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Even though they occupy less than 2% of the earth's surface, rain forests are home to over half the world's plant and animal species. When we destroy the rain forest we are endangering our planet's future. The chain of life depends on a variety of plants and animals that are being destroyed by the day... from the smallest tree frog to the largest tropical tree.

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The Margay is one of many species whose habitat is threatened rain forest.
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Sierra Leone's War Targets Civilians, Industry, Foreigners

After seizing power in a coup d'état three years ago, Capt. Valentine Strasser's National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) declared that one of its principal objectives would be "to ensure that the rebel incursion is brought to an immediate end."

Since that time, the NPRC has more than tripled the size of Sierra Leone's army to some 10,000 soldiers. But a string of rebel attacks beginning late last year underscores the army's inability to contain the four-year-old rebellion. Thousands of people have been killed in violence that has moved ever closer to the NPRC's stronghold around the capital, Freetown. A rebel strike on the northern town of Kambia in late January led some 30,000 Sierra Leoneans to flee across the border into neighboring Guinea.

The rebels—a force of less than 1,000 fighters by government estimates—have done more than terrorize the population. They are also undermining the economy of one of the world's poorest countries. The latest rebel campaign has successfully targeted the mining industry, which normally accounts for as much as 90 percent of Sierra Leone's export earnings.

On January 18 and 20, rebels seized two of the country's most important mines. One of the mines produced about 25 percent of the world's natural rutile and the other is an important bauxite producer. Government forces reportedly regained control of the rutile mine, but it remained closed in early February due to damage from the battle.

Such rebel operations also hurt the economy by scaring off foreign investors, who are the principal owners of the mines. Hundreds of foreign mine workers have left the country because of the attacks.

The government's efforts to soothe foreign investors' worries have been made all the more difficult by the rebels' latest tactic in the war: the kidnapping of foreigners.

The rebels began taking hostages on November 7 when two British aid workers were seized. Efforts to secure the release of the hostages have been frustrated by the difficulty foreign governments say they have had in communicating with the rebel leadership.

In a January 12 radio message, a man identifying himself as Foday Sankoh, the leader of the rebel army, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), said that the two hostages were in fact undercover military advisers. He warned that they would be killed if the NPRC went ahead with the execution of an army lieutenant-colonel who was sentenced to death for aiding the rebels.

Whether or not the demand was made by a Sankoh impersonator as Sierra Leone's intelligence alleged, it is certain that the rebels believe Britain supplies arms to the NPRC—a charge denied by the British Foreign Office. After four more Britons were seized along with other foreigners during the January attacks on the mines, British officials made contact with Sankoh. This time, according to the British officials, it was the rebel leader who said that the hostages would be released when foreign governments end their assistance to the regime.

The RUF demand includes the withdrawal of Nigerian and Guinean troops from the country. But it is not clear that RUF is responsible for all the kidnappings. Some reports say that a splinter rebel group was also holding some of the hostages.

Whoever is responsible, the latest round of hostage-taking took place during the January 25 attack on Kambia. Seven missionary nuns—six Italian and one Brazilian—were seized, along with about 100 Sierra Leoneans.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was able to obtain the release of two hostages, a Russian and a Sierra Leonean. But by mid-February, 17 foreigners were still held captive.

The hostage-taking has helped to increase world attention on Sierra Leone's crisis. But mediation initiatives have yet to translate into anything close to substantive peace talks.

The last time the two sides agreed to meet—at Mano River Bridge in Liberia on December 4—nothing came of it. Since then, the government has been the keener of the two to enter peace talks due to its weakened position. (The "major new offensive" the government claimed it launched on January 24 had virtually no impact on the war.)
The rebels—who sense the Strasser regime’s vulnerability—seem less likely to deal. At the end of January, however, the RUF invited the ICRC to act as a mediator between the two sides, according to Radio France Internationale.

An ICRC spokesman told the radio station that the relief agency “does not usually act as a mediator.” But those willing to try to broker an end to Sierra Leone’s war now include the Commonwealth Secretariat and the United Nations. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali dispatched a special envoy, Ethiopia’s Berhanu Dinka, to the country in early February.

Even if RUF and NPRC negotiators are brought to the bargaining table, questions remain about how much control the two sides have over the combatants in the complicated conflict.

The RUF—which began the war against the preceding corrupt regime with help from Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia—relies on several other smaller groups of fighters to pressure the NPRC. These bands of bandits and rebels will also have to be brought into line if a treaty is signed.

There is also a lack of discipline in the army. Rebels charge that soldiers profit from the illegal sale of diamonds smuggled from the war zones. The army, like the rebels, is accused of carrying out attacks on civilians. Some soldiers have taken to fighting with the rebels. “Sobels” is the new word Sierra Leoneans use to describe soldiers who remain in the army by day, but fight for the rebels by night. At least a dozen officers have been executed for helping the rebel cause since December.

In the meantime, civilians in the towns have taken to creating self-defense units to defend themselves against attacks. But the regions outside of Freetown are becoming more and more dangerous. Scores of houses have been burned to the ground in the attacks. Looting is widespread. On February 2, the World Food Program reported that the number of people internally displaced by the war had doubled to 600,000 over the last year. Some 185,000 Sierra Leonean refugees have fled to Guinea. Another 90,000 have sought refuge in war-torn Liberia.

With much of the country unsafe and ungovernable, the elections that the Strasser regime promised to hold this year seem likely to be postponed. The process is reportedly opposed by elements of the military.

But the chairman of Sierra Leone’s elections commission, James Jonah, continues to push for the voting to be held on schedule. In February, he pleaded his case at a donors’ meeting at the United Nations in New York. Jonah asserted that even under the prevailing insecurity, voter education could begin. Britain, the United States, and the European Union promised to continue support for the democratization process in Sierra Leone.

If Jonah proves successful in implementing his 12-month elections plan, even a little behind schedule, it could be considered a coup for the regime. Besides promising to end the rebellion quickly, the other main objective of the putschists back in 1992 was “to sincerely pursue the process of returning our country to true multi-party democracy.”

Niger’s President Forced to Share Power after Holding Elections

A cohabitation government is not what President Mahamane Ousmane had in mind when he dissolved Parliament last year, paving the way for elections to select an all-new legislature in January.

But the opposition coalition of parties, led by the National Movement for a Developed Society (MNSD)-Nassara, won a slim majority of the 83 Assembly seats. In accordance with the constitution, the prime minister was to be chosen from the new parliamentary majority following the Supreme Court’s validation of the results.

Observers question whether the president’s party, the Democratic and Social Convention (CDS)-Rahama, and the MNSD-Nassara—which are dominated by sometimes competing ethnic groups—can rule side-by-side in a country which faces deep economic and social problems, including labor unrest and a Tuareg rebellion.

In the wake of the elections, the parties have shown more concern for political maneuvering. In late February, the two sides were still wrangling over the selection of a new prime minister. The main opposition leader, Mamadou Tundja, was outraged to learn that the president bypassed the opposition’s choice for prime minister, appointing a different MNSD-Nassara member to the post.

Tundja has been out-flanked by Ousmane in the past. Tundja lost the March 1993 presidential run-off election to Ousmane after leading the pack of presidential contenders in the first round of voting. A month earlier, in the legislative elections which returned the country to multi-party rule, Tundja’s MNSD-Nassara, which once ruled Niger as the sole legal party, had also won more seats (29) than any other single party. But the MNSD-Nassara was prevented from taking power when the CDS-Rahama and five other parties with a combined total of 50 seats quickly united as the Alliance of Forces for Change (AFC) to become the parliamentary majority.

But when the president called for early legislative elections, the coalition equation had changed. Indeed, the catalyst for the president’s decision was the withdrawal of the AFC’s second-largest party, the Niger Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS)-Tarayya, from the ruling coalition in September. The prime minister, PNDS-Tarayya’s Mohammadou Issoufou, was a key Ousmane ally, also resigned from the post he had held since April 1993.

Without the PNDS-Tarayya’s 13 Assembly seats, the AFC lost its parliamentary majority. But the president...
**ANGOLA**

During the two-year United Nations-sponsored peace process which led to Mozambique’s elections in October, diplomats frequently spoke about avoiding the mistakes that led to a return to war after Angola’s 1992 elections.

Now that the UN is again committed to supporting a settlement between Angola’s government and Unita rebels, diplomats may be talking about copying what went right in Mozambique.

On February 9, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to send 7,000 peace-keepers to Angola, 10 times the number that was deployed there for the failed 1992 mission. The first peace-keepers will come from Brazil, Uruguay, India, Pakistan, Romania, and Zimbabwe.

The U.S., which is expected to pay a third of the mission’s $380 million cost, will not contribute troops. But the Clinton administration will consider providing logistical support.

Unlike other peace-keeping operations which risk running into resistance from the Republican-controlled U.S. Congress, the Angolan mission has the full support of Senator Jesse Helms. The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is a long-time supporter of Jonas Savimbi’s Unita.

After a shaky start, the November peace accord signed between the government and Unita in Zambia appears to be holding.

**LESOTHO**

Moshoeshoe II was reinstated as Lesotho’s king in January, four years after he was deposed by a military government and replaced by his son, Letsie III.

Letsie was a reluctant monarch, however, who worked to return his father to the throne following the nation’s restoration of civilian rule two years ago. In August, Letsie dismissed Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle, disbanded Parliament, and suspended parts of the constitution, apparently to clear the way for his father’s return.

Botswana, Zimbabwe, and South Africa brokered an accord to restore democracy in Lesotho the following month. But the agreement also paved the way for Moshoeshoe’s return and granted amnesty to the monarchy’s supporters, many of whom are in the opposition Basotho National Party.

During the January 17 ceremony in which Moshoeshoe was reinstated (and Letsie abdicated), the king recognized the neighboring countries’ role in ending Lesotho’s crisis. “I think the best thanks of all...is if we promise...that we will never ever allow ourselves to sink back to what they have rescued us from,” Moshoeshoe said. The presidents of Zimbabwe and Botswana, Swaziland’s prime minister, and a South African cabinet minister attended the ceremony.

**SOUTH AFRICA**

Accusing the African National Congress and National Party (NP) of “delays, gimmicks, and deceptions,” Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi’s Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) began what was expected to be at least a two-week boycott of Parliament on February 22.

Buthelezi, who is also the minister of home affairs in the national unity government, said his party’s 43 MPs staged the walk-out to protest the failure of the ANC and NP to honor a pre-election agreement to seek international mediation to resolve differences over the future role of the Zulu king.

The IFP did not quit government, however. And Buthelezi said that a special IFP congress, which was scheduled for March 5-6, would decide whether the party would quit Parliament for good.

“We of the IFP must now seek a new mandate from our constituency and until such mandate is received, we are duty-bound to suspend our active participation in parliamentary work and in the constitution-making process,” Buthelezi said.

President Nelson Mandela charged Deputy President Thabo Mbeki with resolving the crisis brought on by the IFP action, according to the Financial Times. But Mbeki left for a tour of the U.S. and Europe on February 23. He was not expected to be back in South Africa until after the IFP conference.

Observers expressed concern that the boycott could signal a return to fighting in KwaZulu/Natal.

**LIBERIA**

Thousands of Liberians fled renewed fighting in the southeast between Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia and the Liberia Peace Council in January and February. The Pan African News Agency called the fighting the most serious violation of the December 1994 cease-fire agreement under the Accosombo Accord, which was signed by Liberia’s seven warring factions.

The failure of the ceasefire comes in the wake of collapsed talks in Ghana mediated by Ghana’s President Jerry Rawlings. The seven warring factions could not agree on the composition of a five-member Council of State to govern until elections scheduled for November. The factions agreed to Ghana’s proposal that Chief Tamba Taylor head the transition council. But disagreement arose over a proposal that Alhaji Kromah of Ulimo and Charles Taylor both hold seats on the council. Other warlords accused Ghana of favoring Taylor, according to the Africa Press Service.

**CORRECTION**

The September-October 1994 anniversary edition of Africa Report omitted the names of two interns who worked on the issue. They are:

Leslie A. Bilchick
Rosina Dewji

Their efforts were appreciated by the entire Africa Report editorial staff.
established in Paris in 1971, Médecins Sans Frontières has offices in 18 countries and is renowned as the world’s largest independent emergency medical aid agency. The organization currently has 2,000 volunteers at work in 70 countries. But in addition to its humanitarian mission, Médecins Sans Frontières places great importance on publicizing—and speaking out on—the world’s crises.

The agency’s latest report, Populations in Danger 1995, argues that the “aid-only response” to humanitarian crises increasingly favored by the international community is ineffective. “Political action and justice are also needed,” says Médecins Sans Frontières’s secretary-general, Dr. Alain Destexhe.

A study of Rwanda, featured in the report, highlights how aid sent to Rwandan refugee camps has empowered former government officials who instigated the mass killings of Tutsi and moderate Hutu last year. Médecins Sans Frontières argues that by controlling relief aid, those responsible for the genocide maintain a grip over the refugee population. The report says that a failure to bring this belligerent group to justice threatens Rwanda’s survival.

Destexhe spoke about the report with Africa Report around the time of the relief organization’s third annual International Day for Populations in Danger in January.

Africa Report: You said in the report, Populations in Danger 1995, that humanitarian aid without political solutions and justice is basically counterproductive. Could you expand on that idea?

Destexhe: More and more we believe that without political action or justice, aid can backfire. I’ll give you two examples. In the refugee camps in Zaire, the only thing that is done is providing relief. But the camps are totally controlled by the former Hutu government which organized the genocide in Rwanda. They don’t have any support from abroad—maybe with the exception of France, but I have no proof of that. Their only strength is the refugee population. And they are only able to control the refugee population because they receive relief, food assistance. So we are not only helping the victim, but we are also helping those that organized and planned the genocide to prepare a new war. That is the obvious objective of the former government. So doing only relief may on the one hand save a few thousand lives, but on the other hand you are making the overall situation much worse.

I can give you the same example for Bosnia. If you are faced with ethnic cleansing as a relief organization, you face a dilemma of moving the population—to protect people, you take them out of their villages. But if you do that, you are doing the cleansing process for the ones that are willing to do it, you are sort of accomplices. You do it to protect the lives of the people, but overall it is part of the problem. So that is why if the world is only willing to provide relief, overall you are playing into the hands of the stronger, of the aggressor, the one who has organized the genocide. That is why it could be called counterproductive.

Africa Report: That is why Médecins Sans Frontières pulled out of the refugee camps in Goma?

Destexhe: Not entirely, but we did pull teams out of Goma, Bukavu, and Benako. We still have some teams in Goma because we and many other organizations called for the deployment of UN forces in that camp. We were waiting to see whether there was a possibility to improve the situation in the camps. Now that the UN Security Council has decided not to deploy such a force we should reconsider our decision very soon.

We felt it would have been a good mix to have organizations like ours providing relief to the people and the UN working to break the control of the former power over the refugees. But if you don’t have that mix, that sharing of responsibility, I think that the refugee camps are just going to become a sanctuary, a backyard for a future war in the area.

Africa Report: You said in the introduction to the report that it’s essential for those responsible for the massacres to be brought to justice. What is happening on that front?

Destexhe: A few things are happening, but they appear to be only cosmetic at this stage. There are three possible ways to judge these people. The first one is in Rwanda. Most of them should be brought to justice and tried in Rwanda.

I strongly believe that the minister of justice in Rwanda [Alphonse-Marie Nkubito]—he is a Hutu and a former leader of a human rights organization—has a really open mind and is willing to do something. The only problem is that he has absolutely no means—no paper, no typewriter. You have more material in this small office than the whole ministry of justice in Rwanda. They should prosecute thousands of people,
but they simply cannot do it if the world does not help. Of course, they have received many commitments and pledges. But in practice, seven months later, very little has been done. Another problem is that they don't have the staff to do it. I was told that there are only four trained lawyers remaining in the entire country.

Another possibility which is often overlooked is that you can try those people in front of a French or Belgian court. In the penal code of many European countries, the Geneva Convention and the Convention on Genocide have been integrated as part of the law. We are talking about genocide and crimes against humanity, so that means, theoretically speaking, any judge anywhere in the world could be competent to try those people. Cases were filed in both France and Belgium in July. Unfortunately, the case in France has been blocked for juridical debate, but I don't think it's only juridical. In Belgium, after so many months, the prosecutors have not decided whether to pursue the case or not. That is not normal. This is important because if a Belgian judge issues an international arrest warrant against some of those killers, he can make their lives very difficult. They would be unable to take a plane to go to Europe and other things like that.

The third scenario is an international tribunal. But again, where is the commitment? Maybe it is a little bit early, but there is still no budget, no staff. The prosecutor is borrowing staff from the former Yugoslavia's tribunal. Also, if you look at what has happened with the tribunal in Bosnia, there are still problems of funding, of organization, and so on. So you can't be very confident that the tribunal in Rwanda can succeed any time soon.

Reconciliation is impossible without a minimum of justice because after 1 million people are killed, you cannot just ask the families of those people from one day to another to shake hands with those responsible. **Africa Report:** Could the crisis in Rwanda have been foreseen and avoided? **Destexhe:** The fact is that there was a report from the UN human rights commission in 1993 that was quite clear about what was going on, all the strategy to prepare the genocide. I don't know if it could have been avoided. But I think the way to avoid it would have been—it's a paradox—to have done something on Bosnia, not in Rwanda. Because the world didn't stop the ethnic cleansing process and the aggression in Bosnia, a green light was given to people willing to do these large-scale massacres. I don't think such a large-scale genocide in Rwanda would have been possible if the aggression had been stopped in Bosnia.

**Africa Report:** Médecins Sans Frontières was against intervention in Somalia prior to the U.S. landing there, but in favor of intervention in Rwanda. At what point do you feel intervention is necessary in a conflict? **Destexhe:** You have to consider what peace-keepers can achieve. Let's put it this way: We consider that Somalia, like Afghanistan, is a civil war. That means you have different clans or groups of people fighting against each other and whole societies involved—a self-destroying country. I don't think you can stop this type of situation by foreign intervention.

If you take Rwanda or Bosnia, we don't believe they are civil wars. Bosnia was an aggression by the Serb force against other people—one side had all the weaponry, all the military equipment, and the other side had absolutely nothing. Rwanda was the same, an organized genocide. You have murderers on one side, and victims on the other. In Somalia, you don't have that. Who was the aggressor? They have at least five or six top guys who were fighting. It is a lot more complex, it's not as clear cut as it is in Bosnia or Rwanda. The world cannot stop a civil war just by sending troops. It doesn't mean you don't do anything, but you can't just stop it because it is deeply rooted in the history and the custom of that place. But when you have a deliberate plan for genocide, then I think the world can stop that because you have in front of you an organized army or a few people who have decided to pursue a strategy.

Over the last 10 years, we have only called for military intervention two times, in Rwanda and Bosnia. **Africa Report:** In addition to helping people on the ground, one of Médecins Sans Frontières's major principles is to speak out about crises. Doesn't that make it more difficult to operate in the field? In Rwanda for instance? **Destexhe:** Yes and no. We were expelled from Ethiopia in 1985 because we spoke out about what was going on there. The world today, however, is not the world of individual member states and sovereignty, the world of the 1970s and the Cold War. Today you have fewer situations with one strong centralized power versus the population, instead you have many more parties involved.

It's difficult now for countries to expel Médecins Sans Frontières because we are better known than before and can exercise pressure through the media and so on. We have experienced in the last year that we could speak out on Bosnia, on Rwanda, and on many other countries. You should see what we wrote about Sudan in our 1992 report. But we still operate there.
Somalia's former president, Mohamed Siad Barre, died in exile in Nigeria on January 2, four years after he was forced to flee Mogadishu by guerrilla fighters opposed to his rule.

Few Somalis paused to reflect on the octogenarian's death, however, as fighting in the country continued in anticipation of the United Nations' forces final withdrawal in March.

"The normal reaction [to the dictator’s passing] would be 'hip hip hooray,' but unfortunately our people are too busy fighting to take much notice," one of Barre's long-time adversaries, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, was quoted as saying in an All African Press Service report. Certainly Egal—who was Somalia's prime minister when Barre seized power in a 1969 coup d'état and is now president of the secessionist-minded republic of Somaliland—is among those who credit Barre with creating conditions which led to Somalia's war and famine.

The corruption, authoritarianism, and "clanism" which Barre promised to stamp out when he first took power became hallmarks of his rule. And Barre imported millions of dollars of weapons into the country by playing Cold War rivals off each other in the 1970s and 1980s. But to the end, Barre denied responsibility for the horrors that befell Somalia after he was overthrown.

Barre's body was flown to his supposed birthplace, Garbahaarey in Somalia, on January 6.

**Somalia’s Former Dictator Dies in Nigeria**

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**Niger continued from page 6**

resisted pressure to form a government of national unity, believing that his alliance could still win a majority in early legislative elections.

The run-up to the elections went fairly smoothly, although incidents in early January did cause officials concern. On January 5, with the scheduled elections date only two days away, it was announced that the polling would be delayed until January 12 to straighten out a disagreement over the legality of ballot papers. On January 9, an opposition candidate, Seydou Dan Djouma, was assassinated.

With less than three days to go before the elections, the opposition threatened to boycott, alleging that it had uncovered a huge fraud scheme involving the inclusion or exclusion of 110,000 names on the voters' lists in the Tahoua, Maradi, and Tillaberi regions. The opposition also charged Prime Minister Abdoulaye Souley, a CDS-Rahama hard-liner, with misusing state resources for campaigning, accused the CDS-Rahama of using intimidation and violence, and condemned the murder of Dan Djouma.

By January 10, however, the opposition announced that it would "participate normally" in the elections.

International observers reported that voting on January 12—in which 774 candidates from some 15 parties competed for the 83 Assembly seats—took place under mostly peaceful and fair conditions. But attacks at some of the 4,980 polling stations helped fuel protests of the results by both parties.

The elections results, announced on January 14, gave 42 seats to MNSD-Nassara coalition and 40 to the AFC parties. (The remaining seat was won by a party which would later be counted with the opposition.)

The post-election atmosphere remained tense, however, as the AFC called on the Supreme Court to nullify the results in several areas in view of “massive and monstrous irregularities” allegedly carried out by the opposition.

The Supreme Court validated the MNSD-Nassara coalition's victory on January 27. Following the verdict, the new opposition majority issued a statement which chided the president for wasting time and "exacerbating the sufferings of our people" by dissolving Parliament in the first place, instead of "clearly acknowledging defeat and accepting...that a new majority had come into existence."

Although Ousmane accepted the election results and called for unity in an address to the nation following the Supreme Court ruling, bickering between the MNSD-Nassara and CDS-Rahama continued.

On February 2, the Supreme Court rejected a petition filed by the president’s party which called for elections in eight constituencies to be nullified, according to the Pan African News Agency. This apparently closed the book on disputes over the results, allowing the parties to turn to forming a new government.

A February 3 MNSD-Nassara coalition statement read by Issoufou on Niger radio said that, in accordance with the constitution, the parliamentary majority requested that the president appoint the MNSD-Nassara’s Hama Amadou as prime minister. But the statement said Ousmane had asked that at least three names for the post be sent to him for consideration.

Then, on February 8, the president surprised the nation by appointing the MNSD-Nassara’s Amadou Cisse prime minister. Two day's later, Cisse was kicked out of his party. By the end of the month, Cisse had lost a no-confidence vote in Parliament and Ousmane named Hama Amadou prime minister.

As the parties continued political maneuvering in the aftermath of the elections, it was clear that the polling process had offered few distractions from the problems Niger's new leaders will have to address. Four days after the voting, the country's 17,000 teachers commenced a five-day strike to demand back pay, according to Radio France Internationale. The Niger Mine Workers' Union also announced a week-long strike on January 30. Civil servants have not been paid in months and inflation is running at 43 percent, according to West Africa.

The Tuareg question will also remain a major concern of Niger's new government. Although the MNSD-Nassara has a reputation of hostility toward the Tuaregs, there are reasons to be optimistic. Last October's ceasefire accord between the government and Tuaregs was renewed a week before the elections. The MNSD-Nassara's new ally, Issoufou, was considered a key player in brokering the accord when he was prime minister. The Tuareg-aligned parties won five seats in the new Assembly.
Algeria’s War Escalates During Ramadan

February was already considered the most violent month in Algeria’s three-year-old conflict between the government and Islamic fundamentalists. Then, on February 22, scores were killed when security forces stormed a high-security prison to put down a rebellion by militant Muslim inmates.

According to government officials, the rebellion at Serkadji prison began when jailed Islamic militants took seven guards hostage a day earlier. The militants, who had planned the escape of some 1,000 prisoners, slit the throats of four of the guards. The number of inmates killed by the security forces was disputed—security officials initially put the number at 95, later press reports said half that number had been killed. There were also conflicting reports over which Islamic fundamentalist leaders were killed in the government crackdown at the prison.

But not in dispute was that the incident was a further sign that the bloody conflict between the government and the militants seeking to bring down the regime is escalating. By some accounts, more than 500 people a week were being killed by the end of February. And despite diplomats’ assertions that neither side can win an outright military victory, the two sides have been described as preparing for a showdown. Others are concerned that the military-backed regime is on the threshold of collapsing.

Beneath this backdrop, attempts to bring the two sides to a compromise have all but fallen on deaf ears. Nonetheless, one notable peace initiative of late was offered by the outlawed Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and other Algerian opposition parties in mid-January.

The opposition peace proposals—issued in a joint statement after a week of discussion in Rome under the auspices of the Catholic group that helped broker Mozambique’s 1992 peace accord—called for negotiations with Algeria’s regime to set up a coalition government and arrange fresh multi-party elections.

The groups doing the fighting were not impressed. The government declined to send a representative to the talks. Government officials called the peace initiative an example of foreign meddling that would benefit fundamentalist terrorists whose only aim is to seize power. The government had failed in its own efforts to negotiate with the FIS after it moved two of the banned party’s leaders, Ali Belhadj and Abassi Madani, from jail and into house arrest last year.

Also absent from the Rome talks were the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the supposed armed wing of the FIS, the Armed Islamic Movement. These groups—which the FIS reportedly has less and less control over—are responsible for most of the fighting on the Islamic fundamentalists’ side.

Nonetheless, the opposition proposals seemed to gain some credibility after they were endorsed later in January by Belhadj, who is the more militant of the two detained FIS leaders. Because external FIS representatives are not always in sync with the thinking of the group’s officials in Algeria, it was not certain that Belhadj—who has spoken out against democracy in the past—would support the initiative.

Hopes that the proposals could still result in negotiations suffered a blow a few days later, however, when a car bomb exploded in Algiers. The January 30 blast in the heart of Algeria’s capital killed at least 42 people and injured almost 300 others. Prior to the Serkadji prison killings, it was considered the worst single violent incident in the country since the conflict began.

In early February, the GIA took responsibility for the bombing, but said that the real target of the attack was a police commissariat across the street from where the bomb actually exploded. The GIA claimed that the headquarters was a known torture center. The group also promised more attacks throughout Ramadan, the Muslim holy month, which began on February 1.

With the country still reeling from the Algiers bomb blast, France’s President François Mitterrand caused a row when he said that the European Union should mediate an accord in Algeria. Mitterrand’s proposal, which led an infuriated Algeria to recall its ambassador to France, was later rejected by France’s conservative government of Prime Minister Edouard Balladur. But the diplomatic incident is said to have stimulated more talk of French or European mediation in Algeria.

In the meantime, Algeria’s government re-jailed Belhadj and Madani, signaling that it did not expect negotiations with FIS anytime soon.

Despite its increasingly tenuous position, the government has insisted that it will hold presidential elections this year, possibly as early as July. This, experts say, would lead to more attacks by Islamic fundamentalist groups which will be left out of the process. Indeed, according to a letter supposedly written shortly before the Algiers bomb blast (but not published until a few days after the attack), Belhadj said: “Talk of presidential elections in these circumstances will not solve the crisis but make it far deeper and more dangerous. And the next few days will demonstrate this.”

Over 30,000 people have been killed in the violence which began after the government nullified legislative elections in 1992 to prevent a FIS victory.

In another development in February, Algerian militants raided a border post in neighboring Tunisia. The GIA took responsibility for the attack in which several Tunisian guards were killed and their weapons seized. Although the attack was downplayed by diplomats, it underscored fears that Algeria’s war would spill over into Tunisia and Morocco.

For many, the late December hijacking of a French airliner already demonstrated that the conflict had spilled over into Europe.
GHANA

Ghana was expected to introduce a new five thousand-cedi note (C$5,000) in February, according to African Business. A C$2,000 note was introduced last year, replacing the C$1,000 bill as the highest denominated note.

A little over a thousand cedis was worth one U.S. dollar in February. "With the higher denomination notes," the article quoted a trader as saying, "we will be able to carry our cash in wallets instead of suitcases."

NIGERIA

A year after head of state Gen. Sani Abacha abandoned the eight-year-old economic reform program begun by his military predecessor, Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, the regime has again embraced the free market.

The 1995 "budget of renewal" unveiled by Abacha on January 14 marks a dramatic reversal from 1994's budget of regulation and state control. New measures, including the deregulation of foreign exchange markets and the lifting of foreign exchange controls, are aimed at recapturing credibility from external creditors and promoting investment.

Foreign investors question whether the government is serious about following through with the steps to liberalize the economy. But businessmen have expressed satisfaction with many of the measures which were explained in some detail by the regime's acting finance minister two days after Abacha's speech.

The deregulation of the exchange rate was perhaps the most welcome change. The "guided deregulation," as Abacha termed it, allows banks to trade naira on behalf of their customers on the new autonomous currency market, which will be regulated by the central bank. The regime abolished the 1962 Exchange Control Act, which outlawed transfers abroad of foreign currency and gold without the permission of the finance ministry. Exchange controls were cited by investors as a major source of corruption and inefficiency.

In conjunction with relaxing the exchange controls, the Nigerian Stock Exchange released guidelines in February to encourage foreign investment in the country's emerging market. Companies listed on the exchange can now introduce new shares to be bought by foreigners. And foreign brokers were invited to join the market, according to the Journal of Commerce.

The regime has been criticized for maintaining a two-tier exchange rate system. The official exchange rate for government agencies and parastatals remains at 22 naira to the U.S. dollar. The artificial rate, which was fixed in the 1994 budget, is much lower than the current market rate of roughly 85 naira to the dollar. The differential between the two rates leaves room for corruption by officials.

In addition, international oil companies must trade naira at a rate fixed by the central bank. Officials promised the rate would be in line with the market rate, however.

Investors were pleased that the Enterprise Promotion Decree, which limited the amount of equity foreign companies could hold in many Nigerian concerns to 40 percent, was also abolished.

The oil and natural gas industries remained subject to foreign ownership restrictions, however. Nigerians will retain at least a 50 percent share in joint ventures in these industries, which will also continue to be required to sell their oil to the central bank. The government has yet to say exactly what size stake foreign companies can have in these concerns.

Creditors and oil investors were heartened by another measure concerning the oil industry. Abacha ordered the closure of all offshore oil accounts. Since 1986, roughly 10 percent of Nigeria's oil revenue—the country's largest foreign exchange earner—has gone into these accounts, which are also susceptible to corruption and mismanagement. A recent panel of inquiry found that $10 billion of the $12.2 billion in oil revenues that were paid into the accounts over a six-year period remained unaccounted for.

The new budget measures also set a maximum ceiling of 21 percent on all interest rates.

Abacha hopes the new economic policy will help to reopen negotiations with the Paris Club of creditors. Talks to reschedule Nigeria's debt were suspended last February due to the abandonment of free market principles unveiled in the 1994 budget. But skepticism among donors remains high based on Nigeria's poor track record in adhering to its policies and the sentiment that deep-seated corruption is even harder to weed out.

In the meantime, the country ran a $4 billion deficit, or 12 percent of GDP, last year. External debt stands at over $30 billion, with at least $8 billion in arrears. Inflation is running at an estimated 100 percent. The country's infrastructure continues to deteriorate. And many multinationals, including Volkswagen and Hoechst, are continuing with plans to pull out of the country.

To win the confidence of creditors and investors, Abacha must also convince the world that he is committed to political change. He acknowledged as much in his budget speech. "This administration draws inspiration from the recognition that free enterprise is the bedrock of a democratic political system," he said.

KENYA

On January 3, a 30-year ban on foreign investment in the Nairobi Stock Exchange came to an end.

But an anticipated buying spree of Kenyan equities by foreigners did not follow in early January. The high expectations for an inflow of overseas capital had driven the value of the exchange up by 35 percent in the two weeks prior to the market's opening, according to the Financial Times.

Nonetheless, foreigners reportedly expressed strong interest in investing in the promising emerging market.

Finance Minister Musalia Mudavadi announced foreign investment would be limited to 20 percent of each company's shares listed on the exchange, according to a December 23 Kenya Broadcasting Corporation report. Individual foreign investors are allowed to invest in up to 2.5 percent of each company.
Finding Friends In Congress

By HERMAN J. COHEN

Is there a place for Africa in the Republican congressional leadership's new agenda? That's the question Africans and friends of Africa are asking. In this article, the Bush administration's...
assistant secretary of state for Africa, Herman J. Cohen, writes that all is not lost for the continent. As Congress pares aid budgets and pinpoints recipients, Africans must develop new strategies to influence American friends, including the hardest of all—building support for private sector-led growth.

Will the Republicans “zero out” Africa? That is the question most African ambassadors in Washington, and the friends of Africa throughout the United States, are asking in the light of statements made by the new Republican majority leadership in the 104th Congress. In essence, will American development assistance to Africa be drastically reduced or eliminated altogether because some of the Republican chairpersons in Congress are saying that the United States has only minimal national interests in Africa?

Since the November 1994 congressional elections, which gave a majority in both houses to the Republicans, statements by the new Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman, Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), and the new Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee chairman, Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky), have caused virtual panic among the friends of Africa. In summation, what both have said is that overall foreign assistance must be reduced, and that what is available must be reserved for areas of the world where America’s economic and security interests are at stake. Moreover, they and others have said they see no significant American interests in Africa.

Africans are asking how widespread this sentiment is in the Congress and what the likely impact is going to be on development assistance to Africa. My response to these questions is first, “Don’t panic,” but secondly, “Don’t be complacent either.” It is important for Africans to look at this issue in perspective, to focus on Africa’s priorities, and to adapt to a changing post-Cold War international environment. What is happening in the 104th Congress is really part of a trend that began five years ago among most of the countries that provide assistance to Africa.

In real terms, United States foreign assistance has diminished about 25 percent since 1989. So, when the new Republican leadership talks about further reductions, it is following a general trend which is relevant to all budgetary allocations, domestic as well as foreign. However, what is significantly new for Africa in the 104th Congress is the strong possibility that the $800 million annual “earmark” (reserved amount) for the African Development Fund (ADF) is likely to be eliminated.

The ADF was a particular favorite of the Democrats when they were in the majority. Does the end of the ADF “earmark” mean that all assistance for Africa will be “zeroed out” (eliminated)? Not at all! Aid to Africa is certainly going to continue, in my view, but the overall foreign aid pie is getting smaller, and Africa will have to compete for the assistance that it heretofore has been receiving almost automatically in the ADF. The Republican leadership has also said that current assistance levels for Israel and Egypt (about $3.5 billion in economic aid) will not be reduced, thereby further lowering the amounts that will be available for Africa and other areas. In addition, without an earmarked appropriation, Africa will also be vulnerable to sudden crises in which the administration will be tempted to take money away from Africa to take care of urgent unexpected needs elsewhere, like Haiti today or Bosnia in earlier years.

What strategy should the friends of Africa be using to defend Africa’s interests with respect to United States policy toward international development assistance?

It is important to keep in mind that there are many centers of power in the United States Congress. The two foreign relations committees legislate overall spending authority. The two appropriations committees, through their subcommittees on foreign operations, actually allocate funds to foreign assistance programs, deciding on specific amounts for specific regions and individual countries and sectors such as agriculture, education, and health. Sometimes ignored by African embassies are the two banking committees, which are very influential in U.S. policy toward the international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the African Development Bank. Indeed, maintaining current funding levels from the IFIs should probably be a higher priority for the Africans than American development aid, which is much less important in terms of monetary volume.

In view of these different centers of power in the Congress, Africans should now be working with pro-African members of these different committees who do not feel it is in the interests of the United States to abandon or marginalize Africa. In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for example, the chair-
person of the Africa Subcommittee is Senator Nancy Kassebaum of Kansas, who has long experience with and sympathy for Africa. The chairperson of the House Banking Committee is Congressman Jim Leach of Iowa, who was in the forefront of the anti-apartheid struggle, and was influential in the denial of bank loans to South Africa in the 1980s. The new chairperson of the House Subcommittee on Africa, Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida, does not have much Africa experience, but in my conversations with her, I detected a strong interest, and even enthusiasm, for cooperation with African nations.

In addition to a steady reduction in U.S. foreign assistance in real terms over the past five years, another important trend has been one of greater selectivity in who is eligible for American aid. In the Cold War days, pro-Western countries were favored. In the mid-1980s, economic performance was added as a major criterion, with human rights a significant but secondary element. In the 1990s, economic performance, movement toward a market economy, and democratization/human rights are all key criteria in American foreign assistance.

In view of this emphasis on selectivity in American foreign assistance policy, the 15 or so African countries which are doing well in areas of concern to U.S. policy-makers may find it advantageous to band together in order to put themselves forward as good potential economic partners for the United States. Instead of the entire OAU membership defending African interests as a bloc, which is the historical tendency, the good-performing, pro-market, and democratizing countries should consider forming their own bloc that will focus attention on their ability to use foreign aid to good advantage. Their message to Senator Helms should be, “Senator, when you talk about aid to Africa going down a rat hole, it does not apply to us.”

The same advice is true for African relationships with the IFIs. The more that African governments can fulfill the tough criteria of structural adjustment programs that are proposed by the World Bank and the IMF, the less likely it will be that the American government will attempt to scale down assistance to Africa from these bodies. The Americans do not have a veto in these institutions, but they are very influential and can have an impact on African interests through their level of contributions and their voting in the board of governors.

Of particular interest in the 104th Congress will be the next replenishment for the International Development Association (IDA), the soft-loan window of the World Bank. That is why the two banking committees, which have oversight authority over
U.S. participation in the IFIs are so important for the Africans to get to know. This is true for all African governments represented in Washington, including those that are not now current recipients of American aid. The members of these committees will increasingly be asking tough questions as such why shouldn’t the IFIs reserve their assistance to the good performers who are making the tough political and economic choices that will enable their countries to start reducing poverty. "The others should not be coddled with our money," they will say. For their part, Africans should be asking why IDA soft loans are going to China and India, which are highly industrialized countries that should and could be financing their own development. The time for Third World solidarity is over, in my view.

Africans can also make foreign assistance look more attractive to Americans by developing projects that can be linked directly and visibly to American exports, and therefore American jobs. The best way to do that is to look for infrastructure projects that might be conducive to American assistance. When American construction, electronic, and telecommunications firms are awarded contracts to install American products in African countries, constituencies in favor of aid to Africa will proliferate significantly. In addition, wherever there is a current U.S. assistance presence, Africans should do a better job of finding the home districts of the American organizations that are supplying technical assistance, training, or other services. Visits by African ambassadors to these districts can go a long way toward building pro-African constituencies at the grassroots.

While the U.S. federal government has excellent public relations assets abroad through the United States Information Agency, its ability to inform the American public about successful foreign aid programs in Africa is extremely limited. USIA, for example, is forbidden by law from disseminating information inside the United States. The State Department is allowed to do this, but has a very limited budget for public information activities. African governments which are making good use of American assistance, and there are a significant number of them, should work together to organize the spread of information about such programs within the U.S.

In the final analysis, African leaders have to take cognizance of the inescapable fact that assistance levels are following a downward trend worldwide. The United States is not the only donor government that is in the process of reducing its foreign aid budget. Money is scarce all over. Citizens are demanding that resources be reserved for unmet needs at home rather than in the Third World. This means that Africans will have to look more and more toward the private sector as the motor of development. Indeed, just as reductions in foreign assistance have been happening for a number of years, so has the importance of the private sector been on the upswing in many African countries for a number of years. The Republicans now in charge of the U.S. Congress are not bringing about a revolution in foreign affairs. They are simply being more vocal about an existing trend, which they hope to accelerate because they feel it is the will of the American people.

It is no coincidence that the African countries which are currently seeing higher economic growth rates have done more to liberate and encourage the private sector than the less successful countries. They have created an improved environment for the private sector by eliminating government monopolies, privatizing loss-making enterprises, improving the legal structures, liberalizing the banking systems, and adopting realistic foreign exchange rates so as to encourage domestic production and discourage unnecessary imports.

Most African governments still need to do a much better job of mobilizing domestic savings so as to supply capital for productive private investments. Right now, government-dictated interest rates are too high for borrowers and too low for savers. In some countries, citizens lack confidence in the banking system. As a result, capital flight is still very high in most countries, and savings that remain in Africa are often invested in real estate or livestock, as opposed to productive business ventures.

My advice to Africans as the 104th Congress gets under way is: Don’t despair. The Republicans are not likely to zero out Africa because they are not isolationist and do not want the United States to be without a significant presence in any part of the world. Nevertheless, the medium-term trends toward reduced foreign aid budgets and greater selectivity in recipients are certainly going to continue. It is important, therefore, for Africans and friends of Africa to develop strategies to cope with these trends.

Against this background, I would recommend that Africa’s three top priorities should be: maintaining funding levels for the international financial institutions, especially the next replenishment of the IDA, which are making good use of American assistance, and there are a significant number of them, should work together to organize the spread of information about such programs within the U.S.

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Three Essentials for Recovery

By VIVIAN LOWERY DERRYCK

Africa today is a study in contrasts, says the author, who visited nine countries in December as part of the delegation of Anthony Lake, the U.S. national security adviser. The road to rehabilitation for many countries is full of pot-holes, but for Africa to leave a legacy to its children, it must resolve the issues of power-sharing, ethnic accommodation, and land tenure without resorting to violence.
African leaders are seeing first-hand the devastating aftermaths of civil strife. In these countries, the aftermath of conflict has spawned a new set of the proverbial three Rs: reconciliation, re-education, and reconstruction.

Reconciliation means that citizens must be willing to acknowledge wrongdoing and take responsibility for their actions. Re-education must involve the examination of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship and the inculcation of a culture of tolerance. Reconstruction must focus on re-establishing the economy, attracting qualified civil servants to run the country, and regularizing ties with the international financial institutions.

All three are essential to re-integration of the state. But the road to rehabilitation is crooked and pockmarked if the Lake delegation's fact-finding trip was any indication. Of the nine countries visited (Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi, Mozambique, Zambia, Angola, Ghana, Benin, and Senegal), five were in the throes of recovering after violent combat and political instability.

Rwanda remains the great challenge for its neighbors, the OAU, the UN, and the international community; for Rwandans are not ready to reconcile. Sadly, after one of the shortest and most deadly civil wars of this century, there is no feeling of remorse by perpetrators and no inclination for reconciliation on the part of the victors.

In a remarkable exchange, one Rwandan minister suggested that the perpetrators could be categorized into four groups: architects of the attempted coup and ethnic cleansing; executors of the heinous deeds; both key army officials and senior enlisted men; local authorities such as mayors and local militia; and, finally, the estimated 250,000 civilians who participated in the bloody purge.

The minister estimated that up to 10,000 persons constituted the first three groups and declared that they should all be executed as war criminals. Objections were raised, as it was noted that at the end of the 20th century, international jurists, human rights groups, and donor governments would certainly oppose such actions. In response, the minister opined that since up to a million Tutsi and moderate Hutu had been killed, another 1 million Rwandans were refugees and still another 2 million were internally displaced (his figures), the deaths of 10,000 perpetrators was a reasonable price to pay for justice.

There can be no progress until all parties acknowledge the tragedy, then work together for reconciliation. Clearly, massive re-education at all levels is needed. The question is whether Rwandans can do it themselves or whether the international community must intervene.

In Burundi, a mirror-like reverse political construction exists with Tutsi having reluctantly ceded...
power to a long-oppressed Hutu majority. While a constitutional crisis revolving around the powers of the Speaker of the House has just been resolved, Burundi-watchers maintain that a new crisis will likely emerge. More than anything, Burundians need massive re-education, a need that many Burundians themselves recognize. Above all, trust must be established between the two dominant ethnic groups. Tutsi must learn to accept legitimate Hutu political leadership and redefine themselves as loyal opposition, while Hutu must understand that tyranny of the majority leads to further divisions and bloodshed.

Land Mines Should Be Outlawed

In Angola and Mozambique, reconstruction presents a huge challenge. In both countries, strategically planted land mines imperil lives, hinder relief efforts, and make development initiatives almost impossible.

Angolan and international officials estimate that there is at least one land mine for every citizen: 10 million people, estimates of 10 to 20 million land mines. Mozambique, the poorest country in the world, is estimated to have 2 million mines, although no UN official will hazard an estimate on the number of mines, fearing that the political consequences are too negative.

"Front Toward Enemy" emblazoned on the front of a Claymore land mine instructs the combatant on how to plant the device. The Claymore and a dozen other samples were Exhibit A in a demonstration of de-mining in Cuahane, Mozambique. Walking carefully in single file, UN de-miners pointed to a mine planted only four inches deep right by the side of the road.

De-mining is a dangerous operation with potentially lethal consequences. The day before this particular exhibition, an instructor had been killed as he attempted to demonstrate to a group of de-mining trainees the proper way to pull the pin out of a mine. (Ten thousand people a year die in mine-related accidents.) In a telling demonstration of the relationship between war and poverty, Mozambicans are not paid more than $5,000 a year for de-mining work, dangerous and high-stress though it is. If locals were paid more, they would purposefully maim themselves for the insurance. Such are the consequences of being the poorest country on earth.

But nothing can prepare a visitor for the devastation of Cuito, Angola. A quiet, picturesque town of 70,000 before phase II of the Angolan war (the post-1992 election fighting), Cuito became a battleground in 1993. The city changed hands several times, but in one long siege, the government held the town for six months. Government troops were hunkered down in below-ground bunkers, while
Unita forces bombarded them every day, targeting even the hospital.

There are no good guys in this story. As Unita forces wreaked devastation through aerial bombings, both offensive and defensive forces sent citizens out to plant mines at night and take them up in the morning. Tales abound in Cuito of people who were maimed handling the mines: the children so engrossed in their childhood games they forgot; the man who had to go to the bathroom in the middle of the night and forgot; the woman who was curious about an object on the side of the road and stepped off into the grass. All were involved in normal, pedestrian tasks. All are now amputees. Angola and Mozambique have the highest amputee rates in the world.

What should the international community do? Since 23 nations provided land mines and other armaments to the combatants, how can they help undo the mischief?

Three specific actions would be helpful. First, continued support for de-mining operations in both countries; second, major support for de-mining legislation in the U.S. Congress; and third, promotion of UN resolutions to ban land mines from production.

**New Leadership and New Appreciation of Regional Institutions**

The new breed of African leadership sees a need to respond to these conflicts. In Ethiopia, OAU Secretary-General Salim Saleh struggles to fashion an African mechanism that can respond to regional crises. It's a hard task, burdened by pitifully small resources and skepticism in some entrenched regimes about the appropriateness of the OAU even assuming a visible role in conflict management.

Other larger assistance questions remain if we are to help these countries with the three Rs of reconciliation, re-education, and reconstruction to make their nations whole. The U.S. and other donors can help by providing mediators perceived as objective. Moreover, they can condition further aid on reconciliation and power-sharing. Finally, they can endorse the OAU conflict-resolution mechanism.

Unfortunately, ongoing conflicts in Africa obscure the remarkable peace that envelops most of the continent. The ravages of war are so stark that they overwhelm the success stories of millions of people going about their daily business.

The Lake delegation saw a hopeful Africa as well, as it contrasted the devastation of Portuguese-speaking southern Africa with the vibrancy and optimism of West Africa. Perhaps it is the vibrancy and optimism that have encouraged the realization that Africans must rely on themselves to solve regional problems that has sustained the three-year involvement of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) in efforts to resolve the Liberian situation.

Former President Dawda Jawara of the Gambia, Nicéphore Soglo of Benin, and Jerry Rawlings of Ghana have all attempted to mediate the crisis through Ecowas. While success has eluded each to date, the initiative itself indicates the new assertiveness that characterizes the sub-region.

From anguished Rwanda to vibrant Benin, at mid-decade Africa is soul-searching. "How do we resolve conflict with those we love?" is a well-known Quaker query. A similar query can be asked in post-modern Africa: How do nations find solutions to emotive questions of power-sharing, ethnic accommodation, and land tenure without resorting to violence?

Perhaps the answers to both queries rest with the children: the Isabels and Moussas who are young enough to have the hate exorcised. At the very least, their legacy should be a peaceful Africa, free of conflict and land mines, led by officials whom they can admire and institutions which they can respect.
By ANTHONY LAKE

The Clinton administration has worked in the knowledge that Africa truly does matter to us. We have supported very strongly the wonderful transition to democracy in South Africa. We have helped resolve conflicts in Mozambique, Angola, and elsewhere. We have addressed humanitarian crises in Rwanda, Angola, Sudan, and Liberia. American soldiers died under tragic circumstances in Somalia so that hundreds of thousands of Somalis could live. The president personally has promoted the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, in which we are trying to anticipate and deal with the causes of potential famine there. We have worked on debt relief, on demobilization, on de-mining. As a sign of our interest, we went across Africa and visited nine countries last December, starting in Ethiopia, and then traveling to Rwanda, Burundi, Mozambique, Zambia, Angola, Benin, Ghana, and finally Senegal.

As we went around, four themes and patterns clearly emerged in my mind. One was the importance in Africa of regional integration. A second was that in all of those countries that are tragically tearing themselves apart, they do now have a window of opportunity to deal with those problems, but now is the moment for them to walk through that window because it may close. The international community will not be there forever, and they need to address their problems now. The third was the importance of helping those nations that are consolidating the democracies that they have just launched, and a fourth was the importance of our supporting those democracies that are relatively well-established and are making a real go of it.

Let me address each of these four briefly. Before we went to Africa, I traveled with the president to Asia and Jakarta where the Asia-Pacific Economic Community meeting set as a target a free trade area in all of Asia in the second or third decade of the next century. I traveled with him to Miami, where the summit of Western hemisphere democracies set a similar goal of negotiating free trade agreements throughout this hemisphere early in the next century. This followed on the passage by Congress of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. We also traveled to Budapest where among other things he emphasized our support for a Europe that is integrated both politically and economically.

What this means is that you have the creation of a global trading system for the 21st century and within that, regions in Europe, Asia, and this hemisphere, that are coming together and integrating so that they can compete effectively in this new global economy and there is a continent that is being left out and that is Africa. And unless Africa can achieve greater regional integration and then greater economic integration as a whole in the next century, it is going to be even harder for African economies to compete. One example of the potential of this is southern Africa. where 13 nations, 125 million people, and $250 billion in gross domestic product offer the potential of a real zone of peace and prosperity there if they can continue to build it. There is a similar potential in IGADD, in Ecowas, and elsewhere — and unhappily only a potential.

A second pattern is a significant barrier to that economic integration. Again, let me emphasize that that kind of integration has to begin now if Africa is to catch up and that means that this barrier has to be surmounted now. The barrier is that in each of these regions, there are nations that are tearing themselves apart in internal conflicts. We visited Angola, potentially either a tremendous force to drive a southern Africa zone of prosperity, or a terrible drag on it depending on how it sorts out its own affairs. This became very evident when we visited Cuito in the center of Angola and saw some of the worst devastation that I have seen in my life including two years in Vietnam. What was so terrible about it is that the signs were of the destruction of buildings and of too many people not through bombing campaigns, but through hand-to-hand conflict, which must have been terrible. We saw all around Cuito amputees, displaced persons, terrible signs of human suffering. There is more than one mine for every person in Angola.

While I was very moved by the human tragedy there, in a metaphorical sense what moved me most was that, as we drove along outside the city, I could see on the trees mangoes that could not be picked because of the mines around them. It seemed to me a metaphor for Angola itself and the potential wealth that could be picked if only there were not the mines and if only the leaders of Angola could put aside their personal and political ambitions and come together and save that country.

There is some progress. Since the trip, we are rather encouraged. The ceasefire is holding, the Lusaka protocol seems to be generally implemented, and we led an effort in the UN to get approval of the 7,000-strong peace-keeping force that could be deployed as we see continuing signs of progress in
implementation. So maybe it can happen and we will continue to work on it.

The contrast was in meeting President Rawlings in Ghana and talking about Liberia, which is now into its 12th ceasefire. While we are working on it, I am not terribly encouraged and the cost will be very high for the Liberian people if they do not succeed.

The message I tried to carry publicly as well as privately everywhere we went was that this is the last chance. I think especially in the wake of Somalia that the willingness of the international community to forever make efforts to support failed ceasefires, to forever provide a safety net for leaders who are more concerned with their own welfare than that of their people, that patience is wearing thin. I hope that the message our government is sending—and I believe that the international community is sending—will offer some shock of recognition and reality for them.

A third pattern that interested me greatly although it is far less dramatic was the importance of consolidating new democracies. It is wonderful when a nation writes a democratic constitution and holds elections. But the real work of democracy comes in the next phase, when the leaders learn how to work with a parliament, how to sit down and debate differences with people who only briefly before they were trying to kill. And even more interesting to me was the importance of those who lost the elections learning how to be a loyal opposition. So we tried to send the message of the importance of this day-to-day work, of learning the habits of democracy that are so important. I came away rather hopeful both in Ethiopia and to a somewhat lesser degree in Mozambique.

In Ethiopia and here recently in Washington, we met with both representatives of the government and of the opposition parties, urging the government to create a level playing field for the elections this spring and urging the opposition to find ways to take part in the elections, so that a boycott of the elections does not become a self-fulfilling prophecy of a one-party state in Ethiopia. In Mozambique, I was surprised in meeting the leader of Renamo to discover that he seemed genuinely interested in turning Renamo into a loyal opposition and building it in democratic ways to take part and do better in the next elections.

The contrast unhappily was Burundi, which truly hangs in the balance. At our meetings with the leaders of the two parties, we all emphasized that the international community and the United States stand with the moderates in both parties, those who are acting in democratic ways and are opposed to the extremists and so far, the understanding reached by the moderates is holding, but a major spark could set off a new fire in Burundi that would have terribly tragic consequences. Rwanda is going to require a lot of work. The next three to six months will be absolutely crucial in deciding whether there is a repetition of the tragedy that we have seen before. The government assured us that it would allow human rights monitors and UN forces to go anywhere in the country. We were able to give enough aid to Rwanda so that it could clear its arrears and open the way for $50 million in World Bank funding that is so important in order for the government to show that there are benefits locally to peace and try to head off a new tragedy. But again we are going to have to work very hard and the future hangs in the balance.

Finally in our visits to Senegal, Benin, and Zambia, we saw more established democracies, but governments and leaders that are behaving with a different kind of courage that very much deserve our support, because in all three countries what they are doing is to try and reinforce their democracies in the face of the kind of public backlash that you get when economic reforms that are sometimes painful are being carried out. I was impressed with the courage of all three countries in persisting both with democracy and with the reforms, because both are so important to the future of their nations.

Let me conclude by recalling the most vivid scene—in Rwanda when we were told that we were going to visit the site of a massacre. We arrived at this site and we started to walk into the church in which more than 1,000 people had sought refuge. We walked through a garden and some other rooms in a smaller building, where hundreds had been massacred, and there on that site still were all of the bodies from months before. We literally had to step over the bodies of those innocent people who had been butchered in horrible ways.

It was hard after seeing that not to come away pessimistic, not only about Africa, but even the human spirit, but it is simply not the case. If you think about the 25 democracies in Africa now and the progress in South Africa and President Mandela and all the Africans we saw who were getting up every day and going to work and trying to make their own futures and the futures of their nations better, it is clear that we should not be "Afro-pessimists." I argue that what we need is an "Afro-realism," a realism about the problems of Africa and a determination based on that realism to deal with those problems.

Just about every place we went, we were asked whether the results of the U.S. elections last fall meant that America was simply going to pay less attention to Africa and would withdraw from African affairs. I said "absolutely not" and that in fact members of both parties had been supportive of Africa, that centrists in Congress would continue to support American policies of engagement, including in Africa, and just as I was not an Afro-pessimist, I encouraged them not to be "Americo-pessimists."
Burundi has not yet erupted into the ethnic violence that convulsed Rwanda last year. Holding the country together is a fear of genocide that has driven hundreds of thousands of Burundians out of their homes and into squalid refugee camps—and a balance of terror between Hutu and Tutsi supporters. The coalition government, comprising both groups, has persevered, despite bands of terrorists loyal to one side or the other trying to destroy the fragile political compromise.

By ALAN ZAREMBO
The killers came at midnight across the steep green tea fields to Isaie Minani's village. A grenade tossed in his front window killed his four-year-old son. Minani and his wife escaped into the darkness. For the next two hours, they hid while the attackers raided more homes, shooting and knifing 25 more relatives to death. All but six were children.

Minani, a 35-year-old peasant farmer dressed in rags, said they died for his political activism in the northern Burundi province of Kayanza. A member of the Hutu ethnic group, he campaigned for the political party that ended decades of rule by the minority Tutsi in June 1993.

The same two ethnic groups fought a genocidal war last year in Rwanda. For months, diplomats, relief workers, and other observers have been predicting a holocaust in neighboring Burundi. The warnings are part insurance against another tragically feeble international response and part rendition of history.

Burundians have tried ethnic purification many time before, most recently the killing of 100,000 in 1993 after government soldiers murdered Melchior Ndadaye, the country's first elected—and first Hutu—president. His replacement, Cyprien Ntaryamira, died in April 1994 in the same plane crash that killed the Rwandan president and marked the start of pogroms there.

But a dead president and the same ethnic mix—85 percent Hutu and 15 percent Tutsi—are not a sure recipe for genocide. Holding Burundi together are a fragile coalition government and a balance of terror: bands of ethnic killers, an army loyal to the Tutsi.
minority, and a society so split that hundreds of thousands of people living in shantytowns and schools for the last year and a half are scared to go home.

"The common enemy is fear," said Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, a Mauritanian heading a small United Nations team keeping watch from the capital, Bujumbura. "People are tired of it, but they are hostage to it." Hutu militants are not organized enough to carry out a genocide and fear retaliation by the army. But the army learned in the 1993 violence that the days of killing without retribution have ended. For the first time in Burundi's history of massacres, it is undisputed that huge numbers of Tutsi died.

So instead of hemorrhaging like Rwanda, Burundi is eroding into a state of terrorism. In the last several months, assassins have murdered at least five leaders, terrorists have exploded grenades in the capital, and armed gangs have exchanged gunfire in the suburbs and slaughtered hundreds of poor people in the countryside. Each month the death toll rises by a few hundred.

At the Bujumbura market in late November, women hosed blood and mashed vegetables toward the gutter. "I am very afraid to work here," said Salvator Nsengiyumva. Two hours earlier, a grenade had blown up 100 feet from his bean and rice stand, killing five people.

Planning Minister Emile Ntanyungu was in the hospital on November 10 fighting an illness. Two men strolled past the soldiers guarding the front door, walked into his room, shot him in the temple, and sliced his forehead open to make sure he was dead. They also killed his 19-year-old son, who was sleeping in the adjacent bed. Other targets for assassins have been a police minister, the energy minister's family, a businesswoman, and the energy minister's family. Nobody has been arrested.

Who are the killers? There are the Tutsi militias like Sans Echecs, young terrorists allegedly backed by the army. Weapons searches have become a license for Tutsi soldiers to kill civilians, according to human rights groups. Palipehutu, a Hutu liberation organization, has operated from Rwanda and Tanzania for years. And Leonard Nyangoma, a former interior minister, claims his National Council for the Defense of Democracy is responsible for attacks on military and police posts.

One thing is clear. The terrorists are on both sides of the ethnic divide, trying to destroy a tenuous compromise. Although Ndadaye and his Front for Democracy in Burundi (Frodebu) won the 1993 elections in a landslide, his assassination, the violence that followed, and powerful Tutsi interests in the military and private sector forced Frodebu to share power. In September, Frodebu and the Tutsi-dominated Union for National Progress (Uprona), and a handful of Tutsi-led opposition parties agreed to form a coalition government under the country's third president in 11 months, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, a Hutu.

Nyangoma—who claims to have 30,000 soldiers, a number most observers believe is wildly exaggerated—took up arms because he believes Ntibantunganya bargained away too much power to the opposition in his bid to be president. The breakaway point was when Ntibantunganya rejected an Organization of African Unity peace-keeping force that could have monitored the army.

The threadbare government is holding—barely. In December, Charles Mukasi, head of Uprona, ordered government ministers from his party to quit to protest the Parliament's election of Jean Minani as speaker. During the 1993 riots, he allegedly broadcast messages from Rwanda to kill Tutsi. After a three-week standoff that shut down Bujumbura for several days and spurred dozens of killings in the capital, Minani, in a UN-brokered deal, agreed to step down and take over Ntibantunganya's position as Frodebu leader.

Then in early February, the president sacked two Uprona ministers after they skipped a cabinet meeting. Mukasi told a news conference that the government "should be overthrown at all costs" and a two-day general strike shut down the capital.

Strife between the two ethnic groups predates political parties. Before colonialism, Tutsi were lords in a feudal society, trading land for crops and labor with Hutu. The Belgians, who ruled Burundi and Rwanda together, widened the class divisions by making Tutsi carry out such unpopular jobs as tax collection.

In Rwanda in 1959, three years before independence, Hutus overthrew their Tutsi rulers, killing tens of thousands. For Burundi's Tutsi, the Rwandan slaughter heightened fears of revolt and justified stiffer repression of Hutus. They quashed each uprising with massacres, purging Hutu from the army and executing dozens of suspected coup plotters.

Hutu rebelled in 1972, killing several thousand Tutsi before the army retaliated with a campaign to murder every educated and employed Hutu. So submissive had some Hutu become that they helped their killers dig mass graves. Trucks dumped in at least 200,000 bodies. Emmanuel Mpfayokurera, now a parliament member, was 13. "Soldiers came to our school. They took all of our Hutu teachers," he recalled. "I lived because I was still in primary school. All secondary students were killed." The
Catharine Watson

For example, out of Burundi’s 228 judges and lawyers today, 13 are Hutu. The rest are Tutsi.

In June 1993, ethnic balance seemed possible when Burundians elected Ndadaye. The defeated Tutsi president, Pierre Buyoya, who had paved the way for the elections, stepped down peacefully. Hutu took top spots in the cabinet. Ndadaye hired more Hutu civil servants.

He never could recruit more Hutu into the 20,000-man army, thought to be 95 percent Tutsi. Four months after the elections, soldiers stormed the presidential palace and killed Ndadaye, the top two parliament officials, and three cabinet ministers, while the president’s Tutsi bodyguards shot in the air. The soldiers came looking for Ntibantunganya, then foreign affairs minister, but he had already left his house. They killed his wife instead.

The massacres that followed were Burundi’s worst since 1972. Hutu felled trees across hilly dirt roads to stall army units while they hacked Tutsi to pieces and torched their homes. The army fought back with equal brutality. At least 600,000 of Burundi’s 5.6 million people became refugees. Another 100,000 died.

Senior officers apologized over the radio, blaming the coup attempt on a few undisciplined soldiers. Ugandan soldiers arrested nine coup plotters in November and are holding them for extradition until a fair trial can be assured.

Soldiers, who go unpunished for crimes against Hutu, remain an important factor in Burundi’s violent decay. Some leaders believe any government will be powerless unless the military is integrated. “What we want is not to convert a Tutsi army into a Hutu army. We want a national army,” said Foreign Minister Jean-Marie Ngendahayo.

After 50 gunmen attacked a military hospital and gangs of young Tutsi burned down dozens of Hutu homes east of the capital, the army vowed to disarm the militias. Such weapon hunts have been used as a pretext for violence against Hutu, say human rights groups.

In September, an army unit went searching for weapons in Kamenge, a slum of Bujumbura cleansed of Tutsi in 1993’s massacres. Tutsi civilians who go there now are stoned or beaten, often to death. Soldiers rounded up hundreds of people in a stadium while they searched their houses for guns. Ten Hutu were loaded into an army truck bound for police post questioning. It never arrived. Instead, soldiers drove to a field near the airport and killed them.

“If the officers wanted to know who did it, they could easily find out,” said a worker at the UN Center for Human Rights. “If you go to the police or the judges, they can’t do anything. People are doing their own justice. To kill three, five, 10 people—it has become usual.”

So distrusted is the army that many Hutu politicians insist on Hutu soldiers as bodyguards. “When someone kills a Hutu, soldiers go laughing. They don’t bother catching them,” said Celestin Kabura, a Hutu corporal who joined the army in 1989. He said some Tutsi comrades supply Tutsi militias with grenades and bayonets. Officers oppose recruiting quotas. Maj. Mamert Sinarinzi, the army’s head of...
communications, acknowledged “discipline problems” among soldiers, but said Hutu militias provoke the military.

Tutsi see the army as their only protection from extermination. "If the army does not stay mainly Tutsi," said Fabien Ngendakuhana, a Tutsi doctor in Bujumbura, "then the Hutus who want to kill us can do it in a few minutes." Rwanda's genocide compounded this fear. The Hutu government there organized the killings. Gangs of young thugs, led by government troops, carried machetes and lists of Tutsi from house to house, butchering up to 1 million people in two months. Burundi soldiers are the only protection for tens of thousands of Tutsi living in internally displaced camps. They fled from Hutu killers in 1993's massacre and are afraid to return home.

Jean Nahimana never strays far from Gakere camp, a shanty town of 1,500 carved into a hillside in Ngozi province. His home is less than a mile away, but he hasn't seen it in more than a year. Instead he lives with his wife and eight children under a dome made of eucalyptus branches and a donated plastic sheet. Flies swoop around frayed clothes hanging from bamboo rafters. Visible on a distant hill is a grid of blue shelters, a refugee camp for Rwandans who poured south into Burundi during last year's civil war, complicating an already tense situation.

Now there are three groups of homeless in Burundi: about 200,000 Tutsi in encampments under military protection; an estimated 200,000 Hutu who hide with friends and relatives; and 212,000 Rwandan Hutu in refugee camps across the north.

When the massacres started in Burundi, Tutsi gathered around military barracks, schools, government buildings, and markets where soldiers could easily guard them. Soldiers brought hundreds to Gakere, where they slept in a dark, concrete office in the government buildings that form the hub of the camp. In nearby Ruhororo, thousands more took over a market. Those unable to squeeze into crumbling cement shops built shelters out of straw mats, sticks, and rusty metal sheets.

The camps have expanded, creating a dilemma for international relief officials. They worry that too much assistance will make camps permanent, taking pressure off the Burundi government to solve the

### The Alleged Assassin

In a concrete cubicle in the Kampala barracks where he is imprisoned, Lt. Jean Paul Kamana calmly refutes accusations that he directed the killing of Burundi's first Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye.

"I told the soldiers to talk to the president, to negotiate with him," said Kamana, who claims mutinous army men cocked their guns at him when he tried to reach the room where the president was held October 21, 1993, the day of his murder.

The November 1994 arrest of Kamana and eight other alleged putschists in Uganda has created a regional conundrum. Though an international inquiry named several as key players in the coup attempt, they have not been charged with any crime in Uganda, and the two countries have no extradition treaty. But Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni is fighting accusations that he covertly supports Tutsi power in central Africa.

In Burundi, officials of the pro-Hutu Frodebu party want Uganda to keep the men behind bars until an international tribunal is set up. With a Tutsi-dominated army and justice system, who would guard and judge them?

The Burundian army and the Tutsi opposition don't want them back either. They fear the alleged putschists, who most likely did not act on their own, could implicate higher-ups in the killing of Ndadaye, the country's first democratically elected president, and four political colleagues. The assassinations triggered the massacre of tens of thousands of Burundians.

The alleged putschists are also a dilemma for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Several have applied for political asylum in Uganda and want resettlement to a third country. But UNHCR has stalled. One officer said, "It is not our job to protect criminals."

Some Frodebu politicians in Burundi say the arrests came a year late and are mere window dressing by Museveni. Two higher-ranking officers, Majors Bernard Busokoza and Rene Rumbete, were spotted in Kampala just weeks after the putsch.

Frodebu delegations visited Uganda twice in late 1993 to pressure Ugandan authorities to make arrests. Nothing happened until March 1994, when a Ugandan intelligence official announced that they had left the country. It now appears that they left only briefly, then returned. Tipped off in September, Ugandan intelligence closed in on them. In contrast, Ugandan authorities wasted no time in arresting six Hutu allegedly recruited by Burundian politicians to fight the Burundian army. They have been held without charges at a separate army barracks since July 1994.

Museveni seems ambivalent and uninformed on Burundian politics. At a December 1994 press conference, he repeated Tutsi opposition propaganda that the crisis in Burundi had been caused by Frodebu intending to “disband” the army.

In an interview three months before his assassination, newly elected President Ndadaye repeated campaign promises that he would not get rid of one problem, a non-national army, by creating another one—thousands of bitter and unemployed soldiers.

It is easy to see why Hutu distrust Museveni. Among Tutsi, he is seen as a sympathetic and powerful big brother. In early 1993, Museveni, who comes from a Tutsi-like cattle-keeping ethnic group
conflict and fortifying ethnic divisions. "This is our frustration," said Shelly Pitterman, the head UNHCR delegate to Burundi. "You are beginning to meddle in internal affairs."

Ethnic considerations drove UNHCR's decision in October to improve camps for 100,000 displaced Tutsis across the north, but not to help that many more in the rest of the country. The agency didn't want to incite clashes between the Rwandan Hutu refugees and Burundi's Tutsi army, which—by international treaty—must guard the refugee camps.

"There were these beautiful camps for refugees and then the army had to look at the squalid camps for their own people," said John Bullard, who heads UNHCR operations in the north. A national newspaper accused relief workers of collaborating with Hutu and some Burundian politicians blamed refugees for tensions.

Ruhoro—"the largest camp of displaced Tutsis, with 13,000 people crammed around a market—is a small town. Most of the nearby trees have been used for building huts or as firewood. People cook under rickety shelters. Children roll bicycle rims with sticks. Shops sell cigarettes, plastic sandals, and skewers of goat meat.

Conditions are worse in dozens of makeshift camps where handouts are limited to maize and beans. In Ngarara, a suburb of Bujumbura, 800 people live in a primary school. Dozens sleep hunched together in each classroom, where clothes hang on lines across blackboards and sacks of potatoes line the windowsills. Others sleep outside under desks draped in plastic. Garbage is piling up in the gravel yard.

Few displaced Burundians dare move back home. "I will return as soon as the hills are safe," said Concorde Nzohabonimana, who lives in Vyera, a northern camp of 3,700 next to a primary school. Some of the displaced work in their fields during the day, usually under army protection, and return to the camps at night.

If they go home permanently, many will have to rebuild. The lush countryside shows evidence of door-to-door war: rows of rooftopless, mud-brick homes with elephant grass sprouting inside. Piecing the rubble back together will be easier than mending a nation bound together by the fear of more death.

in Uganda, went on television to answer politically motivated charges that his regime was dominated by "Rwandan citizens." The core of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) are Tutsi Rwandan refugees who fought in Museveni's own guerrilla war and then invaded Rwanda with Ugandan weapons in 1990. Though he once vowed to punish RPF soldiers who crept back into Uganda, he never did and he remains close to Rwanda's new leaders, who deserted his army.

The RPF's victory last summer bolstered Burundi's Tutsi opposition in negotiations to form a coalition government. The genocide by Hutu in Rwanda also undercut the Hutu-supported Frodebu's bargaining power.

For now, Uganda is complying with the Burundi government's request to hold the suspects.

Some of the arrested men arrived in Uganda before the coup attempt and are clearly innocent. But among them is Kamana, the little-known officer charged with having ordered Ndadaye's killing.

"The direct commander of the assassination of the president was Lt. Kamana," states a June 1994 report by seven human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch/Africa. The investigation of the coup attempt says that Kamana led the attack on the presidential palace and "was the one the soldiers listened to and obeyed."

Ndadaye's murder three months after his election destroyed hopes of a democratic Burundi and had a poisonous domino effect on its neighbor to the north, hardening the resolve of the Rwandan Hutu extremists.

In a January interview, the first time he has talked to journalists, 32-year-old Kamana seemed little haunted by the accusations about his past. Now a prisoner in Uganda's Makindye military police barracks, he complained of inaction by UNHCR, unfair imprisonment, and boredom, only slightly alleviated by a Scrabble game courtesy of the Red Cross.

Asked why hundreds of eyewitnesses implicate him in the coup attempt, the athletic and bearded platoon commander says that he was framed and describes the putsch as a headless effort by thousands of mutinous soldiers.

Though he admits being at the presidential palace during the attack and in the tank barracks at the time when Ndadaye and another leading politician were bayonetted to death, he claims he was present as a hostage. "The soldiers wanted me to command them, perhaps because I was known for my skill at basketball and because a week before, I had asked Ndadaye a question at a rally to which the soldiers had applauded."

"The mutinous soldiers came to my residence and put me into a jeep and took me to the palace. But I told them to stop firing. That created an atmosphere of mistrust between me and them, so they locked me up in a room in the tank barracks. I was in that room when Ndadaye was killed."

The international inquiry tells a different story. It describes Kamana addressing a mass of excited troops on a barracks basketball court and announcing that Ndadaye would be killed.

An autopsy showed that Ndadaye was stabbed in the throat, head, and chest eight times.

—Catharine Watson and Alan Zarembo
The Plight of the Universities

Cash-strapped African countries have other worries than financing higher education—once the training ground for the civil service—such as basic education. But the universities are far from moribund and are raising funds through higher tuition, renting out facilities, tapping alumni for donations, and other methods. As democracy moves through its infancy on the continent, the universities argue that they will become even more important as think-tanks in the creation of a new African model of development.
one of the poorest continents in the world, Court observes. But, he argues, “Africa—perhaps more than other places—also needs institutions for unapplied teaching, learning, reflection, and research.”

This, he says, “is because of a powerful and continuing sense of technological, intellectual, and cultural dependence on the West and the consequent need to think out its own course and model of development. Universities, particularly in an era of pluralistic politics, represent the most likely places for original thought and the conduct of basic research which, in the last resort, the only means by which societies can take hold of their own destinies.”

World Bank education specialist William Saint said in an interview in Maseru that the four themes in the Bank report (differentiation of higher education institutions; diversification of finance; redefining the role of the state in higher education; and the focus on quality, equity, and responsiveness) were not intended as a panacea, but as guides for improving the efficiency and viability of universities.

Saint noted that the Bank has increased the number of educationalists (as opposed to economists) in its human resource division. The former Ford Foundation official, who is one example of this trend, noted that among the key criteria he is evaluated on is seeking consensus on key issues.

At the Maseru conference, vice-chancellors associated themselves with the November 1994 Buenos Aires statement of the International Association of Universities on the World Bank book, which decries the Bank’s failure to take on board any of the criticisms made by universities after the publication of the 1987 report.

But unlike previous AAU conferences, the World Bank report was not the dominant topic for debate. In reality, although World Bank financing for basic education has been growing at a faster rate than that for higher education, the Bank still remains a key donor to the sector.

Despite the Bank’s unbending views on higher education, personnel like Saint, who are well-respected in African academic circles, have helped to take the hype out of the debate and foster a hard look at the realities. Most vice-chancellors noted that with or without the World Bank, undertaking financial reforms had become a matter of survival.

“Self-pity is self defeating,” said Justin Epelu-Opio, deputy vice-chancellor of Uganda’s Makerere University, which was reduced to a shadow of its former self under Idi Amin and Milton Obote in the 1960s and 1970s. Under Yoweri Museveni, a graduate of the University of Dar es Salaam, Makerere is undergoing a facelift, with donor support and local initiative.

Among the measures being taken by the university, Epelu-Opio said in an interview, are renting out university facilities for conferences, and offering evening degree courses at full cost to students. Each facility is allowed to keep the proceeds, for topping up salaries and buying equipment.

The university has started a vigorous fund-raising campaign among its alumni, who are scattered all over the globe. The local community has also pitched in with offers of help ranging from cash to a carpenter who offered one day of his labor.

At the University of Khartoum, said Deputy Vice-Chancellor El Zubeir Bashir Taha, the idea of charging higher fees to oil-rich neighbors like Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya, and the United Arab Emirates has proved a bonanza. The university—one of the oldest established in Africa—is still able to trade on its reputation. Neighbors with newfound wealth are willing to pay the price, while they develop their own institutions of higher learning.

Other measures taken to make the university more self-sufficient include developing the 3,600 acres of land set aside for the university and fund-raising. Substantial resources have been donated by the trade unions and commercial farmers. Although the university is far from realizing the World Bank goal of 30 percent of its financing coming from private sources, it has set a target of its financing of 20 percent, deemed to be realistic.

A growing trend in Sudan, Taha noted, is the sprouting of private universities (about a third of the country’s 36 universities are private). Many of these, he noted, focus on specific skills, such as computers or agriculture. One private university was recently opened by a well-known Sudanese family exclusively for the education of women in the predominantly Muslim country.

Private universities come in for considerable criticism in NERRAG’s Learning from Experience: Policy and Practice in Aid to Higher Education, which questions the quality and value of these institutions. However, Taha argues, the fact that families are willing to find the money to send their children to these universities is an indication of the hunger for higher learning and the willingness of even desperately poor families to contribute.

Ghana has been engaged for the last seven years as part of its overall economic structural adjustment program in a $463.9 million educational reform program, including a World Bank credit of $34.5 million. Although this has not involved cuts in spending on higher education, government resources going into basic education have grown faster. And a basic tenet of the program has been to make universities more cost-effective by switching from subsidies to loans, privatizing food services, and moving toward non-residential boarding.

Over this period, the University of Ghana has been closed at least four times owing to student unrest. In the last incident in 1992, security forces stormed the campus, shooting a female student seven times, after students protested against the failure to raise student loans for board and lodging from the equivalent of $141
In many African countries, relations between governments and university authorities remain tense.
In Sudan, the University of Khartoum charges students from oil-rich neighboring states $6,000 a year to subsidize Sudanese students who pay an average of $2 a year for board, lodging, and tuition. At the University of Ghana in Legon, Accra, students now take loans to cover the cost of their tuition and upkeep, which used to be free.

Makerere, the Ugandan university once regarded as the Harvard of Africa, but which suffered untold human and physical decimation under two brutal dictatorships, now offers law and business administration degrees at full cost to evening students as part of its reconstruction efforts.

These examples, cited at a one-week colloquium, "University in Africa in the 1990s and Beyond," held in the Lesotho capital, Maseru, early this year, sent home the powerful message that while higher education in Africa is under stress, it is far from moribund.

Indeed, the gathering, which was attended by over 300 vice-chancellors and donors, closed with a plea for a broad "alliance in support of higher education" to ensure the survival of the African university into the next century.

Summing up the week-long colloquium, which was co-sponsored by the Accra-based African Association of Universities (AAU) and the Donors to African Education Working Group on Higher Education (DAE-WGHE), AAU Director of Research Akilagpa Sawyerr said the issue was "too important to be left to the universities alone."

"The challenge," said the former vice-chancellor of the University of Ghana in an interview, is to "enter the next century not as passive victims, but as institutions with purpose and vision, evolving strategies to sustain higher education." The colloquium, whose findings will be published in book form later this year, took place against a backdrop of both a recognition of the huge financial problems faced by African universities and the imperative that these institutions survive if Africa's fledgling attempts at democracy are to succeed.

In preparation for the colloquium, the AAU commission a study, titled "The African Experience with Higher Education," by three senior educationalists on the continent, while the DAE-WGHE commissioned eight papers by younger academics who have lived through the recent hardships of higher education.

A summary of the studies notes that in 1972, when the AAU first convened a workshop to define the role of the university, the main concern was training Africans to run the civil services of newly independent countries. African governments generally respected universities and generously provided for them in their budgets.

Two decades later, the summary states, "African governments have to function under such stringent economic conditions that they can only minimally finance the universities.

"Where once well-qualified professors taught small manageable classes, lecture halls are now overflowing, with public address systems sometimes having to be used. The lecturers are often underpaid and do not have access to teaching resources like laboratory equipment, books, and journals that are required in order to teach effectively."

Each year, the number of students increases, and universities are forced to increase their enrollments. For example, according to the AAU, the University of Yaoundé, Cameroon, which opened in 1960 with 500 students, by 1992 had 45,000 students with facilities planned for 5,000.

Adding salt to the wound is the perceived negative attitude of the hugely influential World Bank toward higher education, first articulated in its 1987 report, "Financing of Education in Developing Countries," which drew sharp criticisms at a previous AAU gathering in Harare.

This report argued that developing countries spend too much time on higher education, which the Bank claims has lower economic and social returns than basic education. It advocated an increase in private funding for higher education, as well as cost-cutting and -recovery measures.

African vice-chancellors, fighting what they called an effort to de-emphasize higher education, argued that it is impossible to separate higher and basic education. They argued that economic indicators are insufficient to measure the benefits of higher education since these ignore non-quantifiable indicators such as research, knowledge, new ideas, and a distinctive national identity.

The Bank view of higher education is re-emphasized in a 1994 book titled Higher Education: The Lessons of Experience. It came in for renewed criticism at the Maseru conference with the launching of a book called Learning from Experience: Policy and Practice in Aid to Higher Education, compiled by the Northern Policy Review, Research, and Advisory Network (NORRAG), a group of European academics concerned with the way in which education policy issues in the North affect the South.

The book—a collection of 14 essays by Northern education specialists—accuses the Bank of being narrow and inadequate in its approach to higher education. Protesting the Bank's utilitarian approach to higher education, David Court of the Nairobi office of the Rockefeller Foundation notes that the tone of the book is set by the cover, which features an unnamed African technician, rather than a distinguished African scholar.

The support throughout the book for a higher education which is applied, vocational, private, and diversified might seem particularly appropriate for...
Ghana says its “model” economic reforms aim to eradicate poverty within a generation by attracting foreign investment. Critics say the World Bank/IMF-guided reforms, such as trade liberalization, destroy local industry, and structural adjustment ends up making the poor poorer and the Western creditors richer. The government concedes that growth has been mainly driven by foreign aid, and wants to see expansion in exports and investment. But balancing fiscal conservatism with social pressure for improved living standards is tough while at the same time trying to build democracy.

**of Dependency?**

By PAUL ADAMS

Ghana faces another year of austerity as President Jerry Rawlings’s regime strives for the economic recovery which has so far eluded his 12-year reform program despite strong backing from Western aid donors.

“We have hovered on the edge of recovery for too long, now threatening to relapse into the bleak decade that preceded the recovery program, and now threatening to take off,” said Finance Minister Kweisi Botchwey in his 1995 budget speech. “Now is the time to make that extra little sacrifice to see us through...and remove the discordant strains in our political economy, so that the world will see us in better light.”

Although the government deviated from tight fiscal control in 1992, donors still hold up Rawlings’s Ghana as the model for structural adjustment in Africa. But many Ghanaians are wondering when their country will achieve the long-promised prosperity. The sharp devaluation of the cedi and exposure to imports have taken their toll, but the government has failed to check inflation, and sustained, private sector-led growth remains elusive.

Even Ghanaians who support structural adjustment in principle are critical of its implementation. Apart from the boom in the mining industry, there has been little direct foreign investment in the private sector and bank interest rates of 40 percent are making it hard for small and medium-sized businesses to expand.

But many of the government’s critics believe that structural adjustment only makes the poor poorer, ignores the social cost of reform, and serves the interests of the Western creditors, principally the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which work closely with the government on economic policy. This criticism has been taken up by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) outside Ghana, such as the British charity, Christian Aid, which argue that the World Bank’s influence has been harmful throughout Africa.

“Reforms in Ghana have been pushed through without any social safety net. Structural adjustment has put people out of work and abolished free education,” said a spokesman for Christian Aid during a recent tour of its projects in Ghana with one of its leading sponsors, the UK’s Co-Operative Bank. “The World Bank made its loans conditional on Ghana’s charging a fee for every child at primary school, with the result that many parents have stopped sending their children to school,” says Christian Aid, which is also critical of trade liberalization. “Opening up Ghana to imports has destroyed some local industries such as textiles,” says the organization.

One of the aims of structural adjustment and one of the factors which secured Rawlings’s election victory in 1992 is investments, mainly of aid money, in
poor rural areas which had been neglected by the ruling elite for so long. Rural electrification, funded by donors, and improved prices paid to farmers for cocoa and other export crops have enhanced Rawlings's image as a populist leader.

But these benefits have bypassed some areas. Less than 100 miles west of Accra in the small town of Adjumako, some old houses give a hint of former prosperity, but there is an air of hopelessness in the surrounding villages. The cocoa trees which once earned them a living are old and have not been replaced, as villagers complain that deforestation has made the area too dry for coca.

In Adjumako, the Methodist minister, supported by the Christian Council of Ghana, is trying to improve living conditions in outlying villages where social services scarcely exist. The small concrete block which he is building in the village of Ekrkon will serve as the only clinic within 30 miles.

"When people get sick now, they go to the faith healer," admits the minister, as he glances toward a shrine next to the Christian chapel.

In the primary school, there are six classes but only three teachers, supplied by the government. The children have no desks and very few school books, which should be supplied by the parents. Yet the village elders who gather within sight of the school block seem unconcerned by the children's lack of facilities. "They seem to have given up trying," says a visiting official from the Christian Council of Ghana.

The women who run the palm kernel mill at Adjumako show no signs of giving up trying, but lack the working capital they need to buy locally grown palm kernels, which they crack and boil to make vegetable oil for sale to the markets of Accra. Apart from the cracking machine, all the work is done by hand, including stirring the big pot for boiling the kernels over a log fire. They need credit to expand the business, but their only source of credit is the small annual loan offered by the Methodist minister.

"Aid is not the long-term solution here," says Terry Thomas, managing director of the Co-Operative Bank in the UK. "The danger is that aid creates a cycle of dependency from which small businessmen like this cannot escape without access to commercial credit. The big commercial banks in Accra and Kumasi are not interested in lending to small operators. The only way forward is to form credit unions whereby people in areas like this can pool capital and finance their own development."

Thomas believes that aid agencies, with technical assistance from commercial banks, can help to get such credit unions on their feet. "NGOs could provide the training of a local person to be the manager and help them coordinate nationally, but from there the credit unions would be on their own," he says.

Lack of development is not only a concern in the rural areas. Ghanaian captains of industry admit that private sector growth, especially in manufacturing, is below expectations. "There is no reason why Ghana should not achieve the consistently high growth rates of certain parts of Asia. All the favorable conditions that we see in such fast-growing economies are to be found here and even more," says Ismail Yamson, the chairman of Unilever Ghana.

"Yet we are not growing," he told an audience including President Rawlings at the recent launching of the Private Enterprise Foundation, which aims to influence government economic policy.

"The reasons are not far-fetched. They can be found in the deteriorating macro-economic environment and the poor performance of the manufacturing sector," said Yamson, who blames this on "weaknesses in the management and control of government expenditure."

Budget deficits in 1992 and 1993 pushed the inflation rate to around 25 percent, halved the value of the cedi, and forced the Bank of Ghana to raise interest rates to over 40 percent to check the expansion of money supply. "Just what any country needs to scare away investors and destroy industry," observes Yamson.

But even before government spending pushed the economy off track, manufacturing industry was not matching expectations. Manufacturers say that the lack of long-term finance has inhibited growth and criticize the commercial banks for failing to provide the necessary financing for industry, preferring instead to make short-term, high-yield loans and demanding collateral which businesses describe as excessive.

Indeed, Ghana's transition to capitalism has been slow, and growth throughout the economy has been below expectations. Manufacturers say that the lack of long-term finance has inhibited growth and criticize the commercial banks for failing to provide the necessary financing for industry, preferring instead to make short-term, high-yield loans and demanding collateral which businesses describe as excessive.

Indeed, Ghana's transition to capitalism has been slow, and growth throughout the economy has been below expectations. Manufacturers say that the lack of long-term finance has inhibited growth and criticize the commercial banks for failing to provide the necessary financing for industry, preferring instead to make short-term, high-yield loans and demanding collateral which businesses describe as excessive.

Finance Minister Kwesi Botchwey acknowledges that the performance of industry has been disappointing. "I worry about our entrepreneurial class."

Paul Adams reports for The Financial Times from Lagos, Nigeria.
The only real growth has been from the multinationals and some of the medium-sized companies owned by Indians," he says.

The government is taking a long-term view and Botchwey believes that Ghana can achieve its high growth targets and eradicate poverty within a generation. "We want to see a real push that means exports and real investment, not just aid-driven growth. The government's policies should be seen in this context," says Botchwey.

"It is true that incomes have not risen, but that is because we have invested some of the savings in government overhead in new infrastructure such as roads and electricity. We are shedding civil service staff slowly and a lot of these workers would have lost their jobs if we had not done something radical to improve the economy in the 1980s."

The government has a long way to go in restructuring the public sector. This year's budget targeted the parastatals and "organizations that are on subvention" for review. "Those organizations that can be turned into commercial ventures will be treated that way and those that have outlived their purpose will be liquidated to reduce the burden on government."

The divestiture of part of the government's holding in Ashanti Goldfields Company (AGC) in April 1994 for over $300 million was condemned by some Ghanaians as "selling off the family silver," and Jones Ofori-Attah, an opposition politician, sought a court injunction to prevent the divestment because the government had no program for investing the proceeds of the sale.

Botchwey defends the divestment as part of the process of reducing public sector involvement in industry and releasing the resources for health and education.

The Ashanti flotation also gave a boost to the fledgling Ghana stock market, which was one of the world's best performing emerging markets last year. The number of dealings increased by 145 percent and their value rose 2,000 percent, while liquidity improved as turnover rose from 5 percent of market value in 1993 to 20 percent. More privatizations are expected this year, including government shares in some profitable banks including Barclays.

The shining success of economic liberalization in Ghana is the mining industry. Since Ghana opened up this moribund industry to foreign investment in 1987, the output of gold has risen by 400 percent. Gold has overtaken cocoa as the major export and is set to continue its growth as more international mining companies invest in exploration or take over degraded state-owned mines. These include the Golden Shamrock group from Australia, which developed a new mine at Iduapriem and is now using Ghana as a West African base, and the Pioneer group from Boston, which has taken over the old Teberebe mine. Teberebe has already become the second largest gold mine in Ghana, with 290,000 ounces a year and potential to increase to 400,000. Ashanti produces 1 million ounces a year and is among the top six gold mines in the world.

The next growth sector is likely to be in power generation. "We plan to relax the laws to allow the private sector to generate electricity and sell it to the national grid," says Kwame Peprah, minister of energy and mines.

The expansion is needed. Last year, late rains dropped the level of the Akosombo Dam too low to provide enough power for Ghana and its exports to Togo and Benin. There were domestic power cuts and the Volta Aluminium smelter had to shut down for a short time. But the Takoradi gas power station, funded by the World Bank, plans to produce hydropower from three rivers in the Western region and the new source of gas at the Tano river will take up the shortfall. Peprah believes that Ghana offers exciting potential for independent power generators, as it is at the center of an expanding regional grid. Ghana is linked to Burkina Faso to the north, Côte d'Ivoire to the west, and Togo and Benin to the east. The proposed gas pipeline from Nigeria will be an additional source of fuel for the power sector.

Most years are described by Ghana's leaders as crucial to the success of its economic recovery program, but 1995 is certainly vital if Ghana is to retain its tag as the World Bank's success story in Africa. While Ghana's government is taking a longer-term view, aiming to become a middle-income economy by the next generation, the official creditors measure performance year by year. The problem is compounded by the West's pressure for democracy, which is difficult to reconcile with the rigors of economic reform.

The donors have applauded the 1995 budget as "a bold step," and they will be looking for tight fiscal control this year to end the cycle of high inflation, devaluation, and interest rates, which Industrialists like Yamson condemned. As Ghanaians tire of low living standards and pressure for public-sector pay rises builds up, such discipline will be hard to maintain as the 1996 elections approach. But international donors are keeping a watchful eye, especially the International Monetary Fund with its program of enhanced surveillance. By June, when the World Bank will coordinate a donors' consultative meeting in Paris, the conditions for continued support to Ghana will be clear.
Beyond Economic Stabilization

Long considered the World Bank and IMF's star economic reform pupil, Ghana is poised to achieve a growth rate as high as 8 to 9 percent, making it one of Africa's first tigers. To move from stabilization to accelerated growth, what is needed are inflows of private investment, says Finance Minister Kwesi Botchwey, which will also enable Ghana to break away from dependence on foreign aid.

In this exclusive interview, the Rawlings's government's finance man also examines the adverse consequences of conditionality, including the impact of measures required to calm restive urban constituents in a period of democratic transformation.

Lastly, Dr. Botchwey comments on the divestiture program which has already resulted in the sale of government gold shares.

Africa Report: There is concern over the budget deficits Ghana has experienced over the last two years. What are the cause of these deficits, and what are the implications for the economic recovery program?

Botchwey: In the run-up to the 1992 elections, there was quite a bit of labor agitation. We were more or less obliged to award a substantial wage increase to buy the peace and enable the democratic transformation to go ahead. From an economic, technical point of view, that was not a very sensible thing to do. But this is the political economy of the transition. Political decisions are not taken in ideal conditions, like a chemist in a laboratory.

I should stress that the wage increase was not designed to buy votes. The urban constituents who benefited from wage increases are not typical NDC [National Democratic Congress] supporters. Had we not awarded the wage increase, cynics might even have accused us of deliberately causing havoc to avoid the transition. It was costly, and we are paying the price.

There were also obligations to undertake large development expenditure. As we went around the country campaigning, we saw a lot of deprivation. We could not ignore it. In addition, there was slippage on the revenue collection side. We did not raise the price of petrol to as high a level as the budget had anticipated, because of the potential negative effect on production. But the effect was to contribute to the budget deficit.

In 1993, we decided on a tight program to achieve a turnaround, but that was not possible in one year. We stuck to the program, determined to achieve fiscal balance.

Unfortunately, in this matter, we have been chasing our tail. I am very frustrated personally with the Bretton Woods institutions, especially the World Bank, and Western donors. Because we were unable to achieve
that turnaround, a great deal of external resources were withheld and not disbursed. In 1994, some $200 million in loans, and $100 million in grants were withheld.

These are the perverse effects of conditionality. You are supposed to undertake a certain policy; you don't do it for reasons that are often explainable; because you don't do it, resources are denied and the economy gets destabilized. It's a vicious circle. I made this point at the annual meeting of the Bank and IMF in Madrid (September 1994). The issue calls for a review of policy-based loans. The conditionalities that go with them have caused this economy fairly substantial harm for three consecutive years.

Africa Report: Ghana is now preparing for another election in 1996. What is to say that the same problems won't be repeated next year?

Botchwey: We learned our lessons in 1992. I am confident that no such mistakes will be repeated in the run-up to the next election. The problem has more or less worked itself out of the system. In 1994, I expect to see a small surplus in the balance of payments, or at worst a small deficit.

Africa Report: Some would argue that the main reason for the success of Ghana's economic recovery program so far is the huge amount of aid that has been poured into the country. What is your response?

Botchwey: The statement that the economy has benefited from a substantial injection of aid is true. But when you take account of the terms-of-trade losses that we have suffered annually, I don't believe you would conclude this. And it is not our policy to depend on aid. Given what has happened in the last two years, clearly we have to rely more and more on our own resources.

As you can see from our statistics, exports are growing. Non-traditional exports are not growing as fast as we would have wanted, but they are growing by a respectable margin. We are intensifying our revenue collection efforts and managing our imports more prudently.

As you know, we did well enough to graduate from the Fund. Unfortunately, as a result of the slippage and denial of resources, we have not been able to walk on our own feet yet, as we would have wanted to.

Africa Report: The IMF still keeps a very close eye on the Ghana program. They have a resident representative who sits across from your office. Why is this so?

Botchwey: We made a conscious policy decision that we would maintain close ties with the Fund. Our Article Four consultations have been more rigorous than before. The surveillance has been enhanced, because they don't just look at the books and go; they set benchmarks. The fact that they visit us less regularly than in the past does not mean that much has changed in the quality and extent of collaboration with the Fund. We propose to continue working very closely with them.

Africa Report: If you have such close collaboration with the Fund, how did the large slippage you have just described come about?

Botchwey: We were under a lot of pressure from the Fund not to raise wages. They said it was disaster road, those were their words. But this is the difference between having a formal program with the Fund, and a non-formal program.

Africa Report: Is there any likelihood of your going back to the IMF for resources in the near future?

Botchwey: We presently have no plans to do that. But if these trends continue—mounting terms-of-trade losses, big lapses in the flow of program resources, and so on—this is an option we will have to consider.
Africa Report: You have repeatedly stressed the importance of private investment to break away from dependence on aid. So far, the response of investors has been lukewarm. Why is this so?

Botchwey: We need to set the record straight. In the mining sector, there has been new investment of upwards of $1.5 billion, which is very substantial, by any measure. It is in the manufacturing sector that we have not seen as much response as we would have wanted.

Many point to a lack of investor confidence. I think this is simplistic. The competition for foreign direct investment is much more intense than it has ever been. We are talking of the whole of Asia, including China and Vietnam, competing for investment.

I don't know why people imagine that as long as Ghana has a good investment code, even a good macroeconomic environment, investors will come running here. Investors have many places to run.

We have to do a lot more than in the past to compete for resources. Until recently we were not even paying anyone to tell the Ghana story. We thought it was too expensive. We need to do more by way of promotion in strategic, key countries.

Africa Report: If I could take you up on the issue of confidence. Talking to local business people, who serve as a barometer for foreign investors, there is still a fundamental distrust of the government. One often hears, for example, of the president's associating business with the opposition, and calling for the products of such enterprises to be boycotted. Is this not counterproductive?

Botchwey: The issue has been flogged completely out of proportion. I can't deny that some pronouncements may cause concern in the minds of people, but these pronouncements must be put in context. The incident you are referring to are comments made at a rally in 1992—a rally, two years ago, not a chat with investors, not a dinner. Any businessperson who is still whining about something said two years ago is not doing justice to the overall thrust of government policy.

The latest (1994) investment code was a product almost exclusively of the private sector's recommendations. The new foreign exchange act that we are about to promulgate has come largely from the private sector. Last year, we consulted widely with the private sector on unfair competition as a result of trade liberalization. We agreed with them on specific duties, which we applied. These are the policies against which the government should be judged, not anecdotes and stories.

Africa Report: With regard to practical problems faced by the private sector, some would charge that you have taken IMF and World Bank stabilization policies too far, to the detriment of the very private sector you seek to foster. I am referring here to trade liberalization's wiping out many local industries, high interest rates, the squeeze on credit, and so on. What is your response to these criticisms?

Botchwey: I don't agree that we have taken stabiliza-
When it came to light in January that 3,500 policemen, the police commissioner, and two ex-government ministers had applied for indemnity from crimes committed to defend apartheid, South Africans realized the scope of the 'Third Force' death squads that had operated with impunity in the years before the election of President Nelson Mandela. The extent of the death squads' secret activities in combating the African National Congress, and the ultimate responsibility for their actions, may now eventually be exposed.
Significant progress has been made in the past year in identifying the leaders of the “Third Force,” or reactionary cabal, accused of fomenting much of the violence during South Africa’s transition to democracy between 1990 and 1994.

With the drawing up of draft legislation for the establishment of a Truth Commission aimed at exposing the wounds of the past to the healing powers of confession, contrition, and reconciliation, the process is poised to gather momentum in the months ahead.

Perhaps the most important recent development has been the willingness of former policemen who served under Colonel Eugene de Kock, commander of the dreaded police “counter-insurgency” unit at Vlakplaas, near Pretoria, to make statements under a special witness protection program.

Two of these statements—those of Willem Nortjie and Andries Van Heerden—have been leaked to the press; more are likely to surface and enter the public domain in the weeks ahead.

Their statements, of course, have limited value until they are tested in court. Since they implicate de Kock in serious crimes and since de Kock was due to appear in court in mid-February on 106 charges, including eight for murder, the statements will be tested by de Kock’s defense lawyers during the course of the trial.

On the basis of prima facie evidence, de Kock has been identified by Judge Richard Goldstone as a central figure in the Third Force. The charges are the result in part of inquiries carried out by an international team of investigators, appointed in the wake of Goldstone’s sensational report of March 18, 1994.

Nortjie indicts de Kock with responsibility for two murders during the transitional phase: the slaying of Brian Ngqulunga, an “Askari” or renegade African National Congress guerrilla, and the assassination of Bheki Klangeni, a human rights lawyer and ANC loyalist.

Nortjie expatiates on de Kock’s reputed motive for the killing of Ngqulunga. De Kock was allegedly afraid that the “Askari” would retract false testimony that he gave to the Harms Commission of Inquiry into political violence and admit that another ANC lawyer, Griffiths Mxenge, was murdered by a Vlakplaas death squad (as alleged in 1989 by de Kock’s predecessor at Vlakplaas, Captain Dirk Coeteeze).

Nortjie similarly fills in the background to Klangeni’s death in 1991, who was killed by a bomb hidden in a tape recorder. The parcel containing the tape recorder had been addressed to Coeteeze after he defected to the ANC. Coeteeze was unable to collect the parcel and it was returned to the sender, identified on the parcel as Klangeni. The ANC man took the parcel home. He turned the tape recorder on, presumably to see if there was a message to explain why he had been named as the sender. It exploded, killing him. The power of the concealed explosive had been successfully tested on a pig earlier.

Van Heerden refers to the 1988 bombing of Khotso House, headquarters of the South African Council of Churches and the Black Sash, both institutions which were strongly critical of the apartheid regime of President P.W. Botha. Van Heerden’s testimony provides retrospective confirmation of the suspicions of many people at the time that the Khotso House explosion was the work of police saboteurs.

Van Heerden makes another potentially significant allegation. He reports that the police were congratulated by Adriaan Vlok, the then-minister of law and order, Vlok, who remained as law and order minister for the first part of F.W. de Klerk’s presidency (1989-1994), is reported by Botha’s biographer to have mooted the formation of a “Third Force” when Botha was South Africa’s supreme.

Vlok, who has refused to comment on the allegation that he praised the Khotso House saboteurs, is said to have envisaged the Third Force as a “special capability unit” existing independently of the police and army.

Van Heerden elaborates in his statement on an important component in Goldstone’s report of last year. Goldstone gave details of a nexus between renegade officers in the South African Police and elements in the KwaZulu police and Mangosuthu Buthelezi’s Inkatha Freedom Party. The rogue South African police officers, who included the deputy commissioner of police, General Basie Smit, are reported to have secretly supplied weapons to Buthelezi’s IFP for its undeclared war with the ANC.

In his affidavit, Van Heerden gives details of the weapons supplied to the IFP—including grenades and AK-47 rifles—and implicates a top IFP man, Celani Mthethwa, in the smuggling of guns. Mthethwa, who was Buthelezi’s minister of justice in the now-dissolved KwaZulu government, today holds the police portfolio in the province of KwaZulu/Natal.

Van Heerden avers that Mthethwa transported the weapons from Johannesburg to Ulundi, in the heart of KwaZulu, in his luxury car. Mthethwa, Van
Heerden adds, assumed correctly that his car would not be searched at police road blocks.

Van Heerden's testimony reinforces suspicions that the KwaZulu police (KZP)—who fell under the direct authority of Buthelezi until KwaZulu was dissolved as a separate and partially autonomous polity in April 1994—were secretly involved in violence against IFP political opponents, particularly ANC activists.

Goldstone's comments on the then-deputy commissioner of the KZP, Sipho Mathe, and on the KZP in general are worth quoting. On Mathe, the judge said: "His name has regularly and over the years been linked with improper conduct in the course of his official duties."

On the KZP, he said: "The commission is satisfied that the KZP is presently dragging its feet (probably a generous description) in investigating the presence of...hit squads within its ranks."

The affidavits of former policemen Nortjie and Van Heerden—which were a direct sequel to Goldstone's report of March 18—were drawn up and signed in the South African embassy in Copenhagen.

As early as January 1994, the Danish ambassador in South Africa played a role in facilitating contact between a policeman who was ready to talk about Third Force activities and Judge Goldstone. Hence, presumably, the choice of Copenhagen as the venue for the witness protection program for policemen willing to formally testify on the role of the security forces—or individuals within them—in committing and fomenting violence in, primarily, the black community.

Study of photostat copies of the Nortjie and Van Heerden affidavits shows that they were signed in April last year, although it was not until the end of the year that they found their way into the hands of journalists on the black newspaper, The Sowetan.

In retrospect, the April date assumes special significance. In the same month, 3,500 policemen, including the commissioner of police and his former deputy, applied for indemnity. The applications were made to the Indemnity Board amid the excitement leading up to South Africa's first genuinely democratic elections in April. The ANC—which was clearly poised to win the election and become the dominant partner in the constitutionally prescribed government of national unity—was not told of the applications.

It was not until mid-January 1995 that Nelson Mandela's minister of justice, Dullah Omar, learned of the 3,500 applications. He became aware of them after the then commissioner of police, Johan van der Merwe, disclosed in a letter to a newspaper that he was not investigating charges against former law and order minister Vlok for allegedly approving of, or conniving in, the blowing up of Khotso House.

Omar simultaneously unearthed another potentially significant piece of information. The list of names included those of Vlok and Magnus Malan, who served as minister of defense from 1980 until he was given a less high-profile portfolio by de Klerk in 1991, mainly because of pressure from the ANC.

The convergence of the two events, the signing of the affidavits in Copenhagen and the submission of the applications for indemnity, raises the question of whether there was a connection between them.

Did information that former policemen were cooperating in the drafting of depositions about Third Force activities prompt the nearly 3,500 policemen and the two former ministers to apply for indemnity?

The South African embassy in Copenhagen was still answerable to the de Klerk administration at the time and high-ranking officials would presumably have been alerted to the reason for the presence there of the former policemen.

Be that as it may, news of the 3,500 applications, like disclosure of the existence of the Copenhagen affidavits about six weeks earlier, brought the question of the Third Force to the fore again. Suspicions that attempts had been made by top officials and former members of de Klerk's cabinet to surreptitiously obtain indemnity were kindled.

The ANC took a hard line. Labeling the applications "clandestine," it declared that it regarded them as invalid. A central reason for the ANC's refusal to recognize the applications was that the policemen and former ministers had sought blanket indemnities for all actions covered by the Indemnity Act of 1990, instead of specifying, as required by the law, the individual offenses for which they wanted to be indemnified.
A word of explanation is appropriate. The Indemnity Act of 1990 does not cover politically motivated actions which resulted in death or serious injury. Even so, the applications triggered an acrimonious dispute in Mandela's government of national unity and briefly threatened its existence. The dispute focused on two issues: whether the applications were valid or not, with the ANC insisting that they were not and de Klerk's National Party contesting that they were; and whether de Klerk knew of the applications or not, with the ANC openly voicing its skepticism over de Klerk's adamant contention that he had known of them.

On the second issue, Mandela was reported to have accused de Klerk of lying. De Klerk himself said that Mandela had questioned his moral integrity and good faith and that he could not work with a man who doubted his honesty.

An open breach was avoided, however, for the immediate future after intermediaries from both sides arranged a meeting between the two men, where it was agreed to make a fresh start. A compromise appeared to be in offing on the indemnity row. General indemnities for "all actions" would be granted to neither ANC members nor their opponents on the opposite side of the political fence. As most ANC applications under the 1990 Indemnity Act were for specific offenses, including leaving South Africa illegally and receiving military training abroad, it was an arrangement which promised to benefit Mandela's men more than de Klerk's.

The question of Third Force activities—defined, broadly, as covert, unlawful, and often murderous actions by members of the security forces—has been put on the agenda again by a number of additional developments in the past year. They include...
two judicial inquests into the deaths of anti-apartheid activists in the 1980s.

In the first inquest, that into the murder in June 1985 of Matthew Goniwe, Sparrow Mkhonto, Ford Calata, and Sicelo Mhlawuli, Judge Neville Zietsman found that the killers were members of the security forces, thus confirming a long-held suspicion that security forces, or elements in them, had a hidden agenda.

In the second, that into the assassination in September 1989 of the South West Africa People’s Organization leader, Anton Lubowski, Judge Harold Levy found that the assassin was Donald Acheson, an agent of the secret military unit, the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB). One of the functions of the CCB was to disrupt—or more plainly, murder—men and women identified as “enemies of the state.”

A third court verdict must be recorded—the conviction for murder of two KwaZulu policemen late last year. The killings, carried out in 1983, have been described as political assassinations. Suspicions that the KwaZulu police willfully connived at the formation of death squads within its ranks have been reinforced by the judge’s remark that he suspected the KwaZulu police of harboring “a deliberate intention to destroy evidence.” Looking back, it is clear that the accumulative impact of all these developments has been to bring the Third Force more sharply into focus. A letter to South African newspapers by one of the “master spies” of the apartheid era, Craig Williamson, may portend further disclosures.

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**Principled Pragmatist**

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A radical and fighter, Slovo also maintained an independent and sharply critical mind. This was epitomized by his 1990 paper, “Has Socialism Failed?,” in which he questioned the gulf between socialism and democracy in the Soviet Union. Reversing earlier positions, the SACP came out in support of multi-party democracy in 1991.

Slovo’s pragmatic bent was to prove crucial in the fraught negotiations on South Africa’s political transition following the release of Mandela and other political detainees and the unbanning of parties like the ANC and SACP in 1990.

During the deadlock in multi-party negotiations in 1992, Slovo persuaded the ANC to agree to the power-sharing arrangement that pertains in South Africa today, which essentially guaranteed the National Party a stake in government during a five-year transitional period.

As housing minister in the first Government of National Unity, Slovo wasted no time in seeking practical measures to start redressing the 3 million housing shortage in the country. Contrary to his image as a hard-line communist, Slovo immediately called in the local banking community, persuading them that with the requisite government guarantees, low-cost housing is a profitable business venture for them.

In turn, Slovo, eschewing populist politics, took it upon himself to end the rent and rate boycotts that have been cited by the private sector as justification for not getting involved in low-cost housing. At a huge housing conference shortly before his death, the ailing Slovo told the crowds bluntly that by failing to pay their rates, they were undermining President Mandela. To his successor as housing minister, the former deputy minister for population and welfare, Sakie Nkondo, Slovo leaves behind the legacy of a cogent white paper and practical plan for resolving the country’s housing crisis.

Among those close to him, Slovo conjures many fond memories. Jeremy Cronin, a member of the SACP central committee, likes to tell the story of Slovo going toe to toe with a London docker in a joke-telling contest in the early 1970s that lasted three hours at a dock-side pub. “Joke-telling calls for an alert mind, sociability, and a shrewd sense of timing,” Cronin wrote in a eulogy in Johannesburg’s Mail and Guardian newspaper. “Slovo,” he observed, “had all three.”

Speaking at Slovo’s graveside in the sprawling Soweto cemetery where he lies next to other great names in the liberation struggle, Slovo’s second wife, Helen, cited three main reasons why he was so loved: “He never got too big for his boots; he was endearingly messy. People could relate to his love for wine, women, and song, peanuts, whisky, and red socks—and he had a wonderful sense of humor.”

As dignitaries filed passed the coffin, the thousands in the crowd pressed against security fencing and took the opportunity to quiz their leaders about the state of the nation, as though it was business as usual. They seemed to know intuitively that this is the way Joe would have wanted it to be.

—Colleen Lowe Morna
two judicial inquests into the deaths of anti-apartheid activists in the 1980s.

In the first inquest, that into the murder in June 1985 of Matthew Gonnie, Sparrow Mkhonto, Ford Calata, and Sicelo Mhlawuli, Judge Neville Zietsman found that the killers were members of the security forces, thus confirming a long-held suspicion that security forces, or elements in them, had a hidden agenda.

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A word of explanation is appropriate. The Indemnity Act of 1940 does not cover politically motivated actions which resulted in death or serious injury. Even so, the applications triggered an acrimonious dispute in Mandela's government of national unity and briefly threatened its existence. The dispute focused on two issues: whether the applications were valid or not, with the ANC insisting that they were not and de Klerk's National Party contending that they were; and whether de Klerk knew of the applications or not, with the ANC openly voicing its skepticism over de Klerk's adamant contention that he had known of them.

On the second issue, Mandela was reported to have accused de Klerk of lying. De Klerk himself said that Mandela had questioned his moral integrity and good faith and that he could not work with a man who doubted his honesty.

An open breach was avoided, however, for the immediate future after intermediaries from both sides arranged a meeting between the two men, where it was agreed to make a fresh start. A compromise appeared to be in the offing on the indemnity row. General indemnities for "all actions" would be granted to neither ANC members nor their opponents on the opposite side of the political fence. As most ANC applications under the 1990 Indemnity Act were for specific offenses, including leaving South Africa illegally and receiving military training abroad, it was an arrangement which promised to benefit Mandela's men more than de Klerk's.

The question of Third Force activities—defined, broadly, as covert, unlawful, and often murderous actions by members of the security forces—has been put on the agenda again by a number of additional developments in the past year. They include...
Heerden adds, assumed correctly that his car would not be searched at police road blocks.

Van Heerden's testimony reinforces suspicions that the KwaZulu police (KZP)—who fell under the direct authority of Buthelezi until KwaZulu was dissolved as a separate and partially autonomous polity in April 1994—were secretly involved in violence against IFP political opponents, particularly ANC activists.

Goldstone's comments on the then-deputy commissioner of the KZP, Sipho Mathe, and on the KZP in general are worth quoting. On Mathe, the judge said: "His name has regularly and over the years been linked with improper conduct in the course of his official duties."

On the KZP, he said: "The commission is satisfied that the KZP is presently dragging its feet (probably a generous description) in investigating the presence of hit squads within its ranks."

The affidavits of former policemen Norlje and Van Heerden—which were a direct sequel to Goldstone's report of March 18—were drawn up and signed in the South African embassy in Copenhagen.

As early as January 1994, the Danish ambassador in South Africa played a role in facilitating contact between a policeman who was ready to talk about Third Force activities and Judge Goldstone. Hence, presumably, the choice of Copenhagen as the venue for the witness protection program for policemen willing to formally testify on the role of the security forces—or individuals within them—in committing and fomenting violence in, primarily, the black community.

Study of photostat copies of the Norlje and Van Heerden affidavits shows that they were signed in April last year, although it was not until the end of the year that they found their way into the hands of journalists on the black newspaper, The Sowetan. In retrospect, the April date assumes special significance.

In the same month, 3,500 policemen, including the commissioner of police and his former deputy, applied for indemnity. The applications were made to the Indemnity Board amid the excitement leading up to South Africa's first genuinely democratic elections in April. The ANC—which was clearly poised to win the election and become the dominant partner in the constitutionally prescribed government of national unity—was not told of the applications.

It was not until mid-January 1995 that Nelson Mandela's minister of justice, Dullah Omar, learned of the 3,500 applications. He became aware of them after the then commissioner of police, Johan van der Merwe, disclosed in a letter to a newspaper that he was not investigating charges against former law and order minister Vlok for allegedly approving of, or conniving in, the blowing up of Khotso House.

Omar simultaneously unearthed another potentially significant piece of information. The list of names included those of Vlok and Magnus Malan, who served as minister of defense from 1980 until he was given a less high-profile portfolio by de Klerk in 1991, mainly because of pressure from the ANC.

The convergence of the two events, the signing of the affidavits in Copenhagen and the submission of the applications for indemnity, raises the question of whether there was a connection between them.

Did information that former policemen were cooperating in the drafting of depositions about Third Force activities prompt the nearly 3,500 policemen and the two former ministers to apply for indemnity?

The South African embassy in Copenhagen was still answerable to the de Klerk administration at the time and high-ranking officials would presumably have been alerted to the reason for the presence there of the former policemen.

Be that as it may, news of the 3,500 applications, like disclosure of the existence of the Copenhagen affidavits about six weeks earlier, brought the question of the Third Force to the fore again. Suspicions that attempts had been made by top officials and former members of de Klerk's cabinet to surreptitiously obtain indemnity were kindled.

The ANC took a hard line. Labeling the applications "clandestine," it declared that it regarded them as invalid. A central reason for the ANC's refusal to recognize the applications was that the policemen and former ministers had sought blanket indemnities for all actions covered by the Indemnity Act of 1990, instead of specifying, as required by the law, the individual offenses for which they wanted to be indemnified.
New Press, New Pressures

By THOMAS R. LANSNER

During the apartheid era, South African newspapers operated under a barrage of constraints. Newspapers were often banned, sometimes closed down, the editors and reporters could be detained for lengthy periods under the repressive security laws. Now, the media has real freedom of expression, but it is still constrained—by the need to target an audience that will attract advertising and by a wariness in criticizing the new government.
A grey Klaaste leaned back in his chair behind the editor's desk at South Africa's largest daily newspaper, The Sowetan, reflecting on changes in the South African media since the country began its transition to majority rule five years ago.

"It's a rather weird experience in two ways," he said, "Before, you couldn't even publish a picture of Nelson Mandela. Now we have much more freedom, though the situation is clouded because many repressive laws are still on the books.

"But we have to face that it's a question of business as well," Klaaste added after answering yet another of the calls that kept his telephone lit like a Christmas tree. "It used to be a race thing, but now it is a question of markets. For us, Soweto is our market. Perhaps apartheid created this market, but now it's here for us."

Political uncertainty and turbulent market forces are shaping the new South African media as the country emerges from the apartheid era. For South African journalists, censorship and repression are all-too-recent memories. To allay fears that they could return, civil libertarians and media advocates are seeking guarantees of freedom of expression under the new constitution. But even if these are fully honored, political caution may temper the media's adversarial role. And economic realities mean most media must seek an audience that advertisers will also pay to reach.

Legal safeguards for the press is one critical issue facing South Africa's media. Another is the very basic question of who controls the media—including government proprietary over the broadcast media and the effect of concentrated ownership of media outlets. That these matters are being openly and broadly debated is certainly a healthy sign. How they are handled may be a telling indicator about the development of South Africa's new democracy.

New Freedom, Old Laws

Over 100 statutes directly aimed at stifling free expression remain in effect in South Africa today. Though not enforced since the lifting of the state of emergency in 1990, they remain a latent threat, according to Raymond Louw, vice-chairman of the Freedom of Expression Institute (FEI) and former editor of the now defunct anti-apartheid Rand Daily Mail.

"We are campaigning to have these repressive laws repealed," Louw explained in an interview in Johannesburg. "There is the propensity for any government to keep repressive laws on the books, and then there is the danger they might just dust them off and use them."

FEI projects also include lobbying for freedom of expression to be included as an inalienable right in the new South African constitution now being drafted, a proposal supported by South Africa's National Press Union and many other organizations. Under the current transitional constitution, freedom of expression is not a primary right and is subject to numerous restrictions.

An American-style Freedom of Information Act is another goal the FEI is pursuing, one that Louw says would bring a previously unknown transparency to the workings of the South African government. In November 1994, the government agreed to make public the testimony from hearings regarding South African arms sales abroad, though existing laws would have allowed secrecy.

"In this case, the moral arguments won out over the legalistic and bureaucratic arguments," Louw explained. "Since these things were done in the name of South Africa, with taxpayers' money, the public has a right to know."

Some leading members of the African National Congress have not hesitated to sharply criticize the media. Deputy President Thabo Mbeki has called coverage of the ANC unfair and decried white domination of the media. In June, Defense Minister Joe
Modise obtained a court injunction that temporarily blocked publication of an unflattering story. Many journalists express a wariness about how much latitude the press really has.

"The unspoken question is how much criticism of the ANC can we make," remarked Deon du Plessis, editor of the conservative Pretoria News. "There's now a kind of self-censorship creeping in. Certainly there is a feeling that the ANC's Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) should be treated gently. But we fear that it's a short step from treating the RDP as a sacred cow to making a law banning criticism."

So far, though, du Plessis says, journalists are "having the best times of our lives," writing without restrictions by simply ignoring the many laws that are still on the books. Yet his acknowledgment that he will feel much more comfortable if the repressive statutes are formally rescinded is shared universally by members of the South African media. Sowetan editor Klaaste points to Africa's history of scant tolerance for an independent press.

"In Africa, leaders have talked about 'nation-building' and demanded that the media be part of it. What they meant is that you shouldn't criticize the government. Then if the press finds problems..." He shrugged and shook his head. "They might just come and shut you down."

New Government, New SABC?

One media outlet certainly facing no prospect of being banned is the government-owned South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), which controls almost all television and most radio in South Africa. Throughout the apartheid years, the SABC was an unashamed, if often terribly unsubtle, apologist for minority rule. Its news division was effectively little more than the propaganda arm of the ruling National Party.

Despite a new liveliness and multicultural look, some people fear that the new SABC will end up serving as the same for the ANC. Its new head of daily operations is Zwelakhe Sisulu, a professional journalist and son of Walter Sisulu, a senior ANC figure and a close associate of Nelson Mandela for half a century.

The organizational future of the SABC is now being discussed at public hearings under the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), an autonomous body charged with recasting South Africa's broadcasting system. Questions of financing, cross-ownership of media outlets, and quotas for locally produced programming are under consideration. The IBA, which has already received 184 applications for new radio and television stations, will also monitor coverage during election periods to ensure fairness. It faces an immense and complex task—awarding licenses and assessing programming in a country with 11 official languages and deep ethnic and political divisions. Issues of regional control over local broadcasting and challenges to the legality of the IBA's mandate are further complicating the process.

The mushrooming of broadcast outlets could dilute the influence of the SABC, but for the foreseeable future it will remain the main source of news and information for most South Africans. The government's control over this prime news provider is worrisome to many media analysts.

"SABC reporting is based on their perception of the national interest," says Lara Kantor, director of the independent Media Monitoring Project in Johannesburg. "It used to be white supremacy and apartheid. Now it's national reconciliation and support for the Reconstruction and Development Program. This seems to be the new ideology."

"The Freedom of Expression Institute's Louw shares this concern. "The mindset of some members of the new SABC board is very pro-ANC. Editorial directors of SABC news departments should have autonomy and be expected to produce high-quality journalism of unquestionable integrity."

Yet bringing such fundamental change to the SABC won't be easy. South Africa's transition to majority rule was smoothed in part by promising white civil servants that they could keep their jobs. This means that at the senior management level, white Afrikaner males remain entrenched in 61 of 65 top SABC jobs. Whether they are willing or able to adapt to professional standards of independent journalism is unclear.

According to Anand Naidoo, a long-time print journalist before becoming one of the first non-white news presenters on the SABC's main news broadcasts, both the hangover of apartheid and new pressures are inhibiting the SABC's development.

"There's a new political agenda, even if it's not explicit," he said. "If you look objectively at what makes news and what people want to know, we're not covering it."

Naidoo believes the SABC is slowly proving its bona fides as a genuine news organization, but
emphasized the need for technical and professional training of a new generation of journalists: "What is especially lacking is a culture of journalism. Because the SABC was for so long a state propaganda machine, there's a long tradition of a top-down management style, and no real passion for the news."

**Old Issues, Same Coverage?**

As the South African media tests the limits of its freedom, some analysts worry that even beyond partisan political agendas, the scope and direction of coverage remains circumscribed. Part of the blame is laid to old habits of journalistic subservience, as at the SABC. Media Monitoring Project Director Kantor says some traditional biases also remain unchanged, especially in reporting on labor and social justice issues.

"There is a growing multicultural hegemony in the South African media," she claims. "The idea projected is that all South Africans are middle class, not at all racist and want to live in the suburbs. There is a growing class distinction evident."

Bufana Khumalo is a columnist for the Weekly Mail and Guardian, South Africa’s premier investigative newspaper. There, at least, a real passion for news has taken hold. Khumalo believes that even the African-owned or oriented media is too uncritically pushing the idea that with the arrival of majority rule, South Africa’s problems have been solved.

"Everybody buys into the proposition that things have changed—except the poor people," he argues. "Before, all blacks of whatever class would be worrying about apartheid, but now there are different segments of the African population with very different interests. Usually, to get a job on a newspaper, you need a university degree. Most black journalists are part of the new African middle class. You can become co-opted, perhaps you can buy a car, a house...and somehow the voice of the people just doesn’t come through."

Diversifying South Africa’s media will not be easy. Most independent media that received foreign funding during the anti-apartheid struggle are fast losing their overseas support. Almost all major newspapers, book shops, and news distribution systems are controlled by just a few corporations. Most of the English-language press is now controlled by Irish media magnate Tony O’Reilly, who is reported to have close links to top ANC leaders. Not only do questions of editorial independence naturally arise, but also normal commercial pressures to maintain or increase profitability. The interests of South Africa’s huge underclass might be little considered—"marginalized communities" such as rural poor and urban squatters are the least attractive audiences for publishers or broadcasters seeking demographic profiles that capture lucrative advertisements.

Seeking to fill that gap are several groups encouraging start-up of community radio and television stations. One station already broadcasting is the five-kilowatt Radio Zabolele, operating in Khayelitsha township outside Cape Town. So far, it mostly offers advice on health matters and grassroots community news.

Print materials and videos dealing with health and social issues have been developed with private funding in coordination with radio programs. "The Mother and Child Care Handbook" was distributed with eight newspapers around South Africa in November in conjunction with a series of radio broadcasts on the subject in several languages.

"It’s a tremendous tool for community empowerment at the local level," says Michael Savage, director of the Soros Open Society Foundation for South Africa, which helps finance community radio projects. "Local radio can serve very specific community needs and allows people to have a sense of responsibility over their own lives."

But money for such projects is limited, and competition for scarce resources fierce. Mandating some public service broadcasting on commercial stations is proposed as a possible solution. The massive and effective voter education campaign that saturated South Africa’s airwaves in the months before South Africa’s first multi-party elections last April is offered as an example of broadcast media’s ability to cooperate with government to work for positive change on specific non-partisan issues.

**New Press, New Pressures**

South Africa’s transition to majority rule was the most closely scrutinized political event in Africa’s history. The new government of national unity—locally referred to as the “gnu” after that awkward and ungainly but undeniably prolific beast—is being closely monitored as an example for democratizing governments across Africa.

Likewise the South African media. Freedom of expression is for now a de facto reality in the new South Africa, not only for every brand of political discourse but also for artistic works, popular culture, and even sex magazines. There is growing appreciation of the value of the media as a means of public discussion and a check on arbitrary authority. Long-term democratization demands that this atmosphere of tolerance amid great diversity is preserved and—hopefully—formalized by repealing repressive statutes and adoption of firm constitutional guarantees.

But successful construction of an open democratic society also requires that no one is left voiceless. South Africans must maintain vigilance to ensure that both government and private media address issues about which the broadest spectrum of citizens are concerned. An independent press answerable to the public and not to special interests will stand as a model for all of Africa to emulate.
New approaches to wildlife conservation are gaining ground. “Sustainable use”—pruning wildlife to benefit governments and communities financially so that there will be an additional incentive to conserve the species as a whole—although controversial, is becoming more accepted, especially as donor funds for conservation are drying up, leaving governments to find innovative ways to raise money.
toward being able to trade in elephant products other than ivory, although it ultimately withdrew its proposal to do so. In equally surprising developments, the delegates agreed to allow trade in live southern white rhinoceros from the country and repealed their previous call for destruction of state-held stockpiles of rhino horn, scrapping what was once considered crucial to help gut the illegal market in the product.

The first two actions signaled a growing acceptance of "sustainable use," a philosophy long championed by southern African countries and one that has caused a rift in the environmental community. It is wildlife use that does not endanger survival of the species as a whole. Key to the philosophy, however, is the premise that governments, communities, and individuals must benefit economically from the use of wildlife to conserve it.

Critics charge that the philosophy puts a price tag on wildlife and therefore could even further endanger some species. Indeed, money—or even, more precisely, the lack of it—is often the issue at hand. Villagers who benefit from the use of wildlife have fast learned that a live animal is a resource of equal value to their survival as a dead one. In addition, adequate funds for conservation efforts in Africa have become just as rare as endangered species themselves.

Of equal importance, however, is the push by South Africa and some of its neighboring countries for self-determination on the use of their natural resources and to not be penalized for poor wildlife management elsewhere.

"I come from a country that has the dubious honor of being the first country in Africa, certainly Africa south of the Sahara, to virtually wipe out its wildlife resources through a frontier mentality and greed," said George Hughes, chief executive of the Natal Parks Board. "South Africa takes no pride in this particular bit of our history as we do not in many others. But what South Africa has done is restored virtually all of its wildlife to very nearly former glory in many cases and, for some species, even better."

Conservation efforts in South Africa are a success story. By the early 1900s, for example, human encroachment and the quest for ivory had left the country with only four remnant populations of elephants on some 100,000 hectares of land. Today, the nation's 9,000 elephants are not significantly threatened by poachers or habitat loss. The population has a total range of some 2.6 million hectares on both

Decline in Donor Funds

The ability of many African countries to meet the costs needed to protect their elephants from poaching has plunged in recent years, a reality that researchers now believe may be the single most important factor in why the international ban on ivory trade has decreased demand for ivory, but failed to halt poaching for it.

Following an extensive study on the 1990 ban's impact on elephant poaching, the IUCN African Elephant Specialist Group and TRAFFIC, the joint wildlife trade monitoring program of IUCN and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), have concluded that this plunge is probably the most dramatic—and ominous—finding of all.

Law enforcement budgets in dozens of national parks and protected areas have continually faced the budget ax or failed to keep pace with inflation in recent years, with some plummeting more than 90 percent, according to a new report on the study. "Four Years After the CITES Ban: Illegal Killing of Elephants, Ivory Trade and Stockpiles" also documents increased poaching and the possible creation of new markets for ivory and continued existence of some traditional ones. It records an increase in human-elephant conflicts, which also inevitably lead to more dead elephants.

The study included intensive field work in nine key African countries and broad examination of the situation in 16 others for the period 1988 to 1993. Today, the situation in many countries is worse and expected to continue to decline.

"When you look at the value of African wildlife department budgets, you find most countries are now spending less than 5 percent of what is absolutely critical to safeguard elephants," said report co-author Tom Milliken, a member of the specialist group and director of TRAFFIC East/Southern Africa. "We will probably be able to document increased poaching all over Africa within two years."

In real terms, anti-poaching budgets in the areas studied in Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe plummeted by nearly 90 percent or more, while Malawi's declined 25 percent. Even Kenya, which received more external donor funds than any other country surveyed, experienced a 13.5 percent decline. In francophone Africa, Cameroon's budget declined 20 percent and Gabon's 33 percent, figures that have likely since doubled with recent currency devaluations.

Overall, the study found poaching remains below pre-ban levels, but that it has increased notably in most areas during the past two years. For example, Kenya and Tanzania both showed a decline preceding the ban and immediately after, but then the number of dead elephants began to rise. Kenya recorded 111 elephant killings in 1990-91; the number rose to 208 in 1992-93.

Garamba National Park in northeastern Zaire also represents the trend. It lost approximately 17 elephants to poachers in each of the two years before the ban and then 10 in each of the following
Threatens Conservation

Two. The number climbed to 35 in both 1992 and 1993. Previously, Garamba's elephants were killed primarily by hungry refugees; today, they are again being slaughtered for their ivory.

In Zimbabwe, where budgets in 11 of the 14 studied sites declined 88 percent in real terms, poaching has increased ever since the ban, according to the report. In the two years preceding it, the 14 sites recorded 48 killings of elephants while in 1990-91, they recorded 167 and in 1992-93, 175.

Prior to the ban's inception, foreign donors gave passionate speeches promising to help African countries battle the poaching scourge, which had halved the continental elephant population to some 600,000 in just one decade. However, most donors have since decreased their funding or channeled it elsewhere, perhaps believing the ban alone would be a sufficient weapon against poachers.

The bottom line, the researchers say, is that elephant protection is costly and inflation, devaluation, and structural adjustment programs have further eroded Africa's ability to pay for it. Based on the minimum need to spend $200 per square kilometer of elephant range, Dr. Holly Dublin, co-author of the report and specialist group chairwoman, says more than $1 billion is needed every year to protect all African elephants, or $200 million for those in protected areas alone.

"The desire of people in the developed world is to have these elephants, but they have to recognize the cost," said Dublin, who also serves as WWF senior conservation adviser. "And if they can't help substantially meet that cost, then they have to leave the management decisions to Africa."

The other findings do not bode well for the African elephant, either. The study, funded by WWF and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, found evidence that suggests Taiwan, China, Singapore, and South Korea have been among the final destinations for illegal ivory from Africa in recent years. In addition, South Koreans and Taiwanese are increasingly appearing as middlemen in the illicit trade in ivory from the continent—a post-ban development.

Africa-based Asian operations for processing and directly exporting ivory are also a new development. The output, most often semi-worked ivory blocks disguised as wood and used to make name seals in the Far East, has been recorded in cases involving Cameroon, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi, and Tanzania.

As anti-poaching funds continue to drop and new players join the deadly ivory game, some African governments are pushing more often for controversial alternatives to fund conservation. The authors conclude that one such push to sell the ivory stockpiles of governments will increase and ultimately test the durability of the international ban itself. The ivory caches of some countries, particularly in southern Africa, are expanding by up to six tons annually.

—B.J.K.
The elephant in its 36 range states. Throughout much of Africa, elephants were under siege. Ivory poachers had already killed some 600,000, halving the population to that same number in little more than a decade. In sharp contrast, elephant populations were stable or increasing in some countries, most notably in southern Africa.

The compromise came in the final resolution's acknowledgement that elephant populations in some countries probably did not meet the criteria for a total ban in trade, and its establishment of a panel of experts to assess future proposals to ease the trade restriction. The panel was created to ensure that biological science, rather than emotion, would be the judge when such a country came forward with a proposal.

This year, the panel of experts issued a 10-page analysis favorable to South Africa's proposal. Its findings concluded that a trade in elephant hide from the country would not lead to increased elephant poaching in South Africa or elsewhere on the continent. It noted no recorded instance of illegal hide entering the international trade and that those in the trade would likely shun elephant hide. It would be a logistical nightmare to skin an elephant and then conceal and transport its hide.

The panel opined that allowing South Africa to trade in elephant hide could actually improve the conservation status of elephants in the country. South Africa had planned for the revenue from sales to benefit rural communities alongside protected areas, which could help create positive attitudes toward elephant conservation. In addition, the revenue would have helped pay for the elephant management programs in Kruger National Park, home to 82 percent of the nation's elephant population.

Prior to the ban, South Africa's hide industry had generated money for the elephant management program, which has operated in the red since the industry's collapse after the ban took effect. A recent study of TRAFFIC, the joint wildlife trade monitoring program of WWF and IUCN, found that hide sales directly earned Kruger National Park $1.7 million from 1984-89.

The elephant management program is also the chief source of hides because it includes the annual cull of some 300 elephants, said to be necessary to prevent habitat degradation and loss of biodiversity in the park. This yearly event itself draws heavy criticism from some environmentalists, who denounce it as "killing, not conservation." Emotion aside, however, the program is not driven by market demand and effectively is sustainable use in action. The elephant population in Kruger National Park has remained stable at about 7,500 elephants for 27 years.

In addition, South Africa had promised that if its proposal were accepted, it would withdraw its official objection to the international ban. That objection, known as a reservation, legally allows South Africa to trade in elephant products, including ivory, with non-CITES members and other countries with reservations on the ban—Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. While neither South Africa nor any of the other five have traded in ivory outside their own borders, that possibility still looms large for all but Zambia.

Still, all that explanation means virtually nothing to officials in other African countries who believe allowing trade in elephant hide to help conservation in South Africa could be at the expense of their own populations. Zambia, once a supporter of reopening the ivory trade and now a staunch opponent of trade in any elephant product, warned that trade in elephant hide would bring disastrous consequences.

"This would heighten speculation by poachers and traffickers that an ivory trade will be opened in the near future," one Zambian delegate said. "It should be noted that, at least in Zambia, poaching of elephants has increased markedly each time before a conference of the parties, and poachers have admitted shooting on speculation that a trade in ivory would soon follow."

Kenya also spoke of increased risk to elephants. David Western, director of the Kenya Wildlife Service, told the conference that this meeting "has been read around the world as whether to vote on ivory or not. It has become a self-fulfilling prophecy, with 50 percent of our poaching this year occurring in the last two months."

Whether a consensus in either direction can be reached among African countries remains questionable, but it may well be a far smaller hurdle than Africa had faced in trying to win acceptance of the sustainable-use philosophy. That acceptance was evident in the delegates' approval of South Africa's proposal to commercially trade in live southern white rhinoceros on the international market.

Like the African elephant, the rhinoceros is afforded the highest protection under CITES, with all international commercial trade banned since 1977. Said the Natal Parks Board's chief executive: "We never thought we had a snowball's hope in hell." But it was again South Africa's conservation record that won support.

At the time of the conference, the country was said to be home to more than 6,300 southern white rhinos, the largest and most stable population in Africa. In contrast, there had been perhaps only 20
white rhinos left in the country in 1920. Increased protection helped eventually bring that number up to nearly 1,000 by 1961, and an extensive translocation program since then is largely responsible for the existing healthy population. Sales of southern white rhino from South Africa could mean a boost in the status of white rhino in South Africa and the region. Money from the sales will benefit the country's existing rhino conservation measures, with each rhino sold earning between $20,000 to $30,000. Sales to governments and private landowners in the region could increase white rhino populations long in decline elsewhere.

The situation of the southern white rhino in other countries is dire. The populations in Namibia, Swaziland, and Zambia all number under 100. In fact, there may be only six left in Zambia. Zimbabwe was home to 1,000 white rhino in the 1970s, but poaching has reached crisis proportions in recent years. In 1993 alone, poachers killed at least 90 of Zimbabwe's white rhino. Fewer than 140 remain.

The southern white rhino, however, is not the only rhino under siege. The number of rhino worldwide has plummeted by nearly 90 percent, with fewer than 12,000 remaining. In Africa, the decline of the black rhino has been even more precipitous. In 1960, there may have been 100,000 throughout sub-Saharan Africa and in 1970, 65,000. Today, there are only 2,500. Black rhino have effectively disappeared in Botswana, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Malawi, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda and their status in other countries is ever more precarious.

In addition, Africa's northern white rhino could well become extinct. The sole remaining viable population can be found in Zaire, where efforts are under way to ensure that the 32 survivors are effectively managed and protected.

The crisis facing the world's rhinos has left governments and conservationists scrambling in recent years to assess existing efforts to save the rhino and determine the best way forward before it is too late. It is the findings of those preliminary assessments that have brought a call for change, one heeded by conference delegates when they repealed their 1987 mandate for rhino horn destruction. The repeal came as part of a lengthy resolution concluding that all past efforts to halt the rhino's rapid decline have failed and recommending urgent action on a variety of law enforcement and conservation fronts. Its preamble characterized destroying stocks as "no longer appropriate" and included controversial new findings. Among them was that focus solely on law enforcement efforts has backfired by driving illicit trade further underground and that destruction of horn stocks could actually increase the risks to existing rhino populations. Instead of destroying those stocks, it called for governments to "identify, mark, and secure" their rhino horns.

"We still don't know the role these stocks play in economic terms in the end-use markets and if we continue to call for their destruction, it could give rise to unintended consequences," said Tom Milliken, TRAFFIC East/Southern Africa director. "The kind of thing that could happen if stocks were destroyed include prices going up, which is likely to stimulate further poaching. More importantly, the resolution calls for governments to effectively put their stocks under lock and key. It's going to take a long time to figure out what the next move should be."

The repeal is an economic victory for Africa, where state stockpiles continue to grow from seizures, natural deaths and, in southern Africa, dehorning programs aimed at deterring poachers. Despite the longstanding ban on rhino horn trade, rhino horn is extremely valuable because of its continued use in traditional Oriental medicine and in the manufacture of handles for ceremonial daggers in some Middle Eastern countries.

The call for destruction had included the provision that donors would step forward to help a country offset the consequent financial loss through rhino conservation measures. Not one donor ever did, and to date, only Kenya and Zambia have destroyed rhino horn. TRAFFIC estimates that Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and other countries in Africa hold about seven tons of rhino horn, with a wholesale value of some $1,500 per kilo, although prices on the black market have extreme fluctuations.

Southern African nations argue that these caches of rhino horn could be traded under strict controls and help generate adequate funds for rhino conservation, which is just as rare as the endangered rhino throughout much of Africa. South Africa and Zimbabwe submitted such a proposal at the 1992 CITES meeting, but withdrew it when it became clear it would not win the needed number of votes.

As funding for rhino conservation continues to be woefully inadequate, perhaps the possibility of a limited legal trade in rhino horn will find the same type of reception at the convention as did South Africa's elephant hide proposal. Few would agree today, but some countries seem poised to consider it. Germany said a call for rhino horn destruction was never appropriate from the start and certainly is not now.

"I can't tell any range state that in 1994 we urged them to destroy their stockpiles worth several million dollars and then in the future have them find out they were the fools and those who didn't do it will profit," the German delegate said.
Legacy of a Dictator
By ANDREW MELDRUM

The former dictator of Malawi, the nonagenarian Hastings Kamuzu Banda (photo), is under house arrest, awaiting trial for the murders of four leading opposition politicians a dozen years ago. With the fall of the Banda regime, it has become clear that for nearly 30 years Malawians were savagely repressed by the government, which carried out horrific human rights abuses. But how far can the government of President Bakili Muluzi go in raking up the past and doling out punishment, since many in the government were themselves once members of Banda's ruling party?

Just a year ago, thousands of Malawians lined the streets of Blantyre to cheer and wave to Life President Hastings Kamuzu Banda whenever he made official appearances. Now, thousands of ordinary Malawians have thronged outside the High Court to jeer and throw bricks in anticipation of the appearance of the aged and ailing Banda, who is charged with four counts of murder.

It has been a dramatic reversal of fortunes for Banda, estimated to be 96. He has been stripped of his life president title, voted out of power, and his iron-fisted, one-party rule of Malawi has ended after 30 years. Now Banda languishes under house arrest in Blantyre and is deemed too feeble to attend the impending murder trial.

The murder charges are just the first of many expected to be filed against the Banda regime. With so many officials believed to have been involved in widespread human rights abuses during Banda's 30-year rule, it is not clear how much retribution will be good for the small nation. President Bakili Muluzi's government could easily become so financially and politically embroiled in pressing lawsuits against former Banda officials that it never creates the new economic and development policies that Malawi desperately needs.

The volatile anger of the courthouse crowds is not directed so much at Banda as at his longtime right-hand man, John Tembo, who is also accused of ordering the four murders. Many Malawians still have a residual respect for Banda, and even those who detest him say he is so old now that he should be left to die. But the mere mention of John Tembo's name stirs up blistering, bitter hatred in many Malawians. They blame him for the worst crimes of the Banda years, particularly during the 1980s.

The car carrying Tembo to court was stoned and groups chanted songs calling for his death. A former minister of state and Reserve Bank governor, Tembo is widely reviled throughout Malawi as having been Banda's henchman and the chief instigator of many vile deeds to maintain the regime.

The official charges are that Banda and Tembo ordered the murders of four leading politicians in 1983. Several top police officers are also charged with carrying out the murders, on May 18, 1983, of the three cabinet ministers—Dick Matenje, Aaron Gadama, and Twaibu Sangala—and one member of Parliament, David Chiwanga.

Such was the grip of the Banda regime on Malawi in 1983 that when it was announced that the four popular and prominent politicians had died in a car accident in the remote town of Mwanza, no one questioned the suspicious incident. But many people registered silent protests and the Mwanza incident became a long-festering sore, a symbol of the numerous human rights abuses committed by the Banda regime.

Bakili Muluzi won widespread support when he shouted "Remember the Mwanza Four!" in his campaign against Banda in May last year. Shortly after Muluzi became Malawi's new president, he commissioned a judicial investigation into the Mwanza incident. The lengthy report, about 1,000 pages, concludes that Banda and Tembo ordered that the four men be killed because they were posing a political threat to Banda's rule and more pointedly to Tembo's position as the next in charge. The inquiry found that police carried out the murders, using claw hammers and clubs to beat the men to death, and then stuffed their bodies into a car and pushed the vehicle into a ravine. Once Muluzi received the report, little time was wasted in ordering the arrests of Banda, Tembo, and the police officers.

Andrew Meldrum is a freelance journalist based in Zimbabwe, who writes for The Guardian and The Economist.
The Mwanza report itself has become popular reading material in Malawi. Several newspapers are printing it in installments and people read the testimony of the many witnesses with the consuming interest of a gripping murder mystery.

The popular anger against Tembo is not surprising. It was John Tembo and his niece, Cecilia Kadzimira, who for more than 14 years controlled all access to Banda and effectively maintained a harsh rule in Banda's name. Although Banda never officially married, Kadzimira has been his constant companion since the early 1960s. Banda appointed her "Official Hostess" and she reigned imperiously as Malawi's first lady, ordering all to stand whenever she entered a room. She helped her ambitious uncle, Tembo, get a foothold in politics and he quickly made his way to the top of Banda's Malawi Congress Party. As Banda became more elderly in the 1980s, Kadzimira and Tembo together ran the country, easily manipulating the yes men in Banda's Malawi Congress Party, the rubber stamp Parliament, and the highly politicized courts.

Once the mistress of seven ostentatious palaces throughout Malawi, Kadzimira now spends her days caring for the enfeebled Banda at his much more modest Blantyre residence, Mudi House, which is guarded by armed police as part of the house arrest. Such is the public bitterness at Kadzimira that in January thousands of Malawian women marched to President Mutharika's Sanjika Palace to demand that she be forced to leave Banda. But Kadzimira is a qualified nurse and under law Banda, as a prisoner who is ill, is permitted round-the-clock medical care.

The trial dominates the front pages of Malawi's myriad newspapers as well as all talk on the streets of Blantyre and Lilongwe. It is likely to continue for some time to come, as no date has been set for the trial and public prosecutors estimate that the court proceedings will take a year. The Mwanza case is just the first of many human rights abuses by the Banda regime that are expected to be documented and taken to court.

During his long reign, Banda was widely regarded internationally as a colorful and eccentric African strongman who enforced a quaint Victorian moralism that made it illegal for women to wear trousers. Banda's boast in Parliament that anyone who challenged his rule would be "thrown to the crocodiles in the Shire River" was taken as typical of his outspoken personality. Tourists marveled at the friendliness of Malawians.

But those who looked more closely saw that the people were cowed and afraid to say anything more than "Welcome to Malawi." Western diplomats and aid workers saw that the Banda government had installed a far-reaching network of oppression that included the police and the Women's League of the Malawi Congress Party. Most sinister of all was another so-called youth group, the Malawi Young Pioneers, who were authorized by Parliament to bear arms and to carry out the personal orders of Banda. With John Tembo as the chief officer of the Young Pioneers, they were much feared. For years, this pervasive system prevented any form of political protest and systematically squeezed the poor country's economy of millions of dollars that went directly into the pockets of Banda and his coterie. It was clear that numerous human rights abuses were taking place, but it was very difficult to get any solid information.

Now that the Banda regime has fallen, people are stepping forward with horrifying evidence of murders carried out by government agents, disappearances, cases of torture, beatings, and lengthy detentions without trial. Human rights activists estimate that anywhere from 3,000 to 10,000 people may have been killed during Banda's 30 years in power. Some say even more. Journalists working in Malawi find that one in every five people has a story to tell of a direct experience with human rights abuses during the Banda era.

The Mwanza murders are the most prominent atrocities, but already other well-known incidents are being investigated. The death in prison of former cabinet minister Orton Chirwa is being probed and the assassination in Zimbabwe of exiled opposition leader Attati Mpakati is also being investigated. Aside from these cases involving well-known opponents of the Banda regime, there are thousands more abuses perpetrated against ordinary citizens. Random interviews turn up depressing stories. One garage mechanic tells how a simple trip to neighboring Zambia brought him under suspicion for associating with exiles. He was "arrested" by the Young Pioneers and hung upside down for two days. When he was cut down, his skull was fractured, causing numerous health problems that still plague him. A peasant farmer's son denounced a corrupt village official of Banda's ruling Congress Party. A few days later a group of young men, believed to be Young Pioneers, took away the young man, who was never to be seen again.

"Human rights abuses by the Banda government go right back to 1964 when he first came to power. Banda began using the Malawi Congress Party right away to repress any dissenting voices and six cabinet ministers were forced to flee the country in that first year," said the Reverend Aaron Longwe, director of Malawi's leading human rights organization, the Foundation for the Creation of Integrity, Justice, and Peace. "And in 1974 the Malawi Young Pioneers were formed and began a reign of terror across the country. Peasants who did not buy a Congress Party card were arrested and beaten. The Pioneers killed people, they forced people into jail. They threw people into the Shire River to the crocodiles. The human rights record of this country is terrible."

But how far can the new government go toward punishing all those responsible for human rights abuses? This is a question currently confronting the
new South African government and it is just as pressing in poor, little Malawi. With a population of 10 million and an estimated annual per capita income of $200, Malawi is ranked as one of the world’s 10 poorest countries. The commission of inquiry into the Mwanza killings lasted from June until December 1994, and it is estimated to have cost $150,000. The lengthy trial will also be costly, particularly because both Banda and Tembo have hired top British lawyers who are expected to use every legal manipulation to delay and lengthen the trial. Can the country afford the expense of hundreds more such trials?

Many Malawians believe that once John Tembo is tried and sentenced for the Mwanza killings, a great deal of the current popular anger and bitterness will recede and the nation can get on with reconciliation with the past and building a better future.

Aaron Longwe suggests that Malawi needs a national commission of inquiry, similar to South Africa’s “truth commission,” which would gather evidence about the many crimes committed by the Banda government, but would not necessarily press charges against all the perpetrators.

“What we would like to see is accountability and scrutiny of past atrocities,” said Longwe. “We don’t want recriminations against anybody. We simply want to address these issues so that they are not repeated...As a human rights organization, we want to make sure that no one is deprived of rights or is arbitrarily thrown into prison or that there is unquestioning vengeance in this country. We shall make sure the whole situation is lawful.”

To build up general respect for human rights in Malawi, Longwe’s organization has sponsored special training sessions for members of the police, the army, the prisons, the courts, lawyers, and political officials. In addition, thanks to funding from Denmark, the Foundation for the Creation of Integrity, Justice, and Peace is also planning to establish a center to help Malawians who have suffered torture.

Longwe warned that many of the new leaders in the Muluzi government had previously been members of the Banda regime and may well have committed human rights offenses themselves.

“It is sad to say that some of the very same leaders who now want bring others to court have themselves been involved in the same things,” said Longwe, who charged that three-quarters of the leaders of President Muluzi’s United Democratic Front had previously been members of Banda’s Malawi Congress Party. “There is no way that we can just accuse the members of one political party and say they were responsible for all atrocities,” said Longwe. “I think it was a collective responsibility of so many political leaders.”

The danger to Muluzi’s government of digging too deep into the past atrocities of the Banda regime was highlighted when the Malawi Congress Party, which still functions as a parliamentary opposition party, threatened to expose evidence connecting Muluzi, who previously had been a Banda cabinet minister, to the assassination in Harare of Attati Mpakati.

Other observers suggest that the new Muluzi government has seized on the Mwanza trial as a smoke-screen to divert attention from the government’s lack of action in creating dynamic new policies to reinvigorate Malawi’s crumbling economy—especially positive measures to help the country’s peasants, who make up nearly 80 percent of the population.

“It is important to improve the respect for human rights in Malawi, but it will be a difficult, long-term process that must involve all aspects of society, not just a few show trials,” said outspoken Janet Karim, publisher of the Independent newspaper. “We must correct the 30-year wrongs that have been going on. We need a truly independent judiciary. We need a good, strong Parliament with an articulate opposition, not just a rubber stamp.”

“But power changes people, and those who come to power may soon want to wield the same repressive measures that Banda used,” warned Karim. “We need to change not only the actors, we need to change the whole drama of Malawi.”

Dr. Philip Johnston, president of CARE, served as coordinator of humanitarian assistance for the United Nations Operations in Somalia. SOMALIA DIARY is a personal account of his six months serving the Somali people. He draws a number of lessons from this chapter in American humanitarian military intervention. As “Pax America” gets further defined by other interventions, such as the Haitian experience, you will not want to miss Dr. Johnston’s insights.

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The UN’s Unknown Effort

The Western Sahara conflict, now virtually forgotten, is on track to be resolved this year when a referendum to decide the issue of integrating the territory with Morocco or becoming independent takes place in October. A low-key United Nations effort has achieved an unbroken ceasefire for three years and quietly directed the process leading to the vote. It could be one of the UN’s few success stories in Africa.

By ADEKEYE ADEBAJO
he Sahara desert evokes images of the famed caravans traversing the great trading routes of one of Africa's wondrous geographical landmarks in ages past. Barely three years ago, the Western Sahara, a desolate, barren territory the size of Oregon (250,000 square kilometers), was the battleground of a fierce 16-year war between integration-seeking Moroccan soldiers and independence-minded Polisario (Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro) guerrillas.

Today, United Nations officials from nearly 70 countries are working with French, Chinese, Kenyan, Russian, and American soldiers, assisted by German, Malaysian, Togolese, Nigerian, and Austrian policemen, as part of the nearly 600-strong contingent of the UN Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), in a $36 million a year effort to resolve the Western Sahara conflict.

So little has been written about the UN mission in Western Sahara that some historical and political background is inevitable. A détente in the conflict occurred in August 1988 following the efforts of the then-UN secretary-general, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, who used his "good offices" function successfully to secure agreement from Rabat and Rabouni (the site of the Polisario Front offices in Algeria) for a referendum to resolve the long-festering conflict. The secretary-general then outlined a "settlement plan" in two reports to the Security Council in June 1990 and April 1991.

The main points of the plan involve a six-month transitional period encompassing a ceasefire and an International Committee of the Red Cross-supervised exchange of prisoners; a reduction of Moroccan troops from 100,000 to about 65,000 within three months; disarmament and the confinement of the armies of both sides to designated locations; UN control of key aspects of administration in the territory and suspension of any laws that could hamper a free and fair referendum; the return of Saharan refugees from neighboring countries (mainly Algeria and Mauritania) under the supervision of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); the identification and registration of voters; the organization of a referendum "to enable the people of Western Sahara, in their exercise of their right to self-determination, to choose between independence and integration with Morocco"; and finally, the withdrawal of Moroccan troops or demobilization of Polisario troops, depending on the outcome of the referendum.

Hector Gros Espiell, a Uruguayan lawyer and renowned "trouble-shooter," was appointed as the first special representative of the secretary-general in October 1988 with full responsibilities for organizing and conducting the referendum. He was mandated to guarantee the impartiality of the process and to ensure freedom of movement and security in the territory. An identification commission was to identify and register voters, to whom voter cards would then be issued; a referendum commission would settle electoral complaints and conduct appeals; a security unit of civil policemen was given a dual mandate of ensuring law and order in registration offices and polling booths and monitoring the activities of the Moroccan police force in the territory, and a military unit would have the five-fold task of monitoring the ceasefire, overseeing the confinement of troops and arms to designated locations, verifying the reduction of troops, providing security for returning Saharan refugees, and monitoring the withdrawal or disarming of soldiers after the referendum.

The terms of the ceasefire were laboriously negotiated during a three-year period. Despite a promising start with the coming into effect of a ceasefire on September 6, 1991 and the arrival of 200 UN military observers in the territory, an impasse ensued as both sides adopted a cantankerous stance regarding the criteria for identifying voters, thus delaying the transitional process that was meant to follow automatically. The new UN secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, undertook a mission of "shuttle diplomacy" to Algiers, Rabouni, and Rabat in a bid to emerge from the political stalemate, and the first direct talks between both sides occurred in July 1993. The critical moment however came in March 1994, when the secretary-general presented the Security Council with three options for resolving the impasse: proceeding with the referendum without the necessary consent of both sides; starting identification while pursuing a solution to the political problems; and withdrawing from the territory, leaving behind only a skeletal UN military presence.

By this time, three special representatives had fallen victim to the frustrating demands of their diff-
The Identification Process

Perhaps the most complicated part of the UN mandate in Western Sahara is the painstaking and intricate identification and registration process which began on August 28, 1994. The two primary requirements for inclusion in the referendum are an age barrier of at least 18 years old by December 1993, and membership in a subfaction of one of the 10 tribes listed in the 1974 census conducted by colonial Spain: Erguibat Charg, Erguibat Sahel, Izarguien, Ulad Tidrarin, Ulad Delim, Chorfa, Ait Lahsen, Tribus del Norte, Arosien, and Costeras y del Sur. The tribes are further divided into factions and subfactions.

Selection then centers on five key criteria, with every applicant having to satisfy at least one criterion to be included in the initial voters list: first, those included in the revised list of the 1974 census containing 72,370 names; second, those inhabiting the territory at the time of the 1974 census who were not included in the Spanish headcount (e.g., some people lived in isolated areas that were not reached); third, the immediate family of people in the first two criteria; fourth, persons born outside the territory of a Saharan father who was born in the territory; and fifth, persons who lived in the territory for six consecutive or 12 intermittent years before the 1974 census.

The Polisario Front at first objected to the expansion of the criteria beyond the revised 1974 census list. It particularly took issue with the fourth and fifth criteria due to what it considered the difficulty of proof. Rabat, on the other hand, urged a widening of the criteria, arguing that Saharan migrants resident in Morocco, as well as the great-grandchildren of people born in the territory, be included in the referendum. It further argued that many authentic Saharans would be excluded if a restrictive policy was adopted: soldiers in the Spanish and anti-colonial Army of Liberation; people who fled to southern Moroccan towns like Tan Tan and Tarfaya to escape Spanish colonialism; and roving nomads habituated to a vagrant lifestyle that recognized no political frontiers. In the end, the compromise that emerged limited the descendants of Saharans born outside the territory in the fourth criterion to just one generation, and promised strict standards of proof for all five criteria.

The identification process itself is thus necessarily painstaking and slow. UN identification commissioners interview each individual applicant assisted by Arabic-speaking registration officers in the presence of representatives of Morocco and the Polisario Front, OAU observers, and sheiks (tribal leaders) living on both sides of the dispute.
As of late January, about 13,000 of the roughly 235,000 applicants had been interviewed in the necessarily painstaking process that requires the presence of representatives of both parties: OAU observers and testifying sheiks (tribal leaders) of each faction (see sidebar). The UN secretary-general's December 1994 report to the Security Council, following his recent visit to the region, has added impetus to the identification process. The mandate of Security Council resolution 973 of January 1995 is unequivocal: It demands the acceleration of the pace of identification so that the secretary-general will be able to report favorably to the Security Council by March 31 on the holding of an October 1995 referendum.

The resolution also proposes an increase in Minurso personnel of 25 teams working at ID centers with five mobile teams. In addition, 124 international and 35 local staff, 105 civil policemen, and 12 OAU observers are set to join the process in an attempt to complete identification by August 1995. A recent statement from the U.S. mission to the UN, while recognizing the importance of the sheiks to the process, noting that "...one can hardly overemphasize the crucial role of the cooperation and assistance of tribal chiefs and other notables of the territory."

A palpable nervousness is creeping into both parties, as the process appears to be gathering a momentum of its own and Rabat and Rabouni find themselves at a point of no return in a zero-sum game that neither can afford to lose. As chief of mission Jensen recently put it: "This is not a referendum on whether you should have a common European currency...most people would find they could probably live with one or the other if they had to; this is a referendum which is going to determine the entire future of these people." The stakes are indeed high: King Hassan II appears to have staked the honor of his crown on the issue, while the Polisario Front has lived in the Algerian wilderness for two decades, refusing to submit to rule from Rabat.

The international media has been strangely reticent about one of the potential success stories of UN peace-keeping: In over three years of the cease-fire, not a single shot has been fired in a conflict that had hitherto dragged on incessantly for 16 years. Even six months ago, almost no one believed that the identification process would commence, let alone that so much progress would have been achieved. There admittedly remain many obstacles to be overcome: The requirements that must follow on immediately after the proposed start of the six-month transitional process on June 1, 1995, will affect all still have to be met. But, for the first time in the history of a conflict representing Africa's last great act of decolonization, there exists a real possibility of a successful referendum that will finally answer the Western Sahara question.

The sheiks have a particularly important role to play in the whole process. Their traditional functions in Saharan society were to give counsel to members of their factions or subfactions, keep records of their flock, and preside over rituals like marriages and funerals.

Only sheiks elected in 1973 are automatically eligible to testify, although others may be asked to testify in exceptional circumstances. In the case of death or incapacity, the sheiks can be replaced by their eldest son in accordance with Saharan tradition. The tasks of the sheiks are twofold: to confirm, after swearing an oath, that individuals appearing before them are indeed who they say they are (and not masquerading as ghosts from the 1974 census) and to confirm information relevant to the applicant. The UN secretary-general's report of December 1991 recognized the importance of the sheiks to the process, noting that "...one can hardly overemphasize the crucial role of the cooperation and assistance of tribal chiefs and other notables of the territory."

The knowledge and seemingly photographic memory of the sheiks has often astounded and impressed UN officials, and the emotional reunions that occur during the process between sheiks and siblings, and parents and children, of factions separated by two decades of war add a human touch to the process.

Apart from the sheiks' testimony, regarding the identity of individual applicants, documentary evidence is also considered in reaching decisions: official documents issued by the colonial Spanish government; certified traditional documents; personal identity cards, etc. Madrid recently submitted the Registro Civil Cheranico del Sahara Occidental to the UN, containing birth, death, marriage, and divorce certificates issued to Saharan by the metropolitan government in colonial days. These are expected to be of invaluable assistance to Minurso's work.

The identification process has suffered from human and natural difficulties: The complex procedure for agreeing on the choice of sheiks to testify and subfractions to be identified has so far led to the loss of 21 days; the process was delayed for over three weeks in September 1994 while awaiting the necessary presence of OAU observers who had temporarily left to fulfill prior commitments; and heavy flooding in Polisario refugee camps in Tindouf prevented identification there for three weeks. But still, about 13,000 applicants (out of about 235,000) had been interviewed by the end of January and identification is proceeding at a steady pace.

—A.A.
Our knowledge of the struggle against apartheid was mostly provided by liberal and freedom-fighting whites, through biography, academic studies, and the media.

As one of those responsible, far be it from me to complain. But now, from the top and the inside, comes a meaty yet graceful volume by the black man who incarnated the struggle. Nelson Mandela's *Long Walk to Freedom* has humor and pathos, arrogance and humility, the occasional personal revelation, moments of terrible sadness and, running as a leitmotif through the narrative, the forgiving love for his errant wife. Indeed, the book might be seen as a love letter to Winnie.

But first, a word of caution. I find with the autobiography of the famous that the first two-thirds—Formative Years and The Struggle—are often more absorbing than the last, Time of Fame. In this case, there is a good reason for it. When in prison, Mandela wrote down a lengthy account of his life. He had time on his hands and the past came back "like a waking dream." The manuscript was smuggled out, and forms the spine of this story. No one, certainly not a man in his mid-70s negotiating day and night for the freedom of his people, would have had the time to put a book together. His "ghost-writer," Richard Stengel of *Time* magazine, spent many months with his subject, and has done a fine job. The occasional omissions and misconstructions would be the result of what Stengel has described as Mandela's mask. Or perhaps he was of the wrong gender, for Mandela admits that he could let his hair down with women and "confess to weaknesses and fears I would never reveal to another man."

Yet there can be no excuse for overlooking the
One institution he did not care for was communism. It is amusing to recall the wild, often bloodthirsty, rhetoric leveled against him for all those years by the North Atlantic Right. From the formation in 1944 of the Youth League, which transformed and spearheaded the African National Congress’s drive for power, its attitude was clear. The constitution didn’t object to borrowing from foreign ideologies, but rejected “the wholesale importation of foreign ideologies” into Africa. Mandela seems to have been in the minority which demanded the expulsion of communists from the Youth League. Though they didn’t succeed, he and like-minded nationalists were wont to break up Communist Party meetings, storming the stage and seizing the microphones.

It was only after the Afrikaner nationalists came to power in 1948, and voted in the Suppression of Communism Act, which placed communists, nationalists, Christian activists, and liberals in the same boat, that Mandela was convinced of the need for a common front. And now, rejecting the claim that the ANC was used by the communists, he responds with: “Who is to say we were not using them?” The verdict is not yet in, but I would plump for a draw.

For some, the fact of the guerrilla war remains a controversial aspect of Mandela’s life. (These are the people, perhaps, who forget that to George III and Lord North, George Washington was no more than a bloodthirsty terrorist.) The decision was made after long and agonizing deliberation in the wake of the banning of the liberation movements. That was in 1961. But nine years earlier, Mandela had set the ball rolling through Walter Sisulu, who was leaving on an “unauthorized” (by the ANC leadership) tour of several socialist countries. Mandela told him to broach the idea of an armed struggle with the Chinese. He was warmly received by Mao’s men, but they questioned whether the ANC was ripe for so serious an undertaking. “Walter came back with encouragement but no guns,” Mandela comments laconically.

A half-century of non-violence ended at a dramatic meeting of the ANC Working Committee in June 1961. Most of those present, including the powerful Communist Party secretary Moses Kotane, were against. But Mandela won the day. There was no other way, really. Even Chief Albert Luthuli, venerable president of the ANC and soon to be the Nobel Peace laureate, came on board. When someone accused him of pacifism, Luthuli invited him to try and steal his chickens and he’d discover just how wrong he was.

Three decades later, in the final negotiations with President de Klerk, Mandela was able to give up the armed struggle because its purpose had always been to bring the government to that very negotiating table.

But enough of these weighty issues. You get the flavor of how it was to put the ANC on the map of the emerging Africa of the early 1960s from a visit to Guinea. Sekou Touré listened attentively as Mandela and Tambo explained the history of the ANC, before asking for a $5,000 contribution toward MK, the liberation army. To their annoyance, Touré presented them with signed copies of a book he had...
written. But later, a suitcase of notes arrived at their hotel room. All in Guinean currency. Just paper, said Tambo, worthless outside here. They went to the Czech embassy and found someone to convert it into dollars. You could die for that in Toure's later, bad years. Does Conakry still wish to interview the president about certain currency irregularities?

The core of the book are the Robben Island chapters. Whatever his views on apartheid or the guerrilla war, we want to know how a man of action survives 27 years in prison. Time was on his side and he knew the Afrikaner nationalists would eventually run out of steam. In the meantime, he worked on the warders. When questioned about his motives, he would try to peel away their prejudices and demystify the ANC. Well before the end of his stay, these white working-class Afrikaners, who had good reason to be threatened by black empowerment, would respectfully get to their feet when he entered a room.

A sense of humor and a healthy dollop of patience also came in handy. Mandela describes the rigamarole of ordering a legal text book from a mainland library. It was sent through the mail, but the remoteness of the prison, the vagaries of the postal system, and the often deliberate slowness of the censors might ensure that the book arrived after its return date. So the warders would send it back without even showing it to the lender. In due course, you would be requested to pay an overdue fine for a book you had not even seen.

His marriage became a tool of the struggle. The prison authorities tried to use Winnie to destroy him. He would return from work in the lime quarry to find newspaper cuttings on his bed relating to her numerous arrests, or perhaps nasty reports about her private life which had been leaked to the government press. It made no difference; might even have strengthened his resolve. When, after 21 years, he was allowed to touch her hand, it was the moment he had dreamed of a thousand times.

Winnie was unable to live up to the dream. He is ever-forgiving, and with some justification, "She married a man who soon left her, that man became a myth, and then that myth returned home and proved to be just a man after all." What labyrinth of sexual guilt in those words. But as the cool, clever lawyer he is misguided when he concludes that despite her conviction for her damning role in the death of a young boy in Soweto, her innocence was not in doubt. Blinded by love, wide-eyed about politics. That's why the story can read like historical romance.

There was another, perhaps most relevant reason for surviving in such style—his comrades were there with him. The government put them in that place because they wanted them wiped from memory and in the course of time, dead by natural causes. But they buoyed one another up, planned the future, together took on the nastiest warders and prison commanders. And acted as mother. In the darkest days, Mandela's elder son, Thembi, died in a car accident. (During a busy period of political activity in the 1950s, the five-year-old Thembi had asked his mother, "Where does daddy live?") Walter Sisulu, his great friend, who lived along the corridor, came in and knelt beside his bed. "I handed him the telegram. He said nothing, but only held my hand. I do not know how long he remained with me. There is nothing that one can say to another at such a time."

They survived to shoo apartheid out of the yard and take over themselves. I like to think there was some fail-safe mechanism deep within the Afrikaner soul which reasoned that these men should be kept alive, for if the unthinkable happened and they won, who would run the country?

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