


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**NELSON MANDELA:
FREE AT LAST!**



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To Our Readers:

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The cover photograph was taken in Cape Town by Impact Visuals.



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A Hero's Welcome

The skies over Soweto suddenly opened up, letting loose a heavy downpour on the crowds gathered outside the modest Mandela home, as hundreds of miles away, Nelson, hand-in-hand with wife Winnie, was striding to freedom, at the gate of Victor Verster Prison in Paarl.

In Africa, the rains are an omen—a traditional sign of good fortune and a cause for celebration and thanksgiving. Hence, in the black township which Nelson Mandela called home 27 long years ago, there could have been no better benediction on the event, nor portent of its significance.

As Mandela's stately and elegant form emerged to greet a global audience little prepared for the poignancy the moment was to hold, emotions ran high, from irrepressible joy to tears of sorrow at the sight of a man who had suffered under the cruelty of apartheid perhaps more than any other, yet had emerged with his dignity and commitment ever stronger.

February 11, 1990, was a day many had hoped, prayed, and worked for, but few had expected to occur so precipitately, nor unfold quite so majestically. The suddenness of F.W. de Klerk's announcement of Mandela's imminent release only served to heighten the drama of the event as it transpired before our eyes on television screens around the world.

And nothing could have been more moving than the sight of the aging, bespectacled black nationalist, finally unfettered and no longer silenced, delivering with presidential authority his first public address in decades, before hundreds of thousands of supporters in front of Cape Town City Hall.

The euphoria will soon die down, and South Africans, black and white, will get on with the long, arduous process of negotiating a new future for the nation, but nothing will erase the memory of that historic day in February when a true hero finally made his walk to freedom. We excerpt here Nelson Mandela's speech in Cape Town on February 11, 1990.

—Margaret A. Novicki

"Today, the majority of South Africans, black and white, recognize that apartheid has no future. It has to be ended by our own decisive mass actions in order to build peace and security. The mass campaigns of defiance and other actions of our organizations and people can only culminate in the establishment of democracy.

"The factors which necessitated the armed struggle still continue today. We have no option but to continue. We express the hope that a climate conducive to a negotiated settlement would be created soon so that there may no longer be the need for the armed struggle.

"Today I wish to report to you that my talks with the government have been aimed at normalizing the political situation in the country. We have not as yet begun discussing the basic demands of the struggle.

"I wish to stress that I myself had at no time entered into negotiations about the future of our country, except to insist on a meeting between the ANC and the government.

"Mr. de Klerk has gone further than any other Nationalist president in taking real steps to normalize the situation. However, there are further steps as outlined in the Harare Declaration that have to be met before negotiations on the basic demands of our people can begin.

"I reiterate our call for inter alia the immediate ending of the state of emergency and the freeing of all, not only some, political prisoners.

"Only such a normalized situation which allows for free political activity can allow us to consult our people in order to obtain a mandate. The people need to be consulted on who will negotiate and on the content of such negotiations. Negotiations cannot take place above the heads or behind the backs of our people. It is our belief that the future of our country can only be determined by a body which is democratically elected on a nonracial basis.

"Negotiations on the dismantling of apartheid will have to address the overwhelming demand of our people for a democratic, nonracial, and unitary South Africa. There must be an end to white monopoly on political power. And a fundamental restructuring of our political and economic systems to insure that the inequalities of apartheid are addressed and our society thoroughly democratized.

"Mr. de Klerk himself is a man of integrity who is acutely aware of the dangers of a public figure not honoring his undertaking. But as an organization, we base our policy and strategy on the harsh reality we are faced with, and this reality is that we are still suffering under the policies of the Nationalist government.

"Our struggle has reached a decisive moment. We call on our people to seize this moment so that the process toward democracy is rapid and uninterrupted. We have waited too long for our freedom. We can no longer wait. Now is the time to intensify the struggle on all fronts.

"To relax our efforts now would be a mistake which generations to come will not be able to forgive. The sight of freedom looming on the horizon should encourage us to redouble our efforts. It is only through disciplined mass action that our victory can be assured.

"We call on our white compatriots to join us in the shaping of a new South Africa. The freedom movement is the political home for you, too. We call on the international community to continue the campaign to isolate the apartheid regime. To lift sanctions now would be to run the risk of aborting the process toward the complete eradication of apartheid. Our march to freedom is irreversible. We must not allow fear to stand in our way.

"Universal suffrage on a common voters roll in a united, democratic, and nonracial South Africa is the only way to peace and racial harmony."

UPDATE

IN THE NEWS

Mandela Release: The Beginning of the End of Apartheid?

As the world watched in amazement, Nelson Mandela was freed after 27 and a half years of imprisonment on February 11, 1990, opening a new chapter in South Africa's history. Seeing the 71-year old, gray-haired Mandela exit the grounds of Victor Verster Prison was intensely moving, not only as an event in itself, but also as a foretaste of what is to come—the end of white supremacy and the creation of a non-racial democracy in a country with three centuries of white domination. However far-fetched it would have seemed only a few months ago, Mandela's liberation effectively signalled the beginning of the dismantling of apartheid and the transition to black majority rule.

The breadth of his first public speech from Cape Town's City Hall, before an exuberant crowd of South Africans, was impressive: Mandela stood firm in his opposition to apartheid, but adroitly praised the integrity of President de Klerk; he called for an intensification of the armed struggle, but was eager to point out that violence could be abandoned if certain of his conditions were met; he confirmed the ANC's commitment to black majority rule, but was quick to reassure white South Africans that they would be protected; and while he urged the continuation of sanctions, he renewed his commitment for negotiations with the white minority.

"I have fought against white domination and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony, and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and an ideal for which I am prepared to die," said Mandela during the Rivonia Trial in 1964. Upon being released, he reiterated these words, which sounded as forceful and relevant in February 1990 as they did back then. Only this time, in the wake of the sweeping changes initiated by de Klerk, fortress

South Africa appears to be a more vulnerable and humble edifice, and white South Africans listened carefully to what Mandela had to say. Until de Klerk's February 2 speech before Parliament, the ANC was banned, considered a terrorist organization seeking the installation of a Marxist dictatorship. Today, the ruling National Party views the ANC as a political force to be reckoned with and Mandela a valuable mediator.

Optimistic about Negotiations

Mandela acknowledged that he had held secret talks with top officials of the South African government over the past three years, including Justice Minister Kobie Coetsee, Constitutional Affairs Minister Gerrit Viljoen, former President P.W. Botha, and F.W. de Klerk. These discussions, however, did not in any way compromise his position, but rather helped to transform the political climate in Pretoria and to

facilitate exploratory meetings between the ANC and the government which will pave the way toward dialogue.

In his contacts with the government, Mandela allayed the fears of white South Africans about the future and acknowledged that whites want constitutional guarantees which will prevent the black majority from dominating. He has continually reassured the white community that they will be safe in a black-ruled South Africa: "Whites are fellow South Africans and we want them to feel safe and [to know] that we appreciate the contribution they have made toward the development of the country," he said.

The black leader is optimistic that negotiations between the government and the ANC will begin soon, and has said that the ANC will give up the armed struggle if the state of emergency is lifted and a few other conditions are met: "If the government gives us the opportunity, if they normalize the [political] situation, we are ready to make a positive contribution toward the peaceful settlement of the problems in this country."

In turn, only two days after Mandela's release, Gerrit Viljoen disclosed that Pretoria foresees the end of white rule over the next five years, hinting that South Africa's next general election will be undertaken with universal suffrage.

Mandela's daunting task is only matched by de Klerk's steep road ahead. Will the black leader be able to maintain unity within the ANC and bring together the old guard leaders with the young militants? Can he help the anti-apartheid movement reach a consensus? Will he be able to carry out a negotiated settlement and lead the country toward true democracy? Will he compromise on the subject of nationalization of key industries, including banks and mines—an issue which is deeply disturbing to the business community?



ANC celebrants: "Africa it is ours!"

Part of the answer to these questions can be found in Mandela's strength of conviction during the struggle against apartheid in the 1940s and 1950s, as well as in his remarkable resilience throughout his years in prison. For, even though he was kept behind bars for nearly three decades and his words, voice, and image were banned, Mandela never ceased to be the most powerful symbol of opposition to apartheid South Africa has ever known. Even more importantly perhaps, Mandela personified the future for many black South Africans.

"The Struggle Is My Life"

Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela comes from a Tembu ruling family in the Transkei. After attending a Methodist school, he went to Fort Hare College where he enrolled in a bachelor of arts program from which he was suspended for organizing a boycott of the Students' Representative Council, which had been stripped of its authority. While in Johannesburg, he befriended Walter Sisulu, who encouraged him to study law. In 1944, he joined the ANC and with the help of Sisulu, Oliver Tambo and others, formed the group's youth league, of which Mandela became general secretary.

Initially, the ANC's methods of protest were peaceful. But when apartheid was adopted as official policy of the Afrikaner Nationalist government in 1948, Mandela pushed for militant action such as strikes, boycotts, and acts of civil disobedience. In 1952, he helped organize the Defiance Campaign against selected repressive apartheid legislation. He was tried during the same year and imprisoned for nine months. After his release, he became president of the ANC in the Transvaal, and was declared a banned person confined to Johannesburg. The ban was renewed for an additional two years in 1953 and Mandela was ordered to resign from the ANC.

His popularity continued to increase as a result of the legal practice he set up with Oliver Tambo—the first black legal practice in the country. As lawyers, they defended victims of apartheid and were constantly harassed by the security forces.

The 1955 Congress of the People led to the drafting of the Freedom Charter, which was adopted shortly thereafter as official policy of the

ANC. The following year, he, along with Sisulu, Tambo and others, were arrested. The famous Treason Trial that followed charged Mandela with conspiring to overthrow the state and condemned the ANC as a violent, communist-backed liberation movement. However, the court could not prove that violent means had been used, and thus acquitted the accused.

The year 1960, which signalled the beginning of decolonization in Africa, was also the year of the Sharpeville massacre and the imposition of a state of emergency in South Africa. Mandela was one of 20,000 people arrested during the demonstrations. He was released from prison in 1961, after which he enjoyed a brief period of freedom. He took an active part in the All-African Conference in Pietermaritzburg which called for the creation a new republic for all South Africans instead of a white Boer polity. Mandela called for the creation of a national convention "of elected representatives of all adult men and women, on an equal basis, irrespective of race, color or creed, with full powers to determine a new democratic constitution for South Africa." The National Action Council was formed, which Mandela led as secretary, and a general strike was proposed in the event the government did not agree to a representative national convention.

The state responded with fresh violence and Mandela had to go underground. On May 29, 1961, a stay-at-home was organized. This was a turning point in Mandela's thinking, for it was then that he came to the realization that non-violent protest was futile: "The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices: submit or fight. That time has now come in South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means within our power in defense of our people, our future, and our freedom." The only alternative was armed struggle and Mandela helped found Umkhonto we Sizwe, the military wing of the ANC, which launched attacks on government installations.

Mandela briefly travelled in Africa and Europe, met extensively with politicians, and received some military training. As soon as he returned to South Africa, however, he was arrested, allegedly on a tip by an informer in Natal, in August 1962. Charged with

inciting a strike the previous year, he was sentenced to five years hard labor. In July 1963, nearly all Umkhonto we Sizwe leaders were arrested in Rivonia and tried for treason. Mandela admitted to attempting to overthrow the state and pleaded guilty to sabotage. He and Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba, Ahmed Kathrada, Elias Motsoaledi, Andrew Mlangeni, and Denis Goldberg were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. Robben Island maximum security prison was to be Mandela's home for more than two decades, but his struggle did not end there. He studied vociferously, became the prisoners' spokesman, and undertook to educate them politically—thus the prison's nickname, *Mandela University*.

Mandela served 18 years in Robben Island, following which he was transferred to Pollsmoor Prison near Cape Town. In 1985, President P.W. Botha offered Mandela his freedom, in return for his renunciation of violence. The black leader refused the president's offer and confirmed he would continue to do so until the authorities began to dismantle apartheid and to extend full political rights to black South Africans. A year later, Mandela fell seriously ill with tuberculosis and was transferred to Victor Verster prison farm in Paarl, north of Cape Town, where he lived in a white warden's house.

Mandela was instrumental in securing the unconditional release of Walter Sisulu and four other ANC prisoners in October 1989, after a meeting with then-President P.W. Botha. Two months later, the ANC leader met with the new president. The fruits of their talks were no doubt reflected in de Klerk's historic February 2 speech before Parliament that unbanned the ANC and 60 other political organizations and lifted restrictions on 374 people. Mandela's release was imminent, but the world held its breath for a whole week before de Klerk announced on February 10 that Mandela would be released from prison the following day.

Finding a solution to South Africa's future and agreeing on a political system that will encompass the rights and interests of blacks, Coloureds, and whites will be a path full of obstacles. But if there is one person who can help materialize "universal suffrage on a common voters roll in a united democratic and non-racial South Africa," it is Nelson Mandela. ■

MOZAMBIQUE

The ruling Frelimo party unveiled a draft constitution in early January which, if adopted, will signal the most radical shift in the country's political course since independence. The new constitution omits any mention of Frelimo and the working class as designated to play the "leading role" in state and society, and paves the way for a more participatory form of democracy.

Sweeping constitutional changes include provisions for universal suffrage and a secret ballot in direct elections for both the president and parliament; the right to have access to the courts and be presumed innocent until proven guilty; the right to own private land; freedom of opinion, association and religion; and the abolition of the death penalty and the use of torture. Amid a recent and unprecedented wave of strikes and labor unrest, the draft has also incorporated the right to strike. Whereas the question of a multi-party system has been left open, the one freedom conspicuously missing from the draft is freedom of the press.

While President Chissano is openly in favor of a one-party state, he has recognized that the issue must be incorporated in the upcoming nationwide constitutional debate. The South African-backed Mozambique National Resistance will most likely not be part of the deliberations.

ANGOLA

The withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola was temporarily suspended in late January, following what the Cubans called "a deliberate terrorist attack" by 120 Unita rebels on Cuban soldiers stationed in Valle de Hanha, a water pumping station north of Lobito, in the southwest. Four Cubans were killed and five were injured in the allegedly unprovoked attack.

More than half of the 50,000 Cuban troops stationed in Angola have withdrawn since January 1989, in compliance with the New York peace accords involving Angola, South Africa, and Cuba under the supervision of the United Nations. Unita claims it was not aware that Cuban troops were near the station, but Cuba has blamed the U.S. for continuing to back the rebels and wants some assurance that its troops will not be subjected to further attacks.

POLITICAL POINTERS

SOUTH AFRICA

In a dramatic volte-face from orthodox Marxism to political pluralism spurred by the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe, the South African Communist Party (SACP) has denounced the one-party state as incompatible with democracy, in favor of "a multi-party post-apartheid democracy of organization, speech, thought, press, movement, residence, conscience, and religion; full trade union rights for all workers including the right to strike; and one person, one vote in free and democratic elections."

The shift, which is of crucial importance given the fact that communists hold key positions within the ANC, has been orchestrated by the secretary-general of the SACP, Joe Slovo, who in his policy paper "Has Socialism Failed?" radically reassesses the party's role while renewing his commitment to socialism.

The party's revised position reflects the changes—as yet uncertain—currently under way in the strategic alliance between the SACP, the ANC, and the Eastern bloc.

SUDAN

Between 600 and 2,000 displaced Nilotic Shuluk people were massacred and hundreds were wounded by Muslim Subha local militia forces in el-Jebelein in late December, about 220 miles south of Khartoum, after an Arab farmer was killed by his plantation workers who refused to return to work over pay demands and the observance of the Christmas holiday.

The Sudan People's Liberation Army, which claims to be fighting against the domination of the mainly Christian and animist south by the Muslim north, accused the government of complicity, arguing that 90 Shuluk were shot in a local police station where they had sought refuge. The Sudanese government has admitted to less than 200 deaths and has attributed the massacre to inter-tribal feuding.

NIGERIA

President Babangida's end-of-year radical shake-up in government, the armed forces, security, and police has greatly consolidated his power and raised doubts regarding Nigeria's return to civilian rule by 1992. Most controversial was the unexpected departure of key ministerial leaders, including the president's number-two man, the highly respected Gen. Domkat Bali, minister of defense, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, and member of the Armed Forces Ruling Council. Bali, who refused the portfolio of the ministry of interior, has spoken out against the president's "dictatorial" powers.

The cabinet reshuffle caused angry demonstrations in the north by Christians who are uneasy about the monopoly of power by the country's Muslim majority (Bali is a Christian). Babangida has denied any religious connection in the shake-out and claims he is concentrating power (he is now minister of defense and commander-in-chief) in order to ensure a return to democracy.

The president was quick to downplay the implications of the cabinet changes and asserted that "there are no cracks" in his government, or a problem between himself and Bali. Yet, the gravity of the criticisms levelled against him was reflected in the cancellation of visits to the U.S. and Italy.

SENEGAL/MAURITANIA

Tensions between Senegal and Mauritania along the contested Senegal River border escalated in early January with renewed bloody clashes between soldiers that threatened to develop into open conflict. For the first time since the eruption of violence last April, which left hundreds of people dead and thousands displaced on both sides, heavy artillery was used. The Senegalese government claims that at least two civilians and two soldiers have been killed.

Mediation efforts have so far failed to resolve the conflict and Mauritanian President Maouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya's recent interview with *Jeune Afrique* magazine, in which he squarely blames Senegal for the conflict, is only further deadlocking an already dangerous stalemate.

AFRICAN OUTLOOK

Doe Foils Coup but Is Accused of 'Deliberate Genocide'

More than 500 civilians have died, 70,000 have fled to neighboring Côte d'Ivoire, and a further 13,000 have sought refuge in Guinea, following the violence that erupted after a recent attempt to overthrow President Samuel Doe. Some 5,000 Liberians have found themselves displaced and homeless within the country, while it is reported that an additional 50,000 were hiding in the bush.

Indiscriminate killings and atrocities attributed primarily to the army's "scorched earth" tactics were reportedly continuing in northwestern Nimba county long after the December 24 attempted coup d'état, led by Charles Taylor of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), was quelled, according to government sources. Refugees have given harrowing accounts of the army using tanks and mortars, burning homes, and killing women and children, as well as several people praying in a mosque. The confrontations quickly became ethnic in character and the army is being accused of carrying out a "deliberate genocide."

Taylor's reported 200 rebels are Gio, Nimba's main ethnic group, while President Doe's army are mostly Krahn, like himself. Samuel Doe, an illiterate master-sergeant who seized power in a bloody coup in 1980 and has survived a number of coup and assassination attempts, imposed a curfew on the Nimba region and dismissed his interior minister for ignoring hints of the uprising.

The little-known rebel movement, which entered the border towns of Butuo, Loguato, and the capital of Nimba county, Sanniquillié, from Côte d'Ivoire and who have received military aid and training from Libya, is not part of the mainstream opposition. Taylor was head of the Doe government's procurement agency and fled to the U.S. after being accused of embezzling \$900,000. The U.S. agreed to extradite him, but he managed to jump bail and is now in Côte d'Ivoire from where he oversees NPFL operations. This explains why even though the region has traditionally been a hotbed of



Doe: Losing credibility

opposition (the county was the home of Thomas Quiwonkpa who led the 1985 coup and Nicholas Podier who plotted against the president in 1988), there has

been no popular support for the NPFL.

The economy of Nimba county has suffered heavily as a result of the ongoing violence and iron ore production at the Liberian American Mining Company (Lamco) might decrease significantly as a result. Similar fears exist with regard to timber, coffee, and cocoa production in the region. This is particularly dangerous in view of the fact that the U.S., Liberia's longstanding ally, has reduced its assistance from nearly \$500 million during the Reagan administration to nothing, due to Doe's notoriously poor human rights record, government corruption, and economic mismanagement.

Observers agree that even though Taylor's aborted coup no longer poses an immediate threat to Doe's political survival, it is indicative of a serious political and economic crisis that the president might not be able to resolve. ■

Cambridge

*Namibia Adopts New Constitution
—Hailed as Most Democratic in Africa*

After 23 years of armed struggle, followed by a tense seven-month election campaign, Namibia recently took two historic steps toward independence. The first was unanimously voting for a liberal democratic constitution. The second was accepting March 21 as the date for independence—11 days ahead of the UN target of April 1—signalling the end of South Africa's 70-year rule and the liberation of the continent's last colony.

The South West Africa People's Organization (Swapo), which fell seven seats short of the 48 needed to write the constitution unhindered, apparently worked a miracle of reconciliation with the six opposition parties.

Namibia's constitution, which has been heralded as Africa's most democratic, establishes a sovereign and secular republic founded on the principles of democracy, social, economic, and political justice, and the rule of law. The country will have a multi-party

system, with a bill of fundamental human rights and an independent judiciary. The charter states that "the dignity of every person shall be inviolable and no person shall be subject to torture," and forbids discrimination on the grounds of race, sex color, ethnic origin, religion, or social and economic status. Namibia will also be the first country in Africa (with the exception of Cape Verde) to abolish the death penalty.

The president will be limited to two five-year terms in office. His power to declare a state of emergency, effectively abolishing the guaranteed rights of the constitution, is checked by a clause that requires the approval of the national assembly. The 72-seat assembly can also veto the president's decisions.


The charter stipulates that the economic order is to be "founded on the principles of economic justice, securing Namibians a life of human dignity." While land can be expropriated for just

NAMIBIA...continued

compensation, the right to private property is upheld. Education will be free and mandatory for children up to 16, but the right to private schools, favored by the 70,000 whites in Namibia, is respected in the constitution. Military service will be compulsory, but a clause will allow for conscientious objectors.

Overall, constitutional deliberations proceeded smoothly, with the exception of one instance of serious disagreement which led to the adjournment of the constituent assembly for a week on January 12. Outraged members felt that Vekeii Rukoro of the Namibian National Front and Hartmut Ruppel of Swapo had misrepresented the assembly when advising the three South African constitutional lawyers who drew up the charter.

The greatest controversy was over the constitution's provisions to allow detention without trial and to postpone



Nujoma: Learning to compromise

local elections for at least five years. Although members of Swapo were counted among the outraged, the controversial provisions were regarded as clauses that the party generally supported.

On January 31, Swapo's call for preventive detention was dropped, and the last obstacle to Namibia's constitution was removed. President-designate Sam Nujoma went so far as to accept sections of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance's constitution, despite having been a one-time enemy of the rival party. Swapo, which was committed to a one-party state, agreed to a bicameral parliament and proportional representation, in return for an executive president who is sure to be Nujoma. ■

Egyptian Opposition Victory

In an effort to limit political fallout, President Hosni Mubarak fired the highly unpopular Interior Minister, Gen. Zaki Badr, in mid-January, following the latter's admission of vote-rigging in the last parliamentary elections, his inflammatory statements against government and opposition leaders, and ruthless security crackdowns. The Badr affair, which mobilized Egyptian public opinion like no other event in recent years, marked the first time that the government has yielded to public pressure and is widely regarded by the opposition as a prelude for greater changes in the country.

During his four-year tenure, Badr had exercised his authority with a belligerence that had met with the tacit approval of Mubarak. The 1981 slaying of President Anwar Sadat by Muslim extremists has been habitually invoked as justification for the iron-fisted treatment of the group. With abusive regularity, Badr enforced emergency laws that enabled the security forces to detain suspects indefinitely without charge and ignored scores of allegations made by human rights groups on the routine torture of jailed dissidents. Last year alone, some 10,000 Muslim extremists were arrested and 4,000 are still held without charges, according to the editor of the opposition paper, *Islamic Alliance*.

Badr provoked controversy when he admitted that he had prevented left-wing leader Khalid Mohieddin from taking a seat in the National Assembly during the last elections. The minister's political demise was precipitated shortly thereafter by the harsh words he leveled at Muslim militants. "I only want to kill 1 percent of the population," Badr was quoted as saying, raising concern that such remarks could provide the necessary fuel to reignite the fundamentalist movement.

Badr's chilling remarks occurred less than a month after he was the target of an apparent assassination attempt. A bomb concealed in a truck exploded near the minister's car in the Abbasiya district of Cairo. The failed attempt was widely regarded as a reprisal for a crackdown the minister had ordered against anti-government fundamentalist demonstrators at Assiut University, in which more than 70 people were wounded.

Badr's hardline position became increasingly problematic in view of Mubarak's plans to adopt stringent austerity measures to revitalize Egypt's moribund economy. The government fears that implementing structural changes would enable fundamentalists to exploit popular dissatisfaction to gain broader political support. Mubarak is going to need all the help he can get from the opposition, which, encouraged by events in Eastern Europe, sees the time as ripe for further democratization.

Morocco's Close Call

About 70,000 tons of crude oil—twice the volume leaked by the Exxon Valdez in Alaska—were spilled off the coast of Morocco by a crippled Iranian supertanker which suffered an explosion that tore through its hull about 400 miles north of the Canary Islands in late December. The accident left behind a 185 mile-long oil slick which, experts believed, threatened to create an environmental disaster of tragic proportions.

A false alarm was raised by environmentalist Jean-Jacques Cousteau, who warned of a major ecological catastrophe and accused the authorities and the media of ignoring the incident until it was too late. The spill, which was only 20 miles from the mainland and extended from Mehdiya north of Rabat

to Mohammedia in the south, could have seriously damaged the coastline, affecting vulnerable oyster beds, migratory bird reserves, and an important breeding ground for pink flamingoes. There were also concerns that the oil slick would blacken Morocco's sandy beaches which attract thousands of tourists each year.

However, heavy seas and warm temperatures helped to emulsify and evaporate a large part of the spill, while 60,000 liters of detergents dissolved about 90 percent of the slick. The crisis could have been averted if Spain and Morocco had allowed the leaking supertanker to be towed into port for repairs. As three tug boats led the ship to calmer waters near the Cape Verde islands, Morocco threatened to sue Iran's national oil company for damages. ■

South Africa and Hungary: When Foes Turn to Friends

Angered anti-apartheid groups have watched South Africa waste no time in taking advantage of the recent changes sweeping Eastern Europe to end its international isolation, make new political friends, and normalize trade relations. The most unexpected diplomatic breakthrough came in early January when Pretoria's Foreign Minister, "Pik" Botha, was received in Budapest by his Hungarian counterpart Gyuna Horn.

The surprise visit was the first to a Warsaw Pact country by a South African foreign minister in 35 years, and there is speculation that it served to test the waters for improved relations with the Soviet Union. South African Radio quoted Botha as saying that the two governments had "decided to create channels of communication that could lead to diplomatic ties"—a statement that was confirmed by Horn.

Hungary is apparently seeking to expand trade links and begin several

joint commercial and industrial ventures with South Africa, including a South African holiday resort in Hungary, central bank cooperation, air travel, and a bus manufacturing deal. According to *The Washington Post*, the South African foreign ministry implied that Hungary and South Africa have carried on clandestine trade for some time now, and that the trip was the result of longstanding contacts between the two countries.

As a member of the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid, Hungary has been condemned by African states and anti-apartheid groups throughout the world for its contacts with Pretoria. The Hungarian government had reportedly assured the African National Congress only ten days before Botha's visit that it had no plans for links with South Africa.

The United Democratic Front's spokesman, Azhar Cachalia, echoed the views of anti-apartheid groups inside

and outside South Africa when he said, "One seriously questions the direction in which Hungary wants to go if one of the first countries it wants to have relations with is South Africa." Cachalia further warned that by establishing economic links with Eastern Europe, Pretoria was effectively undermining the international sanctions campaign.

Anti-apartheid groups are also furious about South Africa's recent campaign to attract skilled East German immigrants to work in South Africa, despite massive black unemployment. South Africa has approximately 13,000 Poles, 3,000 Czechoslovaks, and 10,000 Hungarians living within its borders and many are staunch supporters of the establishment. The government claims that the economy is lacking skilled manpower in virtually every sector. But black political groups are wondering why Pretoria, on the brink of reform, does not make the upgrading of black skills a priority. ■

Somali Government Accused in 50,000 Civilian Deaths

The battered presidency of Somalia's Mohamed Siad Barre received another blow with the recent release of a report by the U.S.-based human rights group, Africa Watch, detailing widespread abuses by the government during the 19-month-old civil war.

The report, entitled "Somalia: A Government at War with its Own People," charges the regime with responsibility for the deaths of 50,000 to 60,000 civilians since hostilities broke out between the government and rebels from the Somali National Movement (SNM) in May 1988. Another 400,000 people have been displaced within Somalia, while half a million have fled to neighboring countries.

In hundreds of interviews with refugees, the human rights group describes in chilling detail how the government, frustrated in its attempts to defeat the rebels, turned its guns against the civilian population. According to the report, the army has engaged in systematic violence toward Isaaq clan members in northern Somalia, burning and bombing their villages and detaining hundreds for suspected association with the SNM.



Somali army: On the rampage

Originally confined to the north, the abuses soon spread to the southern and central parts of the country. "Entire regions have been devastated by a military engaged in combat against its own people, resembling a foreign occupation force that recognizes no constraints on its power to kill, rape or loot," argues the report.

Africa Watch calls on the interna-

tional community to exert pressure on the Somali government to end its rule of terror. Emphasizing the U.S.'s support of the regime, the group calls for an end to all American aid to the country, arguing that in its absence, Barre "will be forced either to relinquish power or to take meaningful steps toward reconciliation and peace."

The release of the report comes on the heels of recent calls in Washington for renewal of aid to the Somali government. In December, a conservative think-tank, the Heritage Foundation, issued a report arguing for the reinstatement of aid cut off by the administration's decision in September to reallocate the \$21 million in economic aid intended for Somalia to other countries in Africa. That decision, and an earlier one in July 1988 which cut off \$2.5 million in "lethal" aid, were due in a large part to extensive congressional pressure over the past two years. A spokesperson for Howard Wolpe, chairman of the House subcommittee on Africa, said that the Africa Watch report would likely be the "death knell" on any calls to renew aid to the Barre government. ■

The Ferranti Affair

American arms dealer James Guerin, who has had lucrative dealings with Armscor, South Africa's state-run arms corporation, is currently the focus of a federal investigation and multi-million dollar law suit. The founder of International Signal and Control (ISC), Guerin was accused in December of fabricating a defense contract with Barlow Rand, South Africa's largest industrial company, in order to enhance the salability of ISC. The allegations have been made by Ferranti International of Britain which purchased ISC two years ago for \$670 million.

Ferranti International maintains that the falsified contract guaranteed Barlow Rand's production of a missile system which, upon completion, would be sold to the Pakistani government. It has been reported that Guerin transferred money between companies in several countries, including South Africa, to create a façade of legitimacy for the phantom deal. The entire affair has left Ferranti International nearly insolvent.

Another of Guerin's apparent illegal activities involving Pretoria has been exposed, as U.S. and British authorities are currently investigating claims that the arms dealer smuggled navigational technology for combat jets into South Africa. His privileged standing with Pretoria gave rise to a federal probe in the late 1970s which investigated charges that the Pennsylvania-based ISC was illegally transporting bombs and guns to South Africa.

Sources close to Guerin say that U.S. intelligence agencies exploited his preferential relationship with the South African government and that he served as an operative for the CIA for many years, providing information on South African political and military developments, including Pretoria's efforts to develop nuclear weapons.

Guerin's influence extended as far as the White House. In 1975, President Ford gave Guerin the authority to sell tracking equipment to the South African government as a means of monitoring Soviet vessels in the Indian Ocean. President Carter, however, scrapped the deal.

Meanwhile, Ferranti International has been accused of breaking the UN ban on arms exports to South Africa and imports from Pretoria and for allowing

South African Rail Strike Ends: A Hollow Victory?

A violent and bitter 12-week-long nationwide rail strike, led by 25,000 workers of the South African Railway and Harbor Workers' Union (Sarhwu), ended in late January after an agreement was reached with the South African Transport Services (Sats). At least 35 people died, scores were injured, and millions of rands worth of damages resulted from a dispute over wages and the formal recognition of the union. The third rail strike in three years has been called the bloodiest and most destructive incident of labor unrest since the miners' uprising in 1922, costing Sats an estimated \$16 million from sabotaged rolling stock, and the workers another \$12 million in wages.

In one of the most violent incidents, some 1,000 strikebreakers, armed with machetes, rocks, and knives, ambushed a train in Germiston station, a suburb south of Johannesburg, that was carrying 800 strikers on their way to a union meeting. The non-union workers, who were loyal to Sats, entered the commuter cars and attacked the strikers, leaving at least seven men dead and 18 seriously injured. Cosatu characterized the attack as a "well-orchestrated campaign of violence" and accused the police of complicity, claiming that it encouraged the strikebreakers by firing teargas into the trains, and forcing the strikers into the vigilante ambush.

The negotiated package settlement allowed for the reinstatement of 23,000 dismissed strikers (a quarter of the total workforce), and recognition of the union. The victory, however, is a hollow one, considering the devastating financial losses the strikers suffered and the fact that their demand for a monthly minimum wage increase from R600 (\$240) to R1,500 (\$600) is unlikely to be met.

There is speculation that Sats, a state-owned company, has been intransigent throughout the strike due to its pending privatization. The *New Nation* reported that, according to union officials, Sats deliberately provoked the strike to trim the workforce prior to privatization, in order to forgo negotiating retrenchment benefits.



South African trains: Back on track

John Coen

an American national, Clyde Ivy, on its board. Ivy, who was part of the Kentron Missiles Company, a lucrative subsidiary of the Armscor empire in the 1970s, secretly worked on South Africa's missile development program. He began working for Ferranti International via the ISC and resigned from that company along with Guerin in May 1989.

A British Labor member of parliament and chairman of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, Robert Hughes, has requested that Prime Minister Margaret

Thatcher call for an immediate investigation into Ferranti's South African connections. A spokesman for Ferranti recently denied that the company was "knowingly involved with any illegal trade with South Africa," but the affair continues on both sides of the Atlantic. In January, Guerin admitted before a Pennsylvania court that he was aware that ISC was under investigation by the U.S. for illegal shipments to South Africa after the takeover of ISC by Ferranti International. ■

ZIMBABWE

Following two and a half years of intense debate on the ecological soundness of oil exploration in the Zambezi Valley, Mobil has secured oil rights in Zimbabwe and Zambia, and operations are scheduled to begin in April this year. The government has a vested interest in the deal, as it will have a 10 percent stake should oil be found in the region. The prospects of striking oil are estimated at about 25 percent, but experts believe there could also be significant reserves of natural gas.

The Zambezi Valley is a protected world heritage area and much of it is national park land, rich in wildlife. Pressure from environmentalists in Zimbabwe forced the government last December to agree to allow Mobil to begin operations only after the company conducts two environmental impact surveys and consents to using more costly exploration methods than "vibroiseis"—a technique which involves clearing forests and building roads that has proven disastrous in neighboring Zambia and Tanzania.

GHANA

Ghana's gold sector is currently undergoing a marked revival under the influence of the government's free market approach, with production increasing from 283,000 ounces in 1983 to 429,463 in 1989.

An \$80 million gold mine—reportedly the most sophisticated in the country—designed to process just under a billion tons of ore and yield 120,000 troy ounces per year, is currently under construction by Canadian Bogosu Resources (65.5 percent owned by Biliton International Metals, a Shell subsidiary), and is scheduled to begin production in October. The Ashanti Goldfields Corporation is further expanding its operations. Teberabie Goldfields of the U.S. are to begin production in April, while two of the three mines of the state-owned Gold Mining Corporation are reportedly up for privatization.

It is widely assumed that Ghana's gold sector, which thrived in colonial times but steadily deteriorated thereafter due to unfavorable market conditions and economic mismanagement, could once again become central to the country's economy, in view of the chronic crisis in the cocoa sector.

BUSINESS BRIEFS

LOME IV

After protracted and laborious negotiations, the fourth Lomé Convention was signed in mid-December between the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) states and the European Economic Community (EEC), falling short of the Ecu 15.5 billion demanded by the ACP states, but still 20 percent higher in real terms than Lomé III, with Ecu 12 bn. According to one ACP member, "There was nothing very diplomatic about how we had to fight for every Ecu and every ton we finally managed to secure." France exerted considerable pressure on the EEC states to agree on the final aid package and sign the pact, in view of the fact that Lomé III was due to expire on March 1.

For the first time, Lomé IV is to last ten years and will include Namibia, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. Other innovations include the designation of Ecu 10.8 bn from the European Development Fund (EDF) for non-refundable grants rather than soft loans, the incorporation of gold and uranium in the convention's minerals system, Sysmin, and the introduction of a boosted Stabex package of Ecu 1.5 bn (previously 925 mn), along with the removal of mandatory reimbursement of Stabex transfers.

A new fund has been created to support structural adjustment programs along with provisions protecting the environment, banning imports and exports of toxic and nuclear waste. The debt problem received "political recognition" at the negotiations, but ACP states did not succeed in persuading the EEC to assume an active role in relieving their debt burden.

While Lomé IV has been described as a modest improvement over the previous convention, concern has been expressed over the formidable challenges Africa will face in the 1990s, particularly in view of political and economic changes in Eastern Europe, West European integration, and GATT liberalization negotiations currently under way.

TOGO

The first privately operated duty-free export processing zones (EPZs) in sub-Saharan Africa are scheduled to begin operating in Lomé before the end of the year. EPZs are essentially industrial parks which the government provides with tax holidays and other incentives to mobilize new private sector resources and initiatives for export firms, particularly in the processing and manufacturing of goods. The possibility of making the whole country an EPZ is also being considered.

The project will receive aid from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and U.S. AID, which conducted feasibility studies and selected Togo along with Cameroon, as the best suited sub-Saharan countries for an EPZ. If the project succeeds, EPZs are expected to stimulate economic growth, provide employment, and greatly boost the private sector. Government-sponsored EPZs have met with great success in Mauritius but have failed in Senegal.


KENYA

Kenya will be the first country in Africa to have a competitive second channel television station when the Kenya Times Media Trust's (KTMT) station begins broadcasting, scheduled for February.

The project will team KTMT and British media tycoon Robert Maxwell, along with Rupert Murdoch's SKY TV and Ted Turner's Cable News Network (CNN). SKY and CNN will provide programming around the clock which will be received by a communications satellite stationed over the Indian Ocean.

The Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, which until recently was state-run, and whose programs have been notoriously poor in quality, has long held a monopoly over television. With only 300,000 to 400,000 television sets, there is some concern about the commercial viability of a second channel. KTMT argues that if Kenya can sustain three daily competitive English language newspapers, it can also do with two TV stations.

Plans to install the transmitter on top of a 60-story Nairobi skyscraper (which was to serve as Kanu's headquarters) have been abandoned, along with construction of the controversial building.



Anna Zernovskii/Impact Visuals

DE KLERK'S RUBICON

By PATRICK LAURENCE

President F.W. de Klerk's February speech announcing the repeal of the ban on the ANC and other organizations and the release of Nelson Mandela was greeted with jubilation in some quarters, but with fury and apprehension in others. Reflecting the South African government's acceptance of the inevitability of negotiations with the black majority, the moves have brought the ANC to the political spotlight, but the way ahead remains uncertain.

Dr. Gerrit Viljoen, South Africa's minister of constitutional affairs and confidant of President F.W. de Klerk, observed: "We will have to orientate our constituency." Nobody disagreed.

The silver-haired Viljoen was addressing scores of journalists in the wake of de Klerk's astonishing February 2 policy speech. In it, de Klerk revoked bans on the African National Congress (ANC), its ally, the South African Communist Party (SACP), and its rival, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). He also committed himself to the unconditional release of the jailed ANC leader, Nelson Mandela.

Even seasoned journalists gasped in amazement as they read copies of the 14-page speech behind closed doors, a condition imposed by the authorities to ensure that de Klerk's speech was not leaked before it was delivered. De Klerk had been much more daring than they had anticipated in his quest for a political settlement to South Africa's conflict.

De Klerk spelled out his motivation for repealing the 40-year ban on the SACP and the 30-year ban on the ANC and PAC in a few crisp sentences.

"Today's announcements, in particular, go to the heart of what black leaders—also Mr. Mandela—have been advancing over the years as their reason for having resorted to violence," he said in an address which delighted most South Africans, particularly the unenfranchised blacks, but horrified members of the vociferous right-wing.

"The government wishes to talk to all leaders who seek peace. The unconditional lifting of the prohibition on the said organizations places everybody in a position to pursue politics freely. The justification for violence...no longer exists."

The right-wing opposition Conservative Party (CP) charged that de Klerk did not have a mandate to take such "outrageous steps." On one

level, it was right—de Klerk did not specifically ask for a mandate to repeal the bans on the prohibited organizations during his campaign for the September 6 election.

The election propaganda of de Klerk's ruling National Party (NP) on the ANC was consistent with its long-held view that the ANC was a "terrorist" organization. The NP insisted that there could be no dealing with the ANC until it renounced violence. Seen in that light, Viljoen's statement about having to "orientate" NP supporters to the new position was nothing if not an intellectualized understatement.

There were, however, developments in the brief five months between the September election and de Klerk's February speech which

Even seasoned journalists gasped in amazement, as they read copies of the 14-page speech behind closed doors. De Klerk had been much more daring than they had anticipated in his quest for a political settlement to South Africa's conflict.

prepared the way—and perhaps unconsciously conditioned—NP supporters for the momentous events ahead.

Stated briefly, they were: the freeing of the eight top political prisoners in mid-October, including five men who were jailed for life with Mandela in June 1964, the open re-emergence of the ANC as a de facto if not de jure organization, with its released leaders campaigning publicly under ANC and SACP flags, and declarations by South African police generals that the ANC was switching

tack from the battlefield to the political arena, from armed struggle to negotiations.

These events constituted markers on the way leading to de Klerk's February 2 speech, but they do not explain why he walked down the road or why he travelled with such haste. Two considerations played a primary role in his decision.

The first lay between the lines of de Klerk's speech. It was that legalization of the outlawed organizations had become indispensable to fulfillment of the government's aim of negotiating a settlement. Like the release of political prisoners and the return of exiles, it had become a precondition to the participation of credible black leaders in the negotiations. It was set as a condition even by leaders perceived as "moderate" or "responsible," among them the resourceful and tough-minded Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi (whom the government tried unsuccessfully to lure to the negotiating table for five years).

De Klerk had one important trait which helped him make the necessary deductions and decisions. It was his training as a lawyer at Potchefstroom University for Higher Christian Education. The university has long acted as the custodian of a philosophical tradition encapsulated in the Afrikaans word *konsekwent*. The word translates as "consistent" or, in a wider sense, as being true to one's principles.

The underlying principle in de Klerk's case was a commitment to a negotiated settlement. If it was necessary to unban the ANC, for example, to realize the principle, the *konsekwent* politician would take the step.

The NP's defense of its action, in face of cries of betrayal from the CP, was classically *konsekwent*. The defense took the form of a syllogism: The NP asked for and was given a mandate to negotiate a settlement; the path forward was blocked by

Reaction to de Klerk's speech in Johannesburg: "The address delighted most South Africans particularly the unenfranchised blacks"

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an obstacle, the banned organizations. Hence, after weighing the risk of removing it against the perils of leaving it, they levered it out of the way.

De Klerk was elected as South Africa's president in the September 6 general election. He became the first member of the minority Gereformeerde Church or "dopper" to hold such high office since Paul Kruger, the 19th century Boer patriarch who was president of the old South African republic.

President Kruger, like President de Klerk, was *konsekwent*, when, in 1899, the British presented him with the choice of submission or resistance and he chose to resist. Nearly a century later, on Friday, February 2, 1990, de Klerk was trying to halt the drift to another war. The ghost of Kruger was there as a reminder that if de Klerk's invitation to negotiate was spurned, the demands of being *konsekwent* might point in a different direction altogether.

There was, however, a second more immediate calculation in de Klerk's February 2 decision. He reasoned, as his speech made clear and his cabinet colleagues stressed, that events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union showed that communism was on the retreat. The ANC, with objectives of nationalizing mines, banks, and "monopoly industry," and its "revolutionary ally," the South African Communist Party, should, the government reasoned, be made to come out into the open and defend their "untenable" socialist ideology. As Adriaan Vlok, the bespectacled minister of law and order, told journalists: "I cannot see a better time to allow people to see that communism is a dying ideology."

Koos van der Merwe, chairman of the strategy and information committee of the Conservative Party, saw the government's action in different imagery. "They are trying to get the bully into the ring and defeat him there," he said. "They think by unbanning the ANC and the SACP, they are making them weak. But they are only strengthening them." In the townships, the government's

move was not seen as a clever stratagem, but a giving way before strength, he explained.

The CP's immediate aim was to force the government to hold a general election. It planned to do so by holding a series of rallies and protest marches to show the strength and depth of feeling against de Klerk's policies. A massive strike by CP members in key industries, in the airways, in the hospitals, and even in the schools, was kept in reserve as a contingency measure if the massed ranks of CP protest failed to persuade de Klerk to call an election. There was threatening talk, too, of the nearly 100 municipalities controlled by the CP cutting off essential services—water and electricity—as a demonstration of the party's power. Behind that, hinted indirectly, was the last option—armed resistance.

The CP strategy of forcing de Klerk to call an election appeared to rest on a false premise. De Klerk was certainly committed to submitting whatever constitution he negotiated with black leaders to the white electorate for approval. But he could do so by way of a referendum rather than a general election. Barring a completely unforeseen development, de Klerk was virtually assured of victory in a referendum.

In the last general election, de Klerk's NP obtained 48 percent of the vote, the CP 31 percent, and the liberal-leaning Democratic Party (DP) 21 percent. In a referendum, the DP, which long ago campaigned for the unbanning of the ANC and the unconditional release of Mandela, would certainly urge its followers to vote for de Klerk. To defeat the government in a referendum, the CP would have to persuade another 20 percent of the electorate to vote for it. The chances of doing that were negligible.

With the approval of the white electorate, de Klerk could introduce a new constitution designed to accommodate black political aspirations: In so doing, he could alter the rules of the game radically and eliminate forever the CP's hopes of win-

ning power.

De Klerk's calculated decisions, revealed on February 2, were influenced by another component—they might lead to the easing of international sanctions and a vote-catching improvement in the economy. His action was preceded, it should be remembered, by a decision to reduce the length of military service from two years to one, a measure which did him no harm.

The ANC's immediate reaction to de Klerk's initiative was cautious. Thabo Mbeki, director of the international department, described it as "half a step" in the right direction. Winnie Mandela labelled it a "half-measure," and Walter Sisulu, Mandela's co-prisoner until last October, gave it a qualified welcome (he regretted that Mandela had not been freed immediately, that the state of emergency had not been lifted, and that not all political prisoners were freed).

The ANC was understandably wary of de Klerk. No doubt it reminded itself of the old adage about the leopard not changing its spots. But if it drives too hard a bargain or if it gives de Klerk little or nothing to take to the white electorate by 1994 (the latest possible date for an election or referendum), it could contribute to his defeat. By a strange irony, the ANC might have become an important variable in de Klerk's fate.


The ANC, however, has to consider another possibility: de Klerk might succeed in drawing Buthelezi into the government, thus strengthening his hand immeasurably if he did so while the ANC sidelined itself by adopting an inflexible stance. A long and bloody struggle, stretching into the next century, might lie ahead.

Chief Buthelezi's words had an ominous ring for the ANC: "He [de Klerk] has fulfilled all my conditions for negotiations and so I'm ready to negotiate. If the ANC isn't ready, that is their problem...We have got our organization and I don't see why we should sit around waiting for them to get their act together." ○



The Reverend Allan Boesak:
THE PEOPLE'S DEMANDS

By MARGARET A. NOVICKI



Impact Visuals

Although many observers, inside South Africa and without, were taken by surprise by the boldness of President de Klerk's February speech, several of the demands of the Mass Democratic Movement remain to be met in order for a climate for negotiations to be created.

In this interview undertaken just prior to Nelson Mandela's release, the Reverend Allan Boesak, president of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches and one of the founders of the United Democratic Front, relates his conversation with the then-imprisoned ANC leader only days after the speech and explains where the government's initiatives fall short of the demands of the black majority.

Africa Report: What is your assessment of the measures outlined by President F.W. de Klerk in his February 2 speech? Are they significant steps toward meeting the demands of the Mass Democratic Movement?

Boesak: I think that what Mr. de Klerk has said is indeed a significant move toward meeting some of the demands that have been set by the movement here. Most surprising of all was the unbanning of the political organizations. We had more or less expected the lifting of restrictions on the organizations and people, but it was still nice to hear. The problems that remain concern mainly three areas. One is the fact that the state of emergency has not been completely lifted and that means that it is not true that there is now a free and open climate for political discussion and political participation. The state of emergency is a serious impediment to political participation of all people at all levels.

Another remaining problem is that of the political prisoners. What we had wanted was the unconditional release of all political prisoners. Mr. de Klerk now has made certain categories of political prisoners—some of whom will be released, others pardoned, others may go back to the courts on appeal, others will remain in jail—and that creates a number of difficulties. For instance, on what basis does he decide that a prisoner whom we see as a political prisoner is not a political prisoner, but actually a kind of common criminal who had to do

with arson and with sabotage and so forth? And it raises the other problem as to what the ANC [African National Congress] is to do. The exiles cannot simply return now because so many of those who have been part of the military wing of the ANC will be unsure as to what will happen to them once they are back.

It also raises a particular problem for Nelson Mandela in terms of his release. He did go to jail for sabotage and was found guilty by the South African courts, but he has been told he will be released unconditionally. At the same time, a man like Chris Hani [chief of staff of the ANC's military wing], if he walks across the border, can theoretically be arrested and sent to jail. That is the kind of contradiction that creates difficult, difficult dilemmas for everybody concerned, and Mr. de Klerk has not been helpful there. In fact, he has really exacerbated the problem.

And the other difficulty that remains is the fact that he has not in any way addressed the issue of the dismantling of apartheid. He has not said any meaningful thing about the scrapping of the laws, he has not given a clear undertaking or a statement of intent that this parliamentary session or the next one will deal with the scrapping of the laws. In fact, what we are seeing now is a kind of entrenchment of laws like the Group Areas Act, and while the Separate Amenities Act will probably be scrapped in one way or another, the Population

Benny Gool/Impact Visuals



Registration Act remains totally untouched. That must be seen as a major obstacle, and that is why black people have said we welcome the speech, we have described it as bold, courageous, and hopeful, but it clearly still falls short of creating the kind of climate in which genuine negotiations can take place. And so we are saying that we have made a breakthrough, but we still have a very, very long way to go.

Africa Report: Do you think that de Klerk has a strategy which is ultimately leading toward meaningful negotiations?

Boesak: It is difficult to say. I still fail to see where he is going because if you lift the state of emergency only partially, and you make a decision about the political prisoners that is full of hesitation and equivocation, you must know that the release of Nelson Mandela in turn, about which you were clear, has now become a difficulty. Mandela himself says: "I have set certain conditions for my release, the movement has set conditions for my release. If those conditions are not met and they do release me, I will be obliged to make a statement about what I think of the South African government and its ability to do what is necessary, especially in terms of conditions that are eminently reasonable and that are not impossible to meet."

That has to cast a shadow over what Mr. de Klerk has been saying. How can you not fulfill certain of the basic conditions and still hope that a man like Mandela, whom they know by now, through so many years of discussions with him, whom they know will not compromise on his principles, will simply say, "Let's forget it. I will walk out of here and I will not bother the South African government"? That is impossible to believe.

Furthermore, you have to ask the question: Where are we going from here? If Mr. de Klerk makes these announcements and yet he says nothing about the problem of dismantling apartheid, surely he has to know that for the international community and for us, it is not going to be enough. So you cannot expect, for instance, a serious debate on the lifting of sanctions if you have not met those basic conditions, and if you have not addressed the central problem of the dismantling of apartheid.

I really don't think that there is a clear-cut strategy. I think they are very much feeling their way and then they take a step and they run into obstacles and then they decide to deal with that and take another step. It may very well be the best thing for the government to do from its point of view, but I think they are in danger in running into a number of difficulties at so many levels that they may not be able to control everything.

Africa Report: You met with Nelson Mandela on February 6, and there has been some confusion as to whether he set conditions for his release.

Boesak: What he said was: "I have set my conditions, but my release is the responsibility of the South African government. The onus is on them. I am their prisoner. I cannot say I don't want to go out of here. If they release me, I will go. But I will then have to say that the conditions under which I was released do not make me happy." And that, I think, could turn out to be

"Nelson Mandela believes that for negotiations to get off the ground, there has to be an opportunity for the people to elect those people whom we want to represent us at the negotiating table"

a devastating statement for Mr. de Klerk and his government. What Winnie Mandela had said and that's where the misunderstanding came in, is that he said he would not leave prison under any circumstances unless those conditions are met. He said, "If they release me, I will go, but then I will talk about the fact that they have not been able or willing to meet the conditions that we have set."

Africa Report: What are those conditions as he stated them?

Boesak: One condition obviously has been met—the unbanning of the ANC. The other two have to do with the unconditional release of the political prisoners and the complete lifting of the state of emergency.

Africa Report: How did Mandela characterize the moves that de Klerk has made and is he more optimistic about negotiations beginning in the near future?

Boesak: Mandela did say that the climate for negotiations has not yet been created. He thinks that Mr. de Klerk clearly made a step in the right direction and he encouraged him by calling the speech "courageous, bold, and hopeful." But I don't think he believes that the time is right for the movement to go and sit down and talk with Mr. de Klerk. He still believes that a number of issues have to be addressed and he is very

"THE TIME TO CONSIDER LIFTING SANCTIONS WOULD BE WHEN THE SCRAPPING OF APARTHEID IS DEFINITELY IN PROCESS, AND WHEN THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS COULD BE DESCRIBED AS IRREVERSIBLE. IT WOULD BE A GRIEVOUS MISTAKE TO DO IT BEFORE THAT TIME."

clear—and I was gratified to find that we agree on this—that in order for negotiations to get off the ground, there has to be an opportunity for the people in a democratic fashion to elect those people whom we want to represent us at the negotiating table and to give them the mandate with which to negotiate. I think he knows that the South African government is not yet at that particular point, and my guess is that he will work toward getting the South African government to make sure that these steps are taken so that they can begin seriously negotiating.

But he is clear that there have to be negotiations between the government and the movement and he is very clear that we have to move as rapidly as possible toward an open, non-racial South Africa. He speaks very movingly about reconciliation and about the needs to assure whites of the fact that we are working toward a common future and to make them understand that they should not fear the future and that their only future really lies in accepting the principle of non-racialism for South Africa.

Africa Report: The South African government claimed threats to Mandela's life from the right-wing and from within "his own ranks," presumably meaning the ANC, as the reason his release was delayed.

Boesak: If somebody said that in terms of within the ranks of the ANC, that is pure mischief-making and that is the kind of remark that brings back in my mind all of the old cynicism about the South African government and the National Party that we have become used to. It really lowers the standard of debate that we have seen between the day the State President made the speech and now.

Secondly, if that is their excuse, then they might as well keep Nelson Mandela in jail forever because the only place where he is going to be completely safe is going to be in prison. If they can't control their white people, then it means that Nelson Mandela will never breathe free air outside of Victor Verster Prison and if that is an excuse, then the South African government owes it to us to make an unequivocal statement and say: "Because we are afraid that there are white people out there who will kill him," (there will always be white people who want to kill black people, especially our leadership, and they have proved it) "we don't intend to release Mr. Mandela at all." There is no way they can give him a complete guarantee of safety.

Africa Report: Was this just equivocating on their part?

Boesak: Yes, that's right, and if this is indeed the line that they are taking, it awakens all the mistrust that one used to have in them and that would be bad politically. It is poisoning the climate here. If they don't release him soon, then it could create the kind of backlash in the black community that would not be good for the political process in this country.

Africa Report: The U.S. government said that although it is encouraged by de Klerk's moves, the administration doesn't feel that the government has met the conditions for lifting of sanctions. What is your view of American policy at this point? Is it playing a positive role?

Boesak: If that is the view of the U.S. administration, it is indeed a positive role that they are playing because our view is very clear that we have not seen that all the conditions have been met, and clearly we have not even begun with the dismantling of apartheid, nor has the negotiation process even started. We must keep in mind what happened in Namibia. At one point in 1978, everybody thought that the independence of Namibia would be a serious item on the agenda and that the South African government could be trusted in working toward that agenda. Then all of a sudden, they found a way, when international pressure on that issue in 1978 was relaxed, of dragging this thing out for another decade. There was an intensification of the war, there was unnecessary bloodshed, and so forth.

We don't want this to happen in South Africa. The time to consider lifting sanctions would be when the scrapping of apartheid is definitely in process, when there have been elections through which the people can appoint their own representatives to sit around the table with whomever from the government side, and when the negotiation process could be described as irreversible. When that happens, and it really depends on the South African government how soon that will be, that would be for us the time to begin to consider whether sanctions should be lifted. It would be a grievous mistake to try and do it before that time.

Africa Report: Despite these moves, do you think de Klerk is still clinging to the group rights idea? Do you expect in the

next parliamentary session that he will address any of the apartheid legislation?

Boesak: If he does, it will be a surprise. And maybe he loves to work like that, not saying anything and just springing something on people. He has not given any indication that he will deal with the scrapping of those laws, and so it really will be a surprise if he does that. I can only say that he has not mentioned group rights in the same way as we have become used to. What he has done is to mention "protection for minorities." Those are some of the things, together with his vision that he spelled out, that sound so much like our vision, and yet we are not sure whether it is in fact that. These are some of the things that need to be cleared up with Mr. de Klerk as soon as possible. We need to go and talk with him to find out what he means now. Has there really been a shift in thinking from group rights to minority rights? Is minority rights simply a new phrase for group rights?

My idea about minority rights is absolutely clear in the South African environment here. I am classified as being part of a minority. I have no desire to have special privileges enshrined in the constitution for the minority that I am part of. I believe that any constitution must only work with an entrenched bill of rights for individuals and that bill of rights enshrined in the constitution and backed by an independent judiciary. But again, it can also mean that they are back with the old, hollow-sounding argument that everybody in South Africa is part of a minority. We are all minorities. If that is where they are now all of a sudden, it would be a very weird jump backwards, and certainly not helpful in the present political climate in which we are trying to move forward.

Africa Report: What has been the overall reaction within the country? The Conservative Party wants new elections. How has de Klerk's speech been taken overall by whites and blacks?

Boesak: In general, the whites have welcomed it. Some may be more shocked than others. The right-wing of course is extremely angry, but that was to be expected. In the black community, there was jubilation in terms of the unbanning of the organizations and the lifting of restrictions on persons and organizations. But there was a far more sober assessment of what happens now, because it is one thing to say that the ANC is unbanned, but that doesn't mean a thing. The exiles cannot return now and we may now walk with the flag, but we walked with the flag anyway when it was illegal, so that doesn't make any difference. The only real live symbol of the meaning of the ANC back home is Nelson Mandela, and he is still in jail.

Apart from that, we listened to the speech and there was jubilation and there were motorcades and people danced on the beach until 3 o'clock in the morning. But they went home. And they went home to separate group areas. They went home to the squalor of the townships and they went home to the tensions of the police still present in the townships. And the kids went to school on Monday with the same discriminatory educational system and the same lack of books and facilities and the same bad buildings. The speech lifted hopes, but has not touched in any way any of the harsh and ugly realities of the apartheid system. That is what black people could understand much better and much quicker than white people in gen-

eral and the members of the press who were just here for the excitement for a little while. That is the difference between their assessment and our assessment.

It is gratifying for me to see that the press, unlike 1983 and previous years, has quite quickly come to a more sobering kind of assessment and analysis of the strength of the speech, the possibilities of the speech, but also the weaknesses and shortcomings. That is going to be very helpful, even to Mr. de Klerk and his government, to see how the international community has been able to keep its equilibrium as far as that is concerned.

Africa Report: Is there more unity now in the Mass Democratic Movement, by virtue of the release of the ANC leaders, or has it posed new problems?

Boesak: Again, it's a question of both. It has created more unity and more enthusiasm. They did bring inspiration with them. In terms of the masses, there is more unity now than ever before. Of course, it brings problems, but these are problems that are almost natural in such situations. The ANC leaders have been to jail for so long they are all older men. The question, therefore, is what exactly is their role now? And that relates not only to what their role and place within the organization is. We accept them as leaders, there is no doubt about that. The ANC had a structure up until 30 years ago. You cannot have that same structure with the same political function in 1990. That's impossible. But in order to give any sense to that, they have got to be back home. These are things that we can really only talk about logically once they are there.

My fear is that things will happen so fast, so much will happen at once, and the pressure will be enormous, that we'll have to deal with a million things at the same time, and we may not be able to simply because nobody can deal with this much at once. In a sense, we have much greater support than the South African government will ever have, but we will have less organization because the government has been in place for 40 years with every single instrument of power at its beck and call. We will have to build almost from the very beginning, as far as organizational structure is concerned. It's a daunting task. We will just have to find the energy. Whatever differences there may be, it will be disastrous for us to allow the process within the movement to cloud our common vision and to incapacitate us when it comes to dealing with the basic problems. We will not have time, literally, to fight with each other if these things begin to happen. If we do that, we might as well give up and tell de Klerk that we will deal with him 15 years from now, so just go ahead and run the government.

Africa Report: What will be the impact of Nelson Mandela's release?

Boesak: One never knows, you see. My fear is that de Klerk will try to say, "Releasing Mr. Mandela is in itself such a wonderful thing that I deserve five years more." And I am afraid that these people in the Western governments will allow that to happen, because there is still an underlying racism in the foreign policies of the United States, Britain, and Germany.

I have looked at what has happened in Eastern Europe with some wonder. We rejoice about that. But we have to ask the question of these people [in the West]: How can you rejoice in the falling of the Berlin Wall when you continue to

help carry the bricks and mortar, through your financial, political, and diplomatic support, to build new walls of apartheid in South Africa, or at least to keep the old wall standing? We have seen the dictators fall in Eastern Europe. Ceausescu was gone in a matter of days and everybody rejoiced about that. By what logic are they happy about the rapid fall of dictatorships in Eastern Europe and they turn around and tell us that Mr. de Klerk needs another five years, or two years?

These are the things that de Klerk is banking on. And we just have to find a way of making him understand that that is not on. Just as he hoped that the release of the eight would

"THE SPEECH LIFTED HOPES, BUT HAS NOT TOUCHED IN ANY WAY ANY OF THE HARSH AND UGLY REALITIES OF THE APARTHEID SYSTEM. THAT IS WHAT BLACK PEOPLE COULD UNDERSTAND MUCH BETTER AND MUCH QUICKER THAN WHITE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS WHO WERE HERE JUST FOR THE EXCITEMENT."

stop the Commonwealth and change its mind, so he will hope that the release of Mandela will create that space for him. And that should not happen. If nothing else happens, de Klerk will unleash such feelings of frustration and bitterness that nobody will be able to control them. Whether the man has the vision or the understanding to see these things clearly, nobody knows.

Africa Report: Do you think the ANC leadership has sufficiently fleshed out its positions so that if tomorrow de Klerk was to say, 'Let's sit down around the table and start negotiating,' they would be ready to do it?

Boesak: I don't know. All I can say is I hope so. The worst thing that could happen is for de Klerk to do something like that and for the ANC then to discover that they are not really ready. But that is almost a kind of worst-case scenario. If the ANC is not ready now for this kind of thing, then everybody is in deep trouble. I would hope that they would be ready to respond to any such action from the side of the government.

One thing, though, that we all have to learn—the ANC, the MDM, and everybody in South Africa—is that the most fatal mistake would be for us to sit and wait until Mr. de Klerk does something and then react. If we do not find ways and means of creatively taking the initiative at almost every level now, inside and outside the country, then we're going to find ourselves in deep trouble. And then de Klerk will probably be able to coast along. A lot depends on the imaginative leadership that must now come to the fore within the MDM and the ANC. And it's clear that the time for rhetoric is over: Sloganeering is childish, posturing is only partly helpful, and it is time for rather calculated political thinking and for bold, imaginative political action. ○



SOUTH AFRICA

MARKED FOR MURDER

By PATRICK LAURENCE

Goal/Impact Visuals



Allegations that the South African police operated a secret death squad to eliminate outspoken foes of apartheid have been circulating for years. With recent revelations supplied by former members of the assassination team and widespread demands for an independent inquiry into police activities, an investigation has finally been launched, in a reversal of the government's initial posture.

As 1989 drew to a close, South Africa's influential Afrikaans daily newspaper, *Beeld*, published the photographs of six prominent South African political figures across its front page. They were arranged like a series taken in rapid sequence from the same camera. Below them was the sensational headline: "Order of Death."

It was an incongruous list: It ranged from President F.W. de Klerk, the skillful defender of neo-apartheid, to Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the tireless foe of apartheid in all its forms.

But, *Beeld* informed its readers, the men were all targets of secret ultra-rightist assassins, known as the Order of Death. Its disclosure came after the arrest of five ultra-rightists suspected of involvement in political assassinations.

Many observers, foreign and local, were unimpressed by the sensational revelation: To them, it smacked of obfuscation and disinformation. News of the hitherto unheard-of Order of Death came in the midst of growing suspicions of the existence of a secret police assassination squad or squads whose task was to eliminate anti-apartheid activists.

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Deductions from the clues found on the long, grisly trail of unsolved assassinations in South Africa and its neighboring states had pointed for a long time in the direction of killer units operating with official protection or, at the least, with official connivance.

But, on October 20, these deductions hardened, in the minds of many opponents of the government, to incontestable conclusions. On that day, South African newspapers published details from an affidavit of an ex-policeman on death row.

The policeman, Butana Almond Nofomela, declared under oath that he had been a member of a security police hit squad. It was a name-naming affidavit. He identified the commander of the squad as Capt. Johannes Dirk Coetzee. The squad, he added, operated under the supervision of a senior police officer, Brig. Willem Schoon.

Nofomela went on to give a detailed account of how, in 1981, the squad carried out orders to murder a well-known civil rights lawyer, Griffiths Mxenge. According to Nofomela, the Mxenge dogs were poisoned, and Mxenge was intercepted on his way home, taken at pistol point to a nearby sports stadium, and stabbed to death.

An autopsy showed later that Mxenge had been stabbed more

than 40 times. Nofomela's statement was consistent with the autopsy report. "We all stabbed him several times. He immediately died [but] we carried on butchering his body...We removed Mxenge's items of value, like money and a watch, in order to simulate a robbery."

Nofomela's affidavit concluded with the admission that he had been involved in eight additional assassinations: All the victims, except one, were members or suspected members of the African National Congress. The exception was the brother of an ANC man who, according to police records, blew himself up while planting a limpet mine near a cinema in Pretoria. The assassinations, Nofomela averred, took place in three neighboring countries—Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho—as well as in South Africa itself.

Nofomela's statement provoked widespread reaction, even though the possibility had to be conceded that he had invented the whole macabre tale to escape the hangman's noose.

To anti-apartheid activists, it was proof of what they had always suspected. Their views were ably expressed by Dr. Max Coleman of the Human Rights Commission after the May 1 murder by unknown gunmen of Dr. David Webster, a univer-

sity lecturer and long-time foe of apartheid. Blaming the murder on death squads, Dr. Coleman said outright: "There may be no more profitable place to start [the search] than within the ranks of the police themselves."

The authorities responded quickly too. Nofomela was granted a stay of execution—he had been sentenced to death for killing a farmer—pending the report of an investigation into his allegations by the attorney-general of the Orange Free State, T. M. McNally.

The next installment came a month later. On November 20, the Afrikaans "alternative" newspaper, *Vrye Weekblad*, published a detailed interview with Capt. Coetzee, the man named by Nofomela as the commander of the death squad. For once, the adjective sensational was justified. Coetzee confirmed Nofomela's account of the killing of Mxenge.

His finger jabbed and pointed, metaphorically speaking, in the direction of the police throughout the interview. He blamed the police for several unsolved assassinations and implicated them indirectly in the murder of well-known activists in neighboring countries, including at least two women.

The women belonged to a political species despised—and feared—by the establishment: whites who dedicate their lives to the fight for a new, non-racial order in South Africa. They were Dr. Ruth First, wife of the general secretary of the South African Communist Party, and Mrs. Jeannette Schoon, a member of the exiled South African Congress of Trade Unions. Both were killed by parcel bombs; the one that killed Schoon and her daughter, Katryn, was, according to Coetzee's account of police machinations, meant for her husband, Marius Schoon.

"I was in the heart of the whore," Coetzee said. "I was the commander of the South African police death squad."

His disclosures included another long-suspected fact—that some of

the toughest policemen specializing in operations against "terrorists" from the ANC and the rival Pan Africanist Congress were renegade guerrillas or, in the parlance of the security forces, terrorists who had been "turned."

Coetzee's damning testimony against the police on the Mxenge murder was confirmed within a few days by David Tshikalanga, another ex-policeman who had served with

Deductions from the clues found on the long, grisly trail of unsolved assassinations in South Africa and neighboring states pointed in the direction of killer units operating with official protection or at the least with official connivance.

Nofomela and Coetzee in the alleged police death unit. Like Coetzee, he took the precaution of going into hiding after offering the public a glimpse into the Machiavellian underworld.

Police reaction was quick and sharp. Coetzee's charges were labelled "untested and wild." His flight from South Africa was seen as an attempt to avoid questioning about his allegations, not an elementary precaution to avoid retribution for disloyalty. *Vrye Weekblad* was chided for publishing "one-sided allegations."

But, critically, the police did acknowledge the existence of a special farm where policemen and captured guerrillas who had reneged on "the struggle" were trained in counter-insurgency.

Selected journalists from the South African press were invited to visit the farm and talk to the repentant terrorists. They dutifully reported that there was no death squad,

only an "anti-terrorist unit." Its task, the public was assured, was to intercept and capture infiltrating guerrillas, not to shoot them, except in self-defense.

The Human Rights Commission offered another perspective. It compiled a long list of 49 assassinations and 160 attempted assassinations, dating back to 1977. These were characterized by two factors: The victims were nearly all left-wing activists and—with one exception—police investigations did not result in the trial and conviction of the killers.

Later, in November, the Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression released a report providing "significant corroboration" for Nofomela's allegations. The board was established on the initiative of the general secretary of the South African Council of Churches, the Reverend Frank Chikane. The clergyman was himself the target of an *unknown assailant*—his clothes were impregnated with a highly toxic substance and he fell desperately ill several times while on a trip first to Namibia and then to the United States.

The board's investigators included two professors of law and two human rights lawyers. They identified five episodes in which the alleged police hit squad was involved and found substantial corroboration for Nofomela's charges in each case.

On the murder of the human rights lawyer, Griffiths Mxenge, the board noted that Nofomela's statements were substantially corroborated by those of two co-members of the same unit, Coetzee and Tshikalanga.

Another attack in which Nofomela claimed to have participated was in Swaziland in 1983, when the "death squad" crossed the border to "hit" a house occupied by ANC cadres. The house was attacked with grenades and small arms; at least two ANC men were killed in the attack.

According to Nofomela, he accidentally shot one of the squad members, Jeff Bosego, in the foot during the attack and then drove him to a

hospital in South Africa, where he was treated.

Independent investigation by the board established that Bosego was treated for a bullet wound in the ankle at the hospital on the day mentioned by Nofomela and that he even used his police medical aid card to get free medical treatment.

A third event involved the alleged assassination of Japie Moponye, the brother of an ANC guerrilla. Moponye, Nofomela averred, was arrested outside a building society in Krugersdorp where he worked as a security guard and taken for interrogation to the death squad headquarters at Vlakplaas near Pretoria. There, according to Nofomela, he was beaten up and shot through the head at close range by Maj. Eugene de Kock of the South African police, to prevent him from identifying his tormentors.

Investigation by the board confirmed that Moponye was indeed employed at the building society named by Nofomela. Moponye's family affirmed that he had been detained by the police in May 1985. He was never seen again. The building society described him as a "reliable good worker." The board report noted: "His salary was paid into his account but has been untouched and remains there."

The fourth incident was relatively insignificant; it involved harassment of an activist. Nofomela, according to his own account, stole the activist's car on the instructions of his superior officers. He found live chickens in the trunk. The board established that the activist, Hoffman Galeng, reported the theft of the car and claimed for six chickens on his insurance.

The last action reported by Nofomela was far from trivial. It resulted in the death of four black youths from the township of Chesterville in Natal by AK-47 bullets. In his statement, Nofomela named the hit squad members who went out on a mission that day. Examination of the inquest file showed that the men who gave evidence were "all people that

Nofomela mentioned as having belonged to or being involved in the assassination squad."

The board called for a full and open judicial inquiry into the alleged activities of the death squad, noting that the McNally investigation was an inter-departmental inquiry behind closed doors. In calling for a full judicial inquiry, the board was but echoing a demand which was being voiced across the nation.

The call, however, fell on deaf ears. After the McNally report was completed early in December, it was handed to the Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, and President de Klerk. Then came de Klerk's announcement: He would not appoint a judicial commission of inquiry in open court into allegations about the existence of a police murder unit.

Nofomela was, however, indicted for the murder of Mxenge and a warrant was issued for the arrest of Coetzee. It seemed, some observers reckoned, that Nofomela and Coetzee were being punished for their disclosures. The failure to appoint a judicial commission meant that their superiors, all policemen, would be investigated by fellow policemen. As Peter Gastrow of the opposition Democratic Party noted, the public would not investigate themselves thoroughly.

President de Klerk defended his decision not to appoint a commission of inquiry. "Justice must be done as quickly as possible," he said, noting that: "A judicial commission can take months, if not years, to reach its final conclusions. In the meanwhile, a climate of suspicion can develop, something the country can ill afford..." Hence his preference for "the tried and trusted prosecution mechanism of the state."

Norman Manoim, a lawyer working with the Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression, countered by pointing out that the appointment of a judicial commission of inquiry did not preclude individual prosecutions.

"There would certainly be no bar to conducting criminal prosecutions

and to holding an inquiry at the same time," Manoim said. "It is clear from the revelations so far that the allegations are very widespread, which is precisely why it is necessary to hold a commission of inquiry."

Among those detained for questioning in connection with assassinations were two ex-policemen, Ferdi Barnard, who was jailed in 1984 for the murder of two suspected drug addicts, and Calla Botha, a provincial rugby player.

Opposing a court application for the release of Botha, a senior police officer, Brig. Floris Mostert, named Botha as the "handler" of Donald Acheson. An Irishman, Acheson was arrested in September for the murder in Namibia of Anton Lubowski, the first white man to be appointed to the executive of the black nationalist organization, Swapo.

In anti-apartheid circles, the detention of two ex-policemen did not generate confidence in the police investigation. Instead, it fuelled suspicions that there was a conspiracy to blame the assassinations on rogue policemen who were operating without orders from above.

De Klerk's initial decision not to appoint a commission of inquiry served as a prelude to the obfuscatory disclosure by the police that he—and the Defense Minister, Gen. Magnus Malan, and Foreign Minister Pik Botha—were on the same list of targets as Archbishop Tutu. It might have confused the general public, but it did little to enhance the reputation of the police among anti-apartheid activists.

But shortly before his watershed February speech, de Klerk succumbed to national and international pressure and appointed a judicial commission of inquiry into the squads. The commission, headed by Justice Louis Harms, was mandated to investigate murders which were committed to advance political ends. Its terms of reference were thus wider than the reference of the alleged police death squads; the purported police assassins, however, fell within the ambit of the inquiry. ○

A FAMILY REUNION

By PETER TYGESEN

In January, ANC veterans Govan Mbeki and Walter Sisulu, recently released after more than two decades in prison, flew to Lusaka to be reunited with their sons and with the exile wing of the liberation movement. A week-long meeting, rather than highlighting generational differences, demonstrated the ANC's unity of position regarding the likelihood of negotiations with the government.

Our correspondent talked with Walter Sisulu just prior to his departure to Lusaka about the prospects for talks with the South African government and the state of efforts to unite black South Africans across the political spectrum.

Hilton Barber/Impact Visuals



Not even a tropical rainstorm could dampen the high spirits at Lusaka International Airport as African National Congress (ANC) veterans Govan Mbeki, 79, and Walter Sisulu, 77, proudly hugged their exiled sons, Thabo and Max, amid a shower of reporters' flashbulbs.

Teenagers at the time of their fathers' imprisonment in 1963, the two sons are now themselves high-ranking ANC members. Foreign Affairs Secretary Thabo Mbeki is widely tipped as a leading contender for the ANC presidency. But those who predicted the younger Mbeki would be next to fill ailing Oliver Tambo's shoes did not take into account that Walter Sisulu might assume an important role or that Nelson Mandela would soon be released.

The elder Sisulu and Mbeki also held an equally emotional reunion with their own generation—with acting ANC President Alfred Nzo, Treasurer-General Thomas Nkobi, and the rest of the old-boy comrades who fled South Africa in the 1960s to set up the ANC in exile.

The Pretoria government has long been hoping to discern a split between the ANC veterans and the presumed hotheads of the younger, exiled wing. But the week-long consultation in Zambia showed no sign of cracks in the ANC. Instead, the prospect of being caught flat-footed by fast-moving South African President F.W. de Klerk seemed to unite the old and new leadership even further.

The exiled even admitted their relative impotence compared to the well-organized internal opposition, when they stated that the initiative of the opposition now rests mainly with



The reunited ANC leadership meeting in Lusaka (Walter Sisulu at center): "The prospect of being caught flatfooted by fast-moving South African President F.W. de Klerk seemed to unite the old and new ANC leadership even further"

a united "Congress for a Democratic Future" in December, where 5,000 delegates swore allegiance to a common stand against the government. Though reluctant, Azapo even endorsed the ANC's plan for negotiations.

Forced by this show of strength, the Pretoria government made an about-turn and faced realities. It is now solidly preparing its white electorate for a completely new look at the ANC. Branded "terrorist" and "communist" extremists less than a year ago, the ANC is now widely accepted as the main negotiating partner for the white minority government, eager to drag the country out of its economic, moral, and political cul-de-sac. Thus, the granting of passports so the recently released veterans could visit the ANC in Lusaka, the unbanning of the ANC and other organizations, and the subsequent release of Nelson Mandela.

But whereas Pretoria's motto seemed to be: If you can't ignore them, at least try to split them, the historic reunion in Zambia showed no sign of any immediate success in that strategy. Events are rather pointing to a situation where the old guard will take up leadership posts they had to deposit when incarcerated so many years ago.

They are experienced men indeed. Walter Sisulu was elected ANC secretary-general in 1949. Together with peers Mandela, Mbeki, and Tambo, he radically updated the organization, which was still rooted in an "Uncle Tom"-style tradition of pleading with the white *baas* for reason.

Sisulu then decisively led the ANC through its "golden period" of the 1950s, when it became a broadly based mass organization, whose non-violent actions against still new apartheid attracted thousands of angry and eager supporters. When their success ultimately led to the banning of the ANC in 1960, Sisulu continued steering it in hiding for three years, until its underground headquarters were unearthed by police in 1963.

While in jail, Sisulu and Mandela were continually consulted by the external wing and by the slowly recuperating internal opposition whenever questions of grand strategy arose. Many of today's young anti-apartheid leaders spent time in jail with the veteran activists in Robben Island prison, dubbed Mandela College by the youngsters. When they "graduated" to active service in the 1980s, they went on to form potent organizations: the community-based anti-apartheid umbrella, the United Democratic Front (UDF), and its giant trade union counterpart, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). They built and directed the biggest surge of revolt and defiance South Africa had ever witnessed, and by October last year, internal and international pressure against the Pretoria government forced it to release Walter Sisulu with seven co-prisoners.

Sisulu returned triumphantly to his modest red brick Soweto house, where the ANC's black-green-and-gold banner has waved defiantly ever since.

Africa Report spoke to Sisulu on the eve of his departure to Lusaka in January. The grey-haired, bespectacled leader responded to questions with the vigor and insight that indicated he was never out of the political fray even though imprisoned. Sisulu indicated that real negotiations might be on the agenda this year:

the forces inside South Africa. And when the week of reunion and discussions ended in a full-scale summit of frontline state presidents, the ANC delegation was led by none other than Walter Sisulu.

As expected, the frontline leaders once again backed the ANC's plan for a negotiated settlement to end apartheid, but they stressed the need for further pressure on South Africa to establish the necessary "climate for negotiations."

Even though the pace of de Klerk's promised *perestroika* is not nearly as breathtaking as the winds sweeping Eastern Europe, it is still brisk enough to require the ANC to be constantly vigilant. De Klerk was sworn in as president only six months ago, and at that stage his government clearly aimed to circumvent the ANC by finding other black negotiating partners. Cabinet ministers stated endlessly that South Africa could consult with many other "black interest groups" besides the ANC.

But the government's strategy collapsed long before Christmas. The ANC successfully enlisted support for its stance from several homeland leaders, most notably Gen. Bantu Holomisa of the Transkei, the first homeland to be granted "independence," and previously Pretoria's solid ally. Pressing the government further, the ANC and its internal allies in the trade unions and democratic movement succeeded in forging an unprecedented unity among the anti-apartheid forces. They persuaded rival organizations such as Azapo to participate in

Peter Tygesen is a Danish journalist who has followed events in South Africa since 1980. He freelances for the Danish Broadcasting Corporation and contributes regularly to the Danish Weeken-avisen and various Scandinavian papers and magazines.

"I expect us to make quite some headway in 1990 in creating what we have termed a climate for negotiations. We are talking about lifting the emergency, unbanning the ANC and other organizations, withdrawing the army from the townships and releasing political prisoners, and halting all political trials and executions. As soon as these problems have been tackled, then we begin talking.

"These demands are accepted as reasonable the world over. I even think the government regards them as reasonable, at least they have made no substantial objection to this. It seems that they consider there is sense in our demands, and being cautious, I think we will have most of this solved this year.

"This, of course, is not coming automatically. The Boers will never make any positive change without pressure. All the foundations of apartheid are still fully intact. Even though de Klerk has succeeded P.W. Botha with a much more open and sophisticated style, we have not as yet seen any change of policy. But the National Party is no longer free to do as it pleases. It is no longer backed by a unified white population and it is no longer able to stamp out opposition. It must consider the entire situation and must react corresponding to its desired position in Africa, in America, and in Europe."

Africa Report: Of your demands for a "climate for negotiations," which will be the most difficult for Pretoria to meet?

Sisulu: One of the difficulties for the government, and I don't know how much serious thought they have given this, is the question of a ceasefire. Only when that agreement has been made can they really make progress. In practical terms, lifting the ban on the ANC must be followed by a ceasefire. Otherwise, how can members of our armed wing in Umkhonto we Sizwe surface and enjoy the unbanning? And what about our soldiers abroad?

Africa Report: Does that mean the return of all exiles is a precondition for negotiations?

Sisulu: Yes, of course! They must be here, the ANC must be in a freer position in all matters. Just like the National Party can come together, call meetings, and discuss issues with everybody. There must be no restrictions, so all our people must be here, from outside and from jail, and only then can we really begin to think of sitting down in negotiations.

Africa Report: If you should succeed in this, it seems you must forge a higher degree of unity among the opposition. PAC/Azapo, and some of the homeland leaders, especially Zulu leader Gatsha Buthelezi, are not pulling in your direction. How can you achieve this?

Sisulu: That is why you must regard the Congress for a Democratic Future in December as of significance. It was a success in spite of the fact that the pan-Africanist groups did not throw in their lot. But for Azapo to have come into this lot is a great achievement. They have got a history behind them, and they have done things. It was important to see that we now can work with them. So we are making some progress in this field.

The question of unity is closely linked to the question of relevance. You really never get an ideal situation. The PAC [Pan Africanist Congress] is not significant. Look at the situation in South Africa—where do you see the PAC? They have, for instance, not even been able to call a mass rally in the country after we opened up the possibility. Now this is, of course, in contrast to Azapo, which does have some influence of a kind, though small. It means a great deal, especially in the labor movement. And yet, when we look at the greater picture,

Cosatu has a million members, while the [PAC-oriented] Nactu less than 250,000. Now that camp is even split in two—one which is in favor of working with us, and another opposed. What kind of force is that? A not very relevant one.

Africa Report: How do you see the release of Nelson Mandela in this process—what will happen when he comes out?

Sisulu: Firstly, do not expect any dramatic turn of events. But the ANC will advance further. Mandela's name has become a household word throughout South Africa, and therefore it will have an added impact on the mobilization.

Mandela might be able to persuade Buthelezi. In fact, if anybody can, he is the one man who might be able to. And he will undoubtedly have considerable effect on the situation in the other homelands.

Africa Report: Why?

Sisulu: In the first place, there has always been a personal relationship between Mandela and Buthelezi, and with Zulu King Zwelithini and the king's father. Mandela was the old king's lawyer, and the present king and Buthelezi's wife have known Nelson since they were small children. They grew up with respect for Nelson. Besides, he is of royalty, which matters to Buthelezi and the king, and it also matters to other homeland leaders.

Africa Report: What would you like to see such talks with Buthelezi produce?

Sisulu: The immediate result which I would like to see tomorrow is the ending of the bloodshed in Natal between his Inkatha supporters and the UDF/Cosatu. This has now claimed more than 2,000 lives. It is the question of really getting people committed to peace, and not saying one thing and doing another. Buthelezi is the man who can stop the killings. We had a month where talks [between Buthelezi and the UDF] were taking place and the killings dropped to a very, very low level. That is the kind of thing I am looking forward to as immediate results.

Africa Report: Support for the South African Communist Party is growing fast these days, especially among the youth. They have a rather different political attitude from the old guard ANC. What do you think of this development?

Sisulu: That is what happens in a revolutionary situation. When in any country the situation reaches a revolutionary situation, the people are inspired by revolutionary ideas. And what could be more revolutionary, especially in South Africa, than the Communist Party? This will influence the situation and the young people. And the more hostile the regime is to communism and the like, the more the younger people are interested in it. The regime has been pushing people into the Communist Party.

Africa Report: And what do you think about that?

Sisulu: Well, it is not the direction I personally prefer. In the ANC, we want the young people to understand that national revolution must mean national democracy. But I don't believe in pushing. I think the ANC must be accepted as the national liberation movement. Then, after liberation, the Communist Party can go its own way and develop if it wishes.

I actually think we have done remarkably well in this respect. The labor movement is aiming at socialism, and has stated this clearly; yet they accept that the correct direction is the direction of the ANC.

On top of this: We are not isolated from the world. We have had the experiences of Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Tanzania, Angola, and of Eastern Europe. Of course, we are taking those lessons into account. ○



THE DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE

By COLLEEN LOWE MORNA

Blessed with an abundance of minerals and other natural assets, Namibia and its people were kept deliberately underdeveloped by South Africa. While long-term prospects look bright, the new Swapo government will have to carefully balance existing economic relationships with the need to redress past imbalances.

With the lure of a modern-day El Dorado, Namibia is attracting fortune-seekers, big and small. From African professionals, to Taiwanese businessmen, to would-be South African sanctions busters, all are apparently convinced that—in Africa, anyway—Namibia is where the action will be in the 1990s.

Undoubtedly, the long-term prospects for Africa's youngest nation look most appealing. Like

Colleen Lowe Morna is a Zimbabwean freelance journalist based in Harare.

Botswana—Africa's most booming economy—Namibia has a population of about a million, living in a huge, mineral-rich country.

Although Namibia's diamond reserves are now only reckoned at 10 to 15 years' worth (though current exploration at sea could lead to a revision of that estimate), the country boasts some of the richest uranium deposits in the world. Namibia's agricultural potential, it is thought, has been deliberately underestimated by South Africa to keep the coun-

try dependent. The well-watered Caprivi strip alone, experts say, could probably feed the nation.

Unlike Botswana, Namibia is also blessed with a sea coast, boasting some of the richest fishing grounds in the world—even if they have been sorely abused by a motley bunch of fishing pirates during South Africa's occupation.

And, with its good communications system—thanks, in part, to the needs of the South African Defense Force—Namibia has the basis for a

sound manufacturing sector, which South Africa also kept deliberately small while it ran the show.

Add to this, the smoothness with which Namibia's United Nations-supervised elections took place, Swapo's conciliatory attitude and pledge that no private property will be nationalized, and it is not hard to see why businessmen are beating a path to Windhoek.

According to the country's registrar of companies, some 521 new companies signed up in the first 10 months of 1989, compared with 276 for the whole of 1988. Most of these, the registrar told *Africa Report*, are either local or South African. Foreign companies—mainly from West Germany and the Far East—are waiting in the wings to register as soon as the country formally becomes independent.

Beneath this rosy picture, however, are several immediate concerns which—against the backdrop of the high expectations built up among ordinary Namibians—could make 1990 one of the most trying years for the new Swapo government. Indeed, as Omar Halim, UNTAG deputy director in charge of development, puts it, "There will be many tightropes to walk."

Like Zimbabwe in its last few years before independence, Namibia's economy has recently been performing sluggishly, with an average annual growth rate of over 3 percent.

Namibia's impressive-sounding income per capita of nearly \$2,000 masks gross inequities. Some 6,000 white farmers own 60 percent of the land. Whites, who comprise 6 percent of the population, claim 65 percent of all private property. They earn 10 times more than blacks in urban areas, and 25 times more than blacks in rural areas, for whom social services have been seriously neglected.

Almost all of Namibia's efficient communications network leads to South Africa. Up to now, South African and Western multinationals have exploited the country's fish and mineral resources with little restriction. Swapo estimates that up to 35

percent of the country's GNP flows to foreign bank accounts in the form of profits, dividends, remittances, and capital transfers.

Expectations are naturally running high among Swapo supporters, who consist mainly of the urban poor and peasant farmers. But campaign promises will now have to be balanced against immediate economic problems, the need to ensure increased productivity, as well as to work out a next-door neighbor policy with South Africa.

Unfortunately for Swapo, there won't be much cash in the till to help make things easier when independence occurs on March 21. South Africa, which used to provide some 25 percent of Namibia's budgetary requirements, has been gradually cutting this allocation, and will halt it altogether from next fiscal year. There are some questions surrounding what proportion of this went into financing the war effort, and Namibian economists generally agree that South Africa's annual "grant" was not conducive to good fiscal management.

"We should see the [withdrawal] as a blessing in disguise," says Fanuel Tjingaete, associate professor of economics at the Namibian Academy. "We really need some fiscal discipline here because we have been living beyond our means for quite some time. This should be an eye opener to policy-makers."

But the rather sudden cutback, coupled with Pretoria's refusal to guarantee government loans, restricting commercial borrowing in South Africa, has led to cutbacks in social services. This may have to continue in the short term—at a time when the government is under its greatest pressure to redress past imbalances.

Namibia also inherits an 800 million rands debt, incurred on its behalf by South Africa. This constitutes 3.4 percent of GDP—a small proportion by African standards. But, because Swapo suspects that most of the debt went toward financing the war effort, it presents a moral dilemma.

Swapo economic secretary Ben Amathila says Swapo will have to determine "what we can live with and what we can't." However, as the government will be seeking to join the IMF and World Bank, as well as to open up commercial borrowing options overseas, such a course could backfire.

Like Zimbabwe, which eventually paid back every penny the Ian Smith government borrowed to stay afloat, Swapo may be forced to swallow its pride.

Meanwhile, in one of the cruelest ironies of the transition period, the withdrawal of the SADF from the north, where it is estimated to have spent 240 million rands annually, is causing serious problems. "Their pulling out has affected the economy tremendously and in an adverse way," notes UNTAG's Halim. "Income has gone down drastically and unemployment has gone up."

UNTAG special representative Martti Ahtisaari has been "insisting with the South Africans that during the transitional period they are responsible for the welfare of the people in [Swapo's northern stronghold of] Ovamboland," Halim says. But, he adds, "South Africa has not been willing or able to maintain this expenditure."

To add insult to injury, until South Africa officially ceases to administer the territory on Independence Day, donors can't step in either. UNTAG is trying to bridge the gap temporarily by borrowing from future UNDP funds earmarked for Namibia to take care of the most pressing needs in the north—manning the control towers of four airports, and replacing SADF forces who performed civilian duties in the health and education sectors.

One advantage of independence, says Swapo's Ben Amathila, is that the government will be able to dismantle South Africa's 11 apartheid-style ethnic administrations, estimated to have employed about half the 40,000-strong civil service. "Depending on the efficient administration that we would like to put in, it may be possible to make some savings,

given the duplicity of the South African administration," he says.

But, notes Halim, with unemployment running at 40 percent, it will be difficult to lay off such large numbers. "These people could be employed in development projects," he said. "But they will require a whole new training."

"There are high expectations among our people, and there are a lot of programs which the government has promised," adds Amathila. "We know that development programs cannot possibly all be financed internally from our resources. There is certainly room for external assistance."

UNTAG held a major consultative conference with donors in Oslo on September 19-21, and is urging that donors consider giving budgetary as well as project support to Namibia, at least initially. Halim expects that "aid will pour into Namibia once the country becomes independent."

Many Namibians, however, fear that developments in Eastern Europe will detract attention from the country. Former colonial power West Germany, for example—expected to have been one of Namibia's main benefactors—is currently quite wrapped up with the crumbling of the Iron Curtain. Namibian economists, like Professor Tjingaete, also believe that if there is one lesson the country can learn from its predecessors, it is to rely first on its own strengths. "We should not get ourselves into the aid syndrome," he says.

But maintaining, and indeed increasing, economic growth will entail some political compromises.

In the agricultural sector, for example, Swapo has vowed to break its food dependence on South Africa, and aim for full food self-sufficiency. That means—like Zimbabwe—treading cautiously where land reform is concerned. Already, the party has said it will not nationalize any white farms, and will only seek to buy commercial farm land which is not being used productively.

But, following Zimbabwe's example, the new government will try to

extend credit, marketing, and extension facilities to peasant farmers, in an effort to increase their productivity as well.

Swapo has similarly said that it will not nationalize the country's diamond and uranium mines, despite allegations of overmining and sanctions-busting in the past. However, it will seek participation in these ventures.

Swapo will inherit the majority share of voting rights on the board of Rio Tinto's Rossing uranium mine, and has held informal talks with De Beers Consolidated Diamond Mines on purchasing shares in the company. These companies are well aware that there will be new minimum wage laws and legislation covering workers' rights. Illegal practices of the past, like transfer pricing, are also likely to come under greater scrutiny.

A key, longer-term objective will be diversification of the present economic base. Extending the country's fishing rights from the present 12 to 200 nautical miles off the coast will be a top priority. But experts warn that because of the level of depletion in the past by pirate ships from South Africa and East and West bloc countries, Namibia may have to wait patiently until the stock has been built up again before going out fishing. Joint venture agreements with foreign fishing companies will also have to be entered into.

With manufacturing only accounting for 5 percent of GDP—thanks to South Africa's dumping policies—investors will also be encouraged to pursue value-added manufacturing industries like food processing and beneficiation of minerals. Forging transport links with and joining groups like the nine-member Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) will be crucial to diversifying trade links.

However, delinking with South Africa, which still controls Walvis Bay—Namibia's only deep-water port—and the country's financial sector, will have to be done with caution.

Because it was run as an exten-

sion of South Africa, Namibia is not a formal member of the Pretoria-centered Southern African Customs Union at the moment. To placate South Africa, and because SACU can be a cheap source of revenue in times of budgetary constraint, the country is expected to apply for membership.


But, says Tjingaete, who did his doctoral dissertation on Namibia's economy, "just looking at objective factors, we would be well advised to pull out of the rand monetary area and have our own central bank and currency." Remaining tied to South Africa's currency, he says, means that "whatever South Africa decides, we are automatically pulled along, even when that is not the opportune thing for us."

Walvis Bay presents the more difficult, and ultimately most crucial, test for Namibia in its formative days. Clearly of little economic benefit to South Africa, Pretoria's main reason for reasserting a claim to the harbor on the basis of an archaic colonial agreement in 1976 was to maintain a foothold in the country after independence. By 1981, Walvis Bay boasted one of the largest concentrations of military forces and equipment anywhere on the continent.

Two options are now being considered: developing alternative ports to Walvis Bay, or regaining control of the enclave. The first offers little hope. Namibia's only other port—Luderitz Bay—sits on a rocky bed which would cost millions of dollars to excavate.

And there is a strong consensus, across the political spectrum in Namibia, that South Africa must be made to relinquish its absurd claim. "It is a very serious matter for us," explains Tjingaete. "Walvis Bay belongs to us, and we want it back."

Swapo, suggests Amathila, is pinning its hopes on South Africa's growing and desperate need for friends. "South Africa right now wants international recognition," says the Swapo official. "It can't hope to get that while hanging on to this colonial heritage." ○



President Kenneth Kaunda:
SEEKING SOLUTIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

By MARGARET A. NOVICKI



Margaret A. Novicki

In this interview, conducted prior to the unbanning of South African political organizations, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda articulates Africa's perspective—a combination of optimism and wariness—regarding the Pretoria government's efforts to end apartheid. He also explains the background of the Gbadolite accord on Angola, revealing the story behind the collapse of the agreement between the Luanda government and Savimbi's Unita.

Africa Report: Last August, you met with then-Acting President F.W. de Klerk, who outlined to you his plans for reform in South Africa. Is his vision satisfactory to you in terms of what we can expect in South Africa?

Kaunda: First of all, there is no denying that great things are happening in southern Africa today. What do I mean by this? I am looking at Namibia. It is a big dream come true. We are all now praying that the program toward independence will remain on course. The reports we are receiving show clearly that everybody is cooperating. That is a major step in the right direction, and we are all very happy indeed.

Insofar as South Africa itself is concerned, obviously a number of questions remain unanswered. At my meeting with Mr. de Klerk on 28 August 1989, I asked him many questions. Among them were: Are you just another Botha, or are you the Joshua we have been waiting for? Those questions can only be answered by Mr. de Klerk's words and deeds.

What has he done so far to indicate which way he is going? First and foremost, he left a copy with me of what he refers to as his five-year plan to abolish apartheid. As I told him, I do not think he has more than two years to go. If he does not do anything during that period, he will be overtaken by events. An explosion will then become inevitable. No thinking person wants to see that happen, so all of us are working very hard to try to avoid that.

Apart from the fact that he does not have the five years he is talking about on his hands, he is talking about group interests. I do not think that the people of South Africa today are looking for group interests. They are looking for the real thing. In fairness to him, he has released Walter Sisulu and other political detainees. In fairness to him, he has allowed mass rallies to take place in South African cities for the first time in more than 20 years. Well done. He has declared that all the beaches will be open to everybody. He has allowed that certain amenities will now be open to all the people of South Africa.

But the question is: Is that what sent Oliver Tambo into exile to wage a liberation struggle? Was it just to open the beaches to everybody that sent Nelson Mandela to life imprisonment? Far from it. They are not working for group interests. Group interests is another word for apartheid continuing. Apartheid is for destruction, not reform. Therefore, when President de Klerk talks about group interests, he is not destroying apartheid, he is reforming it. He is trying to bring it out in new clothes, so to speak. That is not the answer to the problem. You need to get that pus out of the wound completely and the only way to do that is to conduct a major operation. I hope he is the surgeon we are waiting for to conduct that operation. The patient is very sick and we need action.

These great men did not go into prison, into exile, did not wage armed struggle in order that they shall swim together with everybody else. They are asking for one thing: one person, one vote, universal adult suffrage. And as long as that doesn't come about, we can expect no peace in South Africa. We can only expect an explosion, and that is not what any sensible person wants to see. I don't know whether Mr. de Klerk will do the job or not. We must wait. But neither he, nor any of us, have that time on our hands. The people are in a hurry. The young Sowetans were walking yesterday, today they are running.

Africa Report: Do you expect meaningful negotiations to take place soon, or are these changes still cosmetic?

Kaunda: I want to believe that de Klerk is serious in what he

is doing. Almost at every stage where he has taken some action, I have sent a message encouraging him. I remember last time was when he met with his own right-wing opposition leader, a former policeman, and that same day he allowed Nelson Mandela to meet with a leader of the PAC [Pan Africanist Congress]. I sent a message to him that that was very important, because part of this movement must aim at reducing sources of conflict by people meeting in all sorts of places. In that way, people will learn what others are thinking about the changes that should take place and so on. So that is moving in the right direction.

Certainly he needs to do more than that. There is need to lift the state of emergency. He needs to unban the ANC [African National Congress], PAC, and other mass movements. He needs to free Nelson Mandela and all other remaining political prisoners. He needs to call back Oliver Tambo and the others. He needs then to summon an *indaba*. Dialogue should begin in earnest. It is from that dialogue that they will be able to work out a new course of action. So I would hope that the steps he has started will take him to something more serious. Every journey begins with one step, but he has to move very quickly because he does not have very much time.

Africa Report: Is the ANC's Harare Declaration the proper basis for negotiations to get under way?

Kaunda: In fact, that is the main reason I and President Mugabe are here [in the United States]. We are hoping that this document will be supported by consensus by everybody, so that the secretary-general of the UN can then take this document to South African leaders, and by leaders I mean not only Mr. de Klerk, but also Oliver Tambo, Nelson Mandela, Archbishop Tutu, Chief Buthelezi, the whole lot of them, the PAC, UDF, and so on, so that they can begin working out their own way of discussing the future of their otherwise great country.


Africa Report: Are you optimistic about efforts to unite black South Africans in light of the Conference for a Democratic Future? Is there a trend toward unification of positions of black South Africans?

Kaunda: I personally would pray for that. It is something which must be done. Speaking from my own country's experience, at independence, we were a multi-party state. The major groups were the party which I am privileged to lead and one led by the veteran nationalist, the late Harry Nkumbula. Every general election or by-election, we bashed heads across the political divide, and unfortunately we had bodies to bury because of political differences, until he and I reached a decision that we must come together and stop this nonsense. Fortunately, we came together and from that time on, it has always been peace. Every election, there is peace. But ours is a population today of only 7.6 million. How much more complicated will that be in South Africa?

I would hope that those who are boycotting this type of get-together will think twice and come and join that truly great movement. If you want to change the name of the organization, if you don't want the ANC, very good, let them change it. But it is important that they all come together and speak with one voice. It will serve them very well in the future.

Africa Report: Do you detect any significant differences in the Bush administration's policy vis-à-vis South Africa and southern Africa from that of its predecessor?

Kaunda: Yes and no. Yes in every other situation except in Angola. That's where the no is coming from. When I was



"The people are in a hurry. The young Sowetans were walking yesterday, today they are running"

Eric Miller/Impact Visuals

privileged to address the AIDS summit in Canada, I called on President Bush. The only question I asked was: Mr. President, are you lifting sanctions against South Africa or not? President Bush's reply was an emphatic no lifting of sanctions. I said hurrah! So we are on the same wavelength there and it is very important. We need the U.S. to take that stance on sanctions. We need to keep sanctions on together until 30 June 1990. That date is very important because I want to believe that by that time, we will have found out precisely what President de Klerk has in mind in South Africa. Is he playing with words or does he mean business?

Give the man the benefit of the doubt. He is only a few months in office. What is more, this period is going to show him in real power, because he will have his own Parliament. He led the National Party to victory, so that Parliament in South Africa is his own, not Mr. Botha's. We must give him a chance to see what he is able to push through his own Parliament by way of destroying apartheid. It is only fair that we give him the six months and then reassess the situation.

That is where the power of the U.S. comes in. If by that time, de Klerk has not done what he promises to do to abolish apartheid, then it will be up to all of us to reassess the situation and probably take this matter to the Security Council for action and hopefully, there will be no dissenting voices insofar as applying mandatory economic sanctions is concerned. I hope, therefore, that Mr. de Klerk can do something during this period so that we don't put President Bush and his govern-

ment to the test.

On Angola, we are not moving together. I was very sad to hear of a CIA plane crashing in Angola, taking weapons to Savimbi. I know that President Bush is under pressure. He has taken over from an extreme right-winger by the name of Ronald Reagan. So I want to give George Bush the benefit of the doubt. We ourselves—the frontline states and other African countries—should be doing a little more. We believe in the independence of Angola as a country. We should be putting across our side of the story. We have not done that. We have left the field to Savimbi and his right-wing supporters. We can never hope to change the situation if we don't canvass congressmen, various organizations for support. We must do that. In a way, we have not helped President Bush to change positions, as I would like to believe he would like to do.

Africa Report: What is your view of recent efforts to restart negotiations between the Angolan government and Unita and what is the main obstacle at this point?

Kaunda: There are quite a lot. President Bush has worked on both President Mobutu and Savimbi, and they are working together again. At the moment, I cannot say much until we have seen the report from our mediator, President Mobutu.

Africa Report: It has been acknowledged, even by the Zairian government, that Savimbi was to blame for collapse of the Gbadolite agreement, having agreed to temporary exile and then denying that he had so agreed. Is that the major sticking point?

Kaunda: The best way of explaining this is to go back to 16 May 1989. That day found a summit of the eight of us in Luanda. President dos Santos explained to us what he had in mind to bring peace to Angola. We all supported that. We decided that President Mobutu would brief President Bush and South Africa, and of course Savimbi. We agreed President dos Santos would brief President Castro of Cuba. We agreed President Mugabe would brief Margaret Thatcher of Britain. We agreed President Nguesso of Congo would brief President Mikhail Gorbachev. We agreed President da Costa of São Tomé and Príncipe would brief Chancellor Kohl. We agreed President Bongo of Gabon would brief President Mitterrand. We agreed President Chissano would brief the Prime Minister of Portugal.

We also agreed that we would be reviewing the situation quarterly so that we would have to meet in Zaire some time in August. But mid-June, President Mobutu sent me a message as chairman of those countries to inform me happily that he had made some progress he would like to report to us. So I called a meeting for June 22 in Gbadolite. At that meeting, a number of things happened. One, President Mobutu as our host and mediator summoned me to his office together with President dos Santos. There he told us he was glad to brief us about his successes. The Bush administration had accepted the approach which was agreed in Luanda. South Africa had agreed, Savimbi had agreed. Savimbi was reluctant to come, but he had spoken to Assistant Secretary of State Cohen, who had prevailed over Savimbi and Savimbi was coming. As we were discussing this matter, he was about to land at the airport. The agreement would entail cessation of hostilities, one. Two, Savimbi would be offered something by the Angolan government, and he would take that into self-imposed exile. He would go on his own free will, nothing definite about timing.

After that, the mediator would continue with talks between the two sides so that the agreement which we reached ourselves, the program which was accepted in Luanda, would be fulfilled. So we clapped hands! Hurrah! And then it was agreed that our host would explain this to the other heads of state. In that request for me to call the summit, President Mobutu had suggested that he would like to invite a number of other heads of state so that they could witness the agreement being signed at Gbadolite. I said please go ahead. As a result, we had 18 heads of state there, plus the prime minister of Tanzania and the speaker of Morocco.

The summit was called, we sent away all our foreign ministers except three interpreters, Portuguese, French, and English. I called upon President Mobutu to brief us on what he had achieved. He explained all that I have said, except the one about Savimbi deciding to go out in exile on his own. That worried President dos Santos. I could see him struggling, asking question after question, and other leaders contributed, praising the efforts and the outcome, but President dos Santos was not happy. I could see clearly that the summit was going to break down unless that point came out of Savimbi choosing to go out into exile.

I decided as chairman to write down notes of what my colleagues were saying. When I decided that I should reveal this part too, it would then soften President dos Santos. I said that one point that President Mobutu has not added is that of Savimbi deciding to go into exile after being offered something by the Angolan government. That cheered President dos Santos, who then said: "Now I am ready to shake the hand of my compatriot," meaning Savimbi. He stood up, Savimbi stood

up, and they shook hands. We all clapped hands and shook hands of both men.


As soon as I stopped talking, somebody took over the floor and I was writing what they were saying, so I could not write what I had said myself. I am referring to this because those of my colleagues, our friends who have seen my minutes which President dos Santos asked for, have not seen that part in the minutes. The reason is that as soon as I stopped speaking, somebody took over and I began writing what he was saying without writing what I put in. And when I went back home, that had escaped my mind.

Fortunately for us, when I said what I said, the interpreter said Savimbi is going to be exiled. President Chissano, who understands all those three languages, said, "No, President Kaunda did not say that. He said Savimbi will then choose of his own free will to leave Angola for 18-24 months or so." So when we met at the summit in Kinshasa, President Chissano reminded us of his correction of the interpreter. He was proving to us that Kaunda did say what Savimbi has been denying. It was said, it was agreed, he was there himself and he knows French, English, Portuguese. So that is the background to what Savimbi has been denying all along, saying President Mobutu was a liar, an egoist, calling me the enemy of Angola, and all sorts of names because I brought out the truth, as we were briefed by President Mobutu. This is exactly what happened.

Africa Report: Are you optimistic for a solution to the Angolan conflict?

Kaunda: I don't know. People in public life must be optimistic all the time; otherwise they should cease to be politicians! ○

Unita leader Jonas Savimbi: "He would go into self-imposed exile after being offered something by the Angolan government"



CAMERON

SOUTHERN AFRICA'S ELDER STATESMAN

Back in 1964, the new president of Zambia, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, had a row with U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson about the American intervention in the Congo to rescue white mercenaries, arguing that it would encourage South Africa to intervene in the affairs of its neighbors to the north. Subsequent developments have proved Kaunda right. Hardly noticed at the time, this row marked the beginning of a quarter-century of experience for Kaunda in dealing with all the principal players in the southern African saga.

Right from the beginning of his presidency, Kaunda had to contend with the ability of the countries to the south to hurt his new nation economically. At independence in October 1964, a primary task for Zambia was to break free of the economic controls then exercised largely through the great mining houses. On the eve of independence, he secured a first victory, regaining mineral rights then held by the old British South Africa Company (BSA).

Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Rhodesia on November 11, 1965, assisted Zambia in breaking ties to the south, at least in part, as it was forced to diversify away from trade with Rhodesia and applied sanctions more thoroughly than did most other states.

From independence onwards, Zambia provided constant support for the various liberation movements, and this hospitality made Zambia a prime target for Rhodesian, Portuguese, and then South African destabilization tactics. Official Zambian policy has always been to allow transit to guerrillas and to permit OAU-recognized movements to be headquartered in Lusaka. By the mid-1970s, the MPLA, Swapo, the ANC, Zapu, and Zanu had offices there. Such openly given support has led to frequent reprisals against Zambia.

The 1970s were to witness a long, difficult battle on a number of fronts. In 1970, in his capacity as chairman of the OAU, Kaunda traveled to Europe and North America in his efforts to prevent the sale of arms to South Africa. His discussion with British Prime Minister Edward Heath was a disaster, and President Richard Nixon would not see him. It was hardly a successful tour, but Kaunda was learning what motivated the Western leaders.

In January 1971, Kaunda took the heat at the Commonwealth meeting in Singapore, again on the issue of arms sales to South Africa. In these years, Kaunda learned just how difficult it would be to persuade the West to change its attitudes toward the white regimes of southern Africa. By October 1971, South African paramilitary units had crossed from the Caprivi Strip into Zambia in reprisal raids for Zambian support of Swapo. Thus the Zambezi—Zambia's southern frontier—had become the frontline demarcating independent black Africa from the white-controlled south.

Throughout the 1970s, close cooperation with neighboring President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania became a vital part of Kaunda's tactics. In 1973, the two presidents initiated regular meetings to coordinate policy toward the south and they invited President Mobutu of Zaire to join them. It was a tactic to which Kaunda returned in 1989 when Mobutu—who had long supported Unita in Angola—was invited to act as principal peace-maker between the Angolan government and Unita.

In January 1973, Smith closed the border with Zambia, forcing the latter to reroute northwards its monthly 27,000 tons of copper exports. By that time, South Africa had an estimated 4,000-5,000 troops deployed along the Zam-

bezi. 1974 was a breakthrough year following the April coup in Lisbon. Once more, Kaunda acted as broker, this time between Frelimo and the Portuguese as they sought an end to the Mozambique war. In October, Kaunda welcomed a speech by South African Prime Minister John Vorster in which he said South Africa would withdraw its troops from the Zambezi if Kaunda would restrain the freedom fighters. Dialogue got under way, with Vorster meeting Félix Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d'Ivoire and Kaunda sending a representative to South Africa to discuss détente.

The climax of the Rhodesian war now approached and from 1977 onward, Kaunda allowed Nkomo's Zapu to have bases in Zambia, a decision which led to reprisal raids by the Smith forces in 1978 and 1979, including air raids upon Lusaka. Kaunda played a crucial role as host of the 1979 Commonwealth conference, where he first met Britain's new prime minister, Margaret Thatcher. Half-way through the Lancaster House talks in London when deadlock had been reached, Kaunda was called in to resolve it. This was a crucial turning point for the frontline states and led to independence for Zimbabwe in 1980.

From 1975 onwards, Zambia was to play a major role in exerting pressure on the Western Contact Group over Namibia at a time when Swapo operated from Zambia, though later it transferred its bases to southern Angola. In 1982, Kaunda met with South Africa's President P.W. Botha in an attempt to find a solution to regional security problems. He was criticized for doing so by other frontline leaders, but maintained his search for solutions.

On the retirement of Nyerere as president of Tanzania in 1985, Kaunda succeeded him as chairman of the frontline states, a position he continues to hold. It is an exacting role, for there is no formal structure for the cooperation of the frontline states. There are, moreover, great differences of emphasis and interests among the frontline states, so it is a major task to ensure that they always present a united front.

The period of 1986 to 1989 was especially fraught with dangers. It witnessed acrimonious debate in the Commonwealth about the application of sanctions against South Africa, given Thatcher's opposition. Pressure for sanctions to be mounted were nonetheless pushed all the time, while Kaunda attempted to coordinate regional sanctions as an interim measure. Given the state of the Zambian economy, he has done well in this regard.

The momentous events of the last two years (Kaunda served as OAU chairman for a second time during 1987-88) have required immense flexibility and a constant readiness to deal with South Africa, while at the same time never relaxing the pressures to which Pretoria so obviously responds.

And so it was fitting that last year Kaunda should host the new South African leader, F.W. de Klerk, in Livingstone on August 28. The meeting produced no surprises. But it did enable the two men to get one another's measure and in terms of what lies ahead it is vital for Kaunda to know the kind of man with whom he must deal.

He has no illusions about South African intentions. Despite all the talk that has taken place in recent months, it is for Pretoria to undertake the fundamental steps to abolish apartheid. Meanwhile, the frontline has in Kaunda a chairman who has accumulated a greater store of knowledge and experience of the players in the southern African drama than anyone else. He will need it all. ■


—Guy Arnold



COMOROS

PARADISE LOST

By AIDAN HARTLEY



The last white mercenaries have finally left the Comoros after a debacle in which President Ahmed Abdallah was murdered. The future of the island nation is by no means clear, however, although the infamous Col Bob Denard and his henchmen have forfeited their control over the country's political life.

Glossy portraits of President Ahmed Abdallah still hung on walls all over Moroni, but he was murdered and buried on the neighboring island of Anjouan. The Comoran rumor machine, known as "Radio Coco," had gone wild. It said Abdallah had died grotesquely at the hand of "The Doctor," a mysterious South African figure, and his body as it had been displayed to the grand mufti was fingerless and disemboweled from throat to groin like a chicken.

At the presidential villa, the bedroom windows were blown in, a rocket-propelled grenade having been fired through them on the night Abdallah died. Now, so people said, *le Colonel* slept in the president's bed, while his henchmen fortified themselves in the Gothic ruins of the sultan's fortress at Itsandra Beach.

"Before, a Comoran was in charge. Now Denard is in control, and this is the problem." The French diplomat said his country was embarrassed. He said France was determined to expel "Colonel" Bob Denard and his 30 mercenaries from the islands, by force if necessary. He conjured up images of 350 foreign

legionnaires poised to invade from the neighboring French island of Mayotte, and of a further 800 paratroopers placed on alert in far-off Réunion island.

"It's a good number, no? All we need is for the Comorans to invite us in," he said. But the rumors were that interim president Said Djohar was being held a virtual hostage of Denard, and that when he met a diplomat in private he clamped his wrists together to show that he was imprisoned.

On the other side of Moroni, South African trade representative Marco Boni was also embarrassed. One of the mercenaries had left his seaside house just before journalists arrived. He said South Africa had cut off aid to the *Garde présidentielle* (GP)—estimated at \$3 million a year—and had never used the islands as a trans-shipment point for weapon runs to Renamo bases in Mozambique. Things had been going badly for some time with the mercenaries, who were now supported only by hard-line elements in the South African Defense Force. One of the sleek young products of Pretoria's foreign ministry, Boni seemed to truly believe in F.W. de Klerk's new policy. "After our successes at brokering peace in Angola and Namibia, I think we can offer a lot in

resolving this situation here," he said without irony.

The politics of the Comoros have been cruel and bizarre only the way a small island's can be. This archipelago of tiny volcanic islands off the coast of Madagascar has been independent from France for just 15 years, and Denard and foreign meddling have been associated with its power struggles all during this period.

Months after independence, Denard led his first coup against President Ahmed Abdallah, helping to install the visionary young socialist Ali Soilih. The French mercenary left the islands for three years to embark on other African escapades. One of them was the bungled attempt to overthrow Benin's President Mathieu Kérékou in 1977, an incident which led to his indictment in the Paris high court and a death sentence in absentia in Cotonou. Denard already had a long career of freebooting in Africa: invading Katanga (on a bicycle) during the 1960 crisis, the Biafran war, as well as jobs in Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, and Chad.

Denard was contracted by Comoran businessmen to overthrow Soilih in 1978. Soilih, it seems, had become quite insane. On taking power, all bureaucratic records were destroyed, while *les jeunesses révolutionnaires* enforced his socialist program with the zeal of China's cultural revolution. When Denard and 50 of his white henchmen invaded Itsandra Beach by trawler, Soilih thought he was God. It took Denard a few hours to conquer Moroni and when Ahmed Abdallah was reinstalled, the mercenaries were held up as national heroes.

It is unlikely Denard could have remained in the Comoros without his Gaullist connections in the French secret service, the DGSE, or his membership in the right-wing *Clan des Gabonais*, the club of mer-

Aidan Hartley is a freelance journalist based in Nairobi.




Bob Denard and President Ahmed Abdallah (right): The president was murdered apparently because he—as well as France and South Africa—wanted the mercenaries to leave the islands

cenaries and legionnaires who based themselves in Omar Bongo's Gabon. When the new French president, François Mitterrand, vowed to rid the Comoros of the mercenaries in 1981, however, other backers had to be found. South Africa, eager to spread influence and gain a strategic hold in the Indian Ocean, stepped in around this time to fund the *Garde présidentielle* set up by Denard ostensibly to protect Ahmed Abdallah.

French journalist Jean Larteguy once wrote of mercenaries: "They fight for 20 or 30 years to reshape the world, but die in their beds of a stroke or cirrhosis of the liver." Perhaps the desire to live out the rest of his days quietly led Denard, born in 1927, to settle in the Comoros. He married a Comoran girl—she was his sixth wife—converted to Islam, and took a Muslim name. "I hate the traffic of Paris," he said, charming his readers, "but I adore the scent of ylang ylang" (a perfume plant). Content to become a cult hero, he reportedly sold the rights of his life story to Clint Eastwood and was interviewed by *Paris Match*.

There was another side to the retired Bob Denard, the desire to monopolize the Comoros' tiny and beleaguered economy. He cut a deal with the South African hotel chain Sun International to build two luxury beach hotels—a \$50 million project South Africa regards as a development program—and ran a South African-funded vegetable plantation for his own profit. He held major shares in the single foreign bank, the Banque Internationale des Comores, and through his French business contacts, held a monopoly on all meat imports. When a Comoran trade mission was established in Johannesburg, he staffed it with his own agent, who channelled all deals through Denard. Finally, when one considers that even the 30 white mercenaries in the presidential guard were paid less than \$1,000 a month, it seems Denard made a profit out of that as well.

It was this greed which contributed to his souring of relations with



France and South Africa. But more importantly, the presence of Denard had become an embarrassment to his tacit supporters abroad. "In this day and age, when South Africa is trying to change its image, do you really think we need an association with him?" asked Marco Boni.

Furthermore, Ahmed Abdallah felt he was losing power to the GP, which had to brutally suppress widespread opposition to the regime. Known as "Papa Bok" after tyrant Bokassa of the Central African Empire, Abdallah held a referendum on his presidency just weeks before he was killed. An unlikely 92.5 percent majority said he should remain as president without opposition parties.

The chief mercenary, Bob Denard: "He tried to monopolize the Comoros' tiny and beleaguered economy, cutting deals with South Africa and France"

Two months before Abdallah died, France dispatched a military adviser to Moroni to research the security forces on the islands. The outcome was a resolution by France that the GP should be absorbed into the regular *Forces armées comoriennes* (FAC). Soon afterwards, Pretoria's foreign ministry secretary, General Neil van Heerden, visited Paris. It was agreed that Denard and his men should depart the islands by the end of December. At the same time, Abdallah had sent his foreign minister, Said Kafe, to Paris to

request assistance in removing Denard.

Radio Coco said that Abdallah, along with Denard and his right-hand man, Commandant "Marques" (real name: Dominique Malacrino), had been seen promenading together on the night of November 26, just hours before the president died. What followed can only be surmised. Denard was desperate to remain on the islands. Abdallah refused to renew the mercenaries' contract. During an argument in the presidential villa, Marques drew on the president and his bodyguard, shooting both dead. A Comoran witness was later decapitated.

Horrified at their mistake, the mercenaries tried to inculcate the FAC. They fired a grenade through the bedroom window and went to find the FAC's commander, Ahmed Mohammed, in his bed, only to discover that he had gone to Anjouan island for the weekend. The GP flew to Anjouan, attacked Ahmed Mohammed's house, and brought him back to Grande Comore suffering severe grenade wounds. Meanwhile, all garrisons of the 600-strong FAC were attacked by the GP. The FAC was disbanded, while the French-officered gendarmerie's firepower was cut back. Denard was now in control of the radio station, the airport, and all military bases.

Forty days of mourning for the president were declared the next day. But nobody was convinced by the FAC story and Ahmed was released from jail. Worst of all, in Denard's daily meetings with cabinet ministers, nobody would accept the job as president.

Denard consistently denied guilt in the murder of Abdallah, who was quickly buried on Anjouan. "We are soldiers, not assassins," he told reporters in one of only two interviews with the press in December. After more than a week, both South Africa and France came out to strongly condemn mercenary control of the islands and both suspended aid. France funds more than 60 percent of the islands' budget, and by early December, civil servants

had not been paid for five months.

On December 5, Denard's fortunes turned against him. Emerging from the grand mosque in Moroni, where he had called the ceremony known as "Hitima" to declare his innocence before the Muslim cadis, he was surrounded by 500 young Comorans chanting "Assassin, assassin." The crowds were beaten back as Denard drove off. The next day, the GP fired teargas on 1,000 rioting students. By now, all schools were boycotted and civil servants were on strike.

A fortnight after Abdallah's death, four French warships appeared on

Denard had a long career of freebooting in Africa: invading Katanga, the Biafran war, as well as jobs in Angola, Cote d'Ivoire, and Chad.

the horizon. On one occasion, a French fighterjet flew low and slow along the Moroni coastline. France ruled out invasion as an option, but 800 paratroopers, six transports, and five helicopters were now on Mayotte. Denard came out to say he would not leave. Itsandra Beach was mined, and gun emplacements looked out to sea from the slopes of Mt. Kartala, the huge volcano above Moroni. Then Denard appeared again, saying he wanted an "honorable departure" with acknowledgment of his "moral and material investment in the islands." His men would not be "slaughtered like lambs in the waves," he said.

Early on December 15, the first Puma helicopters and Transall transports began to arrive at Hahaya. Denard arrived for a ceremony to transfer power. But as the GP guard of honor presented arms, they were ignored by the arriving French troops, and the senior French officer refused to shake Denard's proffered

hand. The colonel turned, disgusted, and strode away.


Four hours later, he and all his remaining mercenaries returned to the airport, where a South African C-130 Hercules waited for them. After loading crates of South African lager and the ship's wheel from the trawler on which Denard invaded in 1978, the mercenaries were prevented from boarding the aircraft with their arms. Late in the afternoon, the plane took off, bound for Johannesburg.

The legacy of the mercenaries is a political vacuum and an economic nightmare. Strikes and riots have broken out all over Grande Comore as teachers and civil servants demand better pay and work conditions. The World Bank and IMF have stepped in to advise structural adjustment and provide loans to rescue the economy from debt arrears, now standing at \$126 million. With low market prices for the main exports of vanilla and ylang ylang, the islands have little but the South African tourist industry to rely on. Meanwhile, the French have announced that they will remain on the islands in a military capacity for two years to reorganize the security forces.

Elections are set for February 18, and are supposedly open to multi-candidate competition. Exiles based until now in Paris have returned to contest them. Opposition leaders Mohammed Taki Abdulkarim and Mouzaïr Abdallah are tipped as favorites in the presidential race.

As for the mercenaries, all but Denard were considered *les soldats perdus*, lost soldiers who sought misdirected adventure. They have all returned to France. Only Denard remains in South Africa, fearful to face a prison sentence in France. Negotiations continue, but it is thought he will find refuge in an African country with which he has been previously associated. Just after his departure from Hahaya, however, a French diplomat reckoned that Denard would be back within four years, not as a soldier but as a businessman. ○

A NEW FACE FOR THE FLN



The FLN is back in business. That was the principal message of the extraordinary congress held in Algiers, after repeated postponements, on November 28-30 last year. The congress was attended by some 5,000 delegates from all parts of the country. Bitter critics of the Chadli regime alternated at the rostrum with defenders of the policies of the last 10 years, and representatives of all the different tendencies, factions, and generations were elected to the central committee. Chadli Benjedid himself, who had appeared throughout the summer and early autumn to be at loggerheads with the National Liberation Front (FLN), was reelected president.

At first sight, it may appear that the congress was an entirely contradictory affair. Was it a victory for President Chadli's critics, for the

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opponents of reform, or was it a qualified success for the reformers? Did the vocal presence of delegates of a distinctly Islamist persuasion indicate that the FLN had been infiltrated by the radical Islamist movement at the grassroots level, and that the leadership had begun to lose its grip on the rank and file? Or is there another explanation for this development?

There can be no doubt that the congress was full of surprises for most observers of Algerian politics since the riots of 1988. In particular, the return to prominence of several war veterans and leading associates of the late President Boumedienne has proven extremely difficult to square with Western media coverage of Algeria over the last 15 months. This is because the conventional wisdom has been premised upon a false analogy.

The events in Algeria since the riots can only be properly understood in historical perspective. But, because the real political history of

By HUGH ROBERTS

At the party congress last November, the FLN underwent some fundamental changes, opening up to all political tendencies—and generations—within Algerian nationalism. The loser is the army, whose stranglehold on the FLN apparatus slipped away following its brutal crackdown during the 1988 riots.

the FLN is extremely obscure, a true perspective is not easily obtained. In its absence, there has been a tendency to misinterpret Algerian politics in terms of a stereotype of the decadent single-party socialist state. From this perspective, the situation in Algeria is regarded as analogous to that in the USSR, with the FLN presented as the Algerian counterpart of the Soviet Communist Party, infested with Brezhnevites determined to thwart the Algerian Gorbachev, President Chadli, in defense of their socialist dogmas and personal privileges.

The FLN has never been the Algerian equivalent of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or of any other communist state. It is a nationalist movement which has been intransigent on only two connected points of doctrine: national sovereignty and national unity. Like all nationalist movements, it has contained a wide range of points of view and therefore, in order to preserve its own unity, has never adopted a clear-cut social doctrine. Its guiding philosophy has been thorough-going empiricism and a concomitant mistrust of ideologies and dogmas, whether fashioned in Cairo or Damascus, Moscow or Washington.

Moreover, until now it has never been a proper political party. The FLN was created in 1954 as a break-away from the mainstream nationalist organization, the *Parti du Peuple Algerien*. From the outset, it was what it claimed to be—a front, not a party, and as such was able to absorb all the main tendencies in Algerian politics. Above all, within this front, it was the military wing which dominated the leadership. Since 1962, the FLN, far from operating as an organized party on Leninist lines, has rather been an informally organized political elite, spanning a wide range of views and loosely scattered throughout Algerian public life.

What has been officially described as “the party of the FLN” has simply been one among many of the state apparatuses staffed by this elite, and by no means the most

important. The army, politically dominant since the war, has never been willing to allow the “party” to become a serious center of decision-making within the state. Its role has been to explain and justify decisions taken elsewhere, not to reason why. All the major figures within the political elite have owed their influence to the positions they have held outside the party apparatus, leaving the party to be staffed by apparatchiks of little talent or standing.

All this has changed over the last 15 months. The army’s political primacy—the fundamental constant of Algerian politics for the past 34 years—was irretrievably undermined by the excessively brutal and indiscriminate way in which it suppressed the riots. As a result, its stranglehold on the party apparatus was destroyed. The first head to roll after the riots was that of the previous party boss, Mohamed Cherif Messaadia, who had personified the lifelessness of the party apparatus and the woodenness of its rhetoric. His successor was Abdelhami Mehri; like Messaadia, a veteran of the wartime FLN, but who, unlike every previous party secretary since 1965, had served throughout in the civilian, not military, wing of the movement.

Under Mehri, a new team quickly took over the party apparatus, and working behind the scenes, set about organizing a new consensus within the Algerian political elite in support of the radical change to a pluralist political system. The latter finally materialized with the enactment of the new, liberal constitution in February last year. Since then, Mehri has been working to convert the party apparatus into a real political party worthy of the name by regrouping within it all the main tendencies among the political elite. His aim is to endow the party with a vigorous internal life and thus the capacity to formulate a program capable of securing, in electoral competition with other parties, a genuine mandate from the Algerian people.

This process has involved encouraging many distinguished figures

who had either retired or been excluded from political life at various points since independence to return to active service in the ranks of the FLN. It has therefore been possible to represent this process as the return of the “old guard” and to misinterpret it as a threat to the reform process. This overlooks the fact that the “old guard”—the generation of the wartime FLN and of the Ben Bella and Boumedienne periods—has never been uniform in its outlook, and that the authoritarian tendency associated with Messaadia and much of the former military hierarchy has been displaced by a commitment to political liberalization.

The existence of a liberal tendency within the old guard was made clear when a group of 18 major figures who had been out of politics for a decade or more addressed an open letter to Chadli on October 29, 1988, calling for “the introduction of democracy permitting Algerians to choose freely their representatives” and suggesting that the presidential election be postponed until the necessary democratic reforms had been undertaken.

The letter was signed by three of the most prominent guerrilla commanders of the wartime FLN: Colonels Lakhdar Bentobbal, Tahar Zbiri, and Mohammed Said, and also by major figures from the Boumedienne era, notably former foreign minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika and former industry minister Belaid Abdessalem, the architect of Algeria’s socialist industrialization strategy in the 1960s and 1970s. This approach was flatly rejected by Chadli, and his election to a third presidential term went ahead on schedule under the old rules permitting no rival candidates.

Since then, this liberal tendency within the old guard has been working closely with Mehri and his colleagues to reorganize and breathe new life into the FLN and, in particular, to draw the younger generation into the party. A major conference of all those who had held leading positions in the FLN since the middle of

the war to the present day was held on September 19 to thrash out their differences and agree on how to organize a full-scale party congress. That done, 14 regional congresses were held across the country in early November to enable the FLN grassroots to debate resolutions and elect delegations. The result was that the extraordinary congress held at the end of November was the most democratic and representative congress since 1979, if not since the FLN's foundation in 1954.

The party's leadership has been concerned to ensure that all tendencies should be represented within the party, as well as each of the FLN's successive generations. For these reasons, longstanding critics of the policies pursued by President Chadli's successive governments since 1979 were allowed their say, notably Belaid Abdessalem and Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui, whom Boumedienne appointed as party chief in 1977, but who was replaced by Messaadia in 1980 and eventually evicted from the central committee in 1983.

Abdessalem not only outlined his disagreements with the economic policies of the last decade, however, but also addressed the two vexing questions of Islam and Berber culture. These issues underlie the appeal of the FLN's two most serious rivals, the radical Islamist movement, now operating in the newly legalized Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) on the one hand, and the Rally for Culture and Democracy, an offshoot of the Berberist movement, on the other.

Abdessalem's speech reflected the concern of the FLN leadership to counter the appeal of these two movements by absorbing the substance of the preoccupations. It is the same concern which explains the presence within the congress of many delegates of strongly Islamic views. Far from signifying the infiltration of the FLN by the Islamist movement as the French press in particular has suggested, this represented a conscious effort by the FLN leadership to incorporate peo-

ple of an Islamist outlook in order to marginalize the FIS.

Powerful speeches were also made by other critics of the Chadli regime, notably Yahiaoui, who attacked the authoritarian and repressive way in which the party had been run by Messaadia. Ali Mendjli, a veteran of the wartime FLN who had been in retirement since breaking with Boumedienne's regime in 1967, re-emerged at the congress to attack the parasitic and corrupt hangers-on who had joined the FLN only once it was in power after 1962 and who had been tarnishing its image ever since.

But the major figures under attack from these quarters were also allowed to have their say, notably Abdelhamid Bralimi, Chadli's prime minister from 1984-88, who defended his economic policies, Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, foreign minister from 1982-88, who argued that all elements of the FLN should share the responsibility for the state of the country, and Messaadia himself, who made a point of blaming France for the riots.

As such, the congress amounted to a vigorous airing of sharply opposing views, and there was no prospect of this giving rise straightaway to a consensus on the FLN's program. But it appears that Mehri and his colleagues have regarded this clearing of the air as a necessary preliminary step to the subsequent work of policy formation, which will now proceed under the new central committee elected at the congress. The latter's first task will be to elect a new political bureau before establishing the various commissions and working groups needed to hammer out policy proposals for incorporation into the program on which the FLN will eventually go to the country for a democratic mandate.

The extent of the FLN's conversion to democratic principles was also seen in the unprecedented democratic manner in which the central committee itself was elected, with each regional delegation allowed to elect three members, the various mass organizations having a

claim to five seats, the FLN's contingent of National Assembly deputies having 15 seats, and the remainder filled by Chadli's nominees.

All the seats were filled by secret ballot and the overall result is a greatly enlarged central committee of some 270 members in all, including "left Boumediennists" such as Abdessalem and Yahiaoui, "right Boumediennists" such as Bouteflika and ex-gendarmerie chief Ahmed Bencherif, but also former opponents of Boumedienne such as Tahar Zbiri (who as army chief of staff organized an abortive coup against Boumedienne in 1967) and Bachir Boumaza, who resigned from Boumedienne's Council of the Revolution in 1966 and has been in the wings ever since.

It also includes veterans of the FLN's diplomatic corps, such as Larbi Demaghatrous, M'Hammed Yazid, and of course, Mehri himself. But all the major figures of the Chadli regime since 1979 are also on the central committee, notably Brahimi, Ibrahimi, and Messaadia, as well as two of the main political casualties of the riots, former interior minister El Hadi Khediri and ex-chief of general staff Abdallah Belhouchet, now a civilian for the first time in over 40 years.


Chadli himself received conditional support for his economic reform policies. But at the same time he has been implicated in the FLN's own overall strategy. Therefore, it will no longer be easy for him to govern Algeria as President Mitterrand has governed France in recent years—as a president disassociated from, and to some extent at odds with, his own party.

As an article in *Algerie-Actualité* commented after the congress, "the FLN gathers up its marbles whatever their color." Guerrilla commanders, ex-regular army officers, veteran diplomats, left and right Boumediennists, Chadli supporters of various hues, Islamists and Arabists—they are all there. But undoubtedly the biggest marble the FLN has back in the palm of its hand is Chadli himself, at least for the time being. ○



THE AFRICA WATCH AGENDA

By ANDREW MELDRUM



Africa enters the 1990s with reason to hope that the human rights of its people will be better respected by its governments as the majority of OAU countries have ratified the African Charter of Human and People's Rights.

A new organization, Africa Watch, intends to monitor human rights abuses throughout the continent. Launched in 1988, Africa Watch published three major reports in 1989: "Angola—Violations of the Laws of War By Both Sides," "No Neutral Ground—South Africa's Confrontation with

Activist Churches," and "Zimbabwe—A Break with the Past? Human Rights and Political Unity." A report on Somalia was released early this year.

Richard Carver, the research director of Africa Watch, has been following African events for 11 years. Formerly with Amnesty International, Carver now studies human rights developments and reports his findings for Africa Watch.

Interviewed on a follow-up trip to Zimbabwe, Carver looks back at the 1980s and forward into the 1990s, and finding some cause for optimism regarding Africa's human rights record, but reason to question the record of one-party states in upholding citizens' rights and civil liberties.

Africa Report: How was Africa Watch founded and what are its objectives?

Carver: Africa Watch is part of the New York-based organization, Human Rights Watch, which began in the late 1970s as Helsinki Watch to monitor adherence to the Helsinki Accords on human rights. Subsequently, the organization has expanded its geographical scope to include Americas Watch, Asia Watch, and more recently, Africa Watch and Middle East Watch.

Human Rights Watch monitors how U.S. foreign policy affects human rights practices in countries with governments that are politically supported by and in sympathy with the United States. Africa Watch has a similar orientation, but we're anxious that we shouldn't be simply a U.S. organization and we want to cover human rights issues on an impartial basis.

We are different from Amnesty International, which has a narrow, specific focus on political detainees. Africa Watch follows a broader range of civilian and political rights, including press freedom, judicial independence, rights of refugees, and the rules of international justice in combat on both sides of armed conflicts, according to the Geneva Conventions.

We don't have aspirations to cover everything. Our method, as we've done in Zimbabwe, is to focus on a particular country and do a fairly exhaustive report on a whole number of human rights issues. In contrast, Amnesty attempts a constant monitoring of every country in the world on those issues. We play a rather different role from Amnesty and we don't see ourselves as rivals. We are funded by grants from charitable foundations in the U.S. and we receive no government funding, by deliberate policy.

Africa Report: How do you assess the current state of human rights in Africa?

Carver: South Africa is one of the major human rights issues and its twists, turns, and developments over the past decade are well-known. Clearly the phase that we're in now is a positive one, after the extremely bad period of widespread emergency detentions and so on. We are now at a point where prominent political prisoners are being released and things

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ZIMBABWE

A BREAK WITH THE PAST?



HUMAN RIGHTS & POLITICAL UNITY



like the exposure of government death squads is taking place. What has remained under-reported are abuses of human rights in the homelands and in the rural areas.

In Africa generally, some situations remain bad, most strikingly in the Horn of Africa. In Somalia, with the outbreak of civil war in the north in 1988, what was already a situation of the most extreme repression became one in which the government essentially declared war on its own population, with widespread massacres and bombings of the civilian population. That has spread now from northern Somalia, previously the focus of opposition to the regime, to all parts of the country.

The Ethiopian regime looks increasingly unsteady, but maintains the style of extreme repression as it has throughout the decade.

Sudan has seen significant changes to and fro over the past 10 years. The regime in power seems to

want to undo some of the initiatives of the previous government in trying to bring about peace in the south of the country at the same time as carrying on with detention of critics, such as independent professionals, lawyers, and academics who are critical of its wish to reinstate sharia law. There, the prospects look somewhat bleak.

There are other depressing problems such as the terrible civilian tolls in Mozambique and Angola, but there are signs of political movement in those countries to reach settlements.

Africa Report: Have you seen any improvements in the past decade?

Carver: Generally, perhaps the picture is not so depressing. In Uganda, after the period of the Amin regime and appalling massacres and torture by the Obote government, the coming to power of the Museveni government was a welcome development. That government, while by no means resolving all human rights abuses, at least has tried to make institutional reforms which will provide a lasting protection for human rights.

This question of institutional reforms has happened in several countries and I think represents one of the bright spots on the scene.

In Togo, a national commission on human rights has been set up in response to international criticism, particularly from Amnesty International, on the state of human rights in Togo.

There are still many weaknesses because the Togo commission is unable to investigate certain things. But the commission has taken on a life of its own; it receives complaints from Togolese citizens about human rights abuses and, in some cases, it is able to investigate and rectify them.

There is now a similar institution in Uganda and an ad hoc committee on human rights was formed in Ghana in 1982 following the murder of some judges and officers.

These commissions don't resolve all the problems, but they do bring things out in the open. The development and growth of independent organizations to monitor abuses is very positive. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe is very unusual and outstanding. Nigeria also has a civil liberties organization, a vigorous non-governmental human rights body.

Africa Report: What about the OAU's charter on human rights?

Carver: The 1980s saw the growth of pan-African protection of human rights. There was the drafting of the OAU's African Charter on Human and People's Rights, which has been ratified by a majority of African governments. A commission was set up to monitor the adherence of African governments to the standards in that charter and to receive complaints from individuals. It's very early to say how effective it will be in bringing up issues to specific governments because the members of the commission are nominated by governments.

What is important so far is that Africa has developed the standards by which African governments should be judged. Certainly the arguments of human rights defenders have been greatly strengthened by the existence of the African charter as a purely African body of human rights law.

It is important to establish that to point out human rights abuses taking place in a particular country is a responsibility, not an interference in the internal affairs or the politics of a country. President Museveni made this point forcefully at the first OAU meeting he attended after taking power in 1986. He took other African governments to task for failing to speak out against what had happened in Uganda over the preceding 15 years or so. He said, "This is your responsibility. As my African brothers, you must not be silent on this."

Of course, governments don't like criticizing other governments because that opens them up to criticism themselves. That is why non-governmental bodies are needed to keep a watch on governments. But there must also be a readiness on governments' part to take action as well. Non-governmental organizations cannot enforce respect for human rights.

Africa Report: Your report on Zimbabwe criticized the government for maintaining the state of emergency, which allows indefinite detention without trial. Have you received any response from the Zimbabwean government? And do you intend to continue following Zimbabwe closely?

Carver: As yet, we have not received an official response from the Zimbabwean government. The next big item on Zimbabwe's political agenda is the elections [set for the end of March] and we raised in the report various points of unease about the possibilities of restrictions on free campaigning up to the elections. We want to see if the minority parties are going to be able to campaign freely, and arguably there are already great restrictions on that. Second, we would like to see

whether the ballot itself is conducted fairly. That is something we will be keeping a close eye on.

And then there's the whole question of the proposed move to a one-party state, which also has important human rights implications. So we intend to continue monitoring Zimbabwe, not because things are so bad, they're not, but because the country is at an interesting, crucial time in its political development.

Africa Report: Do you think the recent events in Eastern Europe will have any effect on political developments in Africa?

Carver: A number of African governments have been somewhat shaken by events in Eastern Europe because of the similarity of political systems: the one-party state.

This raises big questions for Zimbabwe, which is planning to embark on setting up a one-party state. Unfortunately, in its public pronouncements, the government of Zimbabwe doesn't seem to have taken on board the lessons from Eastern Europe. On the other hand, many Zimbabweans, including people within its ruling party, are very perturbed and have drawn the conclusion that the one-party state is not the answer.

In Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, and possibly Zimbabwe, if it indeed chooses to go that way, the suppression of dissent seems to follow logically from the maintenance of a one-party political system.

In Zambia and Tanzania, the governments are well-entrenched and one suspects that independent political activity has been suppressed for so long that the possibilities for dramatic change there are still a way off, but what Eastern Europe has taught us is the foolishness of predicting. I wouldn't want to predict even a year ahead in Africa, let alone a decade. ○

"What is taking place in the Frontline States under aggression by apartheid is the same as one Jumbo jet filled with frontline children crashing without survivors every day!"

—Kenneth Kaunda

Apartheid Terrorism

By Phyllis Johnson and David Martin

Apartheid Terrorism gives the most up-to-date and thorough analysis available of South Africa's policies toward its neighbors with detailed specific examples of the pressures it exerts on the Frontline States, individually and collectively.

"Surely, even if you fail to share, you must at least understand our indignation when confronted with this level of apartheid terrorism." —Kenneth Kaunda

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FORECASTING AFRICA'S FUTURE

By NICK CATER



Karen Durlach

Already vulnerable to the unpredictability of weather, African countries now face a new environmental threat—the greenhouse effect. Although developed nations are mainly responsible for global warming, Africa will have to cope with the potential consequences—changes in its ecological and economic fabric.

With many African economies deeply dependent on agriculture and livestock—and thus reliant on the weather—the continent's planners should be strongly involved in the present international debate on climatic changes, according to researchers in Africa, the U.S., and Europe.

A series of international conferences this year—including a meeting of African ministers, scientists, and environmental groups in Nairobi—looks set to raise attention about issues such as global warming to new heights and draw Africa more firmly into decisions expected to

Nick Cater is a British writer, broadcaster, and consultant on development issues.

have a strategic impact on international economic and political relations.

While those drawing up what could be called extremely long range weather forecasts for Africa show little agreement—opinions range from generally warmer and wetter to a risk of more disastrous droughts—scientists studying the way greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide trap more heat in the earth's atmosphere are now unanimous on two points.

First, investment in climatic research is vital, not only to improve Africa's ability to cope with any irreversible long-term shifts in global weather patterns, but also to begin

successfully predicting and managing the continent's existing wide weather variability. Second, there is no way Africa can expect to be exempt from changes with far-reaching and harmful effects, even if some aspects of them initially appear to be beneficial.

Although global warming is something to be fearful of, it is also something to be grateful for, because of the way heat is trapped in the atmosphere by the so-called "greenhouse gases," including carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, chlorofluorocarbons, and water vapor. Without this mechanism, our planet would be 30° C colder—but the increasing concentrations of those

gases are threatening to raise worldwide temperatures significantly.

The concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere today appears very small at around 340 parts per million, but that is a big increase on the 265 ppm recorded in 1850, a rise mainly from industrialization and fossil fuel combustion. Some researchers predict that without controls, concentrations could double by the year 2050. Methane, from biological decay, and nitrous oxide, from fertilizers, are also increasing fast, while ozone-destroying CFCs, from aerosols and cooling systems, are also extremely efficient greenhouse gases.

Greenhouse gases trap heat by allowing the short-wave energy from the sun through to the earth's surface, but making the atmosphere more opaque to the long-wave energy radiated back by the earth, much of which then bounces back and forth between the atmosphere and the surface.

Dr. Michael Hulme of the Climatic Research Centre at Britain's University of East Anglia warns that there is very little precision in any of the predictions about climatic change and global warming, and admits that far more work is needed to make the computerized models more accurate.

But with that caveat, he adds: "We are more confident about making some predictions, such as that high latitudes—Europe, the Soviet Union, North America—will be more strongly affected than the lower latitudes of Africa.

"We feel that by the middle of the next century, the rise in average temperatures in the higher latitudes could be in the range of 2° to 4° C, while in the lower latitudes toward the equator—including much of Africa—the rise in average temperature would be 1° to 2°."

Over only a few decades, such increases could move the U.S. and USSR grain-producing regions hundreds of miles further north, a clear risk to global food security, and spell disaster for river basins, coastal regions and islands if sea levels rise

as the ice caps melt and oceans warm up. By the middle of the next century, there could be radical changes across Africa in every aspect of weather patterns.

The increase in average temperatures in the last century is put at 0.5°—not enough to be definitely blamed on global warming—but the pace of change is unpredictable because of complex positive and negative feedback mechanisms involving cloud cover, water vapor production, and the melting of ice caps, which then reflect back less solar radiation.

Shifting weather patterns will have other effects, such as changing breeding areas for locusts and increased disease risks.

"While many people in developed countries have been concentrating on the greenhouse effect only in terms of temperature rise, in Africa we may well see far more significant changes from changes in precipitation—rainfall," said Hulme.

"It is still possible that there could be a decrease in average precipitation, which could mean more drought, something obviously disastrous for those in marginal areas. But there is evidence to suggest that in a belt either side of the equator, rainfall might increase. We don't know if that would help crop production, or whether the higher temperatures would counteract some or all of the increased precipitation."

Apart from changes in temperature and rainfall, rising carbon dioxide concentrations could be beneficial for certain crops like sorghum or millet in improving yields, which might enhance food supplies in the Sahel, but some studies suggest that the increase in temperature could

have a very hostile impact on present regions of other crops, such as coffee.

Other researchers have suggested that while the Sahel and Sudan could see improved rainfall, countries further south, including Gabon, Congo, and Zaire, will experience sharp decreases likely to cut yields and create new deserts.

Shifting weather patterns will have other effects, such as changing breeding areas for locusts, better conditions for other pests, and increased disease risks, from malaria to cholera and bilharzia, all of which will be able to adapt far quicker to the new conditions than man. The pace of change may prove too fast for some ecosystems to adapt, accelerating the world's loss of genetic diversity.

The list of measures needed to counteract the impact of global warming is a familiar one, including greater fuel efficiency, increased use of renewable resources, recycling, reforestation, and phasing out CFCs, all of which have a positive environmental impact in other ways.

It is developed nations in the main which produce most greenhouse gases, while developing countries have the lowest per capita carbon emissions, CFC use and energy consumption, while much of their energy use is biomass, not fossil fuels. Hulme warns: "We must be sure that the developed nations and institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund shoulder the main burden of combating global warming and dealing with its impact."

This year, a series of international meetings will be held to discuss climatic change issues. The final meeting of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climatic Change will take place in Stockholm in August and its report will be presented to the second World Climate Conference in Geneva at the end of October.

Within Africa, up to 300 delegates are expected at a meeting in Nairobi in early May on global warming and developing nations, part of a series of conferences also taking place in

Thailand and Brazil. The Nairobi conference will be supported by the U.S. Woods Hole Research Center in Massachusetts, Canadian, and Swedish institutions, and a host of African NGOs, including the Nairobi-based Environment Liaison Centre and the African Centre for Technology Studies.

The international debate aims to reach formal agreement on measures to combat global warming in 1992, when a UN special session on the environment will be called in Brazil. Dr. Mostafa Tolba, executive director of the United Nations Environment Programme, has urged immediate action, including the creation of a multi-billion dollar "climate fund" to help developing nations cope with the economic and social changes they may be required to make.

Some scientists see global warming as a potentially powerful weapon for developing nations, since some of the mechanisms proposed to manage it could give them control of valuable resources. One suggestion has been for a global carbon tax, forcing developed countries which do not reduce emissions to buy tax credits from developing nations. In a similar way, a global quota for tree planting to absorb carbon dioxide could mean developing countries being paid to plant part of a developed nation's quota.

But if developing countries do not take a strong role in the global warming negotiations, they could find a block or limits placed on their economic development through restrictions on use of CFCs or emission of carbon dioxide and methane, for example.

Hulme emphasizes that all the climatic predictions have been in terms of averages on a global scale, and this clearly makes it even more difficult to suggest options for Africa as a whole or for regions—such as the Sahel—within it. "We need at least 10 to 15 years more research before we can begin to make predictions of climatic change with any level of confidence," he adds.

However, he says there is no

room for complacency, since some degree of changes in climate are probably already irreversibly under way, while the costs in time, money, and other resources of any efforts to reduce or reverse global warming will be enormous, and could totally undermine African development efforts.

How Africa copes with its ordinary weather is a central concern of Dr. Michael Glantz, a political scientist who heads the Environmental and Societal Impacts Group at the U.S. National Atmospheric Research

All climatic predictions have been in terms of averages on a global scale, making it even more difficult to suggest options for Africa.

Council in Boulder, Colorado. He says: "We do a poor job at the moment dealing with simple seasonality and variability—it doesn't get enough attention in planning by either African governments or international organizations."

He emphasizes the need for further research into both short-term climatic variability and long-term climate change, but attacks what he dubs as the taboo about winners and losers among the "climate change industry."

"There are winners and losers in the present climatic conditions—look at the United States by comparison with northern Ethiopia. Why shouldn't some countries come out of any climatic change in a better overall situation? Sure, there'll have to be trade-offs on other factors—human health, say, or agricultural pests—but all climatic conditions involve trade-offs."

Glantz identifies two main risks for African governments in global warming: First, the level of develop-

ment in most countries is so low that they will not be able to cope with the scale of changes on the way, and second, the new global controls will harm or cut back development efforts.

The UN Environment Programme, with its headquarters in Kenya, has a major role in coordinating the worldwide response to global warming. Together with the World Meteorological Organization, UNEP established the Intergovernmental Panel of Climatic Change, and set up Gems, the Global Environment Monitoring System. Alex Alusa, a program officer in the atmosphere section of Gems, who previously worked in the Kenyan meteorological service, says UNEP aims to act as a catalyst in raising awareness and encouraging action.

"Developing countries could end up being the most affected, so they need to be sensitive to the risks inherent in global warming." He rejects talk of winners and losers, suggesting that there are so many factors involved that in any one African country there could be regional winners and losers.

Are Africans worried about climatic change? Yes, says Alusa, "there is now the greatest sensitivity at the highest level in many African countries, such as Kenya, Egypt, Senegal, as well as the island states, Cape Verde, Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Madagascar."

And what should be the priority for Africa? "Since even present weather variability can play havoc with economic management and planning, I feel we have to look at the short and long-term changes together. And that means manpower development, so Africa has trained people with the right equipment and can manage its own affairs."

He adds: "Climatic changes are certainly a threat in Africa, because most countries are vulnerable through a lack of strategies or the economic capacity to cope and respond, and Africa must play a full part in turning the world away from its own destruction. We have very little time left." ○

A NEW DEVELOPMENT

Over the past several years, the World Bank has prescribed and African nations had little choice but to go along. In its latest report on Africa's economic prospects, however, the Bank has solicited the views of its critics. The analysis frankly admits the shortcomings of structural adjustment and argues for a new compact between donors and the continent to ensure that its human resources are not neglected in the quest for economic development.

By COLLEEN LOWE MORNA

African finance ministers emerged from their annual consultation with World Bank President Barber Conable late last year in an uncharacteristically upbeat mood.

The closed-door session is a usual part of the annual World Bank/IMF meeting, which last year took place in Washington. Ordinarily, according to a regular participant, it is a dry affair: Conable makes a presentation, a few questions are asked, a few people fall asleep, and the event is declared over.

But the latest meeting, according to the participant, was different. Delegates sat up, questions were asked, and the consultation ran into overtime.

Despite Africa's numerous efforts at structural adjustment, the Bank chief reportedly told his audience, the 1980s had unquestionably proved a disappointment for the continent and its well-wishers.

Declaring "adjustment with a difference" as the new theme for the

Colleen Lowe Morna is a Zimbabwean freelance journalist based in Harare.

margaret A. Novicki



COMPACT?

1990s, and calling for a "global coalition" in support of Africa, Conable went on to say that far more emphasis would now need to be put on human resource development, environmental protection, and self-reliance.

Repeatedly referring to the need for greater "capacity-building," Conable said the emphasis in the future should be on strengthening Africa's own institutions to deal with its problems.


Conable's comments formed the backdrop to the ground-breaking report, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, published in November, and destined to exercise a profound influence on policy directions—both internal and external—as Africa enters the new decade.

Past Bank reports have achieved little more than stirring up controversy. The 1981 World Bank report, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*, or the "Berg report," which simplistically blamed African governments for the economic crisis and prescribed private sector involvement as a panacea, provoked a defensive reaction by African governments.

Three subsequent reports received little attention, until the Bank and UNDP came out with another study, *Africa's Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s*, which claimed that countries undergoing structural adjustment were doing better than those which are not.

This was vehemently challenged by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), a UN think tank based

Barber Conable, president of the World Bank



in Addis Ababa. Using different criteria, the ECA claimed the opposite. The subsequent debate prompted the ECA to formulate an "African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes," more often referred to as the AAF-SAP.

In the interim, through its championing of the theme "adjustment with a human face," Unicef and other NGOs have provided ample evidence of the negative social consequences of structural adjustment programs promoted by the IMF and World Bank.

Why should a new World Bank report on Africa be listened to now? One simple answer is that as Africa enters the 1990s, the problems are so staggering that no one can afford to ignore anything being said, not least by Africa's largest multilateral lending agency.

Today, Africa's 450 million people have a gross domestic product roughly equivalent to that of Belgium with 10 million people. They are, on average, almost as poor as 30 years ago. Yet, at current rates, the population is set to shoot up to 1.7 billion by the year 2050. As the new World Bank report puts it: "The challenge facing Africa is exceptional. The cost of failure would be exceptional."

What makes this report a credible source on the subject, however, is

the painstaking degree to which—for the first time ever—the Bank went out of its way to consult a broad cross-section of opinion before prescribing solutions.

Three years at work, the report's authors have several times reiterated that the process of putting together the report was ultimately as important as the product itself.

Africa Report is in possession of two earlier drafts of the report—one titled *Beyond Adjustment: Toward Sustainable Growth With Equity in Sub-Saharan Africa*, released for comment in November 1988, and the penultimate draft, *Sustainable Growth With Equity, A Long Term Perspective for Sub-Saharan Africa*, released to African finance ministers at the September 1989 meeting of the IMF and World Bank.

Compared to the final report—*Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*—additions, alterations, and modifications are clearly evident all the way along. Right down until the penultimate draft, for example, no mention was made of how South African destabilization has affected southern African economies. One of the African

“Structural adjustment is necessary, but it must be sustained, without dogmatism. It must be adjusted with a difference. Difference in the sense that greater accountability is taken of its social impact.”

finance ministers must have picked this out: The omission is rectified in the final report.

More significantly, compared to earlier reports, the Bank is self-critical and even humble. The report declares that “responsibility for Africa’s economic crisis is shared,” and the Bank owns up to participating in many of the white elephant projects it condemns.

From *Crisis to Sustainable Growth* pays specific tribute to the Bank’s chief opponents in the past, and the report is clearly influenced by their critiques.

Unicef is cited, and those who have tirelessly argued for a basic-needs approach to development will be heartened by the report’s declaration—not present in earlier drafts—that “measuring development in terms of access to basic health services, education, and food, is more satisfactory than using other yardsticks.” Indeed, the chapter on human needs is shifted to greater prominence in the final report, and the title changed from “closing the social gap,” to “investing in people.”

The ECA’s AAF-SAP is also cited, and its human-centered strategy is said to be consistent with the report. Both reports, the World Bank says, “see people as both the ends and means of development.”

While the last World Bank (and UNDP) report, *Africa’s Adjustment*

and *Growth in the 1980s*, argued on the basis of structural adjustment reforms taken that “recovery has begun,” *From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*—published after the ECA challenge—takes a more cautious line. “Structural adjustments are beginning to produce results, but only slowly,” the report says. “In most instances, the process has hardly begun, and too often efforts have not been maintained.”

Setting its theme, “adjustment with transformation,” the AAF-SAP notes: “Africa has to adjust. But in adjusting, it is important that it is the transformation of the structures that fundamentally serve to advance the African socio-economic situation that constitute the focus of attention.”

Putting forward its theme, “adjustment with a difference,” the World Bank notes: “Structural adjustment is necessary, but it must be sustained, without dogmatism. It must be adjustment with a difference. Difference in the sense that greater accountability is taken of its social impact.”

Of course, differences of opinion remain between the Bank and ECA. Following the arguments of most African countries, the ECA sees the continuing drop of commodity prices

as a major cause of Africa’s crisis, and calls for measures to stabilize commodity markets.

Sticking to that part of the analysis in the last report—*Africa’s Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s*—the Bank maintains that too much has been made of the fall in commodity prices.

According to the Bank, although the poorest African countries did suffer a protracted decline in their terms of trade, overall the continent’s terms of trade were higher in the early 1980s than in the 1960s.

Meanwhile, according to Bank calculations, Africa’s share of non-oil primary exports fell from 7 to 4 percent of the world total between 1970 and 1985. If Africa had simply maintained this level of output, export earnings would have been \$9 to \$10 billion a year higher in 1986/87, equal to sub-Saharan Africa’s annual debt service payments or donor assistance. Put differently, the report says, if Africa’s export growth had matched that of other LDCs, its debt service ratio would be about half what it is today.

The conclusion is that export volumes—which are a product of domestic policy—are a more significant issue than commodity

“The agricultural sector will be at the heart of development efforts, and agricultural exports must increase”



Margaret A. Novicki

prices—which are determined by the world market.

The point of departure here between the ECA and World Bank is the proverbial chicken and egg problem: Which came first: falling prices or falling export volumes? However, there is broad consensus on the key issue that domestic economies have been mismanaged.

Indeed, comparing earlier drafts of the Bank's report with the final report, it would appear that the forthrightness with which the AAF-SAP acknowledged political failures strengthened the World Bank's hand in coming out boldly on this issue.

The ECA report is ground-breaking in confronting political issues head on, and asserting that freedom of expression is one of the basic human rights of Africans.

While earlier drafts of the World Bank report made reference to corruption and the breakdown of judicial systems, the final report is bolder, attacking military coups (though several countries undergoing structural adjustment are under military governments), calling for a free press and freedom of association.

With uncharacteristic outspokenness on a political issue, the report declares that "Africa needs not just less government but better government—government that concentrates its efforts less on direct intervention, and more on enabling others to be productive."

There are, again, some differences of opinion between the Bank and ECA over what the role of the state should be.

The Bank report comes out in favor of a Nordic-style system, where the state builds schools, roads, and social services, but leaves all production up to the private sector. The AAF-SAP, on the other hand, argues that in developing countries with tiny, ill-developed private sectors, state intervention is still necessary in some areas of production.

Both agree, however, on the need for parastatal reform, and removal of controls which hamper entrepreneurial activity, especially in the informal sector. Both also agree that

as long as African countries fail to form regional blocs, the numbers simply will not stack up in terms of scale.

On balance, Conable told *Africa Report*, there is no longer "a major parting of ways (between the Bank and ECA). It is simply a question of differences in emphasis here and there." Similarly, ECA executive secretary Adebayo Adedeji has called the Bank's latest report an important contribution toward "building a consensus on the vital policy issues that confront Africa."

While no one can say for sure what will happen in the 1990s, some degree of agreement is starting to build up on the way forward. Fusing the ideas of the AAF-SAP and the World Bank report, *From Crisis to Sustainable Development*, these may be summarized as follows:

- Africa should seek a growth rate of 4 to 5 percent per year, and vigorously pursue measures to reduce its population growth rate, if per capita income is to grow in the next decade. The agricultural sector will be at the heart of development efforts, and agricultural exports must increase. However, as the outlook for commodity prices is not bright, Africa will need to diversify exports and generally prepare itself to be competitive in a new, more technologically driven era.

- Structural adjustment programs must be pursued to get the macroeconomic environment right, but these must take account of the social impact, with human resource development the fulcrum of all efforts.

- African institutions must be strengthened to take on the tasks ahead. "Capacity-building" needs to take place at all levels, from the bottom upward, with particular emphasis on the vast, yet still untapped role that women can play.

- The key role of governments should be to create an "enabling" environment for the talent and skills of its people to blossom. This implies putting the macroeconomic house in order, removing bottlenecks at the microeconomic level (such as restrictions on the informal sector)

and providing infrastructure. Authoritarianism must give way to an openness that brings out people's full potential.

- Environmental issues must increasingly come to the fore, if Africa is to preserve any kind of heritage for its future generations.

- Regional integration must be vigorously pursued to overcome fragmentation.

- Debt relief and donor assistance must continue and be expanded (the World Bank estimates a gross ODA requirement of \$22 billion a year by 2000).

However, both the Bank and ECA stress the need for a more effective partnership between donors and recipients. They also point out that—should Africa finally make a breakthrough in the decade ahead—it will be money well spent, as Africa would then—for the first time—no longer have to go out to the world with a begging bowl. ○

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MUGABE'S FOLLY?

By ANDREW MELDRUM


While Eastern Europeans turn their backs on government monopoly of power, President Robert Mugabe seems more determined than ever to advance his agenda for a Marxist-Leninist one-party state. With national elections due in March, however, opposition to the government's agenda may forestall the accomplishment of Mugabe's plans.

The contrast could not have been more dramatic. As world attention was fixed on the rapid revolt of Eastern Europe's people from one-party rule, Zimbabwe's political leaders gathered to endorse Robert Mugabe's quest for a one-party state.

Nearly 5,000 members of Zimbabwe's ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) gathered December 18-22 in the plush, purple and gold Harare International Conference Center for the party's National People's Congress, akin to a party's national convention in the United States.

The main task of business for the congress was to finally join the country's two nationalist parties in an indissoluble merger. After a bitter split of 26 years, Mugabe's Zanu-PF and Joshua Nkomo's opposition Zim-

Andrew Meldrum, a contributing editor to Africa Report, is an American journalist who has been based in Zimbabwe since 1980. He also writes for The Guardian of London.



Prime Minister Robert Mugabe (left): "Uncharacteristically emotive in his appeal for the creation of a one-party Marxist-Leninist state"

Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano (right): "He explained why his government has begun opening up its centrally controlled Marxist economy and paving the way for a multi-party system"

Edgar Tekere (lower right): The newly merged Zanu-PF is aiming for a sweep of all parliamentary seats in March because of the relative inactivity of Tekere's opposition party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement

babwe African People's Union (Zapu) reunited to bring an end to the political-ethnic divisions that marred Zimbabwe's first 10 years of independence.

The fusion of the country's two major nationalist parties had been long awaited, since it was agreed upon two years earlier when Mugabe and Nkomo signed the Unity Accord. But the historic nature of the event was overshadowed at the congress by the maneuverings to determine the newly united party's policies for the 1990s, particularly to establish a one-party state and to maintain Marxist rhetoric. The congress set the agenda that Zanu-PF will put forward in national elections this March, Zimbabwe's third majority-rule national elections.

The tone was set by President Robert Mugabe, who opened the congress with an earnest appeal for the creation of a Marxist-Leninist one-party state. Usually sedate and academic, Mugabe was uncharacter-

istically emotive in his speech.

"Is our development path to be that of socialism or capitalism? I am a socialist, but what are you?" he asked.

"Socialist! Socialist!" shouted the congress delegates.

Mugabe said he would take part in the debate over the party's future, particularly on the question of a one-party state.

"But it will not be Robert Mugabe, as the BBC would say, who will want to turn the country into a one-party state. It will be you, the delegates, if that decision is made," said Mugabe, to cheers and ululations. "What I find unbearable and cannot brook as a leader is those who, after we make that decision, will deviate and not comply with our decision."

Following Mugabe's exhortation came a round of speeches from representatives of friendly governments and ruling parties, mostly neighboring African countries and Eastern bloc allies. Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda was first with a lengthy lecture effusively praising the merits of one-party rule and urging Zimbabweans to follow Zambia's example to become a single-party state.

Representatives from Kenya's Kanu party and Malawi's Congress Party gave similar addresses hailing the union of Zimbabwe's two parties as the decisive step toward achieving the goal of a one-party state.

"It was rather hard to take," commented a top Western diplomat present for the messages. "All those




Margaret A. Novick

speeches as if the one-party rule in Zambia, Kenya, and Malawi had anything at all positive to offer as a model for Zimbabwe. All anyone has to do is travel to Zambia for a day to see what an economic mess it is in, largely as a result of inefficient party management. And the stifling internal repression in Kenya and Malawi is also well known here."

One African leader, Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano, sounded a note of caution. Chissano described the difficulties that his war-torn country has faced and explained why his government has begun opening up its centrally controlled Marxist economy. Chissano also told why his government is remaking its constitution to pave the way for a multi-party system and why it is entering into negotiations with the Renamo rebels.

"Mugabe's reaction to Chissano's speech was noticeably cooler than to the others, despite the fact that Mozambique has traditionally been



Sarah Jane Poole

his closest ally," said the diplomat.

Also subdued were the solidarity messages by representatives from Eastern Europe. Befitting the fact that their parties were one by one being forced to end their iron grips on the countries' political lives, the representatives of Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia delivered messages of diplomatic waffling with no political cheerleading for the drive toward a one-party state.

Behind closed doors, the congress launched into debate on the united party's new constitution, but a few political analysts managed to sit in on the sessions. They reported how there was opposition to the clauses endorsing the party's drive toward a one-party state. One Zanu-PF member of Parliament, Byron Hove, raised an objection, but was then ejected from the congress because he was not an official delegate. Hove has criticized the Mugabe government on several occasions in Parliament and it appears he was not selected as a delegate to the congress specifically to prevent him from voicing his dissenting opinions.

Another opponent of a single-party system is Eddison Zvobgo, minister of state for political affairs and Zanu-PF chairman of Masvingo province. Zvobgo stated in Zimbabwe's *Moto* magazine in September last year that he was against one-party rule.

"A one-party state is not a panacea to the problems which Zimbabwe faces. Personally I am against a one-party state," Zvobgo told *Moto*. "I do not believe that a one-party state, despite the fact that it embodies some democratic trends, is the best system of democracy...I do not believe in a one-party state brought about by legislation."

Despite his high-ranking position, Zvobgo has been out of favor with Mugabe and other party leaders for some time. He was pushed out of the politburo at the previous Zanu-PF congress in 1984 and was sidelined from the powerful cabinet position of

minister of justice, legal, and parliamentary affairs to the lesser post of minister of state. But Zvobgo has widespread popularity in the central Masvingo province where he was decisively elected Zanu-PF provincial chairman.

Somewhat surprisingly, Zvobgo was quiet on the one-party state issue at the December congress, and perhaps because of his silence he was awarded a place on the powerful politburo.

The opposition was articulated nonetheless by another top Zanu-PF official, Dumiso Dabengwa. Dabengwa, party chairman of Bulawayo province and member of the central committee, announced that he was opposed to a one-party system and to the calls for a Marxist-Leninist state.

The leader of Zapu's wartime guerrilla force, Dabengwa has an enthusiastic following in Matabeleland and among the members of the Zapu section of the new party, second only to Joshua Nkomo himself. When Mugabe sacked Nkomo and other Zapu ministers from his government in 1982 on charges of illegally caching large amounts of weapons, it was Dumiso Dabengwa who was charged with treason for allegedly plotting to overthrow the government. Dabengwa and five co-defendants were acquitted, but under the country's state of emergency, which allows indefinite detention without trial, Dabengwa and the others were immediately re-detained and held in jail for a further four years.

Dabengwa's release in December 1986 was a prerequisite to the unity accord between the two parties, and his participation is considered to be a crucial linchpin in the merger of Zapu with Zanu-PF. A handsome, charismatic man, Dabengwa has rebounded from his lengthy imprisonment, establishing himself in business in Bulawayo and winning influential positions in the newly united Zanu-PF.

Dabengwa's opposition to the draft of the party constitution was described as "courageous" by some

Despite Mugabe's success in getting his pet issues approved at the congress, it is not clear if and how the goal of a one-party state will be accomplished.

who attended the closed-door sessions. He said his province wanted a provision in the Zanu-PF constitution stating that a one-party state would not be legislated. He suggested that Zanu-PF should remain the ruling party as long as its policies warrant it and not because a constitutional monopoly of power guarantees it power regardless of the party's programs and popularity. He said his province also wanted to see references to Marxism-Leninism dropped from the constitution, as that ideology was foreign to Zimbabwe.

Dabengwa's position was refuted by none other than Mugabe himself. Mugabe responded that a one-party state would be "pointless" unless it were legislated. He said the only question to be settled was about the timing and mechanism for bringing about a one-party state.

Attacking Dabengwa's objections to Marxism-Leninism, Mugabe said that it was ironic that some people were rejecting Marxist-Leninist thought as foreign to Zimbabwe while they embraced another foreigner, Jesus Christ, who was not born in Zimbabwe and whom Zimbabweans had never seen. He said the gospel according to Marx and Lenin was universal in its concern about the plight of workers throughout the world.

"Once the president stated his position so strongly on those matters, there was no question of any further debate," said a member of the party's central committee.

"Although many questioned the position, it was clear that debate was not encouraged."

Another present at the congress said that the vast majority of delegates were simple peasants who were very sharp in farming and land issues, but who did not feel affected by the one-party state issue. The middle-ranking party members from urban areas who would have challenged the inclusion of the single-party state were carefully weeded out to avoid any real debate at the congress, charged the party member.

Certainly the mass of the 5,000 delegates did, indeed, appear to be rural people. Many mothers with babies on their backs and some barefoot elderly people were seen wandering around in awe at the plush fittings of the opulent conference center.

In any case, there was no further debate on those issues. The new constitution was endorsed, the 160-member central committee was named according to nominations from the 10 provinces, and the 22-member politburo was appointed.

Mugabe's wife, Sally, won a place on the politburo because of her recent appointment as head of the Zanu-PF Women's League. Many within the party are critical of the rise of Mugabe's wife to such political prominence and fear that she will also gain a cabinet post when Mugabe announces a new government following the elections.

Despite Mugabe's success in getting his pet issues approved at the congress, it is not at all clear if and how the goal of a one-party state will be accomplished. Hard on the heels of the congress, Zanu-PF is preparing for the national elections at the end of March. The party is setting its sights on a national sweep of all parliamentary seats. That goal is possible, especially with the relative inactivity of Edgar Tekere's new opposition party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement.

But voter apathy may be a bigger factor than anything else in the elections. Troubled by raging unemploy-

ment, estimated at more than 30 percent of the potential work force, and the breakdown of Zimbabwe's transport system, many people express a cynical lack of faith that politics will bring any improvement. Human rights activists have also suggested that some of Zimbabwe's recent by-elections may have been tampered with to ensure a resounding win by the ruling party.

The University of Zimbabwe, whose 9,000 students have been the center of organized opposition to the Zanu-PF government, will remain closed until April 23. The suburban Harare campus was shut down in October last year following anti-government riots by the students. The university will conveniently remain closed through the election period and therefore will not be a focus for opposition political activity.

Many political analysts agree that if Zanu-PF gets a landslide win in the March elections, Mugabe may well declare the victory a mandate to create a one-party state. The other way he could go about it is to hold a special national referendum on the issue.

"If Mugabe tries to sing the song of a one-party state as an electioneering tactic, it will fall on deaf ears," commented Willie Musarurwa, former newspaper editor and veteran nationalist. "That tactic would not be successful in key areas, especially Matabeleland and Masvingo."

Musarurwa believes that Mugabe will not achieve a one-party state because there are many members of his new central committee who did not speak out against it at the congress, but who remain opposed to it nonetheless. Joshua Nkomo was quiet throughout the congress and his followers got several top posts in the newly united party. It is understood they are against a one-party state. Similarly, Eddison Zvobgo has said privately that he remains opposed to a one-party state and is supported by others on the central committee.

"There is resistance to the one-party state and Mugabe doesn't want to be spurned," said Musarurwa.

"He will have to postpone the one-party state, just as he has had to postpone putting his Marxism-Leninism into practice."

Others disagree and say that it is the very growth of opposition to single-party rule that frightens Mugabe and his supporters and will be the impetus for them to push for it.

"A one-party state is on the agenda, the evidence is all around us," said Jonathan Moyo, University of Zimbabwe lecturer in political science. "Zanu's desire, Mugabe's desire, is based on the fear of tomorrow's opposition. If a one-party state cannot be achieved now, then it may be impossible later. Therefore they want to act now."

The first step would be to alter the country's British-drafted Lancaster House constitution which specifically prohibits a one-party state. Once Zimbabwe passes its tenth independence anniversary, the Parliament will be able to re-write the constitution and Mugabe has made it clear there are several areas he wants to revamp. Following that, the door would be open to legislating a one-party state later in 1990.

Another scenario Moyo suggests is one in which Mugabe may not be so hurried. "He will want to be smooth about it, to avoid negative business and international reactions. To ban political parties immediately after elections might create trouble," said Moyo, who said as many as seven small parties might take part in the contest. "There is a tendency for the small political parties to go into hibernation after elections. Perhaps the government will let them dwindle and then pounce for a one-party state. That could happen in 1991 or even 1992."


Zimbabwe's elections and the ensuing governmental changes will see its leaders taking momentous decisions about the country's political life. It could well follow the path of other former British colonies—Zambia, Malawi, Kenya, and Tanzania—to become a one-party state. If it does not, then Zimbabwe could be charting a new course for African countries in main-



Margaret A. Novicki

THE LAND

By GUY ARNOLD



The issue of land distribution was at the heart of the war for majority rule. But with the white commercial farming sector essential to Zimbabwe's economy, the government has been loathe to tackle the redistribution problem. Will the central question of the black majority's demands for land be the burning issue of the 1990s?

Tobacco is the engine which runs Zimbabwe's agricultural sector. Half the country's foreign exchange earnings come from agriculture and more than half of that is provided by tobacco. So a poor tobacco season can throw the economy into disarray.

Balancing the demands of the commercial farming sector for export with the subsistence sector, which produces for home consumption, is crucial to any government decisions. But there is a growing sense that export considerations have tipped this balance too far in favor of the commercial sector, which for all practical purposes means the white farmers. Here lie the seeds of a major political problem for the 1990s.

Any attempt to find a balance between the requirements of the two

Guy Arnold is a freelance journalist specializing in North-South relations with particular reference to African affairs. He is the author of numerous books including Aid in Africa, Aid and the Third World, and Third World Handbook.

sectors must take into account the need to maximize export earnings. While agriculture contributes half of these earnings, it utilizes only about 20 percent of foreign exchange on imported inputs. The second objective is to ensure an adequate flow of supplies of agricultural raw materials to domestic industries, since at present about 60 percent of the value-added component of the manufacturing sector stems from agriculture-based industries. These two considerations make a powerful argument for supporting—and even coddling—the commercial farming sector.

An understanding of Zimbabwe's land problem requires a return to the 1979 Lancaster House agreement. Possession of the land lay at the heart of black-white relations throughout the colonial period, and the bitter years of fighting developed increasingly into a revolt by the rural landless who fought for repossession of their land. Today, after nearly a decade of independence, land

DILEMMA

hunger is the principal complaint of the rural population. Moreover, because of the high rate of population growth, the demand for land is considerably greater now than it was in 1980.

Furthermore, the white farmers, whose future looked at best doubtful in 1980, are now more firmly entrenched than ever before. They are doing very well and do not wish to surrender possession of their land. As a result, the government faces a political, social, and economic dilemma which threatens to destroy many of the gains of Zimbabwe's first decades.

On the one hand, the white farmers—the commercial agricultural sector—make a vital contribution to the economy, providing a surplus of foreign exchange to meet other development requirements. President Mugabe's successful policy of racial reconciliation largely depends upon keeping the white farmers happy. On the other hand, there is a growing population of discontented rural blacks, hungry for land, who rightly ask: What were the long years of bitter fighting about if we do not get back our land?

Joshua Nkomo, senior minister in the president's office, brought this issue into public debate recently by remarking upon the unwillingness of white farmers to sell their land to the government for resettlement purposes. As he said: "After all, this land we are talking about was taken away from the very black people by the farmers. So we are asking them to sell to us what they most probably got for nothing, to fairly redistribute the land in the country."

Nkomo's remarks were followed early last August by pleas in *The Sunday Mail* for the government to be prepared to take over land from the whites if they are not willing to sell it for resettlement. These arguments have particular cogency at the present time since the Lancaster House agreements expire in April. During those negotiations, the Patriotic Front leaders were strongly opposed to the compensation clause which was attached to the land issue



and only accepted it reluctantly after Britain and the U.S. gave imprecise promises to provide funds to buy out the whites. In fact, few whites wished to be bought out, the funds have not been forthcoming, and Zimbabwe enters the 1990s with this major issue unresolved.

Immediately after independence, the new government of Zimbabwe faced formidable problems: It needed to achieve reconciliation with the whites; it had Britain and the United States breathing down its neck in their determination to protect white interests, their aid largely dependent upon how Zimbabwe treated the whites; and it desperately required the foreign exchange which could most easily be earned by the white farming sector. Unsurprisingly, therefore, political expediency dictated a course of action which placed white farmer interests before an immediate and equitable land redistribution.

In the difficult—almost dangerous—circumstances in which Zimbabwe found itself, the choice of priorities can be understood and excused. Today, however, there are some welcome signs that the Zimbabwe government is beginning to address the foundations of its power—the rural population.

In a remark about the land question shortly before Heroes' Day last August, President Mugabe said: "If the seller is not willing, he can be made willing." John Brown, president of the Commercial Farmers' Union, reacted against the implica-

tions of such a policy, saying: "There is insufficient land for distribution to everyone without causing national economic disruption."

His statement went to the heart of the issue as well as raising the crucial question of productivity: Who is best-equipped to make most use of the land? Does it make sense to redistribute on a massive scale to small farmers if in the process the country loses a vital contribution to exports from the present commercial sector? Should government dispossess (whether paying adequate compensation or not) a large proportion of white farmers, which could cause an exodus of other whites in industry or mining, doing far wider damage to the economy? These are not easy questions to answer.

On the other hand, shouldn't the government's first responsibility be to the majority of the people who live in the rural areas and have a right to have their expectations, above all in respect to the land, fulfilled? Much of Mugabe's speech to the nation on Heroes' Day was devoted to the land question.

He said: "It makes nonsense of our liberation struggle that the majority of our peasant families have remained the outcasts of our land tenure system. True, we have provided price incentives and extension services to them, but what real land

Tobacco farming accounts for more than a quarter of Zimbabwe's foreign exchange earnings

resources are available to the rural peasant families for both cropping and cattle ranching?" He added that a revolutionary land reform program to redress the existing situation now had to be the goal of government. There was certainly no mistaking the popularity of this statement, but how can it be achieved?

Referring to the Lancaster House settlement, Mugabe said: "The limitations of a constitutional nature are those which inhibit our land resettlement program. As a result, only some 45,000 families or thereabouts, out of the hundreds of thousands who desperately need land, have to date been resettled.

"Our freedom struggle always recognized the question of land as the principal grievance. The present constitutional structures just have to be loosened so that a more courageous land redistribution program can be embarked upon on a more comprehensive and meaningful basis than the present ad hoc manner."

This year will be a milestone: Elections will be held and the 10-year restrictions agreed to under the Lancaster House settlement will end. But it is one thing to talk of massive land redistribution, and another to achieve it.

The very slow pace of resettlement in Zimbabwe might be compared with the land reform program carried out in Kenya in the years from independence to 1979. There, by 1970, a high proportion of the land previously used for large mixed European farms had been transferred to Africans under several different settlement schemes. The best known was the Million Acre Scheme, largely financed by loans and grants from Britain—by 1979, a total of £40 million. Admittedly, Britain has not helped Zimbabwe in the same manner, but such programs depend in part upon the degree of priority they are accorded by government.

The fact is that land resettlement has simply not received the attention it deserves since Zimbabwe's independence. One result has been uncontrolled growth of squatter set-

tlements. It is true that a great deal of land has been acquired by the government for resettlement purposes, but much of it remains unused. In any case, the problem is not simply one of land; an effective resettlement program will require major financing to cover inputs—extension workers, fertilizer, machinery, and the development of essential rural services.

For example, for extension workers to be effective, they should visit a newly established plot or farm twice a week, then once a fortnight, and only phase out their visits over a three-year period. Any major program, therefore, will require many thousands of extension workers if it is to have the required impact. Nonetheless, ex-combatants have the right to ask: Now that the first 10 years since independence have been used to bring about a reconciliation with the whites, should not the 1990s be devoted to satisfying black aspirations for land? The question represents a dangerously explosive political problem that will not go away.

President Mugabe and his government are facing a difficult period. Ten years after independence, the charisma has worn off, while the formula of the one-party state simply does not enjoy the authority of a decade ago. The people insist on airing their grievances and expect government to respond to them. And the questions now being posed about the land issue go to the heart of the political aspirations that motivated the struggle against the Smith regime. They have not been adequately answered.

Recent indications of discontent have come from a variety of sources. Last August, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) called for the seizure from foreign control of "our land and its resources on behalf of all Zimbabweans" as the first step toward building a national economy based on Zimbabwean sovereignty. The ZCTU went on to argue that Zimbabwe faces an economic and social crisis which, it suggests, is revealed by

slow economic growth, increasing unemployment, unacceptable levels of landlessness, and mass disenchantment.

At first glance, these events may not appear to be related to the land issue, yet in a very real sense they are inseparable from it. There are sufficient signs of general discontent in Zimbabwe for it to be a matter of grave concern to the government. The Willowgate corruption scandal last year, which ended the careers of five cabinet ministers, illustrated, as much as anything, the fact that the leadership has become remote from the people at the grassroots whom it supposedly represents. That is the crucial problem. If this trend is to be reversed, the land issue is the most obvious area where such a reversal can be effected. Since landlessness affects by far the largest number of the disgruntled, it makes sense to tackle the issue now, head-on.

The white farmers, most of whom were supporters of Smith during UDI years, have had remarkable good fortune since independence. Economically they have done as well as at any time in the country's history, while few have done more than pay lip service to black majority rule. Now it is time they made more than gestures. But they need to be told by government just what its land policy is going to be. Someone of the highest caliber should be appointed to deal with the land issue in Zimbabwe with a precise brief on which he can work. Uncertainty is always dangerous and it would make far more sense, for example, to tell white farmers that they were to be limited in the amount of land they could retain; or that for every 10,000 hectares they worked, they should provide extension services for another 1,000 hectares of their land now to be made available to smallholders.


It is time the white farmers were drawn into a national land resettlement scheme in which they have to contribute, but are also able to see that its results, by solving a potentially explosive problem, will benefit themselves as well as those who are currently dispossessed. ○

CINEMA

FROM THE SAHEL

By DAPHNE TOPOUZIS

A strikingly visual film about a friendship between an old woman and a 12-year-old boy, played out against the barren Sahelian landscape, has found admiring audiences in Europe and the U.S., causing a new look at African cinema.



Idrissa Ouedraogo's latest film, *Yaaba*, ("Granny" in Mooré, Burkina Faso's main language) is an ambitious poetic adaptation of a fable recounting the friendship between a 12-year-old rebellious boy, Bila, and Sana, an old woman whom the village community believes is a witch. Daily politics, prejudice, love, and injustice weave a story in which, says the director, "we discover man in all his dimensions: good, wicked, generous, intolerant."

A \$750,000 Franco-Swiss-Burkinabè production shot in Ouahigouya, a small town in northern Burkina, *Yaaba* won the most awards in the 1989 Pan-African Film Festival of Ouagadougou (Fespaco), including the Prix du Public; the international jury's special prize; the best music award for the soundtrack composed by Cameroonian Francis Bebey; a Unicef award for the young actor, Noufou Ouedraogo, who played the protagonist, and a special mention from the OAU prize jury.

Yaaba has met with similar success in North America and Europe: It was sold out at the 1989 New York Film Festival

and is now among the first African films to be commercially distributed in the U.S. It also received the International Critics Prize at the Cannes Film Festival and is reportedly playing in six movie theaters in Paris.

Ouedraogo, the 35-year-old director whose other films include *Yam Daabo* (The Choice) and who is a graduate of the Institut d'Hautes Etudes Cinématographiques in Paris, recently described the film in an interview with *The New York Times* as "a fable that is told around the fires at night in my village."

The film begins (and ends) with a delightful scene in which Bila is playing hide-and-seek with his cousin Napoko in the vast, sandy plains surrounding their Sahelian village. This sets the stage for a story that largely unfolds through the eyes of a child and from a perspective free of adult superstition and prejudice.

Unmarried, childless, and ostracized from village life, Sana is from the beginning of the film a compelling and enigmatic character—stoic, wise, and gentle, yet devastatingly lonely and cruelly

isolated for no apparent reason. Even though she keeps to herself, she is invariably blamed for all the misfortunes that befall the village. A tired woman with a weather-beaten body, Sana barely subsists on what she can find and receives no support from the community. In fact, she is routinely mistreated by the women and stoned by the children.

It is Bila who first realizes that Sana is blamed for things for which she is not responsible. He befriends her secretly and helps her out by bringing her gifts such as a chicken he stole from a neighbor and fresh milk. Gradually, he ends up spending a lot of time with her and clearly enjoys her company—so much so, that he gives her the nickname *Yaaba*—a title of affection and respect. In a chilling, yet tender moment in the film, the old woman replies with a wide smile: "This is the first time that someone has called me grandma, and that makes me very happy."

As their friendship develops, Bila dreams of protecting *Yaaba* and building a house for her one day. However, everything changes when his young



Bila (Noufou Ouedraogo) and Nopoko (Roukietou Barry): A tacit agreement that one day things will be better for them

female cousin Nopoko falls ill after a fight between the bullies of the village and Bila, during which she hurts her wrist. Yaaba is held responsible for stealing the young girl's soul and the local witchdoctors suggest that she be chased out of the village. Bila rushes to tell his old friend and to seek her help in saving Nopoko, who is actually suffering from a tetanus infection. After her house is burnt down, Yaaba sets on a long journey to find a healer. The young girl is near death when Yaaba returns, but the villagers refuse her help. Bila secretly sneaks in the healer's medicine and delivers it to Nopoko who eventually recovers.

Shortly thereafter, the two children set out to pay Yaaba a visit, only to find her dead. The old woman is buried by the village drunkard who, upon Nopoko's request, begins to tell Yaaba's story—namely, that the sole reason she was stigmatized as a witch was because she had no parents. Her mother had died upon giving birth and her father died of grief. Even though this is the climax of the film, it is told matter-of-factly

and without fanfare. This allows Ouedraogo to follow with a repetition of the opening scene and end the film on an optimistic note. Bila and Nopoko innocently chase each other in the sands, but they emerge wiser, more tolerant of human frailties, and more courageous.

* * *

Ouedraogo's ability to explore his fascination with the Sahelian landscape and to capitalize on its epic quality without romanticizing village life is among his strongest points. His uncluttered frames maximize the barrenness of the Sahel, while the absence of melodrama renders the story all the more powerful. In addition, the director puts into sharp focus superstition, prejudice toward childless women, social customs, and religious beliefs which adversely affect the lives of the villagers and goes a long way in dispelling stereotypes. Through the eyes of his young protagonists, he takes a closer look at those who are marginalized from society, like Yaaba and the village drunkard, and gives them a second chance.

Among the most enjoyable scenes in the film is when Yaaba and Bila come across a married woman who is flirting with her lover (one of several sub-plots in the film). Bila initially says that the woman is wrong to cheat on her husband, but Yaaba tells him that she must have her reasons for doing so. This clearly has a profound effect on him for, later on in the film, when he and Nopoko encounter the couple again, Bila proudly repeats Yaaba's exact words to his cousin, reprimanding her for criticizing the adulteress.

In an effort to cut across language barriers and make the film accessible throughout Burkina (and the rest of the world), Ouedraogo relegated little importance to dialogue, instead relying heavily on images. The friendship between Bila and Yaaba, in particular, involves a minimal exchange of words but scores of visually rich scenes which hint at the special relationship between the two.

However, his characters are often flat and one-dimensional. While this does not interfere with the roles of Bila and Nopoko, it becomes tedious and monotonous when it comes to the adult characters of the film, with the possible exclusion of Yaaba. At times, the film is also slow-moving and composed of various sub-plots (including the adulterous relationship of the local beauty and her misunderstood and dejected alcoholic husband) that do not always form a tightly knit whole. Lastly, even though the relationship between Bila and Yaaba is promising and has several magical moments, it is never fully developed.

On the whole, however, these shortcomings do not overshadow the humanity and compassion which permeate the film. What is most impressive is the director's ability to identify Yaaba's persona with the Sahelian landscape, at once revealing their harsh and austere beauty and adroitly conveying the loneliness that inhabits both. The minimalist approach and silent eloquence which characterize the film further enhances the timeless quality in Yaaba's character, which, at times, makes her one with, and almost indistinguishable from, the landscape.

Lastly, there is an infectious message of hope in the way Bila and Nopoko cannot make head nor tail of the superstition and bitter squabbling of the adult world, and the silent understanding they establish between themselves that, one day, things will be different for them. ○

A NATIONAL TREASURE

By HOWARD SCHISSEL

With 4,000 exhibition pieces, the National Museum in Bamako aims to educate both Malians and foreigners about the nation's rich cultural heritage.

Mali's National Museum in Bamako, one of the most modern and dynamic art institutions in West Africa, is striving not only to preserve the country's rich past, but also to revitalize its cultural and artistic heritage for the young generations and for the public abroad through traveling exhibitions. It has also become a leading voice calling for the return of art treasures lost to the continent during the colonial period and for a halt to the


ongoing pillage of artifacts for sale to wealthy collectors in the principal Western art centers.

"The museum plays a very important role in Malian society," said its director, Samuel Sidibé. "We want it to be an institution to preserve our culture and inform other people about all aspects of Malian civilization."

Mali has among the richest and most complex historic and artistic traditions in West Africa. Not only was its territory

the seat of such great empires as Ghana (500-1200 A.D.), Mali (1224-1464 A.D.), and Songhay (1473-1600 A.D.), but recent archeological work indicates that West Africa's first urban centers evolved in Mali as early as 400 A.D.

Open to the public since the early 1980s, the sand-colored stucco museum buildings are a cultural repository, housing over 4,000 exhibition pieces covering the entire spectrum of Mali's past civilizations and contemporary society.



Mali's history and civilization is also preserved thanks to the sound and celluloid recordings of traditional rituals and ceremonies.

Considerable efforts have been made to give the exhibitions extra relevancy by placing them in their natural context. A campsite of the nomadic Tuareg people, for example, is exactly reproduced, sand and all, as is a traditional Bambara kitchen.

Audio-visual techniques are utilized too. Masks and fertility statues are made and used in particular ways, so photographs and films are often integrated into exhibitions to better explain their functions to the public.

"The aim is to make all this available to the public because in a large and diverse city like Bamako, people are often unaware of these diverse realities," remarked Daniel Ardouin, former museum director.

One of the principal preoccupations of the museum is the collection and conservation of art works. Under French rule and until the early 1980s, thousands of precious ceremonial masks and ancient artifacts were "lost" or

destroyed. Many were shipped to "primitive" art collections in French museums or illegally exported to satisfy the tastes of rich collectors.

"The restitution of Malian art concerns not only France but also Senegal, where the old IFAN colonial museum in Dakar still has some of our magnificent art works," said Ardouin. The National Museum is also seeking to prevent illegal digging on archeological sites in order to safeguard the national heritage. Malian officials are calling on foreign museums to stop acquiring precious pieces of African art of questionable origin.

Since the mid-1970s discovery by American archeologists of the iron age Jenne-Jeno site in the Niger River delta near the modern town of Djenné, terracotta figures from the area have been in strong demand. According to Ardouin, a good quality Jenne terracotta can be obtained illicitly in Bamako for around \$5,000; once smuggled out of the country, it can fetch up to \$50,000 in New York or Paris. With profits so high, it is extremely difficult to stem this lucrative illegal trade.

A constant aim of the museum is to expand its various collections. Treasure-hunting missions are periodically organized to different parts of this vast West African state. One problem hindering work is lack of funds. "Mali has a rich culture to preserve, but we do not have the money to do all the preservation and documentation work necessary," said Sidibé.

Running an ambitious museum is an expensive undertaking, especially for a country like Mali, where GNP per capita is only \$200 a year. The museum receives government subsidies, but they are hardly sufficient. It is therefore always on the lookout for financial backing from Western governments, international organizations, and private foundations.

In recent years, both the Ford Foundation and the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) have been financially backing Mali's National Museum. Ford Foundation grants, for instance, allowed the museum to carry out research on traditional textiles and set up a photography unit. The museum presently benefits from UCLA's scientific


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AIR AFRIQUE



Mali's National Museum reflects local architectural motifs (above)

capacities and financial resources, while UCLA students gain valuable field experience by working in the country. Four cloth-gathering expeditions have been organized with the help of UCLA funding.

The textiles gathered by these expeditions are to be used to form the core of a traveling exhibition scheduled to tour the United States, particularly UCLA and the National Museum of African Art in Washington, D.C., and later to West Africa. Sidibé hopes the tour will spur interest in the area and help generate additional funds for research into other aspects of Malian culture and civilization.

The museum's activities also have a practical side. Information is gathered on such relevant topics as traditional technology and its use. Said Ardouin: "Our data bank is of direct economic importance because indigenous technology can be readapted to current needs to play a role in the development process." ○

Two restorers working in the museum's restoration workshop (right)



An exhibit at the National Museum of Mali (lower left)



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