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# AFRICA REPORT

JULY-AUGUST 1992


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

## MUGABE'S TRIALS

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

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*Africa Report* (ISSN 0001-9836), a non-profit magazine of African affairs, is published bimonthly and is scheduled to appear at the beginning of each date period at 833 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017. Editorial correspondence and advertising inquiries should be addressed to *Africa Report*, at the above address. Subscription inquiries should be addressed to: Subscription Services, P.O. Box 3000, Dept. AR, Denville N.J. 07834. Subscription rates: *Individuals*: USA \$30, Canada \$36, air rate overseas \$54. *Institutions*: USA \$37, Canada \$43, air rate overseas \$61. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: If this magazine is undeliverable, please send address changes to *Africa Report* at 833 UN Plaza, NY, NY 10017. Telephone: (212) 350-2959. Copyright © 1992 by The African-American Institute, Inc.

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# UPDATE

## IN THE NEWS

### ANC Pulls Out of Negotiations, But for How Long?

The African National Congress announced on June 23 that it was breaking off negotiations with the white-controlled government—both bilateral and within the framework of the Convention on a Democratic South Africa (Codesa)—until the regime takes “practical steps” to stop the recent violence that has wracked South Africa.

The decision followed the massacre of at least 40 people in Boipatong township on June 17, which led to renewed accusations that South Africa’s security forces at the least condone and at the worst are involved in instigating and carrying out the violence.

The national executive committee (NEC) of the ANC gave President F.W. de Klerk’s government a list of demands to get the talks back on track, including the disbanding of special police units that have been accused of political repression, the end of hit squad activities, and the suspension and prosecution of state security personnel involved in violence.


The ANC also called for the implementation of an agreement reached a year ago to curb violence. This includes the phasing out of workers’ hostels, which the ANC says act as military bases for its main rival, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and the banning of all dangerous weapons in public, including so-called cultural weapons, which also applies to Inkatha.

Another crucial promise the ANC sought from the government was the establishment of an international commission of inquiry into the Boipatong massacre and other incidents of violence.

Despite the long list of demands, the ANC maintained a conciliatory tone when it presented its list. A senior NEC official reportedly described the demands as a “reprieve” for the talks and an NEC statement said, “The ANC reaffirms its commitment to a negotiated resolution of the conflict in our country which would bring about

democracy, peace, and justice.” Nelson Mandela told a news conference that not all of the demands had to be met for negotiations to resume, but that the government had to demonstrate a change in attitude.

De Klerk, who had returned to South Africa from Spain on June 24 to handle the crisis, went some of the way toward meeting the ANC demands by announc-



M. Grant/United Nations

*Mandela said the government must change its attitude*

ing that the government would welcome international fact-finding missions. But the president fell short of endorsing international involvement in the crisis, which was a major demand of the ANC. Nonetheless, de Klerk said that a “person of international repute” would join the Goldstone Commission in its investigation of the Boipatong massacre.

De Klerk also announced that the government had budgeted to begin the closing of workers’ hostels. Iscor Steel, which owns the KwaMadala hostel from which the Boipatong attack was allegedly launched, announced that it would be closing it down as soon as alternate housing is found for the residents.

But when de Klerk called for a two-day meeting with the ANC to break the impasse in the talks on June 24, it took the Congress only three hours to reject the plan. The ANC said, “Once more the National Party has shown its lack of appreciation of the depth of the national crisis it has plunged the country into.” Furthermore, the Congress accused de

Klerk of dodging “the real issues”—the role of the security forces and their “surrogates” in the violence.

The reference to “surrogates” is aimed at Inkatha members living in hostels, whom the ANC accuses of staging attacks on township residents allied with the Congress. In the case of the Boipatong massacre, it is widely believed that the estimated 200 attackers came from the nearby KwaMadala hostel. Witnesses claim that the Inkatha members were transported to the scene by security police, who also took part in the assault. But the Inkatha leader, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, denied his movement’s involvement in the attack, saying, “No leadership structure in the IFP had any knowledge whatsoever that this attack was going to take place, and I make this statement not even knowing that it was indeed IFP members who were the attackers.”

On June 26, the Goldstone Commission heard evidence from a witness that linked a covert police unit to the massacre. The Goldstone Commission, the ANC’s intelligence department, and a special police task force had uncovered the unit two days earlier in a raid carried out at a mining hostel east of Johannesburg. The 40-strong unit is made up of ex-members of Koevoet, the counter-insurgency force which carried out brutal covert operations in pre-independence Namibia. Police deny that the unit had any role in the massacre. Nonetheless, the existence of the secret unit has reinforced widespread speculation that the government has a hand in South Africa’s political violence.

The massacre in Boipatong took place shortly after the ANC began a mass action campaign in the form of strikes, rallies, and demonstrations, to speed up the progress at Codesa. The talks brought together 19 parties to negotiate a new South Africa, including the ANC, Inkatha, and the government. Negotiators had made great strides since Codesa was

*Continued on page 11*

# Rwandans Try to Transform War into Democracy

A "full peace conference," in the words of negotiators, between the Rwandan government and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) aimed at ending the civil war was scheduled for July 10-12. A settlement could allow the democratization process, which has moved along at a steady pace during almost two years of war, to flourish. But Rwandans face several obstacles in their quest to end the violence, which has included outbreaks of unrest associated more with the multi-party process than the war itself.

The agreement to hold a full peace conference was signed by the government and the RPF after preparatory talks in Paris, held June 5-7. It was agreed that the July talks would be held in either Tanzania or Zaire and that Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko would mediate. Because of the ongoing fighting, the first issue on the agenda was the implementation of the long-delayed ceasefire accord, signed in Zaire in March 1991.

Two items on the agenda which observers have deemed crucial to a lasting settlement are the integration of the two warring armies and the representation of the RPF in a new transitional government to lead the country to elections. The importance of a political settlement was apparent in comments made by the RPF spokesman, Pasteur Bizimungu, who said, "If the ceasefire is not respected, it will not...prevent us from continuing the political negotiations."

One potentially explosive issue was reportedly resolved during the June talks in Paris, when the Rwandan government accepted the principle that all Rwandan refugees can be repatriated. This had been a critical RPF demand.

Observers say the two sides' increased willingness to negotiate a settlement has partially been due to stepped-up pressure by foreign donor governments. The U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Herman Cohen, visited the war-torn nation in April. Cohen told Radio Kigali, "I expressed to President Habyarimana...[that] we want to encourage an end to war with the RPF and the re-establishment of internal peace in Rwanda." Cohen's mediation effort also brought him to Uganda, which has been accused of allowing the RPF to stage attacks from its side of the

border, a charge repeatedly denied by President Yoweri Museveni.

The U.S., Belgium, and France all agreed to be seated as observers at the peace conference. Because of France's status as Rwanda's main military backer, its inclusion at the talks was considered crucial to persuading the Rwandan government to compromise. Nonetheless, Radio France International reported on June 10 that France had increased its troop strength from 250 to 400. A senior RPF official, Titus Rutaremara commented, "There's no reason for



*Habyarimana called on political parties to stop the violence*

them [the French] to continue aiding a dictatorial regime."

Perhaps the strongest reason for the government's decision to participate in negotiations has been the war's devastating long-term impact on Rwanda's mostly agricultural economy, which is already strained by a burgeoning population. The costs of destruction and displacement aside, the price tag for the war has been a drain that Rwanda's economy can ill afford. Diplomats told *The New York Times* that scarce foreign exchange earnings have been spent on arms from South Africa and a report in February by the human rights group, Africa Watch, said that Rwanda's army had grown from roughly 6,200 soldiers and police officers to a force of over 30,000 since the beginning of the war.

The civil war in Rwanda—the latest in a long history of rebellion—began on October 1, 1990, when the RPF's military arm invaded Rwanda from Uganda. The RPF is predominantly composed of exiles from Rwanda's minority, the Tutsi, who make up about 14 percent of the population. The Tutsi have suffered several waves of repression leading them to exile since the majority Hutu secured power with the help of Belgium colonists shortly before independence in

1962. Prior to 1959, Belgium had supported rule by the Tutsi, which itself had been responsible for the repression of Hutu. Hutu comprise 85 percent of Rwanda's population.

Despite the initial failure of the 1990 invasion—which led to mass reprisals against Tutsi and their supporters including 1,000 executions and over 8,000 detentions, according to Amnesty International—the RPF has made considerable progress in the war. One factor which experts say contributes to the RPF's success is that possibly thousands of the group's fighters are Tutsi deserters from Uganda's National Resistance Army (NRA)—and they have brought NRA weapons and supplies with them. The Tutsi in the NRA had been used by the Ugandan president during the struggle which brought him to power in 1986.

Three months before the war began, in July 1990, President Juvénal Habyarimana announced that Rwanda would be moving toward multi-party democracy. Alison L. DesForges, a board member of Africa Watch and an expert on Rwanda, told *Africa Report* that the war has had an almost contradictory impact on the democratization process. On the one hand, it has accelerated the pace of reform: The original plan to complete a roughly two-year discussion period before the elections has been cut short and Rwanda has already adopted a new constitution, an ostensibly free press, and laws allowing opposition parties to organize. But the government has also used the war as a reason to disallow certain activities which are necessary to the democratization process.

DesForges pointed out that "wartime security made it possible for the government to prohibit free movement around the country." This has given the former ruling party, the National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND), an unfair advantage in the multi-party process because it is already well-established and well-organized throughout the country. But DesForges noted that a cabinet change in April, which brought in opposition members, has allowed for freer movement in the country. "Now people may travel freely and I expect that will have quite an impact in terms of party organization," she said.

*Continued on page 10*

## EGYPT

The recent assassination of columnist Farag Fouda by Islamic extremists has heightened tensions between the Egyptian government and Islamic fundamentalists. Long an outspoken critic of Islamic extremists, Fouda was shot to death outside his Cairo office on June 9, shortly after having proposed anti-terrorist legislation to curb violence by radical religious groups.

Egyptian officials have arrested Abdel-Shafi Ahmed in connection with the case. The 25-year-old is a member of the extremist group, Islamic Jihad, which splintered from the widely influential Muslim Brotherhood. A spokesperson from the Brotherhood told Agence France-Presse shortly after the murder that the group "condemns political assassinations," but added that partial responsibility lay with the government and the press for allowing writers too much freedom.

Fouda's murder is the latest chapter in a series of sectarian clashes in Egypt, where economic instability and rampant unemployment have made the traditionally moderate country increasingly susceptible to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.

On May 4, a clash between Islamic militants and Christians left 14 dead in the largely Christian town of Manshiet Nasser, 130 miles south of Cairo. The incident was apparently ignited by a land dispute between a Christian and a Muslim. However, a May 6 article in *The New York Times* reported that the murders were also committed in retaliation for the killing of an Islamic fundamentalist leader two months earlier.

## BURKINA FASO

President Blaise Compaoré's party, the Organization for Popular Democracy/Labor Movement (ODP/MT), won a landslide victory in Burkina Faso's first legislative elections in 14 years on May 24. The ODP/MT secured 78 of 107 parliamentary seats, ensuring it a clear majority in the future National Assembly.

The strong showing by the president's party was reportedly unexpected, even by its supporters. According to *The Independent* of London, both the ODP/MT and members of the opposition had earlier predicted that no single party would win decisively. *L'Obs-*

## POLITICAL POINTERS

*vateur Paalga*, an independent Burkinabè paper, suggested that the opposition parties were hurt by "their own internal squabbling and uncertain strategy which boycotted the presidential race but took part in the legislative poll."

The opposition had held a successful boycott of the December 1991 presidential election to protest Compaoré's refusal to convene a national conference. Compaoré, the sole candidate, won the election, but less than 25 percent of the electorate participated. In a move widely seen as an effort to appease the opposition after the low turnout, the president postponed the legislative elections, originally scheduled for January of this year.

When the legislative elections were finally held in May, participation increased to roughly 35 percent of eligible voters. *L'Observateur Paalga* has asserted that the president's political legitimacy, which was damaged by the poor turnout in December, may be bolstered by the dramatic success of his party in this election.

Despite opposition accusations of fraud and vote-buying, foreign observers are reportedly satisfied that there were no serious irregularities in the May voting.

## SEYCHELLES

The former president of Seychelles, Sir James Mancham, had not been seen on the Indian Ocean archipelago since his prime minister, France Albert René, seized power in a coup d'état in 1977. In April, Mancham resurfaced on the island to greet an enthusiastic crowd, which reportedly numbered 10,000 supporters. In returning, the former leader of Seychelles is taking advantage of now-President René's decision—after prodding from donor countries—to open up Seychelles to democracy, which includes an invitation for exiles to "participate in the political life of the country." Mancham plans to stand in the presidential elections scheduled for December as the Seychelles Democratic Party (SDP) candidate.

The election process in Seychelles begins on July 26, when Seychellois go

to the polls to elect a commission which will create a new constitution to lead the country to the December general elections. The constitution will be put to a referendum prior to the elections.

Although the election process will be contested among eight parties and the dynamics can change considerably between now and December, observers have been focusing on the race between Mancham and René.

*Africa Confidential* noted that although a rally on May 4 for Wavel Ramkalawan's Seychellois Party drew fewer supporters than had either Mancham or René, it was an extremely enthusiastic crowd "that had come to listen." One of the speakers at the rally who was well received was Jean-François Ferrari, the son of Maxime Ferrari, the influential former foreign minister. The elder Ferrari returned to the archipelago last August after nine years in exile to mediate the electoral process with his Seychelles Institute for Democracy.

## THE GAMBIA

Sir Dawda Jawara was re-elected to a fifth consecutive term as president of the Gambia on April 29, capturing 58.4 percent of the vote. The victory came despite his earlier withdrawal from the race and speculation that he was vulnerable to opposition charges of corruption.

The next best showing in the election was by Sheriff Moustapha Dibba of the National Convention Party, who won 22 percent of the vote.

Jawara allegedly reversed his December 4 decision not to run at the insistence of his People's Progressive Party (PPP). The party's candidates won 25 of the 36 contested parliamentary seats. Although this victory allows it to maintain a majority, the PPP now has six fewer seats under its control.

Following his May 11 inauguration, Jawara announced a new cabinet, which observers say varies little from the previous ones. One significant change, however, is the promotion of Saihou Sabally, former finance and economy minister, to vice president. He will also take over the ministries of defense and women's affairs from Jawara. A *West Africa* article linked Sabally's enhanced role in the government to his grooming as Jawara's successor, saying, "Jawara's given Sabally everything but the keys to SHIA [the state limousine]."

## AFRICAN OUTLOOK

## Sudanese Talk Peace After Government Offensive

Sudan's warring factions appeared to be following the same annual script in their nine-year-old civil war. As in years past, the onset of the dry season signaled the launching of a government offensive on the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in the south. And, after the rains started falling, the rebels launched a counter-offensive, as they had successfully done in the past.

But when the warring factions met for peace negotiations in the Nigerian capital, Abuja, in late May and early

Sudanese government has denied that Iranians are directly involved on the ground in Sudan, but it has reportedly admitted that its Middle Eastern ally sent oil and military vehicles.

While the Sudanese government was working around the international isolation it faces to attract this assistance, the SPLA lost the services of its chief backer, Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia. The fall of the dictator in May 1991 cost the rebels bases, a communication station, and a major source of arms and supplies.

Then in August, a faction of the SPLA, based in Nasir, split from the rebel group. The Nasir faction, led by Lam Akol and Riak Machar, accused Garang of human rights violations, an autocratic leadership style, and favoritism toward his ethnic group, the Dinka. Garang's faction of the SPLA became known as the Torit group.

While the two factions both claim to be fighting against the domination of the south by the Islamic north, they differ over how best to achieve this. The Torit faction advocates a secular, but united Sudan, while the Nasir group has called for an independent south. The government—which has imposed Islamic law on Sudan since Lt.-Gen. Omar Hassan al-Bashir came to power through a coup in 1989—rejects both positions, but has considered offering a federal system where non-Muslim areas could be exempt from shari'a.

Prior to the government offensive, the two rebel groups were fighting each other near Bor and Garang's faction of the SPLA had accused Lam Akol's rebels of allowing the government free passage on the territory it controls. John Prendergast, research associate for the Center of Concern, told *Africa Report* that it is "logistically impossible for the offensive that the government carried out over the last six months to have been carried out without that happening."

Nonetheless, the two rebel groups showed signs of unity after negotiations—organized by Nigeria under an Organization of African Unity mandate—got underway in Abuja, on May 26. With Sudanese government forces knocking at the door of Torit, deep in southeastern Sudan, the rebel factions forged a common front at the bargaining table to press for self-determination for the south, which has 6 million of Sudan's 26 million people. The head of the Sudanese delegation at the talks, Sudan's Speaker of Parliament Mohammad al-Amin Khalifa, agreed that a referendum could be discussed within the framework of Sudanese unity, but rejected the call for an independence referendum. One senior member of the government negotiating team said, "Self-determination means separation...To us, that is unacceptable."

The united SPLA dropped its demand for self-determination on June 1, at the insistence of Nigeria's President Ibrahim Babangida. After the rebels withdrew their demand, a 15-member delegation, which included five representatives each from Khartoum, the SPLA, and the Nigerian government, was set up to discuss power and resource sharing, relations between the south and the central government, and security problems, according to an Agence France-Presse report. Little was accomplished and the talks ended on June 3 with the participants failing to sign any agreements. Both sides said, however, that they would meet again in Abuja at a later date.

Despite the apparent impasse in the negotiations, observers have expressed optimism that a negotiated settlement to the conflict is now possible. Prendergast said, "For the first time since the war began, there's a real chance that...proposals will be discussed seriously by both sides." The SPLA is reportedly more willing to compromise because of its recent military setback, including the loss of support from Ethiopia.

This, Prendergast says, makes the rebels more inclined to negotiate for



John Garang: Will the rebels reunite under one flag?

June, it was apparent that the face of Sudan's civil war may have changed. A number of factors had enabled the Islamic government's offensive, which it described as a jihad, or holy war, to drive deeper than ever before into the predominantly Christian and animist territory of the south.

The government claimed a string of victories from March through May which left the rebels cornered near the borders of Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire. At least 12 towns were captured in the drive, including Kapoeta, the one-time de facto capital of southern Sudan, on May 28. The government had earlier taken Bor—the hometown of SPLA leader John Garang, where the rebel army began its rebellion. In June, government forces battled rebels outside Torit, where Garang's faction of the SPLA is based.

The government effort has been bolstered by assistance from Iran and a \$300 million shipment of arms which sources say it received from China. The

something along the lines of a loose federation—a position that seemed unthinkable for the nationalistic SPLA a year ago, when it was battling government troops as far north as Renk and Darfur.

Despite its recent military success, the Khartoum government also has compelling reasons to reach a negotiated settlement. The economic impact of the war has been heavy in Sudan, which has a \$15.5 billion debt. A negotiated settlement could allow the government to re-allocate scarce funds being used for the war effort. There is also speculation that a settlement could help convince Western donors to resume supplying the development aid they have cut off because of widespread human rights violations.

The northerners may also be more willing to compromise if they are confident that their offensive has secured the oilfields in northern Upper Nile and southern Kordofan. The discovery of oil in the early 1980s contributed to the conflict because it led the north to amend its boundaries, which had been agreed to at the conclusion of the 1955-1972 civil war, so that it could incorporate the discoveries into its region. There is speculation that if the southerners would be willing to forgo claims on areas which contain the oil, the north might be more willing to grant some form of self-determination to the south.

Internal politics could also put pressure on Khartoum to end the war. Sentiment that the war is too costly has grown as it has become impossible for the government to hide the heavy casualties the army has suffered: Omdurman military hospital across the Nile from Khartoum was recently declared full.

There is also speculation that the Sudanese government feels its desire to spread Islamic fundamentalism beyond its borders is being hampered by the drawn-out war. The government is widely believed to be led behind the scenes by the leader of the National Islamic Front, Hassan al-Turabi, who advocates an Islamic revival throughout the Arab and African worlds. Prendergast described the war as being "too big of a drain" on the north which "envisions all kinds of possibilities for moving their ideology and religious agenda northward, westward, and eastward. Right now, the southern Sudan poses the main obstacle to that."

While the warring factions contem-

plate peace proposals, the war continues to imperil the southern Sudanese population. International relief efforts aimed at southern Sudan, which have relied on cooperation from the SPLA, received a serious blow when government troops took control of Kapoeta, on the Kenyan border, the major conduit for humanitarian supplies to the south. The capture forced over 22,000 refugees to flee into Kenya, which is already overburdened by the recent influx of hundreds of thousands of other refugees fleeing conflict in the Horn of Africa. The government has been hostile toward relief organizations and banned most of them from operating in the south during its offensive. Relief officials have contended that this is because the government wants to conceal the Islamization of Sudan from foreign scrutiny.

Sudanese government policies have also contributed to the problems brought on by the war and drought in

the north and south. In January, the government ordered over 400,000 squatters, many of whom were Christians who had fled the war, out of the slums which surround Khartoum and into the desert. According to a U.S. Agency for International Development official, the squatters were left in an area virtually devoid of sustenance. In all, according to the U.S. Committee on Refugees, there are over 4.5 million internally displaced people in Sudan, more than in any other country.

The rebel bargaining strength going into negotiations should be affected by two developments: talks between the two rebel factions and the rebel counter-offensive.

Agence France-Presse reported on June 19 that the two rebel groups meeting in Nairobi agreed to reunite. The Nasir faction spokesman said, "We are united. The few remaining differences between us can easily be resolved dur-

*Continued on page 11*

## The Return of Lesotho's King

After months of debate between Lesotho's ruling military council and exiled King Moshoeshoe II over his planned return to the country of 1.8 million, it appears that the king shall return—but it is not clear that he will be crowned again. On June 9, government officials declared that Moshoeshoe, who has been living in exile in London since 1990, will return to Lesotho as a private citizen in the beginning of August. But Moshoeshoe stated that he expects the people of Lesotho to determine whether he should reign.

Moshoeshoe was ousted in 1990 after a power struggle with the then-military leader, Maj.-Gen. Justin Lekhanya. Upon unseating the king, Lekhanya named Moshoeshoe's eldest son, Letsie David Bereng Seeiso, as King Letsie III. Although Lekhanya was deposed a year later by another military government, Letsie remained on the throne.

The controversy over the ex-monarch's return heated up in April when Moshoeshoe announced that he would arrive in Lesotho on May 30, apparently against the military government's will. The government imposed a curfew on the capital while the country anxiously anticipated the return of the king, but he never arrived. *The Weekly Mail*, a South African paper, reported that Moshoeshoe was persuaded not to take the trip by Britain's minister for overseas development, Lynda Chalker, on the eve of the planned return. The paper reported that the minister cited the potential danger to Lesotho's stability posed by a premature return of Moshoeshoe. A meeting between Moshoeshoe and the military council chairman, E.P. Ramaema, was held the following week to discuss the matter.

Despite accusations that the government was banning Moshoeshoe from the country altogether, Ramaema has insisted otherwise. "What is unacceptable to the government is that he [Moshoeshoe] return as king, because there is a king, King Letsie III," Ramaema said. But Letsie had previously stated that he would be willing to abdicate in favor of his father.

Still at issue are Moshoeshoe's motives for returning to Lesotho. He claims that he wants to help develop a new constitution before elections, which are scheduled to be held on November 28.

But his opponents, along with the two parties participating in the upcoming elections, assert that Moshoeshoe's real purpose in coming to Lesotho is to ensure that the revised constitution does not invalidate the current monarchy and his presence would be a potential disruption to fall elections. ■

## Rwanda *Continued*

The formation of a transitional cabinet on April 16, which gave 11 of 20 ministries to Rwanda's four main opposition parties, has been heralded as a major step in the democratization process. The new prime minister, Dismas Nsengiyaremye, said that the new government's priorities would be to negotiate peace with the RPF, ensure internal security, clean up the state administration, organize debate on the holding of a national conference, solve the refugee problem, and hold general elections.

Nsengiyaremye belongs to the largest opposition party, the Republican Democratic Movement (MDR), which is led by Faustin Twagiramungu and Emmanuel Gapyisi. The party, which has a regional base in the south, received three other portfolios, including the influential foreign ministry, filled by Boniface Ngulinzira.

The Liberal Party (PL), which enjoys the most Tutsi support among the registered parties, received three of the cabinet posts, as did the Social Democratic Party. The smallest of the opposition parties, the Christian Democratic Party, gained only the ministry of environment and tourism.

Critics of the new cabinet point out that aside from the prime ministership and foreign affairs ministries, all the other key posts, including defense, interior, and civil service, are controlled by the MRND. There have also been reports that some opposition ministers are having problems negotiating the existing bureaucracy and have experienced resistance from their subordinates.

Resistance to democratic change outside the ministers' offices has been far deadlier than bureaucratic tie-ups. What is being described as politically driven violence has been on the rise since it began six months ago with bombings in the countryside.

In March, a series of massacres took place in Bugesera province, following a Radio Kigali broadcast that a PL document had called for the assassination of several Hutu politicians. *Africa Confidential* reported that an Italian Catholic lay worker in the province was shot dead on March 9 after telephoning Radio France International twice to testify that the violence was political, and not ethnic, as the government had been maintaining.

In May, deadly violence in the capital, Kigali, included terrorist bombings

and clashes between rival political parties. The MRND has blamed the RPF for instigating the violence. But opposition members have said conservative associates of Habyarimana are orchestrating the violence. Following the clashes between parties in the capital, Radio Kigali reported that Habyarimana called upon the MRND and the MDR to end their violent confrontations through dialogue.

Further complicating Rwanda's quest for peace are recent reports of increased unrest by the armed forces, which included looting and killings at the end of May. The soldiers are reportedly incensed with the prospect of losing their jobs if a full peace accord is signed.

The holding of a peace conference

has raised hope that the ongoing bloodshed in Rwanda can be ended. The timing for a negotiated settlement just may be right: The democratization process has brought people into the government who are better able to negotiate with the RPF because they were not there when the shooting started. International backing for the conference is also crucial. But the prospects for a lasting peace lie with Rwandans themselves. DesForges said, "The problems are enormous, but at the same time there is a very powerful sense of Rwandanness that all of these people share, and there is also a very pragmatic strain in the political history in Rwanda, so it gives one hope that they will be able to reach some kind of negotiated solution." ■

## Nigerian Police Condemned for Abuses

The Nigerian police force was condemned for "extra-judicial executions, the use of excessive force, and torture and mistreatment" in a report released by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights on May 23. The report, entitled *The Nigerian Police Force: A Culture of Impunity*, also singled out "the police authorities, the Ministry of Justice, and the courts" for their failure to punish those guilty of the abuses.

The Lawyers Committee report made several recommendations to the Nigerian government "to overcome obstacles that create a climate of impunity." It called for:

- Investigations of the members of the Nigerian police force who are accused of excessive force and the imposition of sanctions against members found to be guilty of such force;
- Implementation of programs to help the police and the public understand the role of the police;
- An independent "grievance procedure" to handle police brutality complaints;
- The rapid judicial hearing of police brutality cases;
- An end to the harassment of complainants and their lawyers.

The report comes in the midst of government clampdowns on human rights activists. On May 19, three activists, Dr. Beko Ransome-Kuti, Femi Falana, and Baba Omojola, were all detained without charge, an act condemned by the Lawyers Committee in a press release accompanying the report.

On May 29, Gani Fawehinmi, a lawyer for the activists, and Olusegun Mayegun, head of the banned National Association for Nigerian Students, which had called for the safe release of the three, were also arrested.

After calls by the Lagos High Court to produce Ransome-Kuti went unheeded by the government, Radio Nigeria reported that the minister of justice and attorney-general, Clement Akpangbo, stepped in on June 9 and issued a warrant ordering the court appearance of the activists. The radio report said that Akpangbo was "reacting to calls by the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) that the order of the court be obeyed."

On June 15, the day the NBA began a lawyers' strike, all five detainees—who reportedly appeared to have been physically abused—were presented in a court in Gwagwadala in central Nigeria. The government has reportedly charged the defendants with treason for holding illegal meetings and issuing seditious pamphlets.

The Lawyers Committee maintains that "there have been a number of discrepancies in the trial so far." The accused have been denied access to lawyers and had all been detained for periods ranging from 18 to 28 days without being charged. The location of the trial is also suspect; Binaifer Nowrojee, the Africa Program director for the Lawyers Committee, told *Africa Report* that the move may have been motivated by a desire to "reduce the number of observers at the trial." ■

## Sudan *Continued*

ing the ongoing talks in Nairobi." According to the report, both sides had agreed to the possibility of secession for the south.

But the Sudanese News Agency reported that the Torit group had issued a statement in London blasting the Nasir group as being incapable of achieving anything on the war front and called Nasir's secession call "a mere public sale."

The rebel counter-offensive, which has been delayed by lighter than usual rains, has been carried out virtually exclusively by the Torit group. The group began attacks on Juba on June 7, declaring that it was "the only language the government understands." One theory behind the attack on the government garrison town, which has been besieged every year by rebels since 1987, is that the SPLA is trying to draw government forces there to enable it to take back other towns during the rainy season when the Sudanese army's mobility is hampered.

Regardless of the effectiveness of the rebel counter-offensive, the SPLA will have its tenacity as a bargaining chip to use in future negotiations with the government. "The government has the upper hand for now," a Western diplomat was quoted as saying in *The New York Times*, "but the southerners have legitimate grievances against the north. And as long as these grievances are not addressed, the situation remains unsustainable. John Garang may be reduced to leading a band of 50 rebels in the bush, but this does not mean that he and his movement are no longer a threat." ■

## Report Links Environment and Development

The world's population is likely to grow by 3.7 billion during the period 1990-2030, according to the World Bank's recently released annual report on human development. The report, entitled *Development and the Environment*, argues that sustainable development is the key to meeting the demands that the population explosion will impose on the world's resources and ecological system. The World Bank argues that the key to sustainable growth is to produce differently, not to produce less: "Without adequate environmental protection," it argues, "development will be undermined; without development, environmental protection will fail."

The report is primarily concerned with people in the developing world, where 90 percent of the population growth is expected to take place. Sub-Saharan Africa's population is projected to increase to 1.5 billion, three times its current size.

According to the report, priority should be given to the one-third of the world's population that has inadequate sanitation and the 1 billion people without safe water; the 1.3 billion people who are exposed to unsafe conditions caused by soot and smoke; the 300-700 million women and children who suffer from severe indoor pollution from cooking fires; and the hundreds of millions of farmers, forest dwellers, and indigenous people who rely on land and whose livelihood depends on good environmental stewardship.

The report calls upon the developed countries to offer technical assistance and aid to the developing nations to help them implement environmental programs. The report argues that the rich countries should shoulder this burden because they benefit from a cleaner global environment and are largely responsible for the world's environmental problems such as global warming. ■

## Assassination Attempt Investigated in Togo

A delegation from the International Federation of Human Rights was in Lomé from June 8-13, conducting a commission of inquiry into the May 5 assassination attempt on opposition leader Gilchrist Olympio. The delegation came at the behest of both Prime Minister Joseph Koffigoh, acting as chairman of the Togolese Human Rights League, and the influential labor organization, the Union of Independent Trade Organizations (CSI).

Olympio's motorcade was ambushed on May 5 in Assoli Prefecture, in northern Togo, by what an eyewitness interviewed by Radio Lomé described as "armed men" who "opened fire on the motorcade with assault rifles." In the ensuing melée, at least 10 were killed, including the chairman of the Togolese Union for Reconciliation (UTR), Dr. Atti Depe. Olympio's driver escaped the firefight, however, and sped off with the wounded opposition leader to the Benin border.

The 56-year-old Olympio, son of the former president Sylvanus Olympio, who was assassinated in 1963, was operated on at Natitingou Hospital in Benin, where two bullets were removed from his bladder and left lung. Olympio was later transferred to Val de Grâce Military Hospital in Paris. ■

## ANC *Continued*

formed in December of last year, as the two main parties—the government and the ANC—agreed in principle on the establishment of an interim government to be followed by free elections of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. But Codesa became bogged down over the question of how centralized a new South African government should be. Pretoria insists on measures to protect minority rights. But the ANC says, "The fundamental reason for the deadlock is whether there is to be democratic change or white-minority veto power." ■

The Boipatong crisis prompted the ANC, backed by its youth wing and the Pan Africanist Congress, to call for the reimposition of the international sports boycott on South Africa, on the eve of the Barcelona Olympics. South Africa has not competed in the Olympic Games since 1960 and its participation has been viewed as an indicator of how far the "new South Africa" had come in shedding its pariah image on the international stage. It is not clear how much international support the ANC has for its position, and sports leaders in South Africa predicted that the country's athletes would be allowed to compete.

Some analysts said that the impasse in negotiations will force the government and the ANC to realize that they need each other, forcing the two sides to return to the bargaining table.

Nonetheless, the Boipatong massacre has brought to the surface the question of blacks' growing mistrust of the white-controlled government. The mistrust was highlighted when de Klerk attempted a conciliatory visit to Boipatong on June 20. Angry youths forced him to flee before he had a chance to get out of his car to survey the township, but not before security forces had shot dead another three of Boipatong's residents. ■

## ALGERIA

The state-owned energy company, Sonatrach, announced in May that 15 foreign oil companies offered to invest up to \$4.2 billion in Algerian oil fields, according to *The Journal of Commerce*.

Sonatrach said that the foreign companies proposed to finance a multi-phase development program on six oil fields, which is expected to improve the fields' output by 200,000 barrels a day by the end of the century. The investment, which is still being negotiated behind closed doors, would recover 1 billion barrels of oil over a 20-year period.

The potential arrangement grew out of Algeria's call for bids last November. Bidders from the U.S., France, Japan, Italy, Norway, Denmark, and Canada reportedly showed interest in eight of 10 fields Algeria put on offer.

Last November 30, Algeria's Parliament ended the monopoly Sonatrach had held on the production of oil, gas, and minerals, allowing foreign companies to invest up to 49 percent in existing fields and mines. The move was one of several revisions in the country's foreign exchange laws being carried out to attract investment.

*The Financial Times* reported that Algeria's oil minister, Nordine Ait Laoussine, said that the country's oil and gas expansion plans could entail investment worth \$20 billion by the turn of the century.

## ZAIRE

On May 29, the Zairian government, which is experiencing its worst economic crisis yet, announced that it had seized the assets of all foreign oil companies operating in the troubled nation.

Zaire Television announced on May 31 that the government had "put an end to the oil companies' blackmail" by seizing the assets of Mobil, Chevron, Royal Dutch/Shell Group, and Petrofina of Italy. The Zairian foreign minister explained that the seizure grew out of "a dispute between the government and the companies over oil pricing, with the government refusing to put up oil prices for a second time, and offering a subsidy instead." The television report further alleged that the oil companies exacerbated Zaire's existing fuel short-

## BUSINESS BRIEFS

age problem by closing gas stations in retaliation.

This action came as a major blow to the foreign companies involved, which make up the majority of Zaire's substantial oil industry. The Chevron Corporation is the largest oil operator in the country; it runs the only oil wells in Zaire, which reportedly produce 30,000 barrels of crude per day.

Stephen North, a senior adviser at Chevron's International Public Affairs, told *Africa Report*, "We have a process arrangement, we don't own any of the assets at the refinery." He pointed out that Chevron would be reimbursed at world market prices for the petroleum products the government had "requested," and that "we [at Chevron] are not intending to run any more crude."

The foreign oil industry as a bloc has been in intense negotiations with the government since the end of May in hopes of bringing the crisis to a rapid conclusion. In the meantime, U.S. State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler issued a statement on June 8 which said that the U.S. is "seriously concerned about the seizure" of "the assets of American petroleum companies in Zaire," and that it has instructed Ambassador Melissa Wells to "determine how the government intends to fulfill its international legal obligations under the bilateral investment treaty."

The seizure comes at a time when Zaire is experiencing crippling economic problems. Its major source of foreign exchange, the diamond, copper, and cobalt industries, are all operating at less than 50 percent of capacity. According to *African Business*, copper output is at only about 25 percent of capacity. These sources of hard currency are vital to both the public and the private sectors.

In addition, the U.S. embassy has estimated Zaire's rate of inflation at a staggering 16,000 percent since October 1991. This has produced a shortage of cash unprecedented even in Zaire.

Where the zaire was rated at 300:1 against the dollar in October, it is now reported to be up to 250,000:1. In a response to the spiralling inflation, the government issued a new 500,000 zaire note on May 4, in order to "facilitate large transactions in cash." But the note is worth little more than \$2.

## SOUTH AFRICA

Airborne Express has become the latest in a long line of companies to announce service to Jan Smuts airport in Johannesburg. This comes in the wake of the South African government's decision to liberalize its air transport policies, including the relaxing of tariff controls on air traffic.

In a partnership with African Shipping Company, a Johannesburg-based operation, Airborne has taken a large share of the lucrative small packages market running the U.S.-South Africa route. Now that South Africa is no longer the international pariah that it once was, John Birds, Airborne's vice president, expects the market to blossom into a goldmine, moving 3,500 packages every month.

The rush began on April 29, when South African Transport Minister Piet Welgemoed announced that the country would introduce an "open skies" policy, effectively blowing wide open the duopoly previously held by British Airways and South African Airways. Since the announcement, companies from over 25 countries have applied for transit rights, including KLM of the Netherlands and Aeroflot of Russia. Nations previously hostile to South Africa, such as Tanzania, have also joined the fray. Air Tanzania will begin passenger and cargo service on July 3.

Perhaps the greatest beneficiary of the government's action is Virgin Atlantic Airways (VAA). Richard Branson, VAA's owner, has vowed to take advantage of the situation by slashing the roundtrip airfare from Heathrow to Jan Smuts by 40 percent, to around \$780. Branson hopes to capitalize on the increasing trade and tourism to South Africa, adding about 160,000 new passengers every year. As to the mood inside VAA, the Johannesburg *Star* quoted Branson as commenting, "It has been a tremendous challenge trying to break the monopoly and we've been keeping our fingers and toes crossed."

## ZIMBABWE

BY ANDREW MELDRUM

# THE KAUNDA OPTION?



Sarah-Jane Poole

President Robert Mugabe's grasp on government has unravelled this year. Zimbabwe's structural adjustment program has forced up unemployment and inflation, corruption is growing, and the top-heavy administration doesn't have an answer. While Mugabe's problems have become a breeding ground for the growing opposition, which has its eye on the prize in 1995, if not sooner, many are wondering what political options are left for the veteran nationalist, out of step with the democratization era.

Sarah-Jane Poole



**T**hings are falling apart for Robert Mugabe. The whorl of trends and events throughout southern Africa has thrown Zimbabwe's political status quo off balance and Mugabe does not seem to have the will to implement new policies to set things right for his party or for himself.

This year started off well enough for Zimbabwe's executive president, with his ruling Zanu-PF party controlling 147 of Parliament's 150 seats. Mugabe's government had confidently embarked on an economic restructuring that boosted local business confidence and won praise from the World Bank and influential Western

has gone sour, causing inflation to run higher than 35 percent annually, yet not denting Zimbabwe's perilously high unemployment rate of 50 percent of the potential workforce.

Perhaps more ominously, Mugabe's style of leadership and his party's form of government are distinctly out of step with the democratic currents surging through Africa. Determined opposition has sprung up in influential groups ranging from university students and labor unions to mainstream Christian churches and the business community. Political woes have been compounded by personal sorrows as Mugabe's wife, Sally, died in February and his mother, Bona, died at the end of May.

"Which Mugabe has died?" shouted a disrespectful



Sarah-Jane Poole

donors. At 68 and with 12 years as leader of Zimbabwe under his belt, Robert Mugabe looked rock solid as one of the old-style African nationalist leaders destined to run his country for 20 years or more.

But in the intervening months, all that has quickly unravelled. A scorching drought has devastated Zimbabwe's landscape and economy. The restructuring program

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*Above and previous page: University of Zimbabwe students demonstrating for higher student grants and against the Mugabe government*

University of Zimbabwe student at a demonstration in June. "There is so little action in government, maybe our president is dead." The university students boycotted classes for three weeks to demand higher student grants and to protest against the Mugabe government. After a day of rioting during which they broke windows in the city center and overturned government cars, the government closed the university and expelled all 10,000 students.

That action is not quite as drastic as it seems. The students will have to apply for re-admission and officials will weed out those identified as troublemakers. The sweeping government expulsion is not seen as a show of

strength, as much as a return to old tactics to paper over ever-widening cracks. University students had to undergo a similar re-admission process last year which did nothing to quell the stormy anti-government protests on campus.

The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), spurred on by its articulate leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, has acutely criticized the Mugabe government for making the working population and Zimbabwe's poor bear the brunt of the economic restructuring by significantly hiking utility costs, health and education fees, and allowing prices to spiral upwards. In contrast, the government has taken little or no action to pay for its share of the restructuring by trimming the swollen cabinet and the budget deficit. Fearful of organized opposition from labor, Mugabe banned the unions from holding nation-wide demonstrations.

Businessmen, black and white alike, have become frustrated to the point of despair by government officials who stubbornly cling to the levers of economic power, despite the goal of the restructuring program to open the economy to market forces. More businesslike than students or union members, the captains of industry and commerce have not taken to the streets, but they have thrown their weight behind groups looking for a viable alternative to the Mugabe government.

Mainstream Christian churches have also voiced their disillusionment. The Roman Catholic, Anglican, and other Protestant denominations have quietly criticized the government's somewhat shaky human rights record and its growingly evident corruption. The churches and Zimbabwe's legal community have launched Zimrights, a locally based human rights watchdog.

This potent combination of forces—students, labor, business, and churches—joined forces in Zambia to overturn Kenneth Kaunda's top-heavy government last year. A similar coalition is apparent in Kenya and other African countries. It seems Zimbabweans are taking a cue from the Zambians and others and are looking for a new political vehicle.

Confronted by this daunting loss of support, Robert Mugabe, once an astute and canny politician, has been indecisive and his government inactive. Mugabe appears frozen like an antelope caught in the headlights of an oncoming truck. The fast-approaching calamity is seen, but no effective action is taken.

Politics do not allow such vacuums to last very long and in Zimbabwe a new pressure group was launched on May 30 to rally the diverse opposition under its banner, the Forum for Democratic Reform (FDR). Just as Africa's first wind of change spawned parties in the 1960s whose names all seemed to include the words African and National (the Zimbabwe African National Union, Kenyan African National Union, etc.), the second gust of change has inspired parties to use the words Democracy and Forum in their names (Kenya's FORD, Zambia's Movement for a Multi-party Democracy). The words add up to a call for change.

## A NEW FORUM

**W**ith calls for increased democracy, respect for human rights, and efficient government, a new political pressure group started up in Zimbabwe and is positioning itself to challenge the Mugabe government at the polls.

"Freedom of speech and expression and the right to be heard have been scarce in this country since the days of Rhodesia. Those freedoms are still scarce today and we want that to change," said the interim chairman of the Forum for Democratic Reform, Edgar Sansole, a retired High Court judge.

"The failure of political parties up to now is that they have had narrow, tribal bases and have not reached out to the people with a new set of ideas," said Sansole. "Our function is to provide a focus for debate on what has gone wrong and how to improve Zimbabwe's government."

The Forum took pains at its inaugural meeting in Harare on May 30 to stress that it is not a political party. But it is apparent that the leaders of the discussion group intend to establish a nationwide membership in order to become a bona fide political party to field candidates in the 1995 general elections. Many members are already talking of pressuring Mugabe to call early elections.

"Although we have had a multi-party system in legal terms, in a practical sense, Zimbabweans have had little or no experience of such a system," said retired Chief Justice Enoch Dumbutshena, who added his distinguished reputation to the Forum by agreeing to be its patron. "The Forum is an effort to establish conditions for working democracy in this country."

Sansole continued the analogy of the Rhodesian regime and the Mugabe government. He urged a new, democratic departure.

"Ian Smith used the emergency powers to run the country on the backs of our people's human rights," said Sansole. "Unfortunately, the Mugabe government inherited those sweeping powers and continued to use them until very recently. We have had much too much of a white government and then much too much of a black government. Now Zimbabwe needs a government that will respect the rights of the ordinary people and which will listen to what they have to say."

The Forum for Democratic Reform is led by Zimbabwe's business, legal, and religious communities. A sprinkling of liberal whites is included in the predominantly black group. Organized labor has one representative on the Forum board.

With backing from such a broad spectrum of Zimbabwean society, the Forum could well follow the example of Zambia's Movement for Multi-party Democracy and become a coalition of all forces opposed to the Mugabe government. ■

—A.M.

"We are witnessing the exit of one order and the emergence of a new one," commented Jonathan Moyo, Zimbabwe's leading political analyst.

While Mugabe's reversal of fortune has been surprisingly swift, the root causes of his problems have been evident for some time: the nature of his party and his method of leadership.

Coming from an ascetic Catholic upbringing and education, Robert Mugabe entered African nationalist politics in the 1960s. The Zimbabwe African National Union was the leading force battling Ian Smith's white Rhodesian regime, yet the party's leadership was riven with violent rivalries. Soberly, strategically the schoolteacher, Mugabe rose to lead the party, skillfully playing one faction off the other.

From Zimbabwe's independence in 1980 when he became the country's first prime minister, Mugabe consolidated his power, rewriting the constitution to create for himself the more powerful position of executive president. He steered the country toward becoming a socialist, one-party state. When he stepped back from that goal in 1991, it appeared Mugabe had adeptly ridden the crest of Africa's democratic tidal wave that swept many others out of office. But recent events have shown that he has not been able to successfully and enthusiastically use Africa's new political language.

Mugabe is not a strongman-style leader. He relies on reaching a consensus in his cabinet and party politburo for policy decisions. His party remains divided by petty but bitter rivalries, so decision-making is cumbersome. In response to any political challenge, Mugabe has brought new people into his government with the result that he now presides over a swollen cabinet of 52 ministers and deputy ministers. They administer a similarly bloated civil service which has grown inefficient and corrupt.

This old-line Eastern European style of government has tied Mugabe's hands so that he has failed to cope with the country's new pressures, most particularly the popular demand for a more responsive government.

Despite Zimbabwe's Willowgate scandal, which exposed several cabinet ministers in an illegal car-selling racket five years ago, official corruption has crept through the government. In protest, the Malaysian government recently withdrew its high commissioner as well as its business from Zimbabwe. Malaysian International Airways tried for more than a year to establish a route to Harare, but was frustrated by the government's delays and, according to inside accounts, demands by Zimbabwean officials for kickbacks. The Malaysians decided instead to open a new route to Johannesburg.

Since 1980, Zimbabwe and its leader have been prominent in the international arena as foils to apartheid South Africa. As rapidly as South Africa is moving toward majority rule, Zimbabwe is losing that cachet. Mugabe is

compounding the problem by remaining adamantly antagonistic toward the Pretoria government. He has also appeared out of step on other international issues. Zimbabwe and China were the only countries at the UN to abstain in the vote to adopt sanctions against Serbia. En route to the Rio Earth Summit, Mugabe may well have been the only leader to stop off in Havana to see Fidel Castro.

Even in domestic politics, Mugabe appears increasingly out of touch. Addressing the inaugural meeting of the association of guerrilla fighters who brought his party to power, Mugabe reverted to his well-worn language of "staying true to the goals of socialism" and "the need for the nation as a whole to be united behind one party." Such one-party state exhortations only served to anger the veterans. They hooted and jeered Mugabe, who looked stunned with incomprehension on national television.

More than anything else, Mugabe's inability to muster an effective response to these mounting problems indicates that an end to his rule may be fast approaching. For all his faults, Mugabe appears unlikely to repressively maintain his power until he is felled by a coup, as many African leaders have done.

"Mugabe has two options," said Jonathan Moyo, lecturer in political science at the University of Zimbabwe. "The Nyerere option is to step down

gracefully, as Julius Nyerere did two years ago in Tanzania. But Mugabe's party has become so unpopular that he has lost the chance to retire from politics and let his party continue.

"That leaves the Kaunda option, to go and lose at the polls and to allow a new government to take over, as in Zambia," said Moyo. "That is a very likely scenario."


That is why the emergence of the new political group, the FDR, has excited so many Zimbabweans. The FDR has a distinguished leadership from the legal and business communities, as well as the very influential Harare bishops of both the Anglican and Roman Catholic churches. The Forum's platform calls for a cabinet of just 14 people, market-oriented economic policies, the re-establishment of an upper house of Parliament, and a limit of two five-year terms for any president.

Although the Forum is not a political party, its officials say privately they intend to establish a national following before launching directly into the political fray.

Forum leaders are gearing toward challenging the Mugabe government in the national elections which are due in 1995. "But given the government's recent paralysis," said one FDR trustee, "we have to be prepared to face an early election."

Unless Robert Mugabe can quickly and convincingly demonstrate a new, more efficient and more responsive way of governing, the chances of another election by his Zanu-PF party seem slim indeed. ○

## THE CHANCES OF ANOTHER ELECTION WIN BY PRESIDENT MUGABE'S ZANU-PF PARTY SEEM SLIM INDEED.



Sarah-Jane Poole

## || ZIMBABWE ||

BY ANDREW MELDRUM

# RIGHTING THE LAND WRONG

**S**

mall and wiry, Ephraim Nyakujara, 76, looks at his field of wilted maize and complains about the lack of rainfall in the Chiendambuya Communal Lands, 120 miles northeast of Harare.

"This land is too dry and rocky. It can't grow crops. Even in years of good rains, we don't get good harvests."

Nyakujara fondly recalls the land where he grew up. "It was beautiful land, very good. We could grow everything there. There were wet spots where we could even grow rice," says Nyakujara. "But after the Rhodesians moved us to this land, many of our crops failed. Even now it is hard to grow things here."

Nyakujara's hair and beard are gray and his face is deeply creased, but his eyes are sharp and his speech is decisive. In 1945, he said, Rhodesian authorities moved his family and hundreds of others from their traditional land.

"Many of us resisted, but the police burned our homes and fields, they destroyed our property and then just moved us," recalls Nyakujara. "They dispersed our people. Some were taken east, west, and south."

When asked if people were paid any compensation for their land, Nyakujara laughed bitterly. "Nothing, not a shilling, not a penny," he said. "They just dumped us here

Against fierce opposition from commercial farmers, Zimbabwe's Parliament has enacted a law to right the inequities of the colonial system, empowering the government to buy half the white-owned land for redistribution in 12-acre allotments to black farmers. White farmers have since softened somewhat their opposition, but the question remains whether the Mugabe government can devise a resettlement scheme that will satisfy the black majority as well as maintain the land's productivity.

and we had to develop everything from scratch...Even today I want to get our traditional land back."

It is to right the historical wrong of the colonial seizure of the African people's land that the Zimbabwe Parliament in March unanimously passed the Land Acquisition Bill. The bill empowers the government to forcibly purchase half the 11 million hectares currently owned by the country's 4,300 commercial farmers, virtually all of them white.

The days before the bill was passed, on March 20, tensions rose between the white farmers and the government to levels of antagonism not seen since independence. To a lesser extent, the controversy increased tensions between Zimbabwe's blacks and whites in general.

Much of the bad feeling over the bill stemmed from the lack of direct communication, for more than a year, between the government and the powerful Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), which represents the white farmers. In the last weeks before the bill was passed, the CFU

mounted a slick media campaign against the government bill with full-page newspaper advertisements and saturation television spots.

The last-minute barrage backfired. Zimbabwe's black majority resented the white farmers'

*Tobacco is the country's largest single earner of much-needed foreign currency*

obviously costly efforts to stymie the government's plans. Because so many Zimbabweans have relations who, like Ephraim Nyakujara, were thrown off their ancestral land by Rhodesian authorities, public opinion is strongly in favor of renewed land redistribution. The white farmers became identified as defenders of colonial inequities and their case became deeply unpopular.

The Mugabe government is confronted with a serious unpopularity problem because of the country's current

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economic hardships, rampant corruption, and the widespread belief that the swollen government and civil service are enjoying the taxpayers' money without giving service. Frightened by the growing disaffection of what used to be an enthusiastic Zimbabwean public, the Mugabe government determined that a hardline stand against the whites on the land redistribution issue would regain popularity. Indeed, the land bill was very popular among the average man on the street. But it is clear it did not win back overall approval of the Mugabe government.

That widespread support for the government's position was reflected in Parliament's unanimous vote for the land bill, with even whites and opposition members casting yes votes.

The white farmers were joined in their opposition to the bill only by Western diplomats. The Western powers objected to the clause which allows the government to set its own price for land and which prevents farmers from appealing to the courts if they believe the price is too low. Some lawyers advise that it is unconstitutional to deny the farmers the right to appeal to the courts. They say the bill will be ruled invalid by the Supreme Court.

Western diplomats warn that Zimbabwe could lose financial aid over such forced purchase of land at below market prices. "It is completely against the standards of international law, any compulsory purchase must have at least judicial arbitration of the price," said an indignant Western envoy.

"Where were the standards of international law 40 years ago when the land was taken from our people?" retorted Reg Austin, a lawyer who is also a member of Mugabe's ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF).

The white farmers were on stronger ground in opposing the Land Acquisition Bill when arguing that they make a crucial economic contribution to Zimbabwe's economy. Tobacco is the country's largest single earner of much-needed foreign currency; cotton is close behind.

The commercial farms are also Zimbabwe's biggest employer with more than 500,000 laborers. Including the workers' families, it is estimated that more than 2 million people live on the commercial farms. The Mugabe government has not answered the question of where those workers and their dependents will go when the land is purchased for redistribution. The commercial farmers assert their farms support more people than will be possible on the resettlement schemes.

It is clear that both the commercial farmers and the Mugabe government have valid arguments in the land issue. Unfortunately, the two sides did not satisfactorily get together to discuss their points of view during the heated arguments in the run-up to the land bill's passage by Parliament.

The day before the vote, the government amended the bill to strike the clause which prevented farmers from appealing to the courts. The amendment does not repre-



Sarah-Jane Focile

sent a significant softening of the bill, however, as lawyers say farmers will only be able to challenge whether the government followed proper procedure in purchasing land, but will not be able to question whether the price offered by the government represents fair or adequate compensation.

Clearly, this will not satisfy the white farmers and it is likely the constitutionality of the bill will be challenged in court. But belatedly reading the strength of popular opinion for the land bill, the Commercial Farmers Union issued a diplomatic statement which acknowledged the bill's passage and said it looked forward to working with the government. The wealthy Zimbabwe Tobacco Association went a step further by proposing that the government and private sector join hands to establish a Land Development Trust. The trust would train and launch black farmers into the commercial farming business.

Zimbabwe's white farmers have not thrown in the towel. For the most part, they have prospered in the 12 years since independence and they would like to continue to do so. Half of them will be able to stay on their land, as the government's plans are to purchase 50 percent of the land currently owned by the whites. Of those whose land will be purchased by the government, some will be able to fall back on other family-owned farms, some will manage to buy a new farm, while many will have to look elsewhere.

Neighboring Zambia is desperately trying to revitalize its large-scale farming and is offering incentives like low-cost loans and liberal access to foreign exchange which look very appealing to Zimbabweans.

The big question remaining is how the Mugabe government will carry out the land redistribution. It has already chosen 1 million of the 5.5 million hectares it intends to purchase. It may well move ahead and announce where the rest of the 4 million hectares will be, in order to permit at least half of the white farmers to feel secure.

It is not likely that any action will be taken quickly. First the government will have to find the funds to buy the farms and then the money to redevelop the land for resettlement, which is estimated to cost three times the purchase price. The Mugabe government's experience in resettling 3.3 million hectares since 1980 has amply proved that resettlement is expensive and often unsuccessful. The government has confirmed it intends to draw up fresh plans for this new resettlement.

Zimbabwe's black farmers' union strongly endorsed the land bill and at the same time pressed its view that the government must select the best trained and most successful peasant farmers for resettlement, as opposed

## THE GOVERNMENT ADMITS THAT BETTER-TRAINED FARMERS ARE MORE LIKELY TO MAKE THE RESETTLEMENT A SUCCESS.

to the government's previous policy of allocating land to the poorest farmers. Officials now admit that the better-trained farmers are far more likely to make the resettlement exercise a success.

The black farmers' union has also urged the government to sell the plots to the resettled farmers, instead of the previous method of allowing them to farm the land by licenses which must be renewed every five years. Only when a farmer owns his land and can pass it on to his family will he or she put in the work and investment needed to develop the land to its full potential, argues the black farmers' union.

In the past year, Zimbabwean officials have visited Malaysia to study how that country efficiently redistributed its land on a commercial basis. They found the Malaysian scheme entailed a daunting amount of planning and spending, but that it recouped a significant amount of the expenditure by having the resettled farmers pay off the costs over a 20-year period. Most significantly, the land remained very productive.

Another important unanswered question is what will happen to the farmworkers currently on the commercial lands. The commercial farmers argue they support more people than the resettlement schemes. Will the laborers be thrown off the commercial farms to join the ranks of the unemployed?

Heated tempers have already begun to cool down a bit now that the Land Acquisition Bill has passed Parliament, but it is obvious that far more careful planning and cooperation than was evident in making the bill into law is needed to ensure that half of Zimbabwe's best agricultural land is redistributed to black ownership and remains productive.

Zimbabwe's pugnacious minister of lands and rural resettlement, Witness Mangwende, has shown little willingness to work hand in hand with the commercial farming interests. Yet, the unimpressive results of Zimbabwe's resettlement of 3.3 million hectares since 1980 makes it obvious that new approaches to resettlement are needed.

Government resettlement officials admit cooperatives have been a dismal failure with many participants deserting the ventures, despite the availability of good soil and rainfall. Not only have planners recommended scrapping the cooperatives, they have suggested that resettled farmers be allowed to purchase their plots. Currently, the resettled farmers are only granted 10-year permits which allow them to farm the land for that period.

If the government were to permit the resettlement farmers to purchase their 12-acre plots over a period of 20 years, as in Malaysia, it would recoup some of the funds spent to purchase the whites' lands as well as give the peasant farmers an incentive to develop the new land.

The Mugabe government may well abandon some its socialist policies in favor of resettlement schemes that offer incentives to the farmers. As long as such pragmatism promotes industrious farmers, black and white, then Zimbabwe will be the winner. ○

# RIFTS IN THE OPPOSITION



Betty Press

Kenneth Matiba returned to Kenya in triumph in May to stand for the presidency on the ticket of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy. But there are several other contenders, leading to fears that the vote could be split along ethnic lines. While President Daniel arap Moi's prediction that ethnic unrest would follow multi-partyism has come true, with ongoing violence in the west, many maintain that the clashes are a ploy by the government to justify eventually declaring a state of emergency.

**K**enneth Matiba's triumphal return to Kenya on May 2 was a cause for celebration by his supporters in the opposition Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD). But in announcing his intention to stand as a presidential candidate in the forthcoming multi-party elections, Matiba has opened up new rifts within Kenya's burgeoning opposition movement, raising the threat of serious ethnic divisions at a time of uncertainty and mounting tension in Kenya.

Matiba, 58, a cabinet minister until he resigned from the government in 1988, was detained in 1990 after calling for the re-introduction of political pluralism. At least 20 people were killed in serious riots which followed his detention. Matiba endured 11 months in harsh solitary confinement and suffered a stroke. On his release, he sought medical treatment abroad, and spent nearly a

year recuperating in Britain before flying home to Nairobi.

Thousands of Kenyans welcomed Matiba at the airport and lined the route as he drove through the city center. Later the same morning, well-wishers filled Nairobi's Anglican cathedral and packed the grounds outside, as Matiba attended a special thanksgiving service arranged by his family.

"I was very sick," admitted Matiba, "but now I'm back...and I want to take the opportunity to tell you that I'm committed to the welfare of you people of Kenya."

The following day, he invited journalists to a news conference at his Riara Ridge farm just outside Nairobi. Matiba said he intended to stand for the presidency on a FORD ticket, but added that he hoped his announcement would not discourage other potential challengers from within the Forum, Kenya's largest opposition party.

"I would like to see other candidates come forward to represent FORD...Ken Matiba should be opposed by

*Peter Biles reports for the BBC and The Guardian (London) from East Africa.*



everybody who is interested...that is the way politics should develop in this country...we must be prepared to accept democracy. It's the one thing I will not compromise on," he said.

Matiba dismissed suggestions that his health would not stand up to the rigors of fighting a presidential campaign. However, it was noticeable that he had lost some movement on the right side of his body following his stroke, and rumors have persisted of continuing ill health.

Matiba, a wealthy businessman from the Kikuyu community, Kenya's largest ethnic group, need not have worried that President Moi might be short of challengers.

FORD's interim chairman, Oginga Odinga, arguably Kenya's best known opposition figure, has said he will stand, despite his age. Odinga who draws support from the sizable Luo community in western Kenya, is thought to be over 80, and served as Jomo Kenyatta's vice president in Kenya's first post-independence government in 1963. Odinga later left the government to lead an opposition party, the Kenya People's Union, until it was banned in 1969.

The secretary-general of FORD, Martin Shikuku, another former cabinet minister, has also said he is a contender for the country's top post, and will be primarily trying to win the vote of the Luhya people. He incurred the wrath of some FORD colleagues when he recently held a private meeting with President Moi.

Meanwhile, another FORD member, Paul Muite, a younger generation Kikuyu who is the chairman of the Law Society of Kenya, has made little secret of his own driving ambition. But Muite's best chance of high office may be to support Odinga in the hope of becoming prime minister with the aging Odinga as an executive president. Muite was a member of a FORD delegation which visited Britain in April in an unsuccessful bid to dissuade

*Left, Kenneth Matiba speaking to his supporters on his arrival in Kenya*

*Right, Paul Muite, lawyer and FORD activist*

Matiba from entering the presidential race.

However, the Kikuyu vote could be further split by Mwai Kibaki, the leader of the rival Democratic Party, who resigned from a top ministerial post in the government last December, and enjoys a substantial following in Central Province, the main Kikuyu stronghold.

The editor of the influential *Weekly Review*, Hilary Ng'weno, commented in a recent editorial: "It is the ethnic factor that will determine the outcome of this [presidential] contest and indeed the main contest of the general election. Typically of politicians in the country, everyone tried to play down the issue of ethnicity in politics. Now the reality is staring everyone in the face. To get anywhere in Kenyan politics, one has to garner the support of one's ethnic group. In the process, one tends to alienate the members of other ethnic groups. The successful politician is the one who can build on the foundations of his or her ethnic affiliations while managing to build viable bridges across ethnic lines."

Until last year, President Moi had argued fervently for the retention of a one-party state, maintaining that pluralism would cause ethnic chaos in Kenya. However, pressure from Western donors who had opted to suspend further aid to Kenya for six months pending signs of progress on political and economic reform forced Moi into a U-turn last December. The ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (Kanu), voted to scrap Section 2(a) of the Kenyan constitution, the clause which had officially banned opposition parties in 1982.

Seemingly, Moi's earlier warnings that Kenyan society was not cohesive enough for multi-party politics proved to be accurate. The dawn of the new era ushered in the

# END OF TANZANIA'S ONE-PARTY RULE

**A**fter 27 years of socialist one-party rule in Tanzania, external factors have forced the breakup of the power once held exclusively by the invincible Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). An historic about-face was made in April when the Parliament in Dodoma voted in favor of multi-party democracy. Now the CCM is treading carefully in anticipation of the inevitable opposition—President Ali Hassan Mwinyi was anticipated to assent to the registration of new political parties on July 1.

The Nyalali Commission, set up to address reforming the political system, was launched last February by Dr. Julius Nyerere, ex-president and architect of the socialist ideology, "*Ujamaa*" (brotherhood).

Eighty percent of 40,000 people interviewed by the commission voted in favor of keeping Tanzania a one-party state. Yet, President Ali Hassan Mwinyi overrode the people's choice and hailed the introduction of a multi-party system, in effect, pre-empting the opposition.

The CCM party apparatus is slowly being dismantled. Party green and yellow flags are disappearing with the closure of CCM branch offices at workplaces. The armed forces have also been depoliticized. For the CCM, this was a painful decision. It meant a loss of membership and financial support. Up to \$700,000 has been donated annually into CCM coffers by members of the armed forces.

Peace and stability are the main weapons in the CCM armory for fighting the opposition parties. Twenty-seven years of socialist policies have maintained harmony between Tanzania's 105 ethnic groups. With a network of agents, the CCM has in the past infiltrated, or as some argue forced, its ideology into rural areas. This provided vital grassroots support, which at the moment the opposition can only envy.

The CCM has not yet publicly responded to the Nyalali Commission. But, members of the influential Tanganyika Law Society (TLS) are concerned that the legal framework could be abused by the whims of individuals within the CCM. The TLS wants the constitution amended before the first democratic general elections are held in 1995, and recently held a seminar to discuss the changes needed.

One of the participants, Professor Issa Shivji, a law lecturer at the University of Dar es Salaam, said that within a multi-party democracy the president's role "is no more than a candidate of a political party in the boxing ring of the political fray."

Shivji further suggested that the president should not be allowed to appoint an attorney-general or an electoral commission for organizing and supervising elections. He also said that the Permanent Commission of Enquiry (leaders of political parties involved in public affairs) should be accountable to Parliament.

Shivji added: "The first registrar of new political parties would be appointed by the CCM chairperson to midwife the birth of new parties. One would not be surprised if there was a high infant mortality rate as a number of them are still-born."

Economic recovery in Tanzania is running side by side with political developments. However, businessmen are worried that the breakneck speed of political change will jeopardize a stable climate attractive to foreign investors.

"We should have either glasnost or perestroika, but not both," says Rupin Rajani, a Tanzanian businessman. "Tanzania should first improve its economic situation, then allow multi-partyism. We don't want peace and stability to be a trade-off for democracy."

Present political activities are reflected by a car-

worst outbreak of civil unrest since the pre-independence Mau Mau rebellion in the 1950s. However, many observers consider that the ethnic fighting in the Rift Valley and western Kenya, ostensibly over land disputes, is being carefully orchestrated by members of Moi's Kalenjin ethnic group. Officially, about 240 people have been killed since the beginning of the year, but the actual death toll is thought to be far higher. Parts of the country have been plunged into a state of virtual civil war, with the government and the opposition parties repeatedly accusing one another of instigating the clashes.

Many farm workers in the heartland of Kenya's tea-growing region have been forced to flee in fear of their lives after armed Kalenjin attacks on the Luo, Luhya, and Kisii people. Tea is Kenya's most important agricultural product, second only to tourism as a foreign exchange earner, and this mainstay of the economy has been badly affected.

One tea estate manager voiced grave concern about the implications of the clashes: "The hatred this has engendered will take years to reconcile. The government does not care about the destruction of the economy. What a mess they have reduced this country to. I really think this is the end."

The Kenyan government has claimed that FORD is provoking the violence in order "to fulfill their objective of making the country ungovernable." The government also arrested some FORD activists, accusing them of spreading rumors which were designed "to trigger a full-scale civil war between different ethnic communities."

FORD said, however, that President Moi was "personally and deeply involved in the ongoing mass killings and displacement of non-Kalenjins in the so-called tribal clashes."

"The personnel deployed in these clashes, to murder

toon in the *Express*, a weekly newspaper. It depicts a boxing ring with the opposition parties knocking each other out. A heavyweight boxer representing the CCM is peacefully dozing in his corner, unperturbed by the activities of the so-called opposition.

One diplomat recently described the opposition in Tanzania as "having no teeth." Indeed, there have been squabbles over leadership and lack of a strategy for campaigning since the birth of the National Committee for Constitutional Reforms (NCCR), a forum for discussion and promotion of multi-partyism, last year.

The original NCCR group included Mabere Marando, a 41-year-old lawyer, Chief Abdullah Fundikira, a 71-year-old seasoned politician, and James Mapalala, a teacher and civil rights activist in his fifties.

The NCCR has split, with only Marando remaining to convert the forum into a political party. Each of the other politicians has chosen to start his own party—Fundikira with his Union for Multi-Party Democracy and Mapalala's Civic Movement.

At the same time, unregistered political parties are beginning to mushroom all over Tanzania, with about two dozen groups forming them. In April, an attempt was made by the opposition to unite itself into a National Opposition Front (NOF). However, the NOF, like a newly constructed road in Tanzania, began to rapidly disintegrate after a month.

Does this failure to create an opposition reflect Tanzanians' apathy toward politics? Tanzania has not seen strikes or civil disobedience because there has never been an alternative political system to run against the CCM.

Furthermore, Tanzanians do not seem impressed by the collection of opposition leaders who have emerged. Tanzanians do not necessarily accept that any

politician who has served a jail sentence (like Mapalala during his civil rights campaigns) is capable of leading the country. Nor do they seem to want ex-ministers, like Fundikira, who left politics due to disagreements with the Tanganyika African National Union while Nyerere was in power.

"The opposition is full of rejects," said a leading CCM minister. "Our country is poor. These men just want to go into politics to make money. I mean, they have no policies on education, on the social sectors, or roads. The opposition is aided financially by foreigners in our country who invite them to their houses for dinner and feed them multi-partyism!"

More to the point, the current freedom of expression—as displayed in newspapers, offices, or even while having your shoes shined by the roadside—to complain of CCM malpractice is only a recent phenomenon. In the past, even a careless whisper of dissent or a complaint against the CCM would have landed you a couple of months in detention.

Many Tanzanians do not feel that multi-party democracy will necessarily improve their living conditions. To them, one party's squandering and mismanagement of funds is enough. More parties will merely mean less and less money spent on them. Instead, they prefer the CCM to carry out some "viraka"—repair work, on what an aid worker described as "their leaking roof."

Until July 1, calm was expected in Dar es Salaam, "the haven of peace"—with the political mudslinging and dirty tricks campaigns to discredit other parties, usually associated with multi-party democracy, yet to begin. ■

—Tabasim Hussain  
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

fellow Kenyans, belong to Moi's private and personal army, variously called 'Kalenjin Warriors' or 'Kalenjin Liberation Front,' and their mission and goal is to ensure that government and power remain in the hands of Moi and a specific Kalenjin clique," said FORD.

Not for the first time in recent years, church leaders have also taken a strong stand against the state. At the end of April, a delegation of Catholic bishops and members of the National Council of Churches of Kenya met Moi and told him: "Whether you like it or not, the truth is that the people have lost confidence in you and those close to you."

Eighteen Roman Catholic bishops later expressed the view that the Kenyan government no longer had the right to remain in power. "The overwhelming majority of thinking people of Kenya has now accepted that the government is not in control, or has not got the political will to change the existing situation. If these ideas are

true, then the government has no legitimate claim to remain in power, and should consider the good of the people as their first consideration," the bishops said. They urged Moi to take immediate action to end the ethnic clashes, adding that they had been compelled to speak out because of "the suffering and injustice" being experienced by thousands of Kenyans.

It is argued that the Kenyan government, with its reputation for clamping down hard on political unrest, could have easily quelled the recent troubles. But the critics believe that the government is happy to allow lawlessness to prevail, so that it can eventually declare a state of emergency, thus delaying the general election which must be held by February next year.

Few people in Kenya ever expected the transition to multi-party democracy to be a smooth process, but already some of the worst fears have been borne out by the yearning for political power. ○

After 28 years of repression, thousands of Malawians rose up and demonstrated against the autocratic rule of 93-year-old President for Life Kamuzu Banda. The catalyst for their action was the return—and immediate arrest—of reform-minded trade unionist Chakufwa Chihana, hailed by Malawians as a national hero. Finally applying some pressure, international donors then froze \$74 million in aid, while Malawians watch and wait to see how the political scenario will play out.

# THE WAITING

May 1992 was a month that few Malawians will ever forget. For the first time in nearly 30 years, thousands of ordinary people in the main towns of Lilongwe, Blantyre, and Limbe, and in the outlying plantations, found the courage to demonstrate, the voice to demand higher wages, and the strength to fight back against the authorities who tried to stop them.

The following week, Western donors meeting in Paris froze \$74 million of aid to Malawi, after decades of turning a blind eye to the excesses of self-declared Life President Kamuzu Banda's regime. The donors decided that the Malawian government no longer deserved foreign aid because of its persistent violation of human rights and obstinate refusal to accept democratic change. Analysts believe these events could trigger the long-awaited turning point in Malawi's 28-year one-party and one-man rule.

As Mapopa Chipeta, an exiled activist, says: "For the first time, Malawians have broken the psychological barrier by their collective action against Banda and his government. Malawi will never be the same again."

Striking in itself is an overtly political action in Malawi. Since independence from Britain in 1964, the handful of unions have been only appendages of the government, never daring to strike. The last strike by tobacco workers in 1963 was led by Chakufwa Chihana, then the secretary-general of the Nyasaland Trade Union Congress.

Ironically, the same Chihana, now secretary-general of the Southern African Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC), returned to Malawi on April 6 this year after a conference of exiles in Lusaka. His well-publicized intention was to form a democratic alliance to fight for multi-

party democracy. But he was arrested as soon as he stepped on the Lilongwe tarmac.

Analysts dispute whether the May strikes were actually spontaneous and only for wages as the Malawi government would have people believe. It was a known fact that Chihana had been trying to resuscitate the labor movement in Malawi before he left, but whether this had any connection to the strikes is unclear. But Chihana was indisputably the rallying point for the riots that broke out later in the capital, Lilongwe.

The initial strike began on Monday, May 4, at 1 am in Blantyre. Over 3,000 workers at the David Whitehead Textile factory, a subsidiary of the British multinational Lonrho, turned off their machines and went outside to demonstrate for higher wages. Although police quickly dispersed them, they regrouped again on Tuesday and were joined by more workers from other shifts. By noon, police closed the factory and sent the workers home.

On Wednesday, the unrelenting strikers assembled at their factory gates and then marched toward the city center. Transport workers, security guards, and other industrial workers joined them, all calling for improved wages and working conditions.

But the peaceful demonstrations turned violent just as the crowd reached downtown when Malawi Young Pioneers—the vigilante wing of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP)—and police intervened. The demonstrators threw stones and bricks while police fired teargas and blanks.

Unemployed youth, college students, local council and office workers joined the fracas and uprooted flagpoles put up for Kamuzu Day, the life president's birthday on May 14, using them as barricades to block roads into Malawi's biggest city.

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Rioters zeroed in on symbols of the Malawi regime. People's Trading Center supermarkets were the first to be looted. PTC shops are owned by Press Trust of which President Banda is principal trustee. Women wearing "chitenges," traditional skirts with the portrait of Banda emblazoned on them, were attacked, stripped, and some reportedly raped. An MCP office in the poor suburb of Ndirande was torched.

Gunshots continued into the night as police tried, with little success, to herd the looters out of downtown, back to their impoverished suburbs. But in the early hours on Thursday morning, angry crowds stormed the city center again. By this time, all offices, shops, schools, and banks were closed and many boarded up their windows and doors.

The local police had been reinforced with special paramilitary units from the Police Mobile Force. According to eyewitnesses, these new units were responsible for

# GAME

most of the deaths as they used live ammunition and fired directly into the

rampaging crowds who by now were attacking other food, hardware, and clothing shops—mostly-Asian owned—and gas stations.

Doctors at the central Queen Elizabeth Hospital said that by the end of Thursday, 38 corpses with gunshot wounds had piled up in their mortuary and over 100 people had been treated for injuries. The official death toll was 22, but many believe it could have been much higher as many people never reached the hospital.

Meanwhile, Thursday was also the day Chakufwa Chihana was due to appear in the Lilongwe high court. Judge James Kalale had ordered on Wednesday that the prosecution must produce Chihana or the attorney-general must furnish reasons for his continued detention without trial. Over 3,000 people ringed the court house in anticipation. They shouted, "We want to see the brave one." An eyewitness described the scene as "electric."

"It is not Chihana himself, but the idea," said one observer. "He spoke out. He was our voice."

As the hours passed and Chihana did not appear, the crowd grew increasingly agitated. When Chihana's wife, Christina, and lawyer, Bazuka Mhango, emerged from the courtroom, the angry crowd ran alongside their car cheering. Then they spread into Lilongwe's commercial district, again looting PTC supermarkets, a David Whitehead textile shop, and a gas station. Cars were overturned, Malawian flags ripped down.

On Friday, unrest flared in Kanengo, a northern industrial suburb of the capital, where workers at the tobacco auction floors and processing factories went on strike. The strikers built makeshift barricades and threw rocks and bottles at approaching police. But by the afternoon, the strikers were dispersed and calm returned to the capital.

Tobacco is Malawi's main export earner and prolonged disruption in this sector would have severe economic ramifications. Tea and sugar are Malawi's secondary exports and workers in the major plantations in Mulanje and Thyolo just south of Blantyre, realizing their economic power, also went on strike.

On Friday, Banda made a surprisingly conciliatory appeal on national radio for an end to the strikes and a return to peace. "All genuine grievances should be looked into expeditiously and corrective measures should be taken with speed," the 93-year-old president said, acknowledging uncharacteristically that there had been something to strike about.

"Let us behave like ladies and gentlemen and refrain from damaging property. Let us resolve our problems without any loss of life," he said, his voice quavering.

But these words were obviously too little, too late. The strikes, riots, and deaths that followed could not have come at a worse time for Banda and his government as talks between Western donors and Malawian officials began on May 11 in Paris to negotiate the fate of the country's aid lifeline.

After three days of discussions, the chairman of the meeting, Stephen Denning, director of the southern Africa department of the World Bank, announced that \$74 million of new development aid had been frozen.

The donors agreed that the Malawi government had failed to fit their criteria of "good governance" and decided to follow the example of Kenya last year, and use further aid as a lever for political change.

Denning said donors expressed "deep concern about the lack of progress in the area of basic freedoms and human rights," but would review Malawi's progress in six months' time. He added that donors were looking for



Andrew Meldrum



Sheikh Chifuwa

**Top, President for Life  
Kamuzu Banda**

**Chakufwa Chihana,  
secretary-general of the  
Southern African Trade  
Union Coordination Council**

actions more than reassurances: "They are seeking tangible and irreversible evidence of a basic transformation...a fundamental shift in the way human rights in Malawi are viewed."

The donors did not withhold all assistance but pledged relief for the worst drought this century. But their humanitarian pledges fell \$100 million short of requirements which will likely be released bit by bit.

At this meeting, donors demonstrated a significant change of heart toward Malawi as they no longer view it through their Cold War-tinted glasses. Until a few years ago, Malawi received much international praise, especially from the United States, since it had not followed the blatantly Marxist path of its neighbor Mozambique or "humanist" Zambia. Malawi was a beachhead of capitalism in the region.

The fact that tens of thousands of Malawians had fled into political exile around the world, that hundreds of political dissidents crowded Malawi's jails living in appalling conditions, and that many government opponents had "disappeared" was conveniently overlooked.

Malawi was also viewed as a World Bank model of macroeconomic success. The tiny country serviced its loans, had a growing GDP, and was faithfully following a structural adjustment program.

*But distorted development which put an estimated one-third of the economy in the hands of Banda himself through Press Holdings, a giant conglomerate to rival any state-run company in Malawi's "socialist" neighbors, was ignored. So was an agricultural policy which benefited large estates at the expense of small-scale farmers, who were exploited by a corrupt marketing system.*

But with the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a world power and the rise of democracy across the globe, especially in Africa, where multi-party elections are being held in scores of countries, donors seem to have finally awakened to the reality of Malawi.

Since the cabinet crisis of 1964 when the cabinet resigned en masse in protest against Banda's authoritarian ways, it is no coincidence that in this changing democratic climate, more people have spoken or acted against the government—and in turn been muzzled—than ever before.

In March this year, 16,000 copies of a Lenten letter signed by seven Catholic bishops were widely circulated criticizing the Malawian government for human rights abuses and restriction of fundamental freedoms. The bishops were interrogated and put under temporary house arrest for their bold statement.

One of the signatories was Irish-born Msgr. John Roche, the apostolic administrator in Malawi, who had lived in the country for more than 20 years. Roche was called out of his cathedral in Mzimba where he was giving a sermon for Good Friday and deported.

But the bishops' challenge to the government was seen as an inspiration to most Malawians and a handful of courageous people followed the churchmen's lead. A Presbyterian minister in Mzuzu, Aaron Longwe, gave a sermon of solidarity quoting from Micah, chapter seven:

"...The ruler demands gifts, the judge accepts bribes, the powerful dictate what they desire..." These biblical references were too close to Malawian reality and, soon after, Longwe was detained without trial.

But Longwe was not the lone voice of the Protestants. The World Alliance of Reformed Churches sent a four-person delegation to Malawi in late May who signed a joint letter with five senior Church of Central Africa Presbyterians which was presented to the life president.

The letter called on Banda to appoint a broad-based commission including the church to make proposals for political and judicial reform. "We consider that without major democratic changes, peace and calm will not return [to Malawi]," the letter said.

The Protestant churchmen also urged Banda to release all political prisoners and allow freedom of expression and association "to assure those both within and outside Malawi that significant changes are taking place." The letter was widely distributed throughout Malawi.

Banda claims that he is an elder of the Church of Scotland, after he lived and practiced as a medical doctor in Edinburgh in the late 1930s and 1940s. But the Church secretary-general, Chris Wigglesworth, a member of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches delegation to Malawi, denies Banda is an elder "in any meaningful way."

A handful of individuals capitalized on the detention of Chihana and the new climate created by the Church letters to speak out. Krishna Achutan used the opportunity to publicize the 14-year detention without trial of his father-in-law, Aleke Banda.

Achutan called for the release of Banda in an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation because he said his father-in-law's health was failing as he suffered from high blood pressure. Achutan was arrested the next day and was denied all access to his family or lawyer.

Hundreds of people were also detained for their part in the May strikes as authorities try to identify the "ringleaders." Many more people are likely to join them in the already crowded prison cells across the country as pressure mounts against the government.

How the political crisis will be resolved is difficult to predict. Malawi is in a state of political limbo. The aged Banda seems incapable of handling a process of political reform. John Tembo, the minister of state in the president's office and Banda's right-hand man, is similarly unlikely to initiate democratic reforms. And if the opposition continues to keep its head down, the government's hand is unlikely to be forced through a give-and-take process.

With continued industrial unrest, increasing tension, and probably violence in the run-up to the one-party elections, a coup d'état by the military is a scenario that looms on the horizon. There is considerable popular respect for the army, whose officers may decide that in this year of drought and with development aid suspended, an impoverished country like Malawi cannot afford a long and painful period of political uncertainty. ○

# INTERVIEW

By Margaret A. Novicki

## Fighting the AIDS Epidemic Dr. Peter Lamptey

**Africa Report:** What is the impact of AIDS on Africa's social and economic development?

**Lamptey:** There have been all sorts of studies on its socio-economic impact and all of them point to the fact that because AIDS kills the most sexually active age group, predominantly between 25 and 35, and these are the most highly trained persons, there will definitely be some economic impact, especially in the urban areas. In some of the urban areas, especially in Malawi, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Uganda, up to 30 percent of the urban population is infected—invariably the ages that I mentioned. So if all these people were to die off in the next 10-15 years, that certainly will have an impact in terms of the loss of economic potential of that age group.

The effect on the rural population will be much less, and the situation varies from country to country. Even though infection rates in some rural areas have been recorded as high as 10 percent, in most places it is under 5 percent. So it is not going to have any devastating impact on the agricultural economy. But we are only speaking of the next 10 years. The infection rates are still rising and it is possible that the economic impact may be greater.


The other issue that is linked to this is the demographic impact. We have done a number of mathematical projections as to what impact the epidemic will have on the population growth rate. Even in the worst-case scenario, where a very high proportion of the adult population is infected, it appears that the worst scenario is a reduction of the population growth rate from between 3-3.5 percent

to 2.5 percent annually. The lowest it will go to is around 2 percent. So the population will continue to increase, and therefore there will be a considerable replacement of the people who are lost to the disease.

The social impact, no matter what the size of the epidemic, is going to be the most devastating. It is already having a considerable impact in destruction of family structure—the breadwinner dying, or the mother dying which is even more devastating—disrupting families especially in the urban areas, but the rural areas have not been spared. Probably the best marker that we have is the number of orphans. AIDS orphans are defined as any child under 15 who loses one or both parents to AIDS. By the year 2000, there may be as many as 10 million orphans left without one or two parents in Africa alone. Needless to say, that is a lot of social disruption, and people keep on saying that that shouldn't be a problem, the African extended families will absorb the orphans. If the numbers are small, yes they will absorb them. But if the numbers are large, that system will be overextended and there will be a major disruption.

**Africa Report:** What is the particular impact of AIDS on infants and children in Africa?

**Lamptey:** Infants and children are going to be infected in two major ways: One is those that are born to mothers who are infected, and we estimate anywhere between 20 and 40 percent of infants born to mothers who are already infected will be infected. The second is the small number of infants and children who are likely to be transfused with



Alex Tremi

**D**r. Lamptey, a Ghanaian MD, is vice president for AIDS programs at Family Health International. Director of a \$168 million program funded by U.S. AID to assist in the control of AIDS in developing countries, Dr. Lamptey explains the latest in the fight against AIDS in Africa.

infected blood. There is also a third category of a small number of children who might be infected through breast milk. But I'd like to dismiss the last two. Breast milk infection is relatively rare and unimportant, and even though in the U.S. there has been a recommendation against infected mothers breast-feeding their infants, in Africa such a recommendation should not be applied and mothers infected or not should continue to do so. The second category, blood transmission, will contribute to only a small part of the epidemic.

So by and large most of the children who are infected are born to infected mothers. An estimated 750,000 infected infants will be born by the end of this year, and the projected total by the end of the decade is roughly 4 to 8 million. Current studies indicate that most of the children born infected are likely to die within the first two to three years of life from AIDS. The critical issue here is that there is very little that we can do to prevent mothers from delivering an infected child. There are some that have proposed that we counsel mothers and ask them not to have babies if they are likely to be HIV-infected. But first we have to test the mother to see if she is infected and that is expensive and then you have to convince her that she shouldn't get pregnant. Our current strategy in our program is to try and prevent mothers from getting infected in the first place.

There is also another social issue that comes up—if a mother knows or suspects that she is infected because she has seen other children born infected, sometimes that is more of an incentive to have another child because she thinks if she is going to die, she needs someone to survive her. So it is a difficult dilemma, but the bottom line is that a lot of children are going to be born infected and that is going to pose a problem in terms of increasing one-to-five child mortality.

It is also going to reverse some of the advances we have made in reducing mortality overall, because there is nothing we can do for children who are born with HIV at this point in time, not to mention the medical resources that will go into keeping them alive for one or two years before they die. So the social, economic, and demographic effects are likely to be profound.

**Africa Report:** While educating peo-

ple about the disease and how it is transmitted has been a success, that hasn't translated into the necessary behavioral changes. With this knowledge, what are seen as the most important measures to control AIDS today?

**Lamprey:** One of the mistakes that has been made in AIDS programs is the assumption that if you provide a lot of information and improve knowledge, that will affect the epidemic. It has been quite evident that in most countries now, sometimes as high as 90 percent know about AIDS, how it is transmitted and how it can be prevented, but that has not led to people actually changing their behavior and sustaining it. What is becoming painfully clear is that it is not sufficient and some would argue it is not even necessary. So the first thing is that we need to look at the strategies that we

*"We must see how to use the community to sustain changes in behavior that puts people at risk of AIDS."*

have been using to ensure behavior change and there are more things that we need to do.

One is to understand the behavior that we are talking about. What behavior do you want to change? Understand the constraints that people face. Telling a prostitute to reduce the number of sexual partners is naive when the person's livelihood depends on that. So one, we have to have a better understanding of the behavior that puts people at risk, then we have to study what options and constraints that they have. We have to understand the skills that they need to make that change. We also have to attempt to change normative behavior in the society that supports that type of behavior. If you get one individual to change and their peers behave in the same way, that behavior cannot be sus-

tained, so we must see how to use the community to sustain that behavior.

The largest percentage of HIV transmission in Africa is heterosexual. Blood transmission doesn't play a major part, less than 10 percent. Homosexual transmission and breast-feeding is unimportant. The major form of transmission is heterosexual and perinatal transmission. In order to prevent perinatal, you have to prevent the mother from getting infected. So the main focus is preventing men and women from getting infected heterosexually, and behavior change is one essential component.

The second is that it is being shown quite clearly that the presence of sexually transmitted diseases [STDs] enhances the transmission of HIV in three ways: One is that if someone is HIV-infected and has an STD, they have a higher chance of transmitting HIV. The second way is that if they are HIV-negative and they have an STD, they have a higher chance of getting HIV, and the third is that people who have HIV and STDs are more difficult to treat for their STDs. So treating STDs is an important way of preventing HIV infection. Current STD programs in Africa are extremely poor. Most people who get infected with gonorrhea, genital ulcer disease, or syphilis are likely to go to a pharmacy and get an inappropriate drug, or go to a traditional healer or somebody who is not qualified to treat them. So one of the strategies is to improve the treatment of STDs that will subsequently lead to a reduction in the transmission of HIV.

The third element is: What are the tools we could make available for people who want to change their behavior? We know the risk factors—multiple sexual partners, unprotected sex. You can tell people their choices are abstinence or monogamy, but that won't work with everybody, especially single people. Another option is to cut back on the number of partners and use condoms. Make sure that condoms are accessible, affordable, and people can get them when they need them. Current family planning programs have some condoms, but they have been geared in the past toward married people.

Again, the three basic elements to prevent heterosexual transmission are: communications to enhance behavioral change, treating STDs, and making sure

condoms are available. Also, undertaking the appropriate research to make sure you know what you are doing, and working with policy-makers to make sure appropriate decisions are taken to support prevention programs.

**Africa Report:** In the past, African governments were reticent about addressing the AIDS crisis. Has that attitude been vanquished now and are they dealing with it openly?

**Lamprey:** There has been an evolution over the last four to five years in the way decision-makers are reacting to the epidemic. In the early years, a lot of them overreacted, partly because of blame, partly because of denial, but also procrastination, hoping the problem would go away. That has changed, but not completely. Some decisions and commitments have been made, but not enough to do the things that need to be done.

There are countries like Uganda that have had a commitment to AIDS prevention for the last four to five years. The question is how much is actually going on in that country. The issue of condoms has been a controversial one. They have a serious problem: They need to use condoms, but they don't want condoms in public places. Despite that, Uganda is probably far ahead of many countries in terms of policy. There are a number of countries that haven't gotten to that stage yet, a number which are still falsifying recordings of these cases. By and large, most countries have changed, but not sufficiently.

**Africa Report:** What are some positive examples of African countries or programs within countries to address the AIDS crisis?

**Lamprey:** One is an approach that we are using: There are limited resources to prevent AIDS, so we need to target our approaches and resources to those most at risk of acquiring the disease and transmitting it. If you do it early enough in a population, you will be able to contain or slow down the spread. Even in a population where the disease has spread widely, you can still find groups like the urban population that is 20-30 percent infected. That's where you need to put most of your effort, compared with a rural population where only 3 percent are infected. If you have limited resources, that makes sense.

We actually have done this in a num-

ber of countries such as Zimbabwe where we have a program that has targeted the urban population and especially those who are at risk of acquiring the infection—people who have multiple sexual partners, including people with AIDS, to provide education for others. We have a program where we are distributing condoms in bars, in hotels. We take condoms to people in homes. Condom distribution has increased dramatically and that is a good example of a community-based initiative that has involved different levels of people.

Another example is in Cameroon. We used a similar approach, but backed by social marketing of condoms. This is a country that didn't even have a population program at the time that we went in. We started a pilot program to reach high-risk groups and expanded it to three

*"There has been an evolution in the last four to five years in the way decision-makers are reacting to AIDS."*

of the major cities. In a country where condom sales were minimal, we are now selling about 1 million condoms a month. Some of the people who sell the condoms are the prostitutes themselves. It is a social marketing approach we've used quite successfully in three countries—Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Zaire—and the condom sales have been dramatic in all three countries.

A third example is Tanzania. We again approached high-risk groups; there it was truckers because they move across long distances and spend the night in different places. So we set up a program with AMREF and the National AIDS Control Program to train people along the road where truckers stop and the truckers put posters on their trucks. Condom sales went from 80,000 to 180,000 a month. So these have been

success stories. The only problem is that they are not sufficiently large enough in any particular country except Cameroon, Zaire, and Burkina Faso to make a dent in the epidemic.

**Africa Report:** It has been said that the epidemic has been shown to be the worst in East and Central Africa. Is that still valid, or is it as widespread throughout the continent?


**Lamprey:** That question is always difficult to answer. Initially there were premature conclusions that were drawn as to where the epidemic started, etc. We think to some extent it is irrelevant now. What we know for certain is that the epidemic right now is having the worst impact on central and southern Africa. We are not certain as to the reasons, but one of the reasons is that it started spreading quietly before anyone knew there was an epidemic, before we even had a test for HIV. There may be several factors as to why it spread more quickly there: One could be simply historical, that it was spreading before we knew. The second is because of the high prevalence of sexually transmitted disease, and the third could be behavior, because of multiple sexual partners in some cultures.

However, in the last two to three years, the epidemic is spreading the fastest in Thailand and India, and again some of the same factors operate there. But one of the things I would like to emphasize in addition to the three major approaches that I have outlined—STDs, condoms, and behavior change—our program over the last four to five years has decided to focus not only on these three approaches, but also on a few countries and make sure that we have a considerable impact on this epidemic. And the new program we have, AIDS Control and Prevention (AIDSCAP), is going to focus on about 15 countries in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia and try and spend most of our resources in these areas to make a change.

We have learned a lot about the virus and how the disease spreads in the last six or seven years. We know more than enough to try and slow down the epidemic, but we need to share that information more and we need to spend the bulk of our efforts in stopping the epidemic. ■

|| SOMALIA || BY PETER BILES

# ANARCHY



# RULES

Thousands of people have died in fighting between the two warlords battling for control of Somalia's capital, Mogadishu. And thousands more throughout the country are at risk of starvation, even as the United Nations, after protracted negotiations with the warring factions, finally managed to deliver a shipload of food in May.

**T**he traffic policeman cut a striking figure in his khaki uniform and blue beret. Stationed at the busy "Kilometre 5" intersection in the south of Mogadishu, he symbolized a yearning for normalcy. After months of artillery bombardment and lethal street battles between rival clans in Mogadishu, here was a man who had returned to his job, to work voluntarily, intent on bringing some order to a chaotic and devastated city.

But anarchy lurks around every street corner in Mogadishu. And with only a whistle, the policeman struggled in vain to control the flow of traffic. Pick-up trucks and jeeps mounted with rocket launchers and anti-aircraft guns, driven by crazed United Somali Congress (USC) fighters, weaved dangerously between the decrepit buses and the battered four-wheel-drive aid agency vehicles. Hundreds of Somalis thronged the nearby street market, adding to the congestion as they argued and fought over bundles of *qat*, a stimulant chewed in vast quantities throughout the Horn of Africa.

However, a ray of hope has begun to flicker in the famine-stricken Somali capital after the distribution of the first shipment of emergency food aid in nearly six months. But relief officials have nevertheless renewed their appeals for aid to Somalia, in a desperate attempt to stave off mass starvation.

Against all the odds, the United Nations safely unloaded 5,000 tons of wheat in Mogadishu in May and transported the consignment across the divided city where different Hawiye sub-clans exercise control over their respective fiefdoms.

At the same time, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had positioned ships off the Somali coast, and was bringing food ashore on beaches from where it was distributed to the hungry people of Mogadishu.

Months of bitter fighting between USC factions in Mogadishu prevented relief food from reaching the capital until the re-opening of the port at the beginning of May. During the height of the conflict, shelling of the harbor had forced two ships carrying relief food to turn back.


Even in the years when peace prevailed in Mogadishu, Somalia could never produce enough to feed its own people, and large quantities of food have always had to be imported. So the port is considered vital to the latest relief effort.

The arrival of food came two months after the power-hungry warlords—interim president, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, and the USC chairman, Gen. Mohamed Farah Aidid—signed a ceasefire agreement, brokered by the United Nations.

Many Somalis became angered by the UN's slow response to the severe food shortage, blaming the world body for the onset of famine. But according to the UN,

*Peter Biles reports for the BBC and The Guardian (London) from East Africa.*

July / August 1992



the delivery of food had involved "round-the-clock negotiations" with the various groups in Mogadishu. Food is the most valuable commodity in the Somali capital, and easily outstrips the worthless Somali shilling as a form of currency.

When the UN-charted vessel—*Felix*—finally docked on May 3, a three-meter-high security wall of steel containers was erected in the harbor with a single gateway to allow trucks to enter. The vehicles then began the hazardous task of moving the food across the city. Trucks driven by Ali Mahdi's men were escorted to the frontline by guards provided by Gen. Aidid.

"For the moment, the leaders are conscious of the gravity of the situation, and I don't think they can take the risk of resuming hostilities," observed Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, the special representative of the UN secretary-general.

But Sahnoun added that more food must be sent to Somalia without delay. "The provision of humanitarian assistance and the maintenance of the ceasefire are closely linked. We need both at the same time. People are in terrible need of food and medical assistance, and if we fail to address that situation, it will certainly worsen and there might be a flare-up of hostilities," he warned.

The newly appointed UN envoy to Somalia has taken up residence in Mogadishu, re-establishing a permanent UN presence in Somalia for the first time since UN staff were evacuated from Mogadishu shortly before the fall of President Siad Barre in January 1991.

While the fragile ceasefire brought an end to the shelling of Mogadishu by the forces of Ali Mahdi and Aidid, it did little to reduce the level of despair and suffering. The death toll continued to climb, no longer because of war injuries, but as a result of starvation.

As crowds of mothers and children flocked to the emergency feeding centers each morning, the scene rekindled memories of the great Ethiopian famine in 1984-85. A five-year-old boy tugged at my sleeve. He pinched the loose skin on his arm to illustrate the extent of his malnutrition, and held out his hands in a plea for help.

Uncharacteristically, the mothers' voices were raised in anger as they demanded to be admitted to the feeding centers.

"We've been feeding two or three times the number of children that our feeding centers were designed for," said David Shearer, field director of Save The Children Fund. "When a mother places a starving child in front of our eyes, it's a very difficult thing to say: 'Sorry, we're full at the moment,' and turn them away, so we will continue to feed as long as we possibly can."

"The difference from the Ethiopian famine is that the people who are dying of hunger here are often hidden behind walls and inside buildings, rather than in large camps," Shearer added.

Immediately before the re-opening of Mogadishu's port and the arrival of the first UN relief ship, hundreds of people were reported to be dying of starvation every

## IT GOES AGAINST THE GRAIN FOR HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS, BUT ARMED PRO- TECTION HAS BECOME A WAY OF LIFE IN MOGADISHU.

day. "We're facing severe hunger," complained one Somali woman. "The situation is so bad that we're on the point of eating one another."

In a feeding center in the district of Wadajir, the body of a 50-year-old man was being wrapped in a white shroud in preparation for burial. "We don't know who this man was," said Ali Iid,

the feeding supervisor. "He was brought in off the street in a wheelbarrow. We fed him Unimix [a high-protein nutrient] for five days, but we couldn't save him."

People have even been starving to death in the nearby Benadir Hospital where the operating theaters and corridors were awash with the blood of war victims just a few months ago. In the hospital grounds, several hundred displaced people, mainly from Kismayo and Baidoa in southern Somalia, were camped under the trees in conditions of such squalor as to make a Horn of Africa refugee camp look distinctly welcoming.

Dhubow Hussein Aden described how he had traveled with his seven children to Mogadishu in order to escape fighting in the Gedo region. It became a fruitless search for food and shelter. "We don't know where to go now. We can only sit here," he said.

One of Save The Children's relief nurses, Gay Harper, commented: "There's a lot of despair. People are tired and hungry. They've lost everything. Some have only the clothes they're standing in. And we simply can't feed all of them, so we're just having to watch them die." The mass of simple unmarked graves which now lines the sandy streets bears testimony to the tragic loss of life.

Incredibly, many family structures in Mogadishu have remained intact, despite the upheaval caused by the political turmoil, bloodshed, and famine since Siad Barre was overthrown. "If one person is working, or has some money or food, he shares it not just with the immediate family, but with the extended family. So what might suffice for a family of four is shared among as many as 20 or 30 people," explained Gay Harper.

As mountains of rubbish pile up in the streets of Mogadishu, women and children daily forage through the debris like vultures picking clean a carcass.

After the months of artillery exchanges in Mogadishu, many buildings in the central areas have been reduced to rubble. Parts of the capital now resemble Hargeisa in northern Somalia. Hargeisa was almost totally destroyed in 1988 when it was bombed by the MiG fighters of Siad Barre's air force after Somali National Movement (SNM) rebels attacked the town.

A Somali aid worker revealed what little was left of Mogadishu as he unconsciously lapsed into the past tense, while pointing out some of the city's landmarks. "That was the American embassy...this was the pasta factory...that was the fairground."

The gunfire has largely abated, but the residents of Mogadishu have become desensitized by the fighting and the violence. Now they hardly flinch when a shot is fired nearby.

Close to the front-line of the Mogadishu conflict where Gen. Aidid's fighters are separated from Ali Mahdi's forces by a no-man's land of no more than a few hundred yards, the streets are almost deserted. Despite the ceasefire, it remains one of the most dangerous areas of the city.

Staff of international aid agencies, who are the few people prepared to run the gauntlet, now make little secret of their need to carry heavily armed guards on all their vehicles. It goes against the grain for humanitarian organizations, which pride themselves on their neutrality, but armed protection has become an essential way of life in Mogadishu. With flags flying, the aid workers also prefer to drive in convoy to deter the gangs of looters who roam Mogadishu.

A joint report by Africa Watch and Physicians for Human Rights estimates that 14,000 people were killed and 27,000 wounded in Mogadishu between November 1991 and February 1992 as Ali Mahdi and Aidid battled for control of the city. "The carnage inflicted upon the civilian population by indiscriminate use of weapons of extraordinary force and by the failure on all sides to abide by minimum standards of international humanitarian law has earned Mogadishu a special place in the annals of human cruelty," said the report.

"It's a miracle that we've been able to maintain the ceasefire without a UN monitoring unit," admitted the UN envoy, Mohamed Sahnoun, after his initial visit to Mogadishu. But he promised that 50 UN ceasefire observers would be sent to Mogadishu.

However, the proposed deployment of 500 UN military personnel to protect relief convoys has proved to be far more controversial. Ali Mahdi has welcomed such UN intervention, but Aidid has repeatedly expressed his opposition to the presence of an armed UN force.

The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) recently said that the insecurity in Somali had resulted in "an almost total lack of food" in the country. The WFP expressed the hope that the arrival of the first UN ship in Mogadishu would mean that regular relief shipments could be delivered to Mogadishu. But the WFP pointed out that food distribution outside the capital remained difficult.

Fighting raged in southern Somalia in April and May as Aidid's USC forces went in pursuit of Siad Barre who had been living in the remote Gedo region since he was ousted from power in Mogadishu.

After repelling an advance by Siad Barre on Mogadishu, Aidid forced the former dictator and about

2,000 supporters to flee across the border into neighboring Kenya.

A rare opportunity for Somalis to express euphoria: Minutes after the BBC World Service broadcast confirmation of Barre's flight in its Somali language program on April 29, celebratory gunfire echoed around Aidid's headquarters in the south of Mogadishu.

Siad Barre was given temporary asylum by the Kenyan authorities, and moved into a luxury hotel in Nairobi. But a Kenyan newspaper revealed that the former president and his family were running up a hotel bill in excess of \$2,000 a day. A local columnist, Kwendo Opanga, wrote: "While his countrymen who fled to Kenya are flooding the refugee camps where many of them have died, are sick, are hungry, and know not what the immediate future holds for them, Siad Barre and his retinue of relatives and sycophants stay in a presidential suite at the Safari Park Hotel...this is obscene. This is an insult to the people of Somalia and a shame to Africans. Kenyans should not give sanctuary and succor to this dictator."

Some Kenyan members of Parliament, also angered by Siad Barre's presence in the country, demanded his immediate expulsion. After more than two weeks in Nairobi, the Kenyan government organized Siad Barre's departure for Nigeria where President Ibrahim Babangida, the current chairman of the Organization of African Unity, also offered temporary asylum.

Meanwhile, Siad Barre's son-in-law, Gen. Said Hersi Morgan, who had been in control of the southern Somali coastal town of Kismayo, was also defeated by USC forces. Under Siad Barre's regime, Morgan, a skilled U.S.-trained soldier, had served as both defense minister and army commander. He had earned a reputation for being totally ruthless, not least for his role in overseeing the destruction of Hargeisa in 1988.

Somalia, a country of nomadic pastoralists, is like a wasteland after the cataclysmic events of recent years. Flying over southern Somalia en route to Mogadishu, I glimpsed a large irrigation scheme on the Juba River. This was once the country's principal agricultural region, a powerful engine helping to drive an impoverished Third World economy. But the irrigation plant, now deserted, and almost certainly looted and wrecked, was an eerie sight. The only visible movement from the air being the swirling muddy water of the Juba snaking its way toward the Indian Ocean.

The world can provide short-term humanitarian aid to Somalia, but it cannot rebuild a nation that appears set on a path of self-destruction. National reconciliation is proving more and more elusive, if not impossible, especially since northern Somalia, the self-proclaimed independent republic of Somaliland, has also been experiencing a new upsurge of clan warfare and chaos.

Since Siad Barre was forced to flee Mogadishu in January last year, the "USC—Guul [Victory]" slogans daubed across the capital have begun to fade. So too have the hopes of a hungry and increasingly desperate population. ○

# PARTY POLITICS

A giant scoreboard erected in Accra's Independence Square just 100 yards from the Atlantic Ocean told the story that, after 11 years, Ghana was renewing its stormy relationship with democracy. As scores of Ghanaians sat around drinking and listening to a live band performing the West African country's rhythmic "highlife" music into the early morning hours, the scorekeepers chalked up the district-by-district results of a national referendum confirming overwhelming approval of a new multi-party constitution.

That Ghanaian voters said "yes" by at least a 10-to-1 margin in the April 28 referendum was no surprise, since both Ft.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings' Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) government, which effectively proposed the new constitution, and opposition forces campaigned for approval.

Few Ghanaians had time to study the draft constitution, which was unveiled on March 31, but its "transitional provisions" which give the PNDC a blanket amnesty for human rights abuses have sparked controversy. In the PNDC's early days, Ghanaians accused of subversion or economic sabotage were sent to ad hoc "public tribunals" which handed down long prison terms and sometimes death sentences. Human rights groups such as Amnesty International have sharply criticized the Rawlings government for the executions and for jailing dissidents without trial.

Opponents say that the new constitution's indemnity clauses show that the PNDC, on the eve of its demise, is frightened of being held accountable. "We are not against forgiveness of the faults of our military regimes," said the head of the Catholic Bishops Conference, the Rt. Rev. Francis K.A. Lodonu. "We are against legalizing criminal, illegal, and corrupt acts in our society." Former President Hilla Limann, whom Rawlings overthrew in December



Daily Graphic

1981, said the PNDC was concerned about investigations into its human rights record. "It is the blood on their hands that is worrying them," he told a press conference in Accra.

Rawlings has publicly apologized for the PNDC's excesses and has defended the indemnity clauses, saying, "They merely seek

to protect persons who in good faith carried out PNDC policies, and individuals from harassment by aggrieved tax-defaulters, economic saboteurs, and other anti-social individuals who might try to capitalize on the situation."

The return of multi-party politics to Ghana on May 18 was overshadowed by a law passed by the PNDC which banned businesses and foreigners from funding political parties and limited the size of an individual's annual contribution to 200,000 cedis or about \$500. The law also forbids the new groups from using the names or symbols of parties banned since 1981.

The opposition challenged the law in the High Court, but after several days of deliberations, Judge Kwadu Amponsem said his court had no jurisdiction over electoral laws until the new constitution takes effect on January 7, 1993. "Until the constitution officially comes into force, all laws passed by the PNDC are still valid and no individual has the right to challenge any of those laws," he said. After the ruling, the PNDC announced it was ready to compromise on the level of campaign contributions, but not on the use of past party names and insignias.

The episode pointed out the tight control the PNDC still retained over the reform process and seemed to erase any doubts that Rawlings would attempt to exchange his uniform for civilian clothes to run for president in November.

PNDC supporters had already established a fledgling political movement called the Eagle Club to further Rawlings' presidential aspirations. Other close friends were said to argue that he should retire gracefully from the scene, perhaps to return in future elections. With 11

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years in power and unlimited access to the state-run radio and television, however, Rawlings could mount a formidable campaign.

Flt.-Lt. Rawlings is perhaps most popular in the rural areas, where his government, with support from the World Bank, has brought badly needed infrastructure such as electrification, long neglected by civilian politicians who were widely regarded as elitist. His economic policies have also favored the agricultural sector and made Ghana largely self-sufficient in food production.

Business people forthrightly admit that the Rawlings government has done much to commend it, especially the imposition of a harsh free market economic program with massive budget cuts, currency devaluation, and sharp reductions in the living standards of the poor, which no civilian administration would be able to contemplate: "It is true that Rawlings has done much of the necessary dirty work that we could not do," said Nana Akuffo-Addo, a young conservative lawyer who is considering a run for the presidency. "The problem is the shotgun way he has gone about it."

Rawlings, the one-time charismatic radical turned darling of the IMF, had never shown much liking for party politics, which he maintained had led Ghana down the road of corruption and mismanagement. But as other African countries move toward multi-party politics, he bowed to pressure. Additional prodding has come from Western donors who have backed Ghana's nine-year-old structural adjustment program with an estimated \$4.2 billion in aid and soft loans. Despite massive job losses and soaring prices resulting from free market policies, the growth rate of Ghana's economy, traditionally based on cocoa and gold exports, is now the highest in sub-Saharan Africa.

The opposition is organized around two political traditions that have always dominated Ghanaian politics. The more liberal of the two is the Nkrumahist movement, followers of the late Kwame Nkrumah, the man who led Ghana to independence from Britain in 1957. But the Nkrumahists are divided into several groups, and their former belief in state intervention in the economy has been discredited. The more conservative tradition in Ghana, centering around the old United Party of Dr. Kofi Busia, prime minister from 1969-72, is far more united. This camp feels it can argue confidently that its long support for free market economics has been vindicated.

No matter how much charisma Rawlings retains from his fiery early days, many people want a change in government. "Ten years is too long for one man to be at the top," said Kofi Yankah, a 45-year-old trader in Accra. "Most people will vote yes because Ghana needs other people with good ideas to be in government."

While ordinary Ghanaians giggle at Rawlings' renowned populist touch, such as working alongside farmers to bring in the harvest or getting down and dirty to help clean sewage drains, his many opponents are sure to evoke the memories of those, including three heads of state, executed by his regime.

After taking power for the second time on December 31, 1981, Rawlings' PNDC set up Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and a system of public tribunals which the New York-based human rights group, Africa Watch, has described as "a mockery of justice."

In June 1982, three high court judges were kidnapped and executed at an army shooting range. A special inquiry into the killings recommended the prosecution of 10 people, including Rawlings' close aide, former Capt. Kojo Tsikata, who was named as the "mastermind" of the plot. Five people were prosecuted and executed, but Tsikata was not among them.

The death penalty has been widely used, culminating in at least 100 executions, to cover offenses not traditionally meriting capital punishment, such as economic sabotage, smuggling, and subversion. "Under some military governments, the number of people killed here would be a small figure, but you have to remember that Ghanaians abhor violence. To them it is a lot of people," said an observer.

The government has admitted that "excess" occurred in the early days of the Rawlings revolution, but its officials have argued that the ends justified the means. Rawlings, perhaps with an eye to the November elections, has argued in recent months that the violence could have been much worse had it not been for the restraining influence of his administration. On the 10th anniversary of the PNDC's seizure of power, the government authorized the release of 1,000 convicted criminals, and in the past three months at least 20 political detainees have been freed. Western diplomatic sources and former prisoners estimated that between 50 and 70, most of them soldiers, remained in jail. ○

Ghana will have a democratically elected government in November and its new president could be Flt.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings in a suit rather than military fatigues. After a referendum on the constitution, which saw controversy over a clause indemnifying members of the PNDC government from prosecution, political parties have been legalized. Ghanaians are gearing up for the start of campaigning—and waiting for Rawlings' decision whether or not to run.



Lansana Fofana

# THE YOUNG GUNS

A group of junior officers, fed up with low pay and poor conditions, staged a successful putsch against the bankrupt regime of President Joseph Momoh in late April. To prove they meant business, the soldiers moved to instill discipline in the government bureaucracy and named a cabinet containing a few old hands with experience in economics and foreign affairs. The officers are promising to redress a collapsed economy and restore constitutional democracy.

**L**ike a stock-in-trade device employed by a traveling company of seasoned actors, the scene has been played with a disturbing and often tragic regularity over the past three decades in West Africa's young nation-states. Angered by the incumbent regime's inability to halt a rapidly spiraling socio-economic decline, the military intervenes to stop the rot, sets up a junta, and adapts to affairs of state a command structure similar to that of an infantry brigade, in the hope that discipline will lay the foundations for sustainable development.

This time around, the theater is Sierra Leone, a land of relative plenty whose steady decline amid sustained profligacy had marked it as a good example of the failure of Africa's largely myopic, acquisitive crop of indigenous post-colonial leaders. If the ouster of Sierra Leone's incumbent All People's Congress (APC) was effected with little bloodshed (about 40 dead, mostly looters), it certainly ranked among the most dramatic of denouements in recent coup history, since what started as a purely spontaneous manifestation of junior-rank military frustration ended in the toppling of an unpopular clique indelibly associated in the public mind with the near-collapse of the country.

Except for conspiracy theorists who pointed to a method behind the apparent madness of Sierra Leone's itinerant putschists, most agree the coup began on April 29 as a protest by soldiers who rode into the capital, Freetown, firing in the air. Driven to the end of their tether by

the poor conditions under which they had been prosecuting an inconclusive 13-month war against anti-government rebels, the frontline troops cited irregular supplies, unpaid salaries, and poor logistics as reasons behind their protest.

As the protesters moved on State House, they encountered resistance from troops loyal to President Joseph Saidu Momoh—who by noon had broadcast his version of events on government-controlled radio. A “group of malcontents” had stopped employees from entering State House, asserted the media-savvy head of state, appealing for calm in a situation he insisted was under control. Renewing his one-party regime's stated commitment to returning the country to multi-party democracy, Momoh promised an update.

Few of Freetown's half-million inhabitants had time to digest Momoh's reassurances, and an official follow-up never came. Within an hour, an army captain, Valentine Strasser, interrupted the dance music on a popular, privately owned FM station to announce that Momoh's APC government had been overthrown. “Our people are suffering, our children cannot go to school, our roads are in a deplorable condition,” gasped the out-of-breath Strasser. The rest of the day was characterized by confusion and panic, with the blackout-hit city a nighttime battleground between coup loyalists and Momoh's bodyguards.

By 9 am the next morn-

*Capt. Valentine Strasser, above, led the coup which overthrew President Joseph Momoh, right*

*Far right, thousands turned out in support of the coup*

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
members had been spirited by helicopter to a safe haven in neighboring Guinea, which had provided a praetorian guard to defend the beleaguered president. Strasser commandeered the FM airwaves again to report that his men were in complete control. APC kingpins were ordered to hand themselves in to the nearest police station "in their own interest." Calling his group the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), Strasser stressed the "purely internal" nature of the coup and appealed to Nigeria and Guinea—both with troops in Sierra Leone sent in to help the anti-rebel campaign—to "respect our wishes and desires."

As dawn arrived, it became clear that the APC was indeed finished. Later in the day, Strasser broadcast an explanation for the army's action that was riddled with predictable post-military coup rhetoric—"oppressive, corrupt, exploitative bunch of crooks and traitors," "nepotism, tribalism, gross mismanagement, and total collapse of our economic, education, health, transport...systems," "tyrannic APC government," "save our country from the total catastrophe that we are rapidly heading for...." As unequivocal as it was in condemning the APC, the NPRC statement gave only a vague outline of the junta's objectives.

Strasser undertook to "ensure that the rebel incursion is brought to an immediate end and to repatriate our people to their respective homes to be followed by intensive rehabilitation and reconstruction of all areas destroyed." The NPRC spokesman also promised the composition, after the war ended, of a "broad-based committee of dedicated and committed citizens...to ensure the realization of our return to a true multi-party system of government"—a process the APC had begun under duress and with little sincerity, Strasser said. In a subsequent proclamation legalizing the NPRC, the 1978 and 1991 constitutions were suspended, Parliament dissolved, and all politics banned.

Strasser's use of the word "revolution" notwithstanding, his speech was clearly aimed at reassuring the international community that the NPRC's coup d'état was not so much a radical departure from the principles underlying the 31-year-old nation as a move to purge the society of insidious parasites who had stifled the natural tendencies of Sierra Leoneans for participatory democracy.

Peter Biles



"We are only patriotic Sierra Leoneans, most of whom happen to be soldiers fighting on the war front and who have decided to halt our country's slide into oblivion, and to set into motion a mechanism to redeem our beloved nation from the position of the least developed country in the world," Strasser explained. "As soon as we all put our hands together and set this nation on the right track to meaningful development, we shall return to our military barracks where we rightly belong."

Observers saw nothing in the NPRC's initial pronouncements to change their perception of it as nothing other than a military takeover routinely backed by the populace, especially the student community, in knee-jerk reaction to the sacking of a bankrupt regime that had long over-stayed its welcome. Shades of Ghana circa 1979, offered analysts, taking comfort in the rumor that junior officers had struck a deal with their superiors who shared their anti-APC sentiments. The general expectation was that Lt.-Col. Yaya Kanu, commander of the frontline Cobra battalion and a known campaigner for better conditions, would emerge at the head of the NPRC—despite his public denial of being party to the coup.

The naming of Capt. Strasser as NPRC chairman and secretariat boss, head of state and defense minister, soon upset that prognosis. At 27, a relative veteran, Strasser appointed a string of youthful cohorts, among them Lt. Solomon Musa, 26, as vice-chairman and Second Lt. Tom Niuma, 21, as minister for the Eastern Province, effective military governor of the country's richest region that was the staging-post of the rebels' campaign. For his presumption, Lt.-Col. Kanu found himself in Pademba Road prison along with scores of government and APC party officials.

Immediate fears about the NPRC's immaturity were summed up by a Nigerian lieutenant-colonel commanding a battalion of the West African peacekeeping force, Ecomog, in neighboring Liberia, who told *Africa Report*: "How can a group of captains and lieutenants sustain such a coup? Even Strasser himself is not married, they have no commitment, and no responsibility. Anything could happen." As if to address the issue of his Council's suitability, Strasser took a wife within a week of taking power.

If post-coup events were anything to go by, the young guns were deadly serious about their resolve to instill discipline. Lt. Musa's first act as vice-chairman was to lock the gates at 8 am on May 1 of the principal government complex, housing six ministries. Hundreds of late arrivals remained outside as Musa compiled a list of late-comers. Accustomed to deserting their posts between 2 and 4 pm to supplement their low incomes, civil servants quaked in their seats and stayed put. Musa later made an example of the country's most senior civil servant, William Jones, permanent secretary in the president's office, by suspending him indefinitely for leaving work before closing time.

Musa's action was replicated all over town in successive days as raids on houses of government officials unearthed hidden cash and valuables which soldiers displayed as ample evidence of corruption. Former Finance

Minister Hassan Bgassay Kanu was dressed in army fatigues, assigned to man a roadblock, and told his new monthly salary would be \$6 and a bag of rice—a private's pay under the APC. "While our men were dying at the war front to liberate this country from rebels, some of the government officials were busy enriching themselves with resources they plundered from the state," said Strasser.

Aside from hunting down and shaming prominent APC members—who Strasser told diplomats would be held pending the preparation of cases against them—the NPRC got down to business. Two key players in the previous regime, Finance Minister James Funna and Foreign Minister Ahmed Dumbuya, were named in the new 19-man cabinet, the former deemed indispensable because of his strong international financial connections and the latter to indicate a continuation of Sierra Leone's non-aligned, Western-leaning foreign policy.

In naming a cabinet top-heavy with army officers, some brought out of retirement and exile and almost all unfamiliar with the management of government business, Strasser however recognized that technocratic expertise was vital to his regime's credibility. Arnold Godding, a successful, wealthy, and dynamic lawyer, was brought in as justice minister and attorney-general. And the new minister of state enterprises, trade, and industry, John Karimu, is a former university lecturer who got news of his nomination while serving as country director of CUSA (Canadian Universities Service Overseas) in the Gambia.

Given the woeful state of Sierra Leone's economy, the NPRC will need all the expertise it can muster to fulfill its promise to restore the country to its former glory. Apart from an exceptionally high year of diamond production in 1986-87, gross domestic product per capita has fallen for a decade, with foreign debt estimated at \$1 billion. The state of the leone, subject to a series of largely unsuccessful devaluations since being unpegged from the pound sterling in 1978, reflects the high budget deficits and alarming increase in money supply that characterized the APC's failed attempts to keep inflation (as high as 108 percent in 1989-90) down.

Economists say part of the blame must be laid at the door of the world market, with unfavorable terms of trade progressively robbing Sierra Leone of respectable prices for its coffee, palm kernels, cocoa, and cassava. But most agree internal laxity is the main cause of the present state of affairs. Revenues from diamonds, the main export commodity, plummeted as smuggling increased unchecked (according to one source, legal exports declined from 2 million carats in 1970 to 395,000 carats in 1980, and less than 100,000 in 1990).

Finance Minister Funna, interviewed three weeks after the coup, said fiscal discipline would determine whether or not the NPRC succeeded in its social sector-centered plans for reform. "We want to do those things that will make a difference to the quality of life of the ordinary man," he said. The NPRC planned to fuel its schemes with mining revenues from diamonds, iron ore,

bauxite, and rutile, while exploiting the fisheries industry—a sign that the nation's mineral wealth is still considerable despite years of mismanagement.

The NPRC appears genuinely concerned at Sierra Leone's rating in a UN Human Development Index as number 160 of 160—the world's least developed country. Funna told journalists only 22 percent of roads were motorable, only a third of cash crops actually got sold, infant and under-five mortality rates were among the world's highest, life expectancy, at 42, was among the world's lowest, while health services and infrastructure have been in a state of decay for many years.

The NPRC is set to continue Sierra Leone's long association with the Bretton Woods institutions, which have been involved since independence in 1961. The World Bank will fund imports under a credit scheme, while Funna's retention at finance will mean the Rights Accumulation Program agreed to with the IMF shortly before the coup remains in place. Under the three-year adjustment program, Sierra Leone, hitherto disqualified from loans and grants, can accumulate drawing rights of up to \$119 million—close to its current debt to the IMF—provided it meets certain specific targets such as a reduction in inflation and cuts in government expenditure.

At the end of the period, the drawing rights will be used to pay off the country's frozen IMF debt, and Sierra Leone, by avoiding expulsion from the Fund, would become eligible for new money. As analyst Michael Chapman of the UK-based Economist Intelligence Unit explained, "Sierra Leone will benefit because once an agreement with the IMF is in place, other donors...will be happy to lend or give funds almost immediately."

Aside from the IMF and World Bank, international response to the NPRC has been encouragingly positive. U.S. State Department sources told *Africa Report* that though the issue of recognizing the new regime was de-emphasized, the U.S. embassy in Freetown would monitor the situation and resume relations in an unspecific period after thorough review. It is, however, understood that the Bush administration, grateful for the NPRC's cooperation in evacuating some 400 U.S. citizens, is impressed by the regime's first moves.

"They are saying the right things and have demonstrated they can keep control, and that's encouraging," said one insider, adding that since the former government had not been democratically elected in the first place, special economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. on regimes ousting democratically elected governments—as was the case in Haiti—did not apply to Sierra Leone.

Chief Emeka Anyaoku, Commonwealth secretary-general, reacted to the coup by urging the NPRC to "make the realization of multi-party democracy...among the highest priorities" since "any military coup d'état is a setback to the cause of democracy." And the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) pledged to work with the new administration. UNDP boss Joseph Kotta said he would not freeze the current aid program, including \$42 million destined for education and health. Some \$88 mil-

lion for a five-year program would however be held pending the NPRC's respect for human rights and progress on the return to constitutional democracy.

Nigeria was quick to insist that the NPRC maintain Sierra Leone's existing commitment to the peace-keeping operation in Liberia, which Momoh had helped initiate. Recognizing the importance to sub-regional security, the NPRC got the message and soon announced it was firmly on board the 16-member Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) peace plan for Liberia which Nigeria spearheads. This means that despite internal security concerns, the NPRC will leave Sierra Leone's 600-man Liberia contingent in place and allow the continued use of Freetown's Lungi Airport as a rear base for peacekeeping operations. Nigeria's battalion in eastern Sierra Leone, say official sources, has now been moved from a defensive position up to the frontline.

Foreign Minister Dumbuya's first shuttle mission was to Guinea, whose fear of destabilization by Liberian rebels had underscored its offer of a contingent to help Momoh's government quell the rebel incursion. Guinea, known to be aggressively against an initially touted deal between the NPRC and rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), was not keen to withdraw its battalion from Sierra Leone. Analysts say in return for being allowed to help defend the Sierra Leone/Liberia frontier, Guinea's Gen. Lansana Conté had to promise Dumbuya he would not back a counter-coup by his guest Momoh.

From his exile, the 55-year-old Momoh, a major-general on his appointment in 1985 as head of state by the retiring Siaka Stevens, will be ruing the overthrow of his government by the military which had nurtured him and which he had alienated as he surrounded himself with a sycophantic APC clique. Ironically, Stevens appointed Momoh, already an APC member, to safeguard the country from another military coup in its checkered history. As he licks his wounds, the hapless Momoh will also be mulling over the irony that his concern for sub-regional security—which won him brief popular support as he sent troops to Liberia—led to the Liberian rebel-backed RUF rebellion that cost him the presidency.

For now, galvanized into action by the zeal of the NPRC, Sierra Leoneans can only be heartened by Strasser's determination to end the rebel war (he has appealed to the international community for help and set up a war effort committee). In that the NPRC has made all the right noises—reconstituting the electoral commission to rid it of political influence and continuing voter registration—the signs are hopeful. Delivery of promises on poverty alleviation and infrastructural development are keenly awaited, while punishment is certain to be meted out to corrupt APC officials. However, no timetable has yet been announced for the countdown to elections. Only the coming months will determine whether the youthful tenure of Sierra Leone's ascendant captain and his lieutenants will end ignominiously—like so many of post-colonial Africa's military interventions—or in a precedent-setting bolstering of the ideals of democracy. ○

**H**


eld hostage during 23 years of dictatorship by Moussa Traoré's Democratic Union of Malian People (UDPM), the Malian people will not forget the young Lt.-Col. Amadou Toumani Touré, the force behind the coup which toppled Traoré in March 1991. Touré, or "ATT" as he

is affectionately called, "fulfilled his mission" to launch the country on a process of democratization. Unlike many other military coup-makers who find themselves in power and liking it, stay, Touré kept his promise to return power to civilians.

In presidential elections held April 12 and 26, Alpha Oumar Konaré, the leader of the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (*Adema*) was elected with a 69 percent majority by a modest 21 percent of eligible voters. Less than a month into the Third Republic, however, the euphoria generated by what many have called an exemplary transition to democracy has faded. The tasks facing Mali's first democratically elected president are monumental, and the expectations of the Malian people are soaring.

The charismatic Alpha Oumar Konaré inspires confidence. His record as a democrat and activist is impressive. Minister of culture under Traoré in 1978, he resigned from the Traoré government in protest in 1980. In 1983, he created the cultural cooperative "Jamana," which six years later would produce the first independent press group in Mali. In 1986, Konaré participated in the creation of the National Democratic and Popular

Betty Press



# AN EXEMPLARY

After two dozen years of dictatorship, Mali finally has a democratically elected president, Alpha Oumar Konaré, who considers himself "a man of the people." The transition to democracy was smoothed by the young soldier who overthrew Moussa Traoré (*photo*), Lt.-Col. Amadou Toumani Touré, and kept his promise to return power to civilians. The popular Touré may prove to be a tough act to follow.

Front (FNDP) which coordinated the activities of clandestine opposition parties. In 1990, Konaré co-founded Adema, the National Committee for a Democratic Initiative (CNID), and other democratic and youth movements, organized the demonstrations which resulted in the March 1991 coup d'état.

Konaré's image as "a man of the people" fueled his presidential campaign. He mobilized his militants with a borderline Marxist rhetoric. At massive rallies attended mainly by the youth, the word "*Camarades*" punctuated his speeches. Konaré's rhetoric also relies heavily on nationalism. He makes frequent allusions to the famous address given by François Mitterrand at La Baule in 1989. Konaré's stance remains that "Mali owes nothing to France."

Adema holds an absolute majority, 76 out of 116 seats, in the National Assembly. However, at the local municipal level, the party is less well represented. With its monopoly in the legislative assembly, however, other political parties have expressed their concern about "Adema hegemony," that Konaré is leading Mali toward what amounts to single-party rule. Although Konaré has proposed a "republican pact" with all political formations, many have chosen instead to form alliances among themselves within the legislative assembly.

On May 9, the representatives of 13 of the some 50 political parties which currently exist announced their intention to create a Front for the Safeguard of Democracy in Mali (FSD). The Front considers itself a "democratic opposition" watchdog against fraud in the electoral contests.

Leading the Front is Konaré's former arch-rival for the presidency, Tieoule Konate of the African Democratic Assembly (US-RDA). Although Konate received only 31 percent of the votes cast in the second round of presidential elections, he remains a committed opponent of Konaré's Adema. While the US-RDA holds only eight out of the 116 seats in the assembly, the party has significant representation at the local municipal level.

Konate's US-RDA is a solid party, with a solid plat-

forms" during the battles of March 1991—a fact that Konaré harped on during his own campaign.

Following the first round of elections, which eliminated seven of the nine presidential contenders, a "face to face" live broadcast between the remaining two candidates, Konaré and Konate, demonstrated the generation gap. Konaré floundered somewhat, several times relying on prepared texts to respond to his opponent's questions. But Konaré maintained his image as a politician with lyrical appeal. For his part, Konate, despite his austere and almost arrogant airs, projected the image of a serious candidate comfortable with his economic dossier.

Konate's popularity on voting day suffered from the divisions and disputes which have plagued his party, the US-RDA. In January, the party's congress designated him its official candidate, while another wing chose Baba Akim Haidara, violating article 11 of the party's statutes. According to the Konate camp, Haidara represents the "communist tendency" within the US-RDA. After being eliminated in the first round (he received 7.8 percent of the votes), Haidara publicly declared his support for Konaré.

Konate, his defeat imminent in the second round of voting, chose to keep a relatively low profile, focusing instead on the issue of fraud. At a modest press conference held two days before the final round, the president of the party's support committee, Hamacire N'Doure stated, "We would never accept to win by fraud."

Konate has consistently accused Adema of fraud since the beginning of the electoral contest, of buying votes, and arranging for the establishment of voting stations in areas in which the party enjoyed strong support. "I am very sorry to see that the administration and government has lost its neutrality, having been seriously infiltrated by Adema. Fraud exists not only in the system, but in their mentality as well," Konate stated shortly before the second round of presidential elections.

Other parties have also accused Adema of foul play. During the legislative elections, the Progressive Party (PSP), led by Sekene Mody Sissoko, which won no seats in the legislative elections, accused the party of fraud. The Supreme Court decided in favor

# TRANSITION

of the PSP—granting it two seats in the Assembly.

form, but, in the eyes of the young Malian electorate, a party which lacks appeal, out of step with the times.

In contrast to Alpha Konaré, Konate's personal image is far from charismatic. Son of the co-founder of the African Democratic Assembly, Mamadou Konate, his approach is pragmatic. But the average pro-Konaré Malian voter questioned at the polls was adamant that "Tieoule doesn't like the Malian people, Tieoule doesn't like Mali." True, Konate was not there "on the barri-

But most of the controversy surrounded the voting procedure for Malians abroad. In Côte d'Ivoire, voters were required to show not only their identification cards but also cards issued by the Malian consulate in Côte d'Ivoire—a regulation deemed by Konate to be a conspiracy to prevent the maximum number of people from voting. In the first round, out of the 226,433 potential voters in Côte d'Ivoire (representing two-thirds of the total voting pool abroad), only 7,522 turned out to vote (3.32 percent).

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The 45 international observers saw no fraudulent practices in their perusal of the voting stations, although some did comment on inconsistencies, intentional or otherwise, in the electoral procedure. Article 72 of the electoral code requires only that the voter verify his/her identity by presenting either an "elector's card, family ID, official identification card, or the testimony of two voters already listed in that voting station."

According to many observers, organization at the polling stations was at best rudimentary: A voter enters, presents his electoral card, takes envelope and ballot, enters the booth, where the choice takes place. But in more than a few cases, voters confused the ballot box with the waste basket.

On election day in Mali, each of the nine candidates, accompanied by his wife, queued up at the voting booths to perform his civic duty—Lt.-Col. Amadou Toumani Touré included, who, at a polling station not far from CTSP headquarters, arrived with a convoy of government cars and, unassuming in a casual gray suit, waited his turn to cast his vote.

At polling booths throughout the country, no incidents of violence were reported, but the voter turnout was remarkably low. A population which during 23 years of dictatorship had been called on only to approve a decision were, according to the director of a polling station in the northern town of Kayes, "not used to voting—some people came to the polls expecting to be paid to vote." Kessourou Sissoko, director of a voting station in Torokorobougou, Bamako, explained the even lower turnout for the second round of presidential elections: "Many didn't vote simply because their candidates were no longer on the list."

Low voter turnout or lack of organization did not worry the winner, Alpha Oumar Konaré, as he explained: "The low voter turnout does not call into question the legitimacy of the new government, it simply means that the new government has a responsibility to educate the Malian people about democracy and choice."

Despite Konaré's promises, a good number of people are skeptical. Konaré is without doubt a master of mobilization, but as one Malian businessman comments, "Alpha talks in terms of dreams, and the people need to dream with Alpha." During a press conference given the day before the elections, his opponent, Konate, declared: "It is time for the Malian people to wake up...."

What purpose does multi-party democracy serve in a country which does not have the means to translate this democracy at the economic and social levels? A crisis continues to exist at the heart of the Malian education system. University teachers, grouped in a number of unions, boycotted classes in April and May in protest against non-payment of two trimesters of overtime pay. The National Union of Higher Education (SNESUP) and the National Education Federation (FEN) have demanded an adjustment of salaries to correspond with the cost of living, payment of back salaries, and seniority. At the

time, the prime minister of the transitional government, Soumana Sako, warned striking teachers that their demands "must not exceed the reality of the government's budgetary resources."

Strikes by teachers were followed on April 15 by a march organized by students on the ministry of education demanding the resumption of classes suspended since April 6. Only days after the election of the new president, high school and university students voiced concern about their future in view of the serious unemployment problem. The National Union of Malian Workers (UNTM) threatened to call an unlimited general strike on May 8 demanding pay increases, but called it off following an agreement between the government and the union.

Also worrisome for the new government, whose platform rests on the idea of national unity, is the continuing Tuareg rebellion in the northern regions of the country. On April 11, a national reconciliation pact was signed in Bamako between the Azawad United Movements and Fronts and the government, intended to bring a halt to the Tuareg rebellion, which has cost hundreds of lives during the past two years. The essential terms of the pact: the development of the Tuareg-inhabited northern areas and the incorporation of Tuareg militia into the Malian army.


Although intended to lay the foundations for sub-regional integration, the pact remains extremely fragile. According to the independent weekly *Les Echos*, violence broke out on May 13 and 14 in the northern region of Gossi, where rebel Tuaregs killed four people. In reprisal, 11 Tuaregs, eight of whom worked for a Norwegian NGO, were executed by Malian troops. The Azawad People's Movement (MPA) has accused the local Malian authorities of orchestrating the attacks and has criticized the government for failing to ensure the security of Tuaregs returning from Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso, Algeria, and Libya. Dissidence within the Tuareg movement risks compromising the peace process.

From June 4, attention was focused, however, on the long-awaited trial of Moussa Traoré and 32 members of the defunct UDPM for "blood crimes." A trial for economic crimes will follow. Student movements and the CNID have threatened to react if Traoré and members of his government don't receive an "exemplary sentence." The Malian government has assured these organizations and the families of the victims of the bloody repression in March that their interests will be defended.

Malians await not only vindication for the price paid for democracy, but also a return on the promises made by their new president. The confidence inspired by the democratic soldier, "ATT," may be hard for the new civilian government to match. Many fear that the transition period should have lasted longer in order to guarantee that democracy takes hold in Mali. The young Touré may have retired from the political scene, but if things go wrong, it's not inconceivable that he would be the man that the Malian people turn to for help. ○

# THE TUAREG REBELLION

The Berber-speaking Tuaregs of northern Mali rebelled against the authorities two years ago with small-scale attacks on government targets. The violence escalated, with Malian soldiers carrying out massacres of entire Tuareg villages. Many Tuaregs have since fled Mali, some 35,000 seeking refuge in Mauritania. A tenuous ceasefire was signed in April, but it will take political goodwill on both sides to induce the Tuaregs to return home.



**I**n a remote part of the Mauritanian Sahara about 40 miles from the border with Mali lies the village of Bassikounou. This collection of low mud houses was once a small hamlet, home to several hundred people. But with the arrival of thousands of Tuareg and Arab refugees who fled over the border from Mali, the population has increased by about tenfold.

The refugee camp at Bassikounou is one of three in the border area. From the far edge of the village, a sea of white canvas stretches out into the desert. These sturdy tents were provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and each houses about

six people. But there are signs that UNHCR has been unable to keep pace with the arrivals. Dotted among the tents are many cruder shelters, animal skins, and sackcloth draped over sticks knocked into the ground.

The refugees are the victims of a long-running dispute between the Malian government and the Berber-speaking Tuaregs. The Tuaregs' nomadic lifestyle makes them

John Isaac/JIN

different from the sedentary black population, and this has led to conflict between the two ethnic groups. Since independence in 1960, the Tuaregs have aspired to autonomy for the north of the country, a region known to them as Azawad.

Over the years there have been isolated outbreaks of violence, but recent climatic and economic changes have combined with ancient rivalries to aggravate the situation. The Tuaregs are dependent on raising livestock, and the drought which hit the region in the 1970s and 1980s undermined their livelihood, forcing them to appeal to the authorities for help. This crisis coincided with the collapse of oil prices in 1985. Thousands of Tuaregs working in the oil sector in Libya lost their jobs and were sent home, putting a further strain on the local economy.

The situation exploded in June 1990, when Tuareg rebel groups, operating under names such as the Popular Movement of Azawad, started carrying out small-scale attacks on government targets. Abandoning their camels for four-wheel drive vehicles and their sabers for Kalashnikovs, the rebels started to inflict losses on the government. The authorities responded by declaring a state of emergency in the north of the country and labeling the rebels as separatist groups.

The situation in the north of Mali was watched with concern by neighboring countries, such as Niger, Algeria, and Libya, which have their own Tuareg minorities. This accounts for the offer by Algiers to mediate in the conflict between the Malian government and rebels. An agreement signed in Tamanrasset in January 1991 seemed to herald the end of this bitter racial conflict.

Under the terms of the accord, Mali agreed to withdraw troops from the region and grant the Tuaregs greater autonomy. But when Malian President Moussa Traoré was overthrown two months later, the new government rescinded on the agreement, accusing the Tuaregs of supporting the former ruler. What followed was a spiral of escalating violence.

Government troops responded to rebel attacks by carrying out raids on Tuareg villages, ostensibly to flush out any military elements that might be in hiding. But these raids regularly turned into full-scale massacres, with soldiers shooting the entire male population of the village. In parallel with these operations, the Malian army instigated attacks in the north by the local black population on their lighter-skinned neighbors. This tactic proved highly effective, since not only did these blacks know the whereabouts of Tuareg settlements, but in many cases they were also trusted by the villagers.

This daily terror led thousands of Tuaregs and Arabs to leave their homes and flee across vast tracts of desert to neighboring countries. About 35,000 have taken shelter in Mauritania, where they are putting a strain on the country's already weak economy.

The population of the camp at Bassikounou is predom-

inantly made up of women and children who lost their husbands and fathers in the government raids. Most of the women are dressed in rough black cloth, although some of the newer arrivals wear colorful dresses. Their meeting place is a large brown tent in the middle of the camp. They sit on the ground, with crying babies clinging to their clothes or crawling around in the dirt beside them.

Safi comes from Lerneb, a Tuareg settlement about 50 miles from the border with Mauritania. She lost most of her family when government troops attacked her village, including her sister, who was shot dead in front of her. "I was terrified," she said. "I took my two children and fled. I didn't have time to take anything else with me. We crossed the desert with nothing to eat or drink. That's why my children are sick now."

Safi has struck up a friendship with Okha, a widow with three young children. She is from Goundam, a major center in the north of Mali. She is pessimistic about the future of her country, and believes the government wants to wipe out the Tuareg and Arab population. "The troops hunt us like animals," she said. "Whenever they see a Tuareg, they kill him. It makes no difference whether it is a man, a woman, or a baby."

The children at Bassikounou are thin with gaunt faces. Dressed in rags or naked, the stronger ones roam around the camp, while the others lie in the shade, too weak to move.

Twelve-year-old Mohamed has an appealing smile and a helpful manner. But the bullet he wears on a leather thong around his neck tells another story. His father was killed in a government raid on his village, and Mohamed hopes the bullet will protect him from the same fate.

Having escaped the troops, the children are now threatened by disease. The International Committee of the Red Cross and several French humanitarian organizations, such as Médecins sans Frontières, are organizing the delivery of relief supplies to the camp. But resources are stretched by epidemics of whooping cough, measles, and diarrhea which have claimed hundreds of lives. As long as there are not enough medicines, the children will continue to die.

After health and nutrition, education is the most pressing concern at Bassikounou. Ahmed Ag Hammama, the camp coordinator, was a teacher before he was forced to flee his home. Not only does the makeshift school lack basic teaching materials such as paper and pencils, but it is also at the center of a political dispute between two relief agencies—one Western, one Muslim—involved with the camp.

"The agencies disagree over what language the children should be taught in," Ag Hammama explains. "One wants the school to use French, while the other argues it should use Arabic."

The Tuareg men are instantly recognizable by their turbans and traditional sky-blue robes. But the shortage of water at the camp means the cloth is ingrained with the stains of work and past meals.

*Jacky Rowland is the BBC's North Africa correspondent and a regular contributor to The Guardian (London) and National Public Radio.*

Salek Ould Sidi Ali speaks three languages, and proudly tells visitors that he is a former pupil at the Franco-Arab school in Timbuktu. He has been at the refugee camp in Bassikounou for almost a year.

"When the government troops arrived at my village, they said they had come to protect shopkeepers from looting by the rebels," he said. Salek became suspicious when all the men in the village were summoned to a "meeting" in the schoolyard. "As soon as I heard the first gunshot, I leaped through a window and fled," he said.

Toward the end of last year, Algeria re-launched its efforts to bring the conflict to an end. A series of delicate negotiations followed, culminating in a draft peace plan signed by the Malian government and a number of rebel groups in January. The two sides agreed to a provisional ceasefire and have an undertaking to exchange


Toumani Touré, "but it is an important step toward achieving lasting peace."

But the refugee Tuaregs at Bassikounou remained skeptical. "The peace plan won't work," said Salek Ould Siki Ali. "Our side will respect the ceasefire, but we don't trust the government."

The irony of this remark became clear in May, when dissident rebels launched a series of attacks at Gossi, Nampala, and Lere in the region of Timbuktu. In one raid, the rebels killed five people, including the local police chief and a government official.

The incidents have been condemned by both the government and the main rebel groups, who described the attacks as "the work of armed individuals fearing neither God nor man." The two sides agreed to set up mixed patrols to police the north of the country.

The uncertainty surrounding the National Pact means



prisoners and end attacks on civilians. Parallel with the ceasefire, a joint commission was set up to look into the causes of the fighting.

But any optimism generated among the refugees at Bassikounou by this progress was shattered by the arrival at the camp of Maria, a pregnant young widow. Three weeks after the ceasefire came into effect, government troops raided her village near Timbuktu, setting fire to houses and shooting the men. Maria was the only villager to reach Bassikounou.

"I escaped through the desert," she said. "I didn't know where I was going, but I kept on walking. Along the way I saw dead bodies—people who didn't make it."

After repeated delays and accusations about ceasefire violations, the peace agreement between the government and the main rebel groups, known as the National Pact, was signed on April 11, and the two sides exchanged prisoners. "This is perhaps not the best possible solution," said the then Malian head of state, Lt.-Col. Amadou


*Tuaregs are dependent on raising livestock, and the drought which bit the region in the 1970s and 1980s undermined their livelihood*

that the Tuareg refugees in Mauritania are in no hurry to return home. Failed agreements and broken promises in the past have made them cautious, and they say they have no reason to believe this time will be any different. The refugees at Bassikounou claim that at least 60 Tuaregs were killed by government troops in the early weeks of the ceasefire.

The Touré government in Mali appeared to want the peace agreement to work. At the beginning of June, Touré visited the northern provinces, where he underlined the need to preserve the National Pact, but it will take more than an agreement on paper to persuade the Tuaregs to return home. They know their fate lies in the hands of Mali's rulers. The Tuaregs do not only rely on the good will of the government at the time to enforce the peace agreement, but on the willingness of subsequent rulers to go along with it. The Tuaregs fear that a shift in the political tide in Mali could reverse all their gains and they could once again find themselves at the mercy of the black majority. ○


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**THE FLAWED**



The last months in office before President Ibrahim Babangida turns over his military government to civilians are shaping up as a real headache. In the north of Nigeria, there are ethnic clashes; in the south, people are hurting from the harsh measures taken to restructure the economy. Perhaps worst of all for the return to democracy, the government has systematically repressed dissidents, undermining the democratic principles which are supposed to govern the transition to civilian rule.

# P

resident Ibrahim Babangida's last six months in office look to be the most difficult ever. Anti-poverty riots in the south and ethnic clashes in the north appear to have thrown down an unprecedented challenge to the transition to civilian rule program which is scheduled to usher an elected government into power in January 1993.

More than ever before, calls for the resignation of Gen. Babangida have multiplied and the reputation of his seven-year-old military government has reached an all-time low. The prime culprit in the growing crisis is the poor state of the economy, which has seen inflation soar since the March 5 devaluation of the naira from 10.5 to 18.6 to the U.S. dollar. Prices for basic necessities have risen by at least 50 percent. A panel set up by Lagos Governor Michael Otedola, headed by Chief Alade Shonubi, said the May riots in Nigeria's biggest city and commercial center were caused by "serious unemployment, fear of insecurity, astronomical food prices, and the paralytic urban transportation problem."

Negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on a new one-year standby agreement reached a critical stage, and success was key to Nigeria's efforts to reschedule a substantial part of its \$30 billion foreign debt. While the IMF and Western creditors are demanding that Nigeria balance its budget—the deficit is currently running at 10 percent of gross domestic product—demands for wage increases and monies for the voter registration and primaries and elections at the end of the year put heavy pressure on the government's coffers. The only quick way to cover the budget gap—removing the fuel subsidy which makes Nigerian petrol, at the equivalent of 16 U.S. cents a gallon, the cheapest in the world—had become politically impossible.

"Fellow Nigerians: Today I speak to you with a heavy heart," Babangida said in a nation-wide address on May 26 in the wake of riots in Lagos and clashes between the mainly Christian Kataf people and the Muslim Hausas in the northern state of Kaduna which claimed at least 300 lives. The speech had been much anticipated—given the events of the previous few weeks—but it proved to be a disappointment. While appealing to Nigerians to halt the violence, Babangida warned that his government would take all necessary steps, including emergency powers, to ensure that the unrest was stopped.

Babangida said his government would take both "offensive and defensive" measures against opponents and promised that the administration would not be "bullied, through illegal action, to abandon the path of planned economic and political progress." He pledged to "crack down on all persons, associations, and groups that seek to either derail the transition program or destabilize the nation."

*Karl Maier is the West Africa correspondent of The Independent of London and contributes to The Washington Post.*

The promised crackdown had already begun a week earlier. On May 19, the government banned all ethnic, religious, and regional associations that have been organizing support for specific candidates in the national assembly and presidential elections later this year and threatened offenders with jail terms.

That same day, 200 armed police and security agents detained the human rights activist Dr. Beko Ransome-Kuti from his home in Lagos at 4:15 am. Fellow activist Baba Omojola and lawyer Femi Falana were also arrested. All three are prominent members of the Campaign for Democracy, an alliance of human rights and student groups, which has called for Babangida's immediate resignation and the holding of a national conference to lead Nigeria to civilian rule. Three days after the president's nation-wide address, Chief Gani Fawehinmi, a staunch government critic who was leading a team of lawyers seeking court action for the release of Ransome-Kuti and Omojola, was himself picked up by security agents.

After initially ignoring numerous calls by the high courts in Lagos to produce the detainees, the government finally presented them in a court in Gwagwadala in central Nigeria on June 15. Lagos High Court Justice Francis Owobiyi, angry with the government for failing to produce Ransome-Kuti on June 3, had said, "It is recognized that law is no respecter of persons. In a country where the rule of law operates, court orders must be obeyed." Dr. Olu Onagoruwa, who took over leading Ransome-Kuti's team of lawyers after Chief Fawehinmi's arrest, said that "by refusing to obey the order of court, the government is breaking the law of the land." Ransome-Kuti is challenging the legality of his detention and suing the government for about \$800,000 in damages.

"If the government thinks it can divert attention from the ongoing social protests enveloping the country by arresting patriots, it is simply engaging in self-deceit," said a statement from the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CDHR). "We therefore call on the Nigerian people to rise up with us to terminate the Babangida regime without further delay."

The Babangida government, which came to power in 1985, has strongly defended its human rights record as one of the best in Africa. It has argued that the use of military decrees and its tight control over the emerging electoral process were necessary to ensure a stable transition to civilian rule. But the recent crackdown was sure to damage an already soiled reputation.

On April 21, the U.S.-based human rights group, Africa Watch, charged that human rights abuses and the military government's lack of respect for democratic principles are undermining Nigeria's transition to civilian rule. Africa Watch, in a 29-page newsletter, said Babangida's government "continued to hold itself above the law and to deny justice to its critics." It criticized the use of secret trials and military decrees, and accused the government of refusing to allow human rights activists, unions, students, and the press to express their views freely. In its most recent action against the press, the gov-

ernment closed The National Concord media house for three weeks on April 9, alleging that it was undermining the security of the state.

The Africa Watch report, entitled "The Transition Moves Ahead But Human Rights Abuses Continue as 'Democracy' Nears," followed an equally critical report published on April 13 by a prominent Nigerian human rights group, the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CDR), which accused the security forces of involvement in torture and extrajudicial killings.

Africa Watch praised the government's recent moves to release detained relatives of suspects wanted in connection with an aborted coup attempt in April 1990.

Nevertheless, the government's decision to postpone the hand-over to civilians from October 1, 1992 to January 2, 1993, to abandon the secret ballot in favor of the "open ballot" system, and to create nine new states last year, had alienated many Nigerians from the political process, the report said. As a result, Africa Watch warned, the new civilian government would be vulnerable to future army coups.

Despite its criticisms, however, Africa Watch urged Nigerians to be "patient with the flawed government they will inherit and to work through democratic means to encourage a future in which stable, civilian governments succeed each other."

The CDHR, in its 1991 annual report, accused the security forces of using torture and being involved in 27 instances of extrajudicial killings during the year. "Torture has become an institutionalized method employed by the security agencies in the country, particularly the Nigerian police, to extract confessional statements from detained suspects," the CDHR report said. Complaints by human rights groups about torture cases, the 42-page report said, "are met with disturbing silence and more often with outright contempt, leaving us with no other impression than that torture is a state policy in Nigeria."

While the Lagos riots and the criticisms of the human rights groups had become major irritants to the government, it was the Kaduna clashes that gave most cause for alarm. The fighting began in the town of Zango-Kataf, about 75 miles southeast of Kaduna city, where the Katafs have become increasingly militant in recent years against what they see as domination by the more numerous Hausas. Fighting erupted on May 15 in the town, the scene of a small clash on February 6 in which an estimated 100 people were killed.

Two days later, when Hausa casualties from Zango-Kataf reached Kaduna city, the traditional political capital of the mainly Muslim north, the violence took on an increasingly religious flavor. At least three Christian preachers were killed, several churches were burned and the Islamic conference center, the Jemaa Hasir Islam, was ransacked.

The Kataf-Hausa conflict is similar to the continuing war between the Tivs and Jukuns in the remote eastern state of Taraba, where an estimated 5,000 people have died in seven months of fighting. Both disputes center on land and political power. During British colonial rule, the Jukuns in Taraba and the Hausas in the Zango-Kataf in southern Zaria remained politically dominant because their leaders, the Jukuns' Aka Uka and the Hausas' Emir of Zaria, were chosen to be the effective administrators in the British system of indirect rule, with the Tivs and Katafs feeling like second-class citizens.

Such ethnic disputes riddle Nigeria's volatile Middle Belt region, where Islam and Christianity clashed 150 years ago and where minority ethnic groups were dominated either by neighboring peoples or the majority Hausas. As a result, an increasingly vocal Middle Belt Forum has emerged. The Forum, officially banned last month along with other ethnic and religious organizations, supports the presidential candidacy of Jerry

Gana, a Christian from Niger state who formerly headed the Directorate for Social Mobilization, in the December elections. Gana appears set, with former Lagos governor Lateef Jakande as his running mate, to form an alliance in the Social Democratic Party between the Middle Belt and the Yorubas of western Nigeria against what is viewed as the party of the Islamic Caliphate based in Sokoto, the National Republican Convention.

In early June, the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) announced the removal of two powerful northerners from the cabinet, Finance Minister Alhaji Abubakar Alhaji, and Petroleum Minister Jibril Aminu, as well as the sacking of

several top officials of the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC). Aminu, whose NNPC had been widely blamed for the severe fuel shortage which sparked the riots in Lagos in early May, resigned "voluntarily." Alhaji has been sent to become high commissioner in London.

The AFRC also announced what it described as a welfare package, which included benefits for federal employees, staff at the nation's troubled universities, and a \$50 million job creation plan for the swelling ranks of the unemployed. Yet the package did little to address the concerns of ordinary Nigerians and its huge cost appeared set to spark another round of inflation.

The president of the banned National Association of Nigerian Students, Mayegun Olusegun, a 24-year-old philosophy student, headed the peaceful student protests on May 13 which degenerated into widespread rioting and looting in Lagos. He predicted that the next six months would be "full of turmoil" and even worse if the detained human rights activists were harmed. "They had better be okay when they come out, or this country will burn." ○

**BABANGIDA  
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D

emocratization in Africa has been a mixed blessing for the press. While many countries are succumbing to national and international pressure to adopt multi-party systems, freedom of expression continues to be circumscribed. The wave of political change has been accompanied by

the emergence of an outspoken independent print media, but many governments continue to retaliate against journalists and publications they believe threaten their diminishing hold on power.

In 1991, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) documented an increase in the number of attacks against journalists in Africa over previous years. This increase reflects, at least in part, a transition from largely state-controlled to privately owned print media. In short, many African governments are attempting to hold back a press that has taken the forefront in promoting political change.

CPJ, a New York-based organization that researches and protests violations of press freedom, documented 302 cases of attacks against journalists and media in North Africa (excluding Egypt and Libya) and sub-Saharan Africa.

The Committee chronicled more cases in Africa in 1991 than in any other region. These are detailed in *Attacks on the Press 1991*, a report released by CPJ in March, which documents 1,264 violations of press freedom worldwide. *Attacks on the Press* lists 30 African countries in which 91 journalists were subject to short- or long-term detentions, 46 were prosecuted, 19 publications were banned, and 71 issues of publications were confiscated. More publications were banned and more issues were confiscated in Africa than in any other region. More journalists were detained in Africa than in any other region, except for the Middle East. At least 26 journalists were in detention at the time of writing.

These figures are by no means all-inclusive. Many more incidents were not reported to the Committee, while others were difficult or impossible to confirm. Wars, coups, or coup attempts in Chad, Somalia, and Togo, for example, made it difficult for CPJ to gather information.

In recent years, political transitions in Africa have varied widely, making it difficult for the Committee to draw a single conclusion about press freedom. While South African journalists, for example, can write freely about the opposition since the four-year state of emergency was lifted in 1990 and the government can no longer ban or seize publications, Liberian journalists are resuscitating a media which was decimated during the civil war.

*Kim Brice is associate for Africa on the Committee to Protect Journalists in New York.*

Overall, cases that the Committee was able to document provide evidence that leaders like Cameroon's Paul Biya and Rwanda's Maj.-Gen. Juvénal Habyarimana, who claim to support freedom of the press, have not fulfilled their promises. Radio and television remain almost exclusively under government control and print journalists, who are more openly exposing abuses of power and privilege, continue to be imprisoned and their publications shut down. These obstacles not only put into question leaders' commitments to democratization, they may jeopardize Africa's successful transition to freer and fairer governmental systems.

More violations were documented in Cameroon last year than in any other African country: 14 arrests, seven bannings, and 27 issues of publications seized by security forces—these despite President Biya's 1990 promise to liberalize the press. Pius Njawe, the founding editor of *Le Messenger*, Cameroon's leading independent weekly, comments, "The press is a barometer for democracy. Biya's government let the press do what it wanted for a while to show the world that it was democratic. But when things went too far, it was willing to jeopardize its credibility to silence us. President Biya gave hope to Cameroonians that things would change. What was said and what was reality were like day and night. His commitment to press freedom was more utopian than honest."

In January 1991, Njawe and Celestin Monga, a writer who contributes to national and international publications, were convicted of insulting the courts and members of the National Assembly. The charges were based on an open letter to President Biya published in *Le Messenger*. The letter by Monga criticized a speech the president gave in 1990 in which he took credit for bringing freedom and democracy to Cameroon. The Monga-Njawe trial was viewed as a blatant attack against free expression; over 70 lawyers came to the journalists' defense. It even sparked riots and demonstrations in several cities. After national and international pressures, Monga and Njawe were given six-month suspended sentences.

Seven independent Douala-based newspapers, including *Le Messenger*, were banned in August 1991, reflecting the government's reaction to their attempts to circumvent a prior censorship law promulgated after Biya announced a liberalization program in 1990. A protest march by journalists, condemning the bannings, ended in violence when security forces attacked peaceful demonstrators, injuring several. Demonstrators converged on the office of *La Détente*, which were ransacked and teargassed by security officers, forcing the protesters to jump out of a second-story window. All seven newspapers were reinstated within four months.

Many other African countries in political transition lack legal guarantees of press freedom. A large number

**MORE JOURNALISTS WERE DETAINED IN AFRICA THAN IN ANY OTHER REGION, EXCEPT FOR THE MIDDLE EAST.**

of incidents chronicled in CPJ's report are a result of journalists testing their undefined limits of expression. In Rwanda, where close to 60 newspapers now circulate as compared to a dozen in 1990, the constitution still does not explicitly provide for freedom of the press. In 1991, 14 journalists were detained and others were charged with threatening state security or defamation. Twice, officials warned journalists that their writing was considered contemptuous. In May, government officials met with independent newspaper editors, warning them to be cautious in their coverage of political unrest.

In a December radio broadcast, the army accused independent journalists of collaborating with the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a rebel group that invaded Rwanda from Uganda in October 1990. Following the threats, six Rwandan journalists were detained, two were beaten while in detention, and at least seven went into hiding. André Kameya, the editor of *Rwanda Rushya*, received a typewritten death threat on ministry of defense stationery. The letter stated, "...For having provoked the Rwandan Armed Forces...for being dangerous to the Rwandan People, you are condemned to death."

Father André Sibomana, the editor-in-chief of Rwanda's most prestigious newspaper, *Kinyamateka*, told CPJ that he was not surprised by his government's actions. "We are working in a country that is changing from a dictatorship to a democracy. The reality is that no political power allows itself to be attacked. The attacks against journalists are a last attempt of an archaic system to preserve itself in the face of a new system that is not yet born."

The promulgation of repressive laws last year was another means to muzzle the media. In Côte d'Ivoire, where independent newspapers have flourished and opposition parties were legalized in 1990, a press law was passed in 1991 authorizing the suspension or seizure of publications, and imprisonment for those who insult the head of state or foreign dignitaries, or who divulge national secrets or publicly disparage the nation. In July, two journalists were sentenced to three months in prison for insulting President Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Seven other journalists were given suspended sentences for defaming Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara. Ugandan journalists meanwhile express concern about a restrictive press law currently under review by President Yoweri Museveni's minister of information.

Radio broadcasts are the main source of information for most Africans. The reluctance to liberate radio and television broadcasters from state control is symptomatic of a broader unwillingness among African governments to allow democratization to take its course. Last year, eight Congolese radio journalists were temporarily suspended for defying a government order that prohibited

## MANY AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS ARE ATTEMPTING TO HOLD BACK A PRESS THAT HAS TAKEN THE FOREFRONT IN PROMOTING POLITICAL CHANGE.

broadcasts about the opposition. In Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko's personal security force, the Division Speciale Presidentielle, was stationed at the offices of the OZRT radio and television station in Kinshasa. The action was taken in response to a strike by OZRT employees who demanded the resignation of their managing director and campaigned for freer flow of news and information. Soldiers were assigned to read the news on television during the strike.

In the run up to Zambia's first multi-party elections, President Kenneth Kaunda also attempted to muzzle coverage of the opposition in the local media. The press fought back. Prior to the October elections, the Press Association of Zambia won an injunction in the High Court temporarily suspending the government-appointed heads of the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation and the government-owned *Times of Zambia* on grounds of biased reporting.

Several countries continue to resist political change, and the media continues to be under the government's tight grip. In 1991, the Sudanese government conducted a purge of broadcast media. Nearly 200 employees were replaced with members of the National Islamic Front (NIF), loyal to the government. At least two of the eight Sudanese journalists whose detentions were documented by CPJ were held in "ghost houses," clandestine detention centers where political prisoners are typically tortured. Since the military coup led by Lt-Gen. Omar al-Bashir in June 1989, an estimated 450 Sudanese journalists have lost their jobs. After the coup, several publications reappeared but their staffs were appointed by the government.

In Malawi, the press also remains highly censored by a government that can ban any publication that it considers inaccurate or critical of Malawi. *The City Star*, the country's first privately owned daily newspaper, was forced to shut down after publishing only two issues. In February, its printer, Blantyre Print and Publishing, a company owned by Life-President Dr. Kamuzu Banda, announced that it would no longer publish the newspaper. Sources suggest that this decision was made under political pressure.

*Attacks on the Press 1991* demonstrates that journalists throughout the world are experiencing similar pressures. The frequency with which violations occur in Africa indicates that its leaders have failed dismally when it comes to upholding freedom of the press. "African leaders are practicing managed change so that they can control the agenda of [political] reformation," said Peter Kareithi, an exiled Kenyan journalist. "Africans can never go back to treating their presidents like demigods. This does not mean that there is freedom for journalists. It means that journalists will be writing things that they were never able to write before, but at great risk." ○

# VIOLENCE AND

Armed bandits, some of them demobilized soldiers from Angola's two previously warring sides, some of them in the diamond smuggling business, have filled Luandan residents with anxiety, particularly foreigners, who are favored targets of violent crime. The security situation has raised doubts about the coming campaign and voter registration process for the September 29-30 elections. But however imperfect the process or the results, all parties seem to agree that the vote will take place as scheduled.

**A** year after the signing of this southern African country's historic peace accord, Angolans still live in fear, as the crime rate has soared to an unprecedented level.


At the end of April, a helicopter search found the murdered bodies of several Portuguese near the shore about 60 miles south of the capital, Luanda. The seven belonged to two families who had gone to a popular beach, and were attacked and killed by armed bandits, who stole their two four-wheel drive vehicles.

That same week, a 72-year-old Portuguese priest was killed while driving on the outskirts of Luanda, a French citizen was killed, and a Lebanese resident of the city was murdered in his apartment.

The violent attacks are only some of a long string of incidents which has led some people to describe the capital as the "Wild West of Africa." Widespread insecurity has plunged the country into fear.

The number of reported attacks on foreigners has alarmed the expatriate community in the war-impo- verished country. A palpable feeling of uncertainty pervades the capital as the country gears up for its first multi-party elections, scheduled for September 29-30.

Typically furnished with expensive vehicles and a usual stock of material goods, foreigners fear they are prime targets for attacks. Moreover, their anxiety was largely heightened by the combative words of longtime



# THE VOTE

Unita rebel commander Jonas Savimbi, who maintained that all foreigners must leave the country, at a rally of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Unita) in the southern province of Benguela in April.

"There is too much coincidence between the recent attacks on foreigners and Savimbi's words," said João Lurengo, secretary for information for the ruling party, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

Regardless of the impetus behind the violence, a consequence has been a return to wartime precautions. Some foreign embassies have restricted the movement of their nationals to Luanda's city limits, and others have organized plans for a massive sea or air evacuation if necessary during or immediately following the voting in September.

White sand beaches lining the coast outside Luanda have provided a relaxing weekend escape from the garbage-strewn congested city pavements. But now many Luandan residents prefer to stay in the city rather than risk their lives at the beach. "I feel a prisoner in my own city now," says one Luandan resident.

The signing of the peace accords on May 31, 1991 by Savimbi and Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos may have ended the country's bitter 16-year civil war, but unsanctioned violence has continued to plague the country. According to that peace agreement, the two former warring factions must form a unified national army before internationally monitored elections can take place. The scaled-down army will release an estimated 120,000 demobilized soldiers into the rising ranks of the unemployed. While demobilization began March 31, the process is expected to continue slowly until shortly before the elections.

With the actual implementation of many proposed programs for the former soldiers slow to materialize, local observers fear that many of these soldiers, with little education beyond their military training, will continue to live by the gun.

Despite the peace agreement's regulations that all soldiers must turn in their weapons at internationally monitored assembly points throughout the country, observers maintain that this collection will be far from perfect.

"Even with the best will on the part of both sides, it will not be possible for them to control all the arms and get them to the assembly points," says Margaret Anstee, United Nations special representative to Angola.

*Vicki R. Finkel is a freelance journalist based in Luanda, Angola.*



Margaret A. Novicki

The most publicized incident since the ceasefire has been the murder of four British tourists, and injuring of an accompanying New Zealander, in January while their convoy of three Land Rovers was attacked near a Unita assembly point outside Quilengues, about 80 miles from the southwestern city of Lubango. Unita denied responsibility for the killings. Since then, the pages of the state newspaper and images on television have been filled with brutal beatings and killings as the security situation in the country sharply deteriorates.



Daphne Pinkerson

Scores of nighttime armed robberies, house break-ins, and car thefts have been reported. Moreover, the city is littered with windshield-less cars, victims of theft combined with the shortage of new car parts in the war-battered and congested city.

Four officers of the Angolan Air Force were killed in Lubango in March. Two were shot, two were allegedly burned alive, while a fifth officer was beaten unconscious. Unita sympathizers were arrested, but Unita sources maintained that the men were killed by members of the public in retaliation for the killing of a young boy by a government soldier.

The event highlights the growing difficulty in distinguishing between political and common criminality. "There is now a problem of defining the borderline of when a common crime should be construed as a political incident," said Anstee.

A lucrative illicit diamond trade is a common root of many armed attacks springing up in the country, principally those culminating in car thefts. The fourth largest diamond producer at independence in 1975, Angola's official diamond production has been largely paralyzed by insecurity. Last year, however, while the government received \$250 million from its diamond exports, the illicit trade netted \$300 million, according to the local newspaper. The heavy diamond trading in the northeast Lunda Norte province has led to the high demand for four-wheel drive cars to transport the gems on rough roads, as well as soil for sifting. Stolen four-wheel drive cars from the port city of Luanda are reported to fetch up to \$30,000 in Lunda Norte.

Nighttime bandits, moreover, have recently been able to take advantage of power cuts casting most areas of Luanda into complete darkness. Rising prices in the mar-

||| PRESS |||  
BY KIM BRICE

# MUZZLING THE MEDIA

As many African countries have become more democratic, much of the press has been rid of state control and thus freed to criticize the government, which has led to . . . less democracy for the press. The Committee to Protect Journalists has documented a rise in repression of African journalists—who can now write about subjects once taboo, but at great risk.

kets, partially due to another devaluation of the local currency, the kwanza, has further fanned the rising flames of criminality in a country still heavily dependent on imports.

Approaching elections in the war-scarred country, with large-scale mistrust persisting on both sides, provide little reason to believe the security situation will improve in the near future.

Two top Unita commanders, Tony da Costa Fernandes and Miguel N'zau Puna, who defected to Portugal, claim that Unita is preparing an army of 20,000 soldiers at the border with Namibia. And dos Santos has stated over the radio that Unita has yet to deliver its heavy arms to the designated assembly points. In a political rally, Savimbi, intimating a return to armed conflict, declared that "the government will be responsible for the consequences that may occur if the elections are not held on September 29-30 as the president has announced."

International pressure also weighs heavily upon the realization of elections at the end of September, in a bid to end the present political paralysis seizing the country. And dos Santos has acknowledged the formidable task confronting his ruling party, as the former battlefield rivals prepare to fight it out at the ballot box.

"The MPLA is at the threshold of one of its greatest challenges in its history," said the graying president upon opening the MPLA Third Extraordinary Congress on May 7. Officially launching the party's pre-electoral campaign, the Congress unified former members of the MPLA who had defected and were now reunited into the "big MPLA family."

The five-day Congress stressed the need for an active campaign. "This is the moment to abandon the comfort of our offices and conference rooms and to actively live with the people where they are, in their neighborhoods and fields, in all their areas of residence and work, in the urban and rural areas," dos Santos told the 634 participants.

But as the days quickly wind down to the actual voting, many observers believe it is already too late to avoid large-scale confusion surrounding the elections.

"Elections will have to take place in September, but it will be a mess," said one senior UN officer in Luanda.

Including all UN funding for advice, preparation, implementing, and monitoring the elections, the total expenditure is only one-fourth of that contributed to Namibia's pre-independence elections. War-battered Angola is physically larger with a population almost 10 times that of its southern neighbor.

Unlike the Namibian operation, the UN is not running the elections but has deferred that role to the Angolan government.

"The national government is responsible for the elections, and we are here to help provide technical assistance in organizing and implementing the elections and through material support," says Anstee.

UN representatives are programmed to work with a National Elections Committee. After a long delay, this

organizing body, along with an elections director, was finally appointed May 9.

The government has recently announced that its national pre-election registration campaign would be held from May 20-July 31. But one UN field representative estimates it could take up to two years for an accurate registration of his one province alone. Destroyed bridges, landmines, and a ravaged road and communications system present a logistical nightmare for registration of the largely rural and illiterate population.

Government obstacles thus escalate. Lingered tension after 16 years of hostilities has delayed the government's moves to extend its central administration throughout the vast country. The election law maintains that registration can only take place where the government has authority, but this poses potential problems if Unita areas are not registered. Moreover, observers maintain that up to 50,000 prisoners are still held against their will in the southern area of the country.

And the repatriation of up to 400,000 refugees is still in the planning stages, but Angolans will only be permitted to register within the country's borders. Holding national elections in the northern Cabinda province also poses difficulties, where the separatist movement, the Front for the Liberation of Cabinda, known by its Portuguese acronym FLEC, continues to inflict violence among the population. FLEC has recently announced that it will boycott the elections if the government of Angola does not recognize Cabinda's right to self-determination in the oil-rich exclave.

With material damage amounting to \$30 billion in the last 12 years alone, according to UN figures, the chief administration officer for the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM), Tom White, estimates that 50 percent of the registration process must be done with air transport. He calculates that the government will need 90 to 100 helicopters for the process, and costly fuel distribution will present a critical problem.

"This is a daunting task, and we have real concerns over the government's capacity under the time constraints," said White.

Many international observers are realistic about their expectations for Angola's first elections. "This cannot be a perfect election," said Anstee. "It will have to be free and fair and with the best results possible, but we cannot expect what it would be in a much more organized society with a long period of democracy and tranquility."

But election organizers maintain that they must stick to the agreed timetable and elections must be held in September. One of the largest disagreements between the two sides while negotiating the peace accord was the date of elections. Unita wanted voting to be within a year while the MPLA government desired three years from the signing of the ceasefire. The timing of the elections has also been planned for September before the rains come throughout the country, exacerbating the already difficult mobility in a country almost three times the size of California.

"This is a race we have got to win," said Anstee. ○

BY PATRICK LAURENCE

# DEADLOCKED

Before the African National Congress suspended its negotiations with the government of President F.W. de Klerk on June 23, the two sides—each unsure of the size of its popular support—were deadlocked on how much majority of an elected national assembly would be needed to ratify a new constitution, 70 percent (ANC) or 75 percent (de Klerk). The de Klerk government is confident of white support as well as a majority from the Coloured and Indian communities. But the ANC has acknowledged a need to consolidate its support and put in place mechanisms to draw its voters to the polls.

Balic/Sygm



On May 31, Cyril Ramaphosa, secretary-general of the African National Congress, proclaimed that the ANC was ready to assume responsibility for the governance of South Africa. The bearded ANC leader declared to cheers from some 800 delegates at the end of the ANC's four-day special conference: "South Africa will go the ANC way."

Earlier, the ANC had released a report on the deadlocked negotiations for a settlement at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa). The report was entitled: "From Corruption, Murder, and Mismanagement to Democracy, Justice, and Good Government." It summed up the ANC's combative mood.

*Patrick Laurence is a specialist writer on the Johannesburg Star, South African correspondent of The Economist, and a contributor to The Guardian (London) and The Irish Times.*

The report served as a backdrop to the conference's decision to launch a campaign of "mass action"—strikes, popular demonstrations, and protest sit-ins—to break what it saw as the intransigence of the de Klerk administration and force it to "transfer power to the people."

Looked at in the context of recent developments, the ANC's declaration of political war on the "de Klerk regime" was a belated but unequivocal answer to its more radical rivals who had accused it of collaborating with de Klerk's lieutenants.

Less than six months earlier, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) had angrily withdrawn from the negotiations at Codesa, charging that the ANC was colluding with the government to control the agenda and determine the direction of the negotiations. Mangosuthu

# THE GUN CULTURE

Angry youths in the black townships—already riven by continuing violence between ANC and Inkatha supporters—have become deeply drawn into the culture of the gun. Well-armed ANC defense units have fought each other as they jockey for power. Significant for the ANC is the issue of whether the deep-felt anger of these youngsters can be channelled into organized mass political action, such as strikes, demonstrations, and boycotts.



**T**he African National Congress (ANC), plagued by intensifying internal struggles in an era of open organization and popular politics, faces crises on several fronts: an army of frustrated youths ignoring calls for discipline and acting on their own initiative; strife between returning exiles and local leaders threatened by the skills acquired abroad by the former; dissension in ANC-led community-based “defense units” where criminal elements have hijacked control through the barrel of a gun; and the thorny presence of Winnie Mandela, who, despite being increasingly isolated by the upper echelons of the ANC, commands significant support among militants at the grassroots level and allegedly has her own army of “paratroopers.”

All these factors, coupled with ongoing township violence between Inkatha hostel-dwellers and ANC-supporting residents, stirred up by the security forces, have led to the spread of anarchic and divisive power struggles in what were once remarkably united communities.

Confusion reigns in many areas where well-armed ANC-led defense units, which sprung up as a community effort to protect residents against Inkatha-led attacks, have taken control. In some cases, rival defense units have emerged, transforming what were once innocent, grassroots initiatives to quell violence into vicious and dangerous power struggles of mafia-like proportions.


Young “comrades” are aligning themselves around those with the bulk of the ammunition, fearing each other more than their traditional foes: Inkatha and the security forces.

Amid this climate of internal strife, the ANC, in an attempt to force the government’s hand in the current negotiations deadlock and pressure for a speedy transi-

tion to a democracy, is threatening to mobilize popular support across a broad "anti-apartheid" spectrum and, unless the government backs down, embark on a campaign of rolling mass action, unprecedented in scale and duration.

At Codesa II, the second round of formal negotiations between the government, ANC, and other parties, the state refused to budge on the question of minority rights, wanting to safeguard white privilege by calling for veto powers for the upper house of a two-tier parliament and a 75 percent majority to ratify the new constitution drawn up by the constitution-making body.

Convinced that the state is intent on delaying the progression toward an interim government and the drawing up of a new constitution, using whatever means at its disposal to stall on relinquishing power, the ANC is



Balici/Syigma

*Top and bottom, Inkatha Freedom Party supporters in Alexandra township*

*Left, policeman confronting youths*



Justin Shalk

looking back to popular strategies of mass action successfully employed by a broadly aligned "mass democratic movement" in the late 1980s.


But there is growing concern about the possibilities for—and possible consequence of—mass-scale mobilization in townships plagued by anarchic power struggles, disunity, and misdirected, gun-toting youths. The unbanning of organizations like the ANC and PAC in February 1990 opened a new space for political activity and changed the form of political organization: People were at once able to throw themselves into previously forbidden activities without the risks of detention without trial, deportation, banning, or other harassment by the state. This led to the swelling of ANC membership by people with less political knowledge—many jumping on the bandwagon of popular politics.

In the 1980s, activists, aware of the risks involved, were both committed to and well-acquainted with the

issues at stake. In the 1990s, political savvy became less of a requirement, and scores of youths, with little or no political understanding, became card-carrying members of the ANC. Many of these young people, immature and ignorant, stepped in to occupy leadership positions vacated by former youth leaders who left either in disillusionment or to take up new positions in unions and other organizations.

In May this year, Soweto youths took to the streets in an orgy of lawlessness reminiscent of June 1976—petrol-bombing and stoning indiscriminate targets, even killing randomly selected individuals. They were, it seems, not only protesting the intention of the government's Department of Education and Training (for black education) to raise examination fees, but were expressing mounting frustration at their lack of direction and growing cynicism about what the future holds. There is a slow dawning among the youth that the problems of today—no jobs, gutter education, violence, and growing poverty—will not disappear when freedom arrives. In

Balici/Syigma



*Philippa Garson is a reporter for The Weekly Mail in Johannesburg.*

short, for most township youth, there's not much to look forward to.

Most youths want the obvious: peace, school, and jobs. But as fast as schools are built, they are vandalized and stripped by young criminals and poor squatters, and many youths stay away from schools fearing they will be attacked there by Inkatha. With the current level of violence, they fantasize about guns and glorify the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). They are desperate for military training, "to protect our families" and are as much in the forefront of the violence as they were in the 1970s and 1980s. Many youths express frustration at the fact that these days they are criticized for their lawlessness instead of recognized for their role in defending communities. Random expressions of resistance were legitimate a few years ago, when killing local councillors regarded as government "stooges," and petrol-bombing houses and vehicles of all individuals associated with "the system," were part of the strategy to render the townships ungovernable and force the government to capitulate.

Now, however, they are not. When violence continues despite the fact that warring parties are locked into peace agreements (the government, Inkatha, and the ANC are all signatories to the National Peace Accord), when the torching of indiscriminate targets is condemned by all, and when their leaders, huddled in meetings at the ANC's skyscraper head office in Johannesburg, "neglect" them, the youth have nowhere to turn to vent their anger.

In the volatile, sprawling Vaal Triangle townships of Sebokeng and Sharpeville, some 30 miles southwest of Johannesburg, where many people have been killed in recent weeks, youths took command of the streets in May. They set up barricades at every turn in an attempt to root out mysterious snipers, presumed to be Inkatha hit-squads, who roam the areas at dusk, firing on innocent targets.

Undisciplined and a law unto themselves, the young "comrades"—some lucky enough to have guns, others as young as nine years old—grouped on street corners, stoning and setting alight any cars which refused to stop at their make-shift roadblocks.

"They spend their hours patrolling the streets, but they don't know what they're looking for," commented a local Vaal activist at the time. "It's anger that brings us onto the streets," said militant teenager, Abraham Sithetho, a Sebokeng inhabitant. "The young ones are angry too. They feel unsafe—at home, on the playing fields, attacks can occur. They only feel safe in a mob. The youths believe in mobs. Being in a mob is safer." Sithetho battled in recent weeks to keep small children in particular from manning barricades. "The little ones have no fear. Sometimes you'll see a seven-year-old looking at a corpse, and fear becomes dead to him. We don't fear death because death fears no one."

Raymond Vilikazi, another Sebokeng adolescent, summed up his feelings with tragic simplicity. "We are

not like ordinary young people because we have no happiness."

ANC Youth League Secretary-General Rapu Molekane says the ANCYL recognizes the high level of anger and feelings of hopelessness among the youth, intensified by ongoing random violence and the deadlock at Codesa. "That anger must be channelled or we'll have anarchy."

Molekane is adamant that this anger can be translated into constructive, organized forms of action such as the consumer boycotts and general strikes likely to happen soon if the government is not prepared to alter its blueprint for a new constitution.

Molekane admits, however, to a mushrooming militancy among ANC-supporting youth, who are restless for weapons to defend themselves in an era of factional violence and lawlessness, where fighting prowess and having a gun account for a good deal more than political accountability.

"Where there's lots of violence, they organize themselves around the one who's brave and able to lead them in battle," says Molekane. "We just don't have the same political leadership as before."

"In the 1980s, if you had a gun, you didn't tell anyone. Now it's the fashion—and wide open to abuse." The "thugs" of yesterday would more often than not be brought into line by political groups commanding respect and discipline, whereas those of today are armed, dangerous, and untouchable.

And many of these thuggish "comrades," proficient in the use of guns, and with the know-how to secure them, have risen to power in the controversial defense units, blurring the distinction between legitimate defense measures undertaken by communities and criminal violence.

In March this year, a strange "military coup" occurred in the huge squatter camp of Phola Park, housing some 2,000 families and essentially an ANC stronghold. The hardened inhabitants of Phola Park, long since on the receiving end of violent onslaughts by Inkatha and the security forces, are used to putting up a wall around their community in times of crisis. They refuse to say much about what really happened when a group of armed men from one of their defense units allegedly stormed into a meeting of legitimate community elected leaders and forced them to flee the squatter camp.

Now the shacks of the once-respected leaders have been burnt down and two of them have been killed. Large-scale development plans to upgrade and electrify the area and transform the shacks into houses have been put on hold as people struggle to make sense of what sparked the criminal hijack and until a new credible leadership is elected to help facilitate the development plans. The rifts between the powerful defense units and now-deposed leadership have, according to researchers in the area, long since been brewing. Involvement by the old leaders in local peace structures, along with Inkatha and government and security force representatives, generated suspicion among brutalized defense unit warriors who have become notorious for firing on and killing policemen and soldiers.

Police allege the defense units have been hijacked by a dissident band of returning MK cadres. The ANC denies this charge, though concedes that MK cadres are active in defense units around the country in their individual capacity. Others say rivalry is brewing between PAC-supporting and ANC-supporting members of the Phola Park units or that Shanqaans—Mozambican refugees—have taken control of the area.

No one really seems to know. But whatever group is running the show, using weapons and fear tactics, one thing is clear: The ANC has lost control of a formerly united settlement, now a haven for crime, misdirected political violence, and gunrunning.

Phola Park is not the only region where well-armed defense units jockeying for power have taken over, spreading confusion and anarchy among residents who no longer know who their friends or enemies are.

In many of Natal's townships, ANC defense units have degenerated into MK-backed hit squads purportedly commanded by Harry Gwala, aging ANC leader in the Natal Midlands region, where much of the violence occurs.

In Sebokeng in the Vaal Triangle, a major power struggle between rival defense units in two ANC-supporting hostels housing 8,000 men is brewing. The defense units sprung up in response to Inkatha-led attacks from their nearby stronghold, kwaMadala hostel, but now rival commanders are turning guns on each other in what threatens to become an all-out war. Both sides are ANC and claim to be true representatives of their organization, and both are beginning to fear each other more than their common enemies.

"We have told the ANC leadership that people will die inside these hostels. If they leave this thing, there will be war," said a worried resident.

Elderly Ernest Sotsu, charged with terrorism in 1986 for his underground involvement in MK and released in 1989, by all accounts commands the support of several thousand of the hostel-dwellers. Sotsu, 64, was taken into one of the hostels by sympathetic workers when his family was wiped out in a gun attack while he was away attending an ANC conference in July last year. Despite his vulnerable appearance and humble persona, this man commands enormous power and his defense units are armed to the teeth, according to inside sources, with AK-47s channelled from the Transkei homeland which is governed by the ANC-supporting military leader Bantu Holomisa.

Returning MK exiles, disillusioned with many local ANC leaders they see as corrupt and obsessed in their attempts to isolate the returnees to safeguard their positions of power, have put their weight behind Sotsu. Their attempts to coordinate the units under Sotsu's leadership were rejected by emerging rival defense units. The rival units, supported by local unionists and the local ANC leadership, are trying to take control amid allegations of shadow dealings with the police. Sotsu charges that the rival units, armed with the latest AK-47 model apparently

not possessed by MK, are the victims of infiltration by a police-backed "third force" attempting to sow division within the ANC and thwart the peaceful transition to democracy.

"We believe MK is not supplying them with guns. The mystery is, who is supplying them?" asked Sotsu.

An MK cadre said the hostels in Sebokeng were so well-armed, they resembled military training camps. Both sides have brought in reinforcements from similarly strife-torn Phola Park.

"When we say the ANC is highly infiltrated, we are not playing. The war going on in the Vaal is not an open war. It's a secret intelligence war," said the cadre.

While the ANC insists on the need for community-based defense units, the organization sees them as non-partisan and denies responsibility for the problems they have created. "We called for the communities to defend themselves because we believe they have the political right," says Calvin Khan, personal assistant to MK commander Joe Modise. "It is not as though the ANC has created the conditions in which the defense units have flourished." Khan insists that MK members are involved in the units in their individual capacity only, joining those in the areas where they live. He also describes those units responsible for criminal activities as "insignificant."


Jeremy Cronin, central committee member of the ANC-aligned South African Communist Party, acknowledges that several self-defense units around the country have slid into banditry: "It's easy for self-defense units to go off the rails if they are not subjected to strong organizational control and input. They can decay into pockets of gangsterism and warlordism."

"We must not fetishize the use of arms and see self-defense units as the sole answer to problems of violence. At the end of the day, solutions have to be political."

Some blame Winnie Mandela, the controversial estranged wife of ANC President Nelson Mandela, for the current divisions plaguing the ANC strongholds. Although her official power has been strangled in the wake of her resignation or suspension from the various executive positions she held within the ANC, she nevertheless continues to command substantial support among militant youth and some MK members who, alleges one source, have set up their own underground army called, "Winnie Mandela's Paratroopers."

Many youths dismiss the mounting list of her alleged misdemeanors as insignificant against a backdrop of years of apartheid crimes, police and army brutality, and death squads. Her "crimes" pale into insignificance in the eyes of hardened youngsters who confront death on a daily basis.

And despite her isolation by the movement, Mandela continues to be an active force in the townships, often visiting violence-wracked areas, stirring support among those who increasingly see the ANC leadership—the government in waiting—as distanced from their daily struggles. ○



# UPGRADING THE

**A** burning April day, half a degree south of the Tropic of Capricorn...the tall, gray-ing man in academic gown is speaking: "Is it not the irony of history that today I stand before you to be installed as the chancellor of the University of the North...given the fact that the university and I have reached this point through the narrow path of fire?"

Barely two years ago, Nelson Mandela was still waiting for the prison doors to open, while "Turffloep," as the university is known, was one in a chain of despised ethnic institutions created in the name of "separate develop-

ment." Now, with a rapidity which transcends most other changes in the South African racial interregnum, the "bush colleges" are becoming politically respectable. The installation of Mandela as "comrade chancellor" of Turffloep is not the only sign of the upturn of the educational seesaw. His longtime African National Congress colleague, Oliver Tambo, and the Anglican archbishop of Cape Town, Desmond Tutu, have also been rewarded with chancellorships, positions until recently reserved for the high priests of Afrikaner nationalism.

The new management of black universities has inherited a mass of problems—underfunding, poor material coming up from feeder black schools, an overstress on the liberal humanities and not enough on science—all accompanied by an intense debate over whether these

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Guy Tillim/Impact Visuals

## ||| SOUTH AFRICA |||

BY DENIS HERBSTEIN

Once despised ethnic institutions, the “separate development” universities for blacks and “Coloureds” are becoming politically respectable. Administrations that used to be bastions of second-rate Afrikaner academics are now run by blacks. But the terrible legacy of educational apartheid remains and the transformation has only just begun.

# UNIVERSITIES

universities should cultivate the elite or offer everyone who is qualified the chance of a degree.

First, however, the tokens of white domination have to be removed. The Turfloop campus is dominated by a giant sloping rock, a granite waterfall, except that this year, the rains have failed to materialize. At the Turfloop stadium, the walls round the athletic track spell out “Viva Biko” and “BC lives,” a reminder that “black consciousness” and its martyr, Steve Biko, remain a force in ANC-dominated universities. Nelson Mandela takes his place on the pavilion and there begins a ceremony that would have the father of “Bantu education,” Hendrik Verwoerd, jiggling about in his grave. The players include a radical Catholic and one-time detainee, Sister Bernard Ncube, leading the prayers; and the vice-principal, Prof. G. M.

Nkondo, who, while a student at Turfloop, fled abroad to elude the security police.

But the tell-tale group on the official pavilion was white—Afrikaner academics who sat grim-faced as Mandela spoke of making “a clean and at times painful break with tradition and the things to which we are accustomed.” There was a time when every chancellor, principal, dean, most professors, and members of the governing councils at bush colleges were Afrikaners, political appointees or men not good enough for white institutions. Invariably, they belonged to the Broederbond, the secret Afrikaner helping-hand society.

The bureaucratized nepotism was the more cynical because these were supposed to be places where blacks could do their own thing. Nowadays, their numbers are

dropping, though the university selects academic staff on merit and not color. White staff once lived on campus, but moved to nearby "white" Pietersburg after the 1976 student uprising. Here, in the "Far North" region, it is to be noted, whites voted "no" in the recent white referendum on a new deal for South Africa.

Their discomfort had begun the previous day, in a ceremony renaming campus hostels. The icons of the struggle were honored—Steve Biko; Robert Sobukwe (of the PAC); Ruth First, the white Communist letter-bombed by Pretoria; Hector Peterson, first victim of the Soweto rebellion; Tambo, Mandela, and Tutu. Shaka, the Zulu Napoleon, was not forgotten. Nor the eternal inspirations—Kwame Nkrumah, Angola's first president Agostinho Neto, Qaddafi, Frederick Engels, Che Guevara, the English Anglican monk, Trevor Huddleston. But pride of place was reserved for Onkgopotse Tiro, whose life and death exemplified resistance to the inferior status of Bantu education.

Turfloop was born in 1959, placed inside what was to become the Lebowa tribal homeland, with enrollment restricted to students from the Sotho, Venda, and Tsonga language groups. Blacks at the four English-language "open" universities—Witwatersrand, Cape Town, Rhodes, Natal—were sent off to bush colleges established under the curiously titled "Extension of University Education Act." Within years, the assertive ethos of "black consciousness" swept the black campuses, posing a direct threat to the *Obermenschen* of apartheid.

Tiro was chosen to speak on behalf of his fellow students at the Turfloop graduation ceremony in 1972. He looked out on a sea of white faces, the chancellor, Dr. W.M. Eiselen, one of the architects of apartheid, the rector, professors, council, and honored guests—come to savor the perfection of separate development. So Tiro proceeded to excoriate Bantu education, restriction without trial, repugnant legislation, school expulsions, and added: "Our parents have come all the way from their homes only to be locked outside. Front seats are given to people who cannot even cheer us. My father is seated there at the back. My dear people, when shall we ever get a fair deal in this land?"

Looking over the heads of the whites, he concluded: "Let the Lord be praised, for the day shall come when all shall be free to breathe the air of freedom...and no man, no matter how many tanks he has, will reverse the course of events." Tiro was duly expelled, and the resulting sit-in led to the expulsion of every student. At various times since then, order has been maintained at Turfloop through police and military occupation. Two years later, Tiro, having fled to neighboring Botswana, opened a parcel bomb. The naughty student had been punished. Even now, as Mandela reminded his audience, the South African army occupies a post on a nearby hill-top. If white

## EDUCATIONAL APARTHEID HAS ACHIEVED ITS AWFUL AIMS—DR. VERWOERD'S BLUEPRINT OF NEGATIVE SOCIAL ENGINEERING.

revanchistes ever risk a coup, Turfloop will know early on.

The key to the changes is the Broad Transformation Committee, encompassing every strand of campus life from principal to cleaning lady. Its main task is the removal of the university council, a body dominated by Pretoria's appointees and tame tribal dignitaries. Indeed, the appropriate minister of black education, Sam de Beer, appears to have accepted the fait accompli and promised to legislate for a post-apartheid council.

But renaming hostels and democratizing councils hardly alters the fact that educational apartheid has achieved its awful aims. Dr. Verwoerd's blueprint of negative social engineering was designed

to make black school-leavers incapable of competing on equal terms with their white counterparts. He started in the schools: "Natives will be taught from childhood to realize that equality with Europeans is not for them...there is no place for (the Bantu) in the European community above the level of certain forms of labor...He has been subject to a school system which...misled him by showing him the green pastures of European society in which he is not allowed to graze." So the one black pupil in a hundred who reached university found that his/her qualifications were not comparable to a white's. The circle of academic and material privation was geared to keep the black man in his place—as a worker in the apartheid factory, and, for those with university degrees, a buffer between white suburb and black township.

Ten miles outside Cape Town—and 1,500 miles south of Turfloop—the University of the Western Cape began life as a home for the "Coloured" (mixed-blood) people, which meant no whites, Africans, Indians. Here, in South Africa's liberal heartland, there was a more gradual transformation. These days, it is the country's most radical institute of higher learning, "an intellectual home for the left," in the words of its principal, Jakes Gerwel. The campus of the "people's university" is in political and intellectual ferment, encouraged by the arrival of political prisoners and radical exiles, especially from Britain. The debate on the quo vadis of UWC is by no means over, but Gerwel's plans—cash willing—go only in one direction.

An apartheid apologist might point to Gerwel and say, "There you are, separate education worked." The cerebral principal certainly has slalomed through the obstacles of "Coloured education," from the "rags" of his farmworker parents to the "riches" of academe. He was one of the first 1960s Western Cape graduates, and after post-graduate study in Belgium, became professor of Afrikaans at his alma mater. Ironic, but Afrikaans, the language of the oppressor, is also the "Coloured" mother tongue.

UWC has its own track record of closures, police occupations, staff sackings. But after the 1976 rebel-

lion, Gerwel's predecessor as principal, Dick van der Ross, "allowed dissent and so created space for the counter-ethos of the institution to become the dominant ethos." At the time, van der Ross was seen as a government stooge, but Gerwel wants to stress his importance. He was the first bush college rector from a known liberal background, and he did attract better academics, both black and white. The change came from within, when a group of young rebels, Gerwel among them, asserted themselves. Today they run the show, with Gerwel appointed principal in 1985, when the black insurrection was in full spate.

Since then, the university has changed out of all recognition. It is no longer a place for "Coloured" students only. Whereas in 1987, less than 5 percent of the student body was African, next year they will number 40 percent. Which causes problems, and occasional friction, for the Xhosa-speakers don't know Afrikaans. More and more, the language of instruction is English, which is the mother tongue of few of the students. "The Coloureds always had a snobbish idea that English was the language of culture and learning," Gerwel remarks. "I was patronized at meetings—'You may speak Afrikaans if you wish.' " The transformation also encompasses a decisive alteration in the gender balance, through affirmative enrollment for women.

But the big debate is over the role the university should play in shaping events. "Activist-academics" are expected to participate not just in the undoing of apartheid, but in "decolonizing our intellectual models in universities and towards thinking in forms appropriate to our world and its needs." Gerwel says: "The effects of apartheid, which give a white child a ten times better chance of getting to university than an African, have to be undone or we shall be wasting national resources on a grand scale." The intense nature of life at UWC can be irritating, even to the old liberal University of Cape Town, where a leftist may inquire, "Sure thing, but where's the beef?" Western Cape plans a school of public health, to train nurses and doctors in preventive medicine, thus catering for the neglected third world majority, whose needs are not served by the curative, drug-based medicine demanded by wealthy whites.

As it is, the number of African university students increased by 450 percent from 18,000 in 1980 to over 100,000 a decade later. State spending has been switched dramatically from white to black, Coloured, and Indian education, and not a moment too soon, though yet only nibbling at the effects of decades of deprivation. Gerwel has 13,000 students and 500 academic staff. UCT, he says, has twice the staff with the same enrollment. (And it will be "black" one of these days.) How did you get rid of the Broederbond, I asked? "The place no longer

## THE REAL TRANSFORMA- TION HAS BARELY BEGUN, AND THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA WILL NOT ELIMINATE POLITICAL STRAIN.

seemed amenable to them. And the students were not very polite."

Six hundred miles to the east, at the University of Fort Hare, they are quick to remind you, they were never a bush college. Before the word apartheid was invented, the missionary college in the eastern Cape was educating leaders—Tambo, Mandela, Sobukwe, Buthelezi, the Matanzima brothers, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo of Zimbabwe, President Seretse Khama of Botswana. Even the "Coloured" poet-professor Dennis Brutus. A few whites studied there, too. It was the great African liberal institution of the sub-continent. The ANC Youth League flourished in this heartland of African nationalism. It wasn't idyllic, as testified by the

young Oliver Tambo's expulsion on political grounds. But education was valued for its own universal sake.

Then, the government stepped in and tribalized, banned even non-Xhosa-speaking Africans. Most of the staff either left or were kicked out. The elderly Prof. Z. K. Matthews, South Africa's first African graduate, in whose house the Freedom Charter is said to have been conceived, surrendered his pension rights. The same old story...staff applicants were screened to ensure conformity to government policy and National Party ideals. The dark ages were felt more poignantly here than elsewhere. The minister of Bantu education, Willie Maree, directed that white officials should not shake hands with blacks.

The opportunity to transform came in a different way from Turfloop and Western Cape. Ignominiously, Fort Hare had ended up in the Ciskei bantustan. Then-president Lennox Sebe was overthrown, and the successful plotter, Gen. Oupa Gqozo, was persuaded of the wonders of Fort Hare's golden age. The Afrikaner top brass resigned. And the liberals moved back in. Francis Wilson, a Cape Town sociology professor whose mother once taught at Fort Hare, became chairman of the council, which now featured Desmond Tutu, David Russell, activist Anglican bishop of Grahamstown, and Govan Mbeki, Robben Island ANC veteran. In a show of reconciliation, a Zulu, Dr. Sibusiso Bengu, late of the Lutheran World Federation in Geneva, was appointed the first black principal.

The real transformation has barely begun. Cash is perilously short. Nor will the new South Africa eliminate political strain. Universities could be closed down, a black army might even occupy campuses. After all, the man who installed Nelson Mandela as chancellor, Walter Kamba, had just resigned as principal of the University of Zimbabwe, citing interference by Mugabe's government. But now at least South Africa's staff and students have ceased to be guinea pigs in a crazy racial experiment that should have disappeared when Hitler perished in his bunker. ○

# INTERVIEW

By Anne Shepherd

## From Adjustment to Development Jan Pronk



Fotobureau Thuring B.V.

**T**he Netherlands' minister of development and cooperation is a straight-talking economist best known in Africa for championing debt relief proposals. He hosted the 1990 Maastricht conference that led to the launching of the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA), which aims to "further the consensus-building process" between the continent and its cooperating partners.

**Africa Report:** What was the main outcome of the recent GCA meeting?

**Pronk:** As you know, the GCA is not an institution: It is a movement with a catalytic function. In Kampala, we had presidents from five African countries which are in the process of democratization. This provided an avenue for political discussion. Top of the agenda for this meeting was governance on the one hand, and economic reform on the other.

In the discussion on governance, we got a confirmation of the principles of governance in Africa, together with the willingness among African countries to discuss conflict resolution, both within and between countries. There was also a willingness to discuss reducing military expenditures. In addition to the existing subcommittees on governance [chaired by President Masire] and economic reform [chaired by Ghana's finance minister, Kwesi Botchwey], we agreed to set up a subcommittee on regional cooperation. This is being chaired by [Senegalese President] Abdou Diouf [who takes over chairmanship of the Organization of African Unity in June]. We had a major discussion on population, though we did not reach a consensus on this. Some countries are giving a very high priority to reducing population; others claim that Africa is in fact underpopulated. There was, however, an underlying agreement that it is not so much levels of population but population growth rates, which are important in looking to the future. There was strong pressure by [GCA co-chair Robert] McNamara to set up an independent group on agriculture, which would, in part, look into the relationship between population growth and labor productivity. Although we did not dwell on the issue of external resource requirements in too great a detail—since these are being addressed in other frameworks [like the World Bank's Development Committee, and the World Bank, ADB, and donor-

sponsored Special Program for Africa]—this is another issue that we touched on. Debt was not one of the issues we discussed, because there is not yet consensus on this issue, and one of the decisions at Maastricht was that to begin with, we pursue issues on which there is a consensus.

**Africa Report:** What are the main points of divergence on the debt issue?

**Pronk:** As you know, we in the Netherlands are in favor of writing off the debt of the least developed countries. We brought forward a plan which is known as the De Kok Plan [Wim de Kok is Netherlands' finance minister], which went further than the plan put forward by British Prime Minister John Major [or Trinidad terms, which advocate a two-thirds debt cancellation]. We are pleased by the recent decision by all members of the Paris Club, except the United States, to accept these terms. Even the United States did not veto the possibility that they will come along. This is a major breakthrough, and we hope that the United States will come along, on the basis of the emerging consensus that debt is the major problem for the least developed countries in Africa. The U.S. has been taken up with middle income countries like Poland and Egypt, putting poorer countries even lower on the agenda.

Within the Netherlands, it is difficult to go any further, because we have unilaterally written off all the debt of the least developed countries. We also now only give grants to these countries. But we are in discussion at the moment with the private banks in the Netherlands, and I hope it will be possible to come forward with a joint statement on debt rescheduling. I cannot say much about this at the moment, except that some of the Dutch commercial banks seem forthcoming. Ideally, we would like the commercial banks to have the same policy as

governments in cancelling the debt of low income countries, even though this is a relatively small percentage of the total.

The other problem with regard to Africa is that there are countries in the lower middle income bracket that are severely indebted. The third problem is multilateral debt, which poses a major bottleneck for many countries. We have had discussions, particularly with reference to the very difficult situation in Zambia, with a number of other donors. But I don't know the way out at the moment, because it is extremely important to safeguard the credibility of the multilateral institutions. Some are asking Western countries to bail them out, but these are resources which are not adding to development finance. We do not know yet how to solve this problem. It is the next step.

**Africa Report:** Do you see any merit in the argument made by some economists that a fund be set up to clear all the worse debts with the multilateral agencies, so that the countries affected can start on a clean slate?

**Pronk:** That was the idea for Zambia, but it did not fly. What we want to do is to make available as much concessional finance as possible to countries like Zambia, to boost the balance of payments. We also think that multilateral agencies like the IMF could do more, such as reducing the conditionalities on Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility loans. We have some proposals in the pipeline, but we have to pick the right moment to launch these.

**Africa Report:** Why have you taken such a personal interest in Africa's debt crisis?

**Pronk:** It is a major strain on the resources of these countries. If you are really interested in Africa's economic development, you have to try and remove the bottlenecks. I am as much involved in international discussions on protectionism as on debt. I was a minister of development cooperation back in 1973. At that time, I tried to formulate a forward-looking strategy on the debt problem, which was already becoming apparent. Since then, I have watched the situation worsening. I was the deputy secretary-general of UNCTAD from 1980 to 1986. In this forum, I was also actively involved in the debt issue.

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**Africa Report:** What's the outlook on debt at this stage?

**Pronk:** In the 1980s, we thought the debt problem of Latin America was not solvable. That tragedy may now be behind us. There is no increase any more in the debt of these countries. They have been able to get greater access to Western markets, enabling them to increase their payment capacity. That is not the case for the African countries. Debt is piling up on the one hand, while on the other net transfers are negative. Though African debt is much lower than Latin America's, it constitutes a greater burden on the fragile African economies. Yet there appears to have been a greater interest in helping Latin American countries get back on their feet than there is in resolving the African crisis, because the former were of greater economic interest to the West. The African countries are in a completely different political/economic situation.

**Africa Report:** Does that imply that Africa's situation is hopeless?

**Pronk:** As a politician I can never talk about a situation being hopeless. The breakthrough we saw in the Paris Club in December was a result of political action. I see always some steps forward. But we are running behind time. Africa needs more resources especially now that we see a greater willingness to go for better governance, over and above economic reform. In many countries it is evident that they are doing what [the West] asked them to do. You have to reward that. You cannot say: And now you go to the market.

**Africa Report:** The 1980s have been described as a lost decade for Africa. What is your prediction for this decade?

**Pronk:** The 1980s have been lost for some, not all. I would not like to use such generalities, because in the case of some specific countries, and some specific sectors, we see progress. But *looking ahead, the picture is still blurred*. On the one hand, there are great hopes as far as political freedom is concerned, and for me that is extremely important. After perestroika, Africa is the continent that has taken over the winds of change. The fact that in some countries there is more civil strife at the moment than political freedom is part of that process. I expect in the end some sustainability.

As far as the economic situation is concerned, we have already noted the shortfall in external resources. But the

major long-term problem, as I see it, is declining agricultural productivity, a rapidly growing population, and environmental degradation. I hope that after the political changes, these pressing long-term economic issues will be addressed.

I do see a greater willingness, especially in the more democratic countries, to take domestic policies much more seriously than 10 years ago. Not unjustifiably, the external environment has been blamed for many of the continent's ills. It is encouraging to note that now many countries are taking the view that, regardless of the external constraints, they will reform.

There are, of course, transitional problems: You cannot go from adjustment to development just like that. Secondly, there is an imbalance in many countries between economic and political liberalization. They do not always support each other in a balanced way, as we have seen in Eastern Europe. But if we look at this decade as one of a transition, then I think at the end, it will be possible to say it was not a failure.

**Africa Report:** Are you concerned at all about the extent to which donors are making political reform a condition for receiving aid?

**Pronk:** The problem at the moment is the number of conditions which are being imposed on Africa. These include human rights, the domestic market system, the environment, social issues, women's issues, and political compliance. I could mention more—there is an overload of conditionalities. What I am pleading for, with other donors, is to set priorities in their conditionalities. I am willing, for example, to trade off the short-term economic conditionality of the 1980s with human rights conditionalities this decade. Here, I would define human rights broadly as a development approach that puts people first. If countries are taking this approach, they need support, even if they sometimes make short-term economic mistakes.

Of course, the ideal is better political and economic governance, but democracy is something you have to believe in from within, not something which you do because creditors are pressing you to do so. That means dialogue in a multilateral setting. Remember, we in the West have, in the past, supported bad governance in Africa. So it is very important to be modest when approaching this delicate subject. ■



Africa's debt has been described as a blip on the West's radar screen. Yet for the continent, whose debt burden relative to ability to pay is higher than anywhere else in the world, debt is a life and death matter, strangling economic recovery and with it, future repayment prospects.

As a result of tough bargaining and growing realism, the last few years have witnessed a shift of ground by Western creditors—most significantly, the realization that rescheduling, which simply postpones the problem, must increasingly be substituted by cancellation.

But the application of this principle remains patchy. As the World Bank's Vice President for Africa, Edward V.K. Jaycox, puts it: "We have a lot of cups on the table. It is just that some of them are empty, some are not adequately filled, and some don't have access to those cups."

More fundamentally, notes Zimbabwe's finance minister, and former chairman of the World Bank's development committee, Bernard Chidzero: "We need a durable, effective debt strategy under which no country should

exports. Recession, high interest rates, and volatile exchange rate movements throughout the 1980s in creditor countries have added to the continent's woes.

Africa's indebtedness, according to World Bank figures, has ballooned from \$140 billion in 1982 to \$272 billion in 1990. This is equivalent to 90 percent of the continent's, and 112 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's, gross domestic product. This compares to equivalent figures of 48 percent in Latin America, and 50 percent in Eastern Europe.

Unlike the latter regions, where commercial debt has been a major issue, Africa's indebtedness is largely to Western donors and multilateral agencies.

At present, \$113 billion (42 percent) is owed to bilateral creditors, \$100 billion (36 percent) is owed to multilateral agencies, and the remaining \$59 billion (22 percent) is owed to private creditors. For sub-Saharan Africa, the percentage of official debt, at about 60 percent, is even higher than for the continent as a whole. Debt service, at \$20 billion annually, chews up 30 percent of export earnings, achieved through import compression and cutbacks on investment.

## THE MORTGAGED CONTINENT

ever have to pay or meet debt service obligations at the expense of growth."

Debt, as Babacar Ndiaye, the president of the African Development Bank often points out, is not intrinsically bad, provided it generates more wealth than was originally borrowed.

During the commodity boom of the 1970s, African countries, like many of their Third World counterparts, borrowed lavishly. Yet in retrospect, far too high a proportion of these resources went into consumption rather than investment. The return on investment also proved disappointingly low, reflecting policy weaknesses, such as inadequate fiscal discipline, and price and capital market distortions.

External factors have also taken a major toll. According to the United Nations, Africa has lost \$50 billion as a result of falling commodity prices since 1986, while protectionism in northern markets has made it difficult to expand

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Even then, many countries are not meeting their full obligations. For example, Nigeria, which has a debt of \$34 billion, would require \$5.56 billion to service its debt this year, but has decreed that it will pay no more than \$2.5 billion, or 30 percent of export earnings, to its creditors. If Tanzania met its full debt service bill, this would amount to 94 percent of export earnings, with 49 percent of that going in interest payments alone.

Mounting arrears have forced a growing realization that the current situation is not sustainable. Reduction of concessional debt owed by Africa's poorest countries to donors has been the first target of action.

In 1987, the World Bank and 18 other multilateral and bilateral donors launched the Special Programme of Assistance (SPA) for the 23 poorest African countries eligible for low interest aid from the Bank's International Development Agency (IDA) and undertaking structural adjustment programs. The aim of the project has been to increase resource flows to these countries through a combination of debt relief and new money.

Sub-Saharan Africa's debt in 1990 was \$272 billion—112 percent of GDP. Concessional debt owed by the poorest countries is increasingly being forgiven, and other debt relief measures

Between 1978 and 1990, according to World Bank figures, donors cancelled some \$7.8 billion of official development assistance (ODA) owed by SPA countries. Additional cancellations recently announced by France, the U.S., and Italy will substantially reduce the remaining \$2 billion concessional debt owed by the poorest African countries.

This still leaves \$7 billion owed by low-income African countries to non-OECD donors, principally in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, representing particular problems for some countries. About a quarter of Mozambique's \$4.7 billion debt for example, is owed to the former Soviet Union, which has refused to write it off. While the united Germany has written off the concessional debt that Mozambique owed the former West Germany, it has declined to do the same for the debt owed to the former East Germany, estimated at \$300 million, on grounds that this was contracted on commercial rather than aid terms.

For OECD countries, forgiveness of concessional debt is important insofar as it represents an acknowledgment of the principle of cancellation, rather than rescheduling. However, since much of this money was not being paid anyway, and carries low interest rates, the short-term cash flow benefits for debtor countries is minimal, accounting for a reduction of debt service payments of \$100 million (or 2 percent) in 1990.

Of more critical importance is the nonconcessional debt (bearing market interest rates) owed by African countries to donors, and dealt with through the Paris Club. Originally conceived as a forum to find solutions to short-term payments problems, on a strictly commercial basis, the Club has been forced over the last few years to take a more lenient, and longer-term view. As the World Bank 1991/92 report on developing country debt comments, the Paris Club "now accepts the need for debt restructuring to help resolve problems of solvency, as well as liquidity."

The 1988 Toronto agreement marked the first acknowledgement by Western creditor countries that concessional debt relief had to be applied to non-concessional debt for the poorest countries. Unlike before, when creditors agreed to a common set of rescheduling terms, the Toronto package gave three options:

- A) forgive one-third of debt service due;
- B) reschedule with longer grace periods and maturities (14 and 25 years respectively);
- C) reschedule at lower interest rates.

One of the problems with the menu approach, however, is that—like the average diner—many donors have opted

for the cheapest course on offer. As a World Bank briefing paper on African debt points out, "Only one Paris Club member, France, systematically writes off a third of debt service under Option A. About half the members reduce interest rates under Option C. A third of Toronto rescheduling has been at market-based interest rates, though over a longer period of time."

The upshot is that for the 15 beneficiaries, the overall grant element has been 20 percent and the savings in interests payments a paltry \$50 million. More worrying, by increasing the stock of debt through capitalization of interest arrears, the Toronto terms exacerbate the long-term debt problems of beneficiaries.

An improvement on the Toronto terms, first mooted by British Prime Minister John Major at a Commonwealth finance ministers' conference in Trinidad, calls for a rescheduling of the entire stock of debt, rather than one year's dues at a time; increasing the amount to be written off to two-thirds; and repayments over 25 years.

The World Bank estimates that a two-thirds reduction in official debt would give many of the poorest countries a realistic prospect of putting their debt service on a sustainable basis. For example, calculations done by the Bank on Mozambique, which in June 1990 became a beneficiary of the Toronto terms, show that if Trinidad terms are applied, the debt service ratio would be reduced to a viable 22 percent throughout the 1990s, with the added advantage of cutting recurrent aid requests by \$3.3 billion.

These figures and similar calculations for other African countries are, however, predicated on an 8 percent per annum growth in exports, which some economists believe is over-optimistic.

Of even greater concern is that following a failure to get the endorsement of other Western governments at the G7 summit in London last year, Britain is the only country systematically applying the Trinidad terms. In December 1991, the Paris Club shifted some ground, with the granting of terms easier than the Toronto terms for Nicaragua and Benin, but still no equivalent to the Trinidad terms.

Even if Trinidad terms were universally accepted, noted Percy Mistry, senior fellow in international finance at Oxford University during a recent conference on Africa's economic prospects, "they would not go far enough in solving the debt problems of low-income sub-Saharan Africa; they would deal with only one-quarter of the debt service burden that these countries presently have to bear."

This underpins the more far-reaching proposal made

have been applied. But is it enough, or are bold efforts needed which would reduce the debt burden and yet still give Western creditors the leverage they demand to induce economic reform?

by the Dutch Development Corporation Minister Jan Pronk, and later backed by the United Nations secretary-general during a review last year of Africa's economic recovery, for the cancellation of all bilateral official debt (concessional and non-concessional) owed by the poorest countries.

According to Mistry, this would result in the cancellation of about \$40 billion in outstanding debt (compared to \$17 billion under the Trinidad terms). A major attraction, the former World Bank economist notes, is that "it would be easy to administer, involving the least amount of fuss and complexity."

However, largely at the insistence of the U.S. (which has resisted cancelling non-concessional aid on technical grounds, and any attempt at across-the-board solutions to the debt problem on political grounds) the UN resolution called only for a "case by case" application of measures going "well beyond the relief granted under the Toronto terms" for the "poorest, most indebted countries."

A crucial outstanding issue for Africa is the debt of its lower middle-income countries which—unlike counterparts globally, who borrowed mostly from commercial banks—are largely indebted to official creditors, and face serious payments problems, despite their status.

Between 1987 and 1989, according to World Bank figures, these countries had a mere \$206 million in concessional aid cancelled, and have largely remained outside the Toronto agreement. Nigeria is a particular anomaly. Following its oil bust, Africa's largest nation has been reclassified from middle-income to low-income status. But because it continues to borrow from the IBRD, it is not eligible for the SPA, nor has it received Toronto terms from the Paris Club.

Following the 1990 G7 Houston summit, which came up with some relief for lower middle-income countries with high levels of official debt, Morocco and Congo have benefitted from schemes which include the extension of rescheduling maturities to 15 years for ODA loans. A major innovation in this scheme is that it allows for debt-equity, and debt-for-nature swaps, previously only applied to commercial debt. France has gone further to lower interest rates on its non-concessional loans to four middle-income countries.

However, these measures remain insufficient, prompting the World Bank to urge creditors to extend Toronto terms to highly indebted middle-income African countries.

Because commercial debt is relatively insignificant for most African countries, the Brady initiative, helpful in reducing Latin America's debt, has only been applied in Morocco. In September 1991, Nigeria—the only other African country with a significant commercial debt—worked out a deal with its Bank Advisory Committee to reduce its \$16.8 billion private debt through a combination of a cash buy-back, bond for debt exchange at par, and conversion notes combined with new money.

Two years ago, the World Bank established a \$100 million Debt Reduction Facility to provide \$10 million each to low-income countries to buy back their commercial

debt. Niger has concluded such a deal, and Mozambique is next in line.

However, according to Mistry, for the scheme to be effective, it will need to be increased to about \$500 million. Despite spearheading debt initiatives, the multilateral agencies do not reschedule debt themselves, and monies owed to them present a major headache for both low- and middle-income African countries.

In 1988, the World Bank put aside 10 percent of its repayments to IDA to help eligible countries pay their interest on debt owed to the IBRD (contracted at market interest rates). Some donors have helped individual African countries clear their arrears with the Bank.

The IMF has also mobilized additional resources from developed country members to help debtor countries in arrears with the Fund. In 1991, the IMF adopted the "rights approach," in which, for each successful implementation of its economic restructuring program, a country in arrears accumulates a notional credit. Zambia has been the first African country to benefit from this.

Oxford's Mistry maintains, however, that what is most needed is a special one-time emission of about SDR 5 billion to enable the IMF to write off the debts of low-income countries. However, a recommendation by the UN secretary-general that ways be found to substantially reduce Africa's multilateral debt met with stiff resistance from Western donors, especially the U.S., which said such action would undermine the credit ratings of multilateral institutions.

What emerges from the mosaic of debt relief measures so far applied in Africa, according to Mistry, is that though "bold," they are still "insufficient."

While the principle of reducing the debt stock has now been accepted, questions of magnitude, and applicability to debt carrying market interest rates, especially non-concessional aid and multilateral debt, still loom large.

The U.S.'s underlying objection is that if debt is written off, donors will have no leverage to ensure that countries continue to undertake policy reform.

Mistry argues that insofar as commercial banks are being forced to discount their debt by as much as 80 percent, official and multilateral creditors would do well to acknowledge reality, and do the same.

Moreover, he says, "debt reduction on the scale necessary would remove the last excuse that some African governments have in not embracing economic reforms more enthusiastically and speedily. The real cost to creditors in providing such relief is relatively small, but the potential gains to African debtors are so large as to make the risk worth taking."

Unless debt service is brought to a level where economies are able to grow, adds Zimbabwe's Chidzero, African countries will never emerge from the vicious poverty cycle, let alone repay what they owe.

Such a figure need not be rigid, as long as the principle is accepted, the minister says. After all, he reflects, "if nations can evolve laws to deal with bankruptcy, why can't the global financial system do the same?" ○

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## NEWS COMMENTARY AND OPINION

By VIVIAN LOWERY DERRYCK

**E**ducation continues to be the linchpin of development. Long after most other development projects have run their course, the benefits and cost effectiveness of investment in education are clear. This was the unassailable conclusion of more than 250 African alumni of U.S. training programs who met in Dakar, Senegal, in late April. Two activities took place. The first, a regional seminar, discussed issues of governance in Africa. The second, a national colloquium, focused on governance in Senegal.

Both the colloquium and seminar in Senegal were jointly sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development (U.S. AID) through the African Training for Leadership and Advanced Skills program (ATLAS), the U.S. AID mission in Senegal, and the African-American Institute, the implementing agency for ATLAS.

Africa is in a position of paradox. On the one hand, intractable economic problems, ongoing regional conflicts, and a devastating drought raging through East and southern Africa tend to dampen hopes for rapid economic and social development. On the other hand, the rapid re-involvement of citizens in government, and the average of 3 to 4 percent growth rates of some countries make friends of Africa hopeful. On the one hand, we are concerned about the incredible brain drain of skilled labor outside the country—four times as many Ghanaian doctors practice abroad as in Ghana—and on the other hand, skilled managers and professionals are returning home as never before.

Four major currents seem to be flowing through the continent: democratization, privatization, demilitarization, and marginalization. Human resources have a major role to play in addressing each of them.

Educated middle and senior managers are essential to the success of any drive to include a broader sector of the society. Privatization cannot succeed without trained manpower to guide the transition and interpret new economic guidelines. Demilitarization must include teaching literary skills and income generation skills to army regulars for it to be successful. And stemming marginalization requires breaking down intellectual barriers and promoting commonalities. Education is the best way to promote contact among researchers and scholars, as well as to ensure that African research priorities are included on the international agenda.

Africans and Africanists are particularly concerned about formal education in this time of shrinking resources and African marginalization. Ironically, as U.S.-trained professionals move into positions of authority and influence and are deeply involved in the dramatic changes facing the continent, donors are moving toward investment in primary and secondary education. The two symposia offered a timely opportunity to assess the utility and effectiveness of U.S. graduate education, especially given the role of the intellectual elite in monitoring change and interpreting new realities to the broader population.

In the first of the two back-to-back meetings, participants discussed democratization initiatives currently under way in each of the five countries represented and compared responses to common challenges. The second meeting, a colloquium on the art of governing, built upon the conclusions of the first meeting as they applied to Senegal.

The meetings marked the first time in Senegal that a group of Vivian Lowery Derryck is president of the African-American Institute.

U.S.-trained senior officials had the opportunity to bring the skills of their respective disciplines to focus on a unique topic—and entrepreneurs had the chance to focus on their roles and responsibilities as part of the intellectual leadership shaping opinions and popular responses to the sweeping changes dominating the continent.

Two themes were repeated throughout the meetings. Initially, participants focused on democratization and the new access of citizens to participation in government, and debated appropriate strategies for ensuring democratic transitions. Focusing on the second theme, they discussed issues in education: certification and the role of the intelligentsia. Certification is a major issue for those who will live and work in a francophone environment in which U.S. degrees do not always have the same salience and credibility as degrees from French universities. The ability to bring a highly specialized discipline to bear on one of society's larger issues was graphically demonstrated as participants talked about the relationship of education and the military, education and maintenance of intellectual capital, education, and communication with rural populations.

Highlights of the symposia included the presentations by Goran Hyden, professor of political science at the University of Florida, who introduced the concept of social capital, the good will that one accumulates in the normal course of business and governance transactions. He pointed out the importance of social capital in Africa and related it to good governance.

Achille Mbembe, a Cameroonian scholar, advancing the argument that democracy inevitably means social and economic dislocations and exclusion for some part of the population, discussed the politics of exclusion. In vigorous dissent, participants felt that they had a responsibility to ensure that no one was left out in African democratization.

Participants at both meetings concluded that U.S. education was not only substantively strong in their various disciplines, but also provided important management skills. Many participants had acquired a new way of thinking. Participants confirmed the applicability and appropriateness of U.S. education, especially in management training. For instance, brainstorming as a management tool had been introduced in more than one Senegalese ministry.

Most important, civil society as experienced by living in another country was helpful to all of the participants. This exposure has been particularly important in democratization efforts, as new leaders referenced their U.S. experience in national transitions. These new leaders include the prime minister of Côte d'Ivoire, the prime minister of Namibia, and the former prime minister of Mali, Soumana Sako. All are AFGRAD alumni, as are eight vice-chancellors of African universities and various cabinet ministers across the continent. (The African Graduate Fellowship Program, AFGRAD, has been administered by AAI since 1963. Its successor program, also funded by U.S. AID, is ATLAS.)

Ultimately, the two meetings reinforced the pivotal relationship of education to development and affirmed the appropriateness of U.S. investment in human resources development. Participants noted the importance of the U.S. not only in human resources development, but in fostering democratization and urged that AID continue and expand those initiatives.

The two activities were an opportunity to consult with exactly the kind of private and public sector leaders Africa needs to move from growing democracies to growing economies. ■

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