have suffered untold deprivations at the hands of South African-backed Renamo rebels.

From her ninth-floor Maputo office, surrounded by works of Mozambican revolutionary art, Graca Machel shared some of the pains, hopes, and aspirations of the nation's two most vulnerable groups—women and children. The interview took place shortly after a major donor conference in Maputo where, for the second year running, the international community pledged close to \$300 million toward emergency relief efforts.

Africa Report: For the first time this year, education has been included in the emergency appeal. Why has this been necessary?

Machel: The emergency affects people, and people have a whole range of needs. They do not only need to eat and to be dressed. They also have spiritual needs. One of these is the

right to learn, to develop their intellectual faculties, and to be able to solve their own problems. In our own case in Mozambique, we have reached the point where it is no longer adequate to ask for aid in the sense of food, transport, and medical assistance alone. We need to include this concept of rehabilitating human beings themselves.

There are two respects in which this rehabilitation has to take place. First, the rehabilitation of the children. We try to

Colleen Lowe Morna is a Zimbabwean freelance journalist based in Harare.

train teachers to deal with children who have been the victims of war not only to learn normally, but to continue to develop themselves psychologically and intellectually. The other understanding is that we have to rehabilitate infrastructure and schools. You can't rehabilitate children without giving them the basic material conditions to develop themselves.

Africa Report: Could you give us some indication of how the war has affected the government's post-independence literacy campaign?

Machel: Between 1975 and 1980, the rate of illiteracy dropped from 93 to 72 percent. This was a 21 percent improvement in five years. Since then, we have not been able to take a national census, but there are some indications that illiteracy now stands at 64 percent. If we had been able to follow the same dynamic course as in the first five years of independence, the results would obviously have been better.

**"In provinces like Zambezia, Tete,
Sofala, and even Niassa, and in
Maputo province, more than 70
percent of all primary schools have
been destroyed or paralyzed."**

In provinces like Zambezia, Tete, Sofala, and even Niassa, and in the south, in Maputo province, more than 70 percent of all primary schools have been destroyed or paralyzed. These buildings were used for adult education in the evenings. When Renamo destroys a primary school, they destroy the base for extending education at all.

Africa Report: Part of the emergency appeal is for assistance to address the psychological traumas which children have suffered as a result of the war. What form do these traumas take?

Machel: In Mozambique, we have more or less 220,000 children who are orphans. They suffer the trauma of being orphans in circumstances of violence, which is not a normal situation. Second, we have children who have lost their parents. We are not sure whether their parents have died, but for different reasons, because of the conflict situation, they are separated. You can understand the anguish of a child in this situation.

We also have children who are mutilated, who have lost their physical capacity to play and study with other children. Others have suffered severe famine, because for different reasons they have been taken from their villages and have had to walk long distances without food or water to drink. Because of this, their capacity to learn and develop as normal people is reduced.

Increasingly so, the bandits are kidnapping children to train them, transform them, and teach them to kill and rob. They are obliged to kill their relatives, members of their families, to make sure that they are completely disoriented. From then on, they are able to do anything else.



"Graca Machel, still dressed in black, is one of the most powerful spokespersons for Mozambicans who have suffered untold deprivations at the hands of Renamo"

"Attacking women is one of the tactics used to destroy our capacity to develop, because they are the backbone of family, and for the most part, the farmers"



All this has made us aware that we have another more serious problem of how to rehabilitate these children. Here in Maputo, we have started a small experiment with about 30 children in this situation. We hope to spread throughout the country, wherever there are cases of children who have been used by the bandits.

This is what we know happens. What we need to be able to tell more exactly what the traumas are, and how many people are affected, is a national survey. We are asking for international support, for specialized teams to work in each province of our country, to make this assessment, so that we can draw up a clear plan. The ministries of health and education are working together to try to find funding for this project.

Africa Report: I believe there is some evidence that Renamo places children under the influence of drugs in order to get them to commit atrocities.

Machel: Yes, the children themselves have told us this and the ministry of health has gathered evidence of it. It seems to be a normal practice.

Africa Report: Why, in your view, have children become targets?

Machel: I think there are two main reasons. First, any society is very sensitive about children, and South Africa wants to


of the word, who cannot realize themselves completely.

Africa Report: In what ways has Renamo's campaign specifically affected women?

Machel: In societies which are underdeveloped, the family is the basic cell of society. It is so important that a family is not complete unless all its components are together. In many cases, if you go to the accommodation camps, you will find women who are completely alone. They have lost their husbands, they have lost their children. I cannot explain to you in words what this means.

In other cases, there are women who have lost some members of their family, who are not sure whether they are alive or dead. They live in a constant state of anxiety. Sometimes their sons have been captured and are living with the bandits. They cannot do anything about it. Other times, they have lost everything they have; they cannot even find clothes to put on their children. You can understand how a mother feels in this situation. In these camps, you have women who look like they are 60, when in fact they are only in their 30s. Because of so many problems, they have become old before their time.

Attacking women is one of the tactics used to destroy our capacity to develop, because they are the backbone of the family. They are also, for the most part, the farmers. Not



Jørgen Schytier/Unicef

Housing for displaced persons at Moatize camp in Tete province, in disused railway wagons: "You can't rehabilitate children without giving them the basic material conditions to develop themselves"

touch us in a way that hurts most. Second, they want to prolong the problem in the country, so that even one day when we win this war, when we are at peace, we will continue to have social problems, because we have a young generation that is completely deviant—mutilated physically, mentally, and emotionally.

They are not satisfied that they are able to make more difficult our process of development; they want to make it last for a long time, because if they affect our main resource for development, development will become more difficult in the future. We'll have in the next generation thousands and thousands of people who are not human beings in the whole sense

being able to feed her family creates a sense of helplessness in any woman.

There is also systematic sexual abuse in these bandit camps. From what we know—from what women have explained to us—there have been cases in which bandits have abused women in front of their husbands, to destroy completely not only the woman, but to also destroy the husband, to destroy their sense of privacy. In many cases, women just don't want to talk about it, because it is so humiliating.

Africa Report: You have mentioned the separation of families, which I found to be an acute problem everywhere I travelled in the central part of the country. Is there any way in

which families can be reunited given the present security situation?

Machel: First, we have to deal with the basic needs, because people come in such a miserable state. They need medical assistance, they need food, they need to be dressed. Reuniting the family is the next step. It is a problem we still have to work hard on, because unless there is security, it is not easy to reunite people who are in safe areas with those who are in areas that we do not control completely.

"The bandits are kidnapping children to train them, transform them, and teach them to kill and rob. They are obliged to kill their relatives to make sure that they are completely disoriented."

So far, our efforts in this regard have tended to concentrate on children, as a matter of priority, simply because when you have a lot of problems, sometimes you cannot deal with everything at the same time.

Africa Report: What do you see as Renamo's aim?

Machel: The concept of independence and development of a non-racial society, which is exactly the opposite of South Africa, is an example to those who are struggling for their independence. We represent something very advanced which South Africa cannot afford to see.

Initially, we thought South Africa wanted to take over, to install a puppet government here. My opinion is that they have been forced to understand that Frelimo as a party, and the people of Mozambique, are one thing. They were not able to install a puppet government because our people have a deeply rooted appreciation of liberty and sovereignty. It is not possible to fool them with people under the orders of someone else.

Now the bandits do not say they are fighting to take over. They say that they want to negotiate a power-sharing. When someone knows he is strong enough to take over, he is not

going to say that he wants to share. Having failed in this regard, the strategy seems to be to try and make our society unviable. They are not attacking the army or the government, but the people themselves. They want to make the problems of famine and underdevelopment endemic, to become a cycle of misery that constantly repeats itself.

Africa Report: In your view, how and when will this misery end?

Machel: Apartheid and its projects have no long-term future. There is no future for a society which is based on violence, discrimination, massacres, killing, and injustice. Unfortunately, the apartheid system is backed by other forces which help it to last. Ideally, all democratic and humanitarian forces—wherever people are, whatever they believe—should join our people, to build a very large mass movement that will say "no" to apartheid, as happened in the case of Vietnam.

There was a moment in history when almost everyone in the world, religious people, humanitarians, cultural associations, and students took a step to say, "Stop the war in Vietnam." We feel that is not happening in the case of South Africa. People are just not as involved as they should be to end this genocide. This is the first step—the people themselves.

The second is the governments which support South Africa, which say that they need the strategic minerals that come from here. Some way must be found to make them understand that they do not have to sacrifice thousands of human lives because of their selfish interests. They can stop apartheid today, and tomorrow they will continue to have cooperation with a democratic government in South Africa. So we ask, really, what are we being sacrificed for? It is very difficult for us to understand.

Africa Report: How do you see the future?

Machel: I am optimistic as a person. It is a quality of all revolutionaries that they are optimistic. I am optimistic because I believe in the capacity of our people to keep on struggling for their rights and not to surrender at any price. We have a very clear party, we have a very clear policy on how to develop our country, and we have very concrete aims. Once we have peace, the future is in our hands. To achieve peace is first and foremost our own task. But the international community has an obligation to assist, because the source of the problem is apartheid, and that we cannot solve alone. □



Jørgen Schytte/Unicef

Group of displaced children in Tete city: "We have more or less 220,000 children who are orphans, suffering the trauma of being orphans in circumstances of violence"

MARIA EUGENIA NETO

INTERVIEWED BY DAPHNE TOPOUZIS



Margaret A. Novicki

Unicef's 1987 report, "Children on the Frontline," underscored yet another devastating effect of the apartheid conflict in the subcontinent—the tragic plight of 15 million children in southern Africa. "In 1986, more than 140,000 children died from war and destabilization-related causes," said the report. "This. . . death toll for infants and children under five from war and destabilization-related causes means that every four minutes a small Angolan and Mozambican child was lost who otherwise would have lived."

The report inspired the foundation of the Children's Fund for Southern Africa (CHISA), headed by Sally Mugabe, Zimbabwe's First Lady, and supported by Marcela Perez de Cuellar, Jacqueline Jackson, Miriam Makeba, Dabanga dos Santos, and Maria Eugenia Neto, among others. During a recent visit to the U.S., *Africa Report* talked to Maria Eugenia Neto, wife of the late Agostinho Neto, Angola's first president, about the impact of the war on the women and the children of Angola, and CHISA's efforts to reach the victims.

Africa Report: Can you tell us about the origins and objectives of the Children's Fund for Southern Africa [CHISA]?

Neto: I am one of the honorary vice-presidents of CHISA, which was launched last January following Unicef's 1987 report, "Children on the Frontline," in response to the critical and deteriorating situation of the children in southern Africa. Its main objective is to mobilize assistance and funds worldwide for the children of the frontline states. I have been invited to come to the U.S. in order to try to sensitize American public opinion to the tragic condition of these children and particularly the children in Angola.

Africa Report: What do you see as the key problems of the children of the frontline states?

Neto: The main problems are caused by the war. Our children suffer from hunger, disease, and malnutrition, as well as from lack of clothing, proper housing, and schooling. In addition, those whose parents and family are killed in the war are even more vulnerable and deprived of stimulation, care, and affection.

These are the problems the children face and they are all caused by the war or else are related to it, because in reality the government and the MPLA have fully mobilized their resources to help the children. I should say that the policy of the MPLA is a policy of great achievements for the Angolan youth. We have a slogan in our country to give to the child everything he or she deserves.

Intellectuals and the Cultural State Secretariat are also actively involved in helping our children. We have a lot of books, songs, and plays dedicated to the child, but if we are not doing more and if all those things we are doing now only reach a minority of children, it is because of the war which plagues certain regions.

We have built many orphanages for the children who have no parents, children whose parents have been killed in the war, and those who are not being protected by their families. Great efforts are being made to support these children, and to this effect we have instituted some programs together with Unicef in order to give them materials for entertainment and education. But those programs for the protection and promotion of the well-being of the child do not reach all the children in the country. They reach those living in towns, but we have serious problems with children living in rural areas.

"Our children suffer from hunger, disease, and malnutrition, as well as from lack of clothing, proper housing, and schooling."

The reason why the condition of children is much worse in the countryside is because the war is constantly affecting them. It is difficult for assistance from the urban centers to reach the children because bridges have been destroyed, the railway is not dependable, and there is a general problem of transport.

This war is instigated by South Africa because of Namibia. We have no common frontier with South Africa but we are being victimized on account of the support we give to the Namibian people. Angolans have suffered heroically in order to show their solidarity with the Namibians, because we would be traitors to our own philosophy if we did not support them and reciprocate for the help we received when we were waging our own struggle for independence.

Africa Report: How many children are currently suffering from the effects of the war and destabilization-related causes?

Neto: At present, there are over 600,000 displaced people that are obliged to run from one place to another, mostly old men, women, and children. For example, we have more than 160,000 children without fathers, mothers, or other family. They are displaced, often living alone or on the streets. Some 16,000 are already living in orphanages, but there are not enough orphanages to accommodate all the homeless children.


Africa Report: Which age group is most afflicted by the war and war-related problems?

Neto: Children under five to seven are more vulnerable, as they have few chances of defending themselves. At a certain age, I suppose, children begin to learn how to survive.

Africa Report: Can you tell us about the psychological impact of the war on the children?

Neto: I think the war has had a tremendous and devastating

Maggie Murray-Lee/Unicef



"We have over 160,000 children without fathers, mothers, or other family. They are displaced, often living alone or on the streets"

impact on the youth, ranging from violence and anxiety to depression and premature ageing. For example, I have a child in my home that I brought from an orphanage. The little boy was 3 years old when I took him in and he is now 11. I have had a lot of problems with him.

Sometimes he has particular attitudes of aggression that I can't understand—how is it possible when I adopted him so young and treated him like my own son? I suppose that he is not the only child who is like that. There are thousands of children in the same situation. That is one of the reasons we have delinquency, a problem caused by war as well as the lack of affection and care.

Our government and party must make a lot of effort to help delinquent children with no families, or else this will be a major problem for future generations. Nobody is guilty if some par-

ents have survived and others have died, but in the future we will have to work out many serious problems on account of the war.

Africa Report: Has the condition of Angolan children deteriorated since independence?

Neto: In some areas of the country, things have improved substantially. For instance, in most towns where the enemy has not been able to penetrate, we have been able to achieve dramatic results with the youth. Children in the cities now have access to free health, schools, and sporting facilities, and this has been a great development.

The condition of the children receives great attention from all spheres of the government. I should point out that the program of our government and of our party toward the child is very similar to the program of Unicef, in terms of strategy and philosophy.

But in the rural areas where Unita is most active, the condition of children has critically deteriorated and is now much worse than it was at the time of independence. At present, it is very difficult for us to give the children more than we are giving on account of the war—since a great part of our national budget goes to the defense ministry.

Africa Report: What is women's role in the war?

Neto: Since the beginning of national liberation, the women have had a very important role. They have worked not just as mobilizers, but in many other ways such as helping the soldiers transport war materials. But of course, the majority

"In the rural areas where Unita is most active, the condition of children has critically deteriorated and is now much worse than it was at the time of independence."

have to stay behind, in order to take care of their children and cultivate food for the fighting soldiers.

Overall, women are very engaged in all facets of our revolution. Many fought in the first liberation war as well and we have five women who are considered national heroes. In fact, our first national monument was dedicated to those five heroes, as a symbol of the woman fighter.

Presently, we have a lot of women who are members of our government, while others are actively engaged in the immunization and illiteracy campaigns, and yet others are responsible for orphanages. Some have formed mothers' associations in order to help their children with school. Presently, as well as in the past, women have had a very significant stronghold and have vitally supported men.

Africa Report: In what ways has the war in Angola affected women? Do you think that the role of women has changed during the course of the war, and if so how?

Neto: The women's role in the war has not changed per se, but women have continuously adapted to the new circumstances and needs of the country. After so many years of war, we have significantly more trained women, such as doctors, nurses, teachers, and other professionals. Women are present in all spheres of life and there are no prejudices. Schooling is free for both sexes alike, and so women have the same possibility to develop in life as men. Of course when it comes to ruling the country, we do not have as many women as men, and this is partly due to the role of women as mothers. We only have three or four highly positioned women in the government.

Africa Report: What initiatives is the Organization of Angolan Women taking with regard to the improvement of the conditions of children?

Neto: There are special brigades of mothers that help in schools and organize special amusement programs for the children in the orphanages. Three special fields are being emphasized: health, and especially the prevention of illnesses by immunization campaigns, education, particularly literacy campaigns, and lastly, educational centers not only for children but for mothers who come from rural areas and who can be taught about sanitation, sewing, etc.

Africa Report: How will CHISA channel humanitarian assistance to the children of the frontline states?

Neto: There are several ways that CHISA can reach Angolan children. For instance, we have the Social Affairs Secretariat which is a link between the government and the international organizations. It can also be done through women's organizations through which much of the overall aid we receive is disseminated. □



Stan West

"The problems the children face are all caused by the war or else related to it. We have a slogan in our country to give to the child everything he or she deserves"



ZIMBABWE

An Amnesty for UNITY

Tessa Colvin



"It is not clear what will become of the rough and charismatic bush fighters, many of whom have been guerrillas since the mid-1970s"

The majority of the dissidents who had roamed southern Zimbabwe on a six-year spree of politically inspired murder and violence surrendered to officials in May, marking a clear success in the Mugabe government's efforts to achieve peace and national reconciliation.

The ultimate test of the success of Robert Mugabe's decision to merge his ruling party with Joshua Nkomo's opposition party was whether it could bring an end to the politically inspired violence that has plagued southern Zimbabwe for nearly six years.

Dissidents had carried out bloody murders of tourists, missionaries, government officials, white farmers, and poor peasants to protest what they felt was the Mugabe government's unfair treatment of Nkomo, his Zimbabwe African People's Union (Zapu), and the party's followers, the Ndebele people of Matabeleland.

The December "Unity Agreement," which allowed Mugabe's ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu) to absorb Nkomo's Zapu, had significantly reduced political tensions, particularly when Nkomo and other top Zapu officials became highly visible members of Mugabe's government. But it was not clear if the dissidents' Matabeleland violence had ended.


At Zimbabwe's eighth independence anniversary, Mugabe offered an amnesty to the dissidents, inviting the rebels to enjoy the newfound unity in peace. The nation seemed to be holding its collective breath to see if the amnesty offer would end the marauding of the dissident bands throughout Matabeleland. Tensions mounted as the May 31 deadline approached and only 33 dissidents had accepted the amnesty. Disappointment seemed certain.

Then just two days before the amnesty expired, waves of rebels turned themselves in. The eleventh hour surge of surrenders brought the number of amnestied dissidents to 120, significantly close to the government's estimate of 150 active rebels. The wave of surrenders spelled success for Mugabe's amnesty, and the country heaved a sigh of relief. Strife-torn Matabeleland was especially seized with a palpable elation, a kind of spring fever, at the prospect of peace in its rural areas.

The rebels gave themselves up in groups, and impromptu ceremonies were held at police stations as govern-

Andrew Meldrum, an American journalist who has been based in Zimbabwe for seven years, reports on southern Africa for The Guardian of London and the Voice of America.

"The dissidents were well-organized and articulate about why they rebelled so violently against the Mugabe government"



Tessa Colvin

ment officials welcomed the men. In rural Nkayi, smiling police, politicians, and villagers eagerly lined up to shake hands with some 43 rebels who surrendered on May 30, welcomed in a manner befitting returning war heroes.

"This is a great day for Nkayi," said a policewoman of the rebels' surrender. "These are the people we have been fighting and last night we had a couple of drinks with them. We are all surprised at this... Maybe now we will have peace."

**"The eleventh hour
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Until the surrender of the 43 in Nkayi, about 100 miles north of Bulawayo, no dissidents had sought amnesty in Matabeleland north, probably because two rebels were shot and killed in Nkayi on April 26. Police said the two shot first,

but others say they were giving themselves up. The government later stated the killings were a mistake and assured rebels the amnesty was genuine.

A celebratory atmosphere pervaded the amnesty ceremony. The 43 men, mostly in their mid-30s, wore sturdy leather boots and assorted jeans, overalls, and overcoats. Most sported colorful tribal necklaces, headbands, bracelets, and safety-pin earrings. They appeared well-fed and physically fit. They were also well-organized and articulate about why they rebelled so violently against the Mugabe government.

Editor Nkomo, a dissident commander, said he formed a band of 60 rebels in 1983, most of whom had been killed. "We took to the bush to protest the murders and harassment of our people [the Ndebele people of Matabeleland] by the party army," said Nkomo, referring to the army's Fifth Brigade which was formed in 1982 solely of members of Mugabe's Zanu party.

In 1983 and 1984, the Fifth Brigade carried out brutal campaigns in which, according to church and aid officials, more than 2,000 civilians were killed. The Fifth Brigade was deployed to stop the dissidents' violence, but their bloody methods only seemed to increase local support for the rebels. The Fifth Brigade has since been pulled out of Matabeleland and to a large extent has become a regular army unit without a special political character.

The 43 rebels who turned them-

selves in at Nkayi had been dispersed throughout the vast arid bush of Matabeleland north and the adjoining Midland provinces, and had gathered over a few weeks to discuss the amnesty. "We decided to come in as a group because Mugabe has brought unity to the country," said another rebel commander, Leonard Nzombane, who said they were almost all former members of Joshua Nkomo's Zipra army.

The group hiked into Nkayi with AK-47 and G-3 rifles and ammunition. They led police to caches of more guns, grenades, heavy mortars, and rocket launchers, according to district officials.

"We were not defeated in battle. We have accepted the amnesty to salute the unity process," said Juluka Mkwananzi, the group's spokesman, reading from a

erties that were confiscated by the government in 1982 amid charges of arms caches.

**"Strife-torn
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The Mugabe government is not known for easy acceptance of criticism

Throughout Matabeleland, the amnesty has been hailed as a success and there are many signs that life is finally returning to normal. Teachers and health workers are applying in Bulawayo to return to the schools and clinics in the rural areas from which they fled during the dissidents' reign. "I did not ever expect to see such a friendly meeting between those notorious men and the government," said a white Nkayi farmer. "It makes me hopeful that this area will see some peace now."

It is not clear what will become of the rough and charismatic bush fighters, many of whom have been guerrillas since the mid-1970s and have little education. Government officials speak of resettlement help from the ministry of social welfare, but since Zimbabwe is

"In rural Nkayi, smiling police, politicians, and villagers eagerly lined up to shake hands with some 43 rebels, welcomed in a manner befitting returning war heroes"



Tessa Covin

prepared statement. "We are the liberators of our country and now we seek peace." He asserted that there had been atrocities on both sides, adding, "It is not just for us to be forgiven, but rather we all should forgive one another."

The rebels presented a quixotic list of reforms they would like to see, including stronger Marxist-Leninist policies in government, an end to corruption, a pull-out of Zimbabwean troops from Mozambique, pensions for all former guerrillas, and the return of Zipra prop-

and advice, but Matabeleland north governor Jacob Mudenda diplomatically responded that their reform requests would be studied by those at the top. The dissident band insisted that a few hundred local villagers be allowed to enter the police camp to witness how the government officials, to a large degree, conferred legitimacy upon the rebels. The dissidents were not always charming, however. They brusquely refused to answer reporters' questions about possible South African supplies of weapons.


already saddled with a large problem of what to do with nearly 20,000 former guerrillas who are currently unemployed and without pensions, it will be difficult to give the rebels special treatment.

"I just hope all the goodwill will hold until government and other organizations can come up with a program to bring these men into a productive life," said a longtime Bulawayo resident. "We cannot let this bubble burst, because I do not think we will get another chance like this again." □

Angola Special Report



Sam Nujoma



Venancio de Moura



Jonas Savimbi

The war in Angola has been in the headlines since negotiations, mediated by the United States and involving the governments of Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, got underway in early May. In the following pages, AFRICA REPORT examines the background to the Angolan conflict and the state of the ongoing discussions. First, we talk to Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization, about the centrality of Namibian independence to the talks' successful outcome. Next, Venancio de Moura, Angola's Vice Minister of Foreign Relations, explains his government's views of the obstacles to achieving a settlement. Lastly, during his late June visit to the U.S., Jonas Savimbi, leader of the South African-backed Unita movement fighting to overthrow the Angolan government, justifies his claim to participate in the country's future.

SAM NUJOMA

INTERVIEWED BY HOWARD FRENCH

Africa Report: What brings you to the United States at this time?

Nujoma: We are taking advantage of the U.S. presidential elections to talk with the candidates and also with the U.S. government, to speak to our old friends and create new ones, and to impress upon them that Namibia and its people are not yet free.

Africa Report: Who have you seen and what has your reception here been like?

Nujoma: We specifically talked with Jesse Jackson, and to advisers of Michael Dukakis. We called upon [the Dukakis camp] to remind Governor Dukakis that if he succeeds in going to the White House, to support our just cause for freedom and independence by supporting the implementation of UN resolution 435. We also requested a meeting with Vice President Bush to do the same. We are still waiting [to meet him]. So far, there is no positive response.

While in Washington, we also met with officials from the Department of State—Under-Secretary of State Armacost. We are very much impressed by the interest shown by many

"Namibia is the launching pad from which South Africa attacks Angola, and there will be no agreement until those bases are eliminated by the implementation of resolution 435."

people on the question of Namibia. I have been visiting this country since 1960, but I have never seen as many people now keen on the situation that is prevailing in southern Africa—even in Namibia.

When I am talking about these people, I am not referring to the Reagan administration, whose policy is very well-known: constructive engagement, praising the apartheid regime, and initiating the linkage issue. I am rather referring to the congressmen and senators who in 1986 passed a bill sanctioning the apartheid regime. Even under the Reagan regime this has happened. That shocked Botha, who was not expecting that while Reagan was president, he would be facing greater sanctions.

In our talks with Under-Secretary Armacost, we urged the Reagan administration to pressurize the apartheid regime to seriously negotiate in the current talks, so that if the talks are successful, they will improve the prospects for implementation of resolution 435. The Reagan administration should cease to support the Unita bandits and there should be an international agreement that after South African troops are

withdrawn from Angola, South Africa should not assault Angola anymore.

Africa Report: What is your feeling about the talks that took place in London and Brazzaville?

Nujoma: There is a new process which indicates that the parties that are involved are seriously negotiating. If the indications we get from Under-Secretary Armacost, whom we met in Washington, and President dos Santos, who is the originator of this proposal, [are accurate], then the question of implementation of resolution 435 will be included in these talks.

Swapo is expected to participate in these talks when the question of when the South African forces are to depart comes up. Other issues contained in the Angolan proposals include [a provision that] South Africa and the U.S. should cease to support the Unita bandits and immediately withdraw troops from Angolan territory. The last issue [to be resolved] will be the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

Africa Report: Are you disappointed that Swapo was not party to the talks?

Nujoma: We are not disappointed at all. We are being briefed thoroughly by our allies, the Angolans. We were guaranteed that Cuban troops will not depart from Angola until the apartheid regime agrees to the implementation of resolution 435. We are optimistic that if and when South Africa agrees to negotiate meaningfully, the result will also include the implementation of resolution 435.

Africa Report: Do you see any sign that South Africa would accept government by Swapo in Namibia?

Nujoma: Swapo is one. There is no question of elements of Swapo participating in the bantustan schemes that the Botha regime now attempts to impose on the Namibian people.

Africa Report: But South Africa has been fighting against Swapo. Have you seen anything to indicate that South Africa would reverse its opinion and allow Swapo to take its place as the government of Namibia?

Nujoma: The South African government has no intention whatsoever to relinquish its colonial dominion over Namibia. But South Africa is confronted with many problems. Armed resistance in Namibia is being intensified by the combatants of the military wing of Swapo. We have also mobilized the Namibian people to the fullest of their capacity to oppose the continued illegal occupation of their country by the Botha regime—the youth, the workers. For instance, on the first of May in all towns of Namibia, there were demonstrations to demand improvement in the conditions of workers, but also to demand the implementation of UN resolution 435. They know that the condition of workers in Namibia can only be improved once colonialism ends in Namibia. Students in all black schools demonstrated. They refused to attend classes in commemoration of the Kassinga massacre of 1978. The Namibian people are politically mature after 28 years of Swapo's existence.

Africa Report: In the best of worlds, what would be the


Howard French is a reporter for The New York Times.

SWAPO

United Nations

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most positive outcome you could foresee from the talks?

Nujoma: A final agreement on the implementation of resolution 435 and the holding of free and fair elections [in Namibia].

Africa Report: What do you expect South Africa to ask for in exchange?

Nujoma: South Africa has already asked for what it wants. It wants the Reagan administration to get the Cubans out of Angola. The Angolans have already said the Cubans will leave tomorrow, if you do A, B, and C. There will be no thinking of Cubans leaving Angola while there are South African attacks. Namibia is the launching pad from which South Africa attacks Angola, and there will be no agreement until those bases are eliminated by the implementation of resolution 435.

Africa Report: What does South Africa get out of all that? At present they control the economy of Namibia and much of the territory of Angola.

Nujoma: People have created a mythical South Africa, one that is immune from all pressures. The real South Africa is one that is overstretched militarily, which has more than one-third of its armed forces deployed on the Namibian front—more than 100,000 men—and much of the South African air force. It must pay more than \$4 million a day to maintain those troops in a state of combat readiness. White boys are dying on the front. All of that places pressure on them.

It is not an altruistic South Africa that we are begging to leave Namibia, but a South Africa that has to be confronted with severe problems. They realize now that they have problems. For almost three months, they tried to take Cuito Cuanavale. They have come to realize their limits. They cannot walk out of negotiations. They are not in a position to do so. The economy in Namibia is also in decline. Whites for the first time are finding themselves unemployed. South Africa now pays more than it gets from the Namibian economy because of the war. Over the last 11 years, there has been no new investment in Namibia.

Africa Report: South Africa has tried to create a series of buffer-states, either totally beholden to it, or otherwise unable to pose any threat. Given that strategy, would it allow Swapo, its sworn enemy, to set up a government on its border?

Nujoma: We are fighting a struggle. They see that a solution could easily be found in Namibia whereby [whites] could remain. Whites for the first time are joining Swapo. Some of them are forming their own organizations. These are groups composed of the cream of white Namibian society who are opposed to apartheid. Namibia never had liberal whites as you had in South Africa, but the enemy is under siege, the economy is declining, and this has forced people to seek an accommodation.

They do not want to let Swapo take power, but they cannot wish Swapo away. They have tried creating one group after another, but they cannot get the support of the people. Everytime they drag their feet on independence, they force more people to Swapo.

Africa Report: Can there be an implementation of 435 that does not lead to a Swapo government?

Nujoma: There can be no independence that excludes Swapo. The Namibian people will not accept it. Botha has

already tried every trick in the book. Angola would not accept a solution where resolution 435 would be left out.

Africa Report: How do you see the immediate future?

Nujoma: There is a climate of wanting to solve problems by negotiation—between the superpowers—so the People's Republic of Angola is now saying, "Yes, we are ready to let the Cuban troops leave, provided A, B, and C are completely fulfilled." In the meantime, we will continue to intensify political and military action inside Namibia, because we cannot just sit and wait idly to be liberated by outside forces alone.

Africa Report: Some say Angola's prime concern is getting South Africa off its back, and that Namibia is really a sideshow—by accident of geography, the route by which South Africa invades Angola. Is there a risk that Namibia becomes a sideshow in the on-going talks?

Nujoma: South Africa has been using Namibia as a springboard for aggression, not only against Angola, but against Zambia and Botswana. Unita bandits are trained in bases in Namibia, so the Angolans cannot trust the simple withdrawal of South African troops from southern Angola. It will only feel safe when Namibia becomes independent, and this can only be done when resolution 435 is implemented.

Africa Report: Has the imposition of American sanctions had any effect?

Nujoma: Yes, particularly on the community of white settlers. What really remains is for Britain and West Germany to stop resisting the imposition of sanctions. The Botha regime is very worried. They don't know who will be in the White House next, and what their attitude will be toward southern Africa.

Africa Report: What is Swapo's membership and what

means does it have at its disposal to carry on the struggle?

Nujoma: The membership is composed of Namibian citizens. We have thousands and thousands of members. It is they who have sustained the freedom fighters for the last 22 years of armed struggle. If the number of Swapo soldiers who are supposed to have been killed by South Africa were true, there would be no more people in Namibia.

The Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee, created way back in 1963, gives us a significant amount of cash. We also receive a significant amount from the socialist nations, and the non-aligned movement, and some bilateral. Even here in the U.S., we have support.

"There can be no independence that excludes Swapo. The Namibian people will not accept it. Botha has already tried every trick in the book."

Africa Report: How large are your armed forces?

Nujoma: They are drawn from our membership. It is not in our interest to reveal their numbers. One day they are urban dwellers, the next day you will find them in camouflage. Even the support of the Reagan administration will not stop us from scoring the final victory—it will only delay it. Our guerrilla forces can attack anywhere in Namibia. How do they get around, how do they get through the borders? With the assistance of the people. □

VENANCIO DE MOURA

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: What is the current state of the negotiations on Angola? [Editor's note: This interview took place just prior to the latest round of negotiations in Cairo in late June.]

de Moura: As you know, we have entered a new stage since the London meeting. We submitted to the South Africans—through the U.S. State Department in its role as mediator and interested party—two constructive propositions concerning the ongoing negotiations. These propositions aim toward an accord to be signed between Angola, South Africa, the Cubans, and Swapo. In this accord, the obligations and the rights of all the four concerned parties are spelled out. The second proposition concerns the problem that is of the most interest to the Americans in particular and the South Africans in a general way—the gradual retreat of our Cuban friends from Angola. The "calendar" for their withdrawal remains the important question for the Americans.

We think that since the principle of the total, but gradual withdrawal of Cuban troops has been reaffirmed by the Angolan government, we have entered a new phase. If the South

Africans and the Americans are genuinely interested in a peaceful, but honorable solution in southern Africa, Angola has once again, with some flexibility and in coordination with our Cuban friends, put two concrete proposals on the table.

As you know, there will soon be a new round of discussions somewhere, which will enable the South Africans to respond concretely to our proposals. As concerns the calendar, we have suggested that four years, more or less, are reasonable for the gradual retreat of the Cubans troops, equipment, etc. If, however, the situation on Angola's borders evolves favorably concerning our security in the north and a part of the south, we will certainly continue to be flexible and may envisage a small reduction in the calendar that we have fixed. For these kinds of things, we must look at the total picture. That is the state of the current negotiations. Thus we are waiting for all four parties to agree to the location and the date of the next meeting.

Although it may be difficult, we remain interested in continuing this process, despite our strong military position on the



"We fought a long liberation struggle to win our independence as Africans and Angolans"

Margaret A. Novicki

ground. We remain interested in exploiting the diplomatic and political route in order to contribute to peace in Angola and in southern Africa, and in particular to facilitate the implementation of UN resolution 435, which for us, is the fundamental question, because it is from Namibia, illegally occupied by South Africa, that all the aggressions against Angola emanate.

Africa Report: There are some obstacles remaining which threaten the success of the negotiations. First, do you think that South Africa is truly interested in granting independence to Namibia at this point in time?

de Moura: That is an important question that you have raised. We are asking ourselves whether South Africa is truly and finally interested in following the path of negotiation. From our side, one cannot doubt us because looking at our propositions, you can see how flexible we are. We are not overly optimistic concerning the South Africans, but we are waiting until their position is clearer in the upcoming meetings. But I must say that up to this point, we are not yet sure whether South Africa is really interested in exploiting the possibilities which have been presented by Angola. We think it is a unique opportunity and that South Africa must take advantage of it, if it is really interested in resolving the Namibian problem.

But our suspicions oblige us to bear in mind that the South African government may not yet be ready to apply resolution 435. It is always trying to kill time in order to weaken Swapo, to try to find other solutions—all to block the application of resolution 435 and to escape from its obligations concerning the Namibian people. But that will always remain difficult for the Pretoria regime. The more time passes, the more the aggression will continue.

The costs of South Africa's military adventures are also enormous, because now South African youth are forced to leave their country to carry out their government's policy of expansionism and aggression outside their territory. It is they who suffer the consequences. There are a lot of young South African boys who are handicapped or who have died in Angola or Namibia for an unjust cause. The South African youth, like in the period of Portuguese colonialism, must listen to their consciences and react. This policy offers nothing positive to

the white youth of South Africa, a policy that treats them like cannon fodder.

Africa Report: Do you think the South Africans have calculated that it is better for them to negotiate now under the Reagan administration because they are uncertain as to who the next president will be?

de Moura: There is also that element. Before I was speaking only of the realities inside South Africa and in the region. But there are also external factors. Maybe we should recall what happened in 1981. Each time that there is a change in governments in the U.S., the South Africans remain cautious until they see what will happen with their allies. South Africa may not be interested [in negotiating seriously] at the moment, because it is not clear yet who will occupy the White House and what his policy toward southern Africa and the Pretoria regime will be. Perhaps Pretoria is on standby until the situation becomes clear. But no matter what the policy of the new American government, it cannot be worse than the current one, from which we are indirectly suffering the consequences. It can't support the Pretoria regime more than it is now. Maybe there will be a change. We are waiting for it, we hope so and we desire it—a change in the positive sense—in favor of the countries of southern Africa, Angola, Namibia, and South Africa itself.

Africa Report: The issue of American support to Unita must present another obstacle to the negotiations.

de Moura: Yet again, we regret and we condemn this two-track policy that the Reagan administration is pursuing. At the same time that we have concrete proposals on the negotiating table toward a peaceful solution in southern Africa, through the mediation of the United States, we find it unacceptable that the administration is inviting or allowing those who are called the bandits, the leaders of terrorism of Angola, to visit the U.S. We have only one position—of condemnation of the presence of Savimbi in the United States. We ask the U.S., South Africa, and other countries, including those in Africa, to stop the support that they are giving to Savimbi and Unita in order to help us eliminate this scourge from which we are suffering in Angola. If they really want a peaceful solution, it is

not by sending an invitation to Savimbi that they will find it.

We have a policy of clemency to bring together all Angolans, even members of Unita, provided that it free itself from foreign influence, especially that of apartheid. We can pardon them, we can integrate them, like we have done with the FNLA, without criminal consequences to those who hand themselves over to our security. But we will not accept sitting down at the negotiating table with a puppet organization which threatens the interests of our people and which sacrifices innocent lives. Therefore, we cannot but regard the presence of Savimbi in the U.S. as a strengthening of the conservative forces, which can only make more difficult the process of negotiation in which we are involved through the mediation of the U.S. itself.

Africa Report: Dr. Crocker, the assistant secretary of state, has said that the issue of U.S. support to Savimbi is not open to discussion during the negotiations. But how can you separate that issue from the main question of Angolan security, especially given that your government has recently alleged that the U.S. is shifting its supply routes to Unita from southern Angola to the northern border with Zaire?

de Moura: First of all, it must be known that we will not engage in discussions at the negotiating table with Unita. There is no question of that. For us, Unita is a puppet organization which is defending foreign interests and we do not consider it a party to the negotiations. But we continue to insist to the U.S.—in its role as mediator—that it stop its interference in the internal affairs of Angola through the aid it gives to Unita. That's what we demand of everyone, including in particular Dr. Crocker. We have underlined that support to Unita from whatever quarter should stop.

At the moment we are speaking, some acts of destabilization have been recorded in the northern part of Angola, where there is a 2,600-kilometer border with a brother African country, Zaire. We have made our concerns known to the Zairian government, informing them that their territory is being used by the bandits, and that it is desirable in the spirit of good neighborliness, of respect for the accords which have been signed by Presidents Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Mobutu Sese Seko, that they take measures to prevent the territory of Zaire from being used by Unita to launch aggression against our population.

But the government of Zaire has ignored this. This is regrettable. We have information that there are bases in Zaire near our border, which according to journalists and news reports from the U.S., are being used by the U.S. to assist Savimbi and his puppet organization. We can confirm with certitude, by evidence given by prisoners who have made public declarations, by material captured by us, that the brother territory of Zaire is being used—with or without the complicity of the Zairian authorities. Therefore we advise Zaire, in the spirit of peaceful coexistence between the two countries, to bear in mind the consequences that may result from providing facilities to the bandits, which is not in the common interests of the people of Zaire and Angola.

Africa Report: There has been a lot of speculation that your government may be prepared to integrate Unita in a government of national unity, but without Savimbi.

de Moura: No. For us, Unita, with Savimbi or without, is a puppet organization, thus its policy is unacceptable. What we continue to affirm is the opportunity that we have given to all those who want to give themselves up from the ranks of Unita. We do not have any interest in forming a government with the puppets. That would mean sharing our power in Angola with the apartheid regime—which wouldn't be desirable for our people. We fought a long liberation struggle to win our independence as Africans, Angolans, non-aligned, and for the political option we chose, Marxism-Leninism. The possibility of forming such a government is non-existent.

Africa Report: Angola was a subject of discussion between Reagan and Gorbachev at the Moscow summit, at which the date of September 29 was fixed as a deadline for resolution of all outstanding issues.

de Moura: I am not up on the details which were discussed. Each time the U.S. and Soviet Union meet, they review certain regional conflicts which pose a threat to global peace. I don't know the details of their discussions on Angola. But concerning the date of September 29, that date was chosen because it is the tenth anniversary of UN resolution 435 and the idea to initiate the implementation of that resolution is a positive indication. The problem for us is as follows: Are the international institutions prepared to install the UNTAG force [in Namibia]? That is a problem which must concern the UN Security Council and the secretary-general. The secretary-general must be involved to see if the mechanisms can be put into place by that date. But there remain outstanding logistical and administrative problems. From my point of view, when it comes to the question of the liberation of a people, a question of peace, it doesn't matter if it is today or tomorrow, it is necessary to know under what conditions one can achieve such an aim. We must be conscious of our responsibilities in all these phases.

Africa Report: Has the Soviet Union changed its policies in southern Africa, as some have suggested, that it is no longer interested in supporting military solutions to the region's conflicts?

de Moura: No, I don't think so. The Soviet Union as a country has always been interested in the liberation of people and therefore it cannot change its policy vis-à-vis southern Africa where the questions are simple: the struggle for the independence of Namibia, and the struggle which southern Africa and particularly our people are leading against South African aggression and occupation of our territory. The Soviet Union is continuing to support us in our efforts to get South Africa to withdraw from Angola, so that peace can be reestablished. The Soviet Union is continuing its policy of support to our country.

Africa Report: Is your government optimistic that concrete results will come out of these negotiations?

de Moura: We are neither pessimistic nor optimistic. We have to analyze the facts. The concrete proposals on the table show you what our interest and our hopes are. What is the prognosis? That depends on the attitudes of the parties with whom we are discussing. Our objectives—Angola and Cuba—which we are prepared to pursue to the end, are peace and to sign an accord under the aegis of the UN secre-

tary-general or the Security Council to reestablish peace in Angola and contribute to the independence of Namibia. We hope that the U.S. and South Africa will be honest in these efforts, but it is up to them to prove it.

Up until now, what have we seen? The double face, on the one hand as mediator and on the other, as interested party. South Africa also says that it is interested in negotiating, but at the same time it is beginning to pose certain difficulties, by saying for example that the Angolan army is massing at the border with Namibia. But our troops are inside our own coun-

try! Never at any moment has the Angolan army crossed over our borders in the north or south.

Africa Report: South Africa has also complained that the Cuban troops are moving south toward the border with Namibia.

de Moura: Inside our borders, what we do is our right, within the norms of international law. Posing this pretext is a bad sign which complicates our discussions. It is not a question of us crossing over our border. We have no interest in doing so. We have no interest in bringing the war into Namibia or beyond. □

JONAS SAVIMBI

INTERVIEWED BY DAPHNE TOPOUZIS

Africa Report: Why is everyone ready to talk about peace in southern Africa at the moment? What are the specific factors that are conducive to the talks?

Savimbi: First of all, all those who had opted for a military solution now realize that the military solution is not a solution at all after 13 years of fighting. Secondly, the statements from the Soviet Union, whereby they accept the withdrawal of the Cubans and national reconciliation, have created the mood for everybody talking about peace.

Africa Report: What is Unita's relationship with South Africa?

Savimbi: I think that anything that we got from South Africa was out of necessity. Because when anyone is fighting a war, you have to get support where you can get it. It is not only Unita that has been getting support. The founding fathers here [in the United States] got support from the monarchies of France and Spain, and they did not approve at all of the systems which were there because they were fighting to have a more democratic system at that time.

Africa Report: How much military assistance are you receiving at the moment from South Africa?

Savimbi: I think the troops that the South Africans send to Angola, they do not send them for us, they send them for their own interests as the Cubans are there.

Africa Report: Are Unita troops trained by South Africa?

Savimbi: No. Our troops are trained by ourselves and by African instructors from independent African countries.

Africa Report: What does South Africa want from the current situation?

Savimbi: I do not know. I am not the one to explain what the South Africans want. What I can say is that all black nationalists—and I am one, because I have fought for 22 years for the independence of my country and for the dignity of the black man in Angola—all of us condemn apartheid.

Africa Report: You have said on numerous occasions that you oppose apartheid and yet in 1986 you were quoted by "60 Minutes" as saying that P.W. Botha is your friend. How do you explain that?

This interview was filmed for South Africa Now, a weekly television program on southern Africa.

Savimbi: I think that at that time he put forward his program of reforms, and all of us thought that we have to support the reformer because if he could bring about a democratic society, where whites and blacks would work together, I think he deserved the support of anyone.

Africa Report: Many people have called you an opportunist for your alternate support of Maoism, pro-Americanism, anti-Americanism, etc. What is your reply?

Savimbi: I think all those are labels that they put on freedom fighters. They called us Maoists because we went to Mao Tse-Tung to learn how to fight Portuguese colonialism, because we could not get that training elsewhere. But we were not Maoists because we went there as Angolans—to have skills to fight our enemy, which was Portuguese colonialism.

There had never been any anti-American feelings in our movement. I am the son of a minister and I was trained by American scholarship and the people who got me the scholarship are still there in California. I am a Protestant, trained by American missionaries, so there is no anti-American feeling in the past or now.

Africa Report: According to recently revealed documents, you had a formal agreement for military collaboration with Portuguese troops during the last three years of Portuguese rule in Angola.

Savimbi: Working with the Portuguese—Never! Fighting against the Portuguese, yes. I am the only one who was in the bush fighting the Portuguese while the other liberation movements were based in Lusaka, in Dar es Salaam, and in Brazzaville. But I was the only one fighting the Portuguese in the bush for eight years.

Africa Report: What is your relationship with Zaire and President Mobutu?

Savimbi: We do not have any special relationship with President Mobutu. All African countries are now calling for the end of civil war in Angola and for national reconciliation. President Mobutu has voiced that position, but also Nigeria, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Togo, Morocco, and so many other countries. We support that position because African countries now realize that this is the time to call for national reconciliation.

Africa Report: South Africa has often been compared with

Nazi Germany and many have problems with the fact that you are working with such a country.

Savimbi: I think you will remember that when the British were fighting the Second World War, the people in the Commons told Churchill, "Mr. Prime Minister, you are a Communist," if the Germans attack Stalin, and he said, "I am prepared to make a deal with the devil if I have to protect democracy."

Africa Report: Recently, the Reverend Jesse Jackson, Michael Dukakis, and a host of black leaders said that they will put an end to all aid to Unita. What are you going to do if that happens?

Savimbi: They all represent their communities, but in Angola we never had a chance to elect our leaders. But the accords we have signed with the Portuguese called for free and democratic elections. We never had that. I think that is the privilege of free people, free leaders, to decide what they have to do. But we want them to understand. In our country, we want a free system where the people will have that freedom of choosing their own leaders.

Africa Report: The United States has been supporting you actively for many years. What happens if American aid to Unita is suddenly severed?

Savimbi: I think that is the privilege of those who will be elected. What we are asking the American public is to give us a chance to also elect our own people who will also lead our people. And also we do not agree with the one-party system in our country. It is not only because we want opposition. We want the people to have the right to criticize the government. But it is also what we have agreed upon with the MPLA and the Portuguese—to have elections in Angola.

Africa Report: It is rumored that the Angolan government in Luanda would consider holding discussions which will include Unita, but not Savimbi. What are your comments on this?

Savimbi: They never said so. Up to now, we are asking the MPLA to state publicly that they want to negotiate with Unita. They never did so. So I think all that is speculation. What we want is them to accept negotiating with Unita, so that we go back to the Alvor agreement and have elections. And then, the people will have a choice—to choose those who will be in the government.

Africa Report: What happens if the Angolan government agrees to hold discussions with Unita but refuses to include you in the talks?

Savimbi: If they accept negotiating with Unita, that is what we want. We want them to negotiate with Unita. I am the president of Unita.

Africa Report: Would you be prepared to step down if need be?

Savimbi: [Only] if they, as Unita, ask me to and said they want another leader. But not if the MPLA wants it.

Africa Report: What is the purpose of your visit to the U.S.?

Savimbi: First of all, I came here because I was invited by a bipartisan group of Democrats and Republicans. And I came to them, to thank the American public for the support I got. Secondly, this is really a time when there is a favorable mood for negotiations, and the Americans are playing the role of mediator. I also want the American public to know my posi-

tion—that I support the talks for peace and settlement in Angola and in southern Africa.

Africa Report: Michael Dukakis and Jesse Jackson have called South Africa a terrorist state. Do you agree or disagree with them?

Savimbi: I think he [Dukakis] represents the people. When he will be elected and will be the president in the White House, he will represent the will of the American people. So, I am not one to tell him what he is to do. He will be accountable to the American people, to decide what the policy of the U.S. will be.

Africa Report: What are you hoping will come out of the current talks?

Savimbi: We want them to pursue the talks. As I mentioned before, now there is a potential for a peaceful solution to the problem which has been dragging on for 15 years. We are really optimistic that something positive will come out, which means the withdrawal of the Cubans, the independence of Namibia, national reconciliation in Angola. We are very hopeful that they will make progress.

Africa Report: You say you support Swapo and yet most reports point to the contrary.

Savimbi: Who has given the contrary reports? Swapo? I am saying that we were the first in 1966 to train the first group of Swapo guerrillas. The base they are using today in my country, it was me who gave it to them. We have been working together for years. I do not blame them to remain with Luanda. But I am sorry to say that they are paying such a high price: that they have to fight Luanda's war in Angola instead of pursuing their own armed struggle to get their independence. I support Swapo and their freedom fighters.

Africa Report: Unicef has reported that Unita has been planting landmines in fields and roads and that Angola has the highest per capita amputation rate in the world—the majority being women and children. What do you have to say to this?

Savimbi: We want to invite Unicef to come to Jamba and find out how many people have stepped on the mines planted by the MPLA. Again, we want the people to understand the nature of a guerrilla war. You cannot plant mines in an area where you want to have the support of the local people.

The MPLA are the people who are abducting people from their natural habitat to bring them to towns. Those people do not have anything to live on. No food, no conditions, so they are tempted to go back to their own natural areas. It is why the MPLA has to stop them by planting mines. We invite anyone to come to Jamba and to also look at the people who have been crippled because of MPLA mines.

Africa Report: So, are you denying that Unita has ever targeted civilian populations?

Savimbi: It cannot be a policy of an effective guerrilla movement because if it is, they alienate the people. We sent a journalist who travelled through eight provinces when he was there, without being troubled at all by the Cubans or by the MPLA because he was protected all along by the local population.

Africa Report: There are reports that Unita has killed ANC members in refugee camps.


Savimbi: We have not [killed any]. Even the ones we have, we are ready to hand them over. □



Shouldering the Refugee Burden

The Malawi government—the friendliest in the region to the Renamo rebels—has ironically found itself saddled with the largest influx of Mozambicans. Fleeing rebel atrocities, the refugees are straining the nation's logistical capacity and putting pressure on already tight economic resources.

BY COLLEEN LOWE MORNA



Captured Re-namo arms and POWs: "More than 100,000 Mozambicans arrived after charges that Renamo was operating from Malawian bases"

On the evening of May 14, Maria Chale, her husband, and one-year-old daughter went to bed as usual in the makeshift shelter they had erected when they first arrived in the central Mozambican town of Sena, fleeing rebel control.

Suddenly, gunshots peeled through the still air and a grenade was thrown, as the same South African-backed Renamo forces made a determined bid to recapture Sena which has been at the center of a major tug-of-war between rebels and government forces over the last year.

Screaming, Chale grabbed hold of her daughter and rushed into the surrounding bush, losing sight of her husband. "I followed a group of people who seemed to know where they were going," the young woman recalled in a recent interview. For three days, Chale, together with some 392 villagers, plied their way through tall grass and over hills, finally arriving exhausted at the southernmost town of Nsanje in neighboring Malawi.

A deceptive calm envelopes the reception point as relief workers systematically screen newcomers for any diseases they may be carrying, register them, and ensure that they are served a meal of corn and beans. Inside, there is still pain and fear. Asked if she thinks she will see her husband again, Chale turns her head away. Tears well in her tired eyes.

From the reception point, the new arrivals are taken to yellow tarpaulin transit camps and then on to the Mankhokwe refugee camp which, with 200,000 people, bears the distinction of accommodating more people than the adjacent town. All told, there are half a million refugees in Malawi—about half the total number of Mozambican refugees in all of southern Africa—in a country which ironically has been the friendliest of all to the right-wing Mozambican National Resistance Movement, known by its Portuguese acronym Renamo.

In absolute numbers, Malawi now shoulders the third most serious refugee crisis in Africa, after Sudan and Somalia. Moreover, with a local population of 7 million people, the tiny central African country now has one of the highest

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ratios of refugees to nationals in the world. The influx, says U.S. State Department refugee expert Robert Gerstony in his report on Mozambican refugees in the six southern African countries where they are found, would be equivalent to 17 million refugees pouring into the U.S.

Worse still, with prospects for peace in Mozambique still dim and over one-third of its 14 million people facing starvation, ever-increasing numbers are still finding their way into Malawi from the three provinces of Tete, Zambezia, and Niassa which form a 960-mile ring around the southern "spur" of Malawi. With an average of 20,000 new arrivals per month this year, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) expects to handle 750,000 refugees next year. And that could be a conservative

estimate.

For those in the field, there are two primary concerns: first, just how many more refugees Malawi can absorb without beginning to cause economic and political problems, and second, how the refugees are to be kept occupied, given the critical shortage of resources, especially land, in Malawi. The dilemma, says one Malawian relief worker, "is that we can't take another half a million people, but we can't stop them from coming either."

It is almost a joke in relief circles now that when the first refugees arrived, it was felt that Malawi could not possibly handle more than 100,000 newcomers. They had come shortly after the leaders of Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe visited Malawi's pro-South African Life President Kamuzu Banda on Septem-

"There are a half million refugees in Malawi in a country which ironically has been the friendliest of all to the right-wing Renamo."

"Mozambican villagers plied their way through tall grass and over hills, finally arriving exhausted at the southernmost town of Nsanje, Malawi"



Mozambique Information Agency

ber 11, 1986, charging that Renamo was operating from Malawian bases.

Banda denied the charge. However, confronted with threats of sanctions by Zimbabwe and Zambia through which Malawian goods now have to pass to get to far-off South African ports—as Renamo has rendered Malawi's natural outlets through Mozambique inoperative—Banda promised to look into the issue. Soon after, huge Renamo contingents apparently being flushed out of Malawi overran large parts of Zambezia, leading to the first influx of refugees.

The second surge occurred in February 1987 when combined Zimbabwean, Tanzanian, and Mozambican troops, fired by the death of Mozambican President Samora Machel in a plane crash on South African soil, went on a major offensive in northern Mozambique with the aim of clearing rebels out of the area.

At least on paper, relations between Malawi and Mozambique have improved dramatically. Mozambique has upgraded its representation in Lilongwe from chargé d'affaires to full ambassador and the embassy now has a military attaché. Malawi has committed 600 troops to help guard the rail route to the Mozambican port of Nacala and has apparently taken some heavy casualties. Both sides sit on a security and defense commission which meets regularly.

Yet last November, two top Renamo officials, Joao da Silva Ataide and Mateus Lopes, were killed in a car accident in Malawi, after they had reportedly returned from Mozambique for a meeting with Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama. And at a press conference in Maputo in March, Paulo Oliveira, a Renamo defector and previously one of the group's main spokesmen, said the rebels had "no great problems" in passing through Malawi, despite the change in political winds.

Western diplomats deny that Renamo has bases in Malawi, but do not rule out "some political movement back and forth." Although Renamo originally threatened to retaliate against Malawi for making peace with Mozambique, there have been relatively few incidents in Malawi compared to Zambia and Zimbabwe, possibly underlining an unofficial understanding.

This, however, has not reduced the



Francisco Pelucci/Silva/Unicef

poured into the southwestern Dedza district of Malawi between May 9 and 16, fleeing fighting in a concerted campaign by Frelimo to retake the agriculturally rich Angonia district of Tete province.

Such attacks appear to account for the largest number of refugees over the last few months. The point was graphically illustrated in Nsanje when, as a photographer got ready to click his camera, a child—fearing the instrument was a gun—ducked to the ground. A plain-clothes security official was heard to comment that he couldn't have done better himself.

In other cases, the causes are more long-term. While the provinces neighboring Malawi are generally agriculturally rich, the fact that many have not been able to grow crops for the last three seasons is creating its own steady flow of asylum-seekers. "The reasons now cover a broad spectrum, including hunger, harassment, or a combination of both," says Sam Mwanza, assistant district commissioner in Nsanje.

Initially, as Malawi was not a signatory to the UN convention on refugees, the Malawi Red Cross, the ministry of health, and the action wing of Malawi's churches called the Christian Services Committee (CSC), shouldered all relief work. Because the rather artificial boundary between Malawi and Mozambique separates the Sena, Ngoni, and Lomwe peoples, some refugees went to stay with relatives and certainly no one was turned away.

But as the numbers spiralled, UNHCR was invited in to assist and hasty negotiations took place, leading to the signing of the convention in November 1987 and to the opening of a full UNHCR office in February this year. The UN agency now serves as chief coordinator of the relief effort and has budgeted \$20 million for its activities in Malawi for this year alone. This is augmented by approximately \$10 million supplied by NGOs, including the CSC, the Malawi Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières, the International Rescue Committee, and Save the Children (Malawi).

Despite the severe logistical constraints, the immediate crisis appears to be fairly well under control. As World Food Programme project officer

"With prospects for peace in Mozambique still dim and over one-third of its 14 million people facing starvation, ever-increasing numbers are finding their way into Malawi"

"Because Banda has predicated his semi-feudal presidency on the right of every Malawian to shelter, clothes, and food, any deterioration in the economy could have political repercussions."

number of refugees. There is one area along the Malawi border with Mozambique—opposite the majestic Mount Mlanje—where Renamo has been in continuous control since 1985. Elsewhere, as one Western diplomat put it, "Frelimo controls district capitals and other areas which they want to control," while Renamo wanders in between.

In these sway areas—like Sena—each fresh attack leads to a new influx of refugees. Moreover, there is evidence that buoyed by the Zimbabwe army and with its morale boosted by the recent unprecedented condemnation of Renamo, Frelimo is determined to try and consolidate its gains in the north. For example, an estimated 50,000 refugees

Thomas Ruegg explains, because of the closure of Malawi's rail links with both Nacala and Beira, food has to be trucked to Malawi largely from the South African port of Durban, nearly 2,400 miles away.

Some 60 percent of the relief supplies are trucked through Zimbabwe and the "Tête" corridor in Mozambique, which is guarded by Zimbabwean troops, partly paid for by Malawi. The other 40 percent goes via a much longer route through Zambia. "As long as Zimbabwe keeps the Tête route open, we will get all the food in on time in 1989," Ruegg said. "Should the Zimbabwe convoys cease," he added, "we'll be in bad shape."

Ruegg, like several other donor representatives interviewed in Malawi, believes that as long as donor support is maintained, the presence of the refugees will not affect Malawi or lead to fresh arrivals being turned away. In practice, however—especially at the current rate of inflow—the matter may not be quite that simple. For example, although most experts attribute the fact that Malawi itself had to import food for the first time in two decades last year to bad weather and poor pricing policies, many Malawians feel it is not a coincidence that last year also witnessed the largest influx of refugees.

A resident in Blantyre, the commercial hub of Malawi, points out that because of the huge influx of refugees into Dedza, he was not able to cultivate a piece of land he owns there. Many peasant farmers, he notes, ran short of corn at the end of the year because they had shared their supplies with relatives from Mozambique. The Blantyre resident compares the refugees to the camel which asked if it could put its head in a man's tent and ended up taking over the whole tent. "After the man was driven out of the tent, that was all," he said. "But we are even being driven out of our yards."

For the time being, the government has frozen all sales of maize to relief agencies in an effort to build up national stocks. Although this year's harvest looks promising, the buffer stock is so depleted that the country faces a shortfall of 200,000 tons of maize. Some 160,000 tons will come in the form of

food aid, while the rest will have to be purchased, adding to the severe constraints on foreign exchange—already stretched because of Malawi's high transport costs.

There is also some grumbling among businessmen who have to compete with food aid for trucking services. They say the trucking companies prefer to transport food aid—before Malawi's imports—because they get paid promptly, well, and in foreign currency by donor agencies. Some of the economic costs of having large numbers of refugees are less obvious, but pose a burden nonetheless. These include a heavier administrative burden, the need to beef up law enforcement agencies, and strains on services like roads and hospitals.

Because Banda has predicated his semi-feudal presidency on the right of every Malawian to shelter, clothes, and food—if little else—any further deterioration in the economy could have political repercussions. Though relatively weak and disparate, Malawi's opponents-in-exile are watching events closely. They blame Banda for bringing the current transport and refugee crisis upon himself by being disposed to South Africa and Renamo in the first place. They are waiting anxiously to exploit any cracks in the Banda mystique. Whether anything will happen during what is left of Banda's lifetime (he is believed to be over 90) is open to question. But matters such as "famine" have become extremely politically sensitive in Lilongwe.

Meanwhile, in the refugee camps, relief workers are grappling with the problem of how to occupy the teams of refugees, some of whom have now been in the country for close to two years. "We need a more durable solution than just feeding these people," says Christian Services Committee head Dennis Mpashou, who has worked with the refugees since they first started flooding into the country.

For the most part, of course, the refugees are farmers. Their desperate desire to be even in small measure self-sufficient is graphically—if tragically—illustrated by the case of a refugee from Dedza who used to sneak across the border during the daytime to cultivate his field, until the day Renamo caught

him and chopped off his hands.

Because the war in Mozambique is so widespread, other refugees are even more highly qualified. Take, for example, Mario Nchimeka, who used to work as a government clerk in the town of Chemba, Zambezia province, until the February 1987 offensive. "The war is no chooser of persons," he explained. "We all got caught in the crossfire."

Once one of the "better-off" in Mozambique, Nchimeka now lives in a mud hut two miles away from his neighbor in a camp in Nsanje, with no worldly possessions other than the clothes he wears, a cup, and a plate. Sometimes, he does voluntary work for the Red Cross. Often, he dreams of his typewriter. "I wish I could work," he says simply.

Because of the land pressure in Malawi, no Mozambicans have been allowed to farm, work, or sell handicrafts, as they may flood the local market. Over the past few months, UNHCR and the Malawi government have been hammering out a six-volume plan on how to provide employment for the refugees, without prejudicing Malawi and raising the standards of the local population at the same time.

Among the proposals are large capital investment projects such as land reclamation and irrigation to squeeze as much as possible out of existing resources. The study also makes recommendations for rapid reforestation projects, in view of the alarming rate at which trees are being felled in the camp areas.

At a World Council of Churches conference in Harare to review refugee programs in Mozambique's neighboring countries, further suggestions were made. These include helping to create external markets for crafts made by Mozambican refugees and purchase of land held by absentee landlords in Malawi for use by refugees.

One Malawian made the novel suggestion that the UN should hive off a chunk of Mozambique, resettle refugees in the area, and protect it until the war is over. It does not make sense, he reasoned, for refugees to crowd into one of Africa's most densely populated countries while large tracts of rich farmland waste away in Mozambique. □

The Military Mix

BY KARL MAIER



MOZAMBIQUE



The late President Machel inspecting captured Renamo equipment:
"Instructions in tactical warfare and shooting have served the army well in the thick brush lands where it battles Renamo"

Western governments have been providing military training and non-lethal aid to the Frelimo army, while other nations have committed troops in support of Mozambique's efforts to combat the Renamo rebels. However, administrative and logistical assistance remains the Mozambican military's most pressing need.

Mozambique Information Agency

Ten young Mozambican soldiers gathered around a giant iron pot and waited hungrily for the cook to begin spooning out helpings of boiled beans and slices of sardines. Fresh water supplies had just arrived by train and the troops were savoring their first real meal in a week.

"We never know when the food is coming, and the well water is making us sick," said Pvt. Florencio Eduardo Daniel. "At the British training camp we ate well, dressed well, and slept well. Once we came back to Mozambique, everything changed."

Pvt. Daniel, 18, and 103 Mozambican soldiers encamped around this abandoned railroad station about 50 miles north of the capital, Maputo, are some of the best-trained troops in the army. Having graduated in December from a 12-week course run by British military advisers, the instructions in tactical warfare, river crossings, and shooting have served them well in these thick brush lands as they battle rebels of the South African-backed Mozambique National Resistance Movement (Renamo).

But they seem ill-prepared for the logistical nightmare of the war in Mozambique, where shortages of food and supplies are a constant drain on army morale.

As the first full company to be trained by the British at the Nyanga camp in Zimbabwe, these young men have become a symbol of growing British and Western military aid to President Joaquim Chissano's largely Soviet-supplied Frelimo army. A second company took up positions 15 miles south of Ungubana on June 12, and two more British-trained companies are expected by next March, to form a full battalion by the time the current program runs out.

Spirits at Ungubana are relatively high despite the failure of the Mozambican army's logistical system to provide the troops with adequate food and supplies. Just four of the first company's troops went AWOL this year, and all have since returned to camp. Despite regular clashes with the rebels, the company has taken no casualties. The arrival of the British-trained "Green

Berets," the soldiers boast, has scared off the rebel bands in the immediate area.

However, the sporadic supply shipments raise a big question mark over the effectiveness of Britain's current military aid package for Mozambique. Though the Mozambican armed forces can use help on many fronts, including training, improving the government's ability to manage the 30,000-strong army has become President Chissano's biggest challenge and was a major reason he launched the biggest-ever reorganization of the army high command last June.


When asked during an interview last year what was the Mozambican army's most pressing problem, "logistics" was the president's instant reply. Current Western aid efforts, however, do not address that problem squarely, though Portugal is reportedly set to begin logistical training.

To date, Western military aid has focused on training and providing non-lethal equipment, such as radios, boots, and uniforms. The British program, though the biggest of any Western country, is still very modest, costing an estimated \$8 million this year. It will take years to have any real impact on the war, given the small number of soldiers—about 350—British instructors train each year. And because the course takes place outside the country, the trainers are out of touch with local fighting conditions.

British advisers involved in the effort are under no illusion that the training program will break the deadlock in the war. "You cannot be serious unless you are training in-country," said one Western military analyst. "The program was designed by politicians and its importance is largely political."

Nevertheless, the Chissano government hopes such Western assistance will help to curtail South African pressure on Mozambique and gradually improve the quality of its soldiers. Already Western governments are providing over \$200 million in emergency aid to feed millions of war refugees and to revive the collapsed, yet potentially robust economy. Britain, on the other hand, has used the Mozambican military program to deflect criticism—particu-

Karl Maier is southern Africa correspondent for The Independent of London and contributes regularly to The Christian Science Monitor.



"Improving the government's ability to manage the 30,000-strong army has become President Chissano's biggest challenge"



Displaced persons camp at Benga: "Already Western governments are providing \$200 million in emergency aid to feed millions of war refugees"

larly strong among Commonwealth states—of Margaret Thatcher's anti-sanctions policy toward South Africa.

The companies trained at Nyanga are one of a mushrooming number of special Mozambican forces set up with Western training and assistance. Most of the Frelimo soldiers receiving such aid, like the British-trained units, are guarding projects of interest to the particular sponsor. The troops at Ungubana are protecting a British-funded effort to rebuild the great southern railroad that parallels the Limpopo River on its 335-mile route from Zimbabwe to Maputo port.

They were also playing a backup role in the Frelimo offensive launched on May 18 against rebel bases in Maputo

province. Mounting dusk-to-dawn ambushes and regular patrols up to 10 miles out, 30-man platoons pick off Renamo bands fleeing government sweeps in the east and south and lightning strikes by Zimbabwean troops to the north in Gaza province.

Other elite forces include "the Tigers," who are protecting the European Community's biggest agricultural scheme near Maputo. Italian construction firms have long been feeding government troops near the dam projects in the south. The widespread lack of security has also attracted profit-making private security firms, such as the British company, Defense Systems Ltd. (DSL), which has trained about 400 Frelimo soldiers guarding the Nacala rail-

bolster the defense of important transport routes and economic centers. Zimbabwe has by far the deepest commitment in Mozambique, with at least 10,000 troops at an estimated cost of \$500,000 per month.

After protecting the rehabilitation of the Beira Corridor rail line, road, and oil pipeline linking Zimbabwe to the Indian Ocean, the Zimbabwean National Army is now concentrating on checking rebel attacks on the Limpopo railroad. That transport route could help Zimbabwe to divert much of its foreign trade from the South African ports on which it now depends. In mid-March, Zimbabwean troops swept down upon three rebel bases in Gaza province and according to Mozambican sources, killed one of Renamo's top southern commanders, Gen. Gomes. Zimbabwean army operations were continuing into late June.

Some 500 Malawian troops are patrolling the far-western portion of the Nacala railroad, which is Malawi's shortest route to the sea. The war in Mozambique has cut the line and Malawi is forced to spend huge amounts of foreign exchange earnings—some estimates put the figure as high as 40 percent per year—shipping exports by road with military escort through Mozambique's Tete province, across Zimbabwe and on to South Africa.

The estimated 3,000 Tanzanians have begun withdrawing from Zambezia province where they assisted Frelimo's successful offensive last year. Military sources said the Tanzanians plan to establish positions close to their border in the province of Cabo Delgado, the sole Mozambican province still largely free of the conflict.

Some Western diplomats boast that their military aid carries an additional bonus of reducing the Soviet Union's role in Mozambique. But there is little evidence to support that view. Ironically, while Western military analysts and some Mozambican officials deride Moscow's failure since Mozambique's independence in 1975 to mold the government army into an efficient fighting force, the Soviet Union remains by far the military's biggest benefactor, providing nearly all of the army's planes, helicopters, arms, and ammunition.

And of all the special forces trained by

Mozambique's allies, only the Soviet-trained "Red Beret" commandos have made a major difference in the war. As they did last year, the "Red Berets" are spearheading a new and thus far largely successful offensive against Renamo in the rich northern province of Zambezia.


On June 2, they captured the district capital of Milange, on the border with Malawi, which the rebels had held since September 1986. Now government forces are driving against the Western town of Gile, the last district capital in Zambezia held by the guerrillas. The ultimate target is Renamo's strategic mountain "Nantutu" base near Namarrroi in the center of the province which has put the rebels in striking range of key cities.

Although the government has scored recent gains against a 20,000-strong Renamo army badly short of food in certain areas and discredited by detailed refugee accounts of horrific atrocities, few Mozambican officials any longer believe in a purely military solution to the conflict. The government army is simply too small and the country too large.

Thus, in tandem with attempting to put military pressure on Renamo, President Chissano declared an amnesty last December and has stepped up contacts with the Botha government in Pretoria in an effort to reduce South African assistance to the rebels. Western diplomats and Zimbabwean intelligence sources say they have strong evidence that the South African Defense Force continues to furnish the rebels with logistical support and limited supplies.

Despite the widespread publicity, the West's current policy of providing small packages of non-lethal equipment and military training has had little impact on the Mozambican army. And in the long term, the creation of various special forces protecting Western-financed development projects poses dangers for the armed forces. It could make coordination of operations and logistics even more difficult for the overstretched military high command.

It is precisely in the area of administration and army management that Frelimo's needs are most pressing and the West's potential contribution to helping professionalize Mozambique's embattled army the greatest. □



road in the north. DSL was widely expected to land the lucrative contract to organize the defense of the giant Cahora Bassa hydro-electric complex in Tete province with funds from Portugal, Mozambique, and South Africa.

Spain's "Guardia Civil", a rural police force, has begun to train small numbers of Mozambican militia. Even the Americans are expected to begin sending Mozambican officers to school in the United States after the November presidential election.

Added to the myriad of special Mozambican forces are sizable military contingents stationed in the country by three of Mozambique's neighbors—Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Tanzania—to



A Better Life for the Bushmen?

BY ANDREW MELDRUM



"Modern life has changed the way these people live, yet it has not provided a social safety net to assure they find a sustainable place in society"

The Botswana government is faced with the dilemma of how to provide better social services and development options to the Basarwa of the Kalahari, while not threatening their way of life, traditions, and cultural values.

Even at high noon in the Kalahari desert, the dim winter sun brings very little heat. The bitter, piercing wind drives dusty sand at any standing animal, plant, or person.

The cold and grit are ever-present in the Kalahari's winter months—June and July—and the greatest southern African desert, which makes up 80 percent of Botswana, seems a harsh, inhospitable place.

"I have lived here for many seasons," said Manta, an elder of the 145 Basarwa people living in the Khutse settlement. His wizened face and white hair testify to years of hard-earned survival, yet he is estimated to be less than 50 years old. "We cannot get much meat because the hunting is not good. Some people do hunting but I am too old," said Manta, speaking through an interpreter. "The government gives us mealie-meal [cornmeal] to eat."

Nearby, young children, ranging from three to six years, play with bits of bramble in the sand. They are scantily clad, apparently oblivious to the cold, but they have runny noses and hacking coughs. Although the Botswana government has provided a deep well at Khutse for water and food rations, the Basarwa people—popularly known as Bushmen—spend much time each day gathering firewood, both for warmth and for cooking. They also grow hardy Tsama melons, forage for other edible vegetation, and track small antelope to supplement their diet.

In the winter months, the night-time temperature plummets to 20 degrees below freezing. Yet, the Basarwa simply huddle behind stick-made windbreaks, more like fences, with their blankets and fires to keep them warm. Already, the concentration of the 145 people over a two-mile radius has created a shortage of firewood. The Khutse people must hike further and further each day for wood and the competition has resulted in social tensions.

When told that the Botswana government may move a few hundred more Basarwa people to the Khutse area, Manta suggests that it should also pro-

vide a car to help people collect wood.

The way Manta and his neighbors eke out an existence is indicative of the way the Basarwa people are living throughout Botswana and other parts of southern Africa. They are neither the fully self-sufficient, nomadic hunter-gatherers that their ancestors were, nor are they integrated into the mainstream of Botswana life.

As everywhere else in the world, modern life has changed the way these people live, yet it has not provided a social safety net to assure they find a sustainable place in society. The Botswana government is faced with the difficult task of helping the Basarwa so that they have a less precarious existence, yet can retain a sense of cultural identity and viability. The dismal plight of many other semi-nomadic, indigenous people—Australia's aborigines, the U.S.' native Americans, Nicaragua's miskitos, Zaire's pygmies—shows that the path is fraught with pitfalls.

For more than 10,000 years, the Basarwa—also known as the San people as well as the Bushmen—have hunted in the Kalahari. Their populations stretched south to what is now Cape Town and up into Angola, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

The small, golden-skinned people ingeniously devised a method of extracting poison from the larvae of a beetle and putting it at the tips of their arrows and spears. Not only must they stab an animal with the poison, they must then track it, sometimes for days, until the substance affects the unfortunate animal's nervous system and it becomes paralyzed. Basarwa women have developed a vast knowledge of scores of edible roots and mushrooms which they dig up with sticks.

As one of the world's last remaining hunting-gathering cultures, the Basarwa have been studied by social scientists for decades. Their gentle, yet enterprising ways and unmaterialistic values have made them the subjects of academics worldwide. "The Gods Must Be Crazy," a South African-made comedy film that was hugely popular internationally, painted a poignantly romantic view of the Basarwa people, without showing how their way of life is seriously threatened.

Andrew Meldrum, an American journalist who has been based in Zimbabwe for seven years, reports on southern Africa for The Guardian of London and the Voice of America.

In Namibia, the Basarwa are used by the South African army as "Bushmen trackers," so their skilled hunting techniques can locate anti-apartheid guerrillas of the South West Africa People's Organization (Swapo).

Only a few thousand of Botswana's 41,000 Basarwa still rely totally on hunting and foraging. But anthropologists say the majority, whether cattle-herders or farmers, still value their ability to occasionally hunt and find desert delicacies as the essence of their identity. The encroachment of civilization, particularly cattle ranching, has drastically reduced the area where the diminutive (an adult male is often just over five feet) and nimble Basarwa can roam.

Anthropologists and sociologists who study the Basarwa credit President Quett Masire's government with the best of intentions, but warn that it is about to make a serious mistake which will cut the Basarwa off from their hunting and gathering traditions and will only minimally improve their way of life, if at all.

The Botswana government is about to embark on a relocation program that will remove the last 1,200 Basarwa remaining in the central Kalahari game reserve and will prevent all Basarwa from hunting in that preserve, the heart of their ancestral homeland.

"Why shouldn't the Basarwa develop from the situation where they have to chase animals for their basic human comforts?" asked Botswana's Vice President, Peter Mmusi, in an interview. "We are not going to keep the Basarwa as we keep wildebeest and hartebeest [Kalahari antelope]. The wildebeest has depended on grazing and living on what nature provides. But the Basarwa must ultimately depend upon the development of Botswana. We must provide them with other services than those they are getting at the present moment."

That sounds reasonable, but so far, the vast majority of Basarwa who have left the wilderness preserves of the Kalahari have not fared well. A recent Norwegian study shows that the Basarwa who work on cattle ranches or who live on government settlements outside the game reserves are worse off than their "backward" brothers who have contin-

ued hunting in the game reserves. Those outside the reserve have higher rates of malnutrition, alcoholism, unemployment, and poverty, as well as a tangible apathy stemming from a loss of identity, reports the study.


"There is no question that the Basarwa on the game reserves are better off than those in the settlements," said Robert Hitchcock, an assistant professor of anthropology at the University of Nebraska who is serving as an adviser to the Botswana government on the Basarwa and other groups living in remote areas. "The depressing situation [at the settlements] is not much different from the alcoholism and demoralization you see at some native American reservations in the U.S."

Hitchcock has been studying the Basarwa in Botswana on and off since 1975 and ironically helped to develop the

scheme of settlements where many Basarwa now live in conditions criticized by the Norwegian report. He is disappointed that they have not benefitted from the settlements, where water

"The Basarwa are neither the fully self-sufficient, nomadic hunter-gatherers that their ancestors were, nor are they integrated into the mainstream of Botswana life."

"The way Manta and his neighbors eke out an existence is indicative of the way the Basarwa people are living throughout Botswana and southern Africa"



wells and sometimes schools and health posts have been established.

"If you talk to people, you find that they definitely do want modernization, education, transportation, and all that," said Hitchcock. "But they also want to be able to hunt, not full-time, but to be able to be part-time hunter-gatherers." He said the Botswana government is trying to facilitate that transition process and describes a Norwegian aid project to improve the services at settlements which would foster handicrafts, bee-keeping, woodworking, and game harvesting.

"The Botswana government has one of the best records in the world regarding the treatment of indigenous people," said Hitchcock. "But the bottom line is that this is a critical point and the future of the Basarwa is uncertain."

As Botswana is the size of Texas with a population of just 1.2 million, it seems there should be enough land around for everyone. But the Kalahari desert cannot easily support population concentrations. Hitchcock estimates that a group of 30 Basarwa hunter-gatherers needs about 200 square kilometers.

All evidence seems to suggest that the Basarwa should be allowed more access to game reserves, not less. In fact, the central Kalahari game reserve, covering more than 50,000 square kilometers, was created in 1961 specifically to preserve a large portion of the desert for the Basarwa people. Originally, it was to be named the Kalahari Bushman Reserve, but the name was changed because "Bushman" was seen by many as a pejorative term and would have had the effect of putting the Basarwa on the level of animal wildlife.

Botswana government officials have stated the Basarwa are being moved off the central Kalahari game reserve to protect the park's wildlife. That reasoning for the movement of the Basarwa seems especially weak because a government investigation shows that the Basarwa's hunting, limited as it is to bows and arrows and being on foot, does not adversely affect game populations at all.

A government-appointed commission reported that the Basarwa should be permitted to have access to certain areas of the park. But the government

rejected that proposal, saying that the Basarwa can instead hunt in other open areas of Botswana, called wildlife management areas. Anthropologists point out that those areas have very little wild game or unspoiled natural landscape because that land supports large commercial herds of cattle.

And that is where the central conflict affecting the Basarwa people appears to be: land for cattle or land for Basarwa. Commercial cattle ranching is at net center of Botswana's economy and society. Diamonds produce 10 times more earnings than the \$60 million Botswana earns annually from beef exports, but cattle ranching becomes much more im-

portant when it is taken into account that many more people are employed by the cattle business than diamond mining. Botswana has one of the world's highest national ratios of cattle to people at two to one, and that is after the national herd was reduced from 3 to 2 million because of seven consecutive years of drought.

Traditionally, the Basarwa people regard cattle as the purest form of wealth and owning a large herd of cattle brings social status. Cattle ownership is also seen as the key to political power in Botswana. Virtually all of the top members of government are owners of large cattle herds. The cattle business has an

Keeping the Giant At Bay

The plight of the Basarwa is receiving a great deal of publicity, both inside and outside Botswana, because the country has a healthy, multi-party democracy and a tradition of freedom of speech and expression.

"If there is hope that appropriate programs can be implemented for the Basarwa, it is because some of us here in Botswana can raise our voices in protest, both locally and to the international community," said Soblen Mayane, sociologist and executive secretary of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP).

Botswana's democratic traditions encourage lively debate on the Basarwa and other issues which is rare in many other African countries. Thirty-eight of sub-Saharan Africa's 45 countries currently have military rule or one-party states with varying degrees of democratic expression, so Botswana's multi-party democracy stands out, particularly in the midst of southern Africa's current turmoil. An international conference sponsored by the American "Project Democracy" is to be held in Botswana in August to consider the reasons for the country's democratic success. Batswana are proud of their system of government and resent suggestions that they inherited it from British colonial rule.

"We have not learned democracy from Britain or the United States or anywhere else overseas," said Botswana's Vice President Peter Mmusi. "It is part of our tradition to value freedom of expression. Our forefathers developed a system of democracy which has evolved to our current system."

Traditionally, when any issue faced a Botswana village, the chief would call a meeting in the "kgotla"—a square in every village which is set aside for community discussions. At the kgotla, all villagers would air their views and after long debates, a consensus would be reached. Botswana's 1.2 million population remains nearly 80 percent rural and the kgotlas still feature prominently in village life.

"Members of Parliament know that they must go around to all the kgotlas in their constituency to explain what is going on in government," said a Western diplomat in Gaborone. "Those that do not go to their kgotlas generally do not get re-elected."

The kgotlas have an urban counterpart in the colorful "freedom squares," which can be seen—and especially heard—on the street corners of Gaborone and other cities, on most Saturdays. The freedom squares are spots where politicians—of the ruling BDP or the four other parties—can set up a loudspeaker to talk about the various issues of the

elitist character, as 50 percent of the country's cattle is owned by 5 percent of the cattle owners.

Although government officials say the Basarwa should be moved off the Kalahari Game Reserve to protect wildlife, it is actually commercial cattle ranching that is adversely affecting the reserve's game, according to experts. Cattle fences through the reserve have snared and caused the deaths of thousands of antelope which have been following their traditional migration routes. Overgrazing is seen as the country's main environmental problem.

A government report on the future of the Kalahari Game Reserve stated that

"the integrity of the [reserve] as a haven for wild animals and the [Basarwa] lifestyle has become increasingly precarious over the years. This is due mainly to the relentless pressure from cattle owners for more land."

Almost none of the Basarwa people own herds of cattle of 100 or more. But the Basarwa people are vital to Botswana's cattle industry as herders. For more than a hundred years, the Basarwa have herded cattle for the majority Batswana people, and that employment has contributed to their problems as they have acquired a "serf-like status" among cattle owners, according to social scientists.

day and to promote their party's policy. People gather and applaud or heckle the speaker, in a kind of African version of "Speakers' Corner" in London's Hyde Park.

But there are fears that the constant pressure that Botswana faces from its neighboring giant, South Africa, will force the country to curtail its civil liberties and eventually, its democracy. In the past two years, the South African army has raided Botswana three times on the pretext of attacking members of the African National Congress (ANC). Both Batswana nationals and South African exiles have been killed in those raids. In addition, there have been several mysterious car-bomb explosions and assassinations.

In June, three unarmed Botswana police were fired upon and injured by a group of South African commandos. Subsequently, two of the soldiers were captured at a routine police roadblock. South Africa was condemned at the United Nations for the terrorist violation, but security specialists say that South Africa will most likely continue attacking targets in Botswana.

Western diplomats here warn that the insecurity caused by such South African raids may eventually threaten Botswana's open society. The nation was once free of roadblocks, but now motorists must stop frequently at military posts for checks which often include searches of their cars. Batswana have loudly complained about the inconvenience of the roadblocks, but the June capture of the two South African soldiers proves their usefulness.

"Roadblocks are a small thing, but I can see how continued raids could increase insecurity to such an extent that the democracy is weakened," said a top Western diplomat. "Botswana is one of the few democracies in Africa and it would be a damned shame to see civil liberties eroded here because of the threat from South Africa."

University of Botswana sociologist Patrick Molutsi agrees that fears of South African attacks are adversely affecting Botswana's democratic system. "A national security act was passed in Parliament which was put in the context of South African spies coming here," said Molutsi. "But it went a step back in terms of our democratic tradition. The act has not been used a lot yet, but the framework is there to threaten our media, the political opposition, and our democracy in general." □

—A.M.

The Basarwa are paid grossly low wages that sometimes amount to little more than a bag of maize meal or some worn-out clothes for a year's work. The Norwegian study found that the Basarwa who worked as herders had worse nutritional and health standards than those who hunt and gather in the game park.

There is a fear that the Basarwa who are being pushed out of the game reserve will have no recourse but to join the ranks of their people who work as commercial cattle herders under miserable conditions. The Basarwa have distinctive looks, with yellow coloring and high cheekbones, and they are subject to racial discrimination.

Anthropologist Hitchcock suggests that if the Basarwa could have tenure to a specific area of land instead of solely the right to squat on cattle-roaming territory as they do now, it would be easier to develop comprehensive programs to improve health, education, and employment opportunities for the Basarwa. "Like most indigenous populations throughout the world, they are so poorly educated that they cannot easily speak up to fight for their legal rights," said Hitchcock.

Many of the Basarwa's advocates are foreign social scientists who have become familiar with their plight while studying them. Botswana officials deride "these people who study the Basarwa to get their PhD's and then leave them in poverty," as one put it recently.

Soblen Mayane is a Botswana sociologist who is determined to go to bat for the Basarwa people. He may be more effective than the Basarwa's expatriate supporters because he is also executive secretary of Botswana's ruling party, the Botswana Democratic Party. "I see the government's decision to relocate the remaining Basarwa [from the central Kalahari Game Reserve] as an erosion of personal liberties for these people in the long term," said Mayane.

"That should not happen in a country that is considered a shining example of democracy in Africa. I am convinced that the majority of these people do not want to relocate. The government will have to take responsibility when the future of these people becomes no future at all." □

Freedomfest!

In observance of Nelson Mandela's 70th birthday, pop stars from the world over gathered in London to perform in tribute to the leader of the ANC. The concert's political message was clear—solidarity with the struggle for liberation in South Africa.

BY PATRICIA THRANE

On June 11, an unprecedented line-up of international stars paid tribute to Nelson Mandela in the largest political music event ever. One billion people across the world watched the televised all-day event. The focus: worldwide solidarity with the struggle for freedom in South Africa.

Among the hundreds of stars performing were: Sting, the Eurythmics, Stevie Wonder, George Michael, Jim Kerr of Simple Minds, Jonas Gwangwa, Hugh Masekela, Miriam Makeba, UB40, Peter Gabriel, U2, Dire Straits, Whitney Houston, Jerry Dammers of The Specials who wrote and sang "Free Nelson Mandela," and many others.

Oliver Tambo, president of the African National Congress (ANC), colleague and lifelong friend of Nelson Mandela, was guest of honor at the concert at Wembley Stadium in London. Calling on the world to demand Nelson Mandela's release and to observe his birthday, Tambo made this statement:

Patricia Thrane is a freelance journalist based in London.

"I ask all our friends, on as wide a scale as possible, to observe the 70th birthday of that outstanding son of Africa, Nelson Mandela, on July 18, 1988. Let the apartheid regime know the high esteem in which this great South African patriot is held. Celebrate July 18, 1988, in a manner befitting a man whose three-score years and ten represent all that is true and noble in mankind."

The first international initiative on behalf of Mandela in 1963 saved him and his five co-accused from hanging. The Wembley event may play a role in securing Mandela's release in that it has undoubtedly increased international pressure on his jailers. It has also raised awareness of the situation in South Africa and given countless millions in free publicity for the struggle in southern Africa.

Artists Against Apartheid (AAA), formed in 1985 by Jerry Dammers, composer of the movement's anthem, "Free Nelson Mandela," and Dali Tambo, son of Oliver, along with Bishop Trevor Huddleston's Anti-Apartheid



Patricia Thrane

NELSON MANDELA



Movement, were the prime movers behind the event. The AAA Clapham concert in 1986 attracted an audience of 250,000, making it the biggest political concert to be held in England up to that date. But for all that, the 1986 concert left the AAA £50,000 in debt. Wembley started, therefore, as an attempt to repeat Clapham, but to put the AAA back in profit as well as achieving its other more obvious and lofty aims.



Little Steven, Archbishop Huddleston, and Ishmail Ayolo, Mandela's lawyer (l-r): "The irony was that the producers asked that the artists make no mention of the ANC at a concert for the leader of the ANC"

Unlike Live Aid, the Mandela concert was political as well as humanitarian. British conservative members of Parliament accused the AAA and the British Broadcasting Corporation of popularizing the ANC. The MPs, led by John Carlisle, who heads the pro-apartheid British-South Africa group in the House of Commons, spent the concert searching for any pro-ANC messages during the 10-hour transmission. In criticizing the BBC's broadcast of the event, the MPs and the South African government added to the publicity surrounding the event and infuriated many of the performers who in most cases attacked apartheid anyway.

Sir Richard Attenborough reminded the audience of the evils of apartheid and its waste of human talents. But the most outright political statements came from Stevie Wonder, Annie Lennox, and Little Steven Van Zandt. One British comedian came on stage and asked the audience to join him in abusing the South African government. Suddenly, 75,000 people were shouting and gesturing abuses, to the delight of the artists and

the irritation of the BBC producers.

That it was an event with a special spirit is beyond doubt. The sight of Oliver and Adelaide Tambo, Swapo's Toivo Ja Toivo, Sir Shridath Ramphal, secretary-general of the Commonwealth, the Reverend Allan Boesak, and other international figures dancing in the royal enclosure to the sounds of Chubby Checker and the Fat Boys was surely one of the delights of the day—one in which popular music mixed with politics and politicians mixed with musicians.

"It has always been our aim," said Dali Tambo, "to enlist the support of not only musicians, but technicians, filmmakers, and people in every creative walk of life. We live in a society where cultural personalities, in order to sell their products, are given immense social status and with it, responsibility. We have said to people: Do against apartheid whatever it is in life you do best."

"Musicians have as much right to be political as anyone else. The artists here today are thinking people and as some have said, their political principles begin with being anti-apartheid."

Little Steven continued: "We have been quiet for too long, we have been patient too long, we will no longer tolerate the terrorism of the government of South Africa."

This was the mood backstage where performers were expressing their indignation at being told that should they make political statements, the cameras would be turned away. The irony was that the producers asked that the artists make no mention of the ANC, and no funds were to be given to the organization at a concert for the leader of the ANC.

Bearing this in mind, one is tempted to inquire as to why the BBC agreed to film the concert at all. BBC producers were reported in the British press as saying that the concert was non-political, that it was "purely a musical event." This contrasts sharply with the view of Archbishop Huddleston, president of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, who said, "I do not know how they can say that—every second of this is political."

Indeed, in comparison to Live Aid, this was clearly a political event. The apartheid government which banned the ANC, prohibits its mention in public,

and continues to ban the words of its leaders, was not to be allowed to depoliticize this tribute to both the man and the movement.

"The Wembley event may play a role in securing Mandela's release in that it has undoubtedly increased international pressure on his jailers."

Many among the Wembley crowd were not yet born when Nelson Mandela entered jail in 1962. But the fact that his term of imprisonment equals if not exceeds their ages must surely add to the mythical power of this great man.


Oliver Tambo, Toivo Ja Toivo (who spent 17 years on Robben Island with Mandela), and other southern African leaders were visibly moved by the monumental show of support. Toward the climax of the day, Oliver Tambo turned



Ndonda Khuze and others gather for the Free Nelson Mandela anthem: "Unlike Live Aid, the Mandela concert was political as well as humanitarian"

to his son Dali and said, "You know, when you started this Artists Against Apartheid thing, I never dreamed it would reach this scale." Dali was heard to reply, "Neither did we."

What the Wembley event did prove is that for any Western government to be anti-apartheid would not only be prudent but extremely popular. □



BY DAPHNE TOPOUZIS

CULTURE

Abdullah Ibrahim's South African Jazz

Music remains among the most expressive ways of communicating the vibrancy of African culture. One of South Africa's most renowned musicians talks about the varied influences on his work and the role of his music in the struggle against apartheid.

I pianist-composer Abdullah Ibrahim (formerly known as "Dollar Brand") has long ranked among South Africa's music giants alongside Hugh Masekela, Miriam Makeba, and the late Kippie Mokoetsi. A master of improvisation with a distinctive African edge, the exiled Cape Town musician has de-

Unlike artists like Kippie Mokoetsi who were trained in the classical tradition, Ibrahim was trained "in the light classics, a tradition more geared in Britain than in the continent. What I learned was to read music."

He also sang in the choir of the African Methodist Episcopal Church

waltzes, and fox trots were invariably injected with the Cape Town beat, Ibrahim recalls.

Yet it was jazz that most captivated him "because as Duke Ellington said," Ibrahim explains, "jazz is the freest thing one can do." It was also very popular in Cape Town: "When I was a youngster, it was the swing era. We went through the whole jazz experience, the whole swing era, then the turning point came with Ellington, bee-bop, followed by Charlie Parker and Thelonious Monk.

"There was a close affinity between South Africa and the United States those days. And Cape Town being a seaport, African-American seamen used to come into our communities; some among them were musicians, others were record collectors." Merchant sailors brought in the latest recordings from the U.S. and gave Ibrahim the nickname "Dollar Brand"—a name which he forsook in 1969 when he adopted the Muslim faith.

In 1959, he formed The Jazz Epistles, a band comprising Hugh Masekela, Kippie Mokoetsi (whom Ibrahim described as the Charlie Parker of South Africa), Jonas Gwangwa, Makaya, and Johnny Machoko, and recorded original material in the tradition of Ellington, Monk, and Clifford Brown. Unable to pursue his music freely in South Africa, he left for Switzerland in 1962. "When Sharpeville occurred," he said, "it became clear that it was impossible to do anything creative in South Africa; you were completely limited. Either you toed the government line or you left, or you quit."

(whose first South African branch was co-founded by his grandmother), where his mother was a pianist. The black American spirituals that the AME introduced into its services proved to be a lasting force in Ibrahim's music—imbuing it with a celebratory and uplifting quality.

At the age of 14, "the creative process had already begun," and Ibrahim was composing his own material. He recalls the importance of "the unrecognizable, unsung heroes of our community, the local musicians who played in dance bands. In South Africa, I used to go and listen to those piano-players who played from Friday night right through to Monday morning. That is where I learned the stuff."

Cape Town was a cosmopolitan seaport that brought together a rich variety of musical traditions including East Indian, Dutch, English, Chinese, Malaysian, Javanese, and African. Zulu traditional songs, the music of the Khoi (the Coloured community of the Cape), the *marabi* (the two-pedalled organ music of the Marabastad township that was developed in the 1940s), West African ceremonial melodies, and southern African popular songs—can each be singled out as influences in Ibrahim's compositions.

While still in high school, he joined a Xhosa dance band that performed Joe Liggins and Erskine Hawkins arrangements, and later played with groups for the Khoi community. Square dances,

veloped a musical style over the past 30 years that defies categorization.

Rather, it is a fascinating mosaic of diverse traditions including African rural and township rhythms, classical jazz, and gospel. South African folk melodies are enriched with Western harmonies and embellished with unusual instrumentation, coalescing into a gracefully fluid and intensely spiritual whole.

Best known for his hypnotic and introspective stream-of-consciousness compositions and his innovative interpretations of Duke Ellington, Thelonious Monk, and Billy Strayhorn classics, Ibrahim's music is at once accessible and complex, intriguing and lyrical. An impressive output of over 30 albums testifies to a composer who has indefatigably explored and fused classical jazz with the multitude of influences that make up traditional and contemporary South African music. In fact, it has been argued that under different circumstances, Ibrahim might have been singled out as one of the finest composers of the 20th century—alongside Ellington, Gershwin, and Messiaen.

In a recent interview at his New York home, the Chelsea Hotel, Abdullah Ibrahim talked at length about his life at home and in exile, explaining how his music is inextricably tied to the political dynamics of South Africa.

Born in 1934 in Cape Town, Ibrahim's musical career began at the age of seven when he took up piano lessons.

Cathy Henneway



Ibrahim and "Ekaya" performing for Archbishop Tutu: "To this day, music all over Africa has remained intact in its original form and usage—always an integral part of community life."

Upon arrival in Zurich, he formed a trio with his wife, the accomplished jazz singer Sathima Bea Benjamin, and played nightly at the Africana Club. Ibrahim vividly described the evening he encountered Duke Ellington, the musician he qualified as "the most important composer in the 20th century. And I am not just talking about jazz, I am talking about music."

After Duke and his orchestra had finished performing in a jazz nightclub, Ibrahim and his wife sought a meeting with him and ended up giving a midnight performance. A couple of days later, upon Ellington's suggestion, a recording session was arranged in Paris and the

record, "Duke Ellington Presents the Dollar Brand Trio," was released, introducing Ibrahim's music to American audiences.

In 1965, he came to New York where he became involved with the Newport Jazz Festival. Five years later, he decided to return to South Africa where he founded a music school. During the 1976 Soweto unrest, he released the song, "Cape Town Fringe," which turned out to be a big hit and "a theme song of the uprising." Subsequently, he performed in a benefit organized by the African National Congress and made public his support for the armed struggle. He has been banned from South Africa ever since.

After the Soweto uprising, he came to New York where he has lived for the past 12 or so years. In 1983, he formed his own band, called "Ekaya" ("Home"), with Charles Davis (baritone saxophone), Ricky Ford (tenor saxophonist), Dick Griffin (trombone), Craig Hardy, Winnard Harper, and Essiet Okun, and his own record company under the label "Ekapa".

He has been performing regularly at "Sweet Basil," one of New York City's most famous jazz clubs, for many years, while also participating in anti-apartheid events in the U.S. and around the world. Recently, he composed music for a French film shot by Claire Denis in Cameroon entitled "Chocolate," and participated in the Central Park counterpart of London's Freedomfest concert, commemorating Nelson Mandela's 70th birthday.

Ibrahim explains that in Africa, social discourse is communicated through music and that given the political situation in South Africa, it is not surprising that music is such a strong force nor that it plays such a crucial role in society. "South African culture," he says, "is not entertainment. It is our resources, our heritage. To this day, music all over Africa has remained intact in its original form and usage—always an integral part of community life. Basically, in Africa we are all griots."

Living in exile "has not been easy," he adds. "I'm homesick, but I'm homesick for a new democratic society in South Africa, for a new world. Everything must change. Even the stones


must change."

Similar feelings are echoed in his lyrics:

*When it's over
and the struggle is through
deep inner healing
and a peace we never knew*

Abdullah Ibrahim reflects on his role as a musician "as the drummer in the market place who brings people together. The function of music in African society is social, devotional, and healing as well as to record history," and it is these facets that he strives to encompass in his songs. "Music is my personal contribution to the struggle against apartheid and toward the institution of a just society," he says. □

"It has been argued that under different circumstances, Ibrahim might have been singled out as one of the finest composers of the 20th century—alongside Ellington, Gershwin, and Messiaen."



A SEPARATE PEACE

BY ALUN R. ROBERTS

Peter H. Katjavivi, *A History of Resistance in Namibia*, London: James Currey, 1988, 144pp.

Peter Katjavivi's recent book fills a void in what is still a widespread lack of understanding and appreciation of the over 100 years of struggle and resistance by Namibia's people to liberate their southern African country from colonial oppression.

Rather than writing in an expansive academic style, the author provides an easy to read, compact, but moving ac-

Alun R. Roberts is a researcher and writer on the question of Namibia, specializing in international law, and has worked with the UN and several non-governmental organizations on Namibia since 1973.

count of the depth and development of Namibia's place in African history. As



part of the Unesco series, "Apartheid and Society," the book adequately ful-

fills its stated intention by familiarizing the general public with an account of the unfinished and untiring pursuit of Namibia's people for self-determination.

Commencing with the early origins of African settlement in Namibia, the 18 chapters—never more than 10 pages each—over the book's 144 pages, take the reader through the multitude of events and developments (as far back as the 1400s) which clearly distinguish Namibia's history in its own right, and by the time of their conclusion, emphasize its status as a country separate from neighboring South Africa.

That Namibia is a country in its own right, whose people have struggled first to oust German colonial oppression, and now that brutally imposed by South Africa's illegal occupation, is still a misun-

CHASE

derstood issue. Politicians, diplomats, and anti-apartheid and solidarity organizations, in resisting and pursuing pressures against South Africa, often consider Namibia as part of the same problem, or as Chester Crocker would have us all believe, just part of the southern Africa problem—a regional issue.

The book, therefore, does much to lift the veil of misunderstanding by focusing attention on the historical facts which make Namibia a unique case in international law. It is the international responsibility for Namibia as described in the text—from the Allied Powers Peace Conference and League of Nations Mandate of 1920 to direct responsibility by the UN in 1966 and several International Court of Justice advisory opinions—which sets Namibia apart from other major struggles for justice and liberation, such as those in South Africa and Palestine.

The aspects which set out Namibia's unique status as an international question are described in the chapters, "South Africa's Take-Over and the

League of Nations Mandate," "Developments at the UN and the International Court of Justice (1960s)," and "The UN Plan for Independence Elections in Namibia"—all of which provide a valuable reminder of the struggles and frustrations of the international community to wrest Namibia from its present and brutal South African occupation.

Against this background, the author describes the petitions to the UN during the late 1940s and 1950s on behalf of Namibian leaders by the late Reverend Michael Scott, convinced that "great injustices had been and were going to be committed under South Africa's then mandate of administration (1920-1966)." The account of Scott being locked in battle against South Africa at the UN, which eventually resulted in his being banned from entering Namibia, is related.

Similarly, information compiled by Chief Kutako on conditions in Namibia during the 1950s, also used to petition the UN, is included. Kutako's role as the "chief inspirer and leader of the post-

war resistance movement which became the main source of nationalism in Namibia" is focused on, as is the first-ever evidence given directly to the UN on the internal situation by Mbura Karina, a Namibian, in 1957.

The author begins the text of *A History of Resistance in Namibia* in a land free from colonial occupation. Then, after accounting for early European landings—the Portuguese explorer Diego Cao making the first but brief contact in 1485, with Dutch explorers arriving in the 1670s—the book focuses on the brutal conflict with German colonial settlers beginning in the 1840s, and the spirited resistance of the Namibian people.

The account of the 1904-1907 war of resistance particularly stands out, where Namibia's Herero and Nama populations were exterminated on a massive scale—from 60,000 to 80,000 Herero down to just 16,000 and from 15,000 to 20,000 Nama down to under 10,000. In this particular section ("German Conquest and Namibian Resis-

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tance"), the numerous names of Namibia's resistance leaders and the German colonial oppressors are not only provided, but an insight is also given into their respective place in Namibia's history of oppression and struggle.

On one side stand the resistance leaders before, during, and after the 1904-1907 war: Chief Maherero, his son Samuel, Hendrik Witbooi, Simon Koppers, Abraham Morris, the much-revered "guerrilla leader" Jacob Marenga, Chief Fredrick Maherero, and in the 1950s, Andimba Toivo Ja Toivo, founder of the Ovamboland Peoples Congress, and Sam Nujoma, elected president of the Ovamboland Peoples Organization. Nujoma and Toivo Ja Toivo are now the president and general secretary of Swapo, formed in 1960.

On the colonial side are Governor Leutwein, General Von Trotha, who issued the 1904 extermination order, and Dr. H. Goering, father of the Nazi war minister. The account of the nature of German colonial rule in Namibia provides an insight into where the Third Reich later looked for its grounding in mass terror. The author portrays life

under German colonial rule as one of divide and rule, and when resisted, destroy.

Away from the many developments at the UN on Namibia—on which another publication should focus—following the termination of South Africa's mandate by the General Assembly in 1966 and the International Court of Justice opinions, are chapters relating to the development of resistance in Namibia since World War II.


Here the chapters describing the emergence of Namibian nationalist organizations and the response of South Africa to such activities, as well as events that led to the launching of the armed struggle, political trials, and the development of Swapo, give a rare account of the many aspects of the Namibian resistance struggle against South Africa and the personalities and organizations involved.

This paperback publication provides a valuable description of developments seen through the eyes of a leading and respected Namibian scholar, member of Swapo, and its early senior representative to Western Europe, who was either

present or involved in many of the events relating to Swapo, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s.

The conclusion of the book does not give much hope that the end of the long struggle for self-determination by Namibia's people is near at hand. The author says: "If Western governments feel that their interests in southern Africa can no longer be protected by the South African regime, they may choose to step in. In the meantime, their inaction protects the South African regime and helps to perpetuate its illegal occupation of Namibia."

Clearly, this is a publication which needs to be read as a reminder (if not an objective lesson) on the long history of Namibian resistance and struggle. In particular, its depth of information on Namibia's unique status needs to be understood by the State Department, other Western governments, and incoming policy-makers in a future Democratic or Republican administration. Even the outgoing Dr. Crocker would gain an insight into why his seven years of efforts on "linkage" and Namibian independence came to nothing. □



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