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AFRICA REPORT

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1988

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
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Photo Credit:

The cover photograph was taken in Uganda by Mark Peters/Sygma.

Letters to the Editor

To the editor:

I enjoyed your article on agriculture in Ghana [September-October 1988], and I am glad to know that you support our efforts to help farmers in this African nation.

We are delighted to see the important changes taking place in Africa as a result of our Global 2000 program at the Carter Center. In addition to our agricultural projects, we are also involved in eradicating curable diseases indigenous to many parts of central Africa. Our publication, *The Carter Center News*, reports on the work we are doing at the center and around the world. I hope you will have an opportunity to visit the Center soon.

Jimmy Carter
Atlanta, Georgia

To the editor:

The focus of your September-October 1988 issue on agriculture should interest all who care about Africa's future. The dramatic progress reported in Ghana and Zimbabwe is particularly impressive. You should be aware, however, that in addition to directly assisting efforts to increase Ghana's agricultural production, as described in Margaret Novicki's article, another more recent Global 2000 project is contributing indirectly toward achievement of the same objective. This is the nine-month-old Guinea Worm Eradication Program, being conducted by Ghana's Ministry of Health with partial support from the Bank of Credit and Commerce International and Global 2000.

By painfully crippling up to a third or more of farmers in many affected villages

for one to three months during the season when they must plant or harvest their crops, these two-foot-long parasites, which emerge right through the skin, are a serious impediment to agriculture, health, and school attendance. People are infected by drinking contaminated water from stagnant ponds.

But the disease can be completely eliminated within one or two years by teaching villagers to filter their water through a cloth, to boil their water (if they can afford to), by chemically treating the water, or by providing borehole wells as sources of safe drinking water. About 19 African countries are affected in a band stretching from Mauritania to Ethiopia. In Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Nigeria, the disease occurs nationwide.

The relevance of all this to agriculture is underscored by a recent Unicef-funded study in a fertile area of 1.6 million people in southeastern Nigeria, which estimated that the losses of profit from rice production alone because of guinea worm's effect on farmers in that area are about \$20 million each year!

Ghana's head of state, Flt.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings, gave an important boost to the eradication program in June, by spending an entire week visiting 21 affected villages in Ghana's Northern Region. Guinea worm, he accurately observed, "is a disease of underdevelopment." Ghana aims to eradicate this disease by 1993; Nigeria by 1995.

Donald R. Hopkins, M.D.
Senior Consultant
Global 2000
The Carter Center
Atlanta, Georgia

To the editor:

I have received a copy of *Africa Report* which features an interview with CHISA Honorary Vice-President Mrs. Maria Eugenia Neto [July-August 1988].

On August 2, 1988, I returned from a four-week visit to Angola. In Angola, the Children's Fund for Southern Africa was very warmly received. I was permitted to address the Angolan people on national television and radio about CHISA's plans to assist children in southern Africa. In Angola also, a CHISA committee is being formed to receive local currency to assist with our planned activities in that country.

We are anxious to let your readers and the American public in general know that the funds raised by CHISA during Mrs. Neto's visit to the U.S. have been used for emergency assistance, medicine, and food. The beneficiaries of this aid are the children in Primera Orphanage in Moxico, province of Cuando Cubango, and one soon to be selected in Cuito Cuanavale. These are two areas where the civilian population has been bombed heavily on a daily basis during raids by South Africa. As a result, there are many orphaned and injured children.

Information about CHISA's plan to establish emergency health posts at the sites of these two orphanages is available through our New York office.

Mary de Almeida
Children's Fund for Southern Africa
New York, New York

Africa Report welcomes comments from its readers on issues raised in the magazine and on matters relating to African political and economic development. For reasons of space, a contribution sent in the form of a letter to the editor stands a much greater chance of publication than one submitted as an article. Letters should be as brief as possible, normally between 100 and 400 words.

The editor maintains the right to abridge or otherwise alter letters for reasons of space or other editorial requirements. It is editorial policy to maintain a balance of views on controversial issues.

All letters to the editor should bear the name and address of the sender. Requests for anonymity and non-divulgence will be respected, but such a requirement may render the letter less likely to be published.

UPDATE

IN THE NEWS

A news source with a few question marks

The African National Congress (ANC) is becoming increasingly wary of news-gathering organizations which take a particular interest in South African opposition groups, according to a recent report in *The Independent* of London. Over the past two years, more than 20 leading ANC members have been murdered or abducted in Africa and Europe by hit squads—believed to be South African Special Forces agents—fueling concern within the anti-apartheid group that sensitive information is making its way back to Pretoria and is being used by President P.W. Botha's regime.

Newscope, a relatively new publishing company which in April launched a monthly newsletter, *African Preview*, is one news organization that has become a major cause for concern. Headed by Maj. **Kojo Boakye-Djan**, an exiled Ghanaian army officer, and **Daryl Philipson**, a businessman of South African origin, Newscope has focused much of its work on the ANC and other groups involved in anti-apartheid activities abroad.

Boakye-Djan, who says he plans to set up education and training facilities for the ANC in Tanzania and Zambia and make "research documents in depth on the ANC and the rival Pan-Africanist Congress," claims his interest in South African opposition parties is purely journalistic. Questions about his company, he argues, have arisen only because the Ghanaian government is circulating false rumors to discredit him since he is a well-known opponent of Flt.-Lt. **Jerry Rawlings**.

Newscope made its first appearance in November 1987 at an international conference organized by the ANC in Arusha, Tanzania. Boakye-Djan attempted to video the meeting—which was attended

by ANC members from inside South Africa—but the Ghanaian delegation recognized him and asked that he be ejected. He was accompanied by **Victoria Ann Cotterill**, a white South African operating under the name of Catherine, who said she was trying to establish a branch of Newscope in Tanzania.

As for Philipson, Boakye-Djan says his South African business partner is solely interested in the venture for commercial reasons. Philipson is said to have underwritten a \$300,000 account for Newscope at a branch of Lloyds Bank and provided Boakye-Djan with a \$3,000 a month overdraft facility.

A Look at Savimbi's Ivory Tower


Jonas Savimbi's Unita rebels and the South African Defence Force (SADF) have slaughtered close to 100,000 elephants in Angola over the past 10 years to finance the war against the Luanda government, according to detailed evidence submitted to the U.S. Congress by the Washington-based Conservation, Environmental and Animal Welfare Consortium.

The report claims that Pretoria has been running a massive international ivory smuggling ring "with complicity of South African officials at the highest levels of government and military," virtually decimating Angola's once substantial elephant population. Armed Unita poachers have systematically wiped out large herds of elephants so that the movement could pay for its South African aid, alleges the author of the report, **Craig van Note**, and with the assistance of the SADF, the tusks have been ferried by army trucks across the Namibian border. From there, the ivory has been taken by tractor-trailers to South Africa before being shipped abroad.

Van Note describes South Africa

Suspicious about Newscope's activities have been heightened by reports that Boakye-Djan was apparently introduced to Philipson by **Gary van Dyke**, a former mercenary who is thought to have had ties with South African intelligence organizations. Boakye-Djan, who admits that he knows van Dyke but denies that he met Philipson through him, has so far failed to assuage fears that Newscope could be indirectly funded by the regime in Pretoria. As Boakye-Djan himself acknowledges, "I can't rule that out, but as far as I know, I have not knowingly gone to any source [of money] that I cannot defend."

as "one of the largest wildlife outlaws in the world," and accuses the country's military establishment of having "cynically aided" the widespread massacre of elephants in much of central and southern Af-



Savimbi: In the ivory trade

rica. He claims that Pretoria's illegal ivory trafficking, which is being managed by "two former Portuguese colonists from Angola who have close ties to the South African military," also involves poaching in Zambia and Mozambique. "Other heavy flows of ivory to South Africa have been coming out of Zaire,

Daphne Pinkerson

Burundi, Botswana, and Tanzania," adds van Note.

The military has dismissed the allegations as "ludicrous," but Savimbi himself admitted in an interview with a French magazine earlier this year that SADF support for Unita has been repaid with supplies of ivory and teak from the forests of Angola. Van Note says he has additional evidence to back his claims about the Pretoria connection, and is willing to make it available to the public.

The disclosure of South Africa's involvement in the illegal ivory trade has forced Defense Minister **Magnus Malan** to set up a commission of inquiry to investigate the charges, but it has yet to reveal its findings. In the meantime, the newly appointed president of the commission, Brig. **Ben De Wet**, has issued a statement appealing to anyone with information about the allegations to contact the SADF. ■

The Great Escape

An inexplicable security lapse at a major South African air base has left military authorities red in the face, and has dented the government's reputation for upholding high standards when it comes to state-sensitive matters.

According to a report in the London daily, *The Independent*, military authorities apparently forgot all about a group of Johannesburg-based foreign correspondents who had just landed at Pretoria's supposedly well-guarded Waterkloof air base after a government-organized day trip to Mozambique to cover President **P. W. Botha's** first official visit to a black African country. As a result, five journalists—including representatives of *The Washington Post* and *Le Monde*—found themselves in circumstances reminiscent of scenes out of "Escape from Alcatraz," anxiously making their way around the base looking for a gap in the security fence through which to flee.

The reporters had reached Waterkloof in a light aircraft on the night of September 12 and disembarked at the passenger terminal located in a far corner of the huge air

Desperately Seeking a Good Image

South African-backed Mozambique National Resistance Movement (Renamo) rebels are attempting to set up an office in Britain with the assistance of the right-wing International Freedom Foundation (IFF) as part of a concerted effort to improve their severely tarnished image in the West, according to the London-based magazine *New African*. Renamo, which already has key propaganda outlets in the U.S., Canada, and West Germany, has yet to open a permanent information office in Britain—a strategic imperative if it is to challenge Prime Minister **Margaret Thatcher's** commitment to Maputo.

In recent months, Renamo's international standing has taken a beating, particularly since the April release of a detailed U.S. State Department report which claims that the rebel group is responsible for the murder of at least 100,000 Mozambican civilians over the last two years.

Marc Gordon, director of the right-wing IFF in Britain, admits that Renamo is fighting an uphill battle to overcome its image problem in the country, but dismisses the State Department's findings as poorly researched and biased. Re-

base. They quickly realized that something was amiss, however, when they found the terminal locked up, the gates to the visitors' car park shut, and not a soul in sight.

They wandered around the base for 45 minutes, looking for someone to let them out, but only found open offices with military papers dispersed across the desks. After much searching, the reporters finally spotted a flimsy area along the security fence which they succeeded in bending up from the ground, enabling them to dig their way to freedom. Their dramatic escape was now complete, but as they readily admitted, were it not for the somewhat less than air-tight security conditions on the base, their little adventure would likely have had a quite different ending. ■

namo's shaky reputation in Britain, he says, is the product of "misinformation, ignorance, and apathy."

The IFF, which also has offices in South Africa and Israel, has recently been joined in its pro-Renamo lobbying efforts in Britain by the Mozambique Solidarity Campaign. The MSC's aims include a commitment to "inform the British public of the struggle of the Mozambican people, as led by Renamo, against oppression and state-terrorism" and the demand for "free, fair, and internationally recognized elections within Mozambique."



Mozambique: Captured Renamo artillery

More recently, two members of the Mozambique Research Center—which operates as a mouthpiece for Renamo in Washington and is closely connected to the right-wing Heritage Foundation—were in London to meet journalists and businessmen in a bid to raise funds and improve the image of the rebel group. **Tom Schaaf**, the executive director of the Center, and **Antonio da Rocha**, a former Mozambique Foreign Ministry official, extended invitations to journalists to visit Renamo-controlled areas of Mozambique in order to dispel so-called misconceptions about the "freedom fighters" in the Western press. The new public relations campaign reportedly will also include bringing rebel leader **Afonso Dhlakama** to Britain later in the year, using his visit to launch an official Renamo office in London. ■

Mozambique News Agency

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Nine members of the outlawed Guinean Progress Party (PPG) have been detained and sentenced to lengthy prison terms following an alleged plot to assassinate President Teodoro Obiang Nguema in mid-August. PPG Secretary-General José Luis Jones, who earlier returned from exile to press for the legalization of the opposition in time for next year's general elections, was given a 16-year jail term, while others were handed sentences ranging from 12 years to life imprisonment.

The crisis began in June when PPG leader Severo Moto ended his exile after Obiang Nguema assured opposition members that there would be "no problem" if they returned. Moto called on the government to legalize the PPG in accordance with the recently passed law allowing for the creation of a multi-party system, but was again forced to leave the country once the clamp-down began.

KENYA

President Daniel arap Moi's government has once again arrested Raila Odinga, son of former Vice-President Oginga Odinga, under the Preservation of Public Security Act, which allows a suspect to be held indefinitely without charge or trial. Odinga, who was released in February after a presidential pardon that ended five-and-a-half years of imprisonment for his alleged role in a failed 1982 coup attempt, was redetained in late August along with several others for anti-government activities.

The current charges against the detainees surfaced during the sedition case of Gibson Maina Kimani, who implicated Odinga and former member of parliament Koigi wa Wamwere as the respective leaders of two new clandestine groups—the Kenya Revolutionary Movement and the Kenya Patriotic Front—whose aim is to topple Moi's regime. Both men were cited for helping to recruit and train Kenyan guerrillas in Libya, which has long been accused of harboring anti-Moi dissidents.

TUNISIA

During ground-breaking consultations on a "National Pact" to chart the country's future, President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali told a meeting of opposition leaders in early September that he wants to open an unprecedented page of pluralism and democracy in Tunisia. It was the first time since coming to power last year that Ben Ali brought together representatives of all opposition groups, ranging from the legal Tunisian Communist Party (PCT) to the officially outlawed Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI).

Ben Ali described the pact as a code of basic understanding between the different political and social forces in the country, and appealed to the opposition for their active support. He also announced that general and presidential elections would be held on November 7, 1989—two years to the day after the ousting of Habib Bourguiba.

POLITICAL POINTERS

CHAD

Libya and Chad have agreed to restore diplomatic relations, pledging to abide by the September 1987 truce that ended their bitter 15-year conflict. A communiqué signed by both governments said the decision was effective immediately and that they planned to exchange full diplomatic missions by the end of October. Although the two countries continue to claim historical rights over the mineral-rich Aouzou strip of 45,000 square miles, they pledged to "resolve peacefully their territorial dispute" with the help of a special Organization of African Unity mediation committee.

Tripoli also freed an initial 214 Chadian prisoners of war and promised to soon release another 65 detainees, but no official announcement was made concerning the fate of some 2,000 Libyan soldiers still held in Ndjamen. The French government welcomed the accord "with great satisfaction," and announced plans to gradually withdraw its 1,200 troops from Chadian soil.

MAURITANIA

Several black Africans have died recently at the notorious southeast prison of Walata, according to the African Liberation Forces of Mauritania, an unofficial movement of black citizens opposed to the predominantly Arab government of President Maaouya Sid Ahmed Ould Taya. Among those said to have been the victims of torture and deplorable prison conditions was Tene Youssouf Gueye, the prominent writer who was detained in September 1986 for distributing the now famous "Manifesto of Oppressed Black Mauritians."

Meanwhile, the government has also cracked down on the Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party—a pan-Arab movement with Iraqi roots—arresting as many as 600 people, including former Information Minister Mohamed Yedih Ould Breidelleil and Professor Memed Ould Ahmed. Sixteen activists were charged with subversive activity and acting as agents of a foreign power. Thirteen were found guilty and received prison terms of one to five years.

ZAMBIA

At least nine people, including six senior army officers, were detained for questioning about their reported involvement in a coup plot, amid campaigning for the country's October 26 presidential and parliamentary elections. The wave of arrests—which may have included several hundred army personnel according to some unconfirmed reports—took place three weeks before election day, underlining the government's growing sensitivity to organized opposition.

Among those arrested were Bob Litana, former central committee member of the ruling United National Independence Party, and Ben Mwila, a prominent businessman with close ties to senior politicians who owns a paint factory in the Copperbelt. Lt.-Gen. Christon Tembo, former commander of the national army and current ambassador to West Germany, was also detained upon his arrival at Lusaka airport and interrogated about subversive activities.

Rabat and the Polisario Front inch toward desert peace

The Moroccan government and Polisario Front guerrillas have formally accepted in principle a United Nations peace plan aimed at ending the bitter 13-year-old war in Western Sahara, but hopes that it will pave the way for a quick settlement to one of the world's least publicized conflicts may prove to be somewhat premature. As Polisario's U.S. representative Madjid Abdullah put it, "There is nothing to indicate that Morocco is ready to accept a free and fair referendum. The UN plan, which both sides have agreed to, only sets out general principles—most of the details still have to be hammered out. And in this situation, those details are crucial."

On August 30, both sides agreed to the basic outlines of the peace proposal put forward by UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar calling for a ceasefire and a referendum to determine the future of the territory. Said Polisario Front General Secretary Mohamed Abdelaziz, "We will lay down our arms if that is the will of the Sahrawi people. If the Sahrawi people want a free and independent Western Sahara, we will defend that choice. But if they want to be a colony of Morocco's, we will accept their decision and stop the armed struggle."

According to the plan, once the cease-fire has been signed, the UN is to deploy a force of 2,000 troops under its jurisdiction to take charge of Western Sahara's administration. The proposal also calls for the appointment of a special UN representative to administer the country and to organize a referendum giving the Sahrawi people the choice of voting for an independent state or for a form of integration with Morocco. UN officials are optimistic that the entire operation could be completed within six months.

But a number of sticking points remain. One of the key obstacles to a settlement involves the continued presence of Moroccan troops in the

territory. The Polisario Front, having accepted the plan "with certain conditions," wants Morocco to pull out its estimated 150,000 troops and paramilitary forces from Western Sahara and to dismantle its repressive apparatus before a free and fair referendum can be carried out under UN supervision. Although Rabat has agreed to reduce its armed forces, it has rejected demands for a total troop withdrawal and held firm against proposals that would weaken Moroccan administration of the occupied territory.

Setting up face-to-face talks between the two sides has been another point of contention. Abdelaziz has stood by his demand for direct negotiations with the Moroccan government as a precondition for reaching an accord, but Rabat has long refused to consider such an approach as it would be tan-

amount to publicly recognizing the guerrilla organization as a legitimate force.

Voter eligibility for the referendum has similarly been a source of disagreement. The UN has proposed to use the 1974 population census drawn up by Spain before it pulled out of the territory as the basis for the referendum, but negotiations have stumbled over how to update it. With about 80,000 Sahrawis living in Western Sahara, another 170,000 in Polisario-run camps in southern Algeria, and thousands of others scattered in exile, differences of opinion have arisen over who should form part of the electorate.

Likewise, both sides have accused each other of trying to influence the referendum by moving non-Sahrawis into areas they control. *Continued on next page*

Qaddafi opts for the softer touch as he introduces era of domestic reforms

Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi ushered in the 20th year of his revolution on September 1 in typically flamboyant fashion by announcing a wide-ranging package of political and economic reforms, and promising to lead the country into a new era of freedom and prosperity.

Qaddafi urged Libyans to seize the initiative and to exercise their new-found freedoms. "Be rich," he told the stunned crowd in a Revolution Day speech. "Everyone is invited to become bourgeois on condition that he does not do so by stealing the effort of another or plunder." At a meeting of artists and writers—long subject to strict controls—Qaddafi told them to create freely. "Meet and decide anything you want. . . You are free."

In a dramatic series of policy turnabouts over the past 12 months, Qaddafi has been reshaping and re-

defining the basic tenets of his Third Universal Theory. A little more than a year ago, the Libyan leader's popularity at home had reached an all-time low, with discontent growing over the shortages of consumer goods, abuses of power by overzealous members of the Revolutionary Committees, and the effects of a humiliating defeat in the war with neighboring Chad.


As a result, Qaddafi stepped up efforts to improve the country's international image—regularly condemning terrorism—and made a number of goodwill gestures to his North African neighbors. He granted diplomatic recognition to Chad, eliminated the border posts with Tunisia, and unilaterally withdrew troops from the Egyptian frontier.

But the most significant and far-reaching policy shifts have come on *Continued on page 10*

POLISARIO FRONT. . .continued

trol. Morocco has alleged that Polisario is bolstering its numbers in refugee camps by ferrying in Tuareg nomads from drought-stricken areas in Mali, while guerrilla leaders say that Rabat has resettled an estimated 100,000 Moroccans into Western Sahara, scheming to pass them off as local Sahrawis when the balloting takes place.

Hopes of a speedy end to the conflict also took a knock when the Polisario Front staged an attack near the Oum Dreiga section of Morocco's 1,000-mile defensive wall encir-



Margaret A. Novicki

Abdelaziz: The causes of war remain

cling the occupied territory. The assault, involving more than 1,000 Polisario guerrillas, was reportedly one of the fiercest and bloodiest in over a year. Abdelaziz denied allegations that the attack was an attempt by the Polisario Front to put more pressure on King Hassan II to accept direct negotiations, pointing out that "no accord for a cease-fire" has yet been signed, and the "causes of the war have not disappeared."

Nevertheless, UN officials argue that the basic agreement of the international peace plan represents a major breakthrough in the conflict and should provide the impetus for

Africar skids to a halt

Plagued by financial shortages, production delays, and impatient creditors, Africar UK Ltd. appears to have run out of gas. British engineer Anthony Howarth's 10-year-old project to design a unique car which is specially suited to handle the rigors of the African continent, and which ultimately is intended to be manufactured and repaired locally, is on the verge of collapse unless the Lancaster-based company can put together an eleventh-hour financial rescue package to save the new vehicle.

Over the years, Howarth has built Africar prototypes using a steel-reinforced epoxy plywood chassis, a special hydrogas suspension, and a wide wheelbase, making the vehicle durable, light, and cheap to produce. In an effort to gain the necessary financial backing that would enable him to begin production, Howarth engineered a successful test drive from the Arctic to the Equator in 1984 that saw all three Africars reach Nairobi in good working order.

Yet, despite the considerable international interest that the Africar project has attracted, Howarth failed to secure adequate funding—particularly from among African countries, which had been his initial hope. Having originally planned to begin production in Africa, he held lengthy negotiations with several countries, including Ghana and Sudan, which signed sales and agency agreements, but none were prepared to become shareholders or to make the substantial capital investment to produce the vehicle locally.

Howarth did succeed in enlisting Australian support—which was contingent on the start up of production in Britain—before his company ran into financial troubles earlier this year. First, accountants and lawyers blocked a \$30 million public share issue, and then the accountancy firm Deloitte, Haskins, & Sells withdrew its support, leaving the company with insufficient resources to regain the confidence of the stock market.

Howarth did manage to keep the project afloat by raising \$1.5 million from friends and contacts, but after more than \$2 million was spent on vehicle investment, additional financial constraints resulted in only one production vehicle actually being completed. Following a last-ditch attempt to win support from American investors, Africar failed to muster enough capital to fulfill production agreements or to gain a bridging loan from the Lancaster City Council—an enthusiastic backer of the locally based project—forcing the company to dismiss 50 of its employees in July.

In the decade since the project first began, Howarth has invested about \$6.8 million, including his own life savings, in pursuit of his dream to produce the Africar, but the shortage of funds has always been the major stumbling block. As Howarth laments, "We have literally had to live from week to week, even day to day. There was never sufficient money to run a business comfortably, never sufficient to get into production."

As a result, Howarth has reluctantly announced that he is now prepared to sell the Africar concept in an attempt to salvage what remains of his project. At present, the design concept and patents are the property of The Originators Company, a firm formed by 280 backers and registered in Jersey in the Channel Islands.

Unless someone is willing to put up the necessary capital, however, it appears that Africar is destined to crash, with developing countries having perhaps the most to lose. As a relatively cheap and efficient vehicle specifically designed to survive Africa's rugged conditions, and made so that many of its parts can be produced locally, Africar could help countries save valuable foreign exchange and stimulate the development of local skills and technology. But, so far, there have been no takers.

a mutually acceptable accord in the near future. Growing regional and international pressures for a settlement, and the reluctance of either party to openly reject the UN pro-

posal, are certain to improve prospects for ending the war, but both sides will have to make significant concessions if the remaining obstacles are to be overcome. ■

QADDAFY. . . continued

the domestic front, where the Libyan leader has emphasized the theme of human rights and promoted a greater liberalization of the economy. This spring, Qaddafi marked the 11th anniversary of the Jamahiriya (the state of the masses) by personally demolishing the gates of Tripoli's central prison with a bulldozer, and freeing hundreds of detainees. He subsequently announced an amnesty for all imprisoned foreigners, and called for the abolition of capital punishment, except for those conspiring with foreign states.

Similarly, Qaddafi went to the immigration offices and tore up the notorious black lists of persons who had been banned from traveling abroad. He returned confiscated passports, and revealed that exit visas had also been abolished. The Libyan leader then released The Great Green Document, a 27-clause human rights charter approved by the General People's Congress, which officially confirms the right of citizens to freedom of movement, guarantees freedom of expression, and prohibits clandestine arrests by the secret police.

At the annual meeting of Revolutionary Committee members in late August, Qaddafi told them it was time to prepare for "a new era," one in which "the masses themselves, not the Revolutionary Committees, confront the enemies." Although he praised the "historic role" of the committees—the powerful watchdogs of the revolution—he rebuked them for sometimes overstepping their authority, and denounced politically motivated attempts to "liquidate" dissidents within their ranks. "Terrorism, if it arises, must be terrorism of the masses and not individual or committee terrorism," said Qaddafi. "That is the most dangerous type of terrorism."

The Libyan leader also announced plans to replace the traditional army and police with a "Jamahiriya Guard," and to reduce mandatory military service from two years to one. The new peoples army, he argued, was necessary because "classical armies can be eas-

ily defeated. I am calling for the formation of a body that cannot be defeated, and that is the armed masses." Changes in the military structure would be effective immediately, he added, with the new peoples guard coming under the command of popular defense committees which are to be set up in strategic areas around the country.

Qaddafi has introduced equally significant reforms in the economy, allowing private shops to reopen and merchants—once considered unproductive parasites who exploit the people—to operate freely. The expansion in commercial activity has helped reduce widespread shortages in consumer goods and to undermine the black market.

To improve the distribution of goods in the country, Qaddafi has

since banned all import and export institutions run by the state, and approved the transfer of small and medium-sized industry and agricultural projects to individual producers. "Libyans should manage their country's production and service establishments on the basis of equality—the system of partners, not wage-earners," he said.

Qaddafi's perestroika has been responsible for a genuine surge in the Libyan leader's popularity, but it remains to be seen how far he can push his political and economic reforms. For the moment, however, it seems that he has no intention of backtracking. As Qaddafi told a crowd of supporters recently, "We declare that we are going to set up a Jumouriyah (republic) bourgeois state." ■

Campus radicals learn lesson in Harare

Ever since the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) won the country's first independence elections in 1980, left-wing university students have generally been outspoken supporters of President Robert Mugabe, but this special relationship may have come to an end, following a government crackdown on campus radicalism.

Student demonstrations at the University of Zimbabwe, Harare Polytechnic, and teacher's training college, backing the government's socialist goals and Mugabe's August pledge to expel government leaders who have used political power to enrich themselves, were brutally dispersed by riot police in late September. A total of 478 students were arrested and more than 20 injured as riot police used rubber bullets and tear gas to prevent the demonstrators from marching downtown to Harare's Unity Square. Most students were released without charge, but at least seven face prosecution under the notorious Law and Order Maintenance Act, introduced by the white minority regime in the pre-independence era to suppress black nationalist aspirations.

The protestors, who distributed leaflets expressing their "alarm over the growing number of corrup-

tion cases, scandals, and crimes involving members of government and party alike," denounced the "ideologically corrupt comrades" in the top leadership, and criticized capitalist tendencies within the ruling party. As Student Union Secretary General Arthur Mutambara told *In These Times*, "We are communists, and we demonstrate because we cherish Marxist-Leninist ideals."

While some student radicals have continued to emphasize their support for Mugabe, many others have glumly pointed to the growing gap between the government's socialist rhetoric and capitalist realities. Despite the progress made in expanding such social welfare services as education and health care over the years, they bemoan the fact that the government has not pushed ahead with the radical transformation of society that many Zimbabweans had expected and fought for during the war of liberation. "If they just said we are a capitalist state, we wouldn't question their policies," noted one economics student who went on to criticize the government for failing to implement its long-promised land reform program.

Mugabe dismissed the campus protests as a mere nuisance and suggested that the students were dem-

onstrating because they were "tired of pursuing their studies" and had nothing better to do. "Fiction becomes reality with them," he said, claiming that his government was less corrupt than most.

The Mugabe government nevertheless responded to the student protests by deporting law lecturer Shadrack Gutto, a left-wing Kenyan political exile whom the authorities apparently believed inspired the anti-corruption demonstrations. Gutto, who had in the past attracted the government's attention for warning students against "neo-colonialism in socialist disguise," was handed a 48-hour no-appeal expulsion order and forced to leave the country.



Mugabe: *Campus rumpus a nuisance*

The crackdown on left-wing critics continued when the Zanu-PF central committee expelled Edgar Tekere from the party in late October. Tekere, the popular and outspoken former chairman of Zanu-PF, had verbally attacked government ministers for "capitalist excesses" and accused them of violating the party's "leadership code" designed to limit the accumulation of wealth. The decision to expel a strong exponent of socialism—the official ideology of the ruling party—was undoubtedly an awkward one for authorities in Harare and a further blow to student-government relations. ■

Air Afrique makes emergency landing

Air Afrique, the financially strapped multinational carrier owned by 10 francophone states in West and Central Africa, is to be privatized and handed over to French management, following a regional heads of state summit in Cotonou, Benin.

Set up in 1961 as a symbol of pan-African solidarity and as a sign of independence from French colonial ties, Air Afrique is now prepared to swallow its pride in a drastic effort to complete a major overhaul of the company's financial structure. Said one Air Afrique staff member, "As an African, I'm disappointed that after 30 years of independence, we're going to have the French running the show again. But from the airline's point of view, it was really the only thing to do."

The highly controversial decision to replace Congo's Auxence Ickonga with Yves Roland-Billecart—for the past nine years head of the Caisse Central de Coopération Economique, the French government's overseas aid agency—was taken with the view of running Air Afrique on a strictly commercial basis by an outsider less susceptible to regional political pressures. During Ickonga's three-year stewardship, Air Afrique's operations were continually hampered by political interference, causing a sharp deterioration in financial management and bringing the company to the edge of economic collapse.

The move to seek French assistance comes 18 months after regional heads of state agreed to an initial rescue plan involving cuts in salaries and personnel, the clearing of debts, and an attempt to increase the airline's capital base. The Niamey summit in March 1987 also charged Ivorian President Félix Houphouët-Boigny with the task of finding fresh funds and a new management team to bail out the company. But the plan dismally failed to reverse Air Afrique's troubles.

Between 1985 and 1986 turnover fell from \$445 million to \$420 million, while a modest operational profit of \$2.7 million turned into a deficit of \$8 million. Last year, the company's financial standing worsened still further, as turnover dropped to \$378 million and losses reached a record \$21 million.

Ickonga blames Air Afrique's bleak economic outlook on member-states' failure to honor pledged capital subscriptions and their reluctance to meet longstanding arrears on payments for tickets issued to government officials. Overall, the 10 member governments owe a total of more than \$60 million.

Until now, the company's operational losses have only been sustained thanks to generous overdrafts from creditors, but commercial banks have recently shown growing impatience with Air Afrique and have asked for repayment of their loans. Coface, the French export credit insurance agency, has already warned suppliers against providing credit arrangements to Air Afrique, and other companies, claiming long-standing arrears, have also threatened to stop servicing the airline.

Roland-Billecart, who has promised to raise \$100 million to help pay off some of Air Afrique's debts and boost its precariously low capital base, is expected to have access to a sizeable French development aid package as well as substantial loans from the African Development Bank to bolster his rescue plan. He should also benefit from the agreement by member-states forcing regional leaders and transport ministers to relinquish their policy-making and management posts in Air Afrique in an effort to minimize political interference.

But Roland-Billecart's new management team still has some tough decisions to make that are likely to provoke further resentment against the French takeover. More than 1,000 of Air Afrique's nearly 6,000 employees are almost certain to be laid off, while a squeeze on regional governments to pay back their accumulated debts is also on the cards. The success of the French plan, however, ultimately depends on how serious member-states are in rescuing Air Afrique from total bankruptcy.

NIGERIA

President Ibrahim Babangida's government has finally secured a 20-year rescheduling arrangement with commercial banks to repay its \$5.2 billion debt, including \$2.7 billion in medium-term obligations and \$2.5 billion in letters of credit. The agreement—which needs to be ratified by Nigeria's 400 creditor banks—should relieve the country's massive \$26 billion external debt and help the government reach a new accord with the IMF on its economic austerity program.

The rescheduling deal, which is comparable to the terms offered Brazil and Mexico, provides Nigeria with a three-year grace period before a 20-year repayment of medium-term debt and a 12-year repayment of letters of credit. The arrangement also allows principal of medium-term debt to be repaid at a rate of three percent of the sum per annum over the first 12 years, with the balance being paid in equal amounts during the remaining period.

- Following a series of high-level negotiations, the Soviet Union has agreed to complete the first phase of the much-delayed Ajaokuta Steel Complex within 18 months—before handing it over to the Nigerian government. The Ajaokuta project, which has been hampered by financial constraints and bureaucratic bungling since its inception in 1980, is expected to play a key role in a newly integrated steel industry that will help stimulate iron ore production, increase regional trade, and make Nigeria one of the biggest steel producers in the Third World.

Work on the \$3.4 billion steel complex came to a halt three years ago when Nigeria's debt problems and falling oil revenues caused funding sources to dry up, but the new countertrade deal with the Soviet Union should ease the government's financial burden. Although details of the arrangement have not been released, it is believed to be one of the biggest oil-for-technology deals ever reached.

LIBYA

Col. Muammar Qaddafi, accompanied by Tunisian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, officially inaugurated Libya's first—and the Mediterranean's largest—offshore oilfield in early September. The Bouri field, which covers an area of 3,000 square kilometers about 80 miles northwest of Tripoli, is already producing 10,000 barrels per day of medium to heavy crude, but is expected to yield more than five times that amount by the end of the year, and large quantities of natural gas.

The oilfield, operated by the Italian Agip company, borders on Tunisia's territorial waters and has been delineated for joint exploitation, although it is Libya's National Oil Corporation which will receive the lion's share of the profits. Tripoli's overall oil reserves now stand at more than 5 billion barrels, with the Bouri field's untapped reserves estimated at some 670 million barrels.

BUSINESS BRIEFS

ZIMBABWE

In a bid to improve U.S. ties with frontline states, Ambassador James Rawlings approved a \$17 million grant to Zimbabwe in late August, ending a two-year freeze on economic aid by the Reagan administration. The new aid, which Finance Minister Bernard Chidzero called "a giant step in strengthening relations between our two countries," includes an initial \$5 million grant to be followed by an additional \$12 million over the next two years to help boost Zimbabwe's private sector and stimulate rural development.

Aid was cut in 1986 after Youth Minister David Karimanzira sharply criticized U.S. policy toward South Africa at what was meant to be a non-political Fourth of July reception in Harare attended by former President Jimmy Carter. The Reagan administration, already displeased by Zimbabwe's alleged anti-American voting at the UN, promptly cut off all aid, but since then both sides have worked hard to patch up their differences.

ETHIOPIA

Planning Minister Mersie Ejigu has announced government plans to encourage private investment, reform taxes, and pay more to its coffee farmers, as part of a sweeping series of economic reforms that are to be incorporated in the country's next five-year plan scheduled for drafting in mid-1989. The measures are also expected to include a new legislative code allowing for the liberalization of commerce, trade, and property ownership.

The relaxation of economic policy, which began earlier this year when private traders were allowed greater participation in grain marketing, should also help the country meet the structural adjustment demands of the IMF if Ethiopia decides to negotiate a balance of payments loan with the Fund. Ejigu stressed, however, that the government was not abandoning its socialist objectives, but rather that it was "exploring all policy instruments that could enhance production and productivity."

CAPE VERDE

Despite years of drought and harsh desert winds from the Sahel that have continued to plague the country, President Aristides Maria Pereira's government is pushing ahead with a unique reforestation program which has enabled the tiny West African archipelago to plant 17 million trees since independence in 1975. According to Rural Development and Fisheries Minister João Pereira Silva, Cape Verde aims to plant as many as 3 million trees every year, while maintaining its remarkably high survival rate of 80-90 percent.

Some forestry experts already point to the Cape Verdean experience as a model for anti-desertification programs in other Third World nations, as tree planting has played a key role in the country's efforts to combat soil erosion. In the longer term, government officials say the project should also help modify Cape Verde's micro-climate and make the country self-sufficient in wood fuel by the year 2000.

A GLOBAL RESPONSE TO AIDS

By THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION



Mark Peters/Sygnma

Health worker, Uganda: "By the end of 1988, HIV screening facilities for blood transfusions will be available in all African capital and main cities"

The cover story of this issue is AIDS, a major public health challenge world-wide, but especially so in sub-Saharan Africa because of already overstretched and underbudgeted health delivery services. In an effort to clear up the myths, misunderstandings, and sensationalizing which have characterized media coverage of AIDS in Africa, *Africa Report* brings you a series of reports, beginning with the cold, hard facts on the extent and impact of the disease, as well as a strategy for addressing it, from a team of doctors at the World Health Organization's Global Programme on AIDS.

During the 1980s, AIDS (acquired immunodeficiency syndrome) has become a major health problem throughout the world. The first indications that this new disease, initially

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thought to be limited mainly to homosexual communities of the Western industrialized countries, might also be present in Africa were inconclusive. However, with the advent of serologic tests in 1985 to identify HIV-infected persons, hundreds of subsequent surveys confirmed a relatively high prevalence of HIV infections among sexually active adults in many Central African cities.

The Epidemiologic Patterns of AIDS in Africa

Three broad yet distinct epidemiologic

patterns of HIV/AIDS have been described by the World Health Organization (WHO). In Pattern I, the primary population groups affected are homosexual men and IV drug users. In Pattern II, HIV/AIDS is found predominantly in sexually active heterosexuals. Pattern III is where the HIV/AIDS epidemic is just beginning and relatively few HIV-infected persons are currently found.

Important factors which are responsible for these patterns include the probable date of HIV entry and/or period when HIV began to spread extensively in the

population and the relative frequency of the three documented modes of HIV transmission—sexual intercourse (heterosexual or homosexual), injection or administration of infected blood or blood products, and from an infected mother to her infant.

All three of these global patterns are found in Africa. Pattern I is currently present in South Africa, Pattern II in sub-Saharan Africa, and Pattern III in North Africa. This article focuses only on the Pattern II problem in sub-Saharan Africa since the vast majority of AIDS cases in Africa are found in this sub-region.

Available information indicates that HIV did not begin to spread extensively in Central and East Africa until the mid to late 1970s. One study showed in a rural area of Zaire that of about 650 blood specimens collected from villagers in 1976 as part of an investigation into an outbreak of Ebola virus, five persons or 0.8 percent were found to be HIV positive when these blood samples were tested in 1985. HIV was isolated from one of the HIV antibody positive samples.

Upon returning to this same village in 1986, the investigators collected about 400 blood specimens mainly from different persons and again found about 0.8 percent to be HIV positive. Of the five persons who were identified to have been HIV positive in 1976, follow-up revealed that three had died with illnesses suggestive of AIDS; of the remaining two, both were alive and appeared in good health. Both were still HIV positive and one had some laboratory evidence indicating some immune damage and the other's immune system appeared intact.

The investigators concluded from their study that HIV infections had probably been present in the area for an unknown number of years prior to 1976 and that this virus was able to maintain itself in this cultural/social environment at a low endemic level. They further postulated that the higher prevalence of HIV infections found in large urban areas in Central Africa was probably due to the more sexually active lifestyles present in the cities compared to most rural areas.

Current Situation

At the present time, the HIV/AIDS epidemic appears to be most severe in Central and East Africa affecting Zaire,

Zambia, Rwanda, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, and Uganda, as well as Kenya and Tanzania, and also appears to be extending to adjacent countries of southern Africa and into West Africa. Serologic studies of female prostitutes in most large urban areas in Central and East Africa show that usually more than half and up to 80 percent are currently infected with HIV.

Similar surveys among blood donors or pregnant women in these same cities show an HIV seroprevalence ranging from a low of about 5-6 percent up to 25-30 percent. A relatively consistent pattern is that from 5-10 percent of infants born in these urban areas are HIV positive; very few infections are found in the

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five to 15-year old population and an increasing prevalence of HIV infection is found among sexually active young adults peaking at about age 35, where up to 40 percent have been found to be infected.

HIV seroprevalence rates then decline in older age groups. There has been noted a relatively consistent preponderance of HIV infections in younger sexually active women in the 15 to 24-year age group compared to men, but this differential is in some instances reversed for older age groups. Overall the male/female ratio is about equal.

Another relatively consistent finding is the marked differential between urban versus rural HIV seroprevalence rates. In most instances, the rural seroprevalence of HIV is 10-20 fold less than that in large urban areas, but there are a few notable exceptions in rural areas located along many traveled roads where relatively high HIV rates are found.

In most countries in Central and East Africa, the majority (usually 75 percent or more) of the population is rural, and in both urban and rural areas close to 50 percent or more of the population is less than 15 years of age. Thus, the absolute number of HIV-infected persons in Africa is not nearly as high as might be first suspected from the very high (up to 20-30 percent) HIV seroprevalence among sexually active adults in the largest urban areas. Overall, WHO has estimated that there are between 2-3 million HIV-infected persons in Africa as of 1988.

Virtually all of the findings described above are related to HIV-1, which is the virus type responsible for most AIDS cases throughout the world. Another distinct type of the AIDS virus, called HIV-2, has been found primarily in West Africa and more recently in one southern African country. Serologic studies of HIV-2 seroprevalence in West African countries, such as Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, has shown it to be several-fold lower than that of HIV-1 seroprevalence in Central and East African urban areas. In addition, there are indications that HIV-2 may be less pathogenic than HIV-1. Whether this latter possibility is true or not can only be answered by future studies.

Heterosexual Transmission of HIV in Africa

Why does HIV/AIDS in Africa affect sexually active men *and* women in almost equal proportions, compared to the overwhelming preponderance (from 10:1 to 15:1) of male versus female AIDS cases documented in Western countries? What accounts for these widely varying distributions of HIV and particularly what factors can be evoked to explain the preponderance of heterosexual transmission in sub-Saharan Africa? Intravenous drug use is not a significant problem in sub-Saharan Africa and while homosexuality exists worldwide, it has not been documented to date to any appreciable extent among AIDS cases or HIV-infected persons in sub-Saharan Africa.

Many epidemiologic studies have shown that transfusion of HIV-infected blood can only account for a small proportion of HIV infections in sub-Saharan Africa. The use of unsterile needles or other skin-piercing instruments within the health system or as part of traditional

healing (or other) practices can also only account for a small proportion of HIV infections in these areas. Female circumcision has also been postulated to be a contributory factor in the spread of HIV in Africa, but the areas where this practice is prevalent do not correlate well with those areas where HIV/AIDS is prevalent.

While the question of why heterosexual transmission predominates in Africa has not been conclusively answered, there is increasing evidence to implicate several contributory factors ("co-factors") to account for much of this marked difference in the heterosexual spread of HIV in Africa compared to North America or Western Europe.

The relatively high prevalence of numerous infectious diseases including malaria and other parasitic diseases in tropical Africa has been postulated to be one contributory factor since some of these agents may "activate" the immune system to facilitate HIV infection. In addition, recent studies have implicated the presence of other sexually transmitted diseases, especially those associated with genital ulcers (such as syphilis and chancroid) as significant "co-factors" in the spread of HIV.

Some preliminary data suggests that uncircumcised males may be more susceptible to HIV infection than those who are circumcised. Such co-factors, combined with the social/political upheavals which occurred in Central and East Africa since the 1960s and the very large population migration to the cities during the 1970s which may have disrupted the social values of traditional rural Africa, are believed to be important factors in the documented heterosexual spread of HIV in Africa.

Demographic Impact of AIDS in Africa

What impact will the very high HIV infection rates in Central African cities have on population patterns in the future? At the present time, with increasing understanding of the natural history of HIV infections, it is becoming clear that at least half and probably the majority of HIV-infected persons will develop AIDS within 10 to 15 years after the acquisition of HIV infection. As a result, accurate projections or forecasting of the number

of AIDS cases which can be expected to occur in the future will depend on two main factors: the number of HIV-infected persons and the proportion (50-75 percent) of HIV-infected persons who will ultimately develop AIDS.

Short-term predictions (five to 10 years) of the demographic impact of AIDS can be reasonably derived from our current knowledge of the natural history of HIV infections and from available HIV seroprevalence data. Such short-term projections are virtually independent of the future trends of new HIV infections which will occur. The median incubation period of HIV to the development of AIDS has been estimated to be about

**The global
response to AIDS offers
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strengthening of our
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infrastructures.**

eight to nine years. Thus, the majority of new AIDS cases which will become manifest over the next five years will be essentially derived from the pool of persons who have already been infected with HIV in 1987 or prior years.

AIDS in Africa, as it is throughout the world, is primarily an urban problem involving mainly sexually active adults. The short-term demographic impact which can be projected in the most severely affected Central African countries will have little impact in most rural areas where the majority of the population lives.

According to an AIDS forecasting model developed by WHO's Global Programme on AIDS (GPA), the number of AIDS cases which can be expected to occur over the next 10 years in the most severely affected Central African countries will not reverse the positive population growth rate which has been pro-

jected for these countries. Nevertheless, during this period there will be a marked and very selective *decrease* of the *projected increase* in urban areas of the very young due to perinatally acquired AIDS and AIDS in sexually active persons with multiple sexual partners.

The overall positive population growth rate of between 3-4 percent a year for most of these countries will remain positive but will be reduced to about 2-3 percent a year. However, for many Central African countries, the numbers of AIDS-related deaths which can be expected by the mid to late 1990s among adults in their most productive years may be in the hundreds of thousands.

This selective impact on young and middle-aged adults, including business and government workers, as well as members of the social, economic, and political elite, will have grave social/economic consequences well beyond the absolute numbers of deaths. In these same countries, hundreds of thousands of pediatric AIDS cases, as a result of mother-to-infant transmission, may be expected by the late 1990s. The resulting increase of child mortality in these areas from AIDS will more than offset the expected reduction from ongoing child survival programs.

Beyond this short-term forecast, if HIV infections continue to increase in urban areas and if extensive spread of HIV begins in rural areas, then a negative population growth rate is foreseeable. Thus the long-term demographic impact of AIDS in Central Africa cannot be projected with any degree of certainty until it can be determined whether such spread of HIV will occur or not.

Responding to AIDS in Africa

A worldwide mobilization, unprecedented in scope and extent, is underway to prevent and control HIV infection and AIDS. The World Health Organization has the responsibility to direct and coordinate international health work. Its GPA has developed the global strategy for the prevention and control of AIDS and is providing support to over 140 national AIDS programs. The Global AIDS Strategy has the support of all nations of the world. It has been endorsed by the World Health Assembly and the United Nations General Assembly.

Implementation of the Global AIDS Strategy includes efforts to:

- prevent sexual transmission of HIV primarily through information and education and the promotion of condoms;
- prevent HIV transmission through blood;
- prevent HIV transmission from mother to infant;
- support research to develop effective treatments and vaccines;
- reduce disruption and social unrest due to HIV/AIDS.

Up to 1986-87, many African countries were hesitant to respond to the AIDS threat, partly because of the tremendous burden of other public health problems and partly because of reaction to statements in the Western press, blaming the origin of the virus and the resulting global problem of AIDS on Africa. In addition, there was a general reluctance to acknowledge the presence of this disease, which is largely transmitted sexually, since this would tarnish a country's image or affect its tourist trade. However, as documentation of this epidemic has been gathered, both by international and African scientists, an increasing shift toward openness in confronting the AIDS epidemic in Africa is becoming evident.

WHO's Global Programme on AIDS is now working with over 150 countries throughout the world to support and strengthen national AIDS programs. This collaboration has now been extended to all countries on the African continent. As of late 1988, all African countries have had a technical visit from WHO, during which a status and needs assessment was carried out.

Immediate support was provided to start the work of AIDS prevention without delay. National short-term plans (six to 12 months) called for activities in the field of information, education, and communication addressing the public at large as well as specific target groups and persons. These plans also include the strengthening of blood transfusion facilities to help ensure that blood for transfusions can be made as safe as modern technology will allow. It is anticipated that by the end of 1988, such HIV screening facilities for blood transfusions will be available in all African capital and main cities.

During the execution of short-term

programs in Africa, planning missions resulted in the formulation of 23 national medium-term plans (MTPs) covering three to five years. Fourteen of these plans have thus far been endorsed by national governments and the international community at meetings convened by WHO and national ministries of health. At these meetings, full funding (ranging from \$2-8 million) for the first year of the national AIDS programs was obtained. An exceptionally high level of commitment for the development and support of aggressive national AIDS programs has been seen among ministries of health and the international community.

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The order of priority of each of the components of the Global AIDS Strategy has varied with the prevailing country situation. In low prevalence areas, for example, in Sahelian countries, the priority is often given to education and surveillance and its prompt integration with other primary health care activities.

In areas of moderate prevalence, such as that observed in several West African countries, the priority is often given to education of the general public and to targeted information and education to sexually transmitted disease patients, prostitutes, and other high-risk behavior for HIV infection. Education will be combined with the promotion and distribution of condoms. The strengthening of blood transfusion services, epidemiological surveillance, and development of patient care programs will comprise the total program.

In areas of high prevalence, such as those areas in East and Central Africa where surveys have shown that 20-30 percent of sexually active adults are now infected, education should perhaps focus

more on those who are not yet sexually active. In these latter areas, hospital and community care systems must be promptly established in order to provide the appropriate psychological, medical, and social support to those who are HIV-infected today. However, there is also a clear and compelling need to assure that support for other important public health programs is not compromised as a result of our efforts to urgently respond to the AIDS problem in Africa.

AIDS in Africa, as it has throughout the world, has highlighted the many deficiencies that exist in our public health and health care infrastructures. Thus, the global response to AIDS offers a great opportunity to accelerate the strengthening of health infrastructures. The AIDS epidemic will give ministries of health more visibility and challenge for providing leadership; it will forge closer collaboration between governments, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations; it promises to enhance the traditional North to South professional and technical collaboration with a matching South to North exchange of epidemiologic and clinical information on HIV infections and AIDS.

Increased attention and resources will finally be directed to areas which have been long neglected—health education, prevention of sexually transmitted diseases, blood transfusion services, and research into human behavior and communication patterns in different cultural settings throughout the world.

AIDS will be a continuing public health challenge and problem of immense magnitude worldwide, but especially so in sub-Saharan Africa. The greatest public health challenge facing all AIDS prevention programs is to reduce, to the maximum extent possible, the transmission of HIV. In the absence of effective treatment or a vaccine, national programs will not be able to prevent the several million AIDS cases projected to occur worldwide in persons already infected with HIV (with at least a million of these cases expected in Africa) over the next decade. However, beyond the year 2000, how high or low the eventual endemic level of HIV/AIDS will reach will be a measure of both the commitment and effectiveness of the AIDS prevention programs which are now being developed. ○



AIDS and Apartheid:

DOUBLE TROUBLE

By DAVID SEFTEL

Health care is yet another victim of apartheid policy in South Africa, with grossly unequal medical services for whites and blacks. Examining the disparities in the health delivery arena, this *Africa Report* exclusive also documents a government cover-up of the extent of the AIDS crisis in the country, revealing how the apartheid system is overtly and covertly aiding AIDS.

At Baragwanath Hospital, Soweto, "the state spent \$19 per patient daily, compared to \$88 spent for a similar white patient at Johannesburg General Hospital in 1986"

One of the most poorly reported pillars of the apartheid system is its separate and grossly unequal health care services. Most medical services remain strictly segregated—the only recent exceptions being for some cardiac and kidney transplant patients—despite over 50 years of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary protest pleading for the creation of equal, accessible, and adequate health care services for all of South Africa's people.

Statistics of Segregation

Medicine and medical services in South Africa are in a downward spiral, wrote Professor S. Benatar, chief of medicine at the University of Cape Town, in an editorial for the prestigious *South African Medical Journal* on September 5, 1987, "due to the fragmentation of health services and the provision within each fragment of unequal resources."

Daily patient expenditure by the state varies directly with race, he revealed, citing government statistics. At Baragwanath Hospital for blacks, serving Soweto, the state spent \$19 per patient daily, compared to \$88 spent for a similar white patient at Johannesburg General Hospital in 1986. Similar disparities were published for urban and rural centers across the country.

Benatar pointed out that these differences could not be defended on rational grounds. He asserted that they underlined the urgent need to rectify the tragic results of these inequities—gross overcrowding, understaffing, and a frequent shortage of essential medical equipment and medication.

Whites served by the state health services enjoy a doctor-patient ratio of 1:330, while for blacks the ratio is 1:12,000. In apartheid's bantustan "homelands," the situation is even worse—one doctor serves 14,000

blacks in the Transkei, 17,000 in Bophuthatswana, and 19,000 in Gazankulu. Nationwide, whites enjoy a nurse-patient ratio almost 700 percent better than blacks in state hospitals. Faced with a projected need of four hospital beds for every thousand people in South Africa, there is an estimated shortage of 81,431 hospital beds for blacks.

These figures—on par with those in some of the most underdeveloped countries in the world—are recorded in a nation that consistently demands First World recognition. When judged against South Africa's abundant national wealth, it becomes inescapable that these disparities are largely the result of apartheid political control of health services.

The impact of these separate and grossly unequal health care services upon the population are reflected by the relative life expectancy of blacks, 58.9 years, versus whites, 73.2 years, according to the state-published *South African Yearbook*.

Unicef studies have revealed that South Africa has one of the highest infant mortality rates in the world in relation to its national wealth. Fewer white babies died in their first year of life than in the U.S. (14 versus 17 per 1,000 live births), while between 80 and 102 black babies of every thousand born alive did not survive to celebrate their first birthday in 1985.

Malnutrition remains the major cause of infant death. It kills 55 percent of black children who die under the age of five years across the nation. In his report to the Carnegie inquiry into poverty and de-

velopment in southern Africa in 1984, Professor John Hansen, then chief of the Department of Pediatrics at Johannesburg's University of the Witwatersrand, noted that over 50,000 black children died from nutritional diseases in one year. One-third of all black children were underweight and stunted because of malnourishment. Thirty-one times more black children died from nutritional disorders than white children.

Today, three and a half years later, it is even worse. The Race Relations Survey (1987) revealed that between 30 and 70 percent of black schoolchildren were underweight, while 22 to 66 percent had stunted growth in reports from around the country.

Other poverty-related diseases that are widespread in South Africa include tuberculosis and cholera. The South African National Tuberculosis Association reported a 22 percent increase in tuberculosis between the years 1977 and 1983. A total of 62,103 new cases were documented. Epidemics of measles, bubonic plague, and polio have continued to be reported with seasonal regularity in recent years. Between 1980 and 1983, cholera outbreaks claimed 314 lives. These outbreaks of disease related directly to living conditions and the lack of clean water in the respective rural and urban areas.

State Violence Spurs Violence

Disease and death rates soared during the recent period of state violence and repression in black communities. In the July 1988 edition of the *American Journal*

Dr. David Seftel trained and worked at Baragwanath Hospital serving Soweto in the fields of medicine, surgery, and obstetrics-gynecology. In 1987, as a research officer in the department of pediatrics at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, he embarked on a doctoral study to create community-based programs to combat the single biggest killer of black babies in South Africa—infantile gastroenteritis. He provides voluntary research and consulting services to major South African civil rights law firms and community organizations on medico-legal issues. He is currently furthering his studies in the United States.

Polio Immunization Program, Alexandra Township: "Epidemics of measles, bubonic plague, and polio have continued to be reported with seasonal regularity in recent years"



AfricaImpact Visuals

of *Public Health*, Dr. Derek Yach of the Medical Research Council in Cape Town documented the additional problems caused by the state violence-induced disruption of basic services like running water and sanitation.

Access to the financially crippled black hospitals and clinics is more difficult and dangerous at these times. Police and army officers prevent ambulances from entering areas with high levels of state violence, and patients reporting to local state hospitals with bullet wound injuries are liable to arrest in their hospital beds, or even in the operating theater. Police and army personnel maintain a constant presence at all state hospitals and intervene at will in the provision of appropriate health care to black patients.

Politics versus Public Health

The recent government attempts to break the three-year rent boycott in black cities such as Soweto by cutting off unpaid-for utilities like water and electricity has produced a serious surge in fatal infectious disease and further burdened overcrowded and inadequate hospitals and clinics that serve these areas.

While clean water is essential to health, lack of access is common in South Africa's sickest communities. In the 1984 Carnegie report, Andrew Stone of Rhodes University in Grahamstown revealed that 90 percent of the people in the rural areas of the "homeland" Ciskei have to get their water from open sources shared by cattle. Some 152,000 blacks in the Mphala area of the "homeland" Gazankulu have to share use of 165 boreholes, a tap to population ratio of 1:760.

Not unexpectedly, the single largest killers in the black community are infectious and parasitic diseases (21 percent). Whites by contrast die from diseases of excess—circulatory disorders such as heart attacks account for 45 percent of deaths.

A Tale of Two Hospitals

The inadequate number of black state hospitals that do exist are grossly overcrowded, underserved, and poorly equipped and financed.

On January 7, reporter Carina Le Grange of the Johannesburg *Star* interviewed doctors, nurses, and patients at

Baragwanath Hospital, the country's largest black hospital serving Soweto's 2.5 million residents. Here is what she heard:

• "Patients die simply because the doctor is too busy to cope. There are too many patients, but these are unnecessary deaths."

—A doctor

There is clear evidence of a shifting of responsibility, an unwillingness to face up to the truth about AIDS and to initiate a truly effective and colorblind approach to the problem.

• "This place is disgusting, it is a disgrace. Patients queue at the toilets for hours, many defecate or urinate in their clothes while waiting."

—A patient

• "In the mornings, it takes us hours to get the people moving. They are stiff from sleeping on the floor. And at night, it is difficult to identify the correct patient for the appropriate medicine—there are no bed-ends onto which medical files with names and other information can be hung."

—A nurse

An official survey compiled by Baragwanath Deputy Superintendent G. Louw indicated that most medical wards chronically operate at between 160 and 250 percent of rated capacity.

Not eight miles away, the 2,000-bed white Johannesburg Hospital has been kept running with two-thirds of its fully equipped wards patientless since it was opened over 12 years ago. This white hospital's budget—for fewer than 30,000 admissions in 1985—was \$45 million. Baragwanath Hospital admitted more than 120,000 patients and treated 1,600,000 outpatients on a budget of \$40

million that year.

At the white Johannesburg hospital, a \$4 million helicopter-ambulance service was introduced four years ago, while basic motor-ambulance services to many large black communities were inadequate or non-existent. Despite ever-increasing health care needs, the state has slashed Baragwanath's budget by 10 percent this year. As a strategy to decrease the load on its black hospitals, the state cruelly raised fees by 150 percent on January 1. It had the desired effect—temporarily. Then patients began to pour in again, sicker, with many more suffering from advanced disease.

Retribution for Rocking the Boat

Concern over the documented deplorable and inhuman conditions that exist at black hospitals is longstanding. Despite decades of persistent campaigning by progressive doctors, politicians, and the press, the state refuses to open empty white hospitals to persons of all races. Instead, plans for yet another high-tech white hospital in Pretoria have been rapidly translated into reality—the \$150 million disease palace is today rising up alongside the H.F. Verwoerd Hospital in the capital city.

After 101 physicians at Baragwanath Hospital published a scathing letter in the *South African Medical Journal* documenting the horrendous overcrowding, the abominable ablution facilities, and the uncaring, uncompromising attitude of the apartheid administrators to the suffering of sick human beings, the state struck back in characteristic style.

Junior physicians who had signed the letter were denied appointments and senior physicians threatened with dismissal if they did not sign a special state-prepared "apology form." Despite a wave of publicity, a Supreme Court judgment against them, and international condemnation, the state succeeded in bullying the majority of doctors into submission.

The provincial executive committee member for health, Daan Kirstein, told *The Star*: "The doctors are being punished because they won't apologize for telling untruths." The deputy director of hospital services added: "Baragwanath serves a Third World community. They

[the patients] are used to sleeping on the floor. I don't know what all the fuss is about."

To counter adverse publicity, the state pumped close to \$2 million into support for the made-for-the-media separation of the Mathibela Siamese twins by Baragwanath neurosurgeon Lipchitz in February. Almost simultaneously, the rest of the hospital's budget was slashed by \$12 million. Epidemiologists estimate that thousands of other young lives were lost and continue to be lost daily due to the impact of this budget cut on basic medical services, especially for children.

Apartheid Maims

In the emergency room of Baragwanath Hospital, teenage white South African Army soldiers stitch hand, head, back, and leg injuries that their colleagues had inflicted only hours earlier, barely miles away in Soweto. Untrained and unlicensed to practice medicine or surgery, with no education in human anatomy, these soldiers are carrying out the order of a major in the South African Defence Force, Maj. H.H. Lawson, who is also professor and chief of surgery at Baragwanath.

Such joint appointments are not uncommon in state hospitals. Throughout the year, groups of white soldiers are required to get "stitching experience" by learning and practicing on unsuspecting maimed and wounded blacks in many hospitals across the country. No such program exists at any of the white hospitals.

The sad consequences of this unsupervised program are witnessed many months later when their "patients"—mostly children and young adults—start arriving at outpatient clinics with functionless fingers, wasted hand muscles, and crippled arms and legs. Neo-Nazi medicine in 1988. Black life is cheap.

Enter AIDS

Into this seething scenario enters the AIDS virus. How serious is the problem of AIDS in South Africa? The state AIDS Advisory Council reports a total of 96 confirmed cases of AIDS being treated in hospitals. However, there are good reasons not to trust the government figures. Reports in *The Star* of public conflict between Professor Metz of the committee

and Dr. Shapiro, head of the South African Blood Transfusion Services, have heightened fears of a state-orchestrated coverup of the true spread and incidence of the disease.

Responsible for testing all blood donated in South Africa, Shapiro cited figures 300 percent higher than those of Metz, at the National AIDS Conference in March. Metz was reported as ridiculing Shapiro and preventing him from discussing his data at the conference.

Shapiro's results made the front page in the largest black weekend paper, *City Press*. "You're doomed to die...if the spread of the AIDS virus in South Africa is not halted. The disease is moving across South Africa like an icy cold front, yet the authorities continue to mislead the public about its rapid spread."

Quoting Shapiro's data, the article revealed that the ranks of an estimated 15,000 AIDS carriers were increasing by 50 percent every three months. There were an estimated 50,000 carriers in June. Commenting on his organization's ongoing tests on young prospective mothers at maternity clinics in the black townships, Shapiro stated that an alarming number were seropositive and could give birth to babies with AIDS.

What is the source of AIDS in South Africa? HIV carriers in the white community conform to the high-risk groups in the U.S., and are mainly homosexuals and bisexuals, and a few intravenous drug users. White patients receive state-of-the-art intensive care unit and AZT treatment in the well-funded white hospitals and most pay little or nothing for this service. In contrast, AIDS in the black community is largely a curse that has been imported by the various apartheid policies.

Import Route 1: Apartheid's Migrant Labor System

"Ticking AIDS Bomb," announced Percy Qoboza's *City Press* headline in July 1987. It was to be celebrated editor Qoboza's last major story before his untimely death, one in which he almost single-handedly took on South Africa's largest industry, mining, together with the relevant government ministries.

"South Africa, through its mining industry, may soon become the world's

flashpoint for AIDS. And unless the present [government] migratory labor system is reviewed with special attention paid to traffic from African countries plagued by the disease, an AIDS bomb is ticking in our mines."

One of apartheid's oldest and most entrenched programs, the migrant labor system assures South Africa's most important industry with cheap, politically compliant, and stable black labor that has been shuttled back and forth from central African countries like Malawi for decades.

"The mining industry imports 40 percent of its workforce from high-risk AIDS countries like Malawi, Angola, Zambia, Zaire, and Burundi," reported Revelation Ntola in the *City Press* on May 21—this while almost 7 million out of 25 million South African blacks are unemployed.

"The problem doesn't end there. Because of the mines' close proximity to urban cities and townships, Reef communities are being threatened by this explosion through casual sexual relationships between miners and prostitutes." Prostitution, a product of apartheid-induced poverty, is widespread in black communities.

Writing in the journal *Critical Health*, researchers Jean Leger and Karen Jochelson stressed that "efforts to prevent the spread of AIDS that merely concentrate on education and counseling do not recognize the social and political factors that contribute to unsafe sexual practices. The single-sex migrant labor system institutionalizes many factors that facilitate the spread of AIDS—long absences of men away from their partners, those left at home seeking new relationships, and single sex hostels creating a market for prostitution."

In the same edition, Dunbar Moodie's paper on male sexuality on the gold mines reported that homosexual relationships on the mines tend to be monogamous rather than promiscuous.

Health Minister Hennie Van Niekerk added fuel to the fire by announcing that over 2,000 Malawian miners who had tested positive under a state-supported compulsory and non-confidential testing program would be repatriated after they had been "declared prohibited persons." Those foreigners whose contracts were about to expire shortly could stay until

the end of their terms, while those with longer contracts would be sent back to their countries of origin now, he said to *City Press*.

This sparked off a major confrontation with the National Union of Mineworkers, a Cosatu affiliate. Currently, the government has shelved the repatriation plan, but the anger generated by the use of AIDS test results as an excuse for business to dismiss and government to deport mineworkers continues to be vocalized across the nation.

Import Route 2: Contaminated Blood Products

On May 1, Sister C. Sims of the Cape Town branch of the Western Province Blood Transfusion Service told delegates to South Africa's first national AIDS conference that the first South African case of AIDS was diagnosed in 1983. Testing blood for AIDS became mandatory in the United States in September 1984. By September 1985, the South African provincial health services were still buying untested Factor 8 and 9 blood concentrate products from the U.S. blood bank, Cutter Inc.

"We never saw these blood products, and we ran the only testing facilities in South Africa at the time," commented Dr. Shapiro, South African Blood Transfusions' overall chief, to *City Press*. Bypassing the blood transfusion services, the state allowed these untested blood products, contaminated with the AIDS virus, to be distributed to all state hospitals. This tragic act of omission has resulted in 87 percent of the nation's hemophiliacs, mostly children and young adults, becoming AIDS-positive.

When the first hemophiliacs to develop full-blown AIDS started to die, the news erupted onto front pages across the country. Sons of an Afrikaans religious minister, the Del Frate brothers drew attention to the plight of the nation's blood-dependent hemophiliac population. The head of the Hemophiliac Society in Cape Town condemned the government for not acting to stop the flow of poisoned blood into the country. Responding, the state funded tracing and counseling of all the white hemophiliacs who had tested positive. Support facilities were provided.

No visible attempts were made to

trace or inform any of the black hemophiliacs that had been infected with the killer disease. Most hemophiliacs are young and many of the less severe cases in the black community are sexually active. Spouses, partners, families, and communities were kept in the dark. Once again, apartheid political priorities took precedence over public health responsibility.

Commented a member of a civic association: "For almost three years, these infected people have been allowed to spread the disease unknowingly into the community. Even today the criminal cover-up continues. The regime is generating genocide."

Representatives of anti-apartheid health bodies who work at state hospitals around the country commented that overcrowded black hospital wards were now admitting many cases of AIDS that were never reported in the media. No intensive care or isolation facilities were provided, they simply lay among the rest of the patients, often bleeding onto other patients because their intravenous lines were neglected by heavily overworked nurses in chronically understaffed wards.

"Apartheid hospitals have long ago failed to cope with treatment of the massive load of curable sicknesses," commented a nurse. "Hopelessly overcrowded, understaffed, and understocked, without many basic medical supplies, they offer a deplorable service to people suffering from common curable illnesses. How can they even pretend to be able to cope with the AIDS crisis?"

Worldwide, one of the keys to AIDS control is effective community education. How has the South African health care services met this need? There is clear evidence of a shifting of responsibility, an unwillingness to face up to the truth about AIDS and to initiate a truly effective and *colorblind* approach to the problem. The national anti-AIDS advertising campaign was entrusted to a private company, and was one of the last to be launched in the world. Intense controversy raged right up to the final launch date around the refusal of the government to allow the use of condoms to be advocated in the ads.

The campaign itself caused more confusion than clarity. Racially targeted, the white ads used graffiti on a wall, while

those targeted to the black community portrayed a family huddled around a grave, under a banner proclaiming boldly: "AIDS is Now in South Africa," as if it were a new brand of burial casket.

Post-advertising impact assessments by the company as well as by independent bodies revealed that the political constraints imposed by the client (the government) and its lack of coordinated follow-up and back-up facilities had caused the campaign to have a poor response from the target communities. South Africa's premier business weekly, the conservative *Financial Mail*, attacked the government for what it claimed was "an appalling comment on the attitude and lack of commitment of the client."

A survey of black attitudes to the government-sponsored anti-AIDS advertising campaign, conducted in the Johannesburg metropolitan area, revealed:

- Most people still thought that AIDS could be acquired by kissing, touching, toilet seat contact, and eating contaminated food.
- Fear and uncertainty were the most universal responses to the advertising campaign.
- The campaign displayed racist perceptions of the disease. The black ads created the impression that spread of the disease was inevitable, and that the government was "basically announcing a death sentence to the people." The ads left them feeling that there was nothing that they could do to halt the inexorable course of the disease.
- Most people felt distanced by the disease, it was too terrible to affect them.
- AIDS was now being used as an insult. Black women who refused a man's sexual advances were told, "You're not worth it anyway, you've got AIDS."
- Confusion and alarm had been created by the government emphasis on AIDS as a disease carried by laborers from neighboring states.
- Instead of clarity, confusion was compounded by the heavy advertising in the absence of adequate follow-up facilities. The state has attempted to advertise AIDS away. The apartheid regime has once again reacted with too little, too late, too secretly, and the community will have to suffer the consequences.
- Government-supported media was

creating the impression that there were two totally different kinds of AIDS. The one that only affected blacks was acquired through sexual and ritual contact with baboons in central Africa. The other was acquired by sexual contact with homosexuals—white AIDS.

There are also the following acts of deliberate omission:

- Failure to reverse the inequities in the health services and provide hospital and clinics that can offer adequate, efficient, and affordable health care for all of South Africa's citizens. If black hospitals already fail to cope with the load of curable diseases, how can they even hope to fight the AIDS epidemic?
- Failure to inform black hemophiliacs, their partners, or their families that they had been poisoned with AIDS.
- Absence of confidential testing and counseling facilities in the black areas.
- Suppression of free flow of facts about the AIDS situation in the country.
- Condom rationing at family planning clinics (two per person).
- Refusal to provide proper plastic gloves in the emergency rooms of black hospitals to protect physicians and other health workers from acquiring the disease through occupational exposure to blood products. Special petitions had to be made to use these "expensive" gloves at black hospitals, whereas they were readily available in all white hospital casualty units and wards. In black hospitals, the use of proper protective gloves is especially critical in the bloodiest sector, the emergency room. Here not only are doctors, nurses, cleaners, and clerks exposed to blood-borne AIDS, but also other patients.

Community leaders have extended a challenge to the apartheid regime. They advise, if the government is serious about addressing the AIDS crisis, that it should:

- Immediately and substantially expand health care services to ensure equal access for all of South Africa's people and open existing hospitals to all.
- Stop shifting responsibility through racist advertising. Provide more real action on AIDS prevention, and comply with the WHO Global Programme on AIDS.
- Give money back to our hospitals. This year's budget cut at Soweto's

Baragwanath Hospital alone was \$12 million.

- Provide free, confidential testing with freedom from victimization or repatriation.
- Provide free, appropriate, accessible, confidential, professional counseling for all.
- Advise, counsel, and control the tragic hemophiliac blood problem. Compensate

Despite decades
of persistent
campaigning by
progressive doctors,
politicians, and the
press, the state refuses
to open empty white
hospitals to persons of
all races.

those patients, families, friends, and communities contaminated through its negligence.

- Stop hiding the true facts about the AIDS problem. We have to live by its threat. We must have the power of facts to fight its threat against all.

Struggle for Health is Struggle for Freedom

South Africa's government is actively and passively creating a public health disaster—genocide by omission. The fundamental challenge that AIDS poses for the South African government in turn challenges the most entrenched pillars of the apartheid system. South Africa cannot fight AIDS effectively unless it fights the rigidly entrenched inequities of apartheid health care services as well.

AIDS may well prove to be a unique challenge for a government seeking to persuade us that apartheid is dead. Perhaps the most sickening and sinister specter is the covert way that AIDS has been harnessed to aid apartheid. Fundamental to the success of grand apartheid has always been black population control.

The handling of the AIDS crisis is a case study illustrating how the apartheid regime operates in a myriad of other fields: omission for a reason, planning to do nothing for a planned purpose. We are not deceived.

"Greater than the threat of a communist system, a military threat, or any other problems imaginable, the black population explosion is South Africa's biggest problem. Unless Africans get away from the idea that 'we breed and they feed,' the government will have to resort to drastic methods of birth control such as compulsory sterilization," said D. Campher, National Party executive member of the Cape Provincial Council, in 1984.

Now they have AIDS, and all signs indicate that the government is already using the disease to serve its political agenda. As long as the high-profile policy of black population control exists, there can be no reason for us to believe that the government will act differently to curb a disease that will ultimately achieve what war, forced removals, resettlement, the bantustan "homeland" policy, township massacres, severing township utilities, prohibitive rises in hospital tariffs, detention without trial, assassination squads, and sterilization programs have failed to do. Hence the irresponsible and ineffectual way in which it has responded to the AIDS crisis was not unexpected, and answers to another agenda.

This is why we are developing structures to fight the disease and protect the people against the deadly deception of the apartheid regime, one that will stop at nothing to ensure its own self-preservation. AIDS in South Africa under apartheid is a new and serious reason to spur actions that will bring about a speedy dissolution of this heinous system.

In addition to destabilizing its neighbors militarily and financially, South Africa's apartheid advocates are now quietly exploiting a public health crisis to ensure white hegemony and black decimation. In refusing to abide by the WHO Global Programme on AIDS, apartheid health authorities confirmed our worst fears. Through its policy of overtly and covertly aiding the disease, the government is determined to make South Africa a threat to world health. It is up to us to stop them, if we can. ○



DR. MATHILDE KRIM:



Waging War Against AIDS

By MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Why is AIDS primarily a heterosexual disease in Africa? Where and how did the disease originate? What impact will AIDS have on Africa's economic development? *Africa Report* poses these and other questions to one of America's leading experts on the disease, Dr. Mathilde Krim, a research scientist and founding co-chair of the American Foundation for AIDS Research. In this frank and informative interview, Dr. Krim also comments on the role of the donor community in assisting Africa's efforts to combat the public health menace.

Africa Report: Situate AIDS within the context of Africa's overall public health problems.

Krim: In terms of people infected already and sick today with AIDS, the problem is small as compared to other big health problems such as various intestinal parasites, diarrhea of children, malaria, tuberculosis, and so forth. But what is frightening with AIDS is that we are at the beginning of an epidemic. It has by far not reached its climax. We don't know how far it will go geographically and demographically among various groups of people, and we have today no handle on controlling it because we have no vaccine and no effective treatment. Even if in the Western world certain treatments become available in the not too distant future, they are going to be very costly and have to be used for the rest of the life of these patients. So in terms of cost and logistical difficulties, the problem is an enormous one.

AIDS may change the demographics in Africa. The population numbers will be going down instead of up, despite the high birth rate. So it is that serious. And the worst thing is that it is a disease of people who have a lot of intimate relations with others. In Africa, this is the behavior of urban people who have lost touch with their traditional values. I am not saying that the old values are better than the new ones, but they did regulate people's behavior, particularly women.

Big migrations in Africa from the villages to the city—these are the people who are hit by this disease. Because the educated ones are very much among these groups—the mobile, the unattached, those who go to universities and who then

become the cadres of these countries—this is a disease of the upper crust in Africa, the higher echelons. It is destroying the societal infrastructure because it hits these kinds of people. This is more true in Africa than in the U.S., where it tends to be a disease of certain groups with certain lifestyles, or minority groups, the poor, the depressed, people who take drugs, the marginal.

Africa Report: Some reports say that the real impact in Africa is yet to come, but others say that the level of infection is bottoming out.

Krim: No, it is not. However, we don't know how fast the disease is spreading because people who are infected don't have symptoms for a very long time—up to eight years on average. In order to know where the virus is, one has to test certain groups and areas and then extrapolate to the total population, so the estimates are very uncertain. They are still very uncertain in New York, so you can imagine in Africa that we have absolutely no idea. It is a very insidious kind of epidemic. By the time that you realize it is there, it is too late.

Africa Report: Why are modes of transmission in Africa different than in the U.S.?

Krim: They are not different, they are the same everywhere, except that in Africa, there is less segregation of people based on lifestyle. In the U.S., gay men live in communities by themselves because they are discriminated against. They find it more comfortable to live in cities which are more tolerant such as San Francisco or New York. It became part of their political philosophy to divorce sex from traditional val-

ues and have multiple sex partners. That kind of behavior facilitates the transmission of a sexually transmitted disease and this is true for many diseases—syphilis, gonorrhea, and hepatitis, but also for HIV.

But this kind of segregation by lifestyle does not exist in Africa. People are much more easy, so the virus spread by whatever means it found—homosexual, heterosexual, bisexual. In Africa, there is also the problem of malaria which necessitates blood transfusions, particularly in children, and that too spread the virus.

Africa Report: But in Africa, AIDS is primarily a heterosexual disease as compared to the U.S.

Krim: Yes, but that is a statement of fact. From the beginning we could see women getting this disease as often as men. This disease came into the U.S. through New York and it took hold in the gay community and among IV drug users because these were the two groups that did something that facilitated the transmission among themselves. But whenever it has the opportunity, it goes out into the heterosexual world and it is there now, but there was a delay because of the long incubation period. We didn't notice it for a long time. Even today, the numbers of straight men and women affected may be large, but we don't know. The number of cases of AIDS are very few, but in another five years, it is clear that we are going toward an epidemiology which will be much more similar to what it is in Africa.

Africa Report: Why does it seem that the largest number of cases are in central and southern Africa?

Krim: Because that may be where it originated. Africans have been extremely sensitive about the statement that this disease originated in Africa and they take it as an accusation. That is not the intention. We say that because it is a fact that the oldest infected bloods were identified in Zaire. This is why we say it may have started in Africa. It is not a certainty because infected bloods have also been found in South America and by now in other continents. This focus on Africa was brought about also because this type of virus—there are hundreds related to the AIDS virus—is very common in animal species, known to exist for many years in different species—birds, mammals, domestic and wild, and in monkeys. There are certain monkey viruses that are relatively close to the human virus in terms of genetic structures, behavior, and pathogenesis. They cannot cause disease in humans, but they are clearly related to the human virus, so the speculation has been that the human virus is a mutant of one of these monkey viruses, particularly one called the green monkey.

But it is not a single mutation, rather a large number of accumulated mutations, genetic events such as deletions and transpositions. It is conceivable that through a natural evolutionary process of genetic changes, a monkey virus suddenly became infectious for human beings. The more recent theory is that there was a human virus that was not causing disease that may have been around for centuries that suddenly became much more pathogenic. This is a natural phenomenon that occurs all the time. This is why once in a while we have an epidemic of something. In 1918, there was a big influenza epidemic that killed 20 million people around the world. A mutant influenza virus caused it and it mutated itself out of existence in a couple of years. But we cannot count on this with HIV. Hopefully it will happen, but so far it hasn't and we shouldn't wait for it to happen.

Africa Report: You mentioned the sensitivity on the part of African governments to perceiving that they were being

blamed for the disease. Initially that led to them almost denying that the disease existed in their countries. Have we gone beyond that phase?

Krim: Everywhere there has been a reaction of denial of this disease, because first of all it seemed to be a small problem. We had no idea how big it was and public health authorities had the attitude of wait and see what will happen before we frighten everybody and create a panic, before we divert resources from one thing to another. Resources are always limited. That has happened also in Africa.

Africans have been scared—because they depend so much on foreign capital—of creating a fear among those people and they are right. This is something that they have to be very mindful of. But now that they realize the severity of the situation, many African governments are being very courageous in instituting educational programs, which is very difficult. People don't all have a television set at home, communications in writing are more difficult because not all people read and some languages are not even written. So public education on a large scale there is very difficult, but nevertheless they are trying.

Africa Report: What are some of the other obstacles in addressing the disease in Africa—the general poor state of health infrastructure in general for example?

Krim: The general problem is poor communications, less of a pool of teachers, doctors, nurses, social workers to serve as spokesmen. Putting this disease in the general framework of all the other diseases and needs and allocating the meager resources there are in a reasonable way, then there are the specific problems of lack of health care delivery systems and lack of economic means, for example, to buy the testing kits, the equipment needed to do blood tests to protect the blood supply.

For example, in the U.S., we can tell people never to reuse the same needle or gloves, but this is a ridiculous statement to make in Africa. A needle is very valuable and it cannot be used only once. Even the disposable ones must be reused, and we should never talk them out of doing it, because if they don't reuse the needles, people may go untreated. So the message has to be different—how to clean a needle, which is easy in the case of HIV, because this is a very fragile virus which is very difficult to transmit. A needle can be cleaned with soap and water, or even plain water.

In Africa, it is traditionally midwives who help in giving birth, using their hands, and these women are at high risk of catching the infection through contact with fresh blood. They should use gloves, but to buy a new pair each time you touch a patient is unrealistic. They can reuse them by washing them and covering them with talcum powder.

Africa Report: Given the constraints in Africa in the health arena, financial and otherwise, what should be the essential elements of a strategy for African governments to deal with AIDS at this point?

Krim: The major thing is prevention. This is a venereal disease and we should call it that to get the message across on the mode of transmission. We must tell people to reduce the number of sexual partners and to use precautions. They have a pretty good idea what that means in addition to using condoms. In Africa, for men to go to bed with prostitutes is the most dangerous thing. Because of mobility of people and the opening of commercial routes in Africa, people travel by bus along certain routes. Epidemiologically, we can see the disease following these truck routes from West to East. Along

those routes are houses of prostitution and poor women who make a living like this. Men who are away from home for months consort with prostitutes and these women have acquired the infection very rapidly. In certain places in Kenya, 90 percent of them are infected, so for men to patronize prostitutes is very dangerous. That is the first thing that has to be said to them.

The second one is sexual promiscuity in general. If you do have new sexual partners, always use condoms and spermicides. To what extent these are available everywhere is a problem, because it has not been a traditional practice and it will be difficult to institute because religious groups are opposed to it.

Africa Report: How are African governments going to cope with the disease as the numbers increase, given the high cost of treatment?

Krim: It is an absolutely terrible situation. The best investment is in trying to warn people—prevention. Once somebody has the infection, because of the very long incubation period, they remain healthy and productive citizens for a long time, provided they don't infect others in the meantime. This is where education also comes in, to prevent the inadvertent spread on the part of those already infected who may not know it. This is why everybody has to practice safe sex, not only the healthy to protect themselves, but the infected to prevent others from becoming infected.

Once they start coming down with serious opportunistic infections, there is little in Africa given the economic means at hand to treat them effectively and maybe with very limited resources, one should not try. To treat such a person with advanced HIV infection against a second infection that may kill them with heroic, expensive means is maybe something that should not even be attempted and the resources instead should be put into prevention and immunization of young children against other diseases that can be as dangerous, if not more.

Africa Report: Do you think that the international community at large has reached the stage of fairly active global mobilization on the issue? Is it doing enough to assist Africa given its problems?

Krim: No, of course not. It has started and certain agencies are doing their best and on top of the list is the World Health Organization. It has a wonderful director who is extremely concerned and extremely dedicated to the premise that the economically rich countries have a moral obligation to help the countries that are less economically self-sufficient. But action in this area has barely started and it is hardly scratching the surface of the needs. Hopefully we can do better in the future. There are two things that are needed now: first, the funds—whatever rich countries can do for the Third World to provide educational material, information itself in a form that is acceptable culturally. Sometimes it may be pamphlets, videotapes, radio messages. We should help prepare these kinds of materials. And the second thing, not for now but for later when there will be a treatment for HIV infection, is to make it available, to give it in fact, to treat those infected early on so that they cannot infect others.

Africa Report: Can you assess the impact AIDS will have on the continent's economic development?

Krim: AIDS will go on spreading in the next 10 years despite educational efforts. It is very difficult to change people's sexual behavior. I think we are going to see more and more cases—up to 10 times as many as we have today—each year.

In certain areas, population growth may appear to slow down and revert to a decline, and this will have an effect on the work force and on the economies of those countries.

This is assuming that there is no wave of panic such as to prevent tourism and investments in Africa which could much aggravate the situation. That would be totally unjustified because in fact, the U.S. has been an exporter of the AIDS virus. Also it would be a ridiculous reaction because this virus is not transmitted through the air or through food or water. It is transmitted sexually, and as long as people don't have sexual relations with somebody infected, there is no danger whatsoever. So it would be a totally irrational reaction, but it may still happen. So far, it hasn't fortunately.

Africa Report: Are donor agencies and governments taking a more active role in supplying basic equipment to Africa to test for the disease, for example, and condoms, gloves, etc.?

Krim: Yes, in certain places, but it is by far not a general thing. For example, in Africa, there is not yet screening of blood donations and this is terrible because by wanting to help a kid with malaria, we may give him something worse. There have been a number of international conferences, and for example, the Scandinavian Red Cross is running programs and helping as much as they can in sending medical personnel. A World AIDS Foundation is being created, which will use the royalties from the sale of testing kits in the developed world to buy testing kits for African countries. So there are things underway, but not in place yet. It is very spotty right now.

Africa Report: Is there anything else you would like to say to our readers?

Krim: Yes. There is no casual transmission of the virus—it is strictly sex and blood, nothing else, not a single case otherwise. That is important for businessmen who deal with Africa to understand. I get phone calls from American businessmen in Africa, who are scared if they have a car accident, if they need a blood transfusion, will they get contaminated blood? The answer is no. The State Department has made the following arrangements: First, people they send on their jobs are tested before leaving by federal law, and they are all walking blood banks. They pledge that if needed, they will contribute blood. So if an American citizen is in a car accident or medical emergency which requires blood, the American embassy will get him clean, tested blood.

For those who go into the bush, on safari, etc. where there is no American embassy, the embassy provides saline solution for travel, because what is needed in an emergency situation is the liquid. If you lose blood, you need to replace blood volume. Treating the anemia from blood loss can be done a few days later, but you need saline immediately. Travelers are given clean saline by embassies before they embark on a trip. So there is no reason for businessmen or tourists to become worried or handicapped in whatever they want to do because of AIDS in Africa.

Lastly, I'd like to say that Africans have a tremendous resilience—they have put up with a lot! A hundred years ago, the average survival time in Ghana for white men was six weeks. They would die like flies because of malaria, hepatitis, yellow fever. And the African survived, over thousands and thousands of years, and managed to build a culture and a civilization. They have a lot of resilience and resistance and I think they will survive this one too, although over the immediate future, the next 10 years, it is going to be very painful because they are going to lose many people. ○

DISPELLING MYTHS ABOUT

**LOVE
CAREFULLY**



**LOVING IS BEAUTIFUL BUT
COULD ALSO BE DEADLY.**

NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE PREVENTION OF AIDS

UGANDA


AIDS IN AFRICA

The reality of AIDS in Africa is different from popular impressions—not one of widespread devastation of a continent—but of yet another trial for nations struggling to cope with health and poverty-induced crises. Confronted with the same debates as the U.S. over the disease's origins, routes of transmission, and treatment, African countries are also facing similar dilemmas about care for its victims and a renewed discussion of traditional versus modern values.

A young Rwandan truck driver, waiting in Nairobi to head west, stood tire-high among 18-wheelers parked row on row in a great arcade of steel.

The road loops around here, making a large circular park where truckers

Mark Peters/Sygnia



"Myths and misinformation have distorted the West's view of this place, these people, and the epidemic here"

gather. It is one of scores of collecting points for drivers along the trans-Africa highway in Central and East Africa. The men gather here to talk, to eat, to meet the women inevitably stationed nearby.

The wiry young Rwandan smiled and chatted easily until the subject of AIDS came up. Then he bristled.

No group in Africa is more heavily laden with infection than the truckers, prostitutes, and soldiers who ride the highways and visit the truck stops. About 30 percent or more of the truck drivers tested are infected, and between 30 and 90 percent of the prostitutes tested in Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zaire carry the fatal virus.

Standing in the dry, stubbly grass on a warm Nairobi afternoon, the young man

Philip J. Hills spent five weeks traveling through Central Africa and four weeks traveling in Europe and America to compile this report, which is reprinted from The Washington Post with permission. Copyright © 1988 by The Washington Post.

took a while to admit any worry about the disease. "I do not go with the worst women, only the regulars," he said sharply. But it's hard to know who's infected, he said. "It is a very deep disease, you cannot tell if they have it except deep in their eyes. There you can see it," he said.

Among the women, there is a similar mix of fear and fatalism. In the dim, dirty Kampala bars, women now drink their beer through straws. The same women say that when going with a man, they do not insist on the use of a condom. But here in the bar, they pay an extra five shillings for the straws, so they will not have to put their lips to the bottles, where they fear the AIDS virus may lurk.

* * *

From the Indian Ocean east to Zaire, from Uganda and Tanzania south to Zambia, the highways are now lighted up with hot spots of AIDS infection. The virus has traveled down the tangled ribbon of roads known as the trans-Africa highway, cutting across the continent just south of the equator.

It is here that the West has looked for clues about the disease—surprised by the intensity of AIDS and its rapid spread among heterosexuals. But myths and misinformation have darkened and distorted the West's view of this place, these people, and the epidemic here.


Just how rampant is AIDS in Africa? Is the continent dying, as one medical magazine suggested? Why does the virus attack women and men equally in Africa but not in the United States? Is this where the epidemic began?

Amid rumors about a continent of loose morals and political catastrophe, the reality of AIDS in Africa is different from popular imaginings—at once more modest and more complex.

The tale of AIDS in Africa is not one of widespread devastation and the collapse

of nations. There are 53 countries in Africa and AIDS exists substantially in only a few of them in the center of the continent. They are principally Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Zambia, Zaire, Tanzania, Congo, and the Central African Republic. Even in those countries, the disease is intensely concentrated only in some urban areas and the roads between them. The rural areas are largely free of AIDS.

What's more, the new epidemic is only one of a cluster of catastrophes in Central Africa, where there is disease beyond the reach of health care, poverty deeper than most any place on earth, and a tidal wave of population growth that keeps basic living conditions out of control.



"It is a family disease in a culture that values the family and child above all other things"

Going by the number of those who have died, AIDS is not among the top five diseases. In most places, it is not among the top 10. In many African countries, in fact, the disease seems nearly nonexistent.

The tale of AIDS in Africa is about a new disease added to the trials of nations that have no more than a single doctor for every 25,000 people, spend no more than \$9 a year on health care for the average citizen, and cannot even keep records in some hospitals for lack of paper to

Mark Peters/Sygnia

write them on.

It is a family disease in a culture that values the family and child above all other things—where women here have, on average, seven children each.

It is a political issue that sharpens the division between urban and rural, traditional and modern, raising the same medical and moral tangle that characterizes the AIDS debate in the U.S.

Origins and Green Monkeys

Nothing angers African health officials more than assertions that the disease started here. Their anger comes at least partly because they knew the disease as an American phenomenon for two years before they spotted cases in Africa.

The first case in the U.S. was identified in 1981. In Uganda, it was 1983 when pulmonary specialist Dr. David Serwadda first saw the syndrome in a few patients. Initially, he had trouble accepting it. "It looked like the new American disease. But none of us could believe it. We couldn't understand how it got here so fast from America," he said.

Dr. Gottlieb Monekosso, director of the World Health Organization's African office in Congo, said that the obsession with the origin of the disease is needless and harmful. "When a fire is burning in your house, it's not the time to start asking who lit the match or who was smoking the cigarette," Monekosso said.

The origin of the epidemic is still unknown. Like many of the previous great epidemics of history, it could have started in animals. Scientists have identified AIDS-like diseases that affect many animals, including sheep, cattle, goats, and monkeys. But if it did originate in animals, it is probably a virus that does not greatly affect them and only became a fatal epidemic in humans.

Another possibility that researchers now favor is that AIDS could have been a disease harbored by isolated peoples for many years before breaking out into an epidemic. In this latter scenario, a small group of people resistant to the effects of the virus have long had it and only recently passed it out to the world as civilization reached them.

In any scenario, however, two key events must have taken place: The virus must have mutated from a less harmful one to a fatal one, and the virus must

have broken out of an animal or human enclave to infect people around the world.

Some years ago, Western scientists suggested that the intensity of the epidemic in Central Africa indicated the disease started there. When researchers found African green monkeys infected with a similar virus, they began to speak confidently that these animals were the source of the world epidemic. Now, that theory has run into trouble with the facts.

To begin with, it is not clear when the first cases of the disease occurred. In 1981, doctors in the U.S. noticed an unusual outbreak of two relatively rare conditions—the skin cancer called Kaposi's sarcoma and the often-fatal pneumonia called *Pneumocystis carinii*—in homosexuals who had sexual relations with one another.

Then when researchers in Africa looked back through unusual case histories and frozen blood samples, it seemed the disease must have been present in Africa as far back as the 1960s. The earliest trace seen so far in humans was found in the blood of an anonymous donor who gave blood in 1959 in Kinshasa, Zaire; his serum was frozen and checked by two tests 25 years later.

Meanwhile, the green monkey hypothesis also has been largely discredited. Molecular analysis now shows that the virus infecting monkeys was probably not the ancestor of the AIDS virus but rather a cousin, with the ancestor of both viruses still a mystery.

To spread, diseases like AIDS do have some basic requirements, such as a minimum number of people to infect. Outbreaks of new disease have always been associated with the coming of civilization: both the creation of cities, which bring many people together, and the taming of land and animals, which bring animals together with people in frequent, close contact.

The epidemic began when the virus broke out of its confinement and began to spread among people who had no defenses against its attack: a classical "virgin soil" epidemic. But precisely where and how remain a mystery.

All in the Family

One of the biggest question marks about AIDS is why does the disease in

Africa appear to be wholly heterosexual? Here, patients with AIDS are half men and half women—unlike the 13-1 ratio of men to women in the U.S., where the virus has spread primarily among homosexuals and IV drug users.

In the medical literature of the West—and in letters and rumors—there has been a steady offering of dark explanations about strange and unclean rituals that might make some Africans more susceptible to the disease. The list includes female circumcision, creating cosmetic scars, injecting monkey blood into young people at puberty, and forcing a widow to have sexual relations with an in-law to exorcise the spirit of her dead husband.

The facts are simpler. First, there is virtually no anal sex reported among the people of Central Africa. Researchers are firmly convinced that there are few homosexuals in that part of Africa because survey after survey involving thousands of interviews in several nations has turned up few responses indicating homosexual or bisexual activity.

That means the path the disease took in the United States was blocked. Though the disease is not very easy to pass from man to woman and woman to man by ordinary vaginal sex, in Africa, heterosexuals have proved the virus can be transmitted very effectively.

Health officials speculate that the spread among heterosexuals is aided greatly by the heavy load of untreated, sexually transmitted diseases in Central Africa. The presence of syphilis, gonorrhea, chancroid, and herpes appears to make the virus more easily transmitted.

In Central Africa, about 10 percent or more of the population is estimated to be infected with one or more sexually transmitted diseases. What's more, one Zambian study showed that among 29 AIDS-infected people with genital sores from these diseases, all 29 infected their spouses.

But certain unusual cultural practices attributed to Africans, such as female circumcision—the surgical amputation of the clitoris, sometimes accompanied by stitching together of the labia to close access to the vagina prior to marriage—are fairly rare in Central Africa and irrelevant to AIDS, researchers say. Even practices that clearly could spread AIDS,

such as the ritual in which a widow is expected to have sexual intercourse with an in-law to exorcise the spirit of her dead husband, are performed so infrequently that they could have little impact on the general epidemic.

The most controversial issue in the debate is promiscuity. African officials recoil at the word, saying there is neither more nor less than in the cities of other nations.

In Central Africa, conservative values still hold sway in the countryside, where the chiefs, cousins, grandfathers, and grandmothers of those who've moved to the city still reside, and where many of those who get AIDS will return to die.

There, children are not told about sex until marriage. It is thought inappropriate for a man to kiss his wife in public. The reach of these values extends to censoring kissing scenes from movies and preventing sexually explicit magazines and books from being publicly sold.

As in other parts of the world, however, when the people come to the cities they create a new sexual climate. "There is some promiscuity in Central Africa, though it would be a gross misstatement to say all Africans are promiscuous," said Robert W. Ryder, a U.S. researcher who is director of Project SIDA, Zaire's AIDS research program.

The young women arrive in the city from the village, are unable to find work and so turn to the simplest means available to gain some money and security. They seek men with means. The older men, who have jobs and often are married, find they can carry on such affairs with relative ease. Thus, Ryder said, there is a relatively small group of young, sexually active women who are serving the sexual needs of a relatively large group of somewhat older men.

There is a combination of male dominance and female freedom to have sexual relations that is specially African. Many have accepted, if not approved, the habit among married and single men of moving from affair to affair.

That attitude is reflected by one Nairobi woman who calls herself Margaret, a tall husky woman who works part time in the day and goes out to bars in the evenings. "African men are not like men in the United States. They treat women like property. But for the women, that's

okay," she said. "A man, well, he can go out and do it so long as I don't know. He will always come back. For a woman, being taken care of is the important thing. . . ."

Underscoring the sexual attitudes in newly urban Africa is what is called "Chaila's dictum." As columnist Kapelwa Musonda wrote in the *Times of Zambia*, a jealous housewife in Kabwe had "caused grievous bodily harm" to her husband for fooling around with other women.

In passing sentence against the woman, Judge Matthew Chaila told the housewife as well as women in general that a Zambian man is "inherently, culturally, and instinctively polygamous, and married women who failed to appreciate

The tale of AIDS in Africa is not one of widespread devastation and the collapse of nations.

this fact ran the risk of being plagued by stomach ulcers, high blood pressure, insomnia, and alcoholism."

Musonda wrote that the speech was celebrated in bars throughout Zambia. But those attitudes are changing. AIDS "is bringing to an end those polygamous ventures so persistently pursued by the majority of us," he wrote.

Living with AIDS

Just before the rains come in Zambia, it is hot, the dust is red, and the women with infants crowd into the narrow shadows of the tropical trees near the national hospital in Lusaka.

Some time ago in a white, dirtied side building here, doctors began testing newborns for signs of AIDS. But even before the babies could get to them, four of the first six infants died of other causes, taken by the region's more common killers.

Malaria, diarrhea, and tuberculosis are out of control here. The hospitals are jammed with people and short of doctors and drugs. For every 1,000 children born

in Zambia, as many as 300 will die before they reach the age of five. Handling diseases that have treatments or vaccines available is trouble enough in Africa. But to handle one with neither, one that infects years before it causes death is worse.

In the Mulago Hospital in Kampala, the capital of Uganda, down a dark corridor in a small room, is the hurried, intense-looking Dr. Roy Mugerwa. He sits for only a moment to answer questions. His office looks more like a storeroom, with boxes of supplies heaped against the walls, on the floors, and on the desk itself.

Mugerwa is director of medicine at Mulago, the nation's premier hospital, where 40 percent of the patients are infected with AIDS. After the beds in the medical ward were filled, mats were laid on the floor until there was no room there either. Three more new AIDS patients come in every day.

Clasping his hands in front of him, Mugerwa answers a painful question in a low voice. It is common practice not to tell patients if they are infected with AIDS. The disease carriers are sent back into society ignorant of their condition, a situation that offends the sensibilities of doctors elsewhere and weighs on the minds of doctors in Africa as well.

"I am haunted by this," said Mugerwa. Still, he does not routinely tell patients if they are infected. "Do you tell a patient? If you tell, we have no facilities for counseling. You just tell them and send them out with nothing to help. . . . If you don't [tell them], it is also bad. The person has put trust in you, but you are hiding something," he said.

He fears what will happen to a man or woman sent back home with the disastrous news: Women can be divorced and men may be humiliated in Africa for not producing children. The doctor would have to tell his patients to avoid sex without a condom and not to have children, creating a storm among in-laws and grandparents.

Complicating matters is the problem of false test results. Confirmatory tests that are routine in the U.S. cost a month's wages and are often impractical in Central Africa. Without them, patients may be told they are infected when they are not.

"For the majority of patients I am reluctant to tell them if they are infected," Mugerwa said. "If I am in a position to confirm the test, and if the personality of the patient is one that I know can handle the news well, then I may tell the patient."

But Mugerwa says, whether the patient is positive or negative on a test, he still tells patients essentially the same thing—to restrict their sexual activity.

Some African doctors say that to send a man home to infect his wife, or to send a person out with the chance that he will donate infected blood, is dangerous and unethical. Dr. Alan Howarth, a professor of psychiatry at the University of Zambia who counsels AIDS patients, said, "There is no question about this. . . . One should tell them. They should be able to plan their lives with the knowledge of what's ahead."

One program in Zambia represents a striking departure from the usual secretiveness. Dr. Subhash Hira of the University Teaching Hospital in Lusaka and his group in the sexually transmitted disease clinic there began a new policy a year ago to tell patients whether they are infected, and to counsel them.

"The most important area of difference between the West and Africa is that in the West, people talk about AIDS and sex, about homosexuality, about safe sex and sexual release," said the University of Zambia's Howarth. "In Africa, AIDS is a family disease and the whole perspective is different. . . . The emphasis here is on the impact on the married, the extended family, and the strong expectations of family and friends," he said.

In Africa, one of the worst effects of AIDS is that it prevents couples from having children. Howarth recalled a man who already had four children but who was still distraught when he found out that AIDS would prevent him from having more children.

Zambia's Hira and Howarth approach the subject of children carefully when they counsel those who are infected. In one case, when a man became infected, his relatives turned against him and his wife left the marriage bed. She also worried that when the man died, the traditional healer would declare the cause of death to be witchcraft, not AIDS.

The counseling experiment has

proved a success. Among the most important facts imparted in the counseling was that AIDS does not kill immediately, as nearly all patients had thought. "Our results show that patients can do very well" and neither rampages nor suicide are very likely, he said.

Another myth in the West about Africa is that there is no one to care for patients with AIDS. In fact, while there are only a few hundred doctors in all of Zambia, for example, there are 10,000 traditional healers, the nation's chief physicians. They have many different beliefs and practices and range from the witchdoctors of legend to men who wear suits and offer herbs along with modern medical advice.

Traditional healers claim they can cure AIDS by giving herbs, exorcising spirits,

Healers like **Vongo provide a psychological benefit for people suffering from AIDS symptoms.**

and counteracting curses. People believe them, often as much or more than they believe "Western-style" medical doctors at the local clinics and hospitals.

The belief remains firm despite the tale of the witchdoctor in the AIDS-laden Rakai region of Uganda: He claimed to be able to cure AIDS but died of the disease himself.

One of the leading healers in Zambia is Vongo. He explains that while medical doctors say the cause of the disease is a virus, there is no word for virus in African languages. For that reason, healers don't pay any attention to alleged causes but focus on relieving symptoms. Besides, many of the symptoms that come with AIDS are quite familiar to African healers, such as diarrhea, headaches, fevers, and weight loss.

Sitting with his feet on a blessed zebra skin and a python hide dangling from the ceiling, Vongo showed the herbs he uses to treat AIDS, none of which he would name. He spoke of mixing powders and

goo that can be used in a sauna-like steaming. "As you sweat, the virus comes out," he said. "We reduce the virus in our own primitive way."

He spoke of the importance of halting diarrhea immediately with a constipating potion of ground-up bark; in Africa, death caused by the dehydration of diarrhea is among the greatest killers. For the chest symptoms of AIDS, he talked of "certain leaves" that are also suitable to cure tuberculosis and asthma.

Vongo said he has done well in treating AIDS. He will not take patients who are very sick. "I don't want to waste herbs on those who are going to die," he said. But he has treated about 60 victims of AIDS and said that four are still alive and doing well. Ultimately, he said, prevention is more important than treatment, and for that, his chief prescription is for African men: They "must stay home, stick to their wives."

Healers like Vongo provide a psychological benefit for people suffering from AIDS symptoms, even though they may not be able to accurately diagnose AIDS infection. As Hira of the University Teaching Hospital in Lusaka said: "Traditional healers can be valuable. They have a person-to-person relationship with the patients. They are more dependable that way, compared to doctors. They know each other and each other's position in the community. The patients would like to comply with the healer's suggestions much more than with the doctor's."

Prevention and Politics

With no cure for the disease, condoms and education are seen as the only two ways to stem the epidemic. One of the most advanced AIDS prevention programs in the world, more advanced than the U.S. national program, is the WHO-sponsored program in Uganda. There, a random national survey to find out who is infected is nearly complete, and frank texts are beginning to be put into schools.

In Kenya, nurse Elizabeth Ngugi is rapidly becoming famous for her work with Nairobi prostitutes. Condoms are strange objects in Central Africa, she said. They are often called "American socks," just as the disease—which is associated with the U.S.—is sometimes referred to as "foreign AIDS."

Ngugi, a feisty, middle-aged woman,

works in the district of Nairobi called Pumwani, where there is an intense concentration of AIDS and prostitutes. She confronted the "stool-sitters" of Pumwani, the women who perch on stools outside their small, square mud huts while they wait for customers: five to 10 per day at a dollar and a quarter each.

The most recent survey taken last year among some 800 women found that more than 88 percent were infected. It is with these women that Ngugi set out to prove that sexual behavior can be changed, and condoms can be used as a real protection against disease. She employed large diagrams, skits, and plain descriptions of the disease. "Change will come with the beauty of knowing they can do something about the disease," she said as she sat on the mosquito-netted bed and sipped her warm Coke.

"The vaccine of the day, of this time and place, is the condom," she says. Her program and her intense, lively personality have had an effect. When the experiment began, only 8 percent of women were using condoms, and then only occasionally. By last year, she said, "more than 90 percent of the women were using condoms now and again. This was a completely new behavior for them."

It turned out that it did not matter whether a woman was already infected or not; both began to use condoms equally. Those infected felt they might help stave off the worst of their disease if they kept using them, in addition to feeling some responsibility to keep from spreading the disease.

Second, she found that intense counseling was not necessary to get women to use condoms. A few sessions of education and encouragement convinced most of the women. More intense counseling added to condom use, but not greatly. Ngugi's experiment is regarded as a model for other prevention programs.

As in the U.S., there is vehement opposition to the advertising of condom use as a way to prevent AIDS. Most often this opposition comes from church groups. Sometimes, government and church officials are able to resolve their differences. According to one researcher, in Kinshasa, archdiocese officials said they might look the other way in

public, saying privately, "Extramarital affairs are a sin. But don't die of a sin."

When there was a dispute in Zaire about the national AIDS slogan, the government and church made their peace by each printing their own posters and pamphlets.

Beyond the disputes over condoms and posters, there are fights over educational material. What should textbooks and pamphlets sent into the schools say?

One afternoon in the office of the Christian Council of Zambia, Edith Mutale, women's program coordinator, was explaining to a reporter why people had begun to return to the tribal values and the Christian churches.

It is a political issue that sharpens the division between urban and rural, traditional and modern, raising the same medical and moral tangle that characterizes the AIDS debate in the U.S.

"AIDS is a moral issue, not a medical one," she said, leaning back in the chair in her small office. "Morality over medicine. Doctors don't know what to do about it, so people have to turn to the church. For measles, the doctor can give you a vaccine. For other diseases—they have treatments. But AIDS cannot be prevented with a vaccine, nor are there treatments.

"The only way to fight AIDS is to teach people to behave in an acceptable way. If people would be morally high, the problem would be completely solved," she said.

The government booklet in Zambia describes the AIDS problem in simple, direct terms. It explained that the best way to avoid AIDS was to abstain from sex outside marriage, adding that for those who were going to have sex anyway, condoms should be used.

Mrs. Mutale's face grew angry quickly as she began to attack the little pamphlet, which was being distributed to children in some schools. "Information like this going into our schools is wrong.

"It is not Zambian to talk about sex. Parents never talk to children about sex. Only at marriage, and even then it is the grandmothers and aunts who tell children about it," she said.

As she spoke, a young man working with the council came in, listened for a moment, then laughed. "You are naive. The children are going to do it anyway. They are doing it every day. You've got to try to protect them. You are just naive to think they are not doing it," he said.

"We must teach them not to do it," Mutale said staunchly.

"And what of those who do it anyway? Leave them to get the disease and die?" the young man asked.

"Our traditional values must come back," she said, spreading her palms and laying them flat on the desk. "Those who get the disease we should not abandon. We must help people to accept disease, and to die upholding faith in Jesus. Our traditional values must come back," she repeated.

* * *

In the great epidemics of history, people have shrunk back, shifted, and moved on again. In Central Africa, the AIDS epidemic is on, and the people are beginning to take it into account, mourn, and move on.

But out of the villages and out of the past of those who have migrated to the cities with AIDS has come a rekindling of fervor for tradition, for religion. Amid the epidemic, the old values are now being discussed in bars and offices.

Journalist Remy Kabali of the *Sunday Times* of Zambia marveled at how well the current epidemic fit with his grandmother's tales, repeated generation to generation, and now become cogent again.

"There is a word—'tuyebela'—which means small, invisible insects," he said. "We were told stories about these by our grandmothers when we were little. They said you would get these and they would make you sick if you had sex before marriage.

"Now grandma is saying, 'Look! What I told you is true!'" ○



An **OPEN APPROACH** to AIDS

By CATHARINE WATSON

A nation with one of the world's worst AIDS epidemics, Uganda also has one of the most active and open strategies to combat the disease. Despite severe budgetary limitations stemming from the nation's legacy of economic collapse, a vigorous education campaign and counseling services for AIDS patients have made Uganda's approach a model for other African nations.

Bus driver John Kasirye is slowly dying of AIDS. So are his wife and daughter, but he tries not to see it. They live in a dark servants' hut on a hill in Kampala. Neighbors avoid them.

It is John's sister who sustains them, bringing chicken and avocados from the village—one of the few relatives who still keeps in touch.

John may be dead by the end of 1988—he has been sick for two years. By then, however, there will be at least 8,000 other confirmed AIDS cases in this East African nation.

Uganda has one of the worst AIDS epidemics in the world, and the number of cases is doubling every four to six months. Several hundred thousand Ugandans are thought to be infected with the AIDS virus—to be "HIV-positive."

Incomplete and tentative samplings suggest that 11-19 percent of Kampala blood donors, 10-24 percent of Kampala's pregnant women, 30-48 percent of hospital inpatients, and 67 percent of truck-stop barmaids have the AIDS virus in their blood. Experts here stress that even if transmission were to stop today, a vast death toll still looms.

But if few countries in the world are as badly affected by the disease, few have done as much to halt it. Uganda has had a vigorous AIDS education campaign since 1986. It is the only country in the world to carry out a national serosurvey to determine the prevalence of the virus. The national science syllabus has been reworked to include AIDS. There are

AIDS primers and wall charts for schools.

HIV-positive Ugandans run a counseling service, the only one in Africa. The powerful Protestant and Catholic churches have launched anti-AIDS drives, stressing sexual fidelity for the healthy, compassion and care for the sick. Three million gloves and crates of rubber boots have been brought in to protect health workers, particularly midwives.

This forthright approach has its roots in politics. Over 500,000 people died under the Amin and Obote regimes, a slaughter that Yoweri Museveni, president since 1986, fought for years to end. Once in power, he and his colleagues in the National Resistance Movement (NRM) were not about to preside over another one.

It was Museveni himself who instructed the Ministry of Health not to hide the gravity of AIDS. On a trip to Rakai, the worst-affected district, peasants told him that AIDS would go soon because they were now good: They had stopped stealing goats.

"You see," he told ministry officials later, "If you don't mobilize the people with the truth, they will mobilize themselves around a lie."

Openness has had irritating side-effects, however. Journalists and TV teams have flooded in, demanding interviews of overstretched officials. Exhausted AIDS sufferers have poured out their hearts, mistaking the journalists for doctors.

In their articles, many journalists have stressed "promiscuity." Ugandan doc-

tors still brandish a *Washington Post* article which features a man with 100 partners. Others wrote that Uganda was doomed—bad press for a country seeking a fresh start. Ordinary Ugandans resent the insinuation that AIDS is worst in Uganda. "It's because we've talked about it that it looks like it spread faster here," says bank accountant Jane Waswa. "Other countries are just as badly off."

But the advantages of honesty have far outweighed the drawbacks. There is now strong evidence that many Ugandans know what AIDS is, know how the virus is caught, and most importantly, are changing their behavior.

The government's message has been "Love Carefully": Limit your partners, know them, and when in doubt, use a condom. The churches' messages has been the stricter "Love Faithfully": No sex outside marriage.

The campaigns have used leaflets, posters, radio, schools, political cadres, the army, and local civic action groups to spread the word in Uganda's many vernaculars. All have stressed that untested blood transfusions and dirty needles can pass the virus, as can mothers to newborns. They have emphasized that AIDS cannot be caught from shaking hands, from sharing cups or bedding, or from mosquitos.

In a recent survey of 204 Ugandans, 90 percent knew that the best way to avoid AIDS was to only have sex with one faithful partner. Even among respondents in a remote village, over 30 percent could correctly list three or four ways of catching the disease.

But perhaps the best proof that the

Catharine Watson writes for The Independent, The Observer, and the Toronto Globe and Mail from Kampala. She also works for the BBC.

word is getting through comes from the extraordinary decline in sexually transmitted diseases (STDs).

Uganda used to have one of the highest STD rates, possibly the highest, in the world. One medical paper reports that during the early 1970s, Kampala had 5,143 cases of gonorrhea and 572 of syphilis per 100,000 people: Nairobi had 3,600 and 280, Atlanta 2,510 and 88, London 308 and eight. There are no figures for Uganda now, but doctors in Kampala say STDs are almost rare.

Dr. Muktar Ahmed, who has had a downtown clinic for over 30 years, says he used to see up to 50 cases a week. Now he sees a maximum of four. The Uganda General Practitioners Association and Makerere University report the same. Clinics which relied on treating STDs have gone out of business. The price for an injection of the antibiotic Gentamycin, the treatment for chronic gonorrhea, has tumbled from 600 shillings six months ago to 80 today.

Says Dr. Ahmed: "The propaganda about AIDS has worked. People are sticking to one person or using condoms."

Dr. Samuel Okware heads Uganda's AIDS Control Program (ACP). He says the apparent fall-off in STDs could be crucial for two reasons. First, it indicates that sexual contacts are more controlled; possibly, therefore, the AIDS virus is being passed less often. There are fewer new infections.

Second, it is thought that an STD infection, above all if it involves genital sores, helps the virus to enter the body. A decrease in STDs should lessen the

ease of transmission during each act of sex.

Forty-three percent of Uganda's confirmed AIDS cases had a history of genital discharge and 32 percent a history of genital ulcers. Some researchers hypothesize that the high prevalence of STDs in Africa accounts for AIDS' rapid spread on the continent. In Africa, AIDS is a heterosexual disease. In the U.S. and Europe, heterosexual sex is a relatively inefficient way of passing the virus.

Other good news has come out of new research in Uganda.

- Seventy percent of cases come from south and southwest Uganda. Much of the north and east and many distant villages show little trace of the virus.
- Cases contracted through infected blood have fallen from 12 percent in 1987 to 8 percent in 1988. This is due to blood screening, to doctors giving fewer transfusions, and to the selection of healthier blood donors.
- The role of dirty needles seems less

There is strong evidence that many Ugandans know what AIDS is, know how the virus is caught, and most importantly are changing their behavior.

than once thought. There are virtually no AIDS cases in the five to 14 age group, yet most Ugandan children have frequent chloroquine injections for malaria, often with dirty syringes.


- Research from Rakai confirms that the disease is not easily passed, not even by intimate non-sexual contact. For example, 114 household members of 23 AIDS sufferers were tested for the virus: 71 percent of the sexual partners were positive, but everyone else was clear.
- The army, which was taking AIDS deep into rural Uganda, especially during its war in the north and east, is now organizing against it. Army Commander Maj.-Gen. Elly Tumwine announced in July that promiscuous soldiers in his units would be punished.

None of these facts, however, can comfort those already infected, nor the doctors, nurses, and families who have to care for them. They all speak of "frustrations."

"Three things frustrate me," says ACP head Dr. Okware. "What to do with the patient, the fact that the number of cases will continue to go up and we won't be able to see the impact of our health campaign for several years, and the increased awareness which has created a demand for gloves, needles, drugs which we can't afford to meet."

Uganda's AIDS budget for 1988 is less than \$5 million. Okware has already spent \$1 million on gloves; \$2.3 million will go to rehabilitate the blood service and a virus institute. Buying AZT, the only drug known to slow AIDS, is absolutely out of the question for a country as poor as Uganda. "What is the point?"

Bus driver John Kasirye and his family: Infected with AIDS



says Okware. "It costs \$10,000 per person and they die in a year."

"It's incredibly frustrating," echoes Dr. David Serwadda, one of the senior AIDS physicians at Mulago, Uganda's main hospital. "The patients get opportunistic infections, and we don't have enough drugs to treat them. Anti-fungals are very expensive. We have enough for only 30 percent of the people who need them. Neither the hospital nor the patients can afford constant treatment."

"The picture is complicated by the many healers who claim to be able to treat it," adds Serwadda, who was one of the first doctors to recognize the disease when it appeared in Rakai in 1984. "The patients are very desperate and try all sorts of drug cocktails, some of which hasten them to their graves. Some even sell their land and houses to fly to Zaire for treatment."

In the U.S., 50 percent of AIDS cases appear within 10 years of infection. Serwadda says it is impossible to know the figure for Uganda. The hospital offers so little care that patients wander away. "It is difficult to get a cohort to watch."

Serwadda also says that doctors and nurses don't have the time or the training to give AIDS patients and their families the counseling they need. He speaks with relief and respect of The AIDS Support Organization (TASO), a voluntary group based on Mulago hill, which began work in November 1987.

The TASO office is a small room in an old polio clinic. Unlike most offices here, it buzzes with purpose: A woman gives out hardboiled eggs and cups of tea, half-a-dozen counselors, most of them HIV-positive, perch on or squeeze behind three wooden desks.

Noreen Kaleba is one of the founders of TASO. "We want HIV people to know they have a say in how fast they develop AIDS," says the physiotherapist, whose university lecturer husband contracted AIDS from a blood transfusion and died last year.

Kaleba emphasizes good hygiene and nutrition. "We try not to be a handout organization, but it's impossible to encourage 'positive living' among people who can't even afford a bar of soap." Like every AIDS effort in Uganda, TASO is working under appalling constraints.

Currently TASO has 120 families on its

books. It visits them at home, takes them a kilo of dried milk a week, a tray of eggs a month, soap when it can afford to. It advocates condoms between couples, to protect the uninfected partner, or if both are infected, to protect each other from STDs.

Tests show that Kaleba does not have the virus, but counselor David Mulindwa does. His wife and child died in 1984 and 1985. He left his accounting job when his colleagues saw he was sick. Like most of the TASO staff, he takes an herbal medicine he claims controls the diarrhea and fever and boosts the appetite. Trials on the medicine are underway at Mulago. Mulindwa lives day to day, encouraging clients, hoping that a cure will be found, but accepting that as yet there is none.

"Most of the people who come here are young men and women," says Mulindwa. "On learning they are HIV-posi-

**If few countries in
the world are as badly
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to halt it.**

tive, usually they lock themselves up in their rooms. We go and talk to them. Later, we move with them in the city because you feel unsafe to move alone. You think everyone is looking at you. You think you are thin. You think you are going to die. We encourage them to go to work.

"Usually relatives and neighbors stop visiting when they learn you are HIV-positive. By our visiting, they also start visiting again. Eventually these people can go to the market on their own. Then we have gained in that these people have rejoined society.

"We also encourage partners to stay together because in most cases there are accusations. If one partner falls sick, the other says 'You have brought this disease.' At times their families say, 'Don't continue with that person. She is infected and you are not.' If it is the wife who gets sick first, the husband may even disown

the kids saying, 'They are not mine.'

"I've got one case of a lady who fell sick. Her husband abandoned her and told her to leave the house because he wants to bring another wife. We have not been able to do much with him. Usually though we can make a big difference. You should see them walk out of here when they realize they are not the only one with this disease."

In the space of an hour, a mother comes to TASO: She suspects her son has AIDS. A young woman comes. It's her fourth visit about her brother. Kaleba urges her to bring him and his wife. Visitors hover in the doorway, nervous, clutching hats or handbags, anxious to talk, but frightened about the words they are going to have to say.

Mulindwa and Kaleba say AIDS is killing the young, the able, the parents. In Rakai district, there are already thousands of orphans. Says Dr. Serwadda: "AIDS is as bad as war. If a parent gets AIDS, it's often the beginning of that family crumbling."


Interestingly, most AIDS experts here say condoms are not the answer. The church opposes them. And Uganda is too poor. "To condomize the rural areas means money," says Dr. Okware. "If you find a man with a torn shirt in the village, it's likely that his condom is torn too."

Nor is it practical. Uganda received 2 million condoms this year. "Not enough," says Okware laughing, "for a third of the adult population to swing into action for one night, let alone make love two or three times."

The real answer is fidelity and care. "Casual sex," wrote one doctor here recently, "must be seen in everyone's mind as being as risky as irritating Amin's soldiers."

At the peak of San Francisco's epidemic in 1984, like in Uganda today, new AIDS cases were doubling every six months. Now the rate of new AIDS infections in San Francisco is almost zero percent. "This is because," says ACP's epidemiologist Dr. Seth Berkley, "everyone is taking precautions."

That day is still far off in Uganda, but the two-year-old health campaign is already slowing the spread of AIDS—no mean feat in a country that by the end of 1985 had nearly collapsed. ○



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Margaret A. Novicki



Unita deserters, Lubango: "A reduction of support in the south has already left Unita with grave problems"



"FAPLA's hold on Cuemba are important steps toward regaining control of the Benguela railway"

Cuito Cuanavale: The big deployment of Cuban troops undoubtedly strengthened the government's position



Margaret A. Novicki

In recent weeks, Angola, Cuba, and South Africa—the three parties to the Angolan/Namibian talks brokered by the United States—have struggled to meet their deadline of November 1 for the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 435, which calls for the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia and elections in the country.

But for the last seven years, Namibia has borne the albatross of the Angolan war around its neck, and for most of that period, the will to implement 435 was simply overpowered by the intensity of the 13-year old conflict to the north.

For the South Africans, the quid pro quo for Namibian independence has been an acceptable timetable for the withdrawal of more than 50,000 Cubans from Angola. Even as *Africa Report* goes to press, it is on this issue that the success or failure of the 1988 negotiations remains to be decided. Whatever their outcome, however, they have set an agenda for the 1990s which several regional and

international factors may well combine to hold in place.

Between the first round of talks in London during May and the sixth in Brazzaville during September, the Cubans reduced their withdrawal timetable from four to three years. In New York at the beginning of October, they were reported to have offered a further reduction to between 24 and 30 months.

The South Africans at that time were sticking to the proposal they made in Geneva at the beginning of August: The independence plan for Namibia should be under way by November 1 and culminate in elections on June 1, 1989, by which time all Cuban troops would have to be out of Angola. But by mid-October, amid growing suspicions that they wished to scupper the deal, the South Africans were calling for a delay on the implementation of 435 until January 1989.

Over the year, the gap between the opposing deadlines has narrowed, but it has done so slowly. The U.S., apparently agreeable to a 30-month withdrawal, seemed to have changed its position by the New York talks in October, arguing that this was still too long. Two years now appears to be the working goal. The

real obstacle to consensus has been Jonas Savimbi's Unita rebels, who did not respect the ceasefire agreed to by Angola, Cuba, and South Africa in early August, and who pose a serious security threat to the Angolan government in the event of a premature Cuban pull-out.

In the complex web of conflict, Unita is one of three significant forces excluded from the negotiating table. The other two are Swapo, whose president, Sam Nujoma, announced at the end of August that the Namibian liberation movement was ending armed hostilities against South African forces, and the African National Congress. The ANC has important military bases in Angola. Pretoria's wish to see them dismantled as part of any deal was acknowledged in principle when the Angolans and Cubans agreed to a list of 14 points drawn up last July at Governor's Island, New York.

Both Swapo and the ANC have received guerrilla training in Angola and valuable experience fighting alongside

Jeremy Harding is a freelance journalist based in Britain who travels regularly to Africa. He contributes to the BBC, the Financial Times of London, and the African Concord.

Timetable Troubles

By JEREMY HARDING

An unexpected consequence of the twilight of the Reagan era was the apparent acceleration of the peace process in Angola. But the November 1 deadline for implementation of resolution 435 on Namibia has passed, with the timetable for Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola remaining unresolved. Even if the negotiations succeed, however, Angola's problems are far from over, reports our correspondent.

the Angolan and Cuban forces in combat zones on the periphery of the vital south-eastern front, where South Africa's offensive against the strategic town of Cuito Cuanavale collapsed earlier this year. As negotiations began in May, jockeying for position on the ground intensified.

The big deployment of Cuban troops down through the southern Angolan provinces of Namibe and Cunene in the same month undoubtedly strengthened the government's bargaining position. The first big Cuban deployment below the 16th parallel, it brought an impressive force right down to the Namibian border, where it remained until it was clear that South Africa would abide by the ceasefire which came into effect at the beginning of August. In the same month, the second-in-command of the South African Defence Force (SADF), Lt.-Gen. Ian Gleeson, told reporters that the Cubans had agreed to maintain a minimum distance of 30 miles from the frontier with Namibia.

By the end of August, there was cause for optimism that a settlement would indeed occur. Swapo's willingness to observe the ceasefire suggested its growing confidence not only in the regional peace process, but in the strength of its civil and political base inside Namibia, where a schools boycott in June was followed by a successful workers' stay-away as international pressure for independence grew.

At the same time, the negotiating parties seemed to have made progress on the security front with the Ruacana agreement, signed in August, providing for a border peace-keeping process under the auspices of a "Joint Military Monitoring Committee," scheduled to meet regularly from the end of August. In the same month, a large contingent of SADF

troops was withdrawn from Angola amid a blaze of South African publicity.

What moved the peace process forward so rapidly? The most pressing question was undoubtedly the impending U.S. presidential elections, not only for South Africa but for the policy-makers in Washington. Brokering a regional peace would have left the U.S. officiating over the single most important change in southern Africa since the departure of the Portuguese 13 years ago.

It also raised the possibility that the Reagan administration's southern Africa policy, ill-conceived and wasteful in many ways, could be buried with honors instead of ignominy. For eight years, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker has clung to policy positions which seemed merely to narrow the available choices of the protagonists.

The Angolans and Cubans have been in contact with the U.S. since 1982. At the UN in 1984, Angola put forward proposals of its own for a Cuban withdrawal, from which the opening framework of this year's talks differed very little. Nonetheless, Crocker has played a vital role in achieving the latest breakthroughs, which have occurred, ironically, despite the obstacles posed by the very policy over which he has presided for nearly eight years. The real stumbling block has been "linkage," which has made Namibia a hostage to U.S. anti-communist ambitions, by insisting that independence for the occupied territory be conditional on a Cuban withdrawal from Angola.

The policy also showed scant regard for Angola's national sovereignty. The Cubans had been invited by the government; their presence was not in violation of international law, and crucially, they

respected the territorial boundaries of neighboring states, including Namibia. This point continues to rankle the Cubans and Angolans. In Brazzaville during the sixth round of talks, Alcibiades Hidalgo, spokesman for the Cuban delegation, told the press that it was "frankly immoral to establish a fixed relationship between the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, since the latter are in Angola legally."

From the outset, Pretoria welcomed linkage, although it had never cited the Cuban expeditionary force in any of its previous objections to UN resolution 435. Linkage also precipitated the downhill slide which turned Angola into a crude superpower contest, with huge amounts of materiel pouring in. The Angolan government has received \$8.1 billion in Soviet hardware since 1980 according to NATO estimates—\$700 million in excess of Ethiopia's military receipts in the same period from the Soviet Union.

Since the U.S. Congress repealed the Clark Amendment at the end of 1985, Jonas Savimbi's Unita rebels, already fighting side-by-side with well-equipped South African ground forces, have been eligible for at least \$15 million a year in U.S. covert aid. The priority in Washington then has been to achieve some concrete result at the end of the grueling escalation.

In Pretoria too, the twilight of the Reagan era has generated anxiety. While a new Republican administration promises more of the same for southern Africa, George Bush has failed to elicit the same level of confidence in Pretoria as Reagan managed during his first term. By June, with Dukakis pledged to cut off aid to Unita and introduce new sanctions, the prospect of a Democratic administra-

tion seemed more ominous still.

What election anxiety revealed in Pretoria, however, was a deeper level of alarm about the cost of the war in Angola—and thus of hanging on to Namibia. More than \$3 billion worth of foreign debt falls due in the early 1990s and the economy is growing at only 3 percent, while the anomalies of apartheid make waste inevitable and the price of any foreign adventure correspondingly higher.

Presidential elections aside, South Africa has also had to face moves in the Congress for a second, tougher round of sanctions legislation. Sanctions loopholes exist in abundance, but in cost terms, they are hoops of fire. Even an agile dog like Pretoria stands to get badly burned on its way through them in the ruthless circus run by the sanctions busters. Finally, from the end of last year, the Angolan adventure began to exact a higher toll on the SADF, deepening the unpopularity of the war at home, where independent sources claim that 400 white lives were lost in action between September 1987 and February 1988 (official figures are much lower).

The overall trend, which has caused Foreign Minister Pik Botha and others to exert a temporary influence over their opponents in the ruling National Party, is running contrary in the long term to sustained military commitments outside the country. This dovetails conveniently with new inflections in Soviet thinking about the region. Integral to *perestroika* is the sense that spiraling aid to friendly regimes is a hard economic case to argue. The Soviet Union is eager to see peace in southwest Africa, and there have been several hints that its approach to the region, and indeed to apartheid, is changing radically.

This leaves Unita. Even with its rumored relocation from Jamba to the north—close to Kamina, Zaire, and the U.S. supply routes—it is a dangerous period for the Angolan rebels. They have been excluded from the talks and are currently operating in Angola without the massive support that they enjoyed from South Africa during the early part of the year. While Unita is nominally a guerrilla force, this long war has seen the proliferation of conventional fronts, in which the Angolan armed forces (FAPLA) and the Cubans have slowly begun to gain the

upper hand. A reduction of support in the south has already left Unita with grave problems for which its aid from the U.S. is unlikely to compensate while the rebels attempt to maintain a conventional posture.

The damage that this aid can inflict on the MPLA is considerable. Even if it were cut off after January 1989, it could ensure the survival of Unita as a destructive force well beyond June 1, and this fact is at the heart of the withdrawal issue. As President Jose Eduardo dos Santos admitted in August, Unita will not “automatically disappear through the mere cancellation or reduction of [its] direct sources of external support.” Even so, the rebels will have to adapt their strategy in hopes that the ravages they inflict on the country with fewer set-piece engagements can still bring the Angolan government to the bargaining table.

Behind the scenes, the U.S. has lobbied the MPLA to settle with Unita. The movement itself is well-organized and well-funded; its “black nationalist” character—reduced by the South African connection to an exercise in vexed conscience—once gave it credibility among African intellectuals. But Savimbi’s own history, his rise to prominence, his numerous deals at the time of independence, and his links with Pretoria have made him unacceptable in Luanda.

Brute perseverance and lack of imagination are the only reasons for bludgeoning the MPLA with “national reconciliation”—a line which threatened to deadlock the talks in October. There has been no change in the Angolan government’s official stance against negotiations, reiterated in September by Defense Minister Pedro Maria Tonha, and at the Non-Aligned ministerial meeting in Nicosia by External Relations Minister Afonso Van Dunem.

Bleaker still for Unita, military developments reported by the Angolan government appear to be running in the MPLA’s favor. In the first week of September, there were successful operations in seven of Angola’s 18 provinces. At the end of the following week, it was reported that the area of Cangumbe—an Unita stronghold in Moxico province—had fallen to FAPLA after five years of rebel control. On the same day, a FAPLA

communiqué announced that Munhango, a few miles west of Cangumbe, across the provincial boundary in neighboring Bie, had also been taken.

The pattern emerging here could be crucial to the course of the war, for the fall of Munhango and Cangumbe, and the consolidation of FAPLA’s hold on Cuamba are important steps toward regaining control of the Benguela railway, which has been out of action since 1978. Control of a working railway would bring enormous benefits to the government and could persuade international donors, hovering nervously around a proposed rehabilitation project, to make effective commitments to the repair of the line. This in turn would be a blow for Unita, for sabotage on an upgraded railway would antagonize the donors.

Psychologically too, the government’s gains on the rail corridor are important. Munhango is Savimbi’s birth place; it was rumored that he planned to announce a separate Unita state in the locality at the height of the South African offensive against Cuito Cuanavale. One other incidental but significant effect of FAPLA’s victories may also be to increase security in nearby Huambo, a large city which has suffered badly at the hands of Unita’s urban terrorist units over the years.

Whatever Savimbi’s fate, the war in Angola will not be concluded with the formal cessation of hostilities on all sides. It has done immense damage to the country and its effects will be felt for the remainder of the century. The Angolan government has estimated war damage at more than \$20 billion to date. It has a huge catastrophe on its hands, with millions displaced, more than 100,000 dead, and in addition, a steady decimation of the infant population at a rate of 55,000 a year since 1985.

Much of Angolan rural culture is now *tabula rasa*—vast no-go areas strewn with land mines, mostly planted by Unita. In short, a long, vigorous war against hunger and incapacitation will have to be waged for years to come. Angola’s oil and coffee revenues and its additional mineral export potential—notably in diamonds—will be vital assets in the national reconstruction. But for every day that the conflict drags on, the prospective wealth of post-war Angola is being mortgaged away. ○

A CONVERSATION WITH RICARDO ALARCÓN

By MARGARET A. NOVICKI

"Four Nations Agree On Cuban Pullout from Angolan War," read the front-page headline in *The New York Times* on October 10, 1988. Quoting extensively from an unnamed "American official," the *Times* report announced that Angola, Cuba, South Africa, and the United States had agreed during their three days of negotiations in New York City that all Cuban troops should be withdrawn from Angola within 24 and 30 months, characterizing the accord as "another step, and a significant one toward a regional peace settlement in southern Africa."

The Cuban and Angolan delegations, however, did not share quite as optimistic an assessment of the outcome of October's three-day negotiations. *Africa Report* interviewed a member of the Cuban negotiating team, Ricardo Alarcón, deputy minister of foreign affairs, to ascertain the Cuban government's perspective on the ongoing talks, and specifically on the issue of the timetable for withdrawal of its troops from Angola. We print here excerpts of Mr. Alarcón's replies to our questions.

The main theme of the story [in *The New York Times* of October 10, 1988] was wrong, false. In the article itself, you find contradictions. If you go to the end of the article, it doesn't show that there was an agreement, but the way it was presented, the headline, the lead paragraph indicated something that didn't occur in New York. The opposite was closer to the truth. In fact, we all agreed to certain conclusions in New York which were first that we are at an impasse, which is not precisely equal to an agreement. Second, we didn't agree on fixing a new date for a new meeting. Thirdly, we agreed that we couldn't come out with a joint statement, because we didn't have anything to say except that we were at an impasse.

Now we are concentrating on the question of the calendar for the withdrawal of the Cuban forces in Angola. We have already proposed a date for the beginning of the implementation of 435, and the South Africans have already withdrawn from Angola—although it was not a result of the negotiation, but rather of other factors that occurred during the process of the negotiations. In terms of the discussions that we're having, certainly the remaining point is this one of the calendar.

We have shown a large degree of flexibility on this subject. In fact, we believe that we have shown the maximum degree of flexibility—and the minimum in terms of the status of the calendar. Our original plan was for 48 months, which was the ideal, the optimum for what is needed in terms of the withdrawal of the Cuban forces. And 30 months is the result of our effort—Angola's and Cuba's—to find the shortest period of time possible to withdraw all forces taking into account the needs that have to be considered all around in the process. It is not a matter of arithmetics, of playing with numbers. The main question concerning the calendar in our view is guarantees for the security of Angola.

The withdrawal process is a complex operation. We are

not withdrawing like the South Africans did just across the river to the south, we are going across the Atlantic Ocean, and in logistical terms, it is a more complicated operation. Let me remind you that at the beginning of last August, the South Africans announced their willingness to withdraw the remnants of their forces that were in Angola at that time—about 1,500 troops. They completed their withdrawal on August 31, and they needed more than 20 days to get 1,500 people moved down to the border of Namibia and across the Cunene River. They did so without being hampered by us or the Angolans. We allowed them to get out of Angola. If we are willing to project that figure and that duration of the South African withdrawal to the movement of 50,000 people from Angola to Cuba, even a 48-month calendar would be a very speedy way of doing a similar process from our side.

Apart from that, you have the logistical elements of transportation, airplanes or boats. We are going to return to Cuba by the same means that we used to go to Angola—exclusively Angolan or Cuban means. For us, that's important because there have been many efforts to distort the nature of this mission in Angola. It was something that was decided by us—the Angolans and the Cubans—by our own decision. Only we took that decision originally and only we are taking the decision to go, to return. We insist on the point that we are going to use our own means.

Those means are limited. Some are going to ask why we don't use other means to expedite the process. But we have to remember that we are talking about an army that has not been defeated. There are many examples in history when a defeated army had to withdraw, to go back home immediately. Then, somebody else could impose or dictate the terms of their withdrawal. This is not the case. It is very far from that case.

Second, we are not the source of the problem. The Cubans

did not create the problem. We didn't invade Angola, nor Namibia, we haven't imposed apartheid on anybody in the area. We are not to blame for anything. There is no international resolution asking the Cubans to withdraw. And on the contrary, there are more than one expressions of recognition of the role Cuba has played there—the Non-Aligned Summit conference, the UN, and so forth. We are not escaping from Angola. This is not Saigon 1975. It is an entirely different situation.

There is also a more important aspect—a technical or organizational matter. Generally speaking, with a few exceptions, the Cubans are not there organized as an independent force. In practical terms, they are integrated with the Angolan armed forces, FAPLA. There are some exceptions, some of our last reinforcements in the south. But the rule is that they are integrated into FAPLA. That means that the Angolans have to substitute us, and that substitution process is a very complex one.

The issue is the Cuban withdrawal from Angola—not the dismantling of the Cuban forces or the dismantling of the Angolan defenses. That means time, time for the Angolans for preparations, for some training of some officers and some people to handle war materiel, as well as a program for the Angolans to mobilize their forces because in some cases it is mostly Cubans who are defending certain important economic objectives, for example in Cabinda.

The Angolans have to do that, but not under the peaceful conditions the South Africans enjoyed in August for getting out of Angola. They still have to face the Unita problem. They will have to face a conflict that is essentially an externally imposed one. They are facing a band of people that are financed, supported, trained, armed by other forces—namely none other than the country that happens to be the mediator in the negotiating process.

If you take all that into account, as soon as you reach an agreement that everything is fine, what will happen? The Cubans will be thousands of miles away from Angola. Even if 435 is fully implemented without any problem, South Africa will go down to the Orange River, but they will be fairly close to Angola. The experiences are very clear. Practically every other African country in the area has at one time or another been the victim of a South African attack. The risk exists and some amount of caution is appropriate. And two years and a

half cannot be really considered as an exaggeration if you take into account the real African experience in dealing with South Africa.

There is also a quarrel over the status of Walvis Bay, which has been defined by the UN clearly as an integral part of Namibia. But when the Western powers negotiated the UN plan 435 with South Africa, the Walvis Bay question was put aside. That means that there will be a transitional period before Walvis Bay is reintegrated into Namibia in which the South Africans would remain controlling a bay from which they launched the attack on Cabinda, for example, in the northernmost part of Angola.

The calendar is not a matter of hurrying out of Angola or being forced to do that for moral, political, or legal considerations. It is nothing of that kind. It is a contribution of Angola and Cuba to accept to withdraw the Cuban forces from Angola within the context of a comprehensive settlement of the whole conflict. But our presence there is legal. We have never attacked any neighboring country from Angola.

Theoretically, we could have stayed as long as the Angolans would have liked. But we both agreed to contribute this element of the withdrawal to this process in order to facilitate a solution by which South Africa will commit itself not to disregard or disrespect Angola's independence and so on. If South Africa withdraws from Namibia and Namibia becomes an independent state, the reasons why the Cuban forces went to Angola would have disappeared. We went to Angola to help Angola defend itself against South African aggression. We resisted successfully that aggression and we defeated the South Africans. If we also obtained the independence of Namibia, then it was correct within that framework that we should withdraw the Cuban forces. It was our view at the beginning of this process that it would have been easy for the United States, for South Africa, for the other countries to support and encourage this process and solution.


But no, when we go into this concrete aspect of how the withdrawal will take place, we face certain serious obstacles which are related to some positions which are not serious at all. The press reports about 24 or 30 months could give the impression that we are really like children—discussing about two figures that are fairly close. But this is not the only issue. Six months is an important difference. I hope I have explained how the total figure is after all not an exaggeration if you take into account the whole context of Angolan security problems and the South African precedents and so on.

But apart from that, there are some other profound disagreements on how the calendar is conceived, its structure, and the way this process is going to be implemented. We have heard proposals or ideas regarding the 24 months that are completely unacceptable and we have said that very clearly, because a very important aspect is also *how* we are going to withdraw. If we take out of Angola 95 percent of the troops in the first year, in fact you have a one-year calendar, the second year is irrelevant! We don't accept this kind of approach. We think the way the process of withdrawal is done has to depend on those needs of Angolan security that I referred to before. It is not a matter of deciding arbitrarily the number of months or the rate or pace for the withdrawal. Those organizational, technical aspects are very important because nobody has the right to dismantle and disorganize the Angolan defenses. It has never even been raised as an issue, but that would be the practical impact of a calendar that would not take into account those requirements.

Margaret A. Novicki



FAPLA soldiers: "The Angolans have to substitute us, and that substitution process is a very complex one"



Karl Maier

"We are talking about an army that has not been defeated"

Neither has it been accepted—and certainly we cannot accept—a dismantling of the Cuban force in Angola. It is one thing to withdraw, another to dismantle our forces by taking away immediately the main components of that contingent or removing them rapidly to the north—which are some of the proposals that have been made. We cannot accept anything of that kind. The withdrawal will be done in an orderly manner, a proper way, in an honorable, dignified way. I repeat: We have not been defeated, and we were not the aggressors. Secondly, we will leave taking duly into account the Angolan requirements. That's the final, most important consideration, and not the propaganda interests of one party or another, and so on.

Unita is not really a military threat to Angola—the threat is South Africa. In fact, we are in Angola to help Angola defend itself vis-à-vis South Africa, not to intervene in what is happening between Unita and the Angolan people. That's another matter. Militarily speaking, Unita is not as important as is claimed in some propaganda in the West.

According to the press reports that were published in the U.S. here a few weeks after the South Africans left Angola, the Angolan forces had already recovered certain important places from Unita. It is one thing to fight with the support of the South African air force, artillery, and so on, and another to do so without that. With the agreements, now Unita doesn't have that support operationally speaking, in the field. That's a very important change. South Africa is already committed, when the Governors Island principles were adopted, to end its material support to Unita. That's one aspect.

I wonder, though, what the situation will be if we manage to solve the problem. Will the U.S. continue with its present policy of supporting Unita, of making that affront to Africa, violating the Governors Island principles, the agreements that we are supposed to sign with South Africa, that the Security Council, of which the U.S. is a permanent member, is sup-

posed to endorse? I would like to see a discussion of what would be the rationale for the U.S. at that moment to continue maintaining its present policy of support for Unita.

If the U.S. remains with its present position, it will be politically untenable. The U.S. would not have any way of getting support in Africa, for example, for that policy. Let's assume that South Africa fully abides by the agreements and puts an end to its help to Unita. Then, Unita would not be able to use Namibia as a rearguard or a starting point for their attacks on Angola, and that certainly would put Unita in its normal perspective. This big giant invented or fabricated in some parts of the Western media would be reduced to its real proportions.

We do not interfere in any way in this aspect, we leave it exclusively to the Angolan government to decide how to handle the Unita matter. It is an internal problem for them. But we understand, and I read the statement by President Dos Santos to that effect, that the Angolan leadership is willing to find a political solution to the internal dimensions of the problem. It is true to some extent that there is what could be referred to as an internal problem in Angola.

Nevertheless, it is entirely illegal according to international law for any state to get involved in any way in an internal dispute in another state, even if it were a civil war. The U.S. is violating international law by its support to Unita. The only case where what has happened within the border of a state has been accepted as something on which the international community has the right and obligation to have a say is the situation in South Africa. That's why it is really astonishing to see editorials such as in *The New York Times* saying that now what is needed is peace within Angola. What is needed is peace with Angola. What is needed is that the U.S. end its war against Angola, its illegal, clandestine, indirect war, by helping Unita or South Africa. A solution within South Africa is also needed. ○



MOZAMBIQUE

BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND PRETORIA

By KARL MAIER

Launched by the Rhodesian government to spy on the Zimbabwean nationalist movements, then taken over by South African military intelligence, Renamo now finds itself in the middle of a struggle for influence between right-wing supporters in Washington and Pretoria's regional ambitions. The Mozambican government may stand to gain more from this competition than from the South African government's recent diplomatic initiatives.



Alexander Jobe

Victim of Renamo anti-personnel mine: Renamo's connections with South Africa and unsavory reports of rebel atrocities against civilians deferred potential U.S. backers

Maputo: "A South African engineering firm is helping to refurbish the port"



United Nations

They straggled into the shattered central Mozambican town of Inhaminga, barely dressed and half-starved after three days of walking from a rebel-con-

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trolled zone in Sofala province. The group of 20 civilians looked like most refugees pouring into government-run camps around the country, except that they were wrapped in olive green sheets of ultralight nylon of the type used to manufacture parachutes.

The refugees said they had found the material about 60 miles away near a base of Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) guerrillas under whose authority they had lived, some of them for six years. Renamo had forced them to embark on portering missions, known as

"galinda," usually to fetch food for the rebels. But sometimes their burden was of a different nature.

"We had to carry boxes," said Julietta Jhon'e, a 38-year-old woman who had lived for two years in an area run by Renamo commonly known as the "mat-sanga," after their first rebel commander, Andre Matsangaisse, who was killed in 1979. She said that in March, villagers in her area had to carry metal boxes, which she described as about two feet wide and military green. Some of the other refugees said they thought the cans contained bullets.

The parachute material and the refugees' testimony suggested that someone—the Mozambique government routinely says South African military intelligence—is airdropping supplies to the guerrillas.

President Joaquim Chissano's government has often reported sightings of supply drops by plane and by submarine along Mozambique's Indian Ocean coast, but it has allowed independent observers little access to the evidence it claims to have to support the charge. The army found three parachutes in May 1987 in the southern province of Inhambane. U.S. Army officers confirmed they were part of a batch which was manufactured in the United States in the 1960s and later sold to various armies, including the South African Defence Force.

Now, for the second time in four years, South African President P. W. Botha is promising to halt his country's support for Renamo. At a September 11 summit with President Chissano at Songo, near the giant Cahora Bassa hydroelectric complex, he committed his country to help the Frelimo government protect the power lines which run from the northwestern province of Tête to South Africa's Transvaal province.

The last time Botha made such pledges was in March 1984, when he signed the Nkomati non-aggression accord with the late Mozambican President Samora Machel. But South African support for Renamo, though apparently scaled down, continued into 1985, according to Renamo diaries found by Zimbabwean troops when they overran the rebels' Casa Banana headquarters, about 50 miles west of Inhaminga, in August 1985.

Western diplomats say that today Pretoria's backing for Renamo consists mainly of logistical support and only limited supplies. Many believe the support is carried out by maverick army men at odds with politicians in Pretoria who are

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eager to improve relations with Mozambique. That view is shared by a confidential analysis prepared last year by a group of Zimbabwean businessmen. It points to a "maintenance of the communications system and periodic air and sea drops, some of which were authorized and some unauthorized by Renamo's sympathizers in the South African security/military system."

Renamo supporters are believed to be well placed in the South African military. They include the chief of military intelligence, Maj.-Gen. C.J. Van Tonder, and Brig. Charles Van Niekerk, who has run the Renamo operation from bases in the eastern Transvaal since South Africa began sponsoring the movement eight years ago.

Before that, Renamo was run as an arm of the intelligence services in Rhodesia, which became Mozambique's western neighbor of Zimbabwe at independence in 1980. The late Ken Flower, then Rhodesia's intelligence chief, said he built Renamo from the ranks of disgruntled peasants, angered by the war between the Portuguese colonial forces and Frelimo nationalist guerrillas, and defectors from both armies. Renamo's purpose was to spy on Zimbabwean nationalist forces based in Mozambique. When

Ian Smith's Rhodesian regime began to crumble, Flower said he told the Renamo guerrillas across the border that they could either lay down their arms and return home or continue fighting under the wing of South Africa.

"I knew from previous approaches that the South Africans could be interested. So the members of the resistance were told there was that alternative. We were thinking that none of them would be interested. On the contrary, the majority showed that interest," Flower said in an interview shortly before his death in Harare last year. "We warned them that the movement almost certainly would not continue to be handled in the same way. So those who went over to the South Africans' control went with their eyes open."

By 1983, the South African military was making monthly airlifts of arms and supplies from Voortrekkerhoogte barracks near Pretoria to Renamo units in Mozambique, according to Patricia and Derek Hanekom, two white South Africans who penetrated South African Special Forces operations and leaked information to the African National Congress. Military intelligence produced programs for Renamo's "Voice of Free Africa" radio station, which broadcast from the Hillbrow post office tower in Johannesburg. Aides to then Col. Van Niekerk went on shopping sprees for the operation, known as Operation Mila, paying cash for pencils, medicines, agricultural tools, and once hundreds of headscarves for a Renamo rally.

Since Zimbabwean soldiers captured the Renamo diaries at the rebel headquarters in August 1985, however, there has been little hard information about the South African-Renamo relationship. But sources both inside and outside of Renamo said that divisions have erupted in the movement, principally over the level of South African control.

The conflict appears to have claimed at least two lives, and possibly three, in the past year. The first bodies to be counted were those of Joao da Silva Ataide and Mateus Lopes, alias Jose Alfredo da Costa Lopes, who were returning from a meeting with Renamo's guerrilla "president," Afonso Dhlakama. Their trip was a bold bid for power to operate more independently from South African military

intelligence and more closely with right-wing backers in the United States. Several observers said Ataide in particular had contacts with Gen. John Singlaub, president of the "World Anti-Communist Alliance."

But the journey ended in death on November 30 in Malawi, which serves as a major rebel transit route into Mozambique, along the road from Blantyre to Lilongwe, the nation's capital. A simple car crash was the official explanation, but some Renamo officials and Paulo Oliveira, a former Renamo spokesman who left the movement in October 1987, said their deaths were the work of South African military operatives. "Ataide was one of the South Africans' main problems because he wanted to undermine their influence by helping the American conservatives come in," he said. "It was not an accident, but an assassination. The South Africans did not want any other lobby involved which they could not control."

Then on April 20 this year, the bullet-ridden corpse of Evo Fernandes, believed to be Pretoria's top man in Renamo's external wing and a bitter adversary of Ataide and Lopes, was found on a roadside near Lisbon. Who killed Fernandes, a man who once served as legal adviser to the Portuguese colonial police, is a question that may never be answered. Some observers believe that perhaps his was a revenge killing for Ataide and Lopes, or that he was killed because of South African suspicions that he would follow Paulo Oliveira's defection to Mozambique.

The first serious challenge to South African dominance of Renamo started in late 1985 when a young American Christian fundamentalist, Thomas Schaaf, left Zimbabwe for the U.S. and began to build the movement's Washington office into a powerful force. Among far-right congressmen, lobby groups such as the Heritage Foundation, and some Reagan administration officials, Schaaf's portrayal of Renamo as a movement of anti-communist "freedom fighters" struck a responsive chord.

While Renamo has long had contacts with military adventurists linked to *Soldier of Fortune* magazine, its connections with South Africa and unsavory reports of rebel atrocities against civilians had deterred potential backers. But Schaaf's

Mozambique Information Project carried the rebels' message to more influential heights. In August 1986, three Renamo officials were received in the White House gardens and had their photographs taken with Pat Buchanan, then President Reagan's communications director.

As the Washington office gained influence, a fight was brewing over communications with Dhlakama and the rebel bands inside Mozambique. Since 1980, all communications between Dhlakama and the outside world had passed through the Phalaborwa military base on the edge of Kruger National Park in the eastern Transvaal. But by 1987, the Washington faction was mounting radios in Renamo's

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Chire base near the Malawi border so that it could speak more directly to the guerrilla commanders.

South Africa countered the move. Oliveira said that Brig. Van Niekerk visited Lisbon on June 24, 1987, to oversee the installation of a new communications system, complete with a telefax and encoder/decoder, in Oliveira's house. It linked Renamo's external representatives directly to the operations room of the Five Reconnaissance Unit at Phalaborwa base.

"Van Niekerk told me then that he was planning to set up radio transmitters in each of Mozambique's 10 provinces to spread Renamo propaganda," Oliveira said in a recent interview in Maputo.

The depth of South African influence over Dhlakama and the Renamo leadership is said to be a factor in the internal fighting in northern Mozambique, primarily in Zambesia province. Guerrillas from a breakaway group called "Unamo," led by Gimo Phiri, the former Renamo representative in Malawi, have reportedly taken up arms against their erst-

while colleagues and labelled Dhlakama a South African agent. Another factor is said to be resentment in northern Mozambique of Dhlakama's insistence on installing members of his own ethnic group, the Ndau, in command positions.

In the run-up to the Chissano-Botha summit at Songo, relations between Mozambique and South Africa warmed considerably, with regular meetings between security officials of the two countries. South African cargo through the port of Maputo has risen sharply in the past six months, and rebel attacks on the railroad from the border have declined. A South African engineering firm and about \$2 million in loans from Pretoria are helping to refurbish the port.

But many observers believe the biggest test of South African intentions is the deal to protect the rebuilding of over 500 pylons of the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric scheme, which was constructed by the Portuguese in the early 1970s. The complex, the world's sixth largest hydroelectric project, could provide South Africa with 10 percent of its power needs and pump badly needed energy into the dilapidated Mozambican economy. But the giant turbines have remained mostly idle since the early 1980s when the war against Renamo spread out of control.

The Botha government has pledged about \$10 million to train and equip a Mozambican force to guard the scheme, while refurbishment gets underway by Italian and South African companies.

The Cahora Bassa agreement is full of ironies. Ken Flower, the Rhodesian intelligence chief, said that as Portuguese colonial rule of Mozambique was about to collapse in 1974, officials in Lisbon suggested that Renamo be converted into a force to guard the project, which later became a primary rebel target. And Oliveira, the Renamo defector, said that in 1983, he saw photographs of pylons destroyed by Renamo on the desk of South African military officers, who, he said, were helping to plan the sabotage.

"So the question is this: If the South African military wants Cahora Bassa to function, it will function," Oliveira said. "If they don't want it to, then in principle, it will be very difficult to proceed with the rebuilding of these lines. Everything depends on the South Africans." ○



THE POPE'S MESSAGE

By ANDREW MELDRUM

On his recent five-nation tour, Pope John Paul II carried an ambiguous message to his audiences in the frontline states. An unexpected addition of South Africa to his itinerary provoked a strong reaction from anti-apartheid clerics, questioning the Pontiff's position on peace in the strife-torn southern African region.



Alexander Job

The Pope flanked by Zimbabwe's armed forces chiefs was welcomed with a carefully framed theological explanation of the 'just war' doctrine

Just after Pope John Paul II waved goodbye to a wildly enthusiastic crowd in Maputo to end his 10-day, five-nation tour of southern Africa, a senior Western diplomat, commenting on

the papal visit, quipped: "If you get a revelation from God explaining what the Pope meant, please share it with me."

The Pope spoke in English, Portuguese, and at least four different African

dialects, but the diplomat said he could not understand the Pope's message in any language.

The Pope's first tour of the troubled southern African region, from Septem-

ber 11-19, his fourth trip to Africa, was remarkably indecisive. At a time when regional crises appear to be reaching critical turning points, the pontiff's messages were often so vague that all sides—anti-apartheid and pro-Pretoria, Mozambican government and Renamo rebel supporters—could plausibly claim papal support.

Even the Pope's main planned statement on apartheid—his decision not to visit South Africa—was bungled when his plane made an emergency landing in Johannesburg and he received an overabundance of South African government hospitality.

In Zimbabwe, the Pope differed with Robert Mugabe over the use of violence to end oppression and in Mozambique he created a fervor for peace, but offered no solutions.

When Pope John Paul II stepped off his jumbo jet into a sunny and clear Harare morning, he was quickly confronted with a short but pointed message about the struggles against minority rule in the region. Mugabe described the bitter 15-year war which brought Zimbabwe to independence in 1980 at a cost of tens of thousands of lives.

"We achieved independence through the barrel of a gun. Our struggle for justice was a difficult and protracted one," said Mugabe. "It required that in the name of peace, freedom, and justice we take to arms, not for the sake of armed struggle but because we felt we could not achieve justice through a peaceful solution."

Mugabe stressed that in Zimbabwe's case, war "was not an end but a means" and he described how Zimbabweans quickly turned "their guns into plows" following the country's independence. The Zimbabwean leader also related how independence brought not retribution or retaliation, but racial reconciliation that was not possible before the war.

Mugabe said he hoped the Pope's presence in Zimbabwe would "heighten pressure on the Pretoria regime so justice can come to South Africa and so Zimbabwe can live in peace and good neighborliness."

Andrew Meldrum, an American journalist who has been based in Zimbabwe for seven years, reports on southern Africa for The Guardian of London and the Voice of America.

The American Religious Right: *A Double Agenda in Southern Africa*

While Pope John Paul II toured southern Africa offering his ambiguous message of peace, members of a shadowy network of conservative activists were hard at work spreading a much more explicitly political message under the cloak of religious mission.

They are part of a "religious New Right"—best known for their role in helping elect Ronald Reagan to the U.S. presidency in 1980—which has developed an increasingly global thrust in recent years.

Leaders of mainstream churches in several frontline states have charged that fundamentalist groups based in the U.S. are involved in covert activities on behalf of South Africa's apartheid government. "In their fantasies, they are working toward a day when this government will collapse and South Africa can establish a puppet regime," the Reverend Murombedzi Kuchera, general secretary of the Zimbabwe Christian Council, said last year after an American evangelical missionary returned to the U.S. from a preaching trip here to issue a tract attacking Zimbabwe as a communist tyranny and lauding South Africa as an embattled island of democracy.

Many foreign missionaries and some local whites have misidentified Christianity "with westernism, with colonialism, with 'the American way of life,'" adds the Reverend Noah Pashapa, a fiery Zimbabwean Baptist pastor who is working to "decolonize" his own church. Zimbabwe's Baptists share the evangelical religious orientation of the conservative mission groups, but not, Pashapa emphasizes, their political stand.

The most dramatic example of church action in the interests of South Africa involves Shekinah Ministries, an Assemblies of God-related mission group, founded by white

Robert Mugabe was raised by a devoutly Catholic mother and educated in a Jesuit mission. His welcoming speech was not just a bit of history for the Pope. Religious specialists recognized it as a carefully framed theological explanation of the "just war" doctrine. Mugabe's brief address defended the use of violence to bring Zimbabwe to independence and argued that such violence was needed to bring peace and justice to South Africa.

At the airport arrival ceremony, Pope John Paul II read a prepared statement which directly contradicted Mugabe's speech. On "the grave issue of apartheid and for all violations of human rights," the

Pope appealed "to all those who bear responsibility for the destiny of the peoples of this region, of whatever racial extraction or ideological inspiration, to renounce the use of violence as a method for achieving their ends."

The Pope reiterated his position on non-violence that first night in Harare when he spoke to the 72 bishops of the Inter-regional Meeting of the Bishops of Southern Africa (IMBISA)—his only opportunity to formally address the bishops working in South Africa. The Pope praised them for seeking a negotiated end to apartheid through "dialogue sustained by prayer." The papal position was

Zimbabweans but now based in Malawi. In March, a 27-year-old Australian missionary with Shekinah, Ian Grey, was sentenced to ten and a half years in jail by a Mozambican military tribunal after he was caught carrying military messages between Mozambique and Malawi for the Pretoria-backed Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo).

Grey said Shekinah recruited him to work as a missionary in Renamo-held territory, bringing bibles and religious literature. Gradually, however, leaders of the organization shifted his assignment and he found himself turned into a military courier. According to Grey, Shekinah served as transmission belt for communications between the Pretoria-backed group and a Washington office where Thomas Schaaf—a former fundamentalist missionary in Zimbabwe—now serves as a Renamo lobbyist.

Such activities are merely the most extreme edge of a massive thrust into southern Africa by church groups engaged in what they see as "a crusade against godless communism," according to a new study, "The Religious Right in Southern Africa," by former University of Zimbabwe religious studies lecturer Paul Gifford. In Zimbabwe alone, he noted, the American religious right is represented by such well-funded organizations as the Campus Crusade for Christ, Youth With A Mission, and Jimmy Swaggart Ministries.

In many cases, he says, these groups soft-pedal their political views in Zimbabwe, while actively promoting them in South Africa. He charges, for example, that Campus Crusade's South African branch actually split itself along racial lines, setting up separate wings for blacks and whites. He says that only the black section, known as Life Ministries, functions in Zimbabwe. Under that name, it sought top-level

influence by organizing special seminars for senior government and business executives at some of the nation's most fashionable resorts.

Gifford also notes that Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, a group criticized by some leaders of the South African Council of Churches for using its TV programs to offer theological justification for apartheid, operates unhindered in Zimbabwe and Mozambique despite suspicions—rejected as groundless by its local representatives—that it has links to Renamo.

Ironically, church people sometimes take a harder line against these groups than governments. Reverend Kuchera has suggested that government bar "religious right" preachers from the country, if evidence exists that they are linked to South Africa. When he offered that advice to Vice President Simon Muzenda, the Zimbabwean official told him this would provoke a dangerous backlash from conservatives who are eager for an opportunity to say, "Look at this Marxist government cracking down on the church."

Mozambican officials have taken a similar stand. Assemblies of God officials in Maputo report that the arrest of Grey, one missionary involved with their church, has not altered their good relations with the Mozambican government.

Gifford praises frontline leaders for avoiding what he sees as a trap set by right-wing church groups which may want to provoke a crackdown because of its propaganda value. But he argues that the Christian churches should take it upon themselves to challenge and combat these groups because their theology is "a perversion which discredits all Christians."

—Steve Askin
Harare, Zimbabwe

seen to be close to the majority of the South African bishops who are strongly anti-apartheid, but who do not espouse violence.

Yet the theological differences between the Pope and Mugabe over the means of ending racial repression did not dampen the Zimbabwe visit at all. The Pope repeatedly praised Mugabe's policy of racial reconciliation and his efforts at creating national unity. The impression created was of a virtual papal endorsement for Mugabe's drive to merge the country's two ethnically based political parties, thus creating a de facto one-party state.

For his part, Robert Mugabe also showed support for the Pope. The president, who has carefully avoided publicly practicing Catholicism, although all other members of his family do, attended the Pope's open-air mass for some 200,000 people at the suburban Borrowdale Racetrack. Many of his cabinet ministers also attended and even took communion.

At a racetrack mass in the southern city of Bulawayo the next day, the Pope expressed condolences for those who suffered violence both before and after Zimbabwe's independence, a reference to the thousands in the surrounding Matabeleland countryside who were victim-

ized in the political strife of 1982-88. Again the Pope praised Mugabe's efforts at bringing "reconciliation and peace" to the country.

On the advice of South Africa's bishops, the Pope specifically chose not to visit South Africa, a direct snub to the apartheid government. But even at the start of his tour, the Pope muddled the message by telling reporters on his plane that he wanted to visit South Africa soon.

The Pope went to South Africa sooner than he had expected when some troublesome weather caused his chartered Air Zimbabwe plane to change its Botswana-to-Lesotho flight path to land at

Johannesburg's Jan Smuts airport. Although Pope John Paul did not give his customary kiss to the ground in every new country he visits, he met and had lunch with South African Foreign Minister Roelof "Pik" Botha and accepted a South African motorcade for the six-hour drive to Lesotho. Afterwards, Botha said smugly that the Pope was "destined" to visit South Africa.

The South African issue also featured prominently in Lesotho, where the Pope arrived amid a harrowing hostage ordeal. Four gunmen hijacked a bus carrying 70 pilgrims, nuns, and schoolchildren to attend the mass in Lesotho's capital, Maseru. Without saying what their protest was all about, the gunmen said they wanted to see the Pope as well as Lesotho's King Moshoeshoe II. Confirming the well-known South African control of Lesotho's security, a heavily armed group of South African commandos surrounded the bus. Shortly after the Pope drove past the scene of the crisis, there was a shoot-out in which three hijackers were killed, as well as two passengers.

There has been much speculation about what forces conspired to get the Pope to visit South Africa and to be "saved" from the hostage crisis by South African troops. Many suggested it was all a Pretoria plot, but the only thing that seems certain at this point is that South Africa's control of the region's vital communications and transport networks is so complete that even the Pope could not ignore it. In southern Africa, it seems, all roads lead to South Africa.

The trouble in Lesotho apparently took a toll on the turn-out at the open-air mass there, which was predicted to draw 1 million faithful from Lesotho and South Africa. Instead, a mere 25,000 attended the mass. After another mass in Swaziland, Pope John Paul flew to the last and what many billed as his most significant stop, Mozambique.

The Pope visited a Mozambique wracked by war, beset by massive suffering among the country's 14 million people. He also came at a key moment when Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano had just met with South African President P.W. Botha in Songo in northern Mozambique, the site of the giant Cahora Bassa dam. Botha pledged to help revive the dam's power generators,

which have been nearly idle because of constant sabotage by Renamo rebels.

The feeling was that with the Chissano-Botha meeting, perhaps some sort of talks were possible between Chissano's government and Renamo. Such speculation was increased when the Archbishop of Beira, Jaime Goncalves, called for negotiations between the Mozambican government and the rebel movement.

"It is not the point if Renamo is legitimate," said Archbishop Goncalves at the Catholic bishops meeting in Harare in preparation for the Pope's visit. "These are the people who are waging war and destroying our country and causing so much suffering. They are the ones who can stop the suffering."

With such a call for negotiations coming from the Mozambican bishops, it was expected that the Pope would make a similar call. But in fact the pontiff only issued a very ambiguous endorsement of the bishops' position with regard to negotiations. At the same time, he also spoke favorably, in vague terms, of the Maputo government's offer of amnesty to any rebels who surrender.

In contrast to the happy, but relatively sedate crowds that gathered to see the Pope in Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, the Mozambican crowds in Maputo and Beira were almost frenzied in their enthusiasm. Such excitement was not generated by their fervent Catholicism as much as by their desperation caused by the unending conflict.

People held up banners calling on the Pope for peace, and when asked what the Pope's visit meant, people attending the mass simply answered "peace".

"Many people think the Pope will bring peace as some sort of miracle to Mozambique," said Ezequiel Gwembe, an official in the organizing committee for the papal visit. "But his message has been that we should build peace for ourselves."

As the Western diplomat noted at the time of the Pope's departure, the Pope's message was not very clear and it was couched in such intricate Portuguese that the slum dwellers of Maputo and Beira who attended the open-air masses could hardly be expected to grasp its subtleties. Pope John Paul II's conservative and diplomatically vague statements were perhaps designed to provoke no strong

responses, either for or against, in the five countries that he visited.

But that vagueness itself was outspokenly criticized by a group of anti-apartheid South African clerics who accused the Pope of allowing his southern African trip to be used by Pretoria's propaganda.

The South African anti-apartheid church leader, the Reverend Allan Boesak, criticized the Pope for being too soft on the South African government. Boesak attended the Pope's ecumenical meeting with Christian church leaders in Maputo as member of a 10-person delegation from the South African Council of Churches (SACC), and later said he was disappointed that the pontiff was not more critical of the South African government.

"I feel sad that the Pope has not availed himself to be as clear on the South African situation as I would have liked him to be, that he has not specifically addressed the issues that make peace and justice impossible in South Africa today," said Boesak at a Maputo press conference.

Criticizing the Pope for not singling out the South African government in his general condemnations of apartheid and racial oppression, he said: "The Pope may not have intended to do so, but he may have given the South African government more comfort than it deserves."

The South African delegation generally criticized the Pope for allowing the Pretoria government to use his southern African tour for its own publicity, particularly on his emergency landing in Johannesburg and his subsequent meeting with the South African foreign minister.


"Just the very fact of having the Pope land in Jan Smuts puts us in an invidious position where the very people who oppress us and cause us pain are the people who welcome him at the airport," said the Reverend Frank Chikane, secretary-general of the SACC. "The security measures are taken by the very people who torture us. That is the contradiction we have to deal with in the South African context."

Boesak challenged the Pope on his call for non-violent resistance to apartheid. "It is not particularly helpful for the Church to say to the people 'Do not use violence,' without offering clear and practical strategies for resisting injustice by non-violent means." ○

L'ÉTAT *C'est* MOI?

By TODD SHIELDS

While Nairobi received a facelift to commemorate the 10th anniversary of President Moi's rule, the city's sparkle belied a continuing erosion of freedom for Kenya's once-independent judiciary and an ongoing crackdown on critics and suspected political opponents. The constricting political atmosphere is causing worries in a nation once widely respected for its democratic traditions and economic prosperity.



Gamerdax

Gibson Kamau Kuria, a lawyer representing detainees, was himself detained from February to December 1987



Betty Prasse

*Daniel arap Moi:
"The man and his rule
are more important
than the nation
and its institutions"*

There are two new monuments in Kenya's capital these days. One, abstract and subdued, sits on the outskirts of town. The other, raw and hulking, is prominently displayed in the city center. Together, they tell something of the nation's course as it marks 25 years of independence.

The first monument represents a quarter-century of *Uhuru*, a milestone whose observance seemingly would be the major commemorative event of the year. But the structure is overshadowed by its downtown counterpart, a monolithic sculpture honoring President Daniel arap Moi's 10 years in power.

The more expensive, more conspicuous monument—a black marble star supported by a steel framework weighing 65,000 pounds—dominates a major intersection in Nairobi's high-rise business district. From its top emerges a massive hand holding a massive staff, a looming emblem of Moi's authority and power.

The disparity between the monuments creates a clear implication: that the man and his rule are more important than the nation and its institutions. The point, hinted at through the language of celebratory architecture, has found more explicit expression in recent months with a fresh wave of political arrests, an increasingly intolerant national dialogue, and a continued erosion of checks on presidential power.

The constricting political climate threatens to sully Kenya's reputation, which so far is one of success and tolerance. The country feeds itself, has avoided the conflicts and bloodshed which plague its neighbors, and has enjoyed steady expansion while other countries have sunk deeper into poverty.

The economic gains, however, are endangered by the world's highest population growth rate and stagnant investment. Western donors are increasingly concerned over rising public expenditures, with several privately expressing dismay at the amounts dedicated to October's extravagant week-long celebration of Moi's presidency.

The festivities, along with celebrations in December marking 25 years of inde-

pendence from Great Britain, were planned to cost at least \$20 million—more than the current budget for nine of Kenya's 28 ministries. It was unclear what share of that was to be borne directly by the government, which looked outside its normal revenues for help.

The campaign was conducted on several fronts. Civil servants "contributed" to the celebrations through deductions from their pay. At government urging, private businessmen gave tens of millions of shillings, not without some measure of dismay. "What does anybody need that amount of money for?" asked

Moi's chosen instrument is the ruling party, and his method is to increase its power, often at the expense of institutions the British left behind.

one Kenyan in close touch with the business community. Executives summoned to pitch for celebration funds "were not amused."

The pace picked up as the celebration of Moi's presidency approached. Ruling party officials visited shops and told the proprietors to decorate and where necessary, to paint. The more vulnerable communities, like Sikhs, Hindus, and Muslims, erected street-spanning arches congratulating Moi. The net result was a cleaner Nairobi with freshly paved streets, festoons of bunting, and a new monument in the city center that celebrates what is being called "the first decade of the *Nyayo* era"—at a cost of nearly \$1 million.

Nyayo, Swahili for footsteps, is the name chosen by Moi for his governing philosophy. The footsteps to be followed

are those of Jomo Kenyatta, the nation's first president and a man of almost mythological stature to many Kenyans. Moi, who had served quietly as vice president for nearly 12 years, assumed the presidency upon Kenyatta's death in August 1978.

In the decade since, Moi has weathered an attempted coup (in 1982), emerging as the undisputed arbiter of Kenyan politics. His chosen instrument is the ruling party, and his method is to increase its power, often at the expense of institutions the British left behind.

Moi's rule has thus seen the outlawing of opposition parties—a move taken when there were no parties aside from the ruling Kenya African National Union (Kanu)—and the removal of security of tenure from the attorney-general. More recently, Parliament passed constitutional amendments giving Moi unfettered leeway to dismiss judges and increasing from 48 hours to 14 days the time a suspect for a capital offense can be held without charge.

The increased police powers and the undermining of a judiciary known for its independence came as the party tightened its grip on Parliament. Kanu disciplinarians can and do eject from the party members who fail to sufficiently toe the official line. Once out of the party, a politician is out of Parliament. The process, combined with elections that are rigged as often as necessary to weed out undesirable candidates, has emasculated a body once known for robust debates.

Recent constitutional amendments, advanced by the government with little explanation beyond the need to eliminate vestiges of colonialism, are a case in point. These fundamental changes were passed unanimously and without debate in August, prompting the leading local news magazine to note: "On major issues there simply has not been any debate, with contributions overwhelmingly espousing the party line."

That statement was followed by a chorus of protest from Moi and other government leaders, as was a complaint from an Anglican bishop about the hurried passage of resolutions at Kanu's annual delegates conference—during which the party's entire top leadership was elected unopposed.

An attack on the bishop quickly wid-

Todd Shields, a Nairobi-based freelance journalist, reports for The Independent of London, The Dallas Morning News, and The Atlanta Constitution.

ened into an attack on other church leaders known for criticizing the government, with the prelates accused of serving "foreign masters" and even being in league with South Africa. The vitriol came weeks after the Law Society of Kenya was denounced by MP after MP for its opposition to the constitutional amendments.

Such fulminations were not limited to the back-burners, with ministers and high party officials usually joining in protest against any utterances not to official liking. A statement from Vice President Josephat Karanja, who since his appointment in March has increasingly emerged as a government spokesman, perhaps best embodies the rigid atmosphere: "If you don't want the elected Nyayo people, pack up and go elsewhere, as we will not allow you to undermine them."

The attacks on the clergy and lawyers are doubly important given Kanu's eclipse of Parliament. With even the meekest objections gone from the legislature, the churches and the Law Society have become the nation's sole independent voices on public affairs. Both groups have come under direct threat in recent months. The recent church-state "debate" saw Kanu Secretary-General Moses Mudaavadi threaten to curtail freedom of worship—a statement that Moi disavowed. And along with parliamentarians' denunciations of the Law Society came intimations that the lawyers' body, established by law to advise the government on legal matters, might be disbanded.

The verbal thrashing of the two groups was quickly followed by a warning from Moi himself that Kenya's cautious, self-censoring journalists risk being branded subversives. The threat was lent added resonance by a fresh security crackdown and accompanying publicity campaign, complete with a party-sponsored rally, against purported clandestine opposition groups.

From August to mid-October, four people were picked up and held under a law that permits indefinite detention without charge. Another five were convicted on guilty pleas of involvement with subversive groups. Two others, a former MP and the uncle of self-exiled politician Koigi wa Wamwere, were arrested by police, according to relatives.

The government identifies the threat as coming from an organization it calls the Kenya Patriotic Front (KPF), reputedly headed by Wamwere from Norway. In an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation, Wamwere himself claimed leadership of the movement. But there has been no evidence of its activities, or even its existence, aside from Wamwere's claim and court statements by prosecutors.

In obtaining its convictions, the state has told the courts of complicated movements by KPF suspects to meet fellow conspirators abroad and of backing from Libya—always a bogeyman to Kenya's conservative leaders. But none of those recently convicted had the benefit of de-

Kenya's cautious,
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fense counsel, and none of the prosecution's statements were submitted to cross-examination.

The convictions were all obtained on confessions by the accused, following a pattern established in 1986 and 1987 when the government said it was fighting the Mwakenya underground movement. More than 80 Mwakenya suspects were imprisoned on guilty pleas and without defense lawyers on charges of involvement with the clandestine group.

The Mwakenya cases received wide publicity, partly through a report by the human rights group, Amnesty International, outlining torture and ill treatment of suspects. No such allegations have surfaced from the more recent round of detentions, according to Kenyan and Western sources.

In the recent cases, the government has branded the KPF as the successor to Mwakenya, and has also identified another group called the Kenya Revolution-

ary Movement, purportedly led by Raila Odinga, a long-serving political prisoner and son of former Vice President Oginga Odinga.

The younger Odinga, who was first jailed in the wake of the 1982 coup attempt, benefited in February from Moi's order freeing nine of the country's 12 acknowledged political prisoners. But he was again arrested on a Nairobi street in late August.

Nine days later, under the pressure of a habeas corpus application brought by Odinga's wife, the state admitted it was holding him. Within days, his wife, Betty Odinga, was retired "in the public interest" from her teaching post and ejected from the state-supplied house that went with the job. She was later reinstated to another position.

The treatment received by Betty Odinga likely will serve in a small way to deter others who would wish to take the state to task. Similarly, the recent removal of security of tenure from judges is likely to dampen judicial impulses to contest executive actions, as the increased time a suspect can be held augments the security forces' intimidatory powers and the string of confessions undermines the integrity of the legal system.

"Not a single case has come to trial in which evidence has been adduced and subjected to cross-examination," said one prominent Kenyan lawyer. "I'm frightened to death. We have now no legal basis to confront government in the attempt to check abuse of power."

Although the outline of the erosion of liberties may be clear, the reason for the deterioration remains obscure. Speculation runs from the insecurities inherent in a rigid one-party system that equates disagreement with disloyalty and so forces any opposition underground, to the isolation Moi, as a member of the small Kalenjin ethnic group, may feel in the face of a body politic that was dominated until his ascension by members of the large and well-educated Kikuyu group—or more simply, to his personal view of power.

"He pretty much thinks it should be absolute," said one Western diplomat who occasionally meets with the president. "He is pretty well convinced he has to be a strong leader unimpeded by Parliament and other things to keep his country together." ○

LETTER FROM KHARTOUM

Southern Sudan's Suffering

By ALFRED LOGUNE TABAN

The southern half of Sudan is gripped by yet another famine which makes an earlier period of starvation in 1984-85 pale by comparison.

In the three main towns of Juba, Malakal, and Wau, people are dying of hunger at an alarming rate, according to authorities and the few relief agencies still operating in southern Sudan. In a message sent to Khartoum in late September, the deputy governor of Equatoria region, Isiah Paul, said that there was virtually no food, fuel, nor running water in Juba. He said that the army is also short on rations.

About half the 250,000 people of Juba are refugees from the many military engagements between the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) and government troops. The SPLA, a largely southern-based movement, is fighting to overthrow what it calls the Arab Muslim minority clique in Khartoum.

The British relief agency, Oxfam, reports that two to three people are dying daily in a camp in Juba where it is feeding displaced Equatorians. The governor of Equatoria, Morris Lawiya, said that in September refugees or displaced people of his province had received absolutely no food aid for several weeks, while 250 tons of supplies sat in Khartoum, unable to be transported to Juba.

Nile Safari, a privately owned aviation firm and the only airline that made regular flights to Juba, suspended operations on September 25 when its Boeing 707 was shot at while attempting to land at Juba airport. Despite taking seven bullet holes during the attack, the craft returned safely to Khartoum. In August 1986, the SPLA shot down a Sudan Airways plane over Malakal, Upper Nile region, killing all 63 people on board. Less than a year later, a Cessna aircraft was shot down near the same spot, with the loss of over 20 lives. Land transportation also has become hazardous. In September, at least 23 lorry drivers—most of them Kenyans—were killed when a convoy of food aid they were transporting from the Ugandan border to Juba was ambushed.

A recent string of SPLA military successes in Equatoria has made farming and other normal rural activities impossible. The wood, coffee, and food-producing towns of Katire and Kyala fell to the SPLA in mid-September. The sorghum-producing areas of Jebel Lado, 15 miles north of Juba, were captured a week later. The government admits to the loss of the first two towns, but not the last.

One-third of the 1.5 million people of Equatoria are now displaced and must be fed through relief efforts in order to survive—at a time when there is no way of getting food aid into the region. In addition, Governor Lawiya says that Equatorians who have not left their homes should also be considered "displaced" since they require food relief as well. In town, skyrocketing prices and low salaries have made it nearly impossible to purchase food. People still working and living in Juba cannot cover their own needs, not to mention their ever-growing number of dependents—refugees from the countryside.

The long-suffering town of Torit in Eastern Equatoria region, where about five people a day were dying from starvation a few months ago, has been under SPLA siege since early this year. The two towns that the government admits have

fallen, Katire and Kyala, are only 36 miles and 24 miles from Torit, respectively. With the beginning of the rainy season, this historic town (Torit was the site of the first Anya-Nya rebellion in August 1955) may not remain in government hands for long.

Malakal, the capital of Upper Nile region, has fared no better. Ret Chol Jok, governor of Upper Nile, said in September that at least 25 of his people were dying of starvation every month. A quarter of the 200,000 residents of this riverside town are displaced. The last time Malakal received food aid was in February.

Heavy rains have also taken their toll on Malakal. The governor says that 90 percent of the few crops planted this year have been destroyed by the recent floods and almost all the buildings in the town have collapsed or are in danger of coming down. There are only two doctors working in a clinic lacking all basic facilities and drugs.

Malakal itself resembles a fortress. The army has put up barbed wire to seal off the town from SPLA infiltration. Residents are often forbidden to enter or leave. Food never leaves the town, lest it fall into the hands of the SPLA.

About 75 percent of Upper Nile is now controlled by the SPLA. The few towns in the region still in government hands are constantly harassed. At the time of writing, Nasir, a provincial capital near the Ethiopian border, was facing steady bombardment from the SPLA. In early September, the army shot down a SPLA helicopter over Nasir, an attack which angered the SPLA, Western diplomats say. Towns already in SPLA hands in Upper Nile include Pibor, Pashela, and Jekow.

In Wau, the situation is grimmer still. Residents say that looking for food in Wau is like looking for a needle that has fallen in the sand. Angelo Beda, the president of the Council for the South—the government of southern Sudan—made a one-week visit to Wau in late September and said that 62 persons were dying every day of hunger and disease. Wau, a town of 150,000 people—half of whom are refugees—has only three doctors.

About 100 miles away in Awiel, the situation is worse. Beda says that a man who is able to find food in Awiel feeds himself only to be able to bury the dead. At least 60 people die every day from starvation in the town.

Bahr el Ghazal region, of which Awiel and Wau are the main towns, has not received any tangible food aid for over two years. In Babanusa, Southern Kordofan province, there are several tons of stored sorghum which was supposed to be sent to Awiel and Wau, but SPLA activity in the area has made transporting the relief impossible. Last year and early this year, two attempts to move food to these towns by railway failed. The SPLA attacked both trains. Rains have also washed away parts of the line and rendered impassable the few roads in the region.

From Awiel and the surrounding areas, stick-thin mothers carrying their virtually weightless children and old men converge on El Meiram in Southern Kordofan in search of food. Most do not receive aid in time and many thousands of refugees have died while waiting in El Meiram. "The problem in many parts of southern Sudan is no longer war but hunger," Beda said. However, it is the war which is responsible for the starvation. ○

Alfred Logune Taban is a Sudanese journalist who reports for Sudanow in Khartoum.



ALGERIA

RAISING THE STAKES

By GARY ABRAMSON


The government of President Chadli Benjedid was taken by surprise at the depth of popular discontent with its policies which surfaced in October's riots. Although Algeria's revolutionary leaders are attempting to chart a course of economic and political reform, the road ahead is not likely to be an easy one, for the simmering anger of the youth has risen the stakes considerably.

As Algiers returned to its usual rhythms toward the end of six days of violent protest this October, a lanky 18-year-old typical of this capital's newly emboldened youth reflected on the charred facades and a handful of soldiers still posted at one of the more volatile city squares. "Okay, perhaps all this violence is to be regretted. But it was necessary to send a message," he said.

In the aftermath of the worst rioting to hit the country in its 26 years of independence, Algeria's fabled revolutionary leaders are now finding that it is the youn-


Gary Abramson reports frequently on North Africa and Spain for The Chicago Tribune, The St. Petersburg Times, and other publications. He is based in Madrid.

Patrick Robert/Sygnia



Betty Press

President Chadli Benjedid [inset]: "What Chadli is intending to deliver is not likely to please his country's young people"



ger generation which has raised the stakes in their already delicate endeavor to chart major reforms, despite considerable internal resistance.

The violence of the demonstrations that swept Algiers and four main cities in the first half of October, led by thousands of idled young people, Muslim militants, and backed by families feeling the squeeze of economic austerity policies, appeared to have caught the government by surprise. A mood of growing discontent had existed for months as the price of basic foods and other items long subsidized by Algeria's oil and gas earnings steadily climbed as international energy prices tumbled.

But while grumblings over the removal of subsidies and over other austerity measures imposed in recent years was known, few Algerians seem to have expected the widespread protest, in which demonstrators called variously for lower prices, Islamic law, resignation of officials, and even multi-party democracy.

Official accusations of behind-the-scenes culprits were quick to fly. Coming as they did on the heels of a strike at the industrial center of Rouiba and strikes elsewhere called by the party's sole authorized union, the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA), the violent rampages in the poor, outlying quarters of Belcourt, Kouba, and Bab el Oued were said to be politically orchestrated. The motive, according to some Algerians close to the official press, would be to weaken prospects for further reforms pioneered by President Chadli Benjedid.

Many Algiers residents said that a general strike had been called by word of mouth for Tuesday, October 4, while others reported notices being put in their mailboxes once the unrest began in earnest the following day. Diplomatic sources in Algiers shared the belief that no known organization had initiated the demonstrations, although certain mosques in the capital became the departure point for marches later in the week.

The government responded first with force, and then with food. A day after a six-day state of emergency was lifted, the once-bare shelves of local shops were brimming with basic goods such as milk, semolina, and cooking oil, whose shortage helped spark the rioting that

ended in at least 200 deaths as the army fired on demonstrators, according to official figures. Unofficial counts by hospital sources put the toll at closer to 500.

Chadli, who is also head of Algeria's sole political party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), appears to have returned a degree of calm to the country by ordering the state-managed distributors and warehouses to refill the pantries, and by appearing on national television with promises of economic and political change.

The white-haired colonel, seated at a desk flanked by potted plants with the Algerian flag as his backdrop, announced very general reform plans that nonetheless seemed to have captured the enthusiasm of many Algerians. "One cannot proceed with economic, agricultural, educational, and administrative reform without taking up political reform," he insisted, announcing an imminent elimination of "the monopoly of power."

Since then, if the streets of Algiers have grown quiet enough to pull back nearly all the soldiers and armored cars that held the city for nearly a week, Algerians who poured back into the city's graceful boulevards were quick to say that the conflict is not over.

"Chadli has made promises now that are not all that clear, we are waiting to see what he delivers," said Ahmed Reda, a 19-year-old unemployed high school graduate. As he stood around with a group of friends at the Place Premier Mai, workers in blue cleaning outfits swept away the broken glass and debris in front of government offices that were a main target during the unrest.

Young Algerians are not the only ones waiting for Chadli, however. Both Algeria's neighbor to the west, Morocco, and to the east, Tunisia, are watching developments closely, diplomats said. Tunisia and Morocco have suffered price riots in recent years, and reportedly sent messages of solidarity to the Algerian president in October. In Morocco, news of the Algerian unrest has been severely limited, and supplies were being sent to Algeria, Spanish press reports said.

Perhaps more importantly, Algeria's troubles might foreshadow tensions in other oil-producing countries where falling petroleum income could also require belt-tightening. Barely a week after the

Algerian unrest, eight ministers from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) met at the Algerian embassy in Madrid to try to firm up the cartel's increasingly flimsy production quota policy. The OPEC ministers reached an agreement in principle not to raise production further.

Meanwhile, what Chadli is intending to deliver is not likely to please his country's young people, who make up 60 percent of Algeria's 24 million people—at least not in the short-term. Because of three factors largely beyond his control, Chadli is now committed to accelerating his decade-long effort at essentially overturning the centralized, industrial-based socialist economy whose foundations were laid by his predecessor, Houari Boumedienne.

At home, the government must cope with a population growth rate of 3.3 percent, one of the highest in the world, and two years of drought that has lowered agricultural output. At the same time, as world energy prices have tumbled, revenues from natural gas and oil that bring in 98 percent of Algeria's foreign exchange have dropped from \$13 billion in 1985 to a projected \$8 billion this year.

Despite the latest unrest, such economic conditions have convinced Chadli and his less doctrinaire party comrades that a diversified and profitable economy, less dependent on oil and gas, with state enterprises more susceptible to market forces, is the only way forward. Unfortunately, putting this new economy in place is likely to be painful for average wage earners and threatening to many bureaucrats whose performance on the job had not been cause for dismissal until very recently.

Chadli's economic reform is "painful medicine whose benefits may not be seen for many years," said a Western analyst in Algiers.

Out of ideological conviction and, some say, Algerian pride, the government has not sought the sort of rescheduling programs on its \$20 billion debt that normally require acceptance of outside recommendations for economic austerity. Ironically, however, Algeria is imposing on itself some of the very same economic discipline that often comes with International Monetary Fund agreements, such as currency devaluation, a reduction of imports to lower the deficit, and privat-

ization of farming.

The challenge of such economic reform may not be whether it can succeed, but how soon. Older Algerians learned the values of patience and confidence in the future during a very different era, under the revolutionary spirit of a National Liberation Front that had forced France to end 130 years of colonial rule in 1962, and which rapidly became a model for liberation movements throughout the Third World.

Talking nowadays with Algeria's youth, however, it becomes clear that this generation feels as removed from those who bitterly fought the French in a war that took a million lives as do young Americans from veterans of Vietnam. *And they have little patience.*

Rather than revolutionary zeal and faith in socialism, many young—and some older—Algerians want a share of the more comfortable life they hear about from their 800,000 compatriots who work in France, or observe among a privileged elite at home.

It is only a 20-minute walk up the steep hills that rise from this Mediterranean port city from the poor and crowded Bab el Oued district to the shaded enclaves of El Biar and other neighborhoods where embassies share the hilltops with elegant private homes.

The contrast between wealth and poverty appears, at least on a brief visit, less dramatic than in many capitals of developing countries, or even than Manhattan. Utter destitution, if it exists in Algiers, is not obvious on a journey through the capital's poorer quarters. But unlike many developing countries such as Morocco to the west, Algeria at independence found itself without the long-established inequalities between feudal, dominant families and poor masses, a diplomatic analyst said.

This may go far to explain why many Algerians so resent those party leaders, army officers, and bureaucrats whom they perceive to be leading lives at sharp odds with the country's socialist vision. "They [referring to a nebulous clan he believes holds power] make a profit on everything," said a taxi driver who would only identify himself as Mohamed. "If you want to build a house, it takes two years. Pay a colonel, it takes two weeks."

Such perceptions, accurate or not,

help to explain why, when a series of strikes finally exploded into a general rampage, the prime targets included a luxury store complex as well as the FLN headquarters and Air Algérie, the national airline.

In his televised address on October 11, Chadli acknowledged that "it is time to introduce the necessary reforms" that would be approved by the Algerian people as a whole. At least for now, many Algerians appear to be giving him the benefit of the doubt. What he did not say, though he alluded to the problem a few weeks earlier in a speech before FLN cadres, is that his plans for what he termed the next day "greater democratization of political action" are being strongly fought by a range of groups from socialist purists within the FLN, government and state employees threatened by a crackdown on corruption, and factions in the army, Western diplomats said.

For Algerian officials who cherish the country's reputation for support of national liberation the world over, and as one of the Third World's near welfare states during the oil boom years, Chadli's reaction to the economic squeeze sounds

threateningly reactionary, an Algerian intellectual said.

The symptoms of change in Algerians' international outlook could be seen on their doorstep this month. Even as the government reaffirmed its support for the Polisario Front it has hosted in its desert for 12 years, the movement's information office in Algiers was sacked by the demonstrators.


The earliest changes were to be put to a vote in a national referendum on November 3 that, among other reforms, was to give new authority to the near powerless office of prime minister.

The major challenge to Benjedid and his reformers will come in December, however, when the FLN party congress is to hammer out a more complete program of reforms, to be included in a second national referendum to be held shortly thereafter.

Among the now-quiet youth in the streets of Algiers, the stakes seem to be clear. "We are hoping, waiting for Chadli," said a young dancer named Sofiane in a sweatshirt and jeans jacket. "People now are waiting for December." ○

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RECOVERY OR RELAPSE?

By ERNEST HARSCH

The UN's mid-term review of the African economic recovery program elicited many questions about the extent of the donor community's commitment to the continent's redressment efforts. Unless more financial support is forthcoming, the prognosis is not a very pleasant one for Africa's economic ailments.



Yudaka Nagata/United Nations

General Assembly debate on Africa's economic crisis: "There has been precious little in the way of economic recovery since the program was adopted in 1986"

Disappointment, frustration, anger. Though couched in the diplomatic terminology and polite phrases that are customary in United Nations conference rooms, those were the most com-

monly expressed sentiments as delegates gathered at the UN to assess the current state of Africa's economic crisis.

The two-week session, held in the latter half of September by an ad hoc committee of the General Assembly, was convened as the mid-term review of the UN Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development

(UNPAAERD). Yet as the testimonies and statistics presented at the review made clear, there has been precious little in the way of economic recovery since the program was adopted in 1986.

Despite sweeping—and painful—economic reforms undertaken by most African governments, "Africa's economic situation has hardly improved," stated Ma-

Ernest Harsch is a freelance journalist based in New York who has written extensively on African political developments for over a decade.

lian Foreign Minister Modibo Keita. "Even worse, it has seriously deteriorated in a majority of countries."

UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar declared at the opening plenary session that Africa's current economic circumstances "are likely to lead not to recovery and development, but to drift and stagnation, if not to a chronic state of crisis."

The primary reason for this parlous state, most African delegates believe, has been the failure of the international community—Africa's major donors, creditors, and trade partners—to provide the kind of financial assistance needed to turn the situation around. The Permanent Steering Committee of the Organization of African Unity put it bluntly: "So far, the expected resource flows from the international community have been slow and dwindling. . . . This is exactly the opposite of what UNPAAERD was calling for. . . . There is a genuine feeling in Africa of a bitter sense of unfulfilled, even betrayed, expectations."

Efforts to grapple with Africa's economic crisis long predate UNPAAERD, whether through policies and reforms developed by African countries themselves or through structural adjustment programs adopted at the urging of the IMF, World Bank, and other outside bodies. UNPAAERD did not propose anything startlingly new. What it basically amounted to was a pact, with African governments agreeing to sweeping economic reforms and the international community pledging to provide Africa with the financing and improved economic conditions necessary to carry them through.

In the original UNPAAERD projections, African countries estimated the total cost of the five-year program at around \$128 billion. Of that amount, they committed themselves to contributing \$82 billion from their own resources, with the \$46 billion gap expected to come from abroad.

"The donors did not commit themselves to the \$46 billion figure. They did not," explains Jean Ripert, the UN's director-general for development and chairman of the UNPAAERD implementation steering committee. "But there was a tacit understanding in the negotia-

tions that if country A adopts reform measures, that country would not be left in the lurch."

While African delegates appealed to donors to increase their assistance, the latter contented themselves mainly with cataloguing how much they had already done.

To varying degrees, most African governments have lived up to their side of the bargain. According to the UN secretary-general's main report, as of July 1, 1988, about 30 African governments had adopted structural adjustment programs linked to arrangements with the IMF and/or World Bank. Several others had implemented similar programs without such formal IMF/World Bank links. In addition, the great majority of African countries now give agriculture priority in their development budgets, one of UNPAAERD's key recommendations.

Some of the reform measures have entailed jarring shifts in economic policy. Currencies have been devalued, at times massively. Trade regulations were liberalized. Government expenditures were cut and general wage freezes imposed. Subsidies on food and other essential goods were lifted. State enterprises were overhauled, liquidated, or put on the auction block.

The results were hardly what had been hoped for. A handful of countries registered some improvement in their overall economic fortunes. For a slightly greater number, there have been positive trends in certain macroeconomic indices (higher export volumes, lower inflation rates, reduced budgetary deficits). But for the majority of African states, there has not been even a hint of recovery—nor much of the outside assistance that had been called for.

The secretary-general's report paints a stark picture. Africa's gross domestic product rose by 1 percent in 1986 and 0.8 percent in 1987—but in per capita terms that actually meant *declines* of 2 percent and 2.2 percent. By the end of 1987, Africa's total foreign debt had climbed to \$218 billion, or three times the continent's annual export earnings. With larger debt repayments due from 1989 onward, debt service obligations are expected to rise from the estimated figure of \$29 billion in 1987 to \$45 billion in 1995.

Net resource flows to Africa rose nominally between 1985 and 1987, from \$17.9 billion to \$22.9 billion; but again measured in real terms, the 1987 figure was lower than that for 1985. Official development assistance did increase (even in real terms), yet was offset by declining export credits, lower private commercial flows, and a net transfer of financial resources *from Africa to the IMF* of close to \$1 billion in both 1986 and 1987 (due to IMF loan repayments and charges).

On top of this, African countries have been hard hit by an unfavorable world market. Their economies are particularly sensitive to international prices, since most depend on no more than three export commodities for the bulk of their foreign exchange earnings. According to the OAU Steering Committee report, Africa's level of export earnings in 1986 and 1987 was 20 percent below that of 1985, and just 57 percent of the 1980 level. In real terms, non-oil primary commodity prices for Africa are at their lowest levels since the Great Depression half a century ago.

Such "macro" figures may be disappointing for economic planners and government officials. But translated into human terms, they spell disaster for the ordinary African.

States the secretary-general's report: "The most vulnerable population groups, in particular women, youth, the disabled, and the aged, have been severely and adversely affected, directly and indirectly, by such measures as the withdrawal of subsidies on staple food items, the imposition of limits on wage increases at or below the inflation rate, the retrenchment of civil servants and private sector personnel frequently belonging to the lowest salary categories, and the cutting of expenditures on social services,

including health and education, and on basic infrastructure. Access to food has become more difficult for large segments of the population, with the result that malnutrition has increased, particularly among children, infants, and pregnant women."

One bright spot, highlighted by Unicef Executive Director James Grant, has been the decline in child deaths between 1985 and 1987. Thanks to a greater focus in African health programs on immunization and oral rehydration therapy against diarrhea, some 100,000 fewer children died on the continent in 1987, and millions more were healthier than two years earlier. This was despite a larger population and the compounding economic and other difficulties.

Grant added, however, that the overall state of child health in Africa is much gloomier. Africa is the one continent in the world where the number of children dying has been higher in the 1980s than in the previous decade. He quoted Tanzania's Julius Nyerere, who asked a few years ago: "Must we starve our children to pay our debts?" Responded Grant: "Now we know. The answer is yes.

What happens when an African government has to spend one-third of its budget to pay the debt? Basic drugs are not brought in, water systems are allowed to deteriorate, health salaries are not paid." As a result, some 10,000 children die in Africa each day.

Given this reality, it is not surprising that structural adjustment came in for some biting criticism. One of the documents submitted to the UNPAAERD review, called the Khartoum Declaration (adopted at a March 1988 UN-sponsored conference on economic reform's "human dimension"), declared that too many such programs "are rending the fabric of the African society. Rather than improve the human condition, some structural adjustment programs have aggravated it because they are incomplete, mechanistic, and of too short a time perspective."


Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe, addressing a September 15 news conference at the UN, rejected some of the conditionalities often attached to adjustment programs. In Zimbabwe's case, Mugabe stated, the IMF had pressed for reductions in government expenditures on defense and education. "We are con-

fronted by South African destabilization. Should we disarm?" he asked. "On education, is the IMF of the view that some children should go ignorant?"

Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, an exiled Liberian opposition leader who is now with Equator Bank, told a symposium organized by the UN Development Fund for Women: "As perceived by the average African, structural adjustment is bad, imposed by imperialistic powers and their institutions to further impoverish the poor of Africa." In some countries, she noted, there have been violent popular reactions, prompting governments to scrap or modify their reform programs.

Mindful of this critical view, the World Bank's Moeen Qureshi pleaded with African delegates "not to confuse the disease of overall economic decline and deteriorating social conditions with the remedy of structural adjustment."

Few actually did so. During the course of the UN review, most reiterated their commitment to economic reform. Yet they also insisted that the international community live up to its commitments, specifically to provide more development assistance, trade credits, and easier



11:15 p.m.
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Homard Thermidor

11:28 p.m.
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Pièce de boeuf poele au jus

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loans, as well as to take steps to lighten Africa's debt burden and protect its economies from unfavorable trade relations.

They found support in this from some Western representatives. Stephen Lewis, Canada's former UN ambassador and now special assistant to the secretary-general, insisted that responsibility for the economic crisis could no longer be dumped at Africa's feet, since most countries had initiated economic reforms. "The debt is held by the international community. Commodities are bought by the international community. Financial flows are controlled by the international community. So the focus is on the international community and whether it will deliver."

Participants took note of some of the recent debt relief measures agreed upon at the June 1988 Toronto summit of the major industrial powers and of steps by France, West Germany, and a few other countries to forgive part of Africa's debt. Unicef's Grant nevertheless emphasized that these moves were limited, and in the case of the commitments made in Toronto, had yet to be implemented. The OAU report acknowledged that there

now appeared to be some movement toward debt relief, while at the same time observing that the Paris Club's reschedulings had actually increased the long-term debt burdens of some countries, given the high interest rates in effect. The report repeated the OAU's call for an international conference on debt.

Both the OAU and UN secretaries-general drew attention in their reports not only to the problem of declining and unstable commodity prices, but also to the proliferation of tariff and non-tariff barriers against African exports to the industrialized countries. They called for an end to such protectionist measures.

During the first few days of the review, discussions on the question of external assistance seemed to be getting nowhere, with speakers talking past each other. While African delegates appealed to donor countries to increase their levels of assistance, the latter contented themselves mainly with cataloguing how much they had already done. The U.S. representative, Lester Korn, stated flatly that because of budgetary problems, American assistance would have to remain at its current levels; he likewise said that the

United States would not be able to forgive development loans as some other donor countries had done.

In a diluted form, the specific concerns raised by African countries found some reflection in the final recommendations adopted on September 24. There was an appeal to the international community to "address and examine the external factors that aggravate the African situation, especially in terms of trade and the need to deal urgently with commodity issues and alleviate Africa's debt burden." There was also a call for substantially increased levels of assistance, especially to the poorer countries of sub-Saharan Africa. As a benchmark, it was suggested that all developed countries allocate 0.7 percent of their gross domestic product to official development assistance.

When UNPAAERD comes up for its final appraisal in 1991, will Africa have fared any better than it has so far? The review participants expressed the guarded hope that it would, and that the seriousness of the crisis will finally awaken an appropriate international response. Africa cannot afford it to be otherwise. ○

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AIR AFRIQUE

THE PRIVATIZATION DRIVE



United Nations

Tema harbor: The State Fishing Corporation is one of 32 parastatals put up for sale

By COLLEEN LOWE MORNA

As part of its economic recovery program, the Ghana government is putting up for sale 32 of its state-owned enterprises, many of which have been plagued by poor management and general decay, in hopes of rejuvenating the nation's private sector. An examination of the State Fishing Corporation provides a glimpse into the difficulties and potential benefits of privatizing the parastatal sector.

Each morning for the past year, Captain John Crentsil has faithfully led a crew of 30 State Fishing Corporation (SFC) workers to the site where the vessel they are charged with has sat parked.

Yaw Afrifa, chief engineer of the ship, cranks up the engine, just to make sure it does not go cold. The rest of the crew, meanwhile, chips off bits of worn paint from the exterior and touches it up.

Even when a vessel is not seaworthy, "You can never just leave it lying idle," explains Crentsil, who has worked for the Ghanaian parastatal for the past 22

Colleen Lowe Morna is a Zimbabwean freelance journalist based in Harare.

years. "You have to keep the jigsaw together, otherwise it will all fall apart."

By noon, the crew is done and ready to knock off. But Crentsil would rather be at sea. "I miss the calmness, the serenity, the purity of the air," he says nostalgically. It is an atmosphere that contrasts sharply with the general state of the corporation—one of Ghana's oldest.

Out of the corporation's original fleet of 22 vessels, only eight are currently seaworthy, and the last time any of these went to sea was in June. Some—like Crentsil's vessel—have lain idle for even longer.

Those who have been to sea recently

say they spent most of their time mending the worn fishing nets, which developed gaping holes any time they were cast out to sea.

At the time of writing, two vessels had been dry-docked and deemed fit for work. But as the lubrication companies had frozen all lines of credit to the corporation, the vessels were stuck anyway.

Indeed, the corporation has been serving as little more than a glorified refrigerator service, with its only source of revenue the sale of ice blocs. Over 1,000 workers who have been fired since 1986 have not received their benefits, and those still on the payroll have not been

paid since January.

Now—at a time when things could not possibly get any worse—the State Fishing Corporation is one of 32 parastatals put up for sale, as Ghana joins a number of other African countries turning their back on decades of heavy state involvement in the productive sector.

"No private businessman would go on operating an enterprise at a loss for as long as 15 years," says Ghana's State Enterprises Commission Secretary Willie Adda. "We think that divestiture is one way of saving a lot of these enterprises from total ruin."

Though one of the conditions laid down by the IMF and World Bank for the second phase of Ghana's economic reform program—the most advanced on the continent—few would quibble with the basic premise that Ghana's parastatals can't go on as is. But getting rid of them—as other African countries are finding—may not be as easy as it looks either.

Since Ghana's independence in 1957, the state has acquired a majority shareholding in 180 enterprises and a minority shareholding in another 54, covering approximately half of the modern sector. As in the case of the SFC—through which the government aimed to make a cheap source of protein easily accessible to all Ghanaians—the original goals were lofty: to invest in areas generally unattractive to private capital or which included social goals, and to help speed up the modernization process, create jobs, and in some cases, earn money for government coffers.

In practice, the state-owned enterprises (or SOEs as they are called in Ghana) have fallen into the rut of excessive political interference, poor management, lack of maintenance, corruption, and general decay.

In its 28-year life, for example, the SFC has had 18 managing directors. Fish have been sold illegally on the high seas, vessels have gone without their proper maintenance check-ups, there has been a chronic shortage of spare parts, and the requirement that all fish be sold throughout the country at the same price—regardless of transport costs—has hurt the corporation's earnings. From a peak of 38,000 tons of fish delivered by the SFC in 1974, the figure had dropped to 3,400

tons last year.

All told, government support to the SOEs accounted for 8 percent of government expenditure in 1986. In addition, according to Adda, there was considerable indirect support in the form of "substantial arrears" on tax and social security contributions, and "the inability [by SOEs] to service government-guaranteed foreign loans."

"Given the massive problems we have," said Adda, "we had to ask ourselves if we could go on putting resources into a sector which has not been able to give the returns which we expected."

The answer was no. In June—amid great fanfare at home and with a splash of advertisements in the Western press—Ghana announced the sale of the first 32 SOEs. Potential investors were advised, however, that they could express an interest in any of the other enterprises, save for a core of 22, covering mostly essential services like transport, electricity, and sewerage.

Because of experiences during the only other major attempt at privatization in Ghana (under Busia in 1971)—when government is alleged to have dished out enterprises to friends and accepted large kickbacks from foreign firms—the current exercise has been undertaken with particular caution.

"We are trying to make sure that the divestiture process is as transparent as possible, to avoid the allegations of the past," says Kobena Erbynn, chief executive of the Ghana Investment Center, which is charged with facilitating investment in all sectors of the economy apart from mining and oil prospecting.

So far, the results have been encouraging. According to a report in the *Ghanaian Times*, 200 investors have expressed interest: among them 30 companies from the United Kingdom, United States, Japan, Canada, Norway, West Germany, Poland, Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria. Officials decline to specify, however, which particular ventures they have shown an interest in, and what stage their inquiries have reached.

Of the 32, seven enterprises were confiscated for political reasons, and some of these only nominally exist. One, the Kwahu Dairy Farm, was a joint venture with the Austrian government in

which the Ghana government put up the requisite air-conditioned stalls, but the Austrians failed to deliver the cows.

"We hear that the books [of some of the 32 enterprises up for sale] have not been audited for a long time, that the assets have not been re-evaluated, and that the machines have run down," said an influential Accra businessman. "You really wonder what you would be buying at the end of the day."

Ideally, according to Erbynn, the less attractive propositions would be spruced up and sold at a good price. "Unfortunately," he noted, "at this stage, the government does not have enough funds, and some [of the 32 SOEs] may have to be sold on an asset basis, rather than as going concerns," with the distinct possibility that they will be sold at a considerable loss.

Some of the options—like the State Hotels Corporation, State Farms Corporation, Tema Shipyard, and divisions of Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation (GIHOC)—are considered potentially lucrative.

Isaac Morrison, chairman of the recently appointed SFC interim management committee, estimates that if just four vessels made four trips out to sea a year, the corporation would make a profit of over a million dollars. "There is more gold in the sea than you can ever think of," he mused in a recent interview at the corporation's headquarters in Tema, Ghana's main port.

The problem for anyone wishing to buy an enterprise like the SFC, however, is likely to be the labor crisis. Earlier this year, in an effort to ease the burden of SOEs on government spending, the finance secretary slashed all subventions to potentially profitable SOEs. Concurrently, a number started in on restructuring exercises; the SFC, for instance, has reduced its labor force from 3,000 to 1,129 workers, and 200 more are to go.

The cost of paying these workers their full terminal benefits, however, stands at almost half a million dollars. As in several other SOEs, the laid-off workers simply have not been paid. Worse still, those still on the payroll have not been paid either, given the current inability of the enterprise to generate any meaningful revenue.

All told, consultants say that the SOEs

are probably overstaffed by as many as 53,000 workers. Although there has been much talk about the Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD)—Ghana's donor-funded social security component to its structural adjustment program—its budget is nowhere near enough to pay for the retrenchment and redeployment of labor in both the SOEs and the civil service proper.

The burning question is who will ultimately be responsible for the fate of workers laid off from or hanging on in enterprises like the SFC. The government says it does not have the resources. On the other hand, few investors will want to pick up the tab, fewer still any sort of labor disputes.

"The mood here," said a worker at the SFC, "is one of frustration and disillusion." Workers, he said, supported divestiture only if it brought with it their backpay.

Meanwhile, the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union, which covers most of the affected SOEs, has declared itself dead-set against privatization, a position encapsulated in a banner found in Ghana's hall of trade unions reading: "Public Service—It's Yours; Private Service—It's Theirs."

One option originally explored was to convert part of the workers' outstanding pay into company shares. But, says Adda, "This could only be successful in companies which are financially sound and profitable in the short term"—a hard bet to place on any of Ghana's SOEs at the moment.

The labor problem, he concedes, "could cause some political problems." It may be necessary, he said, "to develop some strategy to deal with this in a manner acceptable to our people."

As the government grapples with this issue, a further concern is the state of the private sector in Ghana which, it is hoped, will ultimately play a major role in breathing fresh life into the SOEs.

Subjected to rather crude investigations in the earlier years of Ft.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings' administration, the private sector still suffers from a lack of confidence on the part of local investors. In addition, all complain bitterly about the current lack of access to credit in Ghana, which has ironically arisen partly as a

result of conditions imposed by the IMF.

At the same time, Ghana's nascent industrialists are suddenly faced with stiff competition from outside as a result of the ongoing trade liberalization process. Several enterprises, particularly in the garment industry, are being forced to close down.

Meanwhile, Ghana has no capital market as yet to make large-scale public offers viable. A separate program under the World Bank aims to jack up the entire financial sector. But this will take time. In the interim, a major fear is that foreign investors will have a big advantage over local investors—a phenomenon experienced in other African countries experimenting with privatization.

This, says Erbynn, begins to look like "selling the family silverware," a process in which "there is bound to be a lot of emotion involved."

For the present, according to Adda, the government has committed itself to selling an average of about 10 enterprises a year over the next three years. But, he says, "It is one thing to agree [with the IMF and World Bank] to a schedule at a time when you have not identified all the

constraints, and another to deal with them in practice."

Ideally, he says, the pace and timing should be decided by "the difficulties and constraints that we meet, and by our ability and capacity to manage the program."

But the question of timing is one in which there is "a lot of divergence of opinion" with the IMF and World Bank, he said. "We believe that divestiture should be implemented as speedily as the economy can absorb the repercussions," while "the IMF and World Bank are naturally concerned by the speed with which we get it done," Adda noted.

"Both the Bank and the Fund are very much concerned with financial and economic objectives," says Adda. "We on the other hand have also to be concerned with social and political objectives."

It is inevitable, critics say, that some of these objectives will be compromised along the way. It is unlikely, for example, that whoever finally buys the SFC will continue to distribute fish throughout Ghana at the same price in each place, regardless of distance from the sea. On the other hand, the argument runs, that may be better than having no fish at all. ○

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Human Rights Now!

By VINCENT MURWIRA

Sarah-Jane Poole



Youssou N'Dour, Peter Gabriel, Tracy Chapman, Sting, and Don Gumbo (of Ilanga) "expressed hope that the musical moment they were presenting would help spread the message of peace, love, and understanding universally"

Zimbabwe was the venue for a concert of international pop-stars on a world-wide tour to draw attention to human rights violations and to speak out on behalf of political prisoners. Sponsored by Amnesty International, the musical event in Harare carried all the more significance, sending a clear message of anti-apartheid solidarity.

In 1948, South Africa, along with other governments of the world, adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, agreed to abide by it, and "offer protection to its citizens, offer the right to a free trial to all its citizens, not to exercise arbitrary arrest, detention or exile of its citizens, let its citizens have the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state." The South African government also adopted the declaration with the full knowledge that Article 1 states: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and

Vincent Murwira, a Zimbabwean journalist, is currently completing research for an in-depth historical analysis of the nation's media.

MAKING PEACE WITH AMNESTY

Harare's "Human Rights Now!" concert marked improved relations between the Zimbabwe government and Amnesty International, the tour's sponsor. Three years ago, President Robert Mugabe denounced what he called "Amnesty Lies International" for a report that charged Zimbabwean police with arbitrarily detaining hundreds of people in Matabeleland and the torture of many of them.

Then the government detained some people suspected of providing information to Amnesty and the organization's ability to gather documentation in Zimbabwe was severely restricted.

Now with its unity agreement with the main opposition party and its amnesty to rebel dissidents, the Mugabe government has significantly improved its human rights record. Amnesty officials here for the concert said the police had virtually halted its use of torture and had improved detention procedures.

"We are now assured we are welcome in Zimbabwe and we very much appreciate that cooperation from the government," said Richard Carver, an Amnesty researcher on southern Africa. Carver met with Zimbabwean Justice Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa

rights and they are endowed with reason and conscience and should act toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood."

Since 1948, however, the world press has carried the photos and headlines of deaths, torture, and suffering—so many 'Bikos' who have perished at the hand of the apartheid regime. And it is governments like that of South Africa that have painted an ugly picture of human rights abuse, prompting world human rights organizations to act to put a stop to it.

Using music, a universally understood language, the largest of such human rights organizations, Amnesty International, organized a 20-concert

to discuss further improvements that Amnesty would like to encourage.

"What we particularly remain concerned about is the use of torture by the Central Intelligence Organisation," said Carver. "There are a number of cases of people currently in custody either facing criminal charges or in detention without trial. We have received strong reports that they have been tortured, so that remains a matter of concern."

In contrast to the focus on human rights at the concert, however, the Zimbabwe government deported Kenyan-born Shadrack Gutto, a law lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe, apparently on suspicion of having incited students to demonstrate against government corruption. The student demonstrators hurled rocks at police and made pointed criticisms of the Mugabe government. Gutto, who is in exile from Kenya, then flew to London.

"It infuriates me that with all this talk of human rights, the government can just deport someone like that," said a university employee. "We expect better than that from our independence."

—Andrew Meldrum
Harare, Zimbabwe

tour to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Human Rights Declaration. The concert was also aimed at encouraging individuals to understand the rights guaranteed to them by governments and to generate an irresistible force that will help save lives, stop torture, and free prisoners of conscience—in short to make the Declaration of Human Rights more than just a piece of paper.

The six-week, 35,000-mile tour, dubbed "Human Rights Now!" and made possible through a \$2 million contribution by the Reebok Foundation, kicked off on September 2 at Wembley Stadium in England. The Harare concert was the 15th venue, with the last three dates in Senegal and Brazil.

On arrival in Harare, the artists Bruce Springsteen, Sting, Tracy Chapman, Youssou N'Dour, and Peter Gabriel expressed their dissatisfaction with deprivations of human rights worldwide and expressed hope that the musical moment they were presenting would help spread the message of peace, love, and understanding universally.

Tracy Chapman, an American solo singer, told an attentive journalistic audience that besides being a citizen of the United States, she also considered herself a citizen of the world community and as such felt a responsibility to try and make it a better, more humane, and safer place to live. Amid applause and the clicking of cameras, Chapman explained that the human rights document "should be fully put to use by governments of the world according to the promises they made 40 years ago."

"Out of all the venues we have played, Harare carries a lot of significance in that it is right next to South Africa, a country which should be treated as a special case," said musician Peter Gabriel, an anti-apartheid activist. "Urgent measures have to be undertaken to alleviate the suffering and human rights abuses going on there." He also related how effective Amnesty International is: "Apart from the simple act of writing a letter of persuasion to a government, thousands of people have been brought out of jail, torture, and execution."

Asked whether the United States and Britain have done enough to support those in South Africa whose rights are constantly being trampled upon, Gabriel answered, "No, not at all. The United States has not done enough nor



The crowd itself was mixed—with people having come from Botswana, Malawi, Zambia, Lesotho, Swaziland, some from Mozambique, and at least 15,000 from South Africa

has my country, England. My country has the capability to take a much stronger position on issues like trade, but unfortunately it's doing nothing about it. The U.S. for instance is even going on and offering Botha some help."

Asked what he thinks of the South African president, Gabriel answered, "I think Botha has to be overthrown, but with as little violence as possible."

Rock and roll singers Bruce Springsteen and Sting also joined in castigating those governments that failed to provide citizens with their basic human rights. Springsteen told the Harare audience that on this tour, as he looked down from the stage into French, Spanish, Indian, African faces, he felt a sense of community.

"Amnesty International speaks through that sense of community in a voice that calls for the decency and dignity of every man, woman, and child to simply be respected." He also commended the people of Zimbabwe: "Racism not so long ago oppressed the people of Zimbabwe and as we speak brutalities and attempts to crush the spirit of freedom of the people of South Africa continue."

Soon after the speeches by artists, the tour spokesmen were quizzed over a number of issues. A Danish Radio reporter questioned that since the main issue was that of human rights, and

more so those of Zimbabwe's neighbor, South Africa: "Why did you not just go to Johannesburg and perform there? Don't you think your concert would have had more impact there?" All the spokesmen could say was that they were proud to be in Zimbabwe, a front-line state which had recently overcome its own kind of apartheid.

Another journalist asked where the 100-kilowatt sound system came from, as such powerful systems are not available in Zimbabwe. The spokesman answered that as far as he knew, the sound system was from Hi-Tech Systems, a Lesotho-based company. Some journalists disputed that, claiming to have concrete evidence that it had been supplied by a Johannesburg-based company.

Another reporter asked the artists whether they would support the campaign of a well-known South African musician who is trying to bring international musicians to perform for charity there, the funds to be used to finance social programs, especially to alleviate the suffering of black children. "Never, not at all. . . not until apartheid goes," said Sting.

Why then, asked another journalist, were all these artists selling their records in South Africa? "I believe it's a personal thing. Whoever likes my music will like it for one of three things: either the arrangements only, or the lyrics

only, or both arrangements and lyrics. And I believe that whoever likes my lyrics would obviously not tolerate apartheid. So it's like I am giving messages of hope to people who are deprived of their rights. But to actually go there is not possible. . . at least not now."

The concert itself was the biggest musical gathering in Zimbabwe. More than 80,000 people filled Harare's International Sports Stadium from noon on Friday, October 7. By late afternoon, the stadium was fully packed. Two Zimbabwean groups, Ilanga and Oliver Mutukudzi, entertained the crowd in the afternoon. The crowd itself was mixed—with some people having come from Botswana, Malawi, Zambia, Lesotho, Swaziland, and some from Mozambique. At least 15,000 came from South Africa, and many people were still queuing at the South African side of the border when the concert started at 2 pm.

The performances of Tracy Chapman and Bruce Springsteen were outstanding. While Springsteen sang, "Where there is no equality, there is no justice, where there is no justice, there is no peace and where there is no peace, there is war", the Umkhonto we Sizwe (ANC military wing) flag was raised from somewhere among the crowd. Even when Gabriel sang his song "Biko," which is banned in South Africa, the entire crowd, black and white, sang along in memory of the victims of South African brutality.

The Harare concert had the full backing of the ANC. Patrick Fitzgerald from the ANC's department of arts and culture, said before the concert: "The cultural boycott is intended to isolate apartheid South Africa, not the broad democratic forces. . . and we support the attendance of democratic South Africans at the Human Rights Concert taking place in democratic Zimbabwe."

During the concert, Springsteen told South Africans not to fall into the same trap as that of 50,000 or so young Americans who died in the Vietnam war, a war he termed senseless and illogical. He criticized the conscription of young men into the army and called on the South African government to offer young men their rights.

The Harare concert gave thousands of South Africans a good chance to come to an independent African state where blacks and whites have reconciled their differences to build a nation for all its citizens. ○

PRAKASH DIAR: *A Lawyer for Human Rights*

Practicing law in South Africa—particularly when it comes to defending political prisoners—is no easy task. Despite the appearance of an independent judicial system, cases are often decided on the merits of the government's political agenda. Prakash Diar, the South African attorney who is defending the Sharpeville Six, was recently in the U.S. to speak out about the plight of political prisoners in the country. He spoke to *Africa Report* about the latest developments in the case.

On the status of the Sharpeville Six case:

We've had a long battle. They were supposed to have been executed on March 18 this year and we successfully brought a stay of execution the afternoon before the executions. Since then, we've attempted to reopen the trial to present further evidence because two witnesses at least have confessed to having given perjured evidence. We failed in June this year with getting the trial reopened. We've taken the judge's refusal on appeal and we argued that on September 7 this year before five appeal judges. They have not yet given judgment.

They could take as long as they have to—there's no time limit. Court is in recess throughout October, so it is unlikely that we will get judgment in October. They start again in November, and it is quite possible that they might deliver judgment in November.

I think we've done fairly well. I'm not saying that I'm optimistic that they're going to grant a reopening of the trial. But I think we had a good hearing. We gave it our best shot. The possibility exists that the trial might be reopened. And I certainly hope that it is because then we will have an opportunity of testing the allegations being made, whereas if we are not given an opportunity of reopening the trial and testing all of the allegations made, then we have to go back to the State President. He either grants you clemency—which we're going to be asking for—or the reopening of the trial, or he doesn't. We're totally at his mercy then. Recently, the State President has made statements to the effect that he's prepared to reconsider the petition for the Sharpeville Six after the process of the courts has been exhausted.

On practicing law in apartheid South Africa:

It's a very difficult position that I find myself in. It's absolutely frustrating, I can say. There are significant gains that we have made in certain respects. And then what happens is that the Appeals Court reverses a whole lot of decisions we've attacked on the emergency regulations, for example. There are significant decisions that we succeeded with. But the Appeals Court is so pro-state and anti-individual that it is shocking! Each and every appeal that has been going to the Appeal Court—if it has been appealed by the government—has been successfully upheld in favor of the government. It's very, very frustrating.

As a lawyer, I find lots of things disturbing about the Sharpeville Six case itself, in particular, leaving aside everything else, that the courts were prepared to accept the fact that none of the six killed Mr. Dlamini. They invoked the question of common purpose and convicted them on the basis of common purpose, thereby implying that none of the six had directly killed Mr. Dlamini. But the courts will accept in terms of our law that in order for a conviction, you must have the actual act and you must have the necessary intention coupled with the act for you to be found guilty of the offense you are charged with. In this case, you did not have the actual act—it

was stretched to common purpose. You don't have the intention—it was stretched to what we call indirect intention which means that you must have foreseen that this could have resulted. Now, how could a court, without any doubt, say that each one of the six could have foreseen what the outcome would be whereas they hadn't planned this? They hadn't met, they had no meeting as such to say that they were going to do Mr. Dlamini in.

Having said that, let's assume for one moment that the conviction was good in law on the question of common purpose. Then you have still got to deal with the question of sentence which is totally something else. Each one's degree of participation in the crime is a very important factor when one deals with sentence. And having found that none of them had actually killed Mr. Dlamini, the trial judge, first of all, and thereafter five appeals judges, were prepared to sentence of all six of my clients to death, whereas in fact they shouldn't have. Maybe if it was a jail term, the world wouldn't have been so upset, so shocked.

A lot of people have found it shocking that although the courts accept that none of them had killed anybody but they were part of the crowd and they had associated themselves with the action of the crowd, they had to pay with their lives for that. That has really been shocking not only to the outside world, but to a lot of people inside and a lot of lawyers as well.

On the role of international public opinion in the case:

I certainly think that it has definitely helped—to the extent that we were able to show to the world and to everybody even back home that these are six very ordinary people who don't belong to any particular political organization, who unfortunately—even in terms of the evidence accepted by the court—were members of a crowd who found themselves in an unfortunate position, who really got caught up in the day's events. And they were going to be executed for something they hadn't actually done!

I think that single question that they hadn't actually killed the deceased has really shocked the world. The courts, having accepted this, are prepared to still go ahead and execute them. That shocked the world. That President Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and even Chancellor Kohl personally intervened at some stage calling for Botha not to execute them shows that the international pressure has put them in a spot. President Botha has apparently told the president of Zaire that he's prepared to reconsider.

The one thing that the South Africans have been very proud of has been the so-called independence of the judicial system. The Sharpeville Six case to an extent is questioning that. I think we've put that in a particular focus and the South African government has reacted to that. And maybe because of the international pressure, they might be prepared now to reconsider. To that extent, it has helped. ○

The Kings of Juju and Palm Wine Guitar

By DAPHNE TOPOUZIS

Following recent performances in New York, *Africa Report* talked to two of West Africa's most outstanding guitarists—King Sunny Adé, known the world over for his popularization of Nigerian juju music, and Ko Nimo from Ghana, whose palm wine music fuses guitar, percussion, and song with Asanti poetic imagery.

King Sunny Adé needs little, if any, introduction. He has been the most popular musician in Nigeria and in Africa as a whole for over two decades, and is the first African musician to have become famous in Europe, North America, and Japan. He and his 52-member band, the African Beats, play juju, an offshoot of palm wine music that first emerged in the 1920s and 1930s, drawing from the guitar band tradition of the Yoruba people of western Nigeria.

Sunny Adé's juju music is characterized by a flawlessly synchronized chorus of six guitars (tenor, rhythm, bass, Hawaiian, and pedal steel), accompanied by keyboards, synthesizers, and closely harmonized back-up vocals that unfurl layers of syncopated melodic lines as trap drums, "a gugu" (cowbells), "shekere," congas, maracas, and talking drums interweave pulsating cross-rhythms. Adé's warm, undulating voice tops the infectious and hypnotic beat, leading it through dense layers of intricate call-and-response.

In a recent interview following his performance at New York City's Sounds of Brazil jazz club, Sunny Adé described his music as "traditional roots music that uses some Western instruments."

"It was the white people that colonized Nigeria who gave it the name juju. Juju is a nickname for black

magic. But black magic has nothing to do with the music itself. The white colonialists classified African music as the music of the shrines and of the people worshipping the shrines. Christians wanted the brass bands and wind instruments they brought to take over, so they said that this music was for 'juju people.' "

Little is known about the origin and development of juju music. Some, like Sunny Adé, believe that juju started from *Apala*, (Yoruba traditional religious music), and later became modernized. The Muslim-influenced *Apala* music was originally comprised only of percussion and voice. Gradually, the kalimba (thumb piano), the juju drum, and the palm wine guitar were introduced. Today, the King says, there are over 300 different kinds of juju music,

drawing from different roots and using different instruments.


John Collins, the Ghanaian highlife musician and musicologist, has put forth a very different explanation. He says that the further one goes back in time, the more western juju becomes. To support his thesis, Collins points to the fact that the original instruments of juju bands in the 1920s were the mandolin, the violin, the samba drum, and the gombe rectangular drum (from Jamaica), and that African instruments were introduced much later.

The generic term juju, according to Collins, was probably coined in the 1930s. Before that, the music was called "native blues." The first to call his music juju was Tunde King, who fused Gombe, Konkomba, and Ashiko music that had infiltrated western Nigeria from Ghana. Tunde King used the violin and the mandolin, but no African instruments. The talking drum was first introduced in the 1950s by another juju pioneer, I.K. Dairo, followed by Ebenezer Obey who began using two of these drums, and Sunny Adé added a third.

Talking drums and electric guitars are at the basis of modern juju, Sunny Adé says, but guitars are played as if they were drums. In fact, the King was the first to use large guitar sections that infused juju music with a richer sound, making it one of the most infectious dance musics in Africa. The African Beats were also first to introduce the synthesizer, the Hawaiian steel guitar,

King Sunny Adé: "Talking drums and electric guitars are at the basis of modern juju, but guitars are played like they were drums"

Daphne Topouzis



the pedal steel guitar, and the vibraphone in juju music. In most of his compositions, Adé has two tenor guitars playing together and harmonizing with a third rhythm guitar that plays in between them, but not in 3/3, 4/4, or 5/5 time. Sunny Adé explained that his mu-everybody sings along with me, it becomes a political song," he says.

His recent performance at S.O.B.s featured a series of compositions from his new album entitled "Destiny," which was released in October of this year. "Destiny can never change and no one can tamper with it," he says. "On the flip side, I have a song that I use to back the farmers. It is like a national call, saying let's go back to the farms. There is nobody in the farm no more except the cutlass and hoe, and they are just lying there, waiting for us. It is time we do something about it. The government of Nigeria introduced a program called 'mobilization of people' and it is my duty to back it because it is something Nigeria needs."

In the mid-1980s, when Adé released the album "Aura," many critics were disappointed with what they perceived to be the Westernization of juju music. They predicted that Sunny Adé's juju would get progressively compromised to Western tastes and that it would lose its hypnotic edge. A few years down the road, Sunny Adé has regained their confidence, with extraordinary albums and performances that testify to the musician's dedication to juju roots and to experimentation.

"I want to stick to my kind of music," he says. "You see the problem is that if you leave home, come to another part of the world, and a [Western] manager or producer, all he will be interested in is to change your music to his kind of taste so that he can produce it well. I like to produce myself, I like other people to produce me too, but if I start changing my music for this other part of the world, it means I am not playing my music no more. I have to stick to my music because back home everybody loves it and that is what is important to me."

Known across Ghana as the "classic stylist of palm wine guitar," "King of Up-up-up," and "the Repository of Asante music and culture," the 54-year-old Ko Nimo is among West Africa's foremost virtuoso guitarists. He and his 15-piece band, Adadam Agofomma ("Going Back the

Roots"), founded in 1957 right after Ghana's independence from Britain, play a distinct type of palm wine music, fusing guitar, percussion and song with Asanti poetic imagery and proverbs. Ko Nimo's style of "up-up-up" refers to the buoyant interplay of delicately finger-picked acoustic guitar, polyrhythmic drumming, and smooth vocal harmonies. To this should be added the rich sound of the *seperewa*, the six-stringed lute of the Asante, Sefwi, and Brong people of West Africa.

In an interview before his recent New York City premiere performance at the Lincoln Center's Serious Fun Festival, Ko Nimo spoke to *Africa Report* about highlife music from *adatta* (brass band music) to palm wine, and *odonso* (indigenous blues).

"Before explaining what palm wine music is," Ko Nimo begins, "I would like to correct an impression that prevails among Westerners about palm wine. Palm wine is a local drink with a low alcohol content which should never be associated with intoxication, drunkenness, and the low life. In the villages, when people return from the bush or the farm, they will sit under a shaded tree and wait for the palm wine taster to bring a potful of palm wine. He will pass the calabash for all the attendants to drink. Then, the old men will start talking about their experiences in life. So the setting is a realm for philosophy, for analysis—trying to find the meaning of things. We were not created for nothing, we were created for a purpose. These sessions with palm wine as a lubricant were accompanied by music which came to be known as palm wine music."

"Ko" is short for Kofi which means Friday born and "Nimo" refers to he who assumes responsibility for someone else's wrongdoing. Born Daniel Amponsah in Foase, a few miles north of Kumasi in 1934, Ko Nimo is a biochemist at the University of Science and Technology in Kumasi and a self-taught folk guitarist who has devoted himself to preserving, recording, and reviving the various styles of Ghanaian traditional music and dance.

"The question of why I started playing the guitar—an instrument that is often not associated with Africa—is controversial, because when you read about the origins of the guitar, you find that a similar instrument existed in Egypt and in other places in Africa. In Ghana, we have a guitar-like instru-

ment which I also play. It is called the *seperewa* and it is a quadrophone that was used by our ancestors. The instrument probably came down from the Carthaginians. . . . But this is a scholarly conjecture," he said.

His father was a farmer and tailor who played trumpet and guitar in the local brass band (*adatta* music). His mother was a chorister in the local Methodist church. "I started playing the guitar because there was a guitar at home. I am told that whenever I got naughty, my father would play the guitar and that would put me right. So I was exposed to guitar music at home, but originally, I started on the church organ at the age of 5—you see I lived in the catechist's house while going to school."

After his sister married the Asantehene's brother, he moved to Kumasi where he says he was "irradiated with tradition." He formed his first band, *Abisadel* (a three-piece highlife band), while studying at *Abisadel College* in Cape Coast in the late 1940s, following which he returned to his home village to teach music at the local primary school. During this time, he also learned to play the tuba, the trombone, and the euphonium.

In his early 20s, Ko Nimo moved to Accra, where he studied at the Medical Research Institute and played with different highlife groups. Upon his return to Kumasi, he formed the *Antobre* band which gained considerable popularity. Ko Nimo explained that it was the military brass bands and the sailors from the Caribbean who brought calypso music with them that "made use of the indigenous tunes and then harmonized them, using either eastern or western harmonies. Something evolved. . . a new form was born: The setting was urban, the society was high, so—highlife. In other words, first grew the brass bands, then the guitar bands, and later on the concert parties. Now, highlife is here to stay, but there are hybrids. Highlife has influenced all Ghanaian music."

In 1962, Ko Nimo was awarded a scholarship to study biochemistry in Britain. While in London, he studied part-time at the Len Williams Guitar Center, mastered the classical guitar and listened to Charlie Parker, Oscar Peterson, Wes Montgomery, Duke Ellington, Django Reinhardt, and Dizzy Gillespie. He also met with Thelonious Monk (who gave him the original hand-

written copies of 27 of his compositions), Charlie Parker, and Kurt Anderson (Duke Ellington's trumpeter)—all of whom encouraged him to develop his music. But he did not stop listening to and learning from Ghana's music giants, particularly Kwaa Mensah and Kwame Asare.

"I came back home to find that there was a lot of Western influence in all African music, from East to West. People feel that anything that is their own is no good," Ko Nimo added. "So, I decided to go back to the old men and women of Ghana whom I call 'libraries on fire.' I decided to talk to them, learn from them, and use their lyrics in my singing. Our songs have a lot of proverbs, upon which I improvise."

Ko Nimo sings Asante ballads in Twi, the language of the Akan peoples. The lyrics are drawn from folk tales rich in metaphors, proverbs, and riddles that recount the history and traditions of the Asante kingdom. "Asante Abakosen Bi" tells the story of one of Asante's oldest legends:

*When Osei Tutu came to rule
Down from heaven came
the Golden Stool
There was planted a mighty tree
It grew, and so did Kumasi*

He also sings about death because "death is a co-mingling of time with eternity. And at the death of a great man, eternity is seen looking through time. I sing about death, because it is one thing that is certain."

In 1969, Ko Nimo went to the University of Salford in England to study laboratory techniques in biochemistry. "I took the opportunity to enter the Manchester School of Music and learn more about harmony," he said. His music gained worldwide recognition, and in 1976, he was invited by the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C. to represent Ghana at the Festival of Folk Music where he played with a 27-piece group. The next breakthrough was in 1984, when he performed at the Commonwealth Festival in London.

Ko Nimo has taken his music to West Africa, Europe, the U.S., and the Caribbean and has appeared in the recent British Channel Four series, "Repercussions." His musical talent aside, Ko Nimo is also president of the Musicians' Union of Ghana and interim chairman of the Copyright Society. "I want to help musicians help themselves—to realize their rights, respect their signatures, and give them legal advice so that they

will enjoy the fruits of their labor," he said. He has served as visiting senior lecturer at the University of Cape Coast, is a board member of the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, and member of the Education Commission.

Last year, he, along with the famous British classical guitarist John Williams (who is also a close friend), and John Collins, the Ghanaian musicologist, became honorary life members of the International Association for the Study of Popular Music. Finally, in February 1988, he was invited by Unesco to participate in a conference in Trinidad and Tobago that traced cultural, historical, and social links between the Caribbean and Africa, using highlife and calypso as the vehicle.

Ko Nimo sees music as the single most important art form in Africa because "from the day a child is born, there is music. We have special songs to celebrate a person's birth; then, mothers sing lullabies to their babies as they carry them on their backs. At puberty, again there is music to commemorate the new stage of life. For every stage of life there is music. At the king's palaces, there are drums, seperewa players, and minstrels, performing over 65 different rhythms that have passed down to us from Asante and which I am now researching," he said.

His plans for the future are to "return to the village and start working with children because most of the young people today haven't got the time for what I am doing. For the past 28 years, I have been a scientist, training scientific manpower that Ghana needs badly. So, I have been working in the lab, then practicing at night and performing. My day starts at about 3:00 am. I practice until 7:00 am, walk to my laboratory, work until 4:30, walk back home with my group. It is enough. Now, I want to devote more time to music."

"If I start from the children who have not been exposed to much Western music, I will be able to achieve my goal: I am trying to expose my people to their music which they are trying to forget. At the same time, I am trying to understand my own people and their idiosyncracies through this music, and then to share this understanding, so as to bring unity among men. My purpose is not as much to reach a wide audience but the few people who will share my ideas with me. I want palm wine music to flourish as a living art form, rather than as a tribute to the past." ○

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THE BACK PAGE

N E W S C O M M E N T A R Y
A N D O P I N I O N

By MICHAEL MAREN

South Africa's President P.W. Botha is behaving like a man who expects to be in the running for the Nobel Peace Prize next year. On the strength of some loose agreements over Cuban and South Africa withdrawals from Angola, he has assembled a medicine show and paraded it through as much of Africa as politics will allow, offering the hand of peace and the elixir of economic aid to anyone who will take it.

So far, he has met Presidents Banda of Malawi, Mobutu of Zaire, and Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire—no surprises there—as well as President Chissano of Mozambique, who has little choice but to oblige him since South Africa still holds his entire country hostage despite a pledge to end support for Renamo (which they at times still deny supporting).

Is Botha ushering in a new era of peace and brotherhood in southern Africa as he would like us to believe? A more likely explanation is that he is trying to consolidate and bank all of the good will and PR he has collected from 10 months of well-publicized negotiations before the whole thing goes bust and the world realizes that nothing significant has changed in the region.

South Africa has not really made any concessions over the course of its talks with Angola, Cuba, and the U.S. Pulling its troops out of Angola when they had no business being there in the first place and after they had been soundly defeated by the Cubans in battle hardly ranks as a statesmanlike sacrifice. As for agreeing to elections in Namibia, this has long been South Africa's public position.

South Africa first tried to hold a "tribal-based" election in 1973, but only 2.3 percent of the eligible population showed up at the polls. In 1978, Pretoria accepted a plan for UN-supervised elections, but undermined that plan in the same year by again staging elections on its own terms. In 1980, it once again seemed that the way had been cleared for elections in Namibia. Both the Angolans and South Africans accepted UN resolution 435 and agreed to the creation of a DMZ between Angola and Namibia to be patrolled by a UN peacekeeping force. A conference was held in Geneva in January 1981 to finalize the agreement. Then, as now, it seemed that only the timetable needed to be worked out.

That conference collapsed in a week. Convinced that

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Swapo would win the election and fortified by encouragement from the newly inaugurated Reagan administration, Pretoria's representatives marched out of the talks. The U.S. then set up one more hurdle to Namibian independence when it concocted the policy of "linkage," making a Namibian settlement dependent on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.


South Africa seized the idea of linkage and has insisted on a Cuban withdrawal while at the same time throwing enough troops and arms into Angola to make the Cubans indispensable for Angola's defense. Since then, South Africa and the U.S. have succeeded in turning the Cubans into the main issue, while South African destabilization, Namibian independence, and apartheid have been treated like trivial side issues to be dealt with at another time.

Botha isn't the only one trying to cash in on an agreement before it happens. Vice President George Bush, in the second presidential debate, listed the impending agreement to get the Cubans out of Angola as one of the Reagan administration's foreign policy accomplishments. What he and the administration are trying to prove is that the Republicans' tactic of standing tough against the Cubans and Angolans in southern Africa will accomplish more than challenging South Africa, the Democrats' position. (Fortunately for the Republicans, southern Africa never became an issue in the 1988 presidential campaign, but that's another subject entirely.)

So anxious was the administration to celebrate a settlement that an American official involved in the negotiations, presumably Chester Crocker, jeopardized whatever progress had already been made when he told *The New York Times* that the sides had come to terms and that the Cuban troops would be withdrawn within 24 to 30 months. The *Times* printed the "scoop" on the front page on October 10, but five days later, on page 32, reported that Cuba and Angola had denied that any agreement had been reached and to the contrary, felt that the negotiations were at an "impasse."

Even if an agreement is reached on a Cuban withdrawal—and the Cubans actually go home—little will have been accomplished. The Cuban issue was invented in 1981 and may be disposed of in 1988 or '89. The balance sheet after eight years of bloody confrontation will tell us that we've come full circle. And in Angola, Unita is stronger than ever, guaranteeing that the war will continue. ○

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


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
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