


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AFRICA REPORT

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
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UPDATE

IN THE NEWS

The Balance Sheet on Africa's Human Development

Africa has the lowest life expectancy, highest infant mortality, lowest literacy, and highest population growth rates in the developing world. West and Central Africa in particular are the world's worst-off regions, with eight out of 10 countries ranking lowest in the United Nations Development Programme's just-released *1990 Human Development Report*. Directed by the former planning and finance minister of Pakistan and World Bank official, Mahbub ul Haq, the report quantifies and analyzes human development in 130 countries over the last 30 years, including 43 African countries with populations over 1 million.

The report's findings on Africa hold few surprises: Some 33 African countries were listed in the low human development category; another ten (Egypt, Gabon, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Algeria, Botswana, Tunisia, Libya, South Africa, and Mauritius) fall under the medium human development index. Ethiopia and Sierra Leone have the lowest life expectancy in the world at 42 years, along with Afghanistan; Somalia has the lowest adult literacy rate at 12 percent; Zaire has the lowest purchasing power at \$220; and Niger ranks last in the human development index with a life expectancy of 45 years, literacy at 14 percent, and an average income at \$452.

These figures are not quite the worst: One of the back pages of the report, profiling human development in countries with less than a million people, reveals even starker figures. In Guinea-Bissau, for instance, average life expectancy is still an astonishing 39 years; Djibouti's literacy rivals Somalia's at 12 percent of the adult population; only 9 percent of Equatorial Guineans have access to health services and 21 percent of Bissau-Guineans have access to safe water; Guinea-Bissau also ranks lowest in terms of per capita GNP, at \$160.

What is valuable about this report is

its approach and recommendations that offer some long-overdue competition to the macroeconomic tables of the World Bank and the IMF, which in recent years have dominated both the development debate and policy-making of national governments and non-governmental organizations. The UNDP report steers clear of the World Bank in this instance and establishes a new focus for development strategies of the 1990s, based on the human development index.

New Human Development Index


Up until now, economic and social development was measured in terms of per capita wealth—a crude and misleading indicator, which partly explains ill-conceived and ineffective development strategies and projects. Per capita gross national product, says the report, fails to show how wealth is managed and distributed to promote the well-being of the majority of the population.

The human development index (HDI) ranks countries according to

their quality of life, using a new set of criteria, namely life expectancy, literacy, and average purchasing power, rather than economic growth. The HDI indicators have been selected despite their limitations, which are acknowledged in the report, particularly the fact that they are averages that conceal disparities. Other useful indicators include access to basic goods and services, including safe water and food, as well as rates of maternal mortality, urban crowding, soldier/teacher ratio, and the male-female literacy gap.

The report's underlying thesis is that "income alone is not the answer to human development," that economic growth and social well-being are not automatically linked, and that human development progress is possible even at low levels of income. Tanzania, for instance, ranks higher on the human development scale than on its income, which means that the government has effectively directed economic resources toward improving the quality of life of its people. Nigeria, which witnessed

GNP PER CAPITA AND THE HDI
(SELECTED COUNTRIES)



United Nations

rapid economic growth in the 1960s, did not improve the quality of life of its citizens accordingly, largely because of unequal income distribution and low social expenditures. The report cites it as a case of "missed human opportunities for human development."

Botswana, which achieved considerable growth, though initially unequally distributed, succeeded in significantly improving living conditions for its people, largely as a result of sound "meso" or intermediate social policies and adequate social expenditures, and is classified under the heading "sustained

whole over the last 30 years. Poverty in Africa increased by two-thirds in the first half of the 1980s, so that more than half the continent's population is now living in absolute poverty. In the rest of the developing world, the number of poor rose by one-fifth during the same period.

In the 1980s, expenditures on health, education, and other social programs were drastically reduced in many sub-Saharan countries, with far-reaching consequences. Infant mortality rates rose, nutrition levels deteriorated, employment and incomes declined.



Margaret A. Novicki

Only 37 percent of all Africans have access to safe water

human development." Gabon, Algeria, Senegal, Mauritania, and Cameroon have, on the contrary, done little to improve the lot of their people, even though they have relatively high incomes.

In the long term, however, argues the report, economic growth is essential to sustainable human development, or else there is reversed progress, as is the case in Zimbabwe and Kenya. The last two are listed as countries with "disrupted human development."

Human Development Record

The report confirms that over the past decade, many countries in Africa witnessed stagnation or a reversal of the gains of the 1960s and 1970s, despite the significant progress achieved by the developing world as a

To cite some examples:

- Average life expectancy across the continent is only 51 years, with Ethiopia and Sierra Leone at 42 years and Mauritius at 69 years.
- The highest infant mortality rates (IMR) in the world can be found in Africa, with Angola and Mozambique at 172 per 1,000 live births. Mauritius, on the other end of the scale, succeeded in reducing its IMR and child mortality rates to 29 from 104 per thousand in the last 30 years.
- Access to health care is worse in Africa than anywhere in the developing world, as less than half of the population of the continent has access to basic facilities, excluding North Africa, which has made marked progress.
- Safe water is still out of reach for 63 percent of all Africans, and according

to the report, access to it has declined in one-third of the countries for which current data is available; in eight African countries, only 20 percent of the population drink potable water.

- Progress in adult literacy has been considerable in Africa, with an average rate of 48 percent, but compared to the rest of the developing world, it is still lagging by 12 percent. Kenya witnessed the fastest progress with a 60 percent adult literacy rate in 1985, compared to 32 percent in 1970.
- Incomes in sub-Saharan Africa have been declining by 2.4 percent a year since 1980, and between 1980 and 1985, about 270 million Africans became impoverished. As a result, at least 16 countries witnessed a decline in their daily caloric intakes as opposed to Gabon, Niger, and Mauritius, which witnessed an increase of 15 percent.
- Mauritius, Côte d'Ivoire, and Ghana won points for having among the lowest figures of soldier-teacher ratios, ranking 10, 13, and 14 respectively. At the other end of the scale, Somalia has 525 soldiers per 100 teachers and Ethiopia has 494; Zaire, Chad, and Uganda spend two to three times as much on military spending as on social programs.
- Tunisia, Mauritius, Botswana, and Zimbabwe scored high for democratic human development, ranking 60, 81, 58, and 52 respectively.

Future Outlook

The report concludes that while economic growth is crucial in a long-term perspective, sustainable social expenditure on education, health, and food are more accurate indicators of social well-being than income levels. The report recommends that military spending be reduced and resources diverted to development projects. "Needed most are cuts in spending on the military, on inefficient public enterprises, and on mistargeted social subsidies. To create the enabling framework for more broadly based development, macroeconomic policy formulation and management must improve, and popular participation and private initiatives must increase."

"In any concerted international effort to improve human development in the Third World, priority must go to Africa. The concept of short-term adjustment is inappropriate there.

Continued on page 11

SUDAN

Some 28 officers of the Sudanese armed forces were executed by the 10-month-old military government of Gen. Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Beshir by firing squad in late April in Khartoum—a bloodbath unprecedented in Sudanese history.

The accused were charged with involvement in a coup attempt and “high treason and rioting against the legitimate government,” and were killed 24 hours after the alleged coup, following military tribunals which reportedly lasted a few minutes. Their bodies were buried in a mass grave. An additional 16 officers were either sentenced to imprisonment or dismissed from military service.

Al-Beshir claimed that the aborted coup was the second phase of an earlier plot put down in March. Since its accession to power, the ruling National Islamic Front has imposed a state of emergency, suspended the constitution, dissolved Parliament, political parties, and trade unions, and imposed sharia law, aspiring to establish an Iranian-style government.

Al-Beshir has blamed the coup attempt on an alliance of “leftist secular elements,” including banned political parties and trade unions, and on the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). He has accused the plotters of wanting to eliminate the Revolutionary Command Council and install a civilian, secular government.

Reports cast doubt on whether in fact there was a coup attempt in the first place. Six of the officers involved were arrested and kept in detention three days before the alleged coup took place. The Sudanese opposition argued that it might well have been a preemptive strike by a regime anticipating a coup, but it was probably also a result of the recent extensive purge of the army.

Meanwhile, an Africa Watch report released in May argues that Beshir’s “exceptionally cruel and intolerant government” has been responsible for the death of half a million civilians from war and man-made famine since 1986. Millions of others have been forced to flee the country, while hundreds of political prisoners have been detained, tortured, and abused by unofficial security officers in secret detention centers.

POLITICAL POINTERS

SOUTH AFRICA

Up to 1 million white South Africans are applying for British citizenship and could be emigrating to Britain in the 1990s in fear of civil war and black majority rule, while thousands of East Europeans are eagerly seeking a new life in South Africa.

Between 500,000 and 1 million white South Africans are possibly entitled to British passports, in addition to the quarter of a million who are already British citizens. Britain is presently issuing close to 2,000 passports from the 13,000 applications it receives each month.

The fact that about a fifth of all white South Africans are applying for British passports does not necessarily mean they will be leaving the country *en masse*. Rather, it is a reflection of the fears and skepticism within the white community concerning their status, following the dismantling of apartheid.

While South Africans are making provisions to leave, 2,500 East Europeans recently queued at the South African embassy in Vienna, to obtain permission to emigrate to what many of them regard as the promised land, lured by Pretoria’s glossy tourist brochures, which depict life in South Africa as luxurious and exotic. The South African government is offering enticing incentives for skilled workers, engineers, computer experts, mechanics, lawyers, and other professionals, including coverage of about 80 percent of travel expenses.

Between January and April, over 30,000 East Europeans applied to emigrate to South Africa, but only 10 percent of them will be granted permission, according to the British immigration authorities. Most of the applicants are Hungarians and East Germans, who, in the midst of unemployment and a depressed economy, are searching for a better life abroad.

The South African government is also courting white-collar workers from Hong Kong.

REFUGEES

The number of refugees in Africa escalated markedly in 1989, largely as a result of war, according to a report released by the U.S. Committee for Refugees. In Mozambique, about 420,000 people fled the country to escape the bitter conflict between the government and Renamo. An estimated 1.7 million Mozambicans are internally displaced, while 1.3 million live in neighboring countries, and an additional 2.9 million are dependent on food aid.

In neighboring Angola, 43,000 people became refugees over the past year and the total number of Angolans living in neighboring countries swelled to 438,000. The Liberian conflict has caused an estimated 66,000 to 80,000 Liberians to flee to Guinea, and another 55,000 to Côte d’Ivoire. The Horn of Africa is described in the report as “the most complex region in the world for refugees and displaced people.” The war in Sudan has swelled the number of refugees to 425,000, with 80,000 Sudanese fleeing their country last year alone.

Against this grim picture—compounded by dwindling resources for refugees among international humanitarian organizations, including a crippling financial crisis in the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees—there are two success stories: In Namibia, over 41,000 refugees returned home from Angola, Zambia, and Cuba. Further north, Uganda and Rwanda signed an agreement which could resolve the 25-year-old refugee problem of Banyarwandans in Uganda.

MADAGASCAR

A 13-strong armed rebel unit seized Radio Madagascar in Antananarivo in mid-May in an attempt to overthrow President Didier Ratsiraka. Five people were killed and 20 injured in the failed coup attempt, which was reported to be an exact replica of last July’s “radio coup.” The coup plotters, who had no popular support, planned to replace the president with Gen. Jean Rakotoharison, an opposition leader who has denied any connection with them.

The coup d’état occurred against a backdrop of a newly introduced program of political liberalization, which includes the legalization of political parties independent of the ruling National Front for the Defense of the Revolution.

Just Who Is Mobutu Sese Seko Trying to Please?

President Mobutu Sese Seko's surprise embrace of glasnost, and his promise of democracy and respect of human rights have been accompanied by increased security maneuvers, political confusion, and grisly reports of student massacres in May.

In a nationally broadcast speech in late April, Mobutu announced that he would end a 20-year ban on opposition parties as part of a package of sweeping changes designed to establish multi-party democracy. Thousands of euphoric Zaireans took to the streets of Kinshasa to celebrate. But the opposition at home and in exile listened to Mobutu's promises with wariness. Their fears were more than justified: In early May, Mobutu delivered another speech which lengthened the time-frame for returning the country to multi-party rule, throwing fresh confusion into the political arena. A few days later, government forces reportedly cracked down on students in the southern city of Lubumbashi, who were demonstrating against Mobutu's failure to introduce reform. Unconfirmed reports cite between 50 and 150 people dead and hundreds wounded during the incident.

Mobutu's reform program includes the legalization of political parties; the introduction of a three-party system to replace the monopoly rule of the Popular Revolutionary Movement (MPR) (on condition that the latter would be one of the three parties); the release of opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba from detention and the recognition of his Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) as one of the legal parties; and the setting of elections for April 1991. Mobutu also announced that a transitional government will be created with a new prime minister, and that the constitution will be rewritten and subsequently approved through a referendum. Other reforms included the abolition of the requirements for Zaireans to call each other "citizen" and to wear abacos (derived from *à bas le costume*) instead of suits, thus ending Mobutu's cultural revolution of *authenticité*.

In a move widely interpreted as an attempt to distance himself from the MPR, Mobutu said he would step down as head of the party, but remain president: "Zaireans want me to continue to oversee the destiny of the country," he



Will political reform boost Zaire's ailing economy?

claimed. In reality, however, this maneuver will place him above all legal and political constraints.

Less than a week after his liberalization speech, two Zaireans were killed by government forces at a UDPS rally at Tshisekedi's home. The governor of Kinshasa denied the deaths, but pointed out that the government had broken up an illegal demonstration at the party leader's house. Next, Mobutu delivered another speech that further eroded the sincerity of the promised reforms, with measures largely seen as moves to pacify hard-liners of the MPR, who were angered by Mobutu's earlier promises.

While renewing his commitment to multi-party rule, Mobutu stated clearly that opposition parties would not be allowed to hold public meetings or marches. Contrary to his initial declarations, he announced that elections for a national legislature would take place after the presidential elections and that multi-party democracy would take two years to implement.

On the night of May 11, soldiers of the elite presidential guard massacred

an unknown number of students at the University of Lubumbashi with bayonets and machetes during an anti-Mobutu demonstration in which the students had killed three colleagues they suspected of being police informers. This was reported by the Belgian daily, *Le Soir*. Another daily, *La Libre Belgique*, described in chilling detail how on the night of May 11, the "red berets" asked local police to leave the university and then cut off the electricity throughout the campus. Next, they proceeded to bayonet students and burn their bodies in mass graves. This was confirmed by the UDPS founder François Lusanga Ngiele, who mentioned commandos "in civilian dress with silenced weapons, electric torches, ropes for strangling, and daggers."

Amnesty International estimates that between 50 and 150 students were killed in the government crackdown. A Zairean official has claimed that only one student was killed. Belgium immediately suspended economic aid to Zaire, pending its request for an investigation by international envoys, and France has postponed indefinitely the visit of its francophone minister, Alain Décaux, to Kinshasa.

Mobutu's professed conversion to multi-party politics resulted from his decision to stem unrest last January by embarking on what he called a "direct dialogue with the people." The three-month exercise led to over 6,100 submissions from unions, businesses, church groups, and individuals criticizing the president and the one-party state. The criticism, however, ended up fueling demonstrations greater than the ones he set out to put down.

Mobutu's initial response of raising civil service wages and student grants was not enough, as expectations for change were widespread. Adding to this internal pressure was a growing intolerance by the international community of Mobutu's notorious mismanagement of the economy and use of the state budget for his own purposes, as well as Zaire's poor human rights record. Some observers feel that Mobutu's political reforms were primarily an

attempt to appease aid donors, who had stepped up their demands for rigorous financial accountability.

Mobutu's personal wealth has been estimated to be as high as \$5 billion, or over half of Zaire's foreign debt, despite his own claims that he is worth a mere \$50 million. Meanwhile, real wages in Kinshasa are 6 percent of what they were prior to independence. The 1 percent growth in Zaire's GNP has not been able to sustain a 3 percent population growth rate. Analysts have also voiced concern that the president has been using the printing press to pay government bills, causing the zaire to drop to 30 percent below the official rate on the black market.

Zaire was the continent's third largest economic aid recipient in 1988, receiving \$939 million that year. Over \$4 billion in aid has flowed into the country since 1982. Although Mobutu is still viewed as a friend of the U.S. by President George Bush, a growing number of congressmen have expressed their desire to cut off U.S. aid to Zaire, which was \$110 million in 1988. Prior to his "national consultation" tour, Mobutu seemed eager to deal with the IMF and the World Bank, as evidenced by his cabinet reshuffle and appointment of Kongo wa Dondo as prime minister. Part of Mobutu's reason for naming a new prime minister to oversee the transition to multi-party rule was to tag much of the blame for the people's woes on him. Both the World Bank and the IMF cut off certain loans to Zaire over the past year.

It remains to be seen how freely Mobutu will allow opposition parties to operate within the proposed three-party system. While one of these will be the main opposition party, the UDPS, the other is likely to be the Joint Front of Nationalists, which is closely allied to the MPR. This leaves in serious question the rights and role other parties will have. Mobutu has already hinted that the Roman Catholic Church, which issued a scorching critique of the state in response to the "national consultation," should refrain from political action. The UDPS has refused to join a transitional government in partnership with the MPR, stressing that it should not be up to Mobutu to decide which groups, or how many, should be legalized. Along with eight other parties, the UDPS has called for a national conference to be monitored by Belgium. ■

Sudan's Economic Woes Mount With Threatened IMF Suspension

Sudan faces a declaration of non-cooperation or even suspension from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) if it fails to introduce economic reforms, including exchange rate adjustments, tightened monetary policy and liberalization of business laws, before the IMF's July 15 executive board meeting.

Such an international censure could well increase the country's deep economic problems, while accelerating the military junta's apparent course toward becoming a fundamentalist Islamic republic. Junta member Col. Mohammed Amin Khalifa Yunis, while denying the links which exist between the Revolutionary Command Council and the National Islamic Front, said recently: "Our first enemies are Israel and the IMF."

The economic crisis and IMF ultimatum follow April's failed coup attempt, which led to at least 28 executions by firing squad of army officers and the pensioning off of dozens of other military figures, as the junta tried to consolidate its hold in the run-up to the first anniversary of its own coup against the democratically elected al-Mahdi government.

Despite a year in power, little has changed since the chaos of the fundamentalist-inspired June 30 takeover, which prevented a peace deal from being reached between the government and the southern rebels of the Sudan People's Liberation Army under its leader, Col. John Garang.

The state of emergency remains in force with a tight curfew in Khartoum and soldiers patrolling the streets; all trade unions and political parties are banned; the free press is still closed; thousands of politicians, academics, trade unionists, journalists, and others have been arrested. Torture and intimidation are rife.

With total debts of \$12 billion, Sudan's entire borrowings from the IMF of \$1.5 billion are now long overdue. Junta leader Gen. Omar Hassan al-Beshir has already rejected the demands from the IMF, which is understood to have found this regime more difficult to work with than any other in its experience.

One source close to the IMF said: "Sudan has spent years stifling business; they must focus on freeing up the economy, removing all these cumbersome controls, devalue the currency, and stop fueling inflation by printing money. Given that Sudan's external debt is being offered at one cent to the dollar and finds no buyers, now is the time for Sudan to confront reality."

Women are being purged from the civil service and—like the Islamic vigilantes unleashed amid the final turmoil under former dictator Gaafar al-Nimeiry—members of the extremist National Islamic Front are playing a leading role in the creation of a country-wide network of Libyan-style "popular committees," including military training for selected recruits.

Perhaps the only positive indication for the north of Sudan are early signs of a reasonable harvest this year, with better than expected rains in some areas. In the southern war zones, however, the needs remain enormous, although a network of international relief agencies are increasingly working alongside the indigenous Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association, the aid wing of the SPLA.

While millions go hungry, Sudan has begun what could be its final break-up; for years, the mix of political, economic, social, and religious crises have inevitably weakened control from the center, but now much of the south is under de facto SPLA control. Fighting has intensified in the west between the tribal groupings of Fur, Messeriya, Baggara, and Rigazat, and major incursions continue to take place by both Chadian and Libyan forces.

Despite these problems, al-Beshir and his colleagues have maintained a round of diplomacy in pursuit of arms supplies and in a vain attempt to counter Garang's increasingly successful missions through Africa and elsewhere. Al-Beshir even said he will be in New York for a UN conference on children in September. Pressure groups and children's organizations intend to embarrass him by highlighting the junta's apparent acceptance of widespread child slavery and other human rights violations.

—Nick Cater

Apartheid's Legacy—A Disastrous Ecological Record

Contrary to its well-cultivated image of conservation leader, South Africa's environmental record has been disastrous, mostly due to apartheid, argues a new study released by the Washington-based Worldwatch Institute.

The homelands, where half the black population lives, are essentially wastelands, maintains author Alan B. Durning. Overpopulation, fragile land, labor shortage, and poverty have transformed them into virtual moonscapes, ranking among the most depleted lands in the world. The study cites a South African government report according to which, in the Ciskei, 46 percent of the land was eroded and nearly 40 percent of pastures overgrazed a decade ago. Forests in the homelands are also threatened by unchecked population growth and consumption of wood for fuel. If present trends continue, says the report, "the forests do not stand a chance of survival," and might well disappear by the year 2020. Meanwhile, in the southwest of the country, the desert is advancing by over a mile and a half each year.

The apartheid legislation most destructive to the environment has been its energy policy. "To finance the military superstructure that upholds minority rule, broad areas have been deeply scarred by reckless mining. Meanwhile, air pollution over the nation's coal region ranks with the worst in the world, partly because of an energy strategy that aims at minimizing dependence on anti-apartheid oil exporters," argues the report. About 85 percent of the country's commercial energy comes from coal—a dependence which can be attributed to apartheid, and which makes South Africa the most energy-intensive country in the world. Coal is subsidized by the 85,000 black coal miners who earn one-tenth of the wages of their British counterparts. Miners' wages are so low and the price of coal so artificially cheap, that South Africa exports coal, which accounts for 10 percent of its foreign exchange. Coal-run plants emit sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide that cause acid rain and can have a devastating effect on crops and forests.

South Africa's fuel needs are unusually high, as a result of the apartheid system of migrant labor that necessi-



Gugulethu township near Cape Town: Apartheid has perpetuated dependence on wood for fuel

tates the transportation of millions of workers to and from the homelands every day. To obtain fuel, South Africa is the only country which still uses the Fischer-Tropsch indirect liquefaction method of turning coal into gas and then oil. This technique, which was devised and used by the Germans in the 1930s to boost their war machine, is not only expensive, but environmentally devastating, wasting water and coal, and emitting large quantities of carbon.

The Chamber of Mines has turned a blind eye to criticism, ignoring safety procedures and pollution precautions. The 750,000 black mine workers labor under extremely hazardous conditions. In the gold mines alone, about 46,000 miners have died since the beginning of this century, more than one man every day. In addition, mining is allowed near squatter settlements, thereby exposing the black population to toxic substances leaking from mine wastes. Asbestos-related diseases are common and in one particular mine, 780 out of 3,500 workers had asbestosis. The government has not yet instituted a legal exposure limit to asbestos.

Apartheid's environmental toll has not spared wildlife. In the northern border, the military has decimated the elephant population and Renamo and Unita have long relied on ivory to buy guns. Only 14 out of 50 tons of ivory are legally exported each year.

The abolition of the Land Act, the homelands, the Population Registration Act, the Group Areas Act, and other apartheid legislation, "will automatical-

ly put an end to many of the sources of environmental degradation—overcrowding in the homelands, overreliance on coal, production of synthetic fuels, and scorched-earth warfare on neighboring countries," argues the report.

"If apartheid is dismantled, South Africa's industrial might and scientific infrastructure, which already make it the core of the regional economy, could be tapped to make it a positive force in the area. The region's abundant natural riches, from the minerals of Zimbabwe and South Africa to the fertile soils of Mozambique and Angola, could be integrated in a complementary way that would improve human welfare without degrading the environment. Commercial forestry plantations that are soaking precious water resources in the arid Transvaal Highveld could be shifted onto the coastal plains of Mozambique. Hydroelectric potential in Angola and Mozambique could replace South African coal. Surplus maize production in Zimbabwe could ride a refurbished rail system to help feed the region."


Apartheid's environmental disasters will not disappear overnight, the report acknowledges, and land redistribution, which is essential to arrest rural decline, will undoubtedly be difficult to carry out. But there is room for hope. Concern for the environment is increasing among a growing segment of the white community that squarely blames apartheid for the country's ecological disasters, as well as among the black population, and particularly the unions. ■

United Nations

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT...continued

Required, instead, is long-term development restructuring. Also required is a perspective of at least 25 years for Africa to strengthen its human potential, its national institutions, and the momentum of its growth," argues the report. "The international community should earmark an overwhelming share of its concessional resources for Africa and display the understanding and patience needed to build African economies and societies in an orderly and graduated way."

It is now widely accepted that structural adjustment programs across Africa slashed the wrong expenditures, removing the social safety net of the poor and impoverishing those who were living on the edge of poverty.



Still not granting women the attention they are due

Senegal cut its social spending per person by 48 percent in the period 1980-1985, Somalia by 62 percent, and Madagascar by 44 percent. The report argues that subsidies for basic foodstuffs and services of up to 3 percent of GNP can be reinstated, without overburdening the budgets of poor countries.

The study has been criticized for establishing criteria such as life expectancy, literacy, and purchasing power whose weight is arbitrary and for lacking essential elements in the quality of life index, such as political freedom, human rights, and individual self-respect. In addition, while recognizing the basic gender inequalities in

OBITUARY: A Tribute to Willie Musarurwa

Willie Musarurwa, the veteran Zimbabwean journalist whose work on behalf of the African nationalist cause made him internationally known, died in Harare on April 3, of a heart attack at the age of 63.

Willie Dzawanda Musarurwa was born in November 1927, in the Zvimba area of central Zimbabwe, into a peasant family. His keen intelligence and determination helped him succeed in the discriminatory Rhodesian education system, becoming one of the very few blacks to graduate from high school. He went on to qualify as a teacher and to take a correspondence course in journalism.

In 1953, he began freelancing for Rhodesia's white-dominated *Herald*, *Sunday Mail*, and other publications. Musarurwa's lively and provocative articles describing blacks' lives gained attention and, in 1957, he became editor of the *African Weekly* and later of the *African Daily News*, where he championed the cause of African nationalism.

Musarurwa won a fellowship in 1961 to study at Princeton University. He was active in Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (Zapu) and served as the party's information and publicity secretary. As a result of his political activities, Musarurwa was detained without charge or trial by Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith's government for 10 years and 10 months, until December 1974. Musarurwa remained active during that time, managing to produce a newsletter while in prison, which clandestinely circulated throughout the country.

In 1979, Musarurwa attended the Lancaster House talks in London which led to Zimbabwe's independence and acted as co-spokesman for the Patriotic Front. Following the purchase by Robert Mugabe's government of controlling interest in the *Zimbabwe Newspapers* in 1981, Musarurwa became the first black editor of the *Sunday Mail*. The newspaper became highly regarded by both black and white readers for its sharp articles, astute editorials, and witty columns. He was summarily fired in 1985, as a result of political differences with the government.

Unable to find journalistic work in Zimbabwe, Musarurwa formed a successful public relations and business consultancy firm. Recently, he wrote articles denouncing the moves toward a one-party state in Zimbabwe and criticizing the *Herald* and *Sunday Mail* for their sycophantic coverage of the Mugabe government.

Recognizing Musarurwa's widespread popularity, Mugabe declared him a national hero after his death and honored him with an elaborate state funeral. For days, Musarurwa's picture appeared on the front page of Harare's *Herald* newspaper, the same newspaper that had refused to publish his articles for the past five years.

Mugabe praised Musarurwa for "harnessing media resources to the benefit and advancement of the cause of African freedom and self-rule." Musarurwa is survived by his wife, Elizabeth, and seven children. Journalists have established a fund in Willie Musarurwa's name to be used to train budding Zimbabwean journalists.

—Andrew Meldrum

education and economic and public life, as well as women's "invisible" contribution to society, the report does not break any new ground in addressing the neglect of women's needs in national policies and development strategies. "The low value attached to women's work requires a fundamental remedy: If women's work were more fully accounted for, it would become clear how much women count in development. To do that requires much better gender-specific data on development. There is a need to redesign

national censuses, particularly agricultural surveys," recommends UNDP. While there is a male/female HDI, data limitations severely restricts its usefulness in assessing the real state of the condition of women.

Despite Africa's bleak stature in the report, there is promise: Human development progress in low and middle income countries such as Ghana, Zimbabwe, and Botswana can be applied elsewhere. The underlying message is that, above all, Africa's hope lies in its human development. ■

SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa's gold mines, the nation's top industry and the world's largest gold-producers, are facing a decline as a result of drastic cuts in profit margins from 70 percent in 1979 to a record low 15 percent. This has been attributed to depressed gold prices; declining ore grades; soaring production costs of up to 12 percent; high inflation; and competition from the U.S., Canada, and Australia, whose combined output last year exceeded that of South Africa for the first time since 1911, according to a new report published by Consolidated Gold Fields.

South Africa's output currently accounts for 37 percent of world production, compared to 70 percent in 1979, and there are fears that production could fall by as much as half in the 1990s, leading to several mine closures. Already, Freegold, South Africa's largest gold mine, has closed down two shafts to cut costs.

Kennedy Maxwell, president of the Chamber of Mines, has warned that up to 18 out of South Africa's 31 gold mines, employing over 116,000 laborers, will be operating at a loss by July if gold prices do not rise above this year's predicted \$400 per ounce. The cost of gold in some South African mines is also \$400, even if the national average is \$276 per ounce (the world average is currently \$250 per ounce). Once the lowest cost producer of gold in the world, South Africa is now the highest.

New mining strategies are being proposed to arrest the decline, including a move from exporting gold in the form of bullion to selling it as jewelry. The government has recently announced new regulations and tax concessions to encourage this strategy; other mining houses are now selectively mining high-grade rock.

Many South Africans are counting on a price rise based on the present trends of supply and demand. But, according to Maxwell, "even if the price of gold rose to between \$430 and \$450 an ounce, our industry would be crucially dependent on the dollar/rand exchange rate remaining at its present level," highlighting the fact that the crisis will not be resolved by a simple price windfall. Degussa AG, the West German metals refiner and trader, expects gold prices to remain at their present range of \$360 per ounce.

BUSINESS BRIEFS

LIVESTOCK

African livestock and wildlife are threatened by a highly destructive insect pest, the New World screw-worm—a fly whose parasitic larvae ravage livestock and at times, humans. Immediate action is necessary to avert a disaster and protect some 70 million livestock in North Africa alone, according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). At present, the pest is confined to Libya over an area of 7,200 miles. An estimated \$84 million is needed over the next two years to eradicate it.

The pest, which was until recently only prevalent in the Americas and which has proved to be the most destructive of parasites, was introduced in Africa through an infected animal from South America about a year ago. According to Dr. James E. Novy of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, "based on the economic losses experienced in the Western hemisphere, it is estimated that \$200 million annually in losses could be experienced in the North African region if screwworms were to spread."

The U.S.-Mexico Screwworm Eradication Commission combats the pest by using the sterile male technique, releasing sterile male flies irradiated with gamma radiation, which prevents the eggs from hatching, thereby breaking the life cycle of the parasite. The organization is now selling the fly to the FAO, but the logistical problems of getting the sterile flies from Mexico to Africa are said to be daunting.

"It is still technically feasible to eradicate the screwworm, but once it becomes established in tropical Africa, that will be impossible at any price," recently warned FAO Director-General Edward Saouma.

"The damage to wildlife, including already endangered species, would be devastating. This is truly a now-or-never situation." The parasite also infects humans and can cause madness and death.

INVESTMENT

A report entitled *1990 Africa Investment Climate Survey* was recently released in Washington D.C. by the Africa Investment Promotion Partnership, providing a compilation of investment climate indicators for 39 countries across the continent. This country-by-country comparison of key indicators is the first of its kind, and includes tax and customs duty exemptions, infrastructure, legal agreements, laws, and regulations governing foreign investment. The survey is intended to serve as a reference tool for businessmen to make a first assessment about investing in Africa.

"While Africa attracts less U.S. foreign investment than other regions, it also ranks as the most profitable region for U.S. companies and their subsidiaries," argues the report, underscoring the fact that, on a selective basis, there are profitable opportunities in certain sectors of African countries, particularly in the mining and extractive sectors, where returns are as high as 22 percent. The survey also highlights the increasingly competitive posture of several African countries, arguing that the investment climate in Africa is "vastly different" from only a few years ago, with governments now offering investors a variety of incentive packages, pre-constructed factory shells, and export processing zones.

AUTO INDUSTRY

Kenya and Nigeria have taken a major step toward the establishment of full-fledged automobile industries with the development of new, locally made cars. Kenya recently unveiled the first models of its Nyayo Pioneer 1, 2, and 3, constructed almost exclusively from local components. The plan entails the creation of a company in which Mitsubishi will own 5 percent of the shares. Some 3,000 cars will initially be produced at a cost of KShs 160,000 (\$6,700) each.

The first-ever Nigerian-made vehicle is intended to provide an affordable option to the Peugeot, which costs N140,000 (over \$18,000). With a market price of N15,000 to 20,000, the new vehicle is expected to meet an estimated national demand of 100,000 cars per year. The prototype, however, has been criticized for its low headroom, low ground clearance, and use of imported parts.



THE POLITICS OF PERSUASION

By PATRICK LAURENCE

Eric Miller/Impact Visuals



After the African National Congress and the South African government's "talks about talks" in May, the issues of violence and the fate of political prisoners remain contentious. Apart from these matters on the negotiating table, both F.W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela face political problems in the days ahead—for the South African president, a restive right wing, and for the ANC leader, fall-out from the "Stompie affair."

Settlement of the South African conflict is still a long way off, but the government and its long-standing adversary, the African National Congress, have taken the first important steps on the road to peace.

The preliminary talks between government and ANC representatives in Cape Town from May 2 to 4 ended amicably. Both sides agreed to continue the "peaceful process of negotiations." Held at Groote Schuur, the dignified and historic official residence of South African heads of state, the meeting was characterized by public bonhomie between men who only a few months ago were bitter foes.

Extrapolating from the official statement, it is clear that the Groote Schuur talks focused largely on the contentious issue of violence: Government delegates pressed the ANC to abandon its continued public commitment to "armed struggle," arguing that its repeated justification of armed resistance added to the climate of violence; ANC men tackled the government on the shooting by police of "unarmed civilians" seeking to exercise their democratic right to protest.

Since then, there have been further acts of violence in contravention of the Groote Schuur pledge to

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eschew "violence and intimidation from whatever quarter."

In Welkom, a mining town in South Africa's "Deep South," police killed 12 blacks hardly more than two weeks after the Cape Town talks. Four blacks were shot dead when police stopped an attempted anti-apartheid protest march by militant youths from Thabong, a black township on the outskirts of Welkom, into Welkom itself. More Thabong residents were killed by police when young black people, angered by the police shootings, went on the rampage in Thabong. The angry youths contributed to the death toll, murder-

and threatened to pull out of the negotiations. Later, however, after talks with the Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, he agreed that the talks should continue. "He [Vlok] outlined steps he would take to stop the massacres," Mandela said.

The spiraling violence since the Groote Schuur accord has been fed from another quarter: a series of bomb and grenade attacks by insurgents. The targets have been economic and military, not civilian. The most spectacular was a limpet mine attack on a gasoline depot near the Transvaal town of Louis Trichart. In addition, there have been a series of

gun and grenade attacks on policemen by unknown assailants. No one has claimed responsibility officially. But the grenades have been identified by police as similar to those used in the past by the ANC, suggesting that ANC guerrillas rather than insurgents of the rival Pan Africanist Congress are responsible. The grenades are of Soviet origin. The PAC is armed with Chinese-made grenades.

These attacks have raised anxiety levels in the white community and given the right-wing

leaders an opportunity to attack de Klerk for not dealing firmly with "terrorism"; they have not, however, precipitated threats from the government to break off the negotiations.

The commitment to peace talks has not merely held fast in the face of violence—there has been actual progress. A joint government-ANC working committee was established under the Groote Schuur agreement. Its brief was to find a mutually acceptable definition of what are, and what are not, political offenses, in order to



Steve Hilton-Barber/Impact Visuals

ANC rally: The attacks have raised anxiety levels in the white community and given right-wing leaders an opportunity to attack de Klerk for not dealing firmly with "terrorism"

ing Thabong's former mayor, 67-year-old Albert Pakathi, apparently because of his membership in the Zulu-based movement, Inkatha, and setting fire to the property of suspected collaborators.

Police action in Thabong caused ANC leader Nelson Mandela to speak of a massacre of black civilians and to accuse the security forces of regarding every black person as a military target. He declared that the shootings were inimical to the peaceful resolution of South Africa's problems

speed up the release of political prisoners, the granting of immunity to political offenders, and the return of exiles. They completed their work on schedule, handing in their recommendations on May 21.

Although members of the committee declined to give details of their report, it was clear that a *modus vivendi* had been reached. Jacob Zuma, the ANC's intelligence chief, told journalists: "The issues are behind us." The agreement is expected to accelerate the emergence from prisons all over South Africa of men and women jailed for politically motivated actions. The ANC puts the number of political prisoners in South African jails at 3,000.

But according to a front-page report in *The Star*, South Africa's biggest daily newspaper, the working committee agreement heralded an even more dramatic development: a general amnesty for all political prisoners, including those jailed for offenses leading to loss of life. The general amnesty—which is undoubtedly under consideration in highest government circles—will, it is anticipated, extend to South African agents serving long sentences in Zimbabwean jails. One is a woman, Odile Harrington. Some of Harrington's co-prisoners are under sentence of death. Mandela had "highly sensitive" talks with Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe in Harare while en route back to South Africa from his seven-nation tour of African countries in May.

An amnesty which includes the return of captured South African agents from Zimbabwe and possibly Botswana will make the release of imprisoned ANC bombers more palatable to right-wingers. If it includes a reprieve for Barend Strydom, the former policeman and self-styled "White Wolf" who cold-bloodedly shot and killed seven black civilians in Pretoria, then it will pre-empt much of the fury of the right wing at the freeing of ANC saboteurs responsible for the death of white civilians.

A general amnesty may, moreover, include members of South Africa's police and army "death squads" or

what the government calls "anti-terrorist units." In what may be a precursor to future developments, the ANC has given its protection to two fugitive South African policemen, Dirk Coetzee and David Tshikalange. According to their own testimony before a judicial inquiry into political killings, they were members of a police "death squad" which, acting on orders from above, assassinated the pro-ANC human rights lawyer Griffiths Mxenge.

As the former adversaries moved closer together on the need for an agreement, de Klerk and Mandela vied for world sympathy and support. Their rivalry, however, was not inconsistent with their commitment to negotiations. They were meeting to strengthen their position at the negotiating table, not on the battlefield.

De Klerk left South Africa soon after the Groote Schuur talks on a nine-nation tour of Europe. His formally declared objective was to inform his European hosts—who included President François Mitterrand, Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher—of his policy initiatives and to ask them to reappraise their policies toward South Africa. "I have not come to Europe with a shopping list," he said. His undeclared objective, however, was to set the scene for the lifting of European Community-approved sanctions. De Klerk seems to have made a favorable impression on most of his European interlocutors.

Mandela, who was in Africa while de Klerk was in Europe, kept up his cry for the maintenance of sanctions, contending that the movement away from apartheid was not yet "irreversible" and that sanctions should remain in place until it was. Mandela left for Europe early in June, confidently promising to reverse whatever gain de Klerk may have made. From Europe, he headed for the United States with the same mission: to rally support behind the ANC in a bid to equalize its resources with those of the South African government.

As de Klerk and Mandela edged their way toward the negotiating



Nelson Mandela's problem was to defend his wife and to prevent the "Stompie affair" from adversely affecting the ANC

table, each faced internal problems. De Klerk had to deal with vociferous condemnation as a "traitor" by the right wing. Mandela had to contend with criticism from the black consciousness movement and the PAC who insisted that the time was not yet opportune for negotiations, and that "premature" negotiations inevitably led to compromising the long-term interests of the bulk of the black population.

On May 26, the day that de Klerk returned to South Africa, Andries Treurnicht, leader of the right-wing Conservative Party, addressed an estimated crowd of 60,000 rightists at the Voortrekker Monument, the holiest shrine in Afrikaner folklore. "The third freedom struggle has begun," Treurnicht said to roars of approval. Since the first two "freedom struggles" were fought on the battlefield by the 19th century Boer Republics, the import of his declaration was clear: While the rightists would prefer to oppose de Klerk at the polls, they would, if necessary, resist militarily.

Treurnicht accused de Klerk of

surrendering the rights of whites to self-government, of following a course which would lead to their subjugation by the black majority. He pointedly quoted one of Afrikanerdom's finest modern poets, N.P. van Wyck Louw: "If you put a proud nation in chains, uprising becomes its right."

The right-wing rally, attended by a disparate array of white supremacists, ranging from members of Treurnicht's Conservative Party to zealots of Eugene Terre'Blanche's neo-Nazi Afrikaner Resistance Movement, refocused attention on two critical questions: whether the Conservative Party, as the parliamentary wing of rightist forces, could defeat de Klerk's ruling National Party at the polls, and, if not, whether the rightists would take the course of military rebellion.

De Klerk is committed to seeking the approval of whites for his hoped-for deal with black nationalists through either a parliamentary election or a referendum. He must do so by 1994 at the latest. Thus, the right wing will have one last chance of defeating de Klerk before the rules of the game are altered through the admission of black voters.

The Conservative Party's chance of a ballot box victory seems slight, especially if de Klerk opts—as he is almost certain to do—for a referendum. The Conservative Party obtained only 31 percent of the white vote in last year's general election. The National Party won 48 percent and the strongly pro-reform Democratic Party, 21 percent. In a referendum, the expectation is that the National and Democratic Party supporters will vote in favor of a settlement, provided de Klerk, with the help of Mandela, can assuage their anxieties about black domination or mismanagement of the economy.

The Conservative Party's share of the white vote has remained fixed at 31 percent, according to opinion polls. While it has won Afrikaner voters from de Klerk, the National Party has compensated by winning votes from the English-speaking white community at the expense of the

Democratic Party. Two further factors may help de Klerk considerably.

There is evidence to show that the idea of a negotiated settlement with the ANC is becoming more acceptable to whites with the passage of time. Its "acceptability rating" has more than doubled since May 1989, rising from less than 25 percent to more than 55 percent. White anxieties about black rule are to some extent negated by a growing perception of the rightists as "wild men," whose precipitate actions will hasten rather than forestall disaster.

If the Conservative Party does not defeat de Klerk at the polls, or if rightists give up hope of doing so,

The right wing will have one last chance of defeating de Klerk before the rules of the game are altered through the admission of black voters.

armed rebellion then moves more sharply into focus as a possibility.

The chances of a coup by the South African Defence Force, or elements within it, appear to be minimal. As Deon Fourie, professor of strategic studies at the University of South Africa notes, the prevailing ethos in the Defence Force is loyalty to the government of the day, rather than to a political party or an ideology.

Attempted rebellion by rightists, however, cannot be ruled out. Many rightists own their own weapons. Their private armory has been supplemented by the theft of weapons from the Defence Force, carried out under the instructions of Piet Rudolph, a fanatical rightist. Rudolph, who is on the run from the police, has boasted of his involvement in the theft of Defence Force arms in telephone calls to newspapers.

In a later call, the fugitive rightist claimed responsibility for an explosion in Pretoria. His target was Mel-

rose House—the Peace of Vereeniging which ended the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1901, or what Afrikaner nationalists call the Second War of Freedom, was signed there. The explosion was presumably meant to symbolize the start of the Third Freedom Struggle.

Historical precedent is not auspicious for armed rebellion by whites, however. The only two major rebellions by whites in modern South African history—the 1914 rebellion by some former Boer generals and the 1922 Rand Revolt by disgruntled white miners—were speedily crushed.


If de Klerk faced potential problems from the right, Mandela had intense worries of his own as he set out for Africa, Europe, and America, in a bid to counteract whatever gains de Klerk might have made on the international front. On May 25, Mandela's wife, Winnie, was found by a court to have been present on the night that four abducted youths were assaulted in one of her Soweto homes. The assault took place in December 1988. One of the youths, Stompie Mokhetsi, was later found dead in Soweto.

Jerry Richardson, the coach of the Mandela United Football Club, of which Mrs. Mandela was the patron, was found guilty of murdering Stompie. The three youths who survived told the court they had been assaulted by Winnie Mandela, who they said beat them with a sjambok, or heavy whip. Judge Brian O'Donovan found that their testimony had the "ring of truth."

Mandela's immediate problem was to defend his wife and to prevent the "Stompie affair" from adversely affecting the ANC. Another related difficulty was looming, however. There were suspicions, voiced openly in Parliament by the Conservative Party, that Winnie Mandela had not been prosecuted because of a secret deal between Mandela and de Klerk. Opponents of an ANC-government settlement were preparing to exploit the suspicions in a bid to discredit the two leaders and wreck the negotiations. ○

The Reverend Smangaliso Mkhatsbwa: **A THEOLOGIAN OF THE PEOPLE**

By MARGARET A. NOVICKI



Margaret A. Novicki

Secretary-General of the Institute for Contextual Theology and patron of the United Democratic Front, the Reverend Smangaliso Mkhatsbwa, a Roman Catholic priest, has been at the forefront of the struggle to end apartheid through his religious and community-based activities, ones for which he was imprisoned and tortured.

In this exclusive interview with *Africa Report*, the Reverend Mkhatsbwa analyzes the political climate in South Africa in the wake of Nelson Mandela's release, assessing the strategies of both the government and the Mass Democratic Movement. He also explains the history behind the violence in Natal, and offers the MDM's perspective on policy options for Western governments at this point in the nation's history.

Africa Report: What is your assessment of the current political situation in South Africa following the May talks about talks between the government and the African National Congress [ANC]? What is the next step?

Mkhatsbwa: Naturally, everybody is very interested in what is going on in South Africa. In assessing that situation, one can adopt one of two attitudes: One can be very euphoric and therefore run the danger of being rather simplistic in interpreting what is taking place in South Africa today. If one adopts that attitude, there is a real danger that one can conclude that apartheid is dead and therefore there is no longer any need to continue with the various forms of pressure, whether economic, political, diplomatic, cultural or whatever.

Or one can adopt a more realistic view, being aware that the main pillars of apartheid are still in place, very intact. What F.W. de Klerk has done has some significance in the

sense that he has at least made it possible for people to begin to operate openly, to organize politically, and to express their dissent through protest marches, even though people are still being shot by police. One must be aware that with the talks about talks that took place, there is still a long way to go. The fact that those talks took place at all is a sign of hope about the future, and therefore this process needs to be encouraged. But I don't think de Klerk needs to be rewarded because all that he has done is to give in to internal and international pressure. That pressure, therefore, needs to be maintained, so that he doesn't slip backwards, that he rather continues to allow the political process to take place more and more.

In fact, he must be encouraged to accelerate that process because people's expectations have been raised. If, for instance, the ANC is not able to deliver, there could be some real problems if people begin to be disillusioned and impatient

and quite understandably so. After having waited for over 338 years, you can understand if people are a little bit impatient and they'd like to see results. What happened in May in Cape Town wasn't really negotiations. It was a preliminary discussion which was important to help clear the air, to help build up some form of trust between the two parties to try and find common ground before coming to the nuts and bolts of the real issues.

Africa Report: Will there be further talks about talks?

Mkhatshwa: Yes, there will be more than just talks about talks because they have set up joint committees to study, for instance, the implications of lifting the state of emergency, to look into the whole question of political prisoners and their release, those in exile and the implications of their return, and so forth. Much more work will be done by these joint special committees, rather like what happened in Namibia.

Africa Report: International and domestic pressure led to de Klerk's moves, and de Klerk's trip to Europe and an upcoming visit to the U.S. are obviously intended to ease that pressure. What is his strategy at the moment?

Mkhatshwa: Like any good politician, de Klerk will want to exploit the situation. His trips abroad are an opportunity for him to say: "I've been a good boy, I've been sensitive to

advice, to the pressures and so on, and unlike my predecessors, I am a reasonable fellow to deal with. You've got to reciprocate as well, I've made some concessions, and if you are really concerned about change taking place in South Africa, you must stop applying economic sanctions because you are hurting the very same people you are trying to help. Make things a bit easier for me, stop isolating us, encourage us, and the only way to encourage us is to stop applying economic sanctions."

Now the international community can say: "Yes, we shall reward you because you are reasonable, sensible, and so on." Or they can say: "Not yet...we appreciate what has happened and we would like to encourage you by not intensifying the sanctions that are already in place. If you introduce more changes and even faster, we shall have no option but to lift the sanctions and even invest much more actively in the country, to help rebuild the economy, to restore confidence of various countries in South Africa, and diplomatically also to ensure that we give you the necessary protection and encouragement to do even more."

The international community needs to be very careful that it doesn't fall into de Klerk's trap. It must also be a little more honest in the sense that some countries have been doing a roaring business with South Africa and have been looking for an excuse, however small it may be, to say now we can go ahead and do good business.

Africa Report: What is your view of where the U.S. stands in all of this?

Mkhatshwa: At the best of times, U.S. policy has been a bit ambiguous. The measures it has applied need to be left where they are. The U.S. should encourage this process [that de Klerk

Inkatha impis: "We all know that there are people called the warlords who are actually the ones that are responsible for the violence, they are leading the impis who attack people, murder, maim people"



has begun]. Nelson Mandela will be visiting the U.S. and I hope he will be carrying the same message, namely that the U.S. is certainly one of the players in our part of the world in the quest for peace, and therefore we would want them to tell de Klerk to do much more and quicker. But at this stage, the U.S. should not lift any sanctions, it shouldn't ease any pressures that are in place.

Africa Report: The release of Mandela and unbanning of political organizations has created a whole new situation for the Mass Democratic Movement. What is the line-up of forces within the MDM now? Are most people solidly behind the ANC? Is the movement more unified or less in light of the ANC's talks with government?

Mkhatshwa: First of all, if democracy means anything at all, it means tolerance of other people's opinions and respect for their right to differ. What is happening in South Africa is the normal process of democracy, but what we really need to be looking at is, as you say, the line-up of forces.

Without any doubt whatsoever, the ANC, with its allies, the MDM, Cosatu, the United Democratic Front [UDF], enjoys by far the most massive support in the country and this manifests itself in many different ways. The ANC is setting up structures which could not exist six months ago and the recruitment drive is in full swing. If you look at the rallies, for instance, that have been taking place in the country to receive Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and the others, there is no doubt that the ANC enjoys the most massive support in the country and one can virtually say that it is the alternative government in the making.


Secondly, de Klerk, almost without even consulting anybody, immediately identified the ANC as the negotiating partner. He is no fool. Through intelligence and other ways, he must have concluded that the ANC is the force that he needs to be talking to. Further, the armed struggle has been basically waged by the ANC. The pressure we have been talking about has been waged by the ANC over the years.

It is very clear to me, therefore, and to many other people that in terms of power, influence, and size of membership, the ANC is by far the dominant force in the country. It is stronger than the National Party itself, stronger than anything else that exists in the country. It is true that there are other much smaller forces that also exist, and they must be allowed to say that they are not happy about certain things. But at the end of the day, the question we have to ask is: Who is going to set the agenda and the pace and the tempo of change? To whom will the vast majority of the people in South Africa listen? And I am one to argue that the ANC is that force that is going to really decide what happens in South Africa finally.

Africa Report: What is behind the violence in Natal? What steps are being taken by the ANC and Inkatha to address it?

Mkhatshwa: It is grossly unfair to expect Mandela to suddenly solve that problem. It started years before he was released from prison. The government itself with all its machinery and security apparatus has not managed to solve that situation, either because it didn't have the will to do so or simply because it suits government interests. But having said that, there definitely is concern within the ANC, MDM, and UDF about that situation, that it must be brought under control as soon as possible.

Why have so many peace efforts failed? There are several reasons. First of all, it is very clear that it is a political conflict between the Inkatha movement on the one hand and the progressive forces represented by Cosatu, ANC, UDF on the other.



Sowetans celebrating the release of Nelson Mandela: "There is no doubt that the ANC enjoys the most massive support in the country and one can virtually say that it is the alternative government in the making"

In 1984-85, the whole thing was sparked off by Inkatha's trying to force people to take out membership. There were other socio-economic factors—people being displaced, unemployment, poverty—but the dominant factor is political: Inkatha's desire for hegemony in that area and its unwillingness to brook any opposition from anybody, certainly not from the progressive elements. So that is what it boils down to.

Many efforts at peace have so far failed. Some clergymen came together and encouraged Cosatu, Inkatha, and UDF to set up a peace process and so on. There has been a monitoring group based at the University of Natal, some MPs also got involved to try and bring about normality and find out what the facts were, there have been peace rallies, prayer rallies, all

sorts of things. The government sent in more reinforcements.

Some of the reasons why this exercise has not succeeded is: One, the difficulty of the Cosatu-UDF alliance in trying to reach any agreement with the Inkatha movement under the leadership of Gatsha Buthelezi. Even though some agreements had already been reached, they were never really implemented. So there has been that problem—the failure of the recognized peace process to actually get off the ground.

Secondly, the attitude of the police. The vast majority of the people will tell you that in the conflict in Natal, the police have not played an unbiased, impartial role. They have definitely been very partisan in favor of Inkatha. There are many affidavits before the law courts in which some of the war lords—Inkatha members—have been mentioned and evidence has been collected for everybody to see, but nothing happens.

But I think the problem at the moment is one of distrust. If people took Mandela's call literally to throw their weapons into the sea, they would be wiped out, they would be physically attacked by Inkatha. De Klerk has sent in some more troop reinforcements, people are still dying, but there seems to be an improvement in the situation. I believe myself that if the government has the will and the desire to stop all that, it will stop within days.

We all know that there are people called the war-lords who are actually the ones that are responsible for the violence, they are leading the impis who attack people, murder, maim people. The role of the police, especially the special constables, has been very questionable. It is common course that they have supported the Inkatha movement almost openly. It is true that de Klerk has sent in members of the Defence Force to try and bring some order in that situation, but people continue to die, and practically all those that are dying at the moment are all opponents of Inkatha.

Rather than talking about "black-on-black violence" which gives a false picture of what is happening, we need to look at the socio-economic factors which are responsible for that violence. We need to look at the ideological and political conflict between the two groups. It is a conflict between one group that is totally opposed to apartheid and would like to dismantle that system, and another group which operates within the structures of apartheid; in spite of what they might say, the truth of the matter is that they are financed by apartheid, they continue to exist thanks to the support given to them by the apartheid regime.

Africa Report: Is the process toward one person, one vote irreversible? Has de Klerk accepted it or is he still talking about group rights, protection for minorities, etc.?

Mkhatshwa: I would like to believe that the process is irreversible. It just depends on how many obstacles are placed in its way. I think de Klerk for quite some time will continue with this group rights thing, partly as kind of a political posturing, so he doesn't lose the support of his constituency too soon. He must reassure them that he is in control of things and so on and is not going to sell them down the drain. I do feel that with the passage of time, he probably will give in and the real serious peace process or negotiations will get under way. How soon is anybody's guess. But I would imagine that in the near future the serious negotiations will begin, because it is in everybody's interest to ensure that that actually happens.

Africa Report: The last several years haven't been easy for you, having been imprisoned and tortured. How do you see your role as a churchman in the struggle at the moment?

Mkhatshwa: I have been very much guided by the Mass Democratic Movement and by what has been happening in the country because I believe as a contextual theologian, you need to be sensitive to what is happening around you. For instance, when the United Democratic Front came into being in 1983, it was very clear that there had been a real strong desire for the different organizations to be brought together into some form of front. All the anti-apartheid organizations of different kinds and ideologies had to be brought together if we really wanted to be effective, and that is why I was elected one of the patrons of the UDF. I have worked very closely with that front because I believe in its main objectives—to bring people together to continue the struggle against apartheid.

Because of my participation in anti-apartheid activities, I eventually got myself into big trouble. When the state of emergency was declared, I was taken in during the year 1986-87. I was tortured. They would never tell you exactly why you have been detained, but there are always very vague allegations, such as, "The minister of law and order is satisfied that you have engaged in activities that are prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order and the security of the country," and so on. But they don't actually substantiate that.

When we went out of detention, we continued our work because we just had no choice but to continue resisting apartheid. I got actively involved in civic associations which try to organize people locally. They fight for better living conditions, rent, good roads, garbage collection, but also if someone is detained, they take up that issue. The civic association plays a role that is both civic and political, and they are in contact with other civic associations around the country. So for instance now, when the ANC is trying to embark on a recruitment campaign, the civic associations are playing quite an important role.

I have also continued to run a parish because I felt that it would be dangerous for one just to be involved in academic work without remaining with one's feet on the ground, and the only way to do so is to continue to be in contact with the grass-roots people. And it also helps one to translate the ideas, theories, and so on into practice and therefore one can see whether certain ideas reflect the aspirations of the people or they are just in the clouds.

Then I got involved in the National Reception Committee for not just Mandela alone, but for all the ex-Rivonia trialists. We have been trying to organize their program, speaking engagements, all their needs to the best of our ability.

In closing, I would only emphasize that it is important for people, organizations, and governments that have been supportive in the struggle against apartheid to continue doing so until apartheid has been destroyed. That is very important. What you can do as people involved in the media is to help people understand what the real issues are and what the situation in South Africa is really all about.

The Western countries should listen in a very sensitive way to the voice coming from the majority of the people in South Africa and stop choosing leaders for us, in terms of promoting people that do not enjoy the support of the majority of our people. We are very hopeful that Mandela is such a statesman, a man of such absolute integrity and determination, that if he is given the chance, he can do a great job. Mandela is a symbol as a leader of a movement, and he must not be seen in isolation from that movement. Political support, diplomatic support, and even material support should actually be increased. ○



THE RIGHT'S SHOW OF MIGHT

South Africa's right wing staged a rally in late May to denounce F.W. de Klerk's efforts toward dismantling apartheid. While some 60,000 of the faithful attended, the blustery self-righteousness of the politicians failed to inspire an uprising, suggesting that even the conservatives may have realized that change is inevitable.

By PETER TYGESEN

History repeats itself, so the saying goes, once as tragedy, once as farce. As South Africa's far-right Conservative Party on May 26 launched the Third Liberation War of the Afrikaner people, it was still difficult to assess which stage was reached in this people's torn history.

But it was apparent in their show of horses, guns, and century-old flags that these are riders of a lost cause. For all their fear and frenzy, their vision is blurred and their dream of white supremacy long ago became a violent nightmare.

To blacks, however, the show is one with deadly consequences: They are occasionally gunned down in cold blood, just to prove the point.

White supremacy is dying in South Africa and with it the century-

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AWB leader Eugene Terre'Blanche, Pretoria: The right-wing urgently began planning a massive protest campaign against de Klerk's policies

old dream of an Afrikaner nation is being finally crushed. The *verligte* (enlightened) of the Afrikaner tribe don't really mind. Followers of President F.W. de Klerk's National Party, they are confident that they can strike a deal with the black leadership that will ensure their people partnership in a thriving nation.

Their opposition, the *verkrampste* of the tribe, are clinging to the dogma of apartheid amid South Africa's confusing whorl of change.

They decided on a show of strength against de Klerk's reforms. They talk of war.

For years, they predicted that the "sell-out" leadership of the National Party was going to hand over power to the blacks. On February 2, their fears came true. On this "black Friday," de Klerk unbanned the Communist Party and the nationalist organizations, the ANC and PAC,

and promised the quick release of Nelson Mandela. He immediately set up talks with these "forces of evil." From the right's perspective, the end of everything Afrikaners had stubbornly fought for over 300 years was near.

The right wing urgently began planning a massive protest campaign. At the forefront was the drive to collect a million signatures against de Klerk's policies. After three months of planning, they set the scene for the largest gathering of Afrikaner protest since the Nats won power in 1948.

By May 26, everything was ready.

Arno Zeman/Impact Visuals

Early that morning, they sent their khaki-clad horsemen parading through the streets of Pretoria, urging people to join their *vergadering* at the Voortrekker monument on the outskirts of town. Prominent among the 720-strong horse-commandos were members of the ultra-right Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB), proudly brandishing pistols while parading their swastika-like banners.

Two nights before the gathering at Voortrekkerhoogte, an explosion rocked the capital. A hand grenade had badly damaged the historic Melrose House, where in 1902 battered Boer generals had signed the Peace of Vereeniging, or rather, their defeat by the British.

Bitter-einders of the tribe have still not forgiven the generals for their humiliating acceptance of that defeat. Piet "Skiet" (Shoot) Rudolf, spokesman of a minuscule right-wing falange, phoned *The Pretoria News* proudly claiming responsibility for the bombing. He vowed to continue attacking similar "symbols of humiliation."

Rudolf phoned from hiding. A month earlier, he had pulled off a spectacular weapons raid from nothing less than the Air Force headquarters. The theft provided him with an undisclosed number of R5 assault rifles, a light machine gun, numerous automatic shotguns, 30 9mm automatic pistols, and thousands of rounds of ammunition. With his action, Rudolf had humiliated the government. He had successfully staged a public relations stunt parallel to the famed Boer guerrilla warfare that for years kept the Imperial British army at bay. Had the battle begun again, this time against the Nationalist government, as well as the ANC and the country's black majority?

In dusty Welkom, a fast-growing gold-mining town on the barren plains of the Orange Free State, it certainly looked so. But here the targets were people, not weapons or buildings.

Organized bands of white vigilantes had earlier this year begun to

cruise Welkom's streets at night carrying automatic rifles, pump shotguns, and pistols.

According to Hennie Müller, leader of the White Security organization, his "8,000 able men" were only there to protect life and property. Leaders of local black organizations, however, claimed that they were beating up any black person on the streets after dark.

When two blacks were killed in May, allegedly by the white vigilantes, the black community called a consumer boycott of white-owned shops. Shopowners' combined losses came to R1 million (\$400,000) a day and the atmosphere in Welkom went from bad to worse. White vigilante patrols were increased and the AWB sent in its hoods.

Suddenly, the tense situation exploded. A mob of angry black miners demonstrated against harassment by white foremen for wearing ANC badges. Mine security guards fired on them with teargas and birdshot. In the ensuing pitched battle, two whites were killed.

Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok raced to the scene. In a deal, White Security leader Müller promised to keep his men off the street for three months, in return for more police and a promise from Vlok to persuade the black leaders to give up the boycott. A few days later, a rally in the township resolved to stop the boycott. But as people walked home from the rally, militant youths and police clashed in a battle that left 13 blacks dead and more than 100 injured.

Fear gripped the nation. Near Pretoria, three black men were gunned down on a dark street by khaki-clad whites claiming to be traffic police checking permits. One black survived to tell the tale. Similar incidents ensued, but with no survivors to expose the details.

Newspapers focused on the far right, filling pages with chilling reports of the AWB's "secret training camps" and pictures of target-shooting, frenzy-eyed young men and women in khaki. "Will the right be able to throw the peace process off

track?" they asked. "Can the government control the right-wing elements in the police?" "How fast is the right rising?"

Then came the bomb attack against Melrose House.

The surge of right-wing backlash was to culminate in the mass rally at Voortrekkerhoogte. Never before had the Conservative Party organized such a coalition of the splintered right.

Some followers of Rudolf's Boerestatparty were no doubt among the clear-eyed, khaki-clad youths stalking the Voortrekker amphitheater on Saturday afternoon, listening with dull vigilance to representatives of the country's four provinces deliver "freedom manifestos" and to the main speaker, chairman of the Conservative Party, Dr. Andries Treurnicht. Dull, because nothing new was said. Vigilant, because in fringe politics everybody is a potential sell-out.

And fringe it is. Even in this hour of doom for their belief in institutionalized racial superiority, these activists do not work for, hope for, or even think of white unity. Nor do their leaders. They never say it out loud, but "white" is inherently seen as being Afrikaans, the *volk*. Thus, they have become a minority within another minority.

Beneath this lies fears, rooted in socio-economic facts: The Afrikaners were for centuries the underdog of white South Africa; their families became the hungry armies of job-seekers during industrialization and economic recession. And it is the Afrikaner who, once again, is threatened by poverty in de Klerk's new, reformed South Africa.

Their numbers of poor whites have grown dramatically through the late 1980s due to the sanctions-induced recession. Recession knows no color bar. In the Witwatersrand area alone, the private charity organization Operation Hunger is now feeding 800 white families daily. Co-director Mpho Mashinini, a black South African, ponders the paradox: "Here I am, feeding their children in order for them not to go to school hungry, schools where my children are

denied access because they are considered inferior."

Most of those in the food lines are Afrikaners. They are not interested in politics at all, says Mashinini. "They are only struggling to survive."

Sociologists say that the storm troopers of the extreme right organizations like the AWB, the White Liberation Party, Boerestaparty, World Apartheid Movement, and others, come from the social stratum just above the desperate beneficiaries of Mashinini's food parcels.

The wider right, i.e., the Conservative Party, draws the bulk of its support from blue-collar workers in mining and industry, from the poorly paid civil service (including the police), and from the farming community. They are the foremen of the factories and the mines, just one little step above their black workers, and they know that their children will never get similar jobs. They respond to growing black self-esteem as a threat. It is they who already have lost privileges lightening up dull and dirty jobs. It is their neighborhoods that will be "invaded" by up-and-coming black families when residential segregation goes, not the more expensive neighborhoods of the better-off supporters of the National Party.

Nationalist supporters are generally farmers of the better land, professionals, businessmen, and white-collar workers. They are educated and able to send their children to college. Most of them can afford the high-standard service in private hospitals, schools, and old-age homes. But Dr. T.'s common *volk* cannot. The working-class Afrikaners are the candidates for ending below that dreaded poverty line when unemployment strikes.

This threat could easily become reality as a result of another Nationalist scheme: privatization. Afrikaner poverty was crippling in the 1930s and 1940s, and like any other African tribe after winning power, the Nats funneled their unemployed people into public service. Today, government enterprises and departments

are grossly overstaffed. The enterprises are inefficient and the departments provide a "service" that usually (but not always) is superior to those offered in other African countries.

Forced by an insufficient tax base and by strained private corporations complaining of poor public back-up, the Nationalist government will lay off thousands of civil servants and privatize the large public steel, power, and transport corporations. Once privatized, these too will most likely pare down their bloated staffs.

The fired ones will almost exclusively be Afrikaners. These will immediately recognize increased government expenditure on service for blacks as another reason for their redundancy.

And so it was a vast compounding of anger, fear, and loathing that drew the crowd to Voortrekkerhoogte, to Dr. Treurnicht's consoling promise of a new rise for *Die Volk*.

They met in a haze of greasy mists from gas-fired *braai* barbecues, loaded with boere-sausage and mammoth steaks. There were black cast iron pots, like those used in any rural household all over Africa, with *potjiekos* (stew). And there was every kind of chauvinist minority propa-



Eugene Terre'Blanche, head of AWB, with swastika-like symbol

Chairman of the Conservative Party Andries Treurnicht (left) with the mayor of Boksburg: He promised a new rise of "Die Volk"



ganda available, from the World Apartheid Movement, via the Boerestatparty demanding a Boer Republic comprising the present Transvaal and Orange Free State, to the oranje-workers' call to all true Afrikaners to do all work themselves and avoid employing any blacks. "The recent stay-aways have amply proved that whites are capable of taking over many of the tasks traditionally assigned to blacks," a poster proudly proclaims at their stand.

Some elite. As the crowd good-naturedly wandered past the stands above the amphitheater, they resembled a cross between bored Sunday visitors to an outdoor equipment show and proud families scouting bargains at a garage sale in the county next door.

Their talk centers on battle: battle against "symbols of humiliation," battle against the Brits, battle against the blacks, battle against the government. As Dr. T. lumbered through his 15-page speech, obviously feeling the need to get a lot off his chest on this brilliant day, the crowd turned dormant, satisfied with his assurances that nobody can push a Boer around.

Yet the rally was not the culmination of the day. The organizers had to rush the performers, the enormous church choirs, the taped quotations of Afrikaner heroes, and finally Dr. T. himself, through their acts in order to finish ahead of scheduled time. Cutting the taped German marches short, they wanted to ensure that the rally would be over well in advance of the first match in this year's rugby season, which was kicked off a few miles down the highway.

Minutes after Dr. T. had finished outlining the relentless efforts "our people" will invest in overthrowing the present government, or at least in collecting signatures, chaos broke out in the parking lots as hundreds of cars and screaming horses jammed the exits.

Ebullient organizers had publicly declared they expected a "massive turn-out," adding that they would be disappointed if "no more than 100,000 attended." In spite of having

gathered "the nation" by buses and trailers from every dusty dorp, they never drew more than 60,000.

During the day, it became clear, too, that they still hadn't been able to collect the promised 1 million signatures. In spite of this campaign being launched in February, the goal is still so far ahead that the number up to now has not been published, even though the accepted age of signatories has been lowered to 13 years.

Newspapers focused on the far right, filling pages with chilling reports of the AWB's "secret training camps" and pictures of target-shooting, frenzy-eyed young men and women in khaki.

In spite of the seriousness of the message, that "the government is selling out everything we have fought and worked for," no speaker managed to incite the masses into wild dances or hoarse cries for blood—all they did was to add to a feeling of self-righteousness. Ending the rally, Dr. Treurnicht made them take a vow. They repeated after him that they would "take the message of war to every corner of this great country." But sunset found the *volk* cheering at the rugby stand, more loudly than they had at the rally. They were not seen eagerly gathering signatures, distributing pamphlets, or practicing marksmanship at the rifle ranges.

In other words, the rally was a flop.

Why? "All the right has to show is an ideology of the past, apartheid, which has been shown to fail miserably," says Rolf Meyer, the deputy minister of constitutional development,

adding, "and almost everybody knows that."

Equally, "almost everybody" has felt the consequences of the faltering economy. "Almost everybody" also knows that if the underprivileged of South Africa's various social strata shall retain the status quo, let alone improve their living standards, growth is required; lifting of sanctions is required; a new constitutional dispensation is required. The right has never come up with any alternative for economic growth.


Meyer feels that the right consequently has no chance of ultimately threatening the negotiating process toward a new constitution. "The best way to beat them is to talk to them. They have no arguments that hold up."

Leading Nats consequently sleep well these nights. Never in the last 10 years have they felt more secure in their task.

Every Afrikaner rebellion has been lost and this one shows no signs of being different. Both Boer wars were lost. Later, two armed Afrikaner rebellions took place, and both were crushed—all of this even before the country had an Afrikaner government, as it does now.

In the battle of Welkom, the far right won nothing. On the contrary, it seriously antagonized the business community. Lives were lost. Unable to enforce their own goal of "wanting to protect life and property," the far right was forced off the streets by an increased police force. They have been reduced to negotiations themselves; their complaints of intimidation by blacks at work will be investigated by a tripartite body comprising the mine owners, the black miners' union, and the ultra-conservative whites-only miners' union.

When the chips are finally down, so government thinking goes, the beleaguered conservatives will eventually join the negotiations. One senses an unspoken "and if they don't join—that's tough luck for them...." But the Nats probably are serious in wanting the right-wingers out of the fringe and into the negotiating room. ○



Sarah-Jane Poole

APARTHEID'S LONG ARM

Anglican priest and ANC activist Michael Lapsley was badly wounded by a parcel bomb in Harare in late April. A frightening warning to anti-apartheid campaigners in exile, the attack demonstrated that despite President de Klerk's initiatives and the start of talks with the ANC, there remain elements committed to the liquidation of apartheid's opponents at home and abroad.

By ANDREW MELDRUM

It was the end of a festive day. Michael Lapsley, Anglican priest and African National Congress member, had been feted at a *braai* (barbecue) as his many friends in Harare bid him farewell and wished him success in his new post as a parish priest in Bulawayo.

Many of the guests hadn't seen Lapsley since he returned from a speaking tour of Canada in which he articulated the ANC's point of view and encouraged Canadians to keep up the pressure on their government to maintain economic sanctions against South Africa.

The party had been a happy one with singing and readings, in addition to food and drink. In the early evening, Lapsley returned to his home in central Harare to continue packing up items he would take to Bulawayo.

And then it happened. Lapsley was opening a parcel of books sent from South Africa when an explosion ripped through his hands to blow a hole in the ceiling. Lapsley lay on the floor, bleeding profusely, for more

Andrew Meldrum, a contributing editor to Africa Report, is an American journalist who has been based in Zimbabwe since 1980. He also writes for The Guardian of London.



Albie Sachs with Thabo Mbeki, ANC director of international affairs: Sachs lost his right arm in a car bomb in Maputo in 1987

Sarah Jane Poole

than 30 minutes before help arrived to take him to the hospital where both his hands were amputated and later, one eye was removed.

The ANC priest became the latest victim in the series of vicious sabotage attacks against anti-apartheid activists in South Africa and in neighboring countries. The April 28 bombing sent a chilling signal that despite the exposures of South Africa's death squads, anti-apartheid activists are still at risk.

"With talks between the ANC and the South African government and all these disclosures about the death squads, it appeared that the threat of such bombings had been reduced," said a distraught ANC member in Harare. "We had been thinking more about returning to South Africa than of the danger of another bomb by Pretoria's agents. We were wrong. This is a terrible act against Michael and a warning to all ANC members here and anywhere else that we must not let our guard down."

Lapsley's ANC colleagues said they had no doubt that the parcel bomb was part of the South African government's continuing campaign to strike key members of the organization.

"Mike was tragically the target of the centralized, coordinated network of sabotage emanating from the Pretoria regime," said Father John Lamola, also an Anglican priest who is administrative secretary of the ANC's Department of Religious Affairs. "This was not an act of the lunatic fringe of the far right. It was part of the government's ongoing campaign to hit strategic supporters of the liberation movement. In Mike's case, we think his bombing may have been intended to throw the ANC's team in Cape Town off-balance as they entered into the meetings with de Klerk. Many of them know Mike well."

Experts in South Africa concurred that the bombing appears to have been carried out by a long-established sabotage ring with official links.

"This attack appears to have been carried out with considerable exper-

tise and follows the pattern of previous murders which we now know were the work of the security police or other semi-official organizations," said Dr. Max Coleman of the Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression. "It therefore does not appear to me to be the work of the extreme right. More likely is that it was carried out by units set up by the state and working within cells originally set up with state sanction."

One of the key factors leading Coleman to his conclusion was that Lapsley had received a letter on ANC stationery which told him to expect some anti-apartheid religious books to arrive in the mail.


A similar pattern of letters preceding parcel bombs was used in the attacks which killed ANC members Ruth First in Mozambique in 1981, Jeanette Curtis Schoon in Angola in 1985, and John Dube in Lusaka, Zambia, and in the attempted murder of ANC lawyer Phyllis Naidoo in Lesotho in 1979.

A new wave of assassinations of anti-apartheid activists in South Africa has also begun, according to the *Weekly Mail* newspaper, which reported that seven anti-government campaigners were killed in South Africa in April.

Lapsley, 41, has begun a lengthy recuperation in which he is learning to deal with the loss of both hands and one eye. He has impaired vision in the other eye and his hearing was also damaged by the force of the blast.

"He is recovering quite well and we are happy with his progress," said Jonah Gokova, chairman of Harare's Liberation Support Committee. Lapsley has been read some of the letters that have come in, including a moving letter from fellow victim Albie Sachs who lost his right arm in a car bomb in Maputo, Mozambique, in 1987.

The parcel bombing of Lapsley is the latest in a string of such violence against the ANC in Harare. In July, 1982, Joe Gqabi, the ANC's representative in Zimbabwe, was assassinated. The SADF destroyed the ANC's offices in downtown Harare with



South African-planted car bomb in Avondale shopping center, Harare: The parcel bombing of Lapsley is the latest in a string of such violence against the ANC in Zimbabwe

explosives in 1985 as part of simultaneous raids on the capitals of Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. A bomb in a television set killed an ANC member's wife in May 1987, and a car bomb seriously injured anti-apartheid activists Jeremy and Joan Brickhill in October 1987. Later that year, a mortar attack was launched at a house used by the ANC.

In January 1988, a car bomb exploded at an ANC house in Bulawayo, killing one Zimbabwean. Three Zimbabweans—two white and one black—have admitted that bombing and have been sentenced to death. They gave testimony of a network of South African agents in Zimbabwe who carry out violence against ANC members here.

As a result of the bombings, ANC members in Harare keep very low profiles and many operate underground.

"I personally know five people who have been killed or injured by

bombs," said one ANC member, "I was planning to go back to South Africa. Where will I be safe?"

Lapsley helped found "Heal The Wounds," a Harare organization providing relief to victims of such South African violence. After successfully rebuilding a bomb-damaged apartment block in Harare and aiding the families of victims, Lapsley encouraged "Heal The Wounds" to provide assistance to rural villagers in eastern Zimbabwe who have been attacked by Mozambique's Renamo rebels, saying that they, too, are victims of South African-sponsored aggression.

"It's a grim irony that Michael will now himself need the kind of support that he helped organize in 'Heal The Wounds,'" said an ANC member.

Lapsley, a native New Zealander, was a chaplain at the University of

Lapsley's ANC colleagues said they had no doubt that the parcel bomb was part of the South African government's continuing campaign to strike key members of the organization.

Natal when he was deported by the government in 1977 for his anti-apartheid activities. He then worked at the Anglican Theological College in Roma, Lesotho, until he was warned of death threats against him there. After a period as a member of the Society of Sacred Mission in England, Lapsley came to Zimbabwe in 1982 where he studied for a masters degree in political theology at the University of Zimbabwe. His thesis was published as a book, *Coption or Neutrality?*, a study of the role of Rhodesian Anglican Church leaders during the struggle for majority here.

As the vicar of an Anglican parish in Mbare township, Lapsley encouraged Zimbabweans to actively support the anti-apartheid movement. Since 1987, he worked for the Lutheran World Federation. In addition to his grassroots organizing and solidarity work in Zimbabwe, he went on anti-apartheid speaking tours of New Zealand, Australia, and Canada.

"He is a very good writer and an excellent speaker," said Father John Osmer, an ANC chaplain in Lusaka. "They tried to kill a very capable, dedicated person. They tried to cut down a person very important to the ANC."

Osmer suggested that Lapsley had enraged Pretoria because he is white and a Christian priest and therefore foiled attempts to portray the ANC as godless terrorists.

Like Lapsley, Osmer is also from New Zealand and was also the victim of a parcel bomb in 1979 in Lesotho which blew off his right hand. He said he expects that Lapsley will pull through the vicious bombing with his commitment intact.

"His Christian faith has prepared him. Also his faith in the ANC will help him," said Osmer. "He knows he is part of a long line of struggle with many victims. He knows that he is part of a movement that will lead to true freedom and justice in South Africa. I'm sure that Michael will come through this ordeal with his dedication even stronger than before." ○

Namibia is the quietest place on earth," insists Horst Sayler, a long-time visitor. "You can stand on a hilltop not far from Windhoek and actually hear the



South African Casspir armored vehicles are now used by Namibian police to patrol the Angolan border

silence. Of course," he adds—with just the barest trace of nostalgia—"it was even quieter in the old days."

Strolling down the Kaiserstrasse in Windhoek, across from Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd Park (many of the place-names are in the process of being changed), one would be inclined to agree. Silence in Africa's newest capital city seems in very short supply, indeed.

Construction crews are working seven days a week to change the face of Windhoek in time for the city's observance of its 100th birthday—October 19th. The downtown area is being virtually rebuilt with modern shopping centers, pedestrian malls, widened sidewalks, elevated walkways, and hundreds of new tree plantings.

Many of the older structures are being retained and here less appar-



Construction crews are working seven days a week to change the face of Windhoek

ent, but no less important, changes are also taking place. On a hill above Windhoek stands the old Tintenpalast, once the administrative headquarters for the German colonial government (and named for the vast volume of ink expended on official documents produced there). Namibia's new government is spread throughout the Tintenpalast and several nearby buildings, the most important of which is, ironically, an edifice set aside by the South African colonial regime for the "Administration of Whites."

Since Namibia received its independence from South Africa on March 21, the principal task of its new administration has been twofold: the dismantlement of the apartheid-ridden bureaucratic structure left behind by Pretoria and the creation of a functioning government to take its place. This has meant, for a start, drafting new legislation to replace the old South African laws, as well as establishing a budget to fund the new government. The result is that a lot of fresh ink has been put to paper in the Tintenpalast during the weeks since independence.

The new legislation has been the subject of extended debate since the National Assembly was formally opened by President Sam Nujoma on May 15th. The process has been

Helen Picard

Sean Kelly is a retired Voice of America correspondent who now lives in southern Africa and travels extensively throughout the region.

CONSTRUCTING



**REPORTER'S
NOTEBOOK**

After Namibia's independence in March, the nation is witnessing a storm of activity—from a construction boom to the dismantlement of apartheid structures. The Swapo government's policy of reconciliation and a solid infrastructure left behind by South Africa are two strong pillars upon which Namibia's future is being built.

By SEAN KELLY

lengthy, the speed deliberate. "We could move faster," says Hidipo Hamutenya, Namibia's minister of information and long-time spokesman for the ruling South West Africa People's Organization (Swapo). "We could railroad legislation. We have the votes to do it. But our democracy is young and we would like to give it the opportunity to work. I will be happy if we can complete the government's legislative program by the end of July. If not, we will simply sit through August to get it done."

Pressure for change is mounting, particularly within Swapo. "As an African liberation movement, our task was much easier," says Hamutenya. "Once we identified the enemy, we dealt with him accordingly. But UN resolution 435 forced us to do business with the very people we opposed. Now we are dealing with an opposition party where there is ingrained suspicion and distrust. People say we are not moving fast enough, but the government is barely in place and we need the enabling legislation to make the changes we want."

Roger McGuire, until recently in charge of the American Embassy (a new ambassador has yet to be named) in Windhoek and previously director of the U.S. Liaison Office, agrees with those who feel more time is needed. "If it took 12 years for resolution 435 to be implemented,"

Hamutenya, "and we are bound to honor their contracts. They are Namibians and we will not throw them into the streets, but we are going to have to do a lot of shifting and shuffling." As President Nujoma put it in his opening address to the National Assembly: "Most government officials from the former administration will be retained, although not necessarily in the same posts, structures, or institutions."

One potential problem area involves those many officials employed under the South African regime in 11 separate ethnic-based administrations—the so-called Second Tier Authorities created by Pretoria in its pursuit of homeland-style ethnic self-determination in Namibia. The homeland policy is rapidly coming apart in South Africa and it fell considerably short of achieving ethnic self-determination in Namibia.

"Despite 10 years of ethnic government, all secretaries of the various authorities are white," says a United Nations report prepared for Namibia's government, "and of over 40 posts of head of department, less than six are held by non-whites." Far from advancing development, the UN found that the ethnic administrations tended to fragment essential services in areas such as education, health, and agriculture. This resulted in "a waste of scarce resources and a hindrance to socio-economic development."

serve under a government which is led by blacks." The UN suggests that their departure may create new employment opportunities for those civil servants who remain—as will, for instance, the diplomatic service. On May 9th, Namibia's newly established Ministry of Foreign Affairs began running help wanted ads for diplomats in the local press. A university degree would be required, said the ministry, "or comparable experience in a senior managerial capacity."

During the same week, the Namibian government made two other significant announcements in the local press. According to the *Times of Namibia*, no Namibian citizen will henceforth be required to refer to another as "baas" and reference to black Namibians as "kaffirs" will be equally prohibited. In a separate notice, the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation announced that all television news bulletins will be broadcast in English from June 1.

Both announcements reflect the abundant changes now taking place in Namibia. The South African legacy is being accepted where it is useful and modified or discarded where it is not. Racism in a constitutional democracy with 11 major ethnic groups (including whites) is obviously no longer going to be tolerable. Attitudes do not lend themselves to change by legislation, but where Namibia's government can take

A NEW NATION

he says, "six months doesn't seem too much to ask for the new bureaucracy to get itself organized. Even though Namibia doesn't have to start from scratch, the system it inherited was not all that efficient."

The civil service is a case in point. "We have 47,000 civil servants left over from the previous regime," says

Abolishing the 11 ethnic administrations will, says the UN, "give rise to some redundancies, but many of the people affected can be absorbed by the unified regional and district administration which will be established." Others may want to leave, notes the UN report in all candor, "because of their unwillingness to

steps to ease racial tensions, it will probably seek to do so—with some caution. "Blacks may want to see things turned upside down overnight," says Minister of Information Hamutenya, "but we will not practice racialism in reverse."

Swapo's decision to make English the official language of Namibia can

also be seen as a rejection of South Africa's legacy. Afrikaans has—in recent years, at least—become the lingua franca among Namibia's various linguistic groups, particularly in rural areas where English is rarely spoken at all. This gives rise to the demand (especially by those who speak Afrikaans) that South Africa's official language be retained in Namibia. "How," asks the white manager of a Caprivi game lodge in a pronounced Afrikaans accent, "will you get an Ovambo to read the news on television in English? It just won't happen, man."

It will, of course—but with time and patience. Swapo, having lived most of its life in exile, knows that Afrikaans has virtually no usefulness north of the Limpopo and Namibians do want to be able to talk to the rest of Africa. The teaching of English has therefore become a matter of special priority with Namibia's new government.

Hamutenya says his Ministry of Information is working jointly with the Ministry of Education to develop a series of English lessons by radio that will ultimately be broadcast throughout Namibia. The level of English teaching will soon be raised in schools, helped to some extent by the first contingent of Peace Corps volunteers to arrive in Namibia, all of whom will be experienced English teachers.

Among the good things left behind by South Africa is Namibia's excellent road, rail, and communications system, all of which will be helpful in developing tourism. Driving through Namibia is a tourist's dream, even if one has to whip out an Afrikaans phrase book at a restaurant or filling station (a case where the government's efforts at expanding English will certainly pay off).

Major highways and secondary roads are excellent and well-maintained, as are the camping sites and roadside inns—testimony to the fact that many visitors in the past arrived from South Africa by car. This may no longer prove to be the case. It is still too early to tell how independence may have affected the flow of

tourists from South Africa, but Namibia has already taken steps to draw visitors from further afield.

After a shaky start in April, Namib Air has taken over the twice weekly service between Windhoek and Frankfurt previously flown by South African Airways, using a fueling stop in Cape Verde. Namib Air, the new national airline of Namibia, flies a more direct, non-stop route across Africa, thus cutting three and a half hours off the old flight time. However, the early Windhoek-Frankfurt flights had to follow the old route. In the rush to inaugurate the new service, someone forgot to obtain the necessary overflight clearances.

This problem has since been resolved and passengers flying in the brightly painted Namib Air Boeing 747SP (owned, serviced, and flown by South African Airways) speak highly of the service. Departure and arrival times in Windhoek, according to Namib Air, "have been carefully planned to tie in with connecting flights to and from Johannesburg, Cape Town, and other regional destinations." To make the sanctions-avoidance advantage even clearer to potential customers, Namib Air adds: "...it is obvious that the service will appeal to more than just people travelling to and from Windhoek. Especially to businessmen and diplomats flying from or to other southern African centers, the Namib Air service must surely be the best option available."

Two round trips to Frankfurt a week obviously leave some unprofitable down time for the leased 747 and Namib Air is already looking around at other destinations, including New York. Edward Mouten of Namib Air's marketing office in Windhoek admits that a U.S. connection is a definite possibility, but probably not in 1990. "We need to spend more time working out the Frankfurt run," he says, "before we take on anything more ambitious."

South Africa left behind a considerable amount of debris from its more than 23 years of war with Swapo. There are a lot of empty military bases in Namibia, particularly in

the northern part of the country. One of them, Omega in the Caprivi strip, has been serving as a relief center for thousands of San tribesmen left unemployed when the South African army pulled out. Other military installations are being turned into rehabilitation centers for ex-combatants from both sides. There are plans to form a "development brigade" made up of unemployed veterans—Swapo ex-freedom fighters, as well as those who served in South Africa's SWATF and Koevoet forces—who will be trained at the former military bases for gainful civilian employment in agricultural and construction work.


Even the dreaded Casspir and Strandwolf armored vehicles left behind by the departing South Africans are now being put to civilian use. Newly painted bright blue, they have joined the Namibian police units patrolling the area along the border with Angola.

Being the last African colony to gain independence has made it possible for Namibia to learn from the experience of others. "We have a mineral-based economy," says Hamutenya. "Other African nations inherited similar situations. When the price of copper and other minerals went down, so did their economies. We intend to diversify from the very beginning with agricultural development as our main priority. You will see some changes within the next six months."

Other lessons learned? There is, for instance, the Namibian government's official policy of reconciliation among former enemies. "Yesterday," said Hamutenya, "a water pipe broke in my house. When the plumber came to fix it, he had a map of all the pipes in the house and he finished the job in a couple of hours. I lived in Angola for 10 years. It would have taken weeks to fix the pipe in Luanda because when the Portuguese left, they took all the maps with them. We are hoping in Namibia that the people who have the maps will want to stay. If that happens, our policy of reconciliation will have proven a success." ○



NAMIBIA



United Nations

WOMEN'S NEW

EQUALITY

The status of women has changed radically in the new Namibia, thanks to the recognition of their rights as embodied in the constitution. But the true achievement of political and economic equality with men cannot be legislated, and Namibian women will face tough challenges if they are to stand up and be counted.

By COLLEEN LOWE MORNA

Frieda Ipinge is a middle-aged woman who lives in Windhoek's sprawling, high-density suburb of Katutura, employed as a domestic worker by a white Namibian policeman.

A day before the country became independent on March 21, her boss Colleen Lowe Morna is a Zimbabwean freelance journalist based in Harare.

told her she would have to work on that public holiday, because he would be entertaining some white South African traffic police called in to help with the independence celebrations.

Before, Ipinge would have humbly submitted. This time, she thought twice about it. A single parent living in dismal quarters who had waited

all her life for this special day, Ipinge—for the first time in her life—spoke back to her boss. "I am going to take my holiday," she told him, "because the law is on my side."

Namibian women indeed turned out in large numbers for the colorful independence celebrations. On the morning of March 21, women from all walks of life and social strata

banded together and walked down Windhoek's main Kaiser Street carrying banners such as: "Discrimination Against Women is Unconstitutional!" and "The hand that rocks the cradle should also rock the boat."

Discriminated against by both colonial and traditional systems, separated by war, race, and ethnicity, Namibian women today face the future with more optimism than at any time in the past. No Namibian woman is under the illusion that the journey ahead will be easy. But compared to before, when the country fell under illegal South African occupation, the road certainly looks more clear than it has ever been.

Under the former government, Namibia was carved up into 11 ethnic "homelands," with the 6 percent white population owning 60 percent of the country's best land. Men had little option but to look for jobs in the towns, mines, and commercial farms.

A January 1990 UN report on women and children in Namibia underlines the lack of reliable statistical information on this subject as the country enters nationhood.

But in a preliminary survey, the report concludes that "the main obstacle has been that women, because of the war, the migratory labor schemes, or death, have often had to bear the sole responsibilities for their families. They have succeeded in that duty only by holding several jobs which, because of their lack of education, have been semi- or unskilled jobs, and therefore poorly paid."

Meanwhile, under the colonial system and traditional law, black women remained minors all their lives: first under their fathers, then their husbands, and finally their sons.

The key to change for Namibian women is the new constitution, approved by the country's seven-party, 72-member constituent assembly following UN-supervised elections here last November. Because most constitutions in the world came into being decades or centuries ago, before women took an active role in

public affairs, they were written by men. Namibia is thus unique in Africa, and even the world, because the five women members of its constituent assembly played an active role in drafting the constitution.

One of these women, Pendukeni Ithana, secretary of the ruling South West Africa People's Organization (Swapo) women's council, sat on the 21-member standing committee which hammered out the details of the constitution.

"In the corners, or even in public, some men made jokes that the women were trying to take over," recalls Ithana, who is also the country's new deputy minister for wildlife conservation and tourism. But, she adds, "that accusation did not come out clearly, because people were afraid of being called undemocratic, and this word 'democracy' was being sung through and through."

The first issue to be tackled was the legal status of black Namibian women. "On reaching the age of 18, every person, whether male or female, attains the legal age of majority, and is treated equally before the law," says Ithana, a former Swapo military commander.

The Namibian constitution, she points out, is unique in referring to "he and she"—not just "he"—throughout. It also gives foreign men married to Namibian women the right to citizenship—a remarkable provision in African and even global terms.

Some women legal experts are disappointed that Namibia did not take the opportunity to fully incorporate the 1981 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in the constitution. A similar UN declaration on children appears in the extensive chapter on "Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms." As one UN staffer in Windhoek put it: "Everyone can agree on the rights of children. The rights of women are a trickier issue."

However, Ithana is quick to point out that the chapter on human rights makes some special mention of women. Under a section titled

"Apartheid and Affirmative Action," the document says that "it shall be permissible to have regard to the fact that women in Namibia have traditionally suffered special discrimination."

Women, this section says, "need to be encouraged and enabled to play a full, equal, and effective role in the political, social, economic, and cultural life of the nation."

All told, says Monica Koepp, an educational psychologist and committee member of a non-governmental organization called Women of Namibia, the constitution is "an amazing piece of paper." But she stresses, "It is still only a piece of paper."


Ithana agrees. Now that the constitution has been approved, she says, laws—like paid maternity leave and equal pay for equal work—have to be effected. While drafting a constitution that made everyone equal before the law, Ithana laughs, she herself earned 10 percent less than her male counterparts.

Even when these imbalances are redressed, there will be more deep-seated issues to tackle. Despite their role in drafting the constitution, women only constituted 7 percent of the constituent assembly, which has now become the national assembly. There is only one woman minister, and two women deputy ministers, in President Sam Nujoma's 32-strong cabinet.

Although women played an active role in the independence war, Nujoma recently paid tribute only to the contribution made by women in feeding the cadres.

Many women are disappointed by the fact that there is no specific ministry for women in the new government. "People explained it by saying that in other African countries, women's ministries have become a corner where all women's issues are pushed," says Lindy Kazamboue, who has worked with women's groups for years, primarily through the church.

Kazamboue does not buy that argument. "The problem is," she says, "if you have a good constitution



Namibian women turned out in large numbers for the colorful independence celebrations

and no affirmative action, nothing will ever change."

Namibian women themselves remain deeply divided along political and class lines. A church organization called Women's Voice, which used to provide leadership training, folded after both Swapo and the main opposition Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) accused the group of furthering the other's ends.

Similarly, the Women of Namibia—primarily a middle class Windhoek-based group—ran into problems when it was accused first of supporting the DTA, and now of supporting Swapo. Women have been in the forefront of the Parents Committee, set up to protest the treatment of Swapo cadres suspected of being South African spies while in exile. Tension between this group and the Swapo Women's Council has been plainly evident at various women's fora.

UN women participating in UNTAG, especially Eva Ahtisaari (wife of the special representative Martti Ahtisaari), are credited with helping to play a mediating role. The newly created Women's Desk of the influential Namibia Council of Churches has also been holding meetings to urge women to bury their political differences in the interests of the more crucial tasks ahead.

The development challenges that women face are indeed daunting. According to the UN report, half of all urban Namibian women are employed as domestic workers, earning an

average of about \$100 a month. A survey carried out by Kazamboue, who is also a social worker, showed not only a high proportion of single mothers in Windhoek's high density suburbs, but also revealed that 64 percent of families living in sublet quarters are women and their children.

Rural women, who constitute the bulk of the country's farmers, have been condemned to subsistence farming, without any government support. "I have never been visited by an extension worker," notes Elizabeth Petros, a farmer whose husband works in the northern Namibian town of Ondangwa. "I have never received credit, I have never used fertilizer, and I have never produced any crops for sale."

In the towns of the northern Ovamboland province, which were most affected by war, women have been severely affected by the withdrawal of the 20,000-strong South African Defence Force, and disbanding of the 5,400-strong South West

Africa Territorial Forces, as well as the hated, 2,500-strong Koevoet crack unit.

Despite the conduct of these soldiers, notes Helena Martin, who works for a private sector foundation that is supporting women entrepreneurs in Oshakati, they provided jobs for impoverished women. Many set up small bars called "Cuca" shops after a popular brand of Angolan beer. Others worked as cleaners or domestics for the army.

"There was no work here, only war work," Martin says. Because the past government paid no attention to community development, "women are at a loss as to what to do now," says Martin. "They have no skills or ideas of how to help themselves."

This, according to Ida Hoffman, a prominent member of the Swapo Women's Council, is one of the most dangerous legacies of colonialism in Namibia. "The ex-government did not only kill us in a big mass," she says, "they also blocked our minds so that we could not think clearly for ourselves."

The new government, she says, has promised a new life for women, but changes will only come about if women "stand up to be counted. Development starts with individuals. Change will only come if we first change ourselves."

For her part, Hoffman has turned her tiny matchbox house in Katutura into a day care center where she looks after 170 children each day while their mothers go to work. With independence on the horizon, a Norwegian non-governmental organization donated \$200,000 to build a dream-like crèche with classes and playrooms about 20 times the size of Hoffman's home.


Showing a visitor around the new premises, Hoffman chats excitedly about how she hopes to set up a reading room which parents and their kids can use during their leisure time, and how she has asked President Nujoma to open the new facility. As she opens each new door, Hoffman mutters under her breath, "we have a wonderful lord, my dear, a wonderful lord." ○

A DECADE OF REGIONAL COOPERATION

By MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Ten years ago, the countries of southern Africa joined together to form the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, a regional bloc to develop the economies and infrastructures of its members and lessen their dependence on South Africa's trade and transport routes. After a decade, SADCC has scored a number of successes in its efforts to implement its \$6.5 billion program of action.

Outlining its achievements in the various economic sub-sectors, SADCC Executive Secretary Simba Makoni also points out where the organization has fallen short of its goals and looks ahead to the region's future when South Africa is free. David Zausmer, managing director of the Beira Corridor Group, examines the strides made in rehabilitating Mozambique's transport corridors—an essential linchpin in the region's trade network.



Margaret A. Novicki

Simba Makoni, Executive Secretary, SADCC

Africa Report: This year, SADCC celebrates its tenth anniversary. What are the major accomplishments of SADCC's first decade?

Makoni: Our major accomplishments fall into four categories. The first is that we have managed to hold ourselves together and to strengthen our relationships, on the political, but even on the personal level. There is a team of people now who 10 years ago didn't know each other except in name or in the official mold who are now personal friends—ministers, presidents, senior officials, a whole army of SADCC persons—but outside an even bigger army of SADCC citizens who see themselves as belonging to each other. That regional identity, that common family spirit, that unity, is our single largest achievement.

We have, of course, made progress on our program of

action. It grows every year, and now we are talking about 500 discrete projects, some very large multi-million dollar port and railroad projects, some very small feasibility studies or pilot projects over 11 different economic sectors in all our nine countries, at an estimated cost of about \$6.57 billion. It is important that we could even agree on a high-priority set of projects without people saying, "Ours is more important than yours."

And we have gone ahead to implement concretely some of these projects. In transportation, our railroads are working better, our ports have greater capacity now, more of our goods are flowing through our own ports and railway systems than were going through South Africa two or three years ago. We are now connected with each other by our national airlines several times a week. We don't have to connect via Johannes-

burg, we don't have to wait several days. In telecommunications, we are dialing direct on satellite earth station links, radio microwave links, without having to transit through Johannesburg, London, Lisbon, or Paris.

Agricultural production is growing through systems being developed in SADCC research stations and programs. An early warning system enables us to link all our countries and if there is a drought coming in Mozambique, we know that Zimbabwe will have enough maize, or if a flood is coming in Tanzania, the Malawians should have more maize.

In the area of human resources development, we have a few institutions for high-level training like the veterinary school at the University of Zimbabwe, or the agricultural engineering faculty at the University of Sokoine in Tanzania. But we have more at the technical level for the people who deal with the everyday work of our railroads, our telecommunications, our agricultural machinery, and so forth. This is just a quick run-down of the SADCC program of action.

We have very strong friends in the world—countries, official institutions, individuals, private voluntary organizations, U.S. AID, World Bank, Unesco—all of whom constitute the family of SADCC's international cooperating partners. These are all very important developments in our region for the period we have just come through and more importantly in the period we are entering, where the world is getting smaller and more integrated. The global village is becoming a reality. That is how we look at ourselves in the last 10 years.

Africa Report: In what areas has SADCC not made as much progress as you would have liked?

Makoni: For an economic development organization, the capacity to distribute goods and services—basically industry, investment, trade—must be a high priority. While it has been a high priority for SADCC, we have not demonstrated that high priority with concrete action on the ground. That is one area. It is a disappointment, but it is one which we understand. The circumstances behind cooperation in industry and trade are much more complex than building railroads which cross borders, or interconnecting electricity lines and things like that.

But we are working on it now. We have started with a clearly articulated policy position, to which all our governments are a party, on the pattern of industrial development we are aiming at, how it will utilize the resources of our countries, how it will link our economies, and how it will fund the supply of goods and services to our different markets in the different member-states. The challenge is now to translate it into practical projects.

We have even identified priority sub-sectors in terms of where we want the investments to go—to fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, agricultural equipment and machinery, telecommunications, transportation equipment—in order to sustain the bringing together of our economies. Then the trade facilitation mechanisms associated with it have been identified—export prefinancing, export credits, payments, clearance, and tariffs. So the policy framework is there and the challenge is now to translate it into programs and projects. That is going to be our major preoccupation and our challenge for the 1990s.

But it is an area of some disappointment, as is human resources development. We have not made the impact that we could have made in the training of our people, equipping them with the skills and the capacities that are necessary for the kind of management that we need, not only of the national concerns, but of the regional capacities and institutions we are developing. These are probably two areas of some tempered progress.

Africa Report: Are you satisfied with the role the donor community has played in supporting SADCC? Has the level of aid been sufficient?

Makoni: No, in absolute quantitative terms. We need a lot of resources. I have referred to our program being about \$6.5 billion. We have managed to raise both from our own countries and from the international community about \$3-3.2 billion of that. We are just hovering on the 45-50 percent mark. That's not good enough, but on the other hand, in the climate of the 1980s, with depressed world economies across the board except for Japan and Germany, declining aid budgets in various countries including the U.S., one has to be realistic with one's expectations. We are not unhappy, but things could be better.

The one aspect I am not particularly happy about and for which we are probably partly responsible, is that we have generated a lot of political and moral and material support from the international community. But I regret to say that a large measure of this support has really not come to us on our own account. It has come to us as sympathy support against apartheid. People saw our countries being destabilized, being aggressed, being attacked by South Africa, and this was their response. It was not their response to SADCC, and that is going to be the next major challenge in terms of our international relations.

People have to accept SADCC for what it is, and we have a lot of positive aspects in our own light—SADCC as SADCC, with or without South Africa. So while one appreciates the amounts that we have been receiving, the spirit behind the figures is not a very comforting one, because if it remains the basis for that support, when apartheid goes, then so also will the funds go with it. We have a case to generate support with or without apartheid, and I want to be able to look at the next two years and come to the U.S., Canada, the EEC, or the World Bank and say that SADCC deserves support in its own right because it is doing the right things. It is doing the necessary things for the survival and betterment of the nations of southern Africa. That is both a challenge and an area of disappointment because there are a lot of people who have read us in the opposite image of apartheid. We exist in our own right. That's the message I want to get through and that is the basis on which I want to have relationships with governments and institutions.

Africa Report: SADCC was set up in part to provide alternatives to South African trade routes. Once South Africa is free, how will SADCC reorient its strategy? Will there be excess capacity in the region?

Makoni: This is part of the problem I mentioned earlier. People seem to understand us as doing things because we are running away from apartheid. Before 1982, the transport systems of Mozambique and Angola used to carry Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Zambia's traffic, even before the Tazara came on, and not the South African systems. The basic reason for our rehabilitating the Beira corridor is not because we abhor Port Elizabeth or Durban because they are apartheid ports. It is because it doesn't make economic sense for Zambia's copper to go from Ndola to Port Elizabeth or to Cape Town, when Beira or Nacala or Lobito are there, and that basic economic sense will not change because de Klerk has been replaced by Mandela.

That was the economic sense which existed pre-UDI in Rhodesia, during the colonial times, and that economic sense will remain. The majority of the projects that constitute the

SADCC program of action are premised on long-term economic viability and economic sense. That is the central criterion for us.

To use transportation as an example, we have not established any additional capacity. Most of our programs in transport, especially railroads and ports, are to bring us back to the capacity we had before UDI, before aggression and destabilization, and before our infrastructures were decayed by strife and war. So we are not installing any new capacity at the moment. If that capacity was needed in 1976—and Zimbabwe's economy has been growing in the last 10 years, as has Malawi's and Zambia's—then certainly at the very minimum, it is not more than we need. It may even be less than we need.

The second point is that there are areas where we are introducing new capacities. We are connecting Botswana's power

system to the Zimbabwe-Zambia power system. This is because it makes better sense. Botswana was importing 60 percent of its power from South Africa, one of the highest cost power producers in the world. We have Cahora Bassa, Kariba, and Kafue gorge sitting there, and Cunene and Ruacana between Angola and Namibia. Our desire to connect these systems is not just to remove Botswana's dependence on this hostile neighbor, but because it is more economical for Botswana to burn Cahora Bassa power than to burn South Africa's coal power.

This is how we have been approaching our programs now and how they will be structured after apartheid when South Africa is among us. They must make economic sense first and foremost. ■



Margaret A. Novicki

David Zausmer, Managing Director, Beira Corridor Group

Africa Report: Why was the Beira Corridor Group founded?

Zausmer: The basic idea behind the Beira Corridor Group was that we were utilizing South African trade routes, which are a lot longer than Mozambican trade routes. To go from Harare to Durban in South Africa is 1,200 miles and from Harare to Beira is 360 miles. So we would get a saving, and we estimated it at about \$1,000 a container, by utilizing Mozambican transport routes.

The second point was that regionally, our economies had to be developed, and one of the main ways of doing so was by reinstating capital assets which were there already. The obvious ones were the Mozambican transport corridors, because Zimbabwe had already committed its troops to guarding the oil pipeline. That really set the grounding to it.

Our group was set up in 1986, and the Mozambicans set up the executive authority in 1985. What we found was that it was necessary for users to get together to interact with the executive authorities not only in Mozambique, but also in Zimbabwe, because Zimbabwe Railways, Zambia Railways, Botswana and Malawi Railways are involved, to present one common user front. It is more efficient that way and a lot of the

problems that individuals had were similar to what others were having. So by channeling everything through one organization as a user lobby, we could then create a dialogue on a personal level and that is very important.

We work very closely with the Mozambicans. One of the things that we are interested in is in trying to increase the usage of these transport routes. Our belief is that it is a Mozambican responsibility to market them, but businesses need to have information if they are going to utilize a transport corridor, especially if it is going through a bandit war. We provide all that information so that the businessman gets a balanced view of what the situation is, and from his balanced viewpoint, he is able to assess the economic savings against the risk of attack.

There have been no major attacks on the Beira Corridor, or major losses of cargo, for the last two and a half years, so it shows that our armies have succeeded in what they have tried to do. Bit by bit, our usage is increasing which shows that confidence is being restored to the business sector, and a lot of companies are now going and investigating to see what usage they can make of it. It will take us another five years, but if we


can do it through a process of gradual growth so that the users can grow together with the Mozambicans as the suppliers, then we will achieve the objective we are after.

Africa Report: Who comprises the Beira Corridor Group?

Zausmer: It's composed of 240 shareholders from the corporate sector, for example, companies like Colgate-Palmolive, Caltex, Lonrho, a lot of insurance companies and banks. They pool their resources not only for their individual benefit as importers and exporters, but in the case of the banks, because they recognize the necessity of stimulating the economy over-

all. So we've got 240 shareholders from Malawi, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and shortly from Zambia, and we pool our resources. Our organization is set up with three executive staff—myself as managing director, a general manager, and a security expert who travels with the regional armies across the transport routes to get the information necessary to allow the people to make their decisions. We've then got a support staff of about nine and a representative in Beira so that we can get businessmen backwards and forwards to have a look.

There are currently six on the board of directors from



Margaret A. Novick

Malawi and Zimbabwe, who are all businessmen as well as many having been former government officials. The idea is that by mixing business and political sectors on our board of directors, we have access to just about every board room and to most of the politicians in the region, so we can facilitate that dialogue. Our budget is about \$300,000 a year, because we only need to keep the executive and support staff going. If we need specific advice, we get it from consultants who operate in that field. You don't need a lot of money to run a lobby like that because of the way it was set up and because of the access we have to our businesses and to our politicians.

Africa Report: What are the major problems on the transport corridors?

Zausmer: One of the main points is that our transport system is contiguous and an event that happens on one route affects the remaining routes. The Beira system goes through central Mozambique into Zimbabwe, and then links up into Zambia or by road into Malawi. Bulawayo is Zimbabwe's main manufacturing center and that is linked through our sugar-producing area, which is in the southeastern corner of Zimbabwe, to the port of Maputo by the Limpopo railway line, which had fallen into disrepair.

A project was put into place, which is being funded by Britain, Canada, and various others, to rehabilitate that railway line, which is about 318 miles long, the main reason being that we can access the port of Maputo in Mozambique, but we have to go through South Africa. That may not be politically acceptable, but it is a reality, and an expensive reality. If we can utilize that Limpopo railway line, then we've got a direct link which is probably about 360 miles shorter. Therefore, all of our sugar can be sold far more profitably.

There is a security problem on the Limpopo at the moment from Renamo, but it is guarded by the Mozambican armed forces and the Zimbabwean national army. It is not functioning at the moment—you can move a train up and down it, but not commercially. They are guarding the reconstruction teams and the parts of the railway which have been reconstructed and various strategic things like bridges. In total, about 192 miles out of the whole 318 have been rehabilitated. Zimbabwe started at one end and Mozambique at the other, and the idea is to meet in the middle. That will provide immense savings on the transportation costs of sugar, steel, and ferrochrome.

In the north, there is the Nacala railway corridor which links Malawi with the port of Nacala. Nacala was rehabilitated by the Finns and is the deepest water port on the coast of East Africa, and probably the best port on the coast of eastern Africa because it doesn't require dredging. Half of that railway line was rehabilitated and then the security situation got to the extent that people were unable to operate it because of Renamo, so the rehabilitation team pulled out.

But in August, Dhlakama said he was no longer going to attack the Nacala railway line and in December, the Malawian government said it was now open for operation. They currently send one train a week each way. It is 360 miles, and the reason it takes so long to get that distance is that in the unrehabilitated parts, which is about half of it, you are unable to travel faster than about five miles an hour. It is also necessary to make sure that the track is clear, that there are no land-mines or sabotage on it caused either by Renamo or just bandits. That line is going to be crucial for Malawi, but also for Mozambique, because as its economy develops, it is going to need to transport its produce throughout the country.

One of the questions that a lot of people have is that if we

reopen all these Mozambican transport routes and the Lobito corridor and you've got all the South African ports, then come the time of a democratic South Africa when everything moves freely, aren't we going to have excess capacity? The answer to that is no because we need to generate a capacity which can serve not only our current requirements, but our requirements for the next 50 years and can be easily expanded. The way the systems have been designed means that they will serve the expansion in our economic activity for that next 50 years.

Africa Report: The BCG seems fairly unique as a regional cooperative endeavor involving the private sectors of a number of countries.

Zausmer: Yes, it is unique in various ways in that it is a conglomeration of the regional private sector. It also works closely with regional governments, and we have a mutual trust of each other. We've both got the same objectives. Initially, it was a little difficult to work out exactly what our role should be, but we evolved it to fit in with the role that government has to play, and that individual companies are playing there. It's possibly more than unique just for southern Africa, it may be unique world-wide, which is something that we are proud of, especially of the fact that it actually does work. The Mozambicans ask us for help, we ask the Mozambicans for help in various things, so together we are managing to do what we set out to achieve.

Africa Report: How would you assess the regional security situation? Are developments in South Africa having an effect?

Zausmer: The change in the southern African climate is having an effect. South Africa seems to be playing more of a role of benign neighbor. It doesn't necessarily mean we trust them entirely, but one of the results has been the independence of Namibia. Hopefully, something will now happen with Angola and Mozambique. Mozambique is going through peace negotiations. The security situation is still an unknown quantity in that there are attacks on trains, mainly Mozambican, not Zimbabwean trains, along the Beira route. There are attacks on the road. We are aware of the security situation, but it is not deterring our companies from utilizing the transport routes.

Africa Report: What role would you like the American private sector to play in the region?

Zausmer: It is difficult because of the size of our market. The existing companies can actually satisfy demand. While our access to overseas markets is expensive, then it is not an ideal manufacturing center for world exports yet. It's coming. The Mozambicans are looking at setting up export manufacturing zones on the coast, which will provide an ideal opportunity to service Middle Eastern markets, the Indian subcontinent and various places, and indeed South Africa itself. There is currently a role being played by the American private sector, and we'd like to see increased involvement, but we will only get that when we are able to offer what a business requires. Businesses have shareholders they have to answer to.

Utilizing local domestic investment in combination with foreign investment—that is the sort of thing that American businesses could tie into. But it is up to us to be specific about our requests for investment, to target specific companies or specific areas. One of the things that I noticed is that the African-American business community is interested in increasing its ties with southern Africa, which is a logical thing to do and one which we are going to try and push. Our offices are open to any American company that comes to Zimbabwe or wants to get down to Mozambique. If we can't answer their specific questions, then we will put them in contact with people who can. We are proud of what we've got and we want to build on it. ○




READY FOR PEACE

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Exploratory peace talks were held in Portugal in April between the Angolan government and the Unita rebels, kindling hopes that peace may finally come to the war-torn southern African nation. While the future role of Jonas Savimbi remains a sticking point, both parties to the conflict seem to have a renewed interest in finding a solution to the war.

By COLLEEN LOWE MORNA



Sarah-Jane Poole

It is hard enough to get running water in Luanda at the best of times. When Unita rebels sabotaged the main aqueduct servicing Angola's capital city in early April, it became impossible to get water even at the \$120 a night Presidente Hotel.

Diplomats rushed to the city's few dollar shops to buy crates of mineral water from Lisbon and Paris. The

Colleen Lowe Morna is a Zimbabwean freelance journalist based in Harare.

less fortunate punctured holes in the main water pipe along Luanda's beach-front Marginale, scooping out the remaining drops in bottles and pots. Some filled their buckets from muddy puddles. Others, in desperation, resorted to fetching salt water from the sea.

Offices emptied out. Tempers snapped easily. To even the deaf, the underlying message could not have been more clear. After 30 years of

war—first against the Portuguese, now against U.S.-sponsored rebels—Angolans are ready for peace.

After a long break punctuated by heavy fighting country-wide, officials of the ruling MPLA and Unita forces met once more for "exploratory" talks in Portugal in late April.

In brief comments after the two-day talks, which were held under a heavy cloak of secrecy, Angolan Foreign Minister Pedro de Castro Van-Dunem "Loy" expressed confidence that more discussions would follow. "Everyone, everywhere, very much wants this problem to be resolved," he said.

But, on a more cautious note, Portuguese Foreign Ministry Secretary of State José Durão Barroso underlined the deep divisions between the two sides. There was a long way to go, he said, before the 15-year-old conflict could be ended.

If the last year in Angola has proved anything, it is the danger of treating the country's internal problems too simplistically.

News on December 22, 1988, that Angola had agreed to the withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops in exchange

for South African forces leaving the south of the country and Namibia's independence met with widespread euphoria at home and abroad. As a political stamp of approval, donors meeting months after in Luanda for the annual conference of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) pledged \$93 million toward the reconstruction of the crucial Benguela railway line.

Six months later—on June 22—Unita and the Angolan government signed a ceasefire agreement in front of 17 African heads of state gathered at President Mobutu Sese Seko's palace in Gbadolite, Zaire.

For a few blissful days, the anti-Unita propaganda in Luanda ceased. Ordinary Angolans talked excitedly about linking up with relatives in remote parts of the country whom they had not seen for years. "For the first time in years," recalled an NGO representative in Luanda, "Angolans actually started to see their country as one whole."

But the honeymoon was short-lived. Within weeks of the Gbadolite accord, both sides presented different interpretations of the agreement, and accused each other of launching full-scale offensives. "There is general agreement now," says a Western diplomat in Luanda, "that Mobutu played a confidence trick by telling different stories to different sides" in an effort to score a quick diplomatic success ahead of a crucial trip to Washington.

The consequences on the ground have been devastating. In a major blow to the country's diamond industry, which had been making a steady recovery over the last few years, in August Unita raided a diamond mine in Cafunfo run by a foreign company, RST International. The company subsequently withdrew 300 foreign workers and closed down operations at the mine.

Meanwhile, attacks along the Benguela railway line—always one of Unita's favorite targets—prevented rehabilitation work from resuming. Flights by the International Red Cross to the central, war-devastated

provinces of Huambo and Bie had to be suspended.

In a major show of strength, government forces early this year retook the southeast town of Mavinga, gateway to Unita's Jamba headquarters, and even cast a few bombs into Jamba itself. Savimbi had to cut short a trip to Portugal to return to base, and is reported to have been injured in one of the attacks.

In response, Unita cut off Luanda's water supply and hit Gove dam, which supplies electricity to southern Angola and northern Namibia. Shortly before the talks in Portugal, Unita stepped up attacks in the north, temporarily seizing several towns and shooting down two helicopter gunships providing cover for a supply convoy heading for the town

of Quindando.

Some analysts speculated that following Namibia's independence on March 21, Angola would seek permission from its Swapo allies to launch a final onslaught on Jamba via the Caprivi strip.

But three factors prevented this from happening. First, Namibia has been extremely cautious about becoming embroiled in Angola's war; indeed, in his independence speech (much to the disappointment of Angolan officials), President Sam Nujoma did not even mention Angola's role in providing bases for guerrillas of the South West Africa People's Organization.

Second, military strategists within the Angolan government fear that the less structured Unita becomes,



the more akin it will become to the scattered and ruthless Renamo rebels in Mozambique. Third, and perhaps most important, by early this year both sides were once more grudgingly conceding that there is no military solution to Angola's war.


Although Unita could conceivably go on fighting for some time, the hammering at Mavinga was sobering. While the rebels are still getting \$40 to \$50 million a year from the U.S., they have lost official and even some diplomatic support from South Africa. Now reassessing its interests in the region, and with a keen eye on business possibilities in this well-endowed southern African country, South Africa has even offered to play peace-maker between the two sides.

Although the Angolan govern-


ment is still frustrated about not winning U.S. recognition, it has made diplomatic headway in isolating Unita on the rest of the continent. "When your only friends are the Americans," comments a West European diplomat in Luanda, "it is not a very comfortable situation to be in." Even then—as witnessed during talks between U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and President José Eduardo dos Santos at Namibia's independence celebrations—the U.S. is prodding Unita toward the conference table.

The Angolan government is also under considerable pressure to do the same. In a visit to Luanda soon after Namibia's independence celebrations, Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze made it clear

Jonas Savimbi: The Unita leader has firmly refused—as one diplomat put it—"to walk into the sunset"



Rick Reinhard/Impact Visuals



that the Soviet Union, which has already rescheduled \$2 billion owed by Luanda, is not keen to go on sponsoring its war efforts.

In addition to the 1.5 million Angolans displaced by war, another 1 million peasants, who would normally be self-sufficient in food, face the specter of famine this year.

Despite Angola's membership in the IMF and World Bank last September, the economic reform program is at a standstill, with the country's exchange rate still pegged to its ridiculous 1975 rate of \$1 = 29.92 kwanza (about one-hundredth the black market rate).

Analysts say that as long as the war drags on, the government will not have the guts to push through an austerity program, which would mostly hurt the MPLA's urban stalwarts. Until Angola bites the bullet, however, it cannot draw on IMF funds.

A donor conference, scheduled for this year, has been indefinitely postponed. Donors say that until there are signs of concrete measures to end the war, they are not going to

In addition to the 1.5 million Angolans displaced by war, another 1 million peasants face the specter of famine this year

AN APPEAL FOR WAR'S VICTIMS

Every day for the past few months, church workers at the Catholic mission of Munhino, nine miles from Angola's southern provincial capital of Lubango, put a pot of gruel to boil on an open fire. By lunch time, anywhere up to 500 people from as far as 15 miles away, gather for a plateful.

"We do what we can," says Stawomir Zastepowski, the Polish priest in charge of the mission, "but it is not enough."

According to latest figures released by the UN's World Food Programme, in addition to the 1.5 million Angolans displaced by war, 96,000 Angolans are in critical condition, and another 685,000 are "at risk" as a result of the prolonged drought.

Field workers like Zastepowski believe the figures are conservative for Huila province alone. The provinces of Benguela, Namibe, Kuanza Sul, and Cunene are also seriously affected.

Yet there has been little backup. At a conference last September, donors stumped up a mere \$10 million out of the \$270 million which the government had requested in emergency assistance.

Part of the problem was tactical. According to one field worker, "the Angolans shot themselves in the foot by not getting the appeal together earlier. Alarm bells went out in February, yet it took seven months to put out the request."

By then, most donors were coming to the close of their fiscal year. To make matters worse, the government presented what many donors saw as an unrealistic wish list, including requests for flood victims and returning refugees, along with the more urgent needs of drought victims.

Even at the best of times, say UN officials, Angola has trouble drumming up donor funds. Because it earns \$2 billion a year from oil sales, "the country is seen as rich," says one UN staffer.

But politics also comes into the picture. As long as the U.S. refuses to recognize Angola, donors say other Western countries give aid reluctantly. Competition for funds in countries like Sudan and Ethiopia—and more recently, in Eastern Europe—are also cited as excuses.

For its part, the Angolan government is trying to correct past mistakes. A streamlined appeal now going out to donors via the office of the UN Secretary-General will ask for a bare minimum 200,000 tons of food—twice what Angola has been requesting in a normal year, when some extra food is needed for "deslocados" unable to feed themselves because of the war.

Efforts have also been made to ease traditional restrictions on the foreign press, and to take individual donors on tours of the south.

Soon after Namibia's independence celebrations on March 21, Canadian MP and special southern Africa representative Walter McLean accompanied 12 truckloads of grain transported from Zimbabwe, through the Caprivi Strip, to Lubango. This road link between Zimbabwe and Angola has only recently become accessible with the withdrawal of South African troops from southern Angola, and Namibia's independence.

The purpose of the trip, according to McLean, was to show other donors that it is possible to get supplies from food-surplus Zimbabwe, and move them to southern Angola relatively cheaply and efficiently.

—C.L.M.

be trapped in an embarrassing Benguela-type situation where funds were pledged and projects approved, only to gather dust on the shelves.

With Mobutu's capabilities now in question, the first delay in getting down to talks again was where to

hold them. Eventually, the government gave in to Unita demands to meet in Portugal, though it had favored Cape Verde. Although both sides still nominally recognize Mobutu as mediator—Unita because vital supplies from the U.S. are com-

ing through Zaire, and the government because it wants to keep tabs on the Zairean leader—analysts say that as the talks proceed, mediators will increasingly take a back seat.

Of greater importance now is the substance of the discussions. The MPLA's preferred solution, evidenced in its interpretation of the Gbadolite accord, is for selected Unita members to be absorbed into the MPLA, with Savimbi going into "temporary and voluntary retirement."

The Unita leader, on the other hand, has firmly refused—as one diplomat puts it—"to walk into the sunset." Unita, which initially said it did not recognize the government as legitimate, demands a ceasefire, followed by the drafting of a new constitution and multi-party elections.

There are now some signs of compromise. After the Mavinga affair, Unita has said that it is willing to recognize the "legitimacy of the Angolan state," and has dropped its demands that government forces withdraw to pre-Christmas positions.

The government is also being more conciliatory. Sources say that in a recently released nine-point peace plan, handed to U.S. Secretary of State Baker in Windhoek, the MPLA takes a softer stand on Savimbi.

Major ideological changes are also expected at the party's third congress, to be held before year-end. Under the theme "Broadening Democracy," the party says in recently released draft theses that although it feels that a one-party system is best for Angola now, it does not exclude a "future evolution toward a multi-party system."

The MPLA, one of the most heavily Soviet-influenced in Africa, declares its intention to convert from a vanguard to a mass party, to regard Marxism-Leninism only as a "path of orientation," and to limit the holding of higher office to three terms.

Although the congress is scheduled for December, sources say the MPLA might bring the date forward, if that will help break the current stalemate. Such gestures, analysts say, may be Angola's only hope. ○

REFORM

To prod sub-Saharan nations to democratize, should donor countries and institutions tie their aid to political as well as economic reforms? While improvements in governance are crucial to achieving sustained economic growth, the role of donors needs to be carefully thought out so as not to hinder Africa's budding efforts toward political pluralism.



Betty Press

By CAROL LANCASTER

Should rich countries and international institutions providing concessional assistance and debt relief to sub-Saharan Africa link their aid to political, as well as to economic, reforms? This is the question of the day, raised and debated in the media, in policy discussions within the U.S. government, in public documents by international economic institutions, by African intellectuals, and by development experts.

This question emerges from two rather separate trends in world poli-

tics: efforts at structural adjustment in Africa, begun in the 1980s as a result of the deepening economic crisis, the desperate need of African governments for foreign financing, and the increasing tendency of governments, the IMF, and World Bank to condition their assistance on economic stabilization and structural

adjustment. Over 30 African countries now have stabilization and/or structural adjustment programs with the IMF and World Bank.

But structural adjustment has yet to produce a clear-cut success in sub-Saharan Africa. Sustained economic reform programs in Ghana and elsewhere have contributed to healthy

OR ELSE?

Carol Lancaster is the director of the African Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

growth rates (of 5 percent or above in Ghana) over several years. However, an examination of the components of this growth suggests that it is based on an expansion in capacity utilization in agriculture and industry, large aid inflows, some investments in mining—likely to produce quick and profitable gains—and in the informal sector. Significant new investment in manufacturing and agriculture have not yet materialized. Indeed, in Ghana, domestic savings and investment remain among the lowest in the world and disinvestment in industry continues as inefficient firms collapse in the face of import competition. An increase in private, productive investment is a critical element in the success of structural adjustment; without it, there will be no sustained economic growth. The question is why the investment has not occurred and what can be done to encourage it. This is where the problem of governance arises.

Investors, African or foreign, put their resources at risk to make profits. In many lines of investment, particularly in manufacturing, investors will gain profits only over a period of years and so will invest where they have reasonable confidence that business conditions will not alter dramatically. In many of these aspects, Africa remains uncompetitive with other parts of the world. The logistics of doing business in Africa are still difficult, with transport and communications facilities poor and unreliable in many countries. Physical infrastructure is still inferior to that in other parts of the world. African labor is becoming cheaper, but in many places is still uncompetitive with the disciplined, literate, and often skilled labor in much of Asia or, more recently, Eastern Europe.

But above all, investors lack confidence in African governments which say they want private investment, but then act, at times unintentionally, to discourage it or which are riddled with corruption. Perhaps the most important obstacle to private investment and growth in Africa is that everything is open to negotiation.

Rules and regulations are frequently implemented by government officials in an arbitrary and capricious fashion. Above all, investors require predictability on the part of their host governments. This is not present for them in much of Africa and so they go elsewhere.

Without an improvement in governance, sustained growth will not

Is the pluralism so often thought to be necessary for a successfully functioning democracy sufficiently developed in Africa to support democracy?

occur, for behind problems of economic mismanagement and corruption are problems of leadership, interest group pressures, patronage politics, a lack of transparency and probity in government decision-making, and an absence of public accountability. The Economic Commission for Africa acknowledged the problem of governance in its recent report, *An African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes*, as did the World Bank in its recent long-term study, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*. Thus, the problems with structural adjustment and renewed economic growth in Africa raise the question: Should aid be linked to political reform?

The question is also raised as a result of the recent changes in Eastern Europe and the West's response to them. Eastern Europeans have combined their dramatic moves toward economic and political liberalization with appeals to the West for economic help (less concessional assistance than commercial loans, debt restructuring, technical assistance, and private investment). The Western Europeans and the U.S. have responded with some money and some promises, and the condi-

tioning of their help on continuing political liberalization. The fact that democracy could break out in Eastern Europe, where it was least expected, suggests that it could happen elsewhere. Why not encourage it in Africa by conditioning aid on political liberalization there?

In answering this question, there are several important issues to consider. First of all, what is the *objective* of tying aid to political reform? Is it to promote more open, democratic societies as an end, for the good inherent in them? Or is it to promote economic development?

A corollary to this question is *which reforms* are necessary for meaningful political liberalization? What, in the words of Robert Dahl, would it take to ensure that African governments are "responsive to the preferences of their citizens"? To ensure citizens basic political rights, the following conditions are usually regarded as necessary: freedom of expression (implying media, universities, and public fora free to raise and debate political issues and to criticize government) and freedom of assembly; an independent judiciary enforcing the rule of law; and an opportunity on the part of the public to change the political leadership through periodic, free and fair elections. Much of the experience of independent Africa suggests that it may be difficult to fulfill these conditions within the framework of a one-party state. A multi-party state may be unavoidable.

As attractive as the idea of political liberalization is for Africa, there are some potential problems. First, open political competition may center on ethnic, regional, or religious cleavages dangerous to national unity. At independence, the fear of ethnically based politics (far from groundless) was the justification for the one-party state. Is there reason to believe that the dangers of ethnic politics have by now declined in importance or that ethnic politics would be less disruptive of national unity today than at independence? Does the answer to this question differ from country to country? If so, why? The tensions

resurfacing in Eastern Europe and the USSR suggest that even when they have been suppressed for decades, ethnic politics do not disappear as potent and often destructive political forces.

Second, is the pluralism so often thought to be necessary for a successfully functioning democracy sufficiently developed in Africa to support democracy? Third, are powerful political groups prepared to abide by democratic rules rather than resort to the use of force to gain or retain political power? Where societies lack powerful, organized groups with diverse and sometimes competing interests, a dominant group or coalition can function as an autocracy, even in democratic camouflage, promoting the interests of its own supporters and depriving others of economic opportunities as well as political rights.

Are Zaire, Liberia, Sudan, or Somalia sufficiently pluralist societies in which powerful groups are willing to play by democratic rules? The answer is clear in these cases. It is less so regarding Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, or Côte d'Ivoire—although in each of these cases, ethnic or religious-based politics remain a possibility and a threat.

Fourth, it is possible that democratization in African societies can harm rather than hurt the success of structural adjustment programs, generally regarded as critical for restoring economic growth in the region. Open political debate would inevitably include the major issue with which so much of the continent is now struggling—structural adjustment. Structural adjustment programs are controversial (not the least because of the foreign involvement in them), painful (particularly for vocal and influential groups), and often emotive and ill-understood by the general public. The largest group benefitting from them—rural farmers—are typically the least articulate, the least well-organized, and among the least politically influential group nationally. Would they organize, articulate, and vote their economic interests in an election where

structural adjustment is an issue?

It is very possible that where structural adjustment programs become the subject of open political debate or a major issue in political campaigns, where articulate, powerful groups and individuals are predominant (whose interests are threatened by structural adjustment), these programs will be discarded along with those politicians supporting them. President Babangida of Nigeria has acknowledged this threat by attempting to exclude it from the upcoming national election campaign. It very nearly defeated President Diouf of Senegal. There may well be a trade-off between political liberalization and economic liberalization in sub-Saharan Africa.

A second major issue is *how aid should be linked* to political liberalization. Conditioning foreign aid on political liberalization would add an additional degree of coercion to relationships between African governments and foreign powers, which is already there in conditioning aid on economic reforms. Perhaps, a degree of coercion on economic reform in exchange for additional resources is warranted, but there are limits beyond which such conditioning becomes counter-productive, both in terms of short-run relationships between aid donors and recipients, and in terms of the long-run interests of Africans who, in the last analysis, must be responsible for making their own decisions affecting their destinies.

More important, conditioning aid on political reform puts the initiative of deciding which reforms are appropriate and workable in the hands of foreigners, particularly government officials and international civil servants. There are few who are well enough informed to make such decisions about what will work politically in Africa's complex and changing societies.

An alternative to conditioning foreign aid on political liberalization would be for aid donors to deploy a portion of their aid in support of the many changes useful to promote democracy in Africa: training for

judges, legislators, journalists, trade unionists; support for non-governmental groups which would be important in a pluralist political system, for example, professional, youth, and women's groups; support for independent public policy research institutions which could develop the alternatives to government policies necessary for open and informed debate.

These would not be new activities for the U.S. government, which has funded similar programs for four decades in Asia and the Far East through the Asia Foundation. It has not financed these sorts of activities in Africa (except in a small way in South Africa). This alternative would not be coercive and would leave decision-making in the hands of the Africans, but it would probably not bring about major political reforms quickly.

A further alternative for supporting democracy in Africa would be for aid donors to provide African govern-

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ments with additional aid after moves toward democratization had been implemented. This approach would contain a degree of coercion, but would leave decision-making and initiative in the hands of the Africans.

If the objective of linking aid to political reform is to promote the success of structural adjustment, more limited reforms may be sufficient and appropriate. These reforms could be targeted at *economic governance* and would include: transparent government budgeting (no more hidden accounts for the discretionary use of a Mobutu, Doe, or Ahidjo); well-planned investments appropriate to national economic needs and priorities (no white elephants dedicated to the everlasting memory of a particular leader or foreign aid donor); open and competitive bidding for large public investment projects (no more Turkwell dams in Kenya, Inga-Shabas in Zaire or Ivorian sugar projects); and the consistent and fair implementation of regulations governing investment.

Extending the conditions of foreign aid to economic governance implies that foreigners would assume the role of ensuring public accountability by African governments on issues of economic governance through close coordination of their aid and export policies, through monitoring recipient government economic decision-making and policy implementation, and through reducing or raising their aid levels based on the performance of African governments in this area. In theory, this is what is happening now with IMF stabilization and World Bank structural adjustment programs. The conditions of these programs could be formally extended to include economic governance.

An approach linking additional foreign aid to economic governance is not without problems. The most difficult problem may be getting foreign governments to cooperate in their policies vis-à-vis the Africans. There is a considerable degree of informal cooperation now, but many of the failures of implementation of economic reform programs in Africa

Developed countries have their economic and political interests in Africa and are still often willing to put them ahead of their interests in economic reforms.

can be traced to the support of developed countries of their African clients' desires to avoid reforms. President Mobutu of Zaire has demonstrated the most skill in manipulating his three patrons to avoid serious reforms. But he is not alone. Presidents Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire and Traoré of Mali have sought (and obtained) French intervention to avoid painful policy reforms.

Developed countries have their economic and political interests in Africa and are still often willing to put them ahead of their interests in economic reforms. It remains to be seen whether the economic decline in the region and the decrease in East-West tensions will so erode foreign economic and political interests there that they will be willing to center their economic support for African governments largely on progress toward reforms.

Another problem with adding economic governance to the list of aid reforms required by foreign governments and international institutions is operationalizing the concept. What are the policies that should be reformed? How can we tell when they are changed? Should aid be conditioned on a sliding scale of reforms or on attaining an absolute level of reform? These are difficult, but not impossible questions to answer.

The final and most critical question is whether reforms in economic governance would be effective in promoting investment and growth in Africa. There are obstacles to increased investment in Africa, other than problems of economic gover-

nance. The question of whether extending structural adjustment lending to include economic governance would be effective in stimulating investment can only be answered in practice. Where other factors (infrastructure, labor costs and productivity, potential profitability of an investment) are favorable, improved economic governance could be helpful and perhaps decisive in encouraging investors. And it may only take one or two large and profitable investments in Africa to re-ignite investor confidence in the region.

In any case, improved economic governance is unlikely to worsen economic conditions in Africa or hurt broader prospects for investment and growth. At a very minimum, it would ensure a more efficient use of existing resources. And something needs urgently to be done to make structural adjustment successful—if initially only in one place. The alternative is further decline.


The linking of concessional resources to economic reforms has been with us for most of the decade of the 1980s. It now appears that governments are beginning to think about linking any additional aid resources to political reforms. This is an attractive notion to Western governments and to many Africans and one strongly suggested by the experience of Eastern Europe. There may be some useful and workable reforms to be achieved through this approach, particularly in the area of economic governance.

But linking economic support to broader political liberalization can be a dangerous and destructive approach to forcing desirable changes in African societies because, thus far, it is so poorly thought out on both sides; because foreign officials are not well-positioned to advise Africans on effective political changes; and because Africans, in their desperation to obtain additional concessional resources, may agree to changes which in reality they cannot or will not implement or which implemented, will prove unsustainable and generate further political and economic instability. ○



DOE'S

As Africa Report went to press, the Liberian government and the rebels of the National Patriotic Front had agreed to discuss peace proposals in the six-month-old civil war that threatened to topple President Samuel Doe. After taking virtually every major city, Charles Taylor's rebel force was poised to move on Monrovia, the nation's capital, leaving the Doe government with limited options.



LAST

STAND

By MARK HUBAND

The campaign by insurgents of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), which began on December 26, represented the most serious threat ever faced by Liberian President Samuel Doe, who himself came to power in a violent coup d'état in 1980. Since then, Doe put down as many as eight attempts to overthrow him.

The war started when a small group of rebels crossed from Côte d'Ivoire on Christmas day and the day after launched an early morning attack on an army barracks just across the border. The rebels increased the size of their fighting force to well over 2,000, with many more under training.

At first, the war was centered on Nimba county in northeastern Liberia, where the Gio are the dominant ethnic group. The Gio have long been in conflict with the Krahn peo-

Mark Huband is a freelance journalist based in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.



Riot police putting down an anti-government demonstration in Monrovia: American concern over aid has recently been overshadowed by criticism of the Doe regime's human rights record

ple of President Doe, who was accused of favoring his own ethnic group—the smallest in Liberia—when allotting government posts.

Although the conflict was not essentially ethnic, there were reports of ethnically based killings and mutilations by both the armed forces and the rebels. The killings were believed to have been the direct result of an ethnic conflict which broke out within the army, as Krahn soldiers carried out vendettas against members of other tribes who were also fighting in the Armed Forces of Liberia.

The conflict escalated quickly in January, forcing up to 250,000 refugees to flee into neighboring Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea, though some people returned to Nimba county as the fighting spread south and away from the original war zone. Villages which were deserted and crumbling after the armed forces had set fire to them in a bid to flush out the rebels are now showing renewed signs of life as people return to plant the rice crop before it is too late in the season.

But villages and towns in the south of the country have been devastated. In two villages north of Buchanan, for example, government troops butchered villagers after accusing them of helping the rebels. Survivors said that up to 200 soldiers attacked the villages of Siathon and Kpueton, killing inhabitants as they ran out of their homes. Behind Siathon, decaying bodies, including one child, were dumped in a heap. At least 34 people died, their bodies left to rot in the sun or in the surrounding forests where they ran while trying to escape.

Survivors who managed to reach a nearby hospital said the army shot at everybody, indiscriminately, even as they were running away. A boy, Emmanuel Weh, 12, said: "I ran from the house with my brother. Suddenly I felt my arm burning, but I just kept running. My brother died." At the hospital, doctors amputated his entire right arm, which was completely shattered by bullet wounds. The rebels arrived one hour after the



Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf: Liberia's most prominent dissident in the U.S. would be welcomed back under a National Patriotic Front government

attack and drove the army south, pushing them to the coast.

The rebel force represented one section of the hundreds of Liberians who fled the country after Doe came to power in 1980. The rebel leader, Charles Taylor, 42, was active among Liberians in the United States against the William Tolbert government when he first arrived there in 1971. He took a degree in economics from Bentley College in Waltham, Massachusetts, and returned to Liberia in 1980 to become head of the government's General Services Agency, the department which is responsible for distributing funds to ministries.

The Liberian government alleges that, in 1983, Taylor set up a phony company with two other Liberians living in New Jersey, and embezzled \$900,000. The government claims he fabricated a contract for the company to supply spare parts for heavy equipment owned by the government. He fled Liberia in October 1983, just before the scheme was discovered and was arrested in the U.S. in 1984.

He was imprisoned for 18 months while awaiting extradition, but escaped in 1985 from the Plymouth County House of Correction, in Massachusetts, by sawing through the bars of his cell and lowering himself

to the ground with a rope made of bed sheets. After escaping from the U.S., he made his way back to Africa and began planning the current insurgency.

The NPFL is the largest Liberian dissident group, though its leadership is in dispute, as there are many dissidents not involved in the fighting who have long been critics of Doe. To some, Taylor is regarded as having taken on the role of redeemer without having the backing of Liberians opposed to Doe.

Divisions among Doe's opponents were revealed most clearly when Gen. Thomas Quiwonkpa launched his unsuccessful coup attempt in 1985. Splits between conservatives, socialists, and different ethnic groups were largely responsible for the failure to seriously threaten the Doe regime.

Taylor has publicly criticized those Liberian dissidents who did not join his forces, even though there are a substantial number who question his right to be leader. He has accused dissidents who remain in the United States of being "political gurus" who are only prepared to talk, but not to act. However, he has said he would welcome Liberia's most prominent dissident in the U.S., Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, a former minister of finance, into the government if he were to take over.

Taylor said that the NPFL intends to hold elections. "We are going to the ballot box," he said, "and will permit opposition groups in all districts of the country to operate." He added, "There is no plan to change the form of government. My plan is to take over the reins and clear up the government and the country."

Since the violent coup in 1980, President Doe, the former master sergeant who took over as head of state and ordered the televised killing of 15 defeated government ministers on a beach near Monrovia, saw the standing of his government steadily decline. It had a reputation for economic mismanagement in government, rife corruption, and what the U.S. Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights has described as a

"dismal" human rights record.

It was those issues which built up resentment toward Doe and helped the NPFL secure almost immediate support from thousands of Liberians in the country who say they have been victim to the abuses and prejudices of Doe and his ethnic group.

Millions of dollars have gone missing from ministries, with the figure put at up to \$3 million for 1988 alone. The failure of a U.S. team of financial advisers, Opex, to restore order to the country's finances led to relations with the U.S. turning sour, although relations between the two countries have traditionally been close. Liberia was founded by freed American slaves in 1847, and since 1980, the Doe regime received \$500 million from the U.S.

By mid-1989, arrears in the repayment of aid to the U.S. had reached \$7.1 million, highlighting the seriousness of the economic mismanagement. New U.S. aid to Liberia was stopped altogether until the arrears are paid back.

American concern over aid has recently been overshadowed by criticism of the Doe regime's human rights record. The Lawyers' Committee on Human Rights recommended in 1989 that Liberia should lose preferential trade treatment unless its human rights record improved. However, Liberia remains strategically important to the U.S., and strong action had been resisted in the hope that the Doe regime would improve.

But the conflict has brought the human rights issue to the forefront, particularly with the accusations of government atrocities carried out against civilians alleged to have helped the rebels. The conflict also exposed the uncertainty felt among American foreign policy-makers about the direction Liberia will take once the war is over.

Since January, the NPFL has received a constant supply of weapons. While rebel leaders claim they have relied on capturing American- and Romanian-made weapons from the army, there were strong claims that they were also supplied by Libya. The claim came nearly a

year after the Liberian and Libyan governments signed a bilateral trade and investment cooperation agreement in Tripoli after eight years of cool relations.

The American government responded to the claims of Libyan involvement in January by sending U.S. military advisers to aid government forces, but the advisers were withdrawn when their presence became public during the time that the armed forces were being accused of atrocities against civilians.

Charles Taylor, the rebel leader, denied any Libyan involvement in the conflict. Politically he is on the right, and has declared that Liberia will retain a free market economy if he takes power. At his first press conference for foreign journalists, he said: "We have never trained in Libya. We do not receive any assistance from Libya. We have trained people from an original core group trained in a certain place. But it was not Libya, nor Burkina Faso. Libya must not be blamed."

At the time of writing, Taylor had rejected the possibility of negotiating an end to the conflict, which has left up to 4,000 dead. He said, "If we have to fight for three years we will eventually remove Doe. Legally and illegally, we are going to go after him. Any negotiation which keeps Doe remaining in power is a no-go." Meanwhile, he said he intends to maintain Liberia's close relationship with the U.S. The United States, he said, is "a big brother, father, uncle, and friend to Liberia."

Attempts by the Liberian government to pressure the United States into overseeing a negotiated end to the war failed. A Liberian government delegation was in Washington in May, but largely failed to gain access to top White House officials.

This failure reflected the United States' gradual withdrawal of support for the Doe government. However, there was no suggestion that Taylor managed to secure American backing, although representatives of the rebel force did have contact with congressional representatives and senators in the U.S. in late May. ○



By TUNJI LARDNER, JR.

THE

President Babangida's early mystique as an honorable soldier determined to put an end to corrupt and heavy-handed government and economic mismanagement has been badly tarnished, as demonstrated by the recent coup attempt. With cynicism rife among civilians and the armed forces, questions are now being raised regarding the government's commitment to end military rule by 1992.

Last April's attempted coup in Nigeria was as much a violent and personal display of anger against the man—President Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida—as it was a brazen attempt at overthrowing his administration.

The story very briefly is this: In the wee hours of Sunday, April 22, a small band of soldiers gained control of the offices of the Federal Radio Corporation in Ikoyi, a few blocks from Dodan Barracks, the residence and office of Gen. Babangida. By 2 am, they had gained access to the barracks and assaulted the president's private quarters.

The president escaped and after 12 hours of fierce fighting and

artillery exchanges, the insurrection was put down, but the coup plotters had achieved one significant victory. For the few hours that they controlled the radio station, their fleeting manifesto had again brought to the fore burning national issues that simply refuse to be wished away.

Major Gideon Orka's (the alleged leader of the coup attempt) inelegant but pithy broadcast was partly an attack on the integrity and wholesomeness of the president and a quick-fix solution to the nagging North/South, Muslim/Christian problem of political power and economic control.

He said: "It is our strong view that this kind of dictatorial desire of Babangida is unacceptable to Nigerians of the 1990s and therefore must be resisted by all. Another major rea-

son for the change is the need to stop intrigues, domination, and internal colonization of the Nigerian state by the so-called chosen few. This, in our view, has been and is still responsible for 90 percent of the problems of Nigeria."

His solution was a unilateral and conditional excision of five northern states—Sokoto, Borno, Katsina, Kano, and Bauchi—from the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Immediately exposing the political naïveté of the insurrectionists, this pronouncement contributed to the ambivalent public response to the coup attempt. Nigerians might want change, but they certainly do not want another civil war, which would have been the likely outcome of the proposed secession.

But then, what do Nigerians want for the 1990s? Public reaction in the bustling city of Lagos on the day of the coup provided an abstruse but poignant statement of the nation's faith in the self-proclaimed messiahs in green fatigues. While some crowds gathered to watch the pitched noon-time battles between dissidents and loyalists, some others simply went to the beach, and while some listened ruefully to the counter-broadcasts of the incumbents, others were grateful that the coup attempt had failed. But

Tunji Lardner, Jr. is a Nigerian journalist currently freelancing in New York. He recently returned from several months in Nigeria.

the universal feeling was one of anger at the military for again disturbing civil society.

Some five years ago when Babangida eased out the tyrannical duo of Generals Muhammadu Buhari and Tunde Idiagbon in a palace coup, public expectations and confidence were high. The military as an institution still seemed a credible and disciplined alternative to fractious and venal politicians. Indeed, they have the weight of historical tenure behind them and the helmsman was regarded as a brave and patriotic soldier committed to galvanizing Nigeria.

(SAP) to the exclusion of all others became the Babangida blueprint for Nigeria's economic recovery.


The free-market imperatives of SAP have undoubtedly opened up certain sectors of the Nigerian economy and stimulated economic growth. And even Babangida's critics concede that some aspects of SAP have had a salutary effect on Nigeria's economic culture. However, Nigeria's problems have not been entirely economic—most problems center around the political economy. And it is at the heart of this continuum that major cardiac surgery is needed.

son why politicians and soldiers alike aspire to power in Nigeria.

In Babangida, Nigeria has a consummate soldier-politician who has used the centralized configuration of

The free market imperatives of the Structural Adjustment Program have opened up certain sectors of the Nigerian economy and stimulated economic growth

Beny Press



BABANGIDA BLUES

"We have witnessed our rise to greatness [and] a decline to the state of a bewildered nation," he said in his first address to the nation. "This government is determined to unite this country. We will not rule by force. Fundamental rights and civil liberties will be respected, but their exercise must not degenerate into irrational expressions, nor border on subversion."

Five years on, the Babangida magic and mystique is rather badly frayed at the edges. More than any other Nigerian leader, Babangida has sailed the choppy and often turbulent waters of politics with navigational charts that very often only he can decipher. His Machiavellian grasp of realpolitik and his commitment to free-market policies has resulted in the boldest attempt to date at restructuring the Nigerian economy.

Coming off the starting blocks in 1985, he broke the IMF deadlock that had crippled the Buhari administration, and in another of his populist moves, played to the gallery of public opinion by throwing the IMF issue into the public arena for debate. The anti-IMF lobby won a pyrrhic victory, the IMF loan was rejected, and instead the World Bank-inspired Structural Adjustment Program

Nigeria inherited a unitary and highly centralized mentality of governance from the British, and so in spite of a federal structure, the center has been the near absolute locus of power. And in addition, the Nigerian economy is driven almost exclusively by oil, with the public sector accounting for well over 90 percent of the gross domestic product. The numbers add up to an essentially weak private sector that cannot politically counter-balance the public sector because it derives most of its wealth from the patronage of the state.

And the state in turn predominates in nearly all aspects of political and economic life by its control of the "national cake" (as national budgetary allocations are known). It is this direct access to the bulk of Nigeria's wealth that has made government so powerful, and government officials so corrupt. The struggle for that center, in spite of the usual patriotic platitudes, has been the real rea-

state power to impose his own whimsical vision on Nigeria. Over the years, his steady accretion of power in the office of the presidency has resulted in an insidious dictatorship that is sure to harden given the events of last April.

Clearly the enormous consolidation of power during Babangida's presidency has set off alarm bells. In the office of the President are the following: the chairmanship of the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), the council of ministers, national council of state and the national security council, the minister of defense, the police, the central bank, budget affairs, and the proposed elite military forces, the national guard.

His supporters argue that his personification of a strong presidency is necessary for the success of his twin agenda of liberalizing the economy and returning Nigeria to a civilian democracy in 1992. And further-

more, a strong center is needed to put the lid on the perennial religious and ethnic squabbles that have plagued Nigeria. For a while, this argument seemed tenable due to Babangida's deft handling of political appointments (always a ready index of ethnic balancing) and his constant reassurance that he would hand over to a new breed of Nigerian politicians dedicated to serving the country and not themselves.

But lately, public optimism has hardened into a familiar knot of skepticism about the sincerity of government, and more about the real intentions of Gen. Babangida. His twin agenda has come under blistering criticism. Sam Aluko, a respected economist, has consistently argued that the government could do better. Given the circumstances, "there is an alternative even to death, which is living—SAP is the kiss of death."

And truly, the majority of Nigerians have been alienated from the supposed benefits of the economic restructuring. The administration's once-bold developmental initiatives, like the Directorate of Food, Roads, and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI) and the National Directorate of Employment, have more or less succumbed to the invidious political will of the Nigerian governing elite and are increasingly being viewed as pork barrel projects that serve no one but their inventors.

And as for the other agenda—the transition to civilian democracy in 1992—public faith in the program is at best ambivalent. While some sectors of the Nigerian intelligentsia have quietly quibbled about the irony of a patently non-democratic and anti-constitutional institution such as the military bequeathing a democratic legacy, such arguments were never voiced too loudly until now. The abortive coup threw that debate and other niggling questions into the public arena, one of which is now being asked with increasing stridency, "will Babangida succeed IBB [his initials]?"

The coup plotters seem to have thought so, in spite of government reassurances, including one by Gen.

Sanni Abacha, Chief of Army Staff, in a counter-coup announcement, that said "at this stage, let me reiterate our commitment to pursue vigorously the transition program. No amount of threat or blackmail will detract from the federal military government's attention in this regard. We are set to hand over power to a democratically elected government in 1992."

Gen. Domkat Bali, the respected former minister of defense removed early this year in another of Babangida's famed cabinet reshuffles, noted that "the supremacy which ought to be with the AFRC has been usurped substantially by the presidency."

Many fear that the administration's vaunted transition program has already been usurped by President Babangida's stratagems. Certainly his constant tinkering with the program and the AFRC's rejection of six emergent political parties last year, coupled with his imposition of two government-sponsored political parties—the Social Democratic Party and the National Republican Convention—hint darkly at post-electoral control, which in some quarters down south means as the coup leaders put it, "the domination and internal colonization of the Nigerian state by the so-called chosen few."

In spite of this simmering discontent, politicians and other pundits recognize that for now Babangida's transition plan is the only game in town. Politicians have fallen into line with the bipartisan structure, and despite some vagueness from the public, seem committed to making the show go on.

But there will be very muted applause—if any—from a large section of the Nigerian public, who have grown cynical about politicians (military and civilian) and government's genuine concern for real growth and development in Nigeria. They can readily point to the wall-to-wall corruption in government, and the conspicuous display of wealth concentrated in a few hands that has become the hallmark of all Nigerian governments to date.

Particularly galling is the animal

farm economics of the SAP that precipitated multiple riots across the country last May. In explaining the massive and spontaneous upheavals to the military, Babangida claimed that "detractors want to humiliate and disgrace the military out of office and destroy the credibility of the military as a group."

Perhaps so, but now in the wake of the coup attempt, it is more probable that after over 20 years of intervening in the civil polity, the Nigerian army is succumbing to the inevitable ravages of internecine power struggles. The army, decimated by consecutive purges and coups, has lost a great deal of its esprit de corps and internal cohesion. "The problem with the armed forces today," said retired Gen. Hassan Usman Katsina, former chief of army staff, "is their lack of dedication to duty and the duty of professionalism. Perhaps, no profession is as abused."

A divided army is just part of a slew of problems that the Babangida administration is currently faced with as it rounds the curve on the final sprint to 1992. A large, young, and restive population increasingly asking bolder questions and fired by the pro-democracy movements elsewhere seems determined to organize and challenge the traditional paternalism of Nigerian governments.

The age old North/South dichotomy hasn't let up either—it is now tinged with religious fundamentalism on both sides—and into this boiling cauldron add two parts repression of the press, three parts curtailment of free speech, and four parts deep-seated cynicism about the health of the political economy. Altogether a grand existential crisis for the military in power, a moral collapse of their traditional role, and serious doubts about the validity of their continued rule.

"The army has no moral justification to rule this country," declared another erstwhile chief of army staff, Gen. Gibson Jallo, in the aftermath of the botched coup. Handing over to a morally committed and administratively competent civilian government in 1992 might well be Babangida's biggest challenge yet. ○



THE ONE-PARTY DEBATE



Sarah-Jane Poole

Robert Mugabe speaking at an election rally: "The election victory is a mandate for all our policies including the establishment of a one-party state"

While President Robert Mugabe interpreted Zanu-PF's landslide election win as a mandate for the establishment of a one-party state, a recent debate between cabinet ministers and government critics highlighted the ongoing controversy regarding the role of freedom of association in Zimbabwe's political future.

By ANDREW MELDRUM

Hundreds of eager Zimbabweans packed a large hall to see two cabinet ministers debate the country's future with two well-known government critics. Entitled "Zimbabwe 1980-1990: Hopes, Achievements and Prospects," the forum proved to be a very timely event.

Robert Mugabe's Zanu-PF party decisively won the country's national elections at the end of March and Mugabe declared the win a mandate to establish a one-party state. Yet the elections were marked by violence and controversy and showed significant opposition to Mugabe's party. Then, on April 18, Zimbabwe marked its 10th anniversary of independence with more official calls for a one-party state, although national nurses' and teachers' strikes indicated popular dissatisfaction with the status quo. Zimbabweans of all walks of life were discussing the election results, the prospect of a one-party state, and what had been accomplished during a decade of independence.

Therefore, people responded enthusiastically when the Zimbabwe-German Society brought Senior Political Affairs Minister Didymus Mutasa and Education and Culture Minister Fay Chung face-to-face with some of the Mugabe government's most outspoken critics, Jonathan Moyo of the University of Zimbabwe and Michael Auret, director of Zimbabwe's leading human rights group, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace.

Young professional Zimbabweans and university students, as well as older white liberals and expatriates, filled the seats in the hall and then spilled over onto the floor. Many expressed the view that the Mugabe government has grown increasingly remote and said they looked forward to seeing the ministers directly confronted by their critics.

The evening began with a 10-minute presentation by each of the panelists. The first to speak was Fay Chung, a Chinese-Zimbabwean gen-

erally considered to be one of the government's most capable ministers and most dedicated socialists.

"I want to describe the government's achievements in its first 10 years of independence, its failures, and then its prospects," said Chung. She said the Mugabe government's great improvements for the black majority in the areas of health, education, welfare, and agriculture were major achievements since independence. On the failure side, Chung frankly stated that the Mugabe government had allowed corruption to reach the highest levels of government.

"Highly placed personnel have become car salesmen," said Chung, referring to Zimbabwe's "Willowgate" scandal in which five cabinet ministers last year lost their jobs after exposures of their involvement in an illegal car sales racket.

The other mistakes highlighted by Chung were the failure to build a truly socialist system in Zimbabwe and the slow pace of economic growth. She said an estimated 300,000 young Zimbabweans leave secondary school each year and more than three-quarters of them cannot find jobs.

"Only one out of nine Zimbabweans is in paid employment," said Chung, "and it is becoming increasingly difficult for those employed to support the rest. The number of jobs is not growing and yet our population is growing rapidly. Full employment is needed and for that we need to create 1 million jobs immediately and then 300,000 every year after that. The only way to create that number of jobs is to industrialize."

Turning to Zimbabwe's prospects, Chung said that as "an incurable optimist," she believes that if the government were to establish a truly socialist system, it would solve the problems of corruption and unemployment. "Socialism is the only possible way for Zimbabwe."

A warm round of applause followed her address, as those in the audience judged that she had been forthright and sincere, even if they were not convinced by her remedies.

Next came Jonathan Moyo, the University of Zimbabwe lecturer in political science, who quickly discounted the government's achievements in health, education, and welfare, saying that considering the drastic neglect of the majority of Zimbabwe's population by the previous Rhodesian government, any majority-rule government would have had to improve those services.

Moyo said the people of Zimbabwe had fought the long and bloody war against minority rule in order to win democracy.

"We should judge this government's record by asking if it has cultivated a climate in which democracy can grow. Right now, the question of a one-party state is the issue of the moment. The prospects and consequences of one-party rule are the issues of the day," said Moyo. "Contrary to developments worldwide, including on our continent, Zimbabwe is moving toward single-party rule. The president has used every available forum to put forth his view in favor of a one-party state, saying he believes it will bring about unity and oneness, so we can live together as one family."

Moyo said Zimbabweans should be "critical" of such rhetoric, particularly of a referendum on a one-party state.

"The very idea of a referendum on a one-party state is flawed," he said. "Freedom of political association is a basic human right and it should not be possible to vote it away. It does not matter what proportion votes in favor of a one-party state. We should be morally bound to respect the right of any individual to belong to a different political party."

Moyo's appeal brought a thunderous round of applause and then came Michael Auret of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace. Auret's organization had crusaded for majority rule during the Rhodesian regime and now, he said, it lauded the "miraculous, dramatic improvements and the remarkable progress in health, education, and welfare, and solid gains in economic rights."

Andrew Meldrum, a contributing editor to Africa Report, is an American journalist who has been based in Zimbabwe since 1980. He also writes for The Guardian of London.

On the negative side, Auret noted that corruption had permeated the lower levels of government so that it was becoming a factor in daily life.

"And in the field of human rights, the government does not have a very good record," said Auret. "The emergency powers designed by the Smith government to oppress the majority are still in place and used by this government to detain people without trial and to break strikes. In 1983-85, government forces carried out brutal attacks on the civilian population of Matabeleland in which thousands of people died and many more suffered. For the most part, the government officials who inflicted such misery on so many people are still in those same positions and that is an indictment on the government."

Auret reiterated the Justice and Peace Commission's well-known public stand against a one-party state.

"Why would this government, which has such great mental capacity, want to take up something which has been rejected throughout the world?" he asked. "This government could forge a political system uniquely African and uniquely Zimbabwean, yet it appears intent on picking up Eastern Europe's rejected baggage."

The audience, although cool to Auret at first, cheered his delivery at its finish. An expectant hush fell over the hall as Didymus Mutasa rose to speak. Mutasa has a reputation as a heavyweight power at the top of Zanu-PF. For years, he had served as Speaker of the House in Parliament, but following the March elections, his power became more evident as he was appointed senior minister of political affairs.

"I will not dwell on the failures of the government. To fail is human and in order to fail you first have to try, so any failure by the government means that it has tried," said Mutasa.

"I want to tell what has been the country's greatest achievement in its

first 10 years of independence," he said, "and that is its president, Robert Gabriel Mugabe."

A buzz of disbelief swept through the hall, to which Mutasa responded, "That's right, our president is our greatest achievement. Only he was able enough to transform our liberation struggle and marshal it into a government. Our president is head and shoulders above everybody else."

Mutasa gave a short speech extolling the virtues of Robert Mugabe, claiming, for example, that it was the president who magnanimously permitted the Justice and Peace Commission to work freely in the area of human rights in Zimbabwe, "something that would never be tolerated anywhere else in Africa." While diplomats and aid workers appeared perplexed by Mutasa's presentation, university students showed no such qualms. Their titters grew to become bursts of openly scornful laughter. Applause was matched by hoots of derision when Mutasa ended his talk.

The debate heated up as the audience posed questions to the panelists. Mutasa received much antagonistic questioning. He was asked if


Zanu-PF operated in a truly democratic manner when it openly discouraged members from challenging party leaders in the election primaries. He was also asked if this was the kind of democracy that would exist in a one-party state.

"If Zanu-PF says we are not to criticize or challenge the party leadership, then that is our own housekeeping rule," said Mutasa. "As far as a one-party state is concerned, I do not see what the problem is. As things are now, most of our people in the rural areas are uneducated peasants and do not understand all this talk about other parties, so why should we have a multi-party state which will only confuse them?"

Education Minister Chung pointed out that Zanu-PF was virtually assured a victory in a referendum for a one-party state as the party's staunchest supporters were in the rural areas where 75 percent of the country's population resides. She added that more than half of the people in the rural areas are illiterate and are unlikely to vote against Mugabe's ruling party.

"Our leaders are not supposed to take advantage of a bad situation," retorted Moyo. "There should be an

Edgar Tekere speaking at a pre-election campaign rally: He polled a credible 17 percent of the presidential vote, but apathy was one of the biggest winners, with only 54 percent of registered voters going to the polls



Sarah-Jane Poole

element of vision in our politics with leaders fostering a climate in which democracy will flourish. The only advantages of a one-party state are those which the leadership in power would enjoy."

Cheers arose from the audience to back Moyo and the heckling of Mutasa increased. Mutasa attacked the audience for being over-educated and critical without having the country's best interests at heart.

The invigorating debate brought together many of the issues currently featuring in Zimbabwe, yet it was not covered in the capital's daily newspaper, or on the radio or television news, all of which are government-controlled.

"I was delighted to see such a lively discussion of the issues and so many Zimbabweans actively questioning the issues," said an American aid worker. "Yet I couldn't help wondering if such a meeting would be possible if a one-party state is established."

Zimbabwe's election results, and particularly the way in which they were interpreted by Robert Mugabe, indicate that the country is headed toward a one-party state in the near future.

A jubilant Mugabe welcomed his presidential victory and Zanu-PF's landslide win of 116 of 120 parliamentary seats. Yet Edgar Tekere's opposition Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) made a good showing apart from the two seats it won, and Tekere himself polled a credible 17 percent of the presidential vote. The overall turnout of the poll—54 percent of registered voters—showed that apathy had been one of the biggest winners.

Mugabe brushed aside such reservations and those about campaign violence and the possibility of voting irregularities. He emphatically declared that the election triumph empowered Zanu-PF to proceed with plans to establish a one-party state.

"It's a mandate for all our policies including the establishment of a one-party state," said Mugabe. "It's entirely up to us how we can go

about it. We can take the vote as a mandate for us to go ahead and establish a one-party state. Or we could decide to give the people another chance to vote. It is up to our central committee to decide... However we do it, we will do so with a clear conscience that we have the people's backing."

Mugabe's statement seemed an unequivocal assertion that the country would be directed to a one-party state. But many of Harare's diplomats, journalists, and analysts had maintained that the move toward single-party rule was not at all certain, due to opposition within the 160-person central committee.

Mugabe and the party leadership close to him are "absolutely determined" to have a one-party state as soon as possible, said one Zanu-PF insider. He said that opposition within the party had dwindled.

The resistance within Zanu-PF to a one-party state remains largely with members who previously were in Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (Zapu). This puts the old Zapu members in a quandary. To adamantly oppose a one-party state would not stop Mugabe and would only put them back on the outside of power. They well remember how disastrous it was for the people of Matabeleland when Zapu was excluded from the workings of the system from 1982 to 1987, and so there appears little other choice for them but to go with the flow toward one-party rule.

Former Zapu intelligence chief Dumiso Dabengwa perhaps best illustrated this dilemma. He opposed the resolution for a one-party state at the party congress in December, but was voted down. When, following the March elections, Dabengwa was named to Mugabe's new cabinet, he delayed in accepting the post for about a week. His reluctance to quickly take the position shows the difficulty he has in either embracing leadership in Zanu-PF or in rejecting such participation.

Those who have argued against a one-party state in the central committee say that the examples of Eastern

Europe's failed single-party states are dismissed as "un-African."

"The only way to reason against one-party rule is to use African examples. Show how bad the system has been in Zambia, Kenya, and Malawi," said a party official. "But it appears that these are the very governments with which we are developing closer relations. I've come to the conclusion that Zanu-PF wants a one-party state with a capitalist system favoring those in power. Socialist rhetoric will be used to cover over that reality, just as in Kenya."

The unveiling of Mugabe's new government gave an indication of the shape of things to come in a one-party state: old wine in new bottles, with a few new twists. Although slightly trimmed down, the cabinet of 41 still seems a bit large and unwieldy when the pressures are mounting for dramatically reduced government spending. But as Mugabe maneuvers toward a one-party state, it is unlikely he would want to tip the balance of his carefully aligned regional forces in government. The Ministry of Political Affairs has a handful of government ministers—one senior minister, two ministers of state, and three deputy ministers of state—to run the party's affairs through government offices.

One of the biggest cabinet changes is at the Ministry of Health, where the appointment of Dr. Timothy Stamps signals the government will abandon its embarrassed attitude toward the AIDS crisis and launch an all-out campaign to control the epidemic. So, too, the assignment of Denis Norman as minister of transport indicates the country's crippling road, rail, and bus problems will be tackled with vigor. On the other hand, the appointment of Witness Mangwende to agriculture, lands, and resettlement does not make it clear what the government intends to do about the simmering land issue.

So, with the election results in and the new government installed, Zimbabwe appears to have stepped into its second decade firmly on the march to a one-party state. ○



THE DANGERS



Andrew Medrum

OF DISSENT

While Life-President Kamuzu Banda's iron-fisted rule has relied upon the systematic suppression of dissent, Malawi's Western allies have never seen fit to publicly criticize its human rights record. With the continent's moves toward democratization and the aging Banda nearing the end of his career, Africa Watch argues that now is the time to put on pressure.

By RICHARD CARVER

The current vogue for human rights does have its dangers. In February, Malawi, previously indifferent to international criticism and particularly to the OAU, ratified

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the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.

The irony of this will not be lost on Jack Mapanje, Malawi's leading poet. For some time, he has observed the theatrical methods—such as praise-song and dance—which Life-Presi-

dent Kamuzu Banda uses to legitimize his quarter-century of personal rule. Mapanje will have plenty of time to reflect on the political theater behind the Addis Ababa signing ceremony, since he is currently in his third year of detention without trial.

With Mapanje at Mikuyu Prison are several dozen other political prisoners, including a neurosurgeon, some civil servants, a handful of former cabinet ministers, and one man, Machipisa Munthali, who has been detained for 25 years. They may be wondering whether the Malawian delegation in Addis Ababa was familiar with Article 6 of the charter they have just signed: "No one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained."

Malawi's attitude to the right of free expression, guaranteed in Article 9, has been equally derisive. Mapanje's own collection of poems, *Of Chameleons and Gods*, was banned when he was arrested in September 1987. His detention was probably intended to pre-empt a further volume of poetry, entitled *Out of Bounds*. Mapanje's poems join a list of prohibited publications which includes works by George Orwell, Graham Greene, Ernest Hemingway, and Simone de Beauvoir, as well as the *Kama Sutra* and, indeed, just about anything that anyone might actually want to read.

In a major political trial of the 1970s, one of the counts against the defendant, a former secretary-general of the ruling party, was possession of a copy of *Animal Farm*. In vain, he pleaded that he had studied it as a set book at school and had forgotten to throw it away when it was banned.

Once on a visit to Meharry Medical College in Tennessee, where he has studied, President Banda was presented with a book which he recommended to his cabinet as suitable reading matter. It was later discovered to general embarrassment that it was already on the Malawi Censorship Board's banned list.

Improbably, this list even includes the Simon and Garfunkel song, "Cecilia." The reason is that Banda's unpopular "Official Hostess" is called Cecilia Kadzamira. At one time, bowdlerized versions of the song circulated, satirizing the domestic life of the president and hostess. These days, Cecilia prefers to be known by her middle name of Tamanda.

Banda might seem like a comic-

opera autocrat, with his taste for homburg hats and three-piece suits and his conviction that Malawian children should learn Latin and Greek. However, for the people of Malawi, his capricious style of rule is deadly serious.

The Kafkaesque nature of the Malawian system is illustrated by the sad case of Blaise Machila. A colleague of Jack Mapanje's in the English department of the University of Malawi, he had a long history of mental illness. After Mapanje's arrest, he became distressed and began claiming that it was he who had denounced his friend to the authorities. He was admitted as a voluntary patient to a mental hospital, where he began to criticize Banda and other political leaders for Mapanje's arrest.

The hospital authorities summoned the police. Machila's mental state made him abandon the caution which is usually second nature to Malawians. He repeated his attacks on the leadership. Machila was discharged from the hospital that night, arrested, and detained at Mikuyu Prison. That was in January 1988. More than two years later, he remains there in solitary confinement, his mental health apparently worse than ever. He is permanently chained and naked.

Banda's power rests upon the systematic suppression of dissent. Candidates for Parliament must be approved by Banda himself. Despite his professed enthusiasm for education, he usually chooses candidates of low educational attainment. The effect has generally been a docile Parliament. In 1964, soon after independence, there was a major split in the cabinet, with a number of ministers forced into exile. Since then, the only time when Parliament has begun to voice independent opinions was in the early 1980s. The four most outspoken members of Parliament—three of them cabinet ministers—were promptly murdered in a faked car accident.

Life in Malawi is under the close control of the ruling Malawi Congress Party and the Malawi

Young Pioneers, a paramilitary youth group with powers of arrest. Malawians often have to present a party card before they can board a bus or enter the market. They may be compelled to buy party cards for their children—as well as contributing to frequent collections for President Banda.

Those in detention are the brave ones who try to defy this systematic political control. One such is Margaret Marango Banda, a former radio presenter and prominent laywoman in the Anglican church. The apparent reason for her detention is that she criticized alleged corruption in the national women's organization, the Chituko Cha Amai Mu Malawi (CCAM). The leader of the CCAM is Cecilia Kadzamira. Margaret Banda was arrested in 1988 on her return from a visit to Britain and is still held in poor conditions at Zomba Central Prison. She is 62 years old and suffers from diabetes and high blood pressure, but she is being denied proper medical attention.

Margaret Banda, like a disproportionate number of political prisoners, comes from the Northern Region. Under British colonial rule, northerners were better taught in the mission schools, with the result that they came to dominate the civil service and educational system after independence. This is resented by the Chewa-speaking political elite from the Central Region, including Banda and Kadzamira. Chewa is an official language of Malawi, whereas Tumbuka, the language of the north, is not. Periodically, Banda engages in a purge of northerners in the civil service and education system.

The most recent purge began just over a year ago. A quota system was introduced to reduce the number of northern students at the university and northerners were expelled from the national schools examination board. In early 1989, Banda made two speeches denouncing northern civil servants for allegedly channeling development aid to their region and ordered all teachers to return to their region of origin. The redeployment of teachers is unworkable and

unpopular in all parts of the country.

A number of senior civil servants from the north were retired without pension benefits—they were fired. The country's only neurosurgeon, George Mtafu, dared to criticize this to Banda's face and has been detained ever since. Several dozen other northerners have also been detained in the past year. The case of Thozza Konje is typical. A 42-year-old manager for the Sugar Company of Malawi, he was arrested after a government informer had eavesdropped on a bar room conversation in which he criticized the redeployment of teachers.

Even beyond Malawi's borders, dissent is dangerous. In October 1989, an exiled journalist named Mkwapatira Mhango died after his Lusaka home was firebombed. His two wives and five small children were also burned to death. Only three weeks earlier, Banda had denounced him publicly. In 1987, his brother, Goodluck Mhango, was detained after Mkwapatira had written an article in a foreign magazine alleging corruption in Kadzamira's leadership of the CCAM.

Orton Chirwa, Malawi's first attorney-general, and his wife Vera, a law lecturer, might be surprised to learn that Malawi now subscribes to Article 7 of the African Charter, which guarantees the right to a fair trial in an independent court with a defense lawyer. In 1981, Orton and Vera Chirwa were abducted from Zambia and later put on trial before a "traditional court" composed of untrained judges answerable to the president. They were not allowed to call witnesses in their defense nor hire counsel. They are still serving life sentences at Zomba Prison and only avoided execution because of a rare international outcry.

Banda, an elder of the Church of Scotland, is not one for religious tolerance (Article 8). The Jehovah's Witnesses are banned as a threat to the "prevailing calm, law, and order." It is claimed that many Witnesses are still detained at Dzeleka.

Malawi also practices institutional racial discrimination (banned under

Article 2) against Asians, who are effectively restricted to the towns.

However, Malawi's ratification of the African Charter is not only a joke in poor taste. It is also part of a reorientation of Malawi's foreign policy away from its long-standing alliance with South Africa and toward its frontline neighbors. At one time, Malawi was an essential rear base for the Mozambican rebel group Renamo. It was the route by which South Africa supplied Renamo bands operating in northern Mozambique. Although certain figures in the Malawian regime are still closely bound to South Africa, it has gradually dawned on the government that Renamo was preying on Malawi's own trade route to the Mozambican port of Nacala.

The withdrawal of support for Renamo means that Malawi is no longer the pariah that it once was. In particular, a new axis has emerged between Lilongwe and Harare. Zimbabwean troops guard Malawian convoys in Mozambique, and Zimbabwe recently expelled the exiled Malawian opposition leader Edward Yapwantha. In particular, President Robert Mugabe and his wife Sally, head of the women's league and newly elevated to the party Politburo, seem to admire the Malawi Congress Party and especially the women dancers, the *mbumba*, who greet Banda on every public occasion.

The danger is that once Malawi's foreign policy is deemed acceptable to the rest of Africa, no one will look too closely at Banda's brutal methods of suppressing internal dissent.

Despite its foreign policy shift, Malawi remains as closed as ever to outside scrutiny. Just as it was signing the African Charter, it expelled the only two resident foreign correspondents.

In the offices of Africa Watch, news of the ratification was greeted with wry amusement. A little earlier Malawi's diplomatic representative in London had written in response to a request by Africa Watch to visit the country. He accused Africa Watch of recycling "malicious stories" about

Malawi and "trying to assume the functions of a world government." Malawi had enjoyed "25 years of peace and calm through its united and disciplined people under the wise, pragmatic, and dynamic leadership of His Excellency the Life President Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda." Malawi believes "in resolving any problems through...contact and dialogue and not confrontation." Therefore, in something of a non sequitur, Africa Watch's request was refused.

Banda is now in his 90s—although in Malawi you would be locked up for suggesting such a thing. Recent visitors say that he is increasingly frail. For the past decade, politics in Malawi have focused almost entirely on the succession to Banda. When he dies, power is likely to fall into the hands of Cecilia Kadzamira and her uncle, John Tembo, who have been implicated in some of the worse excesses of recent years. The likelihood that Banda is nearing the end makes it more, not less important, that Malawi's allies apply pressure for an improvement in respect for human rights.

Malawi's principal Western allies—Britain, West Germany, and the United States—have made no public criticism of Banda's human rights record. His pro-Western foreign policy and free market economics have won him favor. Malawi's allies have been prepared to overlook, for example, his whimsical dismissal and imprisonment of senior Reserve Bank officials, although this might seem inconsistent with prudent economic management.

However, at a time when one-party dictatorships are tumbling almost weekly, the Life-President should be told that human rights standards are to be applied universally and that the United States is not only interested in castigating tyrannies of the "left." A good first step would be to insist that journalists and human rights organizations be given free access to the country. Then the world will be able to judge how well Malawi is sticking to the charter it has recently signed. ○



THE FEMINIZATION



As poverty levels in Africa continue to worsen, new evidence indicates those getting poorest fastest are women. While reflective of the continent-wide economic decline, the impoverishment of women is also due to governmental neglect of women, drastic cuts in social spending through structural adjustment programs, and cultural denigration of women's role in society.

An alarming trend with potentially devastating economic, social, and environmental consequences is developing across Africa, with evidence showing that nearly two-thirds of Africa's fast-growing, poverty-stricken population consists of women. The picture becomes bleaker considering that between 1970 and 1985, the number of Africans living in abject poverty rose by 75 percent to about 270 million, or half the population of the continent, according to the International Labor Organization.

Poor shelter, malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, overwork, a short life expectancy, and high maternal and infant mortality rates mark the lives of the poorest of poor women and their dependent families. Poverty is growing faster in Africa than in any other part of the world. Even more alarming, perhaps, is the fact that

Margaret A. Novick

OF POVERTY

By DAPHNE TOPOUZIS

the feminization of poverty is becoming increasingly structural, advancing well beyond the reach of policy-makers and development projects. As a result, it is becoming virtually impossible for women to escape the cycle of crushing poverty in which they are entrenched.

If this trend is not reversed, however, about 400 million Africans will be living in absolute poverty by 1995, argues the newly released UNDP *1990 Human Development Report*, and up to 260 million could be women.

The feminization of poverty is only beginning to be recognized as a pressing problem in Africa and elsewhere in the world, and there are as yet no statistical indicators or figures available to help identify the magnitude of the crisis. At best, studies on poverty refer to it in passing, but more often, they fail to appreciate the ramifications of this shift in the pattern of poverty on overall economic development.

The reasons behind the increasing concentration of poverty among women in Africa are as varied as they are complex. A combination of prolonged drought and the debt crisis have triggered large-scale male migrations to the cities, leaving one-third of all rural households headed by women. In some regions of sub-Saharan Africa, up to 43 percent of all households are headed by women, according to the UN *1989 World Survey on Women in Development*.

This phenomenon is transforming the family structure and socio-economic fabric of African societies across the continent, placing additional financial burdens on already poor and overworked women.

Women heads of households tend to have more dependents, fewer bread-winning family members, and restricted access to productive resources. "Female members of a poor household are often worse off than male members because of gender-based differences in the distribution of food and other entitlements within the family," adds the *1990 Human Development Report*.

The poverty crisis has been further aggravated by ill-fated agricultural policies or a neglect of agriculture by national governments, rapid population growth, and pressure on land available for cultivation—all of which have contributed to declining productivity and food consumption in many African countries. Between 1980 and 1985, per capita income in Africa declined by 30 percent, taking into account the negative terms of trade. The first victims of food shortages and famine tend to be women with young children, which is not surprising, considering that just under half of all African women and 63 percent of pregnant women suffer from anemia.

The adverse effects of the economic recession and remedial structural adjustment programs should be added to the list of factors that have contributed to the impoverishment of women. Structural adjustment has in many cases increased unemployment in the cities, and women are again the first to be laid off in the formal sector. Austerity measures have also decreased women's purchasing power and removed subsidies on basic foodstuffs. Thus, already overworked women have no choice but to work even longer hours to keep their families afloat, often at the expense of

caring for their children and their own health. According to the UN Fund for Population Activity's *State of the World Population 1990*, rural African women tend to have more children in order to lighten their load with food production.

And last but not least, armed conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, and civil unrest in several other countries have left thousands of women widowed, displaced, or abandoned to a life of permanent emergency as refugees: An estimated two-thirds of the 5 million adult refugee population on the continent are women. "When armies march, there is no harvest," reads one African saying. As a result, women refugees often become almost totally dependent on relief from international organizations whose resources for them are currently on the decline.

The Plight of Rural Women

From near food self-sufficiency in 1970, Africa over the past two decades has witnessed a marked decline in food production and consumption per person, while real per capita access to resources has decreased accordingly. African women, who produce, process, and market over 75 percent of the food, suffer greater deprivations than men and continue to be ignored by national policy-makers and international aid organizations.

Thus, even though the past two years have seen bumper crops in many Sahelian countries, women farmers have not benefitted from this, and the poorest among them are still unable to grow enough food to sustain their families. One of the reasons is that, as a whole, they

remain excluded from access to improved technology, credit, extension services, and land. Landless, unskilled, and illiterate rural women often live precarious lives on the edge of impoverishment, regardless of how hard they work.

Women in developing countries work twice as many hours as men for one-tenth of the income. In East Africa, women spend up to 16 hours every day growing, processing, and preparing food, gathering fuel and water, and performing other household chores, in addition to caring for their children and the extended family. In Malawi, women put in twice as many hours as men cultivating maize, the main cash crop, and the same number of hours in cotton, in addition to doing all the housework.

In South Africa's homelands, women walk from three to five miles every other day to collect fuelwood weighing up to 65 pounds, according to *Apartheid's Environmental Toll*, a report released by Worldwatch Institute in Washington, D.C. Environmental degradation affects women directly, as they have to walk longer distances to fetch fuelwood and water. In turn, impoverished women—most of whom live in ecologically fragile areas—have little alternative but to continue degrad-

ing their environment in order to survive. Poverty, overpopulation, and environmental degradation are not only inextricably linked, but they continually reinforce one another.

Urban Women in "Pink Collar Jobs"

Women are still a minority in the public sector in Africa: In Benin and Togo, 21 percent of public sector employees are women, while in Tanzania, their share in formal employment was 15.6 percent in 1983. Poor urban women have little professional training. As a result, they are reduced to low-wage, low-status, or "pink collar" jobs, which include clerical, teaching, and social services. In Kenya, 78.9 percent of the female work force in the service sector is employed in pink collar jobs, while only 6.1 percent is employed in high-paying jobs. The economic crisis has had a profound effect on these women, with unemployment rising by 10 percent annually in the period 1980-1985. In Botswana and Nigeria, the rate of unemployment among young women under 20 was 44 percent and 42 percent respectively in 1987, as opposed to males of the same age group, at 23.5 and 22.2 percent. For those who retained their jobs, wages were often slashed by one-third.

The vast majority of urban women work in the informal sector where earnings are meager, and there is no legal protection or job security: In Ghana, 85 percent of all employment in trade in 1970 was accounted for by women; in Nigeria, 94 percent of the street food vendors are women. These women earn substantially less than their male counterparts and often live on the edge of poverty, so that a slight deterioration in economic conditions, such as price rises of essential foodstuffs, can directly threaten their survival, as well as that of their families. In Dar es Salaam, argues the *1990 Human Development Report*, poor women had to cut back from three meals a day to two. In extreme cases, poor urban women have resorted to begging, prostitution, and other illicit activities in order to survive.

Structural Adjustment

Structural adjustment programs prescribed by international financial institutions have largely failed to integrate women into economic development and have imposed drastic cuts in education and health services, thereby exacerbating existing inequalities and marginalizing women further. A recent study conducted by a group of experts set up by the Commonwealth Ministers Responsible for Women, entitled *Engendering Adjustment for the 1990s*, argues that women in developing countries "have been at the epicenter of the crisis and have borne the brunt of the adjustment efforts."

Particularly alarming is the fact that for the first time in many years, maternal and infant mortality rates are beginning to rise and girls' school enrollments are starting to fall. "If you educate a man, you simply educate an individual, but if you educate a woman, you educate a family," said J.E. Aggrey, a Ghanaian educator. Few, however, have taken

Women spend up to 16 hours a day growing, processing, and preparing food, gathering fuel and water, and performing other chores, in addition to caring for their children and the extended family



this message seriously: Illiteracy in Africa is four times as high among women as among men, and the higher the level of education, the lower the percentage of girls. In Côte d'Ivoire, 82 women among 707 students completed university studies in 1983. In 13 out of 18 African countries for which figures are available, expenditure per pupil in primary school decreased dramatically, up to 40 percent, between 1980 and 1984/5.

Women's health has also suffered severe setbacks as a result of structural adjustment programs. In Nigeria, where health fees and social service subsidies were slashed, health care and food costs have spiraled by 400 to 600 percent, according to a recent report in *West Africa*. About 75,000 women die each year from causes related to pregnancy or childbirth in Nigeria alone—that is, one woman every seven minutes, according to the same source. In Benin, Cameroon, Nigeria, Malawi, Mali, and Mozambique, one out of five 15-year-old women dies before she reaches 45 years of age for reasons related to pregnancy and childbirth.

Women in Development

Between 1965 and 1986, women were neglected by development planners largely due to misconceptions and misdirected efforts and as a result, hardly benefitted from development aid, argued a 1988 World Bank report. Thus, it was taken for granted that all households are male-headed, that women do not work, and that by increasing the income of a household, everyone will benefit. Rural development projects geared toward women tended to emphasize training and health, hygiene, nutrition, and child care, neglecting to help women improve their capabilities as farmers. Women were barred from access to credit and improved technology because it was the men who were addressed as the real producers.

A case in point is the Sedhiou Project in Senegal, which provided credit to cooperatives but refused female

membership. In a British-funded cotton growing project in Bura, Kenya, women have no access to plots where they can grow food, and malnutrition has increased among their children; at an integrated rural development project in Zambia, women have little time to grow food and care for their families because they have to work long hours on their husbands' cash crop, to mention but a few examples.

The devastating drought, famines, and the economic crisis of the 1980s pressured African governments and development organizations into recognizing the vital role women play in economic development. Most African governments now have a ministry, bureau, or department dealing with women's affairs and some legislative adjustments have been made to improve the socio-economic status of women. These initiatives, however, have not reached the most vulnerable and impoverished of women, not least because their needs are multi-sectoral and are unlikely to be met by a single government department, while being ignored or given token recognition by other ministries.

In essence, women's economic contributions remain largely overlooked and equitable development strategies have yet to be translated into effective plans of action. In many countries, African women still cannot own the land they cultivate or get access to credit. In Lesotho, women lack the most basic legal and social rights: They cannot sign contracts, borrow money, or slaughter cattle without their husbands' consent.

Sustainable development has to become synonymous with equitable development, and economic recovery will only come about if the femi-



Margaret A. Novick

In many African countries, women still cannot own the land they cultivate or get access to credit

nization of poverty is tackled as an economic and social problem rather than as a purely developmental or exclusively a women's problem. There are some encouraging initiatives in Ghana, Tanzania, and Nigeria, where farmers' cooperatives are obtaining loans for poor women from local banks.

However, a formidable task awaits national governments and development workers: Access to productive resources such as land, capital, and technology, fair wages, training, and education and basic health care are essential conditions if African women are to break out of the vicious circle of poverty and underdevelopment. Equally pressing, however, are policy-making and legislative reforms to combat discrimination against women and change male attitudes regarding women's contributions to social and economic life. ○

WHY WE DIDN'T SEE WEMBLEY

The whole world was watching on television when rock stars paid tribute to Nelson Mandela at the London gala in April—the whole world except the U.S. Why didn't a single American network carry the concert, or even the news that it was not being covered? Was the reason political, commercial, cultural, or just a reflection of the American media's neglect of African issues?

By DANNY SCHECHTER

This time rock-and-roller Little Steven was determined that his political message not be censored. Invited to return to London's Wembley Stadium for a second globally broadcast concert honoring Nelson Mandela, the founder of Artists United Against Apartheid—the group responsible for the 1985 anti-apartheid anthem "Sun City"—had special pro-sanctions tee-shirts printed up for the singers to wear on camera.

Two years earlier, the musician had returned from London to discover that the political remarks he made at the concert—which had been shown worldwide—had been edited out of the American TV broadcast of the 1988 Mandela birthday concert. At the time, he expressed his displeasure with a *New York Times* Op-Ed page article arguing that the event had been sanitized politically for domestic consumption. To make sure it didn't happen again, he figured that

Danny Schechter is executive producer of "South Africa Now."



at least the visual he planned to wear would make it into America's living rooms.

He figured wrong. What Little Steven and the many musicians who appeared on stage at Wembley on April 16 did not count on was that not one American TV network would broadcast the four-hour superstar concert that the BBC was carrying in Britain and transmitting worldwide. This time, there would be no controversy about the American broadcast because there was to be no American broadcast at all.

Why? Was there a lack of interest among the American people? Was there some conspiracy to suppress the event? Why was it that 63 other countries broadcast it, but no one in

America was willing to do so?

There seem to be several answers, and they have to do with both how the concert was marketed and the political character of the event itself, as well as that of American television. To those of us at "South Africa Now," a public television series which regularly reports stories from the region not seen on the networks, the lack of reporting on the event and the failure to broadcast it is more evidence of TV's lack of commitment to the South African story.

A word first about the concert. The idea was hatched by two of the people involved in creating the 1988 Mandela show. Mike Terry, the untiring organizer of Britain's Anti-Apartheid Movement, and Tony

Hollingsworth, a concert producer, felt with some justification that the earlier 11-hour birthday bash did generate lots of pressure for Mandela's release. After the ANC leader walked so defiantly to freedom in early February, they thought a second concert would be a great way to celebrate his freedom and call on the world to keep the pressure on. When a BBC executive expressed interest, they were on their way.

First, they sought approval from the African National Congress and the "International Reception Committee" that the ANC had established to get all the political mileage it could from Mandela's release. Its 31 patrons included prime ministers, former presidents, Jimmy Carter among them, and personalities including Jesse Jackson and the 1987 European footballer of the year. The veteran anti-apartheid crusader Archbishop Trevor Huddleston had convened the committee. When approached to support another rock show, he was enthusiastic, as was the ANC. In their eyes, the concert would be a global event, a platform from which Mandela, for the first time, could speak directly to a world audience—and in prime time at that.

And so Wembley II, officially known as "An International Tribute for a Free South Africa," was born. The organizers had just 54 days to make it happen on the Easter Monday date they had settled on. It was a vast undertaking, with Hollingsworth responsible for production and the reception committee for its politics. The ANC was not even the financial beneficiary. Like the globally televised Mandela birthday concert in 1988, six charities—the same ones which shared a surplus of £600,000 then—were designated as the recipients of any potential largesse. The organizers now say there wasn't any.

The producers did an impressive job. Seventy-two thousand tickets sold out quickly, the fastest sell-out in the venue's history. Enormous production and technical details were handled smoothly. There were more problems in booking artists, never an easy job given schedule conflicts and

communications difficulties, not to mention ego factors. Stevie Wonder is travelling in Africa...the Stones are in Japan...So and so is recording, someone else is on vacation and unreachable, etc.

There were political problems, too. The producers were determined to have a multi-racial bill, but who should get priority? Big-name musicians, or artists who have been involved with the cause for a long time? A few musicians met both criteria, but most did not. South African musicians were particularly anxious to contribute their talents, but only a few were well-known internationally. The ANC decided that to maximize their input, South African artists would perform together in two 25-minute blocks. Not everyone was satisfied with this arrangement. On show day, both Hugh Masekela and Miriam Makeba were conspicuous by their absence. Some South African artists grumbled that some of the white stars were using the event to boost their careers.

Getting the Right Bill

Getting the right bill was crucial if the event was to find a television buyer in the United States, the most lucrative television market in the world. A U.S. sale represented the concert's profit potential, but it depended on what the concert producers had to sell, and that always comes down to one thing—big names.

In the music business, only a few musicians are considered "A Acts," with enough name value to draw top dollar and land a TV sale. With stars like Peter Gabriel, Tracy Chapman, Anita Baker, Natalie Cole, Neil Young, Lou Reed, and 1990 Grammy Winner Bonnie Raitt among many others, Hollingsworth had an impressive lineup, but would it impress the handful of TV programmers who would have to agree to shell out a significant acquisition fee? He hoped that his real headliner would put him over the top and make the event irresistible: Nelson Mandela, live, was the star of the show. He thought that the hoopla surrounding his first

major appearance outside of South Africa made him "bankable." He thought wrong.

Radiovision International, a Los Angeles-based company with a track record for selling TV rights for rock shows worldwide, had the job of finding a TV buyer. One television trade magazine, *Cablevision*, says it didn't do a very good job, either by overpricing the event, or failing to hype it properly to overcome its "short window," the short time period between its announcement and the broadcast which means less time for promotion. In the same article, the magazine indicted the cable industry for not carrying the show, for not acting more aggressively "to demonstrate once again its ability to go where broadcast won't."

If the leading cable industry magazine tended to blame non-political factors, *Variety*, the journal of the entertainment industry, pinpointed political

The ultimate irony is that South African broadcasters were willing to carry the event—with all of its oppositional content—while American TV looked the other way.

factors as central in the decision by broadcasters not to carry the event. *Variety* blamed their skittishness and a lack of consciousness as well.

"We've talked to everybody," Radiovision exec David Wyler told *Variety*. "American TV is the least risk-taking, the most conservative in the world." It's hard to believe that powerful networks that have been able to send cameras to the moon, and fill the airwaves with far more trivial programs week after week couldn't find the air time if they wanted to. A Radiovision executive told me that most of the TV executives he approached were worried about the political character of the event.

There are many ironies with that concern. A commentator writing in the London *Guardian* argued that the BBC only broadcast Mandela's speech because he has been accorded a personal status above politics as a world symbol and celebrity, "with a strong appeal to the non-political." Apartheid in most parts of the world is not a controversial issue with debatable pros and cons, but a moral issue that invites universal condemnation.

A second irony involves race. Some programmers apparently declined to take the show in part because of the perception that Mandela's non-racialist message would be of interest only to a narrow audience, primarily black. The ultimate irony is that South African broadcasters were willing to carry the event—with all of its oppositional content—while American TV looked the other way. (The ANC decided not to permit a South African broadcast because of its support for the UN's cultural boycott.)

The bottom line is usually economics. *Variety's* story explained that rock concerts overall are not big ratings getters—and hence not considered super-lucrative. Yet other less political rock shows with a conscience have gotten air time. An AIDS music benefit was carried a day later during prime time on CBS. Public television was no more receptive than its commercial counterparts. PBS turned down an opportunity to broadcast the Wembley concert without much consideration. PBS often carries performances by non-A-list artists, but claimed in this instance that its programming guidelines prevent it from carrying benefits. This is not an issue that seems to excite its programmers. In 1986, PBS was criticized for refusing to broadcast another pop-culture anti-apartheid event: the award-winning "Making of Sun City" documentary.

The artists at Wembley were shocked when told about this total TV blackout, encompassing every cable and broadcast network including MTV, which begged off in part because it had committed to airing an all-star muscular dystrophy benefit

later. "It's a scandal," fumed Little Steven. "It's shameful and embarrassing." Equally embarrassing was the lack of news about the blackout itself. A *New York Times* story reported that the concert would not be shown in South Africa, without mentioning that its readers in America would not get to see it either.

The pity is that Americans missed a great show. The Wembley concert was inspiring for its energy and passion. To *The Washington Post*, "it appeared that the use of grandiose rock shows for consciousness-raising had evolved another notch." The link between politics and music was strong, although there were some contradictions, including a virtually all-white crowd.

But Nelson Mandela was received as a conquering hero, and spoke only after a seven-minute screaming ovation. His remarks projected great dignity and presence, calling for continued pressure on the de Klerk government. "Reject any suggestion that the campaign to isolate the apartheid system should be wound down," he urged. His speech was page-one news in every newspaper in Europe. In the United States, only *USA Today* gave it that visibility, perhaps because it caters more to mass interests than elite concerns.

What the world didn't see was Mandela's visit backstage to meet the artists and express his appreciation for their involvement. Only "South Africa Now" covered those emotional remarks. "Over the years in prison I have tried to follow the developments in progressive music," Mandela told them. "Your contribution has given us tremendous inspiration... Your message can reach quarters not necessarily interested in politics, so that the message can go further than we politicians can push it... We admire you. We respect you, and above all, we love you." He thus blessed a continuing marriage between pop culture and liberation politics which remains a vital force inside South Africa where music and the arts are an active component of anti-apartheid political work.

While some politicians in anti-

apartheid political movements and Africa-oriented agencies tend to be dismissive of popular culture as somehow not serious or appropriate for a great leader to associate with, they cannot deny its ability to mobilize people or raise their awareness. A rap song against apartheid will reach a bigger audience than a UN report. Popular culture may also goose the news media. For some time, a decline in news coverage of African issues has angered Africans, and worried their supporters overseas. Over the last year, I've attended four conferences that discussed this problem. Many heard complaints about ignorance, indifference, and racism in the newsrooms and among the media gatekeepers who give assignments and decide what to air. The consensus among the critics is that the TV networks could devote more time to African issues if they had the will to do so.



TV networks influence public awareness by what they choose to show and how they choose to play particular issues and programs. When the networks descended en masse to cover Mandela's release in South Africa, their saturation coverage was popular. A *Times Mirror* poll at the time showed more Americans interested in South Africa than Lithuania. But when the electronic eye moved on to Eastern Europe, coverage declined and soon interest waned as well.

It's clear that when an issue is not on television, it doesn't exist for most Americans. That's why the South Africans have not lifted their restrictions on TV coverage. But the ultimate challenge may be less to convince Pretoria's censors than to make New York's news managers accountable. There are few publications with media critics who regularly monitor Africa coverage, or lobby for more of it. "South Africa Now" is doing that to the extent that a small budget and the reach of PBS stations allow. But more is needed: The media *is* political and its treatment of the Mandela Tribute is another depressing case in point of how timid and out of step we are with the world. ○

Margaret Courtney-Clarke: THE HOME AS CANVAS

By DAPHNE TOPOUZIS

Photojournalist and author Margaret Courtney-Clarke's new book, *African Canvas*, records an art form virtually unknown to the rest of the world. The artists are rural women living in remote villages of seven West African countries, who use their fingers and pigments from the earth and plants, to decorate their houses, their clothing, and their bodies in intricate motifs.



Africa Report: What is the scope and objective of your book?
Courtney-Clarke: The objective of the book was to record an art form—house decoration—which I believe is going to die sooner or later. This is what I did in my previous book, entitled *Ndebele: The Art of an African Tribe*. Today, the Ndebele people do not paint their houses anymore and their artistic tradition has been lost altogether. This gave me the urgency to go out and look for other art done by women and record it, in the hope

that we would eventually have a document about it. I did some preliminary research and found that because it is a very impermanent art form—mud dwellings, earth colors, and pigments wash away every year with the rains—it is an artistic tradition that has gone virtually unnoticed.

Africa Report: Where is this art form most prevalent and how far back does the tradition go?

Courtney-Clarke: It is a tradition which is carried out by rural

women who live far from cities, in poor and remote areas. This is because people in those areas cannot afford to build cinder block houses and since they lack roads and transport in general, tin roofing, and other building material do not reach them. As a result, they are forced to build with mud, which is abundant everywhere. In terms of how long the tradition has been going on, it is hard to say because there is so little documentation on it.

Of all the countries I visited, Ghana was the richest in house decoration. There is house decoration in northern Nigeria among the Hausa people, but it is done by men and there has been quite a lot of coverage on that. The Nigerians have also incorporated bicycles and airplanes and things like that, and a decorated house is a status symbol: A wealthy businessman will hire a painter to decorate his home. These are reasons quite different from the women painting their homes in the countries I documented. The Dogon in Mali also decorate their houses, but again this is done by men. I wanted to stick to what the women are doing since they have been totally ignored and their art has not been documented. I have included a chapter on pottery, one on mud cloth painting in Mali (*bogholamfini*), and another on body art or *uli*, which can be found in Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire. Foremost, I tried to concentrate on clay art.

Africa Report: To what extent has religion influenced this art form?

Courtney-Clarke: It depends on the area. Islamic religion influences everything the women do and dictates what they cannot do—for instance, they are not allowed to represent the human body or animals. So they have used parts of the human body in a very repetitive motif and have created abstract pat-

terns which only they know and understand the significance of. Since this tradition is passed from generation to generation of women, sometimes they themselves do not know the origin of these abstract motifs.

Africa Report: What impressed you most about the mural art you documented?

Courtney-Clarke: What struck me most was that these women live in conditions of extreme hardship, working long days in the fields, in the home, taking care of the children, and in spite of all that, they still find the time and the spirit to decorate their homes. What impressed me was the pride these women have when they beautify their surroundings, which are often drab and barren.

Africa Report: How can this tradition be preserved?

Courtney-Clarke: Unless local governments do something drastic, the tradition will disappear. The Arts Council in Ghana, a government-subsidized organization, could encourage it and I believe it could become an extraordinary tourist attraction for the country. At the moment, all we ever hear about in Ghana is Ashanti art. Any tourist that goes to Ghana goes to Kumasi to see the Ashanti gold, cloth, and pottery, all of which is done by men. But transportation to northern Ghana does not lend itself to tourism. If the government rebuilt that road, you could have tourist buses going up there by the hundreds. For instance, the Arts Council could select five villages, sponsor the women to continue this tradition—which would not require great sums of money—and organize it. Today, there are few tourists who get as far as Bolgatanga, and there is no way that they could ever hear or know about the existence of this art. ○

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AFRICA

Excerpts from *African Canvas*

"As a photojournalist with a fundamental interest in art and design, I wanted to travel and record that particular aspect of African culture (observing and analyzing the socio-political problems and harsh realities of modern-day Africa is a task for specialists). My first project was the photography of colorful mural art in a southern African ethnic group living partly in South Africa and partly in their designated "homeland" of KwaNdebele. When those photographs were published in *Ndebele: The Art of an African Tribe* in 1986, I received letters from photographers, designers and writers around the world who had never heard of this startling African tradition of combining the arts of painting, sculpture, and architecture.

"Curious about a few pictures I had seen in books, I next began to research mural painting by women in West Africa. It soon became clear that because of the nature of this impermanent art form—mud walls, clay canvases, and indigenous pigments—not to speak of industrialization and modernization in a rapidly changing world, this art was vanishing at an alarming rate. The few articles and paragraphs in books that made reference

to mural art either were outdated, sometimes by 20 years or more, or discussed it as simply a "backdrop" for anthropological or architectural studies. No one had seriously endeavored to bring to public attention the existence of a traditional rural life in Africa as expressed through women's art and its relationship to those who live in the dwellings. The numerous publications on African art deal primarily with masks and wood carving, bronzes and terra-cotta work, gold weights, and jewelry, textiles, embroidery, tools, and utensils—all made by men. Wishing to make my own contribution to this neglected art by women, I set out for West Africa in 1986, convinced I would find what I was looking for, although I was not sure exactly where to look. My journey covered a period of three years and exacted such a toll on my health and personal life that I would never wish to repeat it; yet, I discovered more mural decoration—and even more enduring spirit among its makers—than I had expected. For primarily financial reasons, I chose to travel alone. This magnified the difficulties of the trip in many ways—not the least the sense of danger—but it was probably this very vulnerability as a woman alone that

allowed me to enter the world of those I encountered."

* * *

"The African has always had to combine mythical and cultural practices, such as animist and Islamic ideologies, with socio-political and economic influences. The architecture of West Africa incorporates all these factors as well as the African's own concept of form and space. Together, it reflects the culture, sedentary or nomadic peoples, family, and power and wealth.

"Building techniques are similar to those used throughout Africa: The men are responsible for the heavy construction work, whereas women gather the materials and carry out the plastering. A woman plans her own living space according to the principles and customs that she brings with her from her father's settlement, such as raised sleeping platforms and structures to accommodate cooking methods. To complete her design concept, the women will then finish the wall surfaces—with the collaboration of co-wives and relatives—by applying relief work or decorative patterns which are symbolic of the female role and the world around her." ■

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CULTURE

ZIMBABWE'S WOMEN WRITERS

While independence raised expectations of sexual equality, ten years later Zimbabwean women feel disillusioned, as traditions keeping women in a subordinate role remain strong. But women are expressing their frustrations in a new way—in an outpouring of literary and artistic achievement.

By NINA SHAPIRO



Alexander Joe

A small magazine advertisement for budding women writers recently struck a chord in Zimbabwe. Letters streamed in from across the country telling of unpublished novels, poems, and essays.

Many were from young women, like the 18-year-old who boasted of 64 poems, five in Shona. Another teenager wrote in to say that she was on her third novel.

These women were not of the elite. Many were from the rural areas or the townships. Some did not have a high school diploma and few had any specific training in writing. Yet, some of them had compiled a substantial body of work.

The advertisement, placed by a group of women writers formed earlier this year, revealed that women throughout Zimbabwe are telling their own stories. And regardless of the author's back-

ground, their works share a common theme: the mistreatment of women by men and by society. In a country with no unified feminist movement, women are adopting a decidedly feminist tone.

The flood of letters was only one measure of the excitement generated by Zimbabwe Women Writers, comprised of published and unpublished authors. Begun in March as an outgrowth of writing workshops sponsored by the Zimbabwe-German Society, the British Council, and the Alliance Française, the dynamic group has created a stir in male-dominated literary circles. In two months' time, the group has boosted its membership from 45 to 115 and held a reading of new works before an audience of hundreds.

Even the organizers of the group are astounded by their own success. "We are so overwhelmed," said the chair, Sylvia Mabaso-Kwalso.

The group's formation comes at the end of a decade that has seen a grow-

ing number of female authors, among them award-winning Tsitsi Dangarembga, playwright Bertha Msora, poet Freedom Nyambaya, and novelist Barbara Makhalisa. Some women wrote in the past, but the new authors are distinguished by a consciousness of gender, according to Musa Zimunya, chair of the University of Zimbabwe English department. The previous writers developed traditional themes and accepted conservative views of women. Today, women are writing about themselves and, in doing so, are challenging the traditional images of women.

The writers' movement is part of a larger influx of women in the arts. Women are making inroads in theater and film-making. In the fine arts, women are taking up sculpting for the first time. Moreover, the growing number of women artists has prompted Zimbabwe's National Gallery to contemplate putting on an all-woman show.

Many point to the establishment of black majority rule as the driving force behind women's newfound artistic inspiration. As he took power 10 years ago, President Robert Mugabe pledged to bring about equality for women. A series of laws enacted since then has strived toward that goal. The cornerstone of women's emancipation, the Legal Age of Majority Act, declared all people, regardless of gender, adults at the age of 18.

The laws spurred women on to compete in traditionally male arenas, said a local politician, Jane Ngwenya. "Women are becoming more and more confident," she said.

However, with independence also came disillusionment. The war raised women's expectations for equality. Women, many of whom fought as sol-

Nina Shapiro is a Zimbabwe-based freelance writer.

diers alongside men, believed their role in society was forever changed. But, when the war ended, women found they were still expected to defer to men. Traditional custom, which demanded submission from women, proved stronger than the new laws.

"In our society, women are regarded as under their husbands," said Emilia James, a member of a collective whose work was highlighted at the Zimbabwe Women Writers reading. Scholastica Nyakudya, another member of the collective, said, "They expect us to do everything in the house and then they treat us like children."

The new women's literature reflects women's unease with their secondary status. At the reading, held in April, many women spoke of sexism in and outside the home.

In an expression of the changes wrought by independence, attitudes toward sexism crossed racial boundaries. Romey Bucheit, who is white, described a boyfriend who flaunts his new lover. Maria Kaz Mushaw, who is black, pictured the long-suffering wife of a philandering husband.

"What I really find interesting is that it didn't matter whether what was being said was by a black woman or a white woman," said Miriam Patsanza, a filmmaker who taped the reading. "Ten years ago, people's problems were problems of color. Today, there is a commonality of concerns."

"Women are providing an alternative voice," Patsanza continued. "They are raising issues men are not addressing." Those issues include the way women relate to men and the impact of the economy on women, she said.

Despite the concurrence of views among women of different races, there was a glaring difference in their work. Black women are uniquely concerned with the demands of traditional African culture.

Mushaw, in her short story "The African Woman," illustrated the sexual double standard which stems from the custom of a man having several wives. In the story, a husband blatantly conducts extramarital affairs, while expecting his wife to stay at home and care for his four children. The brutish husband arrives home from an infidelity one night to be shocked by his wife's unaccustomed assertiveness. Refusing to cower to his bullying any longer, she announces that she has found a job and from now on will come and go as she pleases.

A young writer, Gloria-Anne Francis, read a poem that also questions traditional expectations of women. "Why sit with legs crossed? Why cook? Why resist confrontation with men?" Francis, 17, asks in "Why, Why and All My Womanly Ambitions."

Francis, who began writing when she was a little girl composing her own bedtime stories, said she wrote the poem after observing her friends' parents. "In so many homes, it's always the girls in the kitchen and the guys outside playing football. Why aren't the girls outside playing football?" she asked.

Francis said she hopes the poems will convince her peers to be less timid. "Women must compete with men, not for their maleness, but for their power," she said.

Many of the women in Zimbabwe Women Writers had never shown their work before. Not all considered themselves writers as such.

Into this category fall a group of women who have been trained at Harare's Danhiko School, a secondary school for veterans of the independence war. Not all of the dozen women in the group fought as soldiers, but they all participated in the liberation movement somehow, whether by bringing food to the soldiers or carrying messages of enemy movements. Reminiscent of the Western consciousness-raising groups of the 1960s, these women meet regularly to discuss issues like rape and contraception or to share their own experiences.

These are the authors of the poem, "Independence," which describes women's disillusionment after the war. "Our tradition had not changed," the poem says. "We were still second to men... We had to wash and to cook and to clean the house. We had to bear a child every year."

The women said they tried their hand at writing because they felt compelled to express their frustration. Their lives, they said, were the inspiration for their work.

Gladys Dadzarira, a member of the group, felt she has earned an equal standing with men. Already a mother of two at 18, Dadzarira, now 33, was persuaded to leave her children behind and join the revolutionary forces. Trained to fight in Mozambique, she never got the chance. While bathing in a stream one morning, she was abducted by enemy soldiers.

After watching the soldiers destroy a village, burning huts and shooting villagers indiscriminately, Dadzarira was

ordered to lift a gargantuan rock as her punishment. She dislocated her hip bones in the process and lost both legs because of resulting complications.

After the war, Dadzarira was startled by the lack of recognition women received for their part in the fighting. "Women were told they were equal over there in Mozambique," she said. "They told us we could hold guns. But, after the war it was not the same." Women were no longer considered equal.

"But, I can do what he can do. I can hold a gun. I can work. I can drive. I can be an engineer. I can be everything."

Nyakudya, 19, another member of the group, rebelled against her family when she refused to become her uncle's second wife. Faced with the prospect of marrying a man at least 30 years her senior, she eloped with her boyfriend instead.

James, 21, also fought her traditional role. Married at 17, a mother at 18, James was ordered by her husband to maintain a farm in the countryside while he worked in town. But, James wanted an education. When her husband forbade her to go back to school, she divorced him. "I have noticed that you want me to suffer. You just want me to bear children for you," James told her husband.


Still, some women went along with the demands placed upon them. Christine Chaya was pressured at 17 to marry her boyfriend of four months. "My mother said I couldn't come back if I didn't marry. I had no place to go," she said.

She learned that a forced marriage is bound to run into trouble. "The wives don't know the husbands very well. Sometimes the men will find other women. If the women complain, the husbands say they are allowed to have many wives according to our tradition."

The Danhiko group said their lives were typical of women in Zimbabwe, a place where women's equality is still a new idea. But no longer, they said, were they willing to submit passively to their fate. Writing was one way of fighting back.

And publishers are taking notice of what these women have to say. One has already expressed interest in publishing an anthology of the works produced by Zimbabwe Women Writers. Another regularly sends a representative to the group's meetings to encourage the women. What began as a group of women trying to hone their writing skills has turned into a literary sensation. ○

BEAUTIFUL RIZZOLI BOOKS ON AFRICAN AND AFRO-AMERICAN ARTS





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Foreword by Maya Angelou.

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