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Moreover, as predicted, President Siad had to bow to international pressure on February 11 and commute the death sentences to life or 24-year terms of imprisonment, to be served only in the case of the former vice president and foreign minister, under house arrest. Yet, according to Amnesty International, all the accused were prisoners of conscience, innocent of any criminal offense. Moreover, at least three prisoners were observed to be seriously ill and letters smuggled out by others, in my possession, make very credible allegations of torture—naming names.

The ambassador may opine about my motives, as he has of all who have spoken out about the human rights situation in his country, but that is irrelevant. Nor have I ever made any secret of the fact that my appointment as political adviser was arbitrarily and retrospectively terminated as a consequence of my urging proper trials and humane treatment for political prisoners.

What is relevant is that so-called "pro-Western Somalia" is fast becoming a prison state. Today, hundreds of mostly young people languish in confinement solely on account of their political beliefs and clan loyalties. To boast that such a situation is "stable" is to mock every democratic value. Sadly, my conclusions have been quite independently corroborated by other observers. See, for example, the report of the human rights committees of the National Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Medicine, "Scientists and Human Rights in Somalia," published in Washington in January.

Richard Greenfield
Oxford University
Centre for International and Development Studies

Dr. Abdillahi A. Addou
Ambassador of the Somali Democratic Republic
to the UN
Washington, D.C.

The author replies:

Unfortunately for the ambassador, two days subsequent to the date of his letter, the prisoners in Somalia—with the striking exception of the president’s clansmen—were sentenced to death by firing squad after brief, stage-managed trial. This, despite previous assurances, was closed to all except a few relatives still in the country.
American human rights observers get some firsthand experience

The arrest of two prominent American citizens in a Nairobi courtroom in mid-January has once again brought the human rights record of President Daniel arap Moi's government under the microscope. Judge Marvin Frankel, chairman of the Board of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, and Robert Kirschner, a forensic pathologist with the American Association for the Advancement of Science, were detained while attending an inquest into the death of businessman and rally driver Peter Njenga karanga, who died in police custody in February 1987.

Karanja had been in seemingly good health when he was detained for questioning about his alleged link to the underground group Mwakenya, which is committed to overthrowing the Moi government. But three weeks later, he died of bruises, wounds, a ruptured intestine, and pneumonia while still in police custody. Amnesty International detailed his death in a July 1987 report focusing on the physical abuse of prisoners, political detentions, and unfair trials in Kenya.

Frankel and Kirschner were taking notes at the inquest when they were whisked away and held incommunicado for seven hours at Nyayo House, an interrogation center for the Special Branch. They were subjected to constant interrogation by different teams of officers and accused of being Amnesty representatives. One officer, recalled Frankel, even tried to "bully me into admitting I was a spy. They questioned us about everything—why we were butting into Kenya's business and spreading lies about them."

Although Frankel and Kirschner were never physically abused, they were denied food and water, were not permitted to contact the U.S. Embassy, and had all their documents confiscated. They were only released following the intervention of the State Department and U.S. Embassy in Nairobi which had been alerted by members of the press corps after they had seen Special Branch officers escort them out of the court room.

The diplomatic incident caused Moi to demote his powerful minister of state in charge of internal security, Justus ole Tipis. One of Moi's closest advisers, Tipis had publicly defended the arrest, saying they were found to be in possession of incriminating documents, including a list of persons connected with subversive activities.

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Savimbi goes to Hollywood

Red Scorpion, an American film loosely based on the life and times of Angolan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi, is being filmed in the occupied territory of Namibia with massive South African military assistance and the financial backing of the Washington-based International Freedom Foundation, according to a report in The New York Times, produced by foundation executive director Jack Abramoff who formerly headed Citizens of America—the right-wing organization linked during the IranGate scandal to Col. Oliver North's scheme to channel funds to the contras—the S8 million Hollywood epic stars Swedish muscleman Dolph Lundgren and South African actor Ruben Nthodi.

The Namihian, the independent weekly newspaper published in
Windhoek, reveals that *Red Scorpion* tells the tale of a Soviet agent—played by Lundgren—sent to assassinate "an African resistance leader" named Sundata (Nthodi). Predictably, Lundgren's character sees the light about "outside forces in Africa," and proceeds to defect to Sundata's camp which is fighting to boot the Russians and Cubans out of the country. Said Abramoff, "The Cubans and Russians in the film are not the good guys."

Not surprisingly, Abramoff has received unprecedented cooperation from the South African military. Pretoria has not only supplied soldiers, tanks, jeeps, and trucks, but also two active-duty army officers to serve as consultants, and an impressive array of Soviet-made tanks and mortars captured in Angola. As a report pointed out in the *Republikein*, a conservative Afrikaans-language daily in Windhoek, "This is equipment that could not be provided by the private sector. The film makers are paying for this assistance."

With the pro-apartheid International Freedom Foundation as a major financial backer, money is not an issue. The foundation, which has offices in Washington. Johannes-burg, Tel Aviv, and London, has always been willing to foot the bill for key right-wing causes. It is a leading supporter of South African-backed Renamo rebels in Mozambique, and it has consistently opposed anti-apartheid groups in South Africa. Last year, for example, the foundation took out advertisements in *The Washington Times*, condemning African National Congress President Oliver Tambo's visit to the U.S.

As a thinly veiled propaganda effort in support of Savimbi's Unita forces in Angola. *Red Scorpion* has already attracted criticism from several anti-apartheid organizations. Explained Arthur Ashe, co-chairman of Artists and Athletes Against Apartheid, "We would oppose any participation by an American, especially a black American, in a film project of which the South African government is a part. If you have part of the South African army as extras, it's hard to see the film as anything less than an endorsement of South Africa's policies." Swapo official Theo-Ben Gurirab concurred. "We call upon friends of Swapo to expose and condemn this scheme by identifying those involved and by boycotting this film," he said.

**Tripoli link adds spice to German nuclear scandal**

Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi, the West's favorite bogeyman, has a knack for making headlines. This time it's in West Germany, where the country's nuclear industry is suffering through its worst scandal in history.

The scandal centers around Germany's main nuclear company—already burdened with the unfortunate name of Nukem—which is suspected of having illegally shipped weapons-grade nuclear materials to Libya and Pakistan in breach of the 1970 nuclear non-proliferation treaty. As a result, the West German government has temporarily shut down Nukem and promised a full-scale investigation.

In recent years, Nukem and its transport subsidiary, Transnuklear, is alleged to have transferred 2,400 nuclear barrels falsely labelled as low-grade atomic waste to the Belgian nuclear research center at Mol, where they were conditioned and reprocessed. Inquiries into the Nukem scandal, involving bribery and corruption worth at least $12.5 million, also revealed that the German company may have circumvented U.S. import bans on South African uranium by transporting the materials through Europe and substituting documentation to conceal their origin.

Some of the materials, including plutonium and other fissile atomic elements, were reportedly shipped to Libya and Pakistan through the German port of Lubeck. Although subsequent investigations by the International Atomic Energy Agency have failed to produce any proof of this, concern remains over the disappearance of two drums of highly fissile-enriched Uranium 235 which seem to have vanished into thin air.

**Qaddafi takes a shot at ice hockey**

Ice hockey has never been the most popular of sports in the Libyan desert, but it may just catch on now that Col. Muammar Qaddafi seems to have taken a special interest in the game.

Qaddafi recently saved a West German ice hockey team from bankruptcy by donating $900,000 to the financially strapped first division club of Iserlohn as part of a curious sport and cultural exchange agreement whereby the owner, Heinz Weifenbach, agreed to advertise Qaddafi \ Green Book on the team's jerseys. The deal between Weifenbach and the World Center for the Studies of the Green Book, however, created quite a stir in the West German media, and the hockey federation promptly refused to let Iserlohn promote Qaddafi's teachings.

"We were astonished with what was said and written about the agreement between the World Center and the club," said Ibrahim Abdurrahman Ibjad, the center's director. "It is a cultural agreement between two institutions, and we believe that it is through activities like this that we will achieve freedom in the world." Added Weifenbach during a ceremonial visit to Tripoli, "We're talking about what is possible in sport and culture between the two countries. It's like ping-pong diplomacy, eh'."
THE GAMBIA

Authorities in Banjul arrested 20 people in late January for allegedly plotting to topple President Dawda Jawara's government with the help of two unnamed African countries. More than half of those arrested were of Senegalese origin, but the majority have since been released on bail. Of the 10 people still being held for questioning, six are Senegalese and the remainder are Gambian nationals, with another 26 dissidents reportedly still in hiding.

Justice Minister Hassan Jallow, however, denied that there had been an actual attempt to overthrow the government, claiming instead that the plot involved the recruitment of dissidents for training in two foreign countries. During a house raid in the capital, police apparently discovered compromising documents and a cassette containing detailed instructions about how the rebels were to travel from Banjul to an undisclosed country in order to receive appropriate military training.

SENEGAL

As Dakar geared up for its presidential and legislative elections on February 28, the country's 16 opposition parties—spearheaded by Abdoulaye Wade's Democratic Party of Senegal (PDS)—stepped up their attacks against President Abdou Diouf's Socialist Party (PS).

Opposition groups have focused their criticism on the country's dismal economic performance, particularly since the Diouf government adopted an IMF-backed austerity program, and called for the revision of the electoral code to avoid the widespread vote-rigging that allegedly took place in the 1983 elections. Wade, who was credited that year with only 17 percent of the popular vote, has demanded the obligatory use of the secret ballot, the presence of opposition party scrutineers at all polling stations, and the presentation of identity cards before voting, but Diouf has refused to comply, promising only to "personally guarantee" the fairness of the election.

ZAIRE

Former Interior Minister Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, a leading member of the opposition Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), was arrested in mid-January for illegally organizing the party's first major political rally since 1983. President Mobutu Sese Seko's security police broke up the meeting by detaining hundreds of UDPS supporters and opening fire on the crowd—leading to at least three deaths and dozens of people injured.

Tshisekedi, who had just returned to Kinshasa after a six-month lobbying tour of the U.S. and Europe, was taken to Makala prison where he was reportedly tortured and charged with threatening internal security. The government later declared him medically unfit to answer charges, and announced that he would undergo "psychiatric treatment."

TANZANIA

Zanzibar! President Idris Adbul Wakil suspended his entire 18-man cabinet and took control of the army in late January, claiming that a group of dissidents—including several unnamed ministers—had been plotting to overthrow his semi-autonomous government and return Zanzibar and its sister island, Pemba, to Arab rule. For centuries, the islands were closely linked to the Arab world before the overthrow of the Sultan in 1964.

Wakil, who is also vice-president of Tanzania, said that responsibility for the army would be shifted away from his Pemban political rival, Chief Minister Seif Shariff Hamad—a strong advocate of liberal economic reform who recently lost his seat on the central committee of Tanzania's Chama Cha Mapinduzi party in October. Hamad's demotion is likely to heighten the political rift between the old guard and those pushing for greater economic liberalization, as well as fuel allegations among Pembans that they suffer from Zanzibari discrimination.

UGANDA

The military fortunes of President Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Movement, which had distinctly improved following the collapse of Alice Lakwena's Holy Spirit Movement in late December, suffered a setback when rebels of the Uganda People's Front (UPF) abducted three cabinet ministers in eastern Uganda who had come to negotiate the government's amnesty bill with the dissidents.

UPF leader Peter Otai, defense minister under former President Milton Obote, said he wanted to trade the ministers for rebel prisoners, but that their eventual release would depend on the outcome of a national peace conference involving all interest groups. Museveni, however, has said that "bargaining with Otai is absolutely out of the question," and warned, "If the ministers die while they are in the hands of the rebels or if anything happens to them, it will be for Otai to answer, and we shall get him wherever he is."

TUNISIA

Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi visited Tunis in early February to mark a new era of cooperation with his neighbor, following the restoration of diplomatic ties between the two countries. Tunis had severed relations with Tripoli in September 1985 after Libya expelled 32,000 Tunisian workers and accused Qaddafi of fomenting subversion in the region, but the latest rapprochement should enable the Libyan leader to emerge from his diplomatic isolation and to endorse the non-aggression pact signed by Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania in 1983.

Evidently concerned by the thaw in relations with Libya, British Home Secretary Douglas Hurd promptly paid an official visit to Tunisia in early January and announced the signing of several cooperation agreements, including Britain's offer to train and equip Tunisian security forces. Hurd also called for greater cooperation with Tunisia in the fight against international terrorism.
Conte moves quickly to stamp out the fire in Conakry

President Lansana Conte, facing the most serious political challenge to his government since the aborted coup attempt by former Prime Minister Diana Traore in July 1985, announced a major cabinet reshuffle in mid-January intended to appease some of his most outspoken critics within the ruling Military Committee for National Redress (CMRN). Coming only two weeks after the government was badly shaken by violent student demonstrations over price rises for basic commodities, the long-awaited cabinet overhaul was engineered amid persistent rumors that a coup attempt against Conte was in the making.

The most significant government change involved Maj. Keif alia Camara, Conte’s number-two and CMRN permanent secretary, who was demoted to a provincial post in Kankan, near the Mali border. In recent months, Camara had gained increasing influence within the government and was reported to have established strong ties with dissatisfied elements in the army, spurring Conte to effectively banish him from the center of power. Two other powerful CMRN members were also demoted: Former Defense Minister Lt.-Col. Sory Doumbouya was transferred to the obscure post of resident-minister in charge of Middle Guinea, while Lt-Col. Oumar Barou was replaced as interior minister and named governor of Conakry.

Conversely, former Foreign Minister Maj. Facine Toure—one of Conte’s harshest critics who had been banished to the Forest Region in an earlier reshuffle—made an unexpected comeback by being named minister of transport and public works. In addition, former Inspector-General of the Armed Forces Maj. Ali Sofani was promoted to the full position of minister of the interior and decentralization, which will give him the political clout to better deal with future disturbances.

Signs of growing discontent in the country and in particular, within the army, had forced Conte to postpone at the last minute an official visit to France in December. Instead, Conte toured the nation’s garrisons to appease soldiers angered by low pay and to subdue ethnic rivalries emerging within the army.

Tensions in the barracks had mounted after Conte admitted for the first time that some of the plotters of the abortive 1985 coup and officials of the former Sekou Toure regime had been executed without trial. A government communiqué in May had disclosed that 20 soldiers and 17 civilians had been sentenced to death, but rumors persisted that Traore and Siaka Toure—nephew of the former president and head of the notorious Camp Boiro where thousands of Guineans had been killed soon after the coup attempt. Said Conte, “Those who were seeking revenge took revenge. I could not do anything about that.”

In an effort to appease his critics, Conte promised to increase salaries for civil servants and the military by 80 percent and announced that the late president’s wife, Andree Toure, and 60 other political detainees had been banished to the Forest Region.

Thatcher leaves her mark in a whirlwind tour of Kenya and Nigeria

Although British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s winter safari to Kenya and Nigeria in early January may have produced a lot of headlines, in the end it led to few, if any, surprises. As expected, the thorny issue of South African apartheid did get in the way from time to time, but once the dust had cleared, the British government left little doubt that her trip had been a resounding success. Buoyed by the flag-waving and enthusiasm of the Kenyans and heartened by the positive response of the Nigerian authorities, Thatcher returned to Britain to promote both countries as models of African capitalism and democracy.

Thatcher’s visit to Africa—her first to the continent since she attended the 1979 Commonwealth Summit in Lusaka—was potentially risky business given her highly unpopular anti-sanctions line on South Africa. But Kenya was hand-picked as a safe bet, and President Daniel arap Moi obliged. Moi downplayed differences with Thatcher over apartheid and the British prime minister did her best to close her eyes to the Kenyan government’s questionable human rights record, which has been marred by widespread reports of torture, political detentions, and unfair trials.

Instead, Thatcher praised Moi for his “strong and decisive leadership within a constitutional framework.” and hailed his government’s support for the private sector. “It is one of the best stories there is to tell in Africa,” she said. “We admire your country’s peace and stability, policies which recognize the worth of individual effort and personal endeavor . . . and an economy in which private ownership and private industry have been encouraged.”

Thatcher spent much of her three-day stay visiting metal workshops, tanneries, sheep pens, and tea estates outside of Nairobi, and even brought some much needed British rain with her while inspecting a self-help project in the arid plains south of the capital among the nomadic Masai people. Wherever Thatcher went, Kenyan authorities gave her royal treatment and it paid off.

Thatcher announced that Britain had cancelled $125 million worth of aid to Kenya.
been released from prison. The government later indicated that an additional number of unspecified prisoners would be "progressively released" over the coming months.

But when authorities announced a 78 percent increase in the cost of petrol, it immediately triggered a price war for basic commodities that eventually led to violent clashes between large groups of students and unemployed youths, and security forces in the streets of Conakry. Within days, transportation and rent in the capital doubled or tripled, as did the price of staple foods like rice, bread, and milk, forcing Conte to decree a return to end of year prices and to denounce the "economic saboteurs" who were intent on ruining the country.

The hike in the cost of living sparked off two days of protests by university students and urban youths who ransacked market stalls and pillaged shops in the Guinean capital. The army, using batons and tear gas to disperse the demonstrators, was called in after the rioters forced their way through police cordon to make their way to the central market. When the demonstrators reassembled on the university campus, police swooped in and arrested about 50 people. One person was reportedly killed and an unspecified number of others were injured, but the government weathered the storm by freezing the prices of basic commodities and agreeing to improve students' living conditions and health facilities on campus.

Compaoré raises the stakes in Burkina

When President Thomas Sankara died in a bloody coup in October and Capt. Blaise Compaoré took over by forming a Popular Front government, Burkina Faso suddenly found itself plunged into a state of disarray and political uncertainty. But in recent weeks, the once-clouded political picture has begun to crystallize as existing tensions have become more polarized—particularly since the mid-December arrest of several leading members of the opposition League for Communist Struggle-Reconstituted (ULC-R).

Among those rounded up were Valere Some, former minister of higher education in the Sankara government, and Basile Guissou, former foreign affairs minister who was a close friend of the late president's. They are being held, according to government sources, for allegedly having written and disseminated tracts calling for the overthrow of the Popular Front government. The ULC-R, however, has denied any involvement in tract-writing and distribution, condemning the "escalation of repression" against its members. The group has also demanded the immediate release of all political detainees, and called on militants to protest against "these anti-democratic acts."

Reports have filtered out of Ouagadougou that both Some and Guissou have been severely tortured, the victims of hosing with freezing water and burning, but these allegations have not been confirmed. Government sources who deny that torture has been utilized, nonetheless do acknowledge that some physical mistreatment may have occurred by overzealous police officers.

The detention of ULC-R members appears to have been sparked by the emergence of the first explicitly pro-Sankara opposition since the coup. Describing itself as the Democratic and Popular Union-Thomas Sankara (RDP), a clandestine group issued a communiqué in Ouagadougou announcing its decision to organize the "popular resistance that has not ceased to grow throughout the country." The group, which characterized the October coup as a "severe blow" to the Burkinabe revolution, called on the Compaoré government to meet several key demands in order to "begin the process of a return to democracy, and close one of the most sombre pages in our country’s history."

The RDP-Thomas Sankara has demanded an end to repressive measures, the release of all political prisoners, the publication of a full list of those who were killed in the coup, and a trial of those responsible for killing the late president and his companions. It has also proposed a conference of "all political forces" in Burkina Faso to be held in a neutral place so as to help avoid a "fratricidal confrontation" and further bloodshed.

But the Compaoré government, which remains politically insecure, has so far chosen to keep its critics in detention. A group of 20 former ministers and government officials closely associated with Sankara have remained in prison since the period immediately following the coup. They include former cabinet ministers Ernest Ouedraogo, Fidele Toe, Abdul Salam Kabore, Eugene Dondasse, Alain Koeffe, and Juste Tiemtore, as well Capt. Pierre Ouedraogo, the former head of the mass-based Committees for the Defense of the Revolution.

Very highly placed sources in Ouagadougou, however, have informed Africa Report that the above group, along with the ULC-R detainees will be released by early March—a decision by the Popular Front which would be an important first step in its efforts to establish credibility in the eyes of many Burkinabe people.
THATCHER...continued

loans, and that as a goodwill gesture, it would provide Kenya with an additional $35 million grant for balance of payments support. Britain, which has the largest foreign investment stake in the country at more than $1 billion and makes use of key naval facilities to guarantee its access to the strategically important Indian Ocean, has made Kenya the largest beneficiary of its overseas aid to Africa. Said Thatcher, "Kenya is the second largest recipient—after India—of aid from Britain and you feel that every pound spent here really does good for the people of Kenya and... as an example for the whole of Africa."

These token gifts, however, did not prevent Nigerian anti-apartheid demonstrators from condemning her visit. Despite a government ban on demonstrations, protestors gathered for her arrival at Lagos airport to burn a Union Jack, chant anti-British slogans, and wave placards such as, "Go home Thatcher. You are unwanted in Nigeria;" "Thatcher, modern day Hitler;" and "Maggie, nanny of the Boers' empire."

But it was during the final day of her African tour in the northern Nigerian city of Kano that things threatened to get out of hand. Prior to a spectacular ceremony organized by the Emir of Kano in her honor, involving thousands of colorfully dressed horsemen, acrobats, and musicians, confusion within the ranks of the Nigerian security forces caused them to lose control of the crowd. As the prime minister's entourage was trying to make its way up the palace stairs, a scuffle broke out and Thatcher's press secretary, Bernard Ingham, was hit in the stomach with a rifle butt. No one else was hurt, however, and Thatcher subsequently made light of the incident at a press conference reserved for British journalists, apologizing, "I'm sorry that some of you had difficulty getting in."

But before returning to Britain, Thatcher could not resist having the last word on South Africa. Although her talks with Babangida centered primarily on economic issues, she claimed to have won the argument over sanctions against Pretoria—an allegation vehemently denied by the Nigerian government. Said Thatcher confidently, even leaders of the frontline states now "accept the validity of the argument against sanctions, because they know that if they impose sanctions, it will harm their own people. We have won the argument and what we have now is the rhetoric."

Botha makes a move on Kudu gas field

Recent reports that South Africa has given Namibia's so-called Transitional Government of National Unity the green light to exploit the potentially crucial Kudu offshore gas field is a sure sign that President P.W. Botha's regime has no intention of relinquishing control of the occupied territory in the near future. According to the London-based Namibia Communications Centre, the Kudu gas field—which is said to be the fifth largest in the world and between 5-10 times as large as the South African gas field near Mossel Bay in Cape Province—could supply Pretoria with 30-65 percent of its fuel requirements for the next 20 years.

Namibian Mining Minister Andreas Shipanga claims to have held "intensive discussions" with several companies in Britain who have shown a "keen interest" in the development and exploitation of the gas field. However, he refrained from disclosing the identity of these corporations, no doubt because of the controversial implications of doing business with the South African-controlled territory.

The massive gas reservoir, which lies off the mouth of the Orange River just inside Namibian waters, was originally discovered in 1974 during drilling operations by Chevron, the U.S.-based oil company. Chevron's rights to the gas deposit were subsequently bought by the South West African Oil Exploration Corporation (Swacor), but for many years the South African government preferred not to treat the find as a well-kept secret.

South Africa, which has no natural oil reserves of its own, apparently considered that exploitation of the gas field was not a financially sound proposition, given Namibia's uncertain political status. But Swacor's managing director, Piet van Zyl, recently revealed that his government had reassessed its position and that a final evaluation of the entire project had been officially approved.

A French offshore engineering company, Forintcr, has already begun the exploratory work from offices in Cape Town, putting in place a test drilling rig and platform to determine the size of the gas deposits.
Somali rights abuses on trial again

After a week-long public trial in early February, Somalia's national security court in Mogadishu sentenced former Vice President Brig.-Gen. Ismail Ah Abokor, former foreign minister Omar Arteh Ghalib, and six others to death by firing squad for plotting to overthrow President Mohamed Siad Bane's government six years ago. The special court found them guilty of "forming and putting into operation a group that was aimed at causing chaos in the unity and security of the Somali nation." but Bane subsequently agreed to commute their sentences to life imprisonment following pressure from human rights organizations and the U.S. State Department.

Amnesty International called the trial a "gross miscarriage of justice." pointing out that the diverse group of 20 politicians, army officers, scientists, doctors, and businessmen had been denied a real opportunity to defend themselves in court. Several rights groups, including the New York-based Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, had requested permission to monitor the trial, but the government chose to ignore their appeals.

Prior to the trial, a report entitled "Scientists and Human Rights in Somalia," published in Washington by the National Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Medicine, charged that many of Mogadishu's political prisoners were frequently tortured and mistreated. Members of a joint delegation, who had gone to Somalia in October to monitor the country's human rights record, found that detainees were held in continuous solitary confinement, that some had been physically abused, and that others had been refused medical treatment.

Authorities in Mogadishu refused to permit the American observers to visit the prisoners and denied their repeated requests to meet with Barre. but the delegation did succeed in gathering substantial information on the detainees' status from other sources in the country. In particular, the delegates documented the cases of 13 dissident scientists, engineers, and physicians who they claim have been kept unjustly imprisoned for years, and called for their immediate and unconditional release.

Two of the U.S-educated intellectuals—architect Suleiman Nuh Ali and professor Abdi Ismail Yunis—were among those condemned to death by the national security court. In a document smuggled to human rights organizations, Ali alleged that he had been tortured by the Somali security police into signing a statement confessing that subversive materials had been found during a search of his home in September 1982.

"I told them I was not a member to any organization... and that they go to hell." Ali wrote in a 28-page manuscript that has been authenticated by Amnesty International. "I was taken from my cell, handcuffed, blindfolded, driven in a land cruiser and taken to a beach. There I was tortured very badly. Many nights were repeated until I was forced to sign anything they wanted."

Somalia's ambassador to the U.S., Abdullahi Ahmed Addou, however, has categorically denied the allegation of torture. "Whoever wrote that statement, I want to tell you it's not our character and our policy to torture people. Of course, anyone can write and say I was tortured."

Had the U.S. fact-finding mission to Somalia been allowed to visit Ali and other political detainees, accounts of torture would have been easier to verify. The delegation's report nonetheless contains extensive medical descriptions provided by the Canadian Centre for Investigation and Prevention of Torture, detailing the examination of 36 recent emigres and confirming the allegation of physical abuse in Somali prisons.

According to the State Department, there are between 300 and 500 political detainees in Somalia with at least 200 of them being held without charge, but the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights believes these figures to be much higher, for they "seriously underestimate the arrests that have become a common feature of political life in Somalia."
COTEd'IVOIRE

Faced with a dramatic and prolonged slide in the prices of cocoa and coffee—which account for 60 percent of the country's export earnings—President Felix Houphouët-Boigny has launched a bitter attack against "Western speculators" whom he claims are responsible for the continuing crisis in the world commodities market. Dutch and English speculators, he said, talk of cocoa overproduction to keep prices down, while actively encouraging new plantations in Asian countries.

Last year, plummeting prices already forced Abidjan to inform dismayed creditors that it could no longer honor its $8.4 billion external debt, but renewed doubts over the effectiveness of the International Cocoa Organization (ICCO) agreement have led the government to ask Western banks to link debt repayments to trends in commodity prices.

RWANDA

Last year's virtual collapse in commodity prices for coffee and tea—Kigali's two main exports—has seriously clouded the country's once bright economic future. Dependent upon coffee exports for 85 percent of its annual foreign earnings, President Juvenal Habyarimana's government was forced to cut its 1987 budget by 15 percent in order to subsidize payments to coffee producers, while dishing out about $40 million to Rwandex, the coffee exporter which buys the local crop.

Because Rwanda pays the highest coffee producer prices in the region, nearly a third of the average yearly coffee exports of 30,000 to 40,000 tons are smuggled in from neighboring Burundi, Uganda, and Zaire. About 8,000 tons of robusta type coffee, for example, are annually exported from Kigali—even though Rwanda has no such trees. But with the drastic fall in prices, widespread smuggling has become a costly embarrassment, causing the government to pay out a great deal more than it can afford.

MOZAMBIQUE

Despite grappling with an unrelenting 12-year-old civil war and a severe drought, Mozambique's once bleak economic fortunes have greatly improved, according to Finance Minister Abdul Magid Osman who is overseeing the second year of a tough IMF-sponsored economic recovery program. After suffering through an annual 8 percent decline in GDP between 1980 and 1986, Mozambique rebounded with a 4 percent growth in GDP last year, enabling Osman to predict that "with more Keynesian measures" ahead, the economy should grow by 6 percent in 1988.

Under the tutelage of the IMF, the government has devalued the metical by more than 400 percent, slashed public spending, and sharply increased producer prices for farmers in an effort to wipe out the black market and encourage private enterprise.

BUSINESS BRIEFS

ANGOLA

In an effort to rebuild the country's war-shattered economy, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos recently announced the start of a three-year economic and financial restructuring program which is expected to improve productivity, purchasing power, and consumption levels by encouraging foreign investment and private enterprise.

Implementation of the wide-ranging reforms—including the selective privatization of the state sector, the ending of budget subsidies for loss-making parastatals, and the eventual devaluation of the kwanza—should pave the way for IMF support and a rescheduling of Angola's $4 billion external debt. Dos Santos, who formally applied for IMF membership last year, acknowledged that "excessive ideological zeal" had caused delays in debt rescheduling talks, but that negotiations with Western governments were now underway to help resolve the debt problem—the "main obstacle" to Luanda's economic recovery.

MADAGASCAR

President Didier Ratsiraka's government, which has been applying a rigid structural adjustment program to the letter for the past five years, has finally been rewarded for being one of the IMF's star pupils. At a meeting in Paris in late January, a total of nine Western countries and a dozen multilateral agencies pledged to supply Madagascar with at least $700 million a year between 1988-90, more than doubling the funds provided at the last donors' conference in April 1986.

The IMF's recipe, however, has failed to stimulate the island's economic growth, with the economy expanding by only 0.8 percent in 1986 and by 2 percent last year against an annual population increase of 3 percent. The massive injection of additional funds should lead to a growth in exports to help service Antananarivo's $3.2 billion external debt, but as the World Bank has already acknowledged, per capita income will continue to fall until 1990—prolonging the steady impoverishment of much of the population.

MALAWI

President-for-Life Hastings Kamuzu Banda's government is facing its worst threat of famine in nearly a decade, with some 200,000 tons of maize needed before April to avoid the likelihood of widespread starvation. The acute maize shortage in a country which has until recently been self-sufficient in food highlights not only the problems of drought, crop pests, and the additional burden of more than 370,000 refugees from neighboring Mozambique, but also exposes the failure of Banda's present agricultural policy.

In recent years, Banda has encouraged smallholders to plant a greater quantity of tobacco to increase export earnings, leading farmers to use more land for cash crops at the expense of maize, the country's staple food. As a result, maize production, which already fell by 4.5 percent in 1986, has continued to do so with the onset of the drought.
Interview with the Reverend Frank Chikane

As Africa Report went to press, the South African government, in its latest crackdown on growing popular resistance, banned 17 organizations—including the United Democratic Front—and arrested several leading churchmen engaged in a peaceful protest. The general secretary of the South African Council of Churches analyzes the increasingly important role of the churches in the deepening crisis, appealing to the international community to assist before it is too late.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: How do you see your mandate as general secretary of the South African Council of Churches at this point in the struggle?

Chikane: My appointment was an extraordinary one. The church leaders searched for a general secretary for two years. They were looking for a general secretary in relation to the nature of the mission the church in South Africa has to carry out in a crisis situation—one which had broken out into a real, visible type of war and confrontation between the forces of apartheid and those of the people. I was called in during this critical time when we have to determine exactly what the role of the church is.

The Council of Churches and the churches affiliated to it have done a lot of good work. We spend millions of rands helping detainees and their families, organizing finance for the legal defense of those who are on trial, those who get displaced and banned away from their homes, those who get attacked by the system. That type of work is ministry to the victims of apartheid. But we have reached a critical point where the victimizer is going to extremes and we now have more victims than ever before.

The churches are beginning to say: Is our role just to try to deal with the victims, or do we need to stop the victimizer?

After the Eminent Persons Group visit and after a number of church leaders visited P. W. Botha after the state of emergency was declared, it became very clear that it is the National Party which does not want to talk. People have gone to Lusaka and talked to the ANC and they are convinced that there is dialogue in Lusaka, but there is no dialogue in Pretoria. And this is the crisis the ordinary church leader, who is no radical whatsoever, is facing.

My assignment is to assist the church leadership in South Africa to look at ways and means of ministering to the victimizer, to actually stop the victimizer from continuing with apartheid. The big question is what do we do? The understanding of the churches is that we need to resolve it around the table, but we need to create the conditions for an around-the-table discussion, and how do you do that? That is the crisis we are facing.

Africa Report: So you expect the churches to play a more direct political role in trying to bring about the conditions for around-the-table discussions with the government?

Chikane: The church traditionally has tried to keep the two
[religion and politics] apart, but in the South African situation it has become impossible especially when Christians belonging to the same church are involved on both sides. We have a unique situation in South Africa where we are oppressed and tortured by Christians. It is Christians who are at war against each other. Secondly, the Dutch Reformed Church white people developed a theology to justify apartheid. So the church has a direct responsibility.

The whole system affects the life of the church, and for that reason, church leaders have been forced to get involved. But it is also the crude, brutal way in which the National Party is trying to maintain apartheid which is moving even the ordinary church leader to say he cannot stand aloof. It affects our congregations, and we must step in and intervene.

For a national council of churches to declare the regime illegitimate and say therefore that we are not bound to obey the unjust laws of the apartheid system, and that we will work with alternative structures which are recognized by the people—that is a very serious decision. It is not because the church in South Africa has become radical or it has become very different from an ordinary church, but it is forced by the circumstances to move in that direction.

Africa Report: Is it not also the fact that given the nature of the apartheid system, which does not allow for the emergence of any other true leadership, that you as churchmen have to play a leadership role?

Chikane: If they go to Soweto and detain its leadership and some go underground and then the police go and evict people from their homes, the only people available are the church. So when people get into trouble, they phone Khotso House at the SACC and ask for assistance. We are bound to go in there and intervene. We feel it is part of our ministry. It is that vacuum that forces the church to move in and close the gap.

I've heard most of the church leaders, like Desmond Tutu, say, "I'm just a caretaker leader. I'm not their leader. The people's leaders are there and when they come back, I'll continue with my church." That is very clear in South Africa. There is no confusion of a church which thinks it's a liberation movement. The church can't be a liberation movement on its own and cannot take over the country as a church. It is the people who have to take over the country.

Africa Report: You said that it took two years before you were chosen as SACC general secretary, and that the choice came out of this crisis situation. What is unique about your background that suits you for the position?

Chikane: In the past, I was a member of a very conservative Pentacostal evangelical church in South Africa which doesn't see any relationship between the political realities in the country and their form of spirituality. But because of the crisis we were facing in the country, I was forced as a black pastor to reanalyze that whole situation and it became very clear that there was no way that you could make people see sense in the Christian faith when it is Christians who are brutalizing them. I needed to redefine what Christianity is, which is different from what the white racist minority is saying Christianity is.

Through that process of reinterpreting the faith and the Bible, I became aware that the powerful and oppressors of this world have sabotaged that religious heritage, a religion of the weak, poor, and victims in society. The powerful had usurped the religion and used it against the people for oppression. It was our responsibility as Christians to liberate the Gospel from the hands of the oppressor, and that has cost me a lot in terms of finding myself in confrontation with the system, getting detained many times, getting tortured, getting suspended by my own church for one year because they felt I was involved in politics.

Then I became general secretary of the Institute for Contextual Theology for about six years, where I developed this theological understanding and assisted the churches in South Africa to reflect theologically on the crisis. Thus we have the Kairos Document, the Evangelical Witness in South Africa, which are influencing the thinking of the church, even if the churches have not adopted those documents. Maybe it was out of my witness and life experience that church leaders thought they should get me to be general secretary at this stage.

Africa Report: You have said before that black theology is liberation theology. What is liberation theology's relevance to the South African situation?

Chikane: The Christian victims of the North who are in the South, basically the Third World, were forced to develop different models of theological perspectives because they realized that religion was used to oppress them. So it is not surprising that new models of theology are developing in the Third World—liberation theology in Latin America, black theology in South Africa, African theology in Africa—all of them are looking at the Bible from the perspective of the oppressed. Is God with the oppressor or with the oppressed? Is God a God of justice or injustice? Is God the God of the powerful who victimize others or of the weak?

Those questions force the victims to develop a different theological perception, a liberating form of theology. The basic message of the Bible is a call to freedom, a call to a kingdom of God where there will be no injustices or oppression. It is a call to salvation. It is difficult for oppressed people not to detect the liberating theme in the Bible, which is not detected by those who see it from the point of view of the powerful. And for that reason, when we say this is a liberating theology, then they say we must be Marxists or communists!

The reality of the struggles in this world have been clouded by ideological and religious conceptions. When they threaten us that the communists will stop us from having our faith, they are using the question of faith for their own interests. For us, it is a question of justice, not whether one is in the East or the West. If anyone proves to me that they are for justice, then they are with us. This is the risk we run in South Africa that
the West, by supporting the apartheid regime, is doing a
disservice to its own cause. If they take sides with justice, the
people of South Africa will welcome them. But if they take
sides with the apartheid system, then they must not blame
people of South Africa when they say that the West is our
enemy.
Africa Report: In the Lusaka Declaration, the SACC ac-
cepted the inevitability of the armed struggle. Given that
churches have traditionally espoused non-violence, did that
indicate a shift in church policy?
Chikane: Yes, there has been the adoption of a new position
within the Council of Churches, moving away from condemn-
ing those who resort to violence to saying we understand why
you have resorted to violence. But that does not mean that we
now are going to take up arms and be violent ourselves. What
we are saying is that given a situation where the whole army
and police are against you and you don't have an army or state to protect you, we
understand why you resort to arms to defend yourself
and police are against you and you don't have an army or state to protect you, we understand why you resort to arms to defend yourself.

**AFRICA REPORT:** What sort of action do you envisage?
Chikane: Creating the conditions which would be conducive
enough for people to sit around the table and resolve the
problem and have a ceasefire, stop the war and rule the coun-
try on the basis of a just system. What the church needs to do
is to create the conditions. Once they are created, then the
people can take over and talk about the future. The church
can't prescribe what type of a future it should be.

It is that role which will give us the legitimacy to make moral
pronouncements to committing themselves to action.

**AFRICA REPORT:** Do you see any positive sign that the govern-
ment is taking up any kind of opening for this kind of discussion
that would be able to create these conditions?
Chikane: As it is now, there is no sign of hope, but I don't
believe that we need to wait for them to change so that we can
see some signs of hope. We need to force them. That reality
has dawned even on ordinary church leaders that those who
are in power brutalizing other people's lives need to be forced
to abandon that power. It is for this reason that people called
for comprehensive, mandatory sanctions against South Africa
because they believe it will weaken the economic base and
therefore the military base and therefore the government
itself. And if it is weakened, the people who are engaged in
struggle will be able to put so much pressure on them without
the army and the support of the West to fall back on that they
are likely to have to give in.

For me, it is a question of how you reduce the amount of
loss of life and suffering before you reach that stage. If the
international community intervenes, it will lessen the pain.
But if it doesn't, the people of South Africa will still fight that
system. It may take longer. Thousands will die, but in the end,
they will have to give in. What we are asking is to do it now, so
that we don't wait until too many people are dead, and then
still come back and do the very thing that should have been
done long, long ago.

**AFRICA REPORT:** So you don't see events such as the release
of Govan Mbeki as a sign of hope?
Chikane: For me, it was not much of a sign of hope. What the
government wants to do is to release Nelson Mandela without
changing apartheid. That is the real issue. They released
Govan Mbeki to test the waters whether they would not have
difficulties both from the left and the right. But their concep-
tion is to release Mandela to accept the apartheid reality in
which we are living. And I am saying it is not going to happen
because the people of South Africa won't allow it. And there-
fore, there isn't hope in that sense.

If Botha wants to release Mandela, he must have guts
equal to face the reality that he will also have to relinquish
power to the people of South Africa. I don't think the govern-
ment has reached that stage. That's why they don't want to go
to the conference table because they will lose power if they
do. And that is the crisis P.W. is facing.

**AFRICA REPORT:** What is the role of the SACC in bringing
the various black movements inside South Africa—
UDF, Azapo, etc.? Is the conflict between these groups exag-
gerrated?
Chikane: I have problems with people who want to see
blacks in South Africa thinking alike—a nation of people who
think alike. They have the right to think differently. They have
the right to form different organizations, like people in the
West form different parties. What concerns us as a church is
when that difference is expressed in a violent form. It is for
this reason that we have taken a resolution which commits us
to working for an end to the violent confrontation between
black political organizations.

But I also think there is a misunderstanding of what this
conflict is all about. The press tends to pick it up as black-on-black violence. I would like to refute that analysis because for me, it is the violence between the system and the people. If a policeman happens to be black and the children are black, and they happen to clash and one dies in the process, it is not black-on-black violence, it is the forces of apartheid fighting with the people of South Africa.

But what about UDF-Azapo, Azapo-Inkatha? My explanation is that people should know that any sophisticated system, faced with an upsurge of the masses in the country for justice, will use what they call counter-revolutionary methods of depressing the resistance of the people. They use their intelligence network to create fragmentation within the opposition, to create violence among those people.

I am a living example. In 1985, two days after I had been released from prison, I was attacked and when I called the police, they came and said it was Azapo which attacked me. I said, "If it is Azapo, then you must bring the person into court tomorrow." We have not seen that Azapo person up to now. But if even an officer of government would say that in public, then you know that they are part of a strategy of creating conflict among people.

They have been making attacks on some of the factions, the vigilantes, Inkatha. That is public knowledge. They have armed some of the groups. They have put up hit squads and assassination units. If you don't want to be implicated as a government, you just set up an unofficial arm of the government to do it. So we are not naive. We are fighting a very sophisticated system and it creates that type of violence.

Africa Report: How does Inkatha fit in in this analysis? Is it being used by the system?

Chikane: I think that is public knowledge. Inkatha has been seen attacking the people backed up by military vehicles, with the police and army behind them. But the world likes what Gatsha Buthelezi is saying and tends to guarantee his future, and protect his interests. They want to believe that Inkatha is not a violent organization when there is ample evidence of the violent way in which Inkatha has been used. I believe those poor ordinary people are being used and it is for this reason that people in South Africa, even youngsters, have said that we must differentiate between the people in Zululand and Inkatha. There is a difference. That is a sophisticated way in which our people are able to handle that type of dynamic.

Africa Report: What about Buthelezi himself?

Chikane: Gatsha Buthelezi is an adult. He has made his political choices. I know that Desmond Tutu tried whatever he could and still got into trouble with the chief and there were public statements made against Tutu. Since then, he couldn't do much about it. Buthelezi has chosen to be a leader of an apartheid homeland based on apartheid structures. He has chosen to operate politically from that base. He has chosen not to be part of the ANC or of the labor movement of South Africa and has set up his own labor movement. It is very clear that the choice is an intelligent one. It is a conscious decision on his part and everybody has the right to make his or her choices. The people of South Africa see him as part and parcel of the system, employed by the system and running part of the country according to the laws of that system, and saying everything that the system would like to hear—attack the ANC, communists, the UDF, the call for sanctions. For me, he is not a problem because you can't do much about it.

Africa Report: What is the future for South Africa's children?

Chikane: We are going to pay heavily for the type of children we are producing today because in South Africa we have a situation where children are not given the chance to be children. They are forced to be adults and are forced to make decisions which are meant for adults. That they have to make such decisions as whether to write an exam because another student has been detained is a very serious ethical-moral decision to make. In a normal society, you don't subject small kids to a situation where they have to make such choices.

For that reason, I think we are going to pay heavily because we are going to produce a community of people who got completely uprooted and destabilized. We are going to face a community of people who, when they were children, were forced into violent options of defending themselves, even at times using very crude methods. It is a very abnormal situation to have a kid of about 14 years engaged in battering a person to death in the streets. Whatever way the regime uses it to show that it is this violence that made us declare the state of emergency, my argument is that that such conditions have been created for a child to do that is the most serious.

Therefore we need to address the conditions so created because an ordinary child does not do that type of thing unless that person is a real psychiatric case. We are going to face the consequences of those children who have been completely destabilized, dehumanized. I doubt there is a way in which we can avoid it. A lot of them have lost their schooling. Most of them are products of Bantu education anyway, which is not helpful. Apartheid has caused so much damage that even when we become free tomorrow, we are going to have to pay heavily for it.

Africa Report: How do you see the next five years?

Chikane: I think there are two options. One is that if the international community still has some tinge of morality to respond to our appeal, then in the next few years we might find ourselves at a conference table where the problem of South Africa is resolved. But if Thatcher and Reagan are going to continue with the types of positions they are taking, then they are going to leave the people of South Africa to sort out the problem on their own.

It may take more than five years, but they are going to do it in the end. It will mean that there will be a bloody war in South Africa, which might engulf the very people who didn't want to be involved and assist in the resolution of the problem. And at that stage, it might not be easy to intervene. I've tried to appeal to people not to leave South Africans to go on that road. There are some people in the West who say South Africa is still strong, it will continue for a long time. And I'm saying the fact that they are strong is an indication that there is going to be a bloody confrontation, because for the people to develop enough power to fight that system will mean that we are going to have a very violent war. We need to avoid that option and I hope that people can see some light to assist us in avoiding it.
Commonwealth

After Vancouver

The Commonwealth Secretary-General outlines the achievements of the last conference in Vancouver in formulating a program of action on southern Africa. Despite Britain's continued opposition to sanctions, Sir Shridath Ramphal argues that the Commonwealth will play an activist and united role in resolving the southern African crisis.

BY SIR SHRIDATH RAMPHAL

I am sometimes asked why Commonwealth summits are so preoccupied with the question of southern Africa. For most people, the answer is self-evident, but it might be worthwhile restating some fundamentals which have rightly ensured that the Commonwealth has become a major actor in relation to southern African issues.

Commonwealth leaders have consistently identified apartheid as the root cause of the major problems throughout the southern African region—problems in the political, social, economic, and alas, in the military sphere as well. At the heart of them all is apartheid. This is reason enough for Commonwealth concern, but there are even deeper reasons why apartheid so affronts the Commonwealth as to be a major preoccupation.

The Commonwealth represents the supremacy of community over otherness and is the negation of both dominance and racism. Apartheid is the embodiment of both. Minority white domination is sustained by doctrines of racial superiority and systems designed to both reflect and entrench racial inequality.

Apartheid is the very antithesis of the fundamental values of the Commonwealth and as such poses an inescapable challenge to governments and peoples throughout the Commonwealth. It is a direct affront to all the Commonwealth's non-white peoples and especially to neighboring black southern African states. But it is no less of an affront to decent people throughout the world regardless of color, to white people as well who resent what apartheid seeks to do through a racist philosophy that wrongly implicates them.

Throughout the countries of the Commonwealth, therefore, whether their majority populations are black, brown, or white, or are themselves so multiracial as to defy classification by color, apartheid stirs deep passions. In the collectivity of the Commonwealth, those passions are multiplied as apartheid is seen to also challenge the most basic of its tenets. That is why in 1961 South Africa had to leave the Commonwealth. Apartheid was not compatible with Commonwealth membership.

Today, it cannot be compatible with Commonwealth acquiescence. The Commonwealth's response to apartheid is not merely a Commonwealth position on serious issues on the global agenda, it is a statement about the Commonwealth as well. In part, at least, what the Commonwealth has been saying and doing on apartheid ever since then has as much to do with the Commonwealth itself as with South Africa.

It is essential to remember this. Not being sensitive to it is a grievous omission, and that omission has been a factor in Commonwealth discussions. It is not possible to be true to the Commonwealth while being less than militant against apartheid. In the evolution of policy—especially since the Nassau summit—this basic truth has come to be more widely recognized. And it is this recognition that has helped the Commonwealth to come through consistently not only with credibility but also with vitality renewed.

Just before setting out from London to the Vancouver Commonwealth conference, I spoke with diplomatic and Commonwealth writers in London about my expectations for the meeting. There has been so much media distortion of what happened at Vancouver—not all of it the work of the media itself—that these prior intimations help to give a true perspective of the Common-
wealth's real achievements at the meet-
ing.

On southern Africa, this is what I said: "On the political front, Common-
wealth leaders will address the situation in southern Africa, pursuing several ap-
proaches. One track will be what more can be done by way of sanctions and
otherwise to apply pressure on Pretoria to hasten the end of the evil system of
apartheid and the establishment of gen-
uine political freedom. A measure of dis-
agreement on sanctions persists; but no one should believe that sanctions are 'off
the boil.'

"Like most of the U.S. Congress, most Commonwealth countries will re-
ject the view that economic sanctions, including disinvestment, have been inef-
factual or simply hurt blacks. They will recall their earlier warnings that the ef-
fect of sanctions will be diminished if they are not applied universally and gen-
uinely—the fault lying not in sanctions themselves but in their non-application
by all who can apply them. And they will underline black South Africa's insis-
tence, repeated time and again, that what they look for essentially is an effec-
tive sanctions program.

"There will, therefore, be a resolve to continue on the path marked out at
the London Review Meeting last Au-
gust Nevertheless, I do not expect
Commonwealth leaders to dwell on dif-
ferences over sanctions against South
Africa. They can, at least for the
present, agree to disagree, as they
reach for common ground in other areas
of action toward shared objectives in
southern Africa.

"One such area, as important as san-
tions, is what the Commonwealth must
do to respond to the plight of the front-
line states, including Mozambique
(which is in the frontline of the frontline),
to enhance their security in the face of
South Africa's de stabilization policies
before the situation throughout the
frontline countries deteriorates irre-
trievably.

"And in wider terms the overall situa-
tion confirms how essential it is that the
Commonwealth adheres to the objec-
tives of the Nassau Accord and keeps
open the path of negotiation pioneered
by the Commonwealth Eminent Per-
sons Group. And Commonwealth lead-
ers will not forget Namibia, which
should be our 50th member."

That is what I hoped would happen at
the Vancouver Commonwealth con-
ference. Now let us look at what actually
did happen. The principal conclusions
of the conference are contained in what
has become known as the "Okanagan
Statement and Program of Action on
Southern Africa." Lake Okanagan was
the venue of the retreat which forms
such an important part of each heads of
government meeting—an occasion
when the presidents, prime ministers,
and their spouses are together in a re-
laxed way, but an occasion which allows
an opportunity for continuing the work
of the meeting. It was at the retreat that
they reached their important conclu-
sions on southern Africa.

"Commonwealth leaders have
consistently identified apartheid as the root
cause of the major problems throughout
the southern African region."

The Okanagan Statement is a 33-
point document of Commonwealth posi-
tions on southern Africa of which 26
constitute a program of action to assist
the region. On 27 of these 33 points,
there is unanimity. On six of them, Brit-
ain does not concur. Five of these six
relate to sanctions; the other to the
Committee of Foreign Ministers estab-
lished under the Okanagan Statement.
This British abstention is of great signifi-
cance—to Britain and to the rest of the
Commonwealth. There remains, how-
ever, a large measure of commitment
under the Okanagan Statement that is
common to all Commonwealth govern-
ments.

Let me deal first with the six points
from which Britain, and Britain alone,
withheld its agreement. The five that
relate to sanctions are as follows:
• The belief "that economic and other
sanctions have had a significant effect on
South Africa and that their wider,
tighter, and more intensified application
must remain an essential part of the in-
ternational community's response to
apartheid."
• A commitment to securing "a more
concerted application of a global san-
tions program" including the "universal
adoption of the measures now adopted
by most Commonwealth and other
countries including the United States
and Nordic countries"—pending the ac-
ceptance by the international commu-
nity as a whole "that comprehensive and
mandatory sanctions would be the
quickest route to bring Pretoria to the
negotiating table."
• Evaluation "on a continuing basis [of]
the application of sanctions in order to
assess their impact."
• Initiation of "an expert study, drawing
on independent sources, of South Afri-
ca's relationship with the international
financial system" with a view to "a bet-
ter understanding of development and
possibilities in this sphere;" and,
• In furtherance of commitments at
Nassau, agreement to "continue to take
further action (including sanctions) indi-
vidually and collectively as deemed ap-
propriate in response to the situation as
it evolves until apartheid is dismantled."

The sixth point from which Britain
dissent was the establishment of the Commo-
monwealth Committee of Foreign
Ministers on Southern Africa to provide
high-level "impetus and guidance in fur-
therance of the objectives" of the Okanagan
Statement and Program of Action. The committee, which will be
caired by the Secretary of State for
External Affairs of Canada, will also in-
clude the foreign ministers of Australia,
Guyana, India, Nigeria, Tanzania, Za-
mbia, and Zimbabwe.

I do not need to underline the signifi-
cance of these agreements. Together,
they represent an evolution and a
strengthening of the Commonwealth's
commitment to sanctions against South
Africa from Nassau through London and
now at Vancouver. The Okanagan
Statement speaks plainly of sanctions. It
no longer uses code-words like "mea-
sures."

The statement was based on the
work of a committee of foreign minis-
ters established by Commonwealth
leaders after a constructive and non-acrimonious plenary session at Vancouver. The committee included the British foreign secretary, and its conclusions—on sanctions as well as on other paragraphs—were strengthened by the heads of governments themselves when they considered the report at the Okanagan retreat.

What is more, despite some media suggestions to the contrary, the agreement to disagree with Britain on those six points was free of contention and hostility on the part of the majority adopting the statement. Other Commonwealth leaders were so sure of the way forward at Vancouver that they did not find it difficult to agree to disagree with Britain. They felt that Britain was wrong. They were sad about this, but as 47 of the 48 Commonwealth leaders saw it—and as President Kaunda later said to the press—they had to accept "Britain's right to be wrong." Throughout the conference, both in the plenary and during the retreat, they did so in an exceptional manner. The British prime minister, in fact, complimented the prime minister of Zimbabwe on the measured manner in which he had opened the discussion on southern Africa.

Such contentions as arose were to do with media briefings—responses to media projections and to what many regarded as highly distorted media reports. In fact, as more than one head of government remarked, and as four found it necessary to protest at a joint press conference, it became impossible to relate what was being said in the British media with what was actually transpiring in the conference. This is a great pity and it is a lesson from which the Commonwealth will need to draw important conclusions for the future.

But what of some of the other 20 points of agreement—unanimous agreement—on action against apartheid? While Pretoria may have taken comfort from Britain's stand against sanctions at Vancouver and even more so from media glorification of it, they can take no comfort from the totality of what was actually agreed.

That area of agreement included such important conclusions as the need to go beyond the substantial and invaluable help already being provided by several Commonwealth countries to South Africa's neighbors to further strengthen their capacity to resist Pretoria's policy of destabilization and destruction. This assistance—in which the international community as a whole must join—is designed both to advance disengagement from the South African economy and to provide for the frontline's security against South African aggression.

In even more specific terms, it includes an enhanced program of coordinated Commonwealth assistance to the region and particularly to Mozambique, assistance directed to such key sectors as transportation and communications, embracing both their rehabilitation and physical protection, with priority attention to the Limpopo Line and the port of Maputo. It includes such related matters as an examination of the question of transit rights of landlocked states of the region—an issue of particular significance to Lesotho. It includes a decision to establish a special fund by which the Commonwealth can provide technical assistance to Mozambique. It includes a process of consultation, on request, to enable Commonwealth countries in a position to do so to contribute to the security needs of Mozambique and other frontline states.

And beyond all this, the area of agreement includes giving support to the victims and opponents of apartheid within South Africa in educational training, in humanitarian and legal assistance to detainees and their families, in increasing support to the trade union movement, and to economic and social development.

As important as anything else, at Vancouver the Commonwealth reiterated its conviction that only through negotiation can catastrophe in South Africa be averted, and its belief that the "negotiating concept" of the Eminent Persons Group remains as valid today as when the group put it forward a year and a half ago. In this context, Commonwealth leaders agreed to take advantage of any opportunity to promote real internal dialogue by increasing contacts with South Africans of differing viewpoints and supporting the opponents of apartheid through such arrangements as conferences and visits, and giving high priority to countering South African propaganda and lifting Pretoria's own "iron curtain" of censorship.

These unanimous conclusions—so closely following what we were seeking at Vancouver—represent a formidable practical response to the situation in southern Africa. The Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers is a process of considerable importance in helping to translate these commitments into practical action, and can play a major role in the months ahead.

It should be no surprise, therefore, that most Commonwealth leaders leaving Vancouver did so with the conviction that the Commonwealth had responded in a manner worthy of its commitments on the ending of apartheid and its particular obligations to the frontline states bordering on South Africa. They have no doubt of being on the right side of history in terms of the terrible blight on human civilization that apartheid constitutes.

Now we must turn our hand to implementing the Vancouver program on southern Africa; indeed, we have already begun to do so. At the beginning of February, the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa held its first formal meeting at Lusaka, following on the SADCC ministerial meeting the previous week at Arusha. The Special Fund for Mozambique will be fully established and a whole host of other decisions will begin to be implemented.

The Commonwealth needs to be activist as the situation in southern Africa continues to deteriorate. Even as I write, South African forces are 150 miles inside Angola waging war against the government of this neighboring country—a clear act of aggression to which all too many in the international community are prepared to turn a blind eye—so greatly do factors of race and ideology override our ethics and our internationalism.

But as the struggle against apartheid goes on, in South Africa itself and beyond it, the Commonwealth's credibility must be sustained. It will be sustained by the resolute and assiduous implementation of the decisions at Vancouver, and especially of the Okanagan Statement and Program of Action on Southern Africa.
Britain

Although Margaret Thatcher continues to oppose economic sanctions against Pretoria, growing "domestic and international criticism of her policy may be forcing her to launch her own southern African diplomatic initiative. The question is: Will South Africa listen?

"Of all the outsiders involved in the drama, Thatcher's role could be the most influential"

By Denis Herbstein

England's earliest woman of renown was a 1st century AD freedom fighter called Boadicea. Her husband, king of the east coast Icenes, died and left his estate to be shared between his two daughters and the music-loving emperor, Nero, in the hope of winning protection from the Romans.

Instead, the colonialists annexed the little kingdom and the peeved widow launched an armed struggle, in the process massacring 70,000 of the enemy and their puppet Briton allies. The big legions had to be marched in to subdue the recalcitrant province, retributions were bloody, and the queen swallowed a lethal dose of poison.

In retrospect, by the standards of present-day Western prime ministers, presidents, and chancellors, Boadicea was nothing more than a "terrorist." Yet, for generations of British schoolchildren, this warrior heroine has been a symbol of how one defends one's home against daunting odds.

The lesson she learned many years ago at school in that same eastern region of England might just have reminded Margaret Thatcher to come to the aid of the little guy. Certainly, the Afghan mujahedin and the Falkland islanders have cause to thank her for generous armed support.

In southern Africa, on the other hand, they will be running out of space for the planting of pins on her effigy. The Swapo "freedom fighters" in Namibia would be hard put to see any real difference between their plight and the cruel occupation and broken promises visited upon the Icenes, while the British prime minister's description of the African National Congress as a "typical terrorist organization" is perceived at best as out of touch with black aspirations, and at worst, as a soft touch on apartheid.

Yet, of all the outsiders involved in the drama, Thatcher's role could be the most influential. She has become the spiritual leader of the anti-sanctionists, to the extent that if she were to concede really biting measures against Pretoria, other waiverers—the Germans, Portuguese, Mitterrand and/or Chirac, the White House, the Japanese even—could follow suit.

Now, as she sets in motion her long-term strategy on South Africa, optimists believe that if she cannot persuade P.W. Botha to make "meaningful concessions," no one can. Whether these reforms will come anywhere near to satisfying black aspirations remains one of the "x" factors in the ever-changing equation of peaceful progress. But the lady has a plan and will see it through.

The cult of personality thrives in Britain. Mrs. Thatcher is the most powerful peacetime prime minister this century, her authority boosted by last year's re-election for a third term and by the disarray of her Labour, Liberal, and Social Democrat opponents. Powerful, yes, and admired, but not popular.

It is surprising how highly she is thought of abroad, how disliked at home. British Toryism used to be a pragmatic, day-to-day attention to problems, but the Thatcher style is a purposeful counter-revolution against the welfare state. Unshackling the economy has led her into a furious row over plans to dismantle the National Health Service, a justifiably much-loved institution.
This apparent indexible view of the world can be misleading. Her dislike of sanctions nevertheless allowed her to invoke trade restrictions against Libya. Yet her fear of "terrorism," in light of Britain's centuries-old connections with Ireland, has given her a greater consistency than her allies in refusing to trade guns for hostages.

As for apartheid, she tells a journalist that it is "repulsive and detestable. . . a deep affront to human dignity and basic human rights." She adds for good measure, "I know how strongly I would feel if I were discriminated against because of the color of my skin and I therefore understand the anger and frustrations felt by others." And yet she has used the provocative verb "swamped" to describe the way the British were said to feel about "immigrants," a code word for the country's 2 million blacks.

Yet, her track record on African negotiation is a perfect one-out-of-one. The year she came into office, 1979, she set up the Lancaster House talks and then presided over the independence of Zimbabwe. Conservatives have a habit of realizing the left's foreign policy aims in a way that eludes the left. De Gaulle and Algeria, Kissinger and China, even Reagan and disarmament. The trip to Kenya and Nigeria last December was Thatcher's first appearance in Africa in over seven years, though since the Bahamas Commonwealth conference in 1985, she has found that South Africa will not be swept under the carpet.

Black rebellion has become a way of life in the Republic, but the West has for the moment forgotten. Credit, if that be the word, must largely go to the state of emergency and the crippling clamp on media reporting. The French philosopher would have said, "I am not on television, therefore I do not exist." The partial success of the Congress's sanctions law and American industry's wholesale disinvestment process have contributed to the feeling that enough has been done for the moment. But in Europe, the British government has staunchly the widespread popular demand for action. There is a feeling that little more can be offered for the next four years.

But Britain has not even carried out the limited measures agreed to. Despite a "voluntary ban" on new investments in South Africa, British companies are at the same time being advised by the Department of Trade and Industry, a government ministry, how to set up subsidiaries there. The government agreed to stop official trade missions to South Africa, but they still go out, under the auspices of the British Overseas Trade Board. Alan Clarke, the Minister for Trade, announced in November that Britain had "done very well" by increasing exports to South Africa by 11 percent in the first nine months of last year.

Another "voluntary ban" applies to the promotion of tourism, but more hooligans than ever are enjoying "sunny South Africa." The Brits are bemiriting with vulturine urine speed from the American airline pull-out. The national carrier, British Airways, advertises in Johannesburg newspapers advising how to "catch a curved flight" to 17 North American destinations, with a "short stop" over in London. You get the clever baseball connection?

Bishop Trevor Huddleston, president of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, says: "Britain has refused to enforce most of the measures which it formally subscribes to and as a result has sent precisely the wrong signals to Pretoria." The Movement has published a report entitled "Sanctions Begin to Bite," which "explosates the myth peddled by Thatcher and Co. that sanctions are not working."

There is little doubt that they have, with non-gold exports down markedly (except for the West Germans and Italians, who are buying cheap South African coal like mad). The argument about their effect is complicated by the "leak" element. But one tiling we do know about Rhodesia—so often used as an argument that sanctions don't work—if there is a will, they can be made water-tight enough.

Robin Renwick, British ambassador to Pretoria, an old Rhodesia hand and a long-time student of sanctions, has admitted, "We were very successful in putting a virtual stop to British trade with Rhodesia, but were totally unsuccessful in putting an end to the trade of other countries with Rhodesia." You might say then that a mandatory trade embargo would be the answer, but no. the British won't have that either.

Clearly, this "nyet, nyet" to sanctions will change nothing in South Africa. So, observers believe, a Thatcher initiative has been signalled. It entails a long-term, not less than two-year strategy, and could involve a venture similar to the Commonwealth "Eminent Persons Group" whose findings and recommendations, brushed aside by Mrs. Thatcher in 1986, are now said to be more to her liking.

Her first step will be to win African, that is frontline states and Nigerian, backing. This would entail a more thorough visit to the continent than the last. Robert Mugabe, in particular, has to be won over. The next biennial Commonwealth heads of government conflag is in Kuala Lumpur in November 1989, where she would arrive with European Community—and the new man in the White House's—support for her non-or minimal sanctions solution.

Meanwhile, inside the laager Ambassador Renwick will be reminding Pik Botha of the insults his prime minister has endured resisting sanctions. "Of course, we wouldn't dream of telling you what to do, but now might be the right time for the following initiatives." Penalties for non-compliance, rewards for doing as you are told. It has been called the "concept of conditionality." Not as simple as "Nelson Mandela released, easy credit from the world banking system; the Group Areas Act abolished, we buy all the coal you can dig," but you get the point.

Maybe the shock of American disinvestment concentrates the mind. Britain must be seen to achieve something concrete before the Commonwealth will touch it. Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe will be doing the rounds rather like Shultz and Shevardnadze, preparing an agreement that merely has to be dotted and crossed by the warning factions.

Then, a great conference, maybe in Harare, or once again on one of those neutral trains—the "blakes alleenlik/whites only" coach in South Africa, the "non-whites" one in black Africa, though where Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo would board is perhaps one of the lesser problems in this majestic tapestry. And after its successful conclusion, who would dance the first fox-trot.
with Maggie at the "Black Rule" ball in the Pretoria city hall?

To be sure, Britain has more realistic, down-to-earth aims. The so-called "Lawson Doctrine" (for the Chancellor of the Exchequer) aims to spread the gospel of Britain's economic miracle to the Third World. Briefly, this amounts to cutting through the bureaucracy that has stifled so much initiative. In South Africa, that bureaucracy is called apartheid.

British business, through the medium of the powerful semi-official trade association, UKSATA, is being encouraged to focus on a black middle-class as a barrier against and a magnet for the radicals. It has been called variously "trickle down," "crumbs from the white man's table," and (pace Ian Smith of UDI fame) "frais de table," and (pace Ian Smith of UDI fame) "frais de table.

A stepped-up program of educational aid will be provided. Research shows that more than 85 percent of the British companies operating in South Africa pay blacks wages below the level of the University of South Africa's "National Average Supplemented Living Level."

Back to the "Plan." Timing is of the essence, for if elections are held in South Africa before those scheduled in 1992, the conservatives and neo-Nazi parties now threatening to inherit the mantle of the pure white Afrikaner will trumpet these concessions across the veld. Even without this heavy breathing, President Botha cannot make any concession likely to release the white man's grip on power.

Can Thatcher really believe that this minority is about to defy the lessons of history and roll over obediently onto its back? No South African, white or black, does. Botha hasn't even relinquished Namibia, and that's quite an easy one.

On the left side of the pincer, the African National Congress has set its sights more loftily on the ultimate target of one-person, one-vote and the people's rule that would ensue. Which is not to say that the abolition of apartheid and the restoration of human rights are not important. But while Mrs. Thatcher goes on about black capitalism, the caravan has moved on. One of her problems is that she has no comfortable allies in South Africa. She is not new in seeking friends in her own image, who reflect the way she would like the world to be.

A favorite is the redoubtable Helen Suzman, whose strictures against sanctions she is wont to quote. But Suzman comes from the very Johannesburg background which depends on digging things out of the ground and selling them abroad. Sanctions would be more damaging to them than to the ordinary Afrikaner. Besides, her Progressive Federal Party, timorously moderate though it is, is falling apart.

Which leaves Gatsha Buthelezi, chief of the Zulu Inkatha movement. The British have long had a weakness for noble tribesmen. They admired the Hausa in Nigeria—Kaduna was their favorite city. The Ghanaian Ashanti of Golden Stool fame intrigued Victorian and Edwardian England. And even since they slapped the Welch Fusiliers in the eye at Isandhlwana in 1878, the Zulus have held a special place in British hearts. Buthelezi is indeed a force to be reckoned with, disruptive though it is to the liberation struggle. But believing him make British policy in the Republic more acceptable to white or black?

As for the Brits, opinion polls show more of them favoring a boycott than not. Many refuse to buy South African goods in the supermarkets and clothing stores. The opposition parties in Parliament, who represent some 60 percent of the country, all want tougher measures, at least on the American scale. Leader of the opposition Neil Kinnock regularly castigates his opposite number as "an ally of apartheid," but until he moves into Downing Street, that's about it. The leading churches—Anglican, Methodist, and Catholic—are prosanctions, with the voice of Desmond Tutu a persuasive factor.

The national press, in particular the mass circulation and Sunday papers, with their South African holdings, are wary of change. Proprietors of left-of-center journals, Robert Maxwell (the Mirror group) and Tiny Rowland of Lonrho's Observer, are tainted—the latter increased his ownership of the Western Platinum mine in the Transvaal from 50 to 100 percent after the "voluntary" investment ban.

As for the BBC, whose television staffer, Michael Buerk, was kicked out of South Africa some time ago, there has been a constructive response. The corporation's World Service, with new, powerful transmitters, now beams into the Republic on short wave thorough southern African news programs which should put the fantasies of the South African Broadcasting Corporation into perspective.

In the last resort, however, Pretoria is pleased with the Thatcher performance. The whites have granted her superstar status. Two examples show why. More than a hundred Labour-controlled local authorities, large cities like Sheffield and Glasgow among them, run their own sanctions campaign, selling off their stocks in "apartheid" companies and refusing to buy South African products. The cumulative effect has been substantial. Now the conservatives are legislating to stop all that idealistic drivel. The bans will themselves be banned.

The other case is the government's refusal to intervene on behalf of political prisoners, most recently the "Sharpeville Six," who lost their appeal against the death penalty in December. In some cases, Washington, Bonn, and Paris have all made their voices heard, leaving London as the hangman's sole friend.

So what is to be done? As long as Mrs. Thatcher is around, very little. Hers, she knows, is the best way of protecting British interests. But the energy she puts into undermining sanctions could equally be directed the opposite way: a dramatic turn around, brought about by the realization that British interests are not best protected by buttering up Botha.

Then her formidable powers could be directed at whipping the world into line, cutting air links, requiring visas of South African visitors, telling the White House to get the Saudis to stop supplying apartheid's oil, closing down the entire world's trade, investment, and the transfer of technology, even emptying the embassy in London's Trafalgar Square in which stands Admiral Nelson, after whom Mandela was named. Blacks would suffer in South Africa, but don't they now, in the townships of Pietermaritzburg and the squatter camps of Cape Town?
United Nations

Interview with Brian Urquhart

The time may be ripe for a new, joint international initiative on southern Africa within the UN framework, says its undersecretary-general for special political affairs from 1974-86. Brian Urquhart offers concrete proposals on how the new U.S.-Soviet relationship might be put to the test in resolving the region’s conflicts.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

"We must get away from the notion that we are fighting the Cold War in southern Africa"

Africa Report: The South African issue seems to have retreated again to the back-burner of international consciousness, perhaps due to a lack of real leadership on the matter within the international community.

Urquhart: It is very striking, isn’t it?

Africa Report: It appears that no new or creative initiatives are coming out of the international community at any level. In the absence of strong international leadership, should the United Nations play that role, as apartheid clearly constitutes a threat to international peace and security?

Urquhart: One of the troubles here is that people tend to try to divide up the issue into compartments. One compartment is apartheid, one compartment is Namibia, another is the destabilization activities in the frontline states, another is the situation in Angola, and so on. If the governments really want to do something about this—and after all, they have all voted for the basic decisions on both apartheid and Namibia—they are going to have to develop an international strategy which takes account of all the aspects of a very complex problem. If they don’t do that, everybody tends to get played off against everybody else.

There was a time when there was a great emphasis on sanctions against South Africa. That was fine as some sort of a threat and signal and as a sign of awareness that there was a terrible problem. But if people believe that they have sent this signal and then go off and occupy themselves with other problems in other parts of the world, it is almost as bad as if they hadn’t done it at all! The international community has to try to think of strategies which will actually do something about these problems.

Foremost among the things to tackle would be the difficult situation of the frontline states and the major disasters in Angola and Mozambique, which are all part of this problem. How can we begin to reverse the economic dependence of the frontline states on South Africa? That is something that would make a qualitative change in the situation.

One way to start would be to look at what the conditions for effective international action in southern Africa really are. One is that we actually have a consensus in the outside world. We must get away from the notion that we are fighting the Cold War in southern Africa. The Soviet Union has recently made a series of very interesting statements on southern Africa, including their ideas on apartheid, their notion that it is time for joint U.S.-Soviet initiatives, the statement that they don’t wish to gain any unilateral advantage out of this area. Why not try these statements out? Southern Africa might be a very good place to try out the new position of the Gorbachev leadership on international affairs. We talk about regional conflicts as a potential source of danger for the future peace of the world. Why not take a really anguishing regional conflict situation like southern Africa and try a new approach? What has anybody got to lose?

The strategy would have to have a number of main points. One would be the redressing of the economic balance, a reopening of the vital communications and trade arteries which will make it possible for the frontline states to develop. Another would be a major effort to assist them to compose their internal differences, particularly in Angola. If the international community was to take a single position, it should be much easier to reach some accommodation.
"Southern Africa might be a very good place to try out the new position of the Gorbachev leadership on international affairs."

Then if South Africa says it has to maintain forces in Namibia because of the danger of the Cubans, let's ask ourselves why the Cubans are in Angola in the first place and look at the means by which this vicious circle can be cut. There may be practical possibilities. For example, there is the demilitarized zone idea on the Namibia-Angola border, which was being negotiated about in the early 1980s. And it would help us to get back to an unanimous international position on the future of Namibia. Maybe there is a need for some sort of international observation on the Namibia-Angola border or for the situation in Mozambique. The aim should be to get away from destabilization and economic and social disorder—as an essential first step.

Africa Report: It would seem that the only way one could develop that international consensus would be within the UN framework. I don't see it being done on a bilateral basis.

Urquhart: The UN works best when it combines the multilateral and bilateral. But if UN action is to be effective, it depends on unanimous support for a general strategy. An effective plan may also entail a considerable outlay of resources and money. I think the frontline states richly deserve that kind of response from the international community. Of all the groups of governments that I have ever dealt with, they have seemed to me the most reasonable, pragmatic, and least liable to fanciful and self-defeating efforts. Southern Africa should provide the opportunity for an experiment in what we hope is going to be the trend of the future—an effort to enhance the UN's capacity for dealing with regional conflicts.

Africa Report: Over the last year, the UN has been credited for the activist role it played in the Gulf War—getting both the U.S. and Soviet Union to endorse a cease-fire. Any parallel with southern Africa?

Urquhart: This is certainly a step in the right direction, but it is only one step. We're still a very long way from the kind of real consensus which would make important decisions a practical reality, which would constitute a showing of some kind of real international authority. I don't think there is any problem more difficult than the apartheid problem, but there are a number of things you could do in the other aspects of the problem which are important in themselves. Why should Mozambique or Angola, having fought so hard for their independence, now be allowed to become international basket cases? Why should the other frontline states, who have made great efforts to be helpful, constructive, and sensible about Namibia and other problems, be condemned to suffer?

It would be helpful to get back to the sort of concentration on some of these problems like Namibia that we had in the late 1970s, for example, the effort led by the Western Contact Group to try to make UN resolutions a reality. It got some of the way, but not far enough. I think you need that kind of effort again, but quite who's going to do it, I don't know.

Africa Report: Within the UN context, who would be able to get this process going in terms of laying out proposals and trying to achieve an international consensus? Would not such an initiative have to be put forth by someone like the UN secretary-general?

Urquhart: Obviously, the frontline states themselves would have to initiate any forms of international action that affects them directly. You can't impose things on them, whether the effort goes through the secretary-general or something like the old Contact Group. It would be interesting to see if the five permanent members of the Security Council could get together on the situation in southern Africa. They have all voted for the basic decisions. But I don't know whether that will happen. I hope so, because southern Africa is one of the world's conflict areas where a realistic, good, imaginative strategy and a real international consensus could have an enormous effect.

Africa Report: In terms of the strategy on the ground, you would foresee a demilitarized zone between Namibia and Angola?

Urquhart: I merely gave that as an example. You can think of lots of examples of things that could be done. That would have to be thought out. But if the problem from the South African side is that they are afraid of attacks by Swapo from bases in Angola and therefore go surging into Angola itself and also support Unita, why not try to make a practical international arrangement which will alleviate such fears? Why are the Cubans in Angola? Clearly because the Angolan government feels threatened from a number of quarters. If it is believed that the Cubans are an obstacle to progress on other matters,
why not address the reason why they are there? I don't know why the international momentum has died down so much on these problems. Do you?

**Africa Report:** In the U.S., it seems the anti-apartheid momentum built up until sanctions were passed and then dissipated again.

**Urquhart:** That is the problem with this particular kind of measure. It's very praiseworthy in its own way, but it's the same with important United Nations resolutions. People go through the four or five-month process of producing a resolution and tend to believe that that is the end of the process. The passing of a resolution in the Security Council should be the beginning of the process—the point when governments should really gel together and decide how they are going to go on. If they can't do that, the resolution looks nice on paper, but it's not necessarily very significant.

On southern Africa, obviously the frontline states have to be intimately concerned with what happens and their sensibilities have to be considered. After that, you have to look for the kind of coalition which will try to develop realistic courses of action for the international community. I don't know who can do that at the present time.

**Africa Report:** Does the Security Council have any teeth at all or is international consensus such a dead concept that to expect it to be able to do anything on southern Africa is pointless?

**Urquhart:** The great difference between the United Nations and the Ixague of Nations was originally supposed to be that the UN had teeth. What was meant by that was that the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee would have the capacity to mobilize all sorts of pressures, including military enforcement action, under the auspices of the five permanent members, the great powers that won the second world war. Unfortunately, the five permanent members soon got divorced. Maybe now they are patching tilings up after 42 years, although one doesn't want to be too optimistic on that score.

But I don't believe that situations such as the one in southern Africa are susceptible to this rather simple enforcement approach. That part of the Charter was very much a retrospective idea of how the world community ought to have dealt with Hitler and Mussolini—how to deal with aggressors. We're not really talking about anything like that in southern Africa. It is a far more complex situation. Effective measures to deal with it should be aimed at fundamentally changing the context of the problem.

It might have a very considerable effect, for example, if it were far less easy for South Africa to destabilize countries like Angola and Mozambique, which is now possible partly because there is a large split in the outside world in the way we view what is happening in southern Africa. Supposing Angola could become a stable and relatively prosperous country and was no longer the site of both foreign incursions and a civil war, all encouraged from the outside. Supposing you could stabilize Mozambique. Supposing you could get the Benguela railroad open again, and have the Beira corridor reinforced and rehabilitated. This would be a much more healthy situation in which to try to persuade South Africa that Namibia has to be independent. I don't know what the effect would be on the problems inside South Africa, but it might conceivably send a very strong message.

**Africa Report:** Couldn't you define South Africa as an aggressor in the region and hence have a case for applying UN enforcement actions?

**Urquhart:** Enforcement actions are not just military actions. They include sanctions, breaking off of relations, all sorts of economic tilings. But it seems to me that such actions would be all the more convincing in the context of a surrounding group of African states that aren't economically so tied in with South Africa. I don't see military enforcement as a possible option. Of course, if the idea of a demilitarized zone came up again, then at the very least you would have to have military observers to monitor it.

**Africa Report:** Wouldn't that be called for in southern Angola and ultimately in Namibia?

**Urquhart:** Under the plan that was evolved under resolution 435, there is a very large peace-keeping element, about 7,500, involved in the transitional phase of elections for a
constituent assembly and so on. But such measures have to be seen in the context of an overall objective and strategy, and they also very much depend upon what the governments themselves actually want. It's important to look at the problems of the region as being in one way or another related, in which case you've got to have some overall idea of how to tackle them. Otherwise, efforts tend to be wasted or manipulated.

Africa Report: So such an initiative should come from the frontline states.

Urquhart: They would have to be a very important part of any kind of planning. But a great deal also depends on how much the rest of the world is prepared to devote its energies to this kind of thing. This is a terribly important issue that tends to go out of fashion for long periods of time. That seems to me to be wrong.

Africa Report: The suggestions you've raised are very good ideas, but who takes the actual leadership for this? The U.S. won't, Britain won't, so again does not the responsibility fall back on the UN?

Urquhart: I would like to think that something could be done about it. In the present situation, the UN would need a very solid commitment not only of intention, but of support of all kinds by the five permanent members and other important members. You can have the best ideas in the world, but you've got to have a constituency to back them. I personally don't see any reason why you couldn't do it. This is something that people basically agree on. This is where things have gone badly wrong in recent years. There have been efforts to deal with one or more symptoms of the problem without any real attempt to get an agreed approach to the whole tiling.

Africa Report: Can you envision the U.S. and Soviet Union agreeing to this basic strategy? Can that consensus be developed in practical terms?

Urquhart: If they can start agreeing on matters as close to their hearts as intercontinental ballistic missiles, and if what is likely to trigger off the ultimate disaster might be some completely unforeseen chain of events in a regional conflict, I don't see why they can't. Why don't they test out the new relationship and see if they can do it? Who would lose? Why should the people of Angola and Mozambique have to pick up the bill for historical developments which have extraordinarily little to do with them?

I hope the problems of southern Africa are not going to go on getting sidetracked. If you are really worried about the issue of Namibia in and of itself, or about the future development of the frontline states, or about trying to help everybody in South Africa do something about apartheid, then you have to think about what context would be the most favorable to those developments. Certainly a total shambles in Angola is not favorable to the independence of Namibia, because it is a constant excuse to hang onto Namibia. If Angola was a peaceful, developing, potentially rich country, it would be very hard to make this argument. So you've got to find the way to move forward, instead of moving backwards into chaos.

Africa Report: Should we move on and abandon trying to get sanctions passed in the Security Council, given that the U.S. has even opposed the same measures that are the law of the land?

Urquhart: It seems unlikely that the Security Council will vote sanctions for one reason or another that we all know too well. Nonetheless, they are unquestionably an important signal and symbol, however effective or ineffective they might prove to be. Personally, I also wonder, given the state of mind of the people we are dealing with, whether psychologically this is necessarily the right way to go. It would be wise to look for ways to bring about a change in the basic context of the situation which might conceivably bring about genuine changes in attitude and intention.

Africa Report: Do you think that resolution 435 is irrelevant at this point?

Urquhart: No, I don't think it's irrelevant. Resolution 435 is a kind of a standard. It's up there on the hill, and the intention is to rally to it. When we finally get there, it may be possible to simplify this procedure, who knows? Until there is something better, it is essential to hang onto 435. As a statement of intention, it's very important. What we've got to think about is how to get to the point where we can implement it.

Africa Report: Maybe a two-track strategy would be best: first changing the context by creating a DMZ on the ground and strengthening the frontline states, and second, trying to maintain diplomatic pressure through sanctions and other enforcement measures.

Urquhart: It seems to me very important to get genuinely unanimous declarations of intent so that we can get away from this whole business of mixed motivations. What is essential is the perception that everybody on the outside is together in trying to do something in a sensible way about this problem. More attention should be paid to what the Soviet Union has been saving the last six months on the subject. I don't see what could be lost by putting these statements to the test. This is one regional conflict area where a really intelligent, far-sighted policy could produce historic results.

Africa Report: Has the UN had any successes in the southern African scenario thus far, or has it been held hostage to the big powers?

Urquhart: Keeping the issues of Namibia and apartheid alive is important, and I don't know how it would have been done without the UN. But as far as practical results are concerned, I don't think the UN so far has done too well. That's why I hope that we might enter into a new chapter where we've got a different idea of using the UN, where there is a benevolent, strategic consensus on how to deal with an immensely complex problem in all its different parts, but with one central thrust.
South Africa: Where Did the Story Go?

American media coverage of the South African crisis has diminished in both quantity and quality since the press restrictions under the state of emergency. This Africa Report exclusive examines why and what can be done about it, talking with the editors and journalists who make the news.

BY DANNY SCHECHTER
with research by ANDRE ASTROW and DAPHNE TOPOUZIS

On the night after Thanksgiving CBS News viewers may have been startled to see a few minutes of an evening news report about apartheid devoted to the pulsating beat of black American rappers chanting "A.K.R.I.C.A./ in music video about southern Africa. Correspondent Bruce Morton cited the song, along with other anti-apartheid films and albums, as evidence that the entertainment industry seems to be doing more to raise awareness about the issue than the news media.

Where has the apartheid story gone? Is it being covered less because less is happening? Has the international press packed up and moved on? Or has South Africa's press ban been so successful that coverage has been effectively curtailed? Could the American media be doing more?

These questions raise important issues about the politics and practices of news coverage. To explore them, Africa Report surveyed South Africa coverage in major American newspapers and reviewed Vanderbilt University's TV News Index and Abstracts, looked at what the "alternative press" in South Africa covers that we may not, and spoke with editors and correspondents, in the U.S. and South Africa.

On average, the Americans interviewed tended to have a more sanguine view of the problem than the South Africans. The editors of prominent American newspapers defended their coverage as adequate. TV journalists tended to be a bit more unhappy because of their need for visual images and their problems getting the stories they do file on the air.

But South Africans opposed to apartheid and activists who support them in this country are far more dissatisfied, arguing that the American media has been essentially complicit in Pretoria's media restrictions. One conclusion was undeniable: There has been less coverage of South Africa overall, especially since the various press bans went into effect starting in late 1985.

'The dominant pre-emergency news frame of rebellion, if not open warfare, has vanished.'

Using my own non-scientific "bathroom scale test," I weighed the TV News Index and Abstracts on South Africa from July-October 1985, a time of intense unrest, comparing it with the same period in 1987, a period of continuing labor unrest which included the strike in the gold mines. There is a three-pound difference. In August 1987, there were 102 citations of TV news stories on South Africa; in August 1985, several hundred. A survey of newspaper clips tells the same story.

No one disputes that South Africa's emergency regulations have had an effect in limiting coverage of unrest, particularly those dramatic confrontations between the army and the community in the townships. The dominant pre-emergency news frame of rebellion, if not open warfare, has vanished.

In August 1985, the three networks—ABC, CBS, and NBC—ran 60 South Africa stories between them. In November, after the first month of the press restrictions, there were only 20. At that time, the violence had not abated. A month later, ABC's principal news anchor, Peter Jennings, acknowledged that the restrictions had "worked." Marc Kusnetz, foreign news producer for NBC's nightly news recently echoed the same theme: "Has the censorship been effective? Sure it has. Is that even a question?"

There is no doubt that media coverage of the violence fueled protests overseas, including calls for disinvestment and sanctions. Media attention turned the battle inside South Africa into a global cause, one which was forcing Pretoria to consider reforms, however modest. Predictably, the South African government's response—given the nature of that government and the way it sees its interests—was to clamp down on coverage, so as to drive "the pictures," particularly vivid white-cops-beating-black-kids pictures, off the air.
Pretoria's press regulations appear calculated to keep the media off balance: They are deliberately vague, calculated to impose caution, restraint, self-censorship. New York Times foreign editor Joseph Lelyveld, who won a Pulitzer Prize for his book about South Africa, told us "the press clampdown has had some success."

"But there is no formal censorship system. I don't think we have ever submitted a line of copy. It's a system of self-censorship. They lay down guidelines and the correspondents have to decide how close they want to come to those guidelines. Some use the government's pressure of close scrutiny as an excuse for not doing a hell of a lot."

Adds Paul van Slambruck, international news editor of The Christian Science Monitor. "The burden of proof is on you. There are a bunch of laws and if you break them, you'll be prosecuted."

CBS senior producer Richard Cohen, formerly Dan Rather's foreign producer, says: "They've spun a web around us," of the ban prohibiting direct coverage of security personnel and all "unrest." "They've kept us from covering the story because of the fear that by unrest. "They've kept us from covering the story because of the fear that by unrest."

"Those journalists who have been ousted seem to have been ejected as 'examples' for domestic political reasons—to assuage the hard-right critics of the ruling National Party—rather than for specifically cited infractions."

Cohen's response was to pen an op-ed article asking the networks to "seriously consider" pulling out of South Africa. "We play an insidious game of video appeasement with the government," he wrote in The New York Times. "Walk up to the line. Don't cross it. Show as much as you think you can get away with, never more." His pull-out proposal, however, was not a popular one among journalists who generally contend that some coverage is better than none, and that to leave would be to do voluntarily what the South African authorities want. Cohen, however, has not backed down.

"The idea deserves an open and honest debate," he told me in February from his post in Iowa where he was directing the network's political coverage. "Nothing really has changed. The story is not being seen. By staying there, the public thinks we are covering the story—but we're not. That's the dirty little secret that journalists don't want to discuss."

Many American journalists we spoke with will discuss the issue, but tend to place the blame on a lack of commitment at the network level, which in turn, is justified because of a perceived lack of interest by the public. Martha Teichner, the CBS correspondent in South Africa, told us, "Half the problem is in South Africa, and half is in the interest in the U.S. Right now, our news organizations pay lip service to being interested in South Africa, and certainly claim they are interested in the analytical stories. But they are not making air. They are simply being eclipsed by other events."

NBC's bureau chief in South Africa, Heather Allan, seems more upbeat about her network's productivity. Of 150 stories shot in 1987, she says, 80 percent were aired. That is a good batting average, but it is not clear how many were shown on the premiere news shows, and how many in early morning slots or less watched weekend news times.

"You do not see violence on TV every night from South Africa," Allan says. "So in that respect, the government has been successful. But we are doing three stories a week, and more in-depth. Those 'in-depth' stories though don't seem to have the power of the earlier coverage, in the same way that nothing NBC has done about the miserable famine in Mozambique has equalled the impact of its first footage out of Ethiopia."

There seems to be a clear link between air time allotted a story and public interest—remove the former and you reduce the latter. When viewers don't see the story, legislators and policymakers don't hear about the issue. According to The Washington Report on Africa, the lack of news media coverage has affected the prospects of tougher sanctions legislation.

"Congressional aides on both sides of the issue agree that curtailed press coverage from South Africa has already been an important, if not decisive, factor in this year's debate," says the newsletter. The House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa is planning to hold hearings on the media black-out.

Most news people agree that an issue's popularity or lack of it should not affect coverage, but that handful of news producers who assign stories and decide what runs are undeniably influenced by what is hot and what isn't. The New Republic's weekly "Zeitgeist" column, which charts issues as if they were on a best-seller list, offers a good illustration of the way news stories tend to flame in and out of media fashion. Apartheid hasn't "made" the list for a long time.

News organizations are also bureaucratic institutions where issues need "champions" in decision-making circles or they are given little priority. ABC's Ken Walker told a Nieman Foundation conference on South Africa and news censorship last April that the U.S. news media is guilty of a failure of will and a failure of nerve.

He says that Nightline's celebrated 1985 programs from South Africa followed years of lobbying by black employees and the growth of the Free South Africa Movement. He said Pretoria only granted Nightline visas after 60 Minutes carried a Morley Safer report considered flattering by the government there. It expected a repeat performance.

Walker believes that the news media doesn't care about the South Africa story and the coverage reflects that. He believes that the absence of regular black network correspondents in the field—none have ever been assigned to South Africa—is another indicator of an unwillingness to challenge the system.

One South African journalist I spoke with (who asked to remain anonymous) said a reporter's political openness is as important as racial sensitivity. "South Africa is viewed as one of us, as a Western democracy, and the correspondents operate as if it was one," he said angrily. "Western reporters cover South Africa
Apartheid hasn't made the best-seller list for a long time. From the point of view of the people who run it, not from the point of view of the people who suffer it.

Can hard-hitting journalists cover South Africa? Brian Ellis, who produced the outspoken CBS documentary, "Children of Apartheid," with Walter Cronkite, says it is difficult to work there "but not impossible." "There is a certain amount of risk to bending or working outside the restrictions, but it can be done."

Ellis took some risks in having Cronkite enter the country as a tourist, not a journalist. The documentary was reportedly delayed for six months so that CBS's South African lawyers could vet it for problems because of a South African government complaint. The script was modified somewhat to avoid provoking a confrontation.

For one of the children interviewed, the CBS exposure may have triggered a confrontation, a fatal one. Eighteen-year-old Godfrey Dhlomo's story of being tortured by police while in detention was featured in the report. On January 24, Dhlomo was found shot to death shortly after being questioned by police.

His funeral on February 6 was described in The New York Times as "one of the most emotional and politically charged events" in Soweto since June 1986. Yet it was played down and treated with only five paragraphs on page six of the Sunday paper. The featured story on that page dealt with a U.S. government official criticizing Romania's human rights record. That story was given twice as much space.

Angry anti-apartheid demonstrators marched outside CBS on the day of the young man's funeral protesting the lack of coverage and demanding a public statement by CBS itself. They called on CBS and the rest of the networks to do more about the issue. Only CBS's local station in New York covered their protest. The written press did not.

After Dhlomo's death, the Johannesburg Star carried a report listing more than 20 incidents of similar unexplained deaths of militant black youths. "Yet none of them were reported in the States," says Jim Cason of the Africa Fund. "Surely the media here can't claim that the information isn't available. Despite all the media restrictions, South Africans can read about it. It's only
Americans who are being kept in the dark. Why?"

Part of the reason one hears over and over again is that if American journalists challenge the government's press regulations, they will be tossed out. Yet those who have been ousted—print journalists primarily—seem to have been ejected as "examples" for domestic political reasons—to assure the hard-right critics of the ruling National Party, rather than for specifically cited infractions.

New York Times editor Lelyveld said that the ouster of correspondent Alan Cowell and the refusal to accredit his replacement, Serge Schmemann, was not attributed to what The Times wrote, only that it was writing too much. Critics say it was not doing enough.

ABC's Walker links the lack of video footage available to TV news also to the fear of expulsion. Yet he asserts that the same fear is not present in Eastern bloc countries where government restrictions are routinely challenged, and where expulsion is often a badge of honor. CBS's Cohen seconds this point. "We smuggle pictures out of the wilderness of Afghanistan. We could do the same in South Africa."

Anti-apartheid activists question news organizations who cite a lack of video footage as reason for reduced coverage, pointing out that there are well-known alternative sources of video inside South Africa—footage shot by independent crews whose work is distributed by such agencies as Afravision, which covers demonstrations, union meetings, and other dissident activity.

Afravision's London-based distributors tell me that they have a hard time selling their stuff to the American networks unless a story is on the wires or has lots of action. ABC, for example, did run excerpts from an Afravision interview with Govan Mbeki, the ANC leader released from prison, but such interactions are rare.

These alternative media outlets also define "the story" somewhat more broadly than most American journalists. They see it in regional terms, as a southern African story, not just a South Africa one. It apparently took the expulsion of a Times reporter inside South Africa to prompt The Times to add more regional coverage, although the paper does not plan to open a bureau in Harare.

For the first time in years, front-page stories appeared from the frontline states with correspondents Serge Schmemann stopping in Maputo and James Brooke writing from Angola. That coverage has continued sporadically. Brooke was able to tour the war zones in southern Angola in late 1987, while Sheila Rule reported from Mozambique's shattered provinces.

Yet curiously, news of South African troops fighting alongside Unita in Angola only followed an uncharacteristic admission by the South African military. Earlier claims by the Angolan government to that effect appear to have been dismissed as propaganda. Likewise, reports in the British press of a mutiny in southern Angola in late 1987, while Sheila Rule reported from Mozambique's shattered provinces.

Angola coverage often appears skewed by a cold war frame. U.S. support for Unita has been justified by the administration with the same arguments that support aid to the Nicaraguan contras. A January 27, 1988 Washington Post dispatch by William Claisborne from Johannesburg was most revealing. The story reported a claim by Unita of a key victory inside southern Angola. The source was an Unita representative in Washington whose statements made up the first 10 paragraphs of the story.

The Post also checked with the Pentagon which would not fully confirm it. That was played in paragraph seven. The South African presence in Angola only surfaced in paragraph twelve as a claim by the Angolan government which the South Africans, a paragraph later, would not respond to. A day later, Keu-

ters in Luanda reported Angolan military sources as saying that the town in question had not been overrun.

A tendency to take Unita claims at face value is mirrored inside South Africa by the American media's lack of serious monitoring of South Africa's alternative press. That media has a reputation for being the best informed about the state of the liberation movements, the people in detention, and the suffering in the black community. The same news organizations which continually seek out refusniks and their samizdat publications in the Soviet orbit seem to steer clear of regular contact with South Africa's alternative press.

"There is not consistent day-to-day contact with the alternative press," admits CBS's Martha Teichler. Heather Allan of NBC says the same: "We are not in close contact, but we use them as interview subjects if we need their comments." The Washington Post's foreign editor, Michael Getler, also says: "I don't see the alternative press."

Are newspapers such as The Sowetan, New Nation, or Weekly Mail reading the TV newsrooms? It does not appear
that their viewpoint exerts much influence over the analysis pursued by American reporters.

For example, a February 4, 1988 NBC news report by Mike Boeticher on conditions in neighboring Mozambique began, "People are dying as a result of a Marxist-Leninist government, a drought, and a civil war." "Nowhere in the report do they mention who is behind the civil war," argued Josh Mamis, associate editor of Africa News, an American independent press service. "There was no mention that South Africa is behind Renamo which is carrying out horrible atrocities against the population."

South Africa's alternative media reports regularly on the destabilization policy its government is carrying out in the frontline states—they see it as the dominant issue—yet recent news reports on NBC and in The New York Times and The Washington Post downplay and minimize the South African role. The British press is not similarly inclined. On January 14, the London Guardian Weekly headlined a report from Maputo: "Mozambique blames Pretoria for wrecking health care."

If Mozambique has not received the play it deserves, Namibia has been all but ignored, except when the South African military runs its annual press tour, prompting a flurry of similar articles. When 4,000 black miners went on strike last year, the story received scant attention. Yet inside Windhoek, The Namibian, a professionally edited weekly, had all the details available.

American newspapers can't use a lack of video footage as an excuse. In fact, they make no excuses and reveal little self-criticism. Michael detler of The Washington Post has said his newspaper has been able to report everything of significance in South Africa. Nothing major was missed, he claims.

Joe Lelyveld of The Times, who was himself ousted from South Africa in 1966 but returned for a second stint a decade later, is disappointed because the newspaper has not been able to assign a full-time correspondent of its choice. Instead, the paper has hired a white South African journalist, John Batteroy, who may not. Lelyveld concedes, have the proper distance to be a Times correspondent. "It's awfully tough to be a foreign correspondent in your own country," he says. "It's hard to see the stories as your audience needs to see them."

John F. Burns, a former Times reporter in South Africa, was dispatched to fill in for Batteroy during a recent vacation. "Burns is the first staff correspondent we've been able to get a visa for," Lelyveld explains. Briefly in the news himself for getting in trouble and then for being tossed out of a country—China, not South Africa—Burns' orientation seems to particularly crystallize what critics find lacking.

"For Burns, the story seems to be upbeat, one of apartheid withering away," says the Africa Fund's Cason. "The headline one day is 'South African Blacks Moving to White Areas,' and the next is 'A Non-White Gets a Finger on the Lever of Power.' Burns spent his time writing about housing bias eroding, the anguish of Africaners, blacks going to amusement parks with whites, and how racial divisions are forgotten during a carnival in Cape Town. All of this in a country that is a virtual racial dictatorship!"

To be fair, Burns did not only file features. A long takeout on "black versus black violence" did describe the political nature of the fighting between Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha movement and the multi-racial anti-apartheid activists of the United Democratic Front. However, Burns did not investigate external support for Inkatha nor did his articles include any reference to government regulations limiting press coverage. That practice seems to have been dropped, although the restrictions haven't been.

At least two American papers devote considerably more space to the South Africa issue. The Washington Times, a conservative outlet owned by the Rev. Sun Myung Mmm, carries more stories on the region than The Washington Post, but most of them reflect hard-right biases and support for Unita, Renamo, and critics of the ANC.

The Christum Science Monitor, on the other hand, features extensive coverage, including a recent piece—not seen elsewhere—on a press ban imposed by the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria which limits journalists' access to what most American officials are doing and saying.

Not many media outlets can make the same kind of claim as that of The Monitor's Van Slambruck: "The kind of coverage we were doing two years ago is the same kind of coverage we had five years ago is the same kind of coverage we have now," he says.

"We're looking at South Africa as a page one possibility every single day...it requires much more cunning and ingenuity on the part of the writer to get at stories, to give them a dynamic and some life so they don't begin to sound like features. And that's a tougher brand of journalism."

In South Africa, the critics contend that as the going got tough, the tough got going—away from challenging the regulations, away from the story itself. At the time the regulations were imposed, there was a lot of heady talk about news organizations sustaining a commitment to South Africa reporting. Peter Jennings denounced South Africa's news policy on the air. Writing in The New York Times, Anthony Lewis, who has probably done more than any single American journalist to keep the information flow going, said that the press ban won't work.

"This is a test for American journalism, but also for the public," he opined on December 10, 1985. "It will influence future editorial judgment if the results show that people aren't interested unless they see shocking pictures, or if they show they can't be hoodwinked by the blackout and understand its purpose."

Have we passed or failed the test? In this election year, when even candidate Jesse Jackson doesn't list South Africa in a mass mailing as one of his principal issues, apartheid seems to "have gone away," to use a TV term about stories assignment editors are hot on one minute and cool the next. The story is on the back burner. A few overseas reporters have been tossed out of South Africa, but others carry on, business as usual. In the "beloved" country, brave black editors like Zwelakhe Sisulu rot in prison, while his newspaper is threatened with official reprisals again and again. How many Americans even know his name?...
Union of Black Journalists to articulate their demands.
At 77K World, Percy Qoboza could have taken the easy way out, maintained the crime-sport formula, and reaped the glamorous rewards of heading a mass-circulation paper. Instead, he rose magnificently to the occasion.

He was the right man at the right time; the champion of black journalists had found a position of power. He relegated sports and crime to their rightful place and promoted politics instead. Inspired by him, black journalists showed what they knew they were capable of when Soweto erupted on June 16, 1976.

With the townships out of bounds to white journalists, the news was reported by courageous black journalists. Some white editors such as Louw at the Rand Daily Mail, who maintained his predecessor's tradition of allowing blacks to have their say within the law, permitted many of the eyewitness reports to be published, knowing full well they would conflict with the official versions of events.

The World under Percy Qoboza became a thorn in the government's side. Sure, the government hated the Rand Daily Mail, and its Information Department secretly funded The Citizen to challenge the liberal morning newspaper. But it was totally unacceptable that a black newspaper should oppose the government with such vigor.

On October 19, 1977, the inevitable happened. As part of the crackdown on black consciousness, the government banned The World and Weekend World. The Rand Daily Mail published a picture of Qoboza standing in front of the papers' idle printing machines and headlined its report: "The end of Percy's World." Qoboza and colleague Aggrey Klaaste were thrown into jail, where they were held without trial for nearly six and eight months respectively.

Qoboza returned to edit Post Transvaal mid Sunday Post, which, though launched by the Argus company to replace The World and Weekend World, were in reality the same as the two banned newspapers. But his career in South African journalism became a little more checkered after that.

In 1980, he went to the United States as a guest editor of the Washington Star. While he was away, members of the black Media Workers' Association of South Africa went on national strike. Hardest hit was Percy's Post Transvaal, which didn't publish within the legally required period. The government closed it down, and made it clear that the paper would have been banned in any case because its offices had become "an African National Congress nest."

Qoboza then became a public relations consultant, associate editor of City Press (started by Drum magazine owner Jim Bailey and then sold to the pro-government Nasionale Pers in what was described as a marriage between Afrikaner and black nationalism) in 1984, and finally the paper's editor the following year.

Many black journalists had a topsyturvy relationship with Percy Qoboza. They accused him of being a showman who took credit for tnings he didn't do. He was credited with having launched the Soweto Committee of Ten at 789 Workfs offices. To be fair, Qoboza always insisted that he merely provided the premises, it was Klaaste, now acting editor of TheSowetan, who inspired the committee's formation.

Many journalists also believe that while Qoboza received the credit for the major editorials in The World and Post Transvaal, many of them were the work of his very able deputy, Joe Latakogomo, who has never received his share of the praise.

Qoboza, by his own admission, was notoriously unreliable. No one could be sure if he would turn up for appointments. He was also partial to liquor, which the newer generation of serious black journalists found hard to accept.

He was at odds with most of his black colleagues over his strong opposition to economic sanctions and disinvestment and his endorsement of liberal institutions such as the Urban Foundation, which was created to get the white private sector involved in black housing.

But Qoboza, at the behest of senior colleagues on Post Transvaal, endorsed the launching of the Free Mandela Campaign in 1980, triggering unprecedented local and international demands for the release of political prisoners. Some unionists remained at loggerheads with him, regarding him as part of their "problem" with management.

Despite his human shortcomings and eccentricities, we still loved Percy Qoboza. His "Percy's Pitch" column in The World and "Percy's Itch" in City Press contained some outstanding examples of writing from the gut. When Percy Qoboza was stung, he was at his best. He didn't believe in intellectual sophistry. Using earthy language, he retaliated by going for the jugular:

A classic example was his televised pow-wow on Ted Koppel's Nightline program a couple of years ago with an Afrikaner journalist who was rationalizing the government's violent actions. Qoboza sailed into him in strong language. The next day, many of Ms detractors in the black press phoned to congratulate him.

"He was the right man at the right time; the champion of black journalists had found a position of power."

Among the criticisms also levelled at him was that he did little for black journalists. In truth, as Harvard's South African representative, Qoboza fought hard for people like Klaaste, Obed Kunene, Zwelakhe Sisulu, and myself to be awarded Nieman Fellowships, and for black graduates to be awarded Harvard scholarships.

Yes, we had our differences with him, we sometimes slandered him in private, we couldn't always fathom why he said..."
or did certain tilings. But such was the charisma of the man that we all remained in touch with him, we could still share a joke and argue with him, and almost without exception in Johannesburg, we genuinely mourn his passing at such a young age.

Hamba kahte, go well, Percy. Black journalists in particular, and South Africa in general, owe you much for your contribution to justice. Even Gandhi and Martin Luther King would approve.

BY LES PAYNE

When I met Percy Qoboza that first time, the legendary editor was half-reclining on his couch, interviewing the student leader of the Soweto uprising who had a price tag on his head.

It was 1976, and Qoboza, as all good journalists should, was working near the horns of the big story. This one was bloody and had put South Africa on the front pages of the globe. Qoboza had spent a year at Harvard as a Nieman Fellow and had returned as editor of The World, a white-owned, black-oriented daily. The newspaper offered the best attainable version of the Boers' crackdown on the majority.

He was an irritant to the government, and then he became a menace. The World's stories appeared nowhere else, from sources the police most wanted. Qoboza regularly ran stories about police killing African children in the streets, mass arrests, deaths in detention, midnight police raids, the brutal Boer regime gone rabid.

Under any oppressive regime, truth is the first throat cut. As soon as the headknocking got serious, foreign journalists were banned from Soweto and all other black townships. Many resorted to The World for their news accounts. The enterprising Qoboza's reporters, who lived in the wretched ghettos, couldn't be banned from them. The government did the next worst tiling.

At one point, the police arrested 11 World reporters, detaining some of them up to nine months without charges or notification to their editors or relatives, in September 1976, the knock came on Qoboza's door. Police took him from his home in the wee hours. Telegrams from this country and Europe inquiring about the editor's detention persuaded the government, then new to this kind of spotlight, to release him.

A year later, during a government crackdown on truth-telling. The World was permanently shut down, costing its owners some $5 million. Qoboza was jailed, without charge, for five and a half months.

After the government shut down The World, Qoboza started another Johannesburg daily called 77k7.7sI. But in January 1980, the government closed it down as well. Five African reporters at The Post, like dozens of their colleagues, were "banned," a special South African contribution to state terror against its citizens.

Under the banning order, the reporters were restricted to their homes from dusk to dawn; they were not allowed to meet with more than two other persons; they were not allowed to make any public statements to the media; they were not allowed to take any job, including sweeping the floor, at a newspaper; and without government permission, they were not allowed to attend relatives' funerals, any social function, or even Sunday church services.

A few years ago, in my living room, Qoboza joked about his detention with other African journalists. "It was dull as hell in there, man," Percy said. "The chaps outside would bring me fruit and melons that they had injected with Scotch."

Qoboza was one of the most courageous—and persecuted—journalists in the world. He was never fully allowed to ply his craft in the Boers' republic. The Boers outlawed a free press, free assembly, the right to vote, free speech, and all the other trinkets of democracy—for which President Ronald Reagan attacks others but not the Boers.

Suffering was Qoboza's birthright when he entered screaming and black in South Africa. He willed himself to write the truth, and thus set himself up as the enemy of the state. Despite the pressure and the brutality, Qoboza maintained, to the end, his habit of ferreting out the truth and publishing it.

"He willed himself to write the truth, and thus set himself up as the enemy of the state. Despite the pressure and the brutality, Qoboza maintained, to the end, his habit of ferreting out the truth and publishing it."

The World, or any other paper quite like it, exists no longer. Journalists, foreign and domestic, have been neutralized. Qoboza took a job as associate editor of City Press in Johannesburg. His staff was closely watched. His reporters have been detained, banned, and imprisoned for practicing their craft.

"Like 1977, it is difficult to pinpoint the real casualty figures [those the government kills and wounds] because of how the information is controlled by authorities," Qoboza told me a while back. "The fires rage on. African students, are being gunned down with bullets of rubber and lead. So, too, are gold miners, youths, the aged, and other innocents caught out on the street."

By enforcing a policy of "consensus journalism," Qoboza said, the government "meant that the press should indulge in 'positive' reporting as opposed to 'negative' reporting." He said, "The South African newsmen must conclude that the government expects nothing from him short of total and unwavering loyalty."

Qoboza gave his loyalty and his life to ferreting out the truth. Last week, after a heart attack at age 50, he died and was buried in the troubled, indifferent ground of Soweto.
Remembering Percy Qoboza

The journalism world mourns the passing of one of the pioneers of the black South African media. A South African and an American journalist who knew Percy Qoboza over the years recall the man and his achievements in the fight to give black writers a voice.
U.S. Policy

Interview with Howard Wolpe

As chairman of the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa over two Reagan terms, Congressman Howard Wolpe provides an assessment of the record of both the administration and the Congress in shaping American policy in southern Africa. He also outlines the new congressional agenda for applying further pressure on Pretoria and assisting the frontline states.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: What is your assessment of the mood in Congress at this point on South Africa? Has the momentum which oilrotinated in the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 dissipated?

Wolpe: The issue of South Africa at the moment is less salient and less visible in large measure because of the absence of media coverage of developments inside South Africa. But I don't believe that there has been any modification of congressional feelings on the subject of apartheid or on the importance of maintaining a very aggressive posture toward dealing with this incredibly repressive regime. I anticipate that there will be new sanctions legislation that will move through the Congress this year. While South Africa may not be on the front burner of congressional consciousness, when the issue is actually presented on the House floor, we will see continuing significant support for a much stronger sanctions effort.

Africa Report: So you intend to push for stronger sanctions as opposed to stricter enforcement of the present measures.

Wolpe: We are going to be doing both. We are going to try to close loopholes in the current sanctions as they have been enforced by the administration, and we also intend to try to press for additional economic and diplomatic pressure on South Africa. Notwithstanding the fairly weak and modest nature of the sanctions which were imposed, the South Africans have finally acknowledged that the withdrawal of capital and the declining confidence of investors in the South African economy has had some major impact upon slowing the rate of economic growth, forcing the regime now to begin to undertake major economic reform. They are trying to figure out new ways of injecting new capital into the economy, they are talking about a total restructuring of their economic program—all a testimony to the major economic pressure that the regime has experienced as a consequence of economic deterioration internally and the sanctions effort internationally.

Africa Report: So you maintain that sanctions remain the most important route to bring about change?

Wolpe: Yes, I think it is all the more important that the sanctions effort and the diplomatic effort be accelerated at this point. There is nothing that we could do that could be more destructive to the process of change than to signal an acceptance of the status quo, either by the U.S. or by the international...
community generally. Anything that we do that conveys a sense of economic normalcy or an acceptance of continued economic linkages with the regime will serve to delay the time when the Afrikaners will accept the inevitable, namely the necessity of abandoning apartheid and sitting down to negotiate a new political order with the authentic leadership of the black majority. That is an invitation for the prolongation of the struggle, for much greater violence and bloodshed. I think that would be tragic.

Africa Report: In the diplomatic arena, who should take the leadership role? In the U.S., given that it is an election year, it is not likely that much will happen between now and the end of the Reagan presidency.

Wolpe: I have a somewhat different view. Clearly, this administration will do only that which is minimally required, but I am very optimistic that a successor administration in the U.S., and it is only a matter of months now, will have a very different view of what needs to be done with respect to American policy toward South Africa. Beyond that, I still remain hopeful that even this administration will take new initiatives as it becomes increasingly clear that South African aggression is unabated within the region itself.

South African operations right now inside Angola, particularly in the context of the recent Angolan-American diplomacy and the very clear indications of Angolan acceptance of the withdrawal of the Cuban troops, ought to be cause for additional American pressure on South Africa, even by this administration. Whether that happens or not remains to be seen, but my hope is that this administration, if it is really serious about achieving a settlement in Namibia and withdrawal of Cuban
troops from Angola, must recognize that the bottom line will have to be South African cooperation with that process.

Secondly, I would also hope that even this administration may rethink the utilization of its veto in the UN to block United Nations acceptance of the sanctions that the U.S. has already put in place. That action alone without anything else would have a major impact on the regime and on the international anti-apartheid movement. Beyond that, it may again fall to the Congress to provide the leadership in these areas and we intend to do as much as we possibly can.

There is also growing evidence of continuing, very strong anti-apartheid sentiment in many of the European countries and in Japan. In Scandinavia, France, even within Germany and Britain, there are very strong domestic pressures for a strengthened campaign against the South African regime, and so we will continue to have conversations with our friends in these areas and do everything we can to broaden their involvement.

Africa Report: Are there any congressional initiatives planned on the issue of Namibia?

Wolpe: The Angolan-American diplomacy that has been in process the last several weeks has reawakened some real interest and focus on the Namibia question. It is dear that the Angolan diplomacy is linked to the independence of Namibia. As we discuss the sanctions effort, we intend to constantly make clear that it is not only South Africa's internal policies that are at issue here, but also its continued illegal occupation of Namibia and continued aggression against neighboring states that also require very significant international response.

The most tragic element of current American policy that needs to be reassessed is our continued open/covert relationship with UNITA, which has been rationalized on the basis of our anti-communist commitments and American strategic interests in seeing an end to the Cuban presence in Angola. Yet the policy has had the perverse consequence of leading to an increase in the number of Cuban troops inside Angola and to the Angolan government's increased dependence upon the Cubans and their Soviet advisers, which runs directly contrary to American goals.

Moreover, it has reinforced the perception that the U.S. is now a military ally of South Africa and has become party to South African aggression against Angola and the neighboring states. I cannot think of anything that is more counterproductive to American interests in southern Africa than that kind of de facto complicity and alliance with South Africa. It is as though the Soviet Union had written our script!

Even more extraordinary is to see the continuation of this effort in assisting Savimbi in the midst of a diplomatic process in which the Angolans have made explicit their willingness to remove all Cuban troops. It would be amusing if it were not so tragic to see the way in which the far-right wing of the U.S. has been manipulated by Jonas Savimbi and how they have become trapped by their own labels. I am sure that there are some people in the U.S. who really believe that he is an anti-communist freedom fighter. And yet Savimbi is one of the most opportunistic individuals on the African continent! This is a man who first traveled to the Soviet Union for assistance, then turned to the Chinese, was an avowed Maoist, then shifted his focus to South Africa, which for the last several years has provided most of his support. The only thing that is consistent about Jonas Savimbi is that there is always a perfect correlation between his ideology of the moment and his source of funding!

Africa Report: The State Department has hailed as a breakthrough the Angolan agreement to withdraw all Cuban troops, but the Angolans say this is contingent on stopping aid to Savimbi from South Africa and the U.S. Is there any legislative action that can be taken to stop aid to Savimbi?

Wolpe: There are some efforts in process to try to minimally shift the debate from a covert program to a more open discussion of what American policy toward Angola should be. I don't know how far that debate will go this year in Congress. There are a lot of other issues competing for congressional attention, but there is a very strong feeling both in the House and Senate that we ought to think very carefully about what we are doing there.

"There is nothing that we could do that would be more destructive to the process of change than to signal an acceptance of the status quo, either by the U.S. or by the international community generally."

My hope is that the administration itself, in light of the new diplomatic developments, will do as it has done in the case of Afghanistan and recognize the necessity of now helping to facilitate the removal of Cuban troops. There is no way that we are going to see a removal of Cuban troops by intensifying military pressure on Angola. All that will do is expand that troop commitment and prolong the conflict.

Africa Report: The emergency situation in Angola and Mozambique is worsening all the time. What is your view of the administration's response to these countries' emergency needs? Is it totally tied up in politics?

Wolpe: The administration has responded very well in the case of Mozambique and I only wish it would pursue the insight it has developed with respect to the Mozambican situation in the Angolan case as well. In the case of Mozambique, the administration has come to recognize that its government is doing everything it can to reduce its dependence on the Soviet Union and to strengthen its ties to the Western economies, and has taken initiatives to try and assist the Mozambicans economically in their effort at resisting the destabilizing activities of the South African government.

We are not doing enough, but the limitations are far more the consequence of our basic overall limitation on resources at this moment than they are a policy perspective of the U.S. Whereas we are putting more emergency assistance into Mozambique, I don't think we are doing enough in Angola with respect to the emergency food situation. My hope is that as we have done in other cases, we will be able to transcend the
politics of the situation to try to keep some people alive.

**Africa Report:** What is the status of American assistance to the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)?

**Wolpe:** That is one of the success stories on the congressional end. This year, we were very successful both in the continuing resolution of the appropriations for 1988 and also in the two-year foreign aid authorization, where we were able to increase the overall allocation for the entire African continent by almost $100 million, even within the context of an overall lower number for the foreign aid function in the budget. As a piece of that overall increase for the African continent, there is a $50 million earmark for this next year for SADCC. So we are beginning to meet our responsibilities to SADCC, to recognize the critical importance of seeing that SADCC is successful in facilitating regional economic development.

The other thing that was significant in terms of what happened in Congress is that we were able to fend off a lot of anti-SADCC amendments that would have restricted in one way or another funds going to SADCC, to Mozambique, and so on. I was delighted to have a number of key people who historically have not been all that involved come to recognize the importance of SADCC and the counterproductive nature of the Mozambique-bashing, for example, that has characterized earlier debates. People like Congressmen Jack Murtha, Dave McCurdy, and Amo Houghton were very helpful in working with the Africa subcommittee and resisting what could have been some very destructive amendments.

**Africa Report:** Having been chairman of the Africa subcommittee through two Reagan terms, could you give your overall assessment of its southern African policy? What have they done right?

**Wolpe:** I have had fundamental disagreements with the administration's approach to South Africa from the very beginning. The disagreements have been heavily focused on tactical considerations, where I thought that the decision to link the issue of Namibian independence to Cuban troop withdrawal in Angola actually compromised our ability to achieve either objective. A diplomatic approach would have been far more helpful and the administration could have achieved both goals in a much earlier time. I also think that the constructive engagement policy has had the major effect of reinforcing the more intransigent elements of the South African government to pursue much more repressive policies and widen bloodshed and violence. It has been terribly counterproductive.

At the same time, the administration has done some things right. Its approach to Mozambique has been right on target. I think it has been generally supportive of SADCC and has recognized its importance both in policy terms and in dollar resources. It also made a very significant and important decision when it decided to open up a public dialogue with the African National Congress. Unfortunately, some of the other initiatives it has taken have compromised the success and effectiveness of what has been positive in its policy.

**Africa Report:** What kind of scorecard would you give Congress over the same period?

**Wolpe:** One of my proudest moments since I have been in Congress—almost a decade now—came when the Congress, on a totally bipartisan basis, succeeded in overriding the president's veto of the sanctions legislation. It was enormously important not only for the message that we were attempting to convey to South Africa, but also in terms of this country—we were saying what we were as a people. To have Dick Lugar, then the Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Nancy Kassebaum, then the Republican chairman of the Africa subcommittee of the Senate, joining with House Democratic leaders in generating the overwhelming vote to override the president's veto—that was very significant. The Congress played a very important role in supporting SADCC, and in trying to rationalize the administration's approach to the African continent, to reshape and redirect the balance of economic versus military assistance.

On the negative side, the biggest failure of Congress was when we repealed the Clark amendment and provided the opening for the openly acknowledged covert program for Savimbi. That was a terrible mistake and my suspicion is that many people who helped make that happen now regret that decision. In more general terms, there has been such an absence of constructive, positive leadership from the administration that it has fallen to the Congress to move into that vacuum and play the role of redirecting and framing American policy.

A few years ago, Africa was not even a subject that was discussed in national debates or within the Congress. Now it is very much a part of the overall foreign policy dialogue that is taking place inside the Congress and across this country. I
think we will id as we move closer to November that the issue of South Africa and of southern African policy will be much more a part of the presidential debates and considerations than they have been historically. It is very unusual for the Congress to successfully oppose any presidential foreign policy initiative, so the fact that we were able to do so on southern Africa is one of the most significant achievements of the Congress in the past several years.

One other point that ought to be mentioned is that Congress is on the verge of implementing a very new approach to African development. We have been working on this initiative for many years and we have even secured administration concurrence on the concept of an African development fund, which is the first time there has been an acceptance of an allocation of economic development funds on a regional basis. Now my hope is that we can get the Senate to act on the foreign aid authorization which contains the reworking of the entire AID program as it relates to the African continent to achieve a much more cost-effective approach to economic development in Africa.

Africa Report: If you could design the policy agenda on South and southern Africa for the new administration, what would be the essential components? Wolpe: Had the administration been working with the Congress rather than at crosspurposes with the Congress with respect to our approach to South Africa, we could have been far more effective in facilitating the process of change inside South Africa and in advancing American interests in the region. I don't think our diplomacy can be credible if we are not prepared to make it clear in South Africa that there will be significant costs attached to the failure to achieve certain specific policy objectives. As long as the South Africans know in advance that this administration will do everything it can to guarantee the continuance of apartheid, then it compromises what we in Congress have been attempting to achieve. That is number one—I would like to see a more clear and consistent approach to the South African regime.

Secondly, I would like to see an end to our covert operations in Angola and I would like to see a real focus on the combined objectives of Namibian independence and the removal of Cuban troops from Angola, which I think is within reach if we really make clear to South Africa the seriousness with which we regard those objectives.

Thirdly, I would like to see an expansion of our commitment to SADCC. We must help strengthen the neighboring southern African states so that they can reduce their dependence and vulnerability with respect to South Africa. That is important not only in terms of the struggle against apartheid, but also in and of itself to see that these countries can develop an effective, regional integrated economic framework.

We also need to broaden the dialogue with all the groups that are struggling for liberation inside South Africa and Namibia. I would like to see that be a much more public, continuous effort, and I would like to see us expand our own commitments to multilateral assistance to the development process not only in southern Africa, but throughout the African continent.

Africa Report: Is there anything else you would like to say? Wolpe: Yes, there is one thing. In this day and age, it is often said that average citizens don't have much impact on national decisions, domestic or foreign policy questions. What has happened with respect to southern African policy and specifically South African policy is testimony to the enormous power that individual citizens can exercise, even on foreign policy issues. It was in fact the grassroots campaign nationally—ranging from everything from divestment efforts on campuses and within local governments to the non-violent civil disobedience campaigns to the more generalized broadening of the debate within the church community as well as within the campuses across this country—that really transformed the political environment and made it possible for the Congress to set a new course with respect to our approach to South Africa. It was a classic instance of where grassroots mobilization made the difference in American foreign policy.

We need to remember that down the road because we are going to need again to maintain that kind of grassroots effort to galvanize the American political process if we are going to be successful in our Africa policy across the board. In the final analysis, the American people are way ahead of national institutions as it relates to the issue of South Africa and sou their Africa. Americans see South Africa out of our own tragic experience with racial conflict and are really committed to trying to make a difference in South Africa and making certain that the U.S. does not remain an accomplice to apartheid. So there is a lot that those who are involved in the anti-apartheid movement can take pride in having achieved up to this point.
U.S. Policy

Lobbying Against Apartheid

Having provided the backbone for the grassroots campaign which culminated in the passage of national sanctions legislation, American lobbying organizations are looking to new strategies to move the anti-apartheid effort forward in this election year.

BY WILLIAM HOWARD

A handful of organizations, generally working with small, dedicated staffs and minuscule budgets, have managed to hold their own in a fight against a host of major corporations who have the considerable power of many conservative members of Congress behind them.

Not unlike some modern fiction written in the mold of David and Goliath, the battleground is the effort to end apartheid in South Africa, and the combatants, a select number of lobbying groups ranged against a corporate world anxious to maintain its profits and prerogatives.

With campus protests to force trustees to divest their shares in companies doing business in South Africa a fading memory, and many others sated on the South African sanctions issue by the passage of national "comprehensive" sanctions legislation, some have begun to gloat that the sanctions movement and lobbying efforts aimed at pressuring the U.S. to isolate Pretoria are a declining force.

At the American Committee on Africa, Richard Knight said, "I don't think the campaign is at its peak, like it was when there were meetings and demonstrations on television every day," referring to the period from 1983 to 1986, when the campus divestment movement was most active. But, he says, the sanctions movement is "still a serious force." "In Congress, we just won the elimination of the foreign tax write-off for companies doing business in South Africa."

Knight adds, "We have already won a lot of battles, but states where we haven't gotten sanctions legislation passed are going to be more difficult because of the country, and focusing on other regional issues such as fighting aid to the Unita rebels in Angola and urging more help for the government of Mozambique.

Still at the local level, Knight said that while working to introduce municipal and state laws in areas where no such legislation exists, the groups are seeking to persuade local governments that have proven sympathetic to their efforts to strengthen laws, thus imposing selective purchase rules on quasi-governmental agencies and other bodies and forcing them to forgo purchase of goods with South Africa, content.

The normal mesh, lesser groups, which typically haven't a dozen full-time staffers, is to maintain a regular stream of mail—a regular stream of mail—educational newsletters, legislative updates, and support on specific issues—keep U.S.-southern Africa issues on the political and social agenda.

"Because of our limited resources, we often pick people who are pivots in committees, and we take the lobbying right into their districts," said Jackie Wilson, legislative director of the Washington Office on Africa, a group founded in 1972 which devotes its efforts to influencing federal law on trade and investment in South Africa.

Explaining her group's lobbying technique, Wilson said, "We are constantly mailing out fact sheets, and calling up staffers, asking if they have received them." By monitoring the voting records of members of Congress and from the feedback her group gets from congressional staffers, Wilson said, "We produce a swing list to determine where people stand, and whose votes we are likely to sway."

"We give that list to the members of Congress who are sympathetic to us.
Generally they ask us for it, and they work on a personal basis to sway their colleagues in Congress," she said. In the House of Representatives, Wilson said, there is an "increasingly diverse corps of sponsors of legislation in the house, Democrat and Republican, black and white."

This, she felt, was because her group, which was founded by a large number of predominantly Protestant church groups working together to "attack the root causes" of misery and oppression in southern Africa, had been successful in mobilizing church members in specific congressional districts to express their concerns locally.

Like other activists and lobbyists, Wilson expressed the belief that the perceived lull in public protests and other actions that brought the anti-apartheid issue into the living rooms of America was merely a cyclical matter. "Some momentum got lost, partly out of the media's complicity in the South African press ban," she said.

Citing examples of what she said were the failures of the mainstream American press to cover South Africa thoroughly, she said, "Many journalists report on the situation in Namibia only by interviewing South African journalists." Others, she said, had failed to cover the continuing crisis in South Africa, "not reporting the truth because they are afraid of what the South African reaction will be." "If Nicaragua seals off the press like South Africa, my God, we will land the Marines. But South Africa does it and nobody makes a peep," she added.

Tim Smith, director of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), a New York-based church organization, denies that there has been any loss in momentum at all, saying, "Virtually every major company that still does business in South Africa is receiving a shareholder resolution this year asking them to cut ties, including an end to licensing arrangements."

As its name implies, the ICCK concentrates on forcing U.S. corporations to reduce or eliminate their involvement in South Africa, primarily through shareholder resolutions, but also through sit-in type protests at corporate offices. Surveying the results of the corporate campaign, Smith said, "Six of the top 20 pension funds in the country are involved in sponsoring shareholder resolutions."

While the efforts of his organization and others "cover every company that would have business in South Africa," Smith said, "the focus is on companies that are active in strategic sectors," like banking or petrochemicals, to name two.

"The climate for American corporations doing business in South Africa is not looking up," Smith said. "Virtually every major company, if not making plans to withdraw, is continuing to evaluate the situation and is working on contingency plans for withdrawal. If anything, there has been an increase in pressure, but as for coverage, it is not in the big newspapers as much at present," he added.

At TransAfrica, the black American lobby for Africa and the Caribbean, the present focus is on U.S. electoral politics. TransAfrica's director, Randall Robinson, explained, "There is a near-term and a long-term objective. The near-term is to firm up the sanctions we already have, with the understanding that the South African government will not capitulate to anything less than global sanctions," the group's ultimate objective.

"There are very serious limits to any real impact than any bilateral policy can have," Robinson said, explaining his group's strategy for arriving at global sanctions. "An important step is to have the U.S. show leadership in bringing its allies and partners to impose sanctions together." "This is not an action, we understand, that the Congress can take, the president must carry it out," Robin-
Angolan society, particularly its peasantry, is seriously imperiled. A highly internationalized 12-year civil war has created widespread human suffering that bears frightening resemblance to the reckless devastation that Renamo has wrought inside Mozambique. Almost one-third of Angola's population—2.7 million people—has either been displaced or severely affected, while 400,000 Angolan refugees have fled to surrounding countries.

A delegation of six congressional staffers, representing the House Select Committee on Hunger, the House Subcommittee on Africa, and individual House and Senate members, visited Angola from January 14-21. Issues of greatest concern included food and non-food emergency needs, the status of government and international relief agency operations, the war's impact on agricultural production and distribution, the government's emergent economic reform program, and its recent diplomatic initiatives.

The delegation met with numerous representatives of the Angolan government and various UN and European donor agencies active in-country. Detailed briefings were provided by officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Catholic and Methodist Church-affiliated relief agencies, and ambassadors of several Western and African nations. The group traveled to a displaced persons camp east of Luanda and to Huambo in the central highlands, where it toured a hospital, an orphanage, and an artificial limb centre.

The Emergency

The emergency has germinated over several years due to several factors: the war's massive absorption of national resources; the low priority the Angolan government has assigned the state secretariat responsible for managing disaster relief (SEAS); the government's failed experiment with centrally planned state farms and its neglect of the peasant sector; and South Africa's repeated military incursions inside Angola, estimated by the UN to have cost Angola's economy $12 billion since 1980. South Africa's disruption of Cunene province alone accounts for over 100,000 displaced persons.

Recently, however, the decline in living standards of Angola's rural society has accelerated. In 1985 and again in 1987, the Angolan government launched offensives, supported by large-scale Soviet and Cuban assistance, against Unita's redoubt in the southeastern corner of Cuando Cubango province. In each instance, South Africa invaded Angolan territory with major commitments of troops, aircraft, heavy artillery, and armored equipment.

Beginning late last year, South Africa expanded its attacks to record proportions, moving several hundred miles north of the Namibian border. By mid-January of this year, the strategic garrison at Cuito Cuanavale was under sustained siege, prompting the entry into Angola of an additional 5000 seasoned Cuban troops and the evacuation of several thousand civilians.

Secondly, since 1984, Unita has attempted to project itself throughout the central, eastern, and northern sectors of Angola. These are areas where Unita's power stems not from effective control of or sanctuary among the local population, but from its ability to destabilize—when fueled by South African (and since late 1985, American) military assistance. The most disturbing aspect of Unita's campaign, confirmed in discussions with a variety of non-Angolan sources, is the degree to which it increasingly resembles the brutal strategy employed by Renamo in Mozambique, with similarly devastating effects.

Land mines laid along fields and roads have made cultivation impossible in large areas, uprooted farming populations, and created the world's largest number of amputees (exceeding 20,000). Last year, a single ICRC facility in Huambo fitted 900 persons with prosthetic devices. Clinics, schools, grain storage facilities, and other infrastructure essential to a functioning rural life have been systematically destroyed by Unita guerrillas.

As in Mozambique, relief assistance and the international and local personnel who administer it have become targets. Food convoys are able to travel along the three major routes leading from coastal ports inland only sporadically and when accompanied by heavy military escorts. Scores of clearly designated relief vehicles have been destroyed, their drivers killed or injured.

Nor are international airlifts immune. The ICRC, which operates a highly effective, self-contained program that brings relief to over 100,000 peasants in remote areas of the central highlands, suspended these activities after its C-130 Hercules was destroyed in-flight on October 14, killing eight persons. Afterwards, Unita repeatedly failed to provide assurances of unconditional respect for the ICRC's efforts, necessary before it could resume operations. (It is reported that Unita did finally provide such an assurance in mid-February, and that ICRC flights will begin again in late February.)

The UN and others now estimate that a minimum of 600,000-700,000 Angolan peasants have been displaced. Wholly dependent upon emergency assistance.
“It is women and children whose lives are most threatened—they constitute 80 percent of the rural displaced.”

they mostly dwell in a network of insecure camps. Moreover, a growing proportion of the remaining rural population—difficult to estimate precisely because of the war—is in need of supplementary food and medical assistance.

Because of the relative safety they provide, Angola’s cities have swelled; 2 million urban residents are severely affected and require emergency assistance. Luanda, with a population of 300,000 in 1975, now numbers 1.5 million, with 500,000 recent destitute arrivals. Another 500,000 destitute are found on the outskirts of Angola’s other cities and towns. The urban center of the central highlands, Huambo, has grown from 50,000 in the mid-1970s to 350,000.

It is women and children whose lives are most threatened—they constitute 80 percent of the rural displaced. Infant mortality, as in Mozambique, is among the highest in the world—among children under five, 325-375 deaths per 1,000, according to Unicef. Little of the nation’s originally weak health infrastructure remains, an open invitation to epidemics of the sort seen last spring when a cholera outbreak in Luanda left 1,111 dead.

Angola has had an annual emergency food deficit in excess of 255,000 metric tons for the past two years. Observers expect that at least 250,000 metric tons of food aid will be required for the crop year beginning April 1. Virtually all domestic production (not likely to be more than 340,000 metric tons) will go toward subsistence consumption in the countryside.

Over $40 million of non-food relief, including trucks, chartered aircraft, logistical support, blankets, clothing, medicines, seeds, and other necessities, will continue to be required. In 1987, while international donors did meet food shortfalls, their response to non-food requirements lagged by approximately $20 million. This, compounded by security problems and the persistent weakness of SEAS, has made it exceedingly difficult to distribute goods outside the port cities. The Bita displaced person camp visited by the delegation, barely 21 miles east of Luanda, had erratic, inadequate food deliveries.

Convoys from Luanda to the far east of Moxico province, where donor officials emphasize there is the highest risk of starvation, can take five months. Airlifts into these areas, the only alternative, are astronomical in cost, underst funed by donors, and when dependent upon by the Angolan government air fleet, compete against the military.

Toward a Government Strategy

In 1987, the government took several steps to demonstrate the heightened priority it assigns to the emergency, especially regarding the imperative to reorganize internally and to collaborate productively with the UN, donor governments, and private international agencies.

Immediately following a government appeal in November, a UN team visited Angola, traveling extensively and consulting closely with government officials. By the end of last year, the team had drafted a comprehensive study that provides an informed, mutually accepted basis for the 1988 relief program—to be organized around a UN donor appeal in the spring. It specifies Angola’s emergency needs, food and non-food, and includes a candid, critical analysis of the weaknesses of SEAS and the priority areas for foreign technical assistance.

Donors in Luanda expect that this step, which is fundamental to the understanding forged between the government and the UN, is near. It would follow naturally upon last September’s appointment of a key Politburo member to direct the relief program in the central plateau, the most populous and fertile area of Angola. By November, rebel
convoys serving that region (from Lobito to Huambo) had tripled.

These changes also fit within Angola's foreign policy goal of opening to the West and moving toward a more genuine non-aligned status. Last year, following its entry into the Lome Convention, Angola began a sweeping economic reform program, a preliminary step in its bid for IMF and World Bank membership. Collective farms have been broken up, while in the secure southwest region, agricultural experimentation has advanced. Supported by price incentives, liberalized marketing structures, and an inflow of consumer goods and agricultural inputs—under the direction, as in the central plateau, of a newly appointed, high-ranking official—food production in 1987 rose sharply, yielding a 60,000 metric ton surplus.

**Politicizing Humanitarian Aid**

The Reagan administration has failed to respond adequately to this crisis due to domestic political realities. U.S. "covert" support of the Unita insurgency places the administration in the shadows of Angola's grinding conflict, in tacit alliance with Unity's major sponsor, South Africa. This, together with budget constraints and fresh memories of the bruising battles of 1987—when the State Department's Africa Bureau was absorbed with staving off far-right challenges to slowly improving relations with Mozambique—has stymied any significant response to the deepening emergency in Angola.

For the State Department to argue that it must collaborate, directly or indirectly, with the relief arm of the Angolan government on behalf of Angola's vulnerable populace is to risk reigniting conflict with ultra-conservatives. Such a move would invite immediate attack from Unita supporters in Washington (most of whom also strenuously object to the sizeable U.S. relief program in Mozambique), thereby further compounding the already formidable difficulties. Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker faces in his efforts to mediate the withdrawal of Cuban and South African forces from Angola.

Apart from the issue of whether this administration is prepared to pressure South Africa to comply with the terms of an accord, a second major obstacle to progress is continued U.S. covert assistance to Unita and doubts regarding Assistant Secretary Crocker's ability to bargain that assistance away as part of a regional settlement.

Our Western allies, especially the European Community, Italy, and Sweden, have mobilized quickly, in league with UN agencies, the ICKC, and the Angolan government, to answer Angola's emergency needs. The U.S. in contrast minimizes the emergency, while citing the weakness and confusion of the Angolan government as justification for U.S. inaction, a logic not applied in other comparable situations.

Administration officials repeat unconfirmed allegations of diversion of relief food to the Angolan military—reports which the delegation found enjoyed scant credibility among UN and Western embassy officials. The administration also questions the magnitude of Angola's national needs, challenging the statistics on the food deficit and the populations at risk provided by the UN, the government of Angola, and international relief agencies.

Throughout 1987 and into 1988, the administration has insisted that before any substantial commitments can even be considered, additional work must be conducted—which the U.S. is reluctant to undertake or organize—to resolve lingering ambiguities regarding commercial food imports, distributional capacities, and "end-use accountability." These concerns are all valid. Thus far, however, they have been employed in an exceptionally strict fashion, less for the sake of guaranteeing standards and facilitating aid than as a bureaucratic delaying tactic.

In the meantime, aid levels remain minimal and static. In 1987, U.S. relief contributions to Angola amounted to a mere 12,410 metric tons, administered by Unicef; this represented approximately 5 percent of the emergency food deficit. Thus far in 1988, commitments have been made for a first six-month tranche of 6,000 metric tons, against a Unicef 12-month request for 32,000 metric tons. The U.S. has contributed no non-food assistance to assure that the food reaches the hungry. Nor is there any evidence that the U.S. has taken steps to pressure Unita or South Africa to cease the inhumane practices that are truly behind this emergency.

Notwithstanding the administration's willingness to struggle with the vast human needs of similarly difficult settings like Mozambique and Ethiopia, the often-stated principle of the Reagan administration that "a hungry child knows no politics" is yet to be applied in Angola. The victims of the escalating emergency face conditions considerably worse than is acknowledged by Washington, so too are there more people at risk than is understood.

The Angolan government is taking steps to improve the coordination of its relief operations and to enable the international donor community to be more effective in the provision of assistance, yet these realities are dismissed by the administration. Various options for the U.S. to channel larger levels of assistance, food and non-food alike, through responsible international relief agencies, with a reasonable expectation of that assistance reaching intended beneficiaries, remain altogether unexplored.

Covert aid to Unita does not simply compromise U.S. efforts at negotiating the withdrawal of Cuban and South African forces from Angola, it also imposes grave limitations upon the United States' ability to adhere to a globally consistent humanitarian policy. U.S. inaction in Angola contrasts sharply with policy toward Mozambique, Ethiopia, and other imperiled countries. It evokes memories of Reagan administration behavior in 1983-84, when American passivity in the face of famine in Ethiopia was a function of political factors—until pressure from Congress, the media, and the American public forced a turn-around in approach.

As long as this reality persists, the U.S. will also increasingly set itself apart from other major Western donors and their encouraging response to the crisis in Angola. Of course, these troubling implications were never addressed when covert aid was first announced in early 1986. Nor are they explicitly discussed today when the administration is asked to explain its apparent indifference to the tragedy unfolding in Angola.
In West Europeans parliaments since the late 1970s, awareness has grown of the West's special responsibility with regard to South Africa and Namibia. The independence of the former Portuguese colonies in 1975, the final success of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, and the growing repression and resistance inside South Africa stimulated the involvement of West European parliamentarians in the struggle against apartheid, resulting in a call for intensified pressure, especially through sanctions, to abolish the apartheid system.

In 1980, after a one-year debate, the Dutch parliament with a two-third majority adopted my resolution calling for an oil embargo against South Africa. Since that time, broad agreement on sanctions has been reached, illustrated by recent resolutions adopted by the European Parliament (the parliament of the European Community), calling for:

- bans on new loans to and investments in South Africa,
- import bans on coal, iron and steel, uranium, gold corns, diamonds, textiles, and agricultural products,
- finding alternative suppliers for strategic minerals,
- a comprehensive embargo on involvement in oil procurement,
- suspension of air links,
- prohibition of nuclear cooperation,
- tightening the application of the mandatory arms embargo, and
- application of current sanctions against South Africa to Namibia as well.

Most Western governments were initially rather reluctant to impose sanctions. They advocated—and the conservative governments of the United Kingdom and West Germany still advocate—a policy of dialogue. It was the time of codes of conduct for corporations operating in South Africa, like the U.S. Sullivan Code and a similar one drawn up by the European Community.

However, even the Reverend Sullivan has finally come to the conclusion that application of his code has not been sufficiently effective and that economic sanctions is now the first priority. Hence, he has a special responsibility to convince conservatives in London and Bonn, given that they have so often invoked his position as a solid argument for avoiding sanctions.

Growing interest and a changing mood in Western Europe's parliaments vis-a-vis the South Africa issue highlighted the need for coordinated European action. Founded in 1984, AWEPA is campaigning at the parliamentary level to increase both economic and diplomatic pressure on the apartheid government.

The growing interest and changing mood in Western Europe's national parliaments made us aware of the need for more coordinated action in Europe. For this reason, we created the Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action Against Apartheid (AWEPA) in November 1984.

AWEPAA has quickly become a network for parliamentarians from all West European countries and links are growing with North America and Japan. The term "action" in our name means that AWEPA members accept that economic sanctions against South Africa are an indispensible part of any effective and credible Western policy in favor of justice and freedom in southern Africa. Sanctions are the strongest peaceful instrument at our disposal to help our friends in southern Africa.

AWEPA therefore campaigns for pressure on South Africa by various means including sanctions, promotion of the independence of Namibia, and promotion of support to SADCC and its member-states. Any present or former member of parliament who agrees with
these aims can join AWKPAA, irrespective of his/her party background. From the very outset, this political breadth has been one of our organizing principles and is reflected in the composition of our governing bodies. AWEPAA now has over 1,000 members from all the political mainstreams of Western Europe.

**Current Western Sanctions: A Mixed Picture**

Reluctantly or not, economic sanctions against South Africa have now been accepted by virtually all Western powers as part of their southern African policies, at least in principle. The breakthrough came in 1986 when the public outcry against oppression in South Africa, as we watched it daily on our television screens, became so strong that even the governments of the U.S., Great Britain, and West Germany had to succumb to pressure to implement at least some restrictions on their economic relations with South Africa.

What sanctions are now in place in the West? The picture is mixed: strong American policies, thanks to the Congress which overruled the presidential veto; a strong Commonwealth policy, with a broad consensus between governments and parliaments, including Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, but not the United Kingdom; and the long-standing common sanctions policy of the Nordic countries of Western Europe.

These policy packages consist of a broad range of measures, such as bans on new loans and investments, most imports, export of oil and other military-strategic commodities, and air links. However, in the European Community, the UK, West Germany, and Portugal have been able to block a similar policy. The European Parliament has advisory power only and common EC foreign policy is determined by compromise and—in the case of southern Africa—by the lowest common denominator.

So we have weakly implemented—sometimes not even by law—and badly monitored investment bans, import bans on gold coins, iron and steel, and embargoes on sale of computers to the South African army and police and on the sale of domestic crude oil. Less than 5 percent of all current EC trade is involved.

Individually, some countries have done more: Denmark has joined its fellow Nordic neighbors; Ireland banned imports of fruit and vegetables; and French state power plants will not conclude new agreements to buy South African coal.

What AWEPAA is campaigning for is the implementation of a joint policy by the European Community which should at least include the measures taken by the U.S., the Nordic countries, and the Commonwealth minus the UK.

The main causes of this poor state of affairs are the loose structure of joint EC policy-making and the conservative majorities in the largest West European countries. But the U.S. administration and Congress alike have a good possibility and therefore a special responsibility to achieve a more coordinated, stronger, and more credible Western policy. The Reagan administration has unfortunately refused—and Congress has not enforced—the implementation of the relevant paragraph of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act on influencing the Western allies to take similar measures as included in the act.

Not all is gloomy, though. In the UK, a number of conservative MPs are disenchanted with Thatcher's policies and the British image thus created in southern Africa. They have formed "Conservatives for Fundamental Change in South Africa," and have joined an all-party group on southern Africa in the House of Commons which aims at British government implementation of the joint Commonwealth policy. In West Germany, the recent visit to South Africa and Namibia by Franz-Joseph Strauss, the Christian-Democratic prime minister of Bavaria, has created tension in the Federal/Liberal coalition even within his own party.

So there is great need and potential for intensified cross-Atlantic action on a parliamentary level to influence center-right politicians in Western Europe, especially in the U.K. and West Germany.

**Namibia: Rejection of "Linkage"**

Namibia is the second and no less important issue in AWPEPA's program. Here we are more critical of current U.S. policy which, in our view, is no contribution to the goal of forcing South Africa to agree to free elections and in-

"There is a great need and potential for intensified cross-Atlantic action on a parliamentary level to influence center-right politicians in Western Europe, especially in the U.K. and West Germany."
aggression and blackmail against Angola. A change of parameters and priorities in U.S. policy is highly urgent: The Namibian issue should primarily be judged as one of decolonization and not of East-West confrontation.

Here the stated positions of Western European countries are more positive, at least on paper. What AWEPAA advocates though is a more active and explicit Namibia policy: increased pressure to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 on the independence on Namibia; pressure on the U.S. to abandon "linkage"; recognition and implementation of Decree No. 1 of the IJN Council for Namibia on the illegal exploitation of Namibian resources; and application of the joint EC sanctions—weak as they are—to Namibia.

In its economic relations with SADCC and the frontline states, the European performance is much better than regarding sanctions and Namibia. Both the Nordic countries and the European Community have special agreements with SADCC. These programs are more than just development cooperation—they recognize the stated aims and needs of the SADCC members to loosen their economic ties with South Africa. They are not an alternative to sanctions; they are a complement to them.

It is remarkable that a growing number of West Europeans have recognized the need for military support expressed by Mozambique and Zimbabwe, to enable them to maintain their defense capability. What is the use of financing development projects if South Africa and South African-supported rebels are destroying them?

Events have moved fast on this issue: The UK—the first Western country—has been training Mozambican and Zimbabwean soldiers in Zimbabwe for over a year. Assistance is also rendered to Malawi, Botswana, and Lesotho. Within the last year, Portugal has agreed to upgrade Mozambique's military infrastructure. France was reported to agree to the supply of military hard-ware; the European Community allows part of its development funds to be spent on protection of transport; Sweden and Norway are considering what military support they can give to Mozambique; Spain's Guardia Civil will train Mozambican village guards.

In the words of the Spanish Secretary of State for International Cooperation at the annual SADCC conference last January in Arusha, Tanzania: Economic development plus security is the formula in the light of the present circumstances. A policy is needed whereby the financing of development projects includes the necessary security factor for guaranteeing their defense.

What a long way to go for the U.S., which is finally supporting Mozambique economically, but upholds its ban on all military aid to that country and explicitly aims at untying Mozambican-Soviet links. And how must Angola feel—left out in the cold regarding its security so that it remains vulnerable to South African aggression and Unita rebellion, with the U.S. supplying Stinger missiles to Unita and Europe refraining from applying its Mozambican policies to Angola as well.

Here again the overtones of East-West confrontation are blurring and counteracting what should be primary policy goals in a strong and coordinated Western policy on the whole of southern Africa: promotion of development, peace, and social justice in non-racial societies. Achievement of those aims are in the interest of the peoples of southern Africa and no less in the political, economic, and strategic interests of our own countries.

Tore Linne Eriksen with Richard Moorsom

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NAMIBIA
An annotated critical bibliography

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Across the Continent

A young black man strode to the podium at Arusha's International Conference Center. He was identified only as a member of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu).

How he had managed to travel from apartheid South Africa to this socialist frontline state or how he planned to return without being harassed by the authorities for his participation in this gathering—the first international conference convened by Pretoria's avowed enemy, the African National Congress (ANC)—was not disclosed to the 500 delegates who listened attentively to his militant speech.

"We believe it is time to make a direct challenge to the international community," the unionist said. "We will wait to see how you respond to that challenge."

The challenge, issued jointly by the ANC, the United Democratic Front (UDF), and Cosatu-aligned activists, urged the international anti-apartheid movement to refine and solidify its position. "They're all «ri-apartheid," said an ANC member, gesturing toward the gathering of solidarity groups. United Nations and governmental bodies, non-governmental organizations, religious movements, unions and student associations. "But what are they for?"

The Arusha conference yielded a decisive answer to that question: The anti-apartheid movement has pledged to direct its support to the ANC, as the sole representative of those fighting apartheid from both inside and outside South Africa, and to the frontline states, the hapless regional victims of "apartheid's second front."

Such explicit support for the ANC has a clear corollary—opposition to, or at least lack of support for, the rival liberation movement, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). Formed in 1959 when members split from the ANC in protest against the latter's alliance with whites, the PAC has since been slowly disintegrating due to a combination of bloody internal feuding and lack of on-the-ground or military presence inside South Africa.

The Arusha site lent symbolic support to the ANC's near-total eclipse of the PAC, for Tanzania has historically hosted both movements and the PAC is headquartered in Dar es Salaam. Equally important was the chairing of the conference by Tanzanian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Salim Salim, and the keynote address given by retired Tanzanian President...
and current chairman of the party, Julius Nyerere. Each gave his wholehearted endorsement of the ANC and its armed struggle without even a mention of the PAC.

Anti-apartheid campaigners from 41 countries attended the four-day conference, officially entitled "Peoples of the World Against Apartheid for a Democratic South Africa," although few of the invited U.S. public figures made it to Arusha. The absence of notable black leaders, from presidential candidate Jesse Jackson to Congressional Black Caucus members, was due to the funeral of Chicago Mayor Harold Washington, which took place during the same week.

At the opening session, the British government's empty seat in the conference hall was filled by black opposition leader Bemie Grant, who made a point of formally disassociating his delegation of labor parliamentarians from Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's denunciation of the ANC as a "typical terrorist organization" at the 1987 Commonwealth Conference.

It was this kind of pro-Pretoria tilt that led the UDF to break relations with Pretoria has good reason to worry about the effects of sanctions, for current trends and future projections show the South African economy as acutely vulnerable."

Britain last year—the impetus being the British government's decision to drop charges against several men accused of plotting to kidnap ANC leaders in London. Many UDF and Cosatu-affiliated organizations also refuse to meet with American, West German, or Japanese government representatives in protest against their continued opposition to the imposition of effective economic sanctions against Pretoria.

However, the ANC's stance is a bit less hard-line, for it extended invitations to the conference to all members of the European Community, as well as to the U.S. After the opening session, a representative from the British High Commission in Dar es Salaam did join the plenary, with similar low-level representation from the U.S. embassy.

In his press conference at Arusha, ANC Secretary-General Alfred Nzo chose to emphasize contacts between the ANC and British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe and American Secretary of State George Shultz over the past year. "In spite of the fact that Thatcher and Reagan distance themselves from us, these are tilings that would not have been thought possible just a few years ago," Nzo maintained.

The Scandinavian countries, who funded the lion's share of the conference, had the most high-profile governmental representation in Arusha. Also present at the conference were delegations from the Soviet Union and the Eastern-bloc countries. Among the hundreds of solidarity messages (whose delivery took up more than a day's worth of sessions, much to the frustra-

ANC President Tambo (right) with Thabo Mbeki: "There can be no solution of the South African question until the people themselves exercise power through a system of one-person, one-vote in a unitary state"
tion of many delegates) was one from Yan Vagris, deputy chairman of the Praesidium of the USSR's Supreme Soviet and a member of the Communist Party central committee.

The statement was especially noteworthy in light of recent reports that the Soviet Union has been pressuring the ANC to adopt a more political strategy involving alternatives to insurgency. In fact, Vagris' statement contained a clarification endorsing the ANC's position on the need for the creation of the conditions necessary for a political solution, such as the release of political prisoners, the unbanning of the ANC, and the withdrawal of security forces from South Africa's townships.

For the international press corps gathered to cover the conference, the focus was inevitably on the question of negotiations with Pretoria, and ANC President Oliver Tambo thus addressed the issue in great detail in his speech to the opening session.

"There can be no solution of the South African question until our country is transformed into a united, democratic, and non-racial entity, until the people themselves exercise power through a system of one-person, one-vote in a unitary state," said Tambo.

The ANC also distributed the October statement of its National Executive Committee, which argued that Pretoria's objective in raising the issue of negotiations was to "defuse the struggle inside our country by holding out false hopes of a just political settlement which the regime has every intention to block," as well as to sabotage the international sanctions campaign.

It was the deteriorating state of relations between the government and the UDF that accounted for the small number of activists from inside South Africa who travelled to Arusha for the conference. In a press briefing as the conference got underway, ANC information director Thabo Mbeki revealed that intimidation by the South African government had led to a general decision by the democratic movement inside the country to cut down on the number of delegates sent to Arusha.

According to Mbeki, representatives from at least one Western country were approached by Pretoria and warned that their funding of South African delegates' travel to the conference could result in serious complications in diplomatic relations. In the face of such threats, a planeload of delegates aborted their trip to Arusha during a layover in Zimbabwe. "We decided in the end that we just couldn't afford to sacrifice more of our people," confided an activist who attended a church-sponsored conference on apartheid in Harare, but did not go to Arusha. "You have to weigh up the pros and cons of sending people out for such direct contact with the movement."

Whatever the risks taken by the South Africans who addressed the conference, their presence had a palpable impact on the international delegates who heard them. Six activists, representing the UDF and Cosatu, speaking for workers, youth, women, rural residents, religious bodies, and the legal profession, spoke anonymously, in an effort to minimize inevitable security problems upon returning home.

The speaker representing South African youth echoed the ANC and UDF stance on the negotiations issue, arguing dramatically that "the table on which negotiations have to take place is covered with a cloth of blood."

"When you listen to what those from inside South Africa have to say, you get a real education as to the level of political consciousness that has developed among the South African people," said the Washington Office on Africa's Damu Smith. "Many of them are calling directly and publicly—under emergency regulations—for support of the ANC, for socialism, and I think we in the U.S. need to hear this."

"The anti-apartheid movement has pledged to direct its support to the ANC, as the sole representative of those fighting apartheid from both inside and outside South Africa, and to the frontline states."

For Jim Cason of the Africa Fund, the real value of the conference came in private meetings outside of the public sessions. "This conference has provided us with an opportunity to dialogue with the trade unions in South Africa and learn better the kind of actions we can take to assist them," explained Cason. "This helps us to ensure that when companies are divesting from South Africa, they are consulting with the workers and meeting their demands."
Cason said his most valuable experience at Arusha came in a long discussion with a Cosatu member who is a shop steward at an American company in South Africa that his organization is targeting for a boycott. "Now, when we go to this company and say, 'You ought to get out of South Africa,'" said Cason, "we can also add: 'And you ought to negotiate with the workers who are making these specific demands.'"

This new-found sensitivity on the need for input into international sanctions campaigns from the South African labor movement formed a central theme of behind-the-scenes deliberations at the conference. Over the past three years since the American Free South Africa Movement breathed new life into the decades-old drive to isolate apartheid, the context of such campaigns has changed completely: The U.S., the Commonwealth, the Nordic states, and most of the VMC have enacted basic sanctions legislation, and more than 2W companies, including top multinationals and all major Western banks, have pulled out of South Africa.

At its most recent national congress, Cosatu suggested various preconditions for disinvesting companies to abide by: keeping unions abreast of each company's disinvestment, including a year's advance notice of withdrawal; requiring new owners to maintain union recognition agreements, embracing worker benefits and the control of pension funds; specific compensation formulae, e.g. workers receiving a month's pay per year of service or the guarantee of five years employment. Cosatu feels it should now be the task of the international sanctions lobby to press business not only to disinvest, but to do so in accordance with such general conditions.

In theory, the means of ensuring coordination between workers' demands in South Africa and pressure from their supporters outside seems simple enough. In practice, there are more nuances to contend with, as exemplified by a novel agreement between the Ford Motor Company and the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa, a Cosatu affiliate), concluded on the eve of the Arusha conference.

Ford undertook to give part of its holdings in the South African Motor Corporation (Samcor, created when Ford began scaling down its involvement in South Africa more than a year ago) to a trust fund controlled by the mainly black workforce. While the agreement does comply with the Cosatu requirement that the assets and wealth of disinvesting foreign companies not leave the country and be used instead in workers' interests, Ford's continuing role in supplying vehicles, components, service parts, management, and technical assistance to Samcor violates the U.S. sanctions lobby's demand that disinvestment extend to franchising and licensing agreements.

In addition, Numsa's acceptance of this deal represents a minority viewpoint in contrast with Cosatu's stated resistance to employee share-ownership plans. The National Union of Mine-workers, Cosatu's largest and most powerful affiliate, recently rejected a similar share offer and the Cosatu-aligned Labor and Economic Research Center in Johannesburg has condemned such schemes as aiming "to draw black South Africans into the benefits of capitalism," which is "particularly inappropriate in a context where most black workers do not earn a living wage and would be better off gaining higher wages than shares in a company."

The Washington Office on Africa's Duma Smith noted that one of Ford's vice-presidents had approached his organization and several others with a copy of the shares plan to ask their opinion. "This is an indication of the tremendous pressure on American corporations by the divestment movement," said Smith. "A few years ago Ford would never have sent someone to consult with us."

Thus the international anti-apartheid movement now finds itself in a position not unlike that of the ANC—whose leadership over the past two years has received a steady stream of visits from businessmen to Afrikaner politicians. Both movements are still far from wielding power, but both are increasingly determining the agenda in international moves toward eroding apartheid's domestic and international base of support. Just as the ANC, and the UDF inside South Africa, are mounting campaigns to woo liberal and moderate whites away from President P.W. Botha's camp, the international solidarity movement is also widening its base.

In Britain, a right-wing Conservative Party member of Parliament is at the head of a new grouping that feels that Margaret Thatcher's South African policy is so out of step with British public opinion that she may be forced by her own supporters to get tough with Pretoria. As for the U.S., it remains to be
seen whether this election year will serve to widen opposition to President Reagan's pro-Pretoria stance.

A clear indication of the worry caused to Pretoria by the increased international recognition now being accorded both the ANC and its activist supporters is evidenced by South Africa's fastest-growing new industry: sanctions-busting.

Backdoor efforts to evade even the weak sanctions of South Africa's major trading partners (which do not restrict imports of strategic minerals nor seriously affect financial links or transfers of technology) are coordinated by the newly established Secretariat for Unconventional Trade, chaired by a veteran Rhodesian sanctions-buster. The public version is managed through a million-dollar international advertising campaign run under the slogan, "Free enterprise frees people—sanctions don't."

Pretoria has good reason to worry about the effects of sanctions, for current trends and future projections show the South African economy as acutely vulnerable, with soaring unemployment and inflation rates accompanied by declining investor confidence and deepening international isolation. Despite lax enforcement, even the present sanctions have dented South Africa's economy: The American Chamber of Commerce in Johannesburg recently announced that exports of commodities banned under the U.S. Anti-Apartheid Act have "effectively dried up," to cite just one recent example.

It was these kinds of reports that buoyed the spirits of the sanctions campaigners who plotted the imposition of comprehensive, mandatory international sanctions at Arusha. In this spirit of confidence, they turned their attention to the anticipated future scenario after the achievement of their goal of dismantling apartheid.

Keynote speaker Julius Nyerere focused attention on the challenges of post-apartheid South Africa, telling the delegates, "We must not try to pretend that the struggle for justice and democracy in South Africa will end on the day when the apartheid government is replaced by a government of the people, for that new government will have urgent need of our support and understanding, especially in its early years."

This theme of the vulnerability of post-apartheid South Africa and its continued need for international support was echoed by the delegates from inside the country. There is widespread concern in ANC and UDF circles, especially in light of the current Inkatha-UDF war in Natal, as well as mounting vigilant attacks on UDF and Cosatu members, about attacks on a future ANC government by a "contra"-type army, possibly including elements from Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha movement, the PAC, and/or other minority groupings.

The Cosatu delegate made a bid for united action in support of the ANC to head off such an onslaught, saying, "We don't want any Savimbis or Renamos in a free South Africa." Given the frontline states' bitter experience with "Savimbis and Renamos," the Cosatu delegate voiced another concern. Reminiscent of the pressure brought to bear on Mozambique during the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe liberation struggle, the destabilization of the frontline states might force them to accept a premature negotiated settlement.

"We know the sacrifices that the frontline states have endured and we are encouraged that comrade Nyerere, like us, believes that conditions are not yet conducive to negotiations," he told the conference. "We're going to go back and tell our people that the frontline states are standing behind us." A veteran concurred with that analysis of Nyerere's speech: "Mwalimu was foreseeing the option of him—or the frontline states—brokering a settlement with Pretoria."

This defiant frontline state stance is timely, for 1987 saw the first deadly Kenyan incursions into Zimbabwe, while Tanzania and even Malawi now have troops fighting Renamo in Mozambique. Thatcher's latest gambit to divert calls for sanctions has been the announcement of stepped-up aid to the frontline states.

Like the British Industry Committee "Marshall Plan" to plough funds into black advancement schemes in South Africa in place of enforcing and strengthening sanctions—roundly rejected by both the UDF and the ANC—the frontline states aid scheme was dismissed at Arusha as a "leaky tap solution." Frontline state delegates to the conference urged that the focus rather be shifted to "eradicating the source of the problem: South Africa."

Solidarity groups also argued for vigilance against international maneuvers toward shaping the post-apartheid economy and society. "While providing U.S. corporations with a useful rationale for their South African ties, [post-apartheid] planning further enables them to invest in specific programs which aim to shape the future South Africa," contended the New York-based Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility in its statement to the conference.

"The emphasis on training black workers and black managers to function more productively within the existing system, like support for black businesses, prepares South Africa's economy for a change of hands rather than a structural transformation."

It was that goal of the structural transformation of South African society that united the activists as they headed home from Arusha to press for "people's sanctions" aimed at breaking the ties that bind their governments with Pretoria.

As the pressure mounts for a negotiated settlement—with inevitable concessions forecast by all sides—the success of the Arusha conference will be measured not only by the immediate popular mobilization that results, but also by the level of insight and analysis that guides the international anti-apartheid movement in the ever-more challenging struggles that lie ahead.

"The need for input into international sanctions campaigns from the South African labor movement formed a central theme of behind-the-scenes deliberations at the conference."
The People's Sanctions

Although most African governments have long expressed their abhorrence of apartheid, it is only recently that African activists have begun to devise concrete strategies of their own. Our correspondent reports on recent efforts across the continent to advance Africa's participation in the struggle against apartheid.

BY ERNEST HARSCH

For years, the peoples of Africa have reacted strongly to developments at the southern tip of their continent. The apartheid regime's mass detentions, killings of children, forced removals, and institutionalized racial discrimination have aroused anger and outrage far beyond South Africa's own borders.

Yet in recent times, the most visible international action against apartheid seems to have come mainly from outside Africa. The drive for economic sanctions has by its nature been focused on those countries of Western Europe and North America that have the most extensive South African investment and trade links.

Increasingly, anti-apartheid activists in Africa are seeking to redress this imbalance—in words used at a recent conference in Burkina Faso, "to move the center of the anti-apartheid struggle out of the drawing rooms and conference halls of the West and place it on its own ground, Africa."

Apartheid, activists point out, is a crime against all humanity, but particularly against the peoples of Africa, most of whom themselves directly experienced racism and colonial rule not that long ago. So Africans, they argue, are morally obliged to do everything possible to rid their continent of apartheid's scourge.

But how? As some note in frustration, the OAU and other African bodies have passed resolution after resolution condemning apartheid and calling for bold action—with very limited consequences. How can these measures be effectively implemented? What more can be done to isolate the apartheid regime and aid the South African people?

A number of gatherings in Africa over the past two years have been marked by efforts to grapple with such questions: the eighth Non-Aligned Summit, convened in Harare as a display of solidarity with the South African and Namibian struggles; the May 1987 Writers Against Apartheid Symposium in Brazzaville; the Bambata Forum, which assembled in Burkina's capital, Ouagadougou, in October 1987; and two conferences in Arusha, Tanzania—an August 1987 frontline states youth seminar and a December 1987 international conference in solidarity with the African National Congress.

Participation in these conferences included representatives of liberation movements, anti-apartheid committees, women's and student's organizations, trade unions, political parties, and governments. Many ideas were raised, many proposals discussed.

A strong desire for action already exists outside such conference halls. Though very poorly covered in the media, people in many African countries have actively expressed their opposition to apartheid by demonstrating, hailing visiting liberation movements, or contributing to solidarity funds.

Sometimes such actions are more visible, as during British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's January visit to Nigeria, when thousands of noisy trade unionists and others lined the streets of Lagos and Kano to protest her government's opposition to economic sanctions against South Africa.

Clearly the potential exists in Africa for building a genuine movement against apartheid, encompassing governments and organizations as well as ordinary people on the streets. But the obstacles to fully tapping that potential are not insignificant.

The most intractable difficulties confront those in the frontline states, under apartheid's immediate shadow. Through proximity and political commitment, it is these African states that have contributed most to the liberation movements. Despite considerable difficulties of their own, they have provided political backing, material support (both financial and military), and refuge to those fighting against apartheid. And in contrast to some other parts of the continent, the peoples of the frontline states generally have a greater understanding of the stakes involved—due in large measure to their own direct conflicts with the apartheid regime.

Bombing raids, commando incursions, economic sabotage, and sponsorship of rightist insurrections have been Pretoria's answer to their acts of anti-apartheid solidarity. It has been estimated that direct South African economic and military destruction, combined with indirect economic losses, have cost these countries some $20 billion since 1980—not to mention the tens of thousands killed and more than one million driven from their homes.

Besides facing the constant threat and reality of South African attacks, most southern African states are locked into a web of long-standing economic, transport, and communications links with Pretoria that cannot be easily disentangled. The foreign trade of several
is overwhelmingly dependent on South African railways and harbors. "Hostages of history" is how the Ouagadougou conference referred to them.

Although these countries have taken some steps to disengage from South Africa, their overall vulnerability imposes severe limits on the pace, extent, and kinds of economic sanctions they can implement. To suddenly break all ties, without alternative trade routes or massive international assistance, would be suicidal.

Speaking at the December 1987 Arusha conference, ANC President Oliver Tambo acknowledged their difficult position. While affirming that Africa should impose economic sanctions against Pretoria, he excluded "those countries involved in an undeclared war with the South African regime." He claimed that it was wrong for the international community to demand that they impose sanctions first.

Growing awareness in the rest of Africa of the plight of the frontline states has led to a closer linking of their defense with the anti-apartheid struggle as such. Most of the recent African anti-apartheid conferences featured calls for increased assistance to and solidarity with the frontline states. The Non-Aligned Summit in Harare led to the establishment of an Africa Fund to assist them.

There has been no such sympathy, however, for African states further north that have economic and other ties with South Africa. They are deemed to be following policies dictated more by narrow self-interest than by necessity.

An official of South Africa's Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed in late 1987 that annual South African trade with sub-Saharan Africa now totals some $1 billion. Most is with other southern African countries, but states as far afield as the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Zaïre, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius, the Comoros, and Somalia are known or believed to have South African ties of one kind or another.

Most of these governments formally deny such trade, while secretly promoting it or at best turning a blind eye. In other cases, private merchants carry out clandestine commerce in defiance of governmental bans.

Côte d'Ivoire's government has been among the more open in its South African contacts. It has long advocated "dialogue" with Pretoria, permitted South African goods to be freely sold in Abidjan's markets, and in November last year formally granted landing rights to South African Airways.

At the Ouagadougou conference, a representative of an Ivorian students' group boldly defended his government's stance. "We believe in dialogue," he proclaimed to boos and hoots from the audience. "In Côte d'Ivoire we make it our second religion."

Since advocating a break with South Africa entails a direct challenge to governmental policy in countries like Côte d'Ivoire, conducting anti-apartheid activities there becomes more difficult. But not impossible: Also present in Ouagadougou was a representative of a newly formed Ivorian anti-apartheid group.

Direct or indirect relations with Pretoria also hamper efforts to present a united African front against apartheid. Exiled South African poet Breyten Breytenbach observes that one of the ways Pretoria tries to disrupt African unity "is by infiltrating Africa, among other routes through the French connection." An aim of both the Ouagadougou and Brazzaville gatherings was to counter this effort by propelling the issue of apartheid more forcefully into francophone Africa.

While most African states are not similarly compromised by dealings with Pretoria, they nevertheless exhibit varying levels of commitment to the struggle against apartheid. Some governments seem to hesitate out of domestic political concerns, apparently viewing any independent initiative as a challenge to their own authority. In August 1985, for example, the Senegalese government banned an anti-apartheid demonstration that had been called by several opposition parties. Thousands of people turned out anyway, but were dispersed by police.

At times, economic difficulties are cited as justification for lack of firmer action. Tanzania's Julius Nyerere responded at the December Arusha conference: "All of us, in our own countries, have our own problems to contend with—sometimes very desperate problems... But nothing can excuse us from actively supporting the struggle against apartheid. We must be active in opposing it, by every means within our power."

A number of African states have already taken important initiatives. It is not possible here to cite more than a few examples. Nigeria, with its considerable resources, has long provided funds, scholarships, and other forms of assistance to the liberation movements. A National Committee Against Apartheid
functions under direct government sponsorship and maintains a Southern Africa Relief Fund, to which all civil servants are obliged to contribute a percentage of their pay. Recently, the Nigerian government announced that it was offering military training facilities to the ANC. The Nigerian Labor Congress has established its own direct contacts with the South African union movement.

Ethiopia, Tanzania, Zambia, and other countries have given the ANC major radio, educational, and training facilities. The National Women’s Union of Mali has organized support meetings and collected funds for southern African combatants. Ghana has seen some sizable anti-apartheid actions and the national media keeps a constant spotlight on southern Africa. As a leading member of the OAU Liberation Committee, Ghana has also solicited contributions to the committee’s liberation fund.

In Congo, a class on apartheid has been introduced into all schools. Streets have been named after Nelson Mandela and a Mandela Cup soccer match was organized to raise funds. The country’s main women’s group maintains educational and training facilities for young Namibian women.

Under Thomas Sankara, Burkina Faso took an especially active approach. South African goods were barred from sale, streets and schools were named after Mandela, and governments that had dealings with Pretoria were roundly denounced. Anti-apartheid themes frequently featured in public speeches and the media.

The response of the Burkina people was encouraging. Several anti-apartheid groups took root and spread their message into the countryside. Students volunteered to organize anti-apartheid film showings and other events. The Ouagadougou conference itself was organized by an ad hoc committee of volunteers, with much of its budget provided by public contributions.

Yet the general sentiment at the various anti-apartheid conferences was that there is much more that can be done, both to induce African governments to take more effective action and to deepen the kind of popular involvement exemplified in Burkina. Taking into account economic constraints, a variety of low-cost measures were proposed: contributions of goods from local industries (clothing, shoes, pencils) that would not require expenditures of scarce foreign exchange, greater access to the national media for ANC and Swapo members, benefit concerts, and public collections to raise money for scholarships.

Besides renewed calls on African governments to observe South African trade embargoes, they were also urged to step up pressure on their Western trading partners to do likewise. "A special responsibility rests on Africa and non-aligned countries to assist in strictly monitoring the imposed sanctions," the December Arusha conference affirmed.

Such appeals to African governments and official organizations have been

"The general sentiment at the various anti-apartheid conferences was that there is much more that can be done, both to induce African governments to take more effective action and to deepen popular involvement.”

made before, but a new emphasis is on reaching out to the African people directly. "We are no longer knocking at the doors of governments,” Nigeria’s UN ambassador Joseph Garba told the Ouagadougou conference. "We are now mobilizing the people.”

The greater the popular participation in anti-apartheid campaigns, activists have pointed out, the more difficult it will be for African states to trade with South Africa or to confine themselves to verbal denunciations.

But before people can be mobilized, they must know what apartheid is. Particularly in rural areas, few Africans have access to precise news and information. Education has therefore emerged as key theme in many of the proposals. The frontline states’ youth seminar, for example, resolved "to undertake a coordinated education campaign among the youth and the broader public about the realities of apartheid and the struggles for the liberation of South Africa and Namibia.” This could be accomplished, the conference’s Program of Action suggested, through meetings, film showings, speaking tours, classes, and other means.

Like this gathering, which focused on ways to mobilize youth, several of the others also addressed specific constituencies. The Brazzaville seminar sought to draw writers more actively behind the anti-apartheid cause. The Ouagadougou conference singled out youth and women. The Pan-African Women’s Organization, which has affiliates in 28 countries, has urged observance of August 9 as a continental day of solidarity with southern African women, increased coverage of apartheid in women’s magazines, and the organization of visits to refugee camps.

Some regional and national trade unions have undertaken campaigns in defense of South African workers, and a representative of the Congress of South African Trade Unions was a featured speaker at the ANC’s Arusha conference.

Among numerous proposals for popular action—ranging from rallies and meetings to mass fundraising—the organization of "people’s sanctions” is an idea that seems to have aroused some interest. Cited specifically at Ouagadougou and the two Arusha gatherings, the call for "people’s sanctions” is based on the assumption that governments alone cannot or will not effectively enforce South African trade embargoes. Individuals and organizations are asked to organize their own boycotts of South African goods, to mount campaigns against Western companies with investments in South Africa, and to expose sanctions-busting operations.

Even if such efforts are only partially successful, they will go some way toward the goal of rooting the anti-apartheid struggle more firmly on the African continent—and moving it out of the conference halls. ”Today we say the time of speeches, the time of resolutions, is past,” ANC leader Mark Shope told the Ouagadougou gathering. "Our people want action.”
On the arrival of a "rebel" New Zealand rugby team, a South African Rugby Board official was reported as exulting that "rugby had changed the face of South Africa" by driving speculation over the release of long-time political prisoner Nelson Mandela off the front pages of national newspapers to page six.

This observation was made in the report of the Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group which visited South Africa in 1986. "The response of whites to the presence of overseas sportsmen—whether representative or not—brought home to us the impact and importance of the international sports boycott," the report stated. "The lengths to which the South African authorities are prepared to go in elevating the importance of visiting teams and the huge financial inducements they offer reveal their craving for supposed international recognition."

In the months before the summer Olympics in Seoul this year, world anti-apartheid sports bodies are closing in to ensure that South Africa's already paltry access to international competition is further curtailed. At a meeting of the International Conference Against Apartheid in Sport (ICAAS) in Harare in November last year, delegates estimated that they have already succeeded in barring South Africa from 90 percent of world sporting activity.

"We are not here to debate the pros and cons of mixing politics and sport," declared Sam Ramsamy, an Indian South African who heads the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC), one of the most effective lobbies worldwide. "We are here to discuss how we can exclude South Africa from the international sporting arena."

Organizing chairman Zimbabwean Tommy Sithole maintains that the sports boycott—alone among the plethora of sanctions being organized against South Africa—is coordinated, coherent, and effective. Sports boycotts, he said, hit at exactly that section of the South African community which...
benefits from policies of apartheid—
conservative, wealthy whites.

The conditional membership of South
African sporting associations in 15 of the
29 international federations with full
Olympic recognition will come under in-
creasing threat as many hold confer-
ces in 1988. Golf, tennis, gymnastics,
rowing, fencing, yachting, and rugby-
have been targetted as sports which
lobbyists will monitor extra-carefully,
said Ramsamy.

And sports applying for Olympic sta-
tus will soon have to prove that they
have dropped any connections with Pre-
toria before they are accepted. The rul-
ing has already affected the World Union
of Karate Organizations and has been
enforced for Softball and baseball associ-
ations applying to the International
Olympic Committee (IOC) meeting in
Canada in February.

A new thrust in the sports boycott
has been powered by Sweden, which
has influence in a number of sports
where South Africa still has tenuous sta-
tus. Together with Scandinavian allies.
Sweden will be pushing for South Afri-
can exclusion in canoeing, ice-hockey,
skiiing, and skating.

The remaining 11 federations for
Olympic sports in which South Africa
has conditional membership are arch-
ery, badminton, equestrian sport, fenc-
ing, hockey, gymnastics, pentathlon,
rowing, shooting, tennis, and yachting.
In almost all of these, South Africa is
barred from international competition,
but has unrestricted membership in
eight of the other 35 Olympic sports—
sport for the disabled, power boating,
practical shooting, rugby, surfing, tram-
poline, tug-of-war, and veterans' ath-
letics.

Boycott lobbyists are pushing for
more governments to strictly imple-
ment the United Nations International
Convention Against Apartheid in Sports
and for the nation's exclusion from world
bodies which would make it difficult for
South African organizations to initiate or
accept bilateral contacts.

With the inclusion of tennis as an
Olympic sport for the first time, there
has been intense pressure on the Inter-
national Tennis Federation (ITF) to cut
ties with South Africa. Until now, South
Africa has had membership in the ITF
but doesn't participate as a country, al-
though individuals can compete.

SANROC, through its new observer
status to the Association of National
Olympic Committees of Africa
(ANOCA), was instrumental in the
ANOCA demand that the IOC should
not reconsider South African member-
ship to the Olympic movement without
ANOCA's agreement.

As the loopholes close, South Africa
has assembled an array of charges, in-
ducements, and arguments to stave off
its increasing isolation. First among
these is the assertion that sport has
been integrated in South Africa for years
and that international bodies only punish
black athletes by implementing the boy-
cott.

Although Pretoria maintains there is
no legislation forbidding integrated
sport, an investigation into sports facil-
ties in South Africa came up with the
following statistics: Whites have 73 per-
cent of athletic tracks, 92.7 percent of
golf courses, 83.7 percent of hockey
fields, 84.7 percent of cricket fields,
96.2 percent of squash courts, 80 per-
cent of badminton courts, 98.2 percent
of all bowling greens, 82.4 percent of
rugby fields, 83.5 percent of swimming
pools, and 26.5 percent of soccer
fields—the latter, one of the few facil-
ties where South Africa's black popula-
tion, which outnumbers whites by five
to one, has more access.

Turning to lack of sports facilities at
schools, white schools have 72.4 per-
cent of all sports facilities—79.9 per-
cent of athletic tracks, 88.6 percent of
cricket pitches, and 87.7 percent of
rugby fields.

Another way of legislating blacks out
of sport is to deny them South African
citizenship and relegate them to tribal-
based "homelands" whose sovereignty
is recognized only by South Africa.
South African sporting bodies claim
international organizations have "moved
the goalposts" by dismissing claims of
progress toward integration.

But embarrassing instances slip out:
In 1976, the South African Rugby Board
threatened some members with expul-
sion for having played multi-racial
matches. Three years later, a parlia-
mentary report said by way of reassur-
ance to the white community that ra-

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cially integrated sports and sports clubs involve less than one percent of the total of sporting activities in the country.

Reflecting common concern with "reds under beds," the President of the South African Rugby Board, Danie Craven, said in 1982 that nations which supported the Commonwealth-sponsored 1977 Gleneagles Agreement, in which signatories pledged not to participate in sports activities with South Africa, were "in the pay of Moscow."

Even up until 1984, rebel tours and individuals were defiant about playing in South Africa, claiming that they wouldn't mix sport and politics. In 1984, the English Rugby Union declared that "contact [with white South African sportspersons] was too constructive than leaving people out in the cold," a sentiment diluted from the comment of a British cricket team which visited South Africa in 1982, "We have a right to earn a living where we like."

As international sport, both through organizations and individuals, becomes more closed to South Africa, the "big guns" of boycott-breaking have been brought into play. The first line of defense here has been money. SANROC estimates that as much as $110 million has been made available annually to promote South Africa through sporting contacts. Visual sports like rugby and tennis are preferred by sponsors and in 1986, Pretoria announced a 90 percent tax rebate for companies sponsoring "international" sport.

A local magazine asked South Africa Tennis Union tournament director Keith Brebnor how his organization was coping with the falling rand and providing higher prize money. Brebnor said 1984 was a disaster of a year, but the Union now realized that sponsorship was the key to the sport, and television was the way to promote the product.

But because of pressures against South African participation in international competitions, the sponsors get little from their backing in the way of media coverage. The one sector which has the facilities to promote both black and white sports development, the money for philanthropic sports sponsorship, and the contacts abroad are the mining houses which employ hundreds of thousands of black migrant laborers from the
disenfranchised "homelands," a labor pool which is one of the main buttresses of the apartheid system.

Sponsorship of individuals is another way around the organizational boycotts. "In 1981, we thought we had maybe another two or three years before the UN Blacklist ended international tennis here," said Brebnor. "It hasn't worked out that way. Tennis is an individual sport, it's a professional sport. A player has a lot of alternatives if Third World countries don't accept him. Our players have always been popular overseas, but it could change here. Players won't come if it puts their careers at risk."

It is not only Western countries which break the boycott. At least 11 sportsmen and one club from African countries have been blacklisted by the UN Centre Against Apartheid for taking part in sporting events in South Africa up to 1985. The 11—from Egypt, Kenya, Swaziland, Malawi, Côte d'Ivoire, and Lesotho—are among 2,190 international sportspeople and 24 national teams to defy the UN ban.

The majority of the sportsmen and virtually all the 23 other teams come from the U.S., Britain, West Germany, France, Switzerland, Austria, Argentina, Australia, Italy, and Israel. The U.S. and Britain top the blacklist with 1,500 sportspersons, who can be removed from the list if they make a public promise not to play in South Africa again. The Centre listed Miloje Grujic of Yugoslavia as the only sports personality from a socialist country to be associated with South Africa. One Zimbabwean cyclist and five golfers living in South Africa have also been blacklisted.

Despite the most strenuous efforts of South African sports organizations, their best talents have to renounce their birthright if they want to compete in the world, and the prefix "South African-born" is the last trace of their origins. The famous case of runner Zola Budd, who achieved British citizenship in 10 days, has highlighted the use of "passesports of convenience" by South Africans. Zimbabwe's President and Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement Robert Mugabe has said that where Zimbabwean passports were used for this purpose, they would be summarily withdrawn or cancelled.

Sweden made 1982 its turning point when after public debate and pressure from lobbyists, the government strengthened common visa regulations for South African nationals generally and closed the loophole whereby South Africans used tourist visas to play in Scandinavian tournaments. Other countries have followed suit, but the frontline states, particularly Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana—all vulnerable to economic and political pressure from Pretoria—have been burdened with a new problem.

Three Springbok (national rugby team) athletes from South Africa— Johan Fourie, Chris de Beer, and Mark Plaatjes—have set up shop in Swaziland, a Commonwealth country, applying for citizenship which will allow them to compete internationally. The pay-off is the sporting connections the three will allegedly bring with them to the tiny state.

South Africans who want to compete in even amateur events outside their country choose those competitions where they can register on the starting line to avoid the pickets, often abusive and dangerous, which tend to accompany athletes abroad. Even so, some are discovered and barred from the events, like marathon runner Leon Swanepeol, who pulled out of a Dutch road race at the halfway mark last year after officials discovered his identity.

Despite the increasing frequency of setbacks, there are odd twists of policy where South Africa has in fact gained. In July 1985, Canada, whose leader Brian Mulroney hit it off well with frontline leaders on a tour in 1987, revised official sporting policy to allow "individual amateurs or professionals of South African origin or citizenship" to compete in Canada as long as the competition is not organized on the basis of national representation.

Few athletic events in Canada are, so in 1987 more South Africans competed in golf, tennis, and road racing than at any other time since the Gleneagles Agreement in 1977, which specifically excluded the 1985 revision. Canada has also refused to sign the UN Convention Against Apartheid in Sport and is sure to be a special target for lobby groups in an Olympic year.
A Conversation with Piet Koornhof

One of the South African government's most ardent advocates of "reform" is now arguing his case not from within the confines of Pretoria's cabinet chambers, but from Embassy Row in Washington, D.C. As South Africa's recently appointed ambassador to the United States, Piet Koornhof, 62, welcomed the opportunity to explain his government's agenda for bringing blacks into "the political processes at all levels on an equal footing," a program which he says will ultimately entail "the dismantling of apartheid," as well as the major economic reforms announced by President Botha on February 5.

In a lengthy conversation with Africa Report—just two days after 17 organizations, including the United Democratic Front, were banned—Ambassador Koornhof made impassioned pleas for understanding of and cooperation with Pretoria's program for economic and political reform. In fact, "reform," Piet Koornhof's political trademark, was the only subject open for on-the-record discussion. Off limits were the creation of a climate within South Africa that might give those reforms the slimmest hope of success, or the events of two days earlier, which seemed to jettison prospects for anything other than a worsening of the violence and polarization. Because of the length of the interview, we publish here excerpts of Ambassador Koornhof's remarks.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

On the South African government's recently announced economic reforms:

I can do no better than to read from State President P. W. Botha's speech when he opened the new, enlarged parliament chambers in South Africa in February. In this speech, he summed up the regional and local situations and then used this occasion to make a very important announcement: a complete, new economic reform which has three legs—privatization, deregulation, and a new tax system.

On southern Africa, President Botha said the following: "War and conflict are not the course we desire for our region because they would worsen an already critical state of affairs. We wish to pursue a course of friendship and cooperation. South Africans are already making a valuable contribution to the process of finding solutions for Africa and our region in Africa. We are prepared to go further."

Then he went on: "Africa needs development. South Africa has the economic strength and expertise to be able to play a considerable part in the progress of this continent. Consequently I wish to propose again that a southern African peace conference be held on matters of health, food production, economic development, and measures to maintain peace and order, as well as non-interference in each other's internal affairs and other related matters."

On the domestic situation, he said the following: "Progress is a prerequisite in the Republic of South Africa. It goes without saying that constitutional development and renewal in South Africa have to take place in an evolutionary manner. During this session and thereafter, we shall accordingly proceed with the measures which have already been announced and which are under consideration. However, reform has economic and social facets which have to be given attention."

Anybody making the point that this government has now moved away from constitutional reform and opted for something else is definitely not on target. South Africa has arrived at the point where it was possible to have announced such important economic reforms. What the president announced is not something that suddenly fell like manna from blue heavens, it is the result of three to five years in-depth research.

It has all along been argued that for constitutional reform to be meaningful, peaceful, and successful, it must be accompanied by tangible and practical economic reform, so that all people can participate and benefit in the total of the society and in the reform process. That is why these in-depth research projects on privatization, deregulation, and tax reform had been going on. What you are looking at therefore is the result of tremendous hard work. You are not looking at a sudden, haphazard change of strategy. This is a concerted, worked-out program of deep reform as you had in your country with Abraham Lincoln, as they had with Wilberforce in Britain. The economic reform which has been announced underlines, as nothing has before, the genuine effort of constitutional reform in South Africa.

If economic reform is successful, then by itself, it will have such motivation and power that you can't stop constitutional reform! So you are looking at something which from within engenders movement for successful constitutional reform. I find myself in damn good company when I say this. On February 22, a London editorial said: "Capitalism and its need for a skilled, stable, and mobile workforce has been the major instrument in the erosion of the apartheid society. Mr. Botha has long known that he could have capitalism or apartheid, but not both. Botha is attempting his own form of perestroika. . . Like Gorbachev, he must know that perestroika, if it is to succeed, cannot and will not stop with the economy."

The president himself said reform has different facets—social, economic, political, and constitutional. To say that economic reform is going to replace the other is not true, it is going to strengthen it. It is part of the same thing. Those tilings that are in the pipeline will come to fruition as far as
constitutional development and renewal is concerned. The economic reform will strengthen and augment it. If you privatize a huge set-up with $216 billion in assets such as Escom, who is going to benefit? It is quite clear—primarily the blacks are going to benefit. You read articles about a tremendous spurt for a black middle class. The underprivileged in the society, mostly the black people, are going to be the prime beneficiaries of the reform announcements.

On the government's political reform agenda:

If I was in the position of Socrates, I would want to stand on the highest pinnacle and say: Please, my black friends in southern Africa, listen, see how the table is laid for peaceful reform, for evolutionary attainment of constitutional development, for complete renewal with the objective of dismantling apartheid and of all people participating in the political processes in South Africa. Please come forward and assist in a positive way.

I'm going to quote from a public document from "The Federal Congress for I-Youedom and Stability," which was held in Durban, 12-13 August 1986. This type of federal congress has only been convened a couple of times in the history of the country and party—once in 1960 to get a mandate for South Africa to become a republic, and in 1983, to bring Indians and mixed origin people into Parliament. The 1986 congress was convened to get a mandate to bring black people into the political process, for a new constitution to be negotiated with the meaningful black leaders.

The first leg of the mandate they got was: "Everybody must participate in the political processes at all levels on an equal footing." The second leg of this mandate on reform is equally important, and I quote again: "This implies the elimination of any discrimination on the ground of color, race, cultural affiliation, or religion." That is a different way of saying to negotiate how apartheid can be dismantled completely and how you can attain a completely new society through negotiation and by way of consensus—evolutionary development and renewal, as the president put it two weeks ago.

This has a more important background. In 1983, when the country had a referendum to break through color bars to have people of different colors in Parliament, the question at the time was could the country bring in blacks, Coloureds, and Indians and deal with the constitutional issue in one shot? And rightly or wrongly, they decided that the country would have to do it in two stages—first, disposal of the question of Coloureds, Indians, and whites, and if you have done that successfully, then deal with the black one by itself.

The president told the country that if the referendum was a yes vote to bring Coloureds and Indians into Parliament, the first priority would be how to deal with the black people in a new constitution. After the referendum was held, the Durban congress took place and the president got this mandate. Next, an election was held for whites in May 1987, in which the president got the mandate approved to bring black people into the political processes by 76 percent of voters against 24.

Three weeks later, on May 25, 1987, the president wrote a letter to all people in South Africa and it reads: "There are black people who say that the recent election was irrelevant. It was not. In this election, the white electorate gave me an overwhelming mandate to negotiate with representative leaders of the black communities and groups about our common future and a new constitution. These negotiations will not be a struggle for domination and power. It will be an honest meeting of men of peace and good will, a meeting that must and will produce a solution to our problem. Above all, the question of our political future must be answered. My government and I have the power, the will, the desire and the mandate to work out the answers to these questions with all leaders who reject violence. . . Join me in talks and negotiations.

Next, he put on the table of Parliament a bill called the National Council Act, because he now has a mandate to negotiate the new constitution on the basis which I read to you—all people participate on an equal footing at all levels in the political processes—and this implies the elimination of any discrimination. The National Council will consist of 30 people, of which at least 15 will be black, with the state president as chairman. The chief minister of each of the six self-governing territories will be members—six blacks. All black people in South Africa will have universal suffrage at the age of 18 to elect nine additional members to represent them on this council to negotiate a new constitution. So that makes 15 blacks out of the 30, plus the three leaders of the Coloured, Indian, and white houses of Parliament and then 10 members chosen for their specialized knowledge on constitutional matters. The color of those 10 is not specified. There could be blacks among them. At the end of the day, you will look at a council which will most likely have a majority of blacks on it to negotiate the new constitution.

On why blacks are planning to boycott these elections:

The answer is very simple—because some black leaders in South Africa who want to negotiate this new constitution find it difficult to come forward and sit on such a council. They make it quite clear why they are not sitting on such a council and what their conditions are for doing so. They say as long as the African National Congress is operating from outside the country and is an illegal organization inside the country, as long as Mr. Mandela is in prison, they can't because if they came forward and negotiated, then their own constituents would say they were Uncle Toms and they would lose authority among their own people. We all understand that and what is more, I think they are right. So that is why the laid table hasn't got people sitting at it. But can't you see that we all have the same target—all people participating on an equal level in the political processes, the dismantling of apartheid? So where do we differ? Not on the target, but on the method.

On whether the target is one-person, one-vote:

No, you can find different structures to have all people participate in the political processes at all levels on an equal footing—the objective and the mandate that the president has received to negotiate with whomever. Now you must negotiate how you are going to achieve that target so that all people participate on an equal footing and in the process the rights of minority groups are insured. I genuinely believe it can be
done. I have yet to come across a black leader of repute in my country with whom I have had talks on this who differs that we must look at how to enshrine the rights of minority groups in South African society.

You haven't got one-man, one-vote in a unitary state in Switzerland or in many other countries. Have you got it in many of the African states? But what we must look for is the target and then you must negotiate how you can achieve that in this complex set-up. If the only way you can achieve it is as you say one-man, one-vote in a unitary state, then you must go and prove it there. It is quite possible that on that basis you can never find a consensus, but there may be other ways to find consensus, where the blacks can have what they want through negotiation. There are a hundred types of federation in the world!

This is where people tend to oversimplify so much and where my plea comes in: Please listen, the table is laid, let's talk because we agree on the objective, but we differ on the method. I am willing to wage a bet with you that if the people would negotiate in the South African context, you would be surprised how they will find each other in consensus as to what the real answers are to achieve these targets. I know the people, I love them, and I know that I am right.

On the South African government's view of the method to achieve negotiation:

I know of three methods to achieve the target which we talk about. One is through revolution, barrel of the gun, through violence. The ANC openly states that there is no other way you can achieve that target but through revolution. I say there is a much quicker, safer, and shorter way.

The second method is one which Governor Michael Dukakis has put best of the presidential candidates so far. On December 4, 1987, he said the method is "toughened U.S. economic sanctions against South Africa and... multilateral agreement with our allies for a more comprehensive trade embargo against that country in the absence of agreement by the South African government to enter into prompt and meaningful negotiations for the abolition of apartheid and the creation of a non-racial South Africa."

That's the second type of method, punitive measures. Hit them. If that doesn't work, hit them harder. If that does not work, total embargo. But this method is just as violent and I don't think it will work. It will have exactly the opposite effect of what Mr. Dukakis and those advocating it want, for many reasons—it weakens the very people that you want to strengthen, it weakens the economy.

A black leader of repute has said: "Has America lost the way so much now that they think by driving Africa back into barbarism through economic and punitive measures they can achieve any valuable target in South Africa?" I could cry when I heard this very noble black leader expressing that thought, because that is the question. As Gatsha Buthelezi is saying, the one jewel and one miracle in Africa is the economy of South Africa. The facts are there for anybody to see. Where are the black people best off in Africa? Why are a million black people coming from outside South Africa to this very bad country? This great, great leader of Africa says it became the miracle because of white people and black people.

I understand people wanting to take a moral stand against apartheid. But my black friends are saying, "Do you want to drive us back into barbarism and think that you've done a good thing? And do you first want a scorched earth which you will have, if you drive these people into a corner?" What are they going to do? Give up and say take us? Do with us what you like? They are not that way inclined, neither blacks nor whites, they are tough people. So you are looking at a long, drawn-out struggle, which I will not see, thank heavens, because I can't live that long! The South African economy is a self-reliant one, it can stick it out indefinitely.

There are better ways to achieve the target which we all agree on and that is the third way—the one that is on the table. What beats me is that it is not tried. The president has said it in very simple terms, "I am inviting the African National Congress, thinking that violence is the only answer, to come home and talk," if only they would accept the president's offer to abandon violence. It beats me why that is not taken up.

If you can negotiate peacefully to have all people participate in the political processes at all levels on an equal footing, why would you not try that, rather than say, "I'm going to kill those bastards and lose my life in the process"? Why would you say, "I'm first going to destroy the economy"? I address black people and ask them, "Why don't you talk with us?" Who blocks it? I have lived and worked my whole life among blacks. I've got more black friends than others, so I think I've got some weee bit of understanding about it. I was embued with only one spirit up to this very day—to make some minor contribution for peace, for understanding, for love, among humans. It's genuine. I'm still trying to do it. If there is a semblance of truth in what I'm saying, is it not better to push us into substantiating it? The government is doing all these tilings that I proved to you here. They are not lying about it. How can 76 percent vote a lie? It's real democracy as far as that goes.

On the rise of the right-wing in South African politics:

What is now a tragedy is that because little success has been registered along this way, the people on the right are making inroads. They now have a very simple message—that people like me, President Botha, and the government are selling out the whites, that we are traitors, communists, God knows what. They are making inroads because they tell the people that the blacks won't talk to us, that we're not improving race relations, we're not solving the problem. They say there is only one way—to divide the country, more apartheid, go back to the old roads, that is the safest, the surest, the best. And that's a tragedy, because later on, you will not be looking at violence from only one side. I fear you will look at a worsening situation. If you could get such a council off the ground, if people would start negotiating, then there is no way that the right-wing could make progress. I know them well, they want a solution as much as anybody else. One thing that is overlooked is that there are no people on this globe who more want a solution to the South African problem than the South Africans themselves. Why would an American want a solution more than I do?
A couple of years ago, Tony Bloom caused a flutter when he accompanied a group of leading white South African businessmen to Lusaka for talks with the outlawed African National Congress (ANC). Bloom headed the business his father established, the Premier Group, which is now one of South Africa's largest employers. The company also conducts business in other parts of Africa.

In January, Bloom caused another stir when he announced that he was quitting South Africa, just as several other business leaders have done in recent years. But he will maintain his links with the country and his company. Bloom has been "out of step with the business regiment" in South Africa, since he is a public critic of the government's apartheid policies and missed out on a round of talks last year between the captains of industry and State President P.W. Botha.

On February 5, the day parliament reconvened, P.W. Botha again met business leaders in Cape Town. But Bloom was not there. He agreed instead to this interview with Ameen Akhalwaya, editor of The Indicator, at Premier's magnificent offices in Johannesburg.

Africa Report: There has been considerable speculation about why you have decided to leave South Africa. What are the real reasons?

Bloom: It's been a traumatic and agonizing decision and as usual in decisions of this kind, there isn't one peg only on which to hang it. In my case, it's an amalgam of personal, family, and business reasons. The family reasons relate to a member of my family who was injured in an accident. [His daughter is being treated in a hospital in England.] As far as business reasons are concerned, I've been able to work out something with the Premier board of directors which will enable me to stay on as a director of the company and to expand and develop their international relationships and hopefully also their business base internationally, which is very important at this time.

People have been looking for a hidden agenda in my decision. There isn't one, I'm afraid. I've been asked if I'm leaving for political reasons. The answer is not really, because I've learned to live with the politics—although I don't like them—over the past 20 years of my political consciousness. Nothing has happened within the last three to six months which has made me suddenly throw my hands up in horror and say: "I've had enough, I want to get out." I'm certainly not leaving 'because I fear revolution or violence. I don't think we are on the brink of some sort of cataclysmic explosion. I think we are in for a long, slow haul.  

Africa Report: What do you ascribe that decline to?

Bloom: If I had to put one word on it, I would say "fear." P.W. Botha in the last election—and one thing you have to hand to him is that he is a skillful exploiter of white political fears—beat the security drum very hard indeed and the white voters responded to that. So I would say that at the bottom of it is fear, compounded by the state of emergency. People are worried that if they get involved in left-wing politics, they might get detained or silenced in some way. Lastly, there is an absence of a coherent leadership. Any political movement has to have a strong core that you can identify with—and the liberal left has been groping for that leadership.

Africa Report: Do you think that was because Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert resigned as leader of the Progressive Federal Party?

Bloom: It is ever since he resigned

Africa Report: Where does that leave people like [PFP MP] Helen Suzman who have a record of fighting for liberal values?

Bloom: There is hardly anybody in the country that I have more admiration for than Helen Suzman, but she has been at it for a very long time in Parliament. I don't think she is about to assume the role of a leader. Helen will always be a standard-bearer for liberal values, in effect the standard against which everybody else will be judged.

Africa Report: What about the independent movement—Van Zyl Slabbert's IDASA [Institute of Democratic Alterna-
Bloom: The work Van Zyl is doing is very important in what I would call a micro-political environment, in working at community level and breaking down prejudices between people in smaller areas. But on a macro-national basis, I think they are going to struggle hard.

Africa Report: You haven’t been exactly beguiled by P.W. Botha in terms of dealings with business leaders. In fact, you missed out on his previous meeting—boycott would be another word for that—and even as we speak now he is meeting business leaders in Cape Town. Is there any reason for this?
Bloom: No. It’s just been my own public stance on those sort of matters. I’ve been very outspoken on the question of racial discrimination and other issues related to apartheid, which I have never hesitated to criticize. Some people think I’m too outspoken, that it’s my job to run a company and not to be a politician. The state president is not a man who deals with criticism easily. He is very tough and he tramps very hard on those who are seen to cross his path. You just have to see what happened to Chris Ball [Barclays National Bank managing director who was accused of financing pro-ANC ads] as an example.

Africa Report: Do you see yourself, Claris Ball, and one or two others as exceptions in the business held in terms of being aware of the political consequences of the government’s policies:

Bloom: Business is very aware of the political and economic consequences of government policy. There are different reactions as to what should be done about it. Some people are quite happy to acquiesce in it, and others are positively acquiescent. Others are happy to just go along with it and not say anything, not stick their necks out. I’m not saying who’s right and who’s wrong. I’ve always felt out of step with the government. I’ve been viewed as the lunatic left of the business establishment by my colleagues!

Africa Report: On the other hand, trade unionists and more radical black activists would regard you as part of the overall apartheid scheme.
Bloom: That’s right. As far as a lot of the black liberation movements—in particular the union movement—are concerned, I’m identified with the capitalist class and therefore on the other side of the fence. That’s natural. I certainly don’t resent that in any way. It is our policy in this group to try very hard to work out some sort of modus vivendi with the unions. We’ve got to learn to live with each other.

We’re probably 85 to 95 percent unionized at this point, and that’s something I welcome. Yes, we’re going to have our punch-ups in wage disputes or work conditions, but that’s a good, healthy negotiating process which I don’t shy away from. In my discussions with union leaders—and there have been few, too few, because there is suspicion and mistrust and I am identified with the capitalist class—I try to point out that there is a difference between exploitative capital on the one hand and free enterprise on the other, and I am very firmly in favor of free enterprise. I think that’s the system that works.

Africa Report: A lot of major employers as well as government fear the increasing political role and power of the unions. Because of the government’s actions against organized politi-

"I've always felt out of step with the regiment. I've been viewed as the lunatic left of the business establishment by my colleagues!"
Africa Report: Would that support those who believe in apartheid? Bloom: That’s very likely to happen because if you close off every other avenue for political expression and leave only one, then you must expect all the political aspirations to be channelled through it. There is a very real danger of that happening—if it hasn’t happened already.

Africa Report: How do you see the economic situation developing in the next 10 to 15 years?

Bloom: I don’t need a crystal ball! I don’t know about 10 to 15 years, it’s hard to look two or three years ahead. There is no doubt that the economy is in better shape than it was two years ago. Let’s start from that point. There seems to be a resurgence of consumer spending, companies are doing better despite the fall of the stock market and so on, there is more of an air of business confidence around, a certain amount of new investment is taking place by South African companies. Those are positive points.

The ones to worry about are inflation and the fact that there is no foreign capital coming in to develop the whole infrastructure of business and create the jobs that are necessary to absorb all the work-seekers who will come onto the market place. But in the short term, I think we can look to reasonable economic conditions.

Africa Report: What do you think the government should be doing in terms of fundamental changes to be able to attract more capital, to change the disinvestment campaign?

Bloom: There is only one answer—you have to scrap statutory discrimination, take it off our statute books in every vestige. You might have to announce a timetable, a very short timetable, but a precise one. But until we take statutorily entrenched discrimination out of our laws, we’re going to be regarded as the polecat of the world.

Africa Report: Do you think the government is ready to do it?

Bloom: No.

Africa Report: Why not?

Bloom: I don’t know the answer to that, but P.W. Botha made it clear in the last elections that there are certain non-negotiable issues. Segregated schooling is non-negotiable except for incremental relaxations as far as private schools are concerned. Segregated residential areas are going to remain. Political rights for blacks are not going to be given except in structures which are not part of the mainstream. You most certainly are not going to have blacks in the overall Parliament. The Population Registration Act is going to remain. Those are the cornerstones, the pillars of apartheid. If you take the state president at his word—and I think you should—those are not going to be abolished, in the near future anyway.

Africa Report: Would that not support those who believe in violent overthrow of the government, or in non-violent change who would support economic sanctions and disinvestment as a form of pressurizing the government?

Bloom: On the question of violence as a political option, I understand what drives people to violence, I don’t condone it. Frankly, I don’t think it’s going to achieve anything in the South African context because the scales are so unevenly weighted. The government is so powerful militarily, with its security apparatus, police, etc. You may well have sporadic acts of violence but basically the government is very firmly in control of the situation. So, I don’t think political rights are going to be won by violence for a very long time.

On the other question, I’m totally against disinvestment and sanctions, basically because I believe that the way to break apartheid is by economic advancement. Because there are such inequities in the South African situation, the way to break them down is to open up the economy to everybody and to really break down in practice, in the work place, what legislation seeks to entrench in theory. I think that’s going to spill over into the broader social fabric.

There have been more transgressions of the Group Areas Act as a result of economic mobility in South Africa than there have been by legislative amendments. Finally, the government will be faced with a situation that it can’t control legislatively and will have to recognize it. And I would argue for that. I don’t think sanctions work. They produce belligerence and defiance in the South African white population and I’ve never seen it as a weapon for black advancement.

Africa Report: One sphere in which sanctions have been applied with a great degree of effect and in which there has been significant change is sport. One could argue that the same could apply to economics—that with sanctions and disinvestment, South Africa has to internalize the economy. This, in turn, should bring black advancement much more quickly and at the same time pressurize the government.

Bloom: I just don’t see it that way. The South African economy is a very strong, robust one and the infrastructure is very developed. It is not that fragile that all you’ve got to do is impose a few sanctions and the whole system will collapse and therefore something will rise from the ashes.

Africa Report: We are talking about comprehensive sanctions.

Bloom: Even so, you could argue the other way—that in some cases where sanctions have been imposed, like the arms embargo, South Africa has developed an indigenous arms industry and in fact has become an exporter of arms. Take the oil embargo. Sasol has been developed, synthetic...
fuels have been developed, and ways around it have been found.

Africa Report: Could your departure not be seen as a form of disinvestment?

Bloom: As I have said, there are serious family reasons and so on behind it. Well, some people are going to see it that way. But I'm not going to sever my links either with the company I work for or with South Africa. I'm going to be coming here four or five times a year, maintaining my position on the board of this company and hopefully on the board of other companies. I have a holiday home here, I have friends and family here, I have roots in this country. I feel deeply and passionately about South Africa, so I will continue to be involved with it. I'm not saying I'm leaving and that's that. I'm going to see it again.

Africa Report: Has your public stance regarding the company's policies, economic direction, and so forth had any adverse effect on it?

Bloom: No. To be absolutely fair, we have never been penalized in any way in our dealings with government departments. We take a fair amount of verbal stick, but we have never been denied a licence.

Africa Report: You're not going to go overboard like a well-known financial institution and start sponsoring everything in sight like rebel rugby tours?

Bloom: No. I've been part of a team that has developed the philosophies and practices of this organization, and they will continue. Peter Wrighton, who takes over from me, has been involved in all the major policy decisions and we feel and think the same way. I'm not saying we're perfect, we're not. But we try. There is a big gap in this organization between policy and practice. It's all very well for the chairman to say that there shall be no discrimination in our organization and do nothing to make it happen.

Africa Report: I recall criticism levelled at you at a conference in Gaborone last year by South African trade unionists regarding your company's policies and actual practices. Do you find a lot of resistance to your policies within the company?

Bloom: No. We are a very large company in the South African context and nationally based. We must assume that our employment mirrors what is happening in the whole of South Africa. The employment is overwhelmingly black. Management is, regrettfully, overwhelmingly white, and that white management probably reflects the attitude of society at large.

"I'm totally against disinvestment and sanctions, basically because I believe that the way to break apartheid is by economic advancement."

If you had to poll them for their political views, they would probably percentage-wise fall into your voting patterns, more or less. I would be surprised if they reflect anything else. So not everybody agrees with my political views or indeed the company's "political philosophies." But having said that, there is a willingness in the organization to listen, and there are certain policies which we regard as cast and concrete, that are immutable. One of them is non-discrimination in employment. If you ask if that happens in our bakery in Naboomspruit [a rural town], the answer is probably not. But if we found out that that's happening, we will try to do something about it.

Africa Report: Do you get people wanting to work for you because of that philosophy or despite it?

Bloom: Both. Earlier, I said we've never been penalized by the government. That is not the reason for doing it. We do it because we feel it is right. On the other hand, for example, we do a fair amount of business in the rest of Africa, where people have checked out for our credentials, liked the way we operate, and we picked up business as a result. That's not the reason for adopting our policies. We adopted them because we think they're right. But there is a spill-over effect, no doubt.

Africa Report: Have you been able to maintain any sort of contact or dialogue with the ANC since you first met them?

Bloom: Yes, totally informally.

Africa Report: It is said that you tried to convince them of the merits of free enterprise.

Bloom: I still do. We have discussions all the time—I'm not winning.

Africa Report: A draw?

Bloom: Not even a draw yet. I think I'm down!

Africa Report: What would you say is needed to break the logjam between the ANC and the government and other organizations as well, to try to get them together?

Bloom: The first thing to be done—and this may be happening and I simply don't know about it—is to establish at least an informal channel of communication, a back channel if you like, through which we can iron out differences, or just see what the stumbling blocks are.

The perceived stumbling blocks from the South African government's side are the ANC's adherence to violence as a means of achieving political ends, primarily. From the ANC’s point of view, quite a laundry list of things: the state of emergency, the imprisonment of black leaders, the government to express its willingness to come to the negotiating table with an open agenda, not a pre-arranged one.

You only have to think of the things Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin said about each other before they threw away their arms around each other at Camp David. I know the peace is fragile. It has its difficulties, but nevertheless two parties who were seemingly irreconcilable and poles apart found that they did have something in common. And at least between Egypt and Israel, for the last eight or nine years, there has been peace.

The public rhetoric has to cool from both sides. You have to stop this tirade of anti-ANC propaganda which is pushed out all the tune by the SABC and the press over here. On the other side, there is equally a level of rhetoric in Radio Freedom that's not helpful. But it's going to take some skilled diplomacy to get them together, some world figure maybe. Maybe Mrs. Margaret Thatcher will see that as her crowning exit role.
United We Stand

Worsening dissident violence and regional conflict were the factors which finally led Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo to put aside their differences and merge their political parties. The foremost task of the new coalition will be to convince the people of Matabeleland that they are truly a part of Zimbabwe's political future.

BY ANDREW MELDRUM

In Zimbabwe, like the rest of southern Africa, the end of the year brings rain, and with it relief from overpowering dry heat and the hope of a good harvest. But by December last year, the seasonal rains had not arrived.

Instead of being wet, November suffered through scorching sunny weather which sent temperatures soaring to record highs. Crops withered in the fields, water reservoirs dwindled, and tempers frayed. Economists began to speak of another drought, the fifth serious one this decade, and a resultant economic downturn.

Zimbabwe's political tensions rose as well. The country was reeling from the vicious axe-murders in November of 15 white missionaries by a band of anti-government dissident rebels in Matabeleland. It looked as if Zimbabwe's political and ethnic divisions could only get worse. Zimbabwe was hot, parched, and tense.

Then a thick belt of clouds rolled down from central Africa and thunder sounded throughout the country, bringing cooling, soothing, and soothing rains. As the rainstorms continued regularly through the holiday season, so did Zimbabwe's political developments.

Just before Christmas, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo resolved to put aside their differences and to join their two rival nationalist parties in order to unite the country and help reduce support for the dissident rebels. On New Year's eve, Robert Mugabe was inaugurated as Zimbabwe's first executive president, and on January 2, he announced a new and restructured cabinet.

Taken together, those three changes have decisively altered the face of Zimbabwe's government, making it representative of all the country's significant population groups and bringing it just one step away from becoming a one-party state.

The announcement of Zimbabwe's "unity agreement" was as dramatic as any drought-breaking cloudburst. On December 22, as the overwhelmingly Christian country was preparing for the Christmas holiday, Mugabe and Nkomo abruptly convened the domestic and international press to attend the signing of a unity accord joining the two parties.

The spirit was jovial and festive, as longtime archfoes Mugabe and Nkomo warmly embraced after signing the document. The normally abstemious Mugabe even sipped a glass of champagne in a celebratory toast.

The signing of the unity accord was hailed by diplomats as the most significant political development since the country's achievement of majority rule in 1980. It was so momentous an occasion because it was the necessary first step toward reducing the political rift which has divided Zimbabwe along ethnic lines. That ethnic division, between the 75 percent Shona majority which generally supports Mugabe's party and the 20 percent Ndebele minority which
largely backs Nkomo's ZAPU, has been the country's most troubling problem since independence.

The usually taciturn Mugabe was uncharacteristically effusive when speaking about the unity agreement. "This occasion fills me with emotion. The younger and elder brothers who have been separated by circumstance have now come back home and are together," said Mugabe of himself, 63, and Nkomo, 70. "We can now move into the future hand-in-hand, knowing that we leave behind us a united country, instead of going to our graves separately, leaving behind us a divided country."

Of course, Mugabe had much to be pleased about. The unity agreement was very much on the terms laid down by his ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Nkomo's party, the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), was not by any means the equal partner in the merger. ZAPU will simply join Mugabe's party and accept the ZANU name.

Mugabe became the newly enlarged party's president and first secretary. Nkomo and ZANU stalwart Simon Muzenda were named the vice-presidents and second secretaries. Thus ZAPU was given a top, but clearly secondary position. The unity pad also called for the establishment of "a socialist society in Zimbabwe on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles" and for the creation of a one-party state.

Nkomo, much more subdued in praising the merger, acknowledged ZAPU's secondary status in the agreement when appealing to his followers "not to look at who has gained and who has not gained," but instead to take pride in a newly unified nation. "We do not want to leave behind a legacy of divisions," said Nkomo. "We want to lay the foundation of a Zimbabwe with one people, one nation."

Both politicians expressed gratitude to President Canaan Banana for working tirelessly as mediator to bring the two opposing parties together. President Banana, soon to retire as Mugabe assumed the new post of executive president, said the achievement of unity between the two parties allowed him to leave office troubled and satisfied.

"With this national unity we have founded our enemies who sought to inflame our differences," said Reverend Banana, a Methodist minister. "With this unity we have found a new political maturity which will see us working together as one nation against violent discord and destabilization."

The merger agreement must be ratified by the full congresses of both parties, which should take place in March or April, according to government sources. In the meantime, the agreement states, "Both parties must take immediate, vigorous steps to eliminate and end the insecurity and violence prevalent in Matabeleland." Despite all Mugabe's warm words, it was the continuing and escalating anti-government violence that brought his proud, even arrogant, party to accept the merger.

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The differences between ZAPU and ZANU date back to 1963. At that time, Nkomo was the leader of ZAPU, the nationalist party with widespread support among blacks throughout the country in its crusade for the end of white minority rule.

In 1963, a group of Nkomo's deputies, including Robert Mugabe, broke away to form ZANU. Some say it was because of Nkomo's domineering style of leadership, others because of policy differences, but the effect of the breakaway was to ethnically divide the nationalist movement. Eventually the majority of Shona people supported ZANU, and the Ndebele minority, concentrated in the southern Matabeleland region of the country, remained loyal to Nkomo.

The differences between the parties increased during the guerrilla war to end Rhodesian rule. Nkomo, the better known leader internationally, won military support from the Soviet Union and set up exile headquarters in Zambia. The Soviets provided large amounts of weapons and training for Nkomo's military force, the Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), which developed largely as a conventional armed force, preparing for a head-to-head battle with the Rhodesian army.

ZANU, on the other hand, received support from China, and its military wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), was based in Mozambique. The Chinese did not spend nearly as much money on hardware, but they imparted their classic Maoist guerrilla techniques to ZANLA.

As a result, ZANLA became very effective in winning the active support of the majority of the country's peasants, which helped tip the scales in favor of the African nationalists before the Rhodesian army was actually defeated in any large-scale battle.

By 1979, Mugabe, as leader of ZANU, and Nkomo set aside their differences to negotiate together as the Patriotic Front at the Lancaster House talks in London. But when it came time for the first elections in 1980, Mugabe pulled away from the Patriotic Front so that his ZANU stood alone in competition against Nkomo's ZAPU, as well as against the parties of Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole.

The 1980 election results confirmed that Mugabe's party had the overwhelming support of the country's Shona majority, as ZANU won 57 of the UK parliamentary seats, while Nkomo's ZAPU took just 20 seats, all of them confined to the Matabeleland and Midlands regions where the Ndebele people are concentrated.

As the new prime minister, Mugabe formed a government of national unity, including whites and Joshua Nkomo and other ZAPU leaders in his new government. But in 1982, Nkomo and other ZAPU cabinet ministers were sacked amid charges that ZAPU had secretly hoarded huge arms caches for use in a coup against the Mugabe government. Top leaders of Nkomo's ZIPRA forces were arrested, charged with treason, acquitted in the High Court, and then held without charges.

The dissident violence began in 1982
when disgruntled former ZIPRA members took to the bush to violently protest what they felt was unfair government treatment of Nkomo, ZAPU, and the Ndebele people in general. Six foreign tourists were kidnapped and murdered by a dissident band, white farmers were killed, and so were government workers throughout rural Matabeleland. Although Nkomo repudiated the anti-government violence, it became clear that the peasants in rural Matabeleland were giving food and shelter to the rebels, much as they had done during the anti-Rhodesian war.

Army campaigns in Matabeleland in 1983 and 1984 to eradicate the dissidents compounded the country's divisions, as thousands of Ndebele peasants were killed and brutalized, according to church and international aid workers at the time. Alienation of the Ndebele people from the Harare government grew, and ZAPU's political participation dwindled. In the 1985 national elections, ZAPU's parliamentary seats were reduced by five to just 15. In 1987, ZAPU's offices were closed by the government and the opposition party was forbidden to hold rallies. Unable to function, ZAPU was as good as banned.

During those years, the two parties, which have no basic ideological differences, sporadically held discussions to end their differences, coming very close to actually accomplishing a merger at least twice. But ZAPU chafed at accepting a junior partner position, top ZANU members did not like the idea of having to share any cabinet and party positions with ZAPU, and the efforts to bring the two parties together faltered.

But by the end of 1987, the dissident rebels had spread their violence throughout Matabeleland and the Midlands, having killed more than 70 white farmers and hundreds of peasant farmers. There was evidence of South African involvement with the dissidents—the pro-dissident Radio Truth was broadcasting from South Africa and dissident ammunition was traced back to that country.

Adding to the Mugabe government's worries was the new spate of attacks along Zimbabwe's western border with Mozambique by the Renamo rebels. Renamo's border raids into Zimbabwe started in June and by December there had been more than 100 incidents, many in which Zimbabweans were brutally hacked to death with machetes.

Already burdened with the costly deployment of some 10,000 troops in central Mozambique, the government began to feel that it could not afford two domestic security threats—the dissidents in the south and Renamo in the east. So with a bowed ZAPU and a worried ZANU, the unity merger was successfully concluded.

Just a week later, Mugabe was inaugurated as Zimbabwe's first executive president, holding the responsibilities of both the head of state and of government. The Zimbabwe constitution was amended to create the new post and abolish those of prime minister and president of state.

Mugabe's inauguration was a gala event at the shiny new Chinese-built 60,000-seat stadium. The heads of state of Botswana, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia attended the ceremonies. Even with all the pomp and circumstance, however, the inauguration remained somewhat overshadowed by the significance of the unity pact. One of the biggest cheers from the stadium crowd was received by a beaming Joshua Nkomo as he took his place on the dais.

A few days later, Robert Mugabe announced his new cabinet. Nkomo, who was named one of three senior ministers to oversee several other ministries, is responsible for rural development, which is very important to Matabeleland as well as to the rest of the country. Two other top ZAPU members, John Nkomo (no relation) and Joseph Msika, were named cabinet ministers.

Mugabe also included one white minister and two deputy ministers in his new cabinet. The only disappointment expressed by diplomats was that he retained all previous ZANU ministers, even though a strong odor of corruption has grown around many.

The enlarged cabinet gives representation to all important interests. "I think Mr. Mugabe is a very shrewd politician," said one Western diplomat approvingly. "I think he knows how to get what he wants from the new cabinet, no matter what size it is."

While it remains to be seen if the merger of Zimbabwe's two nationalist parties can bring an end to the country's dissident violence, it is apparent that the country now has a de facto one-party state and the way is now clear for Mugabe to achieve his often-stated goal of establishing a de jure one-party state.

In many African countries, the problems created by a single party form of government outweigh the benefits. But in Zimbabwe, many diplomats point out, the merger of the two parties is undeniably positive as it has started a process of reducing dangerous conflict between the country's two major ethnic groups. Nevertheless, as heartfelt and moving as the signing of the unity agreement was, the pact alone is not sufficient to solve the dissident problem or the years of bitterness built up among the rural Ndebeles.

The leaders of the amalgamated parties wasted no time in holding rallies throughout Matabeleland to promote the new merger and to encourage the peasants to support the new government line-up, not the dissidents. The need for such promotion was evident at a January rally in Lupane, where when some 10,000 rural villagers were asked if they were aware of the unity agreement and new cabinet, said they knew nothing about it. Top ZAPU members quickly began describing the political developments to them.

Absent for years from newspaper and television reports, the massive figure of Joshua Nkomo was featured making impassioned appeals for his followers to support the Harare government and to end all cooperation with the dissident rebels. At his side were top ZANU ministers, who just a year earlier had described Nkomo himself as a dissident.

But just as the Matabeleland countryside needs more steady rains to ensure a good harvest in April, the troubled region also needs to see new government development projects—roads, schools, and irrigation schemes. Many of those efforts were abandoned during the years of dissident violence, but must be revived again to convince the Ndebele peasants that they are truly included in the political and economic development of Zimbabwe.

The most controversial new book in Zimbabwe is one written by the man who headed Rhodesia’s Central Intelligence Organization from before the illegal Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 until after Rhodesia became the independent, majority-ruled nation of Zimbabwe in 1980. Harare-based author and journalist Julie Frederikse was the first to obtain an interview with the elusive Ken Flower soon after independence, when she was researching her book. None But Ourselves: Masses vs. Media in the Making of Zimbabwe. Africa Report asked her for an assessment of Flower’s memoirs. Serving Secretly, released shortly before his death late last year.

**BY JULIE FREDERIKSE**

It was mid-1980, just a few months after Robert Mugabe had assumed power. I had been interviewing the new minister of state for security, Emmerson Mnangagwa, about the history of the Mozambique National Resistance, now commonly known by its Portuguese acronym, Renamo, and was eager to confirm its origins in both Portuguese and Rhodesian intelligence. Suddenly Mnangagwa picked up the phone and made a call, then motioned to the door. “I’ve arranged for you to speak with the man who knows more about this than anyone,” he explained. “His name is Ken Flower.”

Although Flower was clearly not pleased to see me and my tape recorder, he agreed to answer my questions about the founding, funding, training, and direction of a rebel movement aimed at destabilizing the government of neighboring Mozambique, which had provided wartime support and bases for Zimbabwean guerrillas fighting for majority rule.

“Don’t quote me, and I’ll deny it if you do,” he began, “but it was decided as I Rhodesian government policy to assist the resistance.” Flower went on to claim credit for the rebels’ propaganda radio, telling me, “It was run as a clandestine station and nobody’s proved exactly how it operated, but I’m telling you quite frankly, and you’re the first reporter I’ve ever told, that it operated from inside Rhodesia.”

For me, those startling admissions made more than seven years ago remain more revelatory than anything I have heard or read from Flower since—including the disclosures contained in the book published just before his recent death. Zimbabwe’s main newspaper, the Herald, criticized it as “a scanty survey devoid of any essential details which one would have liked to see in a work written by one who was involved in carving out all the dirty work of the Smith regime.” Indeed, anyone expecting fresh information and insights into the undercover campaigns of Rhodesia’s failed fight to maintain white supremacy will be disappointed.

While Flower uses every opportunity to emphasize his and the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization’s links with the CIA and especially MI6 (to the point of arousing suspicions that he might have been a British intelligence mole), the book’s treatment of various Rhodesian “dirty tricks” is frustratingly sketchy.

Flower takes credit for the assassinations of several guerrilla leaders, the instigation of a rebellion in ZANU’s camps, and even the distribution of poisoned uniforms which reportedly killed hundreds of guerrilla forces, but his dispassionate description of these atrocities will cause no concern to the perpetrators, for few new details are revealed.

Flower concedes that his insistence upon the “militarization of pseudo-operations” via the formation of the notorious Selous Scouts was “the worst mistake I made,” for it “attracted vainglorious extroverts and a few psychopathic killers,” yet Flower protects their methods and identities.

In short, *Serving Secretly* is of some value to the colonial historian or political analyst studying the liberation struggle, specifically in illuminating the extent of South African pressure on Rhodesia for a settlement—motivated by Pretoria’s hope that “sacrificing Rhodesia” would buy time in both Namibia and South Africa itself.

The book’s real value, however, is to those analyzing the evolving regional power balance with a view toward trying to fathom the strategies and predict the tactics of the South African government and military. Flower reviews the history of Rhodesia’s ties to Pretoria from the joint guerrilla incursions of Zimbabwean and African National Congress forces, which brought South African police and troops to Rhodesia in 1967, through Pretoria’s desperate efforts to influence the outcome of the 1980 elections.

“Whether we like it or not we are all in this tiling together,” Flower writes in his diary after a 1973 visit to Salisbury by South Africa’s then-minister of defense, P.W. Botha. The logical follow-up is a briefing to Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith in advance of a private meeting with his South African counterpart, John Vorster: “It should suit the South Africans to put more effort into clandestine operations, within and outside Rhodesia.”

Given Flower’s circumspect style and apparent commitment to protecting his agents and contacts, the reader should expect no dramatic revelations. Rather, his account of the intelligence connections between the two countries offers opportunities to draw parallels, analyze differences, and speculate about future regional trends, as based on the Rhode-
sian experience. Robert Mugabe was released from 10 years in a Rhodesian jail in 1975 and in 1980 moved into Ian Smith's office; where will the newly-released Govan Mbeki and the rest of his ANC comrades in South African prisons be in five years time?

Flower's book chronicles Rhodesia's attempts to co-opt black allies, culminating in the internal settlement that brought the ill-fated Bishop Muzorewa to power in 1978. Pretoria's similar maneuvers, both in Namibia and South Africa, are reminiscent of this tactic. But even more chillingly familiar are the paramilitary structures created to prop up these unmandated alliances; in Rhodesia they were called private armies and "auxiliaries," while in South Africa today vigilantes and "kitskonstabels" (hastily trained black township police) defend the reviled black "sell-outs" who deal with Pretoria.

Another tactic Flower describes resonates in the current South African context: "Because Rhodesia was losing the war at home," he writes, "the military planners turned outwards in frustration, to strike beyond our borders where inhibitions need not apply." Thus the most direct parallel between Rhodesia's prosecution of its war and South Africa's relates to the Renamo rebels that Flower's CIO turned over to South African military intelligence when Zimbabwe gained its independence.

A top secret document reprinted in the book's appendix details Renamo's founding, as modelled on the Angolan Flechas ("arrows" or, as Flower calls them, pseudo-terrorists). In the final chapter, he recounts Renamo's transfer to South Africa, concluding, "I began to wonder whether we had created a monster that was now beyond control." Since it was Flower's CIO that acted as the Dr. Frankenstein that created the monster in the first place. Flower's retrospective regret is unconvincing.

Like Renamo, many of the other monsters he helped create—the Selous Scouts, Muzorewa's auxiliaries, CIO's dirty tricksters—have fled southward to Pretoria. Any sincere effort at undoing the resultant damage wrought throughout the entire region should be directed at exposing those still-active agents of destabilization.

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SENEGAL  BLACK GIRL. 1965-Directed by Ousmane Sembene. Landmark African film about an uprooted Senegalese servant girl in France.


EMITAI. 1972. Directed by Ousmane Sembene. A clash between French colonialists and a mystical African tribe in the closing days of World War II.


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