WOMEN: Equal Partners in Africa’s Development?
This issue is devoted almost exclusively to the topic of African women and their substantial, although not fully realized, role in the continent's economic development. While the majority of African women are engaged in some form of economic activity, particularly in the agricultural sector, they have yet to benefit from free access to training and education. Development planners often ignore women's contributions to the day-to-day functioning of Africa's developing economies.

Ambassador Mildred Malineau Tau of Lesotho provides an overview of the current status and future needs of African women in order to facilitate their full integration into the development process. Dr. Achola Pala Okeyo, a Kenyan anthropologist, reflects on the activities of the past decade in bringing the issue of women and development to the forefront of international discussions. She finds that while action on the issue has intensified, so too has the proliferation of certain myths which could hinder progress in the future.

Samira Harfoush contributes to the understanding of the difficulties and challenges faced by women in the Arab world. She looks at some nontraditional training programs being employed in northern Africa. The staff of the African Training and Research Centre for Women in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia offers an examination of their program and activities. ATRCW, part of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, is the major continent-wide organization working toward women's advancement.

From the United States, Irene Tinker examines the types of policies that must be adopted for the 1980s in order to ensure that the progress made thus far for women has not been in vain. Gayla Cook offers guidelines for outside assistance programs aimed at addressing African women's needs, looking at where the real needs lie.

An interview with Teurai Ropa Nhongo, the only woman minister in the Mugabe government, provides an interesting insight into how an African woman in a policymaking position perceives her own and her countrywomen's roles in a newly independent Zimbabwe. Kathleen McCaffrey, an American freelance journalist, discusses the unique way in which women are portrayed in African films. Several recent publications on women in developing societies are reviewed, and a list of resources on African women is provided.

The remaining articles in the issue address what the decade of the 1980s will mean for African-American relations. From Washington, Richard Deutsch examines how the Reagan administration's new policymakers look at African issues. U.S. Congressman William H. Gray and the Tanzanian minister of information and culture, Benjamin Mkapa, in speeches presented before the African-American Institute's eleventh African-American Conference, give their views on what policymakers in the U.S. and Africa must do if relations are to follow a positive course in the coming years.

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Women: Critical to African Development

BY AMBASSADOR MILDRED MALINEO TAU

Women, especially rural women, are the core of development in most African countries. Most of them are faced with a disproportionate level of responsibility for which they are ill prepared. Development efforts have had the tendency to 'plan for instead of with women.'

Recognition of the role of women in development is critical. There are many efforts to introduce women into the process of development, but these efforts must not be mere gestures to make them appear useful. Women in development projects should make sense and they should fit well within national guidelines and development plans.

Women believe that progress for women is progress for all. That is probably the most compelling reason for African women's efforts to enter the development process as full participants rather than as spectators.

There are many common factors inherent in the status of women throughout the world, such as lack of access to and control over resources, comparatively lower educational attainment, low political participation, and long hours of unremunerated work.

One striking characteristic of African women is their multiplicity of roles. African women's contribution to an active involvement in subsistence farming and wage activities, their critical presence in marketing, food distribution networks, and their continued responsibilities as wives and mothers combine to make their role in the survival of the family and the community most important. Their various activities and responsibilities have resulted in a complex and interrelated set of needs to which development programs must address themselves. The majority of African women are engaged in agriculture.

Several factors have militated against development programs having a positive impact on these women. First, development planning has been based largely on male conceptualizations of life, which most often fail to take into account the activities of, and socio-economic pressures impinging upon, women. Second, they are often designed from an urban viewpoint rather than from an understanding of the dynamics of rural life.
The heavy dependence in Africa on subsistence agriculture, which is largely the province of women, makes policies affecting land, its distribution, and ownership critical to development. The situation of African women has been negatively influenced by colonialism's impact. Where land ownership traditionally fell to the elders, it would appear that administrators who failed to appreciate the importance of this system often deeded land to males as heads of households rather than to women who worked it and were frequently de facto heads of households. Assuming that men were the primary factors in agricultural production, improved technology and training were offered to men, but not to women. Thus, the lives of African women have been doubly circumscribed by the discriminatory practices inherent in their own societies and by the different, but no less discriminatory, norms of Western cultures.

Despite continuing subsistence responsibilities, the increasing monetization of economies in developing countries puts an extra demand on women to raise cash for food, transportation, shelter, school fees, and household supplies. The opportunities for women's entry into the cash economy are severely limited, but it is they who need the cash since incidental cash earned by men is less likely to go into the basic needs of the family than that earned by women. Women's overrepresentation in subsistence farming as unpaid family laborers in the informal sectors of the economy reflects both their hard work and increasing marginality in the economic system. Improving their productive capacity even within these spheres of activity has been limited by their lack of access to training, intermediate and advanced technology, and capital resources.

The heavy and interrelated responsibilities of African women make knowledge and understanding of their use of time and resources important to program planning. The long hours African women labor and the near impossibility of cutting out any of this work which is so necessary for daily survival, hinder their ability to participate in development activities, take advantage of training, health services, political forums, etc.

Environmental conditions present in many African countries have imposed heavy burdens on women. Fetching water and collecting fuel can consume a large portion of a woman's time each day. Improving the productive capacity of women as a means of enhancing general development gains will need to include attention to access to water and fuel.

The social, psychological, and economic value of children in Africa, as well as traditional ideas and means of regulating fertility, influence the way in which family planning programs and policies can operate. The needs of children are paramount to African mothers, and these must be addressed in conjunction with family planning services. Thus, in most countries the integration of family planning with maternal and child health is necessary. Demographic data show that family planning programs in many African countries are not being utilized fully, either in terms of new or continued acceptance. This situation makes reorientation of services to meet the needs of the woman as we perceive them critical. It also suggests that the programs may need to include activities designed to create or

Environmental conditions in African countries impose heavy burdens on women
encourage demand for family planning. Not only are women suffering the increasingly negative impact of development, but due to their primary role as providers of food, clothing, and shelter, socioeconomic development in general is being jeopardized by lack of attention to interrelated concerns of women.

Among the potential resources for development in Africa are a strong tradition of cooperative work and diverse and often strong women’s organizations, both formal and informal. In a number of African countries, there is national machinery of some sort established to advance opportunities and prospects of women, and in some there are strong women in a few top-level policymaking positions, but the national machinery lacks support services and the women in the policymaking positions are too few.

Given the living conditions and social and economic pressures faced by African women and their crucial role in development, there are a number of needs which must be addressed. These are in the areas of agriculture, water, community development, appropriate technology, education and training, women’s roles, credit, marketing and management, and income-related activities. Attention should also be given to projects in which the main objective is to contribute to policy formulation and enforcement. Policy projects may be addressed in legislative revisions, national planning priorities, program planning and implementation.

Attention must be paid to the interrelated concerns of women

Several factors inherent in the African situation are relevant to policy development. First, the contributions of women are critical to social and economic development in Africa. But their roles have been largely invisible. Only recently has recognition of their integral part begun to be reflected in the literature and at conferences and meetings. Second, in Africa both revision and implementation of legislation must recognize the simultaneous existence of civil codes and customary law which operate in most countries. These are particularly critical in determining family rights and responsibilities such as inheritance, divorce, and polygamy. While laws do provide for equality between men and women, their implementation is often inadequate. For example, women may be denied credit as a policy of the bank although by law discrimination is prohibited. We need support for projects which analyze existing legislation, monitor implementation, or disseminate information and education to grass-roots women on their legal rights and responsibilities.

The issue of women’s access to wage work and other sources of cash income in the African continent is more than one of equity. It goes beyond the question of equal rights for women to become one of economic survival for them and their children. Because women in Africa are not secondary earners, neither ideologically or in reality are they in Latin America, for example, but are providers of food, clothing, and shelter, their increased dependence on the monetary economy may have a more immediate negative impact on African women. If their role as main provider continues to go unacknowledged in development planning, the consequences could be serious.

It is inappropriate and artificial to try and make generalizations or recommendations about which development sector to emphasize for African women. These should be left to the national governments which know what situation prevails in each country. In trying to create a new and just order, African governments should also reflect on women as instruments for peace and prosperity.
A general consensus now exists based upon the broad proposition that women's relatively low and even deteriorating status the world over, if allowed to persist, will present a continuing and basic challenge to the effective achievement of development goals.

For those who are persuaded that positive change in the situation of women is vital for development, such a broad-based consensus, however tenuous, carries with it several advantages. Objectively, it continues to support and give rationale to the improvement of concepts, methodologies of research, and data collection to clarify and substantiate the various manifestations of inequality between the sexes. A recent study for instance shows that new research and data seek to challenge previous treatment of women's work in economic analysis (see a review of some of this literature in "Review and Evaluation of Progress Achieved in the Implementation of the World Plan of Action: Employment." World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women held in July 1980 in Copenhagen. Time and again these meetings are faced with reminders that tactics and strategies must be evolved by women of each region in ways most suited to their circumstances for they alone know best what is good for them, what strategies are realistic, and what tactics must be employed in the realization of this universal consensus.

If there is to be any genuine exchange of experiences at the international level, it is particularly important to review some of the basic assumptions that are rapidly becoming entrenched around the subject of women and development and their implications for endogenous processes for women's advancement in Third World countries.

What follows are my own reflections on the subject and why some of these assumptions viewed from an African perspective must be discarded.

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE DEBATE ON WOMEN

The internationalization of the debate on the situation of women particularly within the framework of the United Nations, a body in which all independent African states are members, has perhaps three important consequences for the region. First of all,
African women often define their advancement by improving their families’ standard of living.

This process has helped strengthen and legitimate mandates for national action in the interest of women because of such mandates. Secondly, the debate continues to create an atmosphere for discussion in which African women can articulate their priorities and influence international opinion and images of African women (see, for instance, “Building New Knowledge Through Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries: The Experience of the Association of African Women for Research and Development [AAWORD],” United Nations TCDC/6, March 6, 1980). Thirdly it has become apparent that this is an area in which women of the developed world seek to define for themselves a leading role both in academia and through development assistance programs. As such it is all the more necessary for us to decide whether the assumptions that underlie these external definitions of the woman’s problem are really applicable to our situation.

UNDERSTANDING THE SITUATION OF AFRICAN WOMEN

Central to an understanding of the situation of African women are two basic facts: first the international division of labor that places Africa in a dependency relationship with Europe and the United States; secondly, those indigenous ideologies and socio-economic norms that still form the basis of our aspirations, self-images, and interpersonal relationships.

On one level, therefore, we are faced with those constraints of unequal economic power emanating from a division of labor in which our countries continue to provide raw materials for industrial production that is carried on in the metropolitan countries. This division of labor was highly intensified during the age of colonialism, a period that is by no means behind Africa yet. Its persistence, despite the achievement of political independence, means that African people must continually struggle to resist and eliminate economic exploitation and any ideology that is used to justify it.

On another level, our own cultural traditions, which are by no means monolithic or static, play a role in the definition of woman in society. Like all cultural traditions they have embedded within them ideologies that support male superiority. However, they also have symbols of female superiority and the male and female are not always diametrically opposed to each other. What is of particular relevance here is that there is an interactive process going on between the division of labor at the international and national level, and this process has direct consequences for division of labor within the family and cultural images of men and women.

THREE MYTHS

The Cultural Argument

What I have chosen to describe as the “cultural argument” is the viewpoint that explains inequality of opportunity between the sexes by the degree to which a culture is “open” or “closed.” The so-called open cultures are deemed to be more receptive to change while closed cultures are more resistant. Invariably this viewpoint treats culture as monolithic and static and usually one index is chosen (for example, religion or marriage) as the one overriding determinant of women’s low status.

In regard to Africa, one hears that Islam is a problem for women of North Africa, and for other parts of Africa polygamy or bridewealth are often quoted as obstacles. To assume that there is something inherent and unchanging in a culture first presupposes that there is such a thing as a cultural system divorced from economic and political forces, but this is simply erroneous. Secondly, it presupposes that there are no endogenous processes of change in those cultural traditions. This argument sometimes becomes a camouflage for the introduction of exogenous factors like technical or financial assistance, personnel, etc., and the belief that these alone will change the position of women.

The cultural argument is dangerous, first because it sees women as a separate category outside of the social, economic, and political circumstances in which they live, the totality of which defines their position. Secondly, it is an argument that diverts attention from the economic constraints placed upon African women by the international economic order. As such it argues for the irrelevance of the international division
of labor and any efforts to restructure the exploitative relationship that now exist between developed and developing countries. Thirdly, it is a dangerous argument because in it one discerns a certain resurgence of arrogance and paternalism that ultimately defines a role, albeit illegitimate, for external intervention in changing the local situation. And this is why the myth of culture as an obstacle to the advancement of African women must be discarded.

Single indicators like religion, marriage, or health practices are in themselves inadequate and frequently misleading for explaining the position of women anywhere, and Africa is no exception to this fact. Because research on African society and social change has historically been dominated by metropolitan researchers and development assistance institutions for their own purposes, there is a continuing intellectual tradition that prefers to see Africa in stereotyped and easy-to-explain categories. There is little evidence that these caricatured images of African women in the minds of Western society are really changing.

A standing caricature, for instance, of African women who challenge these alien and patronizing notions is that they are "angry," "militant" or perhaps are no longer fit to speak from an African perspective for other African women because of their Western education! This characterization of articulate sections of our people has been done before. In the colonial times those who often spoke out and even led protest movements against the colonial regimes were often described as terrorists, communists or angry "young men armed with little learning and a lot of patriotism"; and those who were equally educated but said nothing to challenge the regimes were considered "civilized," and "gentlemen." It is therefore easy to see why these notions undermine the integrity of any international consensus on the subject of women and development.

On the "Politicization of Women's Issues"

Another assumption that is often voiced by Western feminists in international fora is that women's issues should not be politicized. At the same time one hears these same persons lamenting the fact that in their countries women are not in senior or high-level decision-making positions. One might ask how these apolitical creatures are ever to penetrate the highly political circles of high-level decision making.

For African women the subject of women's advancement is highly political because it is an integral part of our quest for justice not only at the household level but all the way within the local, national, and world economic order. African women are therefore not alarmed when issues of decolonization are raised in the course of discussing women and development. The sharing of power, the challenging of dominant power structures — be they embodied in class, sex, or race — has never been a nonviolent or nonpolitical act.

Professed innocence about a non-political women's movement or issue is hard to accept in today's world full as it is of conflict, poverty, and the possibility of annexation of one sovereign state by another.

For the majority of African countries the past two decades are poignant because they epitomize the struggle for national independence that was fought and won, and not without long and arduous effort and sacrifice by our women, our men, and our children. Even today the struggle against colonial domination, cultural alienation, and racial discrimination continues. Uppermost in the minds of many is the achievement of national sovereignty for our own reality is different. If the implication is that when women are in decision-making positions. One might ask how these apolitical creatures are ever to penetrate the highly political circles of high-level decision making.

For African women the subject of women's advancement is political because it is an integral part of our quest for justice.

Man the Enemy

It would appear that the extreme atomization of life in industrialized societies and the growing alienation between the home and the work place has led to a general feeling among many women of the developed world that the real enemy of women's advancement is man. If this is true in these circumstances, it is certainly not a universal fact. Indeed many women of the

South Africa: For African women, the subject of advancement is political because it is an integral part of the quest for justice.

Third World do not see their immediate obstacle represented in men.

There are important reasons why in Africa it is not realistic to accept the proposition that man is the enemy. First and foremost it is a distortion of women's aspirations to assume that all they wish to emulate is the male standard, however defined, because it presupposes a psychological ambivalence
about being female where the attributes associated by being female are almost always seen as negative. It represents a denial of femaleness as defined for them by Western society.

In most of Africa, women have always engaged in productive work that is not necessarily confined to the domestic sphere. They are farmers, market women, vendors, and politicians, as well as mothers, sisters, and wives. While their workload is great and increasing, their responsibilities do not often generate the type of psychic stress or alienation that cause them to define their relationship with men in adversary terms.

In some instances the male standard does not really offer anything to emulate. For instance, when men are employed in arduous low-paying jobs in the towns, their wages, conditions of work, and living cannot really be seen as a yardstick for success because the truth of the matter is that these men are being exploited.

If as is sometimes believed by men of the West that supporting women's programs may lead to conflict between men and women in a given community, this too is a myth that must be dispelled. African women often define their advancement in terms of what they can do to improve the standard of living of their families. This objective, which is quite comprehensive, does not in any way preclude the men in their lives. They, however, feel that they want to continue to provide for their families effectively and any efforts that are directed toward fulfilling this objective are not lost.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing is an indication of some of the factors that at the present time stand in the way of meaningful discussion between women of the developed and developing world. It is clear that there are many experiences that could be shared, but the first imperative is an atmosphere of mutual respect. For those interested in supporting the efforts that African women are making toward their own advancement, it is particularly important to discard myths, some of which I have discussed in these notes.

There are efforts at networking among women of the region represented, for instance, by the initiatives of the Association of African Women for Research and Development (AAWORD), at present based in Dakar, Senegal. Women's groups and national organizations are present in virtually every country. African women in academia and public service are writing about their situations. Rural women, for one, are struggling against poverty and the encroachment on their lives by multinationals such as agribusiness, etc. They are not sitting idle waiting to receive manna from heaven. They are working daily to improve their lives. It is in the context of these concerns that any support will be meaningful and desirable.
Women-in-development as a theoretical construct is barely a decade old. When the themes for International Women's Year — peace, equality, and development — were identified during the UN debate in 1971, the reference to development merely reflected the prevailing attitudes toward development as enunciated in the documents for the UN Second Development Decade. Overall attitudes toward development a decade ago were optimistic; integrating women into development would bring to them the fruits of modernization. It is unlikely that any of the delegates stopped to analyze the meaning of that phrase — "integrating women into development." Yet it is clearly based upon the widely held assumption that women around the world generally do little work of economic value. Women's roles are perceived very differently in the various versions of the ideal modern society, so that integrating women into development must necessarily have different meanings and approaches in different ideologies. But none of this was mentioned, much less debated. So the UN delegates could join together on this seemingly benign statement, never anticipating that the women of the world would begin to question the underlying assumptions of women's roles in all development theories and so challenge the verities upon which much development planning is based.

It is important, in light of the discouraging statistics about women's progress presented to the World Conference of the UN Decade for Women in Copenhagen, to recall how recently the women-in-development efforts began. The list of responses is impressive. The U.S. Congress added the Percy Amendment to the 1973 Foreign Assistance Act; in response, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) set up a special office for Women in Development. Senator Charles Percy (R-Ill.) is now the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the most powerful foreign policy post in the U.S. Congress. He has assured us of his continuing concern that women benefit from development equitably with men.

In a 1980 Foreign Relations Committee report, Senator Percy refers to the efforts of AID as concerns women in development: "The Committee has a continuing interest in the Agency's efforts to involve women in its development programs overseas. The Committee appreciates the effort of the Agency to bring the role of women in development to the forefront on the list of priorities considered by AID project aid program planners. The U.S. emphasis in this area has had an impact on the thinking of economic and development experts worldwide."

At an international level, various UN bodies passed resolutions requiring that programs include women as well as men as actors and beneficiaries. Today most agencies have a section or position designated to ensure that women are in fact considered in the design and implementation of programs. Donors of foreign assistance have held special meetings about methods of planning and funding programs for women. Development issues were dominant at the Mexico City meetings for the International Women's Year both at the official UN conference and at the nongovernmental organizations' Tribune.

The increase in literature on the subject has been exponential. The problem is no longer quantity, but how to locate what is available so that planners and scholars alike can have access to the new ideas and data.

What has been the impact of all this activity? Not much. It is clearly easier to project goals than to impact on policy. During the 1970s, many of us tried to influence policy by collecting data to refute development theory and refine development planning. Others developed small women's projects designed to bring income or family planning to

Irene Tinker has been a leading advocate of women in development efforts since 1972. Her testimony before Congress provided the theoretical basis for the 1973 Percy Amendment. In 1976 she founded the Equity Policy Center, a nonprofit organization concerned with the issues, policies, and programs regarding women in development, where she continues to serve as director.
women. With a decade of experience behind us, it is time to review current strategies, both philosophical and programming, and to consider whether they are adequate for the task.

**PHILOSOPHICAL STRATEGIES**

Women work. Women have always worked. Women need work. It may seem strange to call such a statement of fact philosophical. Yet in 1972 when I first began talking about women-in-development, most planners thought of women as nonworking housewives. It became necessary to demonstrate that what women do, in fact, is work, that only a few societies have the affluence that allows their upper-class women the luxury of doing nothing. That women's work is not tabulated in national statistics is more a reflection on the definition of work than a comment on women's time. By ignoring women's economic contributions to nation and family, planners not only left women out of their projects, but actually undercut their traditional activities from rice harvesting to snack foods, from handicrafts to beer-making. The first response of women to the male stereotypes about women was to collect data and design studies to show what women really do. A growing number of carefully constructed time-budget studies show scientifically what we women have always known: that women everywhere work longer hours than men.

**Women Work For Money**

The daily activities fall into several distinct types of work: income-producing, income-substituting, and household tasks. As modernization proceeds, more and more women show up in the first category. But not all of them, for much of this money is earned in the informal sector, both rural and urban. In rural areas the move toward cash cropping has had devastating effects on women's ability to feed their families. Study after study shows that the best land goes for cash crops, that too little land is left for women's vegetable gardens, that women therefore lack money to buy food they at one time grew, that nutritional levels of the women and children fall even when the family income rises. This scenario is typically African, where women's responsibilities toward their children are generally theirs alone. But similar problems are found in Asia. Families are dependent on the women's income, yet women are treated as a short-term labor shortage solution, to be cast out again with agricultural modernization. We know the trends and we have the information, but we need policies, not studies.

Women who flock to the cities are generally absorbed by the informal sector. While doing everything from selling off a cart to owning small shops and restaurants, these women are seldom counted in national statistics. One reason is that some women may deny that they work, particularly in societies where the ideal of women-in-the-home remains dominant. Even in the United States, women who earn money catering meals or watching children may not consider this "work," or not report it because they wish to escape taxes on their income.

Increasingly, time-budget studies try to include income figures and information about who controls expenditure. Such data is much more difficult to obtain than time-use statistics. While time-budget studies are often recorded for the researcher by the women themselves, only observation techniques can be considered fully accurate. Money expenditures would require even closer observation, or greater estimation. How useful are such studies for planners? Or is such information more for theoretical or academic concerns? If you prove that women spend more of their income on food than men do, does it follow that you can then pay women more? Or do you try to educate the husband about his family responsibilities? Do you need the study to do either of these things?

Yet income of women is an important issue, considering that even in the modern sector activities in the United States women make only 59 cents to a male dollar. Despite legal requirements of equal pay for equal work, women around the world find that occupational segregation, if not wage discrimination, keeps women underpaid in jobs at the bottom of the economic status ladder.

**Women's Work Substitutes For Money**

In a subsistence society most of the work done by the family is to provide themselves with food, clothes, and shelter. A man or woman planting a neighbor's grain might receive money. Exchange labor or payment in kind is rapidly disappearing under the pressure of a monetized society; previously such nonmonetary rewards would have slipped through the statisticians' net in most countries as does much family farm labor. Even less likely to be reflected in national budgets is such activity as processing food, fetching water or firewood, or weaving cloth. Once the rice is milled by a machine, water is piped to the home, kerosene is purchased, or readymade clothes bought, such activity is counted. Economists have assumed until recently that modernization would in fact pull most people into the web of the modern marketplace where most such basics are bought and sold. The energy crisis has pushed up the cost of commercial milling, pumping, or weaving, and made kerosene inaccessible to many poor, pushing women back into the drudgery associated with this income-substituting work. Until women are relieved of these time-consuming activities, however, they have no time or energy to devote to activities with a greater return which might help break the cycle of poverty.
Care must be taken not to add to the time burden of women, rather than relieving it.

**Women Work A Double-Day**

Almost everywhere women provide the services and love which define the household. Women cook and wash and clean all their lives, and look after children for a good part of it as the second half of their double-day. American and French feminists have tried to put an economic value on housework; the one agreed conclusion is that the economic cost of paying for a woman's household services is so high that no one can afford it. One strategy is followed in Sweden where men as well as women are given maternity leave, and where theoretically all household tasks are shared. This seems a more realistic response than putting a price tag on every activity.

The existence of the double-day provides much of the rationale for lower wages in both the formal and informal sectors: women only work for pin money; women cannot take full administrative responsibility if they have children at home; women employees cost more if babysitting must be provided. Demands by women's groups worldwide for equal employment opportunities for women move quickly to demands for special childcare facilities. In the United States, decades of special legislation for women which governs hours, places of work, or times of employment have been interpreted by modern feminists as counterproductive today: special provisions inhibit women's equality. Therefore, childcare facilities must be seen as a societal need and not an employment issue, if women with children want to work.

Childcare centers alone do not guarantee equal pay or equal opportunities, as studies in several centralized socialist states have shown. Nor do they relieve women of childcare or household chores after work is over. These activities of women's double-day must also be shared or simplified. The time-consuming duties of women outside the place of work are certainly one major cause of the declining birthrates and high death rates in that country because their policymakers have ignored the facts of the double-day.

**Employment At Mid-Decade**

The major response of women around the world to the concept of integrating women in development has been to assert that women work, but that increasingly they need money. If modernization has undercut women's traditional economic activities, then alternative income-generating activities must be provided. Credit for small market or industrial activities becomes crucial, for in most places women have no rights to land or harvest even where they are the major farmworkers. Accounting and market procedures must be taught to women — even traditional market women need help in filling out governmental forms. Poor women are likely to be illiterate, education having gone to the elite and to men whereas women began to work while still young girls.

The Mid-Decade Conference emphasized three sectors of particular need for women: employment, health, and education. Many would argue that money is the crucial need; poor health is improved with good food; education is a luxury in a 16-hour day spent barely surviving. Yet only in 1980 did AID set up a section on employment; the World Bank still does not list such an office. Probably this was due to the assumption that employment meant modern sector work in industries or bureaucracies; small shops, trading, marketing, or restaurants were considered too small for the national planners to notice. Because women are more likely than men to find a livelihood in this sector, small-scale employment has become a woman's issue, and in many ways the predominant issue of the 70s.

Industrial employment by multinational companies in the rapidly modernizing countries is another growing issue. Young women employed in modern electronic or textile plants may work fewer hours than they did on the farm and will certainly be paid higher wages. But is the rural sector the right comparison? What happens to these young workers after a few years? Most are encouraged or forced to leave when they marry. Since such industry relies on the existence of an excess of semieducated women workers, the problem is not likely to reach Africa in the near future. Domestic industry reflects many of the same dilemmas, however, and so will be of concern to many urban women in Africa.

**PROGRAMMING STRATEGIES**

Since its inception, development planning has emphasized economic activity and measured its success in gross national product. It is little wonder that women's response to being left out of development was to demand economic rights and to propose income-generating programs for women. The credibility of women's demands was enhanced by criticisms within the development community itself about the inability of development to provide basic needs to the poor in the developing countries. Although there have been extensive discussions over what constitutes basic needs, the difficulties of measuring education or health, much less art or beauty, have resulted in an emphasis on programs to enhance income activities.

**Women-Only Projects**

The easiest and quickest response to women's demands for programs reaching women has been to set up
women’s projects. Often these projects were run by local women’s groups with funds flowing through international nongovernmental or women’s organizations. At their best, such programs have had dramatic impacts on the lives of women and have provided invaluable leadership training to local women. The mabati effort in Kenya brought both tin roofs and economic independence to many women; a beer-making project improved women’s income in Upper Volta; a cooperative dairy allowed women in India to earn money for their cows’ milk. Yet the surfeit of vegetables, pork, and chicken pouring into Nairobi undercut the market for the mabati women; a government-supported brewery destroyed the market for homemade beer, and selling milk has reduced the nutritional level of their children while not significantly changing the women’s position in the Indian communities.

The problem was in treating women’s projects as separate from development planning. Often the economic validity of the programs was not tested on the grounds that these were really welfare projects. Or the projects were so isolated that central planners did not know about them. Running projects through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) raises the issue of communication; when the NGOs are women’s groups lacking network ties to governmental ministries, the distance is great indeed. Finally, women-only projects are invariably small because funds are channeled to “more important” projects.

For the 1980s, then, women should focus their efforts on integrating women into development programming. The projects mentioned above should have been part of rural development programs, with beneficiaries clearly identified and economic implications carefully analyzed. Women should also insist that all development planning consider the differential impact on women and on men, especially projects with major funding.

Energy, for example, is currently a high-priority sector. At the country level the solutions to the energy crisis are projected in improved cookstoves and in the planting of community forests. If women are not involved in these projects or in formulating alternatives, the solutions are unlikely to succeed. Similarly, worldwide programs to bring clean water to all by the year 1990 must necessarily work with women at the community level.

Women’s groups and women in planning positions may need to provide the link between such village women and the male programmers. Too often technologies to alleviate human energy are introduced only to men due to the persistence of yet another stereotype about women. When men are given control of new technologies which replace women’s traditional work, then women lose power while men gain. This has been at the root of much of the negative impact of development on women and must be prevented from happening as a result of new energy or water projects.

Once the role of women is recognized in these projects, then special provisions will probably need to be made to reach women. Women’s organizations may well be the best method for contacting local women or delivering services. Working with planners has the added advantage of plugging project results back into the planning procedure. While women-only projects are generally marginal and peripheral, integrated projects which disaggregate the beneficiaries for the purposes of carrying out the project but which put women’s needs into context, remain in the mainstream both for funding and planning purposes.

This strategy requires careful planning and strong local leadership. Without this, integrated programs will too easily fall back into the earlier pattern where women were ignored altogether. Thus women-only projects will still be needed in many places, to develop self-confident leadership and to test out project ideas. Even then, such projects should be set within the overall development context more carefully than has often been the case with earlier projects.

Kenyan women fetching water: Such subsistence activity is not likely to be reflected in national budgets.
Women Decision Makers

One reason given for the adverse impact that development has had on women is the lack of women in decision-making positions. Women in high-level positions are more likely to be sensitive to women's issues and receptive to women's organizations. Yet even in professions, such as health, where women dominate the field, decision makers are largely male. Particularly in health there is a close relationship between the provider and the quality of the service delivered. Traditional birth attendants have always been women, while village healers have been both male and female. As part of the push for primary health care in the Health 2000 plan of the World Health Organization, efforts are being made to upgrade such traditional health providers. In many countries, however, as the village health worker becomes a regular job, it also becomes a male job. Such a trend limits women's access to health information in many countries reducing rather than enhancing the health provision for women and children. On the other hand, if village health workers are female and so can reach village women, the entire family, including the men, will benefit.

An important strategy for the 80s is to stress the programmatic implications of women as decision makers. There is an equity argument as well. But too often that is seen as 'exporting women's lib' by the male planners. What they mean is that demands for equal employment opportunities for elite women in the service of their own country or in international bodies is a direct threat to their own male employment. Apprehension on the part of the men may undermine the programmatic efforts as well as the employment goals. It should be an important aspect of the 80s' strategies to distinguish between women-in-development goals of program planning and women's rights for employment.

INFLUENCING PLANNERS

For many years the only place in the UN where women could meet was the Status of Women's Commission. Over the years it has produced numerous valuable reports and studies that are seldom read. This problem is not limited to UN reports from this body; but other UN documents find their way to reporters whose writings may be read. The women's network is weak on publishing. It is even weaker on influencing policy.

Instead of targeting efforts on politically powerful meetings such as those framing the new International Development Strategy (IDS) for the Third Development Decade, most women's groups put their funds and time into preparation for the Mid-Decade Conference. In fact, the IDS has included reference to women in seven of its 180 articles, but the atmosphere in the room during the debate was heavy with sexual innuendos, hardly a promising indication of taking the issues seriously. The women in Copenhagen argued that women are political beings and so a conference on women's issues alone was unrealistic. Yet in the political conferences, where were they?

Women's issues, as we have argued above, must be set in their context as part of larger development plans. Again, it is essential that women take their concerns to the meetings — be they national, international, or professional — where the context is discussed. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization holds regional meetings every year on topics ranging from community forestry to food processing. Where are the women's organizations at these meetings? Energy for household use is of central concern to women; but where are the women at the rounds of meetings being held in preparation for the UN Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy? The Society for International Development will hold its 25th annual conference in

Pounding millet in Niger: Women are the principal food producers in Africa
1982: Where are women’s issues on the program? A few determined women at each of these meetings will no doubt have a greater impact on program implementation and policy formation than more women-only world conferences, or meetings or panels, however well planned.

Within national bureaucracies women have pressed for “women’s machinery.” Such a center is invaluable both as a resource and as a constant source of pressure on the government. But like women’s projects, these offices tend to be understaffed, particularly with respect to the expectations placed on them by outside groups. Women need to help such offices by seeking out bureaucrats themselves, urging, for instance, the health ministry to insist on training medical students in the needs of poor women, or demanding regulations on credit be changed to allow women’s groups some access. An essential strategy for the 80s is to take women’s issues out into the male world, and insist upon being heard.

If the thrust of programming and information flow is to be on integrated planning and integrated meetings, this does not mean that networking functions among women cease to be important. However, the more that women’s issues become central to development, and the more decision-making positions women hold, the less any highly publicized conference is likely to produce unanimity on women’s issues. Women are citizens as well as females. In the international spotlight they must act as citizens first. Such a realization has led me to question the utility of yet another highly publicized women’s conference. If politics is the name of the game to be played, let it be a political conference with high-level decision makers (who will still be mostly male). If it is to be a women’s networking meeting, then the questions and concerns should be focused on what women can learn from each other about possible strategies within particular political settings to help women achieve equity in development.

SHIFTS IN STRATEGIES

In summary, I have argued that for the 80s women-in-development efforts need to shift the emphasis of the strategies which worked quite admirably in the 70s. Such a shift is in response to the growing strength both of the support for the basic philosophy and of greater information about women’s roles and responsibilities worldwide. Essentially, I am advocating that women get out of the libraries or women’s groups and into the political fray, that their village work not be research, but intervention, that the projects be integrated, not women-only. We do need more research — so collect data as you try solutions. We do need women’s networking, but we should stop putting all our resources into one meeting every five years.

Such suggestions are geared to the current context of development planning. Throughout the decade the thrust of women-in-development efforts have been to prove essential characteristics of women’s work: that women’s access to livelihood has often been undermined by development, that women need access to money for both their own needs and those of their families, that women tend to use their money differently from men, that women work long hours at a variety of essential tasks such as earning income, substituting for income, or supporting the household. These verities require that women have equal access to and equal pay for jobs in all sectors. The double-day issues of childcare and household duties are considered a problem, but are seldom readily addressed.

Women have been justly angry at having their economic activities ignored or bypassed. In an effort to focus attention on this problem we have erred in attributing all status and power to economic activity. In doing so, we are adopting a male measure, for men can and do dismiss childcare and household responsibilities. Indeed, male tendencies to ignore their familial responsibilities have accelerated the trend toward women-headed households. Unless women are similarly willing to give up family, then we shall always be hampered by the double-day concept as long as we use men as the measure.

This is precisely what one group of American radical feminists has done. They argue that living with a male inevitably results in inequality and so insist that the only solution to women’s oppression is a separate or lesbian existence. Such a line of argument is consistent with the basic American philosophic tradition of individualism. No other culture has placed so much emphasis on the ability of a person to make it on one’s own. Rags to riches. The counterculture of the 60s, rebelling against the materialistic conformism they detected in affluent America, called for “doing your own thing.” American women were simply insisting that this free-spirited individual could be female as well as male. The result has been to further the irresponsibility of most Americans to their families. Nowhere else are parents so quickly discarded, are elderly so easily dismissed. Everyone seems to have rights, no one acknowledges responsibilities. This is not a model for the rest of the world, or even for most Americans.

The problem is how to put a family back together to give honor to the elderly without their becoming autocratic, and to divide household tasks without the woman becoming the servant. New concepts of family may be one way. New employment patterns may be another. Changes in living patterns would allow women to work alongside men, both dealing with household needs together. However, this line of thought suggests that women are merely exploited human beings who will be just like male humans once household cares are resolved. The fundamental issue of value must still be addressed. I do not believe that money is the measure of us all. I also know that women generally, whether through biology or socialization, are more concerned with people and relationships than are most men. Is this special knowledge not as important a measure as economic or physical power?

A new strategy for the 80s, then, requires us as women to look at our several types of work and our multifaceted responsibilities and devise a valuation based on our own sensitivities and insights. We need a construct parallel to men’s, an alternate measure, a choice. Essentially we need not only to seek a place to work, but to put work in its place.
African Training and Research Centre for Women: Its Work and Program

BY THE STAFF OF ATRCW

In 1975 the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) established the African Training and Research Centre for Women (ATRCW) in recognition of the fact that the development of the Africa region required the mobilization of all human resources. This belief has recently been reconfirmed by Africa's policymakers when they defined the objective of the development strategy for Africa to be the "establishment of self-sustaining development and economic growth, based on collective self-reliance and aimed at improving the standard of living of the mass of the African people and reducing mass unemployment." The strategy states further that as a consequence of the need for increased self-reliance, Africa must mobilize her entire human and material resources for development and calls for greater effort by African governments to increase the role of women in development.

Whereas this declaration constitutes a major step forward for the advancement of African women, their actual situation leaves much to be desired. According to the International Labor Office, women constitute 50.5 percent of the population of Africa and Africa has the highest proportion of economically active women in the developing world. Women constitute the majority of the agricultural labor force in Africa. Mostly engaged in subsistence agriculture, they contribute to the different stages of cultivation, such as planting, weeding, harvesting, storage, and threshing of food crops. Processing food and supplying water and fuel in rural areas are predominantly women's activities.

Increasingly, evidence exists to show that rural women's access to land, training, improved technology, and participation in off-farm income-generating activities are being adversely affected by the process of mechanization, commercialization, and wrongly conceived development programs. Women continue to be ignored in national development planning in a considerable number of countries.

A major cause of this situation has been the legacy of colonialism which, with the unwitting support of African men, progressively excluded African women from dynamic areas of social
and economic change by promoting an inappropriate model whereby women were viewed as confined to typical feminine occupations and economically dependent on men. Underlying this situation was the dearth of data on the economic productivity of women. ECA held and continues to hold the belief that it is of critical importance to quantify the economic contribution of women, monitor their access to education and training, and present the data to development planners so that appropriate strategies can be formulated and implemented. Though the situation has improved since ECA first launched the women’s program that preceded the ATRCW in 1972, the refinement of social and economic indicators still needs to be strengthened and is a major area to pursue.

African women’s major occupations continue to be farming, animal husbandry, petty trade, and handicrafts. Animal husbandry, often considered men’s work, is in fact, according to ECA findings, an area where women contribute half the labor. It is a major occupation of women in North Africa, the Sahel, and southern Africa. Women perform between 60 and 90 percent of the work in marketing farm and marine produce in West Africa. Data gathered by the ATRCW shows that trade is an important activity for women, even outside West Africa, in such countries as Somalia, Zambia, and the Congo. Handicrafts in which women are engaged include pottery, basketry, mat making, and simple stitching of clothes and skins. Women’s contribution to self-help projects such as construction of roads, nursery and primary schools, and village centers is increasingly being documented.

The economic activity cited above must be viewed against the backdrop of the critical role of women in procreation. A large family is the norm in most countries of the region for reasons too well known to be described here. When many pregnancies are necessary to produce a few children who will survive to adulthood, a woman will be pregnant during most of her child-bearing years. Yet pregnancy, child bearing, lactation, and child rearing do not deter the African rural woman from her other work described above. Both her economic and her social roles continue to make merciless demands upon her.

The general condition of women must be viewed in the context of the African situation where mass poverty, disease, malnutrition, and poor environmental conditions act as serious constraints upon national development. This general state of underdevelopment is a direct consequence of centuries of many forms of colonization and domination under which the continent’s human and natural resources were ruthlessly exploited. The African economy is, therefore, still essentially based on agriculture and artisan production, the main features of which are the low productivity of the techniques used, poorly trained manpower, and inadequate infrastructure. In this context, steps taken to improve the lot of half the population are not only matters of equity but also economic investments of significant importance. In this context the commission has been concerned that United Nations resolutions on women be translated into a realistic and worthwhile program of action.

**ACTIVITIES OF ATRCW**

Prior to 1975, ECA, in collaboration with donor agencies, organized several important conferences that helped shape its programs. Notable among these were:

- **1969, Regional Meeting on the Role of Women in National Development.** (The meeting dealt with a number of issues, such as the role of women in the home and the community and in public and political life.)
- **1971, Regional Conference on Education, Vocational Training and Work Opportunities for Girls and Women in African Countries.** (This conference paid special attention to organizational matters at national and regional levels.)
- **1972, Seminar on Home Economics and Development Planning for English-speaking Countries in Africa.** (This was a joint undertaking between the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), ECA, and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), with special consideration being given to inadequate manpower resources in Africa.)
- **1974, Regional Conference for Africa on the Integration of Women in Development with Special Reference to Population Factors.** (The major achievement of this conference was the formulation of a ten-year African Plan of Action for the Integration of Women in Development.)

In 1975 the United Nations, in General Assembly Resolution 3520, called upon regional commissions to develop and implement, as a matter of priority, effective strategies to further the objectives of the World Plan of Action at the regional and subregional levels, bearing in mind their respective regional plans of action.

It was essential to heighten the awareness of African governments to the recommendations and resolutions passed in these meetings. Most member states, though receptive to the idea of the advancement of women, did not go far beyond granting women equal status.
before the law. Although legal provisions were the first steps, they did not ensure parity in the fields of education, training, and employment, or in decision making. It was clear that the centre needed to promote a multidisciplinary and multisectoral approach to improve the lot of the vast majority of women, most of whom lived and worked in rural areas.

THE LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES OF THE CENTRE

The long-term objective of ATRCW is to make women full partners in development by enhancing women's capacity to participate in rural and urban economies in order to improve the living standards of families and communities, especially in the rural areas. Attainment of this objective will require action at national, subregional, and regional levels, and the commission has been working in cooperation with all concerned at all levels.

This overall objective is broken down into several program-oriented objectives:

— To strengthen the data base on which programs for women may be developed, especially in the rural areas.
— To increase the number and proficiency of personnel trained to provide services to improve the situation of African women.
— To assist member states in developing and implementing policies for productive nonfarm employment for women, including improving their access to credit and awakening in rural families consciousness of improved and appropriate technology.
— To serve as an information and resource centre. The national machineries for the integration of women and development and the African Women's Development Task Force are major vehicles for the achievement of these objectives.

RESEARCH

The first major task of the centre was to strengthen the data base on the situation of women in Africa. Only through such a strategy could national policy at every level be influenced and changed. The absence of reliable data led, in the first place, to the neglect and underestimation of women's contribution to development. Areas of concentration in research have been the development of socioeconomic indicators on the role of women; women and food production; self-employment; wage employment; nonformal education; mass media and its effect on attitudes towards women; legal position of women; survey of indigenous technologies used by women; the relationship between population, women's work, and family welfare; and national bibliographies. More often than not the centre uses national consultants to carry out research and, to the extent possible, government organizations responsible for women's programs are consulted and fully informed of the research projects and their findings. The centre's policy on research is now evolving towards strengthening the capacity of national machineries to carry out research or promoting it themselves. This intention is now seriously being considered and examined in all its facets. There is also a firm policy to strengthen collaboration with research institutions in the region. In addition, in view of the alarming economic and social predictions made concerning Africa, including the fact that the population of the region is expected to increase from 406 million in 1975 to 827 million in 2000, the sixth ECA Conference of Ministers (1980) admitted that "even the maintenance of existing levels of mass poverty and unemployment, not to say their amelioration, will call for heroic and concrete efforts to build the region's economy on a new basis." In view of this, the women's centre is launching a program of research, "Econometric Projections to the Year 2000," designed to alert member states to the consequences these trends may have on the women of the region so that appropriate measures can be taken.

UPGRADING OF SKILLS

No program of the centre has been more intensely pursued, nor has any had greater resources allocated to it, than training for women. Through various seminars, conferences, and meetings, member states have repeatedly made requests for training in specific fields of need. The question that the centre had to answer was what type of training was to be given and to whom.

AFRICA REPORT • March-April 1981

Market in Accra: Women perform between 60 to 90 percent of the marketing of farm and marine produce in West Africa
The training program began in 1973 (under the auspices of the women's program) when refresher courses were requested for persons engaged in planning, implementing, and supervising programs directed at the rural community. These included trainers, community development workers, extension agents, and literacy workers. Those responsible for this type of grass-roots project were often working in isolation, separated from other services and away from power of the city. The objectives of these workshops, which, incidentally, included both men and women, were to consider the role of women in national development planning and to stress their importance in contributing to the quality of family life. At the same time, the workshops indicated the knowledge, skills, and attitudes needed by women themselves if they were to participate fully in all aspects of development. Most important, the workshops provided a forum for an exchange of views between policymakers responsible for national development and agricultural plans and those responsible for carrying out the plans in different Ministries and training institutions.

The methodology adopted in training was one of learning by doing. A wide variety of adult-learning techniques were used, including simple village surveys of the division of rural labor, food consumption patterns, attitudes on family size and child spacing, and evaluation techniques; program planning was also discussed. The cluster of subjects was determined by the special needs of a particular country. No two workshops were identical, and national teams worked closely with the ECA team to mount the special programs. As time went on, member states began to request more specialized follow-up workshops concentrating on specific fields, such as project planning and implementation, food storage and preservation, and appropriate technology.

For the second half of the United Nations Decade for Women the emphasis is to promote longer-term training to be institutionalized in the programs of national, subregional, and regional training institutions. Two institutions that have shown enthusiastic response to incorporating training specifically geared to meet the needs of women are the Pan-African Institute for Development in Douala, Cameroon, which is now running courses on nutrition in rural development for middle-level trainers from rural communities from French-speaking Africa, and the East and Southern African Management Institute in Arusha, Tanzania, which in 1981 is launching a three-month course in women and development planning. (For both these projects the bulk of the funding was obtained from the United Nations Voluntary Fund for the United Nations Decade for Women.) Other training possibilities being explored include the formulation of a concise “women in development curriculum.”

A project that exemplifies the flexible approach adopted by the centre is the African Women’s Development Task Force. The idea is simple. African women who have special skills or experience should share these with other women in the region. Since volunteer services already exist at national level, couldn’t ATRCW facilitate and promote such service by African women across frontiers? Before initiating the project, there were two questions to be answered: What were the special skills most needed by women, and who were the volunteers that would travel away from their home countries? In the course of the task force project, it became obvious that income-generating activities enlisted the most interest. Rural women, as well as the urban poor, needed money to buy oil, sugar, and clothing for their children as well as soap for washing, and to pay school fees. The roster of volunteers has now increased to over 100 men and women from the region. In addition to identifying and placing volunteers, the project promotes study tours for trainees.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A POLITICAL NETWORK FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN

In promotion of the establishment of infrastructure to accelerate the pace of women’s programs, careful consideration has been given to the need for integration into existing structures of ECA rather than creation of a separate, autonomous institution for women. ECA has worked enthusiastically to integrate the women’s component into headquarters programs as well as in five subregional offices.

Since the Rabat conference mentioned above, the commission’s prog-
ress made in the establishment of machine
in the establishment of machinery at national level to promote
the possibility of establishing subregional coordinating bodies.

Thanks to the generous help of the United Nations Development Program,
four out of five Multinational Programming and Operational Centres (MULPOCs) now have coordinators of women’s programs. In June 1980 ATRCW organized a special workshop for these MULPOC coordinators of women’s programs at ECA Headquarters in Addis Ababa in the full realization that ATRCW and the MULPOC coordinators were part and parcel of the overall efforts to promote the advancement of women in the region. The recommendations made at the workshop included: (1) the need for strengthening the staff and the budget of the subregional centres, especially those of Niamey and Lusaka, (2) the formulation of joint programs for the advancement of women for the biennium 1982-83, and (3) the need to improve the flow of information between ECA and the MULPOCs.

To advise, monitor, and guide the work of the coordinators in the MULPOCs, in 1978-79 ECA set up intergovernmental subregional committees for the integration of women in development, with the approval of the Council of Ministers of the subregions concerned. These constitute powerful political organs that carefully watch that the interests of women are not neglected in the programs of the subregion. They all held their second meetings between September 1980 and January 1981.

In March 1979 ECA held the Inaugural Meeting of the Africa Regional Coordinating Committee (ARCC) in Rabat. This structure, whose establishment was recommended by the Africa Regional Plan of Action adopted in 1974, is now fully operational and constitutes the political arm of the ECA women’s program. It is due to the cumulative role played by these structures that the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments in Africa has for the first time incorporated the Women’s Program of ECA into the overall strategy for development of the Africa region (as mentioned earlier). Thus, the Lagos Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa adopted by the OAU heads of states in April 1980 incorporates the program and strategies (1980-1985) for the integration of women in development adopted in Lusaka in December 1979 by the Second Regional Conference in the Integration of Women in Development.

SPECIAL FEATURES OF THE CENTRE

The ATRCW is a cooperative activity of the United Nations system, acting in liaison with the Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs of United Nations headquarters. It was developed together with the FAO Program of Better Family Living, with financial support from the Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA); immediately thereafter UNICEF joined in supporting its staff and activities. ILO began its participation in 1977. The involvement of the United Nations agencies in the work not only strengthens the ability of the centre to serve its members states and the region but also assures that wasteful overlapping of activities is avoided. Thus the United Nations General Assembly resolutions and governmental requests for interagency cooperation to sharpen the thrust of development activities are fulfilled through the centre.

Since 1975 the centre has organized approximately 20 national seminars in countries to promote the idea of effective national structures to promote the advancement of women. It has organized 40 training workshops in different fields; it has conducted five study tours and has produced 104 titles for distribution, including manuals, a research series, bibliography series, workshop report series, newsletters, and papers on development issues. These achievements reflect the above-mentioned interagency effort and the substantial bilateral assistance received from SIDA, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the governments of Belgium, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany, to name a few. The centre activity has been evaluated five times since 1978 in exercises covering the whole or part of its programs. This monitoring has had major supportive effect in enormously enriching the direction and content of its programs. Finally, in a predominately agricultural economy such as that of Africa, the real contributors remain African rural women, whose dedication and selfless service are the pillar of African society.

A woman works on a weaving machine in Kumasi, Ghana
Major Policy Issues for the 1980s

BY WILLIAM H. GRAY AND BENJAMIN MKAPA

The two statements that follow are excerpts from speeches presented before the opening session of the African-American Institute's eleventh African-American Conference, held in Freetown, Sierra Leone from January 8 to 11, 1981. The Institute's conference series seeks to bring together African and American leaders from the public and private sectors for in-depth discussions on policy issues between the United States and Africa.

Congressman William H. Gray:

Today there is a new political reality in the United States. On January 20 a new president, Ronald Reagan, took office. He will confront a divided Congress—a Senate controlled by his own party and a House controlled by the opposition.

Under these circumstances, no one can predict what type of policy the United States will pursue towards Africa. The survival of the new directions and sensitivity fostered by Andrew Young, Richard Moose, and the Carter administration will depend upon many factors: the president; his secretary of state and his deputies for African affairs; the attitude of the members of both houses of Congress; the state of the U.S. economy; and the level of global tensions.

In any event, there are certain pitfalls in dealing with Africa which ought to be avoided, and which often reflect American thinking about our policies in Africa.

First, there is the temptation to choose up sides in Africa, or what I call the "cold warrior's fallacy."

Given the real issues of national security that lie at the heart of the cold war between the Western and Soviet alliances, there is a natural inclination for the United States to become involved militarily with one side in a conflict in Africa where the Soviet Union and its allies are supporting the other side. The new administration has hinted at the possibility of providing military assistance to the South African-supported, Savimbi-led UNITA rebellion against the Soviet and Cuban-aided government in Angola.

Yet in its seeming eagerness to take on the Soviets militarily in Africa, America risks overlooking some powerful African—and American—political and strategic realities. For example, given both regional African power balances and America's own strategic military priorities in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, the new U.S. administration cannot hope, at any reasonable military and human price, to install UNITA in Angola. Under these circumstances, the injection of inadequate U.S. military assistance would be more likely to strengthen the relationships between the Soviets, Cubans, and Angolans than to weaken them.

Thus, for the United States to support these objectives in Africa would help create the very crisis of U.S. "credibility" that Americans presumably hope to avoid in the future.

Also, no government in Africa can fairly be characterized as a Soviet or Cuban satellite in either its domestic or foreign policies.

For example, the present internal economic and political structures of Angola and Ethiopia (including land reforms and military leadership in Ethiopia and the significant role of multinational business in Angola) reflect national histories and political circumstances far more than they reflect the influence of external ideologies. Undoubtedly the important Soviet and Cuban role has given them some influence on diplomatic issues, but such influence has not proved enduring elsewhere in Africa—for example in Egypt, Sudan, Guinea, and Somalia itself.

And as Angola and Mozambique's cooperation with the West on Namibia and Zimbabwe have shown, what America may temporarily lose from an adverse UN vote on a resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

William H. Gray (D-Pa.), a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, headed the U.S. congressional delegation to the conference. Benjamin Mkapa is the Tanzanian minister of information and culture.
can be more than offset by the gains from a peaceful settlement of a conflict.

Second, there is the temptation to support friendly dictatorships at the expense of human rights concerns, or what I call the "illusion of being tough-minded."

Shaken by revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua, some of America's new foreign policy advisers have concluded that the United States should try to shore up "moderately repressive autocracies" threatened by political change. Again one must ask whether the United States really has the capacity to sustain for significant lengths of time African governments that have lost the confidence of their people.

In particular, any U.S. association with the government of South Africa in the absence of fundamental internal economic, social, and political changes clearly leading toward rapid and full self-determination by the people of South Africa would identify the U.S. with a heinous social stratification that has a real chance of plunging into an unthinkable Armageddon. In this connection, those who speak of a policy of "constructive engagement" with South Africa need to define better who we're supposed to become engaged to and under what conditions. If the proposed engagement is with the present South African government, I want to point out that history has taught us that you don't lay the railroad tracks for the trains to run to Auschwitz and hope that by laying those tracks you are going to somehow influence the direction of that train.

Similarly, any U.S. acquiescence in a South Africa-sponsored "internal settlement" in Namibia or a like solution to the problem of the Western Sahara would constitute a vain attempt to defeat powerful and genuine movements for self-determination in Africa. In these cases and others, the superficial realism of "dealing with governments as they are" is denied by the permanence of change in contemporary politics.

In fact, far from being a liability to American diplomacy, America's commitment to democratic values and majority rule is one of its greatest assets in the economically and politically important Third World. It is a tribute to the widespread respect for American values in the Third World that we are often held to a higher standard of behavior than some other countries. Africa's own concern for human rights issues is powerfully illustrated by its strong stand—often at great cost—on the need for self-determination in South Africa, Namibia, and Western Sahara, and the recent progress of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in developing a human rights charter for Africa.

Third, there is the temptation to define U.S. interests in Africa as a series of physical assets in a few countries rather than the need to create an overall political relationship with the continent, or what we might call the "error of a balance-sheet approach to world affairs."

Lately some voices have been complaining about U.S. policy towards Africa being afflicted with "regionalitis" or a "vague desire to get close to Africa" unrelated to "specific and tangible" U.S. interests. These interests are said to be naval "choke points" off the coast of South Africa and natural resources, especially in southern Africa. The new "realists" ask that America's policies be formulated with the objective of ensuring stable American access to key strategic and economic points within Africa. And as political instability might interrupt or complicate such access, they tend to favor—as in "Temptation 2"—the status quo in the key countries.

Beyond a misplaced faith in the permanence of the status quo, the new realists err in proposing too narrow a foundation for American foreign policy in Africa. Militarily, Africa possesses some convenient locations but it is far from the probable theaters of major great-power confrontations. Economically, Africa is increasingly important to the West and the United States as a source of raw materials, although their capacity to cope with short-term supply difficulties is frequently underestimated.

But Africa is much more to the United States than the relatively few countries which currently export to us large amounts of key natural resources and which we must try to please individually. Africa as a whole is a major part of the Third World with which the West must reach a political accommodation on a whole series of issues, such as commodities policies, the Law of the Sea, white rule in South Africa and Namibia, and nuclear nonproliferation.

President Shagari of Nigeria, which is our second-largest oil supplier, made this clear in his important speech to the United Nations last fall. If we cannot make progress on these crucial North-South problems, we risk an increasingly embittered, uncooperative, and unstable Africa and Third World. In such circumstances, Africa will be less likely to provide diplomatic understanding or support for U.S. initiatives like the Camp David process or the Afghanistan resolution, or to take Western interests into account in its commodities production, pricing, and trade policies, or on nuclear issues.

In order to avoid falling prey to these temptations and attitudes in the American body politic, the United States should formulate an African policy based on the following principles:

**Majority rule:** The U.S. must take new and constructive steps to confront the burning moral and political issue of self-determination. American investment in South Africa has continued its long-term rise and continues to represent about half of U.S. investment in sub-Saharan Africa. Much of this American capital is in the strategic oil, computer, and transportation sectors and undoubtedly enhances the South African regime's overall technological capacity. Many major American companies have formally adopted the Sullivan Code of equal employment opportunity, but, as Reverend Sullivan himself has complained, racist labor practices are still common in U.S. multinationals. There are members of Congress—including myself—who are considering the introduction of legislation to restrict U.S. investment in South Africa.

We also need to meet our commitments to provide substantial economic assistance to an independent Zimbabwe. We must increase substantially our efforts to ensure that this new beginning, this miracle of peace, can succeed.
Economic development: We must increase U.S. economic aid to Africa that comprises only about 15% of total foreign assistance. Africa has the lowest gross national product of any continent in the Third World, and its per capita GNP has the lowest rate of increase since 1960. In addition, Africa must cope with the highest rate of population expansion in the world, skyrocketing oil import costs that now consume over 20% of Africa's scarce foreign exchange compared to only 10% four years ago, and a weakening of the terms of trade since the early 1970s with prospects for continued degeneration into the mid-1980s.

Also, much more needs to be done to alleviate the human suffering of refugees in Somalia, Sudan, Cameroon, and many other countries. While Africa has nearly half of all the refugees in the world it receives only about one-tenth of U.S. dollars for refugee assistance. America did respond promptly to the international appeal for aid to refugees in Somalia, providing 58% of the food tonnage donated by the world. Surely a nation that can provide $50 million for displaced persons from the recent Italian earthquake can muster up more than the approximately $50 million we expect to spend this fiscal year for nonfood aid to all refugees in Africa.

Acceptance of ideological pluralism: The U.S. should not continue to refuse diplomatic recognition to the government of Angola, which has played a constructive role in conjunction with the U.S. in trying to resolve the political problems in Namibia and Zimbabwe.

Demilitarization of Africa conflicts: We should be wary of making arms sales to countries involved in border disputes in the explosive Horn of Africa, and support the OAU's efforts to resolve the problem peacefully.

We should be similarly vigilant in our arms policies concerning the Western Sahara, where the OAU has called for a cease-fire and a fair and just referendum to achieve self-determination.

Minister Benjamin Mpaka:

In the eighties, I see African countries multiplying their support for the struggling peoples of South Africa and Namibia. I see them soliciting maximum support from countries outside our continent. I see them working for South Africa's political and economic isolation. I see them seeking to mobilize pressure from the international community to bring it to bear on the South African regime leading to the destruction of its apartheid policies and the promotion of political structures that acknowledge the equality of men and advance the equity of opportunity to all people regardless of color and race.

We would prefer that countries support the African effort to exert pressure on South Africa. But at the very least we do not expect countries to undermine that effort. That effort will be mounted for the cause of African dignity and independence. It will not be mounted against Western interests, nor for that matter in favor of Eastern European and communist interests. If it has a deleterious effect on the economy it is not because we particularly relish economic destruction. Besides we do not want our victorious brothers to take over a wasteland! But it is wrong to perceive the security of financial and mineral interests in terms of the preservation of this anachronistic regime. The choice is clear for those outside our continent. It is to help and be part of the process or to stand clear. It is not to stand in the way.

A deliberate policy of obstruction of a process which Africa sees as mandatory and irreversible would result in the serious erosion of the interests of the country concerned. Those interests would be jeopardized in southern Africa and in independent Africa as well. The temptation always exists to shrug such warnings away. But I need only recall the sentence of substantive influence of independent African states—of the BP oil assets in Nigeria on the eve of the Lusaka Commonwealth Conference in 1979, to warn that Africa’s concern not be dismissed out of hand.

Another concern of Africa during this decade will be the preservation of the independence of its states in the face of big-power rivalry. The weight of the evidence shows a rapid decline in detente between East and West, between the capitalist and communist major powers. The political challenge for independent African states will be to keep out of this rivalry and hold on to the integrity of their independence.

A decade of full throttle big-power and ideological rivalry is littered with veritable political mines. There will be efforts to align us to one side or another. There will be efforts to secure Africa’s nonpolitical, material resources, for one side or another. There will be attempts to fight the silent as well as the explosive wars on our continent, and to establish bridgeheads toward that objective. There will be races to station in and plow our surrounding oceans with increasing vessel loads of deadly and frightening arsenals.

I believe African states will resist all efforts to restrict their freedom and independence in this manner. Most of them will not countenance any attempt to turn our continent, or members thereof, into adjuncts or extensions of NATO or Warsaw Pact countries. We are too conscious of the African proverb: Where elephants fight, it is the grass which suffers. I believe we shall actively seek to distance ourselves from the second scramble for Africa, in order to safeguard the integrity of our independence, and to be able to become a respectable voice of understanding and peace in international relations.

The question will therefore emerge: Will countries outside our continent recognize the legitimacy and integrity of this attitude and respect it? Will the major powers see this independence as antagonistic to them? And will they seek to threaten and intervene to impose or promote regimes made not so much in their own image as in their service?

A policy on the part of the major powers of intervention—by regular soldiers or mercenaries—will only bring about instability. Such intervention, and political instability, profits none, neither those who cause it nor those who are victims of it.
African countries will prove increasingly aware of these extracontinental threats. I am confident that they will act sensibly to face this challenge, and will not be frightened into new alliances or spurious schemes. Two and a half years ago the idea was mooted of an African security force. At the Khartoum summit this scheme was wisely rejected. It was seen through as a measure to sustain Western domination of Africa, not to safeguard African independence and nonalignment. I believe that in the eighties we shall see a double-pronged political endeavor. On the one hand, African states will work to withstand external pressures for hegemony; on the other hand they will work to strengthen machinery for collective support to member states against external aggression.

External factors however are not the only conditions to peace and stability of African states. Relations between the states themselves are decisive, and important also is the consolidation of national unity in individual states. The OAU charter enjoins member states to live at peace with one another and to eschew subversive activities on the part of neighboring states or any other states. It also stresses the need for peaceful settlement of disputes between member states, by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration.

Over the last few years disputes and complaints between member states have proved the limitations of simple commitment and the inadequacy of the machinery for the resolution of these disputes and claims. In some instances wars have flared. In others, internal strife has been ignited leading to buildups of big numbers of refugees.

The current chairman of the OAU, Dr. Siaka Stevens, president of Sierra Leone, and his government have proposed the setting up of an OAU political and security council to deal effectively with inter-African disputes and conflicts. At the last summit meeting his brother heads of state and governments warmly applauded this initiative and the issue is inscribed on the agenda of the next council of ministers meeting. The strengthening of the machinery for settling inter-African disputes and conflicts will remain a major concern of member states during this decade.

The escalation of inter-African conflicts and the exacerbation of internal tensions has given rise to a big refugee problem on our continent. Indeed, half of the world's 10 million refugees are to be found in Africa. The OAU must become increasingly sensitive to the plight of the continent's refugees, and already ways and means are being looked into for raising the funds and evolving the machinery to minister to this large mass of deprived people.

But the efforts of African states will have to be boosted by external assistance. Many of us believe that this has not been sufficiently forthcoming. We note the infusion of massive material and financial assistance to smaller numbers of refugees and victims of disasters in other continents. We shall ask for more help even as we accept the need to undertake political adjustments in relations between and within our states which will make such flows of refugees unlikely.

Directly linked to political stability is the challenge of economic development. In this decade African states will want to give appropriate importance to the struggle to uplift the economic circumstances of the people of this continent by promoting economic growth. Continued economic stagnation inevitably breeds social chaos and political instability.

There has been an increasing awareness in OAU circles in recent years of the need to accelerate the economic welfare of independent African peoples. This awareness reached its highest point with the adoption in July 1979 of the "Monrovia Declaration of Commitment of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU on the guidelines and measures for national and collective self-reliance in economic and social development for the establishment of a new international economic order." This in turn led to the holding in Lagos in April 1980 of the "Extraordinary Summit devoted to the economic problems of our continent."

The plan of action which emerged from Lagos sets out the magnitude of the problem which lies ahead and the plea for support by the international community. It notes candidly that Africa remains the least developed continent containing 20 of the 31 least developed countries of the world. In the past 20 years the average growth rate continent-wide has been no more than 4.8%, and that figure hides divergent realities ranging from a 7% growth rate for the oil exporting countries down to 2.9% for the least developed countries.

And the world economic forecast suggests that this record may represent the golden age compared with that projected for the decade of the eighties.

Africa's uneasiness over its economic achievements is understood when stock is taken of Africa's overall resource situation. The Lagos Plan of Action again is both candid and eloquent:

In assessing those problems, we are convinced that Africa's underdevelopment is not inevitable. Indeed, it is a paradox when one bears in mind the immense human and natural resources of the continent. In addition to its reservoir of human resources, our continent has 97% of world reserves of chrome, 88% of world reserves of platinum, 64% of world reserves of manganese, 25% of world reserves of uranium, and 13% of world reserves of copper without mentioning bauxite, nickel, and lead, 20% of world hydroelectric potential, 20% of traded oil in the world (if we exclude the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.), 70% of world cocoa production, 50% of world coffee production, and 50% of palm produce, to mention just a few.

Despite this endowment, the decade's economic prospects for most of the African countries are staggering and depressing. Only last week, the executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, Dr. Adebayo, told the world that during the past year Africa has borne the brunt of the world economic chaos, facing "devastating and debilitating" economic problems, and that these would be even worse in 1981.

By all accounts, apart from the five oil exporting countries, most African countries will find it difficult to mark time in their economic development, let alone to grow.

To tackle this pernicious economic situation, there are some
things which African countries will have to do themselves. There are the familiar imperatives of formulating a correct rural development policy, including food production policy; vigilant supervision of public expenditure; modest planning and careful supervision of execution of plans; the provision of incentives for increased production; and the like. Important though these measures may be, they will not take us very far up the road of economic development. National mobilization and regional cooperation are a necessary input into the process of economic recovery, but a lot more energy will have to be found to send the patient steadily on his way. There is a very real limit to the efficacy of prayer, labor and self-abnegation.

The efforts of the African states will have to be supplemented by supportive actions of other countries, and the giants of the industrialized world in particular. There are three supportive imperatives. The first is a reform in the international economic arrangements and institutions which make a virtue of the built-in disadvantages allotted to Third World countries. What is the efficacy of national mobilization in the face of what are, in effect, guarantees for rising prices of manufactures of the developed countries and stagnating prices for primary commodities and exports of Third World countries? Regional cooperation will have little impact in a world economic system which virtually guarantees increased purchasing power for industrialized countries and declining purchasing power for developing countries.

The second imperative is a massive injection of external resources into the African economies. How large an amount of this injection in financial terms would very much depend on what advance was made in the realization of the first imperative. Better earnings would clearly increase the capacity of these countries for self-reliance and the generation of investment resources for development. In the meantime there is no gainsaying the need for increased official development assistance, and increasing inflow of private investment.

The third imperative is the deployment of technology for the exploitation of the resources with which these countries are so amply blessed.

In the 1980s the policies for Africa remain the same; but they will be pursued in changed and more trying circumstances. I believe that the developed countries, and the United States in particular, can help to make the change positive, and the circumstances less trying.

The challenge for Africa in this decade is to further its goals of political and economic freedom for all its peoples; for equality, justice, and dignity in the relations with its nations and among the nations of the world. That is the framework of its continuing liberation struggle. The task is exacting; its people's expectations are boundless. The battle was joined with the formation of the OAU; it must be passed to new generations, in this as in coming decades. With or without setbacks the struggle will continue.
Pretoria clamps down on black press, bans five journalists

The South African government continued its purge of the black press by banning two more black journalists active in the black consciousness union that struck the nation's liberal English-language newspapers for two months.

The banned men, both reporters for Post Transvaal and Sunday Post, which were forced to close in January, are Phil Mitmku, 32, and Joe Thloloe, 38. Mitmku was acting president of the Media Workers' Association of South Africa following the banning in late December of Mwasa's president, Zwelakhe Sisulu, and the Natal branch vice president, Marimuthu Subramoney, and the regional officer, Mathata Tsedu, all Post reporters.

Ironically, Mwasa had won some concessions from the English-language newspapers, such as union recognition, when the government clamped down on the journalists and forced South Africa's two main newspapers for blacks to shut permanently under threat of banning. However, Mwasa was fighting for more than bargaining rights. It wanted publishers to recognize the right of black journalists to be "committed" to change, in contrast to white journalists' "objectivity."

One Mwasa official noted: "For the whites, apartheid is just one of many topics to deal with. For us, it makes everything else insignificant."

Post, itself a successor to the World, banned in October 1977, was the "authentic voice of the black people," in the words of Mitmku before he was banned. Mitmku added that Post did not have "an adulterated view of black opinion."

Its successor, Sowetan, a weekly owned by the same publisher, Argus, started publishing daily in February and inevitably will be toned down to avoid another ban-

Rivalry continues to plague Zimbabwe

Rivalry between armed guerrillas loyal to Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and to Joshua Nkomo—a persistent problem since Zimbabwe's independence—erupted again in mid-February with such intensity that elements of the old Rhodesian army had to be called in to put down the rebellion. At least 300 people, mostly civilians caught in the crossfire, were killed.

Ironically, it was this army which had fought Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Army and to a much lesser extent Nkomo's Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army that in the end remained loyal to the government. The factionalism—as well as the frustration—of the armed guerrillas sitting in camps with nothing to do was supposed to have been solved by their integration into the new British-trained national army, whose core is about 4,000 of the old white-officered Rhodesian army, which does not seem to have been affected by the political and ethnic rivalry between Mugabe and Nkomo supporters.

The worst fighting broke out among three 1,000-man battalions newly formed from among the guerrillas. The other six integrated battalions were considered too unreliable to quell the violence.

The political tensions have exacerbated since a cabinet reshuffle in early January, in which Nkomo was demoted from Home Affairs Minister to Public Service Minister. Later that month, however, Mugabe reached a compromise with Nkomo, giving him the job of Minister without Portfolio with some responsibility for defense and public service, but leaving all the key portfolios in the hands of Mugabe supporters. Mugabe also dumped the controversial Edgar Tekere.

As antagonism between supporters of Mugabe and Nkomo continued, a bomb killed a senior official of Nkomo's party in early February.

After the uprising was put down, Nkomo went out of his way to demonstrate a conciliatory attitude, flying to Bulawayo to oversee the ceasefire and telling reporters he and Mugabe were "working well together indeed." (New York Times, February 16 and 17, 1981; Financial Times, February 11, 12 and 13, 1981; London Times, February 7, 1981.)

In January, Nkomo had denounced the government's take-
Woddeye retains Chad rule after Libya helps win civil war

The fall of the Chad capital, Ndjamena, in mid-December to the forces of President Goukouni Woddeye ended the latest nine-month outbreak of the civil war, which had been going on intermittently for 15 years.

Hissene Habre, former Defense Minister under Woddeye and leader of the government's major rival faction, the Armed Forces of the North (FAN), signed the ceasefire agreement to end the war in Yaounde, Cameroon, in December. But he maintained that he considered the Chad government "illegal" and "illegitimate" and vowed to continue the struggle against it.

Libyan troops, tanks and combat aircraft used to support Woddeye's forces apparently were the decisive factor in the fall of Ndjamena and Woddeye's victory over Habre. The FAN leader had refused to sign a November OAU-sponsored ceasefire because it did not include a condemnation of Libya's role in the conflict. Woddeye signed, but warned that he would seek a military solution if Habre did not do the same.

Woddeye reacted to Habre's belated acceptance of the truce by calling it "nonsense dictated by France." He issued a statement calling on France to "stop turning African countries and the OAU against Chad." French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing had made a statement prior to the fall of Ndjamena warning against "the new deterioration of the situation resulting from the intervention of foreign armed elements."

In a late December meeting in Paris, French Foreign Minister Jean François-Poncet called on Libya to respect Chad's independence. He told Ahmed Shahati, a senior Libyan envoy, that France would support the OAU emergency conference called in late December in Lagos, Nigeria, to find a peaceful and lasting settlement to the conflict.

The OAU meeting, attended by 12 African nations, resulted in a final communique which called on all countries to refrain from interference in Chad's affairs. However, a group of seven countries had insisted that Libya be specifically condemned for its intervention, which they alleged, was a blatant violation of the 1979 Lagos Accord uniting the 11 Chad factions into a transitional unity government. The communique also called on Woddeye to arrange for general elections in 1982. Woddeye attended the summit after pressure from Nigeria's President Shehu Shagari, and there defended his "sovereign" right to call for Libyan assistance without prior OAU consultation.

In early January, the Libyan government announced that Woddeye, after a visit to Tripoli, had agreed to a merger between Libya and Chad. Their common frontier was to be opened and under a security pact, Libya was to send troops to maintain Chad's security and rebuild the army.

France was swift to condemn the merger, saying it was contrary to the provisions of the Lagos Accord.

Zimbabwe continued

over, for $4.3 million, of the South African-controlled newspapers, the five main papers in the country. The purchase of the 45 percent interest was aided by a grant from Nigeria.

Nkomo, who has frequently complained that the government-owned radio and television stations give him and his party little exposure, implied that the newspapers would become mouthpieces for Mugabe's party. Information Minister Nathan Shamuyarira insisted that the government remained committed to freedom of the press. (London Times, January 5 and 6, 1981.)

Almost overshadowed by the Nkomo-Mugabe rivalry was the start in February of an ambitious education program that has increased school enrollment by 50 percent since independence. The main goal of the program is to provide a secondary school place for every pupil qualifying for promotion from primary school. Teachers have been recruited from Australia and Britain and some 15,500 Zimbabweans with less than full qualifications will be employed in the program. (London Times, January 24, 1981.)
Cape Verde

- In late December, President Aristides Pereira reshuffled his cabinet, appointing Col. Silvino da Luz, formerly Armed Forces, Defense and National Security Minister, as Foreign Minister. Col. Honario Chan-tre and Col. Julio de Carvalho, both former deputies to the chief of general staff in Guinea-Bissau, were named Defense and Interior Ministers respectively.

Elections to the national assembly were held earlier in December, in which the ruling African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) won 92.5 percent of the vote. The elections were the first for a national assembly since independence in 1975.

In late January, Lisbon Radio reported that Pereira had created a new national party, the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV) to replace the PAIGC. The PAIGC had been the party of both Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde and had as its aim the eventual unification of the two countries. The November coup in Guinea-Bissau by Maj. João Bernardo Vieira was condemned by the Cape Verde government. (Lisbon Radio, January 20, 1981; Africa Research Bulletin, January 15, 1981.)

The Gambia

- In late January, African justice ministers met under the auspices of the OAU in Banjul, the Gambia, and adopted a draft charter of “human and people’s rights.” President Dawda Jawara of the Gambia has been a leading advocate of its adoption.

The charter is to be presented before the OAU heads of state summit in Nairobi in June for approval. It calls for the formation of an 11-member commission of human rights, to be appointed by the heads of state, but who will work independently.

The commission’s mandate will be to investigate allegations of human rights violations in member states and to recommend action against offenders. It will, however, be left to individual governments to take action on the recommendations.

The charter’s provisions include: freedom from arbitrary arrest; right to a fair trial with counsel chosen by the accused; freedom from enslavement and torture; and freedom to travel and seek refuge abroad.

It also provides for “people’s rights” to education, good health and shelter, to be balanced against “duties” of the individual to the society, including ensuring the security of the state and taking care of the family. (Economist, January 31, 1981.)

Ghana

- The Ghanaian government is launching a major program to place a new emphasis on the revival and expansion of its gold-mining industry, which it is hoped, will provide a much-needed boost to Ghana’s lagging economy.

The government of President Hilla Limann appointed a committee, headed by Lloyd Quashie, to investigate the current status of gold production and methods of revitalization for the industry. Quashie called for the development of 14 new mines at a cost of $3 billion, in order to keep the state-owned mining sector, which accounts for three of Ghana’s four mines, from going out of business.

The Quashie committee also reviewed existing laws, and on the basis of its recommendations, the government plans to submit a bill to the legislature to facilitate joint mining ventures, management agreements, and repatriation of capital. Mining taxes will also be revised. All of the measures are hoped to make foreign investment in the mining sector more attractive.

Quashie stated that “Ghana... has the geological endowment to enable her to produce gold on a massive scale, probably on the same scale as South Africa and Russia.” Gottfried Kesse, director of Ghana’s Geological Survey Department, said Ghana’s deposits are richer and more accessible than those in South Africa. He estimated the country’s gold potential at 2 billion ounces.

The gold industry in Ghana peaked at a record level of 915,317 ounces in 1960, but its production has fallen steadily since that time. Among the reasons cited for the in-
industry's decline were: mismanagement, poor planning, outdated machinery, and lack of financing and skilled manpower.

The government held an international seminar on Ghana's gold endowment in mid-January in an effort to attract foreign investment. The government hopes to acquire an initial capital investment of $1.3 billion over the next ten years, which would enable it to embark on a 20-year gold expansion program. (New York Times, January 26, 1981; World Business Weekly, January 26, 1981; West Africa, December 1, 1980 and January 19, 1981.)

Guinea-Bissau

- The heads of state of four Portuguese-speaking African nations met in Luanda, Angola, in December to review the situation in Guinea-Bissau, shortly after the coup by Maj. Joao Bernardo Vieira which deposed President Luis de Almeida Cabral in November.

- To the ire of the new leadership in Bissau, the Lusophone heads of state, Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, Mozambique President Samora Machel, President Manuel Pinto da Costa of Sao Tome and Principe, and President Aristides Pereira of Cape Verde, did not ask Vieira to participate in the meeting, but instead sent a delegation to Bissau.

- The four leaders expressed their "complete identity of views" on the coup, saying "it puts into question the future of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), and the unity between Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde."

- They also expressed their concern at the fate of former President Cabral, who, the new regime had said, will be put on trial for the alleged murders of more than 500 political prisoners. Guinea-Bissau's former security chief, Col. Andre Gomes, whose organization was implicated in the murders, committed suicide in prison in late December.

- Vieira sent a message to the meeting which stated that any decision taken there without the presence of a delegation from his government would be considered as interference in Guinea-Bissau's internal affairs.

While a spokesman for the new government reaffirmed that Bissau was still in favor of the PAIGC's aim of eventual political union with Cape Verde, the prospect for such a union appeared unlikely with the mid-January formation of a new national party in Cape Verde, the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICY).

The Cape Verde government had denounced the coup and Pereira said that "the use of military force to resolve internal problems of the party is in flagrant contradiction with the principles and methods of the PAIGC and the thoughts of its founder, Amilcar Cabral."

In January, it was reported that the government of Mozambique will play a mediating role between Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, in hopes of improving relations. (West Africa, December 8 and 29, 1980; Kenya Weekly Review, December 8, 1980.)

Liberia

- The financially strapped Liberian government, led by Master Sgt. Samuel Doe, reached agreement with its major creditors in December to reschedule $34.4 million of government-owed debts over a nine-year period. Liberia's external debts total over $700 million. About 10 percent of the rescheduled portion of the debt will be repaid over four years, beginning in December 1981, with the remaining 90 percent stretching over five years beginning in 1985.

- Three U.S. banks—Citicorp, Bankers Trust and Chase Manhattan—also provided a $6 million bridging loan to the Monrovia government in December to save it from default on a $60 million Eurocredit loan granted in 1978.

Other international sources have provided financial assistance to alleviate short-term financing problems, including the U.S. government, which approved a $7 million emergency grant in late December. In January, four unnamed foreign banks agreed to provide a $4 million loan.

- The U.S. government also announced that it would provide $1 million worth of military trucks to the Liberian government, and will send a team of personnel to train a Liberian army engineering battalion in military housing construction. Some $500,000 will be furnished to aid with the housing, in addition to $1.2 million in foreign military sales credits planned for the 1981 fiscal year. (New York Times, January 20, 1980; West Africa, December 15, 1980 and January 5 and 12, 1981.)

Mali

- The first session of the joint Libya-Mali commission, formed in 1973, was held in Bamako in December. The commission was originally organized to provide a basis for economic cooperation between the two nations, focusing on three major problems: water control, as Mali is a landlocked nation; road and communications networks; and agriculture and animal husbandry.

- Agreements were signed on the formation of a joint Mali-Libya bank for external commerce and development, on livestock development, and road network improvement. (West Africa, January 5, 1981; Bamako Radio, December 9 and 12, 1980.)

In late January, the government of Mali expelled all Libyan diplomats from the country following the transformation of the Libyan embassy into a "people's bureau." President Moussa Traore said the change was not in conformity with the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. However, expulsion of the diplomats did not mean a break in diplomatic relations and Libyans working on projects in Mali were not affected by the order. (West Africa, February 2, 1981.)

Mauritania

- In line with a decision reached in 1978 by the ruling Military Committee of National Salvation, led by the head of state, Lieut. Col. Mohamed Khouna Ould Heydalla, to establish "democratic institutions" in Mauritania, a new civilian government was appointed in December.

- Led by Prime Minister Sid Ahmed Ould Bnejara, 34, formerly governor of the Nouadhibou province, the 17-member cabinet is composed entirely of civilians with the exception of the Defense Minister, Lieut. Col. Soumane Silman.

- Heydalla announced that a draft constitution had been drawn up and
will be submitted to a referendum. (West Africa, December 29, 1980 and January 5, 1981; Nouakchott Radio, December 16, 1980.)

Niger

• According to a report on Niamey Radio, a demonstration of 10,000 people was held in the capital on December 1, with its primary intention to condemn the policies of the Libyan government of Col. Muammar Qaddafi.

The demonstration was organized by the Federation of Labor Unions of Niger, and was allegedly prompted by Qaddafi's November criticism of Niger's treatment of the nomadic Tuareg population. When Qaddafi was asked during a news conference if he was trying to instigate a separatist movement in Niger, he said: "The Tuaregs do not constitute a separatist movement. It must be recalled, however, that they are Libyans."

In late November, 2,000 women in Zinder demonstrated against "Libyan subversion," and the country's traditional leaders and representatives of the Tuareg population met with President Seyni Kountche to assure him of their support. Kountche has sent ministerial missions throughout Niger to advise the country of "recent acts of destabilization by Libya."

Kountche reportedly has reason to fear that Qaddafi is attempting to destabilize the north of the country, inhabited by the Tuaregs, as it is said to be rich in uranium deposits. (West Africa, December 8 and 29, 1980; Niamey Radio, December 3, 1980.)

Nigeria

• President Shehu Shagari presented a cautious yet optimistic 1981 budget to the national assembly late last year, which doubles expenditures on industry and quadruples it on farming. Emphasis on those two sectors of the economy is designed to achieve self-reliance in food production and industrial output over the next five years.

The largest proportion of capital expenditures, 13 percent, will be allocated to agriculture and water resources, with the second largest to industry, including $2 billion on steel development. Additional funds were made available to the Nigerian National Petroleum Corp. for expanded oil exploration.

A projected deficit of $2.3 billion for the last financial year was almost totally eliminated by an excess of actual revenue over planned revenue, due to the income generated by oil sales. Still, Shagari included a similar projected deficit in the 1981 budget because of "the somewhat unstable and unpredictable nature of the crude oil market." Oil accounts for over 80 percent of total federally collected revenues.

In January, the government's fourth five-year development plan was unveiled. It is to run from 1981-85 and $151 billion is provided as total expenditure. The development plan focuses on boosting agriculture, industrial investment, provision of transport, improved educational facilities, housing and power generation. In addition, the amount of spending to be allocated to the military has been significantly increased to $6.4 billion, a 276 percent jump over 1980's figure.

The plan seeks to maintain the 7 percent growth rate of the last decade, and will be financed primarily by oil sales. Oil production is expected to rise from 2.1 million barrels per day in 1980 to 2.4 million in 1985. Shagari's government also hopes for a doubling of the present agricultural growth rate of 2.5 to 4 percent by increasing domestic food production and exports of cash crops. (London Times, January 22, 1981; West Africa, December 1 and 8, 1980; Economist, November 29, 1980.)

Africa in the U.S.

• The composition of the Senate and House subcommittees on Africa changed with the new session of Congress.

New members on the Senate panel are: Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS), chair; Charles Mathias (R-Md); Christopher Dodd (D-CT); and John Glenn (D-Oh). Continuing from the last session are: Jesse Helms (R-N.C); S.I. Hayakawa (R-Ca); and Paul Tsongas (D-Ma).

The House subcommittee is composed of five Democrats and four Republicans. The Democrats are: Howard Wolpe (Mi), chair; George Crockett (Mi); Stephen Solarz (N.Y.); Gerry Studds (Ma); and Dennis Eckart (Oh). The Republicans are: William Goodling (Pa); Arlen Erdahl (Mn); Olympia Snowe (Me) and Robert Dornan (Ca).
Rimi, the People's Redemption Party, accused Mossad, the Israeli
secret service, of stirring up trouble. "It was a carefully conceived
plan by Mossad to recruit non-Nigerians, train them in the use of
modern weapons and urban guerrilla tactics, exploit the sparse policing
along out northern borders, infiltrate these mercenaries into the
country to disrupt the peace, and by so doing lead to the overthrow of
the federal government," a party statement read.

And a high-ranking assistant to President Shehu Shagari said in Janu-
ary, "We have every reason to believe that Libya was involved."
(West Africa, January 5, 12 and 19, 1981; Financial Times, January 15,
1981; Economist, January 3, 1981; Kenya Weekly Review, January 2,
1981; London Times, December 29 and 31, 1980.)

The Nigerian government expelled the Libyan diplomatic mission
staff in Lagos in January, ostensibly because the embassy had trans-
formed itself into a "people's bureau" without "prior consultation or communication" with Nigerian officials. In addition, the Nigerian ambassador to Libya, Alhaji Ka-
zaure, was called back to Lagos after "undiplomatic exchanges" be-
tween the two governments.

Observers noted that the "people's bureau" issue was probably
used as a pretext to expel the Libyan diplomats. The Nigerian gov-
ernment apparently has reason to fear Libyan attempts to gain influ-
ence among the country's Islamic population, numbering 30 to 40 per-
cent, particularly after the Kano inci-
cident in which 1,000 were killed in rioting spurred by Islamic funda-
mentalists. Some reports indicated that Libyan money may have been
involved in the religious riots.

Nigerian artillery and an air force squadron were recently moved to
Maiduguri, near the border with Chad. Chadian President Goukouni
Woddeye reportedly hinted to the Nigerian government in mid-Janu-
ary that he had signed the merger agreement between his country and
Libya under duress. Libyan arms and military personnel had enabled
his government to drive out their main rival in the 15-year-long civil
war. Hissene Habre and his Armed Forces of the North.

The Nigerian government has also protested over the recruitment of
mercenaries in northeastern Ni-
geria to fight in the Chad civil war, reportedly by the Libyan Ambassa-
dor, Abdulkeddin Sharafeddin.

Shagari also called for a large in-
crease in military spending in the
fourth development plan intro-
duced in January. He assigned $6.4
billion to defense, a figure substan-
tially higher than in the third plan.
He said Nigeria "is being forced by
sudden recent and anticipated world events to reassess its security
and defense preparedness." (Busi-
ness Week, February 2, 1981; West
Africa, January 19, 1981; Econo-
mist, January 10, 1981; London
Times, December 10, 1980 and Jan-
uary 6, 1981.)

Senegal

Abdou Diouf, Senegal's Prime
Minister for ten years, was sworn in
as President on January 1, replacing
President Leopold Senghor, 74, who voluntarily retired from office
the day before. According to a 1976 constitutional amendment, the
Prime Minister automatically suc-
ceds the President in the event of
his death or resignation, until the
term of office ends, in Diouf's case,
until 1983.

Senghor, in a televised speech,
said his resignation was due to his
age. "I can no longer work ten hours
a day, including weekends. It is time
to step down and hand over the
torch to the next generation," he
said.

Diouf, who is 45, named Habib
Thiam, the chief parliamentary
whip of the ruling Socialist Party, as
his Prime Minister. Thiam, 47, is a
former secretary of state for plan-
ning, and Minister for Rural Devel-
opment, and is also party secretary
for foreign relations. A new cabinet
was formed, with many of the prin-
cipal posts remaining in the same
hands, including the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, headed by Musta-
pha Niassse.

Senghor announced plans to con-
centrate after retirement on the cre-
atation of a new worldwide French-
speaking community along the lines of the British Commonwealth. But
the plan was dealt its first blow in
December, when a meeting of Fran-
cophone foreign ministers to be
held in Dakar was postponed indefi-
nitely.

Problems arose because Can-
ada's Pierre Trudeau, who is sup-
portive of the plan, vetoed Que-
beck's participation with equal status
to the federal government. France,
however, backs Quebec's position
and will not participate until the
province is recognized. (West Af-
rica, January 19, 1981; London
Guardian, January 2, 1981; Jeune
Afrique, December 17, 1980; Lon-
don Observer, December 5, 1980; Ken-
yan Weekly Review, December 5,
1980.)

Upper Volta

Col. Saye Zerbo, who overthrew
President Sangoule Lamizana in a
November coup, announced the
formation of a new 17-member cabi-
net in December.

The cabinet is composed of sol-
diers, four of whom served as gov-
ernment ministers under Lamizana,
and civilian technocrats. Zerbo, as
well as being President of the ruling
Military Committee of Redress for
National Progress and head of state,
took over the positions of Prime
Minister, Minister of Defense, and
chief of staff.

On the 20th anniversary of Upper
Volta's independence in December,
Zerbo made his first major address
to the nation, during which he an-
nounced that an investigative com-
mission was set up to look into
"management of public property"
under Lamizana's rule.

He also made reference to the ne-
necessity of "rethinking the nation's
educational program." The Lam-
izana government was brought down
by a series of strikes led by the
National Union of African
Teachers of Upper Volta last fall.

Zerbo made several concessions
to the teachers immediately after
coming to power. He authorized the
payment of salaries to them for the
57-day strike period. He also satis-
fied two of the major complaints
which had caused the strikes; he or-
dered back to their posts the four
relatives of the ex-Minister of Edu-
cation who had allegedly won a
competition to train in Paris, and re-
turned to their original positions
two militants of the teachers' union

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"The politics of U.S. foreign assistance", by F.S.B. Kazadi, May-Jun, 50
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Swaziland
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who had been fired because of their leading roles in the labor unrest. (West Africa, December 15 and 29, 1980.)

**EASTERN AFRICA**

**Ethiopia**

- In December, shortly after Sudan President Gaafar al-Nimeiry’s proposal of a seven-point peace plan was put forth and rejected by Ethiopia, the Ethiopian army launched a major offensive against **Eritrean guerillas**.

  However, like all previous offensives, the result was stalemate. The main Eritrean nationalist group, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), is entrenched in mountain strongholds and has so far repelled all attacks by the Ethiopian army. That army, which is already fighting on two fronts (the other is the southern Ogaden region), reportedly has bolstered a third front, in Tigré, the province just south of Eritrea. Government forces, said Tigré nationalists, have doubled to about 40,000. Tigré guerrillas reportedly maintain close coordination with the EPLF along the border between the two regions. (Christian Science Monitor, February 5, 1981; London Guardian, January 26, 1981; Washington Star, December 7, 1980.)

**Kenya**

- In the words of an Economic Planning Ministry report, Kenya faces “as difficult a year as 1980, if not more,” primarily due to **continuing shortages** of basic foods and balance of payment problems.

  The shortages are blamed on drought, smuggling, panic buying and hoarding and have lasted for the past year. Kenya estimates it will have to spend at least $70 million on further imports of maize, rice and wheat this year, exacerbating the balance of payments situation.

  The U.S. agreed to sell Kenya 70,000 metric tons of maize at a cost of $11.7 million, for delivery in Feb-

**Tanzania**

- “Foreign aid and self-help”, by Arild Vollan, Jan-Feb, 16

**African Update, Jan-Feb, 34; May-Jun, 31, 32; Jul-Aug, 19, 24, 28; Sept-Oct, 31; Nov-Dec, 31, 34**

**Togo**

- African Update, Jan-Feb, 28; Mar-Apr, 29; Jul-Aug, 23

**Tunisia**

- African Update, Jan-Feb, 37; Mar-Apr, 35; May-Jun, 35, 36; Jul-Aug, 29, Nov-Dec, 36

**Uganda**

- African Update, Jan-Feb, 34; Mar-Apr, 31; May-Jun, 32; Jul-Aug, 19, 24; Sept-Oct, 32, 35; Nov-Dec, 32

**United States**

- “Randall Robinson, executive director of Transafrica” (interview), Jan-Feb, 9

  - “African issues and Presidential politics”, by Richard Deutsch, Jan-Feb, 18

- African Update, Jan-Feb, 37, 38

  - “John B. Anderson, candidate for the Republican Presidential nomination” (interview), Jan-Feb, 39

- “Communism in Africa”, by David D. Newsom (document), Jan-Feb, 44

  - “Caesar’s planners look at Africa” (book review), by Sean Gervasi, Jan-Feb, 49

  - “Implications of Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa for U.S. policy” (document), by Michael A. Samuels et al., Jan-Feb, 51

- African Update, Mar-Apr, 27, 35

  - “A new voice in the House” by Richard Deutsch, Mar-Apr, 39

  - “Stephen J. Solarz, chairman, subcommittee on Africa, U.S. House of Representatives” (interview), Mar-Apr, 44

  - “Robert J. Dole, candidate for the Republican Presidential nomination” (interview), Mar-Apr, 57

  - “Carter’s Africa policy shift”, by Richard Deutsch, May-Jun, 15

- African Update, May-Jun, 29, 31, 34, 36

  - “George Bush” (interview), May-Jun, 39

- “U.S. arms and the desert war”, by Tony Hodges, May-Jun, 42

  - “Mahmoud Abdelfettah of Polisario political bureau” (interview), May-Jun, 48


- African Update, Jul-Aug, 29; Sept-Oct, 35; Nov-Dec, 35, 36

**Zaire**

- African Update, Jan-Feb, 36; Mar-Apr, 32, 33; May-Jun, 33


- African Update, Jul-Aug, 26; Sept-Oct, 33, 35; Nov-Dec, 33, 34

**Zambia**

- African Update, Jan-Feb, 36; Mar-Apr, 33; May-Jun, 34; Jul-Aug, 27; Sept-Oct, 34; Nov-Dec, 34

**Zimbabwe**

- “African issues and Presidential politics”, by Richard Deutsch, Jan-Feb, 18

- African Update, Jan-Feb, 23, 24, 25, 28, 36, 38

  - “Tory policy in Africa”, by Derek Ingram, Mar-Apr, 4

- African Update, Mar-Apr, 23, 25, 38

  - “A new voice in the House”, by Richard Deutsch, Mar-Apr, 39

- African Update, May-Jun, 23, 25


- African Update, Jul-Aug, 20

  - “Which way in South Africa?”, by Gay Arnold, Jul-Aug, 40

  - African Update, Sept-Oct, 23, 33; Nov-Dec, 23

  - “Resettling the refugees”, by Roger J. Southall, Nov-Dec, 48

**USSR**

- “Communism in Africa”, by David D. Newsom, Jan-Feb, 44

  - “Caesar’s planners look at Africa” (book review), by Sean Gervasi, Jan-Feb, 49

  - “Implications of Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa for U.S. policy” (document), by Michael A. Samuels et al., Jan-Feb, 51

- African Update, Mar-Apr, 33

  - “Carter’s Africa policy shift”, by Richard Deutsch, May-Jun, 15

  - “Reagan’s African perspectives”, by Richard Deutsch, Jul-Aug, 4


**Upper Volta**

- “Soldiers and civilians in the Third Republic”, by Richard Vengroff, Jan-Feb, 4

**Western Sahara**

- African Update, Jan-Feb, 27, 37; Mar-Apr, 27, 36; May-Jun, 27, 35, 36

  - “U.S. arms and the desert war”, by Tony Hodges, May-Jun, 42

  - “Mahmoud Abdelfettah of Polisario political bureau” (interview), May-Jun, 48

  - African Update, Jul-Aug, 29; Sept-Oct, 28, 35; Nov-Dec, 35, 36

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- “Election-year casualties”, by Richard Deutsch, Nov-Dec, 44

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- “U.S. arms and the desert war”, by Tony Hodges, May-Jun, 42

  - “Mahmoud Abdelfettah of Polisario political bureau” (interview), May-Jun, 48

- African Update, Jul-Aug, 29; Sept-Oct, 28, 35; Nov-Dec, 35, 36

**Zaire**

- African Update, Jan-Feb, 36; Mar-Apr, 32, 33; May-Jun, 33


**Zambia**

- African Update, Jul-Aug, 26; Sept-Oct, 33, 35; Nov-Dec, 33, 34

**Kenya**

- In the words of an Economic Planning Ministry report, Kenya faces “as difficult a year as 1980, if not more,” primarily due to **continuing shortages** of basic foods and balance of payment problems.

  The shortages are blamed on drought, smuggling, panic buying and hoarding and have lasted for the past year. Kenya estimates it will have to spend at least $70 million on further imports of maize, rice and wheat this year, exacerbating the balance of payments situation.

  The U.S. agreed to sell Kenya 70,000 metric tons of maize at a cost of $11.7 million, for delivery in Feb-
rary and March. At the same time, stringent methods were introduced to prevent profiteering in maize and other staples.

Economists say that 1980 probably had little if any real growth and the major reason was that imported oil costs consumed a higher proportion of export earnings, 30 to 35 percent in 1980, against 24 percent in 1979.

While agricultural output has grown at 2.5 percent a year, prices—tea and coffee are the main foreign exchange earners—have been falling. Coffee production, for example, was up 19 percent over 1980, but average prices dropped 30 percent. (Financial Times, January 23, 1981; African Business, January 1981.)

Madagascar
• Five foreigners and two Malagasy citizens were charged with plotting to overthrow the government of President Didier Ratsiraka in December after a wave of unrest in Antananarivo, the capital.

The detainees included three West Germans, an Austrian and an Italian. They were accused of “trying to undermine the internal security of the state” and being in illegal possession of arms.

The unrest in mid-December reportedly was caused by unemployed youths and was triggered by a Kenya-Madagascar soccer match. The government claims the country’s economic problems—sporadic shortages of staples—are caused by worldwide factors such as the rising price of oil, and that socialist construction in Madagascar is under attack by “enemies of the revolution.” (Maputo Radio, December 23, 1980; London Times, December 12, 1980.)

Somalia
• A group opposed to the government of President Mohamed Siad Barre, the Somali Salvation Front (SSF), has claimed responsibility for a series of bomb blasts in Mogadishu that slightly injured two people.

The government, which declared a state of emergency in October to combat dissidents and re instituted the military Supreme Revolutionary Council, blamed the explosions on Soviet sympathizers and arrested an unknown number of people.

But the SSF, through its clandestine “Radio Kulmis,” said the urban bombing campaign was in retaliation for an “extermination program” against suspected SSF supporters. The SSF also claimed in January to have overrun an army base. (Radio Kulmis, January 11, 14 and 24, 1981.)

Tanzania
• The Tanzanian government initiated a nationwide crackdown on corruption in January, suspending dozens of civil servants and detaining several businessmen.

In addition, the Transport Minister, Augustin Mwingira, and Lawrence Masisi, general manager of the government-owned Air Tanzania, were dismissed amid charges of misuse of public funds. President Julius Nyerere ordered the arrest of about a dozen prominent businessmen, mostly Asians, including the Aga Khan’s chief representative in Tanzania and a leading shipowner.

Nyerere made a nationwide broadcast in February urging the public to name officials guilty of corruption. Nyerere said that dishonesty and corruption by those he trusted had caused grave economic losses.

Nyerere also dismissed the head of the Tanzania Investment Bank and its general manager as well.

In Zanzibar, 122 civil servants were suspended when it was discovered that they had taken outside jobs. (London Observer, February 8, 1981; Radio Zanzibar, February 4, 1981; Radio Dar es Salaam, January 23, 1981.)

Uganda
• Uganda’s President, Dr. Milton Obote, has taken steps to restore the economy and crack down on the huge black market and smuggling operations.

Some 700 people were arrested in January for allegedly being involved in the black market. The government said black marketeers would be detained indefinitely and their property confiscated.

Security on Uganda’s borders was tightened to stop smuggling. The Ministry of State for Internal Affairs, Lieut. Col. Wilson Omaria, said he would deal “mercilessly” with smugglers.

One attempt to end the black market backfired in January. When traders and shopkeepers in Kampala were ordered to sell food and other essentials at sharply reduced prices, the normally busy market closed down and Kampala residents could not buy anything. The price reduction order was then rescinded and the market quickly resumed. (London Times, January 26 and 28, 1981; Kampala Radio, January 16 and 22, 1981.)

• The disputed December election has caused a several prominent Ugandans, political foes of President Milton Obote, to leave the country. The main opposition Democratic Party claimed that Obote’s Uganda People’s Congress Party changed election results during the 18 hours that the pro-Obote military commission impounded the ballots.

Democratic Party politicians said, with substantiation from diplomats who have studied the available evidence, that 15 results were changed in favor of the UPC, which officially won 72 seats to 51 for the DP. DP officials say they really won 66 seats and the UPC only 57. (London Guardian, January 12, 1981.)

• The leaders of the three East African states—Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania—that made up the defunct East African Community, plus President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, met in Kampala in January in an effort to renew their regional economic cooperation.

It was the first major attempt of this kind since the break-up of the EAC in 1977 and was made possible by the ousting of Uganda’s Idi Amin and the election in December of Dr. Milton Obote. The meeting was seen as a gesture of support for Obote, and an effort to establish the goodwill necessary for reactivating the EAC.

The concrete conclusion of the meeting, which included Presidents Daniel arap Moi of Kenya and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, was the setting up of an authority to oversee distribution of the EAC’s assets. (Financial Times, January 19, 1981.)
CENTRAL AFRICA

Central African Republic

- President David Dacko put a new constitution to the people for approval in a referendum in early February, in the first balloting in the Central African Republic in 15 years.

The constitution, ratified in December during a "national seminar," provides for a multiparty system of government with a strong emphasis on human rights. The decision to implement a multiparty system by mid-1980 went against Dacko's prior statements that at least two years would be needed to eliminate ethnic-based rivalries in the country before such a system could be introduced.

According to another decision reached at the seminar, presidential elections in which Dacko will be a candidate are slated for March and legislative elections for June.

Two new political parties were formed within a week of the decision to contest the President's Democratic Union of Central Africa in the upcoming elections. The Republican Progress Party was formed by Henri Maitou, who was Prime Minister under Emperor Bokassa and deputy to Dacko until he was sacked in August 1980 for publicly advocating a multiparty system. The RPP, which has close links with the trade unions, stands for "free debate, competition, tolerance and representative democracy." Maitou said it will try to boost the country's economic, social, and cultural development.

The second new party, the Central African People's Rally, was formed by Sylvestre Bangui, who resigned as Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in November. Bangui said he had resigned over the country's "cooperation policy," apparently referring to the Central African Republic's close relations with France.


- The exiled former Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa was tried in absentia in Bangui in December on a number of charges, including multiple murders, plotting against state security and cannibalism, and was found guilty of 13 charges and sentenced to death.

The Bangui court ordered that Bokassa's property within the country and abroad be confiscated and said the government should issue international arrest warrants for the deposed monarch, who is living in the Ivory Coast.

Congo

- The ruling Labor Party reshuffled the government in late December, during a meeting of the central committee. Henri Lopes, Finance Minister, was replaced by Justin Lekoundzou, a member of the party politburo. Dieudonne Kimbembe was appointed to replace Minister of Justice Victor Tamba Tamba, who was also head of the Department of Employment and Social Security. Bernard Combo Matsiona was named to head the latter post.

The new government, still led by Prime Minister Louis Sylvain Goma, consists of 22 members, including five newcomers. Six of the cabinet members are also in the politburo.

The central committee issued a communiqué at the end of its meeting which called for unity within the party and country during a time of "political agitation and attempts to divide the country's revolutionary forces." It also made mention of the serious economic crisis hitting the Congo, despite increased revenues from oil production.

President Denis Sassou-Nguesso is committed to seek increased Western assistance, particularly in the state sector of the economy and for agriculture, despite the fact that most of his military and security aid comes from the Soviet Union. With a new liberal investment code, the government hopes to attract Western investment and financial and technical aid. (West Africa, January 12, 1981; London Times, January 2, 1981; New African, January 1981.)
Zambia

- The expulsion of 17 top officials of the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) from the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) sparked a spate of strikes in Zambia's copper and cobalt mining centers in January.

The ZCTU had opposed legislation decentralizing government authority and extending party control to the local governments. UNIP leaders said the trade unionists were meddling too much in politics and thus had to be disciplined.

Among those expelled from the party were leaders of the Mineworker's Union of Zambia. As a result, mine workers walked off their jobs at both the Roan Consolidated Mines and Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines. The two state-controlled companies' work force generates 95 percent of Zambia's foreign exchange. The country's copper industry was at a standstill as all divisions of the two companies were affected by the strikes.

Commercial bank employees followed the miners in striking, and the unrest spread to financial institutions throughout the country, including the central bank, and state-run insurance and pension fund companies. They were protesting over the report that the leader of their union, Benedict Chikoti, one of the expelled men, was beaten up by UNIP militants.

Rioting occurred at several mines in the copper belt, and in one case where police were called in to quell the unrest, a 14-year-old boy was shot dead and 50 people were injured. Unrest continued for nearly two weeks until the 17 were reinstated by UNIP. In late January, after the reinstatements, the mine and financial institution workers went back to their jobs. (Wall Street Journal, January 22 and 29, 1981; London Times, January 23 and 28, 1981; Financial Times, January 22 and 26, 1981.)

- In mid-January, President Kenneth Kaunda ordered the implementation of the first of a series of austerity measures required in order to obtain a three-year credit of $637 million from the IMF. The measures were expected to be unpopular and could heighten political tensions.

The steps taken include greater restrictions on foreign exchange, possibly toward a total ban on its use for the purchase of anything other than essential commodities. The price of domestically grown corn was also raised between 30 and 50 percent to reduce farm subsidies. The moves are designed to reduce the budget deficit and thus the need for foreign borrowing.

The Zambian government had been negotiating with the IMF for several months to obtain the credit which would relieve the foreign exchange bottleneck resulted from low revenues from copper and cobalt sales.

A new budget was introduced by Kaunda in late January, designed to implement further belt-tightening measures. Taxes on gasoline, beer, cigarettes, sugar, certain imports and some locally produced goods were increased. Both the corporate and personal income tax rates were increased, but the raise in personal taxes affects only the highest income brackets.

Investment incentives will be extended to "approved enterprises" and to farmers. Subsidies to state enterprises, government-owned industries and agricultural marketing agencies will be cut by 39 percent, meaning higher consumer prices. Credit from commercial banks was also restricted.

Kaunda had been hoping to reach agreement with the IMF on the credit by late February or March. But observers noted that it would be unlikely as relations with the fund were strained by Kaunda's abrupt replacement in late January of three financial officers with whom the IMF had been dealing—the governor of the Bank of Zambia, his general manager, and the permanent secretary of the Finance Ministry. Also, some observers said that the budget measures may not have been stringent enough to meet the IMF's conditions. (Wall Street Journal, January 13 and February 3, 1981; Economist, January 24, 1981.)

NORTHERN AFRICA

Algeria

- The role played by the Algerian government in gaining the release of the U.S. hostages from Iran in January may serve as a basis for improved relations between Washington and Algiers.

According to a report in the Washington Post in mid-February, the Reagan administration is considering the sale of C-130 Hercules military transport planes to Algeria. If undertaken, the sale would be the first of U.S. military equipment to the Algerian government. A State Department source noted that although the sale would only involve six of the transports, its significance is on the symbolic level, as the C-130 has been used in the past as a first step toward military relations with formerly hostile governments, such as Egypt.

Although the U.S. and Algeria have maintained strong commercial relations, on the diplomatic and political level, the two countries have often been on opposite ends of the spectrum on a wide range of issues.

The war in the Western Sahara, in which Algeria actively supports the Polisario Front against Morocco, is likely to be a contentious issue. While the U.S. has in the past professed neutrality with regard to the war, Washington's long-standing relations with the Moroccan government caused the Carter administration to sell King Hassan about $232 million in reconnaissance planes and helicopters. The Reagan administration plans to sell more than 100 U.S. M-60 tanks to Morocco.

Government sources said the C-130s could conceivably be used by Algeria in the Sahara war, but a more likely use would be to ferry heavy equipment between Western Europe and Algeria.

Among other recent signs of improved relations between Washington and Algiers were: the docking of a U.S. Navy frigate at Algiers in September, the first American warship to visit there in 17 years; the U.S. provision of $4 million in aid and medical assistance in the wake of the earthquake in Algeria in November; and the posting of a U.S. defense attaché in Algiers in 1980 with an agreement for Algeria to send one to the U.S.

The Algerian intermediary role in the hostage crisis may also have helped in easing problems in the on-
going negotiations between the two countries over the price of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Algeria suspended sales of LNG to the U.S. in April 1980 because the U.S. would not agree to a tripling of the LNG price. Negotiations between the U.S. Department of Energy and Algeria’s Ministry of Energy and Petrochemicals were continuing in February, and reports were optimistic that a compromise agreement would be hammered out. (Business Week, February 16, 1981; Washington Post, January 21 and February 11, 1981.)

Libya

• Col. Muammar Qaddafi’s government has been placing advertisements in Arab newspapers throughout the Middle East, and even in publications in Britain, inviting volunteers to join the Libyan armed forces.

The advertisement offers free military training for men and women, and the promise of the rank of second lieutenant at the end of the three-year course. The only qualifications are that the person must be an Arab national not younger than 17 or older than 25; must pass a medical exam; must possess a school-leaving certificate; and “must not have been convicted of an offense to the prejudice of honor.”

The recruiting drive, through which students may enrol in the air, naval, air defense or women’s military academies, has been launched “in view of the revolutionary role for unity undertaken by Libya, it being the nucleus state of the union and of all Arabs.”

Qaddafi had reportedly said that he was determined to increase the size of his armed forces to 500,000, to man the large arsenal of Soviet and French-built weapons he has acquired. Libya’s population is small, fewer than three million, and few are trained to use and maintain the sophisticated military equipment.

Reports indicated that a special Libyan “Pan-African Legion,” formed for intervention outside Libya and composed of other Arabs and Africans, played a major role in the victory in Chad of President Goukouni Woddeye’s forces. Several African governments, including those of Senegal and the Gambia, have complained in recent months that their nationals have been lured to Libya by promises of paid work, but then find themselves in the Libyan army against their wishes. (London Guardian, January 29, 1981; Washington Post, January 17, 1981.)

Sudan

• The government of Sudan moved troops and heavy military equipment to bolster its long border with Chad in January, following the announcement that Chad and Libya had agreed to a merger. Observers believe that what the Sudanese government fears is not a Libyan military thrust into the country, but rather an attempt by Libya to destabilize the Darfour region along Chad’s border.

Darfour, an area grazed by Chadian nomadic tribes, was the scene of unrest in December, when the region’s capital, El Fasher, was taken over by dissidents protesting the appointment of a non-Darfouri governor. Troops were brought in to regain government control, resulting in several deaths. President Gaafar al-Nimeiry subsequently ordered the governor to resign, to be replaced by a representative from the region.

Sudan’s close relations with Egypt, its northern neighbor, resulted in Nimeiry allowing Egyptian arms to be funneled through Sudan to Habre’s forces during the war, further alienating Libya. In addition, Sudan has been overburdened by an influx of Chad refugees, more than 8,000, who have joined an estimated 500,000 refugees from Ethiopia, Uganda and Zaire.

Tunisia

• President Habib Bourguiba reshuffled his cabinet in December, which, observers said, was indicative of the liberalizing trend that has been going on for several months at various levels of the government. Two former cabinet ministers, Tarak Belkhodja and Beji Caid Essebsi, were returned to the government as Information Minister and Minister Delegate to the Prime Minister, respectively.

Belkhodja was sacked from his position as Home Affairs Minister in late 1977 because of his public opposition to the government’s strict policies toward the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT). After Prime Minister Hedi Nouira was replaced due to illness by Mohamed Mzali, Belkhodja was permitted to return to public life as Tunisian ambassador to West Germany.

Essebsi was ejected from the ruling Socialist Destour Party (PSD) in 1974 for protesting over the lack of democracy in Tunisia. He then joined the opposition Movement of Socialist Democrats, but was reinstated in the PSD early in 1980.

Liberalization in policy toward the trade unionists has also been apparent since Mzali became Prime Minister early in 1980. In mid-January, Bourguiba pardoned five union leaders who had been sentenced after the 1978 strikes, and were released from prison earlier in 1980 on “conditional freedom.”

Mzali said the action showed Bourguiba’s “clemency and wish to turn the page on the past once and for all.” There remain three union leaders, however, who have not benefited from the President’s amnesty measures—Habib Achour, former UGTT secretary-general, Abderrazzak Ghorbal, deputy secretary-general, and Salah Brour, another UGTT official. Although they were released from prison, they remain under house arrest. (Le Monde, January 15, 1981; Jeune Afrique, December 17, 1980.)

Western Sahara

• Harold Saunders, a former assistant secretary of state during the Carter administration, reported to the House of Representatives subcommittee on Africa in December that the U.S. had established contacts with the Polisario Front through visits of U.S. officials to their camps in Algeria, and that he believed that Polisario is not “an instrument of the Soviet Union.”

Saunders said that although Polisario has been using Soviet-made weaponry in the Western Sahara war, the equipment was apparently coming through Algeria and Libya. Washington now recognizes that Polisario is a party to the conflict, and, Saunders reported, speaks for
also blamed on lack of organizations. But poor production was the country's large defense expenditures, construction problems there and for they are partially responsible for 


Malawi

- The trial of former Minister of Youth and Culture Gwanda Chakuamba, arrested and ousted from the government in February 1980, was begun in December and was continuing in February. Chakuamba, regarded as the most powerful political figure in Malawi after President Kamuzu Banda, was detained on charges of illegal possession of firearms, prohibited publications and photos of rebel ex-ministers, and of vocalizing seditionous plans against the Banda regime. The former cabinet minister was a member of the Malawi Congress Party's central executive committee, chairman of its disciplinary committee, and commander of Banda's personal paramilitary force, the Young Pioneer Movement. He has denied the charges.

The prosecution said that a former member of parliament, Faindi Phiri, told a rally in November 1979 that Malawi would be more developed if it had more men of Chakuamba's calibre. Chakuamba's failure to repudiate the statement was said to be evidence of his interest in raising dissatisfaction among the people with the government. Phiri is also on trial.

The government also alleged that Chakuamba was "a sympathizer and supporter of rebels," a charge which Malawi's main exile opposition group, Lesoma, said was completely false. Lesoma issued a statement denouncing the former cabinet minister, calling him "a murderer with sadistic instincts" and adding that the movement had no sympathy for him. Lesoma said "what the people of Malawi would like to see is the public trial of Hastings (Kamuzu) Banda himself." (Blantyre Radio, January 26 and 28, and February 5, 1981; New African, January 1981; London Times, December 10, 1980; London Observer, December 7, 1980.)

Mozambique

- The Mozambique Resistance Movement (MRM), a guerrilla group formed in the mid-1970s in opposition to the government of President Samora Machel, stepped up its activities in the remote western part of the country—the area between the port of Beira and the Zimbabwe border—in late 1980 and early 1981. The guerrilla attacks have increased there despite the October signing of a security pact between Machel and Zimbabwe Prime Minister Robert Mugabe aimed at cooperation in battling the rebels. Mugabe is to deploy troops to seal the 750-mile common border.

In December, reports said that government supporters were decapitated and their heads impaled on stakes at roadside by MRM dissidents. Several hundred Mozambicans fled into Zimbabwe after an unsuccessful rebel attempt to take over the border settlement of Espungabera. The ruling party, Frelimo, provided assistance in evacuating Mozambicans to Zimbabwe and protecting others in fortified villages.

Several acts of sabotage have taken place in the past year along the Umtali-Beira road including the blowing up of rail links and power lines running south from the Cabora Bassa dam. The MRM was previously supported by the white Rhodesian leadership, but lost its base and training facilities at Bindura when Mugabe became prime minister. It is now believed that South Africa provides much of its arms and that the MRM's Radio Free Africa broadcasts from northern Transvaal. MRM also maintains an office in Lisbon. (London Observer, February 8, 1981; Johannesburg Star, January 17, 1981; London Guardian, December 16, 1980.)

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Angola

- The first "extraordinary" congress of the ruling MPLA Workers' Party was held in late December, during which the central committee reviewed Angola's progress since 1977 and planned the country's social and economic development for the next five years. During the meeting, Jose Eduardo dos Santos was confirmed as President of the nation and of the party, and new members were elected to the central committee, representing the working and peasant classes.

The committee's report focused on the poor standard of living for the majority of Angolans, failure to organize economic production or crush black marketeering, poor party control over the executive, and defense problems. It was also very critical of party members who engage in "popularist and demagogic" actions and fail to carry out party guidelines. Observers said this was an indication of an upcoming purge throughout party ranks.

The meeting also discussed South African attacks against the southern provinces, noting that they are partially responsible for reconstruction problems there and for the country's large defense expenditures. But poor production was also blamed on lack of organization, technical and management skills, and responsibility among party ranks. Agricultural development is to be Angola's main priority in the coming years, as currently 90 percent of the nation's food is imported.

Five resolutions were adopted by the congress, calling for increased production, preparation for a general census, war against "anti-social elements" and thefts of food and goods, elimination of corruption, and punishment of leaders, officials, and workers "who practice or are connected with counter-revolutionary acts." (New York Times, February 2, 1981; Africa Research Bulletin, January 15, 1981; Luanda Radio, December 24, 1980; London Guardian, December 19, 1980.)
In reviewing progress that has been made for women in the period 1976 to 1980, the first half of the United Nations World Decade for Women, a gathering in Lusaka, Zambia of African women from 32 countries termed it a period of experimentation and trial and error for women’s programs in the continent. The same might be said of the efforts of outside organizations interested in helping African women. The phrase “women in development” has come to be used to describe a multiplicity of women’s needs and how they relate to the overall need to improve the life of the citizens of nations in the process of rapid change. It is a phrase that covers so much, in fact, that well-intentioned parties embarking on extending a helping hand can often be reduced to a state of paralysis or lured into adopting a shotgun approach. A careful reading of the findings and experiences of the last few years, however, provides some pointers on the role of Westerners who want to assist African women, and equally important, how it should be done.

Three basic principles underlie my assertions:

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The main objective of any effort should be to build the capability of Africans, especially women, to manage their own development processes.

Resources of the West and American resources in particular are of critical importance to African development and must be mobilized on behalf of African women particularly because women are not equal recipients of assistance.

In addition to whatever else is done, and in order to mobilize support, there must be continuing efforts to educate American and African policymakers on the issues and necessity of integrating women into national development.

The three major ways that outsiders can assist African women are:

- Providing education and training opportunities.
- Providing funding and technical assistance.
- Supporting information dissemination and communication efforts.

These are not sector delineations and, in fact, cut across sectors. While organizations might be involved in a particular sector because of their own interests — agriculture, family planning, appropriate technology, formal or nonformal education — these remarks address the types of assistance to be provided, regardless of the sector.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Lack of relevant education and training is perhaps the most serious constraint to the advancement of women and their full participation in African societies. One of the cruelest aspects of underdevelopment is the inability to make use of available natural resources, not the least of which is a nation's human population.

While the lack of trained manpower is serious in Africa, the proportion of trained women is the worst in the world. Fewer than half of the girls of school age in Africa are in school, with the participation of women at the higher education levels at a worldwide low of 25 percent. While research shows that progress has been made in African countries with regard to increased availability of educational facilities, the dropout problem among girls remains serious. The reasons include schoolgirl pregnancies, problems in paying tuition and school fees, lack of role models and achievement orientation, and the preference for educating boys rather than girls particularly among low-income parents.

A report prepared by the African Training and Research Center for Women of the Economic Commission for Africa noted these facts as well as the high correlation between mother and child's education level. The majority of illiterates in Africa are women. Lack of education and training opportunities has grave implications for the state of health of African women. Africa has the world's highest death rate for mothers and children. Yet there are few women trained in the various health professions to engineer the preventative and curative programs that Africa needs. Africa has the world's highest fertility rate with 46 births per 1,000 population. Studies show that high fertility restricts women's opportunities in training and education. Education is an important factor in influencing men and women to limit family size.

The agricultural sector provides the most painful illustration of the need to educate African women. Millions of people are starving to death in Africa. Of the 29 countries suffering from acute food shortages in 1980, the majority were in Africa. Further it is projected that the food shortages will get worse and that the deficits in many African countries will be so large and costly by the year 1990 that it is unlikely that they will be filled by imports from developed countries. This means that the increase in food supplies needed to meet nutritional needs must come from internal food production in Africa.

Since women are the main food producers in Africa, performing an estimated 70 percent of agricultural production and virtually 100 percent of food processing, women must be heavily involved in any such efforts. However, the participation of women in nonformal education related to agriculture was put at a low 15 percent by a 1975 United Nations study. Statistics for African women's enrollment in agricultural courses in formal education are even lower.

Girls and women are discriminated against in taking advantage of technical and vocational training opportunities in addition to being discriminated against in formal education. A report by UNESCO on female education and training points out that they are trapped in low-skill jobs and are not candidates for advanced training for positions requiring higher levels of education and expertise. Women workers in Africa face discrimination in terms of training opportunities, promotions, and studies, and the lack of adequate education is one of the major causes.

A clear role for the West is to provide greater opportunities for education and training. As the needs indicate, these opportunities must be both formal and nonformal and in fields that reflect African needs. While there is the need for higher education to provide the decision makers and the role models who can shape overall policies to benefit women, there is also a need to get girls into schools equally in the primary level in the first place. In some countries, such as Nigeria, this is already happening.

Whether designing formal or nonformal education programs, it is important to involve Africans in identify-
ing areas of need and methodologies. African countries are also emphasizing the need to develop indigenous educational institutions. It is recognized that there is a need for Africans to study abroad when indigenous programs do not exist, but this is seen as an interim rather than a long-term solution. Western assistance can be designed with the objective of institution-building in mind, in collaboration with Africans.

Where possible, short-term and nonformal education, which have become increasingly important as nations try to respond quickly to needs, should also be developed in conjunction with institutions in African countries. In the end, not only is training in Africa more cost-efficient, but the process will create a capability that will continue to be available to the country, unlike the case when a person goes to another country to take a course.

Attention must also be paid to the special needs of African women and national development needs. Women in the liberation movements have pointed out, for example, that scholarships only scratch the surface of women’s needs. In the case of South African and Namibian refugees who have suffered under the Bantu Education Act where education was woefully inadequate, it is first necessary to provide supplemental education to enable women to take advantage of higher education opportunities. Women have unique responsibilities as the caretakers of children, which should be considered when designing educational programs. When donors design assistance programs, for example, stipends should be provided for dependent children if African women are to participate fully. Stipends for husbands, or assistance in entering the United States, should be considered — the prospects of leaving one’s husband could be a constraint to African women. Another possibility is to support in-country, in-service training programs. Not only does such an approach address women’s familial responsibilities, but it keeps people where they are needed.

Certainly providing the indigenous human resources to engineer African development is one of the most fundamental ways of aiding in that process.

Making sure that African women are equal participants in education is one way of ensuring that factors affecting women become part of the total national effort.

FUNDING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Along with education, the need for additional income is one of the most often cited needs of African women. They point out that increased income relates to increased well-being overall; increased income means money for school fees, money for food and therefore better health, etc. Income generation can happen in many ways: cooperative development, small business development, and through generating wage employment. All of these projects require funding and technical assistance.

One view of the role of the West in assisting developing countries, including women’s projects, is to send money and nothing else. Others concede that technical assistance and training is needed at several points along the line, from assessing needs to designing, implementing, and evaluating projects, and writing proposals. What is clear is that improvements are necessary in facilitating the flow of funds and technical assistance to women. Problems include the long delays in processing requests, the excessive paperwork, the lack of understanding of implementation realities on the part of donors, reluctance by donors to find administrative costs, lack of administrative skills on the part of the recipient groups, and so on. Donors, development agencies, and women’s groups must find sensible solutions to these problems. Cooperating with intermediary organizations for example, preferably African, to handle the technical aspects of securing funds and developing appropriate application and evaluation procedures for grassroots groups is one approach.

The African countries have seen the dangers of accepting technical assistance that fosters dependency. As in the case of education and training, technical assistance and funding should be furnished in cooperation with indigenous African institutions. If technical assistance programs were developed in conjunction with women’s organizations, for example, who are already working with women and are aware of the problems, not only is there a transfer of resources but there is a
strengthening of capability with continuing benefits for a community.

There are many resources to work with in African countries including national bodies such as credit banks, local credit unions, national and local women’s organizations, and special governmental offices. There are local education institutions, institutes of management, and associations of researchers and professional organizations, such as local small business development organizations that can provide technical assistance and are familiar with the problems existing within a country. Generally the best way to start out if one is interested in providing funding and technical assistance is by meeting with such organizations to find out what is needed and what has been tried.

INFORMATION DISSEMINATION AND COMMUNICATION

Mrs. Lucille Mair, secretary-general of the United Nations Mid-Decade Conference for Women in Copenhagen last year, stated:

We have learned valuable lessons. The attitudinal prejudices which stand in the way of women’s advancement are held by women as well as men, and both are responsible for the lack of political will in many countries to change the status of women. We have come to understand more fully that even well conceived national machinery for women may fail from a lack of resources, a lack of infrastructure, from an inability to reach to women in greatest need and communicate their needs to those making policy. Above all, we have learned that to achieve full justice and equality for women will require a long patient struggle, waits in many ways and at many levels, with courage and imagination by women and men alike.

The need to communicate and develop and change attitudes, as Mrs. Mair states, is an ongoing need. There are many ways in which this can be done: workshops, seminars, educational travel, publications, and media productions, etc. Such meetings can be held on the local, regional, or international level.

In talking about changing the status of women, one is dealing with the most basic and fundamental of societies’ values. Generally there will be little success in changing laws or social practices that adversely affect women until there has been a change in societies’ attitudes of the necessity to make such changes. A look at education and the use of media can be particularly valuable in this regard. In the Ivory Coast, television has been used to explore the question of women’s legal rights and to advise women of rights.

Outside agencies can help in this area by making resources and technical assistance available to African women for communications and information dissemination and media projects. Again as much as possible, such projects should be done in cooperation with indigenous talent.

In summary, there is much to be said for cooperative efforts with indigenous organizations already working with African women. Whatever the sector, education and training, and financial resources — along with nondependency-producing technical assistance — can produce long-term capability and concrete results. Constant efforts to bring the “message” to people and exchange information and ideas are essential to making steady progress for women.

This education process is one that must go on with organizations that serve Africa as well. Many organizations concerned with African development have decided that special efforts to reach women are not necessary — that women benefit from programs equally with men. The evidence shows that this is generally not the case. It is understandable if organizations want to reach women equally through projects that are not for women only. Organizations should, however, determine that whether women are really benefiting equally.

Whether a women-only project or an integrated project with special provisions for women, programs to provide vastly increased educational and training opportunities and much larger amounts of financial resources and technical assistance are urgently needed if the distressing statistics on the status of African women are to be changed. Donor and programming agencies should pool resources to put together major new programs for African women.
“Our ideals must be reconciled with the reality we face. The United States must pursue its vision of justice in an imperfect and constantly changing world full of peril, but also full of opportunity.” Secretary of State Alexander Haig told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during his confirmation hearings.

At the heart of Secretary Haig’s testimony was the assertion that the problems the U.S. faces abroad are made more intractable by what is perhaps the central strategic phenomenon of the post-World War II era: the transformation of Soviet military power... to a global offensive army, navy, and air force, fully capable of supporting an imperial foreign policy... Today the threat of Soviet military intervention colors attempts to achieve international civility.”

Secretary Haig made clear he does not wish to conduct U.S. foreign policy solely along lines of simplistic anti-Sovietism. Important Western goals, he said, include “the eradication of hunger, poverty, and disease... the spread of social justice... and the improvement of the human condition.” However, he stressed that “these desirable and critical objectives are impossible to achieve in an international environment dominated by violence, terrorism, and threat.”

Throughout much of his testimony on African issues, Secretary Haig highlighted U.S. strategic considerations. But he left little doubt that he is also aware of regional power realities and African political concerns. American foreign policy must demonstrate “balance,” he said, adding that: “By balance, I mean recognizing that complex issues invariably require us to weigh, and somehow reconcile, a variety of pressures often competing.”

Over the course of the week-long Senate hearings, Secretary Haig answered a range of questions on African issues. Most of these were put to him by Democratic Senator Paul Tsongas (Mass.), ranking minority member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s African subcommittee, and by Republican Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum (Kans.), the new chairwoman of the subcommittee.

Asked to comment on the situation in the Horn of Africa, Haig underlined U.S. strategic interests in the Persian Gulf region: “I think that while we all know that we are highly dependent on Persian Gulf sources of oil, that our European partners are even more so, as is Japan in the Pacific... I think that those of us who have watched the changing strategic environment, not only in the Persian Gulf, but also in the Horn of Africa itself, have been concerned with the growing Soviet presence along both littorals of the African continent and... that the lifeline of vital Western raw materials could very rapidly come under serious threat.”

To meet this threat, Haig called for extensive consultation with U.S. allies to form a consensus on how “to deal with these vital lines of maritime access to our oil needs... Were that not to occur, I think as a nation we must be prepared to act even unilaterally to insure access to these vital resources.” He said he is “comfortable” with recent American moves to “gain access to a number of base rights [Kenya, Somalia, Oman]... all designed to enhance American flexibility to react rapidly in the event the vital oil resources of this nation were threatened.”

“I think an increased military presence by the United States is necessary in the period ahead,” Haig concluded, but would not be pinned down on the location of that presence, saying he needed time to study the matter. “One of the problems of talking glibly about the American presence in the Gulf is that it could have precisely the opposite consequences we are seeking... You have to lay out all the implications, ramifications, parse them out, and hopefully arrive at the solution that best meets the vital interests of the American people.”

When asked, however, for his reaction to Libya’s recent “acquisition of Chad,” Secretary Haig was unequivocal. Libya’s action, he said, was “outrageous” and part of a pattern: “They’ve been spawning terrorism, training terrorists, inciting difficulties throughout the northern tier of Africa and beyond. I think its high time the Western world at large assess with greater clarity the implications of this and move in concert to deal with it more effectively.”

Turning to the question of Angola, Secretary Haig again stressed U.S. strategic interests: “The matter of greatest concern to me is the fact that there are 18,000 to 20,000 Cuban mercenaries funded, supported, equipped, and transported by the Soviet Union, maintaining what degree of control and stability that government enjoys today.” Secretary Haig said he had hoped that the United States would
have continued with its efforts in the mid-1970s to block the establishment of a Soviet presence in Angola. And he condemned the Clark Amendment restrictions on the president’s freedom to do so.

Senator Kassebaum asked him to consider the ramifications in Africa, particularly Nigeria’s reaction, if Congress were to repeal these restrictions. Haig concurred that African concerns would have to be taken into account. “We’re there now and we don’t have to just deal with the right and wrong of whether we should have been there, but more importantly we have to deal with the impact of a change in the status quo.”

Secretary Haig said the Reagan administration had not yet made a decision on whether to support Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA movement in Angola, which he characterized as “a very strong independent movement which represents a substantial portion of the popular will.” He promised an extensive review of the situation in Angola and the available U.S. policy options. Among these options was one urged by Senator Tsongas that the U.S. recognize Angola and increase investment in that country so that the Luanda government could use this “opening to the West” to reach a power-sharing arrangement with Mr. Savimbi’s forces.

Also under questioning from Senator Tsongas, Secretary Haig made clear his thoughts on U.S. relations with Zimbabwe: “The last chapter is yet to be written, and I think it’s going to depend on a great deal on the behavior and attitude of that government. Clearly it is not in our interest to leave that government with no alternative but to turn to the East. On the other hand, it is also important that we look at its performance, its de facto alignments, its support for nonpeaceful change in the area, and, above all, its performance with respect to both the expectations and the need of the people. . . . My attitude [towards Zimbabwe] is very much one of watchful waiting.”

On Namibia, Secretary Haig was less specific, and even less committal. He said no one should be surprised that the South Africans are cautious about giving Namibia independence when their strategic interests are at stake. He indicated that the United States should continue working with other Western nations to bring about Namibian independence, but in a way that would not jeopardize U.S. strategic interests: “That is related and associated intimately with geographic location, the control of lines of communication, the raw materials, and historic and traditional friendships and alignments. . . . The U.S. cannot demonstrate impatience if that patience is going to jeopardize the progress we are seeking. That’s a broad generalization which is designed to ensure I have the flexibility to deal with this issue.”

Senator Tsongas responded: “I am convinced that the person who can have the most influence in bringing about a peaceful solution in southern Africa is . . . yourself. And very much like it took Richard Nixon to open up China, it is going to take a conservative administration to convince South Africa that a nonpeaceful evolution will end up with a Marxist government in both Namibia and South Africa. It is in the interest of the West that a peaceful evolution take place. You cannot approach South Africa on that issue from the left, you have to approach from the right. You are in a unique position to make that happen. You are handed a remarkable opportunity.”

If Secretary Haig chooses to seize that opportunity, he will have the support of Senator Charles Percy (R-III.), the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. During the hearings Percy spoke of his own previous efforts to convince former South African leader John Vorster to negotiate with SWAPO on the future of Namibia. Looking at the U.S. position on Namibian independence, Percy said: “We have raised it from a very low-level American position to a leadership position now. We have been exerting the force and influence of our country to move in that direction, but it is a painfully slow process. I am somewhat hopeful that it will eventually be resolved. I hope in the foreseeable future, in this administration. I think it can be.”

Haig can also count on the support of Senator Kassebaum, a moderate Republican. Kassebaum’s experience with African issues is limited, but her interest in the area is said to be high. Taking over the Africa subcommittee as the 97th Congress opened, she told a reporter: “There is a concern in the development of our foreign policy that we not put everything in the light of confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States.”

Senator Charles McC. Mathias of Maryland, another moderate Republican, has also joined the Africa subcommittee in the Senate, as have Democratic Senators Chris Dodd (Conn.) and John Glenn (Ohio). Right-wing Republican Senators Jesse Helms (N.C.) and S.I. Hayakawa (Calif.) are clearly in the minority on the subcommittee in their approach to African issues. Their views, however, probably better represent the general feeling on African issues in the Senate as a whole.

The architect of specific U.S. policies on African issues is expected to be Haig’s choice for assistant secretary for Africa: Dr. Chester Crocker of Georgetown University. Haig’s selection of Dr. Crocker as a top assistant at State, along with other mainline Republican foreign policy experts, rather than long-time, right-wing Reagan supporters, has angered the Republican right wing. In the early days of the Reagan administration, Senator Helms rallied a score of right-wing Republican senators in an attempt to block several Haig nominations, including Dr. Crocker’s.

Secretary Haig’s work in the Nixon White House, during a period of clear American tilt towards white South Africa and general neglect of other African issues, is viewed with suspicion and unease by many liberals and black-American groups. But liberals, now on the defensive in Washington, are likely to give Haig a breathing space to carve out a pragmatic policy designed to both protect U.S. strategic interests and meet the realities of a new decade in Africa.

Whether Secretary Haig will be able to hold to the center, and avoid caving in to strident anti-Marxist and white-supremist sympathies on the right, depends ultimately on President Reagan. At first blush, there are strong indications that Reagan will encourage Secretary Haig to follow a moderate course.
Teurai Ropa Nhongo was named in January 1981 to head the newly created Ministry of Community Development and Women’s Affairs and is the only woman minister in Prime Minister Robert Mugabe’s government. When this interview was conducted, she was the minister of sports, youth and recreation. Born in 1955, she is the youngest member of the Zimbabwe African National Union’s (ZANU) Central Committee and National Executive, and she serves as secretary for women’s affairs of ZANU/Patriotic Front.

She finished junior high school in 1972, the same year that ZANU’s Liberation Army (ZANLA) started its intense guerrilla warfare offensives. In late 1973, at the age of 18, Teurai Ropa joined ZANU, enlisting with the forces after walking hundreds of miles to cross the Zambezi River and enter Zambia. She excelled in military training and, as a young guerrilla officer, was deployed to the northeast war zone.

In Mozambique, where ZANU relocated from Zambia, she became political commissar of all of Tembu camp in 1974. Later she would miss the massacre of Nyadzoniya refugee camp, where she also worked as political commissar, while away on a party assignment. In 1976 she was appointed director of politics of Chibawawa refugee camp.

In 1977, there was a major reorganization of the party at the Chimoio Conference, when Teurai Ropa was elected secretary for women’s affairs, thereby joining ZANU’s highest policymaking body — the Central Committee. This automatically made her a member of the National Executive. Thus, at age 22 and by way of the armed forces, Teurai Ropa was a member of ZANU’s central leadership, which would later be the major force behind the new government. She is married to Commander Rex Nhongo, chief of ZANLA in the Joint High Command. They have two children.

AFRICA REPORT: What led you to become involved with the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe?

NHONGO: In 1973, after I had finished my junior certificate, comrades came to tell us about the struggle and the importance of women being part of the struggle. I was so moved by what they had to say and that I could be part of the combatants that I joined them.

AFRICA REPORT: What was it like? What did you do initially?

NHONGO: It took a week to become accustomed to the gun and how to use it. I worked for three months in the northeast area politicizing the masses. A young men joined then — young men who didn’t want to seem cowardly — I was the only woman in my section.

AFRICA REPORT: Did women achieve levels of significant responsibility in ZANLA?

NHONGO: Yes. For example, by 1976, I became political instructor at Nyadzoniya. By 1977 there were up to 100 women commanders. You see, during the period 1975 to 1977, when much of the leadership was locked up in prison, women were in the leadership in the camps, so they had to become commanders.

AFRICA REPORT: Was it difficult for men to accept women as leaders in the camps?

NHONGO: In our political ideology classes we had lessons on women’s role. The men were receptive. They had to choose who would lead each lesson, and they wanted a lesson on women and chose me to lead it.

AFRICA REPORT: When was the Women’s Affairs Department of ZANU formed, and when were you named to head it?

NHONGO: In 1977 I was named head of the Women’s Affairs Department. Actually the department had existed
Teurai Ropa Nhongo, the only woman minister in the Zimbabwe government

since 1963, when the party was formed, but because of political and sexual oppression it was kept quiet.

AFRICA REPORT: How did your war experience transform you?

NHONGO: We have several cultures in Zimbabwe. In traditional society, women were not expected to take on any challenge. But because of war, we were forced to become involved. In traditional society women weren't included in men's discussions. But men could include us in discussions in the revolution. I developed myself because I was willing to learn. We were forced to make decisions when things were difficult. I had to forget my womanhood and act like a man. Men had to come to accept us because we could contribute.

AFRICA REPORT: Did other women in ZANLA share a similar experience?

NHONGO: Women do not easily change if they see the line.

AFRICA REPORT: What do you mean?

NHONGO: When they saw the purpose of the struggle and what had to be done, the women pursued it and did not get off the track.

AFRICA REPORT: How many of the soldiers in the war were women, and what jobs did they perform?

NHONGO: Women were military instructors, teachers, cooks, commanders — everything. About 10 percent of the forces who served in the rear were women, but another 15 percent were women actually engaged in the war. Women were transporters of materials, taking materials as advance teams, which was very dangerous. Women and children were the bulk of the refugees. They tilled the land.

AFRICA REPORT: What was life like in the camps and in the bush?

NHONGO: It is difficult for most people to believe what it was like. In war we ate worms, baboons, tortoises, and dogs, drank urine, and cooked any leaf we could find because there was nothing else. In one camp — it was a refugee camp of women and children refugees, but it was badly bombed — we used to bury 30 people a day, if there were less we would pray and thank God. They died from low resistance and lack of food. That's why the ZANLA forces could never start another war. The dissidents you hear about are those who have never really suffered hardships.

AFRICA REPORT: You and other women comrades shared a revolutionary experience during the war. Do you think this experience is shared by Zimbabwean women as a whole?

NHONGO: There still needs to be a consciousness-raising. For example, polygamy still exists; the women still do it, but they don't understand that they have accepted a man to be their master. The laws must be changed, and most women will accept change in family law. My husband and I were both soldiers — we both came into our marriage with very little and worked together for what we have. There's no reason that what we have should not belong to us equally, unlike the way present laws provide.

AFRICA REPORT: A new National Women's Organization is being formed in Zimbabwe, although it will be a nongovernmental organization. What do you think it should do?

NHONGO: NZWO should be concerned with protecting women — suggesting ways to achieve economic progress, especially ways to develop women — and it should be involved in consciousness-raising.

AFRICA REPORT: Are the problems of youth and women related?

NHONGO: Yes, more than 60 percent of the population is less than 30 years old. Women make up more than the bulk of the population. In every program and ministry women should be included, and so should youth.

AFRICA REPORT: And how do you see the "sports" side of your ministry?

NHONGO: I see sports as an important part of development, especially for developing our youth. We must achieve total integration of all sports in Zimbabwe. Blacks must get into all sports, such as cricket. There must be integrated facilities so that black children, who were excluded before, can learn to swim.

AFRICA REPORT: Will the attention to women evidenced before independence be carried over in the new Zimbabwean government?

NHONGO: Yes, the government of Zimbabwe is ready to cooperate politically and work with women. Women should be integrated into all activities, not be separated out.

AFRICA REPORT: You have emphasized consciousness-raising as important for women. How should it be done?

NHONGO: The most suitable way to reach women is through face-to-face communication and then with media. Our women are very intelligent. It is not difficult to teach our women.
Nontraditional Training for Women in the Arab World

BY SAMIRA HARFOUSH

Arab educational systems have always been, and continue to be, elitist. Access depends heavily on social class and academic achievement. For example, among all first-year Moroccan primary students (both males and females), only 2% will ultimately reach the final year of secondary level. And only 30% of those who begin the secondary level will eventually complete the final year of their secondary schooling. Most rural and lower-class students, especially females, are eliminated by the rigorous selection in Arab educational systems. As a result, the main beneficiaries of modern education continue to be mostly urban males from diverse socio-economic backgrounds and middle-to-upper-class women.

Females are usually withdrawn at an early age from the education process by their families who, as a result of traditions, do not favor "too much" education for their daughters. The sex enrollment imbalances increase progressively as the level of education increases. Arab countries have always given priority to the education and training of males. Families regard investment in the education and training of their sons as more positive than investing in the education and training of their daughters. A son must provide financial support for his own family as well as any family he will eventually raise. In contrast, the daughter's stay with her family is considered to be temporary. As soon as she gets married, she will join her husband's family. As a result, any investment in her education is considered to be a loss.

Historically, the honor of an Arab family has been represented by the purity of its women. The most disgraceful and shameful event that could befall the family would be for a daughter to lose her virginity prior to marriage. Men have the responsibility to protect women, and hence the family honor, since women are considered to be too weak to protect themselves. As a result,
women are kept in protective environments. For example, in most Arab countries, except for private schools and universities, students are generally segregated by sex at all levels of education. Saudi Arabia is an exception; it continues to practice sex segregation at all levels of education, including universities where females can only be instructed by male professors through closed-circuit television.

Thus, a female’s access to educational and training opportunities depends on how cultural and religious beliefs define her role in society. For centuries Arab women have been brought up to believe that their only objective in life is to prepare for marriage and childbearing. It is expected that they will be dependent on the males in the family for protection and economic support.

This expectation has always been reinforced by the way men and women are portrayed in the textbooks. Females are never portrayed as electricians, mechanics or industrial machine operators. They are always depicted as loving, sacrificing and obedient wives and daughters, or perhaps as teachers and nurses. Men, on the other hand, occupy positions as the strong workers, technicians, doctors and engineers. It is only natural, therefore, for schools to emphasize home economics for girls and industrial arts for boys. In sum, careers that are suggested for females in school are only an extension of their traditional domestic roles.

The early marriage of females also prevents them from having the opportunity of continuing their schooling. Most technical, non-traditional training requires a minimum of nine years of schooling, and withdrawal of females from the school system usually occurs between the seventh and ninth grades.

**TYPES OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING AVAILABLE**

Vocational training falls within two contexts: (1) the formal educational systems, usually under ministries of education, and (2) the non-formal, non-degree level under different ministries including the ministry of education. At both levels, females have very little access to vocational training, especially in nontraditional fields. Egypt has the highest rates of participation, with females representing 34% of its total vocational school enrollments. However, the majority is in commercial and secretarial training, with very few enrolled in laboratory technology and electronics. Tunisia, for example, is considered to be in the forefront of Arab countries in providing equal opportunities for females. However, only 0.1% of female secondary school enrollment is in industrial training compared to 22.5% for boys. In Jordan, although girls are enrolled in the secondary commercial section, they are not allowed in the industrial and agricultural sections. And females in the commercial section are enrolled primarily in secretarial and clerical office skills studies rather than management or accounting areas.

At the non-formal, non-degree training level (training for employment) the situation is not any better. In most Arab countries, the only training available for women at this level is the traditional training or what some call "technical training." This training usually involves child care, sewing, handicrafts, hairstyling, embroidery and knitting. These services can be produced at home, thereby avoiding the mixing of the sexes, and have little if any economic value. The purpose of this kind of training is not necessarily to prepare women for active participation in the labor market, but rather to improve their traditional role as:

- a marketable commodity in the marriage market
- a better educated mother and understanding wife, and
- a more talented housekeeper.

Some Middle Eastern countries have expanded their female vocational training to include some non-traditional training in order to enable females to acquire skills with more economic value in the labor market. Egypt, Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan and Morocco have included laboratory technician and commercial training. Options such as secretarial skills and typing are usually offered to females who drop out of the formal education system. There is limited access, however, for females in agricultural training, even and especially in countries where they have worked in agriculture for centuries. This restricts the options for rural women and traps them in a situation where they continue to be low-paid (or even unpaid), unskilled, agricultural laborers.

**A SPECIAL PROJECT IN MOROCCO**

In mid-1979, after more than two years of discussions, the Ministry of Labor in Morocco initiated a special AID-funded project to provide industrial and commercial training for women in Morocco.

This project originated in December 1976 when, at the request of the Moroccan Government, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) sent three consultants to Morocco to investigate, to evaluate and to make recommendations. There were two national, non-formal education programs for women: the Foyer Femmes and the Ouvroirs. Their programs served approximately 100,000 poor girls between the ages of 10-22, teach-
ing such traditional feminine crafts as embroidery, knitting, sewing and crocheting. There were also other government-sponsored, non-formal educational programs involving women in handicraft training, some commercial training and hotel training. However, women were not allowed in industrial and agricultural training programs.

The consultants recommended that the current vocational training system be expanded to include industrial training; that the existing curricula of the Feminines and Ouvoir Training Centers be strengthened to make them more responsive to both the remedial educational needs of female adolescents and the actual economic prospects of the trainees; and that a study be undertaken to assess the actual structure of job opportunities for women in the modern sector of the Moroccan economy, as well as the extent and degree of receptivity for different types of vocational training programs that would train and prepare female adolescents in Morocco for income earning employment opportunities.

The AID team members were told by Moroccan officials that young Moroccan women and their parents would not accept training outside of traditional handicraft activities. The available statistics, however, indicated that there were increasingly high activity rates of women among the 15-24 year old age group, especially in urban areas. Statistics also demonstrated that a large number of females sought employment, but could not find jobs because they lacked the proper skills in non-traditional fields that the labor market demanded.

After the establishment of a pilot program to integrate women into the Industrial and Commercial Training Centers at Casablanca and Fes, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labor, America-Mideast Educational and Training Services, Inc. (AMIDEAST) was chosen to implement and manage the project.

A 6-member team left for Morocco early October 1979. The team consists of an educator, an economist, a psychologist and three training experts in electricity and electronics, drafting, and business education. The educator administers the program in the field, the economist surveys and analyzes the labor market and locates openings for females graduating from the centers, the psychologist provides career counseling to the female trainees during training and after they are employed, the three training experts train the Moroccan trainers to help them improve their teaching methodology and curricula.

The project is targeted towards urban young women. In the construction design and business education sections, trainees are required to have completed a minimum of 12 years of schooling. In the electricity, electronics and industrial design sections, they must have completed nine years. Training at these centers is directed towards employment and is coordinated with specific labor market demands. The greatest advan-
Tunisian lab technician: "Tunisia is considered to be in the forefront of Arab countries providing equal opportunities for females"
of training and employment offered to women. Policy makers are men who do not believe women should be provided with the same training and educational opportunities as men. Government's educational plans and projects tend to make industrial and agricultural training available only to men. For example, the Vocational Training Corporation in Jordan, a major supplier of skilled and semi-skilled industrial labor for the private and public sectors, does not allow women to enroll. One official stated that industrial training is not "proper" for females, in addition to being above their capacity. Egypt has the highest participation of females in vocational training among Middle Eastern countries, but the ratio of females to males is 1:9 in industrial schools and 1:25 in the agricultural schools.

Middle Eastern countries who face shortages of skilled and semi-skilled labor prefer to import labor, primarily males, rather than train and utilize their educational plans and projects tends to opportunities as men. Government's with the same training and educational not believe women should be provided of training and employment offered to industrial streams, confining women to participation, the World Bank-funded and urban women to the home economics and some commercial efforts on behalf of rural Seventy percent of the economically active people in Kuwait are expatriate. In Qatar the percentage is 81%.

United Nations agencies such as UNDP, ILO, UNICEF, FAO, the World Bank, and other U.S. development agencies have channelled their educational efforts on behalf of rural and urban women to the home economics streams, which is an extension of the discriminatory systems of participation. The World Bank-funded educational and training projects in many Middle Eastern countries exclude women from training in food technology, textile technology and other industrial streams, confining women to home economics and some commercial options.

There are strong traditions and social attitudes that do not encourage girls to enter into non-traditional fields. Such traditions discourage mixes between the sexes, which cause the isolation of most women from receiving such training and actively participating in the modern labor market. For example, families frequently withdraw their daughters from the educational process at an early age, promote early marriage of their daughters, and prevent them from working outside the city or the area of their residence. This contributes to the high illiteracy rates found among females, especially in rural areas, and the low activity rate among females in all sectors except in education. The educational sector is the only profession females are encouraged to enter. Aside from discrimination in the type of education and training offered to females, schools do not usually provide them with adequate vocational guidance and career counseling. Announcements for recruiting trainees for non-traditional training programs almost always use the masculine form, which is usually understood to mean male student only. In addition, scholarships and training seminars outside the Arab World are normally restricted to males.

"Women do not want to participate in non-traditional training" is an expression I always hear whenever talking to educational planners and government officials of Arab countries. This is a myth that hinders females from having the opportunity to prove that they want to receive such training. The first experiment of its kind in the Middle East, a project to integrate women into the Industrial/Commercial Training Centers in Morocco received more applications than officials expected. Five years ago when the Jordanian Ministry of Education set up a training program for women in cosmetology, pottery, mother of pearl industry, dressmaking and carpentry, the women chose to enroll only in carpentry and dressmaking. When a textile factory was established in Yemen by the Chinese, they requested female factory labor. The government officials of Yemen explained that the idea was not feasible since Islamic cultural constraints would prevent such a phenomenon. But after the radio announcement for women labor, over 600 Yemeni women (mostly heads of households) showed up to apply for jobs when the factory opened.

Once educated, trained and employed, women do not get the same pay as men. For example, in Jordan females make 85% of the male's salary for the same job. The notion is that women do not need to be financially independent because there is always the male in the family who will provide economic support. Work opportunities for females are limited to jobs that pay very little and/or discriminate against married female workers. For example, at the Hussein pharmaceutical company in Jordan, females are dismissed as soon as they get married.

It is very clear from the research available that Arab women have always been, and continue to be, discriminated against in education, training and employment. They are trapped in a vicious circle. In order to improve their status and encourage them to actively participate in their economies, the following steps must be considered.

First, compulsory education laws must be implemented at all levels of female education. Arab governments should provide nationwide literacy campaigns.

Second, vocational guidance and career counselling for non-traditional skills at the formal and non-formal education levels must be provided for women. Also, governments of Arab countries should encourage families to allow their females to enroll in the sciences and non-traditional training programs.

Third, male-oriented training areas must be opened to women to provide them with industrial and agricultural skills, so they can fill the shortage of skilled and semi-skilled labor instead of importing foreign labor.

Fourth, attitudes of policy makers and planners must be changed so women can participate in policy making—especially in matters that directly involve women.

Fifth, existing training programs, especially those for women, need to be reformed to reflect the current projected human resource needs of each country, so that once women have been educated and trained, their knowledge and skills can be utilized to contribute directly to the development of their economies.

Sixth, when funding any educational or training projects in the Middle East, development agencies should see to it that women are among the recipients of such training. Development means the full utilization of a country's resources, including men and women.
African Women on the Screen

BY KATHLEEN MCCAFFREY

With few exceptions, the glamorous images of women in American and Western European films have been the product of male fantasy. Unfortunately, then, women on the screen have usually been trivialized or romanticized as individuals. In contrast, women in African film have remained free of the glamour syndrome. Instead, they are portrayed not as "stars," but as mothers, daughters, wives, and sisters in the throes of social and political change.

The African filmgoer sees not a seductive yet elusive "star-image," but rather a mirror-image of herself, in a wholly African context. Furthermore, since the mirror-image interprets reality by revealing its inner layers of meaning, it provokes a growing self-awareness in the viewer, an awareness of her position in society, of her potential for change. Its effect is not to hypnotize, but to energize.

On a continent where no film industry exists, where shoestring budgets for independent filmmakers are common, and where controversial films routinely meet government opposition, premier African filmmaker Ousmane Sembene has continued to write and direct films for over two decades that excel in presenting images of women at the forefront of African history and society. Though scenes in his films often provoke belly laughs and tears, his purpose is not to entertain. On the contrary: "My films aim to awaken the conscience of the African people and to present, either through the past or the present, the situation the African finds himself in.... The main thing is to steer people into taking a stand."

It is often overlooked by Western viewers that those who go furthest in Sembene's films toward realizing themselves and acting effectively are women. Yet from an African viewpoint, such a portrayal is hardly surprising. As Joy Zollner pointed out in an article on women in Africa (January-February 1977), African women have always played a major role in their society, probably more so than American women in theirs. Because woman is the giver of life, she is revered. Further, emphasizes Zollner, the woman has traditionally been responsible for the survival of her society—morally and physically.

Since the role of woman as preserver of life and tradition places her at the heart of African culture, it follows that African women have served as queens and military leaders. Of course, waves of Western influence, Islam, and forces within traditional African society have sabotaged her status. Nonetheless, it is her dynamic power that Sembene chooses to stress in his films. Three in particular portray aspects of this power against a background of shifting historical and cultural forces.

Ceddo (1977), Sembene's most recent and important work, concerns the violent conversion of a village to Islam and the destruction of its traditional African culture. Princess Dior Yacine, the king's daughter, is kidnapped by one of the ceddo (the common people in a feudal society) to protest the efforts of the imam, or Moslem priest, to bring the village under his religious rule. But the king is murdered, the ceddo's revolt cruelly suppressed, and the villagers forcefully converted. Under Islam, the women are now ranked socially with slaves.

When the imam, a comic, diminutive man, decides to marry the princess, soldiers are sent to rescue her. In a stunning final scene, Princess Dior enters the central court of her village to find her people humiliated. In a flash, she snatches the rifle from the hands of a soldier, spins around, and shoots the imam. The film fades here.
In this act, Princess Dior represents not only traditional Africa, but the dignity and stature of the African woman before Islam, before colonialism. In her decisiveness, she easily surpasses her father the king. It is significant that the regal princess is underestimated by the royal guard and the imam — who fatally regards her as his bride, not his murderer. She has been similarly ignored by Western reviewers, who like to focus on the lengthy parleys among the men in the film, and refer only casually to the end as a surprising climax.

*Ceddo* has met with severe government opposition in Senegal. The reason given originally concerned the spelling of the film's title. President Senghor of Senegal insisted it should be "Cedo." Sembene disagreed, maintaining that Senghor's version represented a Europeanized version of the word. The real reason for the banning, according to the filmmaker, was the portrayal of Islam and the image of women in the film:

What is shown in *Ceddo* is a matriarchal era before the coming of Islam, an era when women had an important role. When the princess kills the imam, it has great symbolic significance for modern Senegal. This action is contrary to present ideas and the role that women now hold. And this is the only reason, in my opinion, that the film has been banned in Senegal. Women have no value in our Moslem-dominated society and this representation of women is something Islam cannot accept.

In *Emitai* (1971), filmed in the fertile Casamance region of southern Senegal, the status of women is quite different. In the film, the Diola women of Efok have exclusive control of the rice crop. And because harvesting is interwoven with their mystical beliefs as animists, they possess great economic power and spiritual stature. It is taboo for the men to dispose of the crop in any way. But when a detachment of French soldiers (the period is World War II) invades the village demanding rice, the men lead the French to the cache of rice belonging to the women.

Sembene is concerned in *Emitai* primarily with the religious and social dynamics within Diola society. Though he deeply reveres Diola mythology, he shows that it is ultimately the women — without reference to religion — who stood firm. When they are taken hostage by the French, they do not break. And when they learn of the men's betrayal, they sing mournfully that the men have lost the sense of life in violating the rice taboo. Remorsefully, the men take up the chant, renouncing their act, preferring death to what they have done.

"We must ask the question," comments Sembene, "why the men collaborated with the French and the women did not." As in *Ceddo*, the strength of certain women is underestimated by the men. Certainly the French soldiers understand nothing of Diola culture, particularly of the power and status of its women.

In *Xala* (1975), Sembene portrays the more recent conflict of the African women between traditional and modern values. Besides mocking the new black bourgeoisie in Senegal, *Xala* is a condemnation of polygamy.

El Hadji Abdou Kader Beye is marrying his third wife — for prestige.
Shy and naive, she is the same age as his eldest child, Rama, the daughter of his first wife, a traditional and religious Moslem. Unexpectedly, El Hadji cannot consummate his marriage. His impotence represents the fate of colonial materialism in Africa, and the various women — his second wife being a modern, middle-class wife — seem to symbolize the warring values of traditional Africa and colonialist Europe, in circumstances that often bring out the worst of both.

El Hadji's daughter Rama, about 20, attends the university and is politically active, having participated in the struggle for independence alongside her father. She also belongs to a Wolof study group, where she is learning the traditional language of her people. Insisting that she will borrow selectively from French culture, Rama refuses to speak French with her father. She also opposes polygamy and openly criticizes her father's third marriage. Insisting on traditional filial obedience, he strikes her: "You can be a revolutionary at the university or in the street, but not in my house. Never!" Rama's response is simply to lose respect for her father.

She and Princess Dior are sister spirits. Both are young and unmarried, independent of mind, and potential leaders. While Rama represents a new kind of African woman, forging a compromise between the traditional and the modern, her roots in history are strong, as shown in the character of her predecessor, the princess.

It could be said that the ideal African in Sembene's films is the African woman. One wonders whether such images might not be mixed with some illusion. How realistic are they? Certainly in works by other filmmakers, women are often less heroic, less realized as individuals, but nonetheless believable.

In Kodou (1971) by Ababacar Samb-Makharam of Senegal, for example, a young girl bolts away during a traditional but painful lip-tattooing ceremony, incurring the mockery of the villagers and the anger of her parents, who believe she has shamed them and gone crazy.

Traumatized, Kodou is treated first by a white psychiatrist and then by a fetish healer. The film portrays her slow, unsure recovery, but suggests that she may be more crushed than saved within the strict confines of her traditional role, which makes no room for an individual woman's personality and needs.

During Mahama Traore's Dian-kha-Bi (1968), also Senegalese, the refrain heard is, "Tradition, your weight is heavy," a theme appropriate to Kodou as well. Traore presents three women: the traditional, the modern, and one who combines the two. Maimouna, a traditional woman, is tightly controlled by her mother, even to the choice of her husband. She appears to accept her fate, repressing an urge to complain. Seynabou, in contrast, embraces Western ways, frequenting nightclubs, wearing wigs and make-up. But she is no better off than Maimouna. Alienated from her family, she has no real identity. The third woman, Awa, apparently achieves the ideal compromise, though Traore does not show in any detail how she has succeeded. Awa is not as strong a character as Sembene's Rama, but clearly Traore and Sembene are more sanguine than Samb-Makharam about the value of Western ways (education, medicine) to the African woman.

It is appropriate to end with mention of Sarah Maldoror, a black feminist and filmmaker, deeply influenced by Sembene. Sambizanga (1972), her best-known film, concerns a village woman's lonely attempt to find her husband, an imprisoned Angolan liberation fighter who dies after severe torture. As Maria mourns her husband's death, she grows in political consciousness and gradually welcomes a role in her people's struggle.

Maldoror's aim is neither to idealize women nor to paint a picture of their misery. She simply wishes to show — along documentary lines — what happens in a liberation struggle; to educate audiences around the world about Africa. Still, her point of view is clearly revolutionary. "I'm only interested in women who struggle," she says. "These are the women I want to have in my films, not the others."

In portraying the role of the African woman both in history and in current society, these filmmakers each emphasize the tension of continuity and change. The sad story of Kodou is just as important as the triumph of Princess Dior Yacine.
Books

"The denial of women's rights and opportunities is at the very root of our development problems and socioeconomic ills."
— Helvi Sipila, World Conference Documents.

PERSPECTIVES ON THIRD WORLD WOMEN


With the advent of the 1980 International Women's Conference and the current debate over the status of women, it is timely that several books addressing the issue have recently been published. The three chosen for review here are Comparative Perspectives of Third World Women, edited by Beverly Lindsay, Women and Racial Discrimination in Rhodesia, by A.K.H. Weinrich, and The Domestication of Women, by Barbara Rogers.

A recently compiled study of Third World women is titled Comparative Perspectives of Third World Women: the Impact of Race, Sex and Class. Beverly Lindsay has succeeded in editing a collection of essays by 12 authors.

Part one deals with women in developing countries; Zaire, Kenya, China, northern India, the Caribbean, Cuba, and Latin America are each singled out for study. Part two addresses the problems of minority women in the United States, confronting the discrimination faced by native American, Chicana, black, and Vietnamese women in the United States. The volume clearly links these different women by the triple jeopardy of class, sex, and race that each faces—be they a welfare mother in Alabama or a rural Kenyan woman.

One chapter of particular interest will serve to illuminate the book as a whole. "Women in Cuba: The Revolution Within the Revolution," by Johnetta B. Cole, examines the changing status of women before and after the 1959 revolution.

The plight of Cuban women before the revolution conformed to the pattern repeated throughout underdeveloped Third World countries. Illiteracy, unemployment, and dismally poor housing and health care were the norm. Havana had become a major site for prostitution and gambling for U.S. servicemen. The domination of Cuba by the United States increased the male-supremacist attitude already inherent in the prevailing machismo ideology.

The triumphs of the Cuban revolution have deeply improved the lives of all Cuban people, though the benefits have been most dramatically experienced by Cuban women. The society that once experienced a 25 percent unemployment rate now has a labor shortage. The literacy campaign succeeded, in one year, in teaching 707,000 adults to read and write. The health care system has been transformed, and free education from the elementary through the university level has been instituted. The Maternity Law and the Family Code are especially progressive legislative acts for women.

Cole, despite her high praise for Cuba's advances, is quick to point out that serious problems still remain. Women have yet to be fully integrated into leadership roles. Cuban women still suffer personally exploitive relationships despite stipulations in the Family Code requiring men to shoulder 50 percent of the childcare and housework. Sexist attitudes remain, but with each generation they are being exposed and challenged.

Women and Racial Discrimination in Rhodesia, by A.K.H. Weinrich, was prepared by UNESCO for the World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. The book examines the effects of social and economic structures in Rhodesia on women as well as women's roles in traditional society prior to that country's 1980 independence and reflects on their roles in the country's future.

The volume's five chapters focus on
the economic situation of the country, the effect this situation has on the position of African women, husband-wife relationships, bridewealth, and the legal position of women. The uniform approach used is an assessment of the prevailing conditions in precolonial Rhodesia, an analysis of the present situation, and an outline of possible future developments aimed at overcoming the present sexual inequalities and restrictions placed on African women.

An especially welcome addition are the quotations used to begin each chapter. Sources range from Trotsky to Freire and help to encapsulate the recurring themes in much of this literature. Engels echoes one prevailing message in saying, "In order to change the conditions of life, we must see them through the eyes of women."

Weinreich's study is comprehensive class analysis of the Rhodesian situation. It gives an important perspective on a country whose people have fought hard and suffered much in the last century.

Does "development" lead to further underdevelopment for Third World women? This is the question Barbara Rogers addresses in her well-documented study The Domestication of Women: Discrimination in Developing Societies.

Development projects, she asserts, have been slanted toward men at the expense of women in Third World countries. Although it is women who are responsible for most subsistence agriculture, development planners largely overlook this important fact. Assistance projects have deprived women of their traditional rights to land, excluded them from opportunities to break out of their increasing cycle of poverty, deprived them of male support they relied on in the past, and subjected them to new forms of male domination.

As Rogers states, "Planners do not deal with individuals; rarely do they have direct contact with peasant communities or their representatives. The data base for planning is the statistics, surveys and censuses, and their derivatives such as 'manpower plans' and cost-benefit analyses." When planners do make contact, their Western male prejudices lead them to overlook women's opinions, consulting instead the views of husbands, fathers, sons, and brothers.

The author devotes part one to a discussion of Western male ideology regarding gender distinctions, the division of labor, and other theories that tend to support the myth of women's "rightful" place in society.

Part two analyzes the planning process itself, including the distortions involved in data collection on which such planning is based. This section includes Ms. Rogers' illuminating interviews with planners themselves. One such conversation with senior officials of a World Bank project follows:

"Meet Barbara Rogers, she's visiting this project and wants to know what we're doing for women. I warn you though, she's a feminist.' Embarrassed silence. 'Well, actually I don't think there's anything of much interest to you here. Perhaps UNICEF can show you something. We're a huge program, millions of dollars, a consortium of agencies, got a job to do, and we haven't got any time for special projects.'

Discrimination in data collection is articulated in many ways. A female subsistence farmer who is classified as "farmer's wife" is automatically declared ineligible for agricultural training, credit, or much-needed appropriate technology. When Western land registry officials list land as belonging to "head of household" — overlooking the striking statistic that one out of every three households in the world today is run by women without men present — that woman is deprived of traditional land rights based on the sexist assumption that "head of household" must by definition be male.

Part three examines the discriminatory aspect of planning as it affects subsistence agriculture. This is analyzed in terms of erosion of women's land rights and the question of women's work (or overwork), as well as the effect of development planning on that workload. As Ms. Rogers contends, "It is all too readily believed that women 'do not work' as long as they do housework full time."

Barbara Rogers has made an admirable contribution to the study of Third World women. Her attack on Western male development planners is substantiated and irrefutable. In addition, this is a serious analysis of assistance programs in developing countries, particularly in the realm of subsistence agriculture.

Linda L. Whan
African-American Institute Intern from UCLA

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Who will speak for the African woman?


Recent scholarship on African women in developing societies provides another look at their status. Only two out of five books reviewed here were written by African women, a fact which poses a question, "Who can interpret the lives of African women?" Western women from developed countries may apply Western values when investigating the meaning of development in the context of African nations. The Kenyan anthropologist, Dr. Achola Pala Okeyo, has shared an insight on this issue. She said, "In most international meetings one often encounters polarization between women from developing countries and those from developed countries on the issue of what women's advancement means."

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AFRICA REPORT • March-April 1981
Developing countries are still faced with a number of fundamental problems of survival — food, land, water and questions of autonomy are constant challenges.” Writers will need to bear this issue in mind if they are to advance scholarship on African women.

Caroline Bledsoe's *Women and Marriage in Kpelle Society* attempted to examine marriage patterns of Kpelle women in Liberia. The author did her field work in Fuuma chiefdom, about 70 miles north of Monrovia. In the body of the work, Bledsoe commented on how valuable women’s work is to the society. Women work on rice farms, make oil, grow vegetables, catch fish, and educate children by paying school fees.

Marriage has great significance in Kpelle society, because through this institution, a man gains legal rights, both productive and reproductive, to a woman and to natal kin. Bledsoe convincingly pointed out how marriage is therefore essential to men and she has made a contribution to our understanding of Kpelle women.

A weakness, however, in Bledsoe’s book was the author’s tendency to discuss the sexual relations of the people in a gossipy fashion. For example, Bledsoe wrote of one of her male assistants:

“Needless to say, my male assistant learned a great deal about women’s goals and strategies. People (women) knew he was earning a good salary, so even for the short time he was working for me he was a prime target for women seeking lovers with money. He told me he was leaving the project a much wiser man, able to penetrate the tricks of some of the wildest women in Handi.

Although Bledsoe was attempting to show that Kpelle women take lovers, the impression she left was in bad taste for a scholar. This example implies that the Kpelle women are promiscuous and mercenary.

Sarah LeVine wrote *Mothers and Wives: Gusii Women of East Africa* in collaboration with her husband, Robert. This work is a series of seven case studies. By looking at the intimate lives of seven Kenyan women, the author gave the reader a view of “the psychological function of women in this society.” LeVine has an extraordinary writing talent and her portraits of the African women were vivid and novel-like.

The book seems to have been written for an American audience, and therefore LeVine should have been more careful about her value judgments. Of the first woman, LeVine wrote: “She was very black. With the Gusii, as with many African people, light skin color is prized…” We are asked to accept this kind of generalization without any historical explanation. Dr. Amos Odenyo, a Kenyan anthropologist, stated that the Gusii region is good land for coffee-growing, and therefore this area was populated with white missionaries and farmers, who “brainwashed” the Gusii people for many generations. “This brainwashing would happen in areas where there were great concentrations of missionary work and Westernization,” he explained. LeVine’s book would have been strengthened by this sort of explanation. The physical appearance of African women was an issue for the author, therefore she had an obligation to discuss the impact of colonialism, slavery, and racism upon African family life.

When LeVine discussed a third Gusii woman, she continued to make value judgments, stating, “Phoebe, a pretty and unusually light-skinned girl of about 23, had eloped with Kepha, her long-time sweetheart, five years before.” Another example pertained to a description of another woman’s husband’s desire to remain monogamous. Utilizing biased language, LeVine argued, “she was the only wife…thus her children did not face the prospect of sharing what little there was with a slew of half-siblings.” “Slew” is an inappropriate word for a description of African family life, and “half-siblings” is unflattering when “brothers and sisters” could instead have been used.

*Mothers and Wives* is so filmlike that one feels compassion for the women with their many marital problems. Gusii women are suffering even though they toil endlessly to feed, clothe, and educate their children. To add insult to injury, one of the women in LeVine’s case studies had to put up with a promiscuous husband. LeVine described how infidelity hurt this woman, “Ten hungry mouths, ten children in need of an education would not stop him from seeking out a young girl to bear him yet more children.”

Margaret Strobel’s *Muslim Women in Mombasa 1890-1975* is one of the most interesting books. The author made a thorough investigation into Muslim women’s weddings, sex education, sex segregation, purdah, Western influences, and class society. Subjects like menstruation and sex, for example, were not “to be discussed between mother and daughter.” Readers will be stimulated by the research pertaining to the “somo” or “slave woman” who instructs the bride in sexual matters.

Mombasa society was once very segregated by race and sex. Strobel wrote intelligently about how women were segregated and socialized by sex. Additionally, the British had great influence over Muslim culture and segregated schools for Europeans, Indians, Arabs, and Africans were in existence. The British did not abolish slavery until 1907 and so there remained vestiges of class prejudice and racism. These separations retarded growth in Mombasa society. Although the prophet encouraged Muslims to seek knowledge, the idea of secular education for girls created “ambivalent feelings” in families. There are still people who seek to imitate European values and there are those who oppose this. Some men view education for children as a corrupting Western influence.” However, Muslim women are changing in Mombasa. Complete purdah is in decline. Some of these changes occur, however, because Muslims have less control over forces that change their society.

Strobel reflects one cultural bias in her heading, “Beyond Patriarchy,” because the Muslim women were not necessarily trying to change the patriarchal system. Still this author is well worth reading. Strobel tells us that modernization in Africa often displaces women in the traditional sector. It has been difficult to move beyond patriarchy because of this phenomenon. In some instances where husbands and wives once cooperated in Ghana as work partners, we now witness the wife becoming dependent upon a husband’s civil servant salary. Also, the Muslims always had women’s groups, although
the early women’s collectives in Mombasa were not “feminist.” Rather they were groups that arose from the segregation of the sexes.

This book is well-researched. Without passing a value judgment, Strobel lets her audience know that changing the subordination of Muslim women in Mombasa will be slow in coming.

Stephanie Urdang’s *Fighting Two Colonialisms: Women in Guinea-Bissau* is an exciting and informative volume. It is an analysis of how some African women are transcending tribal exploitation and creating new hope for women in Guinea-Bissau through their participation in the PAIGC. Urdang is a South African journalist speaking to an audience familiar with African liberation movements. She discusses the status of a women’s revolution within a revolution, where women were working with men to end female subordination. The information she provides is difficult to come by. Her examination is politically sophisticated, as she relied upon the thorough scholarship of the late Amilcar Cabral, one of the founders of the PAIGC.

Walking with her translators from village to village, Urdang recorded the testimony of black African women: “The women work like slaves, you know, for the men... the men sit at home and do nothing. Nothing. Nothing. The women do all the work.” Thus was characterized the life of a woman before the revolution, whereas now men also help with farm work.

The superiority of the male sex is being challenged today in Guinea-Bissau. During the war for independence, women could not help mobilize the masses, for they were not allowed to move freely from place to place. Only men had freedom of movement. The political education done by the late Amilcar Cabral, “responsavel” Carmen Pereira, and the PAIGC helped to remove women from subservient roles. For men to become part of the PAIGC, they must be monogamous and women are now allowed divorce from poor marriages. They are also now allowed to participate in the council of elders and to receive an education. Urdang reported that these changes in society correspond to how much political education is undertaken with the people.

The title, *Fighting Two Colonialisms: Women in Guinea-Bissau*, is taken from Amilcar Cabral, who launched the struggle for independence in 1955. Women had to fight against Portuguese colonialism and the domination of tribal men. Cabral’s vision is an inspiration for combating customs which subordinated women. Urdang is a feminist, but she was able to appreciate the intellectual contribution of this African man who conceptualized women’s liberation in Guinea-Bissau, making her book a very strong work. I recommend this book to anyone interested in the topic of women’s liberation in Africa.

While Bledsoe, LeVine, Strobel, and Urdang all treated the question of female circumcision on a superficial level, the last book in this review, *The Hidden Face of Eve*, by Dr. Nawal El Saadawi, an Egyptian and Muslim doctor, depicts how Arab women are made passive through circumcision, socialization, and patriarchal structures in Arab society. Her book is divided into four parts. “The Mutilated Half” is an autobiographical depiction of Saadawi’s own circumcision and a discussion of the hymen as symbolic of the honor of a young woman. Abortion, notions of femininity, love, and beauty are also examined in an enlightening manner. She writes, “A beautiful woman is the young girl with a silvery body, even if her mind is blank.”

The second part is entitled “Women in History,” in which the author explored how Arab society developed and the manner in which women’s roles were defined by economic forces and religious customs. “Property and inheritance therefore destroyed the foundation of matriarchal and matrilineal systems and led to the division of society into social classes,” the author argued. In the third part, “The Arab Woman,” Saadawi traced the role of women in Arab history, providing examples of such women as Nessiba Bint Kaab, who fought with her sword by the side of Mahomet the Prophet in the Battle of Ahad. The prophet’s wife, Aisha, was rebellious and incited his other wives to rebel whenever the prophet took another wife. The fourth part, “Breaking Through,” traced the history of men who sought to change life for women. As in the case of Amilcar Cabral, men in Arab history were the first to agitate for women’s rights. Generally, movements against imperialism led to patriotic feelings and support for women’s rights in society.

*The Hidden Face of Eve* is an example of fine scholarship that advances the understanding of the status of women in Africa. Saadawi’s painful experience with circumcision started her on an inquiry that changed her life. She asked: “Time and again I asked myself the question: Why? Why? But I could never get an answer to this question which was becoming more and more insistent, just as I was never able to get an answer to the questions that raced around in my mind the day that both my sister and I were circumcised.”

*The Hidden Face of Eve* has the potential to enlighten, to end polarization, and to humanize men and women in a new way.

Carole Gregory
York College, Queens, N.Y.
Resources on African Women

RECENT PUBLICATIONS


Dauber, Roslyn and Cain, Melinda L., eds., Women and Technological Change in Developing Countries, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1981.


U.S.-BASED ORGANIZATIONS

THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN INSTITUTE
833 United Nations Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10017

The African-American Institute promotes African educational development through a variety of programs which provide academic and technical education and on-the-job training for Africans both in the United States and in Africa, and also brings African leaders to the U.S. for short-term study and training. The program for women includes identifying American resources to aid demonstration projects benefitting women in African countries and also providing educational and technical assistance to African individuals and organizations working to advance women.
THE EXCHANGE
329 E. 52nd St.
New York, N.Y. 10022

The Exchange project was formed in spring 1980 to coordinate a series of workshops on women and development during the NGO forum at the United Nations World Conference on Women held in Copenhagen in 1980. The principle outcome of the project is a magazine containing dialogue and interviews with Third World women drawn from discussions within the Exchange workshops. The report, which includes discussions on various aspects of development, is available free from the African-American Institute. Future plans are to continue the project under a new name—The International Exchange of Development Resources, with the goal of helping arrange and finance travel and study opportunities for women.

THE INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE
One United Nations Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10017

The International Research and Training Institute for the advancement of women was created by a resolution of the UN General Assembly in 1976 after a group of experts had set guidelines for its structures and responsibilities. The institute is an international clearing house for the collection, processing, and dissemination of development-oriented information on research, training, and action programs concerning women.

THE INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S TRIBUNE CENTER
305 East 46th St.
New York, N.Y. 10017

The International Women's Tribune Center was established in 1976 following the Conference for the Decade for Women held in Mexico in 1975. It is a communications support service for women's groups in the Third World. It responds to requests for information gathering, the development of communications resource materials, and also aids in locating funding agencies. In collaboration with the African and Latin-American Institutes and Research Center for Women of the UN Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the International Women's Tribune Center has compiled an information kit for African women which has sections on funding, publications, and other pertinent materials.

PATHFINDER FUND
Women's Program Division
1330 Boylston St.
Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167

The Pathfinder Fund is a private, nonprofit organization which funds projects in the developing world in the area of family planning, service delivery training, and changing attitudes. The women's program division at the Pathfinder Fund was established in 1977. The division funds projects whose objectives are to integrate women into the development process, improve the operation of fertility services and also help influence policy formulation.

THE SECRETARIAT FOR WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT
New Transcentury Foundation
1789 Columbia Road, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009

The Secretariat for Women in Development at the New Transcentury Foundation is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. Created in 1977, the Secretariat works to heighten awareness of the powerful roles women can and do fill in their societies and in all phases of the development process. The Secretariat actively undertakes and supports projects focused on improving communications and dialogue concerning women in development activities throughout the world. Additionally, the New Transcentury Foundation has a job opportunities bulletin which has employment opportunities in institutions and groups located in developing countries seeking to reach a large community of development professionals.

THE VOLUNTARY FUND FOR THE UNITED NATIONS DECADE FOR WOMEN
Room 10002
New York, N.Y. 10017

The Voluntary Fund for the United Nations Decade for Women gives development support to those countries that have limited financial resources for carrying out their national plans for the advancement of women. Most demands for the fund's resources are from projects at local and national levels, intended at lessening the burden of women's workloads and increasing their incomes. In Africa, projects include the application of appropriate technologies for agricultural production, food processing, and storage.

THE WOMEN AND FOOD COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
24 Peabody Terrace
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02148

U.S. AID has awarded the Arid Lands Natural Resource Committee of the University of Arizona a grant to establish the Women and Food Communications Network. The Network issues information sheets on the purposes, organizational structure, and current activities of Title XII and AID's Women and Development Office, to be distributed through a broad range of networks in agriculture, nutrition, social sciences. The Network also issues newsletters and information packets that contain data on the progress of women and development policies, guidelines, resources and publications of interest, current research, accounts of successful strategies, and news of Title XII activities of special interest to women. The Network assists women's caucuses in professional associations in developing interdisciplinary approaches to the issue. It also has a roster of women with technical skills in food, nutrition, and international development.
Statistics on African Women

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<th>Total Fertility Rate (per woman)</th>
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<th>Infant Mortality Rate, Male/Female</th>
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THE WORLD BANK

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